

SHIN NIPPON KENSETSU DOMEI (New Japan Construction League)

Mie-ken

President

TANAKA Hisao, born December 18, 1905 -- former president of the Board of Directors of the Sendai Fiber Goods Retailers' Controlling Association -- now going into agriculture -- disciple of OZAKI Yukio (veteran parliamentarian).

Membership

200-300

Objective of the Party

Construction of a New Japan which will contribute to the peace and happiness of the peoples of the world.

Number of Candidates Who Ran For Election

1

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

TANAKA Hisao

Number of votes received by the Party

35,918

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

Independent Club

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

TANAKA Hisao did not feel qualified to talk about the Constitution but felt that the government draft was good.

b. Food Problem

The official price of rice is too low. That is the reason the farmers will not sell their stocks. His party has formulated a plan for increasing the price of rice and for distributing of rice. The plan proposes that the government buy 50% of a

(13)

SHIN NIPPON KENSETSU DOMEI (New Japan Construction League)

farmer's rice supply at 300 yen per koku. 30% would be bought at 600 yen per koku, 10% at 1000 yen per koku and 10% at 1500 yen per koku.

Mr. TANAKA is explaining this plan to Diet members and is, according to himself, generally getting their approval.

In order to solve the food problem, the fertilizer problem must be solved. To accomplish this, fertilizer companies must be subsidized by the government.

The Fishery problem also must be solved. At present there are no nets and there is no oil. The cotton for the nets will have to be obtained from America. Fish could be used both as food and fertilizer.

Another problem is the small land-owner question. During the war, many small landowners rented their land, and now they want it back, but the tenant-farmers refuse to give it up. The big landowners' land should be divided up among the tenants and the small landowners should get their land back.

Mr. TANAKA also felt that there should be fewer ministries as there are too many bureaucrats. He feels that 1/3 of the bureaucrats should be eliminated, and higher salaries given to the individual government employee.

(14)

ZEN NIPPON SHOKUIKI DOSHIKAI (All Japan Professionals Fellowship Association)
Osaka

President

TSUGUTA Torao

Membership

40

Objective of the Party

Support of the Emperor System.
Establishment of a Japanese democracy.
Improvement and stabilization of national livelihood.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

4

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

KONISHI Toramatsu

Number of votes received by the Party

74,165

joined Liberals in August

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

Independent Club (Mr. KONISHI believes that the party which elected him will die a natural death)

Diet Representative's Background

KONISHI Toramatsu, born September 10, 1903 -- civil works and building contractor -- Director of Torabayashi-gumi Company -- chief of Hokusen Labor Union -- violated Election Law in 1925 and was imprisoned. In 1935 imprisoned for gambling. In 1938 and in 1944 again imprisoned for gambling.

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. KONISHI has no opinion on the constitution. In his own words

(14)

ZEN NIPPON SHOKUIKI DOSHIKAI (All Japan Professionals Fellowship Association)

he has come up from the laboring classes, is not a politician, and knows little about political matters.

b. Food Problem

SCAP must be asked to alleviate the food shortage.

c. Unemployment

Labor and management must cooperate and produce goods. Then the unemployment problem will be solved.

d. Labor

Mr. KONISHI wants to present the problems of labor to the Diet.

NIPPON MINSHU-TO (Japan Democratic Party)

Ehime-ken

President

NUNO Toshiaki, born August 30, 1889, author, travelled widely in Europe and America

Membership

300

Objective of the Party

Convey the people's will to the government.

Number of Candidates Who Ran For Election

1

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

NUNO Toshiaki

Number of votes received by the Party

77,090

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

Independent

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. NUNO approves of the draft constitution, but he would like the word "daijin" (minister) taken out of it, and the word secretary substituted. He believes minister is old, feudal terminology.

b. Food Problem

The food problem can be solved by a decrease in population. But in the meantime rice will have to be gotten from the southern areas.

c. Other Important Problems

The police force must be diminished. Women's rights must be strengthened.

HYUGA MINSHU-TO (Hyuga Democratic Party)

Miyazaki-ken

President

ITO Iwao, born August 24, 1888, director of the New Timber Company and two other companies -- 3 times elected member of the Diet, former secretary of Seiyukai.

Membership

200-300

Objective of the Party

Establishment of Japanese democracy.
Liberation of the farmers.

Number of Candidates Who Ran For Election

7

Number of Candidates Elected

4

Name of Diet Representatives

ITO Iwao, MORI Yukio, KAWANO Yoshimitsu, OHASHI Kimi

Number of Votes Received by the Party

203,231

Diet Members' Affiliation in the Diet

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) - (the Hyuga Minshuto has become a branch of the Kyodo Minshu-to)

Diet Representatives' Backgrounds

MORI Yukio, born September 24, 1892, lawyer

KAWANO Yoshimitsu, born January 6, 1897, brewer

OHASHI Kimi, born January 29, 1905, school teacher

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. ITO agrees with the Government's draft of the Constitution.

(16)

HYUGA MINSHU-TO (Hyuga Democratic Party)

b. Food Problem

Food production must be increased, and food must be imported. Rationing and distribution must be improved. Fertilizer production must be increased by government control of production.

c. Land Reform

Land must be freed from the landowners and distributed fairly among the farmers and tenants.

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party)

Hiroshima Prefecture

President

OHARA Hiro, born March 15, 1893, doctor, former Minseito member and director of the Great Japan Political Association's branch in Hiroshima, advisor of the Hiroshima Branch of the IRAA.

Membership

20

Objective of the Party

Co-operative Movement.

Number of Candidates Who Ran For Election

6

Number of Candidates Elected

2

Name of Diet Representatives

OHARA Hiro
OMIYA Gosaburo

Number of Votes Received by the Party

302,978

Diet Members' Affiliation in the Diet

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) -- (the large Kyodo Minshu-to - the Hiroshima Prefecture Co-operative Democratic Party has been dissolved).

Diet Representative's Background

OMIYA Gosaburo, born October 17, 1897, manager of a press company.

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

The draft constitution is acceptable except that the Emperor should have the veto power.

b. Food Problem

Food must be collected from the farmers, but as in spite of this there will still not be enough, it must be imported from abroad.

MINKEN DOSHI-KAI (People's Rights Fellowship Association)

Tokyo-to

President

ISHIWARA Noboru, born October 3, 1913, former director of Nakajima Mining Machinery Company, in 1944 head of General Business and Planning of Koa Tokushu Chuko Shares Company.

Membership

1,000

Objective of the Party

Work for cultural enlightenment so as to establish a democratic peaceful country.
Construct a new Japan on the basis of the fundamental human rights.
Break down the feudalistic system and organize a democratic government from the lower classes.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

8

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

ISHIWARA Noboru

Number of votes received by the Party

113,167

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) (as the MINKEN DOSHI-KAI is a cultural association rather than a political party, Mr. ISHIWARA feels he can be a member of both)

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. ISHIWARA agrees with the Government draft of the Constitution, but would like to see the Emperor with the veto power.

(18)

MINKEN DOSHI-KAI (People's Rights Fellowship Association)

b. Food Problem

Farmers want clothing and utensils in payment for their rice. This must be provided. Help must be asked from SCAP to tide over the food crisis. The government is trying hard to increase fertilizer production but is not succeeding very well.

c. Unemployment

Unemployed should be ordered to work in other countries.

d. Education

Care must be exercised in the education of the young, otherwise they will join the Communist Party.

NIPPON NOHONTO CHUO REMMEI (Japan Agricultural Party Central Federation)
Kagoshimaken

President

NISHI Torioto, member of the House of Peers

Membership

70,500

Objective of the Party

Establishment of an agricultural state and the principle of self-governing cooperative management.
Against all destructive movements.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

17

Number of Candidates Elected

3

Names of Diet Representatives

UDA Kunie, HARA Kuni, NAKANO Shiro

Number of votes received by the Party

137,358

Diet Members' Affiliation in the Diet

UDA and HARA joined the KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) - (The whole NIPPON NOHONTO CHUO REMMEI has joined the KYODO MINSHU-TO)

NAKANO Shiro has joined the Independent Club

Diet Representatives' Background

UDA Kunie, born 1 March 1903, former director of a news agency, publisher of a magazine "Toa Kokusei", June 1945 part-time non-official staff member of GEA Ministry, October 1945, non-official staff member in the Foreign Office.

NAKANO Shiro, born 25 January 1907, president of Japan Tourist Coupon Company; formerly advisor of the Ushigome-ku subdivision of the IRAA.

(19)

NIPPON NOHONTO CHUO REMMEI (Japan Agricultural Party Central Federation)

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. UDA agrees with the draft Constitution.

Mr. NAKANO also supports the Government draft of the Constitution, but would like to see the veto power invested in the Emperor.

b. Food Problem

According to Mr. UDA there must be an increase in production. The farmers need fertilizer, and the Government must provide them with it. The Japanese eat too much rice. They must get used to eating more fish, vegetables, etc. They will need the help of SCAP in the procurement of fishing vessels, oil and nets. Nevertheless, Mr. UDA is confident that the Japanese people will be able to live through the summer and autumn, as new crops of potatoes etc. are coming out.

Mr. NAKANO feels that the price of rice paid by the Government must be raised.

c. Reconstruction of Japan

Mr. UDA feels that the Japanese people must work towards the reconstruction of Japan. There are great dangers in Communism because it furthers the class struggle which is destructive rather than constructive.

OITA-KEN NOHONTO (Oita Prefecture Agricultural Party)

Oita-ken

President

MIZUNOE Fumihiko, former member of IRAA

Membership

70

Objective of the Party

Liberation of the farmers.
Establishment of a system of autonomous cooperative organizations within agricultural, mountainous and fishing villages.
Establishment of a truly cultural society based on the principle of morality under the Tenno System.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

1

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

HIRANO Hachiro

Number of votes received by the Party

41,248

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) -- (OITA-KEN NOHONTO is being dissolved - might become branch of KYODO MINSHU-TO)

Diet Representative's Background

HIRANO Hachiro, born March 2, 1889, chief of the Oita branch of the Nogyo-kai (Agricultural Association), former chief of the Oitagun Headquarters of the IRAPS, and councillor of Oita-ken branch of IRAPS.

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. HIRANO agrees with the Government draft of the Constitution.

b. Food Problem

To solve the food problem, food prices must be raised and the government must give the farmers fertilizer.

SHINSEI KOMIN-TO (New Born People's Party)

Aichi-ken

President

TAJIMA Yoshibumi

Membership

3,000

Objective of the Party

Establishment of Japanese democracy based on liberalism.
Construction of a peace-loving Japan.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

2

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

KOSHIHARA Haru (woman)

Number of votes received by the Party

79,225

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

KYODO MINSHU-TO (Co-operative Democratic Party) -- (The SHINSEI KOMIN-TO has become a branch of the KYODO MINSHU-TO)

Diet Representative's Background

KOSHIHARA Haru, born January 24, 1885, principal of Nagoya Girls' High School

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mrs. KOSHIHARA approves of the Government draft of the Constitution.

(21)

SHINSEI KOMIN-TO (New Born People's Party)

b. Food Problem

Mrs. KOSHIHARA is in favor of the government plan to have farmers release hoarded goods. She believes the food shortage would be alleviated if edible roots and vegetables were used to a greater extent. In case there is still an insufficient quantity of food SCAP should be asked for help. The staple food of Japan should be changed from rice to bread. Mrs. KOSHIHARA has a plan which she wants to present in the Diet on starting a movement to grind rice with other grain, potatoes and wild roots to make a new kind of bread.

c. Women's Problems

Women's position must be raised. They must have absolutely equal political and economic rights. The Civil Code must be revised to that end.

HOKKAIDO SEIJI DOMEI (Hokkaido Political League)

Hokkaido

President

CHIZAKI Usaburo, born January 2, 1897, director of a company. Formerly standing director of the Hokkaido Branch of the IRAA as well as an advisor of that organization.

Membership

60

Objective of the Party

Economic and cultural development of Hokkaido

Number of Candidates Who Ran For Election

12

Number of Candidates Elected

3

Names of Diet Representatives

CHIZAKI Usaburo
SHIIKUMA Saburo
HOMMA Takeshi

Number of votes received by the Party

352,751

Diet Members' Affiliation in the Diet

Progressive Party (the three representatives are aiming at establishing the Hokkaido Seiji Domei as a branch of the Progressive Party)

Diet Representatives' Background

SHIIKUMA Saburo, born May 29, 1901, employee of a company.
HOMMA Takeshi, born October 10, 1911, lumber merchant, former member of IRAA

HOKKAIDO SEIJI DOMEI (Hokkaido Political League)

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Mr. HOMMA fully supports the Government's draft constitution, although he feels "sad" about the Emperor's lowered position.

b. Food Problem

Farmers must give up their hoarded rice. But still there will not be enough. Therefore food will have to be imported.

c. Local Government must be strengthened, but the central government must help Hokkaido formulate a far-reaching 10 to 15 year plan for the economic development of that part of the country.

(23)

SHIN NIPPON SEINEN-TO (New Japan Youth Party)

Tokyo-to

President

TANAKA Seigi, writer, former director of the Propaganda Division of the Minseito

Membership

14

Objectives of the Party

To establish a democratic administration.
To fight against Communism.

Number of Candidates Who Ran for Election

4

Number of Candidates Elected

1

Name of Diet Representative

TAKEUCHI Utako (woman)

Number of votes received by the Party

90,013

Diet Member's Affiliation in the Diet

SHIMPO-TO (Japan Progressive Party) -- (Miss TAKEUCHI believes the SHIN NIPPON SEINEN-TO will dissolve itself because the movement is too weak).

Diet Representative's Background

TAKEUCHI Utako, born December 15, 1915, worked for Miyako Shimbun in 1932 as a typist -- since then has been employee of several companies.

(23)

SHIN NIPPON SEINEN-TO (New Japan Youth Party)

Diet Representative's Opinion on the Constitution, the Food Problem and other Important Problems

a. Constitution

Miss TAKEUCHI approves of the government draft of the Constitution.

b. Food Problem

Production must be increased. There will be a shortage, however, because the farmers do not have enough food. The people must cooperate to overcome this crisis. The Government should ration out fertilizer in the villages.

c. Women's Problems

The power of women must be strengthened. There are certain women's problems that men cannot understand and the women will have to be the ones to solve them. There must be higher wages and equal pay for equal work as well as shorter hours for women.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Admin. Division

Political Parties

24 July 1946.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Social Democratic Party Members' Visit, 24 July 1946.

Five members of the Diet, two of them executive committeemen, of the Social Democratic Party visited this Headquarters to request information concerning the operation of political parties in the United States.

They were told that this Headquarters has no desire to insist that the American form of government is necessarily the best for Japan to adopt, and that any opinions concerning the operation of American political parties was wholly unofficial and for information only.

In response to direct questions asked by the Social Democratic Diet members, they were given short explanations concerning the methods by which political parties function within the House of Representatives. They were especially interested in the importance of the party caucus, in the methods by which Cabinet members are appointed, in the status of Cabinet members as party leaders, and in the use of patronage as a lever to insure party loyalty.

A few questions were also asked concerning the operation of the Diet itself, such as the powers of the Speaker, the attendance at legislative sessions, reporting of speeches, length of speeches and the distribution of time between government party and the opposition. Since these questions concerned the Legislative Liaison Branch rather than the Political Party Branch, replies to them were general and inquirers were directed to consult Commander Swope.

Further meetings are expected to be arranged to discuss additional details of party management.

Harry Emerson Wildes
HARRY EMERSON WILDES

Approved: P.K.R.

Noted:

C.L.K.

~~25~~ 26

~~101~~

D

Article LXXXIV. 2nd Paragraph.
Addition to U. Law.

Art. 84-2.

Art. 84 - 2

When a public prosecutor deems an election to be invalid under the provisions of Article CXXXVI on the ground of the person accused for the offences under Article CXII or CXIII having been the election manager or the person who was not the election manager but actually managed election campaigns, he shall, in parallel with the public action, bring a lawsuit against the person elected.

Article LXXXIV-2.

When a public prosecutor deems an election to be invalid under the provisions of Article CXXXVI on the ground of the person accused for the offences under Article CXII or CXIII having been the election manager or the person who was not the election manager but actually managed election campaigns, he shall, in parallel with the public action, bring a lawsuit against the person elected.

Notification concerning Clause 3 Article 6 of the
Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives
(Dispatched by the Director of the Local Administration Bureau
of the Home Ministry to Local Governors, March 9th 1942)

The provisions of Clause 3 Article 6 of the Law for the
Election of Members of the House of Representatives shall not
apply to the following persons.

1. Those discharged military personnel, falling under the provisions of Notification No.13 of the Ministry of Welfare (February 28 1938) who receive either financial assistance in their occupations or assistance in their living expenses.
2. Those persons who are partially exempted from the Post Office Insurance Health Consultation Office Fee by the provisions of Ministerial Ordinance No.34 1940 giving partial exemption from Post Office Insurance Health Consultation Office Fee to military and semi-military personnel drafted in China War and wounded soldiers.
3. Those persons who receive either medical or financial assistance under the provisions of Article 11 of the Law for Medical Protection (Law No.36)
4. Those persons who receive financial assistance under the provisions of the ordinance for giving financial assistance to persons engaged in anti-air-raid duties (Imperial Ordinance No.1137 1941)
5. Those persons who receive aid under the provisions of Article 19-3 of the National Requisition Ordinance.
6. Those persons who receive aid under the provisions of Article 21 of the National Requisition Ordinance pertaining to Persons concerned with Medical Affairs.

War Casualties and Damages Protection Law
(February 25, 1941 Law No.71)

Article 27

The protection provided for by this law shall be other than the assistance or aid from public funds given on the grounds of poverty as prescribed by other laws or ordinances.

Notification concerning Clause 3 Article 6 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives (Dispatched by the Director of the Social Division of the Social Bureau of the Home Ministry to Local Governors, January 24 1936)

The assistance given by Civil Military Affairs Assistance Bodies to Wounded soldiers and their families as well as to soldiers and their families is not deemed to fall under the provisions of clause 3 Article 6 of the Election Law. Reply to the above effect was received from the Director of the Local Administration Bureau and the details are as in appendix.

Appendix.

The Civil Military Affairs Assistance Bodies have been giving financial assistance in living conditions as well as medical assistance and assistance in business. But the above assistance has been extended not by reasons of poverty and neediness but in the spirit of giving prior treatment to those conscripted for military service in the same sense as in the Military Assistance Law, Wounded Soldiers Institute Law and Soldiers' Assistance Funds. Those persons therefore who receive assistance from the Civil Military Affairs Bodies shall be deemed as similarly falling under the conditions of the above mentioned laws and Funds and will therefore not be deemed to fall under the provisions of clause 3 Article 6 of the Election Law.

Notification concerning the relation between the disqualifying clause of clause 3 Article 6 of the Election Law and the recipients of assistance under the provisions of the Assistance Law (Letter dispatched by the Director of the Local Bureau to the Prefectural Governor of Ehime Prefecture in answer to his inquiry. February 1, 1922)

I consider that the reasons for disqualification in clause 3 Article 6 of the Law for the Election of the members of the House of Representatives apply only to those who receive assistance under the provisions of clause 1 Article 10 of the Assistance Law. Of course by assistance I am of the opinion that assistance in the form of stationary goods need not be taken to be included in this category.

