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TREATISE

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PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

OF THE

ACTION OF EJECTMENT,

AND

THE RESULTING ACTION FOR

MESNE PROFITS.

THE THIRD EDITION,
WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS.

By **JOHN ADAMS,**

SERJEANT AT LAW.

LONDON:

SAUNDERS AND BENNING, LAW-BOOKSELLERS,

(SUCCESSORS TO J. BUTTERWORTH AND SON,)

43, FLEET STREET.

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PREFACE

TO THE

THIRD EDITION.

THE period which has elapsed since the publication of the Second Edition of this Treatise, has been marked by important changes in the practice of the Action of Ejectment, as well as in other branches of our law. These changes are incorporated in this Edition; and they will be found to comprise many useful alterations, especially in the regulation of the Action as between Landlord and Tenant.

From the practice which has of late years prevailed, of giving publicity to every adjudged case, however special the facts, or self-evident the propositions, the Author has been compelled to add above *two hundred* new cases to the present Edition. Some of them have been inserted only because the Author could not venture to omit them; but others will be found which determine points before

doubtful, and many which contain valuable elucidations of principles heretofore obscurely laid down, or imperfectly understood.

The whole work has also been carefully revised; and the Author trusts that his increased experience has enabled him materially to diminish its imperfections: that experience has not however removed the diffidence with which he first offered his Treatise to the profession, nor tended to lessen his grateful recollections of the kind indulgence with which the former Editions were received.

12, SERJEANT'S INN,

Nov. 1, 1830.

P R E F A C E

TO THE

F I R S T E D I T I O N .

It has been the Author's chief endeavour in the following pages, to investigate the principles upon which the remedy by ejection is founded; to point out, concisely the different changes which the action has undergone; and to give a full and useful detail of the practical proceedings by which it is at this time conducted. To this end the later decisions have been very fully considered; whilst a slight mention only has been made of the more ancient cases, now, for the most part, indirectly over-ruled, or altogether inapplicable to the modern practice.

Before the time of LORD MANSFIELD, indeed, no regular system seems to have been formed for the government of the action; and that illustrious judge, considering an ejection as a fiction in-

vented for the purposes of individual justice, endeavoured to mould it into an equitable remedy, and to regulate it by maxims, in some degree independent of the general rules of law, as well as of the practice in other actions. The erroneous principles on which this system was founded were pointed out by the late LORD KENYON; and a material alteration, in the mode of conducting the action, took place from the time of his Lordship's elevation to the Bench. By his sound and luminous decisions, the remedy has been placed upon its true principles; and he lived to see a system nearly completed, which, uniting the equitable fictions of the particular action with the general principles of law, has preserved unbroken the great boundaries of our legal jurisprudence, and, at the same time, rendered the remedy most useful and comprehensive. The correct principles established by this great lawyer still prevail, having been uniformly maintained, and ably illustrated, by the more recent decisions of the different courts.

The Author has enlarged upon these circumstances, in order to account for the personal judgment he has, in some instances, found it necessary to exercise with regard to decisions anterior to the time of Lord KENYON; many cases

being still extant as authorities, which seem wholly inconsistent with the modern principles of the action of ejectionment.

The application of the remedy, as between landlord and tenant, forms also a material part of this treatise; and it has there been the Author's endeavour to give some useful practical directions respecting *notices to quit*, and the manner of proceeding on the forfeiture of a lease, at the same time explaining the principles upon which those directions are founded.

The evidence necessary to support and defend the action in common cases has also been considered: and instructions for proceeding according to the ancient practice have been added, as far as can be necessary at the present time.

For practical forms in ejectionment, the reader is referred to those contained in Mr. TIDD'S Appendix to his Practice of the Court of King's Bench: a collection which appears to the Author too complete to require addition, and too accurate to be susceptible of improvement.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Origin—Progress—and Nature of the Action of Ejectment.

	Page
Definition of the action	1
Its origin	8
History of its ancient practice	11
modern practice	15

CHAPTER II.

Of what things an Ejectment will lie, and how they are to be described.

Of what things an ejectment will lie	18
How they are to be described	23

CHAPTER III.

Of the Title necessary to support the Action of Ejectment.

Of the general requisites of title	32
Of discontinuance	35
Of descent cast	41

	Page
Of the statute of limitations	45
Of the persons who by reason of their several titles may maintain ejectment	59
Tenant for years, for life, in tail, in fee	59
Mortgagee	60
Lord of a manor	61
Copyholder	63
Lessee of a copyholder	65
Widow for her free bench	65
Guardian	66
Infant	67
Assignee of a Bankrupt	67
an Insolvent Debtor	67
Conusee of a statute merchant, or staple	69
Tenant by elegit	69
Personal representative	70
Devisee	71
Grantee of a rent-charge	71
Assignee of the reversion	72
Adverse possessor for twenty years	77
Corporation	79
Churchwardens and overseers of the poor	79
Rector or vicar	80
Trustees	81
Joint-tenant, &c.	91
Lunatic	91
Person claiming under an award	91

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Cases which require an actual Entry upon the Land before Ejectment brought.

In what cases an entry must be made	93
By whom the entry must be made	99
Mode of making the entry	100

CHAPTER V.

Of the Action of Ejectment as between Landlord and Tenant.

	Page
Of the notice to quit,	
Origin and history of	105
When necessary, and when not	108
By whom, and to whom to be given	126
Service of	131
Form of	132
Period of its expiration	137
How waived	149
Of provisoes, &c. in leases for re-entry,	
Origin and history of	157
What covenants are valid	158
Proceedings on, for rent in arrear	160
Covenants, how broken	177
Who may bring ejectment on	189
How waived	192
Period of their operation	198

CHAPTER VI.

Of the Cases in which the Ancient Practice is still necessary.

On a vacant possession	199
In an inferior court	199
How to proceed	200

CHAPTER VII.

Of the Declaration in the Modern Action of Ejectment and the Notice to appear.

Of the declaration,	
How entitled	207

	Page
Of the declaration,	
Venue	209
Demise	209
Entry	221
Ouster	222
Of amending the declaration	224
Of the notice to appear	229

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Service of the Declaration, and Proceedings to Judgment against the Casual Ejector, when no Appearance.

Of the service of the declaration	234
the affidavit of service	242
moving for judgment	247
the time for appearance	248
filing common bail	250
signing judgment	251
setting aside judgments	252

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Appearance—Plea—and Issue.

Who may appear	254
Of the consent rule	262
consolidation rule	264
How to appear	265
Of the proceedings after appearance	269
the plea	270
the issue	273

CHAPTER X.

Of the Evidence in the Action of Ejectment.

On the part of the lessor,	
general points relating to	276

	Page
On the part of the lessor,	
By Heirs	281
Devisees	288
Tenants by <i>elegit</i>	301
Conusees of statutes merchant and staple	301
Rectors and vicars	302
Guardians	305
Assignees of bankrupts	305
insolvent debtors	306
Personal representatives	306
Mortgagees	306
Lords of manors	307
Copyholders	309
Lessees of copyholders	309
Landlords	310
Assignees of reversion	318
On the part of the defendant	319

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Trial and subsequent Proceedings.

Of the trial	320
judgment	327
costs	335
execution	339
writ of error	347
bringing a second ejectment	351

CHAPTER XII.

Of Staying the Proceedings in the Action of Ejectment.

Until particulars of breaches be given	353
security be given for costs	353
costs of a former ejectment be paid	355
When two actions are depending for same premises	361
Upon Stat. 7. Geo. II. c. 20	361
Stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28	366

CHAPTER XIII.

Of the Statutes 1 Geo. IV. c. 87, and 1 Wm. IV. c. 70.

	Page
Of the Stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87	367
Of the Stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70.	376

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the Action for Mesne Profits.

Origin and nature of	379
By whom to be brought	382
Against whom	383
Of the pleadings	384
evidence	388
damages	391
costs	393
 APPENDIX OF FORMS	 395
 INDEX	 404

TABLE OF CASES CITED.

	PAGE		PAGE
A.		Anon (11 Mod. 354)	280
Abbott, Wilson v.	140	— (12 Mod. 313)	238
Ablett v. Skinner	221	— (12 Mod. 211)	255, 257
Abrahams, Doe, d. Biddle v.	276	— (12 Mod. 384)	286
Adams, Fitchet v.	100	— (M. T. 1817)	232
— v. Goose	221, 222	— (Ld. Rayd. 728)	324
—, St. Leger v.	289	— (Salk. 257)	229
Addison v. Sir John Otway	204	— (Salk. 255)	355, 357
Addy v. Grix	290, 293	— (Salk. 260)	204, 382
Aislin v. Parkin	212, 382, 388, 389	— (Skin. 174)	289
Alexander, Doe, d. Schofield v.	168	— (Skin. 412)	101
— v. Gibson	298	— (2 Sid. 155)	339
Allen, Doe, d. Shephard v.	109, 196	— (1 Vent. 248)	158
— v. Foreman	203	— (1 Wils. 130)	354
— v. Rivington	32	— (Yelv. 166.)	330
—, Harris v.	381	Ansty v. Dowsing	295
Alker, Goodtitle, d. Chester v.	21, 30	Archer, Lamb v.	257
Alston, Doe, d. Selby v.	355	—, d. Hankey v. Snapp	365
Andrews, Whittingham v.	30	— Doe d. Rodd v.	136
— Doe d. Palmer v.	69	Argoll v. Cheney	14
Angel, Keene, d. Angel v.	356, 357	Armitage, Doe, d. Beaumont v.	227
Anon (1 Barnard, 330)	245	Armstrong, Messenger v.	151
— (2 Brown, 253)	348	Arnsby v. Woodward	198
— (1 Chitty, 573)	229	Arthur, Vivyan v.	75
— (2 Chitty, 171)	232	Ash, Felton v.	365
— (2 Chitty, 172)	207	Astlim v. Parkin	389
— (2 Chitty, 173)	207	Ashburner, Roe, d. Jackson v.	115
— (2 Chitty, 176)	237	Ashworth v. Stanley	25
— (2 Chitty, 181)	243	Askew, Carey v.	299
— (2 Chitty, 182)	236	Atherley, Doe, d. Hamilton	355
— (1 Cowp. 128)	354	Atkins v. Hatton	304
— (2 Dal. 95)	22	Atkinson, Grayson v.	292
— (1 D. & R. 435)	375	Attorney General v. Barnes	292
— (Dyer, 116)	29	Audley's case	100
— (1 Freem, 373)	338	— v. Pollard	100
— (3 Leon, 210)	27	Austine v. Hood	355
— (6 Mod. 222)	207	Awder v. Nokes	76
— (7 Mod. 39)	263	Aylott, Cole v.	29

B.	PAGE		PAGE
Badtitle, Doe v.	245	Bedwell, Thurstout v.	320, 335
—, Goodtitle, d. Gardner v.	269	Belcher, Thunder, d. Weaver v.	61, 107, 109, 122, 307
—, —, —, d. Price v.	207	Bell, Doe, d. Rigge v.	107, 111, 144, 178, 305
—, —, —, d. Read v.	236	— v. Harwood	280
—, —, —, d. Roberts v.	238	Bellamy, Doe, d. Burrell v.	64, 66, 287
—, —, —, d. Sanders v.	246	Bennett, Doe, d. Lucy v.	340
—, —, —, d. Wanklin v.	243	Benson, Doe, d. Hall v.	136, 145
—, Goodright, d. Ward v.	273	Bentley v. Poole	113
—, Lackland, d. Dowling v.	232	—, Throgmorton, d. Fairfax v.	323
Badger v. Floyd	351	Bennington v. Goodtitle	24, 25
Badmering, Pike v.	298	Benion, Legg, d. Scot v.	130, 132
Bagshaw, d. Ashton v. Toogood	239	Benson, Pleasant, d. Hayton v.	130
Bailey, Tiley v.	337	Benn d. Mortimer v. Denn	359
Baker, Whitlock v.	286	Bengo, Sleaburne v.	339
— v. Mellish	88, 276, 310	Bent, Worrall v.	329
— v. Roe	19	Berkley Peerage case	285
—, Doe, d. Green v.	127, 128	Berrington, d. Dormer v. Parkhurst	95, 102, 214
Bally v. Wells	73	Berney, Stocker v.	77
Baldwin, Goodtitle, d. Parker v.	78	Bery, King v.	20
Ball, Partridge v.	60, 216, 217	Bettison v. Bromley	296
Baldwin, Brooke, d. Mence v.	342	Bethill, Floyd v.	343
— v. Wine	29, 30, 81	Bevan, Doe, d. Goodbehere v.	180, 181
Bank of England, Glynn v.	304	Biggs, Doe, d. Leicester v.	82, 86, 120, 314
Banks, Doe, d. Bryan, v.	194, 198	Bindover v. Sindercombe	23, 27
Barnes v. Bulmer	239	Bingham, d. Lane v. Gregg	365
— v. Peterson	24, 25	Bingham, Doe, d. Lewis v.	279
—, Attorney General v.	292	Bishop v. Howard	110
Barrett, Smith v.	19	Birch v. Wright, 60, 109, 137, 154, 307, 381	
Barber, Doe, d. Crisp v.	32	Bird, Doe, d. Hellings v.	55
Barclay, Doe, d. Church v.	359	— v. Snell	204
Bartlett, Howard v.	66	Birkbeck v. Hughes	245
Barry, Morris v.	210	Bissell, Morgan, d. Dowding v.	117
—, Morres v.	323	Blades, Harrison v.	284
Barton, Thre't v.	76, 190	Blakey, Clayton v.	107, 111, 122, 178
Barefoot v. Fry	352	Blackman, Goodwin v.	219, 221
Barnardiston, Smith, d. GINGER v.	339, 357	Blackham, Smith v.	280
Barker, Omichund v.	295	Bliss, Doe, d. Boscawen v.	193
Barlow, Highmore v.	203	Bluck, Doe, d. Morgan v.	34, 81, 341
Barney, Stocker v.	77	Bodily, Grumble v.	361
Barnaby, Turner v.	322, 334	Boner v. Juner	210
Barwick d. Mayor of Richmond v. Thompson	276	Bond v. Seawell	293
Barnard, Murthwaite v.	87	—, Doe, d. Darlington, Earl of, v.	185
Barlte, Doe, d. Nethercote v.	300	Boulton, Doe d. Parker v.	121, 123
Bass v. Bradford	273	Bourne, Hunt v.	97, 98
Bateman, Doe, d. Freeman v.	192	— v. Turner	279
Bath (Earl of) v. Sherwin	352	Bouchier v. Friend	250
Batten, Doe, d. Cheney v.	150, 154, 173, 380	Bradford, Bass v.	273
Bawden, Right, d. Dean of Wells v.	124	Braham, Goodtitle, d. Revett v.	288
Baxter, d. Abrahall v. Brown	114	Breach, Doe, d. Oldershaw v.	188
—, Earl, d. Goodwin v.	318	Bragg, Doe, d. Scales v.	279
Bayliss, Doe, d. Morland v.	236, 245	Bracebridge v. Buckley	183
Beard, Chapman v.	303	Brandling, Doe, d. Bywater v.	188
—, Right, d. Lewis v.	107, 121	Brenton, Doe, d. Carthew v.	358, 361
Beauchamp and Burt, ex parte	201	Brewer, d. Lord Onslow v. Eaton 174	
Beauclerk, Kenrick v.	83, 86	—, Doe, d. Byne v.	204, 274
Beck, d. Hawkins v. Welsh	67	Brewster, Hillingsworth v.	19, 261
Bedell v. Constable	66		

	PAGE		PAGE
Brewster, Medicot v.	264	Chaworth v. Phillips	76
Brend, Tunstall v.	208	Charnock, Roe, d. Henderson v.	141
Brightwen, Doe, d. Milner v.	48	Chater v. Hawkins	295
Brittle v. Dade	272	Chaplin, Radcliffe v.	287
Brice v. Smith	294	——, Doe, d. Whayman v. 127, 128	
Brickhurst, Ramsbottom v.	501	Chapman v. Beard	303
Britts, Hunter v.	390	Chamier v. Llingon	383
Bristow (Mayor of), Rex. v.	199	Cheney, Argoll v.	14
Bridges v. Brooke	391	Checy, Peto v.	204
Britain, Doe, d. Coleman v.	68	Chetwynd, Wyndham v.	295
British Museum, Trustees of, v.		Church, Doe, d. Morgan v.	136
White	291	Clavering, Camell v.	80
Brown's Case	40	Clarke, Kinaston v.	305
——, Doe, d. Warner v. 106, 107,		—— v. Phillips	101
111, 122		——, Doe d. Grundy v.	34, 80
——, Holmes, d. Brown v.	326	——, —, d. Lockwood v.	181
——, Baxter, d. Abrahall v.	114	——, —, d. Spencer v.	366
——, Doe, d. James v.	302	——, —, d. Thompson v.	53
Brooke v. Bridges	391	Clare, Doe, d. Coore v.	115
Brooke, d. Mence v. Baldwin	342	Clayton v. Blakey 107, 111, 122, 178	
Broderick v. Broderick	294	Clayton's case	223
Bromley, Bettison v.	296	Clapham, Holdfast, d. Woollams v. 65,	
Broughton v. Langley	82	286	
Bryan, d. Child v. Winwood	52	Claxmore v. Serle	323
Brydon, Oates, d. Wigfall v. 33, 95,		Cleabourne, Jordan v.	28
263		Clements, Doe, d. Folkes v.	62
Buckley v. Buckley	256	Clerke v. Rowell	215, 327
——, Bracebridge v.	183	——, Linsey v.	331
Bucknell, Weakley, d. Yea v. 33, 112		Close's case	382
Budden, Doe d. Nepean v.	308	Clymer v. Littler	237
Butler, Doe d. Phillips v.	142	Cock, Doe, d. Lord Darlington v.	
Bugby, Crusoe, d. Blencowe v.	177	235, 241	
Bulmer, Barnes v.	349	Cocks v. Darson	91
Barbury v. Yeomans	26	Cocke, Sherman v.	199
Burchett v. Durdant	82	Cole v. Aylott	29
Burgers of Carmarthen, Rex v. 325		——, Taylor v.	69
Burgbers, Grimstone, d. Lord		——, Wade v.	66
Gower v.	264	——, Small, d. Baker v.	324, 331
Burne v. Richardson	383	Coles, Doe, d. Lewis v.	226
Burt and Beauchamp, ex parte	201	Collins v. Silley	76
Bury, Phillips v.	270	Colley, Wilkinson v.	129
Butcher, Doe, d. Taggart v. 338, 346		Comyn v. Kineto	20
Byron, Lord, Deardon v.	352	—— v. Wheatley	20
		——, St. John v.	23, 24
		Coningshy, Lord's case	326
C.		Constable, Bedell v.	66
Calvert, Doe, d. Ash. v. 150, 289, 315		Connor v. West	24, 28
—— v. Horsefall	389	Congleton, Mayor of, v. Pattison 74	
Calcraft, Wadman v.	171	Constable, Parker, d. Walker v.	
Camell v. Clavering	80	106, 125	
Capel v. Saltonstall	228	Cooke, Ogle v.	297
Carleton, d. Griffin v. Griffin	293	Cooke, Higham v.	223
Cartwright, d. Denn, Jacklin v.	137	——, Roberts v.	357
Carter, Doe, d. Mitchinson v.	180	Cooper, Doe, d. Tilyard v.	260
—— v. Cromwell	217, 218	Cope, Glover v.	77
—— Doe d. Kerby v.	121	Copeland, Doe, d. Palmerston v. 323	
Carey v. Askew	299	—— v. Stephens	69
Casson v. Dade	294	Coplestone v. Piper	25
Cator, Goodright, d. Hare v. 60, 93,		Copous, Oakapple, d. Green v.	314
95, 102, 158		Corbett, Doe, d. Corbett v.	301
Challenor v. Thomas	21	Cordwent, Goodright, d. Chester	
Chapman v. Sharpe	66	v.	150, 174
		Cotterell v. Dutton	58

	PAGE		PAGE
Doe, d. Buross v. Lucas	132	Doe, d. Fleming v. Fleming	285
, d. Byne v. Brewer	204, 274	, d. Foley v. Wilson	62, 107
, d. Bywater v. Brandling	188		308
, d. Campbell v. Scott	140	, d. Folkes v. Clements	62
, d. Calvert v. Frowd	125	, d. Forster v. Wandlass	168, 342
, d. Cardigan (Earl of), v. Roe,	374	, d. ——— v. Scott	50
	374	, d. ——— v. Williams	279
, d. Carlisle (Earl of) v.		, d. Foxlow v. Jeffries	227
Woodman	131	, d. Freeman v. Bateman	192
, d. Carthew v. Brenton	358, 361	, d. Gaskell v. Spry	182
, d. Castleton v. Samuel	143, 315	, d. George v. Jesson	58, 59, 285
, d. Cates v. Somerville	121	, d. Gibbons v. Pott	33
, d. Chadwick v. Law	355, 356	, d. Gill v. Pearson	100, 210
, d. Challnor v. Davies	52	, d. Giles v. Warwick	277
, d. Chaplin v. Whayman	127	, d. Ginger v. Roe	263
, d. Cheney v. Batten	150, 154,	, d. Godsell v. Inglis	151
	173, 380	, d. Goodbehere v. Bevan	180,
, d. Chere v. Smith	191		181
, d. Cheese v. Creed	70	, d. Graham v. Scott	89
, d. Chippendale v. Dyson	316	, d. Green v. Baker	127, 128
, d. Church v. Barclay	359	, d. Grubb v. Grubb	253
, d. Clarke v. Roe	231	, d. Grundy v. Clarke	34, 80
, d. ——— v. Grant	278	, d. Grocers' Company v. Roe	252
, d. ——— v. Spencer	67, 68		252
, d. ——— v. Trapaud	307	, d. Gunson v. Welsh	277
, d. Clarges v. Forster	314	, d. Hanley v. Wood	20
, d. Cobbey v. Roe	225	, d. Hall v. Benson	136, 145
, d. Colclough v. Mulliner	52	, d. Halsey v. Roe	237
, d. Collins v. Weller	143	, d. Hallen v. Ironmonger	83
, d. Coore v. Clare	115	, d. Hammeck v. Fellis	211
, d. Compere v. Hicks	97, 392	, d. Hamilton v. Atherley	356,
, d. Cook v. Danvers	42, 50, 299		358
, d. Cox v.	135	, d. ——— v. Hatherley	355, 358
, d. Colclough v. Halse	49	, d. Hanson v. Smith	298
, d. Coleman v. Britain	68	, d. Hardman v. Pilkington	225, 226
, d. Corbett v. Corbett	301		225, 226
, d. Cotterell v. Wylde	273	, d. Harvey v. Roe	239
, d. Courtall v. Thomas	91	, d. Harwood v. Lippencott	260
, d. Crisp v. Barber	32	, d. Hayne v. Redfern	79
, d. Da Costa v. Wharton	32, 61,	, d. Harris v. Masters	162, 170
	65, 70, 110, 301	, d. Harrop v. Green	280
, d. Lord Darlington v. Cock	235	, d. Heapy v. Howard	149
, d. ——— v. Bond	135	, d. Heblethwaite v. Roe	259
, d. Dagget v. Snowdon	147	, d. Hellings v. Bird	55
, d. Davis v. Davis	98	, d. Hele v. Roe	240
, d. ——— v. Roe	323	, d. Henniker v. Watt	188
, d. Draper's Company v.		, d. Hinde v. Vince	136, 146
Wilson	277, 331, 341	, d. Hindly v. Rickarby	318
, d. Digby v. Steel	151, 300	, d. Hitchings v. Lewis	172, 173
, d. Dry v. Roe	239	, d. Hodson v. Staple	33, 89
, d. Duckett v. Watts	95, 99	, d. Holcomb v. Johnson	145
, d. Duroure v. Jones	58	, d. Hollingsworth v. Stennett	107, 122
, d. Edwards v. Roe	244		107, 122
, d. Elwood v. Roe	237	, d. Holland v. Worsley	178
, d. Emmett v. Thorne	302	, d. Holmes v. Darby	155
, d. Esdaile v. Mitchell	213	, d. Huddleston v. Johnson	156
, d. Evans v. Roe	172	, d. Human v. Pettit	281
, d. Eyre v. Lambly	274	, d. Jackson v. Wilkinson	53
, d. Feldon v. Roe	356	, d. ——— v. Ramsbottom	276
, d. Fishar v. Prosser	55	, d. James v. Harris	98, 220
, d. ——— v. Giles	60, 108	, d. ——— v. Brown	302
, d. Fenwick v. Roe	240	, d. ——— v. Stanton	277
, d. Field v. Roe	237	, d. Lord Jersey v. Smith	162

	PAGE		PAGE
Doe, d. Jones v. Crouch . . .	184	Doe, d. Odiarne v. Whitehead	37, 96
, d. ——— v. Roe . . .	240	, d. Oldham v. Wolley	284, 289
, d. ——— v. Wilde . . .	279	, d. Oldershaw v. Breach . . .	188
, d. Johnson v. Lord Pembroke . . .	284	, d. Osborne v. Spencer . . .	98
, d. Kerby v. Carter . . .	121	, d. O'Connell v. Porch . . .	227
, d. Knight v. Quigley	107, 123	, d. Palmer v. Andrews . . .	69
, d. ——— v. Rowe . . .	196	, d. Palmerston, Lord, v. Copeland . . .	323
, d. ——— v. Lady Smith . . .	260	, d. Parry v. Hodson . . .	66
, d. Lawrie v. Dyball . . .	26	, d. ——— v. Hazell . . .	140
, d. Lawrence v. Shawcross . . .	213	, d. Parker v. Boulton . . .	121, 123
, d. Leeson v. Sayer . . .	107, 123	, d. Pate v. Roe . . .	345
, d. Ledger v. Roe . . .	252	, d. Paul v. Hurst . . .	229
, d. Leicester v. Biggs . . .	82, 86, 120, 314	, d. Peacock v. Raffan . . .	144
, d. Leppingwell v. Trussell . . .	339	, d. Pearson v. Roe . . .	230, 260
, d. Lewis v. Bingham . . .	279	, d. Pemberton v. Roe . . .	374
, d. ——— v. Roe . . .	232	, d. Phillips v. Butler . . .	142
, d. ——— v. Coles . . .	226	, d. ——— v. Roe . . .	374
, d. Ligberd v. Lawson . . .	98	, d. Pinckard v. Roe . . .	359
, d. Lintot v. Ford . . .	335	, d. Pitcher v. Donovan . . .	141
, d. Lloyd v. Deakin . . .	285	, d. Pitt v. Laming . . .	179, 184
, d. ——— v. Powell . . .	182	, d. ——— v. Sherwin . . .	183
, d. Lockwood v. Clarke . . .	181	, d. Powell v. King . . .	310, 316
, d. Lock v. Franklin . . .	265, 273	, d. Prior v. Salter . . .	337
, d. Lowe v. Roe . . .	240	, d. Pritchett v. Mitchell	128, 276
, d. Lowdon v. Watson . . .	276	, d. Puddicome v. Harris . . .	315
, d. Lucy v. Bennett . . .	340	, d. Putland v. Hilder . . .	70, 90, 110
, d. Lulham v. Fenn . . .	210	, d. Quintin v. Roe . . .	244
, d. Macartney, Lord, v. Crick . . .	131, 132	, d. Rees v. Thomas . . .	360
, d. Martin v. Watts . . .	111	, d. Rigge v. Bell	107, 111, 144, 178, 305
, d. Marsack v. Read	129, 210, 277	, d. Roby v. Maisey . . .	60
, d. Mason v. Mason . . .	288	, d. Robinson v. Roe . . .	145
, d. Matthewson v. Wrightman . . .	133, 134	, d. Rodd v. Archer . . .	136
, d. Maldon, Mayor of, v. Miller . . .	217	, d. Rumford v. Miller . . .	227
, d. M' Dougall v. Roe . . .	237	, d. Rust v. Roe . . .	272
, d. St Margaret's Hospital, Governors of, v. Roe . . .	229	, d. Lord Say & Sele v. Guy . . .	71
, d. Mayhew v. Erlam . . .	364	, d. Sadler v. Dring . . .	203
, d. Messiter v. Dinely . . .	350	, d. Sampson v. Roe . . .	375
, d. Milner v. Brightwen . . .	48	, d. Scales v. Bragg . . .	279
, d. Milnes v. Lamb . . .	316	, d. Schofield v. Alexander . . .	168
, d. Miller v. Noden . . .	120	, d. Scott v. Miller . . .	192
, d. Mitchell v. Levi . . .	130	, d. Seabrooke v. Roe . . .	172
, d. Mitchinson v. Carter . . .	180	, d. Shepherd v. Allen	109, 196
, d. Morris v. Rosser . . .	92	, d. ——— v. Roe . . .	211
, d. Morgan v. Church . . .	136	, d. Selby v. Alston . . .	355
, d. ——— v. Bluck	34, 81, 341	, d. Shore v. Porter	70, 125, 214
, d. ——— v. Roe . . .	350	, d. Simmons v. Roe . . .	236
, d. Moore v. Lawder . . .	123	, d. Smith v. Smith . . .	299
, d. Morecraft v. Meux . . .	184	, d. Smelt v. Fuchau . . .	317
, d. Morland v. Baylis . . .	236, 244	, d. Spencer v. Godwin . . .	186
, d. Morton v. Roe . . .	271, 272	, d. ——— v. Clarke . . .	366
, d. Neale v. Roe . . .	239	, d. Sore v. Ekins . . .	195
, d. Nepean v. Budden . . .	308	, d. Spicer v. Lea	134, 142, 143, 145
, d. Nethercote v. Bartle . . .	300	, d. Stewart v. Denton . . .	26
, d. Neville v. Dunbar . . .	132	, d. Strickland v. Spence . . .	146, 147
, d. Newby v. Jackson	107, 122	, d. Surtees v. Hall . . .	51, 98
, d. Northey v. Harvey . . .	283	, d. Sutton v. Ridgway . . .	360
, d. Nutt v. Nutt . . .	66	, d. Sykes v. Durnford	133, 312
		, d. Taggart v. Butcher	336, 347

	PAGE		PAGE
Doe, d. Tarrant v. Hellier	62, 08,	Dring, Doe, d. Sadler v.	203
	286, 308	Drinkwater, Gulliver v.	336, 385
, d. Taylor v. Johnson	174	Drury v. Fitch	91
, d. Thompson v. Clark	53	Duckworth, d. Trebly v. Tunstall	171
, d. Thomas v. Roe	232	Dumpor's case	189
, d. Tilt v. Stratton	112	----- v. Syms	190
, d. Tilyard v. Cooper	260	Dunch, Sprightley, d. Collins v.	239
, d. Tindal v. Roe	237	Durant, Potts v.	304
, d. Tomkins v. Willan	87	Durdant, Burchett v.	82
, d. Tollet v. Salter	220	Dunbar, Doe, d. Neville v.	132
, d. Troughton v. Roe	252, 267	Dunk v. Hunter	116
, d. Tubb v. Roe	363	Dutton, Cotterill v.	58
, d. Upton v. Witherwick	347	Durnford, Doe, d. Sykes v.	133, 312
, d. Vernon v. Vernon	65, 208	Dyball, Doe, d. Laurie v.	26
, d. Vickery v. Jackson	185	Dyson, Doe, d. Chippendale v.	316
, d. Vine v. Figgins	212	—, Jeffries v.	382, 388
, d. Wadmore v. Selwyn	145		
, d. Watson v. Fletcher	81	E.	
, d. Walker v. Stephenson	298, 355	Eades, Patterson d. Gradridge v.	203
, d. ----- v. Groves	118	Earl v. Lewis	304
, d. Warry v. Miller	64	—, d. Godwin v. Baxter	318
, d. Warner v. Browne	106, 107,	Eaton, Brewer d. Lord Onslow v.	174
	111, 122	Eastcourt v. Weeks	63
, d. Webb v. Goundry	349	Eccleston v. Petty	294
, d. Whayman v. Chaplin	127, 128	-----, Royston v.	23, 27, 28
, d. Whatley v. Telling	213	Edmunds, Nash v.	299
, d. Wheeldon v. Paul	161	Edwards, Palmer v.	178
, d. Whitfield v. Roe	167, 244	Egau v. Johnson	107
, d. Williams v. Winch	360	Ekins, Doe d. Sore v.	195
, d. ----- v. Pasquali	125	Elden v. Keddell	366
, d. ----- v. Humphreys	151	Eliot, Stephens v.	63
, d. Wilson v. Phillips	189	Elliot, Roe d. Truscott v.	98
, d. Wright v. Plumtree	99	Ellis, Donford v.	381
, d. ----- v. Roe	242	—, Roe, d. Lee v.	228
, Davis, d. Povey v.	252, 345	— v. Smith	291, 292
, Roe d. Cholmondley v.	325	England, d. Syburn v. Slade	89, 276
, —, d. Cook v.	266	Erith, Inhabitants of, Rex v.	284
, —, d. Durant v.	375	Eriswell, Inhabitants of, Rex v.	284, 303
, —, d. Hambrook v.	237, 244	Erlam, Doe d. Mayhew v.	364
, —, d. Humphries v.	347	Evans, v. Croker	223
, —, d. Hyde v.	268	Evans, Smith v.	291
, —, d. Leak v.	258	Evelyn, Stonehouse v.	291
, —, d. Stephenson v.	224	Eves, Rumney v.	286
, Tupper, d. Mercer v.	237	Eyre, Longford v.	293
v. Badtittle	245		
v. Davies	336, 385, 391, 393	F.	
v. Greaves	207, 232	Fabrigas, Mostyn v.	209
v. Law	360	Fagg v. Roberts	323
v. Payne	318	Fairclaim, d. Fowler v. Sham-	
v. Reynolds	351	title	14, 54, 55, 257, 259, 261
v. Roe	229, 237, 240, 245	-----, d. Empson v. Shackle-	
v. Spiller	133	ton	53, 54
v. Stradling	277	Farmer, d. Miles v. Thrustout	239
Donovan, Doe, d. Pitcher v.	141	Far v. Denn	332, 333
Donford v. Ellis	381	Farr, Rede v.	198
Dormer v. Fortescue	392	Fawson, Goodright, d. Griffen v.	219
Dose, Lushington, d. Godfrey v.	349	Fawcett, Longchamps v.	280
Douglas v. Shank	222	Felton v. Ash	365
----- v.	239		
Downingham's case	63		
Dowsing, Ansty v.	295		
Driver, d. Scrutton v. Scrutton	226		
—, d. Oxendon v. Lawrence	258, 276		

	PAGE		PAGE
Fenn, d. Blanchard v. Wood	276		
—, d. Buckle v. Roe	239		
—, d. Knight v. Dean	239		
—, d. Matthews v. Smart	98, 190		
—, d. Pewtress v. Granger	281		
—, d. Thomas v. Griffith	311		
—, d. Tyrrell v. Denn	241		
—, d. Wright v. Johnson	288		
—, Denn, d. Wroot v.	272		
—, Doe, d. Lulham v.	210		
Fenwick's case	261		
— v. Grosvenor	261, 361		
Fellis, Doe d. Hammeck v.	211		
Ferrars, Roe d. Pellat v.	57		
Figgins, Doe d. Vine v.	212		
Fineux, Hatcher v.	51		
Finch, Ivatt v.	281		
Fish, Longchamp d. Goodfellow v.	291		
Fisher v. Hughes	329		
—, Kildare v.	25		
Fitchet v. Adams	100		
Fitch, Drury v.	91		
Fitzgerald v. Marshall	27, 28		
Fleetwood, Thornby d. Hamilton			
v.	338		
Fletcher, Doe d. Watson v.	81		
Fleming, Doe d. Fleming v.	285		
Flood, Goodright d. Welsh v.	25		
Floyd, Badger v.	351		
— v. Bethlill	343		
Focus v. Salisbury	101		
Folkard v. Hemet	298		
Foot, Thrustout d. Wilson v.	333		
Ford v. Lerke	27		
— v. Gray	54, 98		
— Doe, d. Lintot v.	335		
Foster, Miller v.	304		
Forrester, Goodright, d. Fowlerv.	97		
Forse, Zouch, d. Forse v.	71		
Forster, Doe d. Clarges v.	314		
Fortescue, Dormer v.	392		
Fortune v. Johnson	345		
Foreman, Allen v.	203		
Foster v. Pitfall	39, 40		
Fothergill, Crocker v.	20		
Fox v. Swan	177, 192, 280		
—, Mason v.	328		
Fraine, Dillon v.	87		
Franklin, Doe, d. Lock v.	262		
Frazer, M'Kenire v.	289		
Freeman, Holdfast v.	230		
Friend, Bouchier v.	250		
Fryett, d. Harris v. Jeffries	194		
Frowd, Doe d. Calvert v.	125		
Fry, Thorpe v.	389		
—, Barefoot v.	352		
Fuchau, Doe, d. Smelt v.	317		
Fulford, Denn, d. Lucas v.	354		
Fulgam, Molineaux v.	345		
Furley, d. Canterbury, Mayor of,			
v. Wood	136, 145, 216, 217		
Fursden, Moore v.	210, 230		
		G.	
		Gallimore, Moss v.	60
		Galliers, Roe, d. Hunter v.	159, 180
		Gardiner v. Norman	201
		Garrett v. Lister	306
		Gascoigne, Hodgson v.	347
		George, d. Bradley v. Wisdom	348
		Gibson, Wither v.	158
		—, Alexander v.	298
		—, Woodcock v.	80
		Gibbs, Dodwell v.	390
		Giles, Hill v.	27
		—, Doe d. Fisher v.	60, 108
		Girdlestone v. Porter	384
		Glascok, Shires v.	293
		Glover v. Cope	77
		Glynn v. Bank of England	304
		Godwin, Doe, d. Spencer v.	186
		Goodright, d. Balsh v. Rich	276
		—, d. Charter v. Cordwent	
		150, 174	
		—, d. Fowler v. Forrester	97
		—, d. Griffin v. Fawson	219
		—, d. Hare v. Cator	60, 93,
		95, 102, 158	
		—, d. Jones v. Thrustout	236, 355
		—, d. Peters v. Vivian	182
		—, d. Rowell v. Vice	334
		—, d. Russell v. Noright,	252
		—, d. Smallwood v. Stro-	
		ther	30, 216
		—, d. Stevenson v. No-	
		right	170
		—, d. Stevens v. Moss	283
		—, d. Ward v. Badtitle	273
		—, d. Walter v. Davids	192
		—, d. Welsh v. Flood	25
		— v. Hart	255, 257, 345
		— v. Holton	335
		— v. Moore	366
		— v. Wood	325
		—, Moore v.	204
		Goodtitle, d. Bremsbridge v. Wal-	
		ter	218, 220
		—, d. Chester v. Alker	21, 30
		—, d. Estwick v. Way	80, 112,
		114	
		—, d. Gallaway v. Herbert	107,
		122, 212	
		—, d. Gardner v. Badtitle	269
		—, d. Jones v. Jones	32, 89
		—, d. King v. Woodward	126
		—, d. Luxmore v. Saville	186
		—, d. Norris v. Morgan	61
		—, d. Norfolk, Duke of, v.	
		Notitle	233
		—, d. Parker v. Baldwin	78
		—, d. Pinsent v. Lamman	220
		—, d. Price v. Badtitle	207
		—, d. Ranger v. Roe	207
		—, d. Read v. Badtitle	236

	PAGE		PAGE
Goodtitle, d. Revett v. Braham	288	Hall, Doe, d. Bennington v.	65, 213, 299
———, d. Roberts v. Badtitle	238	—— v. Hughs	203
———, d. Sandys v. Badtitle	246	Halse, Doe, d. Colclough v.	49
———, d. Taysum v. Pope	364	Hamond v. Ireland	27
———, d. Wanklen v. Badtitle	243	——— v. Savel	27
———, d. Wright v. Otway	26	Hammond v. Wood	69, 301
——— v. Badtitle	268	Hancock v. Price	25
——— v. Davis	245	Hand v. Dinely	366
——— v. Holdfast	170	Hands v. James	294, 298
——— v. North	380, 387	Harpur's case	10, 29
——— v. Tombs	383, 391	Harvey, Roe, d. Haldane v.	32
——— v. Walton	25	———, Metcalf v.	392
———, Bennington v.	24, 25	Harrison, Roe, d. Gregson v.	178, 190, 191, 196
———, Thomas v.	350	——— v. Harrison	290, 293
Goodwin v. Longhurst	63, 65, 66	——— v. Blades	284
——— v. Blackman	219, 221	Harper, Worrall v.	29
Goodgaine v. Wakefield	223	———, Jordan v.	339
Goose, Adams v.	222, 223	Harris, Withers v.	346, 351
Gough, d. Calthorpe v. Gough	289	———, Rex v.	345
Gowthwaite, Hassell, d. Hodsgon	72, 191	——— v. Allen	381
Gundry, Doe d. Webb v.	349	———, Doe, d. Puddicombe v.	315
Gray, Ford v.	54, 98	Harding, d. Baker v. Greensmith	245
———, Thrustout, d. Turner v.	226, 320, 354	Hart, Goodright v.	255, 257, 345
Grant, Doe, d. Clarke v.	278	Harbert, Tredway v.	355, 356
Grayson v. Atkinson	292	Harwood, Bell v.	280
Gravenor v. Woodhouse	276	Harton v. Harton	83
Granger, Doe, d. Pewtress v.	281	Harrington v. Wise	113
Greenley's case	39	Harris, Doe, d. James v.	98, 220
Green v. Proude	99	———, Rolfe v.	183
Green's case	173	Harvey, Doe, d. Northey v.	283
Gregory v. Henderson	85	Hartley, Philips v.	114
Gregg, Bingham, d. Lane v.	365	Hasland, Roe v.	285
Greensmith, Harding, d. Baker v.	245	Hassell, d. Hodson v. Gowthwaite	72, 191
Gree v. Rolle	51, 100, 333	Hatfield v. Thorpe	296
Greaves, Doe v.	207, 232	Hatcher v. Fineux	51
Green, Doe d. Harrop v.	280	Hatton, Atkins v.	304
Griffith, Fenn, d. Thomas v.	311	Hatherley, Doe, d. Hamilton v.	356, 358
Griffin, Carlton, d. Griffin v.	293	Hawkins, Moore v.	274
———, Doe, d. Banning v.	284	———, Chater v.	295
Grimstone, d. Lord Gower, v. Burghers	264	Haydon, d. Carrol, Vicars v.	228
Grix, Addy v.	290, 293	Hayley, Roe, d. Bamford v.	130
Grills, Hussey v.	289	Hazell, Doe, d. Parry v.	140
Groves, Doe, d. Walker, v.	118	Hazlewood, d. Price v. Thatcher	233
Grosvenor, Fenwick v.	261, 361	Heaton, Little v.	158
Grubb, Doe, d. Grubb v.	253	Heatherly, d. Worthington v. Weston	210
Grumble v. Bodilly	361	Heath, Short v.	393
Gryle v. Gryle	292	Hegan v. Johnson	107, 122
Gulliver v. Wagstaff	243	Hellier, Doe, d. Tarrant v.	62, 63, 286, 308
——— v. Drinkwater	336, 385	Hems v. Stroud	29, 304
Guy, Doe, d. Lord Say and Sele v.	71	Hemet, Folkard v.	298
——— v. Rand	221	Hengest, Jones, d. Thomas v.	324
		Henden, Smartley v.	202
H.		Henderson, Gregory v.	85
Haddock's case	323	Hersey, Roe, d. Wrangham v.	213
Halsal v. Wedgwood	239	Herbert v. Laughlyn	20
Hall, Keech, d. Warne v.	33, 61, 109, 307, 384	———, Goodtitle, d. Galloway v.	107, 122, 212
———, Doe, d. Surtees v.	51, 98	Hicks, Roe, d. Jeffreys v.	64, 298, 308

	PAGE		PAGE
Hicks, Doe, d. Compere v.	97, 392	Ireland, Hammond v.	27
Higham v. Cooke	223	— Roe, d. Johnson v.	309
Higgins v. Highfield	385	Ironmonger, Doe d. Hallen v.	83
Higham v. Ridgway	283	Ivatt v. Finch	281
Highmore v. Barlow	203	Ives, Townsend v.	297
Hill v. Giles	27		
Hilliard v. Jennings	295	J.	
Hillingsworth v. Brewster	19, 261	Jackson, Odingsall v.	29
Hind, Seers v.	190, 191	—, Doe, d. Newby v.	107
Hindson v. Kersey	297	—, Doe, d. Vickery v.	185
Hilder, Doe, d. Putland v.	70, 90, 110	—, Roe, d. Matthews v.	134
Hobson, d. Bigland v. Dobson	266	—, Holdfast, d. Hattersley v.	355
Hockead, Plomer v.	201	—, Trymner v.	291
Hodgson, Doe d. Parry v.	66	James, Hands v.	294, 298
— v. Gascoigne	347	Jeffries, Fryett, d. Harris v.	194
—, Mason d. Kendall v.	252, 268	—, Doe, d. Foxlow v.	227
Hodson v. Sharpe	276	— v. Dyson	382, 388
Hodges, Wilson v.	282	Jefts, Taylor v.	235
Hoel, Joans v.	28	Jemott v. Cowley	71
Holdfast, Goodtitle v.	170	Jenkins, d. Harris v. Pritchard	95, 281
Holton, Goodright v.	335	Jennings, Hilliard v.	295
Holdmyfast, Newman v.	19, 130	Jenny, d. Preston v. Cutts	236, 244, 246
Holford, Lade v.	33	Jesson, Doe, d. George v.	58, 59, 285
Holmes, Poultney v.	178	Joans v. Hoel	28
—, Young v.	71	Johnson, Doe, d. Holcombe v.	145
—, d. Brown v. Brown	326	—, Doe d. Huddleston v.	137, 156
Holdfast, d. Hattersley v. Jackson	355	—, Doe, d. Taylor v.	174
—, d. Woollams v. Clapham	65, 286	—, Fenn, d. Wright v.	288
—, Thrustout, d. Williams	356, 357	—, Rich, d. Cullen v.	309
— v. Freeman	230	—, Egan v.	98
— v. Morris	388	—, Fortune v.	345
Hooper v. Dale	204	—, Hegan v.	107, 122
Hood Austine v.	355	—, Proctor v.	346
Hopkin's case	201	— v. Huddleston	137, 156
Horde, Taylor, d. Atkins v.	41, 327, 329	—, Lawson v.	284
Horsfall, Calvert v.	389	Johns v. Whitley	198
Howard v. Bartlett	66	Joliffe, Lowe v.	298
— v. Wemsley	139	Jones v. Lord Say and Sele	82, 83
—, Doe, d. Heapy v.	149	—, d. Griffiths v. Marsh	132, 199, 205
How, Lucas v.	76	—, Doe, d. Duroure v.	58
Houston v. Hughes	87	—, Goodtitle, d. Jones v.	33, 89
Howard, Bishop v.	110	—, d. Thomas v. Hengest	324
Hudlestone, Johnson v.	137, 156	— v. Thorn	183
Hudson, Hunt v.	381	— v. Tatham	173
Hughs, Hall v.	203	Jordan v. Harper	339
Hughes, Birkbeck v.	245	— v. Cleabourne	28
—, Fisher v.	329	Jourdain v. Wilson	74
—, Houston v.	87	Jory v. Orchard	313
Humphreys, Doe, d. Williams v.	151	Jurdan v. Stone	66
Hunt v. Bourne	97, 98	Juner, Boner v.	210
— v. Hudson	381	Judson, Pinero v.	119
Hunter v. Britts	390		
—, Dunk v.	116	K.	
Hurst, Doe, d. Paul v.	229	Keane, d. Byron v. Deardon	51, 83, 89, 349, 350
Hussey v. Grills	289	Keddell, Elden v.	306
Hutchinson v. Puller	27		
Hyde, d. Culliford v. Thrustout	252		

	PAGE		PAGE
Keech, d. Warne v. Hall	33, 61, 109, 307, 384	Lengridge, Richardson v.	106
Keeling, Doe, d. Bish v.	182	Lerke, Ford v.	27
Keen, Doe, d. Barnett v.	54	Levi, Doe, d. Mitchell v.	130
—, Williams, d. Johnson v.	271	Lewis, Earl v.	304
—, d. Angel v. Angel	356, 357	—, Doe, d. Hitchings v.	172, 173
Kemp v. Derrett	127, 141, 142	Leymayne v. Stanley	290
Kenrick v. Beauclerk	83, 86	Libb, Lea v.	291, 292
Kendrick, Doe, d. Bedford v.	144	Limberty, Lindsay v.	69
Kersey, Hinsdon v.	297	Lindsay v. Limbert	69
Kesworth v. Thomas	226	Linsey v. Clerk	331
Knightley, Doe, d. Duke of Bedford v.	135	Lincoln College case	40
Kildare v. Fisher	25	Lippencott, Doe d. Harwood v.	260
Kineto, Comyn v.	20	Lister, Garrett v.	306
King, Cottingham v.	24, 219	Little v. Heaton	158
—, Doe, d. Powell v.	310, 316	Littler, Clymer v.	327
—, Short, d. Elmes v.	239	Llewelyn v. Williams	223
—, Short v.	356, 359	Lllingon, Chamier v.	383
— v. Bery	209	Lloyd v. Peel	387
—, Watson v.	285	—, Kynaston v.	39
Kingsdale v. Man	343, 345	London (Bishop of) Rex v.	19
Kinaston v. Clarke	305	Longchamp d. Goodfellow v. Fish	291
Kirkman v. Thomson	40	Longhurst, Goodwin v.	63, 65, 66
Knight v. Sims	28	Lonsdale, Roe, d. Raper v.	210
—, d. Phillips v. Smith	85	Longford v. Eyre	293
Knipe v. Palmer	91	Longchamps v. Fawcett	280
Kynaston v. Lloyd	39	Lord, Roe, d. Thorne v.	282
		Loveless v. Rateliff	345
		—, Roe, d. Cosh v.	64, 309
		Lovelock, d. Norris v. Dancaster	259, 260
L.		Lowe, Rowe, d. Ebrall v.	88
Lackland, d. Dowling v. Badtittle	232	— v. Joliffe	298
Lade v. Holford	33	Lowthal v. Tomkins	69
Lambley, Doe, d. Eyre v.	314	Lucas v. How	76
Lamb v. Archer	257	—, Doe, d. Buross v.	132
—, Doe d. Milnes v.	316	Luffe, Rex v.	284
Laming, Doe, d. Pitt v.	179, 184	Lushington, d. Godfrey v. Dose	349
Laminiman, Goodtittle, d. Pin-sent v.	220	Luttrell, Pollard v.	100
Langley, Broughton v.	82	Luxton, Doe, d. Blake v.	32
Lansdowne (Lord) Penphrase v.	292		
Laughlyn, Herbert v.	20	M.	
Lawrence, Driver, d. Oxendon v.	258, 276	Maberly, Thompson v.	137
Law v. Wallis	324	Machel v. Temple	294
—, Doe, d. Chadwick v.	355, 356	Macdunoch v. Stafford	23, 25
—, Doe v.	360	Mackinder, Pendock, d. Mackinder v.	294
Lawder, Doe, d. Knight v.	123	M'Kensie v. Fraser	289
Lawson, Doe, d. Ligberd v.	98	Madden, d. Baker v. White	67, 126
—, Johnson v.	284	Maddox, Orrell v.	311
Lawrence, Doe, d. Barber v.	192	Maisey, Doe, d. Roby v.	60
Lea, Doe, d. Spicer v.	134, 142, 143, 145	Maldon's case	113
Lee v. Libb	291, 292	Mantle v. Wollington	210
— v. Norris	79	Man, Winkworth v.	221
— v. Rowkeley	334	—, Kingsdale v.	343, 345
—, Rigley v.	334	Manning, Parker v.	276
Lees, Roe, d. Bree v.	138	Martyn v. Nichols	28
Leeds (Duke of) Pugh v.	223	Marsh, Jones, d. Griffiths v.	132, 199, 205
Legg, d. Scot v. Benion	130, 132	Marshall, Fitzgerald v.	27, 28
Leighton v. Leighton	352	Martin v. Davis	261

	PAGE		PAGE
Massey v. Rice	28	Newton, Waddy v.	20
Mason, Doe d. Mason v.	288	Nichols, Martin v.	28
——, d. Kendale v. Hodgson	252,	Noden, Doe, d. Miller v.	120
	268	Noke v. Windham	67, 218, 354
—— v. Fox	328	Nokes, Awder v.	76
Masters, Doe, d. Harris v.	162, 170	Noright, Goodright, d. Steven- son v.	170
May v. May	283	——, ——, d. Russell v.	252
Maynard, Rawson v.	27	——, Method v.	243
Medlicott v. Brewster	264	Norris, Lee v.	79
Mellish, Sturt v.	58	Norman, Gardiner v.	201
——, Baker v.	88, 276, 310	North, Goodtitle v.	380, 387
Merlott, Tapner d. Peckham v.	95, 99	Nowell v. Roake	391
Merrell v. Smith	225	Notitle, Goodtitle, d. Norfolk (Duke of) v.	233
Method v. Noright	243	Nutt, Doe, d. Nutt v.	66
Metcalf v. Harvey	392		
Messenger v. Armstrong	151	O.	
Meux, Doe, d. Morecraft v.	184	Oakapple, d. Green v. Copous	314
Miller, Doe d. Warry v.	64	Oates d. Wigfall v. Brydon	33, 95, 263
——, Doe, d. Rumford v.	227	Odingsall v. Jackson	29
——, Doe, d. Maldon (Mayor of) v.	217	Ogle v. Cook	297
——, Doe, d. Scott v.	192	Old, Doe, d. Bristow v.	197
——, v. Foster	304	Old Arlesford, Rex v.	20
Milburn, Powell v.	303	Omichund v. Barker	295
Millener v. Robinson	210	Orchard, Jory v.	313
Minshull, Roe, d. Crompton v.	154, 174	Orrell v. Maddox	311
Mitchell, Doe, d. Esdaile v.	213	Osbourne v. Rider	223
——, Doe, d. Pritchett v.	128, 276	Otway, Goodtitle, d. Wright v.	26
Moggridge v. Davis	388	——, Sir John, Addison v.	204
Molineux v. Molineux	20	Outram v. Morewood	281
—— v. Fulgan	345	Ougly, Peate v.	291
Moody, Tenny, d. Gibbs v.	82, 317		
Moore v. Fursden	210, 330	P.	
—— v. Hawkins	274	Paine, Roe, d. Goatly v.	184
——, Goodright v.	366	Painter, Sturgeon v.	114
—— v. Goodright	204	Palmer's case	28
Morgan, Goodtitle, d. Norris v.	61	Palmer, Knipe v.	91
——, d. Dowding v. Bissell	117	——, Piggott v.	40
Morres v. Barry	328	—— v. Edwards	178
Morris v. Barry	210	Palmer, Doe, d. Brierly v.	152
——, Holdfast v.	388	Partridge v. Ball	60, 216, 217
Morgan v. Stapely	338	Parkin, Aislin v.	212, 382, 388, 389
Morewood, Outram v.	281	——, Astlin v.	389
Moss v. Gallimore	60	Parker, d. Walker v. Constable	106, 125
Mostyn v. Fabrigas	209	—— v. Manning	276
Moss, Goodright, d. Stephens v.	283	—— Roe d. Beebee v.	287
Mulliner, Doe, d. Colclough v.	52	Parkhurst, Berington d. Dormer v.	95, 102, 214
Murthwaite v. Barnard	87	Parsons, Zouch, d. Abbott v.	67
Murless, Doe, d. Batten v.	302	——, —— v.	218
Musgrave, d. Hilton v. Shelley	96	—— v. Lord Rancliffe	289
		Pasquali, Doe, d. Williams v.	125
N.		Passer, Dobbs v.	252, 267
Nash v. Edmunds	299		
Neale, Smalley v.	239		
Negative d. Parsons v. Positive	248		
Neving, Soulby v.	154		
Newman v. Holdmyfast	19, 330		
——, Shirly v.	141		

	PAGE		PAGE
Patterson d. Gradridge v. Eades	203	Pooley v. Bentley	118
Pattison, Mayor of Congleton v.	74	Pollard v. Luttrell	100
Paul, Doe, d. Wheeldon v.	161	———, Audley v.	100
Payne, Doe v.	318	Pomfret v. Windsor	91
———, Wood v.	25, 330	Pope, Goodtitle, d. Taysum v.	364
Payne's case	79	Porch, Doe, d. O'Connell v.	227
Pawlet, Croft v.	294, 298	Porter, Doe, d. Shore v.	70, 125, 214
Pearson, Doe, d. Gill v.	100, 210	———, Girdlestone v.	384
Peaceable, d. Hornblower v. Read	56, 98, 99	Positive, Negative, d. Parson v.	248
——— v. Troublesome	233	Pott, Doe, d. Gibbons v.	33
Peate v. Ougly	291	Potts v. Durant	304
Pearce, Phillips v.	80, 276	Poultney v. Holmes	178
Peell, Lloyd v.	387	Powell v. Milburn	203
Pegge, Doe, d. Bristow v.	33	———, Doe, d. Lloyd v.	182
Pemble v. Sterne	22, 28	Power, Rowe, d. Boyce v.	98, 329
Pembroke Lord, Doe d. Johnson		Price, Hancock v.	25
——— v.	284	———, Right, d. Cator v.	291, 294
Pendrill v. Pendrill	284	Prideaux, Doe, d. Brune v.	110, 124
Pendock d. Mackinder v. Mackinder	294	Pritchard, Jenkins, d. Harris v.	95, 281
Pennant's case	76, 155, 173, 197	Proctor v. Johnson	346
Penphrase v. Lord Lansdowne	292	Proudfoot's case	68
Percival, Thrustout, d. Dunham v.	355	Prossor, Doe, d. Fishar v.	55
Perkins, Doe, d. Burrell v.	98	Proude, Green v.	89
Peto v. Checy	204	Pugh v. Duke of Leeds	223
Peterson, Barnes v.	24, 25	Puller, Hutchinson v.	27
Petifer, Ward v.	21	Pultney v. Warren	383
Petty, Eccleston v.	294	Pure, d. Withers v. Sturdy	170
Pettit, Doe, d. Human v.	281	Purvis, Denn, d. Burghes v.	221
Peytoe's case	270	Purdy, Davis v.	223
Phillips, Chaworth v.	76		
———, Clarke v.	101	Q.	
——— v. Bury	270	Quigley, Doe, d. Knight v.	107, 123
———, Snow, d. Crawley v.	302		
——— v. Hartley	114	R.	
——— v. Pearce	80, 276	Radcliffe v. Chaplin	287
———, Doe, d. Birch v.	353	Raffan, Doe, d. Peacock v.	144
———, ———, d. Wilson v.	189	Ramsbottom v. Brickhurst	301
Phipps v. Pitcher	296	———, Doe, d. Jackson v.	276
Pierson v. Tavenor	345	Rancliffe (Lord) v. Parsons	289
Piers, Swadling v.	217	Rand, Guy v.	221
Pierce, Roe, d. Dean of Rochester v.	129, 132, 206, 313	Ratcliffe's case	66
——— Davis v.	281	——— v. Tate	345
Piggott v. Palmer	40	———, Loveless v.	345
Pike v. Badmering	298	Rawsterne, Reading v.	54
Pilkington, Doe, d. Hardman v.	225, 226	Rawlings, Denn d. Brune v.	107, 110, 124, 304
Pick, Crofts v.	69	———, Tempest v.	115
Pinero v. Judson	119	Rawson v. Maynard	27
Piper, Coplestone v.	25	Reading v. Rawsterne	54
Pitcher, Phipps v.	296	Reade, Doe, d. Burrough v.	71
———, Rogers v.	69	———, Peaceable, d. Hornblower	
Pitt, Reynolds v.	183	——— v.	56, 98
Pitfall, Foster v.	39, 40	———, Roe. Reade v.	32
Pleasant, d. Hayton v. Benson	130	———, Doe, d. Marsack v.	129, 210, 277, 306
Plowman, Doe, d. Bradshaw v.	25	Rede v. Farr	198
Plomer v. Hockhead	201	Redfern, Doe, d. Hayne v.	79
Plumtree, Doe, d. Wright v.	99	Rennie v. Robinson	276
Podger's case	97, 99, 100		

	PAGE		PAGE
Rennet, Rex v.	63	Roe, d. Gregson v. Harrison	178, 190,
Rex v. Bishop of London	19		191, 196
— v. Bery	183	, d. Haldane v. Harvey . . .	32
— v. Burgesses of Carmarthen	325	, d. Hambrook v. Doe . . .	237, 244
— v. Erith	284	, d. Henderson v. Charnock	129,
— v. Eriswell	284, 303		141
— v. Harris	345	, d. Humphries v. Doe . . .	347
— v. Luffe	284	, d. Hunter v. Galliers . . .	159, 180
— v. Mayor of Bristow . . .	199	, d. Hyde v. Doe	268
— v. Old Arlesford	20	, d. Jackson v. Ashburner . .	115
— v. Rennet	63	, d. Jeffreys v. Hicks . . .	64, 98, 308
— v. Shelly	298	, d. Johnson v. Ireland . . .	309
— v. Stoke	22	, d. Jordan v. Ward	105, 111,
— v. Unitt	206		143
Reynolds, Doe v.	351	, d. Kaye v. Soley	365
— v. Pitt	183	, d. Langdon v. Rowleston . .	56
Rhodes, Scrape v.	226	, d. Leak v. Doe	258
Rice, Massey v.	28	, d. Lee v. Ellis	228
Rickhouse, Rochester v. . .	25, 26	, d. Matthews v. Jackson . .	134
Rich, Goodright, d. Balsh v.	276	, d. Pellatt v. Ferrars . . .	57
—, d. Cullen v. Johnson . . .	309	, d. Raper v. Lonsdale . . .	210
—, Wilson v.	201	, d. Reade v. Reade	32
—, Ryal v.	154	, d. Dean of Rochester v.	
Richardson v. Lengridge . .	106	Pearce	129, 132, 216, 313
—, Burne v.	383	, d. Saul v. Dawson	341
Rickarby, Doe, d. Hindly v.	318	, d. Stephenson v. Doe . . .	224
Rider, Osbourn v.	223	, d. Thorne v. Lord	282
Ridgway, Doe, d. Sutton v.	360	, d. Truscott v. Elliott . . .	98
—, Higham v.	283	, d. West v. Davies 160, 162, 166,	
Rigley v. Lee	334	163, 169, 311, 316	
Right, d. Cater v. Price . . .	291, 294	, d. Wrangham v. Hersey . .	213
—, d. Dean of Wells v. Bawden	124	v. Wiggs	130, 235
—, d. Fisher v. Cuthell . . .	126, 128	v. Williamson	215
—, d. Flower v. Darby	124, 139,	, Doe, d. Lord Aylesbury v..	242
	140, 143	, —, d. Bass v.	233
—, d. Lewis v. Beard	107, 121	, —, d. Baddam v.	236
—, Birch v. 60, 109, 137, 154,	307,	, —, d. Bailey v.	237
	381	, —, d. Beyer v.	342
—, d. Freeman v. Roe	237	, —, d. Bird v.	232
— v. Wrong	237	, —, d. Bradford (Earl of),	
Rivington v. Allen	32	v.	374
Roake, Nowell v.	391	, —, d. Bromley v.	237
Roberts v. Cook	357	, —, d. Cardigan, (Earl of),	
—, Fagg v.	323	v.	374
Robinson, Millener v.	210	, —, d. Clarke v.	231
—, Rennie v.	276	, —, d. Cobbey v.	225
Rochester v. Rickhouse . .	25, 26	, —, d. Davis v.	323
Roe, d. Bamford v. Hayley . .	150	, —, d. Dry v.	239
, d. Beebee v. Parker	287	, —, d. Edwards v.	244
, d. Bree v. Lees	138	, —, d. Elwood v.	237
, d. Brune v. Rawlins	304	, —, d. Evans v.	172
, d. Burlton v. Roe 228, 246,	264	, —, d. Feldon v.	356
, d. Cholmondley v. Doe . . .	325	, —, d. Fenwick v.	240
, d. Cook v. Doe	266	, —, d. Field v.	237
, d. Cosh v. Loveless	64, 309	, —, d. Ginger v.	263
, d. Crumpton v. Minshull . .	154,	, —, d. Grocers' Company	
	174	v.	252
, d. Dingley v. Sales	179	, —, d. Harvey v.	239
, d. Durant v. Doe	375	, —, d. Heblethwaite v. . . .	252
, d. Ebrall v. Lowe	79	, —, d. Hele v.	240
, d. Goatly v. Paine	184	, —, d. Jones v.	240
		, —, d. Leak v.	258

	PAGE		PAGE
Roe, Doe, d. Ledger v.	252	Savel's case	27
—, —, d. Lewis v.	232	— — — Hamond v.	27
—, —, d. Lowe v.	240	Savage v. Dent	199, 205
—, —, d. M'Dougall v.	237	Saville, Goodtitle, d. Luxmore v.	186
—, —, d. Morgan v.	350	Say and Sele (Lord) Jones v.	82, 83
—, —, d. Governors of St. Margaret's Hospital v.	229	Sayer, Doe, d. Leeson v.	107, 123
—, —, d. Neale v.	239	Scott, Doe, d. Graham v.	89
—, —, d. Pate v.	345	—, —, d. Foster v.	50
—, —, d. Pearson v.	230, 260	—, —, d. Campbell v.	140
—, —, d. Pemberton v.	374	Scrape v. Rhodes	226
—, —, d. Phillips v.	374	Scrutton, Driver, d. Scrutton v.	226
—, —, d. Pinckard v.	359	Seagrave, Sullivane v.	27
—, —, d. Quintin v.	244	Seawell, Bond v.	293
—, —, d. Robinson v.	245	Seers v. Hind	190, 191
—, —, d. Rust v.	272	Seed, Tyley v.	141
—, —, d. Sampson v.	374	Selwyn, Doe, d. Wadmore v.	145
—, —, d. Shepherd v.	211	Semayne's case	342
—, —, d. Seabrooke v.	172	Serle, Claxmore v.	323
—, —, d. Simmons v.	236	Seymour's case	36, 96
—, —, d. Thomos v.	232	Shamtittle, Fairclaim, d. Fowler v.	14, 54, 55, 257, 259, 261
—, —, d. Tindal v.	237	Shackleton, Fairclaim, d. Empson v.	53, 54
—, —, d. Troughton v.	252, 267	Shank, Douglas v.	222
—, —, d. Tubb v.	363	Shapland v. Smith	82
—, —, d. Whitfield v.	167, 244	Sharpe, Chapman v.	66
—, —, d. Wright v.	242	— — — Hodson v.	276
—, —, Fenn, d. Buckle v.	239	Shawcross, Doe, d. Lawrence v.	213
Ranger, d. Goodtitle v.	207	Sharrington v. Strotton	47
Right, d. Freeman v.	237	Sherman v. Cocke	199
Roe, d. Burlton v.	228, 246, 264	Shelly, Rex v.	298
Baker v.	19	— — — Musgrave, d. Hilton v.	96
Doe v.	229, 237, 240, 245	Sherwin, Earl of Bath v.	352
Rogers v. Pitcher	69	— — — Doe, d. Pitt v.	183
Rolle, Gree v.	51, 100, 333	Shirley v. Newman	141
Rolfe v. Harris	183	Shires v. Glasscock	293
Rosser, Doe, d. Morris v.	92	Short v. King	356, 359
Rowe, Doe d. Knight v.	190	— v. Heath	393
—, d. Boyce v. Power	98, 329	—, d. Elmes v. King	239
— v. Hasland	285	Silvester, d. Law v. Wilson	89
Rowlston, Roe, d. Langdon v.	56	Silley, Collins v.	76
Rowlinson, Timmins v.	106, 132, 154, 381	Sims, Knight v.	28
Rowell, Clerke v.	215, 327	Sindercombe, Bindover v.	23, 27
Rowkeley, Lee v.	334	Skinner v. Stacey	364
Royston v. Eccleston	23, 27, 28	— — — Ablett v.	221
Rudston v. Yates	67	Slade's case	70
Russel, Webb v.	76, 190	— — — England, d. Sybourn v.	89, 276
Rumney v. Eves	286	Sleabourne v. Bengo	330
Ryal v. Rich	154	Smales v. Dale	98
		Smartle v. Williams	61
S.		Smartley v. Henden	202
Saint Leger v. Adams	289	Smart, Wharod v.	350
Saint John v. Comyn	24, 25	— — — Fenn, d. Matthews v.	98, 190
Sales, Roe, d. Dingley v.	179	Smalley v. Neale	239
Salisbury (Lord's) case	507	Small, d. Baker v. Cole	324, 331
— — — Focus v.	101	Smith, d. Ginger v. Barnardiston	339
Salter, Doe, d. Tollet v.	220	— — — Doe, d. Bland v.	302
— — — d. Prior v.	337	— — — Doe d. Chere v.	191
Saltonstall, Capel v.	228	— — — Doe, d. Hanson v.	298
Samuel, Doe d. Castleton v.	143, 315	— — — Lady, Doe, d. Knight v.	260
Sandwich, (Lord's,) case	324		

	PAGE		PAGE
Smith, Doe, d. Lord Jersey v.	162	Strotton, Sharrington v.	47
—, Doe, d. Smith v.	299	Stroud, Hems v.	29, 304
—, Doe, d. Bromfield v.	116, 125	Sturgeon v. Painter	114
—, Knight, d. Phillips v.	85	Sturdy, Pure, d. Withers v.	170
—, Throgmorton, d. Miller v.	354	Sturt v. Mellish	58
— v. Blackham	280	Sullivan v. Stradling	276
— v. Barrett	19	— v. Seagrave	37
— v. Crabb	264	Swann, Fox v.	177, 192, 280
— v. Evans	291	Swadling v. Piers	217
— v. Spooner	168	Sykes, d. Murgatroyd v.	124
— v. Vernon	74, 75	Symonds, Whiteacre, d. Boulton v.	153
—, Brice v.	294	Syms, Dumpor v.	190
—, Davy v.	293		
—, Ellis v.	291, 292	T.	
—, Merrell v.	225		
—, Shapland v.	82		
Snapp, Archer, d. Hankey v.	365	Tailbois, Wimbish v.	43, 44
Snell, Bird v.	204	Tankard, Whaley v.	97
Snow, d. Crawley v. Phillips	302	Tapner, d. Peckham v. Merlott	95, 99
Snowdon, Doe, d. Daggett v.	147	Tate, Ratcliffe v.	345
Soley, Roe, d. Kaye v.	365	Tatham, Jones v.	173
Somerville, Doe d. Cates v.	121	Tavenor, Pierson v.	345
Soulsby v. Neving	154	Taylor, d. Atkins v. Horde	41, 327, 339
Spark, Weeks v.	284	— v. Cole	69
Sparkes's case	63	— v. Jefts	235
Sparrow, Wykes v.	28	— v. Wilbore	332
Spence, Doe d. Strickland v.	146, 147	Telling, Doe, d. Wheatley v.	213
Spencer's case	73	Temple, Machel v.	294
—, Doe, d. Clarke v.	67, 68	Tempest v. Rawlings	115
—, —, d. Osborne v.	98	Tenny d. Gibbs v. Moody	82, 317
Spiller, Doe v.	133	Thatcher, Hazlewood, d. Price v.	233
Spooner, Smith v.	168	Thompson v. Maberly	137
Spray, Denn, d. Goodwin v.	287	—, Kirkman v.	40
Sprightley, d. Collins v. Dunch	239	—, Barwick, d. Mayor of Richmond v.	276
Spry, Doe, d. Gaskell v.	182	Thomas d. Jones v. Thomas	314
Spurrier, Dann v.	138	— William, d. Hughes v.	41
Stanton, Doe, d. James v.	277	— v. Goodtitle	350
Stanley, Ashworth v.	25	—, Challenor v.	21
—, Leymayne v.	290	—, Kesworth v.	226
Stafford, Macdunoch v.	23, 25	—, Doe, d. Courtall v.	91
Staple, Doe d. Hodson v.	33, 89	—, Doe, d. Rees v.	360
Stacey, Skinner v.	364	Thorne, Jones v.	183
Stapely, Morgan v.	338	—, Doe, d. Enmett v.	302
Stephens, Copeland v.	69	Thornby d. Hamilton v. Fleetwood	338
Sterne, Pemble v.	22, 28	Thorpe v. Fry	389
Stennett, Doe, d. Hollingsworth v.	107, 122	—, Hatfield v.	296
Steele, Doe, d. Digby v.	151, 300	Throgmorton d. Fairfax v. Bentley	323
Stephens v. Elliot	63	— d. Miller v. Smith	354
Stephenson, Doe, d. Walker v.	298, 355	Threr v. Barton	76, 190
Stephens v. Croker	223	Thredder v. Travis	231
Stoke, Rex v.	22	Thrustout d. Dunham v. Percival	355
Stone, Jurdan v.	66	—, Farmer d. Miles v.	239
Story, Windsor v.	56	—, Goodright d. Waddington v.	208
Stocker v. Barney	77	—, Goodright d. Jones v.	236, 355
Stonehouse v. Evelyn	291	—, Hyde d. Culliford v.	252
Stowell v. Zouch	58, 59, 97, 102		
Stradling, Doe v.	277		
—, Sullivan v.	276		
Stratton, Doe, d. Tilt v.	112		
Strother, Goodright d. Smallwood v.	30, 218		

Section 4. " Provided always, that notwithstanding any judgment signed or recorded, or execution issued, by virtue of this act, it shall be lawful for the court in which the action shall have been brought, to order such judgment to be vacated, and execution to be stayed or set aside, and to enter an arrest of judgment, or grant a new trial, or new writ of inquiry, as justice may appear to require; and thereupon the party affected by such writ of execution shall be restored to all that he may have lost thereby in such manner as upon the reversal of a judgment by writ of error, or otherwise as the court may think fit to direct."

Section 5. " Provided always, and be it further enacted, That nothing in this act contained shall be deemed to frustrate or make void any provision relating to the issuing of any writ of *habere facias possessionem* contained in the act passed in the first year of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, "*An Act for the more effectual Administration of Justice in England and Wales.*"—*Vide page 376, &c.*

The presiding judge in trials of ejectionment has therefore the power of certifying either under the Stat. 11 G. 4, & 1 Wm. 4. c. 70, s. 38, or Stat. 1 Wm. 4, c. 7. s. 2.

By Reg. Gen. of the courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer of Trin. Term, 1 Wm. 4, it is ordered, " That declarations in *ejectionment* may be served before *the first day of any term*, and thereupon the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment against the casual ejector, in like manner as upon declarations served before the *essoign* or first general return day."—*Vide page 234, &c.*

A

TREATISE

ON THE

ACTION OF EJECTMENT.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Origin, Progress, and Nature of the Action of Ejectment.

THE action of ejectment is a fictitious mode of legal proceeding, by which possessory titles to corporeal hereditaments and tithes, may be tried, and possession obtained, without the process of a real action.

The alterations, which from time to time have taken place, in the nature and uses of the action of ejectment, form a remarkable and important branch of the changes effected in our general system of remedial law. From being a mere action of trespass to recover the damages sustained by a lessee for years, when ousted of his possession, it has gradually

usurped the place of all the ancient remedies for the recovery of possessory rights to real property, and is at the present time the universal mode of trying possessory titles. The alterations have however been effected by the most simple and natural means; and in tracing the remedy through its several gradations, it will be found continually moulding itself to the condition of the times, and extending its uses and powers, as the progress of civil society rendered necessary or convenient.

In the earlier periods of our history, estates for years, according to their present import, were unknown. Under the feudal system, war was the primary object even of legislation; and it is therefore by no means surprising; that the interests of the inferior tenantry were then disregarded, and the remedies for the recovery of lands altogether confined to freehold titles, vested in the superior landholders. The lords, indeed, seldom permitted their vassals to enjoy any interest in the lands they occupied, which could render them independent of their will; and, even when they did grant them a right to the possession for a determinate period, as a stimulus to increase their industry, such grants were not considered as transferring to the grantee any title to the land, but merely as agreements or contracts between the lord and his vassal.

The old writ of covenant, adapted at that time to the recovery of the term, as well as of damages, was the only remedy to which the tenants were entitled upon these leases. But this writ could only extend

to cases in which there was a breach of the original contract, and the tenant was therefore altogether without means of redress, when dispossessed of his land by the act of a stranger, not claiming under the grantor. Great difficulties also attended the proceedings upon the writ of covenant. It only lay between the immediate parties to the grant, and, as it frequently happened that the tenant was dispossessed, by a person claiming under a subsequent feoffment from his grantor, and not by the grantor himself, he was then, notwithstanding the breach of the original contract, enabled to recover only damages for the injury he had sustained, but had no means of regaining possession of the land from which he had been ousted. (a)

So regardless, however, was the law, during the first ages after the conquest, of grants of this nature, that until the time of King Henry III. this writ of covenant remained the sole remedy of the grantee, even upon a breach of the grant. In that reign the first symptoms of a more enlightened policy appeared; and by the wisdom of the court and council, a full remedy was provided for a termor, who was dispossessed of his land, against all persons whatsoever, claiming under the title of the grantor. (a)

The writ invented for this purpose was, according to Bracton (a), called the writ of *quare ejecit infra terminum*, and required the defendant to show wherefore he deforced the plaintiff of certain lands, which A. had demised to him for a term then un-

(a) Bracton, b. 4. f. 220

expired, within which term the said *A.* sold the lands to the defendant, by reason of which sale the defendant ejected the plaintiff therefrom.

The language, indeed, used by Bracton (*a*), when speaking of this writ, may at first sight induce an opinion, that it was intended as a general remedy against all persons, even strangers, who ejected a lessee; and this interpretation has been adopted by a learned writer on the English law (*b*). On a minute investigation, however, it will appear that Bracton meant only to include the grantor himself, or persons claiming under him. One passage certainly militates against this conclusion, "*Si autem alius quàm qui tradidit ejecerit, si hoc fecerit cum AUTORITATE et VOLUNTATE tradentis, uterque tenetur hoc iudicio, unus propter factum, et alius propter auctoritatem. Si autem sine VOLUNTATE, tunc tenetur ejector utrique, tam domino proprietatis, quam firmario: firmario per istud breve, domino proprietatis per assisam novæ disseysinæ, ut unus rehebeat terminum cum damnis, et alius liberum tenementum suum sine damnis.*" But the difficulty is removed by the next sentence, in which he says, "*Si autem dominus proprietatis tenementum ad firmam traditum alicui dederit in dominico tenendum, seysinam ei facere poterit SALVO FIRMARIO TERMINO SUO.*" And it seems therefore, that in the latter clause of the passage first above cited, particularly from the omission of the word *autoritate* in it, Bracton only alluded to cases where the grantor

(*a*) Bracton, b. 4. f. 220.

(*b*) Reeves, Eng. Law, Vol. I. p. 341.

had enfeoffed another, without intending thereby to injure his grantee, and such feoffee afterwards entered upon him. This interpretation is also most consistent with the spirit of the times in which Bracton wrote. It was then held that a man could not enter *vi et armis* into his own freehold, and the writ of *quare ejecit infra terminum* is not a writ of trespass *vi et armis*, which, if it had lain against those not having a title to the freehold, it naturally would have been. The old authorities (a) also, when describing the nature and effect of this writ, invariably speak of it as lying in those cases only where the ejector claims title under the grantor. A sale of the lands to the ejector is also stated in the body of the writ. And indeed, if the interpretation here contended for be incorrect, it seems quite unaccountable, that, more than half a century after the time of Bracton, a new writ, namely, the writ of *ejectione firmæ*,

(a) Thus, in Hil. Term, 3 Edward I. "In *quare ejecit* plaintiff shall recover his term and damages by him sustained by reason of the sale." (Stat. Ab. tit. *qua. ejec.*) In the Reg. Brev. (p. 227.) "*Fuit hoc breve inventum per discretum virum Whilhelmum de Merton ut terminarius recuperet catalla sua versus FEOFFATUM.*" In a case in Hil. Term, 46 Edw. III. 4. 12. per Fulthorpe, Justice, "If a stranger oust a lessee by reason of a *feoffment*, in that case he is put to his action upon the writ of *quare ejecit*;" and in the same case, per Finchden, J. "In such case, at the common law the lessee had no other

writ but his writ of covenant; and although by the law a special writ of *quare ejecit* is ordered against a stranger, a *feoffee*, nevertheless the lessee is not ousted of his writ of covenant against the lessor." This latter doctrine is exactly that laid down in Bracton. So also per Choke J. (21 Edw. IV. 10. 30.) "*Quare ejecit, &c.* lieth where one is in by title, *ejectione firmæ* where one is *by wrong*:" and *per totam curiam* (19 Henry VI. 56. 19.), "If a man lease for years, and sell to F. who oustes the termor, the lessee shall have a *quare ejecit*, and recover his term and damages."

which only gave the plaintiff damages, and did not restore the term, should have been invented for lessees against strangers, when one so much more beneficial was already in existence.

The writ of *quare ejecit* might be drawn either as a *præcipe*, or a *si te fecerit securum*, and, when first invented, the *præcipe* was thought the better mode of proceeding, though in process of time, the latter became more generally used. It is, perhaps, from this circumstance, that Fitzherbert (*a*) has considered the invention of the writ to be posterior to the statute of Westminster the second. (*b*)

The plaintiff by this writ, as by the old writ of covenant, recovered both his term and damages, if the term were unexpired, or his damages only in case of its expiration before the judgment; but the great advantage he derived from it, was the power of proceeding against third persons, as well as against the original grantor.

(*a*) The inaccuracy of Fitzherbert, when speaking of this writ, is remarkable. He considers its invention as posterior to the statute of Westminster 2. (13 Edw. I.), and as intended to remedy a partial evil, occasioned by the writ of *ejectione firmæ*. (F. N. B. 458.) Bracton, however, who wrote in the reign of Henry III. speaks of the writ as in use in his time, and as having been invented to remedy the inconveniences attendant on the old writ of covenant. In the Reg. Brev. (227.) also, the same

reasons are given for its origin. The inaccuracy is evident also from another circumstance. WALTER DE MERTON, called by Fitzherbert *William de Moreton*, and in the Reg. Brev. *William de Merton*, (the inventor of the writ), was Chancellor in the reign of Henry III. (Dugdale's Chron.), and died in the sixth year of Edward I. (Matt. Westmon. p. 366.), seven years before the statute of Westminster 2 was enacted.

(*b*) F. N. B. 458.

Notwithstanding this favourable alteration, the farmer was still without remedy when dispossessed by a mere stranger, not claiming under his grantor. But an ouster by a stranger could then rarely happen; and if at any time the vassal was so dispossessed, he would throw himself on the protection of his lessor, abandon his own claim, and leave the lord to recover, by a real action, both the freehold and possession.

In process of time, however, the vassal demanded a remedy for himself, and in the reign of King Edward II. or in the early part of that of Edward III. (a) a writ was invented, which gave a lessee for years a remedy (though in some respects an imperfect one) against all persons whatsoever, who ousted him of his term; excepting indeed where the grantor himself ejected his lessee, and subsequently enfeoffed another, in which case the old writ of *quare ejecit* was resorted to.

This new writ was a writ of trespass in its nature. The process upon it, as upon all other writs of trespass, was by attachment, distress, and process of outlawry. It called upon the defendant to show, wherefore, with force and arms, he entered upon certain lands which had been demised to the plaintiff for a term then unexpired, and ejected him from the possession thereof; and comprised all cases, with the single exception already mentioned, in which the second lessee, coming into possession by means of a

(a) The first recorded instance in the 44th year of Edward III. of an action of *ejectione firmæ*, is (Trin. 41 Edw. III. 22. 26.)

title, could not be said to be a trespasser. Even the grantor was liable to be sued upon this new writ, notwithstanding the old doctrine, that a man could not enter *vi et armis* into his own freehold. (*a*) As, however, the plaintiff did not possess a freehold interest, his title to the lands was only so far acknowledged in this action, as to give him damages for the injury he had sustained, but not to restore to him the possession of his term.

It is upon this writ, though apparently so dissimilar from the present practice, that the modern remedy by ejectment is founded.

Whilst the feudal system continued in its vigour, and estates for years retained their original character, but little inconvenience resulted to tenants from this imperfect remedy. But when the feudal policy declined, and agriculture became an object of legislative regard, the value and importance of estates of this nature considerably increased, and it was necessary to afford to lessees for years a more effectual protection. It then became the practice for leaseholders, when disturbed in their possessions, to apply to courts of equity for redress, and to prosecute suits against the lessor himself, to obtain a specific performance of the grant, or against strangers for perpetual injunctions to quiet the possession; and these courts would then compel a restitution of the land itself to the party immediately injured. (*b*)

The courts of common law soon afterwards adopted

(*a*) F. N. B. 505.

(*b*) Gilb. Eject. p. 2.

this method of rendering substantial justice : not indeed by the invention of a new writ, which perhaps would have been the best and most prudent method, but by adapting the one already in existence to the circumstances of the times ; and introducing, in the prosecution of a writ of ejectment, a species of remedy neither warranted by the original writ, nor demanded by the declaration, namely, a judgment to recover the term, and a writ of possession thereupon.

It is singular, that neither the causes which led to this important change, nor the principles upon which it was founded, are recorded in any of the legal authorities of those times. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain with accuracy the precise period when the alteration itself took place ; although it certainly must have been made between the years 1455 and 1499, since in the former year it is said by one of the judges, (a) that damages only can be recovered in ejectment ; and an entry of a judgment is still extant, given in the latter of those years, that the plaintiff in ejectment shall recover both his damages and his term. (b) It is said, indeed, in argument as early as the year 1458, that the term may be recovered in ejectment, but no reason is assigned for the assertion, nor is any decision upon the point on record until the time of the entry already mentioned. (c)

But, whatever might be the causes which occa-

(a) Per Choke J. Mich. 33 Hen. VI. 42. 19.

(c) Brooke's Ab. tit. *Quare eject*, folio 167.

(b) Rast. Ent. 253, (a) .

sioned this alteration, the effects they produced were highly important. A new efficacy was given to the action of ejectment, the old real actions fell into disuse, and in the subsequent periods of our history, the action of ejectment became the regular mode of proceeding for the trial of possessory titles.

That an action of ejectment, by means of this alteration in its judgment, might restore termors to possession who had been actually ejected from their lands, is sufficiently obvious; but it is not perhaps so evident how the same proceeding could be applicable to a disputed title of freehold, or why, as soon after happened, the freeholder should have adopted this novel remedy. No report of the case, in which this bold experiment was first made, is extant; but from the innumerable difficulties which attend real actions, it is not surprising that the freeholders should take advantage of any fiction which enabled him to avoid them; and as the Court of Common Pleas possessed an exclusive right of judicature in matters of real property, it is probable that the experiment originated in the Court of King's Bench, as an indirect method of giving to that court a concurrent jurisdiction with the Common Pleas. But however this may be, the experiment succeeded, and the uses of the action, as well as its nature, were changed.

