

INTERP. KIDS (27 Feb. 46)

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INTERROGATION OF
(Marquis) KIDO, KOICHI

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 27 February 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q I think we were down to about June 30th in the diary, Marquis; you indicated on that day that you had a talk with the Emperor, at which time, he informed you about MATSUOKA's position. Do you remember what the Emperor himself said on that occasion? Apparently, Mr. MATSUOKA made a report to the Emperor on that day.
- A I have no recollection what was the problem here.
- Q What was it that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had stated to Count MAKINO on or about that time?
- A This is the story given to me by Count KABAYAMA. Hitherto, relations between KONOYE and MATSUOKA were very bad and MATSUOKA was aware of the fact that KONOYE had ill-feeling against him. MATSUOKA visited Count MAKINO and said at this time KONOYE must continue his cabinet because KONOYE was always saying he will resign from the Cabinet. In the event that KONOYE was made to resign, MATSUOKA said he will form a cabinet himself and if the Emperor ordered him to do so, MATSUOKA will take the task of forming a cabinet.

- Q In other words, Count MAKINO volunteered the statement he will be glad to become Premier if he was called upon to form a cabinet.
- A I believe MAKINO was greatly surprised at this because he had no confidence whatsoever in MATSUOKA forming a cabinet.
- Q Were the relations between KONOYE and MATSUOKA very strained in those days?
- A It was gradually becoming worse.
- Q How did MATSUOKA come to be appointed Foreign Minister by Premier KONOYE in the first instance?
- A MATSUOKA was a close friend of KONOYE from long before. They were together at the Versailles Conference at the close of the last war. MATSUOKA was very active and he gave voice to his opinions very clearly and I believe KONOYE more or less borrowed MATSUOKA's service and opinions.
- Q Did MATSUOKA have some definite ideas on foreign policy when he first became Foreign Minister back in 1940?
- A I do not know if he ever talked of any concrete or foreign relations matters with KONOYE.
- Q He wasn't openly advocating war with Russia or penetration to the South or any such policies at the commencement of the second Konoye Cabinet? That came later, did it?
- A I believe later. Perhaps MATSUOKA had intention in that respect because he executed a great reshuffling in the Foreign Ministry.
- Q Immediately upon becoming Foreign Minister, he, in effect, cleaned house in the Foreign Ministry?
- A Yes.
- Q What type of personnel did he put in or replace? For instance, he made HORIKARI the new Ambassador to Italy?

- A No, SHIROTORI, HORIKARI is different.
- Q Wasn't SHIROTORI at one time Ambassador before?
- A And he was a member of the Diet and General TATEKAWA was made Ambassador to Russia and also he eliminated those persons with Anglo-Saxon leaning from the Foreign Ministry.
- Q Did he make more changes in the Foreign Ministry than normally would be made when a new Minister was coming in?
- A Yes.
- Q And the type of people he removed were those that were sympathetic to cooperation between the Western Hemisphere or the United States and Japan?
- A Yes.
- Q And he placed people in office who were more anti-American, would you say?
- A Those persons that didn't have much relationship with America were put in.
- Q What was the General attitude of this Italian Ambassador SHIROTORI with reference to Japanese-American relations, would you say?
- A SHIROTORI is a scholar of economics and science and he was also a member of the Lower House and he did not have any animosity toward America. He probably was educated in England.
- Q What was the significance of putting him in as Minister in place of his predecessor?
- A I believe it was the plan of MATSUOKA to obtain personnel from various sources.
- Q What reason did MATSUOKA give for making these rather numerous changes in the personnel of the Foreign Office?
- A I believe he attempted to obtain more power for himself in executing his own work.

- Q In other words, you think the new men he appointed were more sympathetic to his point-of-view than people who were formally in the Foreign Office?
- A Yes.
- Q We have talked about this some but I want you to tell me again. What was his philosophy or foreign policy in those days that he desired to establish in Japan and that he was trying to foster by the selection of this new group of Ambassadors and associates?
- A I believe that one reason was to facilitate and to enlarge the power of his own authority and secondly to take away diplomatic powers from the military because hitherto, the military has been more or less meddling in foreign matters. He was probably mindful of the fact that the Foreign Minister up to now has been rather weak. On foreign affairs matters, I believe that MATSUOKA planned to devise measures for dealing with Chungking with his own hands.
- Q In other words you would say that MATSUOKA was a much more forceful leader in the Foreign Office than his predecessor ARITA and it was his desire to shape and control the foreign policy of Japan, and in particular, its attitude toward China?
- A And I wish to mention the fact that MATSUOKA was very ambitious.
- Q A very ambitious man and desired power, and wanted to exercise leadership rather by what we might call a "yes man"? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Were the individuals that he selected to form the personnel of the Foreign Office strong characters or more or less "yes" men that would follow along and do what MATSUOKA decided.
- A There were quite a few strong men among them.