Instruction regarding the interpretation of Head 3 of Article 6 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives. (Despatched by Director of Local Administration Bureau of Home Ministry to Governors of Prefectures under date of March 30, 1926)

The terms "Those persons who depend, due to poverty, on public and private relief or support for the sake of subsistence" in Head 3 of Article 6 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives shall be construed to mean "Those persons in condition of poverty who depend, being reduced to want, wholly or partly for the sake of subsistence on economic support extended by the State, Prefecture, City, Town, Village, and other public bodies, or private juridical person or private person and to indicated such persons as are mentioned to the following Heads 1 to 6 and not to include such persons as are mentioned in Heads 7 to 19.

1. Those persons who live as beggars;
2. Those persons who depend on relief under the Relief Regulations. (The Regulations were enacted by Prefectures and stipulated matters pertaining to relief and were abrogated subsequent to the enactment of the Aid Law.)
3. Those persons who are accommodated in an asylum for the aged or who stay outside an asylum and depend on its relief.
4. Those persons who depend, being reduced to want, on relief extended by their former pupil for the sake of subsistence.
5. These persons adopted into a family who depend, being

reduced to want, on support extended by their original family for the sake of subsistence.

6. Those persons who belong to a family depending on others support for the sake of subsistence.
7. Those persons who depend on aid under the Military Assistance Law.
8. Those persons who depend on aid under the Wounded Soldiers Board Law.
9. Those persons who depend on aid given to sufferers
10. Those persons who depend on pension or allowance to the surviving family under the Pension Law.
11. Those persons who depend on support under the Ordinance for the Assistance of Employees provided for in the Factory Law and the Mining Law.
12. Those persons who receive allowance from various mutual aid societies.
13. Those persons who receive gratuitous medical treatment or dispensation of medicine.
14. Those persons who receive support of their school expenses.
15. Those persons who receive alms under any pretext during the beginning and end of the year season.
16. Those persons who receive living expenses under the Epidemic Diseases Prevention Law.
17. Those persons who receive support from friends and relatives
18. Those persons who receive support from their father and brother or from their child or from a person who belongs to the same family as the supportee,

regardless of the fact that the supporter is a member of the supportee's family under the Civil Code or not.

19. Begging priests, wandering monks and pilgrims.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

15 June 1946

PREFECTURAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN

The following questions are designed to focus attention on the fundamental structural, administrative, and legal relationships in regional and local government which are particularly pertinent to contemporary Japan. They should be studied and resolved in terms of Japanese administrative experience and political limitations, in the context of Japanese social, political, and economic prospects for the predictable future. Decisions should in every case conform to basic occupational policies. The questions are arranged in convenient classifications but because their subject matter is closely interrelated, some duplications inevitably occur.

I. Prefectural and Local Autonomy.

- A. What are the objectives of the proposed establishment of "autonomous" prefectural and local units of government in Japan? How does it comport with occupational directives?
- B. Considering the size of Japan, its population, its economic problem, its administrative and legal tradition, is this development feasible or workable at the present time? What are its likely effects?
- C. Are the Japanese at present competent to manage local affairs without strong central guidance and control?

II. Relationship of Structure to Powers -

Can questions of prefectural and local government structure be divorced from the allocation of powers and functions to the various levels of government? If not

- A. What functions may reasonably be assigned exclusively to prefectural and local administration?
- B. What functions may be assigned to those levels for operation but require some national standards, coordination and control?
- C. Can functions which must be reserved to national control be administered through prefectural officials?
 1. If so, what controls must national government have over prefectural officials? Over prefectural acts?

2. If not, (or in cases where this procedure is not feasible) what effect will prefectural and local "autonomy" have on administrative structure of national ministries?
- D. Where functions are reserved to prefectural and local "autonomous" units, are present tax sources sufficient to support those functions? If not, what adjustments must be made?

III. Prefectural and Local Executives.

- A. How should governor be selected?
1. Home Minister?
 2. Prefectural Council? (If 2 or 3, should (national confirmation be necessary?)
 3. Popular vote? If so, how should candidates be nominated? (be necessary?)
- B. How should mayors and headmen be selected?
- C. Should Ken Governor be "national official?"
1. If not, can any national functions be enforced through him?
 - a. If so, what sanctions can national government exercise over recalcitrant or inefficient governors?
 - b. Is the problem of recalcitrant governors likely to arise?
 2. If so, what power should national government exercise over Ken Governor?
- D. What shall be term of Ken Governor? Fixed term? Pleasure of Council? Pleasure of Home Minister?
- E. Where shall removal power lie? Home Minister at will? Home Minister on petition by percentage of electorate? Non-confidence in Council? If none of above, should impeachment for cause be allowed? *Initiative - recall instead*
- F. Apply questions D and E above to mayors and headmen. Any objections to unpaid officials?
- G. How shall prefectural and local career officials be selected and controlled? Shall National Government have any power over them? Are individual prefectures of sufficient size, do they operate on sufficient scale to provide basis for competent, non-political career service?

- H. How shall deputy Governor and other non-career officials be selected?

IV. Legislators and Legislation.

- A. Shall all law-making power of prefectures and cities be reserved to legislatures? If not, how much should rest with executive? Shall Governor have veto power? Any provisions to override? Shall legislatures have power to investigate administration?
- B. Do proposed Boards of Aldermen serve useful (or evil) purpose? Any objection to their continuation? Might they be made optional for all prefectural and local units?
- C. Should legislators be selected by districts or at large? Any differences between cities and prefectures in this respect? Objections to unpaid legislators?
- D. How shall length and frequency of sessions be determined? How shall permanent legislative staff be selected? Shall secret meetings be permitted?
- E. Are partisan political issues likely to play major role in prefectural and local affairs? If not, what purpose is served by votes of confidence, dissolution and related techniques of Cabinet system? Effect of this system on stability of prefectural and local government? On development of compromise techniques? Any inconsistency between popularly elected executive and legislative votes of confidence?
- F. Should voters be permitted to initiate proceedings to recall legislators by petition? If so, to whom should petition be sent? Who should have authority to dissolve? Effect of this procedure on legislative responsibility and stability?
- G. Should prefectural and local governments be completely free on fiscal matters? Should they have unlimited taxing power? Spending power? Borrowing power? If not, by whom should standards, limitations be established? By whom enforced, higher administrative authorities or courts? If by courts, is the system sufficiently flexible for Japanese needs? Can the Japanese operate under exclusively judicial control?
- H. Where shall power of audit rest?

V. Ultra Vires.

- A. When a prefectural government acts on subjects beyond its jurisdiction or in a manner that conflicts with national

regulations, where shall power lie to review and disallow?
In national administration? In the courts?

- B. In the case of towns and villages, where should the power rest?

VI. Special Problems of Cities.

- A. To what extent should cities be removed from legislative and administrative jurisdiction of Ken Governments?
- B. To what extent should cities be subject to direct administrative authority of national administration?
- C. When cities act ultra vires, should Ken Governor, national administration, or courts have power to set aside?
- D. Should cities be authorized to adopt, with no change in powers exercised, alternative methods of organization in order to encourage experimentation in governmental forms? Should such authority be written into law? Would similar latitude be desirable for Ken governments as well?

VII. Elections.

- A. How can elections be managed independently of political control by party in power?
- B. If by special commissions, how should they be constituted to provide impartiality and efficiency? How financed? How staffed?
- C. Shall uniform election machinery be provided for all elections?
- D. How shall election disputes be settled?

MILTON J. ESMAN
1st Lt, TC

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division

10 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION.

SUBJECT: Investigation of Local Government
in Nagano and Yamanashi Prefectures.

On 23-25 May 1946, Lt. Col. F. E. Hays and Professor Kenneth Colegrove investigated prefectural and municipal governments in Nagano and Yamanashi Prefectures. They also visited two county or gun governments in Yamanashi Prefecture. Captain Richard Park (78th Military Government Company) arranged the interviews with governmental officials in Nagano Prefecture, while Major Earle W. Hessler (32nd Military Government Company) arranged the interviews in Yamanashi Prefecture.

In Nagano Prefecture, conferences were held with the following officials: Kunro Mnobe (Governor); K. Hasegawa (Chief Procurator); Mr. Yasuba (Chief of Prefectural Police); Mr. Osaki (Chief of Education Section); and Mr. Akao (Chief of Liaison Section). In Yamanashi Prefecture, a conference was held with the Governor, Mr. Noboru Saito. In the city (shi) of Kamisuwa, the conference included the Mayor, Mr. Kiyoshi Kanai, and three members of his staff. In the city of Kofu, the interview was with the Mayor, Mr. Hoemon Imai.

The joint office of two counties (gun) which surround the city of Kofu was investigated. These counties are the Nishiyaminashi-gun and the Nakakomo-gun. A conference was held with Mr. Kyoshi Taki, Chief of the Local Administration Office of the two counties, and with several of his assistants.

Nagano Prefecture had a population of 1,710,729 in the census of 1940, while the population of Yamanashi Prefecture was 663,026. The population of the city of Nagano was 76,861; of Kamisuwa was 24,076; and of Kofu was 102,419. Under the census of 1945, Nagano Prefecture shows a population of 2,121,050. Nagano city has increased considerably and Kamisuwa is over 35,000. The population of Nishiyaminashi-gun in 1940 was 15,357 and of Nakakoma-gun was 82,330.

RESTRICTED
(21)

RESTRICTED

TRAINING AND CHARACTER OF PERSONNEL.

The Governors of Nagano Prefecture and Yamanashi Prefecture are civil servants of considerable intelligence; both are graduates of the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo; and both studied under Professor Tatshukicki Minobe at a time when he taught his Emperor-as-organ-of-the-state doctrine. Kunro Monobe was appointed Governor of Nagano Prefecture in October 1945. He was formerly Chief of the Internal Affairs Bureau of Aichi Prefecture. Governor Monobe is conservative and bureaucratic; Governor Saito is rather progressive and somewhat scholarly. Among the administrative chiefs of Nagano Prefecture, Messrs. Hasegawa and Osaki are also graduates of the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo; likewise they were students of Professor Minobe. Of the mayors, both officials were graduates of the Imperial University of Tokyo. Mayor Kanai, who was arrested in 1940, on complaint of the militarists, is today notably progressive. On the other hand, Mayor Imai, who holds the distinction of being the oldest mayor in Japan, is conservative.

POPULAR ELECTION OF GOVERNOR.

Governor Monobe is strongly opposed to popular election of the Prefectural Governor (Kenchiji). Such election, in his opinion, would result in the choice of incompetent and inexperienced administrators. The Japanese people, he believes, will not be ready for the popular election of Governors for twenty years at the most. All the heads of the prefectural bureaus concurred in this view. Governor Saito, who is willing to discuss the problem philosophically, believes that the popular election of Governors is inevitable in a democratic Japan. There are, he holds, two advantages: (1) the elected Governor would be a local man and would tend to be well acquainted with the problems of the prefecture; and (2) the elected Governor would presumably be known by the people who would probably give more willing cooperation to him than to the appointee of the Home Office (Naimusho) in Tokyo. There are two weighty objections to popular election of Governors, namely: (1) the elected Governor would be dependent upon the support of one or more political parties, and would be bitterly condemned by the other parties; and (2) the elected Governor would be tempted to ignore inconvenient or unpopular directives from the Home Office in Tokyo, no matter how much the interest of the entire nation required such directives, with the result that there would be a greater break-down of central authority than was originally intended under the new Constitution of Japan.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

The Mayor of Kofu emphatically holds that popular election of Governors would bring more disadvantages than advantages, and that eventually the people themselves would repudiate the procedure. Popular election of Governors would bring into an administrative post a politician, whereas a competent administrator is required. Party strife, rather than regard for the public welfare, would prevail. The leaders of the new political parties, he believes, are just as self-seeking as the leaders of the former major parties - the Seiyukai and Minseito.

The Governor of Yamanashi, who showed a fine spirit of sportsmanship, and who indicated that he expected to lose his post under a system of popular election of Governor, declares that there had been a tendency for the Home Office (Naikusho) to appoint Governors of the same party affiliation as that of the members of the Cabinet. He believes that Japan will need to trust to the good sense of its voters to select Governors who will at least appoint competent administrative assistants. The voters will learn to appreciate administrative experience and tend to vote for candidates possessed of such experience.

The Governor of Yamanashi thinks that former Governors will be willing to take appointments under an elected Governor. The Governor of Nagano and the Mayor of Kofu are confident that former Governors will refuse to take such subordinate posts and, in any case, that politicians in the governor's office would lack the political wisdom to use such talent. Vice-governorships, if established, would certainly be awarded to party followers.

The Mayor of Kofu declared that before World War II the Governors of all prefectures tended to be mere bureaucrats. But in the nine months following the Surrender, according to Mayor Imai, under the "gracious atmosphere instilled by General MacArthur," many changes in personnel had occurred. Now the Governors are more democratic in character and action. They tend to seek out the people, and listen attentively to complaints. At the same time, the attitude of the people toward the Governor has changed. In Yamanashi Prefecture, at least, the popular clamor for elected Governors has almost entirely subsided and only a few agitators ever mention the subject.

METHOD OF POPULAR ELECTION.

Governor Monobe declined to express an opinion regarding the various methods of popular election of Governor, pleading lack of time to study the problem. Governor Saito, however, proposed election by the Prefectural Assembly or (Kenkai) as the most feasible method of selection. This was also the view of Mayor Kanai. Indirect popular election, both officials believe, might avoid some of the evils of direct election. It would also tend to lead to "complete cooperation between the executive and legislative branches."

ELECTION OF MAYOR.

The Governor of Nagano Prefecture and the Mayor of Kofu oppose the election of Mayors, and favor the present plan of nomination by the Governor and election by the Municipal Assembly (Shikai). The Governor of Yamanashi Prefecture and the Mayor of Kofu approve the popular election of mayors. Says the picturesque Mayor of Kofu: "Elect the Mayor by the people; permit this Mayor a free hand in the selection of the heads of all of his bureaus; and you will almost always have an efficient city government."

POPULAR ELECTION OF CHIEFS OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES.

The Governor of Yamanashi Prefecture sees little advantage in changing the present system of selecting the Chief (Checho) of a town (nachi). Under the Law concerning the Organization of Towns and Villages (1911), the Chief is nominated by the Governor (Kenchii) of the Prefecture and elected by the Town Assembly (Chokai). According to Governor Saito, the Governor frequently consults with members of the Town Assembly (Chokai) prior to nomination of a Chief. Likewise, the procedure for selection of the village chief (Sencho) should be left undisturbed. He is now elected by the Village Assembly (Sonkai) but his appointment requires the approval of the Governor. The Military Government Companies in Nagano Prefecture and Yamanashi Prefecture report that no complaints have ever been received regarding election of Chiefs of towns and villages.

RESTRICTED

ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTION LAWS.

The Governors of Nagano Prefecture and Yamanashi Prefecture have definite views on the subject of the administration of the election laws. As provided in Articles 4-40 of the Law Concerning the Organization of Urban and Rural Prefectures (1899), the Governor has supervision of the elections of members of the Prefectural Assembly (Kenkai), of the Municipal Assembly (Shikai), of the Town Assembly (Chokai) and of the Village Assembly (Sonkai). Both Governors oppose the suggestion that the supervision of these elections be placed in the hands of an Election Commission. If the Governor or the Home Ministry should appoint the Election Commission, the control of elections would still remain subject to central or gubernatorial regulation. If the Commission members are to be elected by the voters, then the opportunity for fraud would be increased. Both Governors admit that a system of popular election of Governors would require some device for an Election Commission, but such Commission should be appointed by the central Government rather than selected by local election. The Mayor of Kofu agrees with this view.

DECENTRALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS (PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT)

Both Governors Monobe and Saito presented eloquently and with considerable logic an identical theme, namely, that there is no similarity between the prefecture in Japan and the "State" in the United States. Accordingly, each Governor concludes that any proposed division of functions in Japan on the basis of similar separation of functions in the United States would be inappropriate. Both Governors insisted that the immature and unbalanced economic condition of the Japanese prefectures necessitated a firm central control of economic life. An uneven distribution of wealth requires a centralized tax system.

Finally, both Governors call attention to the need for an efficient police system at a time when Japan is going through a social revolution. The central administration of the police system is an imperative requirement for public safety. Governor Saito believes that the economic functions should be removed from police administration; but he would go no further. Mr. Yasada (Chief of Prefectural Police in Nagano), as well as the Mayors of Kumisawa and Kofu, hold the same view. All of them expect a sharp increase of crime in case of decentralization of police. Mr. Yasada respectfully recalled the difficulties of extradition of fugitives from justice under the American police system.

RESTRICTED

Even the conservative Governor of Nagano admits that a partial decentralization of education would be appropriate. He believes, however, that increase in the salaries of teachers, which is a much needed reform in Nagano Prefecture, as well as throughout all Japan, will be more readily attained through a centralized than a decentralized educational system. Some prefectures have meagre taxable wealth for this purpose. Inequality of sources of local taxation may be off-set by subsidies from the central government. But, it should be remembered, the granting of subsidies implies central supervision. Governor Saito agrees completely with this viewpoint.

DECENTRALIZATION OF FUNCTIONS (CITY GOVERNMENT)

Mr. Kanai, the Mayor of Kamisuwa, strongly urges decentralization of prefectural control over the city. The city (shi) now has autonomy in law, but none in reality. After the Mayor and his Executive Council (Shi-Sanikai) have drafted an admirably planned budget, the Governor can change it by a mere telephone call. During the present year, while cities have faced a desperate need for new expenditures and new sources of revenue, the Home Ministry (Naimusho) has compelled the Mayors to use the budget of 1945, namely, the budget of the previous year. The excuse offered by the Home Office is the alleged intention to reform the tax system as a whole. But this reform is delayed, and, in the meantime, the cities suffer.

Under an autonomous system, each city could undertake local sacrifices that would promote the local welfare. For instance, the Mayor of Kamisuwa and his Executive Council (Shi-Sanikai) proposed to increase the city revenue by increasing the tax on bicycles from two to ten yen, and to levy entirely new taxes on public hot-springs baths, on dogs, on lake boats, and on iron safes. These new taxes would increase the revenue from direct taxes from a sum of 30,000 yen to 150,000 yen, at a time when city government sorely needs more revenue. Unfortunately, the Governor has disallowed such tax levies. Mayor Kanai also objects to the 2,000 yen limit on income taxes, which he says, favors the rich man as against the poor man. The Mayor of Kofu, likewise, favors more freedom for city taxation. Both mayors admit, at the same time, that rigid control of bond issues is required. The Mayor of Kumisuwa desires more budgeting autonomy in order to increase the salaries of city employees who are sadly underpaid and thereby tempted to engage in graft.

Mayor Kanai of Kamisuwa demands prefectural management of all streets and roads, including prefectural highways, running through a shi. The city loses business because of poor roads. This is especially true of a city like Kamisuwa which is engaged in the development of its hot-springs. Mayor Kanai also desires freedom to undertake municipal enterprises. The Mayor, who seems to possess an unusual zeal for public service, proudly displayed a sample of mud or slime dredged from the bottom of Lake Suwa which has value as a fertilizer. He proposes that the city engage in the dredging business and the sale of fertilizer to farmers as a municipal enterprise.