When first the remedy was applied to the trial of disputed titles, the proceedings were simple and regular, differing but little from those previously in use, when an ejectment was brought to recover the damages of an actual trespass. The right to the free-

hold could only be determined in an indirect manner. It was a term which was to be recovered by the judgment in the action, and it was therefore necessary that a term should be created; and as the injury complained of in the writ was the loss of the possession, it was also necessary that the person to whom the term was given, should be ejected from the lands.

In order to obtain the first of these requisites, namely, a term, the party claiming title entered upon the disputed premises, accompanied by another person, to whom, whilst on the lands, he sealed and delivered a lease for years. This actual entry was absolutely necessary; for, according to the old law of maintenance, it was a penal offence to convey a title to another, when the grantor himself was not in possession. And, indeed, it was at first doubted, whether this nominal possession, taken only for the purpose of trying the title, was sufficient to excuse him from the penalties of that offence. (*a*)

It is from the necessity of this entry also, that the remedy by ejectment is confined to cases in which the claimant has a right to the possession. When only a right of property, or a right of action remained to him, the entry would be illegal, and consequently not sufficient to enable the party making it to convey a title to his lessee: and as the principles of the action still remain the same, although its proceedings are changed, the right to make an entry continues to be requisite, though the entry itself is no longer necessary.

(*a*) 1 Ch. Rep. Append. 39.

The lessee of the claimant, having acquired a right to the possession, by means of the lease already mentioned, remained upon the land, and then the person who came next upon the freehold, *animo possidendi*, or, according to the old authorities, even by chance (*a*), was accounted an ejector of the lessee, and a trespasser on his possession. A writ of trespass and ejectment was then served upon the ejector by the lessee. The cause regularly proceeded to trial as in the common action of trespass; and as the lessee's claim could only be founded upon the title of his lessor, it was necessary to prove the lessor's interest in the land, to enable the plaintiff (the lessee) to obtain a verdict. The claimant's title was thus indirectly determined; and although the writ of possession must of course have been issued in the plaintiff's name, and not in his own, yet as the plaintiff had prosecuted the suit only as the lessor's friend, he would immediately give up to him the possession of the lands.

In the infancy of the experiment, this mode of proceeding could be attended with no ill consequences. As the party previously in possession, must in contemplation of the law be upon the lands, and certainly, *animo possidendi*, the friend of the claimant was allowed to consider him as an ejector, and make him the defendant in the action. When, however, the remedy became more generally used, this simple method was found to be productive of considerable evil. It was easy for the claimant to conceal the

(*a*) 1 Lil. Prac. Reg. 673.

proceedings from the person in possession, and to procure a second friend to enter upon the lands, and eject his lessee immediately after the execution and delivery of the lease. The lessee would then commence his suit against this ejector, and the party in possession might consequently be ousted of his lands, without any opportunity of defending his title. To check this evil, a rule of court was made, forbidding a plaintiff in ejectment to proceed against such third person, without giving a previous notice of the proceedings to the party in possession; and it was the practice for such party, on the receipt of this notice, if he had any title to the lands, to apply to the court for permission to defend the action; which application was uniformly granted, upon his undertaking to indemnify the defendant (the third person) from the expenses of the suit. The action however proceeded in the name of such defendant, though the person in possession was permitted at the trial to give evidence of his own title.

A considerable alteration in the manner of proceeding in the action was occasioned by this rule, although it was only intended to remedy a particular evil. It became the general practice to have the lessee ejected by some third person, since called the casual ejector, and to give the regular notice to the person in possession, instead of making him, as before, the trespasser and defendant. A reasonable time was allowed by the courts, for the person in possession, after the receipt of the notice, to make his application for leave to defend the action, and if he

neglected to do so, the suit proceeded against the casual ejector, as if no notice had been necessary.

The time when this rule was made is unknown, but as the evil it was intended to remove must soon have been discovered, it probably was adopted shortly after the remedy grew into general use. (*a*) It seems also to have been the first instance, in which the courts interfered in the practice of the action, and is therefore remarkable as the foundation of the fictitious system, by which it is now conducted.

In this state, with the exception of a few practical regulations, not necessary to be here noticed, the action of ejectment continued until the time of the Commonwealth. Much trouble and inconvenience, however, attended the observance of the different formalities. If several persons were in possession of the disputed lands, it was necessary to execute separate leases upon the premises of the different tenants, and to commence separate actions upon the several leases. (*b*) Difficulties also attended the making of entries, and the action of ejectment had by this time grown into such general use, as to make these inconveniences sensibly felt. A remedy, however, was discovered for them by Lord Chief Justice Rolle, who presided in the Court of Upper Bench during the Protectorate; and a method of proceeding in

(*a*) Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Sham-title, Burr. 1290—1297.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 252. Argoll v. Cheney, Palm. 402.

ejectment was invented by him, which at once superseded the ancient practice, and has by degrees become fully adapted to the modern uses of the action. (*a*)

By the new system, all the forms which we have been describing are dispensed with. No lease is sealed, no entry or ouster really made, the plaintiff and defendant in the suit are merely fictitious names, and in fact all those preliminaries are now only feigned, which the ancient practice required to be actually complied with.

An inquiry into the numerous regulations which have been made for the improvement of the modern practice, must be reserved for a future part of this work; but it may be useful to give in this place a brief outline of the system, although a detailed account will be hereafter necessary.

A. the person claiming title, delivers to *B.* the person in possession, a declaration in ejectment, in which *C.* and *D.*, two fictitious persons, are made respectively plaintiff and defendant; and in which *C.* states a fictitious demise of the lands in question from *A.* to himself for a term of years, and complains of an ouster from them by *D.* during its continuance. To this declaration is annexed a notice, supposed to be written and signed by *D.*, informing *B.* of the proceedings, and advising him to apply to the court

(*a*) Styles, Prac. Reg. 103. (ed. 1657.)

for permission to be made defendant in his place, as he, having no title, shall leave the suit undefended. Upon the receipt of this declaration, if *B.* do not apply within a limited time to be made defendant, he is supposed to have no title to the premises; and upon an affidavit that a declaration has been regularly served upon him, the court will order judgment to be entered against *D.* the casual ejector, and possession of the lands will be given to *A.* the party claiming title. When, however, *B.* applies, pursuant to the notice, to defend the action, the courts annex certain conditions to the privilege. Four things are necessary to enable a person to support an ejectment, namely, title, lease, entry, and ouster; and as the three latter are only feigned in the modern practice, *C.* (the plaintiff) would be nonsuited at the trial if he were obliged to prove them. The courts therefore compel *B.* if made defendant, to enter into a rule, generally termed *the consent-rule*, by which he undertakes, that at the trial he will confess the lease, entry, and ouster to have been regularly made, and rely solely upon the merits of his title; and, lest at the trial he should break this engagement, another condition is also added, that in such case, he shall pay the costs of the suit, and shall allow judgment to be entered against *D.* the casual ejector. These conditions being complied with, the declaration is altered, by making *B.* the defendant instead of *D.*, and the cause proceeds to trial in the same manner as in other actions.

The advantages resulting from this method are ob-

vious : the claimant is exempted from the observance of useless forms, and the tenant admits nothing which can prejudice the merits of the case.

It could not indeed be expected that a change so extensive should, in the first instance, be entirely free from defects, nor that it would not, like other innovations, occasion some inconvenience when first introduced. For a few years after its invention, the courts seem occasionally to have been confused between the ancient and modern systems, and not to have established, so distinctly as might have been desired, the principles which were to regulate the proceedings they had so newly adopted. The action has, however, now attained a considerable degree of perfection. Its principles are clearly understood, and its practice is reduced to a regular and settled system. The legislature has frequently interfered to correct its deficiencies. The courts continue to regard it with great liberality ; and the remedy by ejectment is at the present time, a safe and expeditious method of trying possessory titles, unembarrassed by the difficulties attendant on real actions, and well adapted to the purposes of substantial justice.

CHAPTER II.

Of what things an Ejectment will lie, and how they are to be described.

BY the common law, an ejectment will not lie for any thing, whereon an entry cannot be made, or of which the sheriff cannot deliver possession; or, in other words, it is only maintainable for corporeal hereditaments. Thus an ejectment will not lie for a rent, an advowson, a common in gross, or *pur cause de vicinage*, or any other thing which passes only by grant. Tithes, indeed, though an incorporeal inheritance, may be recovered by this action, but the right of maintaining an ejectment for them, does not arise from the common law, but is given by the provisions of the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 7.

It was formerly holden that an ejectment did not lie for a chapel, though a corporeal hereditament, because it was *res sacra*, and therefore not demisable; but this doctrine is now exploded, though in point of form, a chapel should still be demanded as a mes-

suage. (a) A church may be also recovered in an ejectment when so demanded; (b) and it is in one case said in argument, that after collation, ejectment will lie for a prebendal stall. (c)

A common appendant or appurtenant may be recovered in an ejectment, brought for the lands to which it is appendant or appurtenant, provided such right of common be mentioned in the description of the premises; because he who has possession of the land has also possession of the common; and the sheriff by giving possession of the one, executes the writ as to the other. But it may be prudent to state in the description, that the common so claimed is a common appendant or appurtenant, although it has been held after verdict, that an ejectment for lands and also for "common of pasture," generally, is sufficient. (d)

An ejectment will also lie for a boilary of salt, although by the grant of a boilary of salt the grantee is only entitled to a certain proportion of the number of buckets of salt water drawn out of a particular salt-water well; for by the grant of a boilary of salt the soil shall pass, inasmuch as it is the whole profit of the soil. (e)

(a) Harpur's case, 11 Co. 25, (b) Thyn v. Thyn, Styles, 101. Doc. Plac. 291.

(b) Hillingsworth v. Brewster, Salk. 256.

(c) The King v. the Bishop of London, 1 Wils. 11. 14.

(d) Baker v. Roe, Cas. Temp. Hard. 127. Newman v. Holdmyfast, Stran. 54.

(e) Smith v. Barrett, Sid. 161. S. C. 1 Lev. 114. Co. Litt. 4, (b).

Upon the same principle an ejectment may be maintained for a coal mine, for it is not to be considered as a bare profit *apprender*, but as comprehending the ground or soil itself, which may be delivered in execution; and though a man may have a right to the mine without any title to the soil, yet the mine being fixed in a certain place, the sheriff has a thing certain before him of which he can deliver possession. (a)

When a grant of mines is so worded as not to operate as an actual demise, but only as a licence to dig search for and take metals and minerals within a certain district during the term granted; it seems that a party claiming under such a grant, and who shall open and work and be in actual possession of any mines, may if ousted maintain ejectment in respect of them; but he cannot maintain ejectment either in respect of mines within the district, which he has not opened, or which, having opened, he has abandoned. (b)

In the old cases it is holden, that an ejectment will not lie for a fishery, because it is only a profit *apprender*; (c) but it is said by Ashhurst, J. in the case of *The King v. the Inhabitants of Old Arlesford*, (d) “There is no doubt but that a fishery is a tene-

(a) *Comyn v. Kineto*, Cro. Jac. 150. *Comyn v. Wheatly*, Noy. 121.

(b) *Doe. d. Hanley v. Wood*, 2 B. & A. 724. *Crocker v. Fothergill*, 2 B. & A. 652.

(c) *Molineaux v. Molineaux*, Cro. Jac. 144. *Herbert v. Laughlyn*, Cro. Car. 492. *Waddy v. Newton*, 8 Mod. 275—277.

(d) 1 T. R. 358.

ment; trespass will lie for an injury to it, *and it may be recovered in ejectment.*"

But an ejectment will not lie for a watercourse or rivulet, though its name be mentioned, because it is impossible to give execution of a thing which is transient, and always running. When, however, the ground over which the rivulet runs, is the property of the claimant, the rivulet may be recovered, by laying the action for "so many acres of land covered with water." (a) An ejectment may be maintained for a pool, or pit of water, because those words comprehend both land and water. (b)

The owner of the soil may maintain an ejectment for land, which is part of the king's highway; because, though the public have a right to pass over it, yet the freehold and all the profits belong to the owner. He must, however, recover the land, and the sheriff give possession of it, subject to the public easement. (c)

An ejectment will lie *pro primâ tonsurâ*: that is to say, if a man has a grant of the first grass which grows on the land every year, he may maintain ejectment against him who withholds it from him. (d) So also a demise of the hay-grass and after-math is sufficient to support an ejectment. (e) And the principle seems to be this, that the parties in these cases,

(a) *Challenor v. Thomas*, Yelv. 143. (d) *Ward v. Petifer*, Cro. Car. 362.
 (b) *Ibid.* Co. Litt. 5, (b.) (e) *Wheeler v. Toulson*, Hard.
 (c) *Goodtitle d. Chester v. Alker*, 330. Bur. 133. 145.

being entitled to all the profits of the land, for the time being, are entitled also for the same time to the land itself; and no man can enter thereon whilst they are so entitled, without being a trespasser. But the ejectment should not be brought for the land generally, but for the first grass or after-math thereof, as the case may be; although where the demise was for so many acres of pasture land, it was held sufficient for the lessor of the plaintiff in the first instance to show that he was entitled to the *primâ tonsurâ* thereof, because the first grass being the most signal profit, the freehold of the land shall be esteemed to be in him who has it, until the contrary is shown. (a)

A right to the herbage will also be sufficient to support an ejectment, because he who has a grant of the herbage has a particular interest in the soil, although by such grant the soil itself does not pass. But the ejectment should be for the herbage of the land, and not for the land itself. (b)

In like manner an ejectment will lie for the pasture of a hundred sheep. (c)

But a right to the pannage is not enough, because pannage is only the mast which falls from the trees, and not part of the soil itself. (d)

With respect to the manner in which the dis-

(a) *Rex v. Inhabitants of Stoke*,
2 T. R. 451.

(c) *Anon.* 2 Dal. 95.

(b) *Wheeler v. Toulson*, Hard.

(d) *Pemble v. Sterne*, 1 Lev.

212, 3. S. C. 1 Sid. 416.

puted premises should be described in an ejectment, no determinate rule exists: nor is it easy to discover from the adjudged cases, any principle which can guide us on the subject. It is very frequently said in general terms, that the description shall be *sufficiently certain*; but the degree of certainty required, particularly in the more ancient cases, seems to depend upon caprice rather than principle. In the earlier stages of the remedy, when ejectments were compared to real actions, and arguments were drawn from analogy with them, a practice which obtained until after the reign of James I., much greater certainty was required than is now necessary; and it appears, that when the action was first invented, as much certainly was requisite as in a *præcipè quod reddat*. (a) The courts, indeed, soon relaxed this severity, and allowed many descriptions to be sufficient in an ejectment, which would have been held too uncertain in a *præcipe*; as, for instance, an ejectment for a hop-yard was held good; so also for an orchard, though in a *præcipe* it should be demanded as a garden; (b) yet notwithstanding this alteration, it was considered an established principle, until within the last sixty years, that the description must be so certain as to enable the sheriff exactly to know, without any information from the lessor of the plaintiff, of what to deliver possession. (c) Amongst other salutary regulations, however, which the wisdom of modern times has introduced into this

(a) *Macdunoch v. Stafford*, 2 Roll. Rep. 166.

b) *Wright v. Wheatley*, Noy. 37. S. C. Cro. Eliz. 854, *Royston v. Eccle-*

ston, Cro. Jac, 654. S. C. Palm. 337.

(c) *Bindover v. Sindercome*, 2 Raym. 1470, and the cases there cited.

action, the abolition of the above-mentioned maxim may be reckoned; and it is now the practice for the sheriff to deliver possession of the premises recovered, according to the directions of the claimant, who therein acts at his own peril. (*a*)

Few cases are to be found in the modern books, wherein points respecting the certainty of description have arisen; and the authority of the old cases is very doubtful. The degree of certainty formerly required was much greater than is now necessary, and it is not improbable that many of the old decisions would be over-ruled, should they again come under the consideration of the courts. (*b*)

Lands will be sufficiently described by the provincial terms of the counties in which they lie. Thus an ejectment may be maintained for "five acres of alder carr" in Norfolk:—alder carr in that county signifying land covered with alders. So also in Suffolk, for a beast gate; and in Yorkshire, for cattle gates. (*c*)

The same principle applies to ejectments in Ireland; and terms used in that country will be sufficiently certain, when writs of error are brought therefrom in this kingdom. Thus an ejectment will lie in Ireland, for a township, for a kneave (*d*) or

(*a*) *Cottingham v. King*, Burr. 623. 1063. *Bennington v. Goodtitle*, ib. 630. *Connor v. West*, Burr. 2672. 1084.

(*b*) *St. John v. Comyn*, Yelv. 117. (*d*) *Cottingham v. King*, Burr. 623, *Cottingham v. King*, Burr. 623. 30.

(*c*) *Barnes v. Peterson*, Stran.

quarter of land, or for so many acres of bog or of mountain, (*a*) the word mountain being in that kingdom rather a description of the quality, than the situation of land. (*b*)

But an ejectment in England for a hundred acres of mountain, or a hundred acres of waste, has been held to be bad for uncertainty, because both waste and mountain comprehend in England many sorts of land. (*c*)

It is no objection to a description that the premises are twice demanded in the same demise. (*d*)

An ejectment will not lie for a tenement, because many incorporeal hereditaments are included in that appellation, (*e*) and therefore the description is not certain enough; nor will an ejectment lie for a messuage, or tenement, for the signification of the word tenement being more extensive than that of the word messuage, it is not sufficiently certain what is intended to be demanded in the ejectment. (*f*) It is also holden that an ejectment will not lie for a messuage and tenement. (*g*)

(*a*) Barnes v. Peterson, Stran. 834. Copleston v. Piper, Ld. Raym. 1063. Bennington v. Goodtitle, ib. 191.
1084.

(*b*) Kildare v. Fisher, Stran. 71. Wood v. Payne, Cro. Eliz. 186.
vide cont. Macdonnogh v. Stafford, Rochester v. Rickhouse, Pop. 203.

(*c*) Hancock v. Price, Hard. 57. (g) Doe d. Bradshaw v. Plowman.
St. John v. Comyn, Yelv. 117. 1 East. 441, and the cases there

(*d*) Warren v. Wakely, 2 Roll. cited.—In the case of Goodright d. Welch v. Flood, (3 Wils. 23,) in which a motion was made to arrest

(*e*) Goodtitle v. Walton, Stran. the judgment, because the plaintiff

But an ejectment for a messuage *or* tenement, with other words expressing its meaning, is good, as a messuage *or* tenement *called the Black Swan*; for the addition reduces it to the certainty of a dwelling-house. (*a*)

So also an ejectment for a messuage *or* burgage is good; because both signify the same thing in a borough. (*b*)

had declared of a messuage *or* tenement, the Court endeavoured to get over the objection, and took time for consideration, but ultimately thought themselves bound by the adjudged cases, and reluctantly arrested the judgment. Afterwards, in *Doe d. Stewart v. Denton*, (1 T. R. 11,) on a similar application, where the plaintiff had declared for a messuage *and* tenement, the Court refused to grant the rule, Buller, J. saying, he remembered a case where a messuage *or* tenement had been held sufficiently certain. But this case was afterwards over-ruled, in *Doe d. Bradshaw v. Plowman*, (1 East. 441,) "for that it passed by surprise, and was not law, being contrary to adjudged cases." The point is therefore now at rest, although from the cases of *Goodtitle d. Wright v. Otway*, (3 East. 357,) and *Doe d. Laurie v. Dyball*, (1 M. & P. 330. and 8 B. & C. 70.) the defendant is precluded from deriving any advantage from such error in description. In the former case, the plaintiff had declared for a messuage *and* tenement, and the verdict was entered generally; but the

Court permitted the lessor (pending a rule *nisi* to arrest the judgment for the uncertainty) to enter the verdict according to the Judges' notes for the messuage *only*, and that without releasing the damages. In the latter case, the declaration was for twenty messuages, twenty tenements &c.; and the judgment being entered generally for the plaintiff, the defendant brought a writ of error in the King's Bench, pending which writ the Court of Common Pleas allowed the record to be amended, by striking out the words "twenty tenements;" and the Court of King's Bench in the following term, (the record I presume not having been amended) gave judgment for the defendant in error on this ground, that if the same count contains two demands or complaints, for one of which only an action lies, all the damages shall be referred to the good cause of action, although *secus* if in separate counts.

(*a*) *Burbury v. Yeomans*, 1 Sid. 295.

(*b*) *Danvers v. Wellington*, Hard. 173. *Rochester v. Rickhouse*, Pop. 203.

An ejectment for four corn mills, without saying of what kind, whether wind-mills or water-mills, is good; for the precedents in the register are so. (*a*)

An ejectment will lie for a stable and cottage, (*b*) and also for a house; though in a *præcipe* it ought to be demanded by the name of a message. (*c*)

Ejectment of a place called a passage-room is certain enough. (*d*) So also of a room, and of a chamber in the second story. (*e*) In like manner it has been held that an ejectment for "part of a house in *A*." is sufficiently certain. (*f*) So also of "a certain place called the vestry." (*g*)

It has formerly been holden that an ejectment for a kitchen could not be supported; because, although the word be well enough understood in common parlance, yet, as any chamber in a house may be applied to that use, the sheriff has not certainty enough to direct him in the execution, and the kitchen may be changed between judgment and execution; but this reasoning does not correspond with the maxims of the present day. (*h*)

An ejectment will not lie for a close, (*i*) nor for the

(*a*) Fitzgerald v. Marshall, 1 Mod. 90.

(*b*) Hill v. Giles, Cro. Eliz. 818. Lady Dacres' case, 1 Lev. 53. Hamond v. Ireland, Sty. 215.

(*c*) Royston v. Eccleston, Cro. Jac. 654. S. C. Palm. 337.

(*d*) Bindover v. Sindercombe, Ld. Raym. 1170.

(*e*) Anon. 3 Leon. 210.

(*f*) Sullivan v. Seagrave, Stran. 695. Rawson v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 286.

(*g*) Hutchinson v. Puller, 3 Lev. 95.

(*h*) Ford v. Lerke, Noy. 109.

(*i*) Savel's case, 11 Co. 55. Hammond v. Savel, 1 Rol. Rep. 55.

third, or other part of a close, nor for a piece of land, unless the particular contents or number of acres be specified. (a) From the old authorities, it seems also formerly to have been holden, (though the point is certainly somewhat obscure,) that the addition of the name of the close, without mention of the number of acres, would be bad; though such a description, it is conceived, would now be deemed sufficiently certain. (b)

In ejectment for land, the particular species should be mentioned in the description, whether *pasture*, *meadow*, &c. because land, in its legal acceptation, signifies only *arable* land. (c)

An ejectment for ten acres of underwood has been held good; (d) because underwood is so well understood in law, that the sheriff has certainty enough to direct him in the execution.

“Fifty acres of gorse and furze” (e) has been held sufficiently certain in an ejectment, without specifying the particular quantity of each: so also “fifty acres of furze and heath,” and “fifty acres of moor and marsh.” (f)

Knight v. Syms, Salk. 254. Joans v. Hoel, Cro. Eliz. 235.

(a) Palmer's case, Owen 18, Martyn v. Nichols, Cro. Car. 573. Jordan v. Cleabourne, Cro. Eliz. 339. Pemble v. Sterne, 1 Lev. 213.

(b) Lady Dacres' case, 1 Lev. 56. Savel's case, 11 Co. 55. Knight v. Syms, 1 Salk. 254. Royston v. Eccleston, Cro. Jac. 654. Jordan

v. Cleabourne, Cro. Eliz. 339.

Wykes v. Sparrow, Cro. Jac. 435.

(c) Massey v. Rice, Cowp. 346. 349. Savel's case, 11 Co. 55.

(d) Warren v. Wakeley, 2 Roll. Rep. 482.

(e) Fitzgerald v. Marshall, 1 Mod. 90.

(f) Connor v. West, Burr. 2672.

An ejectment for "ten acres of pease" has been held to be certain enough, as signifying the same with ten acres of land covered with pease. (*a*)

It seems that an ejectment may be brought for a manor, or a moiety of a manor, generally, without any description of the number of acres, or species of land contained therein, and that under such general description the jury may find the verdict for the plaintiff, for a messuage, or for so many acres "parcel of the said manor," and for the defendant, for the residue of the manor; but it is said in the old cases, not to be safe to bring an ejectment for a manor without describing the quantity and species of the land. (*b*)

When an ejectment is brought for tithes, (*c*) the particular species of tithe demanded should be specified in the declaration, as of hay, wheat, &c. or the description will be bad for uncertainty; (*d*) but it is not also necessary to mention the precise quantity of each species, because tithe is in its nature uncertain, the quantity entirely depending on the fruitfulness of the season, and it is therefore enough to say, "of certain tithes of hay, wool, &c." (*e*)

(*a*) *Odingsall v. Jackson*, 1 Brown, 149.

(*b*) *Warden's case*, Het. 146. *Cole v. Aylott*, Litt. Rep. 299. 301. *Hems v. Stroud*, Latch. 61.

(*c*) It was once contended, that in an ejectment for tithes, the ejectment should be laid, "of the rectory, or chapel, and of the tithes thereunto

appertaining," for that the plaintiff could not have a writ of *habere facias possessionem* of the tithes only; but the objection was over-ruled. *Baldwin v. Wine*, Cro. Car. 301.

(*d*) *Harpur's case*, 11 Co. 25. (*b*) *Worrall v. Harper*, 1 Roll. Rep. 65. 68. *Dyer*, 84, 5.

(*e*) *Anon. Dyer*, 116, (*b*.)

In an old case, where the plaintiff declared on a lease for tithes in *R.* belonging to the rectory of *D.*, and that the defendant entered upon him, and took *such* tithes severed from the nine parts in *R.*, without saying that the tithes so taken belonged to the rectory of *D.*, the description was held ill, because it did not confine the ouster to the tithes laid in the declaration ; for the defendant might have ousted the plaintiff of tithes in *R.*, which did not belong to the rectory of *D.* (*a*)

In an ejectment brought in the county of *Durham*, the plaintiff declared “ for coal-mines in *Gateside*” generally, not specifying the particular number ; and it appearing upon a writ of error, that such was the customary mode of declaring in the county, the judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. (*b*)

If a person eject another from land, and build thereon, it is sufficient if the owner bring his ejectment for the land, without mentioning the building, except where the building is a messuage, and then perhaps it ought to be particularly named. (*c*)

(*a*) *Baldwin v. Wine*, *W. Jones*, Mod. 143. S. C. 1 Show. 364.
321, *tamen quare, et vide Good-* S. C. Salk. 255. S. C. Carth. 277.
right d. Smallwood v. Strother, Blk. S. C. Comb. 201.
706.

(*c*) *Goodtitle d. Chester v. Alker*,

(*b*) *Whittingham v. Andrews*, 4 Burr. 133. 144.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Title necessary to support the Action of Ejectment.

THE modern action of ejectment is the most simple and ready mode of trying every species of possessory title; and nearly all the minute and perplexing distinctions with which our laws of real property abound, are to be found in cases where this form of action has been adopted. A full inquiry into all the points discussed in these cases would render this treatise far too voluminous for practical purposes, and indeed would be foreign to its design, which is to treat of the remedy by ejectment, and not of the laws of real property; whilst on the other hand, an enumeration only of the different titles sufficient to support an ejectment, would be of little service either to the student or practitioner. It is intended, therefore, to keep a middle course; first discussing the general principles upon which the remedy is founded, and afterwards stating in succession the various persons, who, from the nature of their several estates, are entitled to maintain the action; pointing out the leading cases under each separate title, but

leaving the more minute distinctions to those publications, which treat expressly of the laws of real property.

As the party in the possession of property is presumed to be the owner, until the contrary is proved, it is necessary for a claimant in ejectment to show in himself a good and sufficient title to the lands, to enable him to recover them from the defendant. He will not be assisted by the weakness of the defendant's claim. The possession of the latter gives him a right against every man who cannot establish a title; and if he can answer the case on the part of the claimant, by showing the real title to the land to be in another, it will be sufficient for his defence, except in those cases in which the relationship of landlord and tenant subsists between the parties, and the defendant is estopped from disputing his landlord's title, (a) although he does not pretend that he holds the lands with the consent, or under the authority of the real owner. (b)

In order also to enable a claimant to support an action of ejectment, he must be clothed with *the legal title* to the lands. (c) No equitable title will avail. And this principle is so fixed and immutable, that a trustee may maintain ejectment against his own *cestui que trust*, (d) and an unsatisfied term outstanding in

(a) Vide *post*, chap. 10.

(b) *Roe d. Haldane v. Harvey*, 4 Burr. 2484. *Doe d. Crisp v. Barber*, 2 T. R. 749.

(c) *Goodtitle d. Jones v. Jones*, 7

T. R. 43. 47. *Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton*, 8 T. R. 2. *Doe d. Blake v. Luxton*, 6 T. R. 289.

(d) *Roe d. Reade v. Read*, 8 T.

R. 118. 123.

trustees will bar the recovery of the heir at law, even though he claim only subject to the charge. (a) In the time of Lord Mansfield, indeed, the Court of King's Bench adopted a different principle, and exercised a species of equitable jurisdiction in this action. Thus a mortgagee was permitted to maintain ejectment against a tenant, claiming under a lease granted prior to the mortgage, provided he gave notice to the tenant that he did not intend to disturb the possession, but only to get into the receipt of the rents and profits of the estate; (b) the legal estate of a trustee was not allowed to be set up against the *cestui que trust*; (c) an agreement for a lease was held tantamount to a lease; (d) and a reversioner was allowed to recover his reversionary interest, subject to a lease and immediate right of possession in another. (e) But these cases have long been overruled, and the clearness and certainty of the principle since adopted, amply compensate for the partial inconvenience it may at times occasion.

The claimant must also have a right to the possession; that is to say, he must have a right of entry upon the lands at the time of the demise in the declaration. And whatever takes away this right of entry or posses-

(a) *Doe d. Hodson v. Staple*, 2 T. 684. *Doe d. Gibbon v. Pott*, Doug. 710. 721. et vide *Oates d. Wigfall v. Brydon*, Burr. 1895. 1901.

(b) *Keech d. Warne v. Hall*, Doug. 21. *Moss v. Gallimore*, Doug. 279.

(c) *Lade v. Holford*, B. N. P. 96. (d) *Weakley d. Yea v. Bucknell*, B. N. P. 96. Cowp. 473.

(e) Per Buller, J. in *Doe d. Bristow v. Pegge*, 1 T. R. 759, (in notis.)

Doe d. Hodson v. Staple, 2 T. R.

sion, and turns the same into a right of action, will also deprive the claimant of his remedy by ejectment; although the legal title still remains in him. But if he be entitled to the possession at the time the demise is laid, it will be sufficient, although such right of possession be divested before trial; for the action of ejectment is intended to give the party compensation for the trespass, as well as to enable him to recover possession of the land; and he has a right to proceed for such trespass, although his right to the possession should cease. (a)

The origin of the principle that the lessor must have a right of entry, has already been considered, (b) and we must now notice the several ways by which this right of entry or possession may be destroyed. The consideration of the effects of fines levied with proclamations, and of the right of entry, as between landlord and tenant, for condition broken, will be reserved for the two following chapters: those acts only are here to be considered, which take away the right of entry from the claimant, but leave in him, notwithstanding, the right of property or of action.

In this point of view, a right of entry may be destroyed in three several ways. First, by Discontinuance; secondly, by Descent; and, thirdly, by the Statute of Limitations.

1. BY DISCONTINUANCE.

(a) *Doe d. Morgan v. Bluck*. 3 (b) Vide ante, 11. Camp. 447.

A discontinuance of an estate signifies such an alienation made or suffered, by any person seized of an estate tail, or *in autre droit*, in things which lie in livery, as takes away the entry of the person entitled after the death of the alienor.

“ This injury happens when he who hath an estate-tail, maketh a larger estate of the land than by law he is entitled to do : in which case the estate is good, so far as his power extends who made it, but no farther. As if a tenant in-tail makes a feoffment in fee-simple, or for the life of the feoffee, or in-tail ; all which are beyond his power to make, for that by the common law extends no farther than to make a lease for his own life ; here the entry of the feoffee is lawful during the life of his feoffor ; but if he retains the possession after the death of the feoffor, it is an injury which is termed a discontinuance ; the ancient legal estate, which ought to have survived to the heir in-tail, being gone, or at least suspended, and for a while discontinued. For, in this case, on the death of the alienors, neither the heir in-tail, nor they in remainder or reversion expectant on the determination of the estate-tail, can enter on and possess the lands so alienated. Because the original entry of the feoffee being lawful, and an apparent right of possession being thereby gained, the law will not suffer that right to be overthrown by the mere act or entry of the claimant.” (a)

By the common law, an estate-tail may be discon-

(a) 3 Blk. Com. 171, 5.

tinued five ways: first, by confirmation with warranty; secondly, by feoffment; thirdly, by fine; fourthly, by common recovery; fifthly, by release.

An estate-tail cannot, however, be discontinued, except where he who makes the discontinuance was once seized by force of the in-tail; that is, seized of the freehold and inheritance of the estate in-tail, and not of a remainder or reversion expectant upon a freehold. (a) Hence, if there be tenant for life, the remainder in-tail, &c. and tenant for life, and he in the remainder in-tail levy a fine, this is not any discontinuance or divesting of any estate in remainder, but each of them passes that which they have power and authority to pass. (b)

So also, to make a discontinuance by levying a fine, it is necessary that the estate should pass to the alienee by virtue of the fine; if, therefore, the tenant in-tail first alienate his estate by modes of conveyance, which transfer only the possession and not the right, as by bargain and sale, lease and release, &c. and the grantee *is seized by virtue of such conveyance*, a fine, levied afterwards by the tenant in-tail, will not operate as a discontinuance of the estate-tail; but the right of entry will remain to the remainderman, or reversioner, for the first five years after his title accrues. (c)

But, where tenant in tail-male, with remainder

(a) 1 Inst. 347, (b) et vide Litt. s. 640. 658.

(b) 1 Inst. 302, (b).

(c) Seymour's case, 10 Co. 96, (a).

over in-fee, in consideration of a marriage, conveyed his estate-tail by lease and release to trustees, and their heirs to several uses, and in the release covenanted to levy a fine to the same uses, and did after his marriage levy a fine in pursuance of his covenant, it was held that this fine operated as a discontinuance of the estate ; because the lease, release, and fine, were all but *one assurance*, and operated as such ; for that the deeds could only be considered as *a covenant to levy a fine*, and were incomplete till the fine was levied, so that the estate-tail passed by the fine. (a)

This case was distinguished from Seymour's, because, in that case, the fine was not levied until a year after the bargain and sale was enrolled, and it was expressly found by the verdict, that the bargainee entered, and was seized by force of the bargain and sale *only* ; so that the bargain and sale was totally unconnected with the fine : nor did it appear that any fine was intended to be levied at the time when the bargain and sale was executed.

Where the title of the lessor was under a marriage-settlement, by which the premises were settled on the husband for life, remainder to the children of the marriage as tenants in common *in-tail*, with cross remainders in default of issue of any child to the survivors *in-tail*, with remainder to the survivor of husband and wife, in-fee : and two

(a) *Doe d. Odiarne v. Whitehead*, Burr. 704.

daughters were the issue of the marriage; the first of whom married the lessor of the plaintiff, and the second the defendant, and died *without issue*; but previous to her death, she and her husband levied a fine with proclamations of her moiety, to recover which the action was brought: Mr. J. Gould, who tried the cause, nonsuited the plaintiff, being of opinion that the levying of the fine had discontinued the estate-tail, taken away the claimant's right of entry, and driven him to his writ of formedon. (a)

By the common law the alienation of a husband, who was seized in right of his wife, worked a discontinuance of her estate; but now, by the 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28. s. 6, it is provided, that no act of the husband only, shall work a discontinuance of, or prejudice the inheritance or freehold of the wife; but that, after his death, she, or her heirs, may enter on the lands in question; and, therefore, the wife, or her heirs, may now in such cases support ejectment.

A feoffment by husband and wife is within this statute; because in substance it is the act of the husband only; but a fine levied by the husband and wife is not. (b)

When also the husband and wife are jointly seized to them and their heirs, or the heirs of their two bodies, of an estate made during the coverture, and

(a) Run. Eject. 45.

case, 2 Co. 77, (b).

(b) 1 Inst. 326, (a). Cromwell's

the husband makes a feoffment in-fee, and dies, the wife may enter under the provisions of this statute, although it was the inheritance of them both. (a)

By the statute of 11 Hen. VII. c. 20, it is also provided, that "if a woman has any estate-tail jointly with her husband, or only to herself, or to her use, in any lands or hereditaments of the inheritance or purchase of her husband, or given to the husband and wife in-tail, by any of the ancestors of the husband, or by any other person seized to the use of the husband, or his ancestors, and shall hereafter, being sole, or with any other after-taken husband, discontinue, &c. the same; every such discontinuance shall be void, and it shall be lawful for every person to whom the interest, title, or inheritance after the decease of the said woman, should appertain, to enter, &c.

This statute is, for the most part, confined to conveyances by the husband, or his ancestor, for the advancement of the wife. (b) Hence, if land be settled by the ancestor of the wife, in consideration of the marriage, it is not within this act; for it shall be intended that the advancement of the wife was the principal cause of the gift. (c) But where the conveyance is by a stranger, in consideration of the wife's fortune paid by her father to the vendor, and other money paid by the husband, it is within the

(a) 1 Inst. 326, (a). Greenley's S. C. 1 Leon. 261.
case, 8 Co. 142, (b).

(c) Kynaston v. Lloyd, Cro. Jac.

(b) Foster v. Pitfall, Cro. Eliz. 2. 624.

act. (a) So if the conveyance be by the husband, or his ancestor, in consideration of marriage, although it be joined with a money consideration, yet it is within the statute. (b) But no estate is within the meaning of this statute, unless it be for the jointure of the wife. Hence, although an estate devised by the husband to the wife in-tail, with remainder over to a stranger in-fee, be within the words, yet it is not within the meaning of the statute; for it shall not be intended to be for a jointure, where no inheritance is reserved to the husband or his heirs; and the meaning of the statute is, that the wife shall not prevent the lands descending to the heirs of the husband. (c)

If the issue in special-tail, with reversion in-fee expectant, levy a fine, and afterwards his mother, being tenant in-tail within this act, make a lease for three lives (not warranted by the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28.) living the issue; the conusee may enter. (d) But if the reversion in-fee had been in another, the conusee could not enter, because he would have nothing but by estoppel; nor the heir, because he had concluded himself by the fine; (e) nor the issue. (f)

Formerly an alienation made by a sole corporation,

(a) *Piggot v. Palmer*, Moore, 250.

(b) *Kirkman v. Thomson*, Cro. Jac. 474.

(c) *Foster v. Pitfall*, Cro. Eliz. 2. S. C. 1 Leon. 261.

(d) *Brown's case*, 3 Co. 50, (b).

(e) *Ward v. Walthew*, Cro. Jac. 178.

(f) *Lincoln Coll. case*, 3 Co. 61, (a):

as a bishop, or a dean, without the consent of the chapter, was a discontinuance; but since the disabling statutes, (a) which declare such alienations absolutely void, *ab initio*, no discontinuance can by such means be effected. (b)

2. BY DESCENT. (c)

“Descents, which take away entries, are when any one, seized by any means whatsoever of the inheritance of a corporeal hereditament, dies, whereby the same descends to his heir: in this case, however feeble the right of the ancestor might be, the entry of any other person who claims title to the freehold is taken away; and he cannot recover possession against the heir by this summary method, but is driven to his action to gain a legal seisin of the estate. And this, first, because the heir comes to the estate by act of law, and not by his own act; the law therefore protects his title, and will not suffer his possession to be divested, till the claimant hath proved a better right. Secondly, because the heir may not suddenly know the true state of his title; and therefore the law,

(a) 1 Eliz. c. 19. 13 Eliz. c. 10.

(b) F. N. B. 194.

(c) It is scarcely possible to suggest a case, in which the doctrine of descent cast can be now so applied, as to prevent a claimant from maintaining ejectment, as, from the principles of disseisin at election, he may always lay his demise in the time of the ancestor, and elect not to be disseised. But

a general account of the doctrine of descent cast is given here, in order to render this part of the subject complete. Vide Taylor *d. Atkins v. Horde* (Burr. 60.) where the history and principles of the doctrine of descent cast are most ably investigated by Lord Mansfield. Vide also William *d. Hughes v. Thomas*, (12 East. 141.)

which is ever indulgent to heirs, takes away the entry of such claimant as neglected to enter on the ancestor, who was well able to defend his title; and leaves the claimant only the remedy of an action against the heir. Thirdly, this was admirably adapted to the military spirit of the feudal tenures, and tended to make the feudatory bold in war; since his children could not, by any mere entry of another, be dispossessed of the lands whereof he died seized. And, lastly, it is agreeable to the dictates of reason, and general principles of law.” (a)

This doctrine of descent cast does not apply, if the claimant be under any legal disabilities during the life of the ancestor, either of infancy, coverture, imprisonment, insanity, or being out of the realm; because in all these cases there is no neglect or laches in the claimant, and therefore no descent shall bar or take away his entry. (b) Nor does it affect copyhold, or customary estates, where the freehold is in the lord; (c) nor cases where the party has not any remedy but by entry, as a devisee. (d)

The right of entry may be tolled, or taken away, by a descent cast, in cases of abatement, intrusion, and disseisin.

By the common law, if an abator, or intruder, or disseisor, died in peaceable possession, the descent to the heir gave to him a right of possession, and took

(a) 3 Blk. Com. 176.

East. 299.

(b) Litt. l. 3. c. 6.

(d) Co. Litt. 240, (b).

(c) Doe *d.* Cook *v.* Danvers, 7

away from the true owner his right of entry, although such death happened immediately after the wrongful acquisition of the lands ; but by the statute of 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33, it is provided, that “ the dying seized of any disseisor of and in any lands, &c. having no title therein, shall not be deemed a descent to take away the entry of the person, or his heir, who had the lawful title of entry at the time of the descent, unless the disseisor has had peaceable possession for five years next after the disseisin, without entry or continual claim by the person entitled.” This statute, however, being a penal one, is constructed strictly, and does not extend to the feoffee, or donee of the disseisor, mediate or immediate, and therefore the descent in such cases remains as at the common law. (a) It is also said, that abators and intruders are not within the statute : but the successors of bodies politic and corporate in cases of disseisin are within its remedy, although the statute speak of him that at the time of such descent had title of entry, *or his heirs* ; for the statute clearly extends to the predecessor, being disseised, and consequently without naming his successor extendeth to him, for he is the person that, at the time of such descent, had title of entry. (b)

If there be tenant for life, the reversion in-fee, and tenant for life be disseised, and die, and the disseisor afterwards die within five years, the reversioner is within the benefit of the statute, and his entry is not taken away ; for, after the death of the tenant for life, it is a continuation of the same disseisin to the

(a) Co. Litt. 256.

Tailbois, Plow. 38. 47.

(b) Co. Litt. 238. Wimbish v.

reversioner. But if the disseisor had died seized, and the tenant for life had afterwards died, there the descent would have taken away the entry of the reversioner, because there was no continuation of the same disseisin upon the reversioner. The act only continues a right of entry in the disseisee, where a right of entry was *once in him*; but in the last case a right of entry never was in the reversioner, and consequently never having had the right of possession, he is not a disseisee within the statute, to punish the possession of the heir as an actual ouster, since the reversioner was never actually ousted either by the original disseisor, or his heir. (*a*)

It is immaterial whether the descent be in the collateral line or lineal; (*b*) but a dying seized of an estate for life, or of a reversion, or remainder, will not take away an entry; (*c*) because, for this purpose, it is essentially necessary that the disseisor should die seized both of the fee or fee-tail and freehold. If, therefore, the disseisor make a lease for his own life, or the life of another, and die seized of the reversion, this descent will not take away the entry, because although he had the fee he had not the freehold at the time of his death; but if he make a lease for years and die seized of the reversion, the entry will be taken away, for the fee and freehold are both in him. The law is the same in the case of a remainder, and when the land is extended upon a statute, judgment, or recognizance. (*d*)

(*a*) Co. Litt. 238. *Wimbish v.*
Tailbois, Plow. 38. 47.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 339, (*b*).

(*c*) Litt. s. 387, 388.

(*d*) Co. Litt. 239, (*b*).

It is also necessary that the descent of the fee and freehold be immediate to bar the entry. Hence, if feme disseissoress take husband, and have issue, and afterwards the husband die, such descent will not take away the entry of the disseissee; because the heir comes not to the fee and freehold at once, the latter having been suspended until the death of the father, who was tenant by the courtesy. (a)

To constitute a descent, therefore, which shall take away an entry, it appears, that there must be a dying *seized* in demesne of a corporeal inheritance, either in *fee* or *fee-tail*, that the rightful owner be under no legal disability in the time of the ancestor, and also in those cases to which the statute of 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33, extends, that the disseisor have five years quiet possession of the lands.

3. BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

By the statute of 21 Jac. I. c. 16. s. 1, it is enacted, that "no person shall make any entry upon any lands, &c. but within twenty years next after his right or title shall first descend, or accrue; and in default thereof such person so not entering, and his heir, shall be utterly disabled from such entry." Section the second enacts, "that if any person having a right or title of entry shall be, at the time of the said right or title first descended, accrued, come, or fallen, within the age of twenty-one years, *feme covert*, *non compos mentis*, imprisoned, or beyond seas, then such

(a) Litt. s. 394.

person, and his heir, may, notwithstanding the said twenty years be expired, bring his action, or make his entry, as he might have done before this act, so as such person, or his heir, shall, within ten years next after his and their full age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, enlargement out of prison, or coming into this realm, or death, take benefit of, and sue forth the same, and at no period after the said ten years."

From the ancient doctrine of *nullum tempus occurrit regi*, the King is not bound by this statute, (a) nor are ecclesiastical persons within it, because it would be an indirect means of evading the statutes made to prohibit their alienations; but, with these exceptions, the statute applies to all persons, capable of a right to enter; and, therefore, if it appear that there has been a possession by the defendant, or those under whom he holds, for the last twenty years, adverse to the title of the claimant, and that the claimant has not been prevented from prosecuting his claim earlier, by reason of some of the disabilities allowed by the statute, he will be barred of his remedy by ejectment.

It is not easy to define what will constitute an adverse holding of this nature, but it may be safely laid down that an adverse possession will be negatived, when the parties claim under the same title,

(a) By stat. 9. Geo. III. c. 16, the King is disabled from claiming title, (except to liberties and franchises,) unless the same shall accrue within the space of sixty years next before suit or claim; and consequently an adverse possession of lands for sixty years will now be a good title even against the Crown.

when the possession of one party is consistent with the title of the other, when the party claiming title has never in contemplation of law been out of possession, and when the possessor has acknowledged a title in the claimant.

First, where the parties claim under the same title.

As if a man seized of certain land in-fee have issue two sons, and die seized, and the younger son enter by abatement into the land, the statute will not operate against the elder son; for when the younger son so abates into the land after the death of his father, before an entry made by the elder son, the law intends that he entered claiming as heir to his father, by which title the elder son also claims. (*a*) So also if the defendant should make title under the sister of the lessor of the plaintiff, and prove that she had enjoyed the estate above twenty years, and that he had entered as heir to her, the court would not regard it, because her possession would be construed to be by courtesy, and not to make a disherison, but by silence to preserve the possession of the brother, and therefore not within the intent of the statute; though, if the brother be once in actual possession, and ousted by his sister, it would it seems be otherwise, for then her entry could not possibly be construed to be to preserve his possession. (*b*)

Secondly, where the possession of one party is consistent with the title of the other.

(*a*) Co. Litt. s. 396.

(*b*).—Sharrington v. Strotton, Plow.

(*b*) B. N. P. 102. Co. Litt. 242, 298, 306.

Thus, where by a marriage-settlement a certain copyhold estate of the wife was limited to the use of the survivor in-fee, but no surrender was made to the use of the settlement, and, after the death of the wife, the husband was admitted to the lands pursuant to the *equitable* title acquired by the settlement, it was held that if he had had no other title than the admission, a possession by him for twenty years would have barred the heir-at-law of the wife; but as it appeared that there was a custom in the manor for the husband to hold the lands for his life, in the nature of a tenant by the courtesy, *and this without any admittance after the death of the wife*, the possession of the copyhold by the husband was referred to this title, and not to the admission under the settlement; and such possession being consistent with the title of the heir-at-law, he was allowed to maintain ejectment against the devisee of the husband, within twenty years after the husband's death, though more than twenty years after the death of the wife. (a)

And although one third part of the premises had been settled, many years before the marriage, upon a third person for life, and the steward of the manor, appointed by the heir-at-law and her husband, had constantly debited himself with the receipt of two-thirds of the rent for the husband, on account of his wife, and the remaining one-third for the annuitant, yet, as no surrender had been made to the trustees of the annuitant, it was held that such payment to him must be taken to be with the consent of the person

(a) *Doc d. Milner v. Brightwen*, 10 East. 588.

entitled by law to the whole premises, so as to do away the notion of adverse possession by the husband of that third, distinct from his possession of the other two-thirds as tenant by the courtesy after the wife's death.

So also where a party devised a certain estate to his nephew and two neices, as tenants in common, and one of them died in the testator's life-time, leaving an infant daughter; and after the testator's death, the nephew and surviving neice covenanted to convey one-third to a trustee, upon trust to convey the same to the infant if she attained twenty-one, or otherwise to themselves, but no conveyance was executed pursuant to the deed, but a third of the rents were received by the trustee for the use of the infant during her life-time. It was held that there was no adverse possession until the death of the infant, and that the devisee of the nephew might maintain ejectment for his share of the undivided third, within twenty years after the infant's death, although more than twenty years after the death of the nephew. (a)

So also where a copyholder with the licence of the lord leased the copyhold lands for forty years, with a proviso for re-entry if the rent should be in arrear, and made a will devising such copyhold lands to A. and died, twenty years of the lease being then unexpired, and the heir at law received the rent from the lessee from the time of the death of the copyholder

(a) *Doe. d. Colclough v. Halse*, 3. B. & C. 757.

until the expiration of the lease, and for ten years afterwards, when the devisee brought an action of ejectment; it was holden that the lessee was not barred of this remedy by the statute of limitations, although more than twenty years had elapsed from the time of the death of the testator, and the forfeiture of the lease by non-payment of rent to the devisee; for until the termination of the lease the devisee had no right to enter except for the forfeiture, and although he might have entered by reason of the forfeiture, yet he was not bound to do so. (a)

But where copyhold lands were granted to *A.* for the lives of herself and *B.*, and in reversion to *C.*, for other lives; and *A.* died, having devised to *B.*, who entered and kept possession for more than twenty years; it was held, that *C.* was barred by the statute after *B.*'s death from maintaining ejectment, for that *C.*'s right of possession accrued on the death of *A.*, inasmuch as there cannot be a general occupant of copyhold land. (b)

So also where the rents, issues, and profits of a trust estate were received by a *cestui que trust* for more than twenty years after the creation of the trust, without any interference of the trustees, such possession, &c. being consistent with, and secured to the *cestui que trust*, by the terms of the trust-deed, the receipt was held not to be adverse to the title of the trustees, so as to bar their ejectment against the grantees of the *cestui que trust*, brought

(a) *Doe d. Cook v. Danvers*, 7 East 299.

(b) *Doe d. Foster v. Scott*, 4 B. & C. 706.

after the twenty years. (a) And indeed, as the *cestui que trust* is a tenant at will (b) to the trustees, and his possession is the possession of the trustees, the statute will never operate between trustee and *cestui que trust*, except in very particular cases; although it seems that if a *cestui que trust* sell or devise the estate, and the vendee or devisee obtain possession of the title deeds and enter, and do no act recognizing the trustee's title, the statute will operate from the time of such entry. (c)

In like manner the payment of interest upon a mortgage will prevent the statute from running against the mortgagee, although he may not have been in possession of the lands for upwards of twenty years, because such possession is consistent with the original agreement of the parties. (d)

It seems as yet a very unsettled point, whether an encroachment upon the waste adjoining to the demised premises by a lessee, and uninterrupted possession thereof by him for twenty years, shall give to the lessee a possessory right thereto, or whether he shall be deemed to have enclosed the waste, in right of the demised premises, for the benefit of the lessor after the expiration of the term. Lord Kenyon, C. J., Lee, C. J., and Thompson, B., have held that the encroachment belongs to the lessee, whilst on the

(a) Keane *d.* Lord Byron *v.* Dear- Purchasers, 2d Edit. 241.
don, 8 East. 248.

(b) Gree *v.* Rolle, Lord Raym. Raym. 740. Hall *v.* Doe *d.* Surtees, 5 B. & A. 637.

(c) Vide Sugden's Vendors and

other hand, Heath, J., Butler, J., Perryn, B., and Graham, B., have held that the landlord is entitled to it. (a)

But at all events, it seems clear, that such possession will be adverse to the rights of the commoners, and indeed to the lord himself, excepting as landlord at the expiration of the lease. (b)

It should however, be observed, that although twenty years peaceable possession will undoubtedly be a good title against the lord, *quâ* lord, if the possession were, in the first instance, taken in defiance of him, and no acknowledgment at any time afterwards made, yet, that if the possession be at first by the lord's permission, or the party subsequently make an acknowledgment that the lands were originally so taken, the statute will never run against the lord; for the possession of a tenant at will for ever so many years is no disseisin. (c)

On this principle, where a party enclosed a small piece of waste land, and occupied it for thirty years without paying rent, and at the expiration of that time the owner of the adjoining land demanded sixpence rent, which the party paid on three several occasions, it was held, that this evidence, in the absence of all other circumstances, was conclusive

(a) *Doe d. Colclough v. Mulliner*, Taunt. 208.
 1 Esp. 460. *Creach v. Wilmot*, 2 Taunt. 160, (*in notis.*) *Doe d. Challnor v. Davies*, 1 Esp. 461.
 Bryan *d. Child v. Winwood*, 1

(b) *Creach v. Wilmot*, 2 Taunt. 160, (*in notis.*)
 (c) B. N. P. 104.

to show that the occupation of the defendant began by permission. (a)

So also, where a cottage standing in the corner of a meadow, (belonging to the lord of a manor,) but separated from the meadow, and from a highway by a hedge, had been occupied for about twenty years without any payment of rent, and then, upon possession being demanded by the lord, was reluctantly given up; and having been so given up was restored to the party, he being at the same time told, that if allowed to resume possession, it would be only during pleasure, and he kept possession for fifteen years more, and never paid any rent; it was held that the jury were warranted in presuming that the possession had commenced by the permission of the lord. (b)

Thirdly, an adverse possession will be negatived when the party claiming title has never, in contemplation of law, been out of possession.

Thus, when *A.* devised lands to *B.* and his heirs, and died, and *B.* died, and the heir of *B.*, and a stranger entered and took the profits for twenty years, upon ejectment brought by the devisee of the heir of *B.* against the stranger, it was held that this perception of the rents and profits by the stranger was not adverse to the devisee's title; because, when two men are in possession, the law adjudges it to be the

(a) *Doe d. Jackson v. Wilkinson*,
3 B. & C. 413.

(b) *Doe d. Thompson v. Clark*
8 B. & C. 717.

possession of him who hath the right : the lessor of the plaintiff, and the defendant, were not tenants in common, for the defendant was a mere stranger ; and, though he took a moiety of the profits, that would not make him a tenant in common ; for a man cannot disseise another of an undivided moiety, as he may of such a number of acres. (a)

From the principle that the possession of one joint tenant, parcener, or tenant in common, is *primâ facie* the possession of his companion also, (b) it follows, that the possession of the one can never be considered as adverse to the title of the other, unless it be attended by circumstances demonstrative of an adverse intent ; or, in other words, whenever one joint tenant, tenant in common, or parcener, is in possession, his fellow is in *contemplation of law* in possession also, and it is necessary to prove *an actual ouster* to rebut this presumption.

Some ambiguity, indeed, seems formerly to have prevailed as to the meaning of the word *actual ouster*, as though it signified some act accompanied by real force ; (c) but it is now clear, that an actual ouster may be inferred from circumstances ; which circumstances are matter of evidence to be left to the jury. Thus, thirty-six years sole and uninterrupted possession by one tenant in common, without any account to, demand made, or claim set up by his companion, was

(a) Reading v. Rawsterne, Ld. v. Keen, 7 T.R. 386.
Raym. 329.

(b) Ford v. Gray, Salk. 285. Smales v. Dale, 11Cb. 120. Doe d. Barnet

(c) Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Shackleton, Burr. 2604.

held to be sufficient ground for the jury to presume an actual ouster of the co-tenant, and they did so presume. (a)

So also, if upon demand by the co-tenant of his moiety, the other refuse to pay, and deny his title, saying he claims the whole, and will not pay, and continue in possession, such possession is adverse, and ouster enough (b). And in like manner where there were two joint tenants of a lease for years, and one bade the other go out of the house, and he went out accordingly, this was held to be an actual ouster. (c)

Upon the same principle, although the entry of one is, generally speaking, the entry of both, yet if he enter *claiming the whole* to himself, it will be an entry adverse to his companion. (c) But where there was no circumstance to induce a supposition of an actual ouster, but a bare perception of the profits by one tenant in common for twenty-six years, the possession was held not to be adverse. (d) And where a tenant in common levied a fine of the whole premises, and afterwards took all the rents and profits for four or five years, but it did not appear that he held adversely at the time of levying the fine, it was held that such fine and receipt were

(a) Doe *d.* Fisher *v.* Prosser, Bird, 11 East. 49.
Cowp. 217.

(c) Vin. Ab. v. 14, 512.

(b) Doe *d.* Fisher *v.* Prosser, (d) Fairclaim *d.* Fowler *v.* Shackleton, 5 Burr. 2604.
Cowp. 217. Doe *d.* Hellings *v.*

not sufficient evidence of an ouster of his companion. (a)

If, however, in cases of joint tenancy, &c. there be sufficient evidence of an actual ouster, the statute will run as in other cases.

Upon the principles here established, the possession of one heir in gavelkind is not the possession of the other, if he enter with an adverse intent to oust the other. (b)

If an estate descend to parceners, one of whom is under a disability, which continues more than twenty years, and the other does not enter within twenty years, the disability of the one does not preserve the title of the other after the twenty years have elapsed. (c)

Fourthly, when the possessor has acknowledged a title in the claimant.

Thus, where a lease for a long term had been granted, by the lord of the manor, to the rector, in which the lessee covenanted for himself, his executors, and assigns, to pay, during the continuance of the term, a certain annual rent, and also all the tithe straw of wheat and rye within the parish, and the lessee and his assigns (the succeeding rectors) continued

(a) *Peaceable d. Hornblower v. Read*, 1 East. 568, 574, *sed vide* *Story v. Windsor*, 2 Atk. 630, 632.

(b) *Davenport v. Tyrrell*, Blk. 675.

(c) *Roe d. Langdon v. Rowleston*, 2 Taunt. 441.

in possession for twenty years and upwards after the expiration of the term, without payment of rent, but during that twenty years suffered the heir of the lessor to take the tythe of the wheat and rye straw ; it was held, that such sufferance was evidence of an agreement between the lessor and lessee, or their heirs and assigns respectively, that the lessee, or his assigns, should continue his possession, if the lessor, and his heirs, were permitted to receive the tithe as before, and that consequently there was no adverse holding in the assignee of the lessee. (a)

To enable a party to take advantage of the extension of time granted by the second section of this statute, it is necessary that the disability to enter should exist at the time when his title accrued, for if he had the power to enter, but for an instant, no subsequent disability will be sufficient to arrest the operation of the statute. And the principle is the same where a disability, existing at the time of the commencement of the title, is afterwards removed, and a subsequent disability ensues ; the statute continuing to run, notwithstanding the second disability. It was once, indeed, endeavoured to distinguish between cases of voluntary and involuntary disability in this respect, and to maintain that an involuntary disability, as insanity, occurring after the statute had begun to run, would suspend its progress, but the argument was over-ruled, upon the principle that a different construction had always been given to all

(a) *Roe d. Pellat v. Ferrars*, 1 Bos. and Pull. 542.

the statutes of limitations, and that such nice distinctions would be productive of mischief. (a)

It was said, by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, that if a man, both of non-sane memory and out of the kingdom, come into the kingdom, and then go out of the kingdom, his non-sane memory continuing, his privilege, as to being out of the kingdom, is gone; and his privilege, as to non-sane memory, will begin from the time he returns to his senses. (b)

When the ancestor to whom the right first accrues, dies under a disability which suspends the operation of the statute, his heir must make his entry within ten years next after his ancestor's death, provided more than twenty years have elapsed from the time of the commencement of the ancestor's title, to the time of the expiration of the ten years. (c)

It was once indeed contended that the meaning of this second section of the statute was, to allow every person at least twenty years after their title accrued, if there were a continuing disability from the death of the ancestor last seized, and ten years more to the heir of the person dying under a disability, which ten years were in addition to the twenty years allowed by the first clause. But it was justly observed by the court, that if this construction obtained there was no calculating how far the statute might be carried by

(a) *Doe d. Duroure v. Jones*, 4 T. R. 300; *et vide Stowell v. Ld.* 614.
Zouch, Plow. 366. *Cotterell v.*
Dutton, 4 Taunt. 826.

(b) *Sturt v. Mellish*, 2 Atk. 610,
 614.
 (c) *Doe d. George v. Jesson*, 6
 East. 80.

parents and children dying under age, or continuing under other disabilities in succession; that the word *death* in the second clause meant and referred to *the death of the person to whom the right first accrued*, and was probably introduced in order to obviate the difficulty which had arisen in the case of *Stowell v. Lord Zouch*,^(a) upon the construction of the statute of fines from the omission of that word; and that the statute meant that the *heir* of every person, to which person a right of entry had accrued during any of the disabilities there stated, should have *ten years from the death of his ancestor*, to whom the right first accrued during the period of disability, and who died under such disability, notwithstanding the twenty years, from the first accruing of the title to the ancestor, should have before expired.^(b)

Having thus discussed the general principles of the action, that a claimant in ejectment must have both the legal and possessory title, the particular persons, who, by reason of their estate and interest in the lands, are entitled to this action, must next be considered; remembering always, that a right of entry or possession is supposed to accompany their legal title.

1. TENANT FOR YEARS—FOR LIFE—IN TAIL—OR IN FEE.

It has been said by a learned writer, that a tenant for years cannot before entry maintain an action of

(a) Plow. 366.

East. 80.

(b) *Doc d. George v Jesson*, 6

trespass, or *ejectment*; because those acts complain of a violation of the possession, and therefore cannot be maintained by any person who has not had an actual possession; (a) but this reasoning does not seem applicable to the modern principles of the remedy by *ejectment*. (b)

2. MORTGAGEE.

After the mortgage becomes forfeited, the mortgagee may immediately proceed by *ejectment* against the mortgagor, without any notice or demand of possession. (c)

If the party in possession is not the mortgagor him-

(a) 1 Cru. Dig. 248. *et vide*, 4 Bac. Ab. 183.

(b) *Goodright d. Hare v. Cator*, Doug. 477, 86.

(c) *Doe d. Fisher v. Giles*, 5 Bing. 421, S.C. 2 M. & P. 49.—The difficulties with which the courts have been beset, in defining the situation of a mortgagor in possession, after a forfeiture of the mortgage, with respect to his mortgagee, are curious. In *Moss v. Gallimore*, Doug. 279, 82, Lord Mansfield says, “He is not properly a tenant at will to the mortgagee; he is like a tenant at will.” In *Buck v. Wright*, 1 T. R. 381, Ashurst, J. says, “a mortgagor is as much, if not more like a receiver than a tenant at will: in truth, he is not either;” and again, “Mortgagors and mortgagees are characters as well known, and

their rights, powers, and interests, as well settled, as any in the law.” In *Partridge v. Ball*, 5 B. & A. 604, it is said, *Per Curiam*, “a mortgagor is a tenant within the strictest definition of that word;” and the learned reporter commences a long note on the case reported, with this sentence, “As long as the mortgagor or his heir is in possession of the land, and the legal ownership is in the mortgagee, there must subsist a tenancy between the parties;” whilst in *Doe d. Robey v. Maisey*, 8 B. & C. 767, Lord Tenterden says, “The mortgagor is not in the situation of tenant at all, or at all events, he is not more than a tenant at sufferance, but in a peculiar character, and liable to be treated as tenant or as trespasser at the option of the mortgagee.”

self, but a person claiming under a lease granted by the mortgagor prior to the mortgage, the mortgagee will be bound by it; (a) but if the lease be made subsequently to the mortgage, without the privity of the mortgagee, it will be no defence to an ejectment brought by the mortgagee; because the mortgagor has no power to let leases not subject to every circumstance of the mortgage. (b) The principle extends also to cases where the party in possession is tenant from year to year to the mortgagor. (c)

If the mortgagee assign the mortgage, and the assignee assign to another, the last assignee may maintain ejectment for the mortgaged premises. (d)

If there be two several mortgages of the same lands, the mortgagee who has the legal estate will be entitled to recover in an ejectment against the other mortgagee, although his mortgage be posterior in point of time. (e)

3. LORD OF A MANOR.

When the tenant of copyhold premises has committed an act by which he forfeits his lands, he who is lord, at the time of the forfeiture committed, may maintain an ejectment for the recovery of them; but this right is confined to the lord for the time being, unless the act of forfeiture destroy the estate, and

(a) *Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton*, 3 East. 449.
3 T. R. 2.

(b) *Kecch d. Warne v. Hall*, 245.
Doug. 21.

(c) *Thunder d. Weaver v. Bel-* 1 T. R. 755.

(d) *Smartle v. Williams*, Salk.

(e) *Goodtitle d. Norris v. Morgan*,

then the heir of the lord, in whose time it was committed, may also take advantage of it. (*a*)

Where, however, a copyholder, holding of a manor belonging to a bishopric, committed a forfeiture by felling timber during the vacancy of the see, the succeeding bishop was allowed to maintain an ejectment against him. (*b*)

The right of the lord to maintain ejectment against his copyholder, for a forfeiture by committing waste, will not be taken away by an intermediate estate in remainder, between the life estate of the copyholder and the lord's reversion; for if it were, the tenant for life, and remainder-man, by combining together, might strip the inheritance of all the timber. (*c*)

When an inclosure has been made from the waste for twelve or thirteen years, and seen by the steward of the same lord from time to time without objection made, it may be presumed by the jury to have been made by the licence of the lord, and an ejectment cannot be maintained by him against the tenant without a previous notice to throw it up. (*d*)

It has never been expressly decided whether the statute of limitations will run against the lord, in case of a forfeiture by a copyholder, and bar his taking advantage of it after a lapse of twenty years; but

(*a*) Wat. Copy. vol. I. 324 to 353.
Doe *d.* Tarrant *v.* Hellier, 3 T. R.
162.

(*b*) B. N. P. 107.

(*c*) Doe *d.* Folkes *v.* Clements, 2
Maul. & Sel. 68.

(*d*) Doe *d.* Foley *v.* Wilson, 11
East. 56.

from the language of Lord Kenyon, C. J. in the case of *Doe d. Tarrant v. Hellier*, it seems that its provisions would be applicable to this as well as to all other rights of entry. (a)

4. COPYHOLDER.

Whilst the ancient practice of the action of ejectment prevailed, it seems to have been holden, that a copyholder could not maintain an ejectment, upon a demise for a longer term than a year, unless the licence of the lord were first obtained, or a special custom existed in the manor enabling him to make longer leases: and, in some authorities, it is even doubted, whether an ejectment can in any case be supported by a copyholder. (b) But since the introduction of the modern practice, these objections are wholly obviated, and the common consent rule is now sufficient to enable a copyholder to maintain ejectment.

A copyholder who claims by descent as *heir*, may maintain ejectment without admittance, as his title is complete against all the world, except the lord, immediately upon the death of the ancestor; (c) but if it be necessary for him to proceed against the lord for a seizure on the death of the ancestor, he must prove that he has tendered himself to be admitted at the lord's

(a) 3 T. R. 162—172.

Eastcourt v. Weeks, 1 Lut. 799—

(b) *Stephens v. Eliot*, Cro. Eliz. 803.

483. *Goodwin v. Longhurst*, Cro. Eliz. 535. *Sparks' case*, Cro. Eliz.

(c) *Rex. v. Rennett*, 2. T. R.

197.

676. *Downingham's case*, Owen, 17.

court, or that the lord has done some act dispensing with such tender. (*a*)

When also the lord grants a reversion of a copyhold expectant on a life estate, as the grantee acquires a perfect title by the grant only, he may on the termination of the life estate maintain ejectment without admittance. (*b*)

But in all cases where the copyholder claims as *surrenderee*, (*c*) as the surrender and admittance make but one conveyance, (*d*) the legal title does not vest in the surrenderee, and of course he cannot maintain ejectment, until after admittance; but when admitted, the title relates back to the time of the surrender, against all persons but the lord; and therefore a surrenderee may recover in ejectment against his surrenderor, or a stranger, upon

(*a*) *Doe d. Burrell v. Bellamy*, 2 M. & S. 87.

(*b*) *Roe d. Cash v. Loveless*, 2 B. & A. 453.

(*c*) In the case of *Doe d. Warry v. Miller*, (1 T. R. 393,) it was endeavoured to assimilate to copyhold principles, the practice of the Society of New Inn, in granting out their chambers for lives. It is customary with that Society, in such grants, to insert a clause, that the tenant shall not sell or assign, without the licence of the Society, and for the grantees, when they wish to transfer their interest, to surrender the chambers (upon a proper deed stamp) to the Treasurer and An-

cients, to the intent that they shall grant the said chambers to the transferee; which subsequent grant is never in point of fact made, but simply an entry of admittance inserted in the Society's books. It is therefore evident, that after the first surrender, the legal estate always remains in the Treasurer and Ancients, as trustees for the subsequent transferees respectively, and that the terms *surrender* and *admittance* bear not the slightest resemblance in their meaning, to the surrender, and admittance to copyhold premises.

(*d*) *Roe d. Jeffereys v. Hicks*, 2 Wils. 13. 15.

a demise laid between the times of admittance and surrender, provided the admittance be made before the day of the trial. (a)

Where the devisee of a customary estate, which had been surrendered to the use of the will, died before admittance, it was holden that her devisee, though afterwards admitted, could not recover in ejectment; for the admittance of the second devisee had no relation to the last legal surrender, and the legal title remained in the heir of the last surrenderor. (b)

5. LESSEE OF A COPYHOLDER.

If a copyholder, without licence, make a lease for one year, or, with licence, make a lease for many years, and the lessee be ejected, he shall not sue in the lord's court by plaint, but shall have an ejectment at the common law; because he has not a customary estate by copy, but a warrantable estate by the rules of common law. (c)

6. WIDOW FOR HER FREE-BENCH.

(a) *Holdfast d. Woollhams v. Clapham*, 1 T. R. 600. *Doe d. Bennington v. Hall*, 16 East. 208. *Ashurst J.* in delivering the judgment of the court in *Holdfast d. Woollhams v. Clapham*, was of opinion that the surrenderee might maintain ejectment against his surrenderor, although not admitted before the trial, because the surrenderor is but a trustee to his surrenderee; but it

should seem, since the legal estate remains in the surrenderor until the time of admittance, that this doctrine is not applicable to the present principles of the action. Vide *Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton*, 8 T. R. 2. B. N. P. 109.

(b) *Doe d. Vernon v. Vernon*, 7 East. 8.

(c) Co. Copy. s. 5. *Goodwin v. Longhurst*, Cro. Eliz. 535.

When there is a custom in a manor that the widow shall enjoy, during her widowhood, the whole, or part of the customary lands, wherewith her husband died seized, as of free-bench, she may, after challenging her right, and praying to be admitted, (a) maintain ejectment for them without admittance, even against the lord; because it is an excrescence which, by the custom and the law, grows out of the estate. (b)

But if the widow's claim be in the nature of dower, an ejectment will not lie before assignment, (c) but she must levy a plaint in the nature of a writ of dower, in the lord's court. (d)

7. GUARDIAN IN SOCAGE, (e) OR TESTAMENTARY GUARDIAN appointed pursuant to the statute 12 Car. II. c. 24. s. 8. (f)

But a guardian for nurture cannot maintain ejectment, for he cannot make leases for years, either in his own name, or in the name of the infant; because he has only the care of the person, and education of the infant, and has nothing to do with the lands merely in virtue of his office. (g)

(a) Co. Copy. s. 5. Goodwin v. 184.

Longhurst, Cro. Eliz. 535.

(e) Litt. sec. 123, 124. Wade v.

(b) Doe d. Burrell v. Bellamy,
2 M. & S. 87.

Cole, Ld. Raym. 130.

(c) Jurdan v. Stone, Hutt. 18.
Howard v. Bartlett, Hob. 181. Doe

(f) Bedell v. Constable, Vaugh.
177. Doe d. Parry v. Hodgson,

2 Wils. 129.
d. Nutt v. Nutt, 2 C. & P. 430.

(g) Ratcliff's case, 3 Co. 37.

(d) Chapman v. Sharpe, 2 Show.

8. INFANT. (a)

It is difficult to discover any principle upon which both infant and guardian can have the power of maintaining ejectment for the same lands, unless, indeed, the power of the infant be limited to those cases, in which no testamentary guardian has been appointed, and the infant is either above the age of fourteen years, or, being under that age, has had no person to take upon himself the office of guardian in socage. No case, certainly, can be found in which this distinction has been taken, but it is not inconsistent with the doctrine respecting guardians in socage, and accords most fully with the established principles of the action of ejectment.

9. ASSIGNEE OF A BANKRUPT, (b) OF INSOLVENT DEBTOR. (c)

As all the bankrupt's property, real and personal, is vested in the assignees by the statute 13 Eliz. c. 7. ss. 1, 2, it follows of course, that they must be invested with all the power necessary to obtain possession of it; and the general assignment gives them a title to all the leaseholds (except for lives) belonging to the bankrupt, whether the same be in his possession at the time of the bankruptcy, or acquired by him

(a) *Rudston v. Yates*, March. 141.
Zouch v. Parsons, Burr. 1794. 1806.
Noke v. Windham, Stran. 694.
Maddon d. Baker v. White, 2 T. R.
 159.

(b) *Beck d. Hawkins v. Welsh*,
 1 Wils. 276.

(c) *Doe d. Clarke v. Spencer*, 3
 Bing. 203. 370.

afterwards. But with respect to the freehold lands of the bankrupt, they do not pass by such assignment, but must by the provisions of the statute of Elizabeth be conveyed by the commissioners by deed indented and enrolled; and until the enrolment as well as the bargain and sale is completed, the assignees cannot maintain ejectment. The bargain and sale also only affects the lands to which the bankrupt is entitled at the time of its execution; if he acquire any future real estates, there must be a new bargain and sale to vest the legal estate in the assignees. (*a*)

When a trader being seized of an estate for life, with a general power of appointment, with remainder in default of appointment to himself in-fee, after he had committed an act of bankruptcy, executed his appointment in favour of an appointee, and was then declared a bankrupt, and assigned the premises by bargain and sale to his assignee; it was held that the appointment was void, and that the assignee had a sufficient legal title to maintain ejectment. (*b*)

A difference prevails between cases of bankruptcy and insolvency, where the party is possessed of a term of years. In the former case, the term does not pass by the assignment of the commissioners to the assignees, unless they elect to accept it; and if they decline to accept, the term will remain in the bankrupt, as though no commission had issued, unless he deliver up the lease within fourteen days

(*a*) Ex parte Proudfoot, 1 Atk. B. & A. 93. Vide 6 Geo. IV. c. 16. s. 81.

(*b*) Doe d. Coleman v. Britain, 2

to the lessor, and he may maintain ejectment, if ousted, notwithstanding his bankruptcy. But in the case of an insolvent debtor, the term vests absolutely in the provisional assignee by the assignment to him; and if the assignee subsequently appointed should elect not to accept the term, it will not revert to the insolvent, but the lessor must make his application to the Insolvent Court, who have power to make such order therein as they shall deem just. (a)

10. CONUSEE OF A STATUTE-MERCHANT OR STAPLE. (b)

11. TENANT BY ELEGIT.

It is laid down in the case of *Lowthal v. Tomkins*, (c) that if a tenant by *elegit* desire to obtain *actual* possession of the lands, he must bring an ejectment, for the sheriff under the writ delivers only the *legal* possession; which doctrine is recognized by Lord Kenyon, C. J. in the case of *Taylor v. Cole*; (d) but in the case of *Rogers v. Pitcher*, (e) it is said by Gibbs, C. J. "I am aware that it has in several places been said, that the tenant in *elegit* cannot obtain possession without an ejectment, but I have always been of a different opinion. There is no case in which a party may maintain ejectment in which he cannot

(a) 6 Geo. IV. c. 16. s. 75. 7. Geo. C. & P. 526.

IV. c. 57. s. 23. 1 Wm. IV. *Doe d. Palmer v. Andrews*, 4 Bing. 348. *Doe d.*

Clarke v. Spencer, 3 Bing. 203, 370.

Copeland v. Stephens, 1 B. & A. 593.

Crofts v. Pick, 8 Moore, 384; S. C. 1 Bing. 154. *Lindsay v. Limbert*, 2

(b) Co. Litt. 42. a. *Hammond v. Wood*, Salk. 563.

(c) 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 380.

(d) 3 T. R. 295.

(e) 6 Taunt. 202.

enter. The ejectment supposes that he has entered; and that the lessor may do it by another, and not enter himself, is not very intelligible. I would not, however, consider the present case as now deciding these points which I only throw out in answer to the argument that has been used." (a)

When a tenant in possession claimed under a lease granted prior to the date of the judgment against his lessor, it was held that the tenant by *elegit* could not recover in ejectment; because the lessee's title being prior in point of time, the legal estate was in him; (b) but where the possession of the tenant was subsequent to the date of the judgment, although prior by two years to the issuing of the writ of *elegit* and inquisition thereon, the title of the tenant by *elegit* was not barred. (c) If, however, the tenant does not himself claim this protection, but suffers judgment by default, it will not avail the judgment debtor, though he may appear as landlord and defend the action. (d)

12. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE. (e)

This right is of course confined to those lands which the testator, or intestate, held for a term of years; but it is immaterial whether the ouster be after, or before the death of the testator, or intestate. (f)

(a) 6 Taunt. 202.

(b) *Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton*,
3 T. R. 2.

(c) *Doe d. Putland v. Hilder*, 2 B.
& A. 782.

(d) *Doe d. Cheese v. Creed*, 2
M. & P. 648.

(e) 4 Edw. III. c. 7.

(f) *Slade's case*, 4 Co. 92, 95, (a).
Doe d. Shore v. Porter, 3 T. R. 13.

Personal representatives may recover in ejectment under the statute 29 Car. II. c. 3. s. 12, appropriating estates held *pur autre vie* where there is no special occupant. But this statute does not extend to copyholds, and therefore one who was admitted tenant upon a claim as administrator *de bonis non* to the grantee of a copyhold *pur autre vie*, was not permitted to maintain ejectment. (*a*)

13. DEVISEE.

Where the devise is of a freehold interest, the devisee may immediately, and without any possession, maintain ejectment for the lands devised; (*b*) but if it be a legacy of a term of years, he must first obtain the assent of the executors to the bequest. (*c*) When, however, such assent is obtained, the legal estate vests absolutely in the legatee, and he may maintain ejectment against the executor, as well as against a stranger. (*d*)

14. GRANTEE OF A RENT-CHARGE, having power to enter upon the lands, if the rent be in arrear, and hold them until satisfaction. (*e*)

These rights of entry are always taken strictly; and where a man gave a leasehold estate by will to *B.*, his executors, &c., subject to a rent-charge to his wife during her widowhood, with a power to the

(*a*) Zouch *d. Forse v. Forse*, 7 East. 186.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 240, (*b*).

(*c*) Young *v. Holmes*, Stran. 70.

(*d*) Doe *d. Lord Say and Sele v. Guy*, 3 East. 120.

(*e*) Jemott *v. Cowley*, 1 Saund.

112.

widow to enter for non-payment of rent, and to enjoy, &c. until the arrears were satisfied, and in case of the widow's marriage, he willed that *B.* should pay the rent-charge to *C.*, his executors, administrators, and assigns, it was holden that *C.*'s executors, after the widow's marriage, and *C.*'s subsequent death, had no right of entry for non-payment of the rent-charge. (*a*)

15. ASSIGNEE OF THE REVERSION, upon a Right of Re-entry for Condition broken. (*b*)

By the common law, no one could take advantage of a condition, or covenant, but the immediate grantor, or his heirs; a principle consistent with the old feudal maxims, but highly injurious to the rights of grantors, when the practice of alienating estates became general, and leases for years a valuable possession. To remedy this evil, it is enacted by the 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34, that the grantees, or assignees of a reversion shall have the same rights and advantages, with respect to the forfeitures of estates, as the heirs of individuals, and the successors of corporations, had until that time solely enjoyed; and this statute is made most general in its operation, by particularly including the grants from the Monarch of those lands, which had then recently become the property of the crown by the dissolution of the monasteries.

(*a*) *Hassell d. Hodson v. Gowthwaite*, Willes, 500.

(*b*) 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34.

The words of the statute grant the privilege of re-entry to the assignees “for non-payment of rent, or for doing waste, or *for other forfeiture* ;” but these latter words have been limited in their interpretation to “*other forfeiture of the same nature*,” and extend to the breach of such conditions only, as are incident to the reversion, or for the benefit of the estate. Thus, the assignee may take advantage of conditions for keeping houses in repair, for making of fences, scouring of ditches, preserving of woods, &c. but not of collateral conditions, as for the payment of a sum in gross, or for the delivery of corn, or wood, or such like. (a)

In Spencer’s case, (b) many differences are taken and agreed between collateral or personal covenants, and covenants which run with the land or are incident to the reversion; and much learning is displayed, which it would be foreign to the purposes of this treatise to discuss; but it may be useful to present a concise view of the decided cases.

A. covenanted for himself his executors and administrators, that he would build a wall upon part of the land demised; the assignee was not bound by this covenant, because the wall was not *in esse* at the time of the demise made, but to be newly built after; but it was resolved, that if the lessee had covenanted for himself *and his assigns* expressly, it would have bound the assignee, although the wall was not *in esse*, inasmuch as what was covenanted to be done, was to be done on the land demised; (c) but if the

(a) Co. Litt. 215, (b.)

(b) 5 Coke, 16.

(c) Spencer’s case, 5. Co. 16. Bally v. Wells, 3 Wils. 25.

matter covenanted to be done does in no manner touch or concern the thing demised, as to build a wall on other land, or pay a collateral sum to the lessor, the assignee, though named, will not be bound. (a)

A covenant in a lease of land, that the lessee or his assigns will not hire persons to work on the demised premises who are settled in other parishes, is a collateral covenant, and does not bind the assignee, although expressly named; for it does in no way affect the thing demised, although it may collaterally affect the lessor by increasing the poor rates upon him. (b)

A covenant to supply the demised premises with good water during the term runs with the land, for it is a covenant which respects the premises demised, and the manner of enjoyment. (c)

A covenant to insure against fire, premises situated within the weekly bills of mortality mentioned in 14 Geo. III. c. 78, is a covenant that runs with the land; because, by the operation of the 83rd sec. (which enables the landlord, by application to the directors of the insurance office, to have the sum insured laid out in rebuilding the premises) this is in effect a covenant to lay out a given sum of money in rebuilding or repairing premises in case of damage by fire, which clearly is a covenant running with the

(a) *Vernon v. Smith*, 5 B. & A. 1.

(c) *Jourdain v. Wilson*, 4 B. &

(b) *The Mayor of Congleton v. A. 266.*

Pattison, 10 East. 130.

land. Best, J. was of opinion, that if the premises had not been within the limits of the act, it would not have varied the case, *because the original covenantee could not avail himself of the covenant*, inasmuch as after the assignment he sustains no loss by the destruction of the buildings; and “a covenant in a lease, which the covenantee cannot, after his assignment, take advantage of, and which is beneficial to the assignee as such, will go with the estate assigned;” and he defines *collateral covenants* to be such covenants as are beneficial to the lessor, without regard to his continuing the owner of the estate; but the judgments of the other judges proceed entirely on the ground of the locality of the premises. (a)

A. being seized of a mill, and of certain lands, granted a lease of the latter for years, the lessee yielding and paying to the lessor his heirs and assigns, certain rents, and doing suit to the mill of the lessor his heirs and assigns, by grinding all such corn there as should grow upon the demised premises; this reservation of the suit to the mill is in the nature of a rent, and the implied covenant to render it resulting from the *reddendum*, is a covenant that runs with the land, *so long as the ownership of the mill and the demised premises belong to the same person.* (b)

A condition that a lessee shall not assign over his term, without licence from the lessor, is a collateral

(a) *Vernon v. Smith*, 5 B. & A. 1. (b) *Vivyan v. Arthur*, 1 B. & C. 410.

condition; and cannot be taken advantage of by the assignee of the lessor. (a)

The assignee of part of the reversion in all the lands demised, is an assignee within this statute, but the assignee of the reversion in part of the lands is not; for the condition being entire, cannot be apportioned by the act of the parties, but shall be destroyed. If, therefore, *A.* be lessee for years of three acres, with condition of re-entry, and the reversion of all the *three acres* be granted to *B. for life, or for years, B.* can take advantage of the breach of the condition; but if a reversion of any nature whatsoever, even *in-fee, of two acres* only, be granted to *B.* he cannot. (b)

A *cestui que use*, and bargainee of the reversion, are within this statute, because they are assignees by act of the party; but it does not extend to persons coming in by act of the law, as the lord by escheat; (b) nor to an assignee by estoppel only; (c) nor to one who is in of another's estate, and therefore if the reversion, expectant on the determination of the term, be merged in the reversion in-fee, the reversion is no longer within the statute. (d)

This estate is held not to extend to gifts in-tail, (b)

(a) *Lucas v. How*, Sir T. Raym. 250. *Collins v. Silley*, Stiles 265. *Pennant's case*, 3 Co. 64.

(b) Co. Litt. 215, (a),

(c) *Awder v. Nokes*, Moore, 419.