- Q What would you say was the real distinguishing feature between the foreign policy of ARITA and that of MATSUOKA if there is such a distinction?
- A ARITA's foreign policy was closely allied with Britain and America - harmony with Britain and America, while MATSUOKA more or less estranged the relations or more or less went away from that. His foreign policy was to center primarily in solving the matters in East Asia and those countries.
- Q Can it be said that ARITA advocated close cooperation between Japan and the United States while MATSUOKA was more concerned with Greater East Asia pulling away and segregating itself from outside influences and running its own affairs under the dominance of Japan?
- A Yes.
- Q Well, the fact that MATSUOKA desired to take control and leadership of the foreign policy away from the military people met with the approval, no doubt, of Prince KONOYE, did it not? Didn't he favor less control of the foreign policy by the military and more control by the Government so that in that respect, MATSUOKA was favorable to KONOYE and that was probably one of the reasons he was appointed, wasn't it?
- A KONOYE realized the fact that the Foreign Minister hitherto was rather weak and he thought that MATSUOKA's strong power and the strengthening of it would be rather agreeable and to his liking.
- Q But what was Prince KONOYE's reaction to MATSUOKA's philosophy of less cooperation with the United States and more concentration on strictly Far Eastern affairs?
- A The opinion of MATSUOKA was always back-sliding. It was changing from time to time and Prince KONOYE had a difficult time trying to grasp what MATSUOKA was thinking and what sort of an opinion he had and for that reason he was having great difficulty with MATSUOKA. For instance, MATSUOKA always was saying that Japan must work in harmony with America but his deeds were inconsistent to it and that is why KONOYE was having great difficulty with MATSUOKA.

- Q You don't think that Prince KONOYE realized that when he first appointed him as Foreign Minister?
- A KONOYE was aware of his deficiencies and the unique character of MATSUOKA when he appointed him.
- Q Can we say that it is your opinion that Prince KONOYE selected him as Foreign Minister primarily because he was aggressive and a leader and would tend to cause the Government to control the foreign policy of Japan more so than it had when the military was dominating it under ARITA?
- A KONOYE was thinking of conducting more peaceful diplomatic activities through MATSUOKA getting diplomatic power in the Foreign Ministry.
- Q You think that MATSUOKA's statement in those days when he was first appointed were to the effect that he wanted to cooperate with the United States but later on, even though he continued to make such statements, his actions were inconsistent?
- A Yes.
- Q When did the real friction between KONOYE and MATSUOKA start to evidence itself. Was it when he first returned from his trip to Europe in the spring of 1941?
- A Particularly when MATSUOKA returned from his trip to Germany he became difficult to comprehend; especially his attitude at the time of the Russo-German war became a thing that really disgusted KONOYE.
- Q His attitude with reference to the German-Russia war wasn't hard to comprehend, was it. It was just inconsistent with what KONOYE thought was right? Isn't that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q It was very clear that MATSUOKA wanted Japan to attack Russia and wanted to adopt a less cooperative attitude toward the United States? Is that true?
- A Yes.

- Q And that was inconsistent with the thinking of Prince KONOYE?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember what was discussed by the Navy Minister OIKAWA and the Emperor on June 30?
- A It was that Navy Minister OIKAWA visited me upon having an audience with the Emperor and I inquired as to the attitude of the Navy in regard to Russia and OIKAWA said that the Navy is unwilling to go to war against Soviet Russia.
- Q Did he give any reasons why the Navy opposed the Russian campaign?
- A I have no special recollection concerning that.
- Q Did he discuss with you on that occasion the fact that the Navy preferred a campaign in the South as against attacking Russia?
- A The Navy at this time was not talking much about plans toward the South.
- Q You think that discussion was in the Army circles mostly?
- A The Army and a section of the Navy around those young officers in the central body. The directing body was clamping down on such a feeling.
- Q In other words, you mean the young officers in Staff Headquarters were favorable to the Army program of southern penetration while the men at the top of Staff Headquarters were trying to suppress the activities on the part of the young officers?
- A Yes
- Q (June 30) I would be interested in knowing what you and Prince KONOYE discussed with reference to Japan's foreign policy concerning Germany and Russia.