THE EXECUTIVE COUNCILS

Unanimous satisfaction was expressed regarding the executive councils in both the prefecture and the city. Both Governors of Nagano Prefecture and Yamanashi Prefecture declare that their Prefectural Councils (Ken Sanikai) are useful and generally harmonious. Both Mayors of Kamisuwa and Kofu hold their City Councils (Shi Sanikai) in esteem. In both cities the Council is composed of twelve unpaid members elected by the City Assembly which almost always elects its most competent members. The Mayor of Kofu convenes his City Council every month. The Mayor of Kamisuwa, however, summons his Council every fortnight. According to Capt. Park, the superior energy, experience and enthusiasm of Mr. Kanai (the Mayor of Kamisuwa) completely dominates his Municipal Council.

THE PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLY

The Prefectural Assembly (Kenkai) in Nagano Prefecture has forty-six members; and in Yamanashi Prefecture, twenty-eight members. As usual, the members serve without pay. It is generally admitted, according to both Governors Monobe and Saito, that popular election has resulted in the selection of fairly competent local legislators. The usual time of meeting is about one month in December of each year. In both prefectures, the Assembly held its annual session of 1945 in December of that year. Both Governors Monobe and Saito seem inclined to consider a special session of the body as unnecessary except in grave emergency. The Speaker of the Prefectural Assembly, in the words of Governor Monobe, "is elected by the members of the Assembly and he exercises general control over all business of the Assembly."

RESTRICTED

Both Governors are familiar with Chapter VIII of the Government draft of the new Constitution (March 6, 1946). Both of them oppose the principle of local autonomy asserted in Article 88. Again, Article 89 should be clarified, inasmuch as it might be construed to mean that the people of each prefecture are authorized to set up any kind of popular assembly that they please. Local government should be ordained by a general act of the Imperial Diet applicable in the same degree to all prefectures and to all cities, towns and villages.

Both Governors agree that in case the Governor were appointed by the central Government there was little need for the power of dissolution of the Prefectural Assembly (Kenkai). But, if the Governor is to be elected, either by the Assembly or by the electorate, then he should be given the power of dissolution. A party-controlled Governor, confronted by parties in the Assembly which refused to cooperate with the executive, would need to have this protection against such parties. The present power of the Assembly to censure the Governor has little use. In neither prefecture has the Governor recently overruled a resolution of the Kenkai. The term of office of four years for members of the Assembly is satisfactory.

On the question of frequency of meeting of the Prefectural Assembly (Kenkai), both Governors agree. A session of one month each year, as the present Law for the Organization of Urban and Rural Prefectures (1899) provides, is preferable to other arrangements. And, December is the most convenient month for this annual meeting. Governor Saito, however, admits that in case the legislative powers of the Prefectural Assembly are to be increased it might be necessary to give it more elasticity in regard to the length of its annual session.

As to extension of the powers of the Assembly, both Governors held that, even under a system of popular election of Governors, the budget should remain within the control of the Governor, to the end that the Assembly should have authority simply to accept or reject the budget as a whole. Even a party-controlled Governor, says Governor Saito, should be protected against an Assembly of politicians who may try to spend more money than the prefecture can afford.

RESTRICTED

THE TOWN AND VILLAGE ASSEMBLIES.

The Chokai or Town Assembly contain, on the average, eighteen members in Yamanashi Prefecture. Members are elected for four years. The Sonkai or Village Assembly has uniformly twelve members, elected every four years. There seems to be universal satisfaction with the present system, or at least there are no complaints. No changes are recommended by Governor Saito.

POLITICAL PARTIES.

In both prefectures, the Prefectural Assembly (Kenkai) was elected during the late war. The next election is not until September 1946. As a result, political parties are now in abeyance in the Assembly. Both Governors Monebe and Saito expect a lively revival of political parties in the September election. The Progressive, Liberal and Social Democratic parties are about equally strong in both prefectures.

All officials declare that the Communist Party makes a big noise but will not greatly increase in numbers in either Nagano or Yamanashi Prefectures. Governor Saito thinks that the party will have no more than two or three members in the Assembly of his prefecture after the September election. The Mayor of Kamisuwa, although himself a radical (he visited Russia in 1917-1918 and talked with Trotsky and travelled in Russia and Siberia three times later) declared that the Communist Party is un-Japanese, controlled from outside the country, and even behind the times in social outlook. Mayor Imai (of Kofu) believes that the May Day performances in both Tokyo and Kofu found little approval by the great majority of the citizens of Kofu who think that both affairs were instigated by the Communists under Russian support. Citizens of Kofu also deprecate the recent demonstrations before the Imperial Palace and the residence of the Prime Minister in Tokyo. The Communists who are inspiring these demonstrations misjudge the spirit of the Japanese people, according to Mayor Imai. At the same time, all officials declare that free speech is accorded to the Communist Party. In Nakano ken, two demobilized soldiers were recently sentenced to jail for terms of eight months for attacks upon Communist candidates during the general election campaign in April 1946.

COUNTY (GUN) GOVERNMENT.

The Military Government team at Kofu lay considerable stress upon the revival of the county or sub-prefecture (gun) government in Yamanashi-ken. Governor Saito collaborates this fact. There are ten counties (gun) in this prefecture.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Two counties, namely Nishiyaminashi-gun and Nakakomo-gun, surround the city of Kofu, and the administration of these two districts is consolidated in one office or Local Administration Office (chihobu), located in the city of Kofu not far from the Prefectural Office. It is under the direction of Kyoshi Taki, Chief of Local Administration. This officer is appointed by the Governor, from members of the civil service. He supervises all the officers of the towns (machi) and villages (mura) in the county (gun) in matters of: (1) education, (2) statistics, (3) investigations of complaints about rationing, (4) rice collecting and (5) rationing of clothing and other articles, but not of staple foods.

Formerly, the county (gun) had considerable autonomy, according to Administrator Taki. After the Restoration, this autonomy was curtailed and the county became an administrative agency of the prefectural government. About the year 1925, prefectural governments revived the use of the gun in administration of the prefecture.

The gun government now has charge of the inspection of schools. Inspectors travel from town to town and village to village. Their reports go to the county office. In supervising the rice collections, the gun distributes canned foods to farmers who deliver their rice to the government. The gun office serves as a clearing-house of information on rationing. The mayors and headmen of the towns (machi) and villages (mura) send reports to the county office regarding their food requirements. The gun office relays this information to the Food Section of the prefectural government. The Food Section then notifies the Food Control Association (Shokuryo Eidan) of the prefecture in Kofu. This office obtains food stocks for rationing and allocates the same among the counties of the prefecture. Each county office allocates the gun quota among the towns and villages. The towns and villages print their own ration books and divide the rationed goods among the families. Lt. Brabianti expresses the opinion that it is at the gun level that graft and fraud in food rationing occurs. The county office has the duty of investigating and reporting upon all complaints received concerning the rationing of food and other commodities.

One of the activities of the county government now is the compilation of statistics regarding demobilized soldiers. The findings of the gun in this field are reported to the prefectural government.

RESTRICTED

THE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUP SYSTEM (TONARI GUMI).

All officials express confidence in the neighborhood-group system (tonari gumi). They say that the system, although ancient in origin, was extensively promoted during the recent war, and proved remarkably effective in winning the co-operation of the families in every city, town and village of Japan. Today, the tonari gumi is useful in rice collecting, in rationing of food and clothing, in publicising governmental programs and in securing compliance with sanitation regulations. The kai-ran-ban or small billboard, with paper notices posted on it, is still used as a most effective device for informing the people regarding governmental measures for public welfare. Circulated by the neighborhood-group-head (gumicho) each family must indicate that it has read the notices by stamping the family seal thereon.

In Nagano-ken, the tonari gumi average over twelve families in each group. In yamanashi-ken, the governor thinks that the average number of families is higher. Lt. Ralph Brabrianti estimates that the tonari gumi in yamanashi-ken contain from seven to twenty-two families. He also reports that the group meets regularly on the eighth day of each month. The election of the neighborhood-group-head (gumicho) is invariably approved by the chief of police. He also reports that it is often difficult to find a head of a family willing to assume the responsibility of the gumicho. In some cases, the father in the family will accept the dubious honor and will depend on his wife to carry out all his petty but arduous duties.

The Mayor of Kamisuwa says there are twelve hundred tonari gumi groups in his city numbering five to ten families in each group. He proposes more centralization of the groups, namely that the groups be organized into four large sections each containing 300 family groups. This arrangement would allow for more centralized supervision. He believes that much of the petty graft which allegedly occurs occasionally among the tonari gumi is due to the fact that so few high-class family heads will accept the leadership of the neighborhood group with the result that this office often remains for several years in the hands of less high-minded individuals.

Both Governors Monobe and Saito recommend that the central government should pay a small honorium to each gumicho. One hundred yen per year was suggested as being adequate. Such an honorium would stimulate service by indicating that the government

RESTRICTED

appreciates the sacrifices that busy heads of families are making in their capacity as neighborhood-group-head. Both Governors are emphatic in recognizing the value of the tonari gumi system in maintaining good relations between the prefectural (ken) government and the people. No officer admits having received complaints that the tonari gumi has been made the tool of food racketeers or has been used as an outlet for poor grade food that more prosperous classes have rejected.

POLICE ADMINISTRATION.

As indicated in the part of this report concerning Decentralization of Functions, every Japanese officer consulted in Nagano Prefecture and Yamanashi Prefecture unanimously opposed decentralization of the police system. They were also unanimous in recommending the separation of the economic from the regular functions of the police and for the transference of these functions to other agencies. There was also unanimous agreement that the fire extinguishing and sanitary agencies should be separated from the police and set up as separate bureaux.

Mr. Yasuda, Chief of Prefectural Police in Nagano-ken, says there were only two cases of alleged violence in the General Election of April 10, 1946. On the other hand, there has been a sharp increase in criminal cases since the Surrender. The increase is well over 100 per cent. The chief crimes are robbery, fraud and gambling. The police are well aware of the existence of SCAP directives regarding freedom of speech, and they are loyal to the Japanese government and to SCAP in the observance of this democratic principle. Permission of the police is not required for the holding of rallies by political parties. No special effort is made to watch the Communist party or any other political party. At the same time, Chief Yasuda assumes that the Counter Intelligence Section of the General Headquarters keeps tab on the Communist activities in Nagano-ken. He stands ready to assist the Occupation in any such endeavors.

Chief Yasuda thinks that the existing police organization gives an efficient administration and he has no plans for a proposed reorganization. Both Chief Yasuda and the Mayor of Kofu are definitely opposed to the popular election of the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police should be appointed by and responsible to the supreme executive authority in each governmental unit. Police officers need training and experience. The executive is a better

RESTRICTED

judge of administrative competence than are the people, and should have authority to select, train and promote the police. Besides, in the heat of an election campaign, candidates for the office of Chief of Police would be tempted to make unfortunate promises.

The Nagano Chief of Police and the Mayors of Kamisuwa and Kofu hold that the salaries of police officers need drastic increase. Low salaries bring temptation to engage in graft and corruption. According to the Mayor of Kofu, many of the patrolmen (junsu) belonging to a police station (koban) receive presents of food from humble folk. These are not considered bribes; but in some cases actual bribes are solicited and obtained. In any event, the initial step in eliminating bribery and increasing efficiency must be that of elevating the salary of the police and attracting a better class of individual to the force.

The Chief of Police of Nagano Prefecture and the Mayor of Kamisuwa believe that a large part of the increase of crime stems from members of the disbanded army and navy. Deprived of their means of livelihood, in many instances, these discharged soldiers are easily tempted into robbery and black market operations. One half of the robberies in Kamisuwa are committed by ex-soldiers. There are really two groups of ex-soldiers, namely those who saw service abroad and met defeat and again those who remained in Japan and did not suffer on the battlefield. The ex-soldiers of the first group have had occasion to reflect and to adjust their attitudes. The second group have not generally gone through this mental process. They include most of the thieves, looters and agitators, he said.

All officers unanimously and positively oppose any proposal for a national rural police force for towns of less than 30,000 inhabitants, with the chief official responsible to the Diet alone and with a central identification and records bureau in Tokyo (as proposed on 8 May 1946, by the Public Safety Division of the Civil Intelligence Section of SCAP). This idea is so novel and untraditional that it required considerable explanation to convey the meaning of this plan even to the quick-witted Mayor of Kamisuwa. Even he emphatically rejected the proposal. The philosophically minded Governor of Yamanashi-ken branded the proposal as an unnatural separation of powers. The other officials thought that the plan would demoralize the police system and would lead to notorious inefficiency.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

The Chief Procurator of Nagano Prefecture, Mr. K. Hasegawa, is a well-educated and accomplished attorney. He is also a man of refinement and of high moral character. The Governor of Yamanashi Prefecture claims that the Procurator of this prefecture is of equal ability.

Nagano Prefecture constitutes one district for a District Court (*chiho saibansho*). In addition there are seven local courts. There is one president (*chokan*) of the Nagano District Court, and there are seven local judges. Besides the chief procurator (*kenjisei*) there are two or three procurators (*kenji*) for each local court.

According to chief procurator Hasegawa, the chief procurator (*kenjisei*) exercises a close supervision of the local procurators and over all the prosecution of crime not only in the district court but also over the local courts. The Chief Procurator, in turn, reports to the Ministry of Justice (*shihoso*) in Tokyo. The chief procurator is independent of the district court and acts only under instructions from the Ministry of Justice.

Appointment, promotion and transfer of the local procurators are made by the Ministry of Justice upon the written recommendation of the Chief Procurator. Local procurators report regularly to the Chief Procurator. In the prosecution of major crimes, like murder and defamation of character, the local procurator proceeds under definite instructions from the Kenjisei. The Chief Procurator makes regular and full reports to the Criminal Affairs Bureau (Keiji-kyoku) of the Ministry of Justice.

Reports of the Chief Procurator (Kenjisei) to the Ministry of Justice do comment on the decisions of the District Court and upon the attitude of individual judges. While the present system of placing the Procurator under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice has produced efficiency in the prosecution of crime, there has been one unfortunate aspect. Often the Ministry has been dragged into the political arena. In such cases, the Procurator is the pawn of politics.

Chief Procurator Hasegawa is familiar with Chapter VI of the Cabinet Draft Constitution. He does not object to Article 73 giving the proposed Supreme Court power to determine the rules of procedure of all courts and which specifically provides that the procurators shall be subject to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court. Indeed, he favors this proposal inasmuch as it would divorce the procurators from politics. The Governor of Kamisuwa agrees with this view.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Neither Chief Procurator Hasegawa nor Governor Saito approve popular election of the Procurator. This change would force the office into politics. Procurators at all levels should be considered as organs of the executive branch of government and should remain under the Home Ministry. This principle, however, does not mean that the Procurator as well as all the courts above the level of the police courts should not be under the rule-making jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as envisaged under Article 73 of the Cabinet Draft of the Constitution.

None of the officials of Nagano-ken object to preserving the police courts (keizai saibansho) which are now under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry (naimusho) in Tokyo. The police courts are held in the police station (keisatususho). They are minor courts dealing with petty cases such as drunks, traffic violations, etc. They need not be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry to that of the Ministry of Justice.

The administration of prisons remains under the Penal Administration Bureau (gyokei-kyoku) of the Ministry of Justice at Tokyo. The Chief Procurator is expected to inspect the prisons in his prefecture.

ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION.

In Nagano-ken as in other prefectures (ken) the governor is responsible to the Ministry of Education (Mombusho) in Tokyo for the supervision of education in the prefecture. His immediate subordinate is the Chief (bucho) of the Education and Welfare Department. This chief supervises the national elementary schools (kokumin gakko) throughout the prefecture. In the name of the governor, the chief of the Education and Welfare Department licenses teachers, appoints the principals and teachers of the kokumin gakko and controls discipline and promotion. He reports, in the name of the governor, chiefly to the General Education Bureau (futsu gakumi kyoku) in the Ministry of Education in Tokyo. In 1946, Nagano-ken has 693 national elementary schools, with 3,949 teachers and 365,333 pupils. The prefecture also has 20 middle schools (chuto gakko) with 628 teachers and 13,360 pupils; 44 girls high schools (koto jogakko) with 883 teachers and 22,495 pupils; and 49 technical schools (jitsugyo gakko) with 19,929 pupils. There are also two prefectural technical colleges (jitsugyo semmon gakko) and six governmental technical colleges. As explained in the part of this report dealing with county government, the inspection of schools in the towns (machi) and villages (mura) is carried out through the county (gun) administration.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Chief Osaki, who presides over the Department of Education, and Welfare in Nagano-ken, is well informed regarding the recommendations of the United States Education Mission to Japan. He says that this report deals with problems to which he himself has given consideration. He is definitely opposed to any large measure of decentralization. He opposes the proposal for elimination of national supervision of textbooks, teacher-training and teacher-appointment by the Ministry of Education at Tokyo. He opposes the recommendation "that in each city, or other prefectural sub-division, there shall be established a lay educational agency elected by the people, this agency to be in charge of all public primary and secondary schools in its locality, in accordance with statute." (See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES EDUCATION MISSION TO JAPAN, MARCH 1946, p. 30). The Japanese people, as a whole he says, have not been educated along the lines of democratic action sufficiently to permit such a drastic reform to succeed at this time. Perhaps it might work twenty years from now.

Chief Osaki, as a counterproposal, recommends the formation of an Educational Advisory Board at the prefectural level, with authority to advise the governor and Chief of the Education Department regarding every phase of education in the prefecture. This board should be appointed from nominations submitted by cultural, religious and industrial organizations in the prefecture. The teachers also should be represented. Such a board would be the first step in the practical education of the people toward more local participation in the control of the schools.

In Yamanashi-ken, due to the interest and energy of Maj. Nessler and Lt. Brabiantí, both of the 32d M.G. Co., large conferences of teachers with Military Government officers have recently been held. These teachers eagerly ask: (1) What is democracy? (2) How do you teach democracy? (3) How are American schools organized? (4) What methods do American teachers use? Governor Saito heartily supports these conferences. He adds, significantly that while there is no lack in eagerness to reform education, there is a definite lack of educational leadership. Philosophically, he concludes: Reforms ought not to go too far ahead of leadership.

ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC WELFARE.

In Nagano-ken, the administration of education and public welfare is combined under one department. The department of

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Education and Welfare includes six sections as follows:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| (1) Education | Education, science & arts, religion. |
| (2) Welfare | Social welfare & relief. |
| (3) Labor Administration | Enforcement of labor laws and settlement of labor disputes. |
| (4) Sanitation | Enforcement of public health regulations. |
| (5) Labor Supply | Direction of employment. |
| (6) Insurance | Supervision of health insurance. |

The Chief of the Education and Welfare Department readily admits that, in a new era of expanding public services, good administration might well require the separation of the functions of education and public welfare.

TAXATION.