(d) *Threr v. Barton*, Moore, 94. *Chaworth v. Philips*, Moore, 376. *Webb v. Russell*, 3 T. C. 393. 401.

but copyhold lands are within its intention and equity (*a*)

16. ONE HAVING HAD AN ADVERSE POSSESSION FOR TWENTY YEARS.

An adverse possession for twenty years is not only an available defence to the party whilst he continues in possession, but it gives him (unless affected by some of the exceptive provisions in the statute of limitations) (*b*) a complete possessory right to the lands, and is a sufficient title to enable him to maintain an ejectment against any person who ousts him after the expiration of the twenty years. (*c*)

It seems that this doctrine will hold between the party having had the adverse possession for twenty years, and the legal owner of the lands, although the party having had the possession afterwards desert the premises, and the right owner peaceably enter thereon. (*d*)

But if the possession of the party be affected by any of the provisions of the second section of the statute of limitations, (*b*) or if the lands be the property of the Crown or the Church, the defendant may avail himself thereof, in answer to the claim arising from the adverse possession, without showing any title

(*a*) *Glover v. Cope*, Carth. 205. mond, 741.

(*b*) *Ante*, 46. 55.

(*d*) *Doe d. Burrough v. Reade*,

(*c*) *Stocker v. Barney*, *Ld. Ray.* 8 East. 358.

in himself. If indeed the lands are Crown lands, and the claimant has been ousted by a wrong doer, after an uninterrupted possession for more than twenty years, a grant of them from the Crown will be presumed in his favour, unless the Crown is incapable of making such grant; but if such incapacity exist, a grant of course cannot be presumed; and no possession for less than sixty years will then be sufficient to enable him to maintain an ejectment. And indeed as the stat. 9 G. I. c. 16, only bars the *suit* of the Crown after a continuing adverse possession of sixty years, but does not also give a *title* to the adverse possessor, it may be doubted whether *any* length of possession of Crown lands not grantable by the Crown will be a sufficient title to support an ejectment. (a)

17. CORPORATION AGGREGATE, OR SOLE.

It was formerly doubted whether an ejectment could be maintained by the King, because an ejectment is for an injury done to the possession, and the King cannot be put out of possession. But this reasoning seems only to apply where the King is made *plaintiff*, and not where he is the *lessor of the plaintiff*; for it is the lessee, and not the lessor, who by the legal fiction is supposed to be ousted; and it is held, that where the possession is not *actually* in the King, but in lease to another, there, if a stranger enter on the lessee, he gains possession without taking the reversion out of the Crown, and may have

(a) Goodtitle *d. Parker v. Baldwin*, 11 East. 488.

his ejectment to recover the possession, if he be afterwards ousted; because there is a possession *in pais*, and not in the King, and that possession is not privileged by prerogative. Hence it follows, that the *King's lessee* may likewise have an ejectment to punish the trespasser, and to recover the possession which was taken from him. (a)

In cases, however, included in the stat. 8 Hen. VI. 16, and 18 Hen. VI. 6, which prohibit the granting to farm of lands, seized into the King's hands upon inquest before escheators, until such inquest shall be returned in the Chancery or Exchequer, and for a month afterwards, if the King's title in the same be not found of record, and avoid all grants made contrary thereto, the King cannot maintain an ejectment until all the previous requisites are complied with: for, even presuming the right and possession to be in the Crown immediately on the death of the person last seized, the King has no power to grant the same until after office found, and, consequently, he must be considered to be himself in possession, and therefore unable to give a title to his lessee. (b)

18. CHURCHWARDENS AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR for lands belonging to the parish.

To remedy the practical inconveniences which frequently arose from the difficulty of substantiat-

(a) Payne's case, 2 Leon. 205.
Lee v. Norris, Cro. Eliz. 331.

(b) Doe d. Hayne v. Redfern, 13 East. 96.

ing a legal title to parish lands, (a) it was enacted by the stat. 55 Geo. III. c. 12, s. 17, that churchwardens and overseers of the poor, and their successors, should take and hold *in the nature of a body corporate*, for and on behalf of the parish, all buildings, lands, and hereditaments belonging to the parish; and that in all actions, suits, and other proceedings for or in relation to any such buildings, lands, or hereditaments, it shall be sufficient to name the overseers and churchwardens of the poor for the time being; describing them as churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish for which they shall act, and that no suit or other proceeding shall abate by reason of the death of any such churchwarden or overseer.

In order to constitute the body corporate intended by this act, there must be two overseers, and a churchwarden or churchwardens; and where there were two overseers appointed, one of whom was afterwards appointed (by custom) sole churchwarden; the act did not vest parish property in them. (b)

19. RECTOR, OR VICAR, FOR TITHES. (c)

The statute which gives this remedy for tithes, includes only lay impropiators, leaving spiritual persons to pursue the old remedy in the Ecclesiastical Court; though the doctrine has since been extended

(a) *Doe d. Grundy v. Clarke*, 14 East. 488.

(b) *Woodcock v. Gibson*, 4 B. & C. 462. *Phillips v. Pearse*, 5 B. & C.

(c) *Camell v. Clavering*, Lord

by analogy to tithes in the hands of the clergy. (a) But an ejectment for tithes can only be maintained against persons claiming or pretending to have title thereto, and not against such persons as refuse or deny to set them out, which is called subtraction of tithes: (b) nor will it lie where the tithes are not taken in kind, but an annual sum is paid in lieu thereof. (c)

A parson cannot maintain ejectment for glebe land after sequestration. (d)

As a simoniacal presentation is altogether void, the presentee of the King may, after institution and induction, maintain ejectment against a parson, who has been simoniacally presented, although he has been in the receipt of the rents and profits of the rectory. (e)

20. TRUSTEES.

In all cases in which the trusts are not executed by the statute of uses, the legal estate vests in the trustees, and of course in such cases they may maintain ejectment.

The principles upon which this doctrine is founded

(a) Co. Litt. 159. Baldwin v. Wine, Cro. Car. 301.

(b) 2 and 3 Edw. VI. c. 13. s. 13.

(c) Dyer, 116, (b).

(d) Doe d. Morgan v. Bluck, 3 Camp. 447.

(e) Doe d. Watson v. Fletcher, 8 B. & C. 25.

have already been discussed; (*a*) and it therefore only remains to consider a few cases, in which the trustees have been held to take, or not to take, the legal estate.

A distinction has been made between a devise to a person in trust *to pay over* the rents and profits to another, (*b*) and a devise in trust *to permit some other person to receive* the rents and profits; the legal estate, in the first case, being held to be vested in the trustee, and, in the latter, [in the *cestui que trust*; though, to use the words of Sir James Mansfield, C. J. “It seems miraculous how such a distinction became established; for good sense requires that in both cases it should be equally a trust, and that the estate should be executed in the trustee;—for how can a man be said to permit and suffer, who has no estate, and no power to hinder the *cestui que trust* from receiving?” (*c*) It has, indeed, in several cases, been argued, that a devise to trustees to receive the rents and profits, and pay them over, will not vest the legal estate in the trustees, unless something is required of the trustees which renders it necessary that they should have an interest in the lands, as to pay rates and taxes, &c.; but this doctrine has not yet been sanctioned by any decision of the Courts; though

(*a*) Ante, 33.

(*b*) Shep. Touch. 482. 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 383, 384. Shapland *v.* Smith, Brown, Chan. Cas. 75. Silvester *d.* Law *v.* Wilson, 2 T. R. 444. Jones *v.* Ld. Say and Sele, 8 Vin. Ab. 262.

Broughton *v.* Langley, Salk. 679; S. C. 1 Lut. 814. Burchett *v.* Durdant, 2 Vent. 311. Tenny *d.* Gibbs *v.* Moody, 3 Bing. 3.

(*c*) Doe *d.* Leicester *v.* Biggs, 2 Taunt. 109, 113.

certainly it has happened in all the later cases, that the trustees have been required to do other acts, as well as to pay the rents and profits. (a)

In cases where it is necessary for the purposes of the trust that the trustees should take the legal estate, it will be held to vest in them, though the devise be, that *they suffer and permit the cestui que trust* to receive the rents and profits; as where the trust was, that the trustees should permit a *feme covert* to receive and take the rents and profits, during her natural life, for her sole and separate use, they were held to have the legal estate; such construction being necessary to give legal effect to the testator's intention to secure the beneficial interest to the separate use of the *feme covert*. (b) And where lands were conveyed to trustees, and their heirs, in trust, that the trustees should, with the consent of A., sell the inheritance in fee, and apply the purchase-money to certain trusts mentioned in the deed, with a proviso, that the rents, issues, and profits, until the sale of the inheritance, should *be received by such person, and for such uses*, as they would have been if the deed had not been made, it was held, notwithstanding the proviso, that the estate was executed in the trustees immediately, even before A. had given his consent to the sale; and that it was not a mere power of sale annexed to the legal estate of the owner. (c)

(a) Jones v. Ld. Say and Sele, 3 Vin. Ab. 262. Kenrick v. Lord Beauclerk, 3 B. & P. 175. Doe d. Hallen v. Ironmonger, 3 East. 533. (b) Harton v. Harton, 7 T. R. 652. (c) Keene d. Lord Byron v. Dear- [don, 8 East. 248.

In like manner, where the devise was to *A.* in trust, to permit and suffer the testator's widow to have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy the full free and uninterrupted possession and use of all interest of monies in the funds, and rents and profits arising from the testator's houses for her natural life, if she should remain unmarried; and that her receipts for all rents, &c. with the approbation of any one of the trustees, should be good and valid, she providing for and educating properly the testator's children, and also paying certain annuities; and in case the widow should marry again, then upon certain other trusts; it was held that the use was executed in the devisees in trust, and upon this ground, that the testator, having made the approbation of the trustees necessary to the widow's receipts, showed that he did not intend to give her a legal estate; and Gibbs, J. said, "The rule has been misconceived. Though an estate be devised to *A.* and his heirs, to the use of *B.* and his heirs, the Courts will not hold it to be an use executed, unless it appears by the whole will to be the testator's intent that it should be executed. The Courts will rather say the use is not executed, because the approbation of a trustee is made necessary, than that the approbation of a trustee is not necessary because the use is executed. The very circumstance which is to discharge the tenants, is the approbation of one of the trustees. 'I leave my wife to receive the rents, provided there is always the controul of one of the trustees upon her receipts.'—The testator, therefore, certainly meant that some controul should be exercised,—and what could that controul be, ex-

cept they were to exercise it in the character of trustees?" (a)

Where certain *freehold and leasehold* premises were devised to trustees, their heirs, &c. "to *permit and suffer* the testator's wife to receive and take the rents and profits until his son should attain the age of twenty-one," and the will contained also subsequent devises of other lands to the same trustees, upon trusts clearly not executed by the statute, as for the payment of debts, raising portion for younger children, &c. and immediately after the last of the different devises a proviso followed, "that it should be lawful for the trustees, and the survivor, at any time or times, till *all* the said lands, &c. devised to them, *should actually become vested in any other person or persons, by virtue of the will, or until the same, or any part thereof, should be absolutely sold as aforesaid, to lease the same, or any part thereof,*" it was holden, that the legal estate in the freehold lands contained in the first devise, vested in the widow, notwithstanding that *leasehold* premises were contained in the same devise, (the legal interest in which, of course, vested in the trustees,) and the subsequent leasing power given by the will; because the leasing power either extended to *none* of the lands contained in the first devise, or to such of them only as were originally vested in the trustees, (namely, the leaseholds,) "the trustees having no controul over the lands in the first devise for *any purposes of the testator's will.*" (b)

(a) Gregory v. Henderson, 4 Taunt. 772.

(b) Knight *d.* Phillips v. Smith, 12 East. 455.

Where the devise was, that the trustee *should pay unto*, or else *permit and suffer* the testator's niece to receive the rents, the legal estate was held to be in the niece, because the words "to permit and suffer" came last; and in a will, the last words prevail, though in a deed the first. (a)

In a case where the devise was, "I give and bequeath *my real estates, lands, &c.* and also my personal estate, &c. to *A. B.*, upon trust, to the intent that the said *A. B.*, his heirs, &c. shall first dispose of my personal estate, or so much thereof as shall be sufficient for that purpose, in payment of my debts, &c. *and as to all my real estates, wheresoever and whatsoever, subject to my debts, and such charge or charges as I may now, or at any time or times hereafter, think proper to make, I give, devise, and bequeath the same to C. D.*, for the term of his natural life, with remainder to *E. F.*, &c." it was holden that the legal estate was vested in *C. D.*, because an intention that the trustees should pay the debts was not apparent on the face of the will, and therefore there was no reason for giving the legal estate to the trustees. (b)

Where freehold estates are devised to trustees and their heirs, with a devise over, difficult questions frequently arise, as to the quantum of estate taken by the trustees, which it would be foreign to the purposes of this treatise to discuss; but it may be laid

(a) *Doe d. Leicester v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt. 109. Mansfield, C. J. in delivering the judgment of the Court in this case, said, the reason they assigned for their decision was given for want of a better.

(b) *Kenrick v. Beauclerk*, 3 B. & P. 175.

down as a general principle, that where an estate is given to trustees, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, such words will, according to their natural import, give the fee to the trustees, unless it clearly appears from the whole will, that it was not the intention of the devisor, that the trustees should take the fee, but some less estate; in which case, the will will be so construed, as that the less estate should be taken, and not the fee; (a) and of course, in such cases, the trustees cannot, after the determination of such less estate, maintain ejectment.

As the statute of uses mentions only such persons as are *seized* to the use of others, it has been held not to extend to terms of years, or other chattel interests, whereof the termor is not *seized*, but only *possessed*; and therefore, when only a term of years is created, whatever the nature of the trusts may be, the statute does not execute the uses, but the legal estate always vests in the trustees. (b)

And when a term of this kind is created, it does not cease when the trusts are satisfied, unless there is a proviso to that effect in the deed creating the term; and therefore, when the deed contains no such proviso, the legal estate, however ancient the term may be, and notwithstanding it may have been assigned to attend the inheritance, will remain outstanding in the trustees, or their representatives, until it be surren-

(a) *Doe d. Tomkyns v. Willan*, & C. 357, S. C. 3 B. & C. 191.
 2 B. & A. 84. *Houston v. Hughes*, (b) *Dillon v. Fraine*, Poph. 70
 6 B. & C. 403. *Murthwaite v.* 76; *Dyer*, 369; *Jenk.* 244.
Barnard, 2 B. & B. 624, S. C. 2 B.

dered to the party beneficially interested, or merge in a larger estate. (a)

Copyhold estates also are not comprehended within the statute of uses; because a transmutation of possession, by the sole operation of the statute, without the concurrence or permission of the lord, would be an infringement of the lord's rights, and would tend to his prejudice; and therefore, if a copyhold be surrendered to *A.* to the use of *B.*, the legal estate will not be transferred to *B.*, though he would be entitled in equity to the rents and profits, and to call upon *A.* for a surrender of the estate. (b)

It seems to have been held, in the case of *Roe d. Ebrall v. Lowe*, (c) that a *bonâ fide* lease, made by an equitable tenant in-tail, will prevent the trustees, in whom the legal estate is vested, from recovering in ejectment against the lessee; although, if the lease be granted under suspicious circumstances of fraud and imposition, the trustees will not be barred. But this principle cannot now be supported, and a lease from the *cestui que trust* cannot be set up against the trustee in any case, without the aid of a court of equity. (d)

To obviate the inconveniences which may at times arise, when an ejectment is brought by a *cestui que trust*, from the operation of the salutary maxim that the legal title must prevail, as affecting his situation

(a) Vide Sugden's Vendors and Purchasers, 3d Edit. 263. 293.

(c) 1 H. Blk. 446.

(d) Baker v. Mellish, 10 Vez. Jr.

(b) Co. Cop. s. 54. Gilb. Ten. 182. 544.

with his trustees, the jury will in particular cases be permitted to presume, that a regular surrender has been made by the trustees of their estate; thereby clothing the *cestui que trust* with the legal title, and enabling him to recover in the action. Thus a surrender will be presumed if the purposes of the trust-estate have been satisfied; (a) or if the beneficial occupation of the estate by the possessor induces a supposition, that a conveyance of the legal estate has been made to the party beneficially interested; or where it is for the interest of the owner of the inheritance, that the term should be considered as surrendered, (b) or when the trust is a plain one, and a court of equity would compel the trustees to make a conveyance. (c) But this presumption will not be made if the surrender be a breach of the trust; or against the owner of the inheritance who is interested in upholding it; (d) or where the title of the party, for whom the presumption is required, is a doubtful equity only, until a court of equity has first declared in favour of the equitable title; (e) nor can the presumption be made by the court, where the merit of the case would have warranted such presumption at the trial, if it appear, upon a special verdict, or special case reserved for their opinion, that the trust-estate though satisfied, is still, in point of fact, outstanding in the trustees. (f)

(a) *Doe d. Hodson v. Staple*, 2 T. R. 684.

(b) *Doe d. Burdett v. Wright*, 2 B. & C. 710.

(c) *Doe d. Syburn v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682.

(d) *Doe d. Graham v. Scott*, 11 East. 478.

(e) *Keene d. Lord Byron v. Dear- don*, 8 East. 248.

(f) *Goodtitle d. Jones v. Jones*, 7 T. R. 43.

Where a term of years was created in 1762, and assigned over to a trustee in 1779 to attend the inheritance; and in 1814 the owner of the inheritance executed a marriage-settlement, and in 1816 conveyed his life interest in the estate to a purchaser, as a security for a debt, but no assignment of the term, or delivery of the deeds relating to it, took place on either occasion; and in 1819 (a few weeks before the trial of the cause,) an actual assignment of the term was made by the administrator of the trustee in 1779, to a new trustee for the purchaser in 1816; it was held, upon ejectment being brought by a prior incumbrancer against the purchaser, that the jury were warranted in presuming that the term had previously to 1819 been surrendered. (a) Abbott, C. J. in delivering the judgment of the court in this case, observed that the principal ground of objection made to the presumption was, that it was to be made against the owner of the inheritance, the former instances being all in favour of such owner; but that such presumption might be made against, as well as for the owner, if the justice of the case required it; and instanced the case of a mortgagor setting up a term against his own mortgagee, for if in such case, the term *existed* at the time of the mortgage, the mortgagor ought in honesty to have secured the benefit of it to the mortgagee at the time, and not to have reserved it in his own power, as an instrument to defeat his mortgage. And he stated as one of the general grounds of a presumption, “ *the existence of a state of things, which may most reasonably be accounted for, by supposing*

(a) *Doe d. Putland v. Hilder*, 2 B. & C. 782.

the matter presumed," illustrating the principle by the facts of the case then under consideration.

Where the demised premises were settled for life on *A.*, with power to charge the estate with an annuity for a husband, and portions for younger children, and power to grant leases for twenty-one years; and *A.* granted and appointed the same for five hundred years, to trustees upon trust, if she should by deed so appoint, by mortgage or sale of the term to raise portions for the younger children; and after such grant and appointment, leased the premises for twenty-one years to *B.*; it was held, that taking the whole deed together, the term, until it was called into action, was subservient to the leasing power; and was therefore no answer to an ejectment brought by *B.* (*a*)

21. JOINT TENANT, COPARCENER, OR TENANT IN COMMON, against his companion on an actual ouster. (*b*)

22. LUNATIC.

The ejectment must be brought in the name of the lunatic; for his committee is but a bailiff, and has no interest in the land. (*c*)

23. And to these we may add, that an award, under a submission to arbitration, will give a good title on which to maintain this action; for although the award cannot have the operation of conveying the

(*a*) *Doe d. Courtall v. Thomas*, *Cocks v. Darson*, Hob. 215. *Knipe v. Palmer*, 2 Wils. 130. *sed vide*

(*b*) *Ante*, 54.

43 Geo. III. c. 75.

(*c*) *Drury v. Fitch*, Hutt. 16.

land, there is no reason why the defendant may not conclude himself, by his own agreement, from disputing the title of the lessor of the plaintiff in ejectment. The parties consent that the award of an arbitrator chosen by themselves shall be conclusive; as to the right of the land in controversy between them; and this is sufficient to bind them in the action of ejectment. (a)

(a) *Doe d. Morris v. Rosser*, 3 East. 15.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Cases which require an actual Entry upon the land before Ejectment brought.

WHEN an entry is required only to complete the claimant's title, as when a power is reserved to him to re-enter for the breach of any condition of a lease, or grant, the common consent rule will be sufficient to enable him to maintain ejectment, without any actual entry upon the lands in dispute; but when the entry is requisite to rebut the defendant's title, an actual entry upon them must be made, before the action can be supported. (a) Such, at least, is the principle laid down by Lord Mansfield; but the application of the latter part of it is now limited to cases where fines with proclamations have been levied, for in all other cases the common consent rule to confess entry is sufficient; and it may be doubted whether the necessity of an actual entry, even when a fine with proclamations has been levied, does not arise from the construction given to the words of the statute of fines, (b) rather than from the

(a) Per Lord Mansfield, C. J. in 477—84.

Goodright *d. Hare v. Cater*, Doug. (b) 4 Hen. VII. c. 24.

general principle above mentioned. By that statute it is enacted, that when a fine is levied with proclamations, persons wishing to avoid such fine, must pursue their title, claim, or interest, by way of *action*, or *lawful entry*, within five years next after their title, claim, or interest shall accrue; or (provided at such time they be under any legal disability) within five years next after such disability shall cease; and as the action of ejectment was not used, at the time of the enactment of this statute, for the trial of titles, the word *action* in it has been interpreted to extend to *real actions* only, and not to comprehend the remedy by ejectment. When, therefore, a forfeiture is committed by the levying of a fine with proclamations, and the reversioner does not resort to a real action, it becomes necessary for him, if he mean to take advantage of the forfeiture, to have recourse to the other method pointed out by the statute, that is to say, to make a *lawful entry* upon the land; and having made the *lawful entry*, and thereby avoided the fine, an ejectment will afterwards lie for the recovery of the forfeited lands, in the same manner as if the tenant had forfeited his estate by the breach of any condition annexed to his grant.

This seems to be the true principle upon which an actual entry is deemed necessary when a fine with proclamations has been levied; and it is sanctioned by all the modern decisions, although a different doctrine was formerly maintained. In 1703, it was declared by all the judges (Price, B. excepted,) that, *in case of a fine*, there must be an actual entry; and the two first decisions which are extant after this de-

claration, interpret the maxim to extend to fines *generally*, whether with or without proclamations; and consider the necessity of an entry to arise from the puissance of a fine at common law, and not from the provisions of the statute of fines. (a).

It is somewhat singular that neither of these cases is noticed in any of the subsequent decisions by which they have been over-ruled; (b) although from the superiority of the modern doctrine, the omission can by no means be regretted. It is (to use Lord Mansfield's words) "absurd to entangle men's rights in nets of form without meaning; and an ejectment being a mere creature of the court, framed for the purpose of bringing the right to an examination, an actual entry can be of no service." (c)

It was in one case held by the Court of King's Bench, at a trial at bar in ejectment, that where one had made an *actual entry* into the lands *before* any fine was levied, and brought his ejectment *after*, and laid the demise in the declaration before the time of levying the fine, such entry was sufficient to entitle him to a verdict. It is difficult to discover the principle of this decision; for it is evident, by the words of the statute, that an entry *before* the levying of a fine, cannot *avoid* a fine *afterwards* levied; and if it be said that the entry and demise,

(a) *Berrington v. Parkhurst*, And. Burr. 1895. *Jenkins d. Harris v.* 125. S. C. *Stran*. 1086. S. C. 13 *Pritchard*, 2 Wils. 45. *Doe d. East*. 489. *Tapner d. Peckham v. Duckett v. Watts*, 9 East. 17. *Merlott, Willes*, 177.

(b) *Oates d. Wigfall v. Brydon*, Doug. 477. 85.

(c) *Goodright d. Hare v. Cator*,

being before the levying of the fine, enabled the lessor to show a good title at the time of the demise, and so prevented the defendant from giving the subsequent fine in evidence, there seems no reason why the same effect should not be produced by simply laying the demise before the time of levying the fine without making an actual entry, since it is clear that an *actual entry* is never necessary but to *avoid* a fine. (a)

A fine cannot be avoided by entry, except when the person, who seeks to avoid it, has a right to enter; for if the right of entry be taken away by the fine, and a right of action only remain, as if the fine operate as a discontinuance of the estate, a real action must be resorted to. Such is the case when a fine is levied by a tenant in-tail. (b) But if a tenant in tail first alienate his estate by modes of conveyance which transfer only the possession, and not the right of possession, as by bargain and sale, lease and release, covenant to stand seized, &c. and the grantee be seized *by virtue of such conveyance*, a fine levied afterwards by the tenant in-tail, will not operate as a discontinuance of the estate-tail; but the remainderman, or reversioner, after the death of the tenant in-tail without issue, may enter; provided his entry be made within five years next after his title accrues. (c)

A fine levied by a tenant for life operates as a forfeiture of his estate, and divests also the estate of the

(a) Musgrave *d. Hilton v. Shelly*, Burr. 704.

1 Wils. 214.

(c) Seymour's case, 10 Co. 96.

(b) Doe *d. Odiarne v. Whitehead*, Ante, 35.

remainder-man or reversioner, leaving in him only a right of entry. An actual entry must, therefore, be made upon the lands, in order to avoid such fine, before ejectment can be maintained; (a) and this entry may be made, and the ejectment brought, by the party next in remainder, either within five years next after the time when the proclamations upon the fine are completed by reason of the forfeiture, or within five years after the natural determination of the preceding estate. When also there are several remainder-men in succession, the laches of one remainder-man will not prejudice the others, but each remainder-man will be entitled to his right of entry within five years after his title accrues, notwithstanding the laches of those who have preceded him. But this right can only be exercised by the original remainder-men and reversioners, and will not pass by assignment or devise. (b)

When a lessee for years makes a feoffment, and then levies a fine to his feoffee, an actual entry is necessary to avoid the fine, (c) and the reversioner may then likewise enter within five years next after levying the fine, or within five years next after the expiration of the term. (d)

But where a fine is levied by a tenant for ^{years} life without any previous feoffment, although it amounts to a forfeiture of his estate, it is, from the want of a free-

(a) *Doe d. Compere v. Hicks* 7 T. v. Windsor, 2 Ves. 472. 481. R. 433.

(d) *Whaley v. Tankard*, 2 Lev.

(b) *Goodright d. Fowler v. Forrester*, 8 East. 552.

52. S. C. 1 Vent. 241. S. C. Sir T. Raym. 219. Vide cont. per. Catline, *J. Stowell v. Zouch*, Plow. 374.

(c) *Hunt v. Bourne*, Salk. 339, and the cases there cited. Pomfret

(a). *Podger's case*, 9 Co. 105, (b).

hold interest in the parties, wholly inoperative, (*a*) and consequently does not require an actual entry to avoid it; but the reversioner may recover the premises by ejectment, as upon a right of re-entry for the breach of any condition or covenant contained in a lease. (*b*)

So likewise a fine levied by a mortgagor is inoperative. (*c*)

It is also necessary that there should be an interest in possession in the conusor at the time of the fine being levied; and therefore an actual entry is not necessary where a fine is levied by a person in remainder, (*d*) or by one who has parted with the immediate estate of freehold, (*e*) or who is not actually seized at the time of levying the fine. (*f*)

As the possession of one joint tenant, parcener, or tenant in common, is in contemplation of law the possession of his companion also, (*g*) a fine levied by a joint tenant, parcener, or tenant in common, previously to an actual ouster of his companion, will not operate to divest his companion's estate; and if the

(*a*) Shep. Touch. 14, and the cases cited in *Hunt v. Bourne*, 1 Salk, 339. 341, (*b*).

(*b*) *Fenn d. Mathews v. Smart*, 12 East. 444. *Peaceable d. Hornblower v. Read*, 1 East. 568. 74. *Doe d. Burrell v. Perkins*, 3 M. & S. 271. et vide 1 Saund. 319, *c*.

(*c*) *Doe d. Surtees v. Hall*, 5 B. & A. 687.

(*d*) *Roe d. Truscott v. Elliot*, 1

B. & A. 85. *Doe d. James v. Harris*, 5 M. & S. 326.

(*e*) *Rowe v. Power d. Boyce*, 2 N. R. 1.

(*f*) *Doe d. Ligberd v. Lawson*, 8 B. & C. 606. *Doe d. Osborne v. Spencer*, 11 East. 495. *Doe d. Davis v. Davis*, 1 C. & P. 130.

(*g*) *Ford v. Gray*, Salk. 285. S. C. 6 Mod. 44. *Smales v. Dale*, Hob.

120.

party so levying the fine afterwards actually oust his companion, an ejectment may be maintained against him without an actual entry on the lands. (*a*)

If all the proclamations have not been completed, the fine will only enure as a fine at common law, and no entry will be necessary to avoid it. (*b*) When also a tenant for life does not levy, but merely accepts a fine, although such acceptance will create a forfeiture of his estate, (*c*) yet, as the person who levied the fine had not any estate or interest in the lands at the time of levying the fine, it neither alters the estate of the tenant for life, nor divests the remainder or reversion, and consequently no entry is necessary to avoid it. (*d*)

A husband claiming lands in right of his wife must enter within five years after his title accrues, or the fine will operate as a bar during the coverture, but an infant may avoid a fine by entry at any time during his infancy. (*e*)

The entry must be made by the party who claims the land, or by some one appointed for him; (*f*) although if the entry be made by a stranger, in the name of the person who has the right, without any previous command from him, and he afterwards assent

(*a*) *Peaceable d. Hornblower v. Read*, 1 East. 568.

(*b*) *Doe d. Duckett v. Watts*, 9 East. 17, *set vide Tapner d. Peckham v. Merlott*, Willes, 177.

(*c*) Co. Litt. 252, (*a*).

(*d*) *Podger's case*, 9 Co. 106, (*b*).
Green v. Proude, 1 Mod. 117. S. C. 1 Vent. 257, 8.

(*e*) *Doe d. Wright v. Plumtree*, 3 B. & A. 474.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 258, (*a*).

to the entry, within five years after the fine is levied, such entry will be sufficient. (a) If, however, the assent be not given within the five years, any subsequent assent will not avail; for the statute of fines, being made for the purposes of repose and tranquillity, is always taken strictly. (b)

But a guardian by nurture, or in socage, may enter in the name of his ward, without any command or assent, and such entry shall save his right. So also the remainder-man, or reversioner, or lord of a copyhold, may enter in the name of the tenant for life, years, or copyholder; or these particular tenants in the name of the reversioner, or remainder-man, or the lord, without any command or assent, on account of the privity between these persons. (c) So likewise an entry by a *cestui que trust* will be sufficient. (d)

When one joint tenant, tenant in common, or parcener, enters generally into lands, it will be sufficient to avoid the effect of a fine as to his companion, from the principle before mentioned, that the possession of one joint tenant, tenant in common, or parcener, is the possession of his companion also. (e)

With respect to the mode of making the entry, it must be upon the lands comprised in the fine; for an

(a) Co. Litt. 245, (a). *Fitchet v. Adams*, Stran. 1128.

(b) *Pollard v. Luttrell*, Pop. 108. S. C. Moore, 450. *Audley's case*, Moore, 457. *Podger's case*, 9 Co. 106, (a). *Audley v. Pollard*, Cro. Eliz. 561.

(c) *Podger's case*, 9 Co. 106, (a).

(d) *Gree v. Rolle*, 1 Lord Raymond, 716.

(e) *Brook. Ab. Entre Con.* 37. 1 Roll. Abr. 740. *Doe d. Gill v. Pearson*, 6 East. 173.

entry into other lands, claiming those comprised in the fine, will not be sufficient. (a) Thus, where a fine having been levied, the lessor of the plaintiff proved that at the gate of the house in question, he said to the tenant, that he was heir to the house and land, and forbad him to pay more rent to the defendant, but did not enter into the house when he made the demand, it was agreed that the claim at the gate was not sufficient; but as it appeared that there was a court before the house which belonged to it, and that though the claim was at the gate, *yet that it was on the land*, and not in the street, the claim was holden good. (b) But if a person be prevented by force or violence, from entering on the lands whereof a fine has been levied, he must then make his claim as near the land as he can; which in that case will be as effectual as if he had made an actual entry. (c)

When all the lands lie in one county, the party may enter into any part of them, making a declaration in the name of the whole; but if the lands lie in different counties, there must be separate entries for the several counties. (d) The entry must also be made *animo clamandi*, with an intention of claiming the freehold against the fine; (e) and therefore when, upon a special verdict in ejectment, it was found that a fine had been levied of the premises, and that the lessor of the plaintiff entered upon the premises with intent to make the demise in the declaration

(a) *Focus v. Salisbury*, Hard. 400.

(b) *Anon. Skin.* 412.

(c) *Litt. s. 419. Co. Litt. 253, (b).*

(d) *Litt. s. 417.*

(e) *Clarke v. Phillips*, 1 *Vent.* 42.

mentioned, but not for the purpose of avoiding the fine, it was held that such entry was not sufficient. (a)

By the statute 4 Anne, c. 16. s. 15, it is enacted, that no claim, or entry, to be made upon any lands, &c. shall be of any force to avoid a fine levied with proclamations according to the statute, or a sufficient entry within the statute of limitations, unless upon such entry or claim, an action be commenced within one year after the making of such entry or claim, and prosecuted with effect; and therefore, if the claimant fail in the ejectment brought in consequence of the entry, and have not time to commence a second ejectment within twelve months after the making of the entry, a second entry must be made. But if the actual entry be once made, and the claimant proceed to execution in an ejectment brought thereon, it seems clear that the fine is totally avoided, and that no second entry will be necessary, if he be afterwards turned out of possession, by the wrong-doer, who levied the fine; for the fine being once avoided shall be void for ever. (b)

It has been questioned whether an actual entry is not necessary to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations; (c) but it seems quite clear from the whole current of authorities, that no entry is necessary if the action be commenced within the twenty years. If, however, the twenty years be near ex-

(a) *Berrington d. Dormer v. Park-* 366.
hurst, And. 125. S. C. *Stran*. 1086.

(c) *Goodright d. Hare v. Cater*,
 S. C. *Willes*, 327. S. C. 13 *East*. 489. *Doug.* 477. 485, (n. 1).

(b) *Stowell v. Zouch*, *Plowd.* 353.

piring before an ejectment is brought, it will be prudent to make an actual entry; for it seems, that if an actual entry be made *before* the expiration of the twenty years, an ejectment may be brought at any time within twelve months after the entry, although the twenty years should in the mean while have expired; and also that if the lessor of the plaintiff fail in his first ejectment, whether brought within the twenty years or after, he may, from the provisions of the statute of Anne before-mentioned, bring a second, provided this second ejectment be likewise brought within a year after the entry is made; whereas, if an ejectment be brought without an actual entry, and the claimant fail in it, and before another ejectment can be brought, the twenty years expire, he will be entirely barred of this remedy; because the entry which is confessed by the defendant in the first ejectment being only a fictitious entry, and the second ejectment being a *new action*, and not a continuance of the first, it amounts to the same thing as if no entry had been confessed, or no ejectment had been brought until after the expiration of the twenty years.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Action of Ejectment as between Landlord and Tenant.

THE modern action of ejectment is not confined in its beneficial effects, solely to the trial of disputed titles. It is also the common remedy for landlords, on the determination of tenancies, to recover the possession of their lands from refractory tenants; and it therefore properly belongs to this treatise, to inquire into the several relations of landlord and tenant with regard to this remedy, and to point out the different ways by which the tenant's title to the possession may be determined, and the right of entry in the landlord accrue.

A tenancy may be determined in three several ways; first, by the effluxion of time, or the happening of a particular event; secondly, by a notice from the landlord to the tenant to deliver up the possession, or *vice versá*; and thirdly, by a breach on the part of the tenant of any condition of his tenancy, as by the non-payment of rent, or the non-performance of a covenant.

No comments are necessary upon the first of these divisions; it sufficient to say generally, that, when the time expires, or the particular event happens, the tenancy is at once determined; and that the landlord may immediately maintain an ejectment to recover his possession, without giving any previous notice to the tenant. (*a*)

The cases comprised in the second division must be treated of more fully; and, to understand perfectly the principles upon which they have been decided, it will be necessary to give a short history of that species of tenancy, now called a tenancy from year to year.

It has already been observed, that until the reign of King Henry VII., even a tenant, having a lease of lands for a definite period, had not a full and complete remedy when ousted of his possession. The tenants, who during those times occupied lands without any specific grant, held them by a far more precarious tenure. A general occupation of lands, that is to say, a holding of the lands of another without any certain or determinable estate being limited therein, was then considered as a holding at the will and pleasure of the owner of the land; and the tenant was liable to be ejected, at any moment, by the simple determination of his landlord's will. But the same enlightened policy, which secured to lessees for years the complete possession of their terms, soon extended itself also to those general holdings, then called

(*a*) *Roe d. Jordan v. Ward*, 1 II. Blk. 97.

tenancies at will; and in the reign of King Henry VIII., (a) we find it holden by the Courts, that a general occupation should be considered to be an occupation from year to year; and that a person so holding should not be ejected from his lands, without a reasonable notice from his landlord to relinquish the possession. It was also at the same time settled, that this reasonable notice should be a notice for half a year, expiring at the end of the tenancy; because otherwise, a notice, reasonable as to duration, might be given, which would notwithstanding operate greatly to the prejudice of the tenant, by ejecting him from his lands, immediately before the harvest, or other valuable period of the year: and this rule has remained unaltered to the present day, except where a different time is established, either by express agreement, or immemorial custom. (b)

A general occupation of land now therefore enures as a tenancy from year to year, determinable, and necessarily determinable, (c) by a notice to quit; and a holding merely at the will of the landlord, according to the ancient meaning of the term, is an estate unknown in modern times, (d) unless when created by express agreement between the parties. (e) There is indeed an implied modern tenure denominated a tenancy at will, but it differs materially from the old tenancy so called, and in truth is scarcely dis-

(a) 13 Hen. VIII. 15, (b).

(d) *Timmins v. Rawlinson*, 3

(b) *Parker d. Walker v. Constable*,

Burr. 1603—9.

3 Wils. 25.

(e) *Richardson v. Lengridge*, 4

(c) *Doc d. Warner v. Brown*, 8

Taunt. 128.

East. 165.

tinguishable from a mere permissive occupation of the land, independent of the relationship of landlord and tenant. This kind of tenancy arises, when the party is in possession of the premises with the privity (*a*) and consent of the owner, no express tenancy having been created, and no act having been done by the owner impliedly acknowledging such party as his tenant. As where he has been let into possession pending a treaty for a purchase or a lease, (*b*) or under a lease or agreement for a lease which is void, (*c*) or where having been tenant for a term which has expired, he continues in possession negotiating for a new one. (*d*) In all these, and the like cases, it is holden that the party being lawfully in possession, cannot be ejected until such lawful possession is determined, either by demand of possession, breaking off the treaty, or otherwise, and the party is called a tenant at will; but in any of these cases if the landlord receive rent whilst the party is so in possession, or do any other act amounting to an acknowledgment of a subsisting tenancy, a tenancy from year to year will be created thereby. (*e*)

It is singular that we do not find in the old authori-

- (*a*) *Doe d. Knight v. Quigley*, 2 Camp. 505. *Right d. Lewis v. Beard*, 13 East. 210. *Hegan v. Johnson*, 2 Taunt. 148. *Doe d. Leeson v. Sayer*, 3 Camp. 3.
- (*b*) *Goodtitle d. Galloway v. Herbert*, 4 T. R. 680. *Doe d. Warner v. Browne*, 8 East. 165. *Doe d. Newby v. Jackson*, 1 B. & C. 448.
- (*c*) *Doe d. Hollingsworth v. Stennett*, 2 Esp. 717.
- (*d*) *Denn d. Brune v. Rawlins*, 10 East. 261. *Doe d. Foley v. Wilson*, 11 East. 56.
- (*e*) *Doe d. Rigge v. Bell*, 5 T. R. 471. *Clayton v. Blakey*, 8 T. R. 3. *Thunder d. Weaver v. Belcher*, 3 East. 449, 451. *Doe d. Warner v. Browne*, 3 East. 165.

ties, any decisions relative to notices to quit, although the practice of giving them has been so long established; but during the last sixty years they have become objects of considerable attention to our courts, and there is now no difficulty in reducing their requisites to a clear and satisfactory system.

In considering the uses and requisites of the notice to quit, our first inquiry will be directed to those particular cases in which implied tenancies from year to year are created, although the direct relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist; we shall then consider by whom, and to whom, the notice should be given; then proceed to the form of the notice, and the particular times required in certain cases, for its expiration; and lastly point out the means by which the notice may be waived.

A mortgagee may maintain ejectment against a mortgagor, after the forfeiture of the mortgage, without any previous notice to quit, or demand of possession; (a) and the under lessees of the mortgagor may also in like manner be ejected, provided they have been let into possession by the mortgagor, subsequent to the mortgage, and without the privity of the mortgagee; and it is immaterial whether they hold as tenants from year to year, or by leases executed after the date of the mortgage. But if a lease be granted by a mortgagor with the concurrence of the mortgagee, or if a mortgagee, with knowledge that the mortgagor has granted a

(a) *Doe v. Fisher v. Giles*, 5 Bing. 421. S. C. 2. M. & P. 749.

lease, encourage the tenant to lay out money upon the premises, it may admit of doubt whether by such conduct the mortgagee has not confirmed the lease, or so far at least acknowledged the lessee as his tenant, as to render a notice to quit necessary before he can maintain ejectment against him. (a) With respect to tenancies created prior to the mortgage, the situation of the mortgagee is of course the same as that of the mortgagor before the mortgage was made. (b)

The assignees of the mortgagee have also the like privileges with regard to the mortgagor and his under-tenants; and the right of an assignee to maintain ejectment without a notice to quit, or demand of possession, will not be taken away by a tenancy created prior to the assignment, provided such tenancy commenced subsequently to the date of the mortgage, and continued unacknowledged by the mortgagee. (c)

The like principle prevails with respect to claimants under writs of *elegit*; if the judgment debtor be himself in possession, or if the party in possession has been admitted tenant subsequently to the date of the judgment, (whether as a yearly tenant or under a lease) the tenant by *elegit* may maintain ejectment without a notice to quit, or demanding possession;

(a) *Doe d. Sheppard v. Allen*, 3 T. R. 378. *Doe d. Sheppard v. Taunt.* 78. *Allen*, 3 Taunt. 78.

(b) *Warne d. Keech v. Hall*, Doug. 21. *Thunder d. Weaver v. Belcher*, 3 East. 449. *Birch v. Wright*, 1

(c) *Thunder d. Weaver v. Belcher*, 3 East. 449.

but if the tenant claim under a lease, or tenancy from year to year, prior in point of time to the judgment, the claimant will be barred in the last case until he has determined the tenancy by a regular notice to quit; in the first, until the determination of the lease. (*a*)

When a party has obtained possession of premises belonging to another, and the owner does any act from which a jury may infer that he intends to acknowledge him as his tenant, a tenancy from year to year is created by such act, and the party will be entitled to a regular notice to quit before he can be ejected. Thus, if a landlord suffer his tenant to continue in possession after the expiration of his lease, and receive rent from him accruing subsequently to the period of such expiration, he becomes thereby his tenant from year to year upon the conditions of the original lease. (*b*) So also, if a tenant for life make a lease, void against the remainder-man, and the lessee enter, and then the tenant for life die, if the remainder-man receive rent from such lessee, accruing subsequently to the death of the tenant for life, such receipt of rent, although it will not amount to a confirmation of the lease, will be sufficient (unless from the inadequacy of the rent to the value of the premises, the jury should presume otherwise) (*c*) to establish a tenancy from year to year, upon the terms of it, between the remainder-man and the lessee: and it will be no answer for the remainder-

(*a*) *Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton*, 100.

8 T. R. 2. *Doe d. Putland v. Hilder*,
2 B. & A. 732.

(*b*) *Bishop v. Howard*, 2 B. & C.

(*c*) *Doe d. Brune v. Prideaux*, 10
East. 158. *Denn d. Brune v. Raw-*
lins, 10 East. 261.

man, that he was ignorant of his title when he received the rent, for it is more reasonable that the remainder-man, who ought to have looked into his title, should be bound by his own act, than that the lessee should be prejudiced by his ignorance. (a) In like manner, when a party is let into possession under a lease void by the statute of frauds, (b) payment and receipt of rent will not establish the lease, but it will create a tenancy from year to year, regulated by its covenants and conditions. (c) The same principle also holds if the party come into possession under an agreement or lease, invalid from any other circumstance: as where the party held under an agreement that the lessee should pay a certain rent, and that the lessor should not turn out the lessee so long as the rent was duly paid quarterly, and the lessee did not expose to sale or sell any article that might be injurious to the lessor in his business, which agreement was invalid, inasmuch as it would (if the tenant complied with the terms thereof) operate as an estate for life, which cannot be created by such an instrument, yet the lessee having been let into possession, and rent having been paid and received, a tenancy from year to year was created thereby. (d)

The same rule prevails when a party is let into possession under a valid agreement for a future lease. As no interest in the land passes under such an agree-

(a) *Roe d. Jordan v. Ward*, 1 H. Black. 97. *Doe d. Martin v. Watts*, 7 T. R. 83.

(b) 29 Car. II. c. 3.

(c) *Doe d. Rigge v. Bell*, 5 T. R. 471. *Clayton v. Blakey*, 8 T. R. 3.

(d) *Doe d. Warner v. Browne*, 8 East. 165.

ment, no tenancy is created thereby; but the party being let into possession, and rent being paid and received, he becomes, as in the cases already mentioned, a tenant from year to year. (a)

But where a party enters under an agreement of this nature and continues in possession for the period for which the lease was to be granted, his tenancy ceases at the expiration of that period without any notice to quit, as it would have done if a lease had been executed. (b)

(a) The unsettled state of the principles and uses of the action of ejectment in the time of Lord Mansfield, is well illustrated by the decisions in the cases of *Weakly d. Yea v. Bucknell*, Cowp. 473. (Mich. Term, 17 Geo. III.) and *Goodtitle d. Estwick v. Way*, 1 T. R. 735. (Easter Term, 27 Geo. III.) In the former case, an agreement for a lease was held to be tantamount to a lease; and the party making the agreement was estopped from maintaining an ejectment against the other party, although he had given him a regular notice to quit, because "if the Court were to say the ejectment ought to prevail, it would be merely for the sake of giving the Court of Chancery an opportunity to undo all again." In the latter case a similar agreement was held to form no defence to an ejectment, brought by a party to whom the party making the agreement had granted a term in the premises to satisfy creditors, subsequently to the date of the agreement, although no notice to quit had

been given, and the party had paid rent under the agreement; because the conveyance being made by the lessor to a trustee for the benefit of creditors "was not a mere voluntary conveyance," and therefore the lessor could not be considered as a trustee for the defendant, and as such restrained "from bringing ejectment against his own *CESTUI QUE TRUST*;" and the agreement for the lease "gave the defendant only an equitable title, which cannot be set up in a court of law against the plaintiff who has a legal title." Upon the sound principles by which the action is now regulated, it is evident that these two decisions should have been reversed. In both cases the agreement for the lease, and the receipt of rent under it would have been held to create tenancies from year to year, which would have been determined in the first case by the notice to quit, and would have continued in the latter, for want of such notice.

(b) *Doed. Tilt v. Stratton*, 4 Bing. 446.

It is frequently difficult to determine, from the words of an instrument, whether it will operate as a lease, or only as an agreement for one, and it may be therefore useful, although the subject does not strictly fall within the limits of this treatise, shortly to consider the points which have arisen in cases of this description.

Formerly, when an agreement contained words of present demise, it was held to amount to an absolute lease, although covenants were added prospective of some further act to be done, such covenants being construed to be merely in further assurance. As where, before the statute of frauds, a party said, "You shall have a lease of my lands in *D.* for twenty-one years, paying therefore 10*s.* *per annum*, make a lease in writing and I will seal it;" this was held a good lease by parol, and the making of it in writing was but a further assurance. (*a*) So also, and for a similar reason, the words *doth let* in articles of agreement, have been held a present demise, although there was a further covenant "that a lease should be made and sealed, according to the effect of the articles, before the feast of All Saints next ensuing." (*b*) But a different principle now prevails. The intention of the parties is alone considered, and, to use the words of Lord Ch. B. Gilbert, "if the most proper form of words of leasing are made use of, yet if upon the whole there appears no such intent, but that the instrument is

(*a*) Maldon's case, Cro. Eliz. 33.

(*b*) Harrington v. Wise, Cro. Eliz. 486.—Noy. 57.

only preparatory and relative to a future lease to be made, the law will rather do violence to the words, than break through the intent of the parties, by construing a present lease, when the intent was manifestly otherwise." (a) Thus, where articles were drawn up as follows, "A. doth demise his close to S. to have it for forty years," and a rent was reserved with a clause of distress, upon which articles a memorandum was also written, "that the articles were to be ordered by counsel of both parties, according to the due form of law," it was ruled that the articles were not a sufficient lease. (b) So where the words were "A. doth agree to let, and B. agrees to take," for a certain term at a certain rent, all his estates, the said B. to enter upon the premises *immediately*, and it was further agreed that leases with the usual covenants should be made and executed by a certain date; the stipulation that leases should be so drawn, was held to show plainly that it was not the intention of the parties that such agreement, although containing words of present demise, should operate as a lease, but only to give the defendant a right to the immediate possession till a lease could be drawn. (c) So also where an instrument was executed upon an agreement-stamp in *November*, setting forth the conditions of letting a farm, and the regulations to be observed by the tenant, that the term would be from year to year, and the premises to be entered upon in *February*, and that "*a lease was to be made upon*

(a) Bac. Ab. tit. Leases 164.—
Baxter *d. Abrahall v. Browne*, 2
Black. 973—4.

(b) *Sturgion v. Painter*, Noy. 128.

(c) *Goodtitle d. Estwick v. Way*,
1 T. R. 735. *Phillips v. Hartley*,
3 C. & P. 121.

those conditions with all usual covenants," at the foot of which the defendant wrote, "*I agree to take Lot 1. (the premises in question) at the rent of, &c. subject to the covenants;*" such instrument was held to be an agreement for a lease, and not a present demise, there being not only a stipulation for a future lease, but time given to prepare it before the commencement of the term, and no present occupation as tenant contracted for. (a) So also, where upon an agreement stamp, A. agreed to demise and let certain copyhold premises for a certain term at a certain rent, and *further undertook to procure a licence to let* such premises, the court held, that the instrument was an executory agreement only, for two reasons; first, because if it were held to be a lease, a forfeiture would be incurred, which would be contrary to the intent of the parties, who had cautiously guarded against it, by the insertion of a covenant that a licence to lease should be procured from the lord; and, secondly, because the stamp was conformable to the nature of an agreement for a lease, and not adapted to an absolute lease. (b) So also where the words were "that the said mills he shall hold and enjoy, and I engage to give a lease in for a certain term," &c. it was ruled that the words "shall hold and enjoy" would have operated as words of present demise, if they had not been controlled by those which followed. (c) So also where the words were, "agreed this day to let my house to B. for a certain term," a

(a) *Tempest v. Rawlins*, 13 East. 739.

18.

(c) *Roe d. Jackson v. Ashburner*,

(b) *Doe d. Coore v. Clare*, 2 T. R. 5 T. R. 163.

clause to be added in the lease to give my son a power," &c. it was considered to be manifest from the latter words, that a future instrument of demise was contemplated. (a) So also where the agreement was " memorandum of an agreement between *A.* and *B.*, *A.* agrees to let on lease, with purchasing clause for the term of twenty-one years, all that house, &c. entering on the premises at any time on or before the 11th of February, at the net clear rent of £83 per year, and to keep all premises in as good repair as when taken to, the rent payable quarterly," it was held to be only an agreement preparatory to a demise, and not an actual demise; Abbott, C. J. observing, that it had not any one of the forms of a lease; that it began, " memorandum of an agreement, *A.* agrees to let on lease, (which obviously meant to execute a lease;) that it was impossible to infer when the tenancy was to commence, or the rent to become due; and that the whole was left in doubt. (b) And in a case where, in an instrument which contained words of present demise, there was no direct reference to any future lease, but it appeared, upon taking the whole instrument together, that a future lease was intended, the same rule of construction prevailed. In this latter case the agreement was "*A.* agrees to let to *B.* all his farm, &c. (except three pieces of land) to hold for twenty-one years, determinable at the end of the first fourteen, at the yearly rent of 26*l.* payable, &c. and at and under all other usual and customary covenants and

(a) *Doe d. Bromfield v. Smith*,
6 East. 530.

(b) *Dunk v. Hunter*, 5 B. & A.
322.

agreements, as between landlord and tenant where the premises were situate:—*A.* to allow a proportionate part of the rent, for the three pieces of land above excepted;” and the court held that it amounted only to an agreement for a lease for the following reasons: because “at the yearly rent, &c.” and “at and under all usual covenants, &c.” is not the language in which a lawyer would introduce into a lease the technical covenant for further assurance, but contemplates the entire making of an original lease; and because no landlord or tenant of common sense would enter on a term for twenty-one years, without ascertaining what were the terms on the one side and the other, by which they were to be bound for that period, and what was to be the rent apportioned for the excepted premises. (*a*). But where an instrument, upon an agreement stamp, was as follows, “*A.* agrees to let, and *B.* agrees to take, all that land, &c. for the term of sixty-one years from Lady-day next, at the yearly rent of 120*l.*; and for and in consideration of a lease to be granted by the said *A.* for the said term of years, the said *B.* agrees to expend 2000*l.* in building within four years five houses of a third class of building; and the said *A.* agrees to grant a lease or leases of the said land, as soon as the said houses are covered in, and the said *B.* agrees to take such lease or leases, and execute a counterpart or counterparts thereof:—*this agreement to be considered binding till one fully prepared can be produced;*” the court held the same to be a lease, considering it to be the intention of the parties, that the tenant, who was to

(*a*) *Morgan d. Dowding v. Bissell*, 3 Taunt. 65.

expend so much capital upon the premises within the first four years of the term, should have a present legal interest in the term, which was to be binding upon both parties; although when a certain progress was made in the buildings, a more formal lease or leases, in which perhaps the premises might be more particularly described for the convenience of under-letting or assigning, might be executed. (a) So also where the instrument was "A. agrees to let, and also upon demand to execute, to B. a lease of certain lands, and B. agrees to take, and upon demand to execute, a counterpart of a lease of the said lands for a certain term at a certain rent; the lease to contain the usual covenants, and the agreement to bind until the said lease be made and executed, &c." it was held to be a present demise; and that the agreement for a future lease, with further covenants, was for the better security of the parties. (b) And in the last case upon the subject where the instrument was in the following form, "memorandum of agreement made on, &c. between A. and B., the said A. for the considerations hereinafter mentioned, *agrees to grant seal and execute unto B. a legal and effectual lease of all that messuage, &c. to hold the same unto B. his executors, &c. from &c. for the term of five years at and under the yearly rent of, &c. to be made payable quarterly, and under and subject to covenants by and on the part of B. to pay the rent, and all taxes, to keep the premises in repair, to paint the outside every third year of the term, (and certain other covenants which need not be enumerated,)*

(a) *Poole v. Bentley*, 12 East. 168.

(b) *Doe d. Walker v. Groves*, 15 East. 244.

and the said *B.* agreed to accept and take a lease upon the terms aforesaid, *and in the mean time, and until such lease shall be made and executed, to pay the rent as aforesaid, and to hold the premises subject to the covenants above mentioned:* and the said *B.* further agreed to put the premises into good and tenantable repair at his own expense, and to complete all such repairs forthwith, with power of re-entry for non-payment of rent or non-performance of covenants before the lease should be made and executed." The Court held that this instrument amounted to a present demise; observing, that although there were conflicting expressions, it clearly was the paramount intention of the parties that the instrument should operate as a lease; for that the defendant was to hold according to covenants, some of which were inconsistent with a tenancy from year to year, as that to paint once in three years, and that for putting the premises in repair before he commenced his occupation; and that there could be no doubt it was meant that there should be a formal lease, but that the tenant should hold in the mean time under a demise, upon the same terms as if that lease had been executed. (*a*)

But to return to the subject of implied tenancies from year to year. In all the cases already mentioned, the mode of acknowledging the tenancy was by the payment and receipt of rent, which indeed is the common evidence in cases of this nature. But the intention to create such a tenancy may be inferred

(*a*) *Pincro v. Judson*, 6 Bing. 206.

from other circumstances. Thus, where lands descended to an infant, with respect to whom the tenant in possession was a trespasser, and an ejectment was brought on the demise of the infant, and compromised by his attorney upon certain terms, one of which was, that the tenant should attorn to the infant, it was ruled by Lord Kenyon, C. J. at *Nisi Prius*, upon a second ejectment being brought by the infant, when he attained his full age, that although the infant was no party to the agreement, nor had confirmed it, nor received rent since he came of age, yet that such agreement, having been entered into, without fraud or collusion, after an ejectment brought at his suit, had, by his acquiescence therein, established the defendant's title as against himself, and created a new tenancy, which could only be determined by a notice to quit. (a) So also where a *feme-covert* lived many years separated from her husband, and during that time received to her separate use the rents of certain lands, which came to her by devise after separation, it was presumed, that she received the rents by her husband's authority, and held, that a notice to quit must be given by him before he could maintain ejectment. (b)

It has also been held in a recent case, that where a rector had suffered persons, who were in possession as tenants prior to his incumbency, to continue in quiet and undisturbed possession for eight months after his institution, he must be presumed to have assented to the continuance of their tenancy under the

(a) *Doe d. Miller v. Noden*, 2 Esp. 528.

(b) *Doe d. Leicester. v. Biggs*, 1 Taunt. 367.

terms of their previous holding, and therefore unable to eject them without a notice to quit. (*a*)

This is the only case in which a mere permission by the owner to occupy premises, without some positive act of acknowledgment, has been held sufficient to create a tenancy requiring a regular notice to quit, but the principle seems applicable to all cases where the occupant has been tenant to a previous owner, and his tenancy has expired on the determination of his landlord's estate.

But where a party has put another into possession with a view to a future tenancy or purchase, or under circumstances of a similar nature, although he may have done no act acknowledging a regular tenancy, he cannot afterwards eject him without a demand of possession, unless some wrongful act has been done by such party determining his lawful possession.

Thus, where a party was let into possession, under an agreement for the purchase of the land, and had possession formally given to him, and paid part of the purchase-money, and there was no default on his part, (*b*) a demand of possession was held necessary. (*c*) So likewise where it was agreed that *A.* should sell to *B.* certain premises if it turned out that he had a title to them, and that *B.* should have immediate possession, *A.* was not permitted to maintain ejectment

(*a*) *Doe d. Caters v. Somerville*, M. & S. 148—50.

6 B. & C. 126. *Doe d. Kerby v. Carter*, 1 R. & M. 237.

(*c*) *Right d. Lewis v. Beard*, 13 East. 210.

(*b*) *Doe d. Parker v. Boulton*, 6

against *B.* without a demand of possession, although the object of the action was to try the title to the premises. (*a*) So likewise where a tenant, whose lease had expired, continued in possession, pending a treaty for a further lease, although no tenancy from year to year was created by such possession and negotiation, the landlord was thereby precluded from recovering in ejectment, upon a demise anterior to the termination of the treaty. (*b*) So also when a party is admitted into possession under an invalid lease or agreement, the landlord must demand possession, or in some other manner determine the will, before he can maintain ejectment, although he has not acknowledged the party as his tenant. (*c*)

But where the vendor of a term, after payment of part of the purchase-money, let the purchaser into possession upon an agreement, that he (the purchaser) should have possession of the premises until a given day, paying the reserved rent in the meanwhile, and that if he should not pay the residue of the purchase-money on that day, he should forfeit the instalments already paid, and not be entitled to an assignment of the lease; and the purchaser failed to complete the purchase at the appointed day; it was ruled that an ejectment might be maintained without even a demand of possession, the purchaser having by his own

(*a*) *Doe d. Newby v. Jackson*, 1 B. & C. 448.

(*b*) *Doe d. Hollingsworth, v. Stennet*, 2 Esp. 716.

(*c*) *Goodtitle d. Herbert v. Gal- loway*, 4 T. R. 680. *Clayton v.*

Blakey, 8 T. R. 3. *Thunder d. Weaver v. Belcher*, 3 East. 449.

451. *Doe d. Warner v. Browne*, 8 East. 165. *Hegan v. Johnson*,

2 Taunt. 148.

act determined his interest in the premises. (a) And where a man, having obtained possession of a house without the landlord's privity, afterwards entered into a negotiation with him for a lease, which failed, the same rule of construction seems to have prevailed. (b) So also where upon an agreement for a sale to be completed by a certain day, the intended purchaser agreed with A. to let the premises to him to commence from that day, and A. was let into possession prior to that day by the permission of the intended seller, and the party failed to complete his purchase, A. was held not entitled to a demand of possession before ejectment brought, his possession being only the possession of that party by anticipation. (c)

As the implied tenancies from year to year, which have here been treated of, depend wholly upon the presumption, that it was the intention of the parties to create them, evidence may always be received to rebut such presumption, and show their real meaning. Thus, where a remainder-man, on the death of the tenant for life, gave notice to the tenant in possession under a lease, granted by the tenant for life, but void against the remainder-man, to quit at the end of six months, and subsequently to the giving of the notice, but before its expiration, received a quarter's rent, accruing after the death of the tenant for life, it was ruled by Blackstone, J. that the previous notice to quit rebutted the presumption of a

(a) *Doe d. Leeson v. Sayer*, 3 Camp. 505.

Camp. 8. *Doe d. Moore v. Law-*
der, 1 Stark. 308.

(c) *Doe d. Parker v. Boulton*, 6
 M. & S. 148.

(b) *Doe d. Knight v. Quigley*, 2

tenancy from year to year, raised by the acceptance of the rent. (a) So also where the rent is not paid, and received, as between landlord and tenant, but upon some other consideration, no tenancy from year to year will be created. The payment of a customary rent for copyhold premises, has been held to be a payment of this nature; and, if the tenant hold such premises by a title or tenure, which is not supported by the custom of the manor, the receipt of the quit-rent from him by the lord will not create a tenancy from year to year. (b)

Upon the same principle, where a tenant in-tail received an ancient rent, which was but trifling when compared with the real value of the premises, and which had been reserved under a void lease granted by the tenant for life under a power, upon a special case reserved for the opinion of the Court of King's Bench, they intimated that a jury should be strongly advised not to imply a tenancy from year to year from such payment and receipt, (c) although it would amount to such an acknowledgment of a tenancy at will, as would require a demand of possession before ejectment could be maintained. (d)

If the tenant set his landlord at defiance, and do any act disclaiming to hold of him as tenant, as, for instance, if he attorn to some other person, no notice

(a) *Sykes d. Murgatoyd v. —*,
cited in *Right d. Fowler v. Darby*,
1 T. R. 161.

(b) *Right d. Dean of Wells v.*
Bawden, 3 East. 260.

(c) *Roe d. Brune v. Prideaux*, 10
East. 158.

(d) *Denn d. Brune v. Rawlins*,
10 East. 261.

to quit will be necessary; for, in such case, the landlord may treat him as a trespasser. (a) It has, however been held that a refusal to pay rent to a devisee under a contested will, accompanied with a declaration that he (the tenant) was ready to pay the rent to any person who was entitled to receive it, was not a disavowal sufficient to dispense with the necessity of a regular notice. (b)

When a tenant from year to year dies, his interest in the lands vests in his personal representative, who will continue to hold the premises upon the same terms as the original tenant, and be entitled to the same notice to quit. (c) If, however, by the terms of the agreement, no interest vests in the representative, no notice to quit will be necessary. Thus where *A.* agreed to demise a house to *B.*, during the joint lives of *A.* and *B.*, and *B.* entered in pursuance of the agreement, and before any lease was executed, died, after which *B.*'s executor took possession of the house; it was held that *A.* might maintain ejectment against the executor without notice to quit, because the death of *B.* determined his interest, and consequently no interest vested in the executor. The court were also of opinion that the case would have been the same if the lease had been executed. (d)

In like manner the situation of a tenant from year

(a) B. N. P. 96.

(b) *Doe d. Williams v. Pasquali*, Peake's R. 196. Vide *Doe d. Calvert v. Frowd*, 4 Bing. 557. S. C. 1 M. & P. 480.

(c) *Doe d. Shore v. Porter*, 3

T. R. 13. *Parker d. Walker v. Constable*, 3 Wils. 25.

(d) *Doe d. Bromfield v. Smith*, 6 East. 530.

to year remains unaltered, notwithstanding the death of the landlord, and he will be entitled to his regular notice to quit, whether the lands descend to the heir (although such heir be a minor,) (*a*) or pass to the personal representative, or devisee, of the deceased.

We are next to consider the persons by whom, and to whom, the notice to quit is to be given.

The notice to quit must be given by the person interested in the premises, or his authorized agent; and such agent must be clothed with his power to give the notice, at the time when the notice is given; a subsequent assent on the part of the landlord being not sufficient to establish by relation a notice, given in the first instance without his authority. And this principle is founded in reason and good sense, for as the tenant is to act upon the notice at the time it is given to him, it ought to be such an one as he may act upon with security; and if an authority by relation were sufficient, the situation of the tenant must remain doubtful, until the ratification or disavowal of the principal, and he would thereby sustain a manifest injustice. (*b*)

(*a*) *Maddon d. Baker v. White*, 2 T. R. 159.

(*b*) *Right d. Fisher v. Cuthell*, 5 East. 491. Notwithstanding the printed report of the case of *Goodtitle d. King v. Woodward*, 3 B. & A. 689, I have not altered the principle laid down in the former edition of this work: viz, that an agent must be clothed with

authority to give a notice to quit at the time of giving the notice, in order to render it valid. The facts of that case were shortly as follows:—*A. B. C.* and *D.* were joint tenants; *E.* gave the tenant in possession a written notice to quit, purporting to be given as the agent and on the part of all the joint tenants; and at the time of

When also two or more persons are interested in the premises, a notice to quit given by one, on behalf of himself and co-tenants, will be valid only as far as his own share is concerned, (a) unless he was acting at

giving such notice *E.* had a written authority so to do from *A.* and *B.*, which authority was subsequently signed by *C.* and *D.* According to a note taken by myself of the judgment of the Court, the principle upon which the notice was held sufficient was, "that a notice to quit given by one joint tenant was binding upon all, because otherwise the lessee would become a joint tenant with the party giving him notice, by which he would be subject to great inconvenience, and the estate of the co-joint tenants would be prejudiced; and, therefore, the notice must be taken to be an act beneficial to the estate, and consequently binding upon all the joint tenants;" and not as stated in the printed report, that "a notice given by an agent is sufficient, if his authority be subsequently recognized." The report is also I believe incorrect in stating, "that to entitle joint tenants to recover in ejectment against a tenant from year to year, the notice to quit must be signed by all the joint tenants at the time it is received;" the reverse of this proposition was according to my note maintained, viz. "that a notice signed by one joint tenant was binding upon all," and indeed such must have been the decision if I have taken a correct view of the princi-

ple of the judgment. Without inquiring into the soundness of that principle, or whether it would not have been wiser to have placed joint tenants, parceners, and tenants in common, on the same footing with respect to notices to quit, there can be no doubt it is the only principle upon which that judgment can be supported with good faith to the tenant; because if after the delivery of the notice an option remained to the parties who had not then signed the authority to confirm or disallow it, (as assumed in the printed report), the tenant had not "such a notice as he could act upon with certainty at the time it was given," to which all the authorities say he is entitled; but such certainty commenced only from the time of the recognition of the authority of the agent by those parties, which might have been only the day before the notice expired. And as an option to recognize includes of necessity a right to disallow, how can a tenant possibly regulate his conduct as to the management of his farm, &c. if it may be doubtful until the very day on which his notice expires, whether he will be permitted to go, or compelled to stay?

(a) *Doe d. Whayntan v. Chaplin*, 3 Taunt. 120. *Doe d. Green v. Baker*, 8 Taunt. 241.

the time under the authority of the other parties mentioned in the notice. But this rule it seems does not hold when the parties are interested as joint tenants; because of the rule of law, that every act of one joint tenant, which is for the benefit of his co-joint tenant, shall bind him, and it must be predicated that the determination of the tenancy by such notice is for the benefit of the estate. (a) And where several tenants in common are interested, as many of them as give notices may recover their respective shares, (b) although the others do not join, unless indeed by the conditions of the tenancy, it is rendered necessary for all the parties to concur in the notice, in which case a notice given by some of the parties, without the junction or authority of their companions, will be altogether invalid (a)

Where *A.* and *B.*, two tenants in common, had agreed to divide their estate, and that *Blackacre* should belong to *A.*; and the occupier of *Blackacre* afterwards, and with knowledge of this agreement, paid his whole rent to *A.*, and afterwards received from him a notice to quit, such notice was held sufficient for both moieties, although the deed of partition was not signed, because the tenant by payment of rent to *B.* for the whole premises, had estopped himself from disputing his title to them. (c)

The steward of a corporation may give a notice to

(a) Right *d.* Fisher *v.* Cuthell, 5 East. 491. Ante. p. 126. note (b). ker, 8 Taunt. 241.

(b) Doe *d.* Whayman *v.* Chaplin, 3 Taunt. 120. (c) Doe *d.* Pritchett *v.* Mitchell, 1 B. & B. 11. S.C. 3 B. Moore, 229. Doe *d.* Green *v.* Ba-

quit, without a power under the corporation seal for so doing; and if the corporation afterwards bring an ejectment upon such notice, it will not be necessary to give any other evidence of his authority, than that he is steward; for the corporation by bringing the ejectment show that they authorized and adopt the act of their officer. (a)

A receiver appointed by the Court of Chancery, with a power to let the lands, is an agent sufficiently authorized to give a notice to quit; for if he have an authority to let, he must be taken to have a power of determining the letting, as he must determine for how long he will let. (b)

Where a lease contained a proviso, that if either of the parties should be desirous to determine it in seven or fourteen years, it should be lawful for either of them, *his executors, or administrators*, so to do upon twelve months' notice to the other of them, *his heirs, executors, or administrators*, it was considered that the words *executors, or administrators*, were put for *representatives in general*, and that a notice might be given by *an assignee* of either party, or by *the heir, or devisee*, as well as by the parties themselves, their executors, or administrators; because, otherwise, in case of an assignment, or devise, the right of determining the term would be taken from the persons interested in it, and given to a mere stranger,

(a) *Roe d. Dean of Rochester v. Doe d. Marsack v. Read*, 2694. *Pierce*, 2 Campb. 96. 12 East. 57. 61.

(b) *Wilkinson v. Colley*, Burr.

having no interest therein. (a) But, where the demise was for twenty-one years, if both parties should so long live, but if either should die before the end of the term, then the heirs and executors, &c. of the party so dying, might determine the lease by giving twelve months' notice to quit, it was holden, that this power extended only to the representative of the party dying, and that the lease could not be determined by a notice to quit given by the lessor, after the lessee's death, to his representative. (b)

When the relation of landlord and tenant subsists, difficulties can seldom occur as to the party upon whom the notice should be served. The service should invariably be upon the tenant of the party serving the notice, notwithstanding a part, or even the whole of the premises, may have been under-let by him. And in a case where the service was upon a relation of the under-tenant upon the premises, Lord Ellenborough, C. J. ruled the service to be insufficient, although the notice was addressed to the original tenant. (c) The original tenant is also liable to an ejectment, at the expiration of the notice, for the lands in the possession of his under-tenants, although he may, on his part, have given proper notices to them, and delivered up such parts of the premises as were under his own controul. (d)

(a) *Roe d. Bamford v. Hayley*, T. 1811. M. S.
12 East. 464.

(b) *Legg d. Scott v. Benion*, Willes,
44.

(c) *Doe d. Mitchell v. Levi*, M.

(d) *Roe v. Wiggs*, 2 N. R. 330.
Pleasant d. Hayton v. Benson, 14
East. 234.

Where a tenant from year to year had under-let part of the premises, and then gave up to his landlord the part remaining in his own possession, not having received from him a notice to quit, or surrendering such part in the name of the whole, it was held that a notice to quit, from the original landlord to the sub-lessee, for the part so under-let, was irregular; and that the sub-lessee could not be ejected without a regular notice from his immediate landlord. And it seems that if the tenant had surrendered such part in the name of the whole, it would not have varied the case, because the surrender of the lessee would not destroy any interest, which a stranger claiming under him had acquired in the term before such surrender.

When the premises are in the possession of two or more, as joint tenants, or tenants in common, a written notice to quit, addressed to all, and served upon one only, will be a good notice; (*a*) so also a parol notice, given to one co-tenant only, will bind his fellow. (*b*)

When a corporation aggregate is the tenant, the notice should be addressed to the corporation, and served upon its officers, and a notice addressed to the officers will not be sufficient. (*c*)

With respect to the mode of serving the notice, it is in all cases advisable if possible to deliver it

(*a*) *Doe d. Lord Bradford v. Crick*, 5 Esp. 196.

Watkins, 7 East. 551.

(*c*) *Doe d. Lord Carlisle v. Wood-*

(*b*) *Doe d. Lord Macartney v. man*, 8 East. 228.

to the tenant personally; but if personal service cannot be effected, the service will be sufficient if the notice be left with the wife or servant of the tenant at his usual place of residence, whether upon the demised premises, or elsewhere, and its nature and contents explained at the time. (a) But a mere leaving of the notice at the tenant's house, without proof that it was delivered to some member of the household, will not be a sufficient service. (b)

Next of the form of the notice. (c)

When the landlord intends to enforce his claim to double value if the tenant holds over, (d) it is necessary that the notice to quit should be in writing; but for the purposes of an ejectment a parol notice is sufficient, unless the notice is required to be in writing by express agreement between the parties. (e) It is however nevertheless the general practice to give written notices; and it is a precaution which should always, when possible, be observed, as it prevents mistakes, and renders the evidence certain and correct. It is customary also to address the notice to the tenant in possession; and it is perhaps most prudent to adhere to this form, though, if proof can be given that the notice was served personally upon him, it is thereby

(a) *Jones d. Griffith v. Marsh*, 4 T.R. 464. *Doe d. Lord Bradford v. Watkins*, 7 East. 553. *Doe d. Neville v. Dunbar*, 1 M. & M. 10.

(b) *Doe d. Bross v. Lucas*, 5 Esp. 153.

(c) Appendix, Nos. 1, 2, 3.

(d) 4 G. II. c. 28, s. 1.

(e) *Legg d. Scott v. Benion*, Willes, 43. *Timmins v. Rowllison*, 1 Blk. 533. *Doe d. Lord Macartney v. Crick*, 5 Esp. 196. *Roe d. Dean of Rochester v. Pierce*, 2 Camp. 96.

rendered unnecessary. (a) And where a notice was addressed to the tenant by a wrong Christian name, and the tenant did not return the notice, or object to it, and there was no tenant of the name mentioned in the notice, it was ruled at *Nisi Prius* to be sufficient. (b)

A subscribing witness to a notice to quit is unnecessary; and it is prudent not to have one, as it may occasion difficulties in the proof of the service, and cannot be of the slightest advantage to the landlord. (c)

Care should be taken that the words of a notice are clear and decisive, without ambiguity, or giving an alternative to the tenant; for although the courts will reluctantly listen to objections of this nature, yet if the notice be really ambiguous, or optional, it will be sufficient to render it invalid, as far at least as the action of ejectment is concerned.

The notice, however, will not be invalid, unless it contain a real and *bond fide* option, and not merely an apparent one; for if it appear clearly, from the words of the notice, that the landlord had no other end in view than that of turning out the tenant, it will be deemed a notice sufficient to found an ejectment upon, notwithstanding an apparent alternative. Thus the words, "I desire you to quit the possession

(a) *Doed. Matthewson v. Wrightman*, 4 Esp. 5.

(b) *Doc v. Spiller*, 6 Esp. 70.

(c) *Doe d. Sykes v. Duratord*, 2 M. & S. 62.

at Lady-day next of the premises, &c. in your possession, or *I shall insist upon double rent,*" have been held to contain no alternative; because the landlord did not mean to offer a new bargain thereby, but only added the latter words as an emphatical way of enforcing the notice, and showing the tenant the legal consequences of his holding over. It was contended for the tenant, that this could not be the construction of the notice, because the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 28, does not give double the *rent*, but double the *value*, on holding over; but Lord Mansfield, C. J., was of opinion, that the notice, notwithstanding this variance, clearly referred to the statute. It seems, however, that if the words had been "*or else* that you agree to pay double rent," the notice would have been an alternative one. (a)

Where the notice was to quit "on the 25th day of March, or 6th day of April next ensuing," (b) and was delivered before new Michaelmas-day, it was held to be a good notice; as being intended to meet an holding commencing either at new, or old Lady-day, and not to give an alternative. (c)

Upon the same principle, the court will not invalidate a notice, on account of an ambiguity in the wording of it, provided the intention of the notice be sufficiently certain. Thus, an impossible year has

(a) *Doe d. Matthews v. Jackson*,
Doug. 175.

(b) In the printed report, this date is stated to be the *eighth* day of April, which, from the reasoning

in the case, cannot be correct. See also *Doe d. Spicer v. Lea*, 11 East. 312.

(c) *Doe d. Matthewson v. Wrightman*, 4 Esp. 5.

been rejected. The notice was given at Michaelmas, 1795, to quit at Lady-day *which will be* in 1795, and was accompanied, at the time of the delivery to the tenant, with a declaration, that as he would not agree to the terms proposed for a new lease, he must quit *next* Lady-day, and under these circumstances the notice was considered to be sufficiently certain: (a) the court also seemed to be of opinion, that the notice would have been good without the accompanying declaration, the words "*which will be*," manifestly referring to the then next Lady-day.—In like manner where there was a misdescription of the premises in the notice, which could lead to no mistake, the house being described therein as the *Waterman's Arms*, instead of the *Bricklayer's Arms*, no sign called the *Waterman's Arms* being in the parish, the notice was deemed a valid one. (b)

So likewise where a farm was leased for twenty-one years at a certain rent, consisting, as described in the lease, of *the Town Barton* and its several parcels described by name, at one portion of the rent, and *the Shippin Barton* and its several parcels also described by name, at the residue of the rent, with a power reserved to either party to determine the lease at the end of fourteen years on giving a certain notice; it was held that a notice given by the landlord to the tenant to quit "*Town Barton &c. agreeably to the terms of the covenant between us, &c.*" was sufficient, because the landlord must have intended to give such a notice to quit as the lease re-

(a) *Doe d. Duke of Bedford v. Kightley*, 7 T. R. 63.

(b) *Doe d. Cox v. —*, 4 Esp. 185.

served to him the liberty of giving, and not a void notice to quit a part only, and so the notice must have been understood by the tenant. (a)

When a notice is given to quit at Michaelmas, or Lady-day, generally, it will not be deemed an ambiguous notice, but considered *prima facie*, as expiring at *new* Michaelmas, or *new* Lady-day, open however to explanation, that *old* Michaelmas, or *old* Lady-day, was intended. And if it appear, that the customary holdings where the lands lie, are from old Michaelmas, or Lady-day, or even that in point of fact the tenant entered at old Michaelmas, or Lady-day, although no such custom exist, such a notice will be binding upon him. (b)

The notice must include all the premises held under the same demise, for a landlord cannot determine the tenancy as to part of the things demised, and continue it as to the residue. (a) But where the demise was of land and tithes, and the notice was to quit possession of "all that messuage, tenement, or dwelling-house, farm-lands, and premises, with the appurtenances which you rent of me," it was ruled at *Nisi Prius* that this notice was sufficient to include the tithes; for the tithes being held along with the farm, the notice must have been understood by both parties to apply to both. (c)

(a) *Doe d. Rodd v. Archer*, 14 East. 245. *d. Hall v. Benson*, 4 B. & A. 588.

(b) *Furley d. Mayor of Canterbury v. Wood*, 1 Esp. 197. *Doe d. Hinde v. Vince*, 2 Campb. 256. *Doe*

(c) *Doe d. Morgan v. Church*, 3 Campb. 71.

Fourthly, Of the time when the notice should expire.

Before, however, we enter upon this subject, it may be useful to observe, that certain demises, which have the appearance of tenancies from year to year only, are considered by the courts as conveying to the tenant an indefeasible interest for a certain time, though afterwards liable to be determined by a notice to quit.

Thus, a demise, "not for one year only, but from year to year," has been held to constitute a tenancy for two years at least, and not determinable by a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year. (a) The same interpretation has also been given to a demise "for a year, and afterwards from year to year;" (b) though where the demise was "for twelve months certain, and six months' notice afterwards," it was held at *Nisi Prius*, that the tenancy might be determined at the expiration of the first twelve months. (c)

Where the demise was to hold for three, six, or nine years generally, without any stipulation as to the manner in which, or the party by whom, the tenancy might be determined at the end of the third, or sixth year, the tenancy was held to be determinable, at the two earlier periods, at the will of the tenant only, and

(a) *Denn d Jacklin v. Cartright*, 4 East. 31. *son v. Huddleston*, 4 B. & C. 922.

(b) *Birch v. Wright*, 1 T. R. 378. (c) *Thompson v. Maberley*, 2 Camp. 573.

80, and the cases there cited. John-

by a regular notice to quit; and that, as against the landlord, the demise operated as an indefeasible one for nine years. (a)

If the produce of the demised lands require two years to come to perfection, as if it be liquorice, madder, &c. a general holding will, it seems, enure as a tenancy from two years to two years, and cannot be determined by a notice to quit at the end of the first or third year. (b) And it was observed by De Grey, C. J. in his judgment, that it might deserve to be considered whether, if required by the nature of the soil, or the course of husbandry, a general holding will not always enure as a tenancy for such period, as may be necessary to carry the land through its regular course of cultivation, instead of as a tenancy from year to year; but this doctrine seems very doubtful.

It has before been stated generally, that, by the common law, the notice necessary to be given to a tenant, is a notice for *half a year*, expiring at the end of the current year of his tenancy; and that a notice, expiring at any other period, will not be sufficient. (c) This notice is frequently spoken of in the books, as *a six months' notice*; and the distinction seems to be, that when the tenancy expires at any of the usual feasts, as Michaelmas, Christmas, Lady-day, or Midsummer, the notice must

(a) *Denn v. Spurrier*, 3 B. & P. 399.

(b) *Roe v. Lees*, Black. 1171.

(c) *Ante*, 106.

be given prior to the corresponding feast happening in the middle of the year of the tenancy ; (a) whilst, if it expire at any other period of the year, the notice must be given six calendar months previous to such expiration.

The notice, when a tenancy commences at any of the usual feasts, may be given to quit at the end of half a year, or of six months from the date of the corresponding feast in the middle of the year, without stating the day when the tenant is to quit, although the intermediate time be not exactly half a year, or six months, from feast to feast being the usual half yearly computation. And indeed, in a case where the notice was to quit "on or about the expiration of six *calendar* months from the 29th of September, (the tenancy commencing March 25,) the Court ruled the word *calendar* to be surplusage, and held the notice good.(b)

It was once contended, that the principle, that a notice to quit must expire at the end of the year of the tenancy, did not extend to houses as well as lands ; and that in cases where houses alone were concerned,

(a) In a report of a MS. case in Esp. N. P. 460, it is said, that a notice given on the 30th of September, being the day after Michaelmas-day, to quit at Lady-day following, was ruled by Heath, J. to be a sufficient notice. Some particular circumstances, not noticed by the reporter, must, it is conceived, have occasioned Mr.

J. Heath's decision, since the principle laid down in the report is in opposition to every authority upon the subject. Probably the tenant entered at old Lady-day. Vide *Right v. Darby*, 1 T. R. 159, et ante, 136.

(b) *Howard v. Wemsley*, 6 Esp. 53. The marginal note in the report of this case is incorrect.

six months' notice, at any period of the year, would be sufficient; but the Court considered that the same inconvenience might arise in the one case as in the other, since the value of houses varies considerably at different periods of the year; and therefore held that the tenant of a house was entitled to the same privileges, with respect to the notice to quit, as the occupier of land. (*a*)

But this rule extends, with respect to houses, to those cases only in which the tenancy enures as a tenancy from year to year; and the notice required will refer to the original letting, and be regulated by the local custom of the district in which the house is situated, whenever it happens that a shorter term than twelve months is intended to be created by the letting, although no particular period be mentioned. This chiefly happens in the case of lodgings; and the custom, for the most part, requires the same space of time for the notice, as the period for which the lodgings were originally taken; as a week's notice when taken by the week, a month's when taken by the month, and so forth. (*b*)

When, also, the custom of the country, where the premises are situated, requires, or allows, a notice for a longer, or shorter, period than half a year (as for instance, the custom of London, by which a tenant, under the yearly rent of 40s. is entitled to a quarter's

(*a*) *Right v. Darby*, 1 T. R. 159. *Esp. 94. Doe d. Campbell v. Scott*,
Doe d. Brown v. Wilkinson, Co. 6 Bing. 362. *Wilson v. Abbott*, 3
 Litt. 270, (*b*) n. 1. B. & C. 89.

(*b*) *Doe d. Parry v. Hazell*, 1

notice only, (a) the custom will be admitted by the Courts; (b) but such custom must be strictly proved, and the witnesses must not speak to *opinion*, but *facts*. (c) The parties may also by special agreement, vary the time of the duration of the notice; but the notice must, notwithstanding, where the letting is from year to year, expire with the year of the tenancy, unless the agreement also provides some other period for its expiration. (d) Where, however, the terms of the agreement are not intended to create a tenancy from year to year, determinable at a quarter's notice, but to empower the parties to put an end to the tenancy at other periods of the year, as well as at its termination, the Courts will give effect to it. Thus a demise for one year only, and then to continue tenant afterwards, and quit at a quarter's notice; (d) and a demise, where it was agreed "that the tenant was always to be subject to quit at three months' notice," (e) have been held to be demises determinable at the end, although not in the middle, of any quarter. But a quarterly reservation of rent is not a circumstance from which an agreement to dispense with a half-yearly notice is to be inferred; although, where the landlord accepted in such case a three months' notice from his tenant, without expressing either his assent to, or dissent from, such notice, it was ruled at *Nisi Prius* to be presumptive evidence of an agreement that three months' notice should be sufficient. (f)

(a) *Tyley v. Seed*, Skin. 649. 1 Taunt. 155.
 (b) *Roe d. Brown v. Wilkinson*, (c) *Kemp v. Derrett*, 3 Campb. Co. Litt. 270. 6. n. 1. 511.
 (c) *Roe d. Henderson v. Char-* (f) *Shirley v. Newman*, 1 Esp. nock, Peake N. P. C. 4. 266.
 (d) *Doe d. Pitcher v. Donovan*,

The notice may be given to quit upon a particular day, or in general terms at the end and expiration of the current year of the tenancy; which shall expire next after the end of one half year from the service of the notice. (a) The latter form should always be used when the landlord is ignorant of the period when the tenancy commenced, and is unable to serve the tenant personally; and it is also the preferable form, when the commencement of the tenancy is known, as it provides against any misapprehension of the exact day when the tenant entered. If a particular day be mentioned in the notice, it must be the day of the commencement, and not of the conclusion of the tenancy; for the tenant cannot be compelled to quit whilst his right of possession continues, and this right is not determined until the year is fully completed. It must also be the *exact* day of such commencement. The next, or any subsequent day, will not be sufficient. (b)

The time, when a tenancy from year to year commences and expires, takes its date, in the absence of all other circumstances, from the time when the tenant actually enters upon the demised premises; (c) but this general rule may be varied, both as to the commencement and expiration of the tenancy, either by express agreement or legal inference.