- A At that time, I inquired about the result of the liaison conferences that was frequently being opened up at that time and I heard from him that Japan is following the policy of not participating in Russo-German war. I also heard reports on the Japanese-American negotiations that were being conducted.
- Q Do you remember anything in particular that was said about the status of negotiations at that moment?
- A At this time, there were numerous transactions of messages back and forth and KONOYE mentioned the fact that he would like to have that succeed. Prince KONOYE was discussing the fact that the Foreign Minister's opinion and intention was not clear; that he was always saying that America and Japan must come to terms while his actual actions did not facilitate such terms.
- Q I understand your point. Can you tell me what particular things you have in mind that MATSUOKA did that were inconsistent with friendly relations with the United States? You say that he did things that were inconsistent with that? What did he do that you have in mind that were inconsistent?
- A It seems as though that he was not interested in the transactions that were being done between Japan and America and the criticism that he was openly voicing against America more or less stands out for the fact that he was probably thinking it was impossible to come to terms with America.
- Q What did he say by way of criticism of America in those days?
- A I have no accurate recollection.
- Q Did he make any particular speeches or things of that kind where he openly criticized the United States?
- A I don't believe he made any speeches, only he goes around talking about it individually.

- Q When he would talk to you on occasions after seeing the Emperor, would he say things that indicated he was trying to negotiate with the United States, or words to that effect?
- A He did not say anything in particular to me at the Palace, but on the following day, he did say quite a few things.
- Q What did he say on the following day?
- A MATSUOKA was saying that persons outside of the Foreign Ministry; that is, like NOMURA, were negotiating with President Roosevelt and the motive was not right. He said that he became aware of this upon returning from Germany and he was giving this matter serious consideration. At that Liaison Conference, he demanded persistently an expedition against Siberia but I said that is impossible.
- Q Wasn't Ambassador NOMURA really a member or part of the Foreign Office?
- A I meant the group outside of NOMURA were negotiating. They were a group outside of the Embassy.
- Q You mean in Washington?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, he indicated that he felt there were Japanese nationals or citizens in Washington that were influencing the activities of NOMURA in his negotiations with Washington rather than the Foreign Office in Japan controlling what NOMURA was doing?
- A It became clear that persons like IWAKURO, ^{and} a Japanese business man, started talking with a Catholic Priest and that is how Japanese-American negotiations started.
- Q Who was the Japanese business man, do you recall?
- A I cannot recall the name at present.

- Q It was true that there were some people - Japanese citizens in Washington who were endeavoring to bring better relations between Japan and the United States, were there not?
- A Yes.
- Q And MATSUOKA resented that and wanted to control the negotiations himself?
- A They seemed to have entered into the picture frequently and for that reason talks didn't progress smoothly. At this time, through Ambassador NOMURA the negotiation has entered into proper channels.
- Q I don't understand what you mean by your last statement.
- A In the beginning, there were such confusing status of negotiations but at this time, NOMURA has taken over negotiations and proper and authorized official talks has been conducted with Secretary of State Hull.
- Q I know there was an important Imperial Conference on July 2. How long did you say, prior to July 2 was it that it was decided that there would be such an imperial conference? When did the Government or Imperial Headquarters first decide to call an Imperial Conference for July 2?
- A I believe it was called just two or three days previously.
- Q And these liaison conferences where you indicate actual decisions are discussed, how long had they been going on prior to July with reference to the subject matter that was taken up at that particular conference?
- A I believe the conclusion as a result of the Soviet-German war has been taken up here.
- Q Well, there were many things decided in these liaison conferences that are never brought up before the Emperor at an imperial conference. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.