The prefectures suffer, according to both governors because of the failure of the central Finance Ministry (okurasho) to develop a new taxation system. The collection of taxes as they now exist is satisfactory; ninety-nine per cent of the total assessment in Nagano-ken, and well over ninety per cent in Yamanashi-ken. But there is a crying need for the development of new sources of taxation. Both governors agree that the taxation system should be uniform for all prefectures in Japan. Lack of uniformity would be disastrous. Heavy taxes on movable property in one prefecture would drive such property into prefectures with less burdensome taxes.

As already indicated, the Mayor of Kamisuwa demands municipal autonomy for local direct taxes on bicycles, dogs and poll tax and licenses to conduct the hotel and restaurant business. Outside this limited autonomy, he agrees that the tax system should be national.

FOOD DISTRIBUTION.

Both governors declare that scarcity of food is the most difficult problem now confronting their administrations. Farmers

have not suffered; indeed they are still engaged in hoarding rice. But in the cities and towns, the need of the non-agricultural class is acute. In Nagano-ken, stern measures against hoarding have been taken. Thus far in the year 1946, there have been 1540 cases of convicted hoarders (chiefly farmers) who have been reprimanded, and 830 persons who have actually been prosecuted. Most prosecutions ended in conviction.

According to governor Saito, the food problem can be solved only on a national scale and by a national program. He recommends: (1) national purchase and distribution of rice, (2) national manufacture of fertilizer to be distributed only to farmers who sell their rice to the rice monopoly, (3) establishment of a more extensive rationing system, and (4) continued use and expansion of the tonari gumi system.

DEMORILIZATION STATISTICS.

Lt. Braibanti (32d M.G. Co. at Kofu) has made a special study of the efficiency of the prefectural government in the compilation of statistics of demobilized soldiers. The prefectural (ken) government has the responsibility of compiling these statistics for the central government. Within the prefecture, the Local Administration Section (chihoka) depends upon the county (gun) administration and the cities. The gun, in turn, collects its data from the towns and villages.

When a demobilized serviceman arrives in his prefecture, he applies for a ration card at the office of the lowest administrative division in which he lives. If a resident of a city (shi) he applies at the city hall (shiyakusho); of a town (machi), at the town hall (machi yakuba); and of a village (mura) at the village hall (murayakuba). The information received by the county office is telephoned to the prefectural government. A written report is also forwarded.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT COMPANIES.

The 78th M.G. Co. is stationed in Nagano-ken. Twelve officers are assigned to Nagano, the prefectural capital. Four officers are assigned to the city of Kamisuwa in the southern part of the prefecture which is somewhat isolated from the northern part of the prefecture. Kamisuwa is connected with the city of Nagano by

RESTRICTED

an indirect railway connection and by a difficult wagon road over the Wada Pass. Military Government in Nagano has been impaired by the fact that the senior officer has not shown particular interest or aptitude in such government, with the result that the accomplishments in this field have depended upon the junior officers.

The 32d M. G. officials, four in number, assigned to Yamanashi Prefecture are stationed at Kofu, the prefectural capital. They report to 32d M. G. Co. in Tokyo, but they have a large amount of initiative. These four officers constitute an unusually effective team under the leadership of a trained Military Government officer.

The visit with these two Military Government Companies disclosed the prospect of an imminent turnover in personnel. Of the sixteen officers in the 78th Company, eleven are eligible for readjustment in July and August 1946. Only one of these eleven officers expects to volunteer for further service. Of the four officers in the 32d M. G. Co., two are eligible for readjustment in the summer of 1946, and neither one expects to volunteer further service. The replacement of these officers by new officers or civilians who have no practical experience in Military Government will seriously handicap this important phase of the Occupation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Further field trips among the prefectures are probably necessary in order to obtain data regarding local government which may be used in the preparation of final recommendations on the reconstruction of prefectural government in all of its echelons of operation. Among other governmental units, particular attention should be given to county (gun) government. Our information regarding this unit is very meagre. At the same time a study should be made of the neighborhood-group (tonari gumi) as an agency of co-operation between government and people at the lowest level. Without more information regarding these institutions, it is difficult to avoid either over-estimation or under-estimation of the virtues of such institutions.

In addition, it would be advisable to make a survey of the operation of Military Government units on the prefectural level in order to improve the method of operation and also to prevent the too rapid overturn of officers in this service.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

In planning the reconstruction of local government in Japan, it is necessary, of course, to bear in mind the fact that the Potsdam Declaration was not limited to a single objective. On the one hand, the Japanese government is expected, under the Declaration to: (1) remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people; (2) to guarantee freedom of speech, of religion and of thought as well as respect for fundamental human rights; and (3) to establish peacefully inclined and responsible government. In other words, it is expected that Japan shall move far in the direction of democracy. On the other hand, the Declaration assures the Japanese nation, as well as the Allies, that these reforms should be nothing less than the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Liberally interpreted, the second objective implies that democratic reform should not be pushed beyond a point where solid achievements may be impaired by a natural reaction to over-haste in reconstruction of government.

Democracy, in the view of the most universally respected thinkers of America and Europe, does not mean merely government by the majority of the people. It also means the maintenance of a government that will insure freedom of speech, of the press and of religion, which includes the right of free elections and of opposition political parties. It also embraces the idea that any government has the right to protect itself against those who seek to change the government by force rather than by appeal to the ballot box.

By the same token, democracy does not mean that any nation should advance the rule of the people regardless of the danger of violent revolution, anarchy and waste of human and material resources. A wise moderation, urged by sound political advisers from Plato and Aristotle to Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson and men of our day, calls for the progressive development of political institutions, step by step, together with the avoidance of violent revolutions followed by equally dangerous counter-revolutions and reactionary movements.

There was nothing of this ideal of democracy to be found in the Fascist revolution in Italy, in the Nazi revolution in Germany, nor in the Bolshevist revolution in Russia. Each revolution led to the establishment of totalitarian regimes which crushed freedom of speech and of the press, abolished free elections and exterminated opposition parties.

RESTRICTED

From the standpoint of political morality, the occupation of Japan is a sacred trust assumed by the United States and her Allies for the benefit of the Japanese people as well as for the peace of the world. It is fashionable today in some newspaper circles to sneer at the concept that the Occupation is a sacred trust. In reply, it must suffice to say that such sneers are not in line with the views of most of the great philosophers whose books are universally read and taught in the colleges and universities of the United States, the British Commonwealth, France and other democracies. The existence of this solemn responsibility to the peoples of Japan and the Allies cannot be successfully denied. It calls for the adoption of carefully planned reforms that envisage democratic advancement of a permanent character rather than innovations which may create a false and unstable democracy. Accordingly, it may be said that the responsibility of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will be vitiated by the imposition of governmental reconstruction that either leads the Japanese people to abandon the new regime as soon as the Occupation is terminated, or else leads to a violent revolution and the creation of a dictatorship, whether it be proletarian or plutocratic.

Sound political thinking approves the progressive approach to a democratic ideal. But it always warns the statesman of the danger of reforms that march too rapidly in advance of the preparation of the people for such constitutional changes. The program of reconstruction of the British Government imposed by Oliver Cromwell in the seventeenth century was finally adopted two centuries later. But the imposition of the Commonwealth of 1654 resulted in a revolution that erased the reforms of Cromwell two years after his death. Cromwell was too far ahead of his time.

It is not necessary to adhere to the Traditionalist School to recognize that the traditions of a nation are a powerful factor in the evolution of government. No extended proof is here required as to the accuracy of the widely accepted theory that tradition and experience are among the determinants of good government. The Constitution of the United States, adopted in 1787, has remained as the fundamental law largely because of the fact that it was an expression of the political experience of the American people. It has existed well over a century and a half while other constitutions in other states have been adopted in one decade and destroyed in the next decade. No gift of prophecy is required to predict that the Japanese Constitution of 1945 will not long endure if it fails to keep its roots in the traditions of the Japanese nation. This does not imply that all Japanese traditions must find expression

RESTRICTED

in the new Constitution. It is expected that the tradition of militarism will be completely extirpated. At the same time, the new government of Japan, which is required to resist all militarism in the future, will be less vigorous and stable in case it lacks the support of most of the remaining traditions of Japanese political life.

Frequently in recent months, wise Japanese scholars, administrators, legislators and journalists have said that Japan is not ready for complete democracy. They have suggested a moderate approach toward democracy, based on an educational program which will prepare the people for the progressive realization of the democratic way of life. These comments reflect the wisdom of all human experience which rejects counsels of perfection as readily as counsels of despair. A democracy that endures is one that has developed with moderate and sure steps. The American Constitution of 1787 did not produce immediately a democracy. Many aristocratic phases of our polity were not removed until the Jacksonian era in the third decade of the nineteenth century. The American Constitution, however, has permitted the orderly evolution of democratic government. Even today, the American Government is not completely democratic. While we have representative democracy in our internal affairs, we still retain a large measure of government by the minority in our external affairs. Our constitutional method for the ratification of treaties by a two-thirds vote in the Senate is almost the negation of democracy and is a potential menace to world peace. In view of our deficiencies in democracy, it will be vain to expect a full measure of democracy to develop in Japan within the short space of several years. Japan will be unable to reach the ideal of democracy by the mere expedient of adopting a paper constitution. The constitution of a democratic system is worthless if it is not supported by the will of the people. Thus, the constitution should not break too sharply with the past; it should stimulate the political education of the people; and it should allow for progressive development of constitutional institutions as the people gain in political education and experience.

Based on information now available in the Government Section of SCAP, the following recommendations for the reconstruction of local government are herewith submitted:

RESTRICTED

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES.**1. Method of Election.**

a. **Prefectural Governor.** The governor should be elected by the Prefectural Assembly for a two-year term of office. While the Japanese people have had experience in the election of representatives in the legislature which determines policy, they have had little or no experience in the election of the executive which is concerned with administration as well as policy-making. Furthermore, inasmuch as the parliamentary system prevails in the national government, it is inconsistent to abandon the principle on the prefectural level. Election of the Governor by popular vote would promote the novel principle of separation of powers, and would inevitably lead to deadlocks between the governor and the Prefectural Assembly. If the parliamentary system is best for the central government, why is it not equally advisable for the prefectural system? The indirect election of the governor will require, of course, a modification of Article 89 of the Cabinet draft of the Constitution.

b. **City Mayor.** The mayor should be elected by the Municipal Assembly, without the approval of the governor.

c. **Town and Village Headmen.** Headmen should be elected by the town or village assembly but with the approval of the governor. The city (shi) is more politically advanced than the smaller municipalities and is therefore entitled to a greater degree of local autonomy than the town or village.

d. If the governor, mayor and headmen are elected by the legislature in each governmental unit, there will be no need to transfer the administration of election laws from the present officials to an electoral commission. The adequate administration of the election of members of the House of Representatives in the general election of 10 April 1946, indicates that the administration of the Home Office meets the requirements of free elections.

2. Powers and Duties.

a. The need for effective administration on the prefectural level, particularly during the reconstruction of Japanese polity and economy, calls for the retention of a strong executive. The governor should continue to act as the agent of the national government in prefectural affairs. In outline, the governor should have authority to perform the following functions: (1) to carry

into execution the provisions of acts of the Diet and of the Imperial ordinances; (2) to appoint all officers whose appointment is by law vested in his office or to confirm the election of all officers, whose confirmation is vested in his office; (3) to enforce all measures the expenses of which are defrayed out of prefectural funds; (4) to prepare bills or projects of law for the Prefectural Assembly; (5) to manage and supervise governmental property within the prefecture; (6) to arrange for the receipt and payment of accounts; (7) to take custody of prefectural instruments and papers; and (8) to impose and collect rents, fees and rates. This plan suggests that all department chiefs will be appointed by the governor. Such procedure would be in keeping with the strong movement in the United States toward the short ballot and toward concentration of executive responsibility. His powers relating to the prefectural diet should be modified as indicated under the section of these recommendations devoted to Elected Representative Assemblies.

b. City Mayor. The functions and powers of the Mayor should be continued as under the present laws.

c. Town and Village Headmen. The functions and powers of the headman of a town or a village should be continued as under the present laws.

ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES.

1. Prefectural Assembly. The electorate of the Prefectural Assembly should be broadened so as to be identical with that of the lower chamber of the Imperial Diet. The Assembly should have authority to elect its own clerk, as well as speaker, and to establish its own secretariat. The annual session of the Assembly should be held in December of each year, but the length of the session should be extended to ninety days. Meetings of the Assembly should be secret only on proposal of two-thirds of the members. Extraordinary sessions should be called by the governor on his own initiative or on request of half of the members. The governor should have power to dissolve the Assembly and hold a general election after a vote of censure or failure of the Assembly to pass the budget. The budget should be executive in character; namely, the Assembly should not possess power to increase or decrease items of revenue and expenditure, but should have power to adopt or reject the budget as a whole. This method promotes nationwide uniformity in prefectural finance by assuring that governors will draft prefectural budgets in accordance with patterns approved by the national Diet. The Assembly should not

7
non sequitur

have power to regulate the prefectural police which should be administered under national law by officials appointed by the Home Minister on the recommendation of the governor. The Assembly should have more extensive powers over education, sanitation and social welfare.

2. Prefectural Executive Council. The Executive Council (sanjikai) consisting of ten members should be elected by the Prefectural Assembly as under the present law. It should meet, under the chairmanship of the governor, at least once a month.

3. Municipal Assembly. The Municipal Assembly should be elected by voters having the same qualifications as electors of members of the Imperial House of Representatives. The relations with the Mayor should resemble the relations of the Governor and the Prefectural Assembly. Sessions should be held at least twice a year. The Municipal Assembly should have more extensive powers over education, sanitation and social welfare than enjoyed at present. The city should have a limited fiscal autonomy, including power to increase taxation and appropriate money for roads, schools and public works; but the public debt should be increased only with the approval of the Home Ministry.

4. Municipal Executive Council. The Municipal Executive Council (shi sanjikai), composed of ten members elected by the Municipal Assembly from its membership, should meet at least once a month under the chairmanship of the mayor.

5. The Town or Village Assembly. The town or village assembly should be elected by the same electorate as that of the Imperial House of Representatives. Its procedure should resemble that of the Municipal Assembly. It should hold ordinary sessions twice a year and extraordinary sessions at the discretion of the headsmen or by demand of one-third of the members. Increase or decrease of budget estimates should require the approval of the Home Ministry.

ADMINISTRATION.

1. Prefectural Departments and Staff. All prefectural administrative officials, except the governor, should be members of the national civil service. The various administrative departments and staff should be determined by the Home Ministry under national law. Supervision and discipline of the staff should be in the hands of the governor and the national Civil

Service Commission. The governor should have supervision of the mayors including the initiation of dismissal by the Home Ministry. He also should have authority to supervise and dismiss headmen of towns and villages.

2. Municipal Departments and Staff. All municipal administrative departments and staff should be determined by the Home Ministry under national law. All municipal administrative officers except the mayor should be members of the national Civil Service. The mayor should have authority to appoint a deputy mayor, comptroller, treasurer and heads of departments on confirmation of the Municipal Assembly. He should have authority to supervise and to initiate dismissal of all employees.

3. Town and Village Sections and Staff. All administrative sections and staff in towns and villages should be determined by the Home Ministry in conformity with a general law of the Imperial Diet. The headman should have authority to appoint administrative officers with the approval of the governor of the prefecture. He should have authority to supervise and to initiate dismissal of all employees.

CIVIL SERVICE.

1. The Imperial Diet should provide by law for a national Civil Service system embracing both national and prefectural offices.

2. A civil service commission should be established consisting of five members with terms of ten years appointed by the Prime Minister.

3. The Civil Service Commission should make rules for the examination and recruitment of national and prefectural employees, and for promotion and dismissal. The administration of these rules should be in the hands of the respective ministries in the central government, of the governor in the prefectures, and of the mayor in the cities.

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.

1. Chief of Police.

a. The police system should remain centralized. A brutal

RESTRICTED

centralized police system is bad; but an incompetent police system that encourages lawlessness is just as bad. At a time when the United States and the British Commonwealth nations are moving toward centralization of police systems, it seems unwise to force Japan to decentralize the most efficient of all of her administrative agencies. The vicious gendarmerie (kempei-tai) and the equally notorious military police (gumbatzu) have been exterminated. Today there has been an unfortunate tendency to exaggerate the evils of the Japanese police system. Naturally, when militarists controlled the Home Office in Tokyo, this agency of the central government was perverted. There is no good reason why extensive reforms on a national scale cannot be carried out by means of a Home Office responsible to a Cabinet which in turn is responsible to a freely elected national Diet. In the unsettled years of the coming decades, the Japanese government will be entitled to a police system sufficiently strong to protect itself against lawless elements directed toward its destruction. Accordingly, the Chief of Police in each prefecture should be appointed by the Home Minister in Tokyo and should operate under direction of the Home Ministry. The Chief of Police in the cities, towns and villages should be appointed by the governor, from the civil service list, who should operate in this field under instructions of the Home Minister in Tokyo.

b. The economic functions and other functions not relating to the maintenance of law now exercised by the police system should be removed from the jurisdiction of the police. A separate fire department should be created in all prefectures and cities. The execution of sanitation regulations, rationing and similar functions should be separated from the police.

2. Department of Education. The functions of public and social welfare now exercised by the Department of Education and Public Welfare in some prefectures should be separated from this department and relegated to a separate department. The Chief of the Department of Education in all prefectures should be appointed by the governor and should supervise public instruction in his prefecture under directives received from the Ministry of Education in Tokyo. The chief of education as well as the governor should be advised by a Board of Education appointed by the governor for four year terms, from nominations made by educational, cultural, religious and professional organizations in the prefecture, including associations of teachers. A similar Board of Education should be established in the cities, towns and villages. In each city, the Chief of the Education should be appointed by the mayor.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

3. Department of Public Welfare. The functions of social welfare and security should be separated from both the Police Department and from the Education and Welfare Department, and allocated to a separate Department of Public Welfare.

4. Fire Department. The function of prevention of fires should be transferred to a separate Fire Department in each prefecture and city. The Fire Department in the prefecture should supervise the prevention of fires in the towns and villages.

5. Public Health Department. The functions of public health and sanitation should be transferred to a separate department in each prefecture and city. The department or section chief, appointed respectively by the governor or the mayor, should supervise national and prefectural regulations regarding public health, sanitation and public nursing, and should supervise all public hospitals and dispensaries.

6. Labor Department. All labor and employment functions should be concentrated in a Labor Department or Labor Section respectively in each prefecture or city.

KENNETH COLEGROVE.

FRANK E. HAYS.

NOTED: CLK

RESTRICTED

Elections
1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section
Public Administration Division

7 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, LOCAL GOVERNMENT BRANCH.

SUBJECT: Political Parties in the Elections of April 10, 1946,
according to the Prefectures.

The present study has as its purpose to throw some light on the character of the dominant political parties of Japan, their relative strength in various prefectures, the degree of their historical connection with the pre-war parties and other questions which may be demonstrated statistically. In view of the time available only two parties will be analyzed here.

