

SECRET

LET, HQ 707, Subj: REI No. 3, Effectiveness of Night Bombing, to  
SINCE, APO 500, Attn: G-2

1. What is your reaction to night bombing? As compared to day,  
does night or day bombing frighten you more?

2. Does night bombing disrupt movement on roads? More than day?  
How? Have any troops and supplies been re-routed to secondary roads  
because of night bombing? As compared to day bombing, can you give  
any personal experiences?

3. Does night bombing do more damage to supply routes or personnel?

4. Have any orders been received from higher headquarters as to  
action to be taken in case of night attack? What precautions do you and  
your unit take? How effective are they? How long does it take to re-  
organize after a night bombing attack in comparison with a day bombing  
raid?

5. What effect does delayed action have on troops? Supply  
columns? What preventive measures are taken to prevent delayed action  
bombing?

6. What is your reaction to night bombing? Have you ever had a night?

7. What are your views, or what type of action do your troops  
utilize to prevent extensive damage to supply columns? For  
diverse purposes? For supply columns? For supply routes?

8. What bombs are most effective? High bombs, or general purpose?

9. Have you ever been bombed at night with napalm? What effect  
do you think this would have on your fellow soldiers? Would it cause  
fear, disorganization, etc.?

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

J. P. CRIM  
MAJOR USAF  
Asst Adj Gen

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JSA

US

級



**SECRET**

Ltr, Hq FEAF, subj: EMI No. 3, Effectiveness of Night Bombing, to  
CINCPAC, APO 500, Attn: G-2, 2 Apr 51

MISD

1st Ind

G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 9 April 1951

TO: Deputy for Intelligence, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

1. The EMI has been promptly forwarded to ADVATIS; it will be accomplished in the form of a special report and forwarded you as expeditiously as possible. In addition, the EMI will be exploited through other applicable G-2 agencies, which have been alerted.

2. G-2 desires to bring to your attention that at the inception of ADVATIS in Korea it was agreed that ADVATIS would be a joint G-2/FEAF effort as practiced in SWPA and dictated by a general linguist shortage, that FEAF could place requests for information on ADVATIS and would receive copies of all reports and information emanating from ADVATIS.

3. ADVATIS was initially composed of forty-six (46) officers and EM, of which twenty-four (24) were to be furnished by G-2/TIS and twenty-two (22) by FEAF/"Wringer" Project. Of this twenty-two (22), FEAF/"Wringer" Project initially furnished one (1) officer and eighteen (18) Airmen; this number of personnel has decreased to a current strength of nine (9) FEAF Airmen in ADVATIS. Meanwhile to meet volume of business, G-2/TIS strength in ADVATIS has been increased to ninety-eight (98).


4. Since ADVATIS has been in operation, FEAF has placed thirty-eight (38) separate special requests for information on ADVATIS, in addition to the subject EMI, of which seven (7) are currently still being processed by ADVATIS; two (2) of the seven were forwarded to ADVATIS, 3 April 1951.

5. G-2 desires to accomplish all FEAF information requests expeditiously and to render FEAF the best service possible on meeting their PW interrogation requirements. G-2 operated in the SWPA by pooling linguists, in short supply. G-2 still believes this can be accomplished by a joint G-2/FEAF effort, but obviously, in view of FEAF intelligence requirements, greater participation by linguist personnel of "Wringer" Project (now 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron) is necessary.

6. Accordingly, it is suggested that necessary action be taken to increase the number of FEAF personnel in ADVATIS from the present nine (9) to the originally-agreed twenty-two (22); of this number, it would be desirable

**SECRET**

G-2 File





SECRET

Mr. Mc KEAY, subj: EMI No. 3, Effectiveness of Night Bombing, to  
CINCOPAC, APO 500, Attn: G-2, 3 Apr 51

MIRB  
1st Ind

G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 8 April 1951

TO: Deputy for Intelligence, Far East Air Forces, APO 500

1. The EMI has been promptly forwarded to ADVATIS; it will be accomplished in the form of a special report and forwarded you as expeditiously as possible. In addition, the EMI will be exploited through other applicable G-2 agencies, which have been alerted.

2. G-2 desires to bring to your attention that at the inception of ADVATIS in Korea it was agreed that ADVATIS would be a joint G-2/USAF effort as practiced in SWPA and dictated by a general insight shortage, that USAF could place requests for information on ADVATIS and would receive copies of all reports and information emanating from ADVATIS.

3. ADVATIS was initially composed of forty-six (46) officers and EM, of which twenty-four (24) were to be furnished by G-2/TIS and twenty-two (22) by USAF/Wingman Project. Of this twenty-two (22), USAF/Wingman Project initially furnished one (1) officer and eighteen (18) Airmen; the number of personnel has decreased to a current strength of nine (9) USAF Airmen in ADVATIS. Meanwhile to meet volume of business, G-2/TIS strength in ADVATIS has been increased to ninety-eight (98).

4. Since ADVATIS has been in operation, USAF has placed thirty-eight (38) separate special requests for information on ADVATIS, in addition to the subject EMI, of which seven (7) are currently still being processed by ADVATIS; two (2) of the seven were forwarded to ADVATIS, 3 April 1951.

5. G-2 desires to accomplish all USAF information requests expeditiously and to render USAF the best service possible on meeting their PW interrogation requirements. G-2 operated in the SWPA by posting linguists, in short supply. G-2 still believes this can be accomplished by a joint G-2/USAF effort, but optionally, in view of USAF intelligence requirements, expeditious cooperation by linguist personnel of "Wingman" Project (now 500th Air Force Squadron) is necessary.

6. Accordingly, it is suggested that necessary personnel be assigned to the original number of USAF personnel in ADVATIS from the originally agreed twenty-two (22); of this number...



SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

G-S File

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI



16311

SECRET

Ltr, Hq FEAF, subj: NEI No. 3, Effectiveness of Night Bombing, to  
CINCPAC, APO 500, Attn: G-2, 2 Apr 51, 1st Ind (cont'd)

that at least two (2) be intelligence trained officer personnel capable of  
conducting interrogations of PW's for highly specialized air technical informa-  
tion of primary interest to FEAF, such as the relative effectiveness of night  
bombing, the comparative effects of different type bombs, the adequacy of  
enemy pilot training, the comparative efficiency of various type aircraft, etc.

*/s/* C. A. WILLOUGHBY  
Major General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

G-2 File

MEMO FOR RECORD:  
Self-explanatory.

E.H.F.S.  
26-7838

FILE

141  
350.09

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



SECRET

AG 384.5 (2 Apr 1951) INT-IR 2d Ind

Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 925, 26 Apr 1951

TO: Commander in Chief, Far East, APO 500, Attention: G-2

1. The prompt servicing given to our EEI on night bombing is greatly appreciated. Initial reports which have already been received in this headquarters are excellent and promise to be of great assistance to our commanders in the selection of weapons and bombing techniques.

2. This headquarters has a continuing interest in the Korean interrogation program and is most anxious to have available a facility which can effectively service our requirements. Activation of the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron is gradually making more resources available and I have given instructions to build up our ADVATIS strength as rapidly as our manpower situation permits.

3. All of our interpreters are being incorporated into the Air Intelligence Squadron, which will make necessary some organizational revision on our part in ADVATIS. The airmen now on duty with ADVATIS will be assigned to the 6004th and with your concurrence will be formed into an air section within ADVATIS. The ADVATIS section, in common with all our intelligence operations in Korea, will be under the jurisdiction of Fifth Air Force rather than this

SECRET



SECRET

CAN 2 899

1  
6  
3  
1  
1

Ltr Hq FEAF, Subj: EEI No. 3, Effectiveness of Night Bombing, to  
CINCFE, APO 500, ATTN: G-2, 2 Apr 51, 2d Ind (contd)

headquarters. This arrangement will permit Air Force personnel to service  
EEI of special interest to FEAF as suggested in paragraph 6, 1st indorse-  
ment. There would be no change in processing or distribution of reports  
and the air section would continue to be a component of ADVATIS under super-  
vision of its commander.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES Y. BANFILL  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy for Intelligence

G-2 File Copy


MISD 3d Ind  
G2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 2 May 1951  
TO: Deputy for Intelligence, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

The increase in FEAF strength in ADVATIS agreed to in paragraph 2,  
2nd Indorsement will do much to assist ADVATIS in insuring that Air Force  
intelligence requirements are promptly and adequately met on a cooperative  
interservice basis.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

51  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:  
Abv ans in reply to D/I FEAF, 2nd Ind to G2, GHQ, dtd 26 Apr 51,  
which proposes build-up of FEAF air section in ADVATIS to be under juris-  
dictions of Fifth Air Force and direct supervision of CO, ADVATIS.



140  
350109

SECRET

EHFS 26-7838

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500  
18 April 1951

SUBJECT: North Korean Underground Aircraft Hangars  
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Eighth Army  
APO 301

1. Inclosure 1 is copy of Specific Request for Information, Control No. CE 903, which requests engineering information and photographs of aircraft hangars located at Wonsan and Onjin, North Korea, which was reportedly gathered when UN forces were in this area.
2. This SRI is being sent to your office since X Corps, having operated in the Wonsan area, may possibly be able to furnish information desired.
3. Request all available information in answer to above request be forwarded to G2, GHQ not later than 5 May 1951.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

1 Incl  
SRI CE 903, subj as  
above, dtd 3 Apr 51

*RS*  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. SRI, CE 903 was received by MIS Div on 16 Apr 51 fr Targets Br, T/Intel. Copies of this SRI have also been sent to FEAF, COMNAVFE and Engr Sec, GHQ.
2. As X Corps operated in the Wonsan area, it was deemed advisable to forward this request to Eighth Army for action.



FILE

SECRET

134

350109

G-2 File Copy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27







SECRET

10807

19881

North Korean Underground  
Aircraft Hangars  
Sg-8800  
Capt Head

Targets Branch  
MIS Div

1. Attached Specific Request for Information, Control No. CE 903, subject "North Korean Underground Aircraft Hangars", dated 3 April 1951, requests engineering information and photographs of aircraft hangars located at Wonsan and Onjin, North Korea.

2. Request all available information in answer to above request be forwarded to Targets Branch for submittal to DA not later than 10 May 1951.

1 Incl:  
Specific Request  
(3 copies)

NAME: Lt Greer  
PHONE: 26-7007  
DATE: 18 April 1951  
MISD/TMS/RWG/als  
H.S.H.

FROM: MIS Div  
TO: GS

1. Targets Branch, T/Intel has requested FRAP, COMNAVFE, and Engineer Section, GHO, to furnish info pertinent to subject request, if available.  
2. Inclosure 2, draft letter, GS, GHO to ACO's, GS, Eighth Army, forwards SRI CE 903 and suggests that X Corps be queried for information which may be available on this subject.  
3. Recommend approval and dispatch of Incl 2.

2 Incls  
1. SRI, CE 903 subj: NK Underground Aircraft Hangars, dtd 3 Apr 51  
2. Draft ltr GS, GHO to ACO's, 8th Army dtd 18 Apr 51

SECRET





COPY

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

G-2/I Rqmts/ - C

3 April 1951

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, CONTROL NO. CE 903

SUBJECT: North Korean Underground Aircraft Hangars

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East, ATTN: A.C. of S., G-2, APO 500,  
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California

1. Requirement: Engineering information and photographs of aircraft hangars located at Wonsan and Onjin, North Korea. Specifically the following items should be covered:

- a. Hangars, ramps, and taxiways
- b. Entrances and interiors
- c. Results of bombing

2. Reply (within 30 days of receipt). Unsatisfied portions (will) be forwarded after suspense date.

3. All replies to the requirement will refer to the above Control Number.

4. Collection guidance and special instructions:

It is known that Commander Task Force 77 recommended to Commander Task Force 7 on 25 October 1950 that such engineering studies be made. Office of Naval Intelligence is not aware of any completed study as recommended. CTF 7, an operational Task Force in Korean waters, no longer exists as an organization.

For the ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

/s/ U. G. Carlem, Lt Col  
for JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Division, G-2

Incls: None

COPY

SECRET

Incl 1



SECRET

DRAFT

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Service Division

APO 500  
18 April 1951

SUBJECT: North Korean Underground Aircraft Hangars

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Eighth Army  
APO 301

1. Inclosure 1 is Specific Request for Information, Control No. CE 903, which requests engineering information and photographs of aircraft hangars located at Wonsan and Onjin, North Korea, which was reportedly gathered when UN forces were in this area.