- Q And from the time that Germany attacked Russia on routine matters, when was it first decided that it would be necessary to hold an imperial conference?
- A I do not know the details or facts about the liaison conferences so I don't know what days it started.
- Q You would say it was several days before the Imperial Conference that it was concluded that one should be called. Is that right?
- A I believe the liaison conferences was opened right at the start of the Russo-German war and has been conducted frequently and the conclusion reached as a result of that liaison conference was so important that I believe the Imperial Conference has been opened.
- Q And these liaison conferences that were held prior to the Imperial Conference - was the main topic of discussion the foreign policy that Japan should adopt under the circumstances that existed in those days?
- A What I gather from Prince KONOYE, Prince KONOYE was saying it was to suppress the intention or the demands made by MATSUOKA and to establish a sound policy for the future.
- Q During all these liaison conferences, MATSUOKA was insisting upon Japan going to war with Russia. Is that right?
- A At the beginning, he was demanding that but later on he agreed to the decision of the Imperial Conference.
- Q I meant during the liaison conferences and prior to the Imperial Conference, he was strongly advocating war with Russia. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Was he alone in that position, or did he have others in the liaison conferences that sympathized with his point-of-view?
- A I heard that the Army wasn't so keen about it so I believe he was standing alone.

Q There must have been other policies discussed in great detail at those liaison conferences besides the one issue of whether to declare war on Russia. What were the other matters that were being discussed at the liaison conferences?

A I have no accurate recollection.

Q Well, you know what was decided upon at the Imperial Conference. Certainly those policy questions were discussed in the liaison conferences immediately prior thereto. Tell me what you know as to what actually took place at the Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941.

A I believe it was to take on the policy that it would conform with the new situation created as the result of the Russo-German War and also to take up some plans for a rapid conclusion of the China Incident; that is, by attacking China from the South and ending the China Incident quickly, and in the event Russia collapsed soon, Japan was to settle her problems in the North.

Q How was it proposed that Japan should settle these problems in the North if Germany defeated Russia within a short time.

A I believe that was to dispatch troops into Siberia.

Q What was it decided that Japan should seek to obtain in Siberia - to control all of Siberia or just parts of Siberia?

A I do not know, it wasn't clear to me because that wasn't actually decided upon.

Q Well, you would say that Japan wasn't interested in taking control of all of Siberia, was she?

A No, I don't believe she was able to do that.

Q What parts of Siberia was it that Japan would want if she could get them at the end of the Russian War?

A I do not know.

Q But at this Imperial Conference, which I understand you did not personally attend ---

A No I did not attend.

Q It was decided definitely that for the moment, at least, Japan would not attack Russia?

A Yes.

- Q It was also decided that in the event Russia collapsed and war ended in a short time, Japan should then send troops into certain parts of Siberia, at least, and acquire certain territory. Is that correct?
- A I do not know if they decided to that extent.
- Q I thought that is what you just said. What was it you said was decided to do in the event of the collapse of Russia?
- A I did not mention any territorial acquisition.
- Q What was it that it was decided that Japan should acquire in Siberia, if it wasn't territory?
- A I believe it was to settle the border disputes that were frequently occurring and I am sure that Japan did not plan to the extent of acquiring territory.
- Q It was the intention of Japan, if Russia fell, to settle the border disputes along the lines that Japan always contended where the border ought to be. Is that correct?
- A I believe the primary thing was the settlement of disputes occurring around the Amur River.
- Q For a long period of time, there had been disputes between Russia and Japan with reference to the border between China and Manchuria. Although it was determined at this conference that Japan would not go so far as to attack Russia simultaneously with Germany, if Russia fell, she would take advantage of that situation to settle her border disputes.
- A I believe so. It was my personal opinion.
- Q And one of the other things decided at this conference was that Japan would move in and attack China from the South in an effort to end the China War?
- A Yes.
- Q Was it decided, to your knowledge, how these troops would be dispatched into French Indo-China? I mean by that, were they to be sent in by virtue of a negotiated treaty or regardless of a treaty if one couldn't be negotiated?

- A Generally, Japan was to send troops out there after negotiating.
- Q The policy of attacking China from the South was definitely determined and it was decided that an effort would be made to get troops into Indo-China by virtue of a treaty?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you know whether the question was discussed and decided as of this time what Japan would do if a treaty could not be negotiated with French Indo-China or Vichy?
- A I did not hear anything about it. The situation at that time was that French Indo-China would acquiesce to Japanese demands.
- Q In other words, indications were that a treaty could be negotiated? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't it also decided at this conference that Japan would penetrate further into the South?
- A I have no recollection as to that.
- Q There was considerable talk in those days, as indicated by your diary, by various individuals about the policy of southern penetration. Was that limited to the sending of troops to French Indo-China?
- A I believe that forces were to be sent only to French Indo-China.
- Q In other words, it was decided at that conference that military forces would only be sent into French Indo-China but was it not decided that Japanese influence and domination, economically or otherwise, should be pushed into the southern areas?
- A I don't believe that was decided at this Imperial Conference.
- Q According to my information, these two particular things which I will read to you were definitely decided upon at this conference. I want to read them and ask you if these were not decisions made at this Conference. The first one read to this effect:

Q (Cont.) "Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change."