From 1937 to 1940 the political parties of Japan lead a precarious existence and in the latter year were dissolved. Six years passed between their dissolution and revival. A natural question arises then: are the present political parties the parties of yesterday or are they something new? The old parties, chiefly the Seiyukai and Minseito (But partially also the Social Democratic Party) share together with the militarists the responsibility for the course of aggression which Japan chose. As will be shown later, the great majority of the Japanese manhood voted then for these parties. As Showakai and Kokumin Domei were groups only with local influences (see the Tables) it may be safely said that rightist groups voted for these two parties; in other words, they were in agreement with ^{the} parties' major policies. If these parties are old parties, only under new labels, then there is a grave danger that if they continue long enough in power, Japan finally may return to the old course. The present study has as its purpose a determination of this connection by prefectures in which the Local Government Branch is primarily interested.

CIRCULATE

Our purpose may appear to some as at least superfluous, because it is well known that the leaders of the Liberal Party, for example, are former leaders of the Seiyukai, while the leaders of the Progressive party are former prominent members of the Minseito.

Yet the fact that the leaders in Tokyo are more or less the same is not ^{yet} proof that the parties are the same. The leaders may be here, but the ^{org} organization may be absent or may be quite different from what it was before the war. Have these parties preserved their machinery, their organization, their connections, their influences in their particular provinces, or have they not? Such a question may be studied statistically and a certain answer given in this case because here millions are involved; and where millions are involved, statistical methods may be used with profit.

(20)

~~28~~

~~24~~

Before undertaking the actual examination of the election statistics we should note, however, that because of the application of the restricted plural ballot system in the elections of April 10, 1946, and also because of the participation of women the figures for elections of 1946 cannot be directly compared with the figures for the elections of 1936 and 1937, and certain calculations are needed to bring them to the common basis.

If every voter in the elections of 1946 would have voted for, say, two persons and only for two, the matter would be simple. But this was not actually the case. The average number of votes given by each voter in the last elections was 2.08; yet this varied from 1.77 in Wakayama, Nagasaki, and Nara, to 2.58 in Nagano (see Table I showing the ratio for each prefecture); and this was the result not only and not so much of the unwillingness on the part of Wakayamans to write more than one name, but chiefly to the peculiarities of the plural voting system which can not be adjusted smoothly to the number of candidates (sudden jumps at intervals from two names to three names and to four names are inevitable). This serious circumstance should be taken into consideration when the merits and demerits of this system are again discussed by SCAP. This system can not be adjusted in such a way as to give voters in one prefecture equal vote with voters in other prefectures. A person in a prefecture with five candidates wrote two names and a person in a prefecture with ten candidates wrote also two names!

In order to avoid this "inflation" of votes for certain prefectures, we "deflated" their numbers by dividing the ^{total} votes given by the average number of votes given by each voter in a given prefecture; in other words, by this operation we reduced figures to the level at which each voter would give one vote and only one vote. Let us suppose that one million voters voted in the April 10 elections in a prefecture, each writing the names of three persons. Let us suppose further that half of the votes went for the Liberals and half for the Progressives, i.e. 1,500,000 for the Liberals and 1,500,000 for the Progressives, or a total of 3 million. Now we divide these figures by three and say in that prefecture 500,000 voted for the Liberals and 500,000 voted for Progressives, a total of 1,000,000. This involves an assumption that if voters would be permitted to vote only for one candidate, the distribution of votes among the parties ~~in the nation~~ would remain the same. This may be not true; yet we do not see any special reason why this should not be true. The fact that the Communists got 3.2 per cent of the total vote shows probably fairly well their approximate influence in the country at the moment of the elections, just as the Liberals' one-quarter of the total vote is probably a good indication of their present influence in the country. Any statistical investigation (just as any reasoning in general) is based on certain assumptions, and this particular one is no more untenable than any other.

To bring the data to a form comparable with the elections of

Table I

Average Number of Candidates Each Voter Wrote
in the Election of April 10, 1946

	No. of Candidates written	No. of Candidates permitted
Hokkaido	2.30	2½ *
Aomori	1.86	2
Akita	1.84	2
Iwate	1.87	2
Yamagata	1.85	2
Miyagi	1.84	2
Niigata	1.84	2
Fukushima	2.53	3
Gumma	1.85	2
Tochigi	1.81	2
Ibaraki	2.55	3
Chiba	2.55	3
Saitama	2.55	3
Tokyo	2.28	2½ *
Yamanashi	1.90	2
Kanagawa	2.61	3
Shizuoka	2.48	3
Nagano	2.58	3
Toyama	1.86	2
Ishikawa	1.83	2
Fukui	1.79	2
Gifu	1.83	2
Aichi	2.22	2½ *
Shiga	1.80	2
Mie	1.86	2
Nara	1.77	2
Wakayama	1.77	2
Osaka	2.14	2½ *
Kyoto	1.86	2
Hyogo	2.21	2½ *
Tottori	1.81	2
Okayama	1.88	3
Shimane	1.84	2
Hiroshima	2.52	3
Yamaguchi	1.94	2
Kagawa	1.78	2
Tokushima	1.80	2
Kochi	1.86	2
Ehime	1.78	2
Fukuoka	2.01	2
Saga	1.80	2
Nagasaki	1.77	2
Oita	1.87	2
Kumamoto	1.85	2
Miyazaki	1.84	2
Kagoshima	2.47	3
All Japan	2.08	

* "2½" results from the division of the prefecture in two parts in

one of which the number ^{of names} permitted was two and in another-3.

1936 and 1937 we should go, however, one step further. In those years only men voted; in the elections of 1946 women also took part in the elections, with men forming only 48 per cent of the total. In order to bring the figures to the same level we multiplied the figures for the election of 1946 by 48/100, and consider that the final figures represent figures comparable to those of the 1936 and 1937 elections. These figures are presented in table II.

Table II.

Votes Given for Each Major Party in the 1946 Elections,
as Reduced to One Vote per Man-Voter, in Thousands.

	Liberals	Progressives	Social Democrats	Communists
Hokkaido	120	12	83.3	35.4
Aomori	44	48	18.3	3.1
Akita	35	47	37.2	4.6
Iwate	105	35	30.2	4.5
Yamagata	69	20	32.2	5.2
Miyagi	67	22	42.9	7.0
Niigata	109	90	85.7	13.5
Fukushima	74	132	36.8	7.5
Gunma	26	96	68.7	10.3
Tochigi	42	86	55.5	9.1
Ibaraki	83	68	33.9	11.6
Chiba	111	66	28.6	10.3
Saitama	132	68	61.5	21.2
Tokyo	180	72	198	60.2
Yamanashi	22	30	44.7	6.4
Kanagawa	90	27	85.5	17.7
Shizuoka	122	71	78.8	9.8
Nagano	72	16	59.2	30.1
Toyama	37	59	21.4	2.5
Ishikawa	38	23	21.8	5.9
Fukui	26	39	20.1	3.4
Gifu	87	52	39.4	2.6
Aichi	124	73	114	18.7
Shiga	53	18	39.4	2.6
Mie	38	56	40.0	6.1
Nara	24	22	19.2	4.8
Wakayama	60	20	17.3	3.4
Osaka	100	89	108	32.8
Kyoto	99	41	54.5	18.7
Hyogo	138	132	98.6	20.8

	Liberals	Progressives	Social Democrats	Communists
Tottori	18	23	12.7	4.1
Okayama	51	59	39.6	10.7
Shimane	30	57	35.4	6.0
Hiroshima	91	11	46.7	6.9
Yamaguchi	90	7	29.8	7.2
Kagawa	60	13	38.4	4.0
Tokushima	7	1	16.0	1.5
Kochi	39	38	30.0	7.0
Ehime	60	95	31.6	6.7
Fukuoka	50	123	150	14.4
Saga	46	49	14.7	3.1
Nagasaki	56	44	26.9	2.8
Oita	41	33	25.8	4.8
Kumamoto	77	67	27.2	28.8
Miyazaki	11	0	15.5	2.3
Kagoshima	28	54	34.7	2.2
All Japan	3,125	2,380	2,250	502

Those who are suspicious of such manipulations should have in view that in most cases we are interested in ratios, and the ratios are not changed by these conversions. It is true, in comparing these figures with those for 1936 and 1937 we use not only ratios; yet we believe that the logical basis of these conversions is strong and the comparisons made are valid. Moreover see corroboration in the ~~footnote. (1)~~ *2nd from the bottom paragraph, page 8.*

In this table we give only figures for four parties, because the Co-operative Party did not exist in 1936 - 1937 and there was no party which closely corresponds to it in those years. "Minor parties" and "independent" votes are too heterogeneous to permit valid comparisons, and we omit them for the time being. The totals then are as follows:

Table III.

Comparison of Election Figures for the Whole of Japan

	1936	1937	1946
Progressives - Minseito	4,404	3,656	2,380
Liberals - Seiyukai	4,157	3,517	3,125
Musanto (Proletarians)	629	1,005	---

to p. 6 (1) The population figures used for 1936 and 1937 are those of the census of 1935 (they are more reliable than the figures of current statistics); for 1946 - figures of the April census of the population.

	1936	1937	1946
Socialists	--	--	2,250
Communists	--	--	502
Total major parties vote	9,190	8,178	8,257

This table shows:

1. That except for the participation of women, the total vote in 1936 and 1937 is very close to the vote in 1946. This is understandable, because (a) the election law of that time was liberal, (b) many men were away from Japan at the time of elections in 1946.

2. That the vote for the Liberal - Seiyukai ticket in 1946 was very close to what it was in 1937; of course, this party was compelled to give some ground to the new-comers, yet on the whole it kept its own surprisingly well.

3. That the Progressives, as compared with 1936 and 1937, suffered in 1946 a heavy defeat, though still represent a great strength.

4. That the Socialists and Communists increased their vote from one million in 1937 to 2.8 millions in 1946.

Yet, as was mentioned above, it may be that the parties of today have nothing to do with the parties of yesterday. In order to be able to give a definite answer to this question we should analyze prefectural figures. If the liberals, for example, in 1946 are strong in more or less the same prefectures, as in 1936 or 1937, then we may be almost sure that the former Seiyukai succeeded in preserving its organization, its membership, its strength in localities, and under the new name (which is actually even not new for them) continues its former existence. Let us then turn to a comparison by prefectures, as is done in Table IV. In this table, in order to avoid the influence of the population factor, we give not only absolute figures, but also percentages of the vote per total population of each prefecture.

Table IV

	Vote for Liberals by Prefectures			Vote as Percentage of the Total Population of the Prefecture		
	Absolute Figures in Thousands			Percentage of Total Population		
	1936	1937	1946	1936	1937	1946
Hokkaido	189	131	120	6.16	4.27	3.45
Aomori	56	54	44	5.80	5.58	4.04
Akita	50	52	35	4.82	5.01	2.93

	1936	1937	1946	1936	1937	1946
Iwate	101	115	105	9.65	11.0	8.64
Yamagata	101	80	69	11.1	7.16	5.34
Miyagi	56	54	67	4.53	4.37	4.58
Niigata	145	85	109	7.26	4.26	4.69
Fukushima	108	110	74	6.81	6.96	3.86
Gunma	85	71	26	5.84	5.72	1.70
Tochigi	83	83	42	6.95	6.95	2.80
Ibaraki	63	68	83	5.26	5.70	4.27
Chiba	113	103	111	7.30	6.66	5.53
Saitama	120	97	132	7.86	6.36	4.93
Tokyo	271	204	180	4.26	3.27	4.30
Yamanashi	36	32	22	5.56	4.95	2.64
Kanagawa	57	93	90	3.09	5.06	4.45
Shizuoka	122	120	122	6.30	6.19	5.40
Nagano	84	58	72	4.90	3.38	3.57
Toyama	68	73	37	8.52	9.16	3.97
Ishikawa	57	49	38	7.40	6.37	4.33
Fukui	30	42	26	4.64	6.50	3.74
Gifu	107	92	87	8.74	7.50	6.03
Aichi	151	147	124	5.83	5.17	4.26
Shiga	48	40	53	6.75	5.62	6.36
Mie	88	82	38	7.50	6.99	2.76
Nara	33	28	24	5.31	4.50	3.23
Wakayama	71	59	60	8.21	6.82	6.42
Osaka	125	85	100	2.92	1.93	3.36
Kyoto	77	34	99	4.52	1.99	6.10
Hyogo	170	156	138	5.80	5.33	4.88
Tottori	20	17	18	4.07	3.46	3.24
Okayama	136	130	51	10.9	9.75	3.32
Shimane	37	54	30	4.95	7.22	3.54
Hiroshima	74	72	91	4.10	4.00	4.78
Yamaguchi	103	93	90	8.66	7.80	6.54
Kagawa	58	49	60	7.76	6.55	6.89
Tokushima	30	7	7	4.12	0.96	0.85
Kochi	50	29	39	7.00	4.06	4.91
Ehime	88	55	60	7.55	4.74	4.35
Fukuoka	167	155	50	6.03	5.60	1.72
Saga	49	50	46	7.14	7.28	5.35
Nagasaki	71	59	56	5.48	4.56	3.95
Oita	87	52	41	8.90	5.31	3.57
Kumamoto	103	89	77	7.45	6.41	4.71
Miyazaki	44	41	11	5.34	4.98	1.15
Kagoshima	134	104	28	8.40	6.52	1.73
All Japan	4,157	3,517	3,125	6.00	5.06	4.27

An examination of Table IV reveals that on the whole the figures for 1946 fit very well into the scheme of things of 1936 - 1937. In most cases they are surprisingly close to the figures of

1937, in few cases they are above them, and only in eleven provinces the percentage figures are less than half of what they were in 1937.

Yet it is difficult to get a picture of the situation as a whole by such isolated comparisons. In view of this we calculated the standard deviation for all these three series using the formula

$\frac{\sqrt{\sum d^2}}{N}$ where d is the difference in values between two respective years for the same prefecture and N is the number of prefectures (in our case 46).

The standard deviation for 1937 in respect to 1936 is

$$\frac{\sqrt{1,135,245}}{46} = 2.32,$$

or expressed as the percentage of the average for 1936 -- 38.7%.

The standard deviation for 1946 in respect to 1937 is

$$\frac{\sqrt{2,741,435}}{46} = 3.60,$$

or expressed as percentage of the average for 1936 -- 60%.

We must recognize that even in normal times the electoral constituencies are less stable milieu than other objects of statistical research. For example, the swing of the political pendulum in one year only (1936 - 1937) brought about a standard deviation equal to 38.7 per cent of the 1936 average; yet nine years of political and social turmoil brought about a standard deviation of only 60 per cent of 1936 average.

It may be of interest to note that these figures are very close to the coefficients of rank correlation we calculated for the Liberals and Progressives, using the formula

$$r_{xy} = \frac{\sum d^2}{N^3 - n}$$

In the use of this formula it was not necessary to use all the corrections and "deflations" used above, except for making the average vote of one person in one prefecture equal to that in another prefecture. r_{xy} 1937/36 was 0.723 and r_{xy} 1946/36 was 0.391, with the probable error in either direction of about 0.1.

Ten years have passed since 1936; during these stormy years war, defeat, mass migration, dissolution of the parties, their re establishment took place; about thirty five per cent of the voters of 1936 died, and thirty-five new were added; millions of

male voters were away from Japan on April 10; the distribution of the population according to prefectures has considerably changed, millions of homes destroyed, and yet the standard deviation from 1936 is equal to only 60 per cent of the 1936 average. This clearly shows that the Liberal party of today and the Seiyukai of yesterday, so far as their organization in prefectures is concerned is somewhat weakened, but on the whole, the same as in 1936 and 1937.

There is nothing astonishing in it: men, their wealth, their connections, the "old loyalties that survive" (or, less politically but more exactly, the old dependence; subjection, and conditions) are still there. They act in a way now known to us a little better than on the eve of the election through bribery,* social and other pressures, dependence upon the favor of the candidates, political ignorance, conservatism, blind following of the old leaders, in other words -- all that constituted Japan of 1931 - 1941. On the top, a few thousand men were removed from office (but not necessarily from positions of influence), but hundreds of thousands are there, in the same place, in the prefectures, closely knit, ready to follow the clue from their former leaders.

Let us turn now to the Progressive Party, former Minseito. In Table V are given data similar to those in Table IV. They show that the Minseito - Progressives were less successful in preserving their political identity. While the coefficient of dispersion, expressed in percentages of the 1936 average amounted to 36.1% in 1937 (i.e. less than for the Liberals in that year), for 1946 it amounted to 75% (Liberals -- 60%).

Yet a more careful examination of the table shows that the defeat of the Progressive Party was chiefly due to the defeat in some particular areas; in some other areas the progressives succeeded remarkably well in preserving their vote and in three prefectures have succeeded even in increasing it spectacularly. In view of the importance of the problem (see below) we give in Table VI, more detailed data on the results of elections for the prefectures where the Progressives were utterly defeated (Hokkaido, Yamagata, Miyagi, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Nagano, Ishikawa, Shiga, Wakayama, Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kagawa, Tokushima, Kochi and Miyazaki) as well as for those where they greatly gained as compared with 1937 (Ehime, Kumamoto, Kagoshima) for each of these three years.

A careful examination of Table VI shows that the Progressives vote was reduced for two reasons: (1) they lost many votes to the Co-operatives and Socialists, as for example, in Hokkaido, Miyazaki, Nagano, Shiga; (2) many local "Progressives" preferred to parade → on p. 14

* In Saitama, for example, large-scale bribes by the agents and friends of candidates took place; there can be no doubt that Saitama is ^{not} an exception.

Table V.
Vote for Progressives

	Absolute Figures in Thousands (2)			Vote as Percentage of the Total Population of the Prefecture (1)		
	1936	1937	1946 ⁽²⁾	1936	1937	1946
Hokkaido	196	183	12	6.40	5.95	0.34
Aomori	50	58	48	5.20	6.02	4.41
Akita	93	73	47	8.96	7.05	3.94
Iwate	41	29	35	3.92	2.77	2.88
Yamagata	42	46	20	3.91	4.13	1.55
Miyagi	83	66	22	6.73	5.35	1.50
Niigata	117	79	90	5.86	3.96	3.86
Fukushima	126	123	132	7.96	7.76	6.90
Gunma	93	82	96	7.47	6.60	6.30
Tochigi	83	82	86	6.95	6.65	5.72
Ibaraki	94	67	68	6.08	4.32	3.50
Chiba	111	104	66	7.20	6.85	3.29
Saitama	90	94	68	5.89	6.16	3.36
Tokyo	370	282	72	5.82	4.43	1.72
Yamanashi	23	24	30	3.56	3.72	3.78
Kanagawa	114	94	27	6.19	5.10	1.33
Shizuoka	145	132	71	7.45	6.80	3.14
Nagano	146	131	16	8.52	7.65	0.79
Toyama	75	73	59	9.39	9.15	6.32
Ishikawa	77	60	23	9.78	7.63	2.62
Fukui	36	36	39	5.56	5.56	5.60
Gifu	108	87	52	8.81	7.10	3.60
Aichi	208	176	182	7.24	6.14	6.26
Shiga	65	47	18	9.13	6.61	2.16
Mie	97	88	56	8.25	7.50	4.08
Nara	42	34	22	6.76	5.49	2.96
Wakayama	36	38	20	4.17	4.40	2.14
Osaka	278	179	89	6.33	4.18	2.99
Kyoto	121	88	41	7.10	5.17	2.52
Hyogo	206	166	132	7.05	5.68	4.65
Tottori	39	32	23	7.96	6.52	4.12
Okayama	67	57	59	5.02	4.26	3.83
Shimane	107	89	57	14.35	11.90	6.72
Hiroshima	161	125	11	8.90	6.93	0.58
Yamaguchi	30	25	7	2.52	2.09	0.51

(2) Method by which the figures for 1946 were obtained has been described in the text.