2. This SRI is being sent to your office since X Corps, having operated in the Wonsan area, may possibly be able to furnish information desired.

3. Request all available information in answer to above request be forwarded to G2, GHQ not later than 5 May 1951.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

1 Incl  
SRI CE 903 subj as above  
dtd 3 Apr 51

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. SRI, CE 903 was received by MIS Div on 16 Apr 51 fr Targets Branch, T/Intel. Copies of this SRI have also been sent to FEAF, COMNAVFE and Engr Sec, GHQ.

2. As X Corps operated in the Wonsan area, it was deemed advisable to forward this request to Eighth Army for action.

T.N.S.  
26-7489

incl 2

SECRET

DRAFT



CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General StaffAPO 500  
15 February 195115608  
GI(07589)  
Int. Sec.  
Reg GB 6071

SUBJECT: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Reports


TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
General Staff, United States Army  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. G2, GHQ, FEC is on distribution for reports prepared by the Department of State, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research. These reports have been of considerable value and are now being used as background information for Psychological Warfare operations. However, the number of copies received has been erratic, ranging from 1 to 6.

2. Request that distribution to G-2, General Headquarters, on subject reports be standardized at six (6) copies per issue, especially on those reports dealing with China, Russia and Korea in the following fields:

- a. Political conditions.
- b. Economic conditions.
- c. Social conditions.
- d. Police systems.
- e. Labor.
- f. Propaganda.
- g. External relations.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

CONFIDENTIAL

T-1497

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JSA  
GJ



CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

01280  
Reg 68501  
15808

APD 500  
15 February 1951

SUBJECT: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Reports

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
General Staff, United States Army  
Washington 25, D.C.

1. GS, GHO, FEC is on distribution for reports prepared by the Department of State, Division of Research for the Far East, Office of Intelligence Research. These reports have been of considerable value and are now being used as background information for Psychological Warfare operations. However, the number of copies received has been erratic, ranging from 1 to 6.

2. Request that distribution to G-2, General Headquarters, on subject reports be standardized at six (6) copies per issue, especially on those reports dealing with China, Russia and Korea in the following fields:

- a. Political conditions.
- b. Economic conditions.
- c. Social conditions.
- d. Police systems.
- e. Labor.
- f. Propaganda.
- g. External relations.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

R. S. ...  
Colonel  
Deputy

FEB 27 1951

APD 500  
15 FEB 1951  
G-2 DISPATCHED  
FEC  
GHO

CONFIDENTIAL

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

SEKISUI JUSHI

JDA

015

級



15608

CONFIDENTIAL

G2-IDis (15 Feb 51) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Reports

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. 21 MAR 1951

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, APO 500, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California, ATTN: A.C. of S, G-2

1. The Department of State has been requested to furnish additional copies of Office of Intelligence Research Reports to meet requirements of the Far East Command as outlined in basic letter.
2. Subject reports will be forwarded promptly upon receipt in this Headquarters.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2

JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Division, G-2

CONFIDENTIAL

127  
I 1489  
350.09

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JSA

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

27



15808

CONFIDENTIAL

GS-1D1a (15 Feb 51) fat Ind  
SUBJECT: Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research Reports

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Department  
of the Army, Washington 25, D.C. 21 MAR 1951

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, APO 500, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California, ATTN: A.C. of S, G-2

1. The Department of State has been requested to furnish additional copies of Office of Intelligence Research Reports to meet requirements of the Far East Command as outlined in basic letter.
2. Subject reports will be forwarded promptly upon receipt in this Headquarters.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2

*John Weckertling*

JOHN WECKERTLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Division, G-2



CONFIDENTIAL

15808

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JSDA

015

1級



Authority 913562  
By W NARA Date 1/23/12

ACCESS RESTRICTED

350.09

|                              |           |           |           |               |            |                    |  |            |  |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|--------------------|--|------------|--|
| DOCUMENT NUMBER: <u>NONE</u> |           |           |           |               |            | AGENCY RESPONSIBLE |  | AGENCY AC  |  |
| TYPE: <u>MEMO</u>            |           |           |           |               |            | <u>CIA</u>         |  |            |  |
| FROM: <u>MIS, GHQ, FEC</u>   |           |           |           |               |            |                    |  |            |  |
| TO: <u>C/S, D/A</u>          |           |           |           |               |            | REASON WITHHELD    |  | MARKING AP |  |
| SUBJECT: <u>BRIEF...</u>     |           |           |           |               |            | <u>INTEL</u>       |  |            |  |
| FILE NUMBER:                 |           |           |           |               |            |                    |  |            |  |
| TAB NO.                      | DAY       | MO.       | YEAR      | NO. OF COPIES | PAGES EACH | CLASSIFICATION     |  |            |  |
| <u>10</u>                    | <u>27</u> | <u>04</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>1</u>      | <u>1</u>   | <u>S</u>           |  |            |  |

... the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

Authority

Date

8.20.81

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

10

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29



Authority 813562  
By W NARA Date 1/23/12

ACCESS RESTRICTED

|                              |           |           |           |               |            |                |                      |  |              |  |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|----------------|----------------------|--|--------------|--|
| DOCUMENT NUMBER: <u>NONE</u> |           |           |           |               |            |                | AGENCY RESPONSIBLE   |  | AGENCY ACTI  |  |
| TYPE: <u>MEMO</u>            |           |           |           |               |            |                | <u>ARMY/<br/>GBR</u> |  |              |  |
| FROM: <u>MIS, GHQ, FEC</u>   |           |           |           |               |            |                |                      |  |              |  |
| TO: <u>C/S, D/A</u>          |           |           |           |               |            |                |                      |  |              |  |
| SUBJECT: <u>G-2 COMMENTS</u> |           |           |           |               |            |                | REASON WITHHELD      |  | MARKING APPL |  |
| FILE NUMBER:                 |           |           |           |               |            |                | <u>INTEL</u>         |  |              |  |
| TAB NO.                      | DAY       | MO.       | YEAR      | NO. OF COPIES | PAGES EACH | CLASSIFICATION |                      |  |              |  |
| <u>11</u>                    | <u>24</u> | <u>03</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>1</u>      | <u>1</u>   | <u>S</u>       |                      |  |              |  |

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

\_\_\_\_\_  
Authority

8-20-81  
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

11

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29



ACCESS RESTRICTED

|                                  |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |  |               |  |
|----------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|--|---------------|--|
| DOCUMENT NUMBER: <u>NONE</u>     |           |           |           |               |            |                | AGENCY RESPONSIBLE |  | AGENCY ACTION |  |
| TYPE: <u>MEMO W/ENC</u>          |           |           |           |               |            |                | <u>CIA</u>         |  |               |  |
| FROM: <u>G-3, FER</u>            |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |  |               |  |
| TO: <u>G-2, FEC</u>              |           |           |           |               |            |                | REASON WITHHELD    |  | MARKING APPL  |  |
| SUBJECT: <u>VULNERABILITY...</u> |           |           |           |               |            |                | <u>INTEL</u>       |  |               |  |
| FILE NUMBER:                     |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |  |               |  |
| TAB NO.                          | DAY       | MO.       | YEAR      | NO. OF COPIES | PAGES EACH | CLASSIFICATION |                    |  |               |  |
| <u>12</u>                        | <u>09</u> | <u>03</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>1</u>      | <u>2</u>   | <u>S</u>       |                    |  |               |  |

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

\_\_\_\_\_ Authority \_\_\_\_\_ Date 8.20.81

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE





ACCESS RESTRICTED

|                              |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |              |                 |  |
|------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|--|
| DOCUMENT NUMBER: <u>NONE</u> |           |           |           |               |            |                | AGENCY RESPONSIBLE |              | AGENCY ACTION   |  |
| TYPE: <u>MEMO</u>            |           |           |           |               |            |                | <u>CIA</u>         |              |                 |  |
| FROM: <u>MIS, GHQ, FEC</u>   |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |              |                 |  |
| TO: <u>C/S, D/A</u>          |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |              |                 |  |
| SUBJECT: <u>BRIEF...</u>     |           |           |           |               |            |                |                    |              |                 |  |
| FILE NUMBER:                 |           |           |           |               |            |                | REASON WITHHELD    |              | MARKING APPLIED |  |
| TAB NO.                      | DAY       | MO.       | YEAR      | NO. OF COPIES | PAGES EACH | CLASSIFICATION |                    | <u>INTEL</u> |                 |  |
| <u>13</u>                    | <u>06</u> | <u>02</u> | <u>51</u> | <u>1</u>      | <u>1</u>   | <u>S</u>       |                    |              |                 |  |

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- Security-Classified Information
- Otherwise Restricted Information

\_\_\_\_\_ Authority \_\_\_\_\_ Date 8.20.81

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29



Authority 813562  
By W NARA Date 1/23/12

G-2 FILE COPY

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

*Caw 2732*

APO 500  
5 March 1951

Sub. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN CHINESE  
COASTAL ISLANDS

Captain M. R. Stone  
Staff Intelligence Officer  
Naval Forces, Far East  
Navy No 1165

My dear Stone:


This is to thank you for your estimate of the situation concerning the Chinese Coastal Islands. We certainly appreciate your thoughts and efforts on this subject and believe you will be interested to know that your conclusions are in complete accord with our current estimates.

In our efforts to obtain the maximum intelligence yield from all available sources, the current thinking of the major commands in the Far East is invaluable. This collation of ideas from the various services is of great assistance in preventing the pitfall of unilateral estimates.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

H. V. WHITE  
Colonel, GSC  
Chief,  
Theater Intelligence Division

G-2 FILE COPY



*X 091 China*

350.09

102

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JSA

級

8



File : COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES, FAR EAST (25)/JLW/da  
 Serial : NAVY No. 1165  
 F.P.O., SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

25 February 1951

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL WILLOUGHBY

Subj: Estimate of the Situation in Chinese Coastal Islands

1. With reference to our conversation at the meeting on the evening of 24 February 1951, the following estimate concerning the situation pertaining to the small islands lying off the Chinese mainland in the vicinity of the FORMOSA STRAITS, now held by the Chinese Nationalists, is submitted.
2. There has been a gradual build up of indications during the past six or seven weeks of the Chinese Communists intentions to attack the offlying coastal islands at present in the hands of the Chinese Nationalists, with major emphasis, of course, on the two major islands of QUEMOY (Chinmen) and MATSU. This attack may be launched soon - within two weeks to a month.
3. The coastal islands which at present are occupied by Chinese Nationalists follow:

- |    |                              |   |                                   |
|----|------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| a. | (1) QUEMOY (Chinmen-Tao)     | : | All islands within 15 mile radius |
|    |                              | : |                                   |
|    | (2) LIEH-HSU (Little Quemoy) | : | of 24-25N, 118-20E, which centers |
|    |                              | : | -----                             |
|    | (3) TA-T'AN                  | : | on QUEMOY.                        |
|    |                              | : |                                   |
|    | (4) PEI-TING-TAO             | : |                                   |
| b. | OCKSEU Island                |   | 24-59N, 119-28E                   |
| c. | TUNGCHUAN-TAO                |   | 25-58N, 119-57E                   |
| d. | (1) MA-TSU                   |   | 26-09N, 119-55E                   |
|    | (2) PEH-KANTUNG              |   | 26-14N, 119-59E                   |
|    | (3) PAISHA                   |   | 26-17N, 119-59E                   |
| e. | TAICHOU LIEH-TAO             |   |                                   |
|    | (1) HSIA-TA-CHEN             |   | 28-26N, 121-52E                   |
|    | (2) SHANG-TA-CHEN            |   | 28-30N, 121-50E                   |
|    | (3) I-CHIANG-SHAN            |   | 28-37N, 121-48E                   |
|    | (4) PEI-YU-SHAN              |   | 25-53N, 122-15E                   |

SECRET



SECRET

(See attached enclosure sheet for approximate locations.)

All of these islands are located near to the mainland, the overwater distances being comparatively short. QUEMOY is 7-8 miles from the coast, MATSU 15-16 miles, OCKSEU 16-17 miles, TAICHOU LIEH-TAO - 20 miles, TUNGCHUAN-TAO - 21 miles.