That was numbered "one" decided at the conference. Does that sound correct?

A I did not see the actual proposals made at the Imperial Conference, I only heard words or just stories about it so I don't believe I can certify that.

Q Certainly, after this conference you talked to the Emperor and the ministers, and other influential people, and if something to this effect I have just read was decided upon, you would have knowledge of it, would you not?

A Yes.

Q Is this approximately correct of one of the things that was decided upon at this conference?

A I believe that is so. I did not see the actual text of the decisions reached there but I believe it came from the text.

Q For your information, what I am reading is an intercepted code message from Japan to Washington, sent out in those days and intercepted by the United States. The translation of this message contains, among other things, the points I just read.

A If that is the case, that is true, then.

Q What I want to know, from what you discussed with the Emperor and leaders in those days, does that sound correct to you as one of the points that was decided upon?

A I believe so.

Q What was meant by establishing a Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, in your opinion? What was Japan contemplating when at an Imperial Conference she decided to establish a Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity? What did that imply?

- A Hitherto, it meant a block - China, Manchuria and Japan - but at this time, I believe Thailand and French Indo-China was also included in the block.
- Q And why were they added at this particular time to the other three countries?
- A Because as a result of negotiations or relations, it seems as though they became one of the other three.
- Q Was it contemplated by this decision that Japan would lend her efforts and it would be Japanese foreign policy to cooperate with Manchuria and China and Thailand and French Indo-China, and that Japan would endeavor to dominate and control the affairs of this group of countries?
- A I think that under equal basis and equal standing, Japan tried to lead the other nations.
- Q Did the decision on this point at the conference imply that Japan from that date on, would not tolerate any interference by the outside, such as by Great Britain or the United States, in Far Eastern affairs?
- A I believe that she had a fear of interference by the United States and Great Britain.
- Q Was she taking the position that she would not tolerate such interference and would do something to prevent interference on the part of outsiders?
- A I believe she was trying to remove those interferences as much as possible.
- Q In other words, what I am trying to get at is did this decision at this conference indicate a stiffening of Japan's attitude toward the United States and Great Britain insofar as Far Eastern Affairs were concerned and amounted, in effect, in saying that "We, with other countries are dominating East Asia and we don't want you meddling in our affairs". Was this significant of their decision?
- A I believe a step towards that was taken there.
- Q Does "Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity" imply the handling of Far Eastern affairs by these countries without interference by anyone from the outside?

- A I don't believe it implied any prohibition of interference or relationships with other countries.
- Q In your own honest opinion, what is meant by the decision "to establish a Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity"? What does that mean? What was Japan trying to say when she made such a decision in an Imperial Conference?
- A I believe it was to work for the prosperity of East Asia by the cooperation of all these nations.
- Q The other point that was stated in this intercepted message which I want to ask you about, reads as follows:
"The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection."
- Does that sound to you like a fair statement of a decision made at the Imperial Conference?
- A I believe so.
- Q I can understand very clearly what is meant when it is said that Japan desired to dispose of the China incident. That meant, did it not, that they wanted to bring the China war to a close, but what was meant when the Conference decided that measures should be taken with the view of advancing southward?
- A That isn't clear to me.
- Q Do you think that has reference to what we have been discussing, the dispatching of troops into French Indo-China.
- A I believe that was a forerunner to the occupation of southern French Indo-China.
- Q Was it Southern French Indo-China^{that} was occupied by virtue of these treaties, at Saigon?
- A I believe that through the treaty, Japan went into southern French Indo-China.

Q The whole purpose of this Imperial Conference on July 2 was to try to pull the various forces together and have Japan agree on a definite foreign policy. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And at this conference, the foreign policy of Japan for the moment, anyway, was determined and settled. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And that foreign policy was to the effect that Japan would not attack Russia at the moment but if Russia fell in a short time, she would send military forces into Siberia at once and once and for all, settle the border disputes she was having with Russia. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Also, it was determined she would sponsor a Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity between Manchuria, China, Thailand and French Indo-China and herself. That was decided as a policy, was it not?