	1936	1937	1946	1936	1937	1946
Kagawa	63	46	13	8.42	6.16	1.19
Tokushima	51	45	1	7.07	6.24	0.83
Kochi	35	44	38	4.90	6.15	1.25
Ehime	97	44	95	8.32	3.89	6.86
Fukuoka	100	96	123	3.63	3.48	3.44
Saga	63	64	49	9.18	9.31	5.72
Nagasaki	70	59	44	5.42	4.55	3.10
Oita	76	29	33	7.76	2.96	2.88
Kumamoto	36	36	39	2.60	2.24	9.10
Miyazaki	29	21	0	3.52	2.55	0.00
Kagoshima	14	26	54	0.88	1.63	3.31
All Japan	4,438	3,656	2,380			

Table VI

Shifts in Strength of Political Parties
in Certain Prefectures of Japan (Percentages of the Total)

	Liberals	Progressives	Cooperative	Socialist	Communist	Proletarian	Showa kai	Kokumin domei	Tohokai	Other	Independent	Total
A. Defeats:												
Hokkaido:												
1936	43.1	44.7	--	--	--	--	4.5	--	--	1.8	5.9	100.0
1937	33.6	47.1	--	--	--	2.1	4.3	0.0	3.2	4.3	5.4	100.0
1946	22.5	2.3	18.2	15.5	6.6	--	--	--	--	19.5	15.4	100.0
Yamagata:												
1936	53.5	22.2	--	--	--	--	--	3.1	--	--	11.2	100.0
1937	42.0	24.4	--	--	--	1.1	--	6.8	15.4	0.7	9.6	100.0
1946	30.0	8.6	--	14.1	2.2	--	--	--	--	10.5	34.6	100.0
Miyagi:												
1936	29.2	43.1	--	--	--	7.3	15.5	2.5	--	--	2.4	100.0
1937	29.2	35.7	--	--	--	2.2	3.5	2.2	0.4	4.3	2.5	100.0
1946	28.4	9.7	--	18.8	3.1	--	--	--	--	32.1	7.9	100.0
Chiba:												
1936	46.4	45.4	--	--	--	--	2.2	--	--	1.9	4.1	100.0
1937	42.4	42.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.4	13.7	100.0
1946	35.0	10.6	2.4	9.0	3.2	--	--	--	--	7.7	12.1	100.0

Table VI (Cont'd)

	Liberals	Progressives	Cooperative	Socialist	Communist	Proletarian	Showa kai	Kokuin domei	Tohokai	Other	Independent	Total
Tokyo:												
1936	29.3	40.0	--	--	--	21.5	1.4	2.5	--	0.9	4.4	100.0
1937	25.4	35.1	--	--	--	28.5	2.3	2.0	--	0.7	5.2	100.0
1946	28.0	11.1	0.6	30.0	9.4	--	--	--	--	13.7	7.2	100.0
Kanagawa:												
1936	25.1	50.0	--	--	--	17.9	4.6	--	--	2.1	0.3	100.0
1937	36.8	37.0	--	--	--	17.7	3.1	--	--	3.8	1.6	100.0
1946	28.0	8.5	0.4	26.3	5.4	--	--	--	--	10.3	21.1	100.0
Shizuoka:												
1936	38.6	45.8	--	--	--	3.5	4.1	--	--	3.1	4.9	100.0
1937	40.0	44.0	--	--	--	8.1	3.9	--	--	1.8	2.2	100.0
1946	30.0	17.5	3.5	19.5	2.4	--	--	--	--	9.4	17.7	100.0
Nagano:												
1936	28.2	49.0	--	--	--	--	--	4.7	--	7.9	10.2	100.0
1937	21.4	48.8	--	--	--	10.5	--	--	--	9.8	9.5	100.0
1946	19.1	4.3	15.4	15.7	8.0	--	--	--	--	12.9	24.6	100.0
Ishikawa:												
1936	42.5	57.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	100.0
1937	36.6	45.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.0	100.0
1946	23.4	14.4	2.5	13.7	3.6	--	--	--	--	3.2	39.2	100.0
Shiga:												
1936	36.1	49.3	--	--	--	--	--	10.6	--	4.0	--	100.0
1937	33.2	39.0	--	--	--	--	--	3.8	14.5	9.5	--	100.0
1946	35.2	12.2	--	26.3	1.7	--	--	--	--	5.2	19.4	100.0
Wakayama:												
1936	48.8	25.0	--	--	--	--	5.4	2.5	--	3.6	14.7	100.0
1937	46.8	30.3	--	--	--	2.5	4.0	4.7	--	--	11.7	100.0
1946	36.4	11.7	3.2	10.3	2.4	--	--	--	--	8.4	27.6	100.0
Osaka:												
1936	22.5	40.9	--	--	--	17.0	4.5	1.0	--	0.8	4.3	100.0
1937	17.6	37.1	--	--	--	28.4	4.8	1.7	--	--	10.4	100.0
1946	19.3	17.4	1.2	21.0	6.4	--	--	--	--	14.8	19.9	100.0

Table VI (Cont'd)

	Liberals	Progressives	Cooperative	Socialist	Communist	Proletarian	Showa kai	Kokumin domei	Tohokai	Other	Independent	Total
Kyoto:												
1936	32.0	50.6	--	--	--	7.7	4.1	--	--	5.6	0.0	100.0
1937	19.1	49.4	--	--	--	26.8	--	--	--	4.7	--	100.0
1946	34.0	14.0	3.6	18.9	5.4	--	--	--	--	4.4	19.7	100.0
Hiroshima:												
1936	23.0	50.2	--	--	--	2.9	20.6	--	--	1.0	2.3	100.0
1937	23.0	40.0	--	--	--	8.5	25.4	--	2.3	0.8	--	100.0
1946	25.6	3.0	0.4	13.2	2.0	--	--	--	--	22.7	33.1	100.0
Kagawa:												
1936	42.0	45.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12.5	100.0
1937	38.0	35.3	--	--	--	15.9	--	--	--	--	10.2	100.0
1946	36.8	8.0	--	23.5	2.4	--	--	--	--	5.3	24.0	100.0
Tokushima:												
1936	26.6	45.5	--	--	--	--	--	6.7	--	--	21.2	100.0
1937	9.1	59.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	31.7	100.0
1946	5.0	0.4	2.2	11.3	1.1	--	--	--	--	7.5	72.5	100.0
Kochi:												
1936	39.5	28.1	--	--	--	32.4	--	--	--	--	--	100.0
1937	26.3	40.4	--	--	--	17.5	1.2	--	14.6	--	--	100.0
1946	25.6	25.0	4.8	19.9	4.6	--	--	--	--	17.6	2.5	100.0
Miyazaki:												
1936	35.9	24.0	--	--	--	--	21.6	12.7	--	--	5.8	100.0
1937	36.9	19.4	--	--	--	--	11.3	--	13.2	--	19.2	100.0
1946	9.4	--	4.4	10.4	1.6	--	--	--	--	43.0	31.2	100.0
B. Victories:												
Ehime:												
1936	43.5	48.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	8.5	100.0
1937	46.0	36.3	--	--	--	6.6	--	--	6.0	--	5.1	100.0
1946	25.2	39.8	--	13.4	2.8	--	--	--	--	11.4	7.4	100.0
Kumamoto:												
1936	47.3	16.5	--	--	--	2.1	--	33.0	--	--	1.1	100.0
1937	41.6	14.7	--	--	--	2.8	--	33.1	--	--	7.8	100.0
1946	26.3	22.9	--	9.3	1.0	--	--	--	--	5.3	35.2	100.0

Table VI (Cont'd)

	Liberals	Progressives	Cooperative	Socialist	Communist	Proletarian	Showa kai	Kokumin domei	Tohokai	Other	Independent	Total
Kagoshima:												
1936	56.8	6.1	--	--	--	6.6	8.7	--	--	--	21.8	100.0
1937	48.2	12.0	--	--	--	7.9	16.3	--	1.8	--	13.8	100.0
1946	11.2	21.2	11.4	13.6	0.8	--	--	--	--	17.2	24.6	100.0

under the guise of some other local party or as so-called "independents", because the purge of the Progressives in Tokyo produced an unfavorable impression for the party everywhere else. Their success in Kumamoto and Kagoshima is due to the fact that the ultra nationalistic Kokumin Domei and Showa Kai, not acting now openly, probably joined hands with the Progressives.

The Minseito of 1936-37 was a party with two souls: it combined the reactionary, narrow-nationalistic, if not ultra-nationalistic third estate of the small cities and villages, with progressive elements in larger cities. The war broke this alliance. The really progressive elements of the Minseito-Shimpoto now joined the cooperative party, socialists, and communists. On the other hand the decimated ranks of the party were filled by former members of Kokumin Domei and Showakai, thus increasing the reactionary character of the party.

But this movement of the Progressive party to the right brought it closer to the party which always stood for foreign aggression ("a positive foreign policy") and thus made possible now talks of their fusion.

Thus, the parties defeated on the battlefields now retained their power through their victory at the polls, and this fact imposes upon us a duty of extreme vigilance in that respect.

Of course, one may say that the fact that these two parties approved of aggression before 1941 does not mean that they would do it again in the future. There may take place, in view of the new circumstances, a real change of heart and these parties would in the future sincerely embrace the tenets of American-type democracy to which they now pay only lip-service. It may be so; such a probability cannot be excluded in social life. Yet it should be recognized that such a probability is extremely small. The following figures may help to clear up this point.

Table VII.
 Combined Vote of Liberals and Progressives
 as Percentage of Total

	1936	1937	1946
City-prefectures			
Tokyo	69.3	60.5	39.1
Osaka	72.4	63.5	36.7
Kyoto	82.6	68.5	48.0
Aichi	77.7	63.3	49.9
Industrial prefectures			
Hokkaido	87.8	80.7	24.8
Fukuoka	57.9	56.2	36.1
Kanagawa	75.1	73.8	36.5

Thus in the large cities and, especially, in the industrial districts these parties lost their majority. Yet it is different in the rural prefectures:

Fukushima	90.9	90.2	63.1
Ehime	91.5	82.3	65.0
Saga	92.5	98.3	59.8
Shimane	100.0	100.0	50.6
Toyama	98.0	100.0	51.7
Chiba	91.8	84.9	55.6
Iwate	89.0	90.6	67.2
Aomori	72.4	79.4	63.4

Here, as elsewhere, they were compelled to give ground to the parties which were practically only tolerated in former years or driven completely underground (communists); yet they retained here from half to two-thirds of the total vote, in other words they preserved in rural prefectures their supremacy shattered in the cities. But one cannot expect liberal and progressive policies from the parties (whatever the name of these parties may be) which lost their influence in the cities and industrial centers and retained it only in poorer, more backward prefectures.

Furthermore, as was mentioned, these parties lost their liberal wing (especially the Progressive party; the Liberals never had it) and absorbed the reactionary groups, so far as these did not prefer to appear under some even more high-sounding name.

Our conclusions then are:

1. The Liberal and Progressive parties of today are the Seiyukai and Minseito of yesterday.
2. They succeeded in preserving their party organizations in

the prefectures, their electorates and influence, in spite of formal dissolution of 1940.

3. In the cities they -- especially the Progressives -- lost heavily to the more progressive political movements, but they better succeeded in preserving their influence in the rural prefectures.

4. They absorbed extreme nationalist groups.

5. With the loss by the Progressives of their progressive wing the difference between Liberals and Progressives diminished.

In the past -- venal to the core, fawning upon the militarists, ready to suppress with iron hand any democratic movement which had vitality and a promise of growth, in the present they have no principles, except one -- to preserve their power and influence by whatever means. They make presidents or the Chairmen of the General Affairs Committees any one who has chances to get and hold power for them. Shidehara never was a member of the Minseito Progressives and Yoshida had nothing to do with the Seiyukai-Liberals.

A. J. Grajdanzev
A. J. GRAJDANZEV

Elections

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PA

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Office of the Chief of Counter Intelligence
Civil Censorship Detachment
APO 500

AFPAC A/6
7 May 1946

JAPANESE POST-ELECTION REACTIONS AND ATTITUDES
INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The present report is based on data extracted from communications examined by the Civil Censorship Detachment. All the material used herein is from letters written on or after election day (10 April 1946).

The communications from which information has been extracted represent a cross section of Japanese internal first class mail. Regional coverage in the period covered, however, has been uneven with the ratio of examination higher in some areas, notably the Kinki (Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe) district. Nevertheless, no divergence of opinion from region to region has been noted.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HA

19

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SYNTHESIS

Japanese comment on the elections of 10 April falls broadly into two categories: Comment on the election procedure itself and reactions to the election results.

The outstanding feature of comment relative to election mechanics is the strong and widespread criticism of the omission of names from election registers. This is greater in volume than all other comment combined. Correspondents recount as first-hand knowledge omissions ranging as high as "a hundred" and more names. Usually these are ascribed to mishandling by local officials charged with compiling voting lists. In the opinion of many, disfranchisement was so frequent that a new election is necessary.

Reactions to election results are usually unfavorable. The greatest objections made are to the predominantly rightist trend of the returns. Some criticize the poor caliber of the new Diet members. The large number of women representatives elected is viewed with general disfavor and explained by many as due to women voters blindly supporting their own sex.

An additional feature worthy of note is the unusually high proportion of comment coming from country districts. Sample check of data on other subjects, however, shows roughly two-thirds of the comment to be of urban origin, that is, from towns (machi) and cities (shi).

A. CRITICISM OF ELECTION PROCEDURE

1. Comment relative to the election itself consists principally of complaints and criticisms of the mechanics used. Some correspondents, however, are interested in other aspects. Unfair campaign methods and the system of voting are attacked by several; by far the greatest single group of complaints, however, concerns deficiencies in the election rolls.

2. General Comment.- Some writers criticize candidates on the score of general incompetence. A Fuse (Osaka) correspondent who abstained from voting writes, "There is nothing important and convincing in the platforms of all the parties. All the candidates are playing the hypocrite and are lacking in force. I wonder whether they can do without self-contradiction between their opinions and daily lives" (IS/OSA/4217). A rural Osakan who cast his ballot regrets, "I could find no suitable candidate in our electoral district. Their policy is generally abstract. They don't consider the real situation of our society which is still in a chaotic condition" (IS/OSA/4225).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Others comment on the general lack of information regarding candidates. Writing Asahi (Osaka) a rural Kyoto voter declares, "The comparison of political views of major parties appearing in Asahi was a very convenient guide to us" (IS/OSA/4094). Another (Nagahama-shi, Shiga-ken) complains in a letter to the same paper that the official report on Diet candidates provides the only material by which "people living in mountainous and rural areas" can judge candidates. But, he says, the reports printed and disseminated in Shiga "were so poorly printed that we could hardly read them." This causes him to doubt the sincerity of the authorities and to suspect "government interference in the elections" (IS/OSA/4191).

A Sapporo resident attempts to explain the low percentage of voting in Hokkaido as "due to the bad food conditions of the masses" (IS/NAG/546).

3. Charges of Undue Pressure.- Several correspondents accuse candidates of undue pressure on voters and excessive expenditures. A rural Hiroshima resident asks, "Why did Hirakawa Tokus, a candidate in Hiroshima-ken, get the largest number of votes?", and ascribes it to "wrong acts" of teachers. "First, in our town, female teachers visited the electors from house to house soliciting votes for him. Second, the parents were requested to elect him through their children. Third, all electors whom he taught were urged to vote for him. It is regrettable that teachers should use their vocation to carry on an unjust campaign" (IS/OSA/4232). Sato Gisen, a candidate in the second Osaka district, is accused of having ordered students in the Otani Women's College of which he is director "to bring some 80 or 100 sheets of his election posters to their homes and paste them in the street. Teachers of the college were submissive in canvassing for his votes in order to gratify their director. Therefore, schoolwork was set at naught. This caused troubles to some parents of the students" (IS/OSA/4174).

In Aomori, a Liberal candidate (Matsubori) is accused of "trying to win over the villagers by sending fish to the rural districts since last year!!" He "also recently brought fish into towns, too" (IS/TOK/3872). A rural Gifu resident charges, "I know some candidates whose campaign expenditures was around ¥500,000. One laid down some several million yen to buy 20 or 30 bales of rice to entertain his guests and followers. Of course, I feel they got this money through some illicit way in the confusion of the surrender" (IS/NAG/512).

4. Complaints on Voting System.- Correspondents frequently complain of the plural voting system and other procedures. "Generally speaking, the defects of the plural voting system have been made manifest, and the attitude of the eligible voters

C O N F I D E N T I A L

was quite unfair. The results showed the low intellectual standard of the Japanese people in general (Tokyo) (IS/TOK/3857). Others subscribe to the same opinion (IS/TOK/3722). One (Nagano) considers the plural polling system the reason for the defeat of well qualified candidates and election of those of "questionable character". Women voters, "who have little knowledge of politics", he says, were especially hampered (IS/NAG/491). "I was surprised that Ando Hatsu, who had evacuated here from Shizuoka-ken was elected with the heaviest poll in Nagano-ken... Funny enough, it is said that she will soon return to Shizuoka-ken... The women-suffrage and the limited double entry system have caused these queer results" (Nagano) (IS/NAG/518).

A rural Okayaman complains of poor facilities for voting. "At the polling-place, I saw many people waiting on the road in a long line. Some of them grew tired of waiting and abstained from voting. The abstainees were mostly women and invalids. This was because of the polling place being too far away. My father's name was omitted from the voters' list. If the authorities concerned want to prevent abstention, they must make complete preparations and provide proper facilities" (IS/OSA/4130).

5. Omission of Names from Voting Register.- The greatest single group of complaints is in regard to omission of names from voting registers. These are considerably greater in volume than are all other complaints combined, and come from all sections of Japan, with those from Osaka and other prefectures in the Kinki district especially heavy. (This may be due in part at least to unevenness of censorship coverage).

Most complainants discuss the omissions from their own personal knowledge, and often recount their own experiences. Many specifically ascribe the omission of their names to mishandling by election officials and insist that a new general election should be held. Rural areas contribute a large part of this type of comment.

The greatest single group of complaints is from Osaka Prefecture, with rural voters heavily represented. One Osaka-fu villager declares, "To our great regret, we found two of my family members were not registered in the voters' list. A village official said to me, 'This is due to your own failure to examine the voters' list in advance!'" (IS/OSA/4110). Several protests from Fuse are noted. "I cannot execute my right of suffrage owing to some faults in the voters' list... A defective election such as this cannot be the foundation for reconstructing Japan as a democratic state" (IS/OSA/4127). "I demand of the government a new election or that it take responsibility for its fault. I demand the resignation of the municipal clerks concerned and of the chiefs of the section and of the mayor" (IS/OSA/4112). "I could not vote because my name was not listed. Inspecting the voters' list and the report on qualified persons

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

for voting, I found that this was utterly due to the negligence of the municipal employees. I met the section chief concerned and the Mayor only to be lectured to on the difficulty and complexity of making voters' list. I could get no satisfactory answer" (IS/OSA/4155). A Sakai writer relates, "In spite of my high fever, I went to the polling place, but I was astonished at the fact that my name was not registered in the poll-book. Moreover, I got angry with the arrogant behavior of the officer in making an excuse." He then demands to know, "When the poll-book was shown in public for several days, why didn't they announce it beforehand and let everybody know it well? I did my best to vote for the most trustworthy man, sparing my time in listening to the speeches of candidates. Nevertheless, I was compelled to give up my suffrage for such an absurd reason, so I can not but feel regretful" (IS/OSA/4119).