4. QUEMOY occupies a very strategic position covering the mouth of AMOY Harbor. The Chinese Nationalists at present have six regular army divisions of the 19th and 5th Armies (Corps), plus the 87th Army Artillery Battalion, one Mortar Battalion, and one Tank Company on the islands. The estimated strength of these troops is between 40,000 and 45,000 men.

5. MATSU island also occupies a strategic position covering the approaches to FOCHOW (FUCHOU). There are about 10,000 Nationalist troops on MATSU comprising the 13th Division plus one Artillery Battalion.

6. The islands in the vicinity of TAICHOU LIEH-TAO are manned by small forces of the Chinese Nationalists' Army, Navy, and guerrillas. The estimated strength of these forces is between 1,500 to 2,500.

7. TUNGCHUAN and OCKSEU have comparatively small forces on them of unknown strength.

8. The Chinese Communists have an estimated five CCF Armies (Corps) plus various independent artillery regiments and special coast defense troops deployed along the coast between SWATOW and HANGCHOW (see encl.). These troops aggregate between 165,000 to 180,000 men. It also should be noted that these troops could be easily and quickly reenforced by movements of other forces which are available inland and to the north around Shanghai.

9. As was noted above, the islands of QUEMOY and MATSU cover the approaches to the major ports of AMOY and FOCHOW (FUCHOU) respectively. By holding these islands the Nationalist can detect and disrupt any planned CCF invasion forces staged in these harbors. Since these are the two largest ports in the area, and would consequently be of major importance in staging an invasion of FORMOSA, the Chinese Communists must endeavor to neutralize these obstacles in some manner, the most likely method being an attack and invasion of the islands to kill and capture all Nationalists troops.

10. Among the indications which have cropped up in the past few weeks to support the theory of a CCF attack on QUEMOY and MATSU are:

- (a) Passing of many rumors to this effect all along the coast for at least the previous two months.
- (b) Movement of several new divisions from inland to the FOCHOW and AMOY areas.
- (c) The commandeering by the CCF of all junks in the vicinity of AMOY.



SECRET

- (d) Chinese Communist naval vessel of about 800 tons (class and type unspecified) opened fire on a Nationalist patrol plane (type not known) just west of QUEMOY on 16 Feb 1951.
- (e) Concentration of approximately 450 large and small wooden boats along the coast opposite to QUEMOY.
- (f) Continued reports of CCF amphibious training on small scale using small boats and sailing craft.
- (g) Massing of motor junks by 62nd CCF Division opposite TAICHOU LIEH-TAO
- (h) Chinese Nationalist QUEMOY island Commander reports a concentration of two LST, 87 motor junks and 1240 junks sighted west of QUEMOY.

The above evidence would appear confirmatory since most of them have been individually confirmed.

11. Chinese Nationalist Naval vessels are stationed at these coastal islands which are considered by the Chinese more in the light of advance operating bases than merely safe anchorages. There are five patrol craft each, class and type unknown, stationed at TAICHOU LIEH-TAO, MATSU, and QUEMOY. They endeavor to patrol in the vicinity of the islands. The Navy also attempts to supply and support the troops on the islands.

12. As can be seen the taking of either QUEMOY or MATSU would be a major operation, which is not to be belittled or written off. It must be borne in mind that the Chinese Nationalists have held these islands for a long time and have been fortifying them and preparing for a defense of them. To take QUEMOY the CCF must conquer at least six divisions of Nationalists troops. It is believed that the latter have the capability of repelling an invasion of less than three to one strength, and even then there would be a battle. The unknown factor of morale enters into the situation also, but so far minor attempts to reduce these garrisons have failed. With continued U.S. moral support there is no reason to look for a let down in morale.

13. An invasion of the coastal islands also poses a problem for the U.S. forces in the Far East. This is mainly concerned with the current Presidential directive to prevent an invasion of FORMOSA and to stop Chinese government action against the mainland. If the CCF were to employ air power to assault the Chinese government forces on QUEMOY or MATSU, and there is every reason to believe they will, the Chinese Nationalists will probably also want to use their aircraft for the defense of the islands. Is this to be permitted, or are these islands considered a part of the mainland? Are Chinese Naval vessels to be allowed to fire on CCF troops and gun positions in the staging areas? Is the Seventh Fleet to be used to support the position of the Nationalists on the coastal islands? Any action on the part of the Seventh Fleet to prevent defensive action by the Nationalists will be sure to bring a turn-about-face in the attitude of the Nationalists toward the U.S. It will also




SECRET

have an adverse effect on the prestige of the United States in the eyes of the other peoples of the Orient who are fighting Communism in Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Philippines, and Indonesia.

14. This paper is presented as an intelligence estimate and the problems outlined above are merely pointed out as some that are likely to be encountered in the formulation of plans and operations.

Very respectfully,



M. R. STONE  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Staff Intelligence Officer  
Commander Naval Forces, Far East

SECRET







DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813562

By W NARA Date 1/23/12

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JDA

15

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
MEMBER NATIONAL GUARDIAN  
OF THE PEOPLE

SECRET

013938



**SECRET**

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND**  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500  
5 June 1951

**SUBJECT:** Counter Intelligence Requirements  
(Essential Elements of Information)

**TO :** Deputy for Intelligence  
Far East Air Forces  
APO 925

1. The request made by OSI, FFAF for information to satisfy requirements set forth in Department of Air Forces letter dated 15 December 1950, Subject: "Counter Intelligence Requirements," was referred to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, Ft Holabird, Md., and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA for policy clarification.

a. The Chief, CIC in his reply pointed out that it is his understanding that OSI has the mission of collecting air intelligence (strategic and technical) within Army jurisdictional areas but that collection or investigation of other items of intelligence (subversive, espionage, and sabotage activities) by OSI is confined to the limits of the areas of Air Force jurisdiction; therefore the collection of non-Air Force intelligence is the responsibility of the overall commander.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA stated that this matter has been checked with OSI, Department of Air Forces. OSI, Washington pointed out that they have not been receiving copies of the Far East Periodic Intelligence Reports, which consistently contain information which progressively will satisfy the above mentioned EEI's. G-2 agencies, FEC, have been instructed to furnish OSI, FFAF, with one additional copy each of the daily G-2 Intelligence Summary and CIC District Field Reports for transmission to OSI, Washington.

2. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt Col Raynor, FFAF to Col Ewert dtd 7 April 1951 (Incl 1) which outlines the basic requirements for information on subversive activities near Air Force installations. To help to fulfill these requirements, the following procedure is being established by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

a. OSI detachments are authorized to establish liaison with CIC areas and districts locally. Distribution to OSI of Summaries of Information on activities outlined under 2a, b, c, d, will be controlled at district level while dissemination of spot report information under the above paragraphs can be made at area or district level.

b. Reference to paragraph 2f. Requests for security checks on

**SECRET**

101  
350.09

17-5-51

G-2

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

SEKISUI JUSHI

JDA

(15)

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27



SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APG 800  
5 June 1951

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Requirements  
(Essential Elements of Information)

TO : Deputy for Intelligence  
Far East Air Force  
APG 928

Handwritten initials: WFP

1. The request made by OGI, FEAF for information to assist re-  
quirements set forth in Department of Air Force letter dated 18 December  
1950, Subject: "Counter Intelligence Requirements," was referred to the  
Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, Ft. Hays, KS., and Assistant Chief  
of Staff, G-2, USAF for policy clarification.


a. The Chief, OGI in his reply pointed out that it is his under-  
standing that OGI has the mission of collecting air intelligence (strategic  
and technical) within every jurisdictional area but that collection or  
investigation of other items of intelligence (subversive, espionage, and  
sabotage activities) by OGI is confined to the limits of the area of air  
force jurisdiction; therefore the collection of non-air force intelligence  
is the responsibility of the overall commander.

b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAF stated that this  
matter has been checked with OGI, Department of Air Force, OGI, Washington  
and pointed out that they have not been receiving copies of the far East  
Periodic Intelligence Reports, which contain information which  
progressively will assist the above mentioned OGI's, G-2 agencies, etc.  
have been instructed to furnish OGI, FEAF, with one additional copy each of  
the daily G-2 Intelligence Summary and the District field reports for trans-  
mission to OGI, Washington.

2. Reference is made to memorandum from Lt Col Hayer, FEAF to Col  
Laur 604 V April 1951 (Encl 1) which outlines the basic requirements for  
information on subversive activities near Air Force installations. To  
help to fulfill these requirements, the following procedure is being es-  
tablished by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:


a. OGI detachments are authorized to establish liaison with OGI  
areas and districts locally. Distribution to OGI of information on subver-  
sive activities outlined under 2a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z, aa, ab, ac, ad, ae, af, ag, ah, ai, aj, ak, al, am, an, ao, ap, aq, ar, as, at, au, av, aw, ax, ay, az, ba, bb, bc, bd, be, bf, bg, bh, bi, bj, bk, bl, bm, bn, bo, bp, bq, br, bs, bt, bu, bv, bw, bx, by, bz, ca, cb, cc, cd, ce, cf, cg, ch, ci, cj, ck, cl, cm, cn, co, cp, cq, cr, cs, ct, cu, cv, cw, cx, cy, cz, da, db, dc, dd, de, df, dg, dh, di, dj, dk, dl, dm, dn, do, dp, dq, dr, ds, dt, du, dv, dw, dx, dy, dz, ea, eb, ec, ed, ee, ef, eg, eh, ei, ej, ek, el, em, en, eo, ep, eq, er, es, et, eu, ev, ew, ex, ey, ez, fa, fb, fc, fd, fe, ff, fg, fh, fi, fj, fk, fl, fm, fn, fo, fp, fq, fr, fs, ft, fu, fv, fw, fx, fy, fz, ga, gb, gc, gd, ge, gf, gg, gh, gi, gj, gk, gl, gm, gn, go, gp, gq, gr, gs, gt, gu, gv, gw, gx, gy, gz, ha, hb, hc, hd, he, hf, hg, hh, hi, hj, hk, hl, hm, hn, ho, hp, hq, hr, hs, ht, hu, hv, hw, hx, hy, hz, ia, ib, ic, id, ie, if, ig, ih, ii, ij, ik, il, im, in, io, ip, iq, ir, is, it, iu, iv, iw, ix, iy, iz, ja, jb, jc, jd, je, jf, jg, jh, ji, jj, jk, jl, jm, jn, jo, jp, jq, jr, js, jt, ju, jv, jw, jx, jy, jz, ka, kb, kc, kd, ke, kf, kg, kh, ki, kj, kk, kl, km, kn, ko, kp, kq, kr, ks, kt, ku, kv, kw, kx, ky, kz, la, lb, lc, ld, le, lf, lg, lh, li, lj, lk, ll, lm, ln, lo, lp, lq, lr, ls, lt, lu, lv, lw, lx, ly, lz, ma, mb, mc, md, me, mf, mg, mh, mi, mj, mk, ml, mm, mn, mo, mp, mq, mr, ms, mt, mu, mv, mw, mx, my, mz, na, nb, nc, nd, ne, nf, ng, nh, ni, nj, nk, nl, nm, nn, no, np, nq, nr, ns, nt, nu, nv, nw, nx, ny, nz, oa, ob, oc, od, oe, of, og, oh, oi, oj, ok, ol, om, on, oo, op, oq, or, os, ot, ou, ov, ow, ox, oy, oz, pa, pb, pc, pd, pe, pf, pg, ph, pi, pj, pk, pl, pm, pn, po, pp, pq, pr, ps, pt, pu, pv, pw, px, py, pz, qa, qb, qc, qd, qe, qf, qg, qh, qi, qj, qk, ql, qm, qn, qo, qp, qq, qr, qs, qt, qu, qv, qw, qx, qy, qz, ra, rb, rc, rd, re, rf, rg, rh, ri, rj, rk, rl, rm, rn, ro, rp, rq, rr, rs, rt, ru, rv, rw, rx, ry, rz, sa, sb, sc, sd, se, sf, sg, sh, si, sj, sk, sl, sm, sn, so, sp, sq, sr, ss, st, su, sv, sw, sx, sy, sz, ta, tb, tc, td, te, tf, tg, th, ti, tj, tk, tl, tm, tn, to, tp, tq, tr, ts, tt, tu, tv, tw, tx, ty, tz, ua, ub, uc, ud, ue, uf, ug, uh, ui, uj, uk, ul, um, un, uo, up, uq, ur, us, ut, uu, uv, uw, ux, uy, uz, va, vb, vc, vd, ve, vf, vg, vh, vi, vj, vk, vl, vm, vn, vo, vp, vq, vr, vs, vt, vu, vv, vw, vx, vy, vz, wa, wb, wc, wd, we, wf, wg, wh, wi, wj, wk, wl, wm, wn, wo, wp, wq, wr, ws, wt, wu, wv, ww, wx, wy, wz, xa, xb, xc, xd, xe, xf, xg, xh, xi, xj, xk, xl, xm, xn, xo, xp, xq, xr, xs, xt, xu, xv, xw, xx, xy, xz, ya, yb, yc, yd, ye, yf, yg, yh, yi, yj, yk, yl, ym, yn, yo, yp, yq, yr, ys, yt, yu, yv, yw, yx, yy, yz, za, zb, zc, zd, ze, zf, zg, zh, zi, zj, zk, zl, zm, zn, zo, zp, zq, zr, zs, zt, zu, zv, zw, zx, zy, zz

b. Reference to paragraph 2f. Reports for check on



SECRET

Handwritten number: 101





**SECRET**

indigenous personnel employed at air installations should be directed to CI Div, G-2. However, there is no objection to lateral exchange of information obtained by local OSI and CIC installations on indigenous employees not requiring a security check.

c. CI Div will furnish OSI with information on any activities outlined under para 2e as rapidly as received and evaluated. In addition, the District Field Reports would contain information if secured during the month on that subject. Any spot news of immediate urgency will be transmitted direct from the local CIC Districts to local OSI agencies.

d. Requests for information under para 2g on Who's Who of Communist leaders may be secured only from G-2, FEC, CI Div Central Files.

e. As an overall policy, OSI, FEAF, is requested not to include in any of their publications which have external distribution any unevaluated intelligence obtained from G-2, FEC sources without designating that the intelligence is unevaluated. The use of source comment and/or G-2, FEC comment, when furnished, should be quoted by OSI, FEAF in each instance.