A Yes.

Q Another thing decided was that every effort should be made to bring the China war to a successful conclusion?

A Yes.

Q Another thing decided at the Conference was that Japan would adopt a foreign policy of southern expansion of her influence. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q In your entry on July 2, you mention WANG CHAO-MING, who, I presume is a Chinese gentleman. Who was he?

A I heard from the Finance Minister that ¥300,000,000 was granted to the Nanking Government of WANG CHAO-MING.

Q Is WANG CAHO-MING the same individual that we referred to the other day as WAN CHIN WEI?

A I believe it is the same man. It is WAN CHIN WEI.

- Q You were referring to the Nanking Puppet Governor?
- A Yes.
- Q Japan in those days was furnishing money to the Nanking Government in order to assist it in running government affairs of that puppet government? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Can we say that at this Imperial Conference that was held on July 2, all those who participated agreed to the foreign policy that was decided on that occasion?
- A I believe that everybody agreed.
- Q In other words, if someone present disagreed on major points, he would have resigned or withdrawn from the Conference. Is that correct?
- A I believe that the President of the Privy Council made a strong questioning.
- Q What part of the decision as to foreign policy did the President of the Privy Council oppose?
- A He inquired if a move to the South would mean that it would provoke war there.
- Q What answer did he get?
- A I remember that the military replied that they contemplated no war there.
- Q How did the military propose to accomplish this Southern penetration without war?
- A It held as its premise it will do so through treaties.
- Q And this southern penetration policy that was adopted by Japan not only contemplated penetration into French Indo-China but also other countries in the southern Pacific, didn't it?
- A I don't believe that it was to that extent.
- Q You think that this statement of policy as to advancing southward had reference merely to French Indo-China?

- A I believe that the immediate goal was French Indo-China.
- Q Maybe the immediate goal was French Indo-China but the policy referred to in the decision of the Conference had a larger goal than just the immediate goal of French Indo-China, did it not?
- A Any further expansion would more or less bring into conflict with American and British influence there so I didn't hear any explanation or stories to that effect.
- Q Isn't it true that those elements in the Conference that were advocating penetration into the South, such as the Army, and the War Minister, TOJO, were desirous of obtaining critical supplies and oil from the South?
- A It was desirous of obtaining oil and those things through trade and through negotiations and to use some method of pressure in order to gain it but it did not go to the extent of using force.
- Q But it was contemplated by this decision as to foreign policy that all the pressure that was possible should be brought to obtain these supplies in the Southern Pacific without the necessary use of force insofar as the decision at that particular time was concerned?
- A Yes.
- Q The only one you recall that was somewhat critical of this Southern penetration and policy was the President of the Privy Council?
- A Because all the rest of the persons were those that had agreed at the liaison conferences so the opinions were already formulated.
- Q In other words, the President of the Privy Council was not normally in attendance at the Liaison Conferences and he had his first chance to voice his opinion at the Imperial Conference, itself?
- A Yes.

- Q Did the Emperor express himself at the Imperial Conference on July 2?
- A I don't believe that the Emperor said anything at this time because the Emperor only listens generally at Imperial Conferences and would not say anything.
- Q What did the Emperor tell you the following day or July 4 after the Imperial Conference had been concluded. Certainly he discussed with you what had been discussed at the Conference?
- A The Emperor was not favorable toward expansion to the South and he cautioned that it would have to be taken with caution because it would be terrible if difficulties arose.
- Q Did he do anything affirmative by way of calling in any of the ministers or Government officials to try to discourage this program.
- A I believe he has told the War Minister and the Chief of Staff that in carrying such a measure out, they would have to be very cautious.
- Q In other words, in view of the unanimity of decision with reference to the foreign policy, the Emperor wouldn't go so far as to say "That can't be our foreign policy", he would only admonish them to be cautious in administering it? Is that right?
- A Because the Emperor cannot oppose any matters which had been agreed upon by the Supreme Command and the Government, so that he only cautioned as a matter of prime concern to him and the Emperor was very hopeful of Japanese-American negotiations. The Emperor was greatly worried that this action may prove an obstacle to negotiations with the United States.
- Q Isn't it true that the Emperor wasn't so much opposed to Japan acquiring bases in French Indo-China as he was fearful of the trouble it might cause in the negotiations between the United States and Japan?
- A Yes, that was of prime concern.
- Q He really was perfectly agreeable to Japan having bases in French Indo-China if it didn't cause world-wide friction. Is that correct?
- A Yes.