When a person is let into possession as a yearly tenant, and afterwards takes a lease of the premises,

(a) Appendix, No. 1, 2, 3. Doe East. 312.
 d. Phillips v. Butler, 2 Esp. 589. (c) Kemp v. Derrett, 3 Campb.
 (b) Doe d. Spicer v. Lea, 11 511.

and continues to hold the land after the lease has expired, the time of the expiration of the tenancy, created by such holding over, will be regulated by the terms of the lease, and not by the time of the original entry. Thus, if a man enters at Lady-day, continues tenant for one or more years, then accepts a lease for a certain term expiring at Michaelmas, and afterwards holds over and pays rent, the notice must be given to quit at Michaelmas, and not at Lady-day. (a) And the rule extends to the assignees of the original lessee, and their assigns. Whatever may be the period of the year when they enter upon the demised premises, the time of the expiration of their tenancies will be the same as if the original lessee had continued in possession; and it seems immaterial whether they come into possession before or after the expiration of the lease. (b)

In like manner when a remainder-man receives rent from a person in possession under a lease, granted by the tenant for life, but void against the remainder-man, and thereby creates a tenancy from year to year, the time at which a notice to quit, given by such remainder-man, must expire, will be regulated by the terms of the lease, and not by the time of the death of the tenant for life. (c) As, if the lease be for a certain number of years, to commence on the 5th of April, and the tenant for life die on the 30th of September,

(a) *Doe d. Spicer v. Lea*, 11 East. 312.

(b) *Doe d. Castleton v. Samuel*, 5 Esp. 173.

(c) *Doe d. Collins v. Weller*, 7 T. R. 478. *Right d. Flower v. Darby*, 1 T. R. 159. *Roe d. Jordan v. Ward*, 1 H. Blk. 97. ante 110.

the proper period for the expiration of the notice will be the 5th of April.

The principle is the same if the tenant hold under a parol lease, void by the statute of frauds. As, where there was a verbal agreement to hold for seven years, and the tenant was to enter at Lady-day, and quit at Candlemas, it was held that the lease, although void as to its duration, nevertheless regulated the terms of the tenancy in other respects, and that a notice to quit must expire at Candlemas, and not at Lady-day. (a)

It may be collected from these cases, that if there be a lease for years, commencing on one day, and terminating on another, as for example, commencing at Lady-day, and terminating at Michaelmas, a tenancy created by the landlord's receipt of rent after the expiration of the lease, will be held to commence at Michaelmas, and to require half-a-year's notice from Lady-day.

No new tenancy is created by a mere agreement between landlord and tenant for an increase of rent in the middle of the year of a tenancy; but a notice to quit given after the receipt of the increased rent, must expire at the time when the tenant originally entered. (b)

When a tenant took possession in the middle of a quarter, paid rent from the time of his coming in up to the next quarter-day, (Christmas,) and then paid his

(a) *Doe d. Rigge v. Bell*, 5 T. R. 471. *Doe d. Peacock. v. Raffan*, 6 Esp. 4.

(b) *Doe d. Bedford v. Kendrick*, Warwick, Sum. Ass. 1810.—MS.

rent half-yearly at Midsummer and Christmas, it was ruled at *Nisi Prius* that the tenancy commenced from Christmas, and not from the preceding half-quarter. (a) But where the tenant entered in the middle of a quarter upon an agreement "to pay rent quarterly and for the half-quarter," it was left to the jury whether the party was tenant from the quarter-day, prior to the time when he entered, or from the succeeding quarter-day; and under the direction of Lord Ellenborough, C. J. the jury found that the tenancy commenced with the preceding quarter. (b)

When the demise is by parol, and in general terms to hold from feast to feast, as from Michaelmas to Michaelmas, it will be a holding from such feast according to the *new style*; unless by the custom of the country where the lands lie (which custom may be proved by parol testimony) such tenancies commence according to the *old style*. (c) If, however, the demise be by deed to hold from any particular feast, as "*from the feast of St. Michael's,*" &c. the holding must be taken to be according to the new style notwithstanding the custom; and this rule prevails although the tenancy be created by a holding over after the expiration of the lease, and the original entry was according to the old style. (d)

Upon the same principle a notice to quit at Michaelmas generally, *primâ facie* means new Michaelmas;

(a) *Doe d. Holcomb v. Johnson*, 6 Esp. 10. *bury v. Wood*, 1 Esp. 198. *Doe d. Hall v. Benson*, 4 B. & A. 588.

(b) *Doe d. Wadmore v. Selwyn*, H. T. 47 Geo. 3.—MS. (d) *Doe d. Spicer v. Lea*, 11 East. 312.

(c) *Furley d. Mayor of Canter-*

but if the tenant entered at old Michaelmas, it will be construed to mean old Michaelmas. (*a*)

A tenant sometimes enters upon different parts of the land, at different periods of the year, although all are contained in one demise; and the notice to quit must then be given with reference to the substantial time of entry, that is to say, with reference to the time of entry on the substantial part of the premises demised; no notice being taken of the time of entry on the other parts, which are auxiliaries only; though the tenant will be obliged to quit them at the respective times of entry thereon. (*b*)

This substantial time of entry, it has been contended, must be determined by the times when the rent is payable; but it is holden to depend, either upon the general custom of the country where the lands lie, or upon the relative value and importance of the different parts of the demised premises; and of these facts it is the province of the jury to determine.

As few decisions are to be found on these points, it will be useful to give a concise statement of them.

Where the landlord agreed to let the defendant a farm, to hold the arable land from the 13th of February then next, the pasture from the 5th of April, and the meadow from the 12th of May, at a yearly rent payable at old Michaelmas and old Lady-day, the first

(*a*) *Doe d. Hinde v. Vince*, 2
Campb. 256.

(*b*) *Doe d. Strickland v. Spence*, 6
East. 120.

payment to be made at Michaelmas then next, it was held to be a tenancy from old Lady-day to old Lady-day; because the custom of most countries would have required the tenant to have quitted the arable and meadow lands on the 13th of February, and 12th of May, without any special agreement, and a notice to quit at old Lady-day delivered before old Michaelmas was held sufficient. (a)

So also upon a demise of the same nature, namely, that the tenant should enter upon the arable land at Candlemas, and the house and other premises at Lady-day, to which was added a proviso, that the tenant should quit the premises "*according to the times of entry as aforesaid,*" it was held that the proviso made no alteration in the tenancy, so as to require a notice six months before Candlemas, because it merely expressed what the law would otherwise have implied; that the substantial time of entry was at Lady-day, with a privilege to the tenant on the one hand to enter on the arable land before that period for the purpose of preparing it, and on the other hand a stipulation by him when he quitted the farm to allow the same privilege to the incoming tenant; and, therefore, that a notice to quit, given six months previous to Lady-day, although less than six months before Candlemas, was sufficient. (b)

Where the premises contained in the demise con-

(a) Doe *d.* Dagget *v.* Snowdon, 2
Blk. 1224.

(b) Doe *d.* Strickland *v.* Spence, 6
East. 120.

sisted of dwelling-houses, and other buildings, used for the purpose of carrying on a manufacture, a few acres of meadow, and pasture land, and bleaching-grounds, together with all water-courses, &c. and the tenant held under a written agreement for a lease, to commence as to the meadow ground from 25th of December then last, as to the pasture from the 25th of March then next, and as to the houses, mills, and all the rest of the premises, from the 1st of May, the rent payable on the day of Pentecost and Martinmas, the Court held, that the substantial time of entry was the 1st of May, inasmuch as the substantial subject of the demise was the house and buildings for the purpose of the manufacture, to which every thing else in the demise was merely auxiliary. (a)

Where a house, and thirteen acres of land, were demised for eleven years, to hold the lands from the 2nd of February, and the house and other premises from the 1st of May, at the yearly rent of 24*l.* payable at Michaelmas and Lady-day, the jury found the land to be the principal subject of the demise; and the plaintiff was nonsuited on account of the notice to quit not having been given six months previous to the 2nd of February. The Court was afterwards moved to set aside the nonsuit, on the ground that the house was the principal part of the demise (being situated near a borough); or, at all events, that the relative value and importance of the house and lands were so nearly balanced, it was immaterial to which the notice referred; but the court refused the rule, saying, it

(a) *Doe d. Lord Bradford v. Watkins*, 7 East, 551.

was for the jury to decide which was the principal, and which the accessory part of the demise. (a)

Lastly, of the acts by which a regular notice to quit may be waived.

The acceptance of rent, accruing subsequently to the expiration of the notice, is the most usual means by which a waiver of it is occasioned ; but the acceptance of such rent is not of itself a waiver of the notice, but matter of evidence only to be left to the jury, to determine with what views, and under what circumstances, the rent is paid and received.

If the money be taken *nomine pœnæ*, as a compensation for the trespass, or with an express declaration that the notice is not thereby intended to be waived, or if there be any fraud or contrivance on the part of the tenant in paying it, or if the payment be accompanied by other circumstances which may induce an opinion, that the landlord did not intend to continue the tenancy, no waiver will be produced by the acceptance. The rent must be paid and received *as rent*, that is to say, it must be so paid and received, as to satisfy the jury of an intention to continue the tenancy, or the notice will remain in force. Thus, where the landlord brought an ejection immediately upon the expiration of the notice, and after the appearance of the tenant in the action, received from him a quarter's rent, accruing subsequently to the day when the notice expired, but nevertheless continued

(a) *Doc d. Heapy v. Howard*, 11 East. 498.

his action, the Court were of opinion (upon a motion for a new trial, after a verdict for the defendant), that from the continuance of the suit by the landlord, after the acceptance of the rent, a fair inference might be drawn, that he did not mean to waive his notice; and as that point had not been left for the consideration of the jury (who had been directed at the trial to find for the defendant, upon the simple fact of the quarter's rent having been paid and received), the motion for the new trial was granted. (a) So also, where the rent was usually paid at a banker's, and the banker, in the common routine of business, received a quarter's rent from the tenant after the expiration of the notice, no waiver of the notice was thereby created. (b) But where the notice expired at Michaelmas, 1792, and the landlord accepted rent due at Lady-day, 1793, and did not bring his ejectment until after such acceptance, nor try the cause until 1795, the jury held that the notice was waived. (c)

The notice may also be waived by other acts of the landlord; but they are all open to explanation, and the particular act will, or will not, be a waiver of the notice, according to the circumstances which attend it. Thus, a second notice to quit, given after the expiration of the first notice, but also after the commencement of an ejectment, in which the landlord continued to proceed, notwithstanding his second notice, was holden to be no waiver of the notice originally given; because it was impossible for the tenant

(a) *Doe d. Cheny v. Batten*, Campb. 387.

Cowp. 243.

(c) *Goodright d. Charter v. Cord-*

(b) *Doe d. Ash v. Calvert*, 2 went, 6 T. R. 219.

to suppose, that the landlord meant to waive a notice upon the foundation of which he was proceeding to turn him out of his farm. (a) Where also, after the expiration of a regular notice to quit, the landlord gave a second notice in these words :—“ I do hereby desire you to quit the premises which you *now* hold of me, within fourteen days from this date, or I shall insist upon double value,” it was ruled by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. at *Nisi Prius*, that the second notice could not be intended, or understood to be intended, as a waiver of the first, or even as an acknowledgment of a subsisting tenancy *at will*, having for its object merely the recovery of double value; and the lessor of the plaintiff recovered upon a demise, anterior to the expiration of the second notice. (b) So also where a notice was given “ to quit the premises *which you hold under me*, your term therein having long since expired,” the Court considered the paper as a mere demand of possession, and not as a recognition of a subsisting tenancy. (c)

But where the defendant was lessee by assignment of certain tithes, under an agreement, which only operated to create a tenancy from year to year, and the impropiator, in March, 1810, (some days after the assignment,) gave the original lessee a notice to quit at the Michaelmas following, and afterwards, in March 1811, gave the assignee a notice to quit at the then next Michaelmas, the Court were

(a) *Doe d. Williams v. Humphreys*, 2 East. 236; *et vide*, *Messenger v. Armstrong*, 1 T. R. 53.

(b) *Doe d. Digby v. Steel*, MS.

and 3 Campb. 115.

(c) *Doe d. Godsell v. Inglis*, 3 Taunt. 54.

clearly of opinion, that such second notice was a waiver as to the assignee of the former notice given to the original lessee. And, in answer to an argument in support of the efficacy of the first notice, that the original tenancy having expired at Michaelmas, 1810, could not be set up again by another notice to the defendant in 1811, inasmuch as the giving of a person notice to quit does not operate to create a tenancy in him, the Court observed, "It does not necessarily do so, but it is generally considered as an acknowledgment of a subsisting tenancy; and if the party obeys the notice, how can he be deemed a trespasser on account of a prior notice to another person? Nothing appears to show, that the defendant had knowledge of any other notice to quit than the one which was served upon him;" and *Bayley, J.* added, "the second notice gives the defendant to understand, that if he quits at Michaelmas 1811, he will not be deemed a trespasser. (a)

It may be collected from this case, that if a tenant, having underlet the premises, receive from his landlord a notice to quit, and the landlord afterwards give to the under-tenant a notice to quit, expiring at a subsequent period, (b) he is precluded from recovering in an ejectment against such under-tenant, upon a demise anterior to the time of the expiration of the notice so given by him to the under-tenant. And if, after the expiration of a regular notice, the landlord should give to the same tenant a second regular notice, in the usual form, to quit at the termination of the

(a) *Doe d. Brierly v. Palmer*, 16 East. 53. (b) *Aute*, 129.

next, or any subsequent year of the tenancy, without referring therein to any claim for double value, and without having taken any steps, in the intermediate time, to enforce the first notice, it may be doubted whether such second notice will not also amount to a waiver of the first.

In a case where a landlord, after the delivery of a notice to quit, promised the tenant that he should not be turned out until the place was sold, and after the sale of the premises, brought an ejectment upon a demise anterior to the time of the sale; it was contended that the permission to occupy was a waiver of the antecedent notice, so far as to prevent the tenant from being considered as a trespasser by relation back to the time when the notice expired, and that the demise ought to have been laid posterior to the day when the contract for the sale was made. But the Court held, that the permission amounted only to a declaration on the part of the landlord, that until the sale of the place, he would suspend the exercise of his right under the notice, and indulge the tenant by permitting him to remain on the premises; and that it was not intended to vacate the notice, or be destructive of any of the rights which the landlord had acquired under it. (a)

The acceptance by the landlord of the double *value* of the premises, given by the stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, when the tenant wilfully holds over after the expiration of a written notice to quit, or the bringing of an

(a) *Whiteacre d. Boulton v. Symonds*, 10 East, 13.

action of debt for the same, will not be a waiver of the notice; for the double value is given as a penalty for the trespass, and not as a payment between landlord and tenant. But if, after the expiration of a notice to quit by the tenant, the landlord accept the double *rent* to which he is entitled by the stat. 11 Geo. II. c. 19, it seems that he cannot afterwards proceed upon the notice to quit, for this latter statute recognizes the party by the name of tenant, which the first statute does not, and gives a right of distress for the double rent, which is a remedy applicable only to the relation of landlord and tenant. (*a*)

In cases where the act of the landlord cannot be qualified, but must of necessity be taken as a confirmation of the tenancy, as if he distrain for rent accruing after the expiration of the notice, or recover it in an action for use and occupation, the notice will of course be waived: (*b*) but it seems that a pending action for such use and occupation will not be sufficient to invalidate the notice; for the landlord may only recover to the time of the expiration of the notice, although he claim rent to a later period. (*c*) And where a landlord, after a verdict in ejectment founded on a notice to quit, distrained for rent due subsequently to the expiration of the notice, and the party submitted and paid the rent, it was held to be no ground

(*a*) *Doc d. Cheney v. Batten*,
Cowp. 245. *Timmins v. Rowlinson*,
Burr. 1603. *Soulsby v. Neving*,
9 East. 310. *Ryal v. Rich*, 10
East. 43.

(*b*) *Zouch d. Ward v. Willingale*,
1 II. Bl. 311.

(*c*) Per Buller, *J. Birch v. Wright*,
1 T. R. 378; et vide *Roe d. Crompton v. Minshall*, S. N. P. 650.

for staying the subsequent proceedings in the ejectment; for the distress was wrongful, and might have been disputed by the tenant. (*a*)

By the common law, if a landlord distrained after the expiration of a term, though for rent accruing during its continuance, he was held to have acknowledged a subsequent tenancy; because, by the common law, no distress could be made after the determination of a demise; (*b*) but since the statute 8 Ann. c. 14. s. 6. & 7, by which a landlord is allowed to distrain within six calendar months after the determination of a lease for life, for years, or at will, provided his own title, or interest, and the possession of the tenant, from whom such rent became due, be continuing, a distress for rent accruing at the time of the expiration of the notice to quit, if made within the six months, will be no waiver thereof.

Where a tenancy from year to year subsists between the parties, an ejectment cannot be maintained on a *parol* notice to quit at a shorter period than half a year, or expiring at a wrong period of the tenancy, notwithstanding the assent of the tenant to such notice, unless such assent be *in writing*; because the notice being insufficient in itself to determine the tenant's interest, his assent can only make it operative as a surrender of the term; and as such surrender is not by operation of law, but an actual surrender by agreement between the parties, it is

(*a*) Doe *d.* Holmes *v.* Darby, 8 Taunt. 538.

(*b*) Pennant's case, 3 Co. 64.

void by the statute of frauds, which requires that such surrender should be by note in writing. (a)

Next, of the determination of a tenancy by the act of the tenant, which may happen in two several ways; first, by a notice to his landlord that he intends to quit the possession; (b) secondly, by the non-payment of rent, or breach of a covenant or condition. (c)

As the relation of landlord and tenant is mutual, the principles which govern the first of these modes have been discussed, when treating of the notice to quit as given by the landlord; and it therefore now only remains to inquire into the rules adopted by the Courts in the two latter instances.

The right to give a notice to quit is given by the common law, and is necessarily incidental to a tenancy from year to year: the termination of a tenancy by the non-payment of rent, or the breach of a covenant, or condition, can only rise under an express agreement between the parties, and seldom occurs but where the tenant has a written lease for a determinate period.

(a) *Doe d. Hudlestone v. Johnson*, 1 M'Leland and Yonge, 141. *Johnson v. Hudlestone*, 4 B. & C. 922.

(b) Appendix, No. 4.

(c) As the non-payment of rent is in fact the non-performance of a covenant, this particular enumera-

tion may perhaps be logically incorrect; but as the proceedings differ so materially in cases of non-payment of rent, and of non-performance of other covenants, it was thought most conducive to perspicuity to name them separately.

It has already been observed, (a) that an actual entry upon the lands was formerly necessary before an ejectment could be maintained, and that the claimant's title must be of such a nature as to render his entry lawful. When, therefore, a lease for years was granted to the tenant, and the right of possession thereby transferred to him, the landlord could not legally enter upon the land during the continuance of the term; and was consequently without remedy to recover back his possession whilst the term lasted, although the tenant should neglect to render his rent, or otherwise disregard the conditions of his grant. When terms for years increased in length and value, this became a serious evil to landlords. The tenant might be so indigent as to render an action of covenant upon the original lease altogether useless, and the premises might be left without a sufficient distress to countervail an arrear of rent. As a means of obviating these difficulties, it became the practice for landlords to insert in their leases a proviso declaring the lease forfeited, if the rent remained unpaid for a certain time after it became due, or if any other particular covenant of the lease were broken by the lessee, and empowering the landlord in such cases to re-enter upon, and re-occupy his lands.

When provisos of this nature were first introduced, the ancient practice prevailed, and of course actual entries were then made in these as in all other cases; and it seems also to have been necessary, for some years after the modern practice was invented, and the sealing of leases dispensed with, for landlords

(a) Ante, 10.

to make actual entries upon the lands, before they could take advantage by ejectment of the forfeiture of a lease. This useless form is now indeed abolished; but as the right to make the entry is still necessary, the provisoes are continued to the present day in their ancient terms. (a)

Having thus briefly shown the principles upon which these provisoes are founded, we shall now inquire, first as to the covenants deemed by our law to be valid; secondly, as to what will amount to the breach of any particular covenant, and herein of the proceedings at common law, and under the statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28, on a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent; and, thirdly, as to the modes by which conditions may be dispensed with, or forfeitures waived.

The landlord, having the *jus disponendi*, may annex whatever conditions he pleases to his grant, provided they be neither contrary to the laws of the kingdom, nor to the principles of reason, or public policy; and it is by these general maxims we must be guided, when called upon to consider the validity of any particular covenant in a lease; for only one decided case upon the subject is to be found in our legal authorities.

The lease in that case was for twenty-one years,

(a) Little v. Heaton, Salk. 258, 1 Vent. 248. Wither v. Gibson, 3 S. C. Ld. Raym. 750. Goodright Keb. 218.
d. Hare v. Cator, Doug. 477. Anon.

and the proviso, that the landlord should have the power to re-enter, if the tenant committed any act of bankruptcy whereon a commission should issue. This proviso was holden valid, upon the principle, that as it is reasonable for a landlord to restrain his tenant from assigning, so it is equally reasonable for him to guard against such an event as bankruptcy, for the consequences of bankruptcy would be an assignment; and that such a proviso is not contrary to any express law, nor against reason or public policy, for it is a proviso which cannot injure the creditors, who would not rely on the possession of the land by the occupier without a knowledge also of the interest he had therein; and to discover this they must look into the lease itself, where they would find the proviso that the tenant's interest would be forfeited in case of bankruptcy. Buller, J. in his judgment on the case, made a distinction between leases for short terms, and very long leases, with respect to provisos of this nature; because if they were to be inserted in very long leases, it would be tying up property for a considerable length of time, and be open to the objections of creating a perpetuity; but he afterwards adds, that the principal ground of his decision was, because it was a stipulation not against law, nor repugnant to any thing stated in the former part of the lease, but merely a stipulation against the act of the lessee himself, which it was competent for the lessor to make. (a)

Secondly, Of what will amount to the breach of

(a) *Roe d. Hunter v. Galliers*, 2 T. R. 133.

any particular covenant, and herein of the proceedings at common law, and under the statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28. on a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent.

The power generally reserved in leases to landlords, to re-enter upon the premises, in case the rent shall remain in arrear for a certain time after it is due, is the most common proviso upon which ejectments for forfeitures for breach of covenant are founded, and as several provisions are made, both by the common and statute law, for regulating ejectments brought upon such provisos, a separate consideration of the mode of proceeding upon a clause of re-entry for rent in arrear, seems the most perspicuous method of treating the subject.

At the time when provisos for re-entry were first introduced, it was unfortunately the practice to disfigure the principles of law by endless subtilties and distinctions; and the preliminaries required by the common law, before a landlord can bring an ejectment upon a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent, are so numerous, as to render it next to impossible for any, unversed in the practice of the Courts, to take advantage of a proviso of this nature. "First, a demand of the rent must be made, either in person, or by an agent properly authorized. (a) Secondly, the demand must be of the precise rent due; (b) for

(a) *Roe d. West v. Davies*, 7 East. 363. rent. due, by the non-payment whereof the forfeiture will be incurred;

(b) That is to say, of the precise rent due, as a quarter's rent, if the rent be

if he demand a penny more, or less, it will be ill. Thirdly, It must be made *precisely upon the day* when the rent is due, and payable, by the lease, to save the forfeiture; as, where the proviso is, “that if the rent shall be behind and unpaid, by the space of thirty, or any other number of days after the day of payment, it shall be lawful for the lessor to re-enter,” a demand must be made on the thirtieth, or other *last* day. Fourthly, It must be made a convenient time before sun-set. (a) Fifthly, It must be made upon the land, and at the most notorious place of it. Therefore, if there be a dwelling-house upon the land, the demand must be at the front or fore door, though it is not necessary to enter the house, notwithstanding the door be open; but if the tenant meet the lessor either *on* or *off* the land, *at any time* of the last day of payment, and tender the rent, it is sufficient to save a forfeiture, for the law leans against forfeitures. Sixthly, Unless a place is appointed where the rent is payable, in which case the demand must be made at such place. Seventhly, A demand of the rent must be made *in fact*, although there should be no person on the land ready to pay it.” (b)

Nor are these the only vexatious difficulties to

payable quarterly, half a year's rent, if payable half-yearly, and so forth; and if there be any previous arrears of rent, and the rent demanded include such arrears, it will not be sufficient to work a forfeiture. Doe *d. Wheeldon v. Paul*, M.S. S. C.

3 C. & P. 613.

(a) According to the case of Doe *d. Wheeldon v. Paul*, 3 C. and P. 613, the demand ought to be made at the last hour of the day, *at sun-set*.

(b) 1 Saund. 287, (n. 16.)

which a landlord, by the common law, was subject. The courts, notwithstanding his compliance with all the required formalities, would set aside the forfeiture, upon the payment of the debt and costs, at any time before execution executed; (*a*) and the tenant might at any time apply to a court of equity for relief.

Where the ejectment is brought upon a clause of re-entry, and *less than six months' rent is due*, all these evils still exist, (unless dispensed with by the express words of the lease,) (*b*) but, by the wise provisions of the legislature, the landlord is now relieved from the two latter inconveniences in all cases where six months' rent is in arrear; and is also exempted from an observance of the forms and niceties of the common law, if there be likewise no sufficient distress upon the premises.

By the 4th Geo. II. c. 28. s. 2, it is enacted, that, "in all cases between landlord and tenant, as often as it shall happen that one half-year's rent shall be in arrear, and the landlord or lessor, to whom the same is due, hath right by law to re-enter for the

(*a*) *Roe d. West v. Davis*, 7 East. 363, and the cases there cited.

(*b*) *Doe d. Harris v. Masters*, 2 B. & C. 490. Wood, B. in his judgment in the Exchequer Chamber, in the case of *Doe d. Lord Jersey v. Smith*, 1 B. & B. 178, intimated a strong opinion that the stat. 4. Geo. II. c. 28, put an

end to all proceedings by re-entry at common law, and repeated that opinion in his judgment on the same case in the House of Lords (2 B. & B. 554); but his opinion was not supported by any other Judge; and many of the Judges expressed their dissent from it.

“ non-payment thereof, such landlord or lessor shall
“ and may, without any formal demand or re-entry,
“ serve a declaration in ejectment for the recovery
“ of the demised premises, or in case the same cannot
“ be legally served, or no tenant be in actual posses-
“ sion of the premises, may then affix the same upon
“ the door of any demised messuage, or in case such
“ ejectment shall not be for the recovery of any mes-
“ suage, then upon some notorious place of the lands,
“ tenements or hereditaments, comprised in such
“ declaration in ejectment, and such affixing shall be
“ deemed legal service thereof, which service or affix-
“ ing such declaration in ejectment, shall stand in the
“ place and stead of a demand and re-entry ; and in
“ case of judgment against the casual ejector, or
“ nonsuit for not confessing, lease entry, and ouster,
“ it shall be made appear to the court where the said
“ suit is depending, by affidavit, or be proved upon
“ the trial, in case the defendant appears, that half a
“ year’s rent was due before the said declaration was
“ served, and that no sufficient distress was to be
“ found on the demised premises, countervailing the
“ arrears then due, and that the lessor or lessors in
“ ejectment had power to re-enter ; that then, and in
“ every such case, the lessor or lessors in ejectment
“ shall recover judgment and execution, in the same
“ manner as if the rent in arrear had been legally de-
“ manded, and a re-entry made ; and in case the lessee
“ or lessees, his, her, or their assignee or assignees,
“ or other person or persons claiming or deriving
“ under the said leases, shall permit and suffer judg-
“ ment to be had and recovered on such ejectment;

“ and execution to be executed thereon, without pay-
“ ing the rent and arrears, together with full costs,
“ and without filing any bill or bills for relief in
“ equity, within six calendar months after such exe-
“ cution executed; then such lessee, &c. and all other
“ persons claiming and deriving under the said lease;
“ shall be barred and foreclosed from all relief or
“ remedy in law or equity, other than by writ of
“ error, for reversal of such judgment, in case the
“ same shall be erroneous, and the said landlord or
“ lessor shall from thenceforth hold the said demised
“ premises discharged from such lease; and if on
“ such ejectment a verdict shall pass for the defendant,
“ or the plaintiff shall be nonsuited therein, except
“ for the defendant’s not confessing, &c. then such
“ defendant shall have and recover his, her, or their
“ full costs: provided always, that nothing herein
“ contained shall extend to bar the right of any mort-
“ gagee or mortgagees of such lease, or any part
“ thereof, who shall not be in possession, so as such
“ mortgagee or mortgagees shall, within six calendar
“ months after such judgment obtained, and execu-
“ tion executed, pay all rent in arrear, and all costs
“ and damages sustained by such lessor, or persons
“ entitled to the remainder or reversion as aforesaid,
“ and perform all the covenants and agreements,
“ which on the part and behalf of the first lessee or
“ lessees ought to be performed.”

By section 3, “in case the said lessee or lessees, his,
“ her, or their assignee or assignees, or other person
“ claiming any right, title, or interest, in law or

“ equity, of, in, or to the said lease, shall within the
“ time aforesaid, file one or more bill or bills, for re-
“ lief in any court of equity, such person or persons
“ shall not have or continue any injunction, against
“ the proceedings at law on such ejectment, unless
“ he, she, or they shall, within forty days next after
“ a full and perfect answer shall be filed by the lessor
“ or lessors of the plaintiff in such ejectment, bring
“ into court, and lodge with the proper officer, such
“ sum of money as the lessor or lessors of the plaintiff
“ in the said ejectment shall, in their answers, swear
“ to be due and in arrear, over and above all just al-
“ lowances, and also the costs taxed in the said suit,
“ there to remain till the hearing of the cause, or to
“ be paid out to the lessor or landlord on good se-
“ curity, subject to the decree of the court; and in
“ case such bill or bills shall be filed within the time
“ aforesaid, and after execution is executed, the lessor
“ or lessors of the plaintiff shall be accountable only
“ for so much and no more as he, she, or they shall
“ really and *bonâ fide*, without fraud, deceit, or wilful
“ neglect, make of the demised premises from the time
“ of their entering into the actual possession thereof;
“ and if what shall be so made by the lessor or lessors
“ of the plaintiff, happen to be less than the rent re-
“ served on the said lease, then the said lessee or
“ lessees, his, her, or their assignee or assignees,
“ before he, she, or they shall be restored to his, her,
“ or their possession or possessions, shall pay such
“ lessor or lessors, or landlord or landlords, what the
“ money so by them made, fell short of the reserved
“ rent, for the time such lessor or lessors of the plain-
“ tiff, landlord or landlords, held the said lands.”

Section 4. " Provided, that if the tenant or tenants, his, her, or their assignee or assignees, shall at any time before the trial in such ejectment, pay or tender to the lessor or landlord, his executors or administrators, or his, her, or their attorney in that cause, or pay into the court where the same cause is depending, all the rent and arrears, together with the costs, then all further proceedings on the said ejectment shall cease and be discontinued; and if such lessee, &c. or their executors, administrators, or assigns, shall, upon such bill filed as aforesaid, be relieved in equity, he, she, and they, shall have, hold, and enjoy the demised lands, according to the lease thereof made, without any new lease to be thereof made to him, her, or them."

Some little perplexity attends the wording of these sections, which seem, upon the first reading, to extend only to cases of ejectment brought after half a year's rent due, where the landlord has a right to re-enter, and where no sufficient distress is to be found upon the premises; but the statute has been held to be more general in its operation, and its provisions (with the exception of the one, which dispenses with the formalities required by the common law upon a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent) extend to all cases where there is six months' rent in arrear, and a right of re-entry in the landlord. (*a*)

The legislature appear to have four different objects in view, in the enactments of this statute. First, to

(*a*) *Roc d. West v. Davis*, 7 East, 363.

abolish the idle form of a demand of rent, where no sufficient distress can be found upon the premises to answer that demand; secondly, in cases of beneficial leases which may have been mortgaged, to protect the mortgagees against the fraud or negligence of their mortgagors. Thirdly, to render the possession of the landlord secure, after he has recovered the lands; and fourthly, to take from the court the discretionary power they formerly exercised, of staying the proceedings, at any stage of them, upon payment of the rent in arrear, and costs. The first of these objects is effected by permitting the landlord to bring his ejectment without previously demanding the rent: the second, by permitting a mortgagee not in possession to recover back the premises at any time within six months after execution executed, by paying all the rent in arrear, damages and costs of the lessor, and performing all the covenants of the lease: (a) the third, by limiting the time for the lessee or his assigns to make an application to a court of equity for relief, to six calendar months after execution executed: and the fourth, by limiting the application of the lessee to stay proceedings, upon payment of the rent in arrear

(a) It is difficult to discover from the report of the case of *Doe d. Whitfield v. Roe*, 3 Taunt. 402, what was the true point submitted to the judgment of the court. It is quite clear it is not the one stated in the margin, viz. "that the mortgagee of a lease has the same title to relief, against an ejectment for non-payment of rent, and upon the same terms, as the lessee against

whom the recovery is had," because by the provisions of this statute, a lessee can only have relief against an ejectment for a forfeiture, upon paying the arrears of rent and costs of suit into court *before trial*, whereas a mortgagee may obtain relief upon paying the arrears, costs, and damages, at any time *within six months after execution executed*.

and costs, to the time anterior to the trial, and making it compulsory upon the court to grant the application when properly made. (a)

As this statute dispenses with a demand for rent in those cases only where there is no sufficient distress upon the premises as well as six months' rent in arrear, it is still necessary for the lessor to comply with all the formalities of the common law, before he can proceed upon a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent, if a sufficient distress can be found. (b) But an insertion in the proviso of the lease that the right of re-entry shall accrue *upon the rent being lawfully demanded*, will not render a demand necessary if there be no sufficient distress, for it is only stating in express words, that which is in substance contained, from the principles of the common law, in every proviso of this nature. (c)

It has been observed that the provisions of this statute (with the exception of the one relating to the demand of rent) extend to all cases where there is

(a) *Roe d. West v. Davis*, 7 East. 363.

(b) *Doe d. Forster v. Wandlass*, 7 T. R. 117. Vide *Smith v. Spooner*, 3 Taunt. 251. If the reader can comprehend the meaning of the expressions reported to have been used by the Judges in pages 251, 252, of this case, he will be more fortunate than the writer of this note.

(c) *Doe d. Schofield v. Alexander*, 2 M. & S. 525. Lord Ellenborough,

C. J. differed from the other Judges in this case, he being of opinion, that when the words "*being lawfully demanded*" were inserted in a proviso for re-entry, they were to be considered as a stipulation between the parties that the rent should be, in fact, demanded (though not with the strictness of the common law) before ejectment brought.

six months' rent unpaid, and the landlord has a right to re-enter. This point has only been decided upon that part of the fourth section which directs all proceedings to be staid upon payment of the rent in arrear and costs before trial; but the principle of the decision seems to apply to all the other provisions of the statute as well as to the one then immediately before the Court.—It was objected in that case that *the statute* only applied to cases of ejectment brought after half a year's rent due, where no sufficient distress was to be found upon the premises, but Lord *Ellenborough*, C. J. says, "*the statute* is more general in its operation; for though the fourth clause has the word *such* (such ejectment), yet the second clause to which it refers is in the disjunctive; stating first, that in *all* cases between landlord and tenant, when half a-year's rent shall be in arrear, and the landlord has a right of re-entry for non-payment thereof, he may bring ejectment, &c., *or* in case the same cannot be legally served, &c. *or* in case such ejectment shall not be for the recovery of any messuage, &c., and in case of judgment against the casual ejector or nonsuit for not confessing lease, entry, and ouster, it shall appear by affidavit, or be proved upon the trial, in case the defendant appears, that half a year's rent was due before the declaration served, and that no sufficient distress was to be found on the premises, and that the lessor had power to re-enter; *then, and in every such case*, the lessor in ejectment shall recover judgment and execution." (a)

By the words of the fourth section the lessee is to

(a) *Roe d. West v. Davis*, 7 East. 363.

pay the arrears of rent, &c. into Court *before the trial*; and no provision is expressly made for his relief in case he should suffer judgment to go by default against the casual ejector; but the Courts do not consider a judgment so obtained as equivalent to a trial, but will grant relief to the lessee at any time before execution executed. (a)

The provision of this fourth section seems also to extend only to cases where the rent and costs are tendered to the lessor, or paid into Court, after action brought; yet where the tenant tendered the rent in arrear after the lessor had given instructions to his attorney to commence an action, but before the declaration had been delivered, the Court set aside the proceedings with costs, although it was urged by the lessor that such tender was merely matter of defence at the trial. (b)

Where the ejectment was brought on a clause of re-entry in the lease for not repairing, as well as for rent in arrear under the statute, it was argued, on a motion to stay proceedings upon payment of the rent, that the case was not within the act, because it was not an ejectment founded singly on the non-payment of rent; but the Court, notwithstanding, made the rule absolute, with liberty for the lessor to proceed on any other title. (c) But where the lessor has recovered possession of the premises, a court of

(a) *Goodtitle v. Holdfast*. Stran. Noright, Black. 746.
900. *Doe d. Harris v. Masters*, 2 B. & C. 490.

(c) *Pure d. Withers v. Sturdy*,
B. N. P. 97.

(b) *Goodright d. Stephenson v.*

equity will not grant relief under the second section, if such recovery was by reason of the breach of other covenants or conditions, as well as by the non-payment of rent. And where the tenant applied to the Court of Chancery to relieve against a recovery upon a judgment by default against the casual ejector, alleging that the ejectment was brought for a forfeiture incurred by non-payment of rent, which allegation was contradicted by the landlord, who stated in his answer, that the tenant had also broken many of the covenants of the lease, for which the landlord had a right to re-enter; the Court directed an issue to try, whether the landlord knew of any of the breaches of the covenant, at the time of bringing the ejectment. (*a*)

Where the lessors of the plaintiff were both devisees and executors, and in each capacity rent was due to them, the defendant moved to stay proceedings on payment of the rent due to the lessors of the plaintiff as devisees, they not being entitled to bring ejectment as executors; there appeared to be a mutual debt to the defendant by simple contract, and the defendant offered to go into the whole account, taking in both demands, as devisees and executors, having just allowances, which the lessors of the plaintiff refused: the rule was made absolute to stay proceedings on payment of the rent due to the lessors as devisees, and costs. (*b*)

The proceedings may be staid, either by moving the Court, or in vacation time by summons. (*c*)

(*a*) *Wadman v. Calcraft*, 10 *Vez.* stall, *Barn.* 134.

67.

(*c*) 2 *Sell. Prac.* 127.

(*b*) *Duckworth v. Tubley v. Tun-*

In moving for judgment against the casual ejector in an ejectment brought under the provisions of this statute, the Court will not grant a rule for judgment without an affidavit, (*a*) pursuant to the statute, that half a year's rent was in arrear before declaration served, that the lessor of the plaintiff had a right to re-enter, and that no sufficient distress was to be found upon the premises countervailing the arrears of rent then due: and the affidavit must also state the service of the declaration in ejectment on the tenant in possession, or that the premises were untenanted, or that the tenant could not be legally served, or as the facts may be, and in such cases that a copy of the declaration was affixed on the most notorious (stating what) part of the premises (*b*)

This affidavit is of course only necessary upon moving for judgment against the casual ejector, or after a nonsuit at the trial for the tenant's not con-

(*a*) In the case of *Doe d. Hitchings v. Lewis*, (Burr. 614,) it appeared, that the lessor of the plaintiff had once been tenant to the defendant, under a lease for a term of years, of which some were yet to come: and had been ejected by him nearly twenty years before, by a judgment in ejectment against the casual ejector, pursuant to the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 28, for non-payment of rent. The title set up by the lessor in this last action was the irregularity of the proceedings in the first ejectment, from the want of a proper affidavit whereon to ground the judgment; and the question for the Court to decide was, whether it was necessary for the defendant (the original land-

lord) to give evidence of this affidavit. The Court were unanimously of opinion, that from the lapse of years no such evidence was necessary; but it seems to have been Lord *Mansfield's* opinion, that if the lessor of the plaintiff in the second action had proved, that in point of fact no affidavit had been made, he would have been entitled to recover. But *quære*, if the proper method in such case, if the judgment be recent, is not to move the Court, upon affidavit of facts, to set aside the judgment for irregularity.

(*b*) App. No. 19. *Doe d. Seabrook v. Roe*, 4 B. Moore, 350. *Doe d. Evans v. Roe*, 4 B. Moore, 469.

fessing lease, entry, and ouster; but if the tenant appear, and the ejectment come to trial, the matters contained in the above affidavit must be proved. (a)

When a forfeiture has accrued upon a clause of re-entry for rent in arrear, such forfeiture will be waived if the landlord do any act after the forfeiture, which amounts to an acknowledgment of a subsisting tenancy; as if he receives rent due at a subsequent quarter, or distrain for that in respect of which the forfeiture accrued, or receive the same and give a receipt for it as for so much rent, or in which he calls the party his tenant. It seems, however, according to the old authorities, that in the case of a lease for years, the bare acceptance by the lessor at a subsequent day of the rent, in respect of which the forfeiture accrued, although before ejectment brought, will not of itself, unless accompanied with circumstances which show an intention to continue the tenancy, bar him of his right to re-enter, because the rent is a duty due to him, and as well before as after re-entry, he may have an action of debt for the same on the contract between the lessor and lessee; but that in the case of a lease for life, the mere acceptance of such rent will be sufficient to affirm the lease, as the lessor could not receive it as due upon any contract, but must receive it as his rent; for when he accepted the rent he could not have an action of debt for it, but his remedy was by assize, if he had seizin, or distress. (b)

(a) *Doe d. Hitchings v. Lewis*, S. C. 1 Leon. 262. Pennant's case, Burr. 614. 20. 3 Co. 64. et vide *Doe d. Cheney v. Batten, Cowp*, 243.

(b) *Green's case*, Cro. Eliz. 3.

Where an ejectment was brought upon a proviso of re-entry for non-payment of rent, and the lessor also commenced an action of covenant for rent, accruing subsequently to the day of the demise in the ejectment, and the tenant paid into Court the rent demanded in the action of covenant, the forfeiture was holden to be waived; but it seems doubtful whether the commencement of the action of covenant was *of itself* sufficient to waive the forfeiture. (*a*)

A right of re-entry for non-payment of rent under the stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, will not be waived by taking an insufficient distress for that rent, nor by continuing in possession under such distress after the expiration of the last day for the payment of the rent. (*b*) But the mere act of taking a distress, although an insufficient one, is waiver of a right of re-entry at common law. (*c*)

(*a*) *Doe d. Crampton v. Minshul*, B. N. P. 96. S. N. P. 650.

(*b*) *Doe d. Taylor v. Johnson*, 1 Stark. 411.

(*c*) *Brewer d. Lord Onslow v. Eaton*, K. B. *Easter Term*, 1773, MS. This case, as cited in *Goodright d. Charter v. Cordwent*, 6 T. R. 220, seems to warrant a conclusion, that the taking of an insufficient distress will not waive a right of re-entry at common law. I have been favoured by Mr. Jardine with a MS. report of the case, taken from the note-book of Gibbs C. J. (the marginal note being in his hand-writing, and the body of the note in the hand-writing of Mr. Justice Dampier,) which limits the

principle to cases under the stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. The note is subjoined.

Brewer d. Lord Onslow v. Eaton.

An ejectment may be supported on 4 Geo. II. c. 28. though the landlord, subsequently to the time of the demise, distrained for rent accruing previously to that, for the non-payment of which the ejectment was brought.

Ejectment under 4 Geo. II. c. 28, for non-payment of rent. £200., was in arrear for two years' rent due at Michaelmas 1782; on the 3d of December, Lord Onslow distrained, and could levy but 35*l*. For this distress a replevin was still

With respect to provisoes for re-entry upon the breach of other conditions, no general principle can be laid down, excepting that which arises out of the

subsisting; the declaration in ejectment was delivered in January, and the demise laid on October 3d, 1782. The plaintiff had a verdict before Mr. J. Ashurst, and liberty was reserved for the defendant to move for a nonsuit if this Court should admit of an objection which was now pursued; viz. that the landlord having taken a distress subsequently to the time of the demise, had thereby waived his right of entry.

Erskine for Plaintiff; *Morgan* for Defendant.

Lord Mansfield, C. J. At common law, if a distress had been taken after an ejectment brought for a forfeiture, the Court would lay hold of this or any other grounds they could, to say the landlord had waived his forfeiture, because forfeitures are reckoned odious in law. It is like the receipt of rent after the demise, about which there was so long a puzzle. That is now finally settled to be no objection to an ejectment; it is receiving what the landlord might have recovered in an action for mesne profits. Here the party has a right of re-entry; then, by the statute, he has a right to recover in a particular way, if there is not a sufficient distress. He has distrained since: that is no presumption of the waiver of his right of entry, because it is consistent with it; it seems a necessary step to ascertain the sufficiency of the distress.

Willes J. At common law the landlord had two remedies, re-entry and distress. The resorting to the latter would have been a waiver of the re-entry; but if the distress be not sufficient, the statute restores that remedy, when, by the common law, the waiver had taken it away.
—Rule discharged.

It may be useful to notice in this place a provision of the legislature in one particular case of rent in arrear, although it does not strictly belong to a treatise on ejectment. By the statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19. s. 16, (extended by 57 Geo. III. c. 52, to cases where half a year's rent shall be in arrear,) after reciting, that landlords are often great sufferers by tenants running away in arrear, and not only suffering the demised premises to be uncultivated, without any distress thereon, whereby the landlords or lessors might be satisfied for the rent in arrear; but also refusing to deliver up the possession of the demised premises, whereby the landlords are put to the expense and delay of recovering them in ejectment; it is enacted, "that if any tenant holding any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, at a rack rent, or where the rent reserved shall be full three-fourths of the yearly value of the demised premises, who shall be in arrear for one year's

maxim of our law, that every doubtful grant shall be construed in favour of the grantee; namely, that the breach complained of must come within the very letter of the covenant, or the lease will not be forfeited; and the clearest method of showing the appli-

“rent, shall desert the demised
 “premises, and leave the same un-
 “cultivated or unoccupied, so as
 “no sufficient distress can be had
 “to countervail the arrears of rent;
 “it shall and may be lawful, to and
 “for two or more justices of the
 “peace of the county, riding, di-
 “vision, or place, (having no in-
 “terest in the demised premises,) at
 “the request of the lessor or land-
 “lord, lessors or landlords, or his,
 “her, or their bailiff or receiver, to
 “go upon and view the same, and
 “to affix, or cause to be affixed, on
 “the most notorious part of the pre-
 “mises, notice in writing, what day
 “(at the distance of fourteen days
 “at least,) they will return to take
 “a second view thereof; and if
 “upon such second view, the
 “tenant, or some person on his or
 “her behalf, shall not appear, and
 “pay the rent in arrear, or there
 “shall not be sufficient distress
 “upon the premises; then the said
 “justices may put the landlord or
 “landlords, lessor or lessors, into
 “the possession of the said demised
 “premises, and the lease thereof
 “to such tenant, as to any demise
 “therein contained only, shall from
 “thenceforth become void.”

“Sect 17. “Provided always

“that such proceedings of the said
 “justices shall be examinable in a
 “summary way, by the next justice
 “or justices of assize of the re-
 “spective counties in which such
 “lands or premises lie; and if they
 “lie in the city of London, or
 “county of Middlesex, by the
 “Judges of the courts of King’s
 “Bench or Common Pleas; and
 “if in the counties palatine of
 “Chester, Lancaster, or Durham,
 “then before the Judges thereof;
 “and if in Wales, then before the
 “courts of grand session respec-
 “tively; who are hereby respec-
 “tively empowered to order re-
 “stitution to be made to such
 “tenant, together with his or her
 “expenses and costs, to be paid by
 “the lessor or landlord, lessors or
 “landlords, if they shall see cause
 “for the same; and in case they
 “shall affirm the act of the said
 “justices, to award costs, not ex-
 “ceeding five pounds, for the fri-
 “volous appeal.” The provisions
 of this statute, however, like those
 of 4 Geo. II. c. 28, are holden to
 extend only to cases where the
 landlord has a right of re-entry re-
 served to him by the demise.—
 Wood, L. & T. 523.

cation of this principle will be by giving a short digest of the cases upon the subject.

Where the lessee covenanted with the lessor not to *assign* his term without the lessor's consent, and afterwards *devised* his term without such consent, it was holden not to amount to a forfeiture, for a *devise* is not a *lease*. (a)

Where the lessee covenanted not to demise, assign, transfer, or set over, or *otherwise do or put away* the indenture of demise, or the premises thereby demised, or any part thereof, to any person or persons whatsoever, and afterwards made an *under-lease* of the premises, it was held not to be a breach of the covenant, or a forfeiture of term, for an *under-lease* is not an *assignment*. And it was said by the Court, in answer to an argument, that although an *under-lease* did not amount to an *assignment*, yet that it was a *transferring, setting over, doing, or putting away with the premises*, that the Courts have always looked nearly into these conditions, covenants, and provisoes, that the devising a term *was a doing or putting it away*, so being in debt by confessing a judgment, and having the term taken in execution was the like, but that none of these amounted to an *assignment*, or to a breach of the covenant, or condition. (b)

It seems to have been once holden, that if a lessee for years grant the lands to another for the whole term he has therein, but reserve the rent payable to

(a) Fox v. Swan, Sty. 482.

3 Wils. 234.

(b) Crusoe d. Blencowe v. Bugby,

himself, and not to the original lessor, it will be a lease, and not an assignment, notwithstanding the want of a reversion in the party so granting; but this doctrine, if the decision were as reported, has since been overruled. (a)

Where the lease contained a proviso, that the lessee should not set, *let*, or assign *over*, the whole, or any part, of the premises, without leave in writing, on pain of forfeiting the lease, it was held that the lessee could not *under-let* without incurring a forfeiture; because the word *over* was annexed only to the word *assign*, and therefore the condition was broken if the lessee *let* the premises, or any part of them, for any part of the time. (b) And where the proviso was not to assign, or *otherwise part with the premises*, for the whole, or any part, of the term, the proviso was held to be broken by an under-lease, as well as by an assignment. (c)

Where the covenant, was not to set, let, assign, transfer, set over, or *otherwise part with*, the premises thereby demised, or *that present indenture of lease*, a deposit of the indenture with a creditor, as a receipt for money advanced, was held not to

(a) *Poultney v. Holmes*, Stran. 405. *Palmer v. Edwards*, Doug. 187, *in notis*. It seems from these cases, that a parol assignment of the whole term, which is void by the statute of frauds, will be good as an under-lease; but *quære* if the tenancy thereby created does not enure as a tenancy from year to

year, and not as a tenancy for the residue of the term. *Vide Doe d. Rigge v. Bell*, 5 T. R. 471. *Clayton v. Blakey*, 8 T. R. 3.

(b) *Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison*, 2 T. R. 425.

(c) *Doe d. Holland v. Worseley*, 1 Campb. 20.

be a *parting with it*, within the meaning of the covenant.-(a)

Where a lease contained a proviso for re-entry in case the tenant should demise or let the demised premises, or any part thereof, for all or any part of the term without licence, and the tenant without licence agreed with a person to enter into partnership with him, and that he should have the use of certain parts of the premises *exclusively*, and of the rest jointly with him the tenant, and accordingly let him into possession; it was held that the lease was forfeited thereby, for that it was a parting with the exclusive possession of some part of the demised premises, and whether it were gratuitously or for rent reserved was immaterial. (b)

A covenant not to under-let any part of the premises without licence, is not broken by taking in lodgers; for, *per Lord Ellenborough, C. J.* "The covenant can only extend to such under-letting as a licence might be expected to be applied for, and whoever heard of a licence from a landlord to take in a lodger? (c)

Where the lessee enters into covenants not to assign, &c. the Courts will distinguish between those acts which are done by him voluntarily, and those which pass *in invitum*, and will not hold the latter to

(a) *Doe d. Pitt v. Laming*, 1 R. M. & S. 297.
 & M. 36. (c) *Doe d. Pitt v. Laming*, 4
 (b) *Roe d. Dingley v. Sales*, 1 Campb. 77.

be a breach of the covenant. Thus, if the lessee become bankrupt, and the term be assigned under the commission, no forfeiture will be incurred; (a) unless, indeed, there be an express stipulation in the proviso that it shall extend to the bankruptcy of the lessee. (b) And where a lessee, who had covenanted not to "let, set, assign, transfer, make over, barter, exchange, or otherwise part with the indenture," with a proviso, that in such case the landlord might re-enter, afterwards gave a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, on which the lease was taken in execution and sold; it was held to be no forfeiture of the lease, unless the warrant of attorney were given expressly for the purpose of having the lease taken; for judgments, in contemplation of law, always pass *in invitum*. And Lord *Kenyon*, C. J. said, "there was no difference between a judgment obtained in consequence of an action resisted, and a judgment that is signed under a warrant of attorney; since the latter is merely to shorten the process, and lessen the expense of the proceedings:" but if the warrant of attorney be expressly given for the purpose of having the lease taken in execution, it will be held to be in fraud of the covenant, and a forfeiture of the lease. (c)

This protection extends also to the party, to whom the term is by law assigned. The reason of this is, that such assignee cannot be encumbered with the engagement belonging to the property which he

(a) *Doe d. Goodbehere v. Bevan*, 2 T. R. 133.
3 M. & S. 353.

(c) *Doe d. Mitchinson v. Carter*,

(b) *Roe d. Hunter v. Galliers*, 8. T. R. 57. 300.

takes, but must be allowed to divest himself of it, and convert it into a fund for the benefit of the creditors ; and therefore a forfeiture is not incurred, if the assignees sell the term. (a)

But where one leased for twenty-one years, “ if the tenant, his executors, &c. should so long continue to inhabit and dwell in the farm-house, and *actually occupy* the lands, &c. and not let, set, assign over, or otherwise depart with the lease,” the tenant having become bankrupt, and his assignees having possessed themselves of the premises, and sold the lease, and the bankrupt being out of the possession and occupation of the farm, it was held, that the lessor might maintain ejectment. And this case was distinguished from the one just mentioned, as not being a case of forfeiture ; but one in which the term itself was made to continue and depend upon the personal occupation of the lessee, and that therefore the term itself ceased, when the lessee had no longer the occupation of the farm. (b)

Where the lease contained a proviso for re-entry on the lessee assigning without licence, and the lessee executed a deed purporting to convey all his property real and personal to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, and afterwards a commission of bankrupt was taken out against him, and he was duly declared a bankrupt ; it was held that the trust-deed, being an act of bankruptcy and void, did not

(a) *Doe d. Goodbehere v. Bevan*,
3 M. & S. 353.

(b) *Doe d. Lockwood v. Clarke*,
3 East 185.

operate as a valid assignment of the lessee's interest in the lease, nor create a forfeiture. (a)

Where a lease contained an exception out of the demise of all trees then growing, or thereafter to grow upon the demised premises, and also a proviso, that if the defendant should commit any *waste in or upon the said demised premises*, it should be lawful for the lessor to re-enter; it was held to be no forfeiture of the lease, to cut down the trees excepted; for that waste could only be committed of the thing demised, and those trees being excepted out of the demise, no waste could be committed of them, and consequently no forfeiture, within the provision of the lease, could be incurred by cutting them down. (b)

A covenant, "not to use or exercise, or permit or suffer to be used or exercised, upon the demise premises, or any part thereof, any trade or business whatsoever," is broken by an assignment to a school-master, who kept his school upon the premises. (c)

A covenant that the lessee shall not exercise the trade of a butcher upon the premises, is broken by selling there raw meat by retail, although no beasts were there slaughtered. (d)

A proviso for re-entry if the lessee shall permit

(a) *Doe d. Lloyd v. Powell*, 5 B. & C. 308.

(c) *Doe d. Bish v. Keeling*, 1 M. & S. 95.

(b) *Goodright d. Peters v. Vivian*, 3 East. 190.

(d) *Doe d. Gaskell v. Spry*, 1 B. & A. 617.

any person to inhabit the premises who should carry on certain specified trades, (that of a licensed victualer not being one,) *or any other business that might be, or grow, or lead to be offensive, or any annoyance or disturbance to any of the lessor's tenants,* is not broken by the opening of a public-house upon the premises. (a)

Where a lease contained a covenant "to insure and keep insured a given sum of money upon the premises during the term, in some sufficient insurance office," the covenant was interpreted, by reasonable intendment, to mean insurance against fire; and the lessee, having insured the proper sum, but omitted to pay the annual premium within the time allowed by the office for payment, was held to have forfeited his lease upon a clause of re-entry, although he paid the premium within fourteen days after such time, and no action had been commenced, and no accident had happened by fire to the premises, in the mean time. (b) But where, in pursuance of a similar covenant, the lessee effected an insurance (the policy containing a memorandum, that in case of the death of the assured, the policy might be continued to his personal representative, provided an indorsement to that effect was made upon it within three months after his death), and died, and the representative, after the three months had expired, but

(a) *Jones v. Thorne*, 1 B. & C. 715. *Reynolds v. Pitt*, 2 Price, 206—212; and *Bracebridge v. Buckley*, 2 Price,

(b) *Doe d. Pitt v. Sherwin*, 3 200.
Campb. 134; *vide Rolfe v. Harris*, and

before ejectment brought, obtained the proper indorsement, Lord Ellenborough, C. J. was of opinion that the policy did not become void for want of the indorsement within the three months, but at most was only voidable by the company, and ruled, that no forfeiture was incurred. (a)

A covenant in a lease to deliver up at the end of the term all the trees standing in an orchard at the time of the demise, "*reasonable use and wear only excepted,*" is not broken by removing trees decayed and past bearing, from a part of the orchard which was too crowded. (b)

A lease with a clause of re-entry, for non-performance of covenants, contained a general covenant on the part of the lessee, to keep the premises in repair, and also another independent covenant to repair, within three months after notice; the landlord, after serving the tenant with a notice to repair *forthwith*, was allowed to bring an ejectment within the three months, for a breach of the general covenant to repair. (c) But where on similar covenants, and with a similar clause of re-entry, the landlord gave a notice to repair *within the three calendar months* from the date of the notice, it was held that he had by such notice precluded himself from insisting on the forfeiture until the expiration of the three months. (d)

(a) Doe d. Pitt v. Laming, 4 Campb. 76.

(b) Doe d. Jones v. Crouch, 2 Campb. 449.

(c) Roe d. Goatley v. Paine, 2 Campb. 520.

(d) Doe d. Morecraft v. Meux, 4 B. & C. 606.

The breaking of a door-way through the wall of a demised house into an adjoining house, and keeping it open for a long space of time, amounts to a breach of covenant to repair. (a)

Where a lease contained a proviso for re-entry, if the lessee committed waste to the value of 10*l.* and the tenant pulled down some old buildings of more than 10*l.* value, and substituted others of a different description; it was held that the waste contemplated in the proviso *was waste producing an injury to the reversion*; and that it was a question for the jury whether *such waste* had been committed. (b)

Where a lease, rendering rent, contained a covenant that the lessee should not assign without leave of the lessor, after which covenant was a proviso, that if the rent should be in arrear, or if all or any of the covenants *thereinafter* contained on the part of the lessee, should be broken, it should be lawful for the lessor to re-enter, and there were no covenants on the part of the lessee after the proviso, but only a covenant by the lessor, that the lessee paying rent, and performing all and every the covenants *thereinbefore* contained on his part to be performed, should quietly enjoy; it was held that the lessor could not re-enter for breach of the covenant not to assign, the proviso being restrained by the word "*hereinafter*" to subse-

(a) *Doe d. Vickery v. Jackson*, 2 Stark. 293. (b) *Doe d. Earl of Darlington v. Bond*, 5 B. & C. 855.

quent covenants; and although there were none such, yet the Court could not reject the word. (a)

Where a beneficial long lease reserved to the lessee the liberty to cut down and dispose of all timber, &c. then growing, or thereafter to grow during the term, subject to the following proviso, that *when and so often as* the lessee should intend, during the term, to fell timber, &c. he should immediately give notice in writing to the lessor of such intention, who should thereupon have the option of purchasing it, with a power of re-entry, in case of a breach of this proviso, and the lessee, soon after the execution of the lease, (at that time intending *bonâ fide* to cut down the whole of the then growing timber,) gave the proper notice in writing to the lessor, who did not accept the purchase, but disclaimed it; the lease was not forfeited, although the lessee did not forthwith fell all the timber, &c. but proceeded to cut down the same in different seasons at his own convenience, without giving any fresh notices to the lessee, or his assignee, to whom he had, previously to the last cuttings, conveyed his interest. (b)

Where a lease of certain waggon-ways was granted to *A. B.* under the authority of an act of parliament, in which, as well as in the lease, there was a proviso for re-entry, in case he neglected in any one year

(a) *Doe d. Spencer v. Godwin*, 4 M. & S. 265.

(b) *Goodtitle d. Luxmore v. Saville*, 16 East. 87. Lord Ellenborough, C. J. and Le Blanc, J.

intimated an opinion, that a court of equity would probably, under the circumstances, give the lessor or his assignee a new option to purchase.

to bring a certain number of coals to C., for the use of the inhabitants of L., and sell them there at a certain price; and by a subsequent act, the preamble of which recited that the price was inadequate, and that the inhabitants of L. would sustain great inconvenience if A. B. ceased to supply them with coals, it was enacted, first, that the former act, confirming the lease, (except such parts as were thereby altered or repealed,) should continue; then that A. B. might sell his coals brought to and deposited at C., or at any other place near thereto, to be used as a repository for coals instead thereof, at a certain increased price; and another section provided, that if A. B. neglected to bring the stipulated quantity of coals to C., or to such other place near thereto, to be used as a repository for coals instead thereof, and sell them there at the price fixed by the act, his interest in the waggon-ways should cease: it was held, that although the preamble did not recite an intention to give A. B. the liberty to change the place used as a repository for coals, and although it was not expressly enacted that he might do so, yet that the intention of the legislature to give him that privilege was clear, and that he might do so without forfeiting his interest in the waggon-ways; because, in construing acts of parliament, the Court must take into consideration, not only the language of the preamble, or of any particular clause, but of the whole act; and if in some of the enacting clauses expressions are found of more extensive import than in others, or than in the preamble, the Court will give effect to those more extensive expressions, if upon a view of the whole act, it

appears to have been the intention of the legislature that they should have effect. (a)

In all the cases above-mentioned, the tenancy was created by deed; but the principle is the same if the tenant holds under an agreement for a lease, which specifies the covenants to be inserted in the lease, and that there shall be a power of re-entry for a breach of them. (b)

By a memorandum of agreement, in consideration of the rent and *conditions* therein after-mentioned, A. was to have, hold, and occupy as on lease, certain premises therein specified, at a certain rent per acre. And it was *stipulated*, that no buildings should be included or leased by virtue of the agreement; and it was further *agreed and stipulated*, that A. should take at the rent aforesaid, certain other parcels, as the same might fall in; and lastly, it was *stipulated and conditioned* that A. should not assign, transfer, or under-let, any part of the said lands and premises otherwise than to his wife, child, or children; it was held, that by the last clause *a condition* was created, for the breach of which the lessor might maintain an ejectment. (c)

But in an agreement to let, in which there was no clause of entry, the following stipulation was held to be a covenant, and not a condition operating in

(a) *Doe d. Bywater v. Brandling*, 6 Esp. 106.
7 B. & C. 643.

(b) *Doe d. Oldershaw v. Breach*, & C. 308.

(c) *Doe d. Henniker v. Watt*, 8 B.

defeasance of the estate: " It is also hereby agreed, " and clearly understood, that in case the said *A. W.* " or his heirs, executors, and assigns, should want " any part of the said land to build or otherwise, or " cause to be built, then the said *T. R.*, or his heirs, " executors, or assigns, shall and will give up that part " or parts of the said lands as shall be requested by the " said *A. W.*, by his making an abatement in propor- " tion to the rent charged, and also to pay for so " much of the fence, at a fair valuation, as he shall " have occasion from time to time to take away, by " his giving or leaving six months' notice of what he " intends to do." (a)

Next, of the parties who may take advantage by forfeiture of the breach of a covenant or condition.

To enable a reversioner (b) to take advantage of a forfeiture, it is necessary that he should have the same estate in the lands at the time of the breach, as he had when the condition was created; an extinguishment of the estate in reversion, in respect of which the condition was made, extinguishing the condition also. (c) Thus, where a lease was made for a hundred years, and the lessee made an under-lease for twenty years, rendering rent, with a clause of re-entry, and afterwards the original lessor granted the reversion in fee, and the grantee purchased the re-

(a) *Doe d. Wilson v. Phillips*, 2 Bing. 13. the assignee of a reversion may sue, vide ante, 73.

(b) For covenants upon which (c) *Dumpor's case*, 4 Co. 120, (b).

version of the term; it was holden that the grantee should not have either the rent, or the power of re-entry, for the reversion of the term to which they were incident was extinguished in the reversion in fee. (a)

The reversioner must also be entitled to the reversion, at the time the forfeiture is committed, or he cannot take advantage of it. (b)

When the condition is, that the lessee will not do any particular act without leave from his lessor, if leave be once granted, the condition is gone for ever; for the condition is to be taken strictly, and by the licence it is satisfied. (c) And, in like manner, when a condition is entire, a licence to dispense with a part of the condition is a dispensation of the whole. Thus, where a lease was made to three, on condition that they, nor any of them, should alien without licence of the lessor, and the one by licence aliened his part, and afterwards the other two without licence aliened their parts, it was adjudged the lessor could not enter, for the condition was dispensed with. (c) So likewise, where the lease contains a clause, that the lessee shall not assign without leave from his lessor, the lessee, under a licence to assign part of the premises, may assign the whole without incurring a forfeiture. (d) But the licence must be such as is required by the

- (a) *Thre'r v. Barton*, Moore, 94. 815. S. C. 4 Co. 119, (b).
Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393. 402. (d) *Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison*,
 2 T. R. 425. *Seers v. Hind*, 1 Vez.
 12 East. 444. jun. 294.
 (c) *Dumpor v. Syms*, Cro. Eliz.

lease; and therefore, where the lease required the licence to be in writing, a parol licence was held to be insufficient. (a)

Provisoes for re-entry are also construed strictly with respect to the parties who may take advantage of them, and only include the persons who are expressly named. Thus, a power for C. to enter will not extend to his executor. (b) And it seems also, that if a lessee covenant with his lessor that *he* will not assign, &c., a covenant so framed will not extend to his executors or administrators, although if the executors or administrators be mentioned in the clause, they will be bound by it. (a)

So also, where a lease contained a covenant that the lessee, his executors or administrators (without mentioning *assigns*) should not under-let, and the lessee became bankrupt, and his assignees assigned the premises to a third person, who re-assigned to the bankrupt, (having obtained his certificate,) who under-let them; it was held that the lessee having been discharged of all his covenants by his bankruptcy, the under-letting by him was in the character of assignee, and therefore no forfeiture of the lease. (c)

A power of re-entry cannot be reserved to a stranger; (d) and where, in a building lease, a trustee and his *cestui que trust* were both demising par-

(a) *Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison*, waite, Willes, 500.

2 T. R. 425. *Seers v. Hind*, 1 Vez. jun. 294.

(c) *Doe d. Chere v. Smith*. 1 Mars. 359.

(b) *Hassel d. Hodson v. Gowth-*

(d) *Co. Litt.* 214.

ties, and the power of re-entry was reserved to both, and the state of the title appeared in the recitals in the lease, the Court, without argument, held the proviso to be void. (*a*)

But where a lessee made an underlease containing a proviso that the lessor *and* lessee might re-enter for breach of covenant, it was held that the lessee might *alone* maintain ejectment without joining the lessor. (*b*)

And where a party, being possessed of a term of years, demised his whole interest subject to a right of re-entry on the breach of a condition, it was held that he might enter for condition broken, although he had no reversion. (*c*)

The forfeiture of a lease by breach of a covenant or condition may be waived, in like manner as a forfeiture for non-payment of rent, or a notice to quit; that is to say, if the landlord do any act, with knowledge of the breach which can be considered as an acknowledgment of a tenancy still subsisting; as, for example, if he receive rent accruing subsequently to the forfeiture, (*d*) unaccompanied

(*a*) *Doe d. Barber v. Lawrence*, 4 Taunt. 23.

(*b*) *Doe d. Bedford v. Wheeler*, 4 Bing, 276.

(*c*) *Doe d. Freeman v. Bateman*, 2 B. & A. 158.

(*d*) *Fox v. Swann*, Styles, 482. *Goodright d. Walter v. Davids*, Cowp. 803. The authority of the

case of *Doe d. Scott v. Miller*, 2 C. & P. seems very doubtful. The defendant held under a lease containing a clause of re-entry on breach of covenant to repair—an ejectment was brought on such clause of re-entry, and after proof being given of execution of the lease, and of the dilapidated state of the premises up to the day

by circumstances which show a contrary intention. (a)

But a waiver of one forfeiture incurred by breach of covenant, will not be a waiver of a second forfeiture incurred by another breach of the same covenant; nor where the breach is a *continuing* breach, will the landlord be precluded from taking advantage of it, by having received rent, &c. after the breach was originally committed. Thus where a right of re-entry was reserved on a breach of covenant not to underlet, it was held that the lessor was entitled to re-enter upon a second under-letting, although he had waived his right so to do upon the first. (b) So also where the forfeiture incurred was by using rooms in a house in a manner prohibited by the lease, it was held that such user was a continuing breach, and that the landlord might recover after receiving rent, provided the user continued after such receipt. (c) So also where a lease of coal-mines reserved a certain rent, and contained a proviso that the lease should be void if the tenant should cease working at any time two years, and the tenant did cease working two years

of the trial; the defendant put in a written notice to the lessor to quit at the end of six months from the date thereof, (which notice had not expired when the action was brought,) describing the premises in these terms—"which you now hold of me as tenant from year to year." There was no proof that the lessor had any knowledge of the state of repair of the premises, at the time he gave the notice; nor was a notice

to quit necessary to determine the tenancy, nor could it be determined by such notice. Best, C. J. held that the giving of such notice was equivalent to the receipt of rent, and operated as a waiver of the forfeiture until the time of its expiration.

(a) Ante, 149.

(b) *Doe d. Boscawen v. Bliss*, 4 Taunt. 735.

(c) *Doe d. Ambler v. Woodbridge*, 9 B. & C. 376.

and then paid rent, but did not resume the working, it was held that this was a continuing breach, and that ejectment might be maintained for the ceasing to work after the payment of the rent. (a)

But in a case where a lease contained a covenant to repair, with a right of re-entry, in case the lessee should not repair within three months after notice, and the landlord gave notice, and after the three months had expired, received rent accruing after such expiration, and then brought an ejectment, the premises continuing out of repair, and the jury found a verdict for the defendant, the Court of King's Bench refused to set the verdict aside, notwithstanding the opinion of Lord Kenyon, as expressed on the trial, that the forfeiture had not been waived. And it seems the jury were right, for the power to re-enter was not given for breach of the general covenant to repair, but "in case the lessee should not repair within three months after notice;" the receipt of rent therefore after the expiration of the notice to repair was a waiver of that notice, and consequently a fresh notice was necessary to bring the party within the penalty of the proviso. (b)

Where the defendant being the mortgagee of a term, purchased the mortgagor's whole interest in the premises, in consequence of the lessor's advice, "to take to the premises, and finish the buildings," given after a right of re-entry had accrued for the non-completion of the buildings; it was held, that the

(a) *Doe d. Bryan v. Banks*, 4 B. & A. 401.

(b) *Fryett d. Harris v. Jeffreys*, 1 Esp. 393.

lessor's right of re-entry was not thereby waived, but suspended only for such reasonable time after the purchase, as might be required to complete the buildings, and that ejectment might be maintained for the forfeiture after that time had elapsed, against the purchaser, who had proceeded in part to finish, but had never wholly completed the buildings, or put them in a habitable state. (a)

A lease contained a covenant on the part of the lessee, to insure the premises in the joint names of himself and the lessor, and in two-thirds of the value of the premises demised. Both parts of the lease continued in the possession of the lessor, and an abstract only was delivered to the lessee, in which it was stated, that the tenant was to insure the premises in two-thirds of the value, but it was not stated in whose name or names the policy was to be effected. The lessee insured in his own name only, and, as was contended, to a less amount than two-thirds of the value of the premises, but to the same amount as the lessor had himself insured the premises during two years of the lease, when the lessee had been in embarrassed circumstances. Lord Tenterden, C. J. ruled that although there was no dispensation or release from the covenant, yet that if the conduct of the lessor of the premises had been such as to induce a reasonable and cautious man to believe, that he would do all that was necessary or required of him, by insuring in his own name, and to the amount proved, he could not proceed against his lessee for a forfeiture; and

(a) *Doe d. Sore v. Ekins*, 1 R. & M. 29.

he left to the consideration of the jury, the question whether such had been the conduct of the lessor: the jury found a verdict for the defendant. (a)

A landlord will not lose his right to re-enter, by merely lying by, (however long the period,) and witnessing the act of forfeiture; but it seems, that if with full knowledge thereof, he permits the tenant to expend money in improvements, it is a circumstance from which the jury may presume a waiver, as well as ground for application to a court of equity for relief. (b)

It seems scarcely necessary to observe, that no act of the landlord will operate as a confirmation of a lease, rendered voidable by a breach of covenant, unless he had full notice, at the time of such act, that the forfeiture had been committed. (c)

Before quitting this branch of our subject, it is necessary to notice a material distinction which prevails between leases for *lives*, and leases for *years*, as to the consequences of a forfeiture upon the breach of a condition, where the lease is declared “*to be null and void,*” or “*to cease and determine, &c.*” upon the breach of the condition, instead of being expressed in the common form, “*that it shall and may be lawful for the lessor, in such case, to re-enter.*” In leases for lives, whatever may be the

(a) *Doe d. Knight v. Rowe*, 1 R. Taunt. 78.
& M. 343.

(c) *Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison*,

(b) *Doe d. Sheppard v. Allen*, 3 2 T. R. 425.

words of the condition, it is in all cases held, that if the tenant be guilty of any breach of it, the lease is voidable only, and not void; and therefore not determined until the lessor re-enters. Because when an estate commences *by livery*, it cannot be determined before *entry*; and consequently, if the lessor do any act which amounts to a dispensation of the breach, the lease, which before was voidable only, is thereby affirmed, and the forfeiture waived. But when a condition of the import of those first above-mentioned is inserted in a lease for years, if the lessee be guilty of any breach of it, the lease becomes absolutely void, and determined thereby; and cannot be again set up by any subsequent act of the lessor. But if the condition be “*that it shall and may be lawful for the lessor to re-enter,*” or “*that the term shall cease and determine, if the lessor please,*” (a) or the like, the lease will be only voidable by a breach of the condition; and the forfeiture may be waived by a subsequent acknowledgment of a tenancy, in the same manner as in all cases of leases for lives. (b)

These distinctions however do not exist, when the forfeiture accrues by reason of the non-performance of a covenant, instead of the breach of a condition. In all cases of this nature, whatever may be the words of the proviso, leases for lives and leases for years are governed by the same principles, and a forfeiture

(a) *Doe d. Bristow v. Old*, K. B. Sittings after T. T. 1814. M. S.

(b) *Co. Litt. 215, (a)*. Pennant's case, 3 Co. 64, 65.

may be enforced, or the lease confirmed, at the option of the lessor. (a) *Quere see the cases cited.*

A proviso in a lease to re-enter for a condition broken, operates only during the term, and cannot be taken advantage of after its expiration. Thus, where a lease for ninety-nine years, if A. and B. should so long live, was granted, with a proviso, giving the power of re-entry, in case the lessee should under-let the premises for the purpose of tillage, and an under-tenant of the lessee ploughed up and sowed the land, but the lessor did not enter during the continuance of the estate: it was held in an action of trespass by the lessor against the under-tenant, for entering upon the land, after the determination of the estate, for the purpose of carrying off the emblements, that the plaintiff having never been in possession by *right of re-entry* for condition broken, could have no advantage thereof, and that the defendant, who ploughed and sowed the land, was entitled to take the emblements. (b)

(a) *Rede v. Farr*, 6 M. & S. 121. C. 519.

Doe d. Bryan v. Bancks, 4 B. & A. 401. (b) *Johns v. Whitley*, 3 Wils. 127.

Arnsby v. Woodward, 6 B. & 127.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the Ancient Practice ; and the Cases in which it is still necessary.

WHEN the remedy by ejectment is pursued in an inferior court, the fictions of the modern system are not applicable, for inferior courts have not the power of framing rules for confessing lease, entry, and ouster, nor the means, if such rules were entered into, of enforcing obedience to them. (a) When also the premises are vacated, and wholly deserted by the tenant, and his place of residence is unknown, (b) the modern practice, for reasons which will be noticed

(a) *The King v. Mayor of Bristol*, 1 Keb. 690. *Sherman v. Cocke*, 1 Keb. 795. It is said by Gilbert, C. B. that if the defendant in an inferior court, enter into a rule to confess lease, &c. and the cause be removed, and the judge of the inferior court grant an attachment against the defendant for disobedience to the rule, the superior court will grant an attachment against the judge, for exceeding his authority, and obstructing the course of the superior court. (Gilb. Eject.

38.)

(b) Strict proof of this fact will be required ; and if it appear, that the premises were not *wholly* deserted, or that the plaintiff's lessor knew *where the tenant lived*, a judgment obtained by means of the ancient practice will be set aside. A very little matter has been held sufficient to keep possession, such as, leaving beer in a cellar, or hay in a barn. (*Savage v. Dent*, Stran. 1064.) *Jones d. Griffiths v. March*, 4 T. R. 464.)

in a subsequent chapter, (*a*) cannot be adopted. When, therefore, the party brings his action in a superior court, the possession being vacant, (*b*) and the lessor's abode unknown, and when he is desirous of trying his title in a court of inferior jurisdiction, all the forms of the ancient practice must be observed: a lease must be sealed upon the premises; an ouster actually made; and the parties to the suit will be real, and not imaginary persons.

The manner of proceeding in these cases is as follows. *A.* the party claiming title, must enter upon the land before the essoign-day of the term of which the declaration is to be entitled, and whilst on the premises, execute a lease of them to *B.* (any person (*c*) who may accompany him,) at the same time delivering to him the possession by some one of the common modes. *C.* (some other person) must then enter upon the premises, and eject *B.* therefrom, and having done so, must remain upon them, whilst *B.* delivers to him a declaration in ejectment, founded upon the demise contained in the lease; and in all respects like the declaration in the modern proceedings, (*d*) except that the parties to it are real instead of fictitious persons; *B.* being made the plaintiff, *A.* the lessor, and *C.* the defendant. To this declaration a notice must be added, signed by *B.*'s attorney, and addressed to *C.*, requiring him to appear and plead

(*a*) Chap. VII.

(*b*) Appendix, No. 7.

(*c*) Attornies form an exception to this statement; for, by the rules of B. R. and C. B. (M.T. 1654.) it is

ordered, "that for the prevention of maintenance and brocage, no attorney shall be lessee in an ejectment."

(*d*) Appendix, No. 12.

to the declaration, and informing him that if he do not, judgment will be signed against him by default. (a)

When the landlord, or person claiming title, does not wish to go through this ceremony himself, he may execute a power of attorney, authorizing another to enter for him; (b) and the proceedings are then the same as if he himself entered. But it must be remembered, that if it be necessary, when the ancient practice is used, to join the wife in the demise, the lease must be executed by the husband and wife, in their proper persons, because a *feme covert* cannot constitute an attorney. (c)

When the ancient practice is resorted to, the suit must proceed in the name of the casual ejector, and if the proceedings are in a superior court, no person claiming title will be admitted to defend the action. If, therefore, in such case, the right to the premises be disputed, the party who seals the lease must, in the first instance, recover the possession, and the other party must afterwards bring a common ejectment against him to try the title. (d)

When the proceedings are in the King's Bench, an affidavit must be made (e) of the sealing of the lease,

(a) Appendix, No. 8.

(b) 2 Sell. Prac. 131. Appendix, Nos. 5 and 6.

(c) *Wilson v. Rich*, 1 Yelv. 1 S. C. 1 *Brown*, 134. *Plomer v. Hockhead*, 2 *Brown*, 248. S. C.

Noy. 133. *Sed vide Hopkins's case*, Cro. Car. 165. *Gardiner v. Norman*, Cro. Jac. 617.

(d) *Ex parte Beauchamp and Burt*. Barn. 177. B. N. P. 96.

(e) Appendix, No. 9.

ouster of the plaintiff, &c. ; and upon this affidavit a motion is made for judgment against the defendant, and unless he appears and pleads, judgment will be signed against him, upon moving the court, as in a common ejectment. (a)

In the Common Pleas, this affidavit and motion are unnecessary, and instead of them a rule to plead must be given on the first day of term, as in other actions, and if there be no appearance and plea at the expiration of the rule, judgment may be signed. (b)

It is immaterial, as far as the forms of sealing the lease, &c. are concerned, whether the action be commenced in a superior, or inferior court ; but the subsequent proceedings in inferior courts must of course depend upon the general practice in them in other actions, and cannot form a part of this treatise. How far it may even be *necessary* to give the tenant in possession notice of the claimant's proceedings, in an ejectment brought in an inferior court, may appear doubtful, when it is remembered, that such notice was only requisite in the superior courts, in consequence of a rule made for that particular purpose ; (c) but it certainly is more *prudent* to conform to the general practice in this respect, and the notice need not to be given until after the entry, and execution of the lease. (d)

The defendant is entitled to remove an ejectment

(a) *Smartley v. Henden*, 1 Salk. 255. 2 Sell. Prac. 131.

(b) 2 Sell. Prac. 131.

(c) Ante, 13.

(d) 1 Lill. Pr. Reg. 675.

from an inferior to a superior court, either by writ of *certiorari*, (a) or of *habeas corpus*; (b) and when removed, the tenant in possession is entitled to the same privilege of confessing lease, entry, and ouster, and defending the action, as if the plaintiff had originally declared in the superior court. (c) The superior court also will not grant a *procedendo* when a cause has been so removed, if there be reason for believing that an impartial trial cannot be had in the inferior court, or upon other special grounds; and it is to be inferred from the reasoning of the judges in the only modern case upon the subject, that a writ of *certiorari* is a matter of course, and that a *procedendo* will in no case be granted. (d)

When the lands lie partly within, and partly without, the jurisdiction of the inferior court, the defendant cannot plead above the jurisdiction of such inferior court, because the demise is transitory, and may be tried anywhere. (e)

As the plaintiff, in the ancient practice, is a person actually in existence, his death would of course abate the action, according to the general rules of law; but as the courts look upon the lessor of the plaintiff to be the person concerned in interest, they will not suffer him to be deprived of his remedy, by such an event. If, therefore, there be any one of the same name with the plaintiff, he will be presumed to have

(a) Doe *d.* Sadler *v.* Dring, 1 B. & C. 253.

(c) Gilb. Eject. 37.

(b) Highmore *v.* Barlow, Barn. 421. Allen *v.* Foreman, 1 Sid. 313.

(d) Patterson *d.* Gradridge *v.* Eades, 3 B. & C. 550.

(e) Hall *v.* Hughs, 2 Keb. 69.

been the person ; and it has also been held to be a contempt of the Court, to assign for error the nominal plaintiff's death. (a)

In like manner, before the introduction of the modern practice, it was said, that if the plaintiff released to one of the tenants in possession, who had been made defendant, such release would be a good bar, because the plaintiff could not recover against his own release, since he was the plaintiff upon the record ; but the Courts considered such a release as a contempt, and it does not appear that a plea of this nature ever occurred in practice. (b)

The casual ejector is also in the ancient practice a real person, but the court will not allow him to confess judgment ; and where, upon proceedings on a vacant possession, the casual ejector gave a warrant of attorney for this purpose, the Court set the judgment aside. (c)

Where an action of ejectment, and an action of assault and battery, were joined in the same writ, after verdict it was moved in arrest of judgment, because it was without precedent ; but the Court seemed to think the misjoinder cured by the verdict. (d)

(a) Addison v. Sir John Otway, v. Brewer, 4 M. & S. 300.
1 Mod. 250—52. Moore v. Goodright, Stran. 899.

(b) Peto v. Checy, 2 Brown, 128.
Anon. Salk. 260. Vide Doe d. Byne

(c) Hooper v. Dale, Stran. 531.

(d) Bird v. Snell, Hob. 249 ; et vide Gilb. Eject. 52.

CHAPTER VII.

Of the Declaration in the Modern Action of Ejectment, and Notice to Appear.

THE proceedings in the modern action of ejectment being founded in fiction, and regulated altogether by the courts of common law, a system of practice has gradually been formed, adapted to the uses of the particular remedy, but for the most part independent of the general practical regulations in other actions. The singularity of the modern practice has indeed, occasioned it to be denominated a string of legal fictions; and the remedy itself has frequently been called a child and creature of the court.

To enable a party claiming title to lands, to take advantage of the modern method of bringing an ejectment, it is necessary, as has been already observed, (a) that a person should be in possession of the premises in question; that is to say, that they should not be vacated *and altogether deserted*; (b) or at least (supposing them to be so deserted) that the residence of

(a) Ante, 199.

Jones *d. Griffiths v. Marsh*, 4 T. R.(b) *Savage v. Dent*, Stran. 1064. 464.

the last tenant be not unknown to the claimant. (a) This arises from a particular regulation of the modern practice, which requires an affidavit of the service of a declaration in ejectment upon the tenant in possession, before judgment can be obtained against the casual ejector ; and as this service cannot of course take place, when a tenant does not exist, the necessary affidavit cannot then be made, but the claimant is compelled to resort to the ancient practice.

With this single exception, however, a claimant in ejectment may always proceed, in the superior courts, by the modern method.

The suit is commenced by the delivery of the declaration against the casual ejector, to the tenant in possession ; for, as the plaintiff and defendant in the action, are only fictitious persons, the suing out of a writ would be an useless form. This declaration is, in fact, in itself a kind of writ, or process ; and is the only means by which the party in possession is informed of the claim set up by the lessor and required to appear and defend his title. (b)

The declaration, when the proceedings are in the King's Bench, may be framed to answer either to an action commenced *by bill*, or *by original*, but the

(a) Exceptions to this general rule are created, in particular cases, by the provisions of the statutes 4 Geo. II. c. 28; 11 Geo. II. c. 19. *Vide* ante, 163. 175. so far, considered a process of the Court, that the Court will punish as a contempt any improper conduct of the tenant at the time of its delivery. *Rex v. Unitt, Stran.* 567.