3. For your information and action deemed appropriate.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:  
Ltr fr Lt Col Raynor to  
Col Ewert, dtd 7 Apr 51

*RS*  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

This ltr outlines our policy in furnishing info to OSI, FEAF as required by DAF ltr dtd 15 Dec 50, subj: Counter Intelligence Requirements. This policy is in line with replies received from Chief CIC and G-2 GSUSA to our request for policy clarification. This also replies to questions raised by OSI in memo to Col Ewert (Incl 1). This ltr and action has been coordinated with Col Smith, CO, 441st Det.

Lt Col Bochnowski  
26-5655

**FILE**

**SECRET**



SECRET

G-2 Files

CAW 2772  
CIDiv/ECE/JSB/dc  
Phone: 26-5655 3 Jun 51  
Name: Lt Col Bochnowski

From: CI Div To: G-2

1. Reference is made to Comment 7, above. Inclosure 11 is a letter from General Bolling which answers G-2 FEC's letter of 15 March, Subject: "Request by OSI, Hq USAF, for Counter Intelligence Information" requesting DA policy on furnishing OSI, FEAF with information to satisfy their needs as required in Air Force letter (Incl 1). This reply from DA suggests:

9

a. That G-2 furnish OSI, FEAF with additional copies of Far East Command Periodic Intelligence Reports, namely, the daily G-2 Intelligence Summary and CIC District Field Reports

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



SECRET

CAW 2772  
CIDiv/ECE/JSB/dcAir Force Counter-Intelli-  
gence Requirements

3 Jun 51

CI Div

G-2

26-5655  
Lt Col Bochnowski

for transmission to OSI, Department of Air Force.

9  
(cont'd)

b. Further states since counter-intelligence capabilities of G-2, FEC are in being and greater than those of OSI, FEAF and the information contained in the G-2 publications mentioned above would satisfy the counter-intelligence requirements set up in the Air Force basic letter, it would be unnecessary for OSI, FEAF to parallel this collection effort.

2. Necessary steps have been taken to provide OSI, FEAF with one additional copy of CIC District Field Reports for transmission to OSI, DAF.

3. Recommend that OSI, FEAF be furnished with one additional copy of daily G-2 Intelligence Summary for OSI, DAF.

4. Recommend approval of draft letter (Incl 12) to Deputy for Intelligence, FEAF outlining our policy.

5. This action has been co-ordinated with and concurred by Col Smith, CO, 441st CIC Det.

9 Incls

1, 4, 6: n/c

5: w/d

7-10: n/c

Added 2 Incls:

11. DA ltr to CINCFE, dtd  
30 Apr 51, subj: Re-  
quest by OSI, Hq USAF  
for Counter Intel Info

12. EEI for Deputy for Intel,  
FEAF, subj: Counter Intel  
Requirements

-----E. C. E.-----

SECRET



**SECRET**

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL  
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST AIR FORCES  
APO 925

7 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO COLONEL EWERT, CI DIV, G-2, FEC

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Counterintelligence Requirements  
(Essential Elements of Information)

With reference to Memorandum, above subject dated 10 March 1951 and our meeting subsequent thereto, the following is submitted per your request:

1. Extracting counterintelligence information from the GHQ Daily Intelligence Summaries and Monthly CIC Field Reports only, will not enable OSI district and detachment commanders to fulfill their responsibilities to keep Air Force commanders and particularly Wing Base commanders advised of threats to their installations resulting from subversive activities in sufficient time for responsible commanders to plan and to put into effect counter-measures.

2. In order to plan and implement adequate security measures, base commanders require timely information of the following:

a. Communist plans and efforts to infiltrate air installations to secure information or to commit acts of sabotage or other subversive acts.

b. Communist plans and efforts to commit acts of sabotage against lines of supply, lines of communication, and utilities which might require the use of emergency equipment and facilities by the Air Force. In this connection, the Air Force is dependent upon Japanese facilities which are particularly vulnerable especially in the movement of vitally needed POL supplies.

c. Communist plans and efforts to spread propaganda and disaffection among indigenous laborers employed on Air Force installations.

d. Communist plans and efforts to incite riots, disorders, and domestic disturbances which may indirectly affect Air Force activities or personnel.

e. Communist plans and efforts to support guerrilla operations which may eventually be directed against Air Force operations.

f. Derogatory information pertaining to indigenous personnel employed at air installations to enable commanders to promptly discharge those who may be security risks.

**SECRET****COPY**



SECRET

BASIC: Memo to Col Ewert, CI Div, G-2, FEC, dtd 7 Apr 51, subj:  
(Unclassified) Counterintelligence Requirements  
(Essential Elements of Information)

g. Who's who data regarding communist leaders who may be expected to direct subversive activities against Air Force installations particularly in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.

3. Suggest CIC units at all levels be authorized to maintain liaison with and furnish OSI districts and detachments with information as outlined above in the form of evaluated summaries of information and spot reports on a current basis.

4. The Deputy for Intelligence and The Inspector General, FEAF concur in this Memorandum.

/s/ Spencer W. Raynor  
/t/ SPENCER W. RAYNOR  
Lt Colonel, USAF  
Director, Special Investigations  
The Inspector General, FEAF

SECRET

COPY



**SECRET****COPY**

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON 25, C.C.

G2-IR qmtO

30 April 1951

SUBJECT: Request by OSI, Hqs, U.S. Air Force, for Counter Intelligence information

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East  
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
APO 500, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to Far East Command letter dated 15 March 1951, File CIS/ExSp, same subject, concerning request made by OSI, Far East Air Force, for information to satisfy requirements set forth in Department of the Air Force letter dated 15 December 1950, subject, "Counter Intelligence Requirements", and the request by the Far East Command for policy clarification.
2. This matter has been checked with the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force. Presumably, OSI, FEAR, in forwarding EEIs, has failed to point out that OSI is not a part of A-2, even though the EEIs relate to intelligence matters. It has also been noted that OIS, Washington, has not been receiving copies of the Far East Command Periodic Intelligence Reports, which consistently contain information which would progressively satisfy the above mentioned EEIs.
3. It is therefore suggested that copies of these Periodic Reports be furnished to the OSI, FEAR for transmission to OSI, Department of the Air Force. Since the information contained in these reports is already being collected by G-2, FEC, it would appear unnecessary that OSI, FEAR paralled this collection effort. It may be, of course, that OSI, FEAR will be able to handle or assist on counter intelligence matters dealing directly with U.S. Air Force installations and personnel.
4. Because the collection capabilities of G-2, FEC are in being and are greater than those of OSI, FEAR, it seems only logical that the G-2, FEC should continue its collection efforts as it has in the past. Highly sensitive operations must, of course, be handled judiciously, as they have been, with the proviso that information which has a bearing on the FEAR mission should be furnished to FEAR, less operational data.

A.R. BOLLING  
Major General, GSC  
AC of S., G-2

**COPY**101  
350.09**SECRET**

G-2 File CAW 2772

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JGA  
15  
16



**SECRET**

CIS/Exop

APO 500  
15 March 1951

SUBJECT: Request by OSI, HQ USAF, for Counter Intelligence Information  
TO : Chief, Counter Intelligence Corps, Camp Holabird, Baltimore,  
19, Maryland

1. Attached hereto is a copy of secret letter AFCSI 350.09, Subject: "Counter Intelligence Requirements," from Department of the Air Force, Headquarters, United States Air Force, Washington, dated 15 December 1950, together with inclosure from OSI, HQ USAF, listing ERI in a Counter Intelligence Requirements Guide.
2. This Office has been contacted by OSI, FEAF, for information in order to satisfy these requirements.
3. While G-2, GHQ, FEC, desires to cooperate in every way possible with all governmental intelligence agencies, yet it appears that this program would be duplicatory in nature and parallels the field of counter-intelligence collection charged to the Counter Intelligence Corps.
4. In the meantime we are authorizing access to certain evaluated material and are currently engaged in a joint endeavor to meet certain of the OSI requirements.
5. This is submitted for your information.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:  
Ltr AFCSI 350.09, Subj:  
Counter Intelligence  
Requirements, 15 Dec 50

*151*  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Ltr fwded to CIC, Fort Holabird, in compliance w/par 3, CAW 2772, dtd 8 Mar 51. Draft for G-2 approval.

Lt Col Thornton 26-5654

**SECRET**

G-2 File Copy

1  
1  
2  
1  
8

*[Handwritten signature]*  
**FILE**  
*[Handwritten signature]*

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JGA  
①②



**SECRET****COPY****G-2, GHQ**  
**INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

(For use within G-2 only)

CIDiv/ECE/vvm

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Date:** 5 Mar 51**FROM:** CI Div**TO:** G-2**PHONE:**  
**NAME:****Comment**  
**Number**

1. On 3 March 1951, Lt Col Raynor, Chief, OSI, FEAF, called at this office and presented the document he had received from USAF, subj: "Counter Intelligence Requirements, " attached hereto as Tab 1.

2. a. This amazing document directs that each major air command submit an initial report, followed by continuing reports, on the listed EEI in order "to fulfill the counterintelligence requirements of the Air Force."

b. The EEI require detailed reports on:

- (1) Organizational data pertaining to Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Service of Russia and satellite countries.
- (2) Subversive organizations and fronts of these countries.
- (3) Guerrilla and partisan organizations of these same countries.
- (4) Personnel data on "Who's Who" of Foreign Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Service, subversive organizations and fronts, and guerrilla and partisan organizations of Russia and satellite countries.
- (5) Operational data on the same countries of sabotage, espionage and unconventional warfare, including schools on these subjects.
- (6) Logistic data on above.

3. Lt Col Raynor said he wrote to USAF Director OSI asking for exemptions, since FEAF is under FEC here and the latter secures such information through its long established agencies. However, he has now been directed to submit such information as he has available or can obtain to fulfill these EEI requirements.

4. In order to comply with his directive, Lt Col Raynor proposed to place 6 men to work on his own files and wanted permission for his people in the field to contact CIC agencies there to secure more information, and he suggested that perhaps CI Div files could be made available to him for research in these matters.