- Q So, can we say that the Emperor wasn't really opposed to the expansion of Japan into the South if it could be accomplished without incurring the ill-will and bad feeling of nations such as Great Britain and the United States?
- A Because the military said that this measure would conclude the China incident and they made all sorts of explanations to that effect and the Emperor naturally wanted to conclude the China incident as quickly as possible, so he was in a difficult position.
- Q In fact, there wasn't anyone in high Government office in Japan that was opposed to the expansion of Japanese influence into the South if it could be done without bringing war with the United States or England, or countries of that type? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Tell me who all were present at that Imperial Conference. What individuals, and their office, personally attended the Imperial Conference of July 2 - their names and capacity.
- A I do not remember the persons that attended there so.....
- Q I appreciate that you wouldn't be able to name them all. Even though you might miss some, tell me those that were there for sure.
- A President of the Privy Council HARA, Prime Minister KONOYE, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO, Navy Minister OIKAWA, Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA, CHIEF OF Navy General Staff NAGANO. I do not know if the Finance Minister and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board was present. In the event they were present, the Finance Minister was KAYA and the President of the Planning Board was SUZUKI. The others were secretaries and clerks.
- Q Do you remember being told who spoke at the Imperial Conference and generally what was said? For example, no doubt Prince KONOYE spoke at the Conference. Did you hear what he had to say at the Conference in your talk with the Emperor and others at the Conference?
- A He just made a formal explanation.

- Q In other words, as you explained once before, when it reached the stage of the Imperial Conference, the Premier would normally get up and announce what had been unanimously decided at the liaison conference in the presence of the Emperor. I take it from what you say, individuals such as HARA, who would not be at the liaison conferences would have the opportunity to express their opinions at the Imperial Conference. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Apparently at this particular conference, HARA expressed concern over this southern expansion policy causing difficulty with the negotiations with the United States?
- A I believe so.
- Q And the Army answered him to the effect that they didn't anticipate that interfering with the negotiations? Is that what happened?
- A The Army said it would do things so that such interference would not arise.
- Q Did TOJO speak at this Conference?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q I think you said the other day that although TOJO was agreeable to attempting to negotiate for bases in French Indo-China, he advocated the taking of the bases for operations with China by force in the absence of a treaty, if necessary.
- A I believe so, as a war minister.
- Q You talked to him on many occasions over the spring of 1941 and after this French Indo-China base question came up he disclosed in his conversation to you that it was absolutely necessary that Japan have some bases in French Indo-China in order to go into China from the South, and that his policy was to get the bases in one way or another? Is that correct?
- A Yes.

Q He was supported in that by the Chief of Staff in the Army?

A Yes.

Q And MATSUOKA?

A Yes.

Q This Mr. ABE you mention on July 4. Is he different from the former Premier? If so, who is he?

A No, he is an official of the Home Ministry.

Q He is different from the former Premier?

A Yes.

Q What did he have to say about the southern penetration?

A He told me about the information concerning the sentiment for southern expansion as a result of the fact that he was very close to the young officers in the Army and Navy.

Q What did he say that sentiment was?

A He told me that the younger officers all favored southern expansion.

Q No doubt their opinion on that subject was reflected in the decisions that was made at the Imperial Conference, wasn't it?

A As a consequence, we got to know the sentiment beneath the surface.

Q Isn't it true that the sentiment of the younger officers went so far as to advocate expansion southward by use of force, if necessary?

A Yes, therefore, there were many advocates of that among the younger officers in the Army and Navy.

Q Do you remember any names of those individuals you might say were extremists that wanted to go South with the military force right now?

A I do not remember names.