(b) A declaration in ejectment is

latter is the preferable and most common method ; because the action is then considered by the Court as though it actually had been commenced *by original*, and no writ of error can be brought thereon except in Parliament. In the Common Pleas, the declaration is, of course, always framed as if the proceedings were *by original*. (a)

The declaration should regularly (except in the cases mentioned in the stat. 1 W. IV. c. 70. s. 36) be entitled of the term immediately preceding the vacation in which it is delivered ; but if it be not entitled of any term, or of a wrong term, it will be immaterial provided the tenant has sufficient notice given him therein to appear to the action. Thus declarations have been upheld entitled *Michaelmas* term, 54 G. III., instead of 55 G. III. ; (b) *Trinity* term, 56 G. III., instead of 55 G. III. ; (c) *Hilary* instead of *Michaelmas* term, (d) and *Michaelmas* instead of *Easter* term ; (e) the notices to appear being correct, and the declarations delivered at the proper times ; and where the declaration was delivered before the essoign day of *Hilary* term, and the notice at its foot was dated January 1, 1818, and was to appear within the four first days of the next term, it was held sufficiently certain, although not entitled at all. (f)

When the title of the lessor of the plaintiff ac-

(a) Appendix, Nos. 12. 14. 15.

(d) Anon. 2 Chitty, 172.

(b) Goodtitle *d. Ranger v. Roe*, 2

(e) Anon. 2 Chitty, 173.

Chitty, 172.

(f) Goodtitle *d. Price v. Badtyle*,

(c) Doe *v. Greaves*, 2 Chitty, H. T. 1818. K. B., MS.

crues after the essoign day of an issuable term, and the ejectment is founded on stat. 1 W. IV. c. 70. s. 36, the declaration against the casual ejector must be specially entitled of the day next after the day of the demise in such declaration, whether the same shall be in term or vacation; but in all other cases the declaration against the casual ejector may be entitled of a term anterior to the day of the demise. This is strikingly dissimilar from the practice in all other actions. The demise stated in the declaration, is the title upon which the plaintiff is supposed to enter, and the ouster the supposed wrong for which the action is brought. The plaintiff has consequently no cause of action antecedently to the day of the ouster; which must be subsequent to the day of the demise, and according to the general rules of pleading, could not entitle his declaration anterior to that time. But the casual ejector being a nominal person, cannot take advantage of the objection; and if the tenant appear, and apply to be admitted a defendant instead of the casual ejector, he will be compelled by the consent rule to accept a declaration entitled of a subsequent term. Therefore, if the demise be laid in the vacation time, and the declaration against the casual ejector be entitled of the preceding term, it will be sufficient; because, if the party in possession defend the action, the declaration against him (as will be explained hereafter) will be entitled of the subsequent term; and if he leave the suit undefended, judgment will be taken out against the casual ejector. (a)

(a) Imp. K. B. 642. 1 Lil. Prac. Vent. 174.
Reg. 680. Tunstall v. Brend, 2

The *venue* in ejectment is local, and confined to the county in which the lands are situated. (*a*)

The demise declared upon by the plaintiff, in the modern practice, is fictitious only; but still it must be consistent with the title of his lessor; that is to say, such a demise must be supposed to be made, as would, if actually made, have transferred the right of possession to the lessee. Thus, if there be several lessors, and a joint demise by them all be alleged, such a title must be shown at the trial, as would enable each of them to demise the whole; because if any one of the lessors have not a legal interest in the whole premises, he cannot in law be said to demise them. As, where *A.* was tenant for life, and *B.* had the remainder in fee, and they made a lease to *C.*, and declared upon the lease as a *joint demise*, it was held bad; because, during *A.*'s life, it was the lease of *A.*, and the confirmation of *B.*, and after the death of *A.*, it was the lease of *B.*, and the confirmation of *A.*, but not a joint demise. (*b*)

Joint tenants, or parceners, have a sufficient interest in the lands held in joint tenancy, or parcenery, to entitle them to make a joint demise of the whole premises, but tenants in common have not: and the reason for this difference seems to be, that tenants in common have several and distinct titles and estates, independent of each other, so as to render the freehold several also; whilst joint tenants and parceners

(*a*) Anon. 6 Mod. 222. Mostyn
v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161. 176.

(*b*) King v. Bery, Poph. 57.
Treport's case, 6 Co. 75, (*b*).

are seized *per my et per tout*, derive by one and the same title, have a *joint* possession, and must join in any action for an injury thereto; so that each of them may properly be said to demise the whole. (a)

It is not, however, compulsory upon joint tenants, or parceners, to allege a joint demise; for if a joint tenant, or parcener, bring an ejectment without joining his companion in the demise, it is considered as a severance of the tenancy, and he will be allowed to recover his separate moiety of the land. And if all the joint tenants, or parceners, join in the action, but declare upon separate demises by each, it is held that they may recover the whole premises; because, by the several demises, the plaintiff has the entire interest in the whole subject matter, although the joint tenancy is severed by the separate letting. (b)

When two, or more, tenants in common are lessors of the plaintiff, a separate demise must be laid by each; (c) or they must join in a lease to a third person, and state the demise to the plaintiff to have been made by their lessee. The first is the most usual mode of proceeding, and the declaration need not state the several demises to be of the several shares belonging to the several tenants respectively; but

(a) *Moore v. Fursden*, 1 Show. 342. *Millener v. Robinson*, Moore, 682. *Boner v. Juner*, Ld. Raym. 726. *Mantle v. Wollington*, Cro. Jac. 166. *Morris v. Barry*, 1 Wils. 1. *Heatherly d. Worthington v. Weston*, 2 Wils. 232.

(b) *Doe d. Gill v. Pearson*, 6 East. 173. *Roe d. Raper v. Lonsdale*, 12 East. 39. *Doe d. Marsack v. Read*, 12 East. 57. *Doe d. Lulham v. Fenn*, 3 Campb. 190.

(c) App. No. 14, 15.

each demise may be alleged generally to be of the whole premises demanded ; for under a demise of the whole an undivided moiety may be recovered. (a)

When any doubt exists as to the party in whom the legal title is vested, it is usual to declare upon several distinct demises by the several persons concerned in interest, (b) and the claimants will not then be confined at the trial to one particular demise, but will be allowed to resort to any included in the declaration, under which they may be able to prove a title to the premises. Difficulties of this nature frequently occur when trustees are lessors of the plaintiff; and it is always advisable to lay separate demises by the trustees, and *cestui que trust*, unless the effect of the statute of uses upon the trust is most clear and indisputable. But application should in strictness be first made to such trustees for permission to make use of their names ; and where demises are inserted in the names of any parties without their authority, the Court on motion will order such demises to be struck out of the declaration, (c) unless the justice of the case requires their insertion, and a sufficient indemnity is given ; and they will also interfere to set aside proceedings after verdict under similar circumstances, if the application be *bonâ fide*, and the affidavit on which it is grounded distinctly and unequivocally show the want of such authority. (d) But where a bankrupt laid a demise by his assignees

(a) *Doe d. Bryant v. Wippel*, 1 Chitty, 171.
Esp. 330.

(d) *Doe d. Hammeck v. Fellis*, 2 Chitty 170.

(b) App. No. 14, 15.

(c) *Doe d. Shepherd v. Roc*, 2

without their permission (they having given upon him the property in the premises) and obtained judgment and execution thereupon, the court refused to set the proceedings aside at *the instance of the defendant in the ejectment*, notwithstanding an affidavit from one of the assignees that he knew nothing of the premises in question; considering the application a mere contrivance for defeating the action. (a)

The day, on which the demise is stated to have been made, is so far material, that it must be subsequent to the time when the claimant's right of entry accrues; for if the lessor have not a right to enter, he cannot have a right to demise the lands, and consequently the plaintiff must be nonsuited at the trial, for his lessor cannot be *supposed* to have made an illegal demise. (b) It is usual, however, to lay the demise as far back as the lessor's title will admit; because the judgment in ejectment is conclusive evidence as to the title of the lessor, for all the mesne profits accruing subsequently to the day of the demise; (c) and when there are any doubts as to the period when the lessor's title accrued, it is customary to state different demises by him on different days.

In an ejectment on the demise of an heir by descent, the demise was laid on the day the ancestor died, and held to be well enough; for the ancestor might die at five o'clock, the heir enter at six, and

(a) *Doe d. Vine v. Figgins*, 3 Taunt. 440. way, *v. Herbert*, 4 T. R. 680.

(c) *Aislin v. Parkin*, Burr. 665.

(b) Ante, 11. *Goodtitle d. Gallo-*

make a lease at seven, which would be a good lease. (a) It seems also, according to Lord Hardwicke, that a posthumous son, taking lands under the provisions of 10 and 11 Wm. III. c. 16, would be entitled to lay the demise, from the day of his father's death. (b)

It has already been observed, that in an ejectment, by the surrenderee of copyhold premises, the demise may be laid against all persons, but the lord, on a day between the times of surrender and admittance, provided the surrenderee be admitted before trial. (c)

But this doctrine of relation does not apply where the assignees of a bankrupt are the lessors of the plaintiff, so as to enable them to recover the freehold lands of the bankrupt, upon a demise subsequently to the act of bankruptcy, but before the date of the bargain and sale by the commissioners; for the freehold remains in the bankrupt, though not beneficially, until taken out by him of the conveyance. (d)

When an ejectment is founded on stat. 4. Geo. II. c. 28. s. 2., the day of the demise must be subsequently to the last day on which the rent is payable to save the forfeiture, and prior to the day on which the declaration is delivered. (e)

(a) *Roe d. Wrangham v. Hersey*, 3 Wils. 274.

(b) B. N. P. 105.

(c) *Ante*, 64. *Doe d. Bennington v. Hall*, 16 East. 208.

(d) *Doe d. Esdaile v. Mitchell*, 2 M. & S. 446. *et vide. Doe d. Whately v. Telling*, 2 East. 256.

(e) *Doe d. Lawrence v. Shawcross*, 3 B. & C. 752. *Ante*, 162.

When a fine with proclamations has been levied, and an actual entry is necessary to avoid it, the demise must be laid on a day subsequent to the entry. (a)

Tenancies at will scarcely exist at the present day; but when an ejectment is brought against a tenant at will, the demise must be laid subsequently to the time when possession is demanded, that is to say, subsequently to the determination of the will. (b)

When an ejectment is brought against a tenant from year to year, the commencement of whose tenancy is unknown, and no presumptive proof of the time of such commencement can be obtained, (c) the only sure method of avoiding a nonsuit is to give a general notice to quit "at the end and expiration of the current year of the tenancy thereof, which shall expire next after the end of one half year from the date of the notice," and to lay the demise eighteen months after the delivery of such notice.

The length of the term, during which the premises are alleged in the declaration to have been demised to the plaintiff, is wholly unconnected with the title of the claimant, and may be of longer duration than his interest in the land. (d) A contrary doctrine was once indeed maintained, upon the principle, that by a judgment in ejectment the plaintiff recovers his *term* mentioned in the declaration, and, therefore, if

(a) *Berington d. Dormer v. Parkhurst*, And. 125. S. C. Stran. 1086. (c) *Vide post*, Chap. 10.
 (d) *Doe d. Shore v. Porter*, 3 S. C. Willes. 327. S. C. 13 East. 489. T. R. 13.

(b) *Ante*, 106.

the term declared on be of greater duration than the lessor's title, as, for instance, if the lessor be entitled to the lands for three years only, and the plaintiff declare on a demise for five, he would wrongfully hold the lands for the last two years. (a) But this doctrine has since been very correctly over-ruled; because if the lessor have the right of possession but for a month, and make a lease for seven years, it will enure to his lessee for the month duly, and during that time he will be entitled to the possession; and, as a judgment in ejectment is not admitted as evidence of the lessor's title, he cannot by reason of it be enabled to keep possession after the month has expired. (b)

*wrong see
2 G. M. & W. 37*

Seven years is the term usually declared upon; and the only direction necessary to be given upon this point is, that the term be of a length sufficient to admit of the lessor's recovering possession of the land before its expiration; although the courts are now very liberal in permitting lessors to amend in this respect, as will be stated hereafter.

It was for some time, even after the introduction of the modern practice, holden necessary, that when an ejectment was brought by a corporation aggregate, they should execute a power of attorney, authorizing some person to enter and make a lease on the lands; that such person accordingly should enter, and make a lease under seal; and that the declaration should state the demise to be by deed. (c) These forms, it

(a) *Roe v. Williamson*, 2 Lev. 140. 1 Mod. 10.

S. C. 3 Keb. 490.

(c) *Gilb. Eject.* 35.

(b) *B. N. P.* 106. *Clerke v. Rowell*,

seems, were deemed necessary upon the principle, that a corporation aggregate cannot perform any corporate act otherwise than under the corporation seal, nor make an attorney, or bailiff, but by deed. They could not, it was therefore said, enter and demise upon the land in person, as natural persons could, nor substitute an attorney to enter into a rule for their costs; nor would an attachment go against them for disobedience to that rule. They therefore made an actual lease upon the lands, and then the attorney proceeded in the common method. But, since the principles of this action have been more clearly understood, none of these peculiarities are necessary; and the demise may now be laid in the general way, without any power of attorney being made, any lease being signed, (a) or any statement of such a lease being introduced into the declaration. One case only is indeed to be found upon the latter point, and in that the question arose after verdict; (b) but from the reasoning then used by the court, no doubt can be entertained that the principle would be extended to every stage of the action; and that a plaintiff in ejectment would never be non suited for the omission of such a statement. (c) The demise is still certainly sometimes stated to be by deed; and it is immaterial whether it be so or not, as, notwith-

(a) *Furley d. Mayor of Canterbury v. Wood*, 1 Esp. 198.

(b) *Partridge v. Ball*, Ld Raym. 136. S. C. Carth. 390.

(c) In the case of *Doe d. Dean and Chapter of Rochester v. Pierce*, the demise was in the common

form, and many objections were taken upon other points by the defendant's counsel, and overruled; but they never adverted to the circumstance of the demise not being stated to be by deed. Kent, (Sun. Ass. 1809, MS.)

standing the statement, no proof of the deed is required. (a)

If a corporation be aggregate of many, they may set forth the demise in the declaration, without mentioning the Christian names of those who constitute the corporation; but if the corporation be sole, as if the demise be by a bishop, the name of baptism must be inserted. The reason of this is, that in the first case the name solely consists of its character, but in the last in its person; therefore there cannot be a sufficient specification of that person without mentioning his name. (b)

In a case where the demise was laid to be by the Mayor, &c. of *the borough town* of Maldon, and the name of the Corporation as appeared from the charter was the Mayor, &c. of Maldon, it was held to be no variance, it appearing from the charter, which was in evidence, that Maldon was a borough town. (c)

In the case of *Swadling v. Piers*, (d) it was ruled, that in an ejectment for tithes, the plaintiff must declare on a demise by deed, because tithes cannot pass but by deed; but this decision has since been overruled, and the statement of a deed seems even in this case to be no longer necessary. (e)

It seems also to have been holden, that on a de-

(a) *Furley d. Mayor of Canterbury v. Wood*, 1 Esp. 198. *v. Miller*, 1 B. & A. 699.

(d) Cro. Jac. 613.

(b) *Carter v. Cromwell*, Sav. 123, cited Dyer, 86.

(e) *Partridge v. Ball, Ld.*, Raym. 136. S. C. Carth. 390.

(c) *Doc d. Mayor, &c. of Maldon*

mise by the master and fellows of a college, dean and chapter of a cathedral, master or guardian of an hospital, parson, vicar, or other ecclesiastical person, of any lands, &c. the declaration should state that there was a rent reserved, &c. pursuant to the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10; but this form cannot now be necessary. (a)

A similar doctrine was once applied to the case of an infant; (b) but it has been long settled, that an infant may make a lease without rent to try his title. (c) When, however, a demise is laid by an infant, his father or guardian should be made plaintiff, instead of a nominal person, in order to save the trouble and expense of giving security for the costs, which he would otherwise be compelled to do. (d)

It is not necessary to state, in the declaration, that the premises are situated in a parish, hamlet, &c. it is sufficient to mention the name of the place in which they are situate, without also describing it by the name of its ecclesiastical or civil division. (e) And in one case, where even the name of the place was omitted when describing the premises, but such name could be collected from other parts of the declaration, the court held the description to be sufficiently certain. (f) When, however, the premises are described

(a) *Carter v. Cromwell*, Sav. 129.

(b) *Lill. Prac. Reg.* 673.

(c) *Zouch v. Parsons*, Burr. 1794.
1806.

(d) *Noke v. Windham*, Stran. 694.
Anon. 1. Wils. 130.

(e) *Goodtitle d. Bembridge v. Walker*, 4 Taunt. 671.

(f) *Goodright d. Smallwood v. Strother*, Black. 706. The declaration in this case stated, that one M. S. "at Haswell in the county of

as lying in a parish, hamlet, &c. such description must be a correct one, and an uncertain or improper description will be fatal. Thus, in an ejectment for lands, "in the parishes of *A.* and *B.* or one of them," the judgment was arrested for the uncertainty, although it appeared that the parties had originally been one, and lately been divided by an act of parliament, and that the boundaries were not settled. (a) But if the words "or one of them" had been omitted, it seems the description would have been sufficient, though all the lands were contained in one of the parishes. (b)

Where the premises were described as situate "*in the united parishes of St. Giles in the Fields, and St. George Bloomsbury,*" and it appeared that those two parishes were united together by act of parliament,

B." demised to plaintiff two messuages, from which messuages defendant at *Haswell aforesaid* ousted plaintiff; and the court considered, that the statement of the ouster being at *Haswell*, amounted to a sufficient certainty that the lands demised lay at *Haswell*.

(a) *Goodright v. Fawson*, 7 Mod. 457. S. C. Barn. 184. *Cottingham v. King*, Burr. 624, and the authorities there cited.

(b) *Goodwin v. Blackman*, 3 Lev. 334. In this case the ejectment was "for a tenth part of a messuage in *D.* and *F.*" and the whole messuage appearing in evidence to lay in *D.*, and no part in *F.*, the description was held ill, because it

was "precisely of the tenth part of an entire thing;" though it was said by the Court, that if the ejectment had been of an acre of land in *D.* and *F.*, and it appeared that the whole acre was in *D.*, it would be well enough. The reason for this diversity seems to be, that the acre being the whole thing demanded, the description is sufficiently certain, although it all be in one parish; whereas, when only a tenth part is demanded, it is uncertain which tenth part is meant, and, therefore, as no tenth part answers the description, the sheriff could not give execution; *tamen quære et vide Burr.* 330, *et antc.* 22.

for the maintaining of their poor, but for no other purpose, the variance was held fatal; for by the description, the parishes were stated as if they were completely blended together, and formed only one parish, when, in truth, they remained entirely distinct, except as to the maintenance of the poor. (a) But where the premises were described as situate *in the parish of West Putworth and Bradworthy*, and it appeared that *West Putworth* and *Bradworthy* were separate parishes, the Court held the description to be sufficiently certain, rejecting the word *parish* as surplusage, and considering the demise as of lands in *West Putworth* and *Bradworthy*. (b) And where the premises were laid to be at the parish of *Farnham*, and were proved at the trial to be in the parish of *Farnham Royal*, it was held not to be a fatal variance, unless it could be proved that there were two *Farnhams*. (c) Where also the premises were described as being in the parish of *Westbury*, and it was proved that there were two parishes of *Westbury*, viz. *Westbury on Trym*, and *Westbury on Severn*, the description was holden to be sufficiently certain. (d)

When the premises lie in different parishes, it has been usual to enumerate the whole as lying in one parish, and to repeat the description of them as lying in the other parish; but it seems sufficient to enumerate them once only, describing them as lying in the

(a) *Goodtitle v. Pinsent d. Lam-*
miman, 2 Campb. 274. S. C. 6
 Esp. 128.

(b) *Goodtitle d. Brembridge v.*
Walter, 4 Taunt. 671.

(c) *Doe d. Tollet v. Salter*, 13
 East. 9.

(d) *Doe d. James v. Harris*, 5
 M. & S. 326.

parishes of *A.* and *B.*, or in *A.* and *B.* respectively. (*a*)

The number of messuages, acres, &c. mentioned in the demise, need not correspond with the number to which the lessor claims title. He may declare for an indefinite number, as a hundred messuages, a thousand acres of arable land, &c.; and care should be taken that the number specified in the demise be larger than the number claimed; because, although if he declare for *more* than he is entitled to, he may recover less, the reverse will not hold. (*b*) Upon the same principle, if the lessor of the plaintiff be entitled to a moiety, or other part, of an entire thing, as the half, or third part, of a house, he may recover such moiety, or third part, on a demand for the whole. (*c*)

The entry of the plaintiff on the land need not be alleged in the declaration, to be made on any particular day, although in the precedents it is usually so stated. It is sufficient if it be declared generally, that the plaintiff entered by virtue of the demise: nor does it seem to have been required, even in the ancient practice, to be more explicit, because, as the plaintiff entered *by virtue* of the lease, he must neces-

(*a*) 2 Chitty, Prec. 395.

(*b*) Denn *d.* Burgis *v.* Purvis, Burr. 326. Guy *v.* Rand; Cro. Eliz. 13.

(*c*) Ablett *v.* Skinner, 1 Siderf. 229. Goodwin *v.* Blackman, 3 Lev. 334. In an ancient case it is said, that if an ejectment be brought for an acre of land, and the metes and

bounds be described in the declaration, and the jury find the defendant guilty in half an acre of land, the verdict will be bad; because of the uncertainty of which part, or moiety, the plaintiff is to have execution. (Winkworth *v.* Mann, Yelv. 114, *tamen quare, et vide ante*, chap. 2.)

sarily have entered after his title accrued; though it was then said, that it might have been otherwise, if the declaration had been *prætextu cuius* he entered, for the plaintiff might enter unlawfully, or before his time, under pretence of the lease. (a)

The day upon which the ouster of the plaintiff, by the casual ejector, is alleged to have taken place, should regularly be after the commencement of the supposed lease and entry. This is requisite, in order to support the consistency of the fiction; because, as the title of the plaintiff is supposed to arise from the lease mentioned in the declaration, it would be absurd for him to complain of an injury to his possession before, by his own showing, he had any claim to be possessed. But it does not seem absolutely necessary that this consistency should be preserved; for, as the words "*afterwards, to wit,*" are always used immediately before mentioning the day of the ouster, it is most probable, upon the principles by which ejectments are at present regulated, that the Courts would in all cases consider an ouster laid previously to the day of the entry, "as impossible and repugnant," and as such reject it. (b) Even when the old practice prevailed, and the true principles of the remedy were so little understood, every possible intention was made in favour of the plaintiff, when an ouster was alleged anterior to the time of the demise. Thus, on a demise from the 1st of February, 1752, to hold from the 8th of January before, and that afterwards, namely,

(a) *Wakeley v. Warren*, 2 Roll. Rep. 466. *Sed vide* *Douglas v. Shank*, Cro. Eliz. 766.

(b) *Adams v. Goose*, Cro. Jac. 96; B. N. P. 106.

on the 28th of January, 1752, defendant ejected him, and it was insisted for the defendants, that the plaintiff's title did not commence until the 1st of February, and therefore that the ouster was laid too soon; the Court held, that the day of the ouster, being laid under a *scilicet*, was surplusage, and that "afterwards" should relate to the time of making the lease, and then all would be well enough. (a) In like manner, on a demise from the 6th of May, *anno septimo*, by virtue of which plaintiff entered, and was possessed until afterwards, on the 18th of the *same* month, *anno sexto supradicto*, defendant ejected him, the Court held the declaration sufficient; because the ouster was laid to be on the 18th of the *same* month, which it could not be if it were done in the sixth year, and rejected the word *sexto* as inconsistent and void. (b) Upon the same principle, where the demise was on the *sixth* of September, 2 Jac., by virtue of which the plaintiff held, until afterwards, (to wit) on the *fourth* day of September, 2 Jac., defendant ejected him, the declaration was holden good, and the words under the *scilicet* rejected as surplusage. (c)

(a) B. N. P. 106.

(b) *Davis v. Purdy*, Yelv. 132.

(c) *Adams v. Goose*, Cro. 96.

Some old ejectment cases are to be found in the books, (*Goodgain v. Wakefield*, 1 Sid. 7. *Evans v. Croker*, 3 Mod. 198. *Stephens v. Croker*, Comb. 83. *Higham v. Cooke*, 4 Leon. 144. *Osborn v. Rider*, Cro. Jac. 135. *Llewelyn v. Williams*, Cro. Jac. 258. *Clayton's case*, 5 Co. 1.) in which the ousters were laid on the same days as the demises, and which were decided

upon the distinctions formerly taken, as to the time of the commencement of a demise, when stated in the lease to be "from the date," and when from "the day of the date" of the lease; but, since the judgment in *Pugh v. Duke of Leeds* (Cowp. 714,) by which it has been determined, that these expressions shall be construed indifferently, either *inclusively* or *exclusively*, so as to give effect to the deed, these cases can no longer be authorities.

From the case of *Merrell v. Smith*, (*a*) it does not seem necessary to allege any particular day for the ouster, provided it appears from the declaration, to be subsequently to the commencement of the term, and prior to the bringing of the action; but in the precedents a day certain is always laid, and it is the better method to mention a particular day.

With respect to the ouster in an ejectment for tithes, it is said in the case of *Worrall v. Harper*, (*b*) that where the ouster was set forth to have been made in the month of May, it was held ill, because there were no tithes to be ousted of at that season of the year; but this doctrine is controverted by Gilbert, C. B., on the principle that the law does not judicially take notice of the time when tithes arise. (*c*)

OF AMENDING THE DECLARATION.

It was formerly the practice both in the King's Bench and the Common Pleas, not to permit the declaration in ejectment to be amended, until the landlord, or tenant, had been made defendant instead of the casual ejector; and, consequently, if the defects were such as to prevent the Courts from granting the common rule for judgment against the casual ejector, the plaintiff's lessor was compelled to discontinue the action, and resort to a new ejectment. (*d*) But this practice is inconsistent with the present mode of regulating the remedy; and the Court would, it is pre-

(*a*) Cro. Jac. 311. Jenk. 341.

(*b*) 1 Roll. Rep. 65.

(*c*) Gilb. Eject. 67.

(*d*) *Roe d. Stephenson v. Doe*,
Barn. 186.

sumed, now permit the lessor to amend his declaration before appearance, provided such amendment did no injustice to the tenant. Indeed, where by mistake, the name of the tenant in possession was inserted at the commencement of the declaration, instead of that of the casual ejector, (the declaration and notice to appear being in other respects regular,) the court granted the rule for judgment upon the common affidavit of service, and *suggested* that if the tenant did not appear to the action, an application should be made to amend the declaration. (a)

It is also said that, even after appearance, the declaration can be amended in *form* only, and not in *matter of substance*; but it is now difficult to point out what errors would be deemed substance, and not amendable. Under the strict rules, by which the action was formerly conducted, the demise, the length of the term, the time of the ouster, &c., (b) were all considered as matters of substance; (c) and so unbending were the courts upon these points, that if the term expired, pending the action, by injunction from the Court of Chancery at the defendant's application, or by the delay of the Court, in which the action was

(a) *Doe d. Cobbey v. Roe*, K. B. T. T. 1816. MS.

(b) Formerly when a person declared in ejectment in the Common Pleas, it was the course of the Court, that after imparlance he should make a second declaration; and, when this practice prevailed, if the plaintiff, by his first declaration, had laid the ouster before the commencement of his term, or omitted

any other matter of substance, though the second declaration were correct, he could not recover; because the declaration on the imparlance roll was the material one on which the action was grounded.—(*Merrell v. Smith*, Cro. Jac. 311.—*Jenk.* 341.)

(c) *Doe d. Hardman v. Pilkington*, Burr. 2447, and the cases there cited.

brought, in giving judgment, the lessor was obliged to resort to a new ejectment. (a)

A more liberal principle has, however, of late years been adopted; and the demise, term, &c, are now most correctly considered as formal only, and may be amended by the Court, or by a Judge at chambers, or at the sittings, or on the circuit, until the cause is called on for trial, and the jury sworn; the judges acting uniformly on this sensible rule, that if the defendant has relied solely upon the formal defence, and will surrender up possession upon the amendment being made, he shall be paid the whole of his costs, but if he refuses to relinquish the possession and will hazard a trial notwithstanding the amendment, he is entitled to the costs of the amendment only. (b) Thus in an ejectment to recover lands, forfeited by the levying of a fine, where the demise was laid anterior to the time of the entry to avoid the fine, and the suit was staid, by injunction in the Court of Chancery, for more than five years after the fine was levied, so that the lessor was not in time to make a second entry, or bring a second ejectment, the Court permitted him to change the day of the demise, to a day subsequent to the day of the entry: Lord Mansfield observing, that the demise was a mere matter of form, and did not exist. (c) So likewise the Court permitted the declaration to be

(a) Anon. Salk. 257. S. C. 6 Mod. 130. *Scrape v. Rhodes*, Barn. 8. *Driver v. Scratton*, Barn. 17. *Kesworth v. Thomas*, And. 208. *Thrustout v. Gray*, Cas. Temp. Hard. 165.

(b) *Doc d. Lewis v. Coles*, 1 R. & M. 380. *Vide* 1 Chitty. 535, note (a).

(c) *Roe d. Hardman v. Pilkington*, Burr. 2447.

amended by the insertion of a new count on a new demise, after three terms had elapsed, and the roll had been made up and carried in. (a) So also after issue joined, by altering the parish, *from the parish of G, to the parish of St. John in G.* (b) And where an ejectment was brought upon a forfeiture, and the demise was laid on a day anterior to the time when the forfeiture was committed, the court permitted the lessor of the plaintiff to amend (upon payment of costs) after the record was made up, and the cause set down for trial. (c) But this permission is not to be extended to the injury of the defendant, and therefore the court will not suffer the day of the demise to be altered to a day subsequent to the day of the delivery of the declaration, for this would be to give the lessor of the plaintiff a right of action which did not subsist at the time of the commencement of his suit. (d)

The term also has been enlarged after its ex-

(a) Doe *d.* Beaumont *v.* Armitage. 2 Chitty, 302.

(b) Doe *d.* O'Connell *v.* Porch.—*Coram* Heath, J. Trin. Vac. 1814. MS.

(c) Doe *d.* Rumford *v.* Miller. K. B. H. T. 1814. MS.—This case seems to carry the principle of allowing an amendment of the demise in an ejectment to its utmost limit. The ejectment was brought upon a covenant to finish certain buildings in a workmanlike manner before the 29th of Sept. 1813. The demise was laid on the 26th day of

March, 1813, and the declaration delivered on the 29th of Oct. 1813.

The cause was set down for trial, at the first sittings in Middlesex, in Hilary Term, 1814; but stood over until the second sittings. And two days before the second sittings, a rule to shew cause why the day of the demise should not be altered to the 30th of Sept. was obtained; and made absolute immediately before the rising of the court on the morning of the second sittings.

(d) Doe *d.* Foxlow *v.* Jeffries, K. B. M. T. 1814. MS.

piration, upon payment of costs, although the issue was made up, the special jury struck, and the cause gone down to trial, before the mistake was discovered; the Court considering, that it was a plain mistake in the declaration, and might be amended by the writ, which spoke of a term not yet expired. (a) An enlargement of the term was also permitted, by Lord Mansfield, in a case where a judgment in ejectment in Ireland had been affirmed, upon a writ of error, in the King's Bench in England, but, from various delays, the term in the declaration had expired before the plaintiff's lessor could obtain possession. (b)

When the old principles of the action prevailed, and the term was considered substance, and not amendable, the plaintiff was not nonsuited if the term expired before the trial, but was permitted to proceed for his damages and costs, though not for the recovery of his land; for the right to damages for the ouster remained, although the right to possession upon the lease was determined. It is not probable at the present day, that opportunity will be offered to raise a point of this nature, but if the lessor of the plaintiff should act so negligently as to proceed to trial upon an expired term, there seems no reason why the above-mentioned principle should not be applicable to the modern practice. (c)

In the case of *Goodtitle v. Meymott*, the court re-

(a) *Roe d. Lee v. Ellis*, Blk. 940.

(c) *Capel v. Saltonstall*, 3 Mod.

(b) *Vicars v. Heydon*, Cowp. 341. 249.

fused to amend a declaration, in which "the said James," instead of "the said John," was said to enter by virtue of the demise; and a case was cited, by Wright, J., in which the premises were laid to be in Twickenham, or Isleworth, "or one of them," and the Court refused to let the plaintiff amend, by striking out the disjunctive words; but it seems that amendments have since been permitted, both in the parcels and the names. (a)

OF THE NOTICE TO APPEAR. (b)

The name of the tenant in possession must be prefixed to the notice; and, when the possession of the disputed premises is divided amongst several, it is usual to prefix the names of all the tenants, to each separate declaration; although it does not seem necessary to prefix more than the name of the individual tenant, upon whom the particular declaration is served. (c) The notice must contain the christian and surnames of the tenant or tenants in possession. A notice addressed "*To Mrs. Hicks*" has been held insufficient; (d) as also a notice addressed "*To the personal representatives of A. B.,*" (the deceased tenant.) (e) But where the tenant's name was thus abbreviated "*John B. Jones,*" instead of "*John Benjamin Jones,*" the notice was held good. (f)

(a) 2 Sell. Prac. 143.

(b) Appendix, No. 13.

(c) *Roe d. Burlton v. Roe*, 7 T. R. 477.(d) *Doe v. Roe*, 1 Chitty. 573.(e) *Doe d. Governors of St. Margaret's Hospital v. Roe*, 1 B. Moore 113. *Doe d. Paul v. Hurst*, 1 Chitty, 162.(f) *Anon.* 1 Chitty, 573, note (a).

It seems also that the notice will be sufficient, although the address to the tenant be altogether omitted, provided it be stated in the affidavit of service, that the tenant was duly served with a copy of the declaration before the essoign day, and acknowledged such service. (*a*)

The notice must require the tenant to appear, and apply to the Court to be admitted defendant instead of the casual ejector, within a certain time after the declaration is delivered; and when the provisions of the stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87, s. 1, are resorted to, the notice must also inform the tenant that he will be required to enter into a recognizance with two sufficient sureties, in such reasonable sum as the Court shall direct, to pay the costs and damages which may be recovered in the action.

The time when the notice should require the tenant to appear and apply to be made defendant, is regulated by the locality of the premises; unless the proceedings are regulated by stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70, s. 36, when the notice must invariably require the tenant to appear *within ten days* after the delivery of the declaration.

In other cases when the premises are situated in London, or Middlesex, the notice should be for the tenant to appear "on the first day" (not the essoign day,) (*b*) or "within the four first days" of the term

(*a*) *Doe d. Pearson v. Roe*, 5 B. Moore, 73.

(*b*) *Holdfast v. Freeman*, Stran. 1049.

next after the delivery of the declaration; and this mode of expression should be strictly observed; for although where the notice was to appear "in the beginning of the term," the Court granted a rule for judgment against the casual ejector, (a) yet where the notice was to appear "on the morrow of the Holy Trinity," the judgment against the casual ejector was set aside, upon the principle, that the notice was designed to inform the *lay gents.* of the time of appearing, and should therefore be expressed in such terms as they might understand. (b) It will, however, be sufficient if the notice be to appear *generally* of the term; but the tenant will then have the whole term to appear in.

When the premises are situated in any other county than London or Middlesex, the notice should regularly require the tenant to appear generally in the term, next ensuing the delivery of the declaration; but it will be sufficient when the proceedings are in the Common Pleas, if it require him to appear in the *issuable* term, next ensuing such delivery, although a non-issuable term intervene. Thus, when a declaration is entitled of *Trinity* term, and delivered during the long vacation, the notice may require the tenant to appear in *Hilary* term. (c)

The notice usually specifies the term by name, in which the tenant is to appear, and the declaration should regularly be entitled of the term preceding; but where a declaration, delivered in *Hilary* vacation,

(a) *Tredder v. Travis*, Barn 175.(c) *Doc d. Clarke v. Roe*, 4 Taunt.

(b) Sel. N. P. 640.

was entitled of *Easter* Term, and the notice was to appear on the first day of *next* term, the Court granted the common rule for judgment against the casual ejector during *Easter* term, considering that the tenant could not be misled by the wrong title to the declaration, so as to imagine he had until *Trinity* term to appear, inasmuch as the declaration was delivered, and the notice dated on a day antecedent to the essoign-day of *Easter* Term. (a) Where also the notice had been given by mistake for *Hilary* instead of *Trinity* term, and the tenant was afterwards informed of the mistake, a rule *nisi* was granted; (b) and in a subsequent case, upon a similar error, Holroyd, J. granted the common rule. (c) Where also the declaration was by original, and the notice was as if by bill, omitting "wheresoever, &c." the variation was held immaterial. (d) But where the notice was to appear *in eight days of St. Hilary*, instead of *Hilary* term generally, the Court refused the rule; (e) as they also did where the declaration was entitled *in the King's Bench*, and the notice was to appear in the *Common Pleas*. (f)

The declaration must be delivered before the essoign-day of the term, in which the notice is given to appear. (g)

The notice should regularly be subscribed with the

(a) Anon. K. B. E. T. 1817, MS.

(b) Anon. 2 Chitty, 171.

(c) Doe v. Greaves, 2 Chitty, 172.

(d) Doe d. Thomas v. Roe, 2 Chitty, 171.

(e) Lackland d. Dowling v. Badland, 8 B. Moore, 79.

(f) Doe d. Lewis v. Roe, K. B. M. T. 1821. MS.

(g) Doe d. Bird v. Roe, Barns. 172.

name of the casual ejector, and formerly proceedings have been set aside for an irregular signature; but it is now sufficient if the notice be subscribed with the name of the lessor of the plaintiff, or of any other person. (a)

One case only is extant, in which an amendment has been made, by rule of court, in the notice subscribed to the declaration; although it cannot be doubted that any amendments would now be allowed, which the justice of the case might require. In the case above alluded to, the lands were situated in Devonshire, and the notice was for the tenant to appear in *Michaelmas* term, when, according to the practice in country causes at that time, it should have been to appear in an issuable term, and the affidavit stated, that if the lessor were not permitted to amend, he would be barred, by the statute of limitations, from bringing a new ejectment: the Court permitted the lessor to amend upon payment of costs. (b)

(a) *Peaceable v. Troublesome*, should have obtained of giving notices to tenants to appear in *non-issuable* as well as *issuable* terms, and that such change of practice should not have been noticed in

Barn. 172. *Hazlewood d. Price v. Thatcher*, 3 T. R. 351. *Goodtitle d. Duke of Norfolk v. Notile*, 5 B. & A. 849.]

(b) *Doe d. Bass v. Roe*, 7 T. R. 469. It is singular, that a practice

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Service of the Declaration, and Proceedings to Judgment against the casual Ejector when no appearance.

THE declaration in ejectment being a kind of process to bring the party interested into court, its delivery to the tenant resembles the service of a writ, rather than the delivery of a declaration; and, as it is the only warning, which the tenant in possession receives, of the proceedings of the claimant, the courts are careful that a proper delivery be made, and that the nature and contents of the declaration be explained at the time, to the party to whom it is delivered. This delivery and explanation are generally termed *the service of the declaration*; and our next inquiry will be directed to the different modes by which this service may be made.

The service to be strictly regular should be made personally upon the party *in possession of the premises* at the time of the service, or, when the possession is divided amongst several, upon each party separately. (a) When the ejectment is brought by a landlord against his tenant, and the tenant has under-

(a) B. N. P. 93.

let the premises, the same rule prevails, and the service must be upon the under-tenant, or under-tenants if more than one, and a service upon the original tenant will not be sufficient. (a) But if the service is upon the original tenant, and he appears and pleads, he cannot afterwards release himself from the action upon the ground, that his under-tenants, and not himself, are in possession. (b)

When personal service can be effected, it is immaterial whether it be upon the premises demised, or elsewhere. (c)

It frequently however happens, from the wilful or accidental absence of the tenant, or some other circumstance, that the claimant is unable to serve him personally: the declaration is then delivered to one of the family, nailed to the door of the house, or in some other manner left upon the demised premises; and, when any of these irregularities happen, the service will be considered good, or otherwise, according to the particular circumstances of the case. In all these cases, the facts should be disclosed in the affidavit of service, and mentioned to the Court on moving for judgment against the casual ejector; and if they are satisfied that the tenant has had notice of the declaration, they will make the rule absolute in the first instance; but otherwise, they will grant a rule upon the tenant, to show cause why the service should not, under the special circumstances, be suf-

(a) *Doe d. Lord Darlington v. Cock*, 4 B. & C. 259.

(c) *Savage v. Dent*, Stran. 1064.
Taylor v. Jeffs, 11 Mod. 302.

(b) *Roe v. Wiggs*, 2 N. R. 330.

ficient and direct that the service of the rule on the premises shall be deemed good service.

The power exercised by the courts in this respect is altogether discretionary; and it will be necessary to enter rather largely into a detail of the cases, in order to give a clear idea of the principles upon which they have been decided.

Service of the declaration upon the wife of the tenant in possession upon the premises, or at the husband's house elsewhere, will be good service. (a) So also, if the affidavit state that the parties were living together as man and wife, when the service was made, service on the wife any where will be good. (b) But the mere acknowledgment of the wife, that she has received a declaration, and given it to her husband, if it be not personally served upon the wife, will not be good service; (c) nor will an affidavit be sufficient which states the service to be upon the premises on a woman, representing herself to be the wife of the tenant in possession, if it does not also aver the defendant's belief of the fact. (d)

When two or more tenants are in possession of the same premises, if it appear from the affidavit that the parties are all in possession, but that one only has

(a) *Doe d. Baddam v. Roe*, 2 B. & P. 55. *Goodright d. Jones v. Thrustout*, Blk. 800. *Doe d. Morland v. Bayliss*, 6 T. R. 765.

(b) *Jenny d. Preston v. Cutts*, 1 N. R. 308—10.

(c) *Goodtitle d. Read v. Badtitle*, 1 B. & P. 384. *Et vide Anon.* 2 Chitty, 182.

(d) *Doe d. Simmons v. Roe*, 1 Chitty, 228.

been served with the declaration, the Court will grant the common rule against the party served, and a rule *nisi* against the other parties; but if the affidavit does not show such possession, the rule will be refused against all but those actually served. (a)

Service upon the wife of one of two joint tenants will not bind the co-tenant. (b)

Service of the declaration upon the child, or servant of the tenant, will be sufficient service, provided it appears from the affidavit, that the declaration was delivered on the premises before the essoign-day of the term, and that the tenant, previously to such essoign-day, has acknowledged himself to have received such declaration, or to have known of the service thereof. (c)

Where the ejectment was brought for a house, which was rented by the churchwardens and overseers of the parish, for the purpose of accommodating some of the parish poor, a service of the declaration upon the churchwardens, and overseers, was held sufficient, although they did not occupy the house, otherwise than by placing the poor in it. (d) And

(a) *Right v. Wrong*, 2 Chitty, 175. *East*. 441. *Doe d. Macdougall v. Doe d. Field v. Roe*, 2 Chitty, 174. *Roe*, 4 B. Moore, 20. *Doe d. Halsey v. Roe*, 1 Chitty, 100. *Doe d. Tindall v. Roe*, 2 Chitty, 180. *Right d. Freeman v. Roe*, 2 Chitty, 180. *Doe v. Roe*, 5 B. & C. 764.

(d) *Tupper d. Mercer v. Doe, Barnes*, 181.

(b) *Wood, L. & T.* 463.

(c) *Roe d. Hambrook v. Doe*, 14

in an ejection for a chapel, the service may be made on the chapel-wardens, or on the persons to whom the keys are intrusted. (a) But where the ejection is for a house, service upon the person, having the charge of the keys in order to let the house, will not be good service; (b) and service upon a person appointed by the Court of Chancery, to manage an estate for an infant, although the estate consisted of a large wood, of which no tenant was in possession, has also been held insufficient, as being nothing more than a service on a gentleman's bailiff. (c)

Where the premises consisted of a mansion, and four small houses in a yard, surrounded by a wall, through which was a door to them, forming the only means of access, in one of which small houses resided A., who was permitted to live there merely to take care of them and of the mansion-house, and the rest of the messuages were vacant: upon motion, that service on A. might be deemed good service under those circumstances, the Court refused the motion, and recommended the plaintiff to affix a declaration on the empty houses, and then to move that it be deemed good service. (d)

In the preceding cases no wilful opposition appears, on the part of the tenant, to the service of the declaration; and such of the services already mentioned as are considered good, are called *regular services*;

(a) Run. Eject. 136.

title, 1 B. & P. 385.

(b) Anon. 12 Mod. 313.

(d) Wood, L. & T. 466.

(c) Goodtitle *d.* Roberts *v.* Bad-

but when the tenant absconds, or does any act which shows a resolution not to receive the declaration, the Court, upon affidavit of facts, will sometimes allow that to be good service, which otherwise would be deemed *irregular*.

Thus, a tender of the declaration, and reading the notice aloud, although the tenant refuse to receive it, or run away and shut the doors, or threaten with a gun to shoot the person serving it, if he should come near; throwing the declaration in at the window, sticking it against the door, or leaving it at the house, upon the servants refusing to call their master, and the like, have upon application to the court been holden sufficient. So also a tender of the declaration in the shop, and reading the notice aloud there to the wife, when the tenant refused to receive the declaration; delivering it to the niece of the tenant, she being the manager of the house, and the tenant having absconded; nailing the declaration on the barn-door of the premises, in which barn the tenant had occasionally slept, there being no dwelling-house on the premises, and the tenant not to be found at his last place of abode; have respectively been considered good and sufficient services. (*a*)

Where the tenant resided abroad, and carried on

(*a*) *Douglas v. —*, Stran. 575. Barn. 188. *Fenn d. Hildyard v. Smalley v. Neale*, Barn. 173. *Hal-* Dean, Barn. 192. *Sprightly d. Col-*
sal v. Wedgwood, Barn. 174. *Doe* lins *v. Dunch*, Burr. 1116. *Doe d.*
d. Dry v. Roe. Barn. 178. *Farmer* Neale *v. Roe*, 2 Wils. 263. *Fenn d.*
d. Miles v. Thrustout, Barn. 180. *Buckle v. Roe*, 1 N. R. 293. *Doe d.*
Bagshaw d. Ashton v. Toogood, Hervey *v. Roe*, 2 Price, 112. 2 *Chit-*
 Barn. 185. *Short d. Elmes v. King*, ty's cases. *Title, Ejectment, passim.*

his business by an agent residing on the premises, and the service was by delivering the declaration in the usual way to the agent, and affixing a copy on the premises, the Court of King's Bench held the service to be sufficient. (a) But in a case where it appeared that the tenant resided abroad for the purpose of avoiding his creditors, and had declared himself afraid to return to England unless he could obtain a letter of licence, and that a copy of the declaration was duly served on the premises on a servant who was left in charge thereof, and at the same time another copy was affixed on the outer door of the dwelling-house, the Court of Common Pleas refused the rule and also refused a rule to show cause why service on the tenant's solicitor should not be deemed good service; because it did not appear by the affidavits that the party had gone abroad to avoid the particular process in this action. (b) And the Court of King's Bench also refused a rule, where the affidavit did state, in addition to the fact that the party was resident in France, the belief of the party making the affidavit, that he was gone there for the purpose of the avoiding the service of the declaration; but the service was only stated to be upon the servant on the premises, without also adding that a copy of the declaration was affixed to them. (c)

Where the tenant of a house locked it up and

(a) *Doe v. Roe*, 4 B. & A. 653. 213. *Doe d. Lowe v. Roe*, 2

(b) *Doe d. Fenwick v. Roe*, 3 B. Chitty, 177. *Doe d. Hele v. Roe*, 2 Moore, 576. 2 Chitty, 178.

(c) *Doe d. Jones v. Roe*, 1 Chitty

and quitted it, and the landlord three months afterwards fixed a copy of the declaration to the door, it was held that the service was not sufficient, but that the landlord should have treated it as a vacant possession (a)

In a case where the tenant in possession was personated, at the time of the service, by another, who accepted the service in the tenant's name, the Court granted a rule to show cause, why this should not be deemed good service; and that leaving a copy of the rule at the house, with some person there, or, if no one was to be met with, affixing it to the door, should be good service of such rule. And this rule was afterwards made absolute, upon an affidavit, "that the tenant was either not at home, or (if at home) was denied; and, that her servant-maid was at home, but could not be served; whereupon a copy of the rule was affixed to the door of the house;" and moreover, "that at a subsequent day," (upon a doubt whether what had been already done was sufficient,) "the maid being at home, and opening the window, but refusing to open the door, and denying that her mistress was at home, *another copy was affixed* on the door, and the maid was told the effect of it; and *another copy was thrown in* at the window, and the original rule was *shown* to the maid." (b)

In a case, where one of the tenants was a lunatic, and one C. lived with her, transacted her business, and had the sole conduct thereof, and of her person,

(a) Doe *d.* Lord Darlington *v.* (b) Fenn *d.* Tyrrell *v.* Denn, Burr. Cock, 4 B. & C. 259. 1181.

but would not permit the deponent to have access to her in order to serve her with the declaration, whereupon he delivered it to the said *C.* ; a rule was granted that the lunatic, and *C.*, should both show cause, why such service should not be sufficient ; and the service on *C.* was held to be good. (*a*)

Where the declaration was tendered on the day before the essoign day, but the defendant's servant said, he had orders not to receive any such thing, whereupon it was not then served, but was left at the house upon the day following ; the Court refused the rule, saying, " We sometimes make that service, under particular circumstances, good, which otherwise would have been imperfect ; but here there was no service on the proper day, and we cannot antedate the service." (*b*)

When the service is good for part, and bad for part, the lessor may recover those premises for which the service is good ; but if he proceed for all, and obtain possession by means of a judgment against the casual ejector, the Court will compel him to make restitution of that part, for which the service was bad. (*c*)

OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE. (*d*)

When the service of the declaration is made in the regular way, the next step to be taken, in order to ob-

(*a*) *Doe d. Wright v. Roe*, Barn. 190. *Doe d. Lord Aylesbury v. Roe*, 2 Chitty, 183.

(*b*) Wood. L. & T. 466.

(*c*) *Ibid*, 463. Appendix, No. 41.

(*d*) Appendix, Nos. 16, 17, 18.

tain judgment against the casual ejector, is to make an affidavit of such service; which affidavit is annexed to the declaration, and is the ground upon which the rule for judgment is to be moved for. But, when the circumstances of the case are special, it is usual to move, in the first instance, for a rule to show cause, why the service, mentioned in the affidavit, should not be deemed good service; and this motion may be made, either before, or after the service of the declaration; although, if the lessor be aware of the difficulties he will have to encounter, it is better to make an affidavit of the circumstances, which are likely to happen, and move, prior to the service, for a rule to show cause, why a service of such a nature should not be sufficient. (*a*)

The affidavit may be sworn before a judge, or a commissioner, and should regularly be made by the person who served the declaration; although the Court have been satisfied with the affidavit of a person, who saw the declaration served upon, and heard it explained to, the tenant in possession. (*b*)

The affidavit must be entitled with the name of the casual ejector, (*c*) and when no special circumstances take the case out of the general rule, it must state that the declaration was delivered to the tenant in possession, or his wife, &c. and that the notice thereto annexed, was read and explained, at the

(*a*) *Methold v. Noright*, Blk. 290. *Gulliver v. Wagstaff*, Blk. 317.

(*b*) *Goodtitle d. Wanklen v. Badtitle*, 2 B. & P. 120.

(*c*) *Anon.* 2 Chitty, 131.

time of the delivery, or generally that the tenant was informed of the intent and meaning of the service. (a) If the affidavit only state that the notice was *read*, the service will not be sufficient; (b) and where it was said, on the delivery of the declaration, "*This is an ejectment from Mrs. C. C. ;*" (c) as also where the expression was, "*This is an ejectment from Mrs. C. C., but it is not intended to turn you out of possession, but to get into the receipt of the rents and profits,*" (c) the services were held not to be good; (c) and an insufficient service of this kind will not be aided by an explanation after the essoign day of its nature and meaning. (c) But if the tenant acknowledge that he understands the meaning and intention of the service, it will be good, without any such reading or explanation. (d)

If the service was upon the wife, the affidavit must also state, that the service was on the premises, or at the husband's house, (e) or that the husband and wife were living together; (f) and, if the service were on the child or servant of the tenant, "that the service was acknowledged by the tenant before the essoign day of the term. (g)

The affidavit must be positive, that the person

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| (a) Appendix, Nos. 16, 17, 18. | (e) Doe <i>d.</i> Morland <i>v.</i> Bayliss, 6 |
| (b) Doe <i>d.</i> Whitfield <i>v.</i> Roe, K. B. | T. R. 765. |
| T. T. 1815.—MS. | (f) Jenny <i>d.</i> Preston <i>v.</i> Cutts, 1 |
| (c) Doe <i>d.</i> Edwards <i>v.</i> Roe, K. B. | N. R. 308. Appendix, No. 18. |
| H. T. 1821.—MS. | (g) Roe <i>d.</i> Hambrook <i>v.</i> Doe, 14 |
| (d) Doe <i>d.</i> Quintin <i>v.</i> Roe, K. B. | East. 441. |
| T. T. 1816. MS. | |

served was the tenant in possession, (*a*) or that he acknowledged himself to be so. (*b*) An affidavit therefore that the deponent did serve *A. B.* tenant in possession, or *his wife*, was held not to be sufficiently certain as to either. (*c*) So also affidavits, that the deponent did serve the wives of *A.* and *B.* who, or one of them, are tenants in possession; (*d*) that he served the *person* in possession, (*e*) and that he served *A. B.* whom *he verily believed* to be the tenant in possession, (*f*) have been held insufficient.

If several persons be in possession of the disputed premises, and separate declarations in ejectment be served upon them, one affidavit of the service upon all, annexed to the copy of one declaration, is sufficient, provided one action of ejectment only be intended; (*g*) but if the ejectments are made several, so as to have separate judgments, writs of possession, &c. then separate affidavits, of the several services upon the different tenants, must be annexed to copies of the several declarations respectively. (*h*)

When one action only is intended, the names of *all* the tenants are generally prefixed to each notice; but in a case where, in the several declarations served, the name of the individual tenant alone, to whom any particular declaration was delivered, was prefixed to the

(*a*) *Doe v. Roe*, 1 Chitty, 574.

(*e*) *Doe d. Robinson v. Roe*, 1

(*b*) *Anon.* 1 Barnard, 330. *Goodtitle v. Davis*, 1 Barnard, 429.

Chitty, 118, note (*a*).

(*c*) *Birkbeck v. Hughes*, Barn. 173.

(*f*) *Doe v. Badtitle*, 1 Chitty, 215.

(*d*) *Harding d. Baker v. Green-smith*, Barn. 174.

(*g*) Appendix, No. 17.

(*h*) 2 Sell. Prac. 100.

notice to such declaration, instead of the names of all the tenants, so that the person making the affidavit of service could not swear, that a copy of any *one* declaration and notice had been served on *all* the tenants, the Court, notwithstanding, thought one rule sufficient, on motion for judgment against the casual ejector. (*a*)

When an affidavit of service is defective, the Court will not grant a rule upon an undertaking that a supplemental affidavit shall be made remedying the defect; but upon obtaining such supplemental affidavit, the rule may be moved for as in ordinary cases. (*b*)

When the action is founded on the stat. 1 G. IV. c. 87. s. 1, instead of moving for judgment in the ordinary way, the lessor should be prepared with the affidavits required by that statute, in addition to the usual affidavit of service, and the motion should be for a rule to show cause "why the party should not undertake, upon being admitted defendant, besides entering into the common rule, and giving the common undertaking, to give the plaintiff judgment, in case he obtain a verdict, of the term next preceding the trial; and why he should not enter into a recognizance by himself and two sufficient sureties, in a sum to be named by the Court, to pay the costs and damages which may be recovered in the action."

(*a*) *Roe d. Burlton v. Roe*, 7 T. R. N. R. 308. *Goodtitle d. Sandys v. Badtitle*, K. B. T. T. 1819.—MS. 477.

(*b*) *Jenny d. Preston v. Cutts*, 1

When the claimant proceeds upon the stat. 1 Wm. 4. c. 70. s. 36, it must be sworn, in addition to the usual affidavit of service, that the relation of landlord and tenant subsisted between the lessor and the party in possession, and that the interest of the latter in the premises expired within ten days next before the service of the declaration.

OF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CASUAL EJECTOR.

The motion for judgment against the casual ejector, in ordinary cases, is *of course*; that is, such only as requires the signature of a counsel, or serjeant; and after it is signed it must be taken by the attorney to the clerk of the rules in the King's Bench, or to the secondary of the Common Pleas; as these motions will not be received in court unless there is something special in the service of the declaration: (*a*) but when any special circumstances exist, the rule must be moved for as in other cases. The rule granted upon this motion is, that the judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the casual ejector by default, unless the tenant in possession appear, and plead to issue, within a certain time mentioned in the rule. (*b*)

The time for moving for judgment, as also the time for the defendant's appearance, is governed by the locality of the premises, and the time mentioned in the notice, when the defendant is to appear.

(*a*) Ante, 243.

(*b*) Appendix, Nos. 20, 21, 22.

In the King's Bench, if the premises are situated in London, or Middlesex, and the notice requires the tenant to appear on the first day, or within the first four days, of the next term, the motion for judgment against the casual ejector should regularly be made in the beginning of that term; and then the tenant must appear within four days inclusive, after the motion, or the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment. If, however, the motion be deferred until the latter end of the term, the Court will order the tenant to appear in two or three days, and sometimes immediately, that the plaintiff may proceed to trial at the sittings after term; but, if the motion be not made before the last four days of the term, the tenant need not appear until two days before the essoign day of the subsequent term.

In the Common Pleas, if the premises are situated in London or Middlesex, and the tenant has notice to appear in the beginning of the term, judgment against the casual ejector must be moved for, within one week next after the first day of every Michaelmas and Easter term, and within four days next after the first day of every Hilary and Trinity term; (a) except, it seems, when the tenant has absconded, and the proceedings are upon the statute of 4 Geo. II., and then the motion may be made at any time during the term; because the rule of 32 Car. II. relates only to declarations in ejectment, served upon tenants in possession. (b)

(a) Reg. Trin. 32 Car. II. C. B.

(b) Negative *d. Parsons v. Positive*, Barn. 172. If the principle upon which this exception is taken

be correct, it seems to extend to similar cases when the proceedings are at common law.

When the premises are situated elsewhere than in London or Middlesex, or being situated in London or Middlesex, the notice is to appear *generally* of the term, judgment must be moved for in all the courts during the term in which the notice is given to appear; and the appearance must be entered within four days next after the expiration of such term, whether it be an issuable or non-issuable one. (a)

When the action is brought under the provisions of the statute 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. s. 36, the tenant must in all cases enter his appearance within ten days after the delivery of the declaration.

By a rule of the Court of King's Bench, which has been adopted by the Court of Common Pleas, (b) the clerk of the rules now keeps a book, in which are entered all the rules delivered out in ejectments, instead of that formerly kept, which contained a list of the ejectments moved. The entry must specify the number of the entry, the county in which the premises lie, the name of the nominal plaintiff, the first lessor of the plaintiff, with the words "and others," if more than one, and also the name of the casual ejector. And unless the rule for judgment be drawn up, and taken away from the office of the clerk of the rules within two days after the end of the term, in which the ejectment shall be moved, no rule is to be drawn up or entered, nor any proceeding had in such ejectment.

(a) *Reg. gen.* 4 B. & A. 539. 2 B. & B. 705; 9 Price 299.

(b) M. T. 31 Geo. III. 4 T. R. 1. E. T. 43 Geo. III. 1 Taunt. 317.

When the proceedings are in the King's Bench by bill, bail must be filed for the casual ejector before the judgment can be signed against him, or the Court will set the judgment aside; (a) but the bail need not be filed until after the rule for judgment is drawn up. (b)

The reason for this form seems to be, that there is no cause in Court against the casual ejector, before bail is filed; and therefore nothing upon which to ground the judgment. (c) But where no bail was filed in ejectment, and a writ of error was brought, and it appeared by the attorney's books that the attorney had his fee to file bail, but was since dead, the Court ordered bail to be filed *nunc pro tunc*, that no error might appear upon the record; because as it was on the part of the defendant to file bail, therefore he should not be allowed to take advantage of his own error: and although the plaintiff proceeded without any bail filed by the defendant, yet as the defendant's attorney had had his fee to file such bail, and as there was no proper remedy against the defendant, because he had given the fee, nor against the attorney because he was dead, it therefore became the justice of the Court to set it right, that the plaintiff might have no mischief. (d)

(a) *Bouchier v. Friend*, 2 Show, 249.

(b) *Gilb. Eject.* 21.

(c) It has been said that if the tenant appear and the cause go on to trial, the Court will not compel him, if the proceedings are *by bill*, to confess lease, entry, and ouster, unless common bail has been filed

for the casual ejector; but this doctrine seems scarcely consistent with the modern principles of the remedy. *Gilb. Eject.* 22.

(d) *Gilb. Eject.* 22. This case seems scarcely applicable to the modern practice. (*Vide post*, Writ of Error.)

In the time of Charles II. the Court published a rule, (a) that no person should be permitted to take out judgment against the casual ejector without a certificate that a *latitat* had been taken out, and bail filed; because the Court had no authority to proceed by bill, unless the defendant appeared to be a prisoner of the Court. But this certificate is not now required, nor is a *latitat* necessary; for when the casual ejector finds common bail, he admits himself to be a prisoner of the Court, and whether he came into Court regularly by *latitat*, or not, yet the judgment is not *coram non judice*. (b)

When the time appointed for the appearance of the landlord, or tenant, has expired, it is not necessary to give a rule to plead, but judgment may at once be signed against the casual ejector, provided the party interested has neglected to appear; which fact is ascertained by searching the ejectment books of the judges in the King's Bench and the prothonotary's plea book in the Common Pleas. A rule for judgment must then be drawn up with the clerk of the rules in the former, and the secondary in the latter court; and an *incipitur* of the declaration made on a proper stamp, and also on a roll of that term. These must be then taken to the clerk of the judgments in the King's Bench, and to the prothonotary in the Common Pleas, (together, when the proceedings are in the Common Pleas, with a warrant of attorney for the defendant,) and judgment will then be signed accordingly. (c)

(a) Reg. Trin. 14 Car. II. and
Mich. 33. Car. II.

(b) Gilb. Eject. 22.

(c) App. No. 23.

The judgment, however, must not be signed, until the afternoon of the day next after that on which the rule expires; and if Sunday happen to be the last day, not until the afternoon of Tuesday. (a)

After the judgment is signed, the writ of possession must be made out, (together with the præcipe for it, if in the King's Bench,) and delivered to the sheriff, who will execute the same by giving possession of the premises to the plaintiff's lessor.

Judgments against the casual ejector irregularly obtained, will, as a matter of course, be set aside; and as the situations of claimant, and defendant, in ejectment, are materially different, the Courts are liberal in their rules for setting aside judgments against the casual ejector, although regularly signed; and will grant them even after execution executed, upon affidavit of merits, or other circumstances, which at their discretion they may deem sufficient. (b) The regular mode of setting aside such judgments is by rule of court, for the party having obtained the judgment to give up the possession; but if the circumstances of the case require it, the Courts will order a writ of restitution to be issued. (c)

In an ejectment where a party having been admitted

(a) *Hyde d. Culliford v. Thrustout*, Say. 303.

(b) *Doe d. Troughton v. Roe*, Burr. 1996. *Dobbs v. Passer*, Stran. 975. *Mason d. Kendale v. Hodgson*, Barn. 250. *Doe d. Grocers' Company v. Roe*, 5 Taunt. 205. *Sed*

vide Doe d. Ledger v. Roe, 3 Taunt. 506. *See also Shaw's Rep. 138*

(c) *Goodright d. Russell v. Norright*, Barn. 178. *Davies d. Povey v. Doe*, Blk. 892. Appendix, No. 41.

to defend alone, as landlord, died before the trial of the cause, devising his real estates to *B*, and the lessor (having committed no wilful delay,) was prevented by the Statute of Limitations from bringing a fresh ejectment, the Court gave him leave to sign judgment against the casual ejector in the old suit, and issue execution thereon, unless *B*. would appear and defend as landlord. (*a*)

(*a*) *Doe d. Grubb v. Grubb*, 5 B. & C. 457.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Appearance—Plea—and Issue.

IN the preceding chapter the suit has been conducted to its termination, when no appearance is entered in pursuance of the notice subscribed to the declaration; we must now consider, who may appear and defend the action, and in what manner such appearance should be made.

Notwithstanding the power possessed by the Courts of framing rules for the improvement of this remedy, the interference of the legislature has at times been called for, and it has been most beneficially exerted in regulating the appearances to the action. The tenant in possession, being the person *prima facie* interested, is, of course, the party on whom the declaration is always served; although it frequently happens in practice, that the lands belong to some third person out of possession, to whom such service can afford no information of the proceedings against him, and who by the common law has no remedy against his tenant if he omit to give him notice of them. By the rules

and practice of the Courts also, for it would scarcely be correct to say by the common law, the landlord it seems was not permitted to defend, even when he did receive notice, unless the tenant consented to become a co-defendant with him; (a) and no means existed by which the tenant could be compelled to appear, and be made such co-defendant. (b) This system occasioned great inconvenience to landlords. The tenants from negligence, or fraud, frequently omitted to appear themselves, or to give to the landlords the necessary notice; and although judgments against the casual ejector have been set aside, upon affidavits of circumstances of this nature, the remedy was still very incomplete. (c)

To remedy these imperfections, by the statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19. s. 13, it is enacted, “That it shall
 “ and may be lawful for the court in which an eject-
 “ ment is brought, to suffer the landlord or landlords
 “ to make him, her, or themselves, defendant or de-
 “ fendants, by joining with the tenant or tenants, to
 “ whom such declaration in ejectment shall be de-
 “ livered, in case he or they shall appear; but in case
 “ such tenant or tenants shall refuse, or neglect to
 “ appear, judgment shall be signed against the casual
 “ ejector for want of such appearance; but if the
 “ landlord or landlords of any part of the lands, tene-
 “ ments, or hereditaments, for which such ejectment
 “ was brought, shall desire to appear by himself or
 “ themselves, and consent to enter into the like rule,
 “ that by the course of the court the tenant in posses-

(a) Lill. Pr. Reg. 674.

(c) Anon. 12 Mod. 211.

(b) Goodright v. Hart, Stran. 880.

“ sion in case he or she had appeared, ought to have
 “ done; then the Court, where such ejectment shall
 “ be brought, shall and may permit such landlord or
 “ landlords so to do, and order a stay of execution
 “ upon such judgment against the casual ejector, un-
 “ til they shall make further order therein.”

By the 12th section of the same statute it is also enacted, “That every tenant, to whom any declara-
 “ tion in ejectment shall be delivered, shall forthwith
 “ give notice thereof to his landlord, bailiff, or re-
 “ ceiver, under the penalty of forfeiting the value of
 “ three years’ improved, or rack-rent of the premises
 “ so demised, or holden, in the possession of such
 “ tenant, to the person of whom he holds; to be re-
 “ covered by action of debt to be brought in any of
 “ his Majesty’s courts of record at Westminster, or
 “ in the counties palatine of Chester, Lancaster, or
 “ Durham, respectively; or in the courts of grand
 “ sessions in Wales.”

With respect to this latter section, it may be proper at once to observe, that it has been interpreted to extend only to those cases, in which the ejectments are inconsistent with the landlord’s title. Thus, a tenant of a mortgagor, who does not give him notice of an ejectment, brought by the mortgagee upon the forfeiture of the mortgage, is not within the penalties of the clause. (*a*)

The first enactment in the thirteenth section of this statute, namely, that landlords may be made defend-

(*a*) Buckley v. Buckley, 1 T. R. 647.

ants by joining with the tenants in possession, is decidedly only a legislative sanction of the previous uniform practice of the courts; and it is also said, by Wilmot, J., in the case of *Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Shamtitle*, (*a*) that landlords were permitted before this statute to defend ejectments without joining the tenants in possession. There is indeed but one case extant in which the contrary doctrine is maintained; (*b*) and the loose notes to be found of cases previous to that decision certainly favour Mr. J. Wilmot's opinion. (*c*) It is therefore probable, particularly since the case above alluded to happened but a few years before the statute was passed, that the practice was not clearly settled until the time of that decision, and that the statute was enacted in consequence of the inconvenience resulting therefrom. (*d*)

By the words of the statute the courts can admit *landlords* only to defend, and difficulties have frequently arisen, as to the meaning of the word *landlord* in the act, and as to what interest in the disputed premises will be sufficient to entitle a person claiming title, to appear and defend the action.

In the first reported case upon the construction of this section, it was holden, that it was not every person *claiming title*, who could be admitted to defend as landlord, but only he, who had been in *some degree in possession*, as receiving rent, &c.; and upon this

(*a*) Burr, 1301.

Anon. 12 Mod. 211.

(*b*) *Goodright v. Hart*, Stran. 830.

(*d*) *Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Sham-*

(*c*) *Lamb v. Archer*, Comb. 208.

title, Burr. 1290. 1298.

principle, the Court would not allow a devisee claiming under one will of the testator, to defend as landlord in an ejectment, brought by a devisee claiming under another will of the same testator. (a) But this doctrine was afterwards reprobated by Lord Mansfield, in a case where the principles of the section were fully considered, and the decisions, anterior to the act, investigated and explained.

“There are (says Lord Mansfield) two matters to be considered. First, whether the term ‘*landlord*,’ ought not, as to this purpose, to *extend to every* person whose title is connected to, and consistent with, the possession of the occupier, and divested, or disturbed, by any claim adverse to such possession, as in the case of remainders, or reversions, expectant upon particular estates : secondly, whether it does not extend, as between two persons claiming to be landlords *de jure*, in right of representation to a landlord *de facto*, so as to prevent *either* from recovering by collusion with the occupier, without *a fair trial* with the *other*. Where a person claims in *opposition* to the title of the tenant in possession, (b) he can in *no* light be considered as landlord : and it would be unjust to the tenant, to make *him* a co-defendant : their defences might *clash*. Whereas, when there is a *privy* between them, their defence must be upon the *same bottom* : and letting in the person behind, can only operate to prevent treachery and collusion. It is no answer, “that any person affected by the judgment may bring a new ejectment ;” because there is

(a) *Roe d. Leak v. Doe*, Barn. 193.

(b) *Driver d. Oxendon v. Lawrence*, Blk. 1259.

a great difference between being *plaintiff*, or *defendant*, in ejectment. (a)

The judgment in this case was not, indeed, ultimately given upon these points; but the principle upon which the statute is to be interpreted, seems to have been established by it; and we may now consider, that the word *landlord* is extended to all persons claiming title, consistent with the possession of the occupier: and that it is not necessary they should previously have exercised any act of ownership over the lands. Thus, the courts have permitted an heir, who had never been in possession, to defend where the father, under whom he claimed, had died just before, having previously obtained the same rule. (b) So a devisee in trust, not having been in possession,

(a) *Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Sham-* title, Burr. 1290.—94. The principles laid down by Lord Kenyon, C.J., in the case of *Lovelock d. Norris v. Dancaſter* (3 T. R. 783.) seem to support the doctrine of Lord Mansfield, above mentioned; although, from the omission, in the report of the case, of the facts upon which Lord Kenyon's judgment was founded, the point cannot be clearly ascertained.

It was moved, that the *cestui que trust* might be made defendant in ejectment instead of the tenant, and objected to on the opposite side, because he had never been in possession, and could not be considered as a *landlord* under the statute 11 Geo. II. c. 19. s. 13.

Lord Kenyon, C.J. "If the per-

son requiring to be made a defendant under the act had stood in the situation of immediate heir to the person last seized, or had been in the relation of remainder-man, under the same title as the original landlord, I am of opinion that he might have been permitted to defend as a landlord, by virtue of the directions of the statute; but here the very question in dispute between the adverse party and himself is, whether he is entitled to be landlord or not; and therefore we are not authorized to extend the provision of the statute to such a case as this." The rule was discharged.

(b) *Doc d. Heblethwaite v. Roe*, cited 3 T. R. 783.

was permitted to defend, (a) and a mortgagee has been made defendant with the mortgagor; (b) but in a recent case, the Court refused to permit a mortgagee to defend, because it did not appear that he was interested in the result of the suit. (c)

If a party should be admitted to defend as landlord whose title is inconsistent with the possession of the tenant, the lessor of the plaintiff may apply to the Court, or to a judge at chambers, and have the rule discharged with costs. (d) If, however, he neglect to do so, and the party continue upon the record as defendant, such party will not be allowed to set up such inconsistent title as a defence at the trial. (e)

The Court of King's Bench, in a case which has already been frequently cited, exercised a singular species of equitable jurisdiction, with respect to the admission of a person claiming title, to defend an ejectment. The action was brought by one, claiming as the heir of a copyholder; and the lord of the manor, claiming by escheat *pro defectu hæredis*, obtained a rule to show cause, why he should not be admitted defendant. After considerable argument as to the legality of the lord's claim to defend, it was agreed

(a) *Lovelock d. Norris v. Dan-*
caster, 4 T. R. 122.

(b) *Doe d. Tilyard v. Cooper*, 8
T. R. 645. It does not appear,
from the report of this case, whether the mortgagee had previously received any rent; but, from the principles above laid down, the circumstance seems immaterial. (Sed

vide B. N. P. 95.)

(c) *Doe d. Pearson v. Roe*, 6
Bing. 613.

(d) *Doe d. Harwood v. Lippen-*
cott.—*Coram Wood*, B. Trin. Vac.
1817. MS.

(e) *Doe d. Knight v. Lady Smythie*,
4 M. & S. 447.

by both parties, at the recommendation of the Court, that the then ejection should be discontinued, and a fresh one brought in the lord's name, in which the heir should be admitted defendant: and Lord Mansfield, C. J. declared afterwards, that if the heir had refused to consent to this arrangement, they would have admitted the lord to defend, and that if the lord had refused his consent, they would have discharged the rule. (*a*)

A wife has been permitted to defend, where the title of the plaintiff's lessor arose from a pretended intermarriage with her, which marriage she disputed. (*b*)

But a parson claiming a right to enter, and perform divine service, has been held not to have a sufficient title to be admitted defendant; (*c*) and, where the application for admission appeared only a device to put off the trial, the Court refused to grant a rule. (*d*)

It may be useful to observe, that it is not necessary for the landlord to be made defendant in order to make his title admissible in evidence; but that he may with the tenant's consent defend in the tenant's name. And where a suit was so defended, and the lessor of the plaintiff, having knowledge thereof, ob-

(*a*) *Fairclaim d. Fowler v. Sham-*
title, Burr. 1290.

(*b*) *Fenwick v. Gravenor*, 7 Mod.
71.

(*c*) *Martin v. Davis*, Stran. 914.
Vid. Cont. Hillingsworth v. Brew-
ster, Salk. 256.

(*d*) *Fenwick's case*, Salk. 257.

tained from the tenants a *retraxit* of the plea, and a *cognovit* of the action, the Court directed the judgment to be set aside. (a)

Thus far as to who may appear: we must now consider how the appearance should be made, and herein first of the Consent Rule.

The form (b) and purposes of the consent rule have already been cursorily mentioned; (c) but they must now be spoken of more fully. It is in substance as follows: First, The person appearing consents to be made defendant instead of the casual ejector. Secondly, To appear at the suit of the plaintiff; and, if the proceedings are by bill, to file common bail. Thirdly, to receive a declaration in ejectment, (d) and plead not guilty: Fourthly, At the trial of the issue to confess lease, entry, and ouster, and possession of the premises in respect of which he defends, and insist upon title only. Fifthly, That if at the trial he shall not confess lease, entry, ouster, and possession, whereby the plaintiff shall not be able to prosecute his suit, such party shall pay to the plaintiff the costs of the *non pros*, and suffer judgment to be entered against the casual ejector. Sixthly, That if a verdict shall be given for the defendant, or the plaintiff shall not prosecute his suit for any other cause than the non-confession of lease, entry, ouster,

(a) *Doe d. Locke v. Franklin*, 7 Taunt. 9.

(b) Appendix, No. 25.

(c) Ante, 15,

(d) The declaration, served upon the tenant to bring him into court is the only declaration now delivered.

and possession, the lessor of the plaintiff shall pay costs to the defendant. Seventhly, When the landlord appears alone, that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to sign judgment immediately against the casual ejector, but that execution be stayed until the Court shall further order; (a) and Eighthly, where the proceedings are under stat. 1. Geo. IV. c. 87, to give judgment of the term preceding the trial, in case verdict shall pass for the plaintiff.

This consent rule will, in all cases, be sufficient to prevent a nonsuit for want of a real lease, and of a real entry and ouster by the defendant. When, therefore, an ejectment is brought by a joint tenant, parcener, or tenant in common, against his companion (to support which an *actual ouster* (b) is necessary), the defendant ought to apply to the Court upon affidavit, (c) for leave to enter into a special rule, requiring him to confess lease and entry at the trial, but not ouster also, unless an actual ouster of the plaintiff's lessor by him, the defendant, should be proved; and this special rule will always be granted, (d) unless it appear that the claimant has been actually obstructed in his occupation. (e)

As the consent rule contains conditions to be observed on the part of the claimant, as well as of the tenant, the claimant is obliged to join in it; and an

(a) Sel. N. P. 644.

(b) Ante, 54.

(c) Appendix, No. 26.

(d) Appendix, Nos. 27, 28.

(e) Anon. 7 Mod. 39. Oates *d.*
Wigfall *v.* Brydon, Burr. 1895.
Doe *d.* Ginger *v.* Roe, 2 Taunt. 397.

attachment will lie against either party for disobedience of this, as of every other, rule of court.

It may here be observed, that when several tenants are in possession, to whom the claimant delivers declarations for different premises, the Court will not join them in one action, on the motion of either party, although the claimant has but one title to all the lands; for, if the motion be made on the part of the plaintiff, the Court will object, that each defendant must have a remedy for his costs, which he could not have if all were joined in one declaration, and the plaintiff prevailed only against one of them; and, if it be made on the part of the defendants, that the lessor might have sued them at different times, and it would be obliging him to go on against all, when perhaps he might be ready against some of them only. (a) But where several ejectments are brought for the *same premises*, upon the *same demise*, the Court on motion, or a judge at his chambers, will order them to be consolidated: (b) and although, where the premises are different, the Court will not consolidate the actions, yet in a modern case, where on a rule to show cause why the proceedings in all the causes (which were thirty-seven in number, and brought against the several inhabitants of the houses in Sackville-street) should not be stayed, and abide the event of a special verdict in one of them, as they all depended upon the same title, Lord Kenyon, C. J.

(a) *Medlicot v. Brewster*, 2 Keb. Burghers, Barn. 176. *Roe d. Burlington v. Roe*, 7 T. R. 477.

(b) *Grimstone d. Lord Gower, v.*

said, it was a scandalous proceeding on the part of the claimant; and the rule was made absolute. (a)

When the tenant intends to apply to be made defendant, his attorney must procure a blank form of a consent rule, and entitle it in the margin with the names of the plaintiff and casual ejector, inserting also therein, the premises as described in the declaration, or such part of them as he would wish to defend, and stating in the body the consent of both parties that the tenant be made defendant. He must then sign his name to this paper, which is called the agreement for the consent rule, (b) and leave the same at one of the judges' chambers when the proceedings are in the King's Bench, or with the prothonotary when in the Common Pleas, (where it will also receive the signature of the attorney of the lessor of the plaintiff,) together with a plea of the general issue. Common bail is then entered for the tenant, if the proceedings are by bill, or the usual appearance, if by original; and the suit proceeds in his name, instead of that of the casual ejector. (c)

When the landlord and tenant appear jointly, or the landlord appears alone, the same forms are observed, *mutatis mutandis*, together with the addition of counsel's signature to a motion (which is motion of course, and must be annexed to the consent rule) to admit the landlord and tenant, or landlord only, to defend; accompanied also, when the landlord ap-

(a) 2 Sell. Prac. 144.

(c) 2 Sell. Prac. 102.

(b) Appendix, No. 24.

appears alone, with an affidavit of the tenant's refusal to appear. (a)

When the party who wishes to be made defendant is not the tenant, or *actual* landlord, but *has some interest to sustain*, the Court must be moved, on an affidavit of the facts, to permit him to defend with, or without, the tenant, as the case may require.

If the tenant refuse to appear, the landlord cannot appear in his name, nor appoint an attorney to do so for him, and an irregular appearance of this sort will be ordered to be withdrawn. (b)

When it happens that the lessor of the plaintiff claims lands in the possession of different persons, and one of the tenants would be a material witness for the others; such tenant should suffer judgment to go by default, as to the part in his possession; because, if he appear, and be made a defendant, he becomes a party to the suit, and consequently cannot be a witness therein; and it seems that if he appear and plead, the Court will not afterwards strike out his name upon motion. (c)

When the landlord is admitted to defend without the tenant, judgment must be signed against the casual ejector, according to the conditions of the consent rule. The reason for this practice is, to enable

(a) *Hobson d. Bigland v. Dobson*,
Barn. 179. 2 Sell. Prac. 102.—
Appendix, No. 29.

(b) *Roe d. Cook v. Doe*, Barn.
39. 178.

(c) B. N. P. 98.

the claimant to obtain possession of the premises, in case the verdict be in his favour; because, as the landlord is not in possession, no writ of possession could issue upon a judgment against him.

The motion to admit the landlord to be defendant, instead of the tenant, ought regularly to be made before judgment is signed against the casual ejector, by the opposite party; and if it be delayed until after that time, the Court will grant the motion, or not, at their discretion. (a) Thus, where a judgment against the casual ejector was signed, and a writ of possession executed thereon, and it appeared, upon motion, that the landlord's delay in his application arose from the tenant's negligence, in not giving him due notice of the service of the declaration, according to the provisions of statute 11. Geo. II. c. 19. s. 12; the Court ordered the judgment and execution to be set aside, compelled the tenant to pay all the costs, and permitted the landlord to be made defendant on the usual terms; notwithstanding it was strongly argued by the opposite party, that the judgment was perfectly regular, and that the tenant's negligence was entirely a matter between him and his landlord, for which the statute had given the landlord ample compensation. (b) But in a late case, the Court of Common Pleas, after a recovery in an undefended ejectment, without collusion, and after the lessor of the plaintiff had contracted for the sale of part of the premises, and let the purchaser into possession, refused to set aside the

(a) *Dobbs v. Passer*, Stran. 975. Burr. 1996.

(b) *Doe d. Troughton v. Roe*,

judgment and writ of possession upon an application of this nature, and assigned as their reason, that the concealment of the delivery of the declaration was a matter between the tenant and his landlord, with which the plaintiff's lessor had no concern. (a) And in another case where the landlord applied to be made defendant, after judgment had been signed, but before execution, and the claimant offered to waive his judgment, if the landlord, who resided in Jamaica, would give security for the costs, to which offer the landlord's counsel would not accede, the Court refused the application, and permitted the plaintiff's lessor to take out execution. (b)

The appearance should, in all cases, be entered of the term mentioned in the notice; and where the notice was to appear in Hilary term, and the tenant entered an appearance in Michaelmas term, and did nothing farther, and the plaintiff's lessor, finding no appearance of Hilary term, signed judgment against the casual ejector, the Court held the judgment regular, but afterwards set it aside upon payment of costs, to try the merits. (c)

The party, intending to defend the action, having appeared according to the forms above mentioned, the lessor's duty, in consequence thereof, must be our next consideration.

When the time for appearance has expired, the

(a) *Goodtitle v. Badtitle*, 4 Taunt. 186.

820.

(c) *Mason d. Kendall v. Hodgson*, Barn. 250.

(b) *Roe d. Hyde v. Doe*, Barn.

lessor's attorney must search at the proper offices for the agreement before mentioned on the part of the defendant, to enter into the consent rule; and having signed his name on it, above that of the defendant's attorney, and also (when the proceedings are in the King's Bench) obtained the signature of the judge at whose chambers the agreement was left, he must take it to the clerk of the rules, or secondary, who will file it, and draw up the consent rule thereupon: (a) which consent rule is, in truth, a copy of the agreement, prefixing only the date of drawing it up, omitting the premises in the margin, and adding, "by the Court," instead of the attornies' names, at the end.

The plea of the general issue, we have before observed, is generally left by the defendant with the agreement for the consent rule; and, when this is the case, as soon as the consent rule is drawn out, the issue is at once made up, with a copy of the rule annexed, and delivered to the defendant's attorney, with notice of trial as in other actions. But if the plea be not left with the consent rule, (b) the plaintiff must give a rule to plead, and then judgment may be entered for want of a plea, as in other ac-

(a) Appendix, No. 25.

(b) Where the plea was entitled with the true name of the cause, but by mistake in the body of the plea, the name of the lessor was inserted as the person complaining, instead of that of the plaintiff, and the lessor's attorney, looking upon

this plea as null and void, signed judgment against the casual ejector; the judgment was set aside with costs, as irregular, for the plea was properly entitled, and not a nullity. *Goodtitle d. Gardiner v. Badtitle*, Barn. 191.

tions without a special motion in Court for the purpose. (a)

OF THE PLEA, AND ISSUE.

The general issue in this action is, *not guilty*; (b) and it seldom happens, by reason of the consent rule, that the defendant can plead any other plea. It is not, indeed, easy to imagine a case, in which any other plea in bar can be necessary; for as the claimant must, in the first instance, prove his right to the possession, whatever operates as a bar to that right, as a fine with non-claim, the statute of limitations, a descent cast, &c. must cause him to fail in proving his possessory title, and consequently entitle the defendant to a verdict upon the general issue. (c) As, however, the consent rule was introduced for the purposes of justice, the Courts would undoubtedly permit the defendant to plead specially, if the particular circumstances of the case should require it. (d)

A plea to the jurisdiction may be pleaded in ejectment by permission of the Court, but not otherwise. This permission is necessary, because a plea to the jurisdiction is a plea in abatement, and must therefore be pleaded within the four first days of the term

(a) Reg. Hil. 1649, and Trin. 18 Car. II. B. R.

(b) Appendix, No. 30.