5. I had Col Blakeney and Col Lacey in my office during the interview and it was pointed out to Lt Col Raynor that this entire list of EEI's was

**COPY****SECRET**  
Permanent Record—Do not Detach1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

SEKISUI JUSHI

JBA

15

14

15







**SECRET**  
**G-2, GHQ**

**COPY**

# INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** Air Force Counterintelligence CI Div/ExGp/ECE/ckw Requirements **Date:** 11 Mar 51

**FROM:** Col Ewert **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** 26-5651  
**THRU:** T/Intel **NAME:** Col Ewert

**Comment Number**

3

1. Drafts of letters to MID Washington and CIC Fort Holabird attached as Tabs 2 and 3 respectively.

2. I had a conference with General Banfill, D/I, FEAF, and his assistant, Col Rogers, Brig General Picher, Inspector General, and Lt Col Raynor, OSI, on 10 March. The following observations and conclusions resulted:

a. Both Generals agreed on their own volition that OSI Washington appears overly-ambitious and that the proposed program is duplicatory to a certain degree.

b. General Picher felt the project might die of its own weight since OSI FEAF would require more personnel to do the job and he did not believe a manpower board review would justify it.

c. Col Rogers suggested to General Banfill that he acquaint General Cabell of this OSI directive in a letter which the General is about to write; Banfill did not commithimself, however.

d. Col Raynor suggested he could review OSI EEI's from the viewpoint of Air Force interests here and thereby narrow the scope. I suggested that when he completed such a list he and I could then confer with the object of satisfying as many as possible from our evaluated material.

e. General Picher agreed that the foregoing was good procedure, stating that many EEI could be satisfied if Raynor could have access to evaluated material.

3. It is recommended that Lt Col Raynor be given access to evaluated materials such as "Internal Factors as Security Problems for the Occupation Forces" and the "Study of Dissident Groups" dated Oct 15, 1950, and such other materials which do not involve access to our files.

4. T/Intel informed.

5. Lt Col Raynor is in charge of OSI under General Picher, IG (Re your par. 6 C/N 2)

3 Incls:

1. n/c

Added 2 Incls:

2. Draft Ltr to MID, Wash.

3. Draft ltr to CIC, Camp Holabird.

-----E. C. E.-----

**COPY**

**SECRET**  
Permanent Record—Do not Detach

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



*Secret*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

①  
47622APO 500  
August 1951

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirements, Far East Command

TO :

- Commanding General, Eighth Army, APO 301  
Attention: G-2
- Commanding General, Japan Logistical Command, APO 343  
Attention: G-2
- Commander, United States Naval Forces, Far East, Navy No. 1165  
Attention: Flag Intelligence Officer
- Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925  
Attention: Deputy for Intelligence
- Commanding General, XVI Corps, APO 547  
Attention: G-2

1. These Intelligence Requirements supersede directive, this headquarters, same subject dated 5 February 1951 which will be destroyed.

2. The constantly worsening international situation and the critical relationship between the United States on the one hand and the USSR and Chinese People's Republic on the other, have such serious implications reference the security and mission of the Far East Command that a review of intelligence requirements is deemed necessary.

3. The attached document is a compilation of the current essential elements of information, concerning potential enemies and areas of operations, that are considered necessary to GHQ, FEC in arriving at sound decisions, formulating plans of operations, and avoiding surprise.

4. In focusing the attention of all collecting agencies and intelligence personnel of subordinate commands on the collection of that information called for herein, this document is presented in three parts.

a. Part One: List of eight basic critical questions confronting the Command.

b. Part Two: List of specific requests for information concerning Korea, Manchuria, Southern Kuriles Island Area, Southern Sakhalin, Southeast Siberia and the Southern Maritime Territory.

c. Part Three: List of specific requests for information relating to certain designated key areas in China, and in Inner and Outer Mongolia.

5. It is realized that the scope of activity of FEC collecting agencies and of intelligence personnel of subordinate commands limits the ability to collect information from certain areas, particularly those areas listed under Part Three; however, the entire list of specific requests is distributed to all addressees in order to emphasize information of interest to FEC.

6. It is desired that within the limit of your capabilities all means be exploited to supplement the efforts of G-2, GHQ agencies in accomplishing the maximum results.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:  
EEI, FEC

Distribution:  
CG, FEAF (3)  
COMNAVFE (3)  
(continued)

*R. S. Bratton*  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

*Secret*

G-2, GHQ, FEC

65  
350.09



SECRET

Distribution (cont'd):  
CG, 8th ARMY (3)  
CG, XVI CORPS (3)  
CG, JLCOM (3)  
C/S, GHQ, FEC (1)  
G-2, GHQ, FEC (1)  
G-2, GSUSA (4)  
TI Div, G-2, GHQ (4)  
CI Div, G-2, GHQ (1)  
MIS Div, G-2, GHQ (6)  
FEC/LG, GHQ (6)  
DOC RESEARCH (3)  
AS/PAC (3)

SECRET





*Secret*

## ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION, FAR EAST COMMAND

## Part One

## BASIC LIST OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION, EEL

1. What are the Communist objectives in Korea? What means will they employ in attempting to realize these objectives?
- II. Will the Communists undertake offensive action against Taiwan?
- III. Will the Communists initiate military operations against Hokkaido?
- IV. Will the Communists launch a major air attack against targets in the Far East Command?
- V. Will the Communists initiate naval operations against the Far East Command?
- VI. Will the Communists initiate airborne operations against the Far East Command?
- VII. Will the Communists potential for sabotage, subversion and espionage affect friendly military operations?
- VIII. Will the Communists conduct chemical, biological or atomic warfare in the Far East Command?

## Part Two

## SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

It is desired that all intelligence agencies report information relative to the following:

## A. KOREA

Military

1. Movement of troops across Yalu River to include number, type, nationality, direction of movement and method of travel.
2. Motor movements across Yalu River to include direction, density and cargo.
3. Rail movement across Yalu River to include direction, number and type of cars and cargo
4. Increased standardization of military weapons and equipment of Communist forces in Korea to conform to Soviet models.
5. Presence and identifications of Soviet Military forces in Korea.
6. Identification of weapons not previously utilized in the Korean war.
7. Presence of Soviet shipping, especially submarines in Korean waters.
8. Planting of sea mines with particular attention to the Inchon, Wonsan and Hungnam areas.
9. Degree of control the USSR exercises over NK armed forces.
10. Presence of Soviet military, technical and/or diplomatic personnel in Korea.
11. Areas in which Communist forces attempt concentration of major groupments.

*Secret*



*Secret*

12. Presence of chemical or bacteriological warfare units in Korea; determine strength, organization, equipment and methods of operation.
13. Location, types of munitions, quantities, and security measures of chemical dumps.
14. Issue of gas masks, protective clothing or protective equipment against A-B-C warfare.
15. Stockage of chemical shell in Korea particularly in forward areas.
16. Initiation of training of troops or civilians in defense against A-B-C warfare.
17. Location, details of construction, and facilities of airfields capable of accommodating medium bombers (B-29 type).

Economic

1. Evidence of USSR economic aid to North Korea; appearance of Soviet food products and clothing for the civilian populace.
2. Status of food supply in North Korea. The source of supply, method and routes of transportation, location of stockpiles and method of distribution.
3. Details of trade agreements between the USSR and the North Korean governments.

Propaganda - Subversion

1. Increased propaganda against the "American Imperialist".
2. Increased propaganda of a revengeful nature against the Japanese.
3. Existence of schools for the training of saboteurs, espionage agents and guerrillas. Give location, size, number of students, methods of recruiting trainees, and key personnel involved.
4. Existence of anti-Communist organizations in North Korea. To include names and location of leaders and details concerning their activities.
5. Incidents of civilian uprisings, evidence of defection and resistance to Communist domination in North Korea.

## B. MANCHURIA

Military

1. Location, identification, nationality and strength of units in Manchuria.
2. Movement of troops from Manchuria into Korea, to include time, place, strength, identification and method of transportation.
3. Movement of military supplies from Manchuria into Korea, to include time, place, type and quantity, and method of transportation.
4. Movement of Soviet military supplies into Manchuria, to include time, place, type and quantity, and method of transportation.
5. Location of military installations in Manchuria, to include type, size, strength, purpose and identification of persons.

*Secret*



*Secret*

6. Military installations located at Mukden. Give specific locations and purpose of each.
7. Presence of Soviet tanks to include type, location and number present.
8. Location of military training centers to include type of troops (Inf, Armored, etc.), nationality, strength and identification of troops or units undergoing training.
9. Degree of control exercised by the USSR over troops in Manchuria.
10. Type of weapons and munitions manufactured at the Mukden arsenal, to include daily production rate, disposition of the finished products, and method of transportation.
11. Construction of new airfields and improvements of airfields presently in existence. Location, construction, facilities, and defense of fields capable of accommodating medium bombers (B-29 type).
12. Activity and number of aircraft particularly MIGs, bombers and troop transport type aircraft at airfields, especially vicinity of Antung, Harbin and Mukden.
13. The nationality of jet aircraft pilots located in the Antung area.
14. Instances of friction or outbreaks between Soviet, CCF and NK forces.
15. Location and other pertinent information in connection with Prisoner of War installations.
16. Significant concentration of ships in the Port Arthur - Dairen area.
17. Amphibious training in the Port Arthur - Dairen area.
18. Recent or sudden increase in security measures at military installations, particularly in the vicinity of airfield and sea coast installations.
19. Nationality, location, type, size, strength and identities of leaders of Soviet puppet forces within Manchuria.
20. Movements of Soviet troops into Manchuria to include organization, strength, composition and identity of commanders.

Political - Sociological

1. Sino - Soviet agreements regarding Manchuria.
2. Degree of control exercised by the USSR over Manchuria.
3. Political sub-divisions of Manchuria, to include area coverage and identification of leading personalities.
4. General feeling of the Manchurian populace concerning hostilities in Korea.
5. Any increase in antipathy of the Manchurian populace toward the Japanese government or people.

Economic

1. Status of food supply; for the military, for the civilian populace.
2. Critical points along the railroad lines between Mukden and the Korean border to include specific location of marshalling yards, bridges, tunnels, culverts and rail junctions.
3. Recent or sudden increase in the number of railroad salvage equipment and mobile machine shops.

*3  
Secret*



*Secret*

## C. SOUTHERN KURILES ISLAND AREA

Military

1. Strength, designation, and disposition of Soviet troops in the area.
2. Strength, organization, and location of Soviet Air Force units in the area.
3. Seaports being used as naval bases.
4. Submarines based at these ports, to include number, type and specific location of berths.
5. Surface forces based at ports in the Kuriles.
6. Amphibious or airborne training being conducted to include location, identification of troops and presence of special equipment.
7. Recent arrival of military equipment and supplies, particularly weapons, ammunition, POL, technical equipment and trucks; evidence of large concentrations or build-up. Stockpiling.
8. Concentration of small seagoing vessels suitable as personnel carriers, to include location, quantity, type and capacity.
9. Existence, strength, organization, location, control and activities of any elements of a Japanese Liberation Army.
10. Rebuilding or construction of island defenses and presence of significant numbers of Soviet technical personnel.
11. Location of radar and radio installations.
12. Recent emplacements or increase in manning of antiaircraft weapons to include location, type and numbers.
13. Existence and location of any radar controlled antiaircraft around airfields and other key military installations in the area.
14. Existence or construction of missile launching sites, to include location, size, type of construction, presence of special type vehicles, and location and type of construction of adjacent storage facilities.
15. Recent or sudden increase in security measures, with particular attention to airfield and seaport facilities.
16. Location of airfields of sufficient length to accommodate jet aircraft and/or of construction adequate to handle medium bombers (B-29 type).

## D. SOUTHERN SAKHALIN AREA

Military

1. Strength, designation and disposition of Soviet troops in the area.
2. Strength, organization and location of Soviet Air Force units in the area.
3. Existence, strength, organization, location, control and activities of any elements of a Japanese Liberation Army.
4. Seaports used as naval bases.
5. Submarine activity with particular attention to Kholmak, Nevelak and Korsakov. Report to include number, type and specific location of berths.

*Secret*<sup>4</sup>



*Secret*

6. Surface forces based at Sakhalin ports.
7. Evidence of arming merchant ships.
8. Concentration of landing craft and small vessels suitable for carrying personnel, to include location, type and capacity.
9. Amphibious or airborne training being conducted, to include location, identification of troops and presence of special equipment.
10. Recent arrival of military equipment and supplies, particularly weapons, ammunition, POL, technical equipment and trucks, evidence of large concentrations or build-up. Stockpiling.
11. Recent emplacement or increase in manning of antiaircraft weapons, to include location, type and numbers.
12. Existence and location of any radar controlled antiaircraft around airfields and other key military installations in the area.
13. Security measures in connection with installations, including those underground in vicinity of Nishinotero Point on southern tip of Karafuto. Report existence of any airfields, underground hangars, fueling facilities, guided missile or rocket launching sites, and nature of any construction work currently being undertaken.
14. Location of airfields of sufficient length to accommodate jet aircraft and/or of construction adequate to handle medium bombers (B-29 type).
15. Recent or sudden increase in security measures, with particular attention to airfields, seaports and underground installations vicinity Nishinotero Point.