In Osaka City, a correspondent asserts, "many boarders" were disfranchised owing to defects in the list. "many others in Osaka could not vote either. Bitter complaints are being heard against such an election as this" (IS/OSA/4203). Another of several protesting would-be voters in Osaka writes:

"After waiting in line for a long time, I was told by the investigation committee that my name was not found on the voters' list, and I had to go to the polling station of my former dwelling-place. Of course I had sent in the necessary report of election through the neighborhood association in which I had been living since suffering from the air-raid last year. At the poll of my former residence again, after waiting in a very long line, to my great disappointment, a committee told me, 'It is quite natural that your name should not be entered in the list here, as the investigation was made as of 1 November last' (IS/OSA/4123).

In other areas similar complaints are made. "I am a woman 24 years old, but my name was not registered in the voters' list... Preparing for my precious ballot, I went out often to listen to election speeches even in the bad weather. Little did I dream of this result!" (rural Ehime) (IS/OSA/4126). "I had the right to vote, but I could not enter the polling place as I had not the admission ticket. The officials of the village office said that they made the voters list on 15 September, and that there was 20 days' interval for inspection" (rural Kagawa) (IS/OSA/4116). "My name was not found in the voters' list. The government officials are responsible for my abstention, nevertheless, they have no sense of responsibility" (rural Kyoto) (IS/OSA/4129). "My name was not on the voters' list ... due to the careless preparation of the list on the part of the municipal authorities" (Wakayama) (IS/OSA/4172). "By some mistake I do not understand, the men who have been evacuated here could not vote. Neither my brother nor I could vote and only my sister-in-law got the entrance ticket... Even though there were no desirable candidates, I feel

C O N F I D E N T I A L

hurt, not to be given the proper right to which I am entitled" (Niigata) (IS/TOK/3682).

A correspondent in Yokkaichi-shi (Mie) details his experiences:

"When our family moved here from Suzuga City on 2 April 1946, we registered our residence at the town office, because our child was going to the primary school. On 15 September 1945, we took the required steps to qualify for election registration, but on election day, my entrance ticket for the election was not delivered to me.

"After inquiring about the matter to the chief of the neighborhood association and the chief of the town association, I came at last to the election place. There I was told I had no right to vote, because my name was omitted from the voters' list. The town officials asked why I had not come to the town office beforehand to examine whether my name was mentioned on the voters' list.

"I was very disappointed at my inability to participate in the first general election at which the will of the nation should be expressed freely for establishing a new democratic Japan. My abstention from voting was due entirely to faults of the officials, but to my great regret, they did not take any responsibility for it. Instead, they scolded me. I have heard of more cases in my town. The bureaucratic attitude of officials toward people is unchanged... Such officials must be dismissed" (IS/OSA/4144).

Some correspondents regard the frequent omissions of names as deliberately done by government officials. A 24-year old Kyoto student writes, "Statistics show that voters support different parties according to the difference of their age and sex. If students are ill-treated like this, I cannot help suspecting some intention on the part of the government officials in the background" (Kyoto) (IS/OSA/4147). On his part, a communist voter in Tsuruda charges that it was "a plot prepared by the government." He argues,

"The war-sufferers and the repatriates are supporters of leftwing parties. But the government prevented such people, amounting to over two hundred thousand, from voting, on the pretext of 'careless dropping of names from the list.' About this problem, the chief members of Shimpō To (the Progressive Party) declared that the number of the dropped was less than five percent; they tried to deceive the people. "The election has passed without giving the people any opportunity to discuss the Emperor system, and moreover,

C O N F I D E N T I A L

it was done secretly, not under the supervision of General MacArthur" (IS/TOK/4122).

Only occasionally is there a suggestion of appeal to the Supreme Allied Command. A Tokyo correspondent declares, "I have been and am living in Tokyo, so I went to a polling station in Tokyo, but in vain. I was not allowed to cast a vote as my family are all living in the country. I could not help not voting, although I wanted to do so. There are many who were treated like me. I should like to let the Americans know of this, or they may think that we Japanese are quite indifferent to politics" (IS/TOK/3812). Another, in rural Osaka, writes, "After I moved here last April, I had my name registered at this village. I never dreamed that my name had been omitted from the voters' list... As for my husband, he was included. How will Americans settle such a case?" (IS/OSA/4180).

6. Mass Omission of Names.- According to a large number of correspondents, wholesale omissions of eligible voters' names were made in their immediate neighborhood. "In this election there was a mass omission in the voters' list. The authorities concerned seem to take it as a matter of no consequence... I went to my former residence for voting, where I ought to have been registered, and found my name omitted. I have never been notified as to the way of voting in absence. Moreover, I could not go there and peruse the voters' list beforehand, due to the transportation difficulty" (Matsuyama-shi) (IS/OSA/4230). "All the woman members lodging in this university dormitory were put off the list" (Sendai-shi) (IS/NAG/529). "Afterwards I heard that electors of my neighborhood association had also been rejected like myself" (Sakai-shi) (IS/OSA/4053). "It was rumored that in Arakugawa village, some 300 to 500 men out of the whole qualified voters were omitted from the voters' list" (rural Wakayama) (IS/OSA/4176). "Among some 4,000 voters in our village, 300 to 500 persons were not registered in the voters' list. On the day previous to the election, these persons thronged to the village office to call the officials' attention to it and to have them negotiate at once with the prefectural authorities concerned. But the officials took no steps at all. Those who were obliged to abstain from voting, are pressing the village master for answers" (Arakugawa, Wakayama) (IS/OSA/4181). "Even in such a country village as this there are several persons who failed to vote for the same reason" (Kyoto) (IS/OSA/4179). "I was unable to vote, as all the voters in our 'Neighborhood Group' were disqualified. Mr. Yasuhata or somebody else probably failed to submit the voters' list of Neighborhood Group No. 3 to the city office" (Amagasaki-shi) (IS/OSA/4137). "Even in my neighborhood, which is not damaged by bombs, scores of voters' names had been omitted from the voters' list" (Osaka) (IS/OSA/4138). "I was compelled to abstain from voting in the general election on April

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

10 on the ground that my name was omitted from the voters' list. There are some 100 persons in my town, who could not vote because of the same reason" (rural Hyogo) (IS/OSA/4141).

Official responsibility is conceded by the Mayor of Masudamachi (Shimane-ken) who, according to the Shimane Asahi "Resigned his post for his responsibility in the omission from the official list of an estimated 200 voters in the recent election" (IS/FUK/PPB/97).

7. Omission of Special Groups.- Communications indicate that special groups were frequently omitted from the register. Prominent among these are hospital patients and staffs and demobilized men.

Patients in three different sanatoriums charge that they were disfranchised en masse. One in Gifu writes, "We patients numbering 200 could not cast our ballots in the last general election because our names were not listed in the voters' list. The village office authorities say that a hospital can not be regarded as the dwelling place as fixed by law. We patients could not be given the right to vote" (Gifu) (IS/OSA/4120). In a Hyogo sanatorium "more than one hundred" and in Hiroshima thirty were denied the vote on similar grounds (IS/OSA/4175, IS/OSA/4183).

Several demobilized soldiers take exceptions to the failure to include their names in the register. "I could not vote in the last general election, because my name was not on the voters' list. Most of these more than one hundred in all who could not vote on that day at the poll of our neighborhood association, were war-sufferers and repatriated soldiers. Some of them have lived in this city for more than ten years" (Hiroshiam) (IS/OSA/4125). "I think you voted in the last election. I could not, like many others who were demobilized or repatriated from overseas after September 1945" (rural Akita) (IS/TOK/3726). "I cannot vote, against my will, because I was a demobilized soldier. I guess there are many people like me... In the case of unregistered demobilized soldiers, the officials should have registered them immediately and made them vote" (Kishiwada-shi) (IS/OSA/4103). A 22-year old ex-soldier in Osaka writes to Mainichi:

"While in the Army we were strictly prohibited from concerning ourselves in politics, so that I was quite indifferent to it. Now having been newly given the right to vote, I took greater interest in the election and felt a great responsibility for it. So I spent as much time as possible in listening to the speeches of candidates and their broadcasting, and in studying everything about elections through the newspapers. At last I decided for whom to vote,

C O N F I D E N T I A L

and believed them to be our real representatives.

"Then I went to the polling place with a great expectation. But to my disappointment, my name was not registered. An officer said, 'I am very sorry for you. It must be a mistake of the former investigation of electors. So you have no right to vote in this election anyhow.' So I came back with disappointment. I heard that there were many who were treated like me. I think such an election is not democratic" (IS/OSA/4047).

Other groups, too, complain. In Takamatsu (Shikoku), a 22-year old higher school student writes Asahi (Osaka), that, though he did not return home until mid-February 1946, his name was registered at his present and not at his former residence. "But my friends who came back at the end of March could not vote either at their homes or at their former dwelling-place" (IS/OSA/4111). An Osaka primary-school teacher writes the same newspaper;

"I was not here on 15 September 1945, but returned in mid-February. Strange to say, my name was on the voters' list here and not at the former dwelling place. I was fortunate by accident, but my friends who returned home at the end of March, could not exercise their elective franchise, either at their home or at their former dwelling" "During the war, we were obliged to move to the country together with our pupils. To my astonishment, I found that we have no suffrage in the coming general election. The majority of primary school teachers in big cities returned to their former schools after October last year. According to the ward office, suffrage is given to those who were here on 15 October last year, although I expected it to be based on last year's census. Thus, we are obliged to give up the right to vote, since it is almost impossible to go all the way to the place where we took refuge, even if we have suffrage there. We educators cannot help feeling ashamed, whenever we speak about preventing abstention from voting. It is not too much to say that we teachers are practically given no suffrage" (IS/OSA/3939).

Writing in Japanese Braille, a blind man in rural Nagano sends Mainichi (Osaka) a plea on behalf of blind voters:

"To my disappointment, I was not given a special polling paper for blind men; the paper given was so bad that I could not write on it with a Braille pencil. Fortunately I could write my candidates' names correctly... I suppose many blind men were in great distress at the poll, because they could not write in pencil, or, against their will, were compelled

-9-

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

to choose such candidates whose names they could easily write. I hope we, the blind, will have special paper for future general elections" (IS/OSA/4146).

8. Communist Criticism.- Several apparent adherents of the Communist Party voice their objections. One (Osaka) complained: "I went to vote with my wife and children on election day. At the polls I found that my name was not registered. I propose that a re-voting be carried out only for those who were prevented from voting for the same reason" (IS/OSA/4169). Another in the same city writes:

"Many voters' names were omitted from the voters' list in the fifth polling-station, Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka City. Mine was among them. I find that there were many similar cases in other polling-stations. As the territory for the fifth polling-station was the ground of the Communist Party, or the Social Democratic Party, hundreds of thousands of the voters were thus denied their right to vote. Clearly, other parties profited by it... It is probable that there may have been violations of the election laws by bribing officials" (IS/OSA/4109).

A Saijo (Ehime) man notes Communist demands for a new election on the grounds of omission of names and of "false examination of candidates' qualifications", and tells Asahi (Osaka); "As for the first reason, we regret very much, of course; but I think that there is no help for it, because it is due to a technical fault. How about the second, then? I surely believe that it is nonsense on the part of the Communists, nay, an insult to the people, because the Communists' demand of reelection for the second reason merely ignores the people's will expressed through the last general election" (IS/OSA/4240).

B. REACTIONS TO ELECTION RESULTS

1. Japanese comment in considerable volume on election results. Though their attitudes are varied, the majority are somewhat disappointed with the success of the reactionary Liberal and Progressive parties in this, Japan's first postwar election. Many, however, are confident that in succeeding elections this condition will be remedied.

2. Expectations for the Future.- Some writers show a continued lack of faith in the efficiency of political measures to solve Japanese problems. "The general election is over and the new Members of Parliament of the Liberal, Progressive, and Socialist parties appeared, but whoever may conduct the affairs of state, it may be difficult to cope with the present food crisis" (rural

Gifu) (IS/NAG/509). "Now the food situation is in crisis, and the solution of the food problem solely depends upon the import of staple foods. It is far beyond the government's power" (Nagoya) (IS/NAG/499). "Whatever political party may have first position in the elections, I cannot expect much. As long as MacArthur has the superior power he is able to prevent any Japanese government from acting rebelliously, and shall be able to have only a puppet Government of America. There is nothing so absurd as this general election, I am sure" (rural Hokkaido) (IS/NAG/479).

In rural Aichi a correspondent writes:

"In the recent general election, the Allied Occupation Forces have examined the qualification of each candidate in order to make the control of Japan easier. But it is necessary for us Japanese to examine it in order to maintain the Yamato race, as it is a political basis for the expansion of the race so we must see to it that representatives should be married men and women who have children" (IS/NAG/507).

Others, however, with the hope of bettering conditions through governmental action, urge immediate convening of the Diet and reorganization of the Cabinet. "It is an urgent matter for the government to open the Diet as quickly as possible and settle the accumulated important affairs" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/488). "To talk about democracy without relying upon the election is like building a castle on sand. As the result of the election the Liberal Party became the top-winner. I advocate that the Imperial Command to form new cabinet be given to Hatoyama, president of the Liberal Party" (Aichi) (IS/TOK/3934).

3. Reactions to the Election and Its Immediate Results.- Surprise at the heavy vote is often expressed. A rural Tochigi woman had expected half the voters would abstain. "But against my anticipation, the uneducated people of my village rehearsed Japanese-Kana letters of the names of the candidates for whom they wanted to vote and there was almost no abstention from voting. I carried grandfather to the polls on the rear-car of a bicycle" (IS/TOK/3899). A Karuizawa woman, however, declares, "The Japanese masses did not realize their legal right to write their candidates' names in Kana." She has heard "there were many old and even young women in small villages who said they would vote for these whose names were easiest to write, because they did not know how to write difficult characters" (IS/TOK/3886).

A few conservatives, for their part, are displeased by the extent of leftist success. A Nagoya banker writes, "I suppose a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Party and Socialist Party will

C O N F I D E N T I A L

be formed. If the Minister of Finance should be picked from the Socialist Party, banks would fall into more painful positions than ever. Of course it will bring an undersirable result to our livelihood, too. You should prepare for it beforehand" (IS/NAG/579). A rural Nagano resident expresses alarm because "the lower class people are gaining power not only in Tokyo but also in the country, and now it is almost in a state of anarchy", and adds, "It is a good thing that the four communists who stood as candidates were all defeated. It is a matter of deep concern, however, that they received quite a few votes" (IS/TOK/4112). A Chiba villager exclaims, "Socialism under the Tenno system! What a funny phrase it is! It seems worthy of being preserved in alcohol together with the brains of the man who first uttered this phrase" (IS/TOK/4119).

A wide variety of comment is provoked from more liberal elements by what a rural Shizuoka terms "the victory of the same old influences" (IS/TOK/3897). "Looking over the election returns, we find out that the conservatives are in overwhelming majority. Democratic Japan is still far, far from us" (Yokosuka) (IS/TOK/3783). "It is doubtful, whether a government by the will of people can be formed. We can no longer endure to have a reactionary government, created by the conservatives, remain in power" (rural Niigata) (IS/TOK/3855). "The election is over, but conservative powers still as influential as before. This is because suffrage has been given equally to people who are in reality not competent to use it" (rural Ibaragi) (IS/TOK/3850). "The democratic general election is over, but the conservative forces are as strong as they were before" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/482). "The result of the general election revealed that the agents or tools of the militarists have the power as ever. Such being the present condition, very little can be expected toward reconstruction and democratization" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/523). "The election is over and I am looking forward to a strong new government, but on looking back upon the achievements of the past politicians, I believe that second and third purge directives are still required to make Japan a truly democratic country" (Maizuru-shi) (IS/OSA/4121). "In the farming prefectures, especially in Nara Prefecture, the results of the election have been less favorable to democracy than in cities. The conservative parties got the upper hand in the election" (rural Nara) (IS/OSA/4184).

4. Reactions to Successful Candidates.- Japanese comment on successful candidates, too, that "most of the elected candidates seem too conservative for us working people to expect much of them" (Osaka) (IS/OSA/4161). "Most representatives of the 1st Aichi district are rubbish, and even poorer in quality than members of the prefectural assembly" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/476).

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Hatoyama and a few others are singled out for individual criticism. "We found the Liberals ranked top in the election, but we cannot accept President Hatoyama of the party as head of the next Government, when we consider his career during the war. In the Kyoto Imperial University Affairs in 1933 he expelled famous democratic professors from the university in accordance with militarism. He is a doublecrosser" (rural Shiga) (IS/OSA/4187). "There is no possibility that such a Japanese monkey as the Boss of the Liberal Party, Hatoyama, who is nothing but the enemy of education, can carry out any responsibility in politics" (rural Mie) (IS/NAG/502). "Many are expressing dissatisfaction with the results of the recent general election, especially with such disgusting candidates as Hatoyama and Ozaki. We are anxious for SCAP's directive for a new election" (Nagoya) (IS/NAC/474). "I wonder why Hatoyama won in the election in Tokyo and such a professional entertainer as Ishida Ishimatsu was also successful. It is absurd. In my district, Takakura Teru, a communist of respectable character, has been elected. He is a great man" (rural Nagano) (IS/TOK/3843). "The fact that such a man as Ishida Ishimatsu and many women have won, suggests the majority of senseless ballots cast for popularity rather than for a particular party or a person" (Tochigi) (IS/TOK/3676). "Mrs. Sugawara En who has won the election, getting the largest number of votes in Iwate, stood as a candidate because she could find no way to spend her property due to a property trouble with her brothers. I hear also she had even been in some mental hospital two or three times" (Morioka-shi) (IS/NAG/522).

A Kumamoto newspaper gives a list of ineffectual ballots cast. These include votes for General MacArthur, the Emperor, Seigo Nakano (a prominent statesman who opposed the Tojo cabinet and committed suicide during the war), and the American jeep. "General MacArthur and Seigo Nakano led the list in this ineffectual balloting," the newspaper reports (IS/FUK/PP3/74).

An anonymous writer in Nagahama (Shiga-ken) objects to post-election posters such as "Thanks for your kind support in the election," and advises Diet members to "consider the election as a public matter and not a private one. Your position must not be used selfishly for the benefit of yourself. Your promises to the voters must be kept strictly" (IS/OSA/4222).

An unsuccessful independent candidate in Niigata attempts to analyze the causes of defeat.