(c) In the time of Lord Coke, (Peytoe's case, 9 Co. 77,) an accord with satisfaction was held to be a good plea in ejectment, "because an ejectment is an action of

trespass in its nature, and in trespass accord is a good plea;" but as this plea is quite inapplicable to the modern uses of the action, the Court, it is conceived, would not at this time allow a defendant to plead it.

(d) Philips v. Bury, Carth. 180.

next ensuing that of which the declaration is entitled, at which time the casual ejector, and not the tenant, is defendant. To obtain leave to plead such plea, the Court must be moved upon affidavit before the expiration of the four first days of term, the plea itself being first filed; and the motion should be for a rule to show cause why the defendant should not be permitted to plead the facts stated in the affidavit; and why the plea then filed to that effect, should not be allowed. The latter part of the rule, and the filing of the plea, are necessary parts of the application, because the four days would in all probability expire before cause could be shown and the plea pleaded, unless such plea were pleaded *be bene esse* in the first instance. (a)

Such, at least, has been the mode of proceeding in the only two reported cases upon the subject, which can be cited as authorities. But a practical difficulty occurs, for which these cases seem not to provide. At the time when the application for leave to plead to the jurisdiction is made, the tenant has not appeared, and the proceedings are against the casual ejector. By whom then should the plea be pleaded, and how is the tenant to appear? The most simple method of avoiding these difficulties, is for the tenant in the first instance to file the plea in his own name, and then move for a rule to show cause "why he should not be forthwith admitted defendant upon the usual terms, except as far as relates to pleading the general issue, and why he should not be permitted

(a) Williams *d. Johnson v. Keen*, 10 East. 523.
Blk. 197. Doe *d. Morton v. Roe*,

to plead the facts stated in the affidavit, upon which he moves in lieu thereof, and why the plea already filed by him to that effect, should not be allowed."

Ancient demesne is a good plea in ejectment; (a) but it is a plea much discouraged, and the person pleading it must carefully observe every form which the Court deems necessary. As it is a plea in abatement, application for leave to plead it, must, as has already been stated, be made within the four first days of term; and the application must be accompanied by an affidavit, that the lands are holden of a manor which is ancient demesne, that there is a court of ancient demesne regularly holden, and that the claimant has a freehold interest; and the Court will refuse the motion, if any of these facts be omitted in the affidavit. (b)

Ancient demesne cannot of course be pleaded where the ejectment is brought for copyhold lands; (c) but if the affidavit state that the lands are ancient demesne, the Court will not reject the plea upon a counter affidavit that great part of the lands are copyhold; but will leave the plaintiff to state such matter in his reply. (d)

When the party appearing has entered into the consent rule and pleaded, he may move for a rule to reply, before the plaintiff's lessor has joined in the

(a) Appendix, Nos. 31, 32.

(c) *Brittle v. Dade*, Salk. 185, S.

(b) *Doe d. Rust v. Roe*, Burr.

C. Ld. Raym. 43.

1046. *Denn d. Wroot v. Fenn*, 8 T. R. 474.

(d) *Doe d. Morton v. Roe*, 10 East. 523.

consent rule, and the plaintiff may be *non-prossed* thereby; but as the plaintiff is only a fictitious person, the defendant will not be entitled to costs. (a)

The issue must agree with the declaration against the casual ejector in all respects, except in the defendant's name, unless an order for the alteration be obtained; and if there be a difference between the issue and the declaration, the Court on motion will set it right. (b) But where there was a variance between the description of the premises in the *Nisi Prius* record, (upon which the plaintiff recovered,) and the issue, and it did not appear how the premises were described in the declaration, the Court refused to set the verdict aside. (c)

If the party interested appear and plead, and after having pleaded, withdraw his plea, the judgment must be entered against the party so appearing; but where the costs of the suit were defrayed by the landlord in the name of his tenants, who gave a *retraxit* of the plea, and a *cognovit* of the action, the Court set aside the *retraxit* and *cognovit*, and permitted the landlord to defend the action in his own name. (d)

The record and issue are made up with memorandums, if the proceedings are by bill; and without

(a) *Goodright d. Ward v. Bad-* B. & A. 471. *Jones v. Tatham*, 8
title, Blk. 763. Taunt. 634.

(b) *Bass v. Bradford*, Ld. Raym. 1411. (d) *Doe d. Lock v. Franklin*, 7
Taunt. 9.

(c) *Doe d. Cotterell v. Wylde*, 2

any memorandum, if by original, as in other actions : the time allowed for notice of trial is also the same.

A plea *puis darrien continuance* it seems may be pleaded to this action ; but where the plea was that after issue joined one of the lessors of the plaintiff had released to the defendant, the Court held the plea insufficient, and said the release ought to have been by the nominal plaintiff ; because although in every other respect the Court would look upon the lessor as the interested person, as far as the record was concerned they must consider the nominal plaintiff as the real party. (a) A release by the nominal plaintiff so pleaded, would certainly, when the old practice prevailed, have been a good defence to the action ; but even then the Courts held such a release to be a contempt, (b) and it may be doubted whether a judge would receive the plea at the present day.

When the ancient practice prevailed, if the plaintiff in ejectment after issue joined, and before the trial, entered into any part of the premises, the defendant at the assizes might plead such entry as a plea *puis darrien continuance*. But this plea cannot now be ever necessary ; for the plaintiff, being a fictitious person, cannot enter upon the land ; and if the lessor of the plaintiff should enter, he would be unable at the trial to prove the possession of the defendant, and must consequently fail in his ejectment. (c)

(a) *Doc d. Byne v. Brewer*, 4 M. & S. 300. (c) *Moore v. Hawkins*, Yelv. 130.

(b) *Ante*, 203.

CHAPTER X.

Of the Evidence in the Action of Ejectment.

THE proofs, by which a claimant in ejectment is required to support his claim, not only vary with the nature of his title to the premises, but are also dependent on the position in which he is placed, with respect to the defendant. When no privity has existed between the parties; that is to say, when neither the defendant, nor those under whom he holds, have been immediately or derivatively admitted into possession, either by the lessor of the plaintiff himself, or those under whom he claims, the lessor must establish a *legal* and *possessory* title to the premises; (*a*) because, as has been already observed, it is by the strength of his own title, and not by the weakness of his adversary's, that he must prevail. (*a*) But where there has been a privity between the parties, as where the relation of landlord and tenant has subsisted between them, or where the defendant has been admitted into possession, pending a treaty for a purchase or on other grounds, (*b*) proof of title is not required, but instead thereof, the lessor should

(*a*) Ante, 32, 33.(*b*) Ante, 108. 123.

prove that the defendant, or those under whom he holds, (*a*) were so admitted into possession, and that their right to the possession has ceased: together also, when the privity is not between the immediate parties to the action, with the derivative title of the claimant from the party, by whom the defendant was originally admitted into possession. (*b*) And the defendant will not be permitted to rebut this evidence, by showing that the title of the claimant was originally defective and insufficient, for it would be contrary to good faith to permit a party to controvert the title of him, by whom he has obtained possession; (*c*) but he is allowed notwithstanding to prove the nature of such title, and to show, that although originally a valid one, it expired before the commencement of the action, and that the land then belonged to another, for such a defence is not inconsistent with the terms of the original possession. (*d*)

Notwithstanding the terms of the consent rule, it was formerly holden necessary to prove the defendant in possession of the premises in dispute, (*e*) and plaintiffs were frequently nonsuited on subtle points arising out of this practice, quite independent of

(*a*) *Barwick d. Mayor of Richmond v. Thompson*, 7 T. R. 488.

(*b*) *Doe d. Biddle v. Abrahams*, 1 Stark. 305. *Rennie v. Robinson*, 1 Bing. 147.

(*c*) *Sullivan v. Stradling*, 2 Wils. 208. *Driver d. Oxenden v. Lawrence*, Blk. 1259. *Parker v. Manning*, 7 T. R. 537. *Hodson v. Sharpe*, 10 East. 355. *Doe d. Pritchett v. Mitchell*, 1 B. & B. 11.

(*d*) *England d. Syburn v. Slade*, 4 T. R. 682. *Doe d. Jackson v. Ramsbottom*, 3 M. & S. 516. *Doe d. Lowdon v. Watson*, 2 Star. 230. *Baker v. Mellish*, 10 Ves. jun. 544.

Gravenor v. Woodhouse, 1 Bing. 38. *Phillips v. Pearse*, 5 B. & C. 433.

(*e*) *Goodright d. Balsh v. Rich*, 7 T. R. 327. *Fenn d. Blanchard v. Wood*, 1 B. & P. 573.

the merits of the case. (a) But by recent orders of the different Courts, the consent rule has been altered, so as to include the confession of possession, as well as of lease, entry, and ouster, (b) and no proof of possession is now required beyond the production of the rule.

The locality of the premises as described in the declaration, must be proved, (c) but after the plaintiff has established his title to a verdict, the Court will not try the extent of his claim, as defined by particular metes and bounds. (d)

The title proved must not be inconsistent with the demise in the declaration. When therefore several lessors declare upon a joint demise, proof of a joint interest in the whole premises must be given. But, if a demise is laid by each of several lessors separately, they will be entitled to recover, whether they have a joint or several interest, for a several demise severs a joint tenancy. (e) And in a case where a joint demise was laid by seven trustees of a charity, who were appointed at different times, and the tenant had paid one entire rent to the common clerk of the trustees, it was held that such payment of rent should enure in the most beneficial way for the trustees in support of their title as brought forward by them-

(a) *Doe d. James v. Stanton*, 2 B. & A. 371. *Doe d. Giles v. Warwick*, 5 M. & S. 393. *Doe v. Stradling*, 2 Stark. 187.

(b) *Ante*, 262.

(c) *Ante*, 218—20. *Vide Doe d.*

Gunson v. Welsh, 4 Camp. 264.

(d) *Doe d. Draper's Company v. Wilson*, 2 Stark. 477.

(e) *Doe d. Marsack v. Read*, 12 East. 57.

selves, unless the defendant expressly proved them to be entitled in a different manner. And it was considered that the circumstance of their being appointed at different times was not sufficient evidence for that purpose. (*a*)

The claimant need not in any case prove that he has made an actual entry on the premises, unless when a fine with proclamations (*b*) has been levied by a party having a sufficient estate to make the fine operative, (*c*) or when his title would be otherwise barred by the statute of limitations; (*d*) but in both these cases, the claimant must prove that he has made an actual entry on the land before the day of the demise in the declaration, and within a year next before the commencement of the action. (*e*)

It has already been observed, that the common consent rule dispenses, in all cases, with proof of entry and ouster by the defendant. (*f*)

As the evidence necessary to establish the lessor's case varies according to the nature of his claim, we shall now separately consider the proofs requisite in support of each particular title; firstly, when no privity exists between the parties; and, secondly, when such privity does exist.

Before however we proceed in this inquiry, it will

(*a*) *Doe d. Clarke v. Grant*, 12 East. 221.

(*b*) Ante, 99.

(*c*) Ante, 94—97.

(*d*) Ante, 92.

(*e*) Ante, 102.

(*f*) Ante, 263.

be useful to give a short account of the decisions respecting the competency of parties, having an interest in the lands, to give testimony concerning them.

The tenant in possession is not a competent witness to support his landlord's title, inasmuch as he is interested in the event of the suit; for if the verdict be against his landlord, he is liable for the mesne profits, and may also be turned out of possession: (a) nor is his evidence admissible to prove that he, and not the defendant, is really the tenant; for a verdict against such defendant would have the effect of ejecting him (the witness) from the lands, which is an immediate interest, and outweighs the contrary and remoter effect of subjecting himself by his testimony to a future action. (b)

So also, a witness, to whom the claimant has agreed to grant a lease of the lands in question, in case he recover them, is incompetent to give evidence against the defendant. (c) So also, where a witness stated that the claimant had formerly assigned to him the premises for a particular purpose, but that he had given up the deed, and did not believe that he had any beneficial interest in them, he was considered incompetent. (d) Upon the principle of interest also,

(a) *Doe d. Forster v. Williams*,
Cowp. 621. *Bourne v. Turner*,
Stran. 632.

Bingham, 4 B. & A. 672.

(c) *Gilb. Evid.* 108.

(d) *Doe d. Scales v. Bragg*, 1 R.
& M. 87.

(b) *Doe d. Jones v. Wilde*, 5
Taunt. 183. *Doe d. Lewis v.*

the person having the inheritance of the lands is not an admissible witness, where two persons, both of whom admit his title, are contending for the possession under different grants from him, (unless indeed they claim under grants not rendering rent,) for he is interested, inasmuch as he may prefer one tenant to another. (a) But where both contending parties claimed under the same person, who had become bankrupt, he was permitted to prove, after releasing his surplus and allowance, that the premises in dispute were not included in the first lease. (b) A person who has mortgaged lands, cannot, on the same principle, be an evidence concerning them; for the equity of redemption still remains in him. (c) An heir apparent may, however, be a witness, because his heirship is a mere contingency; but a remainder-man cannot, for he hath a present estate in the land; and this rule extends to the remainder-man in tail. (d)

But a joint defendant who has suffered judgment by default, is a good witness to prove the other defendant in possession. (e)

So also the declarations of deceased tenants are admissible for the purpose of proving that any

(a) Fox v. Swann, Styl. 482. Bell v. Harwood, 3 T. R. 308.

(b) Longchamps v. Fawcett, Peake, N. P. C. 101.

(c) Anon. 11 Mod. 354.

(d) Smith v. Blackham, Salk. 283. Doe d. Lord Teynham v. Tyler, 6 Bing. 391.

(e) Doe d. Harrop v. Green, 4 Esp. 198. Ante, 266.

particular lands formed part of the estate they occupied; (a) and also to negative an adverse possession. (b)

Where the ejectment is brought on several demises, and the evidence shows that the title is exclusively in one of the lessors, the other cannot be compelled to be examined as a witness for the defendant, as all the lessors are jointly liable for the costs. (c)

Let us now consider the proofs to be adduced by a claimant in ejectment, when his title to the lands can be controverted.

And first, when he claims by descent, as heir of the person last seized.

When the party claims by descent, he must prove that the ancestor from whom he derives his title, was the person last seized of the lands in fee simple, (d) and that he, the claimant, is his heir.

This seisin of the ancestor may be proved by showing, that he was either in the actual possession of the premises, at the time of his death, or in the receipt of rent from the ter-tenant; for possession is presumptive evidence of a seisin in fee, until the contrary be shown. (e) But if it is probable that the

(a) *Davies v. Pierce*, 2 T. R. 53. (c) *Fenn d. Pewtress v. Granger*,
Outram v. Morewood, 5 T. R. 121. 3 Camp. 178.

Et vide *Ivat v. Finch*, 1 Taunt. 141. (d) *Co. Litt. 11. b. Jenkins d. Harris v. Pritchard*, 2 Wils. 45.

(b) *Doe d. Human v. Pettit*, 5 B. & A. 223. (e) B. N. P. 103.

defendant will rebut this presumption, the lessor should be prepared with other proofs of his ancestors' title.

In order to show the heirship of the claimant, he must prove his descent from the person last seised, when he claims as lineal heir, or the descent of himself and the person last seised from some common ancestor, or at least from two brothers or sisters, (*a*) if he claims collaterally ; together with the extinction of all those lines of descent which would claim before him. This is done by proving the marriages, births, and deaths, necessary to complete his title, and showing the identity of the several parties. Thus, supposing *A.* the claimant, and *B.* the person last seised, to be cousins, descended from a common ancestor *C.*, *B.* being the only child of *D.*, the elder son of *C.*, and *A.* the only child of *E.*, the younger son of *C.* In this case *A.* must prove the marriage of *C.*, the birth and marriage of *D.*, the birth, marriage, and death of *E.*, the birth and death without issue of *B.*, and his own birth ; (*b*) for it is a maxim of law, that he who asserts the death of another, who was once living, must prove his death, whether the affirmative issue be that he be dead or living. (*c*)

The testimony of persons present when the events happened, or who knew the parties concerned at those periods, and the production of extracts from parish registers, are the most satisfactory modes of

(*a*) *Roe d. Thorne v. Lord*, 2 Blk. 1099.

(*c*) *Wilson v. Hodges*, 2 East. 312.

(*b*) 2 Blk. Comm. 208, &c.

proving facts of this nature ; and when the claimant is the lineal descendant of the person last seized, but little difficulty can arise in procuring the necessary proofs. But when he claims as collateral heir, and it is necessary to trace the relationship between him and the person last seized through many descents to a common ancestor, difficulties often intervene, from the remoteness of the period to which the inquiries must be directed, which upon the ordinary rules of evidence would be insuperable. To remedy this evil, the Courts, from the necessity of the case, have relaxed those rules in inquiries of this nature ; and allow hearsay and reputation (which latter is the hearsay of those, who may be supposed to have known the fact, handed down from one to another) to be admitted as evidence in cases of pedigree. (a)

Thus the declarations of deceased members of the family, whether relations or connexions by marriage, (b) are admissible evidence to prove relationship ; as who a person's grandfather was, or whom he married, or how many children he had, or as to the time of a marriage, or of the birth of a child, and the like ; so likewise the declarations of deceased persons, as to the fact and time of their own marriages, and whether their children were born before or after marriage, are admissible ; (c) though such declarations cannot be received to bastardize their children born

(a) *Higham v. Ridgway*, 10 East. 120. *Futter v. Randall*, 2 M. & P. 20.
 (b) B. N. P. 294. *Vowels v. Young*, 13 Vez. 148. *Doe d. Northey v. Harvey*, 1 R. & M. 297. *Doe d. Goodright d. Stevens v. Moss*, Cowp. 591. *May v. May*, B. N. P. 112.
 (c) *Doe d.*

in wedlock. (a) Where likewise a cancelled will of a deceased ancestor was found amongst the papers of the person last seized, it was allowed to be read in evidence as a paper relating to the family; the place in which it was found being considered as amounting to its recognition, by the party last seized, as the declaration of his ancestor concerning the state of his family. (b)

The reputation of a family may also afford presumptive evidence of the death of a person without issue. (c)

But hearsay evidence is not admissible to prove the *place* of any particular birth; for that is a question of locality only, and does not fall within the principle of the rules applicable to cases of pedigree: (d) nor are the declarations of deceased neighbours, or of the intimate acquaintances, or servants of the family, evidence on questions of this nature; (e) nor is the hearsay of a relative to be admitted when the relative himself can be produced. (f) It is also necessary in order to entitle the declarations of a deceased relative to be admitted, that they should be made under circumstances, when the relation may be supposed without an interest, and without a bias; and, there-

(a) *Rex v. Luffe*, 8 East. 193.

(b) *Doe d. Johnson v. Lord Pembroke*, 11 East. 505.

(c) *Doe d. Banning v. Griffin*, 15 East. 293. *Doe d. Oldham v. Wolley*, 8 B. & C. 22.

(d) *Rex v. Inhabitants of Erith*, 8 East. 542.

(e) *Vowels v. Young*, 13 Vez. 147.

514. *Rex v. Inhabitants of Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 707. 723. *Weeks v. Sparke*, 1 M. & S. 688. *Johnson v. Lawson*, 2 Bing. 90. *Et vide* 14 East. 330.

(f) *Pendrell v. Pendrell*, Stran. 294. *Harrison v. Blades*, 3 Campb. 457.

fore, if they are made on a subject in dispute after the commencement of a suit, or after a controversy preparatory to one, they ought not to be received, on account of the probability that they were partially drawn from the deceased, or perhaps intended by him to serve one of the contending parties. (*a*)

The presumption of the continuance of human life ends in general at the expiration of seven years, from the time when the person was last known to be living; (*b*) but such death may under particular circumstances be presumed in a shorter time; as where a party sailed in a vessel which was never afterwards heard of. (*c*) Proof also of the fact that a tenant for life has not been seen or heard of for fourteen years, by a person residing near the estate although not a member of the family, is *primâ facie* evidence of his death. (*d*)

Reputation has been held good evidence of a marriage, in an ejectment brought by an heir, though his parents (whose marriage was the subject in dispute) were both living. (*e*)

It need scarcely be stated, that in all cases where the declarations of parties if deceased would be admissible in evidence, the parties themselves may

(*a*) The case of the Berkeley Peerage, 4 Campb. 401.

(*b*) 19 Car. II. c. 6. s. 1. Doe. *d.* George v. Jesson, 6 East. 80. Rowe v. Hasland, Blk. 404.

(*c*) Watson v. King, 1 Stark. 121.

(*d*) Doe *d.* Lloyd v. Deakin, 4 B. & A. 433.

(*e*) Doe *d.* Fleming v. Fleming, 4 Bing. 266.

be called as witnesses, whilst living, unless rendered incompetent by interest.

Entries in family bibles and other books may likewise be received in evidence in questions of pedigree. (*a*) So also recitals in family deeds, monumental inscriptions, engravings on rings, old pedigrees hung up in a family mansion, and the like. (*b*)

The original visitation books of heralds, compiled when progresses were solemnly and regularly made into every part of the kingdom to inquire into the state of families, and to register such marriages and descents as were verified to them on oath, are also allowed to be good evidence of pedigrees; (*c*) but a recital in an act of Parliament, stating *I. S.* to be heir at law to a particular person, has been held not to be evidence. (*d*)

When the lessor claims as heir to copyhold premises, he must, in addition to the foregoing evidence, produce the rolls of the manor, which show a surrender to him, or to those under whom he claims; but it is not necessary that he should prove his own admittance, unless the ejectment be against the lord. (*f*) If, however, the ejectment is against the lord, he must either show that he is admitted, or that he has tendered him-

(*a*) *Whitlocke v. Baker*, 13 *Ve.* B. N. P. 112.

514.

(*e*) *Rumney v. Eves*, 1 *Leon.* 100.

(*b*) *Vowels v. Young*, 13 *Ve.* 148.

Holdfast d. Woollams v. Clapham, 1 *East.* 600. *Doe d. Tarrant v.*

(*c*) 2 *S. N. P.* 772.

Hellier, 3 *T. R.* 162. *Ante*, 63.

(*d*) *Anon.* 12 *Mod.* 384; *et vide*

self to be admitted and been refused; but it is not necessary to tender himself to be admitted at the lord's court, if the steward, upon application out of court, has refused to admit him. (a)

When he claims as *customary heir*, he must, after proving his pedigree, show that he is heir strictly within the custom, for every custom which departs from the common law is construed strictly; and if the custom be silent, the common law must regulate the descent. (b) Thus, where the custom is that the eldest *sister* shall inherit, the eldest *aunt*, or *niece*, is not within it. (c) So also, if the custom be that the youngest *son* shall inherit, it will not extend to the youngest *nephew*. (d)

The usual method of proving these several customs, is by means of the different admissions of the customary heirs upon the court rolls of the manor, produced by the steward upon oath; or by the medium of verified examined copies. But if the ancient court rolls should be lost, or there should be no instance of an admission upon them, similar to the custom set up by the lessor, an entry upon the rolls, stating the mode of descent of lands in the manor, will be admissible evidence, as to the existence of the custom. (e) Where, however, the lessor claimed as youngest nephew, and produced, as the only evidence to sup-

(a) *Doe d. Burrell v. Bellamy*, 2 M. & S. 87. Ante, 63.

(b) Co. Copy, 43.

(c) *Radcliff v. Chaplin*, 4 Leon.

(d) 1 Roll. 624.

(e) *Roe d. Beebee v. Parker*, 5 T. R. 26. *Denn d. Goodwin v.*

Spray, 1 T. R. 466.

port his title, an admission upon the court rolls of a youngest nephew, as customary heir, at a court-leet and baron held in 1657; and for the defendant it appeared upon the same rules, that at a court-leet and baron held in 1692, the jury and homage found, that the custom of descent extended only to the youngest son, and if no son, to the youngest brother, and no farther, (which entry was corroborated by two old witnesses, who testified, that they had heard and believed that the custom went no farther;) upon a verdict being found for the lessor of the plaintiff, the Court refused to set it aside. (*a*)

It may here be useful to observe, that when the lessor claims as heir, and proves his pedigree and stops, and the defendant sets up a new case, which is answered by fresh evidence on the part of the lessor, the defendant is entitled to the general reply. (*b*) And if, after the pleadings are opened by the junior counsel for the lessor, the defendant's counsel expresses himself ready to admit the lessor to be the heir, it will entitle him to open the case, and make the first address to the jury. (*c*)

Secondly, of the title by devise.

When the lessor claims as the devisee of a freehold

(*a*) *Doe d. Mason v. Mason*, 3 Wils. 63.

(*b*) *Goodtitle d. Revett v. Braham*, 4 T. R. 497.

(*c*) So ruled by Le Blanc, J. in *Fenn d. Wright v. Johnson*, Not-

tingham Summer Assizes, 1813, MS. and by Wood, B. in a subsequent ejectment between the same parties, Nottingham Lent Assizes, 1814, MS.

interest at common law, or of a customary freehold where there is no custom to surrender to the use of the will, (a) he must prove the seisin of his devisor; (b) and if the devise under which he claims, be of a remainder, or a reversion in fee, or the like, he must prove the determination of all the precedent estates. He must also prove the due execution of the will pursuant to the provisions of the statute 29 Car. II. c. 3. s. 5; unless it be more than thirty years old, in which case it proves itself; and the age of the will is to be reckoned from the day it bears date, and not from the time of the testator's death. (c)

When the devise is of a freehold interest, the original will must be produced; but if the will be lost, an examined copy of it may be proved, or parol evidence may be given of its contents. But neither an exemplification under the great seal, (d) nor the probate under the seal of the Ecclesiastical Court, (e) will be admitted as secondary evidence; though it seems that the register-book, or ledger-book, in which the will is set out at length, is in such case admissible. (f)

The statutory regulations for the execution of wills containing devises of freehold lands, are to be found in the fifth section of the statute of frauds, (g) whereby

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| (a) <i>Hussey v. Grills</i> , Amb. 299. | <i>Gough</i> , 4 T. R. 707. (<i>in notis.</i>) |
| (b) <i>Ante.</i> | (d) <i>Comber</i> . 46. |
| (c) <i>Doe d. Oldham v. Wolley</i> , 8 B. & C. 22. <i>Lord Rancliffe v. Parsons</i> , 6 Dow. 202. <i>M'Kenire v. Fraser</i> , 9 Vez. 5, <i>et vide n.</i> † to the case of <i>Gough d. Calthorpe v.</i> | (e) <i>Doe d. Ash v. Calvert</i> , 2 Camp. 389. |
| | (f) <i>St. Leger v. Adams</i> , 1 Lord Raym. 731. <i>Anon. Skin.</i> 174. |
| | (g) 29 Car. II. c. 3. |

it is enacted, that, “ all devises and bequests of any
 “ lands, or tenements, devisable either by force of
 “ the statute of wills, or by that statute, or by force
 “ of any particular custom, shall be in writing, and
 “ signed by the party so devising the same, or by
 “ some other person in his presence and by his ex-
 “ press direction, and shall be attested and sub-
 “ scribed in the presence of the devisor by three or
 “ four credible witnesses, or else shall be utterly void
 “ and of none effect.”

This section of the statute of frauds is very loosely worded, and it will be necessary to enter rather largely into the different points, which have arisen respecting the due execution of a will under it.

The first solemnity required is the signature of the testator ; but it is not necessary that he should sign his name at the bottom of the will ; it is sufficient if his name be at the beginning, or on the side or in any part of it, in his own handwriting. As, for instance, a will in the handwriting of the testator, beginning with the words, “ I, *A. B.*, do make this my last will,” has been held to be properly signed ; (*a*) and if the testator cannot write, his mark will be a sufficient signature. (*b*) But if the will be on several sheets, and it appear to have been the intention of the testator to sign every one, but, from weakness or incapacity, he leave some of them unsigned, it will not, it seems,

(*a*) *Lemayne v. Stanley*, 3 Lev. 1. 185, and *Addy v. Grix*, 3 Ves. Hilton *v. King*, 3 Lev. 86. 504.

(*b*) *Harrison v. Harrison*, 3 Ves.

be a sufficient execution within the statute. (*a*) The effect of sealing alone is not yet quite decided; but it is the better opinion, that it is not a sufficient signature. (*b*)

It is not required by the statute, that the witnesses should see the devisor sign, or that he should sign in their presence, or that they should be informed of the nature of the instrument they are about to attest; it is sufficient, if the devisor declare to them, that the signature is his handwriting, or without such declaration, if the whole body of the will, as well as the name, be written by himself. (*c*) And in a late case where the testator was blind, the Court of Common Pleas determined, that it was not necessary on that account, under the statute, to read over the will, previous to the execution, in the presence of the attesting witness, although if there were other circumstances inducing a suspicion of fraud, such an execution would materially strengthen the presumption. (*d*)

The next formality is the attestation and subscription. It must be attested and subscribed by three, or more witnesses, but it is not necessary that the attestation and subscription of all the witnesses should

- (*a*) Right *d. Cator v. Price*, Doug. 241. 454. *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jun. 11. S. C. 1 Dick. 225. *Trymner v. Jackson*, cited 1 Ves, 487, recog. 2 Ves. 258. *Stonehouse v. Evelyn*, 3 P. Wm. 252. *Peate v. Ougly*, Comyn. 197. *White v. Trustees of British Museum*, 6 Bing. 310.
- (*b*) *Lemayne v. Stanley*, 3 Lev. 1. *Lee v. Libb*, 1 Show. 69. S. C. Carth. 35. *Warneford v. Warneford*, Stran. 764. *Smith v. Evans*, 1 Wils. 313. *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jun. 11. S. C. 1 Dick. 225.
- (*c*) *Grayson v. Atkinson*, 2 Ves. 454. *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jun. 11. S. C. 1 Dick. 225. *Trymner v. Jackson*, cited 1 Ves, 487, recog. 2 Ves. 258. *Stonehouse v. Evelyn*, 3 P. Wm. 252. *Peate v. Ougly*, Comyn. 197. *White v. Trustees of British Museum*, 6 Bing. 310.
- (*d*) *Longchamp d. Goodfellow v. Fish*, 2 N. R. 415.

be at one time. Hence, where the deviser published his will in the presence of two witnesses, who subscribed it in his presence, and some time after he sent for a third witness, and published it in his presence also, the will was holden to be duly attested. (a) But it is necessary that all the witnesses attest the *same instrument*, and that the instrument attested be that by which the lands are intended to pass. Therefore, where a testator devised his lands by a will, made in the presence of, and attested by two witnesses only, and about a year after made a codicil, whereby he revoked a legacy given by his will, and declared that the will should be ratified and confirmed in all things, except as altered by that writing, and that his codicil should be taken as part of his will; and executed this codicil in the presence of one of the former witnesses, and another person, neither the first will, nor the other witness to it, being present, it was holden to be an insufficient attestation. (b) And where a testator, by a will *not witnessed*, devised lands, and afterwards made a codicil, and taking the codicil in one hand, and the will in the other, said, "This is my will whereby I have settled my estate, and I publish this codicil as part thereof," the signature of the codicil, by the testator and three witnesses, was held insufficient to render the will valid. (c) But if there be several instruments written by the testator upon one paper, and it plainly appear that his inten-

(a) *Gryle v. Gryle*, 2 Atk. 170, Carth. 35.
 (n.) *Ellis v. Smith*, 1 Ves. jun. 11. (c) *Penphrase v. Lord Lansdowne*,
 14. *Grayson v. Atkinson*, 2 Ves. cited Com. 334. Attorney General
 454. 458. *v. Barnes*, Prec. Cha. 270.
 (b) *Lee v. Libb*, 3 Lev. 1. S.C.

tion was that all should form but one will, and not a will and codicil, in such case the execution of the last instrument will be considered as an execution of the whole. (a) So also if a will be written upon several sheets of paper, but at one time, it will be valid, although all the sheets are not executed by the testator, nor signed by the witnesses, nor even seen by them; provided the last sheet be regularly signed and attested, and every part of the will be present at the time of the execution; of which latter fact the presumption of law will be in favour, should the different sheets correspond. (b)

An attestation by a mark has been adjudged to be a sufficient execution within the meaning of the statute. (c)

The attestation and subscription of the witnesses must be in the presence of the testator, but proof need not be given that the testator *actually did see* the witnesses subscribing: their attestation is sufficient if it appear that he *might see them*. (d) Thus, where the witnesses signed in a room adjoining to the one which contained the testator's bed, upon a table opposite to the door of communication, it was holden to be sufficiently in the testator's presence. (e) So also, where the testator executed his will in his

(a) Carleton *d.* Griffin *v.* Griffin, Burr. 549.

(b) Bond *v.* Seawell, Burr. 1773. S. C. Blk. 407. B. N. P. 264.

(c) Harrison *v.* Harrison, 8 Ves. 185. Addy *v.* Grix, *ib.* 504.

(d) Todd *d.* Lord Winchelsea; 1 M. & M. 13. Longford *v.* Eyre, 1 P. Wms. 740.

(e) Shires *v.* Glasscock, Salk. 688. Davy *v.* Smith, 3 Salk. 395.

carriage, and the witnesses signed their names in a room hard by, the carriage being in such a situation, as to enable the testator to see what was passing in the room, the will was held to be valid. (a) But if the testator could not possibly see the witnesses subscribe, as if they subscribe in another room, out of sight, although by the testator's express directions, the execution will not be good: the design of the statute being to prevent a wrong paper from being intruded on the testator, in the place of the true one. (b) And upon this principle, if the testator, between the time of his own subscription, and the subscription of the witnesses, lose his mental powers, it will invalidate the will, although signed in his presence. (c)

The clause of attestation generally expresses, that the witnesses subscribed in the presence of the testator; but such a statement is not absolutely necessary, and if omitted, the jury will not be concluded from finding that the will was duly subscribed, although all the witnesses are dead, and their signatures proved in the common way. (d)

With respect to the credibility of the attesting witnesses, it may be observed generally that they must, at the time of their attestation, (e) have the

(a) *Casson v Dade*, 1 Bro. C. C. 241.

99.

(b) *Eccleston v. Petty*, Carth. 79.
Broderick v. Broderick, 1 P. Wms.
 239. *Machel v. Temple*, 2 Show.
 288.

(c) *Right d. Cator v. Price*, Doug.

(d) *Hands v. James*, Com. 531.

Brice v. Smith, Willes, 1. *Croft v. Pawlet*, Stran. 1109.

(e) *Pendock d. Mackinder v. Mackinder*, Willes, 665.

use of their reason, (a) be sensible of the obligation of an oath, (b) and unconvicted of any infamous crime. (c) Formerly a devisee taking a beneficial interest under the will, was considered not a credible witness to prove its execution within the intent of the statute; (d) but doubts being entertained, whether his credibility might not be restored by a release, payment, or extinguishment of all his interest, (e) it is enacted by the statute 25 G. II. c. 6, (after reciting that it had been doubted who were to be deemed legal witnesses within the statute of frauds,) “that if any person shall attest the execution of any will or codicil (to whom any beneficial devise, legacy, estate, interest, gift or appointment, affecting any real or personal estate, except charges on land, &c. for payment of debts shall be given,) such devise, legacy, &c. shall so far only as concerns such person attesting the execution, or any person claiming under him, be utterly null and void; and such person shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such will or codicil, within the intent of the said act, notwithstanding such devise, legacy, &c. And in case any will or codicil shall be charged with any debt, and any creditor, whose debt is so charged, shall attest the execution of such will or codicil, every such creditor, notwithstanding such charge, shall be admitted as a witness to the execution of such

(a) Gilb. Evid. 109.

(d) Hilliard v. Jennings, 1 Ld.

(b) Hales, P. C. 2 vol. 279.—

Raym. 505. S. C. Com. Rep. 91.

Omichund v. Barker, Willes, 538.

(e) Vide Anstey v. Dowsing, 2

(c) 31 Geo. III. c. 35. Chater v.

Stran. 1253. Wyndham v. Chet-

Hawkins, 3 Lev. 426.

wynd, 1 Burr. 414.

“ will or codicil, within the intent of the said act.
 “ Provided always that the credit of every such wit-
 “ ness so attesting the execution of any will or codi-
 “ cil, in any of the cases within this act, and all cir-
 “ cumstances relating thereto, shall be subject to the
 “ consideration and determination of the Court, and
 “ the jury, before whom any such witness shall be
 “ examined, or his testimony, or attestation made use
 “ of, in like manner as the credit of witnesses in all
 “ other cases, ought to be considered and determin-
 “ ed.” The provisions of this statute extend only to
 cases where the attesting witness is himself the de-
 visee or legatee, and as to him, and any person
 claiming under him, it makes the devise or legacy
 absolutely void; but, they do not extend to cases
 where the attesting witness is the husband or wife of
 the devisee or legatee, (a) and a will has been held to
 be insufficiently attested, which devised to the wife of
 one of the subscribing witnesses a reversion in fee,
 upon the determination of an estate for life, although the
 wife died before the determination of the life estate:
 the interest which renders an attesting witness incom-
 petent under the statute, being an interest at the time
 of the attestation, and not at the time when his testi-
 mony is required. (b)

An executor, and also the wife of an executor, taking
 no beneficial interest under the will, are credible
 witnesses within the meaning of the statute. (c)

(a) *Bettison v. Bromley*, 12. East. 589.

250. *Hatfield v. Thorpe*, 5 B. & A.
 589.

(c) *Phipps. v. Pitcher*, 2 Mars.
 20. *Bettison v. Bromley*, 12 East.

(b) *Hatfield v. Thorpe*, 5 B. & A. 250.

The result of the foregoing inquiry seems to be, that in order to prove a will duly executed within the statute of frauds, it must appear, that it was signed by the testator; that it was published by him in the presence of three or more credible witnesses, either at the same, or different times; that the witnesses subscribed their names respectively in the presence of the testator; and that they all signed the same instrument.

These facts must be proved by the subscribing witnesses, if they are alive and can be produced. But if one witness can prove the whole execution, (as that the testator signed in the presence of himself and two other witnesses, or that he acknowledged his signing to each of them, and that each of the witnesses subscribed in his presence,) this will be sufficient proof of the will, without calling the others. (a) But if the witness who is called, can only prove his own share of the transaction, as must happen where the testator acknowledged his signing to the witnesses separately, the other witnesses must be called. If also the will is disputed by the heir-at-law, he is always entitled to the testimony of all the subscribing witnesses; but then he must produce them himself, if the testimony of one is sufficient for the devisee.

If all the witnesses are dead, or insane, or out

(a) The rule is different in equity; —Hinsdon v. Kersey, 4 Burn. Ec. and when a bill is filed in Chancery Law. 93. Ogle v. Cook, 1 Vez. to establish a will, all the witnesses 177. Townsend v. Ives, 1 Wils. must be examined by the plaintiff. 216.

of the jurisdiction of the Court, proof of the handwriting of the devisor and witnesses, or of the devisor alone, if no proof of the handwriting of the witnesses can be obtained, will be sufficient without evidence of the solemnities. (*a*)

If a subscribing witness should deny the execution of the will, he may be contradicted as to that fact by another subscribing witness; (*b*) and even if they all swear, that the will was not duly executed, the devisee will be allowed to go into circumstantial evidence to prove its due execution. (*c*) So also if one of the subscribing witnesses impeach the validity of the will on the ground of fraud, and accuse other witnesses who are dead, of being accomplices in the fraud, the devisee may give evidence of their general character. (*d*)

When an ejectment is brought by the devisee of a copyholder, he must prove his own admission, and the admission of his testator; (*e*) and these facts will be sufficiently established, by producing the original entries on the rolls of the manor by the proper officer (which entries the Courts will compel the lord to permit his tenant to inspect,) (*f*) and proving the identity of the parties admitted, (*g*) without also producing the

- (*a*) *Hands v. James*, Com. 531. 3 Esp. 284. S. C. 4 Esp. 50.
Croft v. Pawlett, Stran. 1109. (*e*) *Roe d. Jefferey v. Hicks*, 2
 (*b*) *Vide Alexander v. Gibson*, 2 Wils. 13. *Doe d. Vernon v. Vernon*,
 Campb. 556. 7 East. 8. Ante, 64.
 (*c*) *Lowe v. Jolliffe*, Blk. 365. (*f*) *Folkard v. Hemet*, Blk. 1061.
Pike v. Badmering, cited Stran. The King *v. Shelly*, 3 T. R. 141.
 1096. *Gilb. Evid.* 69. B.N.P. 264. (*g*) *Doe d. Hanson v. Smith*, 1
 (*d*) *Doe d. Walker v. Stephenson*, Campb. 197.

stamped copies required by the stat. 55 Geo. III. c. 184. (a) The will of the deviser must likewise be proved; but as copyhold lands are not within the statute of frauds, it will be sufficient to show a will in writing, (b) although it be neither signed by the testator, nor attested by any witnesses. (c) Indeed even short notes taken by an attorney for the purpose of drawing up a will, where the party died before the will could be completed, have been held sufficient to pass copyhold premises. (d)

It has been said, that any paper, which the Ecclesiastical Court would hold to be a will, shall be sufficient to pass a copyhold, (e) and it is therefore usual to produce the probate, as well as the original paper-writing; but this probate does not appear to be necessary, for it seems, that the courts of common law may enter into the question, whether the paper amounts to a will, although no probate has in fact been granted. (f)

The stat. 55 Geo. III. c. 192, which dispenses with the necessity of the surrender of copyholds to the use of the will of the copyholder, has been held to extend to those cases only, where the surrender is merely formal; and therefore, where by the custom of a manor, a *feme covert* was allowed by will to pass her

(a) *Doe d. Bennington v. Hall*,
16 East. 208.

(b) 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1.

(c) *Nash v. Edmunds, Cro. Eliz.*
100. *Doe d. Cook v. Danvers*,
7 East. 299.

(d) 1 Ander. 34, 85.

(e) *Carey v. Askew*, 2 Bro. Cha.
Rep. 58.

(f) *Doe d. Smith v. Smith, Peake*
Evid. 456.

copyholds, the same having been previously surrendered by the husband and wife, (the wife being examined separate and apart) and the wife subsequently to the statute made her will, but without making a previous surrender, the copyholds did not pass; the surrender being matter of substance, and requiring to be accompanied by the separate examination of the wife. (*a*)

If the lessor be the legatee of a term for years, he must give in evidence the probate of the will, and prove the assent of the executor to the bequest; for where a person bequeaths either specifically, or generally, goods or chattels, real or personal, and dies, the legatee cannot take them without the assent of the executors. (*b*) He must also prove the title of his testator, and show that he had a chattel and not a freehold interest in the premises; because when a party dies in possession, it is presumed that he is seized in fee until the contrary is shown. (*c*) This is most commonly done by the production of the lease: but in a late case where the lessor put in an answer of the defendant to a bill in equity, in which the defendant stated, that "he believed the lessor was *possessed* of the *leasehold* premises in the bill mentioned," it was held, as against the defendant, sufficient evidence that the interest of the testator was only a chattel interest. (*d*)

When the lessor of the plaintiff claims under a

(*a*) *Doe d. Nethercote v. Bartle*, 5
B. & A. 492.

(*c*) *Ante*.

(*d*) *Doe d. Digby v. Steel*, 3

(*b*) 1 Inst. 111, (*a*). *Ante*, 71. *Campb.* 115.

will, and the defendant under a codicil, the validity of which is the question between them, the defendant, on admitting the title of the lessor, has a right to begin, and to have the general reply. (a)

Thirdly, of the evidence necessary when a party claims the land under an execution.

When an ejectment is brought by a tenant by *elegit*, (b) and the debtor is himself in possession of the land, the only evidence necessary is an examined copy of the judgment roll, containing the award of the *elegit*, and return of the inquisition. But if the possession is in a third person, the lessor must either show that such third person came into possession under the debtor, and that his right to the possession has ceased, (c) or (should the party in possession hold adversely to the debtor) be prepared with evidence of his debtor's title. (d) It is not necessary in any case to prove a copy of the *elegit* and inquisition. (e)

The conusee of a statute merchant, when the debtor is in possession, must prove a copy of the statute, of the *capias si laicus*, extent and *liberate* returned; for although by the return of the extent an interest is vested in the conusee, yet the actual possession of that interest is acquired by the *liberate*. (f) The

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| (a) Doe d. Corbett v. Corbett, 3 | 8 T. R. 2. |
| Camp. 368. | (e) Ramsbottom v. Brickhurst, 2 |
| (b) Ante, 69. 109. | M. & S. 565. |
| (c) Ante. | (f) Hammond v. Wood, 2 Salk. |
| (d) Doe d. Da Costa v. Wharton, | 563. |

same proofs are also necessary, when a third person is in possession, as in the case of a tenant by *elegit*. (a)

When the ejectment is to recover lands taken in execution, under a writ of *feri facias*, on a judgment obtained against a termor, if the party in the original action, in which the execution issues, is the claimant, the judgment must be proved. (b) But the writ alone is a sufficient title to the vendee of the sheriff. (c) And where an assignment of a lease by deed taken in execution, was made by the undersheriff in the name, and under the seal of office of the sheriff, it was held unnecessary to prove his authority. (d)

Fourthly, of the proofs to be given, when the claimant is a parson.

When a parson brings ejectment for the parsonage-house, glebe, or tithes, he must prove his admission, institution, and induction; (e) but he need not show a title in his patron, for institution and induction, although upon the presentation of a stranger, are sufficient to put the rightful patron to his *quare impedit*. (f)

Presentation may be by parol, or by writing in

(a) Ante, 301.

(d) Doe *d.* James *v.* Brown, 5 B.

(b) Doe *d.* Bland *v.* Smith, 2 & A. 243.
Star. 199. S. C. Holt. 589.

(e) Snow *d.* Crawley *v.* Phillips, 1

(c) Doe *d.* Batten *v.* Murless, 6 Sid. 220.

M. & S. 113. *Et vide* Doe *d.* Emmet *v.* Thorn, 1 M. & S. 425.

(f) B. N. P. 105.

the nature of a letter to the bishop ; (*a*) in the latter case it may be proved by production of the letter ; in the former by a witness who was present and heard it ; but it cannot be proved by the person making the presentation, although he were only grantee of the avoidance. (*b*) The ceremony of institution may be proved by the letters testimonial of institution ; or by the official entry in the public register of the diocese, which ought regularly to record the time of the institution, and on whose presentation it was given. This entry, therefore, if regularly made, is proof of the presentation, as well as of the institution. The induction may be proved, either by some person present at the ceremony, or by the indorsement on the mandate of the ordinary to induct, or by the return of the mandate, if any has been made, (*c*)

Proof was formerly required that the claimant had read and subscribed the thirty-nine articles, according to the statute, and declared his assent and consent to all things contained in the book of common prayer ; but this is no longer held to be necessary, unless some ground be laid by the defendant to show, that he has not complied with these requisites ; because the presumption is, that every man has conformed to the law, until there be some evidence to the contrary. (*d*)

Entries made by a deceased rector in his books,

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| (<i>a</i>) Co. Litt. 120, (<i>a</i>). B. N. P. | (<i>c</i>) Chapman v. Beard, 3 Ans. |
| 105. The King v. Eriswell, 3 T. R. | 942. |
| 723. | (<i>d</i>) Powell v. Milburn, 3 Wils. |
| (<i>b</i>) B. N. P. 105. | 355. S. C. 2 Black. 851. |

may be given in evidence by his successor, (*a*) upon a question of tithes; and he is also entitled to give in evidence such terriers as have been regularly made and preserved in the proper repository; that is to say, such terriers as are signed by a churchwarden, or (if the churchwardens are nominated by the parson) by some of the substantial inhabitants of the parish, (*b*) and are found either in the bishop's register office, (*c*) or in the register of the archdeacon of the diocese. (*d*) It is not necessary that the terrier should be signed by the parson; but, unless it possesses the marks of authenticity above mentioned, it cannot in general be received in evidence. But where a terrier was found in the registry of the dean and chapter of Lichfield, it was admitted in evidence against one of the prebendaries, upon the principle that there appeared to be a proper connexion between the terrier, and the place where it was found. (*e*)

An ejectment for a parsonage and glebe, will not be supported, by showing that the defendant entered and took the tithes belonging thereto; because the tithes and the rectory are not the same. (*f*)

When a lay impropiator brings an ejectment for tithes, the strict proof of title is to show that the rectory originally belonged to one of the dissolved

(*a*) *Glynn v. Bank of England*, 1406.

2 *Veaz.* 38. 43. *Roe d. Brune v.*
Rawlings, 7 *East.* 279. 290.

(*b*) *B. N. P.* 248. *Earl v. Lewis*,
4 *Esp.* 3.

(*c*) *Atkins v. Hatton*, 4 *Gwill.*

(*d*) *Potts v. Durant*, 4 *Gwill.*
1050. 1054.

(*e*) *Miller v. Foster*, 4 *Gwill.* 1406.

(*f*) *Hem v. Stroud*, *Latch.* 61.

monasteries, and was granted by the crown to those under whom he claims; (*a*) but, as deeds and instruments are liable to be lost, length of possession, and old deeds conveying tithes, have been deemed sufficient evidence of title. (*b*)

Fifthly, of the proofs required, when the action is brought by a guardian, for the lands of an infant.

If the claimant be a guardian in socage, (*c*) he must prove the seizin of the person from whom his ward claims; (*d*) the heirship of the ward; that he was under the age of fourteen years at the time of the demise in the declaration; and that amongst those relations to whom the inheritance cannot descend, he himself is the next of blood to the ward. (*e*)

If the claimant be a testamentary guardian appointed by stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24. s. 8, he must prove the seizin of the father; the due execution of the deed or will, which appoints him guardian; and the minority of the ward at the time of the demise.

Sixthly, of the proofs required by persons claiming in a representative character, that is to say, by assignees of bankrupts, or insolvent debtors, (*f*) and by executors and administrators. (*g*)

Assignees of a bankrupt must prove the title of the

(*a*) *Vide* Com. 651.

(*e*) Litt. Sec. 123: Doe *v.* Rigge

(*b*) *Kinaston v. Clarke*, 5 T. R. 265, *in notis*.

v. Bell, 5 T. R. 471.

(*f*) Ante, 70.

(*c*) Ante, 66.

(*g*) Ante, 67.

(*d*) Ante, 28.

bankrupt to the premises, as when the bankrupt himself is the lessor of the plaintiff; and if the lands are freehold, they must prove the bargain and sale to them by the commissioners, and its enrolment. (*a*) Their representative character as assignees must be proved in the same manner, and subject to the same rules, as in other actions. (*b*)

The assignee of an insolvent debtor, after proving the title of the insolvent, is only required to produce a copy of the record of the conveyance and assignment to such assignee, as filed in the Insolvent Court; but such copy must be written on parchment, and purport to have the certificate of the provisional assignee of the Court, or his deputy, indorsed thereon, and be sealed with the seal of the Court. (*c*)

When an ejectment is brought by a personal representative, he must show his representative character by producing the probate of the will, or letters of administration, or the book of the Ecclesiastical Court, wherein they are entered, (*d*) in addition to the proof of his testator's, or intestate's, title.

Seventhly, of the proofs by mortgagees. (*e*)

When the lessor of the plaintiff is the mortgagee of the premises, and the mortgagor is himself the defendant, proof of the due execution of the mortgage deeds

(*a*) Esp. N. P. 431. 438. Doe *d.* (*d*) Garret *v.* Lister, 1 Lev. 25, Elden
Marsack *v.* Read, 12 East. 57. *v.* Keddell, 8 East. 187. Cont. B. N. P.

(*b*) 6 Geo. IV. c. 16. s. 90. 92. 108.

(*c*) 7 Geo. IV. c. 57. s. 19; 1 Wm. (e) Ante, 60.
IV. c. 38. s. 1.

is the only evidence required. (a) If the ejectment be against a third person, who holds the mortgaged lands as tenant to the mortgagor, it will be necessary, in addition to the proof of the mortgage deeds, to give evidence of such tenancy, and either of its regular determination, or that it was created by the mortgagor subsequently to the execution of the mortgage deed. (b) Proof of the title of the mortgagor is only necessary when the defendant holds the land adversely to such title.

The proofs are the same when the assignee of a mortgagee is the claimant, with the additional proof of the derivative title of the assignee from the mortgagee.

Eighthly, of the proofs by a lord of a manor, and by copyholders.

When a lord seizes the land as forfeited *pro defectu tenentis*, if he seize absolutely, he must prove a custom in the manor entitling him to do so ; but if he seize only *quousque*, the custom need not be proved ; and an absolute seizure unwarranted by the custom, cannot afterwards be set up as a seizure *quousque*. (c) He must also prove that the regular proclamations have been made, and in one report of Lord Salisbury's case, (c) it is said, that the proclamations must be proved by *vivâ voce* evidence, and that the entry thereof on the court rolls is not sufficient ; but no

(a) Ante, 108.

R. 378. Doe *d.* Clark *v.* Trap-
paud, 1 Stark. 281.

(b) Keech *v.* Hall, Doug. 21.

Thunder *d.* Weaver *v.* Belcher, 3
East. 449. Birch *v.* Wright, 1 T.

(c) Lord Salisbury's case, 1 Lev.
63. S. C. 1 Keb. 287.

mention is made of this point in the other report of the same case, nor does it appear in a modern similar decision, that any evidence of this nature was required. (*a*)

When the lord of a manor brings an ejectment for a forfeiture, he must prove that he was lord at the time of the forfeiture committed (unless the act of forfeiture destroys the estate, in which case, the heir of such lord may also take advantage of it,) (*b*) and that the person, who is alleged to have committed the forfeiture, has been admitted tenant on the rolls of the manor. Proof of the admittance of the father, and of the descent to the copyholder as son and heir, and payment of quit-rents by him, will not be sufficient evidence: the tenant must be himself admitted, for nothing vests in a copyholder which he can forfeit, before admittance and entry. The act of forfeiture must of course also be proved; but proof is not required of the presentment of the forfeiture, nor of the entry, or seizure of the lord; (*c*) nor will the defendant be allowed, having been admitted and done fealty, to show that the *legal* estate was not in the lord at the time of admittance. (*d*)

A lord of a manor cannot maintain ejectment for mines upon his manor, without proof that he has been actually possessed of them within the last twenty

(*a*) *Doe d. Tarrant v. Hellier*, 3 T. 11 East. 56. B. N. P. 108. *Et vide* R. 162. *Watk. Copy*, v. i. 324 to 353.

(*b*) *Ante*, 61.

(*d*) *Doe d. Nepean v. Budden*, 5 B.

(*c*) *Roe d. Jeffreys v. Hicks*, 2 & A. 626.
Wils. 13. *Doe d. Foley v. Wilson*,

years; because they are a distinct possession from the manor, and may be of different inheritances. (a) And a verdict in trover, for lead dug out of them, will not be evidence of the possession of the mines; for trover may be brought on property without possession. (b)

The doctrine of presumption extends to copyhold lands, and upon proper evidence an enfranchisement of them may be presumed even against the crown. (c)

When an ejectment is brought by the surrenderee of copyhold lands, he must prove the surrender to his use, and his subsequent admittance; but it is immaterial whether the admittance be before or after the day of the demise in the declaration. (d)

But where the lessor claims as heir, or under a grant of a reversion by the lord expectant on a life estate, proof of admittance is unnecessary. (e)

When the lessor of the plaintiff is the lessee for years of a copyholder, he must, after proving his lessor's title, show either a special custom in the manor, allowing the copyholder to make leases for years, or that the licence of the lord was obtained before the lease was granted. (f)

(a) Rich v. Johnson, Stran. 1142.

(b) R. N. P. 102.

(c) Roe d. Johnson v. Ireland,
11 East. 220.

(d) Ante, 64.

(e) Ante, 64. Roe d. Cosh v.
Loveless, 2 B. & A. 453.

(f) Co. Copy. s. 51. 2. Watkins
on Copyhold, 30.

We must now consider the proofs required when a privity exists between the defendant and lessor of the plaintiff, or those under whom he claims.

When such privity exists, the claimant instead of proving his title, must show the existence and termination of the privity; for a privity will not be presumed to exist without proof, but being proved the presumption is in favour of its continuance. Thus, if the defendant be let into possession pending a negotiation for a purchase or a lease, proof must be given that he was so let into possession, and that the negotiation was broken off before the day of the demise in the ejectment. (a) In like manner if he has become tenant at will of the premises, the lessor must show how he became so, and that the will was determined by demand of possession or otherwise, and so forth. (a)

When the relation of landlord and tenant regularly subsists between the parties, or those under whom they claim, which is commonly the case in ejectments of this nature, the tenancy may be determined as we have already observed, (b) in three several ways. First, by the efflux of time, or the happening of a particular event. Secondly, by a notice from the

(a) Ante, 121.—In a case, where the landlord by his own negligence, suffered a third person to recover in ejectment against his tenant, who held under a lease, and who attorned to such third person, the Court of Chancery restrained the tenant from setting up

the lease against an ejectment about to be brought by his landlord, although only one year and three quarters of the term was unexpired.—*Baker v. Mellish*, 10 Ves. 544. *Et vide Doe d. Powell v. King*, Forrest. 19.

(b) Ante, 104.

landlord to the tenant to deliver up the possession, or *vice versa*; and, thirdly, by a breach on the part of the tenant of any condition of his tenancy, as by the non-payment of rent, or non-performance of a covenant.

When the tenancy is determined by the efflux of time, if the demise be by deed, or other writing, the lessor has only to prove the counterpart of the lease by one of the subscribing witnesses; and it is not necessary that he should have given notice to the tenant to produce the original lease, to enable him so to do. (a) If there is no counterpart, notice to produce the original lease should be given, and then, but not otherwise, the claimant will be entitled, if the original lease be not produced, to give secondary evidence of its contents. If the demise be by parol, the agreement may be proved by any person present at the making of it; but if it should appear on the trial by the witnesses on the part of the plaintiff, that a written agreement has at any time been drawn up between the lessor, and the party under whom the defendant came into possession, it must be produced by the plaintiff. (b) It is not necessary for the lessor to prove that he, or those under whom he claims, has received the reserved rent within the last twenty years. (c)

Where the tenancy is determined by the happening of a particular event, the lessor must of course also

(a) *Roe d. West v. Davis*, 7 East. 6 Bing. 533.

363.

(c) *Orrell v. Maddox*, Runn. Eject.

(b) *Fenn d. Thomas v. Griffith*, Appen. 458.

prove, that the event, upon which the tenancy is to determine, has happened.

When the tenancy expires by reason of a notice to quit, the lessor must prove the tenancy of the defendant, the service of the notice and its contents, (and if given by an agent, the agent's authority,) (a) and that the notice and the year of the tenancy expire at the same time. When also the notice is for a shorter period than half a year, or expires at any other period than the end of the year of the tenancy, it will be necessary to show the custom of the country where the lands lie, or an express agreement, by which such notice is authorised. (b)

The tenancy of the defendant is commonly admitted, and may be proved when necessary, if no direct evidence can be given of the demise, by declarations on the part of the tenant, the fact of payment of rent (and it is advisable to give the tenant notice to produce his receipts) or the like.

The service of the notice, (c) and the authority to serve it, will be proved by the person who delivered it to the tenant; but if there is a subscribing witness thereto, such subscribing witness must also be called, (d) although it should happen that he only witnessed the signature of the landlord, and did not deliver the notice himself. The contents of the notice may be proved by a duplicate original, which should be com-

(a) Ante, 126.

(b) Ante, 140.

(c) Ante, 133.

(d) Doe. *d.* Sykes *v.* Durnford,
2 M. & S. 62.

pared with the notice actually served, by the party serving it; but if this precaution is not taken, parol evidence may be given of its contents; and it is not necessary in either case, to give the defendant notice to produce the original in his possession. (*a*)

When the notice is given by an agent, it must be shown that he was vested with his authority at the time the notice was given. (*b*) And where two or more joint tenants, &c., are lessors of the plaintiff, and a notice to quit is given by one or more in the name of all, although they all afterwards join in an ejectment, it will not be presumed, from that circumstance, that an authority was originally given by the parties not joining in the notice, to their co-tenants. (*c*) But where a notice to quit was given by the steward of a corporation, it was presumed, inasmuch as he was an officer of the corporation, that he had an authority to give the notice. (*d*)

When the tenant has been long in possession of the premises, it frequently becomes extremely difficult to prove the time of his original entry; but nevertheless, some evidence must be given, from which the jury may presume that the time of the expiration of the notice and of the year of the tenancy are the same, or the plaintiff will be nonsuited.

If the tenant has been applied to by his landlord respecting the time of the commencement of his te-

(*a*) *Jory v. Orchard*, 2 B. & P. 41.

(*d*) *Roe d. Dean of Rochester v.*

(*b*) *Ante*, 126.

Pearce, 2 Campb. 96.

(*c*) *Ante*, 126. (note *b*.)

nancy, and has informed him that it began on a certain day, and in consequence of such information, a notice to quit on that day is given at a subsequent period, the evidence is conclusive upon the tenant, and he will not be permitted to prove that in point of fact the tenancy has a different commencement: nor is it material whether the information be the result of design or ignorance, as the landlord is in both instances equally led into an error. (a) When also the tenant at the time of the service of the notice assents to the terms of it, he will be precluded from showing that it expires at a wrong time. But such assent must be strictly proved; and in a case where the party made no objection to the notice at the time of its delivery, but said, "I pay rent enough already, it is hard to use me thus;" it was held that these circumstances were not sufficient to prevent him from showing the time when the tenancy actually commenced. (b)

When a notice to quit upon any particular day, is served upon the tenant personally, if he read its contents, or they be explained to him, without any objection being made on his part, as to the time of the expiration of the notice, it will be *primâ facie* evidence of a holding from the day mentioned in the notice. (c) In like manner, a receipt for a year's rent up to a particular day, is *primâ facie* evidence

(a) *Doe d. Eyre v. Lambley*, 2 Esp. 635.

(b) *Oakapple d. Green v. Copous*, 4 T. R. 361.

(c) *Thomas d. Joues v. Thomas*, 2 Campb. 647. *Doe d. Clarges v. Foster*, 13 East. 405. *Doe d. Leicester v. Biggs*, 2 Taunt 109.

of a holding from that day. (a) But if the notice be not delivered personally, or be not read over or explained to the party, no such presumption will arise, although a contrary doctrine was formerly maintained. (b) When also the notice is to quit generally at the expiration of the current year of the tenancy, &c. (c) no presumption can arise, as to the time of the commencement of the tenancy, from a personal delivery to the tenant. But where a general notice was delivered on the 22d of March, to quit at the expiration of the current year, &c. and on the 16th of January following, a declaration in ejectment was delivered to the tenant, laying the demise on the 1st of November, and the tenant on the receipt of this declaration made no objection to the notice to quit, nor set up any right to the possession of the premises, but said he should go out as soon as he could suit himself with another house, it was ruled by Lord Ellenborough, C. J. that the defendant's declaration, when served with the ejectment, was evidence to go to the jury, whether the holding was a Michaelmas holding, and the jury found a verdict for the landlord. (d) And in a case where the notice was delivered on Sept. 27, to quit "at the expiration of the term for which you hold the same," which notice was served personally upon the tenant, who observed, "I hope Mr. M. does not mean to turn me out," Holroyd, J. permitted the lessor to prove, that it was the general custom, in that part of the country where

(a) *Doe d. Castleton v. Samuel*, 2 Campb. 387.

5 Esp. 174.

(c) *Ante*, 142.

(b) *Doe d. Puddicombe v. Harris*,

(d) *Doe d. Baker v. Wombwell*,

1 T. R. 161. *Doe d. Ash v. Calvert*, 2 Campb. 559.

the demised lands lay, to let the same from Lady-day to Lady-day, and that the defendant's rent was due at Michaelmas and Lady-day respectively, and directed the jury to presume, that this tenancy, like other tenancies in that part of the country, was a tenancy from Lady-day to Lady-day. (*a*)

When the ejectment is brought upon a clause of re-entry for non-payment of rent, if the proceedings are at common law, the lessor must prove the lease, or counterpart, (*b*) and that the rent has been demanded with all the formalities mentioned in a preceding chapter. (*c*) If the case falls within the provisions of the statute 4 Geo. II. c. 28, instead of proving a demand of rent, he must show that six months rent is in arrear, and that there is not a sufficient distress upon the premises. (*d*) In order to prove the latter fact, evidence must be given that every part of the premises has been searched; and in a case where the party who was about to make the distress, omitted to enter a cottage upon the premises, the Court considered the search insufficient. (*e*) But if the lessor show that he was prevented by the defendant from entering on the premises, proof that there was no sufficient distress will be dispensed with. (*f*)

(*a*) *Doe d. Milnes v. Lamb*, Nottingham Summer Assizes, 1817.—MS.

(*b*) *Roe d. West v. Davis*, 7 East. 363.

(*c*) *Ante*, 160.

(*d*) *Ante*, 162.

(*e*) *Doe d. Powell v. King*, Forrest. 19.

(*f*) *Doe d. Chippendale v. Dyson*, 1 M. & M. 77.

The search must, of course, be made after the time when the rent became due, and also after the expiration of the time when it was payable to save the forfeiture; (a) but it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that there was no sufficient distress upon the premises, throughout the whole period of time during which the rent has been in arrear. If he proves that on any one day, from the time when the rent became due, to the day of the demise in the declaration, there was no sufficient distress, it will entitle him to a verdict. And even if he proves an insufficient distress, on some day *after* the day of the demise; as, for example, on *some day* in May, (the demise being laid on May 2,) it will be sufficient *prima facie* evidence to call upon the defendant to show, that there was a sufficient distress upon the premises within the terms of the proviso. (b)

It is not necessary that the amount of rent proved to be due, should correspond with the amount stated in the particulars of breaches delivered by the plaintiff. (c)

When the ejectment is for the breach of any other covenant, the lessor must show the covenant broken, by the same evidence as in an action of covenant; and if he has been ordered by the Court to give to the tenant particulars of the breaches upon which he means to rely, he will be precluded from giving in evidence different breaches from those contained in the particulars.

(a) Ante, 161.

(c) Tenny *d. Gibbs v. Moody*, 3(b) Doe *d. Smalt v. Fuchau*, 15 Bing. 3.

In an ejectment on a proviso for re-entry, for breach of covenant not to assign or let the premises, it was ruled by Lord Alvanley, C. J., that if a person was found in possession acting and appearing as tenant, it was sufficient *prima facie* evidence of an underletting to call upon the defendant (the lessee) to show in what character such person was upon the premises; and that the declarations of such person were admissible in evidence against the lessee. (a) But in a subsequent case, upon similar evidence of possession, (accompanied, indeed, by a declaration of the party that he had taken the premises from a third person, but which does not seem to form the ground of the decision) Lord Ellenborough, C. J., directed a nonsuit; observing, that upon such evidence, *non constat*, that the party was not a tortious intruder, that it was incumbent on the lessor to prove that the lessee had either *assigned* or *let*, and that the evidence produced would not be sufficient, even if the lessee had covenanted *not to part with the possession*. (b)

If the claimant is the assignee of the reversion, after proving the forfeiture, evidence must be given that he was entitled to the reversion at the time the forfeiture was committed, (c) and if possible of the mesne assignments from the original lessor. These mesne assignments, however, will be presumed, if the original lease be for a long term, and the possession of the assignee has continued for a considerable time. (d)

(a) Doe *d.* Hindley *v.* Rickarby, (c) Ante, 72.

5 Esp. 4.

(d) Earl *d.* Goodwin *v.* Baxter,

(b) Doe *v.* Payne, 1 Star. 86. Blk. 1223.

Lastly; Of the evidence on the part of the defendant.

The principle that a claimant in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title, is now so clearly established that little can be said respecting the evidence necessary on the part of the defendant. The lessor of the plaintiff must always, in the first instance, make out a clear and substantial possessory title to the premises in question; and the defendant's evidence is altogether confined to falsifying his adversary's proofs, or rebutting the presumptions which may arise out of them. He needs not show that he has himself any claim whatever to the premises, nor even give evidence of a title in a third person; it is sufficient if he make it appear to the jury, that a legal and possessory title does not subsist in the plaintiff's lessor. Thus, when the lessor claims as heir, he may show a devise by the ancestor to a stranger; that by a particular custom another, and not the claimant, is the heir; that the claimant is a bastard; or any other circumstances which will invalidate his title. In like manner when the lessor claims as devisee, the defendant may show, that the will was obtained by fraud; that it was not duly executed; that the testator was a lunatic; and so forth. And as the same principle holds, whatever be the title of the claimant, any particular directions respecting the defendant's proofs are altogether unnecessary. It is sufficient to observe generally, that the defendant's evidence entirely depends on the nature of the proofs advanced by the plaintiff's lessor, and need in no case to be extended beyond the rebuttal of them.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the Trial and subsequent Proceedings.

THE claims of the several parties being prepared for the decision of a jury, by means of the fictions, conditions and proofs, described in the preceding chapters, the trial with its incidents, and the subsequent proceedings, will now occupy our attention.

The death of the lessor of the plaintiff, although he be only tenant for life, will not abate the action, nor can it be pleaded *puis darrien continuance*; because the right is supposed to be in his lessee, (the plaintiff,) who may proceed for the damages occasioned by the supposed ouster, although he cannot obtain possession of the land; (a) but a trial of this nature is unknown in practice, for the damages in ejectment are only nominal, and if the plaintiff be nonsuited from the refusal of the defendant to appear at the trial, the executor of the lessor will not be entitled to his costs, for the consent rule is merely personal. (b)

(a) *Thrustout d. Turner v. Grey*, (b) *Thrustout v. Bedwell*, 2 Wils. 7. Stran. 1056.

If the defendant refuses at the trial to appear, and confess lease, entry, and ouster, the plaintiff must be nonsuited, unless the action be at the suit of a landlord against his tenant, in which case it is optional with the lessor of the plaintiff to be nonsuited, or proceed with the trial. If he adopt the latter course, he must produce the consent rule and undertaking of the defendant (which by stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. s. 2, is made evidence of lease, entry, and ouster,) and prove that the tenant, or his attorney, has been served with due notice of trial; and he will then be enabled, after proof of his right to the demised premises, to go into evidence, and recover the amount of the mesne profits, accruing from the day of the determination of the tenant's interest, to the time of the verdict, or to some preceding day, to be specially mentioned therein.

The landlord has also, by the same statute, a like privilege with regard to the recovery of the mesne profits, in case of the appearance of the tenant at the trial; but the statute does not extend to cases in which the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist.

By the stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 87. s. 38, the presiding judge is authorized in all cases of trials of ejectments, when the verdict shall pass for the plaintiff, or he shall be nonsuited for want of the defendant's appearance to confess lease, entry, and ouster, to certify on the back of the record that a writ of possession ought to issue immediately, and such writ shall thereupon issue. (a)

(a) Appendix, No. 37.

The judge is also authorized when the rule required by stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. s. 1, has been entered into by the defendant, (a) to stay the execution of the judgment, absolutely, until the fifth day of the ensuing term, if he shall think the finding of the jury was contrary to evidence, or that the damages were excessive; and is *compelled* so to stay the execution, upon the requisition of the defendant, upon his undertaking to find, and within four days from the trial actually finding security, by the recognizance of himself and two sufficient sureties in such reasonable sum as the judge shall direct, not to commit any waste or wilful damage, or sell, or carry off any standing crops, hay, straw, or manure, from the premises, from the day of the verdict until the day of execution. (b)

When the plaintiff is nonsuited, from the defendant's refusal to appear and confess, the cause of the nonsuit should be specially indorsed upon the *postea*, in order to entitle the plaintiff to have his costs taxed and allowed, upon the consent rule; (c) and also to enable him (in case the judge should refuse under stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. s. 38,) to have judgment entered against the casual ejector. (d)

With respect to the time of entering this judgment, a considerable difference prevails between the practice of the Court of King's Bench, and of the Common Pleas: the judgment being signed, and the execution

(a) Ante, 246.

(b) 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. s. 3.

(c) Ante, 232.

(d) *Turner v. Barnaby*, Salk. 259.

Appen. No. 33.

taken out, in the latter Court, immediately after the entering of the nonsuit, and, in the former, not until the day in bank when the *postea* should be returned ; (a) and it is to be regretted that two of the superior courts should differ on a point so essential to the regular administration of justice.

If there be several defendants, and some of them refuse to appear and confess, it is the practice to proceed against those who do appear, and enter a verdict for those who do not, indorsing upon the *postea*, that such verdict is entered for them, because they do not appear and confess ; and the plaintiff's lessor will then be entitled to his costs against such defendants, and to judgment against the casual ejector for the lands in their possession. (b)

If there be any material variance between the issue and the record, it seems that the defendant should nevertheless appear at the trial, and afterwards move the Court to set aside the verdict for the variance ; (c) because if he do not appear, he is out of court, and cannot afterwards properly move to set aside the nonsuit ; yet, upon a motion of this nature, the Court did, in one case, grant the rule upon payment of

(a) *Doe d. Palmerston v. Copeland, et Throgmorton d. Fairfax v. Bentley*, 2 T. R. 779. *Doe d. Davies v. Roe*, 1 B. & C. 118.

(b) *Claxmore v. Searle*, Lord Raym. 729. B. N. P. 98. Formerly, if some of the defendants did not appear, the plaintiff was nonsuited

as to all, because *all* the defendants not admitting *the demise*, he could not maintain his declaration. The present practice was adopted in the reign of William III. (*Haddock's case*, 1 Vent. 355.) *Fagg v. Roberts*, 2 Vent. 195.

(c) *Ante*, 273.

costs, (a) and in another case stayed the proceedings. (b)

In a case where the demise was laid on a day not come at the time of the trial, the defendant was notwithstanding obliged to confess, as the plaintiff would otherwise have been nonsuited, and have been entitled to judgment against the casual ejector. (c)

If the property litigated be of great value, and difficulties are likely to arise in the course of the trial, the Court will grant a trial at bar; and the motion for this purpose may be made by either party. But the mere value of the premises, (d) or the probability of a protracted trial, will not be sufficient to induce the Court to grant the application; *difficulty* must concur; and therefore the motion must be supported by an affidavit, stating "the value *per annum* of the estate; that many witnesses are to be produced on each side; that the title of the lessor of the plaintiff will depend, as the case may be, on an intricate course of descent, or the legal operation of deeds; that various points of law, and other questions, will necessarily arise at the trial; and that the cause therefore should be tried at the bar of the Court, by a special jury of the county where the estate lies, if the Court shall so think fit, and not before any one judge of assize."

It has been said, that the rule is not to allow a trial

(a) *Jones d. Thomas v. Hengest*,
Barn. 175.

(b) *Law v. Wallis*, 1 Barnard, 156.

(c) *Anon. l.d. Raym.* 798; *et*

Small d. Baker v. Cole, Burr. 1159.

(d) *Lord Sandwich's case*, Salk.

648.

at bar in ejectment, unless the value of the lands be a hundred pounds *per annum*; (a) and in some authorities it is laid down, that it is not sufficient to swear generally, that the cause is expected to be difficult, but that the particular difficulty, which is expected to arise, ought to be pointed out, to enable the Court to judge whether it be sufficient. (b) And, in a late case, the Court refused a trial at bar, on the mere allegation of length, and probable questions of difficulty in a cause respecting a pedigree. (c)

In other actions, a rule for a trial at bar is never granted before issue joined; but as the issue in ejectment is very seldom joined until after the end of term, when it would be too late to make the application, the motion in this action may be granted even before appearance. (d)

As the granting of a trial at bar is a *favour* conferred upon the applicant, the Courts exercise the power of annexing equitable conditions to their grant. Thus where, on an application made by the defendant for a trial at bar, it appeared, on showing cause against the rule, that the lessor of the plaintiff was unable to bear the expense, and that one of his witnesses was above eighty years of age, who might die before a trial at bar could be had; the Court granted the application, but said, that as it was a favour asked by the defendant, they would lay him under terms, that

(a) *Goodright v. Wood*, 1 Barnard, 141. *Goodright v. Wood*, 1 Barnard, 141.

(b) *Rex v. Burgesses of Caer-marthen*, Say 79. 2 Lil. P. R. 740.

(c) *Tidd*, 768.

(d) *Roe d. Cholmondley v. Doe*, Barn. 455.

if he succeeded, he should only have *nisi prius* costs, but if the lessor of the plaintiff were to succeed *he* should have bar costs, and that the old witness should be examined on interrogatories, and her deposition read, if she should die before the trial. It was also, by consent, made part of the rule, that the cause should be tried by a Middlesex jury, instead of one from Norfolk, where the premises were situated. (a) And in another case, where the lessor of the plaintiff had had a rule for a trial at bar, but having laid the demise by a wrong person, had discontinued the action, and brought a new ejectment; the Court would not grant him a second rule for a trial at bar, until he had paid the costs of the former ejectment. (b)

After verdict the successful party is of course entitled to the judgment of the Court; and, unless when the statutes 1 Geo. IV. c. 87, and 1 Wm. IV. c. 70, provide otherwise, the same time is allowed to the other party to move for a new trial, or an arrest of judgment, in ejectment, as in other actions.

The Courts will seldom grant a new trial in ejectment, when the verdict is given for the defendant, because all parties remaining in the situation they were, previously to the commencement of the action, the claimant may bring a second ejectment without subjecting himself to additional difficulties; but this principle does not apply when the verdict is given against the defendant. The possession is then changed. The defendant in the first ejectment becomes the

(a) *Holmes d. Brown v. Brown*,
Doug. 437.

(b) *Lord Coningsby's case*, Stran.
548.

plaintiff's lessor in the second, and is obliged to give evidence of his own title, instead of merely rebutting the claim set up by his opponent; and as this is a point of material consequence to him, "the Courts (to use Lord Mansfield's words) rather lean to new trials on behalf of defendants in the case of ejectments, especially on the footing of surprise." (a)

OF THE JUDGMENT.

By the judgment in ejectment, the plaintiff's lessor obtains possession of the lands recovered by the verdict, but does not acquire any title thereto, except such as he previously had. If, therefore, he has a freehold interest in them, he is in as a freeholder; if he has a chattel interest, he is in as a termor; and if he has no title at all, he is in as a trespasser, and liable to account for the profits to the legal owner, without any re-entry on his part: (b) the verdict in the ejectment being no evidence in a subsequent action, even between the same parties. (c) Since, then, the claimant has a mere *possession* given to him by the judgment, it may be asked how he can become *seized* according to his title if he have more than a chattel interest in the land. This is effected by another fiction. It is a rule of law, that when a man having a title to an estate comes into possession of it by lawful means, he shall be in possession according to his title; and therefore when *possession* is once

(a) *Clymer v. Littler*, 1 Blk. 345. Burr. 60. 90. 114.

348.

(c) *Clerke v. Rowell*, 1 Mod. 10.(b) *Taylor d. Atkins v. Horde*,

given by the sheriff, the possession and title are said to unite, and the plaintiff's lessor holds the lands according to the nature of his interest in them.

As the judgment is grounded on the verdict, it ought not to be entered up for more land, or for different parcels, than the defendant was found guilty of by the verdict, though a variance between the verdict and judgment, occasioned by the misprision, or default, of the clerk in entering the judgment, is not fatal, but may be amended by the Court, even after a writ of error brought. (a)

The Courts, indeed, after judgment, make every possible intendment in favour of the claimant; and if the title declared on can by any means be supposed to exist, consistently with the judgment, such judgment will be supported. Thus, where two demises were laid, by different lessors, of the same premises for the same term, both as to commencement and duration, and the judgment was that the plaintiff recover his *terms* in the premises; and it was objected, that both lessors could not have a title to demise the whole; and that therefore there was an inconsistency in the judgment, and that it did not appear which of the lessors' rights was established; the Court affirmed the judgment; because, after a verdict, a bare possibility of title consistent with the judgment is sufficient, and the two lessors might have been joint tenants, and yet refuse to join in a lease. (b) In like manner

(a) *Mason v. Fox*, Cro. Jac. 631. Appendix, No. 34.

(b) *Morres v. Barry*, Stran. 1180. Ante, 209.

where the declaration contained two distinct demises, by two different lessors, of two distinct undivided thirds, and judgment was given that the plaintiff "*do recover his said terms,*" and on error it appeared (from the facts stated in a bill of exceptions to the judge's directions on a point of law), that the ejectment respected only one undivided third, the judgment was held well enough, when the point was only raised on a bill of exceptions, and *semble* that it would have been well even on a special verdict. (a) Upon the same principle, when in an ejectment on two several demises of two separate parcels of lands, the judgment was entered, that the plaintiff *do recover his term*, and an objection was taken, that it should have said, that the plaintiff *do recover his terms*, the Court said they would extend the word *term* to his *term* in *A.*, and his *term* in *B.*, and affirmed the judgment. (b) And where the ejectment was upon two demises, by different lessors, and the second demise was "*of the aforesaid premises,*" and judgment was entered for the plaintiff as to the first demise, and the defendant as to the other; and it was objected, that from not stating the second demise to be of "*other premises,*" the judgments were contradictory to each other, inasmuch as the defendant was put without day, as to the same premises for which the plaintiff recovered, the Court affirmed the judgment, and construed *the aforesaid premises which the second lessor demised* to mean the term in the premises. (c) So also, where the plaintiff in ejectment declared upon two demises

(a) *Rowe d. Boyce v. Power*, 2 N. R. 1. 35.

(b) *Worrall v. Bent*, Stran. 835.
(c) *Fisher v. Hughes*, Stran. 908.

of several lands, by several parties, but laid only one *habendum*, namely *habendum tenementa prædicta*, so demised by the aforesaid several parties, for seven years, and it was assigned for error, that the declaration was ill for want of another *habendum*; for that the verdict was general, and it was uncertain to which demise the single *habendum* related, the Court held that *reddendo singula singulis*, it was well enough. (a) Where also the declaration was for lands, and common of pasture generally, without stating the common to be appendant, or appurtenant, it was intended after verdict, on a writ of error, to be such common as ejectment could be maintained for. (b) And where the ejectment was for one messuage, or tenement, and four acres of land to the same belonging, the words "to the same belonging" were held to be void; for land cannot properly belong to a house, and then it is a declaration of a messuage or tenement, and four acres of land, which though it be void for the tenement, is good for the *land*; for which the plaintiff, upon releasing the damages, had judgment. (c)

Upon a similar principle, where the plaintiff, in the

(a) *Slebourne v. Bengo*, 1 Ld. Raym. 561. *Moore v. Fursden*, 2 Vent. 214. *S. C. Carth. 224*. *S. C. Comb. 190*.

(b) *Newman v. Holdmyfast*, Stran. 54. Ante, 19.

(c) *Wood v. Payne*, Cro. Eliz. 186. In an old case, where the plaintiff declared on a lease of a house, ten acres of land, twenty acres of meadow, and twenty acres of pasture, by the name of "a

house and ten acres of meadow, be the same more or less," and had a verdict, the judgment was arrested; because the declaration was so uncertain and repugnant, that even the verdict could not help it, the land mentioned in the declaration being so different from that mentioned in the pernomens. (*Anon Yelv. 166.*) But *quare* if such a verdict would not now be good for the ten acres?

first year of the reign of Geo. III. declared upon a demise of the *thirty-third* year of that reign, the Court held that it was well enough after verdict, because it was only a title defectively set out, and there could be no doubt but that a proper title was proved at the trial. (a)

If the plaintiff obtain a verdict for the whole premises demanded, the entry of the judgment is, that the plaintiff recover his term against the defendant of and in the premises aforesaid, or that he recover possession of the term aforesaid. And this form is also used, where a moiety, or other part, of the whole premises is recovered; as, for example, when the plaintiff declares for forty acres in *A.*, and recovers only twenty; and it is at the lessor's peril, that he take out execution for no more than he has proved title to. (b) But where the verdict is for some parcels and not for all, or part of all, as where the plaintiff declares for lands in *A.*, and lands in *B.*, and the defendant is found guilty in *A.* only, the judgment (c) is, that the plaintiff recover his term in *A.*; and as to the other part, whereof the jury acquitted the defendant, that the plaintiff be in mercy, and that the defendant go thereof without day. (d)

If the defendant be acquitted of part, and judg-

(a) *Small d. Baker v. Cole, Burr.* 1159.

(b) *Doe d. Draper's Company v. Wilson, 2 Star.* 477.

(c) As an ejectment is an action of trespass *vi et armis*, the judgment before the statute of 5 and 6

W. & M. c. 12, used to run *quod defendens capiatur*; but, since that statute, such entry is no longer necessary. (*Linsey v. Clerk, Carth.* 390. *S. C. 5 Mod.* 285.

(d) *Judgment Book, 72, 73.*

ment be entered, *quod defendens sit quietus quoad* that part whereof he is acquitted, this is error; for the judgment in this action is not final, as in a writ of right; nor does it protect the defendant from any further suit, but only acquits him against the title set up by the plaintiff in the action. (a)

If a sole defendant die after the commencement of the assizes and before verdict, or after verdict and before judgment, it will not abate the suit; nor can his death be alleged for error, provided the judgment be entered within two terms after the verdict. (b)

When there are several defendants, and one of them dies at any time before judgment, the lessor may proceed against the survivors, upon suggesting the death (c) of such defendant upon the plea roll: the suggestion need not also be entered upon the *nisi prius* roll; for it is sufficient if it there appear to the judge, what he is to try and between whom; nor need the judgment say, *quod quærens nil capiat per breve* against the dead defendant. (d)

If one of several defendants die before verdict, it is the better way to suggest his death on the roll before the trial, and to award a *venire* to try the issue against the surviving defendants; (d) although where in such case the *venire* was awarded against all, upon suggest-

(a) Taylor v. Wilbore, Cro. Eliz. 768.

(b) 17 Car. II. c. 8.

(c) 8 and 9 Will. III. c. 11. s. 7.

(d) Far v. Denn, Burr. 362.

ing the death of the one upon the roll after the verdict, the plaintiff had judgment for the whole against the others. (a) But if the lessor proceed to trial, and obtain judgment against all the defendants, without such suggestion, it is error, because there can be no verdict, or judgment, against a person not in being. (b)

The entry of the judgment, notwithstanding the death of one of several defendants, ought to be general, that the plaintiff recover his term in the premises against the survivors; (c) but execution must not be taken out for more than the plaintiff has a right to recover.

It seems that if the defendants make a joint defence for the whole land demanded, and one of them die, execution may be given of the whole, because the whole interest comes by survivorship to the others, and therefore the plaintiff hath still persons before the Court to defend the whole; but that where each of the defendants makes a defence for part only, the plaintiff, upon the death of one of them, must not take out execution for the part in his possession, because they are in the nature of distinct defendants, and consequently, as to that part which was defended by the person deceased, there is no person in Court against whom judgment can be given, or execution taken out. (b)

If an ejectment be brought against baron and *feme*,

(a) *Gree v. Rolle*, Ld Raym. 716.

(c) *Far v. Denn*, 1 Burr. 362.

(b) *Gilb. Eject.* 98.

and the plaintiff have a verdict against *both*, but, before judgment, the husband dies, the plaintiff, on suggesting his death, may have judgment against the wife ; because (having been found guilty of the trespass) she must have obtained the unlawful possession *jointly* with her husband, or have had the whole possession in her own right ; and in either case, the possession is wholly in her on the death of her husband. (a)

OF THE COSTS.