E. SOVETSKAYA-GAVAN-KHABAROVSK-KOMSOMOLSK-NEKOLAYEVSK-DE KASTRI AREA (SIBERIA.)

Military

1. Presence of high-ranking officers or government officials particularly at Khabarovsk, including length of stay, conference and activities.
2. Troop concentrations to include strength, types, equipment, location, activities and identification.
3. Strength, organization and location of Soviet Air Force units in the area.
4. Number and type of submarines being constructed.
5. Number and type of surface vessels being constructed.
6. Extent of repair facilities for shipping at these ports.
7. Characteristics and numbers of torpedoes and mines constructed or stored in the area.
8. Military equipment and supplies, particularly weapons, ammunition, POL, technical equipment, and trucks that are arriving or have arrived recently in the area from the north or west. Location. Type. Quantity. Report if supplies are stockpiled or issued to units.
9. Any shipping, merchant or naval, concentrated at any ports in the area.
10. Location of main military supply dumps in the area including POL depots.

*Secret*



*Secret*

11. Existence and location of any radar controlled antiaircraft around key installations in the area.
12. Reputed existence in Khabarovsk area of a fast B-32 (?) tank armed with an 85mm gun; also a possible B-64 (?) tank armed with a 121mm gun.
13. Status of completion of construction of the De Kastro - Ozero Kizi - Amur Canal, to include its capacity and nature of traffic if completed.
14. Location of airfields of sufficient length to accommodate jet aircraft and/or of construction adequate to handle medium bombers (B-29 type).
15. Recent or sudden increase in security measures.

F. POSET-VOROSHILOV-VLADIVOSTOK-NAKHODA AREA (SOUTHERN MARITIME TERRITORY)

Military

1. Presence or visits of high-ranking officers or government officials including length of stay, conferences and activities.
2. Presence of any German or Japanese personnel connected with activities at naval installations and facilities in the area. If present, report numbers, status and missions.
3. Troop concentrations to include strength, types, equipment, location, activities and identification.
4. Strength, organization and location of Soviet Air Force units in the area.
5. Extent of night flying activity giving location of airfields used.
6. Arrival of significant quantities of military equipment and supplies, particularly weapons, ammunition, POL, technical equipment and trucks from north or west, to include location, type, quantity and any trans-shipment by sea.
7. Location, size and description of the submarine installations at seaports.
8. Number, type, description and location of submarines based in area.
9. Number, type and location of surface vessels based in area to include any particular concentration.
10. Characteristics, numbers and location of torpedoes and mines constructed or stored in area.
11. Any ships being loaded with troops.
12. Any amphibious or airborne training being conducted, to include location, identification of troops and presence of special equipment.
13. Student body, supervisors, course, duration, etc. of reputed school in Vladivostok area for submarine operation, communications and supply.
14. Recent or sudden increase in security measures.
15. Existence and location of any radar controlled antiaircraft around industrial areas and airfields.
16. Extent and nature of any defensive fortifications and recent related activity along the Siberian-Korean border.
17. Locations of main military supply installations in the area.

*Secret*



*Secret*

18. Reputed existence in Vladivostok area of a lost B-32 (?) tank armed with an 85mm gun; also a possible B-64 (?) tank armed with a 121mm gun.

## Part Three

## SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

It is desired that all intelligence agencies report information relative to the following:

A. Peiping - Tientsin Area (North China)

1. Political, military, and economic agreements between the USSR and Communist China with special attention to secret provisions.
2. Evidence of USSR influence being exerted on Chinese Communist government.
3. Information in connection with existence and activities of a Far East Cominform.
4. Presence and visits of high-ranking CCF or Soviet officers and government officials including length of stay, conferences, attendance etc.
5. Information reference goings and coming of Mao and arrivals and departures of foreign groups and missions.
6. If Mao utilizes a private plane. If so, give description of plane and location of base.
7. Number and activities of Soviet individuals and groups in area; advisors, technicians, supervisors, planning missions, etc.
8. Steps being taken indicating removal of the capital.
9. Evidence of cliques, factions, dissension, and friction within the Chinese Communist government.
10. Degree of influence that LI Li-san, present director of Trade Unions, has in the Communist government.
11. Degree of influence maintained by the Young Democratic League and the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee.
12. Attitude of people to the USSR and any sign of friction between USSR and Chinese Communist governments and officials.
13. Status of former Nationalist General FU Tso-yi and degree of control he exercises over his former troops in Suiyuan Province.
14. Activation of 5th and 6th Field Armies or possible redesignation of the North China Special Army Group as the 5th Field Army.
15. Information or rumors reference Soviet troops in Mongolia and mobilization of Mongolian forces.
16. Strength, designation, description, location and activities of any USSR troops in the area.
17. Details obtainable in Peiping area reference organization of Japanese Liberation Army.
18. Location and strength of any Soviet Air Force units in the area including airfields used and nature of any new construction, with particular attention to fields basing jet aircraft and/or medium bombers (B-29 type).

*Secret*



*Secret*

19. Movement of troop trains through Peiping and Tientsin giving estimated strength, identification, equipment, nationality, number of cars, direction of movement and date.

20. Strength and disposition of Chinese troops in the area of North China.

21. Extent, nature and location of all defensive installations and air raid precautions in the capital area.

22. Extent and nature of security measures employed in the area.

23. Details concerning possible chemical warfare schools in Taiyuan and Tungshan areas.

24. Extent of guerrilla activity and measures being taken by the government to eliminate the internal threat.

25. Any national program for redeployment of industry particularly munitions and power plants, including current status.

26. National program for evacuation of military dependents and non-essential civilians from key areas.

27. Morale of the people, their attitude to the regime, and the effect of the Voice of America.

28. Capacity, daily output, and type of weapons and munitions produced at the Taiyuan Arsenal.

29. Rail lines in North China that have been double tracked, and new construction.

#### B. Tsingtao Area (Shantung)

1. Strength, designation and description, location and activities of any USSR troops in the area.

2. Strength, designation, location and activities of Chinese Communist forces in the area.

3. Strength and location of any USSR Air Force units in the area.

4. Number, type and location of submarines based in the area.

5. Number, type and location of surface vessels based in the area.

6. Characteristics, numbers and location of torpedoes and mines constructed or stored in the area.

7. Presence of any German or Japanese personnel connected with activities at naval installations and facilities in the area. If present report in what numbers and their status and mission.

8. Any large-scale Soviet training of Chinese paratroopers particularly in Kaifeng area.

9. Numbers and activities of Soviet individuals in area; advisors, technicians, supervisors, etc.

10. Movement of troop trains through Kaifeng giving estimated strength, identification, equipment, nationality, number of cars, direction of movement and date.

11. Possible parachute training center at Hsuehou.

*Secret*



*Secret*

12. Extent of amphibious training being conducted including purpose and participating units, particularly in the Weihaiwei area of Shantung Province.

13. Nature and extent of any increase in security measures imposed in the area.

14. Antiaircraft emplacements, any increase in manning, and location of any antiaircraft artillery in the area including information as to whether it is radar controlled.

15. Location of major supply installations in the area including POL depots.

C. Nanking - Shanghai Area (Central China)

1. Extent and effectiveness of anti-Communist resistance groups in Central China including information as to their loyalty to the Nationalists, probability of support of a Nationalist landing, and location and command organization of the units.

2. Presence or visits of high-ranking officers or government officials including length of stay, conferences and areas inspected.

3. Numbers and activities of Soviet individuals in area; advisors, technicians, supervisors etc.

4. Strength, designations, descriptions, location and activities of any USSR troops in the area.

5. Strength and location of any Soviet Air Force units in the area.

6. Locations, strength and designation of Chinese Communist forces in the area.

7. Movements of troop trains through Hankow, Nanking and Shanghai giving estimated strength, identification, equipment, nationality, number of cars, direction of movement and date.

8. Arrival and/or existence of large quantities of military equipment and supplies in the area or being moved south through the area.

9. Strength and type of any concentrations of shipping in the area, both naval ships and vessels suitable for transporting troops, including location and activity.

10. Amphibious training being conducted in the area including identification of participating units and the presence of special equipment.

11. Location, extent and type of any marine minefields in the area.

12. New construction on airfields in the area including lengthening of runways and increasing thickness.

13. Activity and type of ships being built in shipyards in Shanghai area with disposition upon completion.

14. Locations of main supply installations in area including POL depots.

15. Security measures being taken in the area and whether they are being increased.

16. Nature and extent of defensive measures being undertaken including any increased manning of antiaircraft positions and location of any radar-controlled antiaircraft artillery.

*Secret*



*Secret*

17. Rail lines in Central China that are being double tracked and new construction.

D. Yunghia - Tsinkiang - Amoy - Swatow Area (South Central China)

1. Strength, designation, descriptions, location and activities of any USSR troops in the area.
2. Numbers and activities of Soviet individuals and groups in the area; advisors, technicians, supervisors, etc.
3. Strength, designation, locations and evidence of build-up of all Chinese Communist troops in the area to include details of return of troops who had previously moved north.
4. Presence of units or high-ranking officers or government officials including conferences, areas inspected and activities.
5. Strength, organizations, and locations of any Soviet Air Force units in the area.
6. Location of CCAF units in area to include type, strength and location of headquarters.
7. Extent and effectiveness of anti-Communist resistance groups in South China including their loyalty to the Nationalists; probability of supporting a Nationalist landing; and location and command organization of the groups.
8. Arrival and status of any existing large quantities of military equipment and supplies in the area.
9. Strength, type, location and activity of any concentrations of shipping in the area to include both naval ships and vessels suitable for transporting troops.
10. Extent, location and nature of all amphibious training being conducted in the area including commando type training by "dare to die" troops.
11. Security measures being taken in the area both defensive in nature and counter-intelligence.
12. Extent, character, location and underlying philosophy of defensive measures being undertaking in the area.
13. Evidence of receipt of instructions by units or assumption of alert status concerning contemplated offensive action against Formosa, Hongkong, or Indo-China.
14. Tactical radio frequencies of the CCAF.
15. Locations of main radio communication centers.
16. Airfields being reserved for Soviet use to include location and description.
17. Location of major POL depots and supply installations in the area.

E. INNER MONGOLIA

Military

1. Location, strength, composition, state of training, status of materiel and personalities of armed forces.

*Secret*



*Secret*

2. Presence of dissident elements, location and strength of such forces, areas under their domination, biographical information on important personalities.

3. Strength and mission of USSR missions and groups present in the area.

Political

1. Structure of the Inner Mongolian Peoples Autonomous Government (IMPAG).

2. Degree and nature of Chinese Communist control over the IMPAG.

3. Degree of Soviet influence or control over the IMPAG, whether exercised directly or through CCP.

4. Relations between the Inner Mongolian Peoples Autonomous Government and the Mongolian Peoples Republic (MPR). Confirmation or negation of MPR officials filling administrative or other posts in the IMPAG.

5. Popular reaction to the policies of the Government.

6. Identification and strength of dissident elements, particularly whereabouts and political activities of Te Wang.

Economic

1. Information on Chinese, MPR or Soviet sponsorship of economic development of industry and popular reaction to such policies.

2. Information of Chinese exploitation or non-concern with land policies.

3. Improvement of means for the distribution of goods.

Biographical

1. Identification and whereabouts of important figures in government and in dissident groups.

Cultural

1. Information confirming or denying a Chinese policy of assimilation toward the Mongolians.

2. Imposition of Chinese Communist culture upon the people.

3. Emphasis being shown on teaching the Russian language.

F. MONGOLIA

Political

1. Details of the organization of the Mongolian Government and identification of persons.

2. Interrelationships and treaties between Mongolia and Inner Mongolia Peoples Autonomous Government (IMPAG).

3. Interrelationships between Mongolia and the USSR.

4. Information on the role to be played by Mongolia in Soviet plans for communization of Asia.

*Secret*



*Secret*  
Military

1. Unit identification, strength, organization, equipment, commanders, subordination of units, status of training, combat effectiveness, current mission and location of Mongolian military forces.
2. Information of the organization and leaders of military headquarters; subdivisions for military control.
3. Position and identity of Soviet officials in Mongolia.
4. Presence of Soviet military units in Mongolia and information of their mission.
5. Movement of Mongolian troops to Manchuria.
6. Location, product and capacity of Mongolian arsenals.