"There were several disadvantages on my side, which were as follows: 1. The disadvantage of having been an independent candidate. As you told me of the disadvantage of being independent, and I thought so, too, I consulted the committees of the Niigata branch of the Liberal Party just before

the general election. One of the chief committees made special efforts for me, but finally my joining became hopeless because of the limit of publicly approved candidates. By further investigation I discovered an offering of some thousands of yen to the branch. Moreover, the press emphasized each party rather than individual candidates. 2. Both Nakaonuma-gun and Higashikubiki-gun turned against me. I had expected at least 8,000 to 10,000 ballots from Nakaonuma-gun, the second district of my candidacy, because I had known the three very influential men of the prefecture who had offered their help for my election. With the start of the election, however, I saw that the attitudes of these three had changed, and eventually learned they had been won over by some bribery from the two Liberal candidates. I was surprised to see that the transfer of ballots from one party to another could be so easily done in such a remote place as this. 3. My ignorance about gaining additional funds. Though it was a perfect violation of the election law, some candidates tied up with theaters, bath houses, and department stores in order to gain more money needed for their election expenses" (IS/TOK/4124).

5. Women and the Election.- The activity of women in the election is frequently commented upon. A Sapporo correspondent claims that far fewer women than men abstained from voting. (IS/TOK/3709). "To my great surprise," a rural Chiba voter declares, "I found many women at polls. There was even an old woman leaning on her cane. It is quite an unexpected and promising thing" (IS/TOK/3859). Another (rural Ibaragi) writes,

"My mother stayed away from home about half a day to go to the voting place which was more than a ri (2½ miles) away. Even women bent with age walked to the polling station. They seemed to have an idea that the future government of Japan should not be directed by men alone, and although they did not know whom they should vote for, they at least wished female candidates to be elected" (IS/TOK/3849).

Some correspondents look upon the election of women candidates as a good portent for the future. "The recent election has turned out a considerable number of women members of the Diet. In the course of the four or five years to come there will be a great change in Japan" (rural Tochigi) (IS/TOK/3846). Most, however, take a pessimistic view, "I think the reason why there were many people who generally had the simple idea that democracy would not be complete if only those who are estimated as strong, talented and able were selected" (Morioka-shi) (IS/NAG/471). "Contrary to our expectation, women candidates have fairly succeeded in the election. This seems to be due to the

voters' curiosity toward woman suffrage. I cannot but wonder whether those women will be able to perform their political duty or not" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/490). "I am glad of the low abstention percentage shown by the women, but I guess their knowledge pertaining to political affairs is just as inferior as men" (rural Yamagata) (IS/TOK/3819). "Many women candidates were elected. But some of them were elected because of their skilful handling of the nationalistic and militaristic sentiment which is still firm in women" (a rural Fukui schoolgirl) (IS/OSA/4132). "I was astonished at the ignorance of women in Tottori prefecture. We are told that they voted for Tanaka Tatsu, simply because she was the only female candidate in that district, without any consideration of the candidate's character" (Yonago-shi) (IS/OSA/4186). "Here in Iwate Prefecture, women in the farming districts generally are without intellectual culture. They went to the poll partly for fun and cast their votes for women candidates alone. This is why Sugawara En, a 42 or 43 year-old maid, was returned with the largest vote" (IS/TOK/3894).

6. The Liberal and Progressive Parties. Comment directly on the two main right-wing parties is mixed, although usually adverse. "The victory of the conservatives---represented by the Liberal Party," asserts a woman in rural Yamanashi, "shows there is no doubt that the Japanese people in general are conservative" (IS/TOK/3893).

A preponderance of correspondents, however, "regret" the conservative victory. "I did not expect that such a number of conservative candidates belonging to the Liberal and Progressive Parties would be elected. Above all, the victory of so many progressive Party candidates is deplorable. I had expected that the Socialist Party would turn out to be the major party, and that at least 30 or 40% of the total seats would be occupied by Communists" (Takasaki-shi, Gumma-ken) (IS/OSA/4160). "The fact that the Liberal and Progressive Parties have been supported strongly shows that feudalism is still well-rooted in the country" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/494). "I think democracy is impossible to realize now that the Liberal and Progressive Parties are taking the reins of the government. Only the Communist Party can realize real democracy" (Kofu-shi) (IS/NAG/497). In an open letter to a newspaper, a Mie resident reproaches the "electors who gave your votes to the Liberals and Progressive," and asks: "Are you not leading your difficult life from morning till night? We parent have to beg pardon of our children for our failure in making Japan democratic through the election" (IS/OSA/4131).

7. The Social Democratic Party. Correspondents usually discuss Socialist gains approvingly. "The great political party of the proletariat, of which we had been dreaming from the days

of the former 'Shakai Minshu To' (Social Democrat Party), has at last emerged, after a difficult campaign for twenty years" (Chiba) (IS/TOK/3898). "As I did not have time to hear campaign speeches, I was at a loss whom to support. But reflecting that the policy held by the Socialists is the best for those who work in earnest, and being assured of their capacity of solving food problem, I voted for the candidates of that party" (Osaka) (IS/NAG/472). "I am in favor of the Socialist Party as you are. But I am sorry that it has failed to become the first party. The democratic front will be sure to succeed in the second, or third election" (Tachikawa-shi) (IS/TOK/3816).

A Tokyoan explains that he voted socialist because the Communist Party "is like a mad dog. I cannot agree with it at all and feel easy only toward Nozaka" (IS/NAG/480). Another capital resident writes of his disappointment at the elections outcome. "The seeds were bad," he says. "Furthermore, the field was also bad, so it is impossible for the democratic flower to bloom." To him, "The winners of the recent election are all vagabonds or idle people and the only competent man is Nosaka Sanzo. I cast all my votes for the Socialists, but I am afraid they will again become idlers after the election is over" (IS/TOK/3722).

8. The Communist Party.- A letter to Asahi (Osaka) from rural Mie is typical of most reaction to the Communist setback in the recent election.

"The election resulted in the victory of the Conservatives, ignorant, hypocritical, and feudalistic. The Japanese people will be under the sway of reactionary influences for the time being.

"However, our democratic revolution has already started and it has taken its first great step. In favor of the democratisation of Japan, in favor of the establishment of the government by the people, we expect much from the five Communist Congressmen. At the back of them stand several hundred millions of voters and several thousand millions of oppressed people" (IS/OSA/4148).

Others reiterate this confidence in the future unaffected by their past disappointment. "The elections have finished. The Communist Party, from which I am expecting a great deal, has failed to emerge victorious. Although it still lacks enough strength for the present, I believe that the party will certainly become No. 1 in the Diet outdoing others in several years or so" (Yokosuka) (IS/TOK/3873). "Though the Communists returned to the Diet are few in number I expect much of them" (Tokyo) (IS/TOK/3811). A Yokosuka woman comments: "My understanding

CONFIDENTIAL

of the Communist Party after the election is a bit too late, but I am glad of it anyway. I am looking forward to their movements hereafter with full confidence" (IS/TOK/3936).

Several writers ascribe the relative unpopularity of the communists, in part, to their relationship with Russia. "The miserable result of the Communist party was caused not only by their opinion against the Tenno System but also by such news of the Russians committing unexpected deeds as thieves, carrying away Japanese soldiers and civilians in Manchuria to Siberia and stopping all their communications from there" (rural Aichi) (IS/NAG/469). "I feel very sorry that the Communist Party could get only a few seats in the Imperial Diet. I believe that it is due to both the threatening manners of the low members of the Communist Party and the slogan of the destruction of the Tenno System. I think we are suspicious of U.S.S.R. as backing the Communist Party" (Nagoya) (IS/NAG/468).

Writing two weeks after the election, a Nagoyan declares, "At first, we did not like the communist party at all, and almost all students supported the Liberalist Party. I myself could not like Mr. Nozaka Sanzo, by any means, but after studying his political opinions and attitudes, I found that he has a most democratic mind. I can't approve the Liberal Party or Progressive Party, though they are acting democratic externally. And I trust the Communist Party, for it is sincere, for the benefit of the laborers. I think the members of the Communist party are most excellently combined together among present political parties" (IS/NAG/582).

DISTRIBUTION:

GHQ C/S	ASF	XXIV G-2	1st Cav Div.
G-2	PH&W	8th A, G-2	11th A/B Div.
G-4	LS	PM 8th A	24th Inf. Div.
CIS	FBI	PM Tok	25th Inf. Div.
CI&E	CIC	8th A, MG	2nd Marine Div.
ESS	WDC	ComNavJap	CCD, HP & Dist. Sta.
GS	IPS	I Corps G-2	
PRO	UKLM	IX Corps G-2	
SRS	BCOF	XI Corps G-2	

CONFIDENTIAL

" LOCAL GOVERNMENT. "

P.P. Br.
PKR com.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

30 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

1. The policy of SCAP is to enforce among others the fifth term of the Potsdam Declaration, "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people." The fundamentals of democratic institutions and principles must be laid in the villages, towns, cities and prefectures through increased freedom of action by the populace.

2. To attain these aims profound alterations in laws, procedures and practices will of necessity be made in the whole structure of Japanese Government. Some major changes will have to be made in each of the local echelons to construct the foundations of liberalism for the people. The changes advocated should be practical in terms of the aims of the occupation and the framework of government of which they must be a functioning part; they should as well have sequence and time of introduction to insure efficient administration.

3. The following objectives comprise the heart of the problem for the reorganization of local government:

a. Greater opportunity for popular participation in political affairs at local levels, to provide the Japanese people with experience and training which is essential if they are to establish and maintain democratic government at the national level.

b. Increased responsibility for elected and appointed officials in local government in order to develop their qualities of leadership and initiative which subsequently can be exercised in the arena of national affairs.

c. Elimination of many of the practices and procedures which now cause the local units to be dependent upon the central government, such as abolishing the requirements for the local governments to submit so many of their decisions to the Ministry of Home Affairs or other ministries for approval or final action.

d. Transfer authority in so far as possible from administrative officials to the people's representatives.

(18.)

e. Opportunity for the people of a city or town to select for themselves the governmental organization of their community. The present laws prescribe a rigid structure dominated by the central government which deprive the people of the opportunity to use other democratic forms or structures. Variations from the staid required pattern would be of value in the development of greater political consciousness which also is needed in national affairs.

f. Opportunity for local representative bodies and officials to participate in the determination of national policies. At the present, local units of government, as mere administrative subdivisions of the central government, have been vehicles for the transmission of central policy, but have had no opportunity to participate in the formulation of that policy. It is desirable that local representative bodies be elevated in responsibility and prestige so that their deliberations will be of greater influence as channels of public opinion and special group interests. From a long time point of view the populace must come to the realization that all and each of them have a part in government. Heretofore only a special few had any conviction that they were to be concerned with "their" government or with those who governed them.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM.

General Statement.

1. Local government both as to form and as to function, is determined by a series of laws and Imperial Ordinances the titles of which are self-explanatory.

a. Each of the three civil echelons has an organic law of some 150 articles which provides its basic structure: the Law concerning the Organization of Prefectures, Law No. 63, 1899 with amendments, the Law concerning the Organization of Cities, Law No. 68, 1911 with amendments, and the Law concerning the Organization of Towns and Villages, Law No. 69, 1911 with amendments.

b. Supplementary organizational elements as well as other matters for each of the echelons are provided for in Imperial Ordinances: the Chihōkankansei or Regulations Governing the Organization of Local Governments, the Bunkanninyōrei or the Regulations concerning the appointment of Civil Officials and the Naimushōkansei or Ministry of Home Affairs supervisory ordinances.

c. Budgetary and financial matters historically, have been the control mostly frequently utilized by the central government for regulation of local affairs. Fundamental to the administrations of each of the local governments therefore are national and local tax laws which provide the means for funds of operation.

2. This study is concerned with the three organic laws which both in form and substance are quite alike. There are provisions for (1) assemblies and councils with articles on their duties and powers and direct election of members, (2) duties and powers of the executive, (3) administration of personnel, (4) finances and (5) miscellaneous matters. Hence, a uniform system of local government is found throughout Japan.

3. The basic laws provide for a highly centralized national control of local affairs. The prefectural governments are administrative sub-divisions of the central government controlling and supervising cities, towns and villages. These latter, therefore, exercise only the vestiges of local autonomy. Each echelon has (1) an executive who exercises most of the local government's powers, (2) an assembly and council (the latter excepted for towns and villages) which have few legislative powers, and (3) administrative departments and sections which carry the functions of government to the people.

Home Ministry Drafts.

1. Following conferences with the Local Government Branch, the Home Ministry has submitted proposed amendments to the laws concerning the organization of local units of government. These amendments are in the right direction, but fall far short of providing for the changes which are necessary for the accomplishment of SCAP policy. The basic pattern of centralized control is not changed, nor is there any significant increase in the authority and responsibility of local representative bodies. There is no marked curtailment in Home Ministry control of local affairs.

2. In the three divisions -- executive, representative bodies and administration -- below, the principal features of the organization of local government in general treatment are presented in terms of, (1) provisions in the three laws under consideration, (2) Home Ministry draft amendments, and (3) recommendations of the Local Government Branch.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES

1. Method of Election

A. Prefectural Governor

- a. Present Law: Imperial appointment upon recommendation of the Home Minister.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: Popular election of governor from among those candidates who file, with no other system of selective nomination.

Note: The Imperial Cabinet on 12 April adopted a resolution opposing direct election of the governor,

proposing indirect election by group of approximately 20 electors selected by voters. ...The Home Ministry suggests, moreover, that after election within the prefecture, the governor should be confirmed in office by the national government, stressing their feeling that he should continue as a part of the national administrative structure.

- c. Local Government Branch: Popular election of the governor, with nomination as follows: Popular primary election one month prior to the regular election for which candidates file according to the provisions of the Home Ministry draft; three highest candidates to qualify for the general election.

B. City Mayor

- a. Present Law: Appointment by Home Ministry upon recommendation of city assembly.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: Popular election of mayor from among candidates who file.
- c. Local Government Branch: Accept Home Ministry draft.

C. Village and Town Headman

- a. Present Law: Election by town or village assembly.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: Popular election from among candidates who file, supported by 30 signatures.
- c. Local Government Branch: Accept Home Ministry draft.

2. Powers and Duties

A. Prefectural Governor

- a. Present Law: The present law provides for a strong executive with authority to manage and supervise prefectural affairs. Actually the governor performs his duties very largely as the agent of the national government in the exercise of his authority. Specifically, the law authorizes the governor to perform the following functions: 1. to carry into effect any matter the expenses of which are defrayed out of the prefectural funds, 2. to present a bill to the assembly, 3. to manage and supervise property and establishments of the prefecture, 4. to provide orders for

the receipt and payment of accounts, 5. to take custody of prefectural instruments and papers, 6. to impose and collect rents, fees, rates, etc., 7. and to carry out any other matters prescribed in laws or ordinances. The governor is authorized to delegate authority to subordinates, to supervise these subordinates, and to take disciplinary action against them.

The powers of the governor in respect to the Assembly and to administrative matters are discussed in the next two major divisions of this study.

- b. Home Ministry Draft: The draft amendments do not alter the broad powers of the governor.
- c. Local Government Branch: The Branch favors in general, the retention by the governor of the powers outlined above. However, certain of his powers in relation to the popularly elected assembly should be reduced. These matters are discussed in connection with other provisions of the law relating to the Assembly.

Note: Attention is called to the fact that much of the authority of local executives, particularly that of the governor, is delegated in other national laws, ordinances and ministerial orders, or according to developed practice. Further recommendations concerning the status of local executives relating specifically to these other elements will be made separately.

B. City Mayor

- a. Present Law: The powers of the mayor, as provided in the present law, are similar to those assigned to the prefectural governor.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: No changes.
- c. Local Government Branch: The position of the Branch is the same as for that concerning the prefectural governor.

C. Town and Village Headman

- a. Present Law: The powers of the headman, within his jurisdiction, are similar to those of the governor and mayor.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: No changes.
- c. Local Government Branch: The position of the Branch is the same as for that concerning the governor and the mayor.

D. Duties of Executives in Respect to Elections.

- a. Present Laws: Under the present laws, the governor, mayor and headman play an extremely important part in the administration of local and national elections. These executives are responsible for the preparation of voting lists, hearing cases relating to these lists, and rendering decisions thereon, administering the work of election inspectors, prescribing the form of the ballot papers, appointing presiding officers at polling places, and appointing responsible officers to count the vote.
- b. Home Ministry Draft: The Home Ministry drafts include no change in these provisions. Moreover, additional authority in this respect is granted to the chief executive at each level, making him the responsible officer in charge of the conduct of the election of his successor in office.
- c. Local Government Branch: The Local Government Branch recommends the transfer of the authority of the local executive in the conduct of elections to a special election committee. (Discussed in a separate memorandum.)

ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE BODIES

1. Prefecture

A. Prefectural Assembly

- a. Present Law: Under the present law the prefectural assembly, elected by direct popular vote, is a deliberative body of strictly limited powers. It may consider and decide upon a number of subjects enumerated in the law, including those "falling within the powers of the Assembly...under the Laws or Ordinances," but the number of such subjects is limited. The Assembly is convened only once a year, unless called into special session by the Governor, sessions continue for not more than thirty days, meetings may be secret at the request of the Governor or three members. Members have no right to present bills dealing with the budget, and the Assembly is not permitted to increase revenue and/or expenditures in the budget bill presented by the Governor. In the event of a tie vote, the chairman, who is a member of the Assembly, casts the deciding vote. The clerk of the Assembly is appointed by the Governor.

The present law gives the Governor considerable authority over the Assembly in the event of disagreement. He can set aside a resolution of the Assembly if he considers it ultra vires or contrary to public interest, in which case he applies to the Home Ministry for direction.

- b. Home Ministry Draft: The Home Ministry proposes the following important changes: It broadens the base of elections, making the qualifications practically the same as in the law for the election of members of the House of Representatives. It increases the competence of the Assembly with the provision that "a prefecture may specify such matters as shall be referred to the Assembly," although it is not clear by whom. It emphasizes the right of the Assembly to examine prefectural documents and accounts. It provides that the Assembly meetings shall be public, and that the clerk of the Assembly shall be "determined" by the chairman of the Assembly with the consent of the Governor.

The Home Ministry also proposes that when the Assembly has adopted a resolution of non-confidence the Governor may request the Home Minister to dissolve the Assembly; if a resolution of non-confidence again is passed by a newly-elected assembly, the Governor shall resign. The Home Ministry also proposes a provision for dissolution by the Ministry of the Assembly upon the initiative of 1/50 of the electorate, or 10,000 persons, whichever is smaller.

- c. Local Government Branch: The Local Government Branch accepts those provisions of the draft which increase the competence of the Assembly, but favors further strengthening of Assembly's powers. The provision that the prefecture may specify such matters as shall be referred to the Assembly should be clarified, and the Assembly should have final authority in the selection of its or a clerk and other staff. The Assembly should possess the right to change the budget bill presented by the Governor, increasing or decreasing revenue and expenditure measures. Meetings should be closed to the public only at the request of 2/3 of the members present, and the chairman should not possess the right to cast a second vote to break a tie. Sessions of the Assembly should be held twice a year with extraordinary sessions at the request not only of the governor but also of 1/3 of the membership. The length of the sessions should be determined by the Assembly itself and not of the Governor.