When the action is undefended, and judgment is entered against the casual ejector, the only remedy which the lessor of the plaintiff has for his costs, is an action for mesne profits, in which, at the discretion of the jury, they are recoverable as consequential damages.

When the party interested appears and enters into the consent rule, and afterwards at the trial refuses to confess, he is liable, upon such consent rule, to the payment of costs, and an attachment may be issued against him if he refuse, or neglect to pay the m ; (b) but no writ of *fierifacias*, or *capias ad satisfaciendum*, will in this case lie, because the judgment in the ejectment is against the casual ejector. (c)

When there are several defendants, some of whom appear at the trial and confess, but others do not

(a) *Rigley v. Lee*, Cro. Jac. 356. 259.

Lee v. Rowkeley, 1 Roll. 14.

(c) *Goodright d. Rowell v. Vice*,

(b) *Turner v. Barnaby* 1, Salk. Barn. 182.

appear, and a verdict is found against those who do appear, each defendant is liable for the whole costs, and the plaintiff's lessor may tax them all against any one or all of the defendants at the same time; that is to say, upon the *postea* against those who appear, and upon the consent rule against those who do not appear; and if after satisfaction from one defendant for the costs, he take out execution against another, the Court will interfere to prevent it. But it seems he cannot separate the costs, and tax part of them against one defendant, and part against another. (a)

If the lessor of the plaintiff die after issue joined and before trial, or even after trial and before taxation of costs, the defendant cannot recover his costs against the representative, the consent rule being, (as already mentioned,) merely personal; and it seems immaterial, whether the defendant's claim arises from a verdict in his favour, or from the plaintiff's being nonsuited upon the merits, (b) or by reason of the defendant's refusal to confess; but where the plaintiff's lessor died after the trial, the defendant was compelled by the Court to pay to his representative the costs, which had been taxed *by consent* upon the consent rule. (c)

When the tenant appears, and there is a verdict and judgment against him, execution may be taken out thereon for the costs, as in ordinary cases; and the lessor of the plaintiff may have a *capias ad satis-*

(a) *Thrustout d. Wilson v. Foot*, 7. *Doe d. Lintot v. Ford*, 2 Smith, B. N. P. 335. S. C. Barn. 149. 407.

(b) *Thrustout v. Bedwell*, 2 Wils. (c) *Goodright v. Holton*, Barn, 119.

faciendum, or a *feri facias*, for the costs, and an *habere facias possessionem* for the possession, separately, or in one writ at his pleasure. (a)

When the judgment in ejectment is against a *femese*, who marries before execution, the plaintiff's lessor should sue out an *habere facias possessionem* in the maiden name of the defendant for the land, and then proceed by *scire facias* against the husband and wife for the costs. (b)

When the landlord is made defendant without the tenant, the judgment to recover the possession is against the casual ejector; but nevertheless, as there is a judgment in existence against the landlord, execution may be taken out thereon for the costs. (c)

It may be collected from the case of *Gulliver v. Drinkwater*, (d) that, independently of these remedies, the lessor may, in all cases, recover the amount of his taxed costs (e) in an action for mesne profits; but that the Court will not interfere to assist him, if the jury do not include such costs in their damages, when the lessor might have proceeded for them in a different manner.

When the proceedings are in the Court of King's Bench, and a verdict is found for the defendant, or the plaintiff is nonsuited for any other cause than

(a) Appendix, Nos. 36, 37, 38, 39, 40.

(b) *Doe d. Taggart v. Butcher*, 3 M. & S. 557.—Appendix, No. 42.

(c) Appendix, No. 35.

(d) 1 T. R. 261.

(e) *Doe v. Davis*, 1 Esp. 358.

the defendant's not confessing lease, &c. the defendant must tax his costs on the *postea*, as in other actions, and sue out a *capias ad satisfaciendum*, or *fieri facias*, for the same against the plaintiff; and if, upon showing this writ under seal to the lessor, serving him with a copy of the consent rule, and demanding the costs, the lessor do not pay them, the Court will, on an affidavit of the facts, grant an attachment against him. (a)

When the proceedings are in the Court of Common Pleas, it is the practice in such case, for the prothonotary to tax the costs upon the *postea*, and mark them upon the consent rule. This rule is then shown to the plaintiff's lessor, and at the same time the costs are demanded of him by the defendant personally, or by his attorney named in the rule; and, upon affidavit of such demand, and of the lessor's refusal to pay the costs, an attachment may be obtained. (b)

When there are several defendants, and any of them are acquitted by the verdict, they will, by the provisions of statute 8 & 9 Wm. and M. c. 11, be entitled to costs, unless the judge

(a) *Tily v. Baily*, M. 6. Geo. II.

(b) Imp. C. B. 5 Ed. 654. In a late case in the Common Pleas, in which the parties had pursued the practice of the Court of King's Bench, Mansfield, C. J. expressed

a hope that nothing so absurd as a *capias ad satisfaciendum* against the nominal plaintiff, would ever again be heard of. *Doe d. Prior v. Salter*, 3 Taunt. 485.

shall certify in open court that there was a good cause for making them defendants. (a)

When the lessor of the plaintiff is a peer, no attachment will be granted against his person; but the Court will grant a rule to show cause, why an attachment, as to his goods and chattels, should not be issued, and, if necessary, will make that rule absolute. (b)

In a case where baron and *feme* were lessors in ejectment, and the baron died after entering into the rule, the *feme* was held liable to the payment of the costs; because they were to be paid by the lessors of the plaintiff, and both of them were in the lease. (c)

Where the lessor of the plaintiff was an infant, and his lessee was nonsuited, and 50*l.* costs were given to the defendant, and the infant's father, who prosecuted the suit, was dead, the Court made a rule, that the lessor should pay the costs; yet, says the book, it was doubted in this case, because of his infancy; but if the father had been alive, the Court would have made him pay the costs, or, if he had left assets, his executor. The question was adjourned. (d)

If the lessor of the plaintiff abandon the action

(a) The provisions of this statute seem scarcely applicable to the present mode of conducting ejectments, for how can it be said, that he who was made a defendant at his own request, was made so with-

out good cause!

(b) *Thornby d. Hamilton v. Fleetwood*, Cas. Pr. C. P. 7.

(c) *Morgan v. Stapely*, 1 Keb. 827.

(d) *Anon.* 1 Freem. 373.

after the appearance of the tenant, or landlord, and refuse to join in the consent rule, he is held not liable for the defendant's costs, upon the principle, that until he has put his signature to the rule, he has not consented to proceed against the new defendant. (a)

If the lessor of the plaintiff sue *in formâ pauperis*, he will be dispaupered in case of vexatious delay ; but it does not seem, that the Court will also compel him to pay the defendant's costs. (b)

When there are several defendants, the lessor of the plaintiff has his election to pay costs to which defendant he pleases. (c)

If the lessor proceeds under the stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. s. 1, and is nonsuited on the merits, or has a verdict pass against him, the defendant is entitled to double costs.

OF THE EXECUTION.

When the lessor of the plaintiff prevails, he may enter peaceably upon the premises recovered, without any writ of execution, because the land recovered is certain ; (d) but it is more prudent to sue out the regular writ, as the assistance of the sheriff may be necessary to preserve the peace.

(a) Smith *d.* Ginger *v.* Barnardiston, Blk. 904.

(c) Jordan *v.* Harper, Stran. 516.

(b) Doe *d.* Leppingwell *v.* Trussell, 6 East. 505.

(d) Taylor *d.* Atkins *v.* Horde, Burr. 60. 88. Anon. 2 Sid. 155. 6.

The writ of execution in an ejectment is called the writ of *habere facias possessionem*, and answers to the *habere facias seisinam* in real actions: for as in the one case, the freehold being recovered, the sheriff is ordered to give the demandant *seisin* of the lands in question, so also in the other case, the *possession* being recovered, the sheriff is commanded to give execution of the *possession*. (a)

When the landlord is admitted to defend the action, and the judgment is entered against the casual ejector, with a stay of execution until further order, if the plaintiff be nonsuited at the trial, because of the refusal of the defendant to appear and confess, the lessor cannot sue out a writ of possession, without first moving the Court for leave to do so; and the rule is, in the first instance, only a rule to show cause. And if he sue out a writ of possession without such motion, the execution will be set aside for irregularity. But if the plaintiff obtains a verdict and judgment against the landlord, he may take out execution on the judgment against the casual ejector, notwithstanding the terms of the consent rule, without any further order of the Court. (b)

When the writ of possession issues upon a judge's certificate, under the authority of stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. s. 37, it must, instead of the usual recital of a recovery by judgment, recite as directed by the statute,

(a) Appendix, Nos. 36 to 40.

B. & C. 897.

(b) *Doe d. Lucy v. Bennett*, 4.

that the cause came on for trial at *Nisi Prius*, at such a time and place, and before such a judge, (naming time, place and judge) and that thereupon the judge certified his opinion that a writ of possession ought to issue immediately. (a)

If the lessor of the plaintiff be divested of his right of possession between the time when his demise is laid, and the time of issuing execution, it seems that the Court will prevent him from issuing a writ of *habere facias possessionem*, or set one aside, if issued. (b)

In other cases the execution follows, of course, upon the judgment.

The writ of possession is drawn up in general terms, commanding the sheriff to give to the plaintiff "the possession of his term, of and in the premises recovered in the ejectment;" but without any particular specification of the lands whereof he is to make execution; and as the description of the premises, in the demise in the declaration, is also too general to serve as a direction to the sheriff, it is the practice, for the lessor of the plaintiff, at his own peril, to point out to the sheriff the premises whereof he is to give him possession; and if the lessor take more than he has recovered in the action, the Courts will interfere in a summary manner, and compel him to make restitution. (c)

(a) Appendix, No. 37.

(b) *Doe d. Morgan v. Bluck*, 3
Campb. 447.

(c) *Roe d. Saul v. Dawson*, 3

Wils. 49. *Doe d. Draper's Comp.*
v. Wilson, 2 Stark. 477. Ante, 23.

They will also, if circumstances require, interfere before the execution of the writ, and restrain the lessor from taking possession of more than he is entitled to. As, where the lessor had declared for lands held under two separate titles, and by a mistake of the judge upon the law of the case, the verdict was given for the plaintiff upon both titles, when it ought to have been entered for the defendant as to the lands comprised in one of them; the Court after argument granted a rule to confine the execution to those lands only, to which the lessor had a valid title. (a)

The sheriff it seems, previously to the execution of the writ, may demand an indemnity from the plaintiff; (b) and when he has to deliver possession of any particular number of acres, he must estimate them according to the custom of the country in which the lands are situated. (c)

The possession to be given by the sheriff, is a full and actual possession, and he is armed with all power necessary to this end. Thus, if the recovery be of a house, and he be denied entrance, he may justify breaking open the door, for the writ cannot otherwise be executed. (d)

If the lessor recover several messuages in the possession of different persons, the sheriff must go to each of the several houses, and severally deliver pos-

(a) *Doe d. Forster v. Wandlass*,
7 T. R. 118, *in notis*. *Et vide*
Brooke d. Mence v. Baldwin, Barn.
468.

(b) *Gilb. Eject.* 110.
(c) *Roll. Ab.* 886. H. 4.
(d) *Semayne's case*, 5 Co. 91, (b).

session thereof, (which is done by turning out the tenants;) for the delivery of the possession of one messuage, in the name of all, is not a good execution of the writ; since the possession of one tenant is not the possession of the other. (a) But when the several messuages are in the possession of one tenant only, it is sufficient if he give possession of one messuage in the name of all. (b)

When the recovery is of land, the same distinction seems to prevail; that is to say, if there be only one tenant, a delivery of any part, in the name of the whole, will be sufficient; but if there be more than one, a separate delivery of the lands in the possession of each tenant respectively must be made. (a)

If the officers be disturbed in the execution of the writ, the Court will, on affidavit of the circumstances, grant an attachment against the party, whether he be the defendant, or a stranger: (c) and the writ is not understood to be completely executed, until the sheriff and his officers are gone, and the plaintiff is left in quiet possession.

In an old case where the sheriff returned, that in the execution of the writ, he removed all the persons, whom upon diligent search he could find on the premises, and gave peaceable possession to the plaintiff, and that, immediately after he was gone, three men, who were secretly lodged in the house, expelled the

(a) 1 Roll. Ab. 886. H. 2.

(c) Kingsdale v. Man, 6 Mod. 27.

(b) Floyd v. Bethill, 1 Roll. Rep. S. C. Salk. 321.

plaintiff, upon notice of which he returned to the house to put the plaintiff in full possession, but met with such resistance that he could not do it, but at the peril of his life; the Court held that the same was no execution, and awarded a new writ: (*a*)

In the old authorities we find it laid down, that if the lessor, after having had possession given to him by the sheriff, and before the writ of possession has been returned and filed, be again ousted by the defendant, he shall have a new writ of possession, or an attachment; but that if he be ousted by a stranger, he shall be driven to another ejectment; and the reason assigned for this distinction is, that in the one case the defendant shall never, by his own act, keep the possession which the plaintiff has recovered from him by due course of law, and in the other that, as the title was never tried between the plaintiff and the stranger, he may claim the land under a title paramount to that of the plaintiff, and therefore the recovery and execution in the former action, ought not to hinder the stranger from keeping that possession, to which he may have a right. It is also said, that the return of the writ of the execution is so much in the power of the plaintiff, that the Court will not, at the instance of the defendant, direct it to be returned; for the return is left to the discretion of the plaintiff, that he may do what is most for his own advantage, in order to have the benefit of his judgment; the best way to effect which is, to permit him to renew the

(*a*) *Upton v. Wells*, 1 Leon. 145.

execution at his pleasure, until full execution be obtained. (a)

All these cases, however, seem to be overruled by a late decision of the Court of Common Pleas. The lessor of the plaintiff had been put into possession by virtue of a writ of *habere facias possessionem*, on the 22d day of February, 1806, which writ had never been returned by the sheriff; and on the 10th day of October, 1807, whilst he continued in possession, the person, against whom he had recovered the premises, entered into the house by force, and resisted with violence all attempts to regain the possession. Upon these grounds, a new writ of *habere facias* was moved for, and the case of *Radcliff v. Tate*, (b) was cited: but “the Court denied the authority of that case, and held that possession having been given under the first writ, the sheriff ought to have returned, ‘that he had given possession,’ and that the plaintiff could not afterwards have had another writ: an *alias* cannot issue after a writ is executed. If it could, the plaintiff, by omitting to call on the sheriff to make his return to the writ, might retain the right of suing out a new *habere facias possessionem*, as a remedy for any trespass which the same tenant might commit within twenty years next after the date of the judgment;” (c) and the rule was refused.

(a) *Rex v. Harris*, *Ld. Raym.* 482. *Molincux v. Fulgam*, *Palm.* 289. *Ratcliff v. Tate*, 1 *Keb.* 776. *Loveless v. Ratcliff*, 1 *Keb.* 785. *Devereux v. Underhill*, 2 *Keb.* 245. *Fortune v. Johnson*, *Styl.* 318. *Pierson v. Tavenor*, 1 *Roll. Rep.* 353. *Da-*

vies d. Povey v. Doe, *Blk.* 392. *Anon.* 2 *Brown*, 253. *Kingsdale v. Mann*, 6 *Mod.* 27. *S. C.* *Salk.* 321. *Goodright v. Hart*, *Stran.* 830.

(b) 1 *Keb.* 779.

(c) *Doe d. Pate v. Roe*. 1 *Taunt.* 55.

If the lessor neglect to sue out his writ of possession for a year and a day after judgment, he must revive the judgment by *scire facias*, as in other cases ; and when the judgment is against the casual ejector, the ter-tenant must be joined in the writ. (a)

When a sole defendant in ejectment dies after judgment, and before execution, it has been doubted whether a *scire facias* is necessary, because the execution is of the land only, and no new person is charged ; (b) but the surer method is, notwithstanding, to sue out a *scire facias*. And as a *scire facias* for the land must issue against the ter-tenant, whoever he may be, it will be also necessary to sue out another *scire facias* for the costs against the personal representative, unless he be himself the ter-tenant. (c)

When the judgment in ejectment is against a *feme sole*, who marries before execution, the plaintiff's lessor should sue out an *habere facias possessionem* in the maiden name of the defendant for the land, and then proceed by *scire facias* against the husband and wife, for the costs. (c)

If the lessor of the plaintiff die after the *teste* of the writ, but before it is actually sued out, it is not necessary to revive the judgment by *scire facias* ; and as he is not a party on the record, it seems no *scire facias* would be necessary, if he died before the *teste*

(a) Withers v. Harris, Lord Raym. Proctor v. Johnson, 2 Salk. 600.
806.—Appendix, No. 42. S. C. Id. Raym. 669.

(b) Per Holt, C. J. Withers v. (c) Doe d. Taggart v. Butcher,
Harris, Id. Raym. 806. Sed vide 3 M. & S. 557.

of the *habere facias possessionem*, although the case of *Doe d. Beyer v. Roe*, (a) has certainly left this point somewhat doubtful.

When the sheriff delivers possession of the land under the writ of *habere facias possessionem*, he thereby also delivers possession of the crops upon it; and such crops will pass to the lessor, although severed at the time of the execution of the writ, provided such severance has been made subsequently to the determination of the tenant's interest, and of the day of the demise in the declaration. (b) And the growing crops will also pass to the lessor by the execution of the writ of possession, although previously seized under a *feri facias* against the tenant, if the day of the demise be prior to the issuing of such *feri facias*, inasmuch as they cannot be said to belong to the tenant, who is a trespasser from that day. (c)

OF THE WRIT OF ERROR.

A writ of error in ejectment cannot be brought in the name of the casual ejector, (d) and consequently it will not lie until after verdict; for, before appearance, the casual ejector is the only defendant in the suit, and, after appearance, the new defendant is bound by the terms of the consent rule to plead the

(a) Burr. 1970.

(b) *Doe d. Upton v. Witherwick*,
3 Bing. 11.

(c) *Hodgson v. Gascoigne*, 5 B.
& A. 88.

(d) *Roe d. Humphreys v. Doe*,
Barn. 181. This principle is of
course limited to the modern prac-
tice.—Ante, chap. VI.

general issue. (a) If also the defendant refuse at the trial to confess, &c. he will be precluded from bringing error, because the plaintiff will then be nonsuited as to him, and the judgment will be entered against the casual ejector. (a)

When indeed the landlord defends alone, and the verdict is found against him, error may be brought, notwithstanding that the judgment, upon which the execution issues, is entered against the casual ejector: (a) for a judgment is also in existence against the landlord, and upon that judgment, the writ of error may be taken out in the landlord's name. To enable him, however, to proceed with the writ of error, he must, it seems, obtain a rule to stay the plaintiff from taking out execution against the casual ejector; (b) and if he omit to do this, and suffer a regular execution to take place, the Court will not, on a subsequent motion, order the execution to be set aside. (c)

By statutes 16 and 17 Car. II. c. 8. s. 3 and 4, it is enacted, that no execution shall be staid by writ of error, upon any judgment after verdict in ejectment, unless the plaintiff in error shall become bound in a reasonable sum to pay the plaintiff in ejectment all such costs, damages, and sums of money, as shall be awarded to such plaintiff, upon judgment being affirmed, or on a nonsuit, or discontinuance had; and, in case of affirmance, discontinuance, or nonsuit, the

(a) Ante, 263.

(b) Ante, 340.

(c) *George d. Bradley v. Wisdom*,
Burr. 756.

Court may issue a writ to inquire, as well of the mesne profits, as of the damages by any waste committed after the first judgment; and are upon the return thereof to give judgment, and award execution for the same, and also for costs of suit.

The words of this statute seem to render it necessary for the plaintiff in error to be *personally* bound; but by a reasonable construction, it is held sufficient, if he procure proper sureties to enter into the recognizance of bail, for otherwise lessors residing in distant counties would sustain great inconvenience, and an infant lessor, or a lessor becoming a *feme covert* after action brought, would be entirely excluded from the benefit of the act. (a) But, although the sureties may be examined as to their sufficiency, the plaintiff in error cannot, and therefore where the lessor of the plaintiff swore, that the defendant was insolvent, and also that he (the lessor) had a mortgage upon the land for more than it was worth, the Court still held, that the defendant's recognizance was sufficient to entitle him to his writ of error.

The plaintiff in error is not bound to give the defendant in error notice of his entering into the recognizance pursuant to stat. 16 and 17 Car. II. c. 8. s. 3; (b) and the reasonable sum in which the recognizance is taken under this statute, is generally

(a) *Barnes v. Bulmer*, Carth. 121. *Deardon*, 8 East. 298.

Lushington d. Godfrey v. Dose, 7 Mod. 304. (b) *Doe d. Webb v. Goundry*, 7 Taunt. 427.

double the improved rent of the premises in dispute, and the single costs of the ejectment. (a)

The writ of error does not operate as a stay of execution until bail is put in, which cannot be done until the plaintiff's lessor has taxed his costs, for until costs are taxed, the amount of the penalty of the recognizance of the bail in error cannot be fixed; and if the lessor choose to waive his taxation of costs, and proceed for his possession only, the Court will not interfere to prevent him, notwithstanding the allowance of the writ of error. (b)

Where the tenants in possession, having undertaken to appear on the usual terms, and also to take short notice of trial, made no defence at the trial, but sued out a writ of error, when the judgment was signed; the Court, on motion, allowed the lessor to take his judgment and execution against the casual ejector, notwithstanding the pendency of the writ of error. (c)

In the case of *Wharod v. Smart*, (d) the defendant brought a writ of error in parliament, and the Court compelled him to enter into a rule "not to commit waste, or destruction, during the pendency of the writ of error."

When the plaintiff's lessor proceeds against the bail by action on the recognizances, they are not

(a) *Thomas v. Goodtitle*, Burr. Taunt. 289.
 2501. *Keene d. Lord Byron v. Deardon*, 3 East. 298. (c) *Doe d. Morgan v. Roe*, 3 Bing. 169.
 (b) *Doe d. Messiter v. Dinely*, 4 (d) Burr. 1823.

chargeable with the mesne profits under stat. 16 and 17 Car. II. c. 1. s. 4, unless their amount has been first ascertained by writ of inquiry pursuant to the provisions therein contained. (a).

After a recovery in ejectment, the lessor of the plaintiff may peaceably enter, pending a writ of error, if he find the premises vacant; but he cannot enter by force, nor take out a writ of execution. (b)

OF BRINGING A SECOND EJECTMENT.

We have now traced the proceedings in this action, from the commencement to the conclusion; and it only remains to add a few remarks respecting the bringing of a new, or second ejectment.

It has already been observed, that a judgment in ejectment confers no title upon the party in whose favour it is given; and that it is not evidence in a subsequent action, even between the same parties. (c) From these circumstances it is manifest, that the judgment can never be final; and that it is always in the power of the party failing, whether claimant, or defendant, to bring a new action. The structure of the record also renders it impossible to plead a former recovery in bar of a second ejectment: for the plaintiff in the suit is only a fictitious person, and as the demise, term, &c. may be laid many different ways, it never can be made appear that the second ejectment is brought upon the same title as the first.

(a) *Doe v. Reynolds*, 1 M. & S. 398. Recog. in *Withers v. Harris*, 247. Ld. Raym. 806. 8.

(b) *Badger v. Floyd*, 12 Mod. (c) *Ante*, 215.

It is said by Mr. Serjeant Sellon, in his Practice of the Courts, (a) “ that it has sometimes been attempted in Chancery, after three or four ejectments by a *bill of peace* to establish the prevailing party’s title ; yet it hath always been denied, for every *termor* may have an ejectment, and every ejectment supposes a new demise, and the *costs* in ejectment are a recompence for the trouble and expense to which the possessor is put. But that where the suit begins in Chancery for relief touching pretended incumbrances on the title of lands, and the Court has ordered the defendant to pursue an ejectment at law, there, after one or two ejectments tried, and the right settled to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court hath ordered a *perpetual injunction* against the defendant, because there the suit is first attached in that Court, and never began at law ; and such precedent incumbrances appearing to be fraudulent, and inequitable against the possession, it is within the compass of the Court to relieve against it.” It should seem however from the cases of *Barefoot v. Fry*, (b) and *Leighton v. Leighton*, (c) that courts of equity will sometimes interfere, and grant perpetual injunctions, when the ejectments have been commenced in the usual way at the common law. (d) And in one case, where upon a most vexatious prosecution of ejectments, the Court of Chancery refused to grant a perpetual injunction, upon an appeal to the House of Lords, the injunction was allowed. (e)

(a) 2 Sell. Prac. 144.

(b) Bumb. 158.

(c) 1 P. Wms. 671.

(d) *Deardon v. Lord Byron*, 8

Price, 417.

(e) *Earl of Bath v. Sherwin*, Bro.

Cas. Parl. 270.

CHAPTER XII.

Of staying the Proceedings in the Action of Ejectment.

THE discretionary power exercised by the Courts in the regulation of ejectments, is frequently called forth by applications from the defendant, to stay the proceedings in the action; and a separate consideration of the cases in which these applications have been granted, seems preferable to intermixing them with the detail of the regular practice.

When the ejectment is brought on the forfeiture of a lease, the proceedings will be stayed upon the application of the tenant, until the lessor of the plaintiff has delivered particulars of the breaches of covenant, on which he intends to rely; and a summons for this purpose will be granted before the tenant has appeared to the action, or entered into the consent rule. (a)

When the lessor of the plaintiff is an infant, the Court will stay the proceedings until security be

(a) *Doe d. Birch v. Phillips*, 6 T. R. 597.

given for the costs, unless a responsible person has been made the plaintiff in the suit, or the father, or guardian undertake to pay them; but an inquiry as to these facts should be made previously to the application. (a) The proceedings will also be stayed until security be given for the costs, when the lessor resides abroad; (b) and, in a case where an ejectment was brought upon the demise of a person resident in Ireland, the Court of King's Bench stayed the proceedings until security should be given for the costs, although it was an ejectment brought under the direction of the Court of Chancery, where the bill was retained until after the trial of the ejectment, and security had already been given there to the amount of £40. (c) In like manner, if the plaintiff's lessor should die pending the action, it seems that the Court, although they cannot stay the proceedings *in toto*, will not suffer the suit to proceed, unless security be given for the costs. (d) And when the lessor is unknown to the defendant, the latter may demand an account of his residence, or place of abode, from the lessor's attorney, and if he refuse to give it, or give a fictitious account of a person who cannot be found, proceedings will be stayed until security for the costs be given. (e) But these are the utmost limits to which the Courts will go in granting rules of this nature; and an application has been refused, founded on the

(a) *Noke v. Windham*, Stran. 694. *Throgmorton d. Miller v. Smith*, Stran. 932. *Anon.* 1 Wils. 130. *Anon.* 1 Cowp. 128. Appendix, No. 43.

(b) B. N. P. 111. Appendix, No. 44.

(c) *Denn d. Lucas v. Fulford*, Burr. 1177.

(d) *Thrustout d. Turner v. Grey*, Stran. 1056.

(e) *Tidd's Prac.* 476, 7.

poverty of the lessor, (*a*) and also one in which it appeared, that an ejectment had previously been brought in another court and abandoned, and that the lessor had been obliged to give security in the first ejectment, because his residence was then unknown. (*b*) The practice of granting these rules originated in the Court of King's Bench, and were indeed at first entirely confined to cases of infant lessors. (*c*)

The proper time to take out a summons, or move the Court for this rule, is after plea pleaded. (*d*)

The next case, in which the Courts interfere to stay the proceedings, is when the costs of a prior ejectment upon the same title, or between the same parties, are left unpaid. (*e*)

For some time after the introduction of this practice, the Court would not interfere unless the two ejectments were brought in the same court; (*f*) but this limitation no longer prevails, and it is now immaterial in what court the first ejectment is brought. (*g*) Formerly also there was a diversity of opinion, whether the proceedings could be stayed, where the two ejectments were brought (without fraud, or collusion) upon

(*a*) *Goodright d. Jones v. Thrustout*, Cas. Pr. C. P. 15.

(*b*) *Doe d. Selby v. Alston*, 1 T. R. 491.

(*c*) *Thrustout d. Dunham v. Percival*, Barn. 183.

(*d*) 2 Sell. Prac. 139.

(*e*) Append. No. 45.

(*f*) *Austine v. Hood*, 1 Sid. 279. *Tredway v. Harbert*, Comb. 106.

(*g*) *Doe d. Hamilton v. Atherly*, 7 Mod. 420. *Anon.* 1 Salk. 255. *Holdfast d. Hattersley v. Jackson*, Barn. 133. *Doe d. Chadwick v. Law*, Blk. 1158. *Doe d. Walker v. Stephenson*, 3 B. & P. 22.

different demises although upon the same title; (a) but it is now of no consequence whether the two ejectments are brought upon the demise of the same or different persons, against all or some of the same parties, or for the same or different premises, provided they are brought upon the same title, and for the recovery of part of the same estate. Thus, proceedings have been stayed where one of the lessors of the plaintiff in the first action died before the commencement of the second; where in the second ejectment two trustees were added to the lessors; where part of the lands were occupied by new tenants; where the second action was between the heir of the plaintiff's lessor, and the heir of the defendant in the first action. (b) And in a case, where the second ejectment was brought by the lessee of an insolvent debtor, who had been the lessor of the plaintiff in the first action, and it appeared that the assignment was fraudulent to evade the payment of the costs, the Court, (without entering into the point, whether, in a fair case, the assignee of an insolvent debtor shall be called upon for former costs, before he be suffered to bring a new ejectment on the title of his principal) made the rule absolute to stay the proceedings until the costs of the first action were paid. (c)

A distinction was also formerly taken as to the situation of the parties in the different actions, and it was holden, that if the defendant in the second

(a) *Short v. King*, Stran. 681.
Tredway v. Harbert, Comb. 106.

(b) *Doe d. Hamilton v. Hatherly*,
 Stran. 1152. *Thrustout d. Williams*
v. Holdfast, 6 T. R. 223. *Keene d.*

Angel v. Angel, 6 T. R. 740. *Doe*
d. Feldon v. Roe, 8 T. R. 645.

(c) *Doe d. Chadwick v. Law*, Blk.
 1180.

ejectment had been the claimant in the first, the proceedings should not be stayed: (a) but this doctrine is now also exploded, and the change of situation in the parties is immaterial. (b) The rule will also be granted, whether the merits be decided in the former action, or whether a judgment of nonsuit, or of *non-pros*, be given: nor is the length of time which elapses between the two actions any bar to the rule; for many good reasons may exist for such delay, as the poverty of the other party, or a wish to end the controversy. (c)

The Courts will likewise stay the proceedings in a second ejectment until the costs of a former one be paid, if the conduct of the party, against whom the application is made, has been vexatious or oppressive, although he is not liable to the costs of the first action. Thus, where the lessor of the plaintiff in the second action was also the lessor in the first, and had refused, after the appearance of the defendant in such first action, to enter into the consent rule; whereby, although nonsuited for want of a replication, he was exempted from the costs of the defendant's appearance, the Court would not let him proceed in the second ejectment until he had satisfied the defendant for the expenses of such first appearance. (d) And, upon the same principle, where the first ejectment was on the demise of the husband and wife, but the husband alone entered into the consent rule,

(a) *Roberts v. Cook*, 4 Mod. 379. *Keene d. Angel v. Angel*, 6 T. R.

(b) *Thrustout d. Williams v. Holdfast*, 6 T. R. 223. 740. *Anon. Salk.* 255.

(d) *Smith d. Ginger v. Barnardiston*, Blk. 904. *Ante*, 273.

(c) *Dence v. Doble*, Comb. 110.

and judgment was given therein in the Common Pleas for the defendant, (which judgment was afterwards affirmed in the King's Bench and the House of Lords,) and after the death of the husband, the wife brought a second ejectment on her own demise; the Court would not suffer her to proceed until the costs of the first ejectment were paid, saying, "We are not going to compel the lessor to pay the costs, but only to prevent her being vexatious." (a)

In a recent case, in which claimants under very peculiar circumstances had brought three actions, in three different terms, in the Court of King's Bench, for the same property, and all three were pending together, and the parties had not proceeded to trial in either, but several orders had been made in the first cause, and the defendants had obtained a rule calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why they should not elect to proceed in one action only, and in case they should elect to proceed in either of the two last actions, why the first action should not be discontinued, and the costs paid by the claimants; and thereupon an improvident rule was agreed to, by which the proceedings in the two last actions were stayed, and the claimants were to proceed to trial in the first action under great disadvantages as to costs, and instead of proceeding with that action, they brought a new ejectment in the Court of Common Pleas, that Court upon motion stayed the proceedings therein. (b)

It was once holden, that the proceedings in a

(a) *Doe d. Hamilton v. Hatherly*,
Stran. 1152.

(b) *Doe d. Carthew v. Brenton*,
6 Bing. 469.

second ejectment ought *not in any case* to be stayed for non-payment of the costs in the first action, if costs were not of right payable to the party applying; (a) and that it was *in all cases* necessary to show, that the party against whom the application was made, had acted vexatiously, or oppressively, before the rule could be obtained. But these maxims have long given place to more just and equitable principles. (b)

The Court has also ordered the proceedings in a second ejectment to be stayed until the costs of an action for mesne profits (upon which the lessor in the second ejectment, who had been the defendant in the first, had brought a writ of error) as well as the costs of the first ejectment, were paid. (c) But the Court will not extend the rule to include the damages recovered in such action for the mesne profits, however vexatious the proceedings of the party may have been. (d)

The Courts will not stay the proceedings in the second action, where the party, against whom the application is made, is already in custody under an attachment for non-payment of the costs of the first action, (d) nor will they include the taxed costs of a suit in equity, brought by the same party for the same property, as well as the costs of a prior ejectment, in

(a) *Thrustout d. Parke v. Trou-
blesome*, Stran. 1099. S. C. And.
297:

(b) *Short v. King*, Stran. 681.

(c) *Doe d. Pinckard v. Roe*, 4
East. 585.

(d) *Doe d. Church v. Barclay*, 15
East. 833.

the rule: (a) nor will they stay the proceedings, if it clearly appear that the verdict in the first action was obtained by fraud and perjury: (b) nor will they in any case in which they stay the proceedings further interfere, so as to compel the claimant to pay the costs by a particular day, or permit the defendant to *non-pros* the action. (c)

There is no particular stage of the proceedings in which it is necessary to move the Court, or take out a summons for this rule. It will be granted even before the defendant has appeared: and it always should be moved for as early in the action as it conveniently can be. Where, however, satisfactory reasons were given to the Court, why the application was not made at an earlier stage of the suit, the Court ordered the proceedings to be stayed until the costs of a former ejectment were paid, after a notice of trial had been given, and the lessor of the plaintiff had been at the expense of bringing his witnesses to the place of trial. (d) The reasons assigned to the Court were, that the cause was so clear at the last trial, and the parties had delayed so long commencing their second action (four years,) that the defendants did not think them in earnest until notice of trial was given, and that the defendant then proceeded to tax his costs, in order to ground the application, which otherwise he would not have done, the lessor of the plaintiff being insolvent.

(a) *Doe d. Williams v. Winch*, 3 B. & A. 602.

(b) *Doe d. Rees v. Thomas*, 2 B. & C. 622.

(c) *Doe d. Sutton v. Ridgway*, 5 B. & A. 523.

(d) *Doe v. Law*, Blk. 1158.

The Courts will also stay proceedings when the lessor of the plaintiff has two actions depending, at the same time, for the same premises, in the same or different courts; and the proceedings in the one action will then be stayed, until the other action is determined. (a) And in a case where the claimant brought thirty-seven separate ejectments for thirty-seven different houses, all of which depended on the same title, the Court said it was a scandalous proceeding, stayed the proceedings in thirty-six of them, and made a rule that they should abide the event of the thirty-seventh. (b)

When the party, against whom a verdict in ejectment has been obtained, brings a writ of error, and pending that writ commences a second ejectment, the Court will order the proceedings in the second action to be stayed until the writ of error is determined; and it seems also, that if it do not appear to the Court, that the writ of error was brought with some other view than to keep off the payment of costs, proceedings will be stayed until the costs of the first action are paid, notwithstanding such costs are suspended by the writ of error. (c)

By the statute 7 Geo. II. c. 20. s. 1, it is enacted, "that when an ejectment is brought by a mortgagee, his heirs, &c. for the recovery of the possession of the

(a) *Thrustout d. Park v. Troublesome*, And. 297. S. C. Stran. 1099.
Doe d. Carthew v. Brenton, 6 Bing. 469.

(b) 2 Sell. Prac. 144. Ante, 264.
 (c) *Fenwick v. Grosvenor*, 1 Salk. 258. *Grumble v. Bodily*, Stran. 554.

mortgaged premises, and no suit is depending in any court of equity, for the foreclosing or redeeming of such mortgaged premises, if the person having a right to redeem, having been made the defendant in the action, shall at any time, pending the suit, pay to the mortgagee, or in case of his refusal, bring into court, all the principal monies, and interest due on the mortgage, and also costs to be computed by the Court, or proper officer appointed for that purpose; the same shall be deemed and taken to be a full satisfaction and discharge of the mortgage, and the Court shall discharge the mortgagor of and from the same accordingly." By the third section, the act is not to extend to any case where the person, against whom the redemption is prayed, shall insist either that the party praying a redemption has not a right to redeem, or that the premises are chargeable with other sums than what appear on the face of the mortgage, or are admitted by the other side, nor to any case where the right of redemption in any cause, or suit, shall be controverted or questioned, by or between different defendants in the same cause or suit.

An application for a rule to stay proceedings under this statute, (a) must of course be made before execution executed, and must be accompanied by an affidavit that no suit in equity is depending. The party should also appear to the action before the application is made, for the Courts have no power to interfere under the statute until after appearance. But where

(a) Append. No. 46.

the premises were in possession of a tenant of the mortgagor, who neglected to appear to the action, in consequence of which the mortgagee recovered possession of the premises under a judgment by default against the casual ejector, the Court of Common Pleas (if the other party had not consented to take what was due upon the mortgage, and restore the possession) would have set the judgment and execution aside, in order to let the mortgagor in as defendant, and place him in a condition to apply to the Court to stay the proceedings on the terms of the statute. (a)

In a case in the Court of King's Bench where a mortgagee made a will, leaving all his property to executors upon certain trusts, and died, and his will was disputed by his heir in the Prerogative Court, but by the sentence of that Court established, and letters testamentary in consequence granted to the executors; after which grant the heir appealed to the Court of Delegates against the sentence of the Prerogative Court, pending which appeal the executors assigned the mortgage to the lessor of the plaintiff, who also pending the appeal, brought an ejectment against the mortgagor for the recovery of the mortgaged premises, to which ejectment the mortgagor did not appear, but suffered judgment to go by default against the casual ejector. Upon an application on the part of the mortgagor (accompanied by an affidavit of the facts) to stay the execution until the determination of the appeal, upon the ground, that the title of the lessor would be invalidated, provided the appeal were given in favour of the heir, and that the defendant

(a) *Doc d. Tubb v. Roe*, 4 Taunt. 887.

might then perhaps be compelled to pay the mortgage-money twice, the Court made the following order: "That the execution obtained by the lessor of the plaintiff in this action of ejectment, be stayed until such time as the appeal, now pending before the Court of Delegates, be determined, upon the defendant vesting the mortgage-money, interest, and costs to be taxed by the Master, in Exchequer bills, and depositing such Exchequer bills in the hands of the signer of the writs in this Court." (a)

A rule upon this statute has been granted after an agreement, on the part of the mortgagor, to convey the equity of redemption to the mortgagee, where no tender of a deed of conveyance for execution had been made to the defendant, or bill in equity filed; (b) but where it appeared that, subsequently to the defendant's agreement, several applications had been made to him, but without effect, to complete the purchase, the Court refused to stay the proceedings. (c)

In a case where, upon an application by the mortgagor to stay proceedings under this statute, it appeared that he had also taken up money from the mortgagee upon his bond, the Court granted the rule upon the payment of the mortgage and interest only, the bond debt not being a lien upon the lands; but it seems that when in such case *the heir* is bound by the

(a) *Doe d. Mayhew v. Erlam*, appeared to the action.
MS. M. T. 1811. The Court did not in this case advert to the circumstance that the mortgagor, who made the application, had not

(b) *Skinner v. Stacey*, 1 Wils. 80.

(c) *Goodtitle d. Taysum v. Pope*, 7 T. R. 185.

bond, and the mortgagor dies, the heir must discharge the bond debt, as well as the mortgage. (a) Where, however, the bond was *a lien on the estate*, and the mortgagee had given notice to the mortgagor, that he should insist upon payment of the money due upon it, the Court refused to stay the proceedings, upon payment of the mortgage-money only. (b) Where also other mortgages, although upon different premises, existed between the defendant and the claimant, the Court would not stay proceedings under this statute, upon the payment of the sum due upon one of the mortgages only. (c)

If upon a motion of this nature, any doubt exist as to the amount of what is due between the parties, the Court of King's Bench will refer the case to the master, and the Court of the Common Pleas to the prothonotary, whose respective duty it is to tax the costs; and in a case where an affidavit was made, that the mortgagee had been at great expense in necessary repairs of part of the premises in his possession (the ejectment being brought for the residue,) and it was prayed, that the prothonotary might be directed to make allowance for such repairs; the Court said, that the rule must follow the words of the statute, and that the prothonotary would make just allowances and de-

(a) *Bingham d. Lane v. Gregg*, Barn. 182. *Archer d. Hankey v. Snapp*, And. 341. S. C. Stran. 1107, and the cases there cited.

(b) *Felton v. Ash*, Barn. 177.

(c) *Roe d. Kaye v. Soley*, Blk. 726. It does not appear from the report

of this case, that the other mortgaged premises were included in the ejectment; but it is difficult to reconcile the decision either to the letter or spirit of the statute, unless they were also contained in the declaration.

ductions. (a) If, however, after taxation, the debt and costs are not paid, the lessor must proceed in the suit, and cannot have an attachment. (b)

The cases in which the Courts have stayed the proceedings under stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, have already been considered. (c)

The Court would not stay proceedings in an action brought by the provisional assignee of the Insolvent Debtor's Court, on an objection that it was not proved at the trial of the cause that the assignee had, pursuant to stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 119. s. 11, the authority of the Insolvent Debtor's Court to proceed. (d)

(a) *Goodright v. Moore*, Barn. 176. (c) *Ante*, 169, &c. *Append. No. 47.*

(b) *Hand v. Dinely*, Stran. 1220. (d) *Doe d. Spencer v. Clarke*, 3 Bing. 370.

CHAPTER XIII.

*Of the Statutes 1 Geo. IV. c. 87, and 1 Wm. IV.
c. 70.*

THE protracted period during which, dishonest or insolvent tenants are enabled, by the ordinary course of law, to retain possession of their farms after the determination of their interest, has long been productive of serious evils to landowners. Unless a tenancy expires at Christmas, upwards of six months will always, and eight or nine months will frequently, elapse, before final judgment and execution can be obtained; and during the whole of that period the tenant has the uncontrolled power of suffering the land to remain uncultivated, or of committing wilful destruction, as his temper or immediate interests may prompt. The legislative provisions of the stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, enacting that tenants holding over shall pay double the yearly value of the land, affords no efficient relief in cases of this description. These frauds are not committed by respectable or responsible tenants; and when the tenant is insolvent or dishonest, the judgment of the Insolvent Debtor's Court gives but an unsubstantial remedy for the injury which the landlord has sustained.

To lessen, and in a great degree remedy, these evils, the beneficial statutes now under consideration have been passed, and the general effect of them is as follows. They enable the landlord, when the tenant *holds under an agreement in writing*, to compel him before he is admitted to defend, to give security for the damages and costs of the action, and that he will relinquish possession within four days after the trial, unless he shall, within that time, give further security that he will not commit waste, or otherwise injure the land, before the ordinary time of obtaining judgment or execution. And they also enable the landlord in all cases, *whether the holding has been in writing or by parol*, to bring his cause to trial at the assizes next following the expiration of the tenancy, unfettered by the machinery of terms and returns; as likewise to recover the mesne profits as well as the land itself in the ejectment, and to obtain possession immediately after the trial, if the judge shall certify his opinion on the record that he ought to do so.

By stat. 4 Geo. I. c. 87, after reciting the losses to which landlords were exposed by the law as it then stood, it was enacted, “That where the term or interest of
 “any tenant, holding under a lease or agreement in
 “writing any lands, &c. for any term or number of
 “years certain, (a) or from year to year, shall have ex-
 “pired or been determined either by the landlord or
 “tenant by regular notice to quit, (a) and such tenant,
 “or any one holding or claiming by or under him, shall

(a) Post. 374.

“ refuse to deliver up possession accordingly, after
 “ lawful demand in writing made and signed by the
 “ landlord or his agent, and served personally upon,
 “ or left at the dwelling-house or usual place of abode
 “ of such tenant or person, and the landlord shall
 “ thereupon proceed by action of ejectment for the
 “ recovery of possession, it shall be lawful for him, at
 “ the foot of the declaration, to address a notice to
 “ such tenant or person, requiring him to appear in
 “ the court in which the action shall have been com-
 “ menced, on the first day of term then next follow-
 “ ing, (a) or if the action shall be brought in Wales, or
 “ in the counties Palatine of Chester, Lancaster, or
 “ Durham respectively, then on the first day of the
 “ next session or assize, or at the court day, or other
 “ usual period for appearance to process then next
 “ following, (as the case may be,) there to be made
 “ defendant, and to find such bail, if ordered by the
 “ Court, and for such purposes, as are hereinafter
 “ next specified; and upon the appearance of the
 “ party at the day prescribed, or in case of non-
 “ appearance on making the usual affidavit of ser-
 “ vice of the declaration and notice, it shall be lawful
 “ for the landlord, producing the lease or agreement,
 “ or some counterpart or duplicate thereof, and prov-
 “ ing the execution of the same by affidavit, and upon
 “ affidavit (b) that the premises have been actually en-
 “ joyed under such lease or agreement, and that the
 “ interest of the tenant has expired, or been deter-
 “ mined by regular notice to quit, as the case may
 “ be, and that possession has been lawfully demanded

(a) Post. 375.

(b) Ante, 246.

“ in manner aforesaid, to move the Court for a rule
“ for such tenant or person to show cause, within a
“ time to be fixed by the Court on a consideration
“ of the situation of the premises, why such tenant
“ or person, upon being admitted defendant, besides
“ entering into the common rule, and giving the com-
“ mon undertaking, should not undertake, in case a
“ verdict shall pass for the plaintiff, to give the plain-
“ tiff a judgment, to be entered up against the real
“ defendant, of the term next preceding the time of
“ trial, or if the action shall be brought in Wales, or
“ in the counties Palatine respectively, then of the
“ session, assize, or court day, (as the case may be)
“ at which the trial shall be had, and also why he
“ should not enter into a recognizance, by himself
“ and two sufficient sureties, in a reasonable sum,
“ conditioned to pay the costs and damages which
“ shall be recovered by the plaintiff in the action;
“ and it shall be lawful for the Court, upon cause
“ shown, or upon affidavit of the service of the rule
“ in case no cause shall be shown, to make the same
“ absolute in the whole, or in part, and to order such
“ tenant or person, within a time to be fixed, upon
“ a consideration of all the circumstances, to give
“ such undertaking, and find such bail, with such
“ conditions and in such manner as shall be specified
“ in the said rule, or such part of the same so made
“ absolute; and in case the party shall neglect or
“ refuse so to do, and shall lay no ground to induce
“ the Court to enlarge the time for obeying the same,
“ then upon affidavit of the service of such order an
“ absolute rule shall be made for entering up judg-
“ ment for the plaintiff.”

By section 2, it is further enacted, "That wher-
 ever it shall appear on the trial of any ejectment, at
 the suit of a landlord against a tenant, that such
 tenant, or his attorney, hath been served with due
 notice of trial, the plaintiff shall not be nonsuited
 for default of the defendant's appearance, or of
 confession of lease, entry, and ouster, but the pro-
 duction of the consent rule and undertaking of the
 defendant shall, in all such cases, be sufficient evi-
 dence of lease, entry, and ouster; and the Judge
 before whom such cause shall come on to be tried
 shall, whether the defendant shall appear upon
 such trial or not, permit the plaintiff on the trial,
 after proof of his right to recover possession of the
 whole, or of any part of the premises mentioned in
 the declaration, to go into evidence of the mesne pro-
 fits thereof, (a) which shall, or might have accrued
 from the day of the expiration or determination
 of the tenant's interest in the same, down to the
 time of the verdict given in the cause, or to some
 preceding day to be specially mentioned therein;
 and the jury on the trial, finding for the plaintiff,
 shall, in such case, give their verdict upon the
 whole matter, both as to the recovery of the whole
 or any part of the premises, and also as to the
 amount of the damages to be paid for such mesne
 profits: provided always, that nothing herein-
 before contained shall be construed to bar any
 such landlord from bringing an action of trespass
 for the mesne profits which shall accrue from the ver-
 dict, or the day so specified therein, down to the

(a) Post. 380.

“ day of the delivery of possession of the premises
“ recovered in the ejectment.” (a)

By section 3, it is further enacted, “ That in all
“ cases in which such undertaking shall have been
“ given, and security found as aforesaid, if upon the
“ trial a verdict shall pass for the plaintiff, but it
“ shall appear to the Judge, before whom the same
“ shall have been had, that the finding of the jury
“ was contrary to the evidence, or that the damages
“ given were excessive, it shall be lawful for the
“ Judge to order the execution of the judgment to be
“ stayed absolutely till the fifth day of the term then
“ next following, or till the next session, assize or
“ court day, (as the case may be ;) which order the
“ Judge shall in all other cases make upon the requi-
“ sition of the defendant, in case he shall forthwith
“ undertake to find, and on condition that, within
“ four days from the day of the trial, he shall actually
“ find security by the recognizance of himself and
“ two sufficient sureties, in such reasonable sum as
“ the Judge shall direct, conditioned not to commit
“ any waste, or act in the nature of waste, or other
“ wilful damage, and not to sell or carry off any
“ standing crops, hay, straw, or manure produced or
“ made (if any) upon the premises, and which may
“ happen to be thereupon, from the day upon which
“ the verdict shall have been given, to the day on
“ which execution shall finally be made upon the
“ judgment, or the same be set aside, as the case may
“ be: Provided always, that the recognizance last

“ above mentioned shall immediately stand discharged
“ and be of no effect, in case a writ of error shall be
“ brought upon such judgment, and the plaintiff in
“ such writ shall become bound with two sufficient
“ sureties unto the defendant in the same, in such
“ sum and with such conditions as may be conform-
“ able to the provisions respectively made for staying
“ execution on bringing writs of error upon judg-
“ ments in actions of ejectment, by an Act passed in
“ England in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of
“ the reign of King Charles the Second, and by an
“ Act passed in Ireland in the seventeenth and
“ eighteenth years of the reign of the same king,
“ which Acts are respectively intituled, *An Act to*
“ *prevent arrests of judgment, and superseding*
“ *executions.*”

Section 4 enacts, “ That all recognizances and se-
“ curities entered into pursuant to the provisions of
“ this Act, may and shall be taken respectively in
“ such manner, and by and before such persons as
“ are provided and authorised in respect of recog-
“ nizances of bail, upon actions and suits depending
“ in the court in which any such action of ejectment
“ shall have been commenced: and that the officer
“ of the same court, with whom recognizances of bail
“ are filed, shall file such recognizances and secu-
“ rities, for which respectively the sum of two shil-
“ lings and six-pence, and no more, shall be paid,
“ but no action, or other proceeding, shall be com-
“ menced upon any such recognizance or security,
“ after the expiration of six months from the time
“ when possession of the premises, or any part

“ thereof, shall actually have been delivered to the
“ landlord.”

The 6th section relates only to the Welsh jurisdiction now abolished ; (a) and by the 7th, 8th, and 9th sections, Scotland is exempted from the operation of the act, all other remedies of landlords are retained, and double costs are given to the defendant if he obtain a verdict, or the plaintiff be nonsuited on the merits.

A tenancy by virtue of an agreement in writing, for *three months certain*, is a tenancy within the meaning of this statute, because it is a tenancy “ for a term certain ;” (b) but a tenancy for years *determinable on lives* is not, because it is not a holding for “ a number of years certain.” (c) So likewise a holding by parol from year to year is not within the statute, the words *in writing* extending to the whole sentence, and not being confined to holdings for a term, or number of years certain. (d) The statute also only applies to cases, where the lease or term has expired by the mere efflux of time, and not to a tenancy determined by a notice to quit, either from or to the landlord, where there is a subsisting lease for a term of years, determinable at the end of a certain number of them, and so determined by a notice under the lease. (e)

(a) Stat. 1 W. IV. c. 70.

(d) *Doe d. Earl of Bradford v.*

(b) *Doe d. Phillips v. Roe*, 5 B. & A. 766.

Roe, 5 B. & A. 770.

(e) *Doe d. Lord Cardigan v. Roe*,

(c) *Doe d. Pemberton v. Roe*, 7 B. & C. 2.

K. B. T. T. 3 Geo. IV. MS. S. C. 1 D. & R. 540.

The Court will only direct recognizances to be entered into under this statute, on the appearance of the defendant, for the costs of the action, and not for the mesne profits. (a)

The notice at the foot of the declaration required by this statute, should be signed by the landlord or his attorney, and should be in addition to, and not form part of; the ordinary notice signed by the casual ejector. (b)

Where upon showing cause against a rule obtained under this statute, upon an affidavit stating a tenancy from year to year, under a written agreement, and that the tenant's interest had been duly determined by a notice to quit, and that there had been a written demand of possession, and that the tenant had been served with the declaration on April 24, 1830, it was sworn by the defendant, that long after the service of the notice to quit, which expired on March 25, 1829, he saw the steward of his landlord, and retook the premises by parol, and that he had rented and held them under such parol agreement, from the said 29th of March to that time, and that he was advised there was a valid tenancy then existing, and that he had a good defence to the action, the Court of Common Pleas made the rule absolute, because the affidavit only deposed that he retook the premises, without stating for what period, or on what terms; and therefore, that in the absence of satis-

(a) *Doe d. Sampson v. Roe*, 6 B. Moore, 54.

(b) *Anon.* 1 D. & R. 435. *Doe d. Sampson v. Roe*, 6 B. Moore, 54.

factory evidence of a new taking, the case was within the act. (a)

By stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. s. 36, after reciting the delays suffered by landlords in recovering possession of their lands, it is enacted, "that in all actions of ejection to be brought in any of his Majesty's Courts at Westminster by any landlord against his tenant, or against any person claiming through or under such tenant, for the recovery of any lands or hereditaments where the tenancy shall expire, or the right of entry into or upon such lands or hereditaments shall accrue to such landlord, in or after *Hilary* or *Trinity* Terms respectively, it shall be lawful for the lessor of the plaintiff in any such action, at any time within ten days after such tenancy shall expire, or right of entry accrue as aforesaid, (b) to serve a declaration in ejection, entitled of the day next after the day of the demise in such declaration, whether the same shall be in term or in vacation, (c) with a notice thereunto subscribed, requiring the tenants in possession to appear and plead thereto, within ten days in the Court, in which such action may be brought; (d) and proceedings shall be had on such declaration, and rules to plead entered and given, in such and the same manner; as nearly as may be, as if such declaration had been duly served before the preceding term: Provided always, that no judgment shall be signed against the casual ejector until default of appear-

(a) *Roe d. Durant v. Doe*, 6 Bing. 574.

(b) *Ante*, 247.

(c) *Ante*, 207, 208.

(d) *Ante*, 230, 249.

“ance and plea within such ten days, and that at
“least six clear days’ notice of trial shall be given
“to the defendant before the commission day of
“the assizes at which such ejectment is intended to
“be tried; provided also, that any defendant in
“such action may, at any time before the trial
“thereof, apply to a judge of either of his Majesty’s
“superior Courts at Westminster, by summons in
“the usual manner, for time to plead, or for staying
“or setting aside the proceedings, or for postponing
“the trial until the next assizes; and that it shall be
“lawful for the Judge in his discretion to make such
“order in the said cause as to him shall seem
“expedient.”

By section 37, it is enacted, “that in making up
“the record of the proceedings on any such de-
“claration in ejectment, it shall be lawful to entitle
“such declaration specially of the day next after the
“day of the demise therein, whether such day shall
“be in term or in vacation, and no judgment there-
“upon shall be avoided or reversed by reason only
“of such special title.” (a)

And by section 38, it is enacted, “that in all
“cases of trials of ejectments at *Nisi Prius*, when a
“verdict shall be given for the plaintiff, or the
“plaintiff shall be nonsuited for want of the defend-
“ant’s appearance to confess lease, entry, or ouster,
“it shall be lawful for the Judge, before whom the
“cause shall be tried, to certify his opinion on the

(a) Ante, 207.

“ back of the record, that a writ of possession ought
“ to issue immediately, and upon such certificate a
“ writ of possession may be issued forthwith; (a) and
“ the costs may be taxed, and judgment signed and
“ executed afterwards at the usual time, as if no
“ such writ had issued: Provided always, that such
“ writ, instead of reciting a recovery by judgment
“ in the form now in use, shall recite shortly that
“ the cause came on for trial at *Nisi Prius* at
“ such a time and place and before such a Judge,
“ (naming the time, place, and judge,) and that
“ thereupon the said Judge certified his opinion
“ that a writ of possession ought to issue im-
“ mediately.”

(a) Appendix, No. 37.

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the Action for Mesne Profits.

WHILST the action of ejectment remained in its original state, and the ancient practice prevailed, the measure of the damages given by the jury, when the plaintiff recovered his term, were the profits of the land accruing during the *tortious* holding of the defendant. But as upon the introduction of the modern system, the proceedings became altogether fictitious, and the plaintiff merely nominal, the damages assessed became nominal also; and they have not since that time included the injury sustained by the claimant from the loss of his possession. It was therefore necessary to give another remedy to the claimant for these damages; and this was effected by a new application of the common action of trespass *vi et armis*, generally termed *an action for mesne profits*: (a) in which action, the plaintiff complains of his ejection and loss of possession, states the time during which the defendant (the real tenant) held the lands and

(a) Reev, E. L. 4 vol. 169.

took the rents and profits, and prays judgment for the damages which he has thereby sustained.

This action is partly superseded, when the relation of landlord and tenant has subsisted between the parties to the ejectment, by the provisions of the stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87, (a) which enables landlords to recover in that action, the mesne profits accruing from the day of the determination of the tenancy (without reference to the day of the demise in the declaration) to the day of the trial, or some *preceding* day. But this mode of recovering the mesne profits is optional with the landlord; and as an action for mesne profits must notwithstanding be resorted to, for the recovery of those profits from the day of the trial, or other *preceding* day, to the day of obtaining possession, and as it is often difficult for the landlord to ascertain what injury he has actually sustained, by the holding over of the tenant (the amount of the damages not being limited to the amount of the rent) until he obtains actual possession, this provision of the statute is in practice seldom resorted to.

It has been said, that a lessor in ejectment may, if he please, waive the trespass, and recover the mesne profits in an action for use and occupation; (b) but this election must be limited to the profits accruing antecedently to the time of the demise in the ejectment; for the action for use and occupation is founded on *contract*, the action of ejectment upon *wrong*, and

(a) Ante, 321. 371.

584. Doc. d. Cheney v. Batten,

(b) Goodtitle v. North, Doug. Cowp. 243.

they are therefore wholly inconsistent with each other when applied to the same period of time; since in the one action the plaintiff treats the defendant as a *tenant*, and in the other as a *trespasser*. (a) When, however, a tenant holds over after the expiration of the landlord's notice to quit, the landlord, after a recovery in ejectment, may waive his action for mesne profits, and maintain debt upon the 4 Geo. II. c. 28, against the tenant, for double the yearly value of the premises during the time the tenant so holds over: for the double value is given by way of penalty, and not as rent. (b)

The action for mesne profits may be brought pending a writ of error in ejectment, and the plaintiff may proceed to ascertain his damages, and to sign his judgment; but the Court will stay execution until the writ of error is determined. (c)

The action isailable or not, at the discretion of the Court, or Judge, and when an order for bail is made, the recognizance is usually taken in two years value of the premises, but this is also discretionary. (d)

The lessor of the plaintiff in the antecedent action

(a) *Birch v. Wright*, 1 T. R. 378.

(b) *Timmings v. Rowilson*, Burr. 1603. It is not yet settled whether, when the ejectment is founded upon a notice to quit given by the tenant, the landlord is entitled to maintain debt upon the 11 Geo. II. c. 19, for double rent, but it seems

the better opinion that he is not. Ante, 153.

(c) *Harris v. Allen*, Cas. Prac. C. P. 46. *Donford v. Ellis*, 12 Mod. 138.

(d) *Hunt v. Hudson*, Barn. 85. 1 Sell. Prac. 36.

of ejectment, is of course the person concerned in interest, but he may bring his action for mesne profits either in his own name, or that of his nominal lessee. (a) The former, however, is the more advantageous method; as he may then, upon proper proofs, recover damages for the rents and profits received by the defendant, anterior to the time of the demise in the ejectment, which cannot be done in an action at the suit of the nominal plaintiff, (b) and the Courts will not stay the proceedings until security be given for the costs, which will be done when the action for mesne profits is brought in the name of such nominal lessee. (c)

It was once indeed doubted whether this action could be maintained in the name of the plaintiff in the ejectment, after a judgment by default against the casual ejector, because, being a possessory action, an entry must be either proved or admitted, neither of which, it was argued, could in such case be done; but it is now settled, that there is no distinction between a judgment in ejectment upon a verdict and one by default, the right of the claimant being in the one case tried and determined, and in the other confessed. (d)

A tenant in common, who has recovered in eject-

(a) It may here be incidentally observed, that when the ancient practice is resorted to, and the plaintiff in the ejectment is a real person, the Court will not permit him to release the action for mesne profits, should the lessor bring it in

his name. (Close's case, Skin. 247. Anon. Salk. 260.)

(b) B. N. P. 87.

(c) Say. Costs. 126.

(d) Aislin v. Parkin, Burr. 655
Jeffries v. Byson, Stran. 960.

ment, may maintain an action for mesne profits against his companion. (a)

A joint action for mesne profits, may be supported by several lessors of the plaintiff in ejectment, after a recovery therein, although there were only separate demises by each. (b)

As the action for mesne profits is an action of trespass, it cannot be maintained against executors or administrators, for the profits accruing during the lifetime of the testator or intestate; nor will a court of equity interfere to enforce the payment of them against personal representatives, when the lessor has been deprived of his legal remedy by the mere accident of the defendant's death. But where the lessor was delayed from recovering in ejectment by a rule of the court of law, and by an injunction at the instance of the defendant, who ultimately failed both at law and in equity, the Court decreed an account of the mesne profits against his (the defendant's) executors. (c)

It is also doubtful whether the action can be maintained against a tenant for the holding over of his undertenants, for it should be brought against the person in actual possession and trespassing. (d) But any person so found in possession after a recovery in ejectment is liable to the action; and it is no defence

(a) *Goodtitle v. Tombs*, 3 Wils. 118. *Cutting v. Derby*, Black. 1077.

(b) *Chamier & another v. Llingon*, 5 M. & S. 64 S. C. 2 Chitty, 410.

(c) *Pulteney v. Warren*, 6 Vez. J. 73.

(d) *Burne v. Richardson*, 4 Taunt. 720.

to say that he was upon the premises as the agent and under the licence of the defendant in ejectment, for no man can license another to do an illegal act. But the measure of the damages in such case will not be the whole mesne profits of the lands, but will depend upon the time such person has had them in his occupation, together with the other circumstances of the case. (a)

In the case of *Keech d. Warne v. Hall*, (b) where it was decided that a mortgagee might recover in ejectment without a previous notice to quit, against a tenant claiming under a lease from the mortgagor, granted after the mortgage, without the privity of the mortgagee, it was asked by the counsel for the defendant, if such mortgagee might also maintain an action against the tenant for mesne profits, which would be a manifest hardship and injustice to the tenant, as he would then pay the rent twice. Lord Mansfield, C. J. gave no opinion on that point; but said, there might be a distinction, for the mortgagor might be considered as receiving the rent in order to pay the interest, by an implied authority from the mortgagee, until he determined his will. (c)

The declaration in the action for mesne profits must expressly state the different parcels of land from which the profits arose, or the defendant may plead the common bar. It should also state the time when the defendant broke and entered the premises and ejected the plaintiff, the length of time during

(a) *Girdlestone v. Porter*, K. B. M. T. 39 Geo. III. Wood. L. and T. 511.

(b) Doug. 21. Ante, 38.

(c) *Et vide*, 4 Ann. c. 16. s. 10.

which he so ejected him, and the value of the mesne profits of which he deprived him; and a declaration which does not contain these statements will be holden ill on special demurrer; but the defect is cured by verdict, or after judgment by default and writ of inquiry executed, by the operation of the stat. 4 Ann. c. 16. (a)

In the statement of the damages in the declaration the costs of the ejectment may be included, whether the judgment be against the casual ejector, or against the tenant or landlord; and when the judgment is against the casual ejector, for want of an appearance, the costs are invariably included in the statement of the damages, though it is more prudent, for reasons already assigned, in other cases to omit them; (b) and in a case where after a recovery in ejectment, and before an action for mesne profits, the defendant became bankrupt, and the lessor inserted the taxed costs of the ejectment as damages in his action for mesne profits, but the jury did not include them in their verdict in executing a writ of inquiry therein, the Court refused to set aside the inquisition; because the costs being a liquidated debt, the plaintiff might have proved them under the defendant's commission of bankruptcy, and as he had chosen to take the chance of recovering in an oblique way, more than he could have recovered in a direct manner, and had failed, the Court did not think it necessary to assist him. (c)

(a) *Higgins v. Highfield*, 13 East. 407. *et vide Utterson v. Vernon*, 3 T. R. 539, 47. Ante, 336.

(b) *Gulliver v. Drinkwater*, 2 T. R. 261. *Doe v. Davies*, 1 Esp. 358; (c) *Gulliver v. Drinkwater*, 2 T. R. 261.

The general issue is *not guilty*; and if the plaintiff declare against the defendant, for having taken the mesne profits for a longer period than six years before action brought, the defendant may plead the statute of limitations, namely, *not guilty within six years* before the commencement of the suit, and thereby protect himself from all but six years. (a)

(a) B. N. P. 88. Subject to the defence founded on the statute of limitations, the party entitled to the possession of real property, and of chattels real, may, by the law of England, recover the mesne profits from the time his title accrued; and at law, this general right to recover is not affected by any equitable circumstances in the situation of the defendant; such as his ignorance of the plaintiff's right, or an innocent mistake in point of law, as to the construction of a demise, the due execution of a power, and the like, where the defendant may have obtained possession in the fullest confidence of the validity of his title.

In equity there are cases in which the right to mesne profits is restricted to the filing of the bill; as where the defendant has possessed in entire and justifiable ignorance of an adverse right, or where the plaintiff has been guilty of laches in prosecuting his claim. See *Dormer v. Fortescue*, 3 Ashurst, 130, and the cases referred to 1 Maddock's Chancery, 90, &c.

According to the civil law, and still more according to the law of some of the countries of Europe,

which have adopted the principles of the civil law, the right to recover the profits of real property enjoyed without title, and to which the title of the claimant is established, has been restricted to an extent which will appear extraordinary to an English lawyer.

By the civil law as laid down in the *Senatus Consultum de Hereditatis Petitione*; (D. Lib. 5, Tit. iii. l. 20, &c.) *bonæ fidei* possessors are defined to be those "qui justas causas habuissent quare bona ad se pertinere existimassent;" and the distinctions as to liability for intermediate profits in the various cases of *bona fides* and *mala fides* are laid down in the 5th book of the Digest above cited.

Generally in the case of *bona fide* possession, the true owner was entitled to mesne profits from the time of *litis contestation* or plea. And the time from which the *bonæ fidei* possession was liable, even when held to be *locupletior factus*, (as then having the rents and profits in his hands in specie and unconsumed) was the period of final judgment, or, "*rei judicata*." See a clear and concise view of the Roman law upon this

Neither bankruptcy, (*a*) nor a discharge under the Insolvent Debtor's Act, (*b*) can be pleaded in bar to this action; and it has been held that the stat. 6 Geo. IV. c. 16. s. 57, which directs, that all persons *who shall*

subject in *Bynkershock* (Opera 1,262.) Lib. 8, c. 12. *Observationum Juris Romani*.

The law of Scotland has gone beyond the civil law in favour of the *bonæ fidei* possessor; and the case of *bona fides* has been very liberally construed. Many questions involving this doctrine arose on the leases granted by the late Duke of Queensbury, who being tenant in tail had granted a great number of leases at inadequate rents, taking very profitable *grassums* or *finés*, a thing which had been held lawful by a series of decisions of the Scotch Courts, but finally, the law was settled otherwise by the House of Lords, and all the leases granted on such terms by the Duke were set aside. (1 Bligh, 339.)

The next heir of entail in prejudice of whom these leases had been granted brought actions for what the law of Scotland terms "*violent profits*;" but it was held in these cases that the *bona fides* of the tenants, the lessees, continued till the final judgment in the House of Lords referred to.

A very strong case is now pending in the House of Lords. The late Earl of Peterborough being entitled as heir of entail to a considerable estate in Scotland, granted in 1795 leases for a long term at rents

fully adequate at the time to the highest previously received, but taking a sum in hand as *grassum* or *fine*, the next heir of entail instituted an action to reduce the leases, and for "*violent profits*," and they followed the decision in the Queensbury case. The action had been commenced in 1814. The Court of Session first determined that the *bonæ fidei* possession of the lessee ceased on the 12th of July, 1819, the date of the judgment in the Queensbury cases; but subsequently fixed the period to be the 9th of March, 1819, the date of the judgment of the Court of Session, reducing and setting aside the lease. The defendant had appealed from the latter judgment which was affirmed in the House of Lords, (5th July, 1822,) and he contended that the period when *bonæ fidei* possession ceased was that of *affirmance* in the particular case. The point now under appeal is,—at which of the periods 1819, or 1822, the defendant became liable for violent or mesne profits, the title of the plaintiff having accrued in 1814.

As to the general principles of the law of Scotland on this subject, see Erskine, B. 2. Tit. 1. s. 25. Stair. B. 2. Tit. 1. s. 23.

(*a*) Goodtitle *v.* North, Doug. 534.

(*b*) Lloyd *v.* Peell, 3 B. & A. 407.

have given credit upon good and valuable consideration *bonâ fide*, for any money whatsoever, which is not due at the time of the bankruptcy, shall be admitted to prove such debts, &c. has been holden not to extend to damages recoverable in an action for mesne profits. (a)

As also this action is for a *tortious* occupation, the defendant cannot pay money into court. (b)

Where the plaintiff proceeds only for the recovery of the mesne profits, accruing subsequently to the day of the demise in the declaration, he need not prove his title to the premises. The judgment in ejectment is conclusive evidence of his right from that period; and it is immaterial whether the judgment is founded on a verdict, or has been obtained by default against the casual ejector; and whether the action is brought in the name of the real claimant, or the nominal plaintiff in the ejectment. (c) It was formerly indeed holden that if the action were brought in the name of such claimant, or after judgment by default against the casual ejector, the judgment would not operate by way of estoppel; but that the defendant was at liberty to controvert the plaintiff's title; because the plaintiff in the action for mesne profits, in the one case, and the defendant in the other, were not parties to the record in the previous ejectment. (d) But it is now settled that there is no solid distinction between

(a) *Moggridge v. Davis*, 1 Whit. B. N. P. 87.

16. (d) 1 Lill. Prac. Reg. 676. *Jef-*

(b) *Holdfast v. Morris*, 2 Wils. 115. *fries v. Dyson*, Stran. 960.

(c) *Aislin v. Parkin*, Burr. 688.

the two judgments, the right being tried and determined in the one case, and confessed in the other; and that the claimant and tenant in possession are judicially to be considered the only parties to the suit.

When, therefore, the plaintiff seeks to recover such profits only as have accrued subsequently to such demise, no other evidence of his title is, generally speaking, required, than examined copies of the judgment in ejectment, of the writ of possession, and of the sheriff's return thereon; (a) and if the plaintiff has been let into possession of the premises by the defendant, an examined copy of the judgment in ejectment only will be sufficient. (b) It has indeed been doubted, whether evidence of the writ of possession and sheriff's return is ever necessary, except upon judgment by default against the casual ejector, but it is, notwithstanding, prudent to be prepared with it in all cases, unless the plaintiff has been let into possession by the defendant. (c)

The judgment in ejectment, however, is not evi-

(a) *Astlin v. Parkin*, B. N. P. 87.

(b) *Calvert v. Horsefall*, 4 Esp. 67.

(c) *Vide Thorp v. Fry*, B. N. P. 87, *et S. N. P.* 693. (n. 50), *et Aislin v. Parkin*, Burr. 665. The reason assigned for this distinction is, that where the judgment is had against the tenant in possession, the defendant, by entering into the consent rule, is estopped both as to the lessor and lessee, so that either may maintain trespass, without an actual entry, but that where the judgment is had against the casual

ejector, no rule having been entered into, the lessor shall not maintain trespass without an actual entry, and therefore ought to prove the writ of possession executed. But this reasoning is not satisfactory; for if the tenant be concluded by the judgment in the ejectment from controverting the plaintiff's title, it should seem he is also concluded from controverting his possession, for possession is part of his title.

dence against a previous occupier ; (a) nor is a judgment against the wife evidence in an action for mesne profits against the husband and wife, for the wife's confession of a trespass committed by her, cannot be given in evidence to affect the husband, in an action in which he is liable for the damages and costs ; (b) and if the action for mesne profits be brought against the landlord, after a judgment by default against the casual ejector, such judgment will not be evidence against him, without proof that he received due notice of the service of the ejectment upon the tenant in possession. (c) But where a landlord subsequently to the judgment promised to pay the rent and costs to the plaintiff, Lord Ellenborough, C. J. was of opinion, that such promise, there being no proof that he had received notice of the ejectment, amounted to an admission, that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the premises, and that he was a trespasser. (c)

The plaintiff must also prove the length of time that the defendant (or his tenants if he be the landlord) have been in possession of the premises, for the judgment in ejectment affords no evidence of possession, and he can only recover damages for the time he proves the defendant to be in actual occupation, or receipt of the rents and profits. The production of the consent rule proves possession, only from the time of the service of the declaration. (d)

(a) B. N. P. 87.

(d) *Dodwell v. Gibbs*, 2 C. & P.

(b) *Denn v. White*, 7 T. R. 112. 615.

(c) *Hunter v. Britts*, 3 Camp. 455.

He must also, of course, prove the amount of his damages ; and as the action for mesne profits is an action of trespass *vi et armis*, the jury are not confined in their verdict to the mere *rent* of the premises, although the action is said to be brought to recover the *rents and profits* of the estate, but may give such extra damages as they may think the particular circumstances of the case may demand. (a) He must also prove the amount of his costs where they are stated in the declaration as part of his damages, and if the ejectment has been defended, his claim is limited to the amount of *the taxed costs* only. (b) Yet a plaintiff in this action has been allowed to recover, by way of damages, the full costs incurred by him in a court of error in reversing a judgment in ejectment obtained by the defendant, although they were costs which the court of error had no power to allow. (c)

The plaintiff will also be entitled to give evidence of any injury done to the premises, in consequence of the misconduct of the defendant, provided such fact be especially alleged in the declaration.

When the plaintiff seeks to recover the mesne profits accruing antecedent to the day of the demise in the declaration, it follows from what has been already said, that he must produce the regular proof of his title to the premises. He must also, it appears, in such case prove an entry upon the lands, though some doubt seems to exist as to what proof of entry will be

(a) *Goodtitle v. Tombs*, 3 Wils. 471. *Doe v. Davis*, 1 Esp. 358.
118. 121.

(c) *Nowell v. Roake*, 7 B. & C.

(b) *Brooke v. Bridges*, 7 B. Moore, 404.

sufficient. By some it has been said, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the mesne profits only from the time he can prove himself to have been in possession; and that, therefore, if a man make his will and die, the devisee will not be entitled to the profits until he has made an actual entry, or in other words until the day of the demise in the ejectment; for that none can have an action for mesne profits unless in case of actual entry and possession. Others have holden, that when once an entry has been made, it will have relation to the time the title accrued, so as to entitle the claimant to recover the mesne profits from that time; and they say that if the law were not so, the Courts would never have suffered plaintiffs in ejectments to lay their demises back in the manner they now do, and by that means entitle themselves to recover profits, to which they would not otherwise be entitled. (a) The latter seems the better opinion; but these antecedent profits are now seldom the object of litigation, from the practice of laying the demise and ouster immediately after the time when the lessor's title accrues. (b) It should however be observed, that when a fine with proclamations has been levied, an entry to avoid it will not, in this action, entitle the plaintiff to the profits between the time of the fine levied, and the time of the entry, although they probably may be recovered in a court of equity. (c)

If the plaintiff in an action for mesne profits recover less than forty shillings, and the judge do not

(a) *Metcalf v. Harvey*, 1 Ves. 248,
9.—B. N. P. 87.

(b) *Ante*, 212.

(c) *Dormer v. Fortescue*, 3 Atk.
124. *Compere v. Hicks*, 7 T. R. 727.

certify that the title came in question, the plaintiff is entitled to no more costs than damages; and this is the case whether the action is brought in the name of the lessor of the plaintiff in the ejectment, or in that of his nominal lessee. (a)

If in an ejectment there be a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant bring a writ of error, and enter into a recognizance to pay costs in case of nonsuit, &c. pursuant to stat. 16 & 17 Car. II. c. 8, and he be nonsuited, &c., the defendant in error needs not bring a *scire facias* or debt on the recognizance, but may sue out an *elegit*, or writ of inquiry, to recover the mesne profits since the first judgment in ejectment. (b)

(a) Doe v. Davis, 6 T. R. 593.
S. C. 1 Esp. 358.

(b) Short v. Heath, 2 Crompt. Prac.
225.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

SIR,

I hereby give you notice to quit and deliver up, on the day of _____ next, the possession of the messuage or dwelling house, (or "rooms and apartments," or "farm lands and premises,") with the appurtenances, which you now hold of me, situate in the parish of _____ in the county of _____

Notice to quit by the landlord, to a tenant from year to year.

Dated the _____ day of _____ 18 _____ Yours, &c.
A. B.

To Mr. C. D. (the tenant in possession :) or (if it be doubtful who is tenant,) To Mr. C. D. or whom else it may concern.

No. 2.

SIR.

I do hereby, as the agent for and on behalf of your landlord A. B. of _____ give you notice to quit and deliver up, on (&c.) (as in No. 1.) which you now hold of the said A. B. situate, (&c.)

The like, by an agent for the landlord.

Dated, (&c.) _____ Yours, &c. E. F.
Agent for the said A. B.

To Mr. C. D. (&c.)

No. 3.

SIR.

I hereby give you notice, &c. (as in No. 1. to "county of _____") provided your tenancy originally commenced at that time of the year ; or otherwise, that you quit and deliver up the possession of the said messuage, (&c.) at the end of the

The like, by the landlord, where the commencement of the tenancy is doubtful.

year of your tenancy, which shall expire next after the end of half a year from the time of your being served with this notice.

Dated, (&c.)

Yours, &c.

To Mr. C. D. (&c.)

A. B.

No. 4.

The like,
by a tenant
from year
to year, of
his inten-
tion to quit.

SIR,

I hereby give you notice of my intention to quit, and that I shall on the day of next, quit and deliver up the possession of the messuage, (&c.) which I now hold of you, situate (&c.)

Dated, (&c.)

Yours, &c.

To Mr. A. B.

C. D.

No. 5.

Letter of
attorney
to enter
and seal a
lease on the
premises.

Know all men by these presents, that I, A. B. of, (&c.) have made, ordained, constituted and appointed, and by these presents do make, ordain, constitute and appoint C. D. of, (&c.) my true and lawful attorney, for me, and in my name, to enter into and take possession of a certain messuage, (&c.) late in the tenure and occupation of G. H., situate (&c.) but now untenanted; and after the said C. D. hath taken possession thereof, for me, and in my name, and as my act and deed, to sign, seal, and execute a lease of the said premises with the appurtenances, unto E. F. of, (&c.) to hold the same to him the said E. F. his executors, administrators, and assigns, from the of last past, before the date hereof, for the term of seven years, at the yearly rent of a peppercorn, if lawfully demanded; subject to a proviso, for making void the same, on tendering the sum of sixpence to the said E. F. his executors or administrators. In witness (&c.)

Sealed and delivered (&c.)

No. 6.

Affidavit of
executing
the same.

I. K. of, (&c.) gentleman, maketh oath and saith, that he was present and did see A. B. of, (&c.) named in the letter of attorney hereunto annexed, duly sign, seal and deliver the said letter of attorney.

Sworn, (&c.)

I. K.

term, at the suit of the above named plaintiff E. F. and plead to this declaration in ejectment, judgment will be thereon entered against you by default.

Yours, &c.

To Mr. G. H.

I. K. plaintiff's attorney.

No. 9.

In the King's Bench.

Affidavit to
move for
judgment
in K. B.

Between { E. F. on the demise of A. B. plaintiff, and
G. P. defendant.

I. K. of gentleman, maketh oath and saith, that on the day of last, he this deponent did see C. D. in the letter of attorney hereunto annexed named, for and in the name of A. B. the lessor of the plaintiff, enter upon and take possession of the messuage in the lease hereto also annexed mentioned, by entering on the threshold of the outer door thereof; and putting his finger into the keyhole of the said door, the said messuage being then locked up and uninhabited, so that no other entry thereon could be made, nor any possession thereof taken, without force; and this deponent further saith, that he did, on the same day, see the above named C. D. after such entry made, and whilst he stood on the threshold of the said door, duly sign and seal the lease hereunto annexed, in the name of the said A. B. and as his act and deed deliver the same unto the said E. F. the plaintiff above named; and that after the said lease was so executed, this deponent did see the said E. F. take possession of the said messuage, by virtue of the said lease, by entering upon the threshold of the said outer door, and putting his finger into the key-hole of the said door, the said messuage being then locked up and uninhabited, so that no other entry could be made thereon, save as aforesaid; and that immediately afterwards, the said G. H. the defendant, came and removed the said E. F. from the said door, and put his foot on the threshold thereof; whereupon this deponent did, on the day and year aforesaid, deliver to the said defendant G. H. who still continued upon the said threshold, a true copy of the declaration of ejectment, and notice thereunder written hereto annexed.

Sworn, (&c.)

his attorney complains ; that whereas the said A. B. on (&c.) at (&c.) had demised the said tenements with the appurtenances, to the said John Doe, to have and to hold the same to the said John Doe and his assigns, from the day of then last past, for and during and unto the full end and term of years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended: By virtue of which said demise, the said John Doe entered into the said tenements with the appurtenances, and became and was thereof possessed, for the said term so to him thereof granted: And the said John Doe being so thereof possessed, the said Richard Roe afterwards, to wit, on (&c.) with force and arms, (&c.) entered into the said tenements with the appurtenances, which the said A. B. had demised to the said John Doe, in manner and for the term aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected the said John Doe from his said farm; and other wrongs to the said John Doe then and there did, to the great damage of the said John Doe, and against the peace of our said lord the now king; wherefore the said John Doe saith, that he is injured, and hath sustained damage to the value of £ and therefore he brings his suit, &c.

No. 13.

Notice to
appear.

Mr. C. D.

I am informed that you are in possession of, or claim title to the premises in this declaration of ejectment mentioned, or some part thereof; and I, being sued in this action as a casual ejector only, and having no claim or title to the same, do advise you to appear in next term, (or, in London or Middlesex, "on the first day of next term") in his Majesty's Court of King's Bench, wheresoever his said Majesty shall then be in England, (or, in the Common Pleas, "in his Majesty's Court of Common Bench at Westminster,") by some attorney of that court; and then and there, by rule of the same court, to cause yourself to be made defendant in my stead; otherwise I shall suffer judgment therein to be entered against me by default, and you will be turned out of possession

Yours, &c.

Richard Roe.

No. 14.

In the King's Bench, (or Common Pleas).

term (&c.)

The like
on a double
demise,
with one
ouster.

(to wit,) Richard Roe, late of yeoman, was attached to answer John Doe, of a plea wherefore the said Richard Roe, with force and arms, &c. entered into messuages (&c.) with the appurtenances, situate &c. which A. B. had demised to the said John Doe, for a term which is not yet expired; And also wherefore the said Richard Roe, with force and arms, &c. entered into other messuages, (&c) with the appurtenances, situate &c. which E. F. had demised to the said John Doe for a term which is not yet expired, and ejected him from his said several farms, and other wrongs, (&c.) And thereupon, (&c.) that whereas the said A. B. on &c. at &c. had demised the said tenements first above mentioned with the appurtenances, to the said John Doe; to have and to hold the same to the said John Doe and his assigns, from the day of then last past, for and during and unto the full end and term of years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended.* And also that whereas the said E. F. on &c. at &c. had demised the said tenements secondly above-mentioned with the appurtenances, to the said John Doe, to have and to hold the same to the said John Doe and his assigns, from the said day of then last past, for and during and unto the full end and term of years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended: By virtue of which said several demises, the said John Doe entered into the said several tenements first and secondly above mentioned with the appurtenances, and became and was thereof possessed, for the said several terms so to him thereof respectively granted: And the said John Doe being so thereof possessed, the said Richard Roe afterwards, to wit, on &c. with force and arms, (&c.) entered into the said several tenements first and secondly above mentioned with the appurtenances, which the said A. B. and E. F. had respectively demised to the said John Doe, in manner and for the several terms aforesaid, which are not yet expired, and ejected the said John Doe from his said several farms; and

other wrongs; &c. (as in the preceding precedent with the like notice to appear.)

No. 15.

The like,
with two
ousters.

(As in last precedent to this mark.*) By virtue of which said demise, the said John Doe entered into the said tenements first above mentioned with the appurtenances, and became and was thereof possessed for the said term so to him thereof granted, and the said John Doe being so thereof possessed, the said Richard Roe afterwards, (to wit,) on &c. with force and arms, &c. entered into the said tenements first above mentioned with the appurtenances, which the said A. B. had demised to the said John Doe, in manner and for the term aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected him the said John Doe from his said farm: And also, that whereas the said E. F. on &c. at &c. had demised the said tenements secondly above mentioned, with the appurtenances, to the said John Doe; to have and to hold the same to the said John Doe and his assigns, from the said day of then last past, for and during and unto the full end and term of years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended; By virtue of which said last mentioned demise, the said John Doe entered into the said tenements secondly above mentioned with the appurtenances, and became and was thereof possessed for the said last mentioned term so to him thereof granted: And the said John Doe being so thereof possessed, the said Richard Roe afterwards, to wit, on &c. with force and arms, &c. entered into the said tenements secondly above mentioned with the appurtenances, which the said E. F. had demised to the said John Doe, in manner and for the term last aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected the said John Doe from his said last mentioned farm, and other wrongs, &c. (as in No. 14, with the like notice to appear.)