*Secret*



**SECRET**

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff**

APO 500  
17 March 51

**SUBJECT:** Technical Intelligence Operational Organization

**TO:** Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.



0999

1. Observation of technical and scientific intelligence procedures employed in the current action in Korea, when viewed from the background of experience gained in this field during World War II, has revealed that there are certain shortcomings in the presently authorized organization.

2. A satisfactory system was developed during World War II in the Pacific Theater and is described in some detail in Volume VII, Intelligence Series, Subject: "Operations of the Technical Intelligence Unit in the SWPA", 20 Mar 48. However, publication of FM 30-15 and subsequent changes set up a decentralized system of operation whereby each technical service would have its own teams. G-2's of all levels were charged with general staff direction, supervision, and coordination of this technical service intelligence activity.

3. Although a very considerable amount of technical and scientific intelligence has been derived under the present system, practical experience demonstrates quite clearly that the current system of operation leads to much wasted effort and has failed in some instances to exploit in full the technical intelligence potential.

4. This headquarters has always recognized the importance of technical intelligence, and successfully conducted this type of intelligence activity during WW II. Experience has proven that, to fulfill the responsibility for the production of technical intelligence, Field Army G-2's must have operational control of a composite group to carry out the mission.

5. A copy of a staff study on technical intelligence operational organization, based on observations of current operations and past experience in this theater during WW II, is attached for your consideration. We believe that the procedures and organization recommended in this study will improve immeasurably the quality and quantity of information to be derived from captured materiel but, of course, it will be necessary for action to be initiated at Department of Army level.

G-2 File

1 Incl:  
Staff Study, subj:  
Organization of Tech  
Intel Agencies

C. A. WILLOUGHBY  
Major General, GSC  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

SC  
**FILE**

**SECRET**

59  
350.09

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



SECRET

MEMO FOR RECORD:

17 MARCH 1951

SUBJECT: Technical Intelligence Operational Organization

Above letter fwds staff study to DA which recommends changes in T/O&E 30-600 and FM 30-15, thereby placing tech intell opns under operational control of G2, Army.

C.S.M.

26-7489

SECRET





**SECRET**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 FAR EAST COMMAND  
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500  
 19 April 1951

SUBJECT: Technical Intelligence

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
 Eighth Army  
 APO 301  
 ATTENTION: Technical Intelligence Coordinator

1. In accordance with your request for certain pamphlets pertaining to technical intelligence, the following are furnished for your information:

a. GHQ, FEC, OTTI 2-1, subject: "Direct Support Ordnance Maintenance and Supply Service", dated 9 Jan 51, which outlines the responsibilities of direct support ordnance units in relation to Ordnance technical intelligence detachments (Incl 1).

b. GHQ, FEC, OTTI 6-1, subject: "Ordnance Technical Intelligence", 8 Feb 51, which outlines the missions of Ordnance technical intelligence detachments (Incl 2).

c. Volume II, Serial Nbr. 4, Ordnance Intelligence Summary, published by Office of Chief of Ordnance based on information obtained from ACOFS, G2, DA, Ordnance Technical Intelligence Teams, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Military Attaches, POW Interrogation Reports, and other sources (Incl 3).

2. The instructions outlined in pamphlets listed in paragraphs 1a and b above were prepared by the Ordnance Officer, GHQ, FEC, with the object of improving the ordnance participation in the technical intelligence effort.

3. The Ordnance Intelligence Summary (Incl 3) has only recently been made available to this office. Since the preponderance of the data contained in this publication is the result of the technical intelligence effort in Korea, arrangements have been made so that your office will be furnished a copy of this publication although it is primarily designed for ordnance personnel.

4. The recent staff visit to your headquarters by Capt Blake has proved most beneficial here. The success of this visit can be attributed to the keen interest your G2 technical intelligence personnel have exhibited in the field of technical intelligence. The prompt and aggressive action taken on requests for information and the consideration given the suggestions made on ways and means of improving the quality of the reports

**SECRET**

(59)

358-09

19949

19949 G-2 File

*W*

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JGA  
級



SECRET

Ltr G2, GHQ, FEC to G2, Eighth Army, 19 April 1951

prepared by the technical service intelligence teams, as well as the corrective measures taken without delay, were most noteworthy and deeply appreciated.

5. Reference is made to the discussion between Lt Col Casey and Capt Blake on the possibility of setting up a standard report form. It is believed that the use of a standard fill-in form for reporting is not satisfactory. Such a form has been used by the 1st and 2d Sig Intel Units and the resulting reports are considered by this office to be the poorest prepared by technical intelligence field agencies, as the signal teams have shown little or no initiative in reporting information which is not required by the form. The check lists outlined in SR 380-305-5 cover quite adequately the fields of engineer and ordnance technical service intelligence teams. These check lists are considered excellent and adequate guides to insure complete coverage of an item of captured materiel.

6. In regard to the procedure for handling QM TID reports which was discussed with your office, it is the desire here that the reports of the 590th QM TID be processed and forwarded as outlined in FM 30-15, the procedure employed by the other technical services.

7. It has been realized here that detailed guides to supplement present instructions on the collection of markings and nameplate data are needed by collection agencies. To remedy this situation, a guide of this type has been prepared and eighty(80) copies were forwarded on 18 April. This initial guide deals primarily with ordnance type items, but supplementary material, now being compiled, will include guidance data on items for which other technical services are responsible.

8. It has been of interest to note the various types of Japanese weapons which are being captured. Some of these are definitely from the stocks taken over from the Japanese forces which surrendered in Manchuria and China at the end of WW II. In other cases, however, it is known that some of the enemy weapons captured are copies of Japanese-type weapons and have been manufactured as late as 1949. The best method for determining the differences is by the markings which appear on the items.

9. For your information, it appears that a medical technical intelligence officer will soon be operating in Korea. With this addition, six of the seven technical services will have representation.

SECRET



SECRET

Ltr G2, GHQ, FEC to G2, Eighth Army, 19 April 1951

10. The assistance your staff give Capt Blake on his recent staff visit is appreciated, and this office will continue its efforts to make available to you all possible material and information which will aid the technical intelligence field collection effort.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

## 3 Incls:

1. GHQ, FEC, OTTI 2-1,  
9 Jan 51 (in dup)
2. GHQ, FEC, OTTI 6-1,  
8 Feb 51 (in dup)
3. Vol II, Serial No. 4,  
Ord Intel Summary (in dup)

*B/* R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

T.N.S. 26-7489

*AB*  
FILE

SECRET



SECRET

09433

Countersubversive System Plan

G-2

Chief of Staff

6 March 1951  
CIDiv/LOY/WHH/bb

1

1. Department of the Army letters dated 31 October and 9 November 1950 (Incls 1 and 2) forwarded a plan for establishing a countersubversive system within all units of the Army Field Establishment down to and including those equivalent to the infantry company.

2. The countersubversive system is an informative, non-punitive, non-investigative undercover organization, operated for the sole purpose of detecting subversion on the part of military and civilian personnel of the Army.

3. The establishment of the system is a function of command and is to be operated through the chain of command by unit intelligence officers with the knowledge of their commanding officers.

4. The plan provides that each commanding officer will establish throughout his command a countersubversive system composed of observer-informants from whom he will receive immediate reports concerning the existence within his command of disloyal or disaffected elements or activities, harmful propaganda, acts or contemplated acts of sabotage or espionage and unauthorized disclosure of military information. Investigation of pertinent reports received through the countersubversive system via unit intelligence officers in the Far East Command will be conducted by regular Counter Intelligence Corps agencies.

5. Department of the Army letters, referenced in paragraph 1 above, point out that the contents of the countersubversive system plan will not be discussed with or otherwise made known to agencies or individuals outside the Army Establishment unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Army.

6. The plan is submitted by Department of the Army for planning purposes only and will not be put into effect until specifically directed by the Secretary of the Army.

7. G-2 will be prepared to implement subject plan within Far East Command when the Department of the Army so directs.

8. This is for your information. Recommend approval or implementation of the subject plan, within Far East Command, when directed by the Department of Army.

2 Incls:

- 1. DA ltr, 31 Oct 50, w/1 Incl
- 2. DA ltr, 9 Nov 50

89

350.09



SECRET

G-2 File Copy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



SECRET

C/S fr G-2 to CofS, Subj: Countersubversive System Plan, dtd 6 Mar 51

MEMO FOR RECORD:

DA ltrs dtd 31 Oct and 9 Nov 50 file AGAO-S 350.09, fwds for planning purposes a plan for establishing a countersubversive system within the Army Field Establishment. Synopsis of plan is given in pars 2 thru 6 above. CI Div is preparing a plan for implementing system within GHQ. This fwds synopsis to CofS with draft ltr to the major sub-commands for approval.

Maj Hunt - 26-5659

SECRET





**SECRET**

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND**  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500  
27 February 1951

**SUBJECT:** Estimated Japanese Casualties in the China Area During Period 1937-1945 and Total Japanese Casualties in All Areas of the Pacific Theater During World War II


**TO :** Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Attached is a detailed report in reply to your radio request (DA 83286, dtd 13 Feb 51) for our estimated number of Japanese casualties in the China Area during the period 1937-1945 and the total Japanese casualties in all areas of the Pacific Theater during World War II. The attached documents, compiled by the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus, list the total known casualties by all causes during the period 7 December 1941 - 15 August 1945 and are the most accurate figures available.

2. A study of available Japanese records reveals that Japanese casualties from 1937-1945 were as follows:

|                                   |           |                |                  |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|----------------|------------------|
| China Area (1937-1941)            | Army      | 168,807        |                  |
|                                   | Navy      | 7,345          |                  |
|                                   | Sub-Total | <u>176,152</u> |                  |
| China Area (7 Dec 41-15 Aug 45)   | Army      | 203,851        |                  |
|                                   | Navy      | 39,197         |                  |
|                                   | Sub-Total | <u>243,048</u> |                  |
| Total China Area                  |           |                | 419,200          |
| Pacific Area (7 Dec 41-15 Aug 45) | Army      | 1,289,605      |                  |
|                                   | Navy      | 439,505        |                  |
| Total Pacific Area                |           |                | <u>1,729,110</u> |
| GRAND TOTAL                       |           |                | <u>2,148,310</u> |

3. Attention is invited to the large number of Japanese who perished in the Southwest Pacific Area during the course of World War II. The figure reached almost half of the grand total of Japanese killed in all areas of combat. The toll in the Philippines was particularly heavy. The figures for SWPA are as follows:



**B  
FILE**

**SECRET**

19  
350:09

813562

G-2 File

*JSM*



SECRET

| <u>Area</u>              | <u>Army</u>   | <u>Navy</u>  | <u>Total</u>  |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------|
| New Guinea               | 104,963       | 19,223       | 124,186       |
| Philippines              | 367,058       | 103,059      | 470,117       |
| *Solomons                | 58,782        | 35,072       | 93,854        |
| **Netherland East Indies | 56,872        | 10,323       | 67,195        |
| Borneo                   | <u>10,412</u> | <u>5,504</u> | <u>15,916</u> |
| Total                    | 598,087       | 173,181      | 771,268       |

\*Includes Guadalcanal

\*\*Does not include Sumatra

NOTE: Figures include civilian personnel attached to both services.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl  
Demob Bureau Casualty Rept  
(7 Dec 41-15 Aug 45)

*S*  
R. S. BRATTON  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

The above letter together with attached inclosure is in response to Radio DA 83286 dtd 13 Feb 51 which requested subject information. Ltr and interim radio reply apprvd by CofS 26 Feb. Initials "H" on G-2 Memo, subj: "Estimate of Japanese Casualties," same date on file G-2.