- Q But Mr. ABE expressed to you his opinion that the younger element in the Army and Navy were anxious for Japan to start a military campaign to the South?
- A Yes, that is what he said.
- Q What did the Foreign Minister have to say two days following the conference? What was his reaction to the Imperial Conference and the decisions that were made there?
- A I have no special recollection.
- Q He, no doubt, had some comment to make, did he not, with reference to the Conference deciding against him on his policy towards Russia since he advocated that so strongly?
- A Because MATSUOKA probably was always thinking about the occupancy of French Indo-China, he agreed to the decision.
- Q No doubt he expressed to you his feelings in regard to the decision of the Conference insofar as French Indo-China was concerned?
- A This Imperial Conference has been conducted for quite a time and this decision more or less was a compromise between that advocated by MATSUOKA and KONOYE.
- Q In other words, by compromise, you mean that MATSUOKA advocated campaigns both in the North and in the South and the matter was finally compromised and a policy agreed upon for Southern expansion only?
- A Yes.
- Q Was MATSUOKA critical of the fact that Japan had not decided to attack Russia?
- A That is the funny thing about MATSUOKA. At this time, he completely forgot about it.
- Q Do you remember what TOJO said on the 4th when you talked to him? That was immediately after this important conference. He might very well have had a reaction, do you recall?

- A I don't believe there was any special reaction because if there was, I would have written something about it.
- Q You got the impression he was satisfied and pleased with the decision reached by the Conference?
- A Yes.
- Q On the 5th, when you talked to the Emperor about Army conditions and the complicated elements within the Army, what did the Emperor have in mind? What did he say?
- A It says here "the strong demands or opinions voiced by the Navy General Staff" - not the Army.
- Q Tell me what you discussed with the Emperor with reference to conditions in the Navy on July 5.
- A It was reported to me here that the young officers in the Navy were strongly voicing opinions regarding the need of oil and about the Navy expansion being undertaken by the United States and that seems to be stimulating the Navy very much.
- Q In other words, the Emperor informed you he understood that the younger elements in the Navy were demanding expansion into the South in order to get oil for the Japanese Navy?
- A Because the Emperor was greatly concerned about that, he has told me about it.
- Q Did he make any suggestions as to what you or anyone else should do to try to control this element?
- A He didn't go to that extent because if he had said anything in the matters of the Navy General Staff, he would be in great difficulty.
- Q Well, did he indicate that he was going to have someone else control this tendency?
- A I believe that the Navy Minister has been cautioned in that respect. I believe that the Emperor talked with the Navy Minister on various matters because this Navy Minister was Attache when the Emperor took a trip to Europe, so the relationship was very close and friendly.

- Q I think we can agree, can't we, as of this time, the time of this Imperial Conference when these foreign policies were determined, that all of the leaders in Japan, from the Emperor on down, were in accord in feeling that it was necessary for Japan to expand into the South in order to get oil. The only dispute between the Government officials, including the Emperor, was how to go about getting it - whether to get it by force of arms or otherwise?
- A And in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations, the lifting of the embargo of oil by the United States would remove this difficulty and the Emperor was very hopeful in that respect.
- Q You can go a step further in that reasoning and say that the withdrawal of troops from China and French Indo-China would have relieved that situation. The real question was whether Japan was willing to withdraw troops from China in that matter.
- A And I believe they had the intention of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China before the settlement of the China Incident. I remember that there were negotiations to the effect of withdrawing Japanese troops garrisoned in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of French Indo-China.
- Q Certainly, the sending of troops into French Indo-China in the month of July 1941 didn't help the negotiations any between the United States and Japan, did it?
- A Rather than help, it became an obstacle. We were in a dilemma because they explained it was a fast way of ending the China Incident.
- Q In other words, the military group headed by TOJO and the Chief of Staff and sympathized with by MATSUOKA and the younger elements in the Army and Navy, forced Japaned to take the course of taking these troops into French Indo-China right in the middle of these neogtiations. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q On July 5, MATSUOKA reported to the Emperor and later talked to you with reference to England having discovered the fact that negotiations were going on between Japan and Vichy for the right to place troops in French Indo-China. What was his attitude when he talked to you with reference to what should be done in view of this disclosure to England and her resentment of that fact?
- A As written here, because such a thing happened, it was requested that negotiations be continued for five days more.
- Q What was his idea that the delay of four or five days would accomplish in the negotiation?
- A I believe it was to find out what the British intentions were?
- Q In other words, if Britain took a firm enough stand, why Japan might have backed down on its demands? But his idea was if she could go ahead and negotiate this with Vichy, she should force it through? Was that his attitude?
- A It did not think about carrying it out.
- Q I don't understand.
- A It did not think of stopping of carrying this matter out.
- Q He wasn't in favor of abonding the obtaining of bases in Indo-China merely because Britain didn't like it?
- A No.

* * *

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 27 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~xxxx~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 27th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Place

27 February 1946
Date