No. 16.

Affidavit of
service of
declaration
in eject-
ment.

In King's Bench, (Common Pleas, or Exchequer Pleas.)
Between { John Doe on the demise of A. B. plaintiff, and
 { Richard Roe, - - - - - defendant.

I. K. of gentleman, maketh oath, that he this deponent did on &c. * personally serve C. D. tenant in possession of the premises in the declaration of ejectment hereunto

annexed mentioned, or (if he be not tenant of the whole) some part thereof, with a true copy of the said declaration, and of the notice thereunder written, hereunto annexed, and this deponent at the same time read over the said notice to the said C. D. and explained to him the intent and meaning of such service, † (or generally thus: and this deponent, at the same time, acquainted the same C. D. of the intent and meaning of the said declaration and notice.)

Sworn, &c.

I. K.

No. 17.

(As in last precedent to this mark*) personally serve C. D. (&c.) tenants in possession, (&c.) (as in the last) with the said declaration, and the notice thereunto written, by delivering a true copy of the said declaration and notice to each of them the said C. D. &c. (and if the notice was not directed to all the tenants, say "except that the said notice was directed to each of them the said C. D. &c. separately;") and this deponent at the same time read over the said notice to each of them the said C. D. (&c.) and explained to them respectively the intent and meaning of such service; (or generally, that "this deponent, at the same time, acquainted each of them the said C. D. &c. of the intent and meaning of the said declaration and notice.")

The like where there are several tenants.

Sworn, &c.

I. K.

No. 18.

(As in No. 16, to *) personally serve C. D. tenant in possession of part of the premises in the declaration of ejectment hereunto annexed mentioned, with a true copy &c. (as in No. 16 to †): And this deponent further saith, that he did, on the same day, also serve G. H. tenant in possession of other part (or residue) of the premises in the said declaration mentioned, with another true copy of the said declaration and notice thereunder written, by delivering the same to, and leaving it with M. H. the wife of the said G. H. at the dwelling-house of the said G. H. being a parcel of the premises in the said declaration mentioned, and this deponent at the same time read over the notice thereunder written to the said M. H. and explained to her the intent and meaning of such service.

The like, where the declaration was served on one tenant, and the wife of another.

(Sworn, &c.)

I. K.

No. 19.

The like, on stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 23, where the premises are untenanted.

In the King's Bench (&c.)

Between { John Doe on the demise of A. B. plaintiff, and Richard Roe, defendant.

A. B. of lessor of the plaintiff in this case, and I. K. both of gentleman, severally make oath and say; and first, this deponent I. K. for himself saith, that he did on &c. affix a copy of the declaration in ejectment hereto annexed, and the notice thereunder written upon the door of the messuage in the said declaration mentioned, (or, in case the ejectment is not for the recovery of a messuage, "upon being a notorious place of the lands, tenements or hereditaments, comprised in the said declaration in ejectment,") there being no tenant then in actual possession thereof. And this deponent A. B. for himself saith, that before such copy of the said declaration in ejectment was so fixed as aforesaid, there was due to him this deponent, as landlord of such messuage, (or "lands, tenement, or hereditaments,") with the appurtenances, from C. D. the tenant thereof, the sum of £. for half a year's rent, upon and by virtue of a certain indenture of lease, bearing date &c. and made between &c. and that no sufficient distress was then to be found upon the said messuage, (or, "lands, tenements, or hereditaments,") with the appurtenances, countervailing the arrears of rent then due to this deponent; And this deponent further saith, that at the time of affixing the copy of the said declaration in ejectment as aforesaid, he had power to re-enter the said messuage, (or lands, tenements, and hereditaments,") with the appurtenances, by virtue of the said lease, for the non-payment of the rent so in arrear as aforesaid.

Sworn, (&c.)

A. B.
I. K.

No. 20.

Rule for judgment, for the whole premises in K. B.

next after in the year of &c.
Doe on the demise of A. B. } Unless the tenant in possession
v. Roe } of (or, if the premises are untenanted, "unless some person claiming title to") the premises in question shall appear and plead to issue, on

preclusion of the said action of the said J. D. whereby the said J. D. remains therein undefended against the said R. R.: Therefore it is considered, that the said J. D. recover against the said R. R. his said term yet to come of and in the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and also his damages sustained by reason of the trespass and ejectment aforesaid:— And hereupon the said J. D. freely here in court remits to the said R. R. all such damages, costs and charges, as might or ought to be adjudged to him the said J. D. by reason of the trespass and ejectment as aforesaid: therefore, let the said R. R. be acquitted of those damages, costs and charges, &c.: —And hereupon the said J. D. prays the writ of the said lord the king, to be directed to the sheriff of the county aforesaid, to cause him to have possession of his said term yet to come of, and in the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and it is granted to him, returnable before the said lord the king, on _____ wheresoever, &c.

No. 24.

Consent of _____ on (or next after) _____ in the _____ year, &c.
 attornies, _____ (to wit) Doe on the demise of A. B.)
 for the te- _____ against Roe, for messuages (&c.) in the consent of the
 nant to be admitted to defend the parish of _____ in the said county: attornies for both
 &c. in K.B. (or, if there be several demises, say) “Doe, D. be made de-
 on the demise of A. B. for messuages, fendant in the
 (&c.) in the parish of _____ in the said stand of the now
 county, and also on the demise of E. F. defendant Roe,
 for other messuages (&c.) in the and do forthwith
 parish of _____ in the said county, against appear at the suit
 Roe;” and if the tenant appear for part of the plaintiff;
 only, add, “being part of the premises and (if the eject-
 mentioned in the declaration.” ment be by bill) file common bail, and receive a declaration in
 an action of trespass and ejectment, for the premises in ques-
 tion, which said premises he the said C. D. does hereby admit
 to be or consist of, (Here describe the premises for which it is
 intended to defend) for which he intends as (tenant or landlord,
 as the case may be) to defend this action of trespass and
 ejectment. And it is further ordered by the like consent,
 that the said C. D. do forthwith plead not guilty thereto;

and upon the trial of the issue,* confess lease entry and ouster, and that he was, at the time of the service of the said declaration, in possession of the premises hereinbefore mentioned and specified, and insist upon the title only, otherwise let judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the now defendant Richard Roe, by default, and if upon trial of the said issue, the said C. D. shall not confess lease, entry, and ouster, and such possession as aforesaid, whereby the plaintiff shall not be able further to prosecute his (*writ or bill*) against the said C. D. then no costs shall be allowed for not further prosecuting the same, but the said C. D. shall pay costs to the plaintiff, in that case to be taxed by the master. And it is further ordered, that if upon the trial of the said issue a verdict shall be given for the said C. D., or it shall happen that the plaintiff shall not further prosecute his the said (*writ or bill*) for any other cause than for not † confessing lease, entry, ouster, and such possession as aforesaid, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall pay to the said C. D. costs in that case to be adjudged.

I. K. attorney for plaintiff,

L. M. attorney for defendant.

No. 25.

In the Common Pleas.

_____ term in the _____ year, &c.
_____ the _____ day of

_____ (to wit) Doe, on the demise of } It is ordered by
A. B. against Roe. } consent of I. K.

attorney for the plaintiff, and L. M. attorney for C. D. who claims title to _____ the tenements in question, which premises he, the said C. D. hereby admits to be or consist of (*here describe the premises for which it is intended to defend*) for which he intends as (*tenant or landlord*) to defend this action of trespass and ejectionment, that he may be admitted defendant, and that the said defendant shall immediately appear by his attorney, who shall receive a declaration, and plead thereto the general issue, this term; and at the trial thereupon to be had, the said defendant shall appear in his own proper person, or by counsel or attorney, and confess lease, entry and ouster, and that he was, at the time of the service of the declaration, in possession of the premises hereinbefore mentioned and spe-

Consent
Rule in
C. P.

cified, and insist upon the title only, otherwise let judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the now defendant by default. And by the like consent, it is ordered, that if upon trial of the said issue, the said C. D. shall not confess lease entry and ouster, and such possession as aforesaid, whereby the plaintiff shall not be able further to prosecute this action against the said C. D., then no costs shall be allowed for not further prosecuting the same, but the said C. D. shall pay costs to the plaintiff's lessor in that case, to be taxed by the prothonotary. And it is further ordered by the like consent, that if upon the trial of the said issue, a verdict be found for the said C. D. or it shall happen that the plaintiff shall not further prosecute his said action for any other cause than for not confessing lease entry and ouster, and such possession as aforesaid, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall pay to the said C. D. costs in that case to be adjudged.

By the Court.

No. 26.

In the King's Bench.

Affidavit
in support
of rule, to
authorize
the tenant
to confess
lease and
entry only
in K. B.

C. D. of &c. maketh oath and saith, that no actual ouster of the lessor of the plaintiff has been committed by this deponent, and that (as he this deponent verily believes) this ejection may involve a question between tenants in common, or joint-tenants.

Sworn, (&c.)

C. D.

No. 27.

Rule in
K. B. to
authorize
the tenant
to confess
lease and
entry only.

Doe, on the demise of A. B. v. } Upon reading the rule
Roe } made yesterday, and upon
hearing Mr. — &c. for the lessor of the plaintiff, and Mr.
— &c. for the tenant; it is ordered, that the defendant
enter into a rule for confessing lease, entry, and possession,
and also for confessing ouster of the nominal plaintiff, in case
an actual ouster of the plaintiff's lessor by the defendant shall
be proved at the trial, but not otherwise.

By the Court.

No. 28.

Doe } It is ordered, &c. (*as in No. 24 to **) confess lease, Consent
Rule there-
on.
v. } entry, and that he was at the time of the service of
Roe. } the declaration, in possession of the premises here-
inbefore mentioned and specified, and also ouster of the
nominal plaintiff, in case an actual ouster of the plaintiff's
lessor by the defendant shall be proved at the trial, but not
otherwise, and insist upon the title and such actual ouster
only; otherwise let judgment be entered for the plaintiff against
the now defendant Roe, by default. And if upon the trial
of the said issue, the said C. D. shall not confess lease and
entry, and also ouster upon the condition aforesaid, whereby
&c. (*as in No. 24. to †*) confessing lease, entry, and such pos-
session as aforesaid, and also ouster subject to the conditions
aforesaid, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall pay to the said
C. D. costs in that case to be adjudged.

By the Court.

No. 29.

Doe, on the demise of A. B. v. } It is ordered that E. F. Rule in
K. B. for
admitting
the land-
lord to de-
fend, &c.
Roe } landlord of the tenant in
possession of the premises in question in this cause, shall be
joined and made defendant with the said tenant, if he shall
appear: And the said E. F. desiring, if the said tenant shall
not appear, that he may appear by himself, and consenting
that in such case he will enter into the common rule to confess
lease, entry, and ouster, in such manner as the said tenant
ought, in case he had appeared; (*or if the rule be special, to
confess lease and entry only, say " to confess lease and entry
only, without ouster, unless an actual ouster of the lessor of
the plaintiff, by the said C. D. or those claiming under him,
be proved at the trial,"*) leave is given to the said E. F. pur-
suant to the late act of Parliament, if the said tenant shall
not appear, to appear by himself, and upon his entering into
such common rule, to become defendant in the stead of the
casual ejector, and to defend his title to the said premises
without the said tenant: the plaintiff nevertheless is at liberty
to sign judgment against the casual ejector; but execution
thereon is stayed, until the Court shall further order. Upon
the motion of Mr. _____

By the Court.

No. 30.

Plea of not guilty.

C. D. } term (&c.) And the said
 ats. } C. D. by L. M. his attorney,
 Doe, on the demise of A. B. } comes and defends the force and
 injury, when, &c. and says that he is not guilty of the sup-
 posed trespass and ejectment, (or if several ousters are laid in
 the declaration, "of the supposed trespasses and ejectments,")
 above laid to his charge, in manner and form as the said John
 Doe hath above thereof complained against him ; And of this
 he the said C. D. puts himself upon the country, &c.

No. 31.

Plea of ancient demesne.

C. D. } And the said — by—
 ats. } his attorney comes and de-
 Doe, on the demise of A. B. } fends the force and injury,
 when, &c. and says, that all the tenements and premises in
 the declaration aforesaid specified, in which the trespass and
 ejectment are above supposed to have been done, are held of
 — as of his manor of — in the county of — and
 which said manor is, and from time whereof the memory of
 man is not to the contrary was, of ancient demesne of the
 crown of the king of England, and now of our lord the king ;
 and that the aforesaid tenements and premises are and for all
 the time aforesaid were pleaded and pleadable in the court of the
 same manor by patent writ of our lord the king of right close
 only and not elsewhere or otherwise ; and this he is ready to
 verify as the court shall think proper ; Wherefore he prays
 judgment if the court of our said lord the king, now here will
 take cognizance of the said plea, &c.

No. 32.

Affidavit to accompany plea of ancient demesne.

C. D. the tenant in possession of the premises in the decla-
 ration of ejectment in this cause above mentioned, maketh
 oath, and saith, that the said premises in the said declaration
 in this cause above mentioned, with the appurtenances, are
 held of — as of his manor of — in the county of —
 and which said manor is holden in ancient demesne :
 And this deponent further saith, and there is a court of ancient
 demesne held within the said manor of — and that there

are suitors in the same court, in which said court and before which suitors the said A. B. the lessor of the plaintiff above named might have proceeded in the said ejectment; and this deponent further saith, that to the best of this deponent's knowledge and belief, the said A. B. the said lessor of the plaintiff is seized in his demesne as of fee of and in the said premises with the appurtenances in the said declaration of ejectment mentioned.

Sworn, &c.

C. D.

No. 33.

Afterwards, that is to say, on &c. at &c. before, (&c.) comes the within-named John Doe, by his attorney within mentioned and the within-named C. D. although solemnly required, comes not, but makes default; therefore, let the jurors of the jury whereof mention is within made, be taken against him by his default; and the jurors of that jury being summoned also to come, and to speak the truth of the matters within contained, being chosen, tried and sworn, the said C. D. although solemnly called to appear by himself or his counsel or attorney, to confess lease, entry and ouster, and possession of the premises hereinbefore mentioned, doth not come, by himself or his counsel or attorney, nor doth he confess lease, entry, ouster, and possession, but therein makes default; wherefore the said John Doe doth not further prosecute his writ (or bill) against the said C. D.

Postea for defendant on a non-suit, for not confessing lease, entry and ouster.

Therefore, (&c.)

No. 34.

(To the end of the issue, and then as follows :) At which day before our lord the king at Westminster comes (or in the Common Pleas or Exchequer "At which day comes here,") the parties aforesaid, by their attornies aforesaid; and hereupon the said C. D. as to ——— parcel of the tenements in the said declaration mentioned, relinquishing his said plea by him above pleaded, says that he cannot deny the action of the said John Doe, nor but that he the said C. D. is guilty of the trespass and ejectment above laid to his charge, in manner and form as the said John Doe hath above thereof complained against him: And upon this the said John Doe says, that he will not further prosecute his suit against the said C. D. for

Judgment for the plaintiff, as to part of the premises, and for the defendant, on a nolle prosequi, as to the residue.

the trespass and ejectment in the residue of the tenements aforesaid ; and he prays judgment, and his term yet to come of and in the said ——— with the appurtenances, parcel, &c. together with his damages, costs and charges by him in this behalf sustained : Therefore it is considered, that the said John Doe do recover against the said C. D. his said term yet to come of and in the said ——— with the appurtenances, parcel, (&c.) and also £ ——— for his said damages, costs and charges, by the court of the said lord the king now here adjudged to the said John Doe, and with his assent, and also with the assent of the said C. D. : And let the said C. D. be acquitted of the said trespass and ejectment in the residue of the tenements aforesaid, and go thereof without day, (&c.) : And the said John Doe prays the writ of our said lord the king, to be directed to the sheriff of ——— aforesaid, to cause him to have possession of his said term yet to come of and in the said ——— with the appurtenances, parcel, (&c.) and it is granted to him, returnable before our said lord the king on ——— wheresoever, (&c.) (*or in the Common Pleas or Exchequer, “ returnable here on ——— &c.”*)

No. 35.

Rule for execution against the casual ejector, where the landlord had been made defendant, and failed at the trial.

Doe, on the demise of A. B. v. } Upon reading a rule made
 Roe } in this cause on ———
 and E. F. therein named, having made himself defendant in the stead of the casual ejector, pursuant to the said rule, and the postea in the said cause being produced and read, and a rule made in the same cause this day ; it is ordered that the said E. F. upon notice of this rule to be given to his attorney, (&c.) show cause, why the plaintiff should not have leave to sue out execution, upon the judgment signed against the casual ejector pursuant to the first mentioned rule. Upon the motion of Mr. ———

By the Court.

No. 36.

Habere facias possessionem.

William the Fourth, (&c.) To the sheriff of ——— greeting : Whereas John Doe lately in our court before us at Westminster, by our writ, (*or if by bill, say “ by bill without our writ,”*) and by the judgment of the same court recovered

against C. D. (or if the judgment be by default "against Richard Roe,") his term ‡ then and yet to come of and in ——— dwelling-houses, (&c.) (as in the declaration in ejectment) with the appurtenances, situate (&c.) which A. B. on (&c.) had demised to the said J. D. to hold the same to the said J. D. and his assigns, from (&c.) for and during and until the full end and term of ——— years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended, * by virtue of which said demise, the said J. D. entered into the said tenements with the appurtenances, and was possessed thereof, until the said C. D. afterwards (to wit,) on (&c.) with force and arms, (&c.) entered into the said tenements with the appurtenances, which the said A. B. had demised to the said J. D. in manner, and for the term aforesaid, which was not then, nor is yet expired, and ejected the said J. D. from his said farm ↵; whereof the said C. D. is convicted, as appears to us of record; therefore we command you, that without delay you cause the said J. D. to have the possession of his said term yet to come of and in the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances: and in what manner you shall have executed this our writ, make appear to us, on ——— where-soever we shall then be in England, (or by bill, "to us at Westminster, on ——— next after ———,"†) and have there (or by bill, "have there then,") this writ.

Witness, Charles Lord Tenterden, (&c.)

No. 36. (a)

(As in preceding precedent to *;) and also his term, then, and yet to come, of and in ——— other dwelling-houses, (&c.) with the appurtenances, which E. F. on, (&c.) had demised to the said J. D., to hold the same to the said J. D. and his assigns, from, &c. for, and during, and unto, the full end and term of ——— years from thence next ensuing, and fully to be complete and ended; by virtue of which said several demises, the said J. D. entered into the said several tenements with the appurtenances, and was possessed thereof, until the said C. D. afterwards, to wit, on, (&c.) with force, and arms, (&c.) entered into the said several tenements with the appurtenances, which the said A. B. and E. F. had respectively demised to the said John Doe, in manner, and for the several

The like, on a double demise.

terms aforesaid, which were not then, nor are yet expired, and ejected the said J. D. from his said several farms ; whereof the said C. D. is convicted, (*adding in K. B.* “ as appears to us of record : ”) therefore we command you, that without delay, you cause the said J. D. to have the possession of his said several terms, yet to come of, and in, the said several tenements with the appurtenances : and in what manner, &c. (*as in preceding precedent to the end.*)

No. 37.

The like,
when the
judge has
certified
under stat.
1 Wm. IV.
c. 70.

William the Fourth, (&c.) to the Sheriff of
greeting : Whereas at the assizes holden at in and for
the county of on the day of last,
before Sir Nicholas Conyngham Tindal, Knt., L. C. J., (&c.)
a cause came on to be tried, in which John Doe was the
plaintiff, and C. D. the defendant, and in which cause the
said John Doe sought to recover against the said C. D. his
term, (*as in precedent No. 36, from † to £.*) And whereas
at the trial of the said cause, the jury found a verdict for the
said John Doe, and the said Sir Nicholas Conyngham Tindal
hath duly certified on the back of the said record in the said
action, according to the form of the statute in that case made
and provided, his opinion that a writ of possession ought to
issue immediately : therefore, &c. (*As in precedent No. 36
to the end.*)

No. 38.

The like,
and *feri
facias* for
costs, by
original in
K. B.

(As in No. 36, to †.) We also command you, that of the
goods and chattels of the said C. D. in your bailiwick, you
cause to be made £. which the said J. D. lately in our
said Court before us, at Westminster, aforesaid, recovered
against the said C. D. for his damages, which he had sus-
tained, as well on occasion of the trespass and ejectment
aforesaid, as for his costs and charges by him, about his suit,
in that behalf expended ; whereof the said C. D. is convicted,
as appears to us of record ; and have you the monies before
us, on the return day aforesaid, wheresoever, (&c.) to be ren-
dered to the said John Doe, for his damages aforesaid,
and have there this writ. Witness, Charles Lord Tenterden.

No. 39.

(As in No. 36. to †.) We also command you, that you take the said C. D. if he shall be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before us, on the return day aforesaid, wheresoever, (&c.) to satisfy the said J. D. £. which in our said Court before us, at Westminster aforesaid, were adjudged to the said J. D., for his damages, which, &c. (*as in preceding precedent to the end.*)

The like, and *capias ad satisfaciendum* for costs, by original in K. B.

No. 40.

(Copy the last precedent to the end, omitting the words "and have there this writ," and then as follows:) and also £. which in our Court of Parliament were adjudged to the said J. D. according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, for his damages, costs, and charges, which he had sustained and expended by reason of the delay of execution of the judgment aforesaid, on pretext of prosecuting our writ of error, brought thereupon by the said C. D., against the said J. D. in the same Court of Parliament, the said judgment being there in all things affirmed: whereof the said C. D. is also convicted, as by the inspection of the record and proceedings thereof, remitted from our said Court of Parliament into our said Court before us, likewise appear to us of record; and have there this writ. Witness, (&c.)

The like, and also for costs in error, on an affirmance in the House of Lords.

No. 41.

(As in No. 36. to "whereof the said C. D. is convicted," (&c.) and then as follows:) and whereas we afterwards, to wit, in — term aforesaid, by our writ, commanded you that without delay you should cause the said J. D. to have possession of his said term, then to come of, and in the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and that you should make known to us on a day now past, in what manner you should have executed that our writ: and because since the issuing of our said writ, it hath appeared to us, that the said judgment, obtained by the said J. D. in manner aforesaid, was irregularly obtained, and that our said writ thereupon issued improvidently and unjustly; therefore we command you, that if possession of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurte-

Writ of restitution.

nances, hath by virtue of our said writ, been given or delivered to the said J. D. then that without delay you cause restitution of the said tenements with the appurtenances, to be made to the said G. H. or his assigns, at whose instance the judgment aforesaid hath been set aside by our said Court, he the said G. H. being landlord and owner of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and that whatever has been done by virtue of our said writ, you deem altogether void, and of no effect, as you will answer the contrary at your peril; and in what manner, &c. (as in No. 34 to the end.)

No. 42.

Scire facias
for the
plaintiff.

(As in No. 36. to this mark ☞, and then as follows :) and also £.— for the damages which the said John Doe had sustained, as well on occasion of the trespass and ejection aforesaid, as for his costs and charges by him, about his suit in that behalf expended; whereof the said C. D. is convicted, as appears to us of record: And now, on the behalf of the said J. D. in our said Court before us, we have been informed, that although judgment be thereupon given, yet execution of that judgment still remains to be made to him; wherefore the said J. D. hath humbly besought us to provide him a proper remedy in this behalf: and we being willing that what is just in this behalf should be done, command you, that by honest and lawful men of your bailiwick, you make known to the said C. D. (*if against the casual ejector* “to the said Richard Roe, and also to — and — the tenants in possession of the premises aforesaid,”) that he (or they) be before us, on — wheresoever, (&c.) to show if he has or knows of anything to say for himself, or (if they have or know, or if either of them hath or knoweth, of any thing to say for themselves or himself,) why the said J. D. ought not to have the possession of his said term yet to come of, and in the tenements aforesaid, and also execution of the damages, costs and charges, aforesaid, according to the force, form and effect of the said recovery, if it shall seem expedient for him so to do, and further to do and receive what our said Court before us shall consider of him (or them) in this behalf: And have there the names of those by whom you shall so make known to him (or them) and this writ.

Witness, Charles Lord Tenterden, (&c.)

No. 43.

Doe on the demise of A. B. } Upon reading the affidavit of Rule for
 v. Roe } L. M. (&c.) it is ordered, that staying
 the lessor of the plaintiff upon notice, (&c.) show cause, why proceedings, till a
 further proceedings in this action should not be stayed, until guardian be appoint-
 a sufficient guardian be appointed for the lessor of the ed for an
 plaintiff, who will undertake to pay to the defendant such infant less-
 costs as may happen to be adjudged to him; and that in the or to an-
 mean time further proceedings be stayed. Upon the motion swer costs.
 of Mr. _____

By the Court.

No. 44.

Doe on the demise of A. B. } Upon reading the affidavit of The like,
 v. Roe } L. M. and another, it is ordered till security
 that the lessor of the plaintiff, upon notice, (&c.) show cause, be given for
 why further proceedings in this action should not be stayed, costs.
 until * sufficient security be given to answer the defendant his
 costs, in case the plaintiff be nonsuited, or a verdict shall be
 given for the said defendant; and that in the mean time fur-
 ther proceedings be stayed. Upon (&c.)

No. 45.

(As in No. 44, to *) the costs taxed in a former action The like,
 brought in the Court of King's Bench, on the demise of the in C. P.
 lessor of the plaintiff, for the same premises, are paid; and in until the
 the mean time and until this Court shall otherwise order, that costs are
 all further proceedings be stayed. Upon (&c.) paid of a
 former ac-
 tion in K.B.

No. 46.

Upon reading the affidavit of G. H. it is ordered, that the The like,
 lessor of the plaintiff upon notice (&c.) shall show cause, (&c.) on payment
 why, upon the defendant's bringing into this Court the princi- of mortgage
 pal money and interest due to the lessor of the plaintiff upon money, &c.
 his mortgage, and also such costs as have been expended in
 any suit or suits at law or equity upon such mortgage, his
 costs in this cause to be ascertained, computed and taxed by
 one of the prothonotaries, the money so brought into this

Court should not be deemed and taken to be in full satisfaction and discharge of such mortgage; and upon payment thereof to the lessor of the plaintiff, why all proceedings in this action should not be stayed; and why the mortgaged premises, and the lessor of the plaintiff's estate and interest therein, should not be assigned and conveyed, at the cost and charges of the defendants, to such persons as they shall appoint: and why all deeds, evidences and writings, in the custody of the lessor of the plaintiff, relating to the title of such mortgaged premises, should not be delivered up to the defendants, or to such person or persons as they shall for that purpose nominate and appoint.

By the Court.

No. 47.

The like,
on payment
of rent, &c.
in K. B.

Doe on the demise of A. B. } Upon reading the affidavit of
v. Roe. } the defendant, it is ordered,
upon the said defendants forthwith bringing into Court the whole rent due and in arrear, and such sum to answer the costs as the master shall direct, that further proceedings in this cause be stayed. And it is referred to the master to compute the said arrears of rent, and to tax the said costs; and upon the said defendant's paying the said lessor of the plaintiff what the said master shall find due and allow for the said rent and costs, that all further proceedings therein as to the non-payment of the said rent, be stayed. But it is further ordered, if the said lessor of the plaintiff has any other title to the premises in question, than for the non-payment of the said rent, he is at liberty to proceed. Upon the motion of Mr. ———.

By the Court.

INDEX.

A.

ABATEMENT,

mode of pleading in, 271.

jurisdiction of another court may be pleaded in, 270.

ancient demesne, good plea in, 272.

not created, by death of lessor of plaintiff, 320.

defendant, after assizes began, 332.

plaintiff, in ancient practice, 203.

ABATOR, not within stat. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 42.

ACCORD, formerly good plea in ejectment, 270 (c)

ACTIONS,

real, when first disused, 10.

statute of fines only includes, 94.

consolidation of, 264. 361.

ADMINISTRATOR.—*Vide* Personal Representative.

ADMINISTRATION, Letters of, when evidence, 289. 300.

ADMITTANCE, to Copyholds,

surrenderee cannot bring ejectment before, 64.

cannot devise before, 65.

heir may bring ejectment before 63. 286.

except against lord, 63. 286.

title relates to time of surrender after, 64.

copyholds cannot be forfeited before, 308.

manner of proving, 287,

to chambers, not similar to, 64 (g)

ADVOWSON, ejectment will not lie for an, 18.

AFFIDAVIT,

to stay proceedings unæ 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 172.

7 Geo. II. c. 20. 362.

for leave to plead ancient demesne, 272.

for motion for trial at bar, 324.

in ancient practice, of sealing lease, 201.

of service of declaration,

must be annexed to declaration, 243.

AFFIDAVIT, continued.

- of service of declaration,
 - when to be made, 243.
 - how to be entitled, 243.
 - by and before whom to be made, 243.
 - facts to be stated in, 244.
 - when action founded on 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. 246, 367.
 - on 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 247, 376.
- must be positive, and why, 244.
- when more than one necessary, 245.
- defective, how remedied, 246.

AFTER-MATH, 12.**AGENT,**

- may give notice to quit, 126.
- authority to, when to be given, 126, (b)

AGREEMENT,

- void, when implied tenancy created by, 110.
- for lease, proviso for re-entry in, 188.
 - what words will create, 113, &c.
 - formerly equivalent to lease, 33.
- for increase of rent does not alter tenancy, 144.

ALDER CARR, 24.**ALTERNATIVE Notice.—Vide Notice to quit.**

- AMENDMENT** of declaration, 224.
 - courts liberal in permitting, 226.
 - costs, how payable in respect of, 226.

ANCIENT Demesne, plea of, 272.**ANCESTOR,**

- dying under disability to enter, 58.
 - possessed, evidence of seisin, 281.
- descent from common, how proved, 282.

APPEARANCE,

- how regulated by common law, 254.
 - statute, 255.
- who may appear as landlords, 257, &c.
- of what term to be entered, 268.
- how to be made, 265, &c.
 - under 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 249.
 - 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. 369.
- time allowed for, 248, &c.
- cannot be entered by landlord for tenant, 266.
 - by parson for right to perform service, 261.
 - if trick to put off trial, 261.
- when permitted by wife alone, 261.
- by landlord, motion for, when to be made, 267.
- power once assumed by king's bench respecting, 260.
- how lessor to proceed after, 269.

ARTICLES of church of England,

- when proof of subscription to, necessary, 303.

ASSIGNEE,

- of a bankrupt, may maintain ejectment, 67.
 - evidence in ejectment by, 305.

ASSIGNEE, continued.

- of a bankrupt,
 - assignment to, not breach of covenant not to assign, 160. 180. 191.
- of an insolvent debtor,
 - may maintain ejectment, 67.
 - evidence in ejectment by, 306.
- by estoppel, not within 32 Henry VIII. c. 34. 76.
- of mortgagee, may maintain ejectment, 61.
 - when exempted from giving notice to quit, 109.
 - may defend as landlord, 260.
 - evidence in ejectment by, 307.
- of reversion, may maintain ejectment, in what cases, 72. 189.
 - evidence in ejectment by, 318.

ASSIGNMENTS of Lease, when presumed, 318.

ATTACHMENT,

- granted, on breach of consent rule, 264. 334.
 - for disturbing sheriff in execution, 343.
 - how in the case of a peer, 338.
- not granted, on consent rule, till signed by lessor, 263. 272.
 - upon stat. 7 Geo. II. c. 20: 366.

ATTESTATION OF WITNESSES,

- to devise of freeholds, what sufficient, 290.
 - how to be made, 291.
 - form of, 294.
 - by mark sufficient, 293.

ATTORNEY,

- must not be lessee in ejectment, 200, (c)
- forms in ancient practice, executed by, 201.
- warrant of to confess judgment, when lease forfeited by, 180.

ATTORNMENT to stranger destroys tenancy, 124.

AWARD, ejectment will lie on, 91.

B**BAIL, common,**

- must be filed, in what cases, 250.
- to file, when part of consent rule, 262.
- time of filing, 250.

in error,

- notice of, unnecessary, 349.
- who may be, 349.
- sum required of, 350.
- when chargeable with mesne profits, 351.

in action for mesne profits, 381.

BAILIFF, service of declaration upon, not good, 238.

BANKRUPT, assignee of.—Vide Assignee of Bankrupt.

BANKRUPTCY,

- proviso in lease to re-enter on, good, 159.
- and sale, breach of covenant to occupy, 181.
 - no breach of covenant not to assign, 180.

BANKRUPTCY *continued*,

no plea to action for mesne profits, 387.

BARGAINEE OF REVERSION, within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34. 76.

BEAST-GATE, 24.

BILL OF PEACE, when granted in ejectments, 352.

BIRTHS, how proved, 283, 284.

BIS PETITUM, no objection in ejectment, 25.

BODY POLITIC.—*Vide* Corporation.

BOG, 25.

BOILARY OF SALT, 19.

BREACHES, particulars of,

lessor, how and when compelled to give, 353.

evidence confined to breaches contained in, 317.

rent as stated in, need not be proved, 317.

BUILDING by encroachment, when to be mentioned in demise, 30.

BURGAGE, 26.

C.

CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM, writ of,

when lessor entitled to, for costs, 335, &c.

when to be sued out by defendant for costs, 337.

CASUAL EJECTOR.

in ancient practice,

when first used, and why, 13.

suit proceeds in name of, 201.

cannot confess judgment, 204.

in modern practice,

declaration against, how entitled, 207.

under stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70., 207.

judgment against,

motion for, for want of appearance,

when absolute in first instance, 235.

on what founded, 243.

not to be moved in court in common cases, 247.

at what time to be made, 248, 249.

on 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 172.

on nonsuit for not confessing, 323.

is not within stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. s. 2. 170.

rule for, when and how drawn up, 249.

when common bail necessary before, 250.

how and when to be signed, 252. 262. 267. 322.

in what cases set aside, and how, 252.

how entered, when some of several defendants confess, 323.

not equivalent to trial under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 170.

CATTLE-GATES, 24.

CERTIORARI, writ of, ejectment may be removed by, 203.

CESTUI QUE TRUST,

lease by, will not bar trustee from recovering in ejectment, 88.

when legal estate vested in, 82, &c.

when possession of not adverse to trustees, 50.

- CESTUI QUE TRUST**, *continued*,
 when demise to be laid by, 211,
CESTUI QUE USE, within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34. 76.
 entry by will avoid fine, 100.
- CHAMBER**, 27.
- CHAPEL**,
 ejectment will lie for, 18.
 how to be described, 18.
 service of declaration for, 238.
- CHURCH**, 19.
- CHURCHWARDENS**, service of declaration upon, 237.
 may maintain ejectment, 79.
 one cannot, 80.
- CLERK OF THE RULES**, ejectment book how to be kept by, 249.
- CLOSE**, ejectment will lie for a, when, 27.
- COAL MINES** in Durham, how described in demise, 30.
- CO-DEFENDANT**, landlord may be with tenant, 255.
- CODICIL**, signing of, not signing of will, 292.
- COMMON BAIL**.—*Vide* Bail.
- COMMON**, Tenants in.—*Vide* Tenant.
- COMMON**,
 for what kinds of, ejectment will lie, 19.
 encroachment on, belongs to whom, 51.
 of pasture generally, good after verdict, 330.
- COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES**, 279, 295.
- CONDITION**,
 what words will create, 188, 189.
 how dispensed with, 190.
 in leases for lives and years, difference of, 196.
 once gone, gone for ever, 190.
 dispensation of part, is of whole, 190.
 breach of.—*Vide* Proviso.
- CONFESSION OF LEASE**, &c. 262.
- CONSENT RULE**,
 when invented, 16.
 form and terms of, 262.
 is evidence of defendant's possession, 276. 390.
 when non-suit for want of lease, &c. prevented by, 263.
 how drawn up in case of joint-tenants, &c. 263.
 lessor of plaintiff must join in, 263.
 attachment lies for breach of, 264. 334.
 when to be produced at trial, 276. 321.
- CONSOLIDATION RULE**, 264.
- CONTEMPT OF COURT**,
 misconduct on delivery of declaration is, 206, (*b.*)
 assigning death of plaintiff for error is, 204.
 release of plaintiff to tenant is, 204.
- CONTINUAL CLAIM**, what is, and how made, 101.
- CONUSEE**, of statute Merchant or Staple,
 may maintain ejectment, 69.
 evidence by, 301.
- CONUSOR** of fine.
 must have interest in possession, 98.

COPYHOLDER,

- may maintain ejectment, 63.
- cannot forfeit lands before admittance, 308.
- evidence in ejectment by, 309.
- devisee of,
- surrenderee of, } *Vide Copyholds.*
- heir of,
- lessee of, may maintain ejectment, 65.
- evidence in ejectment by, 309.

COPYHOLDS,

- not affected by descents cast, 42.
- within stat. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34. 77.
- not within stat. of uses, 88.
- stat. 29. Car. II. c. 3. 71.
- cannot be general occupant of, 50.
- enfranchisement of, may be presumed, 309.
- what sufficient will, to pass, 299.
- forfeiture of, cannot be before admittance, 308.
- who may take advantage of, 61.
- q. if 21 Jac. I. c. 16. operates on, 62.
- ejectment for, may be maintained,
- before admittance, by grantee, 64.
- by heir, 66.
- except against lord, 64.
- after admittance by devisee, 65.
- by surrenderee, 65, 213.
- evidence in ejectments for, 309.
- ancient demesne, no plea in ejectment for, 272.
- receipt of customary rent for, does not create tenancy, 124.

CORPORATIONS,

- cannot make a discontinuance, 41.
- are within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 43.
- may maintain ejectment, 78.
- how notice to quit to be given to, 131.
- officers of, may give notices to quit, 129.
- how demise to be laid by, 215.
- how name of to be stated in demise, 217.

CORN MILLS, 27.

COSTS payable,

- how under 4 Geo. II. c. 28, 167.
- 1 Geo. IV c. 87. 339.
- by infant's lessor, when, 338.
- by feme, after baron co-defendant's death, 338.
- when to one of several defendants acquitted, 337.
- by such defendants as refuse to confess, 323.
- by lessor, to which defendant he pleases, 339.
- not payable,
- by lessor, if he join not in consent rule, 339.
- by lessor suing in *forma pauperis*, though dispaupered, 339.
- by executor of lessor in any case, 335.
- to executor of lessor on consent rule, when, 335.
- how to be recovered by lessor,
- on judgment for want of appearance, 334, 335.

COSTS, continued,

- how to be recovered by lessor,
 - on non-suit for not confessing, 334.
 - when some of several defendants confess, 335.
 - on verdict against tenant, 335.
 - landlord, 336.
 - feme sole married before execution, 336.
- rule respecting, on amendments, 226.
- each defendant liable for the whole, 335.
- general remedy for recovery of, 336, 391.
- what recoverable in action for mesne profits, 385. 391.
- defendant when entitled to, by 8 & 9 W. III. c. 11. 337.
- how to be recovered, by defendant,
 - in the king's bench, 336.
 - in the common pleas, 336.
 - when plaintiff's lessor is a peer, 338.
- security granted for, in what cases, 353, &c.
- proceedings stayed till payment of, when, 355, &c.
- if not paid, court will not *non-pros* second ejectment, 360.
- in action for mesne profits,
 - when security for granted, 382.
 - certificate for necessary, if damages under 40s., 392.

COTTAGE, 26.**COUNTERPART.** of lease,

- evidence, without notice to produce, 311.

COURTS OF EQUITY,

- ousters of leaseholders formerly redressed by, 8.
- application to, under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 167—171.
- interference of, to prevent repeated ejectments, 352.
- mesne profits, before entry to avoid fine, recoverable in, 39

COURT-ROLLS,

- when evidence, 298.
- court will grant inspection of, 298.

COVENANT, writ of, 2.

- action of, will waive a forfeiture, when, 174.

COVENANTS,

- what run with the land, 73, &c.
 - are collateral, 75.
 - are good, 158.
- each of,
 - who may take advantage of, 190.
 - when tenancy determined by, 158.
 - who may bring ejectment on, 72. 189.
 - actual entry not necessary on, 93. 158.
 - landlord not bound to notice, 50.
 - what will be a waiver of, 192, &c.
 - suspension of, 194.
 - waiver of, not waiver of subsequent breach, 193.
 - continuing breach, 193.
 - evidence in ejectment on,
 - what amounts to, not to assign, 177, 178. 181. 318.
 - let, 179. 191. 318.

COVENANTS, *continued*,

- breach of, what amounts to, not to,
 - put away, 177.
 - part with, 178.
 - commit waste, 182.
 - exercise a trade, 182.
- to actually occupy, 181.
- insure, 183, 195.
- deliver up trees, 184.
- give notice of felling timber, 186.
- repair generally, 184.
- after notice, 184, 194.
- how affected by statutory enactments, 186.
- and conditions difference between, 197.
- in agreement for lease, what words create, 189.
- what affected by *hereafter* in proviso, 185.

CREDITORS may witness wills, 295.

CROPS, growing,

- security not to take away, when to be given, 322.
- pass by writ of possession, when, 347.

CUSTOMARY ESTATES not affected by descents cast, 42.

CUSTOMS,

- to give three or twelve months' notice to quit, good, 140.
- must be strictly proved, 141.
- manner of proving, 287.

D.

DAMAGES,

- in ejectment,
 - action may proceed for, though term expire, 228.
 - lessor die, 320.
- are nominal only, 320.
- formerly comprehended real injury sustained, 379.
- in action for mesne profits, 391.

DEATH

- of lessor, no abatement of suit, ~~222~~ 320
 - q. if *scire facias* necessary after, 346.
 - security given for costs upon, 354.
 - costs not payable to defendant upon, 335.
- of defendant, not cause of error, when, 333.
 - suggestion of, how entitled, 333.
 - q. if *scire facias* necessary upon, 346.
- of plaintiff, no abatement of suit, 203.
 - to assign for error, is a contempt, 204.
- of person, how proved, 282, &c.
- presumption of, when arises, 285.

DECLARATION,

- how framed in ancient practice, 200.
 - modern practice, 15.
 - action for mesne profits, 384.

DECLARATION, continued,

- how entitled, 207.
 - under 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 208.
- may be by bill, or by original, 207.
- service of, suit commenced by, 206.
 - resembles service of writ, 234.
 - should be personal, 235.
 - must be before essoign-day, 232.
 - should be on party actually in possession, 235.
 - how made in common cases,
 - upon tenants in possession, 234, 235.
 - wife of tenant, 236.
 - child or servant of tenant, 237.
 - when tenant absconds, 239, &c.
 - in ejectment for a chapel, 238.
 - poorhouse, 237.
 - when some of the houses are untenanted, 238.
 - upon one tenant in possession, good against all, when, 236.
 - wife of one tenant not good against all, 237.
 - not good, upon person having keys, 238.
 - receiver under Court of Chancery, 238.
 - irregular, when made good, 236, &c.
 - court will not antedate, 242.
 - tenant must give notice of, when, 256.
 - may be good for part, and bad for part, 242.
 - in action for mesne profits, 384.
- amendment of,
 - semble*, may be before appearance, 225.
 - may be in demise, term, &c. 226, &c.
 - names of parties, 229.
 - description of premises, 229.
 - not permitted to real injury of defendant, 227.

DECLARATIONS

- of deceased relations,
 - when evidence, 283.
 - when not evidence, 284.
 - tenants, when evidence, 280.
 - neighbours, not evidence, 284,
- not evidence, if parties living, 284, 285.

DEED, demise by, deed need not be proved, 217.

- now unnecessary, 216.

DEFENDANT,

- who may be admitted, 256, &c.
- death of, no abatement of suit when, 332.
 - cause of error, when, 333.
- evidence in ejectment, on the part of, 319.
- in action for mesne profits, who should be, 388.
- when entitled to make the first address to the jury, 288. 301.

DEMISE, in declaration,

- must be consistent with lessor's title, 209. 277.
- court will strike out, when, 211.

DEMISE, continued.

- declaration, how entitled with respect to, 208.
- on a joint, lessors must have joint interest, 209.
- who may make a joint or several, 209.
- when several distinct necessary, 211,
- under a, of whole, undivided moiety may be recovered, 211.
- must be after lessor's title accrues, 212.
- should be soon after lessor's title accrues, and why, 212.
- not necessary to state premises to be in a parish in, 218.
- if parish is stated in, must be proved as laid, 219.
- premises, how described in, when more than one parish, 220.
- need not state exact quantities to be recovered, 221.
- time of laying, by heir, 212.
 - posthumous son, 213.
 - surrenderee of copyholds, 213.
 - assignees of bankrupt, 213.
 - under stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 213.
 - when fine levied, 214.
 - against tenants at will, 214.
 - when commencement of tenancy unknown, 214.
- how to be laid, by corporations, 215.
 - overseers of a parish, 79.
 - in ejectment for tithes, 217.
 - by masters of colleges, &c. 218.
 - infants, 218.
- period of, caution respecting, 215.
- is transitory, 203.
- may be amended after its expiration, 227.
- intendment is in favour of, after verdict, 328.

DESCENTS CAST,

- definition of, 41.
- happen when, 41.
- doctrine of, not applicable to ejectments, and why, 41, (e)
 - summary of, 45.
- what persons are not affected by, 42.
- right of entry, why tolled by, 41.
 - when tolled by 42, &c.
- need not be pleaded in ejectment, 270.

DESCRIPTION

- of premises, what certainty required in, 23.
- of parish of demised premises, material, 219.

DEVISEES,

- not affected by descents cast, 43.
- of copyholds, cannot devise before admittance, 65.
- refusal to pay rent to, when no disclaimer of tenancy, 125.
- may maintain ejectment, 71.
 - defend ejectment, 259.
- evidence by, of freeholds, 288, &c.
 - copyholds, 298.
 - terms for years, 300.
- cannot bring ejectment for rent due to them as executors, 176.

DEVISE,

- to trustees, legal estate vested in them by, when, 82, &c.
- of a term, no breach of covenant not to assign, 177.
- to witnesses to a will, when void, 295.
 - when not void, 296.
- of freehold interest, how to be made, 290.

DISCLAIMER of Tenancy, 125.**DISCONTINUANCE,**

- definition of, 35.
- happens in what cases, 35.
- different modes of making, 36.
- when caused by levying a fine, 36, &c.
- law respecting, how altered by 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28. 38.
 - 11 Hen. VII. c. 20. 39.
- cannot be effected by a corporation, 41.

DISSEISIN at Election, 41, (c)**DISSEISOR,**

- within stat. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 43.
- donee or feoffee of, not within stat. 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 43.

DISTRESS for rent,

- when waiver of notice to quit, 154. 155. 174.
- insufficient.
 - right of re-entry at common law waived by, 174.
 - under stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28, not waived by, 174.
 - evidence of, what necessary, 317.

DOUBLE RENT, action for, 154.**DOUBLE VALUE, action for 132. 153.****DOWER, ejectment will not lie for, before assignment, 66.****E.****ECCLESIASTICAL PERSONS,**

- not within stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16. 46.
- demise by, how laid, 217.

EJECTIONE FIRMLÆ, writ of, 7.**EJECTMENT,**

- definition of, 1.
- formerly only action of trespass, 1.
- when term first recovered in, 9.
- how and when titles first tried in, 10.
- confined to possessory titles, and why, 11.
- will lie, for what things, 18, &c.
- of bringing a second, 311.

EJECTOR, CASUAL.—Vide Casual Ejector.**ELEGIT,**

- tenant by, may maintain ejectment, when, 70. 109.
 - evidence in ejectment by, 301.
- judgment debtor in,
 - estopped from setting up tenant's interest, 70.

ELEGIT, continued.

judgment debtor in,
must give notice to quit, when, 70.

ENTRIES,

on court rolls, when evidence, 298.
in a bible, when evidence, 286.
in parsons' books, when evidence, 303.

ENTRY, ACTUAL,

formerly always made, and why, 11. 157.

is still necessary,

when fine with proclamations levied, and why, 93. 278.
when ancient practice is used, 200.

is not necessary,

if party levying fine has not a freehold interest, 97, &c.

when fine levied at common law, 95.

when all the proclamations not completed, 99.

when fine is once avoided, 102.

when fine is only accepted, 99.

in ejectment on the forfeiture of a lease, 158.

on fine by joint tenant, &c. without previous ouster,
98.

to avoid statute of limitations, but prudent, 102.

before fine levied, will not avoid subsequent fine, 95.

party making must have right to enter, 96.

time of making to avoid a fine, 97.

by whom to be made, 87. 99.

how to be made, 100.

ejectment must be brought within a year after, 102.

ENTRY, right of, must be in lessor, 33. 157.

proved at the trial, and how, 275. 313.

how taken away, 34.

is not devisable, 97.

must accrue before day of demise, 212.

of judgment—*Vide Judgment.*

of plaintiff, how stated in declaration, 221.

confessed by consent rule, 262.

when pleadable *puis darrien continuance*, 274.

of one joint tenant, &c. entry of all, 100.

lease for life cannot be avoided without, 196.

years cannot be avoided without, when, 197.

of nonsuit for not confessing lease, &c. 263.

may be made pending error, when, 351.

upon demised lands, substantial time of, 146, &c.

when and how proved in action for mesne profits, 391.

ERROR,

judgment *quod defendens sit quietus* is, 332.

death of defendant, is not, 332.

want of suggestion of, is, 332.

rule not to commit waste pending, 350.

bail in, 349.

action for mesne profits will lie pending, 381.

elegit for mesne profits may be sued out after, 393.

- ERROR**, writ of,
 will not lie, before verdict, 347.
 against casual ejector, 347.
 except in ancient practice, 347, (*d*)
 if defendant do not confess, 348.
 how brought by landlord, 348.
 no stay of execution, until bail put in, 350.
- ESCHEAT**, Lord by,
 not within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34. 76.
 may defend judgment, *quare*, 260.
- ESSOIGN-DAY**,
 declaration, must be served before, 232.
 except under 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 376.
 receipt of, must be acknowledged before, 237.
- ESTATE-TAIL**, how discontinued, 35.
- EVIDENCE**,
 on the part of the lessor,
 general points of, 275.
 by heirs, at common law, 281.
 to copyhold lands, 286.
 customary, 287.
 devisees, of freeholds, 288, &c.
 copyholds, 298.
 terms for years, 300.
 tenant by legit, 301.
 conusees of statutes merchant or staple, 301.
 rectors or vicars, 302.
 guardians, 305.
 assignees of bankrupts, 305.
 insolvent debtors, 306.
 personal representatives, 306.
 mortgagees, 306.
 lords of manors, 307.
 copyholders, 309.
 lessees of, 309.
 joint tenants, &c. against companions, 277.
 landlords against tenants,
 on the termination of leases, 310.
 notices to quit, 312.
 the forfeiture of leases, 316.
 assignees of the reversion, 318.
 on the part of the defendant, 319.
 in actions for mesne profits,
 when profits to be recovered, are antecedent to demise 391.
 subsequent to demise, 389.
- EXECUTION**,
 sheriff, may demand indemnity before, 342.
 power of, to enforce 342.
 stayed by consent rule, when, 263.
 judge's order, when, 322.
 is made at lessor's peril, 23. 341.

EXECUTION, continued.

- how to be taken out,
 - on judgment for want of an appearance, 251.
 - after verdict against landlord, 340.
 - when some defendants die, 333.
 - when a sole defendant dies, 346.
 - on stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 340.
 - when defendant marries before execution, 346.
 - cannot be taken out pending error, 350.
 - not stayed by writ of error till bail put in, 350.
 - set aside if lessor's right cease before writ issued, 341.
 - landlord on error brought must move to stay, 348.
 - must only be for premises recovered, 341.
 - or courts will interfere, 341.
 - sometimes confined by rule to premises recovered, 342.
 - how to be made by sheriff, 342, 343.
 - instances of insufficient, 343, 344.
 - attachment granted for disturbing, 343.
 - when second granted, 344, &c.
 - when *scire facias* necessary before, 346.
 - executed, when judgments set aside after, 252, 267.
 - cannot apply under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. after, 167.
 - 7 Geo. II. c. 20. after, 362.
 - for mesne profits, stayed until error determined, 38.
 - of will, under statute of frauds, 288, &c.
- EXECUTION, writ of.**
- its nature, 340.
 - how drawn up, 341.
 - lessor may enter peaceably without, 339.
- EXECUTOR.**—*Vide* Personal Representative.
- EXTINGUISHMENT** of estate, 189.

F.

FEME COVERT,

- cannot constitute an attorney, 201.
 - devise to trustees, to suffer to receive rents, 83.
 - receipt of rent by, after separation from baron, 120.
 - service of declaration upon, 236.
 - may defend ejection against baron, when, 261.
 - liable to costs, if baron co-defendant die, 338.
 - judgment against, not evidence against baron, 390.
 - statute of limitations runs not against, 45.
 - not affected by descents cast, 42.
 - baron, cannot discontinue lands of, 39.
 - must avoid fine within five years, 99.
- FEOFFMENT,** by tenant for years, 97.
- FIERI FACIAS, writ of,**
- when lessor entitled to for costs, 336.
 - when sued out by defendant for costs, 337.
 - evidence, when lessor claims under, 302.
 - superseded by writ of possession, when, 347.

FINE,

- when entry necessary to avoid, 93, &c.
- when not, 95. 98.
- when avoided by entry, 96.
- when discontinuance worked by, 36. 96.
- by joint tenant, &c. no ouster of companion, 55.
- tenant for life accepting, is a forfeiture, 99.
- and non-claim, need not be pleaded, 270.
- mesne profits before avoidance of, how recovered, 392.

FISHERY, 20.**FORFEITURE,**

- by copyholder.—*Vide* Copyholds.
- of lease.—*Vide* Covenant.

FREE BENCH, 65.**FURZE and HEATH, 28.****G.****GAVELKIND, 56.****GLEBE,**

- parson cannot bring ejectment for, after sequestration, 81.
- evidence in ejectment for, 304.

GORSE and FURZE, 28.**GUARDIANS,**

- in socage or testamentary, may bring ejectment, 66.
- make actual entry for ward, 100.
- evidence in ejectments by, 305.

H.**HABEAS CORPUS, ejectments removed from inferior courts by 203.****HABERE FACIAS POSSESSIONEM, writ of,**

- nature of, 340.
- may issue on judge's certificate, when, 321.
- how drawn up, 340, 341.
- return of, should be made, 344.
- when evidence in action for mesne profits, 389.
- Vide* Execution.

HABERE FACIAS SEISINAM, writ of, 340.**HAY-GRASS, 21,****HEARSAY, when evidence, 283, 284.****HEIRS,**

- time allowed for entry of, by 21 Jac. I. c. 16. 58.
- demise by, when to be laid, 212.
- staying proceedings by, under 7 Geo. II. c. 20. 361.
- may defend ejectment, 259.
- are competent witnesses in ejectment, 280.
- may examine all the witnesses to a will, 297.
- evidence by, at common law, 281.

- HEIRS, *continued*,
 evidence by,
 to copyholds, 286.
 customary, 287.
 HERALD'S BOOKS, evidence of pedigree, 286.
 HERBAGE, 21.
 HEREDITAMENTS, corporeal, recoverable in ejectment, 18.
 HIGH-WAY, 21.
 HOP-YARD, 23.
 HOUSE.—*Vide* Message.

I.

- IMPARLANCE, new declaration formerly delivered after, 225, (*b*).
 IMPOSSIBLE YEAR,
 rejected in notice to quit, 135.
 ouster in declaration, 223.
 INDUCTION, how proved, 303.
 INFANT,
 may maintain ejectment, 67.
 enter at any time to avoid fine, 99.
 when bound by his attorney's acts, 120.
 must give notice to quit, 126.
 security for costs, when, 218. 354.
 demise by, how laid, 218.
 liable for costs, when, 338.
 INFERIOR COURTS,
 ancient practice necessary in, and why, 199.
 ejectments, how removed from, 203.
 when jurisdiction of not pleadable, 203.
 how to proceed in, 202.
 INJUNCTION against bringing ejectments, when granted, 352.
 INSOLVENT DEBTOR,
 assignee of, may maintain ejectment, 67.
 evidence required by, 306.
 not discharged from liability to mesne profits, 387.
 INSURANCE against fire,
 covenant for, runs with land, when, 74.
 INSTITUTION, how proved, 303.
 INTRUDER, not within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 42.
 IRELAND,
 premises described by terms used in, 24.
 security for costs on demise by resident in, 354.
 ISSUE,
 must agree with declaration, 273.
 how made up, 273.
 variance between and record, how to proceed, when, 323.
 general, commonly left with consent rule, 265, 269.
 in action for mesne profits, 386.

J.

JOINT-TENANTS,

- may maintain ejectment against co-tenants, when, 54, 91.
- when affected by 21 Jac. I. c. 16, 54.
- demise by, how laid, 209.
- entry of one is entry of all, 100.
- possession of one is possession of all, 54, 98.
- what acts of, are ousters of companions, 54.
- fine by one no ouster of others, 98.
- notice to quit, by one will bind all, 126 (*b*), 128.
 - to one, will bind all, when, 131.
 - by agent of, how to be given, 126 (*b*)
- service of declaration upon, 236.
- special consent rule, when granted to, 263.
- evidence in ejectments by, 277.
- may bring action against co-tenants for mesne profits, 382.

JUDGMENT, in ejectment,

- is not final, 327, 351.
- possession only is recovered by, 327, 351.
- must be entered according to the verdict, 328.
- intendment after, in favour of claimant, 328, &c.
- how entered, *relictâ verificatione*, 273.
 - when defendant will not confess, 322.
 - whole premises are recovered, 331.
 - part of whole premises are recovered, 331.
 - some parcels only, 301.
 - sole defendant dies, 332.
 - some of several die, 332.
 - against *feme*, when baron dies, 334.
- is not evidence in a second ejectment, 215.
- when evidence in action for mesne profits, 212, 388, 389.
- when entered for want of plea, 269.
- formerly entered *quod defendens capiatur*, 331 (*c*).
- casual ejector cannot confess, 204.
- proceedings to, in ancient practice, 200, 202.
- arrest of, motion for, 326.
- against casual ejector.—*Vide* Casual Ejector.

JURISDICTION,

- may be pleaded to in ejectment, 270.
- of inferior court, cannot be pleaded when, 203.
- rule to plead to, when granted, 270.
 - how drawn up, 271.

K.

KING,

- may maintain ejectment *semble*, 78.
 - how under 8 Hen. VI. c. 16, and 18 Hen. VI. c. 6, 79.
- is not within 21 Jac. I. c. 16, 46.

KING, *continued.*

when concluded by 9 Geo. III. c. 16. 46 (a).

KITCHEN, 27.

KNEAVE of LAND, 24.

L.

LADY-DAY, notice to quit at generally, how construed, 136.

LAND,

how to be described in demise, 27.

piece of, ejectment will lie for, when, 27.

general occupation of, what is, 105.

LANDLORD,

jus disponendi in, 158.

tenant may dispute title of, when, 276.

by common law cannot be sole defendant, *quære*, 255, 257.

who may defend as, under 11 Geo. II. c. 19. 256, &c.

may defend in tenant's name, 261.

admitted to defend, after *cognovit* by tenant, 273.

how to appear as, 265.

how to proceed if improper person admitted to defend as, 260.

when defendant, judgment how signed, 263, 267.

error, how brought by, 348.

remedies for, under stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. 367, &c.

1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 376, &c.

evidence in ejectments by,

on termination of lease, 311.

notice to quit, 312.

forfeiture of lease, 316.

LATITAT, 251.

LAY IMPROPRIATORS, evidence by, for tithes, 304.

LEASE,

by *cestui que* trust, no bar to trustee, 88.

possession under treaty for, effect of, 121.

when tenancy created under a void, 110.

when entry necessary, upon a forfeiture, to avoid, 196.

cannot exist without a reversion, 177.

who may make a joint, 209.

determinable generally at third or sixth years, how construed, 137.

assignment of, when presumed, 318.

notice to produce, when necessary, 317.

forfeiture of.—*Vide* Covenant.

agreement for, what words will create, 113, &c.

evidence by landlord in ejectment, on expiration of, 311.

forfeiture of, 316.

in ancient practice, actually executed, 11, 200.

in modern practice, feigned only, 15.

confessed by defendant, 262.

LICENSE, to work mines, 20.

if written required, parol insufficient, 191.

LIMITATIONS, statute of, 45.

who not within, 46, 62.

LIMITATIONS, *continued.*

quære, if lord of manor bound by, upon forfeiture by a copyholder, 62.

when joint tenant, &c. affected by, 54.

extension of time in second section, how construed, 46. 55, &c.

does not operate between trustee and *cestui que trust*, 51.

against lord of manor, when, 52.

entry not necessary to avoid, 102.

operation of, will bar ejectment, 45. 77.

barred by payment of interest on mortgage, 51.

need not be pleaded in ejectment, 270.

must be pleaded in action for mesne profits, 386.

LIQUORICE, demise of lands producing, 138.

LODGINGS, notice to quit, how regulated, 140.

LUNATIC,

may maintain ejectment, 91.

committee of, cannot maintain ejectment, 91.

service of declaration upon, 241.

stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, does not run against, 45.

M.

MADDER, demise of lands producing, 138.

MAINTENANCE, 11, 174 (*c*).

MANOR, ejectment will lie for a, 29.

MANOR, Lord of a,

may maintain ejectment on a forfeiture, when, 61.

evidence by, on a forfeiture, 308.

on a seizure, *pro defectu tenentis*, 307.

in ejectment for mines, 308.

quære, if 21 Jac. I. c. 16, runs against a, 62.

quære, if entitled to defend ejectment, 260.

MARRIAGE, how proved, 283. 285.

MESNE PROFITS, action for,

when invented, 379.

nature and uses of, 380.

may be recovered in ejectment, when, 321, 371, 380.

may be waived,

for assumpsit for use and occupation, when, 380.

for debt on 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 381.

11 Geo. II. c. 19, *quære*, 381 (*b*).

may be brought pending error, 381.

is bailable at discretion, 381.

must be brought, by whom, 382.

against whom, 383.

declaration in, how framed, 384.

pleas in, what are good, 386.

money cannot be paid into court in, 388.

evidence in,

when profits antecedent to demise recovered, 391.

subsequent to demise, 388.

damages in,

have reference to time of defendant's occupation, 390.

MESNE PROFITS, continued.

- damages in,
 - not confined to rent of premises, 391.
 - may include costs of ejectment, 391.
 - profits before fine avoided, not recoverable as, 392.
- costs in,
 - second ejectment stayed till paid, 359.
 - judge must certify, if under 40s., 392.
- when unnecessary after error, 393.
- law regarding in Scotland, 386 (a).

MESSAGE,

- ejectment will lie for, 25.
 - part of, 27.
- notice to quit, how regulated, 139.
- rent must be demanded at, when, 161.

MICHAELMAS,

- notice to quit at generally, how construed, 136.
- holding generally from, how construed, 145.

MILLS, 27.**MINES, 20. 30. 308.****MOIETY, undivided,**

- cannot be a disseisin of, 54.
- recoverable on demise of whole, 211.

MOOR and MARSH, 28.**MORTGAGEES,**

- may maintain ejectment, 60.
 - without demanding possession, when, 108.
 - after notice to quit, when, 108.
- may defend as landlords, 260.
 - unless not interested in suit, 260.
- how protected by 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 167.
- proceedings by, when stayed under 7 Geo. II. c. 20. 361, &c.
- evidence in ejectments by, 306.
- assignee of.—*Vide Assignee.*

MORTGAGOR

- not tenant to mortgagee, 60. 108.
 - competent witness for mortgaged lands, 280.
- relation of to mortgagee after forfeiture, 60 (c).
- fine levied by, inoperative, 98.
- tenant of, need not give notice of ejectment by mortgagee, 256.
 - quere*, if liable for mesne profits, 384.
- when tenant to mortgagee, 108, 109.

MOUNTAIN, 24.

N

NON-SUIT,

- for not confessing lease, &c.
 - optional in ejectment by landlord, 321.
 - how to proceed on, 322.
 - error cannot be brought after, 348

NONSUIT, continued,

for not confessing lease, &c.

costs, how recoverable on, 334.

when not recoverable on, 335.

lessor liable to, before signing of consent rule, 272.

NOTICE TO APPEAR,

to whom to be addressed, 229.

by whom to be subscribed, 233.

should specify term by name, 231.

time of appearance of tenant, how regulated by, 230.

may be amended, 233.

how framed in ancient practice, 13, 200.

in proceedings under stat. 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. 375.

quare, if necessary in inferior courts, 202.

NOTICE OF TRIAL,

same as in other actions, 274.

except under stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 376.

proceedings stayed after, 360.

NOTICE TO QUIT,

origin and history of, 105, &c.

must be given,

in common tenancies from year to year, 106.

under implied tenancies from year to year, 107.

to personal representatives, when, 125.

is not necessary,

at expiration of lease, 105.

agreement for a lease, 112.

from mortgagee to mortgagor, 60. 108.

when tenant attorns to another, 124.

to under-tenants of mortgagor, when, 108. 384.

from assignee of mortgagee, when, 109.

time of giving, 106. 138. 142. 146.

time for expiration of,

in common tenancies, 138. 142.

in cases of lodgings, 140.

under implied tenancies, 142.

particular customs, or agreements, 140, 141.

when tenant enters at several times, 146.

irregularity as to, how waived, 275.

generally, at end of current year, good, 142.

when to be so framed, 142.

on a particular day, must be day tenancy began, 142.

by whom to be given, 126, &c.

to whom to be given, 130, &c.

how to be served, 131.

framed, 132, &c.

by parol, when good, 132.

not made good by parol consent, 155.

must be in writing, when, 132.

how to be addressed, 132..

must not be alternative or ambiguous, 133.

what so deemed, 133, &c.

NOTICE TO QUIT, continued.

- must contain all things comprised in the demise, 136.
- may be waived, and how, 149, &c.
- may be given by tenant, 156.
- implied tenancy, when rebutted by, 123.
- service of, how to be proved, 312, &c.
- when and how evidence of commencement of tenancy, 314, &c.
- power of giving, necessarily incidental to tenancy from year to year, 106.
- evidence necessary in an ejectment on, 312, &c.
- subscribing witness to, unnecessary, 133.

O.

OCCUPATION, permissive,

when tenancy created by, 121.

OCCUPANT, special, 71.

general, 50.

ORCHARD, 23.**OUSTER,**

actual, what acts amount to, 54.

evidence of, when necessary, 54. 200. 263. 278.

consent rule substitute for, when, 263.

of plaintiff, how stated in declaration, 222, &c.

nonsuit for not confessing, 262.

of tithes, how laid, 224.

OVERSEERS of the poor, service of declaration upon, 237.

may maintain ejectment, 79.

P.

PANNAGE, 22.**PARCENERS,**

may maintain ejectment against each other, when, 55. 91.

when affected by 21 Jac. I. c. 16. 54. 56.

demise by, how laid 209.

entry of one is entry of all, 100.

possession of one is possession of all, 54. 100.

what acts of, are ousters of companions, 54.

fine by one, no ouster of others, 55.

must all join in notice to quit, 127.

notice to quit to one, will bind all, when, 131.

service of declaration on, 236.

special consent rule, when granted to, 263.

evidence in ejectments by, 277.

may bring action for mesne profits, 382.

PARISH REGISTERS, when evidence, and for what, 282.**PARISH,**

need not be stated in demise, 218.

if stated in demise, material, 218.

PARISH, *continued.*

- what description of, sufficient, 219.*
- how stated when more than one, 220.
- amendment of permitted, 229.

PARSON,

- cannot bring ejectment for glebe after sequestration, 81.
- cannot defend for right to perform divine service, 261.
- evidence in ejectments by, 302.

PARTICULARS of breaches, defendant entitled to, 353.

PASSAGE-ROOM, 27.

PASTURE OF SHEEP, 27.

PEASE, acres of, 29.

PEDIGREE—when and how proved, 282, &c.

PEER, attachment against, how granted, 338.

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES,

- may maintain ejectment, 70.
 - not on 4 Geo. II. c. 28. if land devised, 171.
- must give notice to quit, 125.
- can take advantage of a forfeiture, when, 189.
- included generally, in proviso for executors to re-enter, 129.
- are not bound by consent rule, 320.
 - entitled to costs, when, 335.
 - liable for costs, when, 335.
- consent of, when necessary to a devise, 71.
- evidence in ejectments by, 306.
- when credible witnesses to prove will, 296.
- wives of, when credible witnesses, 296.
- not liable for mesne profits, when, 383.

PLEA,

- of general issue is not guilty, 270.
- special, seldom pleaded, 270.
- to jurisdiction, allowed, 270.
- ancient demesne pleadable in ejectment, 272.
 - how pleaded, 272.
- accord and satisfaction, formerly a good, 270 (c).
- of release by defendant, good formerly, 204.
 - lessor of plaintiff cannot now be pleaded, 274.
- puis darrien continuance*, 274.
- rightly entitled, not a nullity, 269, (b).
- signing judgment for want of, 269.
- withdrawn, judgment how entered after, 273.
- in action for mesne profits,
 - of general issue is not guilty, 386.
 - statute of limitations, good, 386.
 - bankruptcy, not good, 387.

PLEA-ROLL, death of defendant suggested on, 332.

POOL OF WATER, 20.

POSSESSION,

- adverse,
 - for twenty years, good title in ejectment, 77.
 - what will amount to, 46, &c.
- not adverse,
 - if parties claim under the same title, 47.

POSSESSION, *continued*,

- not adverse,
 - if possession and title consistent, 47.
 - against lord, if originally taken by his consent, 52.
 - aliter*, if taken without consent, 52.
 - if party claiming, was never in law dispossessed, 53.
 - if possessor has acknowledged claimant's title, 56.
- vacant,
 - ancient practice necessary on, and why, 199.
 - premises must be entirely deserted to constitute, 199 (a).
 - formal proceedings on, 200.
- prima facie* evidence of property, 281.
- how to be delivered by sheriff, 24. 341.
- lessor of plaintiff must be entitled to, 33, 275.
- recovery in ejectment is of the, 327.
- who have a joint, 210.
- of one joint tenant, &c. is possession of all, 54.
- of defendant, how proved, 277.
 - admitted by consent rule, 262.
- demand of before ejectment,
 - when necessary, 121.
 - when not, 60, 122.

POSTEA,

- how indorsed, if defendant will not confess, 322.
 - if some of several will not, 323.
- when costs taxed on, 335.

POSTHUMOUS SON, demise by, when laid, 213.

PRACTICE, ancient,

- general detail of, 10, &c.
- inconveniences attending, 13.
- when now necessary, 199.
- how to seal lease, &c. in, 200.
- how to proceed to judgment in, 201, 202.
- no person admitted to defend in, 201.

PRACTICE, modern,

- when invented, 14.
- outline of, 15.
- not applicable to vacant possessions, 199.
 - in inferior courts, 199.

PREBENDAL STALL, 19.

PREMISES,

- how described in demise, 22, 218. &c.
- mis-description of, when fatal, 219.
- locality of, must be proved as stated, 277.

PRESENTATION,

- simoniacal void, 81.
- how proved, 303.

PRIMA TONSURA, 21.

PROBATE OF WILL, when evidence, and when not, 289. 299, 300.

PROCEEDINGS, staying of,

- how and when stayed, under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 170, &c.
- 7 Geo. II. c. 20. 361, &c.
- stayed, when variance between issue and record, 323.

- PROCEEDINGS, staying of, *continued*.
 stayed until particulars of breaches delivered, 353.
 when stayed, until security for costs given,
 in action of ejectment, 354.
 in action for mesne profits, 382.
 in second ejectment,
 till costs of first paid, 355, &c.
 action for mesne profits
 paid, 359.
 pending error in first, 361.
 not stayed in second ejectment,
 when party in custody, 359.
 until costs in equity paid, 359.
 when verdict obtained by fraud, 360.
 how stayed, when two ejectments are depending at once, 358. 361.
 several ejectments on one title, 361.
- PROCESS not sued out in ejectment, 206.
- PROVINCIAL TERMS, premises described by, 24.
- PROVISO for re-entry,
 for non-payment of rent,
 origin of, 157.
 at common law, how enforced, 160.
 provisions of stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. respecting, 162.
 proceedings under, 168, &c.
 stat. 11 Geo. II. c. 19. 175, *note*.
 how waived, 173.
 not waived by taking insufficient distress, when, 174.
- for breach of covenant,
 may be enforced on agreement for lease, 188.
 who may take advantage of, 191.
 reserved to lessor and lessee, lessee may enter alone, 192.
- PUIS DARRIEN CONTINUANCE, 274.
- PUR AUTRE VIE, estates held, 71.

Q.

- QUARE EJECIT INFRA TERMINUM, writ of, 3.
 QUARE IMPEDIT, patron must resort to, when, 302.
 QUARTER OF LAND, 24.

R.

- RECEIVER IN CHANCERY,
 may give notice to quit, 129.
 service of declaration upon, not good, 238.
- RECORD,
 how made up, 273.
 variance between issue and, how to proceed when, 323.

RECTORS,

- may maintain ejectment, when, 80.
- confirm former tenancies, how, 120.
- evidence in ejectments by, 302.

RE-ENTRY, proviso for,

- origin of, 157.
- holding not adverse if not enforced, 50.
- operates only during the lease, 198.
- for rent in arrear,
 - forms at common law upon, 160.
 - when now necessary, 162. 169.
- how and when to proceed upon, under 4 Geo. II. c. 20
166, &c.
- evidence in ejectment upon, 316.
- for breach of covenant—*Vide* Covenant.
- cannot be reserved to a stranger, 191.
- right of, how waived, 149, &c. 192, &c.

REGISTER, PARISH, when evidence, 282.

RELICTA VERIFICATIONE judgment, how entered, 273.

REMAINDER-MAN,

- when required to give a notice to quit, 110. 123.
- time at which such notice must expire, 143.
- for entry of, to avoid a fine, 97.
- laches of one no prejudice to another, 97.
- not competent witness in ejectment, 280.

RENT,

- receipt of, when tenancy created by, 107. 110.
- old doctrine respecting, 112.
- notice to quit waived by, when, 149, &c.
- forfeiture waived by, when, 192.
- by feme, after separation from baron, 120.
- distress for, when waiver of notice to quit, 154.
- demand of,
 - when necessary upon forfeiture, 162. 168.
 - how to be made at common law, 160.
 - not necessary under stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 162.
- amount in particulars, need not be proved, 317.
- non-payment of, proviso for re-entry for.—*Vide* Proviso.
- increase of, new tenancy not created by, 144.
- refusal to pay, when disclaimer of tenancy, 125.
- usual notice to quit required though payable quarterly, 141.
- double, action for, 154.
- in arrear, how recoverable under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 162.
- forfeiture by reason of, how waived, 173.
- notice to produce receipts of, 312.
- action for double, 154. 381 (*b*).

RENT-CHARGE, grantee of, may bring ejectment, when, 71.

REPLICATION, rule for, when granted, 272.

REPLY GENERAL, defendant when entitled to, 288. 301.

REPUTATION, when evidence, 283, &c.

RESTITUTION, writ of, 252.

REVERSION, assignee of—*Vide* Assignee.

REVERSIONER,

- when required to give a notice to quit, 123.
- time at which notice to quit by, must expire, 143.
- when within 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 43.
- time for entry of, to avoid a fine, 97.
- may take advantage of a forfeiture, when, 190.

RIVULET, 20.

ROOM, 27.

RULES OF COURT,

- Hilary, 1649. 270.
- Michaelmas, 1654. 200 (c).
- Trinity, 14 Car. II. 251.
 - 18 Car. II. 270.
 - 32 Car. II. 248.
 - 31 Geo. III. 249.
- Easter, 48 Geo. III. 249.

S.

SCIRE FACIAS, when necessary in ejectment, 346. 393.

SEIZIN IN FEE, how proved, 281.

SIGNATURE, to will, 290.

mark sufficient, 293.

if sealing, sufficient, 291.

SOCAGE—*Vide* Guardians.

STABLE, 27.

STATUTES,

- 13 Edw. I. c. 24. 6.
- 4 Edw. III. c. 7. 69.
- 8 Hen. VI. c. 16. 79.
- 18 Hen. VI. c. 6. 79.
 - 4 Hen. VII. c. 24. 93.
- 11 Hen. VII. c. 20. 39.
- 27 Hen. VIII. c. 10. 81, &c.
- 32 Hen. VIII. c. 1. 299.
- 32 Hen. VIII. c. 7. 18.
- 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28. 38.
- 32 Hen. VIII. c. 33. 43. 45.
- 32 Hen. VIII. c. 34. 72.
 - 2 & 3 Edw. VI. c. 13. 81.
- 13 Eliz. c. 7. 67.
- 13 Eliz. c. 10. 218.
- 21 Jac. I. c. 16. 45. 102.
 - 2 Car. II. c. 24. 67.
- 16 & 17. Car. II. c. 8. 348. 393.
- 17 Car. II. c. 8. 332.
- 19 Car. II. c. 6. 285.
- 29 Car. II. c. 3. 71. 111. 156. 289.
 - 5 & 6 Wm. III. c. 12. 338.
 - 8 & 9 Wm. III. c. 11. 332. 337.
 - 10 & 11 Wm. III. c. 16. 213.

STATUTES, *continued*,

- 4 Anne, c. 16. 102.
- 8 Anne, c. 14. 155.
- 9 Geo. I. c. 16. 78.
- 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 134. 153. 158. 162. 213. 248. 316.
366. 367. 381.
- 7 Geo, II. c. 20. 361.
- 11 Geo. II. c. 19. 154. 175. 255. 267. 381.
- 25 Geo. II. c. 6, 295.
- 9 Geo. III. c. 16. 46. 78.
- 14 Geo. III. c. 78. 74.
- 31 Geo. III. c. 35. 295.
- 43 Geo. III. c. 75. 91.
- 55 Geo. III. c. 12. 80.
- 55 Geo. III. c. 184. 299.
- 55 Geo. III. c. 192. 299.
- 1 Geo. IV. c. 87. 246. 321. 322. 326. 339. 367, &c. 380.
- 6 Geo. IV. c. 16. 69. 306. 333.
- 1 Wm. IV. c. 38. 69. 306.
- 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 208. 230. 247. 249. 321. 326. 340.
376, &c.

STATUTE MERCHANT.—*Vide* Conusee.

SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES,

- notice to quit should not have, and why, 133.
- to devise of freehold, must be three, 290.
- who may be, 294.

SURRENDER,

- of term, when presumed, 89.
- acceptance of invalid notice, amounts to, 154.
- of copyholds, how proved, 299.
- not necessary to will of, 299,
- unless matter of substance, 300.

T.

TENANTS,

- joint and in common.
- may maintain ejectment against co-tenants, when, 91.
- when affected by 21 Jac. I. c. 16. 56.
- demise by, how laid, 209.
- entry of one is entry of all, 100.
- possession of one is possession of all, 54. 98.
- what acts of, are ousters of companions, 54, &c.
- fine by one no ouster of others, 55. 98.
- how notice to quit should be given by, 127.
- notice to quit to one will bind all, when, 131.
- service of declaration upon one good against all, 236.
- special consent rule, when granted to, 263.
- evidence in ejectments by, 277.
- may bring action for mesne profits against co-tenants, 382.

TENANTS, *continued.*

in tail,

- may discontinue their estates, and how, 35, &c.
- maintain ejectment, 59.
- equitable, cannot make leases, 88.
- fine by, when avoided by entry, 96.

for life,

- may maintain ejectment, 59.
- entry necessary to avoid fine levied by, 96.
- not necessary to avoid fine accepted by, 99.
- estates of, determinable by entry only, 196.

from year to year,

- may maintain ejectment, 59.
- give notice to quit, 156:
- cannot levy fine, 97.
- entry not necessary to avoid fine by, 97.
- permissive occupation may create, 121.
- origin and history of, 105, &c.
- estates of, how determined, 106. 156.
- who are implied, 110. 119. 121.
- not permitted to give *cognovit*, 273.

at will,

- who where formerly, 105.
- who so denominated now, 106.
- mortgagors are not, 60 (*c*). 108.
- tenancy of, how determined, 121.
- demise against, how laid, 214.

in possession,

- declarations by, as to commencement of tenancies, 314.
- how to serve declaration upon, 234, &c.
- must give notice of delivery of declaration, when, 256.
- appearance by, how made, 265.
- how to act if material witnesses, 266.
- service, of, declaration upon one of two, 236.
- not competent witnesses, when, 270.
- may dispute landlord's title, when, 32. 276.

TENEMENT,

- not sufficient description in ejectment, 25.
- unless other words added, 26.
- may be struck out of declaration after verdict, 25 (*g*).

TERM,

- when first recovered in ejectment, 9.
- in declaration—*Vide* Demise.
- for years,
- not within statute of uses, 87.
- surrender of, when presumed, 88.
- outstanding will bar ejectment, 33.
- assignment of, not a lease, 177.
- notice to quit not necessary at end of, 105.

TERRE-TENANTS,

- scire facias* in ejectment must be against, 346.

TERRIERS, when evidence, 304.

TITHES,

- ejectment will lie for, and when, 18. 80.
- how to be described in demise, 29.
- demise of, how laid, 217.
- ouster of, how laid, 224.
- evidence in ejectments for, 302.

TITLE LEGAL, 32. 275.

TOMB-STONE, inscription on, proof of death, 286.

TONSURA PRIMA, 21.

TOWNSHIP, 24.

TRIAL,

- notice of.—*Vide* Notice.
- how to proceed at,
 - when a sole defendant will not confess, 322.
 - some of several will not confess, 323.
 - old practice in such case, 323 (*b*).
 - variance between issue and record, 323.
 - day of demise posterior to time of, 324.
- at bar, when and how granted, 324.
- new, how and when moved for and granted, 326.
- proceedings under 4 Geo. II. c. 28. not staid after, 167. 169.

TROVER, verdict in, no evidence of possession, 309.

TRUSTEES,

- may maintain ejectment, 33.
 - in what cases, 81, &c.
- demises by, when necessary, 211.
 - stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, runs against when, 50.

TRUSTS, when executed by statute of uses, 82, &c.

U.

UNDER-TENANT,

- service of declaration should be upon, 235.
- cannot dispute original lessor's title, 276.
- bound by notice to quit to tenant, 130.
- delivery of notice to quit to relation of, not good, 130.

UNDERWOOD, 28.**USE AND OCCUPATION,** action for,

- when waiver of notice to quit, 154.
- what mesne profits may be recovered in, 380.

V.

VALUE, DOUBLE, action for, 153.

VARIANCE between declaration and issue, 273.

- issue and record, 323.
- verdict and judgment, 328.

VENIRE, how awarded when one defendant dies, 332.

VENUE, 209.

VERDICT,

- is not evidence in second ejectment, 327.
- is ground of judgment, 328.
- every intendment made to support, 328, &c.
- title defectively set out, cured by, 331.
- entered for defendants who do not appear, 323.
- semble*, will cure misjoinder of assault and battery with ejectment, 204.

VESTRY, 27.**VICAR,**

- may maintain ejectment, when, 80.
- evidence in ejectments by, 302.

W.**WAIVER—Vide Notice to Quit and Covenant.****WASTE,**

- can only be committed of thing demised, 182.
- security not to commit, 322. 370. 372.
- rule not to commit pending error, 350.
- encroachment on, *quare* to whom it belongs, 51.
- inclosure from, 62.

WATER-COURSE, 21.

- WIDOW** may bring ejectment for her free bench, 65.
- not for dower before assignment, 66.

WIFE.—Vide Feme Covert.**WILL,**

- forms necessary to pass freeholds by, 290, &c.
- how proved, 297.
- what sufficient to pass copyholds, 299.
- copy of, when evidence, 289. 299. 300.
- probate, of, when evidence, 299, 300.
- when not, 289.

WITNESSES,

- when incompetent from interest, 279. 295.
- to a devise of freeholds,
 - how many necessary, 290.
 - mode of attestation of 291.
 - who may be, 295.
 - not be, 296.
- co-lessor cannot be compelled to be, 281.
- credible, who are, 294,
- when dead, &c. will how proved, 297.

PRACTICAL FORMS.

AFFIDAVIT,

- to move for judgment against casual ejector, 398.
- of executing power of attorney, 396.
- of service of declaration,
 - upon one tenant only, 402.
 - when several tenants are in possession, 403.
 - service is upon one tenant and wife of another, 403.
 - upon stat. 4 Geo. II. c. 28. 404.
- for rule for tenant to confess lease and entry only, 407.
- to accompany plea of ancient demesne, 408.

CONSENT OF ATTORNIES for tenant to be admitted to defend,
406.

CONSENT RULE, common, 407.
to confess lease and entry only, 409.

DECLARATION by original, on a single demise, 399:

- on a double demise with one ouster,
401.
- with two ousters,
402.

JUDGMENT for plaintiff by *nil dicit*, with a *remittitur damna*, 405.
as to part of the premises, and for
defendant on a *nolle prosequi* as to the residue, 411.

LETTER of attorney to enter and seal a lease on the premises, 396.

LEASE in ancient practice, 397.

NOTICE to appear in ancient practice, 397.
modern practice, 400.

NOTICE to quit, by landlord to tenant, from year to year, 395.

- by an agent for the landlord, 395.
- where the commencement of the tenancy is
doubtful, 395.
- by a tenant from year to year, 396.

PLEA of not guilty, 410.

ancient demesne, 410.

POSTEA for defendant on a nonsuit, for not confessing lease, entry and ouster, 411.

RULE,

for judgment for the whole premises, 404.

part only, 405.

where part of premises are tenanted and part untenanted, 405.

to authorize tenant to confess lease and entry only, 408.

for admitting landlord to defend, 409.

for execution against the casual ejector, where the landlord had been made defendant, and failed at the trial, 412.

for staying proceedings,

till guardian be appointed for infant lessor to answer costs, 417.

security be given for costs, 417.

until costs of former action in another court be paid, 417.

on payment of mortgage money. &c. 417.

rent, &c. 418.

WRIT,

original and return thereto, 399.

of *habere facias possessionem*, 412.

on a double demise, 413.

under stat. 1 Wm. IV. c. 70. 414.

and *feri facias* in one, 414.

capias ad satisfaciendum in one, 415.

including costs in error, 415.

of restitution, 416.

of *scire facias* for plaintiff, 417.

ERRATUM.

Page 97, line 3 from the bottom, insert years instead of life.

THE END.

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