G.W.P. \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET



**SECRET**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 FAR EAST COMMAND  
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

26 February 1951

SUBJECT: Estimate of Japanese Casualties

MEMO TO: Chief of Staff

1. In radio DA 83286 the Department of the Army requested the estimated number of Japanese troops killed by Chinese action during hostilities from 1937 to 1945 and a separate estimate of the number of Japanese killed by US or Allied action in the Pacific area during World War II (Tab 1). On the basis of information obtained from the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus and from other Japanese Government sources, a radio reply to the Department of the Army (Tab 2) has been prepared showing the following figures: Deaths by all causes including civilian personnel attached to both services

|                                 |       |                |
|---------------------------------|-------|----------------|
| China Area                      | Army  | 372,658        |
|                                 | Navy  | <u>46,542</u>  |
|                                 | Total | 419,200        |
| Pacific Area 7 Dec 41-15 Aug 45 | Army  | 1,289,605      |
|                                 | Navy  | <u>439,505</u> |
|                                 | Total | 1,729,110      |

Attention is invited to the large number of Japanese who perished in the Southwest Pacific Area during the course of World War II:

|       |                |
|-------|----------------|
| Army  | 598,087        |
| Navy  | <u>173,181</u> |
| Total | 771,268        |

This figure reached almost half of the total shown above for the entire Pacific Area. Of this number 470,117 deaths occurred in the Philippines.


2. In order to furnish more details a letter to be airmailed to the Department of the Army has been prepared inclosing copies of documents from which figures for World War II were extracted (Tab 3).

3. Recommend approval of draft radio (Tab 2) and draft letter (tab 3).

3 Incls

1. Radio DA 83286
2. Draft radio reply
3. Draft letter to DA

C.A.W.

**SECRET**

79

350.09



CONFIDENTIAL

2435  
04187

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500  
26 January 1951

SUBJECT: Drug Ration of Chinese Army in North Korea

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Eighth Army  
APO 301  
ATTN: Technical Intelligence Coordinator

0  
4  
1  
8  
7

1. Inclosure 1 is G-2, DA, Specific Request for Information, Control Nr MD-654 R.P., subject as above, dated 8 Jan 51, with attached memorandum dated 28 Dec 50.

2. Request attempt be made to confirm or deny report on use of narcotics carried as standard equipment by Chinese soldiers. Sample boxes of narcotics should be furnished this headquarters if available.

G-2 File

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:  
1. G2 DA Specific Rqst for Info, Control Nr MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51, w/Incl

/S/ WASHINGTON M. IVES, JR  
Colonel, GSC  
Executive

MEMO FOR RECORD:

DA SRI Control Nr MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51, rqsts confirmation or denial of rept on use of narcotics carried by Chinese soldiers as standard equip in boxes slightly larger than pack of cigarettes. Further rqsts sample of boxes if aval. Rqst based on newspaper article in Washington Star of 4 Dec 50 and interview with a lieutenant woulded in Korea who is now in WRAH. Copy of interview fwded with specific rqst. GHQ Med Sec (Col Long) and T/Intel (Capt West) have no info to confirm or deny subj rept. CID Lab and Med Lab in Tokyo have received no samples for analysis. Copies of Specific Rqst furn ATIS w/rqst for info fr R&I and ADVATIS.

CSM 26-7489

FILE

33

350.09

CONFIDENTIAL

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27



CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

26 January 1951  
APO 500

SUBJECT: Divy Ration of Chinese Army in North Korea

ATTN: Technical Intelligence Coordinator  
APO 301  
Right Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1. Reference is made to DA Specific Request for Information Control No. MD-654 R.P., subject as above, dated 8 Jan 51, with attached memorandum dated 28 Dec 50.

2. Request attempt be made to confirm or deny report on use of narcotics carried as standard equipment by Chinese soldiers. Sample boxes of narcotics should be furnished this headquarters if available.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

WASHINGTON M. IVEC, JR.  
Colonel, GSC  
Executive

1. G-2 DA Specific Request for Info.  
Control No. MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51, w/incl.

MEMO FOR RECORD:


DA SRI Control No. MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51, re: confirmation or denial of report on use of narcotics carried by Chinese soldiers as standard equip in boxes slightly larger than pack of cigarettes. Further re: sample of boxes if avail. Rpt based on newspaper article in Washington Star of 4 Dec 50 and interview with a lieutenant wounded in Korea who is now in WRAH. Copy of interview filed with specific rpt. The Lt. (Col Long) and Intel (Capt West) have no info to confirm or deny and no samples for analysis. Lab and Med Lab in Tokyo have received no samples of specific Rpt from ATIS w/rpt for info fr R&I and ADVA. Copies



C8M

CONFIDENTIAL

32009



02-20L  
G-2 LIP



CONFIDENTIAL

COPY  
2435DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2  
Washington 25, D. C.

G-2/IT/

8 January 1951

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, CONTROL NO. MD-654 R.P.

SUBJECT: Drug Ration of Chinese Army in North Korea

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East  
Attn: A. C. of S., G-2  
APO 500, c/o Postmaster  
San Francisco, California

## 1. Requirements:

a. Confirmation or denial of the report on the use of narcotics "carried as standard equipment" by Chinese soldiers.

b. One or more samples of the "little boxes of dope slightly larger than a pack of cigarettes" if it is established that such boxes of narcotics are carried by the Chinese soldiers.

2. Reply should be forwarded as soon as information is available.

3. All replies to the requirement will refer to the above Control Number.

## 4. Collection guidance and special instructions:

a. The Washington Star of 4 December 1950 carried an article by AP correspondent Tom Stone about the use of a drug by Chinese soldiers. In part the article states, "Chinese soldiers keep hopped up on dope carried as standard equipment which is kept in little boxes just a little bit larger than a pack of cigarettes. All of them have it and chew it like chewing gum. Makes the Chinks act like crazy." The quoted statements are supposed to be those of a wounded American soldier, and sixteen other wounded Americans are reported to have seen the Chinese with these tins of dope.

b. See Inclosure.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

/s/ Russell G. Duff  
for JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief, Intelligence Division, G-2Incl:  
Memo dtd 28 Dec 50

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY



RESTRICTED

COPY 2435

## MEMORANDUM

28 December 1950

SUBJECT: Interview with 1st Lt. Philip Harper at WRAH

Lt Harper was in command of the weapons platoon, I Company, 24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division until wounded in early December 1950.

He was interviewed on Ward II at Walter Reed Army Hospital at 0900 hours, 27 December 1950, to check on a paragraph published in the Washington Post 22 December 1950, to the effect that it was his belief, like others in his outfit that the North Koreans fought under the influence of drugs. He said his outfit had found syringes and little glass vials apparently containing a liquid drug.

Detailed questioning revealed that the above equipment was not found on individual soldiers but was found in several cheap "suitcases" in homes and buildings in North Korea which were overrun by American Forces. These "suitcases" contained other medical equipment as well as non medical materiel. Lt. Harper did not think that these "suitcases" were medical chests or kits even though they contained more equipment than one person could use. It seems reasonable to suppose that equipment and supplies might have been stored in these suitcases prior to moving.

Lt. Harper like many other Americans feel that the Koreans must have had "dope" to make them fight in the manner that they do, with a complete disregard of life and oriental fanaticism. He states that a friend of his captured a number of Chinese soldiers, and that individual packets containing "dope" were found on all of them. He was unable to say what the "dope" was, but stated that he thought it had been sent back to Tokyo for Analysis. He did not know whether these packets contained tablets, something to chew, or vials.

COMMENT: It would seem improvable that wholesale use of "dope" which required the use of needles and syringes was employed. Syringes are scarce and the kind of narcotics so used would be expensive. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that some kind of crude opium preparation which might be chewed or placed under the tongue has been given to the Chinese troops either to stimulate them or to fill an addicts need. As many orientals are addicted to the use of opium it is a theoretical possibility that some sort of ration is issued regularly to them.

SARAH H. BOWDITCH, M.D.  
Assistant Chief  
Medical Intelligence Branch

RESTRICTED

COPY



CONFIDENTIAL

# G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** Drug Ration of Chinese Army in North Korea **Date:** \_\_\_\_\_

**FROM:** \_\_\_\_\_ **TO:** \_\_\_\_\_ **PHONE:** \_\_\_\_\_  
**NAME:** \_\_\_\_\_

Comment  
Number

From: MIS Div To: G2 MISD/GSM/RTB/ac  
25 Jan 51

1. Incl 2 is draft letter from G2 GHQ to G2, Eighth Army, which:
  - a. Forwards Specific Request (Incl 1) to G2, Eighth Army;
  - b. Requests G2, Eighth Army, confirm or deny use of narcotics carried as standard equipment by Chinese soldiers;
  - c. States that samples of drugs should be forwarded this Hq if available.
2. Recommend approval and dispatch of Incl 2.

2

- 2 Incls
1. SRI, Control #MD-654 R.P.,  
8 Jan 51 w/Incl
  2. Draft ltr to G2, 8A

C.S.M.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

SEKISUI JUSHI

JSA

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT 435

APO 500  
25 January 1951

SUBJECT: Drug Ration of Chinese Army in North Korea

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
Eighth Army  
APO 301  
ATTN: Technical Intelligence Coordinator

1. Inclosure 1 is G2, DA, Specific Request for Information. Control Nr MD-654 R.P., subject as above, dated 8 Jan 51, <sup>with</sup> ~~which~~ attached memorandum dated 28 Dec 50.
2. Request attempt be made to confirm or deny report on use of narcotics carried as standard equipment by Chinese soldiers. Sample boxes of narcotics should be furnished this headquarters if available.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

1 Incl  
G2 DA Specific Rqst for Info,  
Control Nr MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51.  
w/Incl

## MEMO FOR RECORD:

DA SRI Control Nr MD-654 R.P., 8 Jan 51, rqsts confirmation or denial of rept on use of narcotics carried by Chinese soldiers as standard equip in boxes slightly larger than pack of cigarettes. Further rqsts sample of boxes if aval. Rqst based on newspaper article in Washington Star of 4 Dec 50 and interview with a lieutenant wounded in Korea who is now in WRAH. Copy of interview fwded with specific rqst. GHQ Med Sec (Col Long) and T/Intel (Capt West) have no info to confirm or deny subj rept. CID Lab and Med Lab in Tokyo have received no samples for analysis. Copies of Specific Rqst furn ATIS w/rqst for info fr R&I and ADVATIS.

CSM  
26-7489

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

 1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JGA

JIS

1級

3



SECRET

Study of the Defense of Japan Following the Withdrawal of UN Forces from Korea

G-2

JSPOG/G-3

4 January 1950

4  
5  
6  
5  
8

1 Forwarded herewith as Inclosure 1, Document Number 64087, Subject: "Study of the Defense of Japan Following the Withdrawal of UN Forces from Korea", for your information and possible use in defense planning for Japan. A brief with G-2 comments is attached as Inclosure 2.

2 Incls:

- 1. Document #64087
- 2. Brief of Doc #64087

WR 51


-C.A.W.-

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject document prepared by Special Net and forwarded to General Willoughby for his perusal and disposition. General Willoughby in turn forwarded document to T/I for briefing and comment and recommendation for forwarding to JSPOG/G-3. This CS forwards subj doc to JSPOG/G-3.

HVW  
26-6066

FILE



3

350.09

SECRET

G-2 File

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JGA

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



SECRET

Study of the Defense of Japan Following the  
Withdrawal of UN Forces from Korea

4 January 1954

18POG/G-3

G-3

Forwarded herewith as Inclosure 1, Document Number 64087, Subject:  
"Study of the Defense of Japan Following the Withdrawal of UN Forces  
from Korea", for your information and possible use in defense planning  
for Japan. A brief with G-3 comments is attached as Inclosure 2.

2 Incls:  
1. Document #64087  
2. Brief of Doc #64087

986

C.A.W.


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Subject document prepared by Special Net and forwarded to General  
Willoughby for his perusal and disposition. General Willoughby in turn  
forwarded document to T/I for briefing and comment and recommendation for  
forwarding to 18POG/G-3. This G3 forwards subj doc to 18POG/G-3.

HVM

28-6086

Handwritten signature and stamp



SECRET

3  
350.04

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI

G-3 File



## BRIEF

BRIEF OF DOC #64087, STUDY OF THE DEFENSE  
OF JAPAN FOLLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES FROM KOREA

1. This document, prepared by the Special G-2 informants, is in two parts. The first part covers main factors determining the consequences of UN forces withdrawal from Korea, its effect on Japan and the consequences of a complete or partial withdrawal of American Forces from Japan. The second part deals with defense requirements of Japan, with views of its position in Far East strategy in World War III, military strength requirements and domestic preparations for Communist uprisings and/or Red attack on the homeland.

2. Part I. - The author opines that UN Forces withdrawal from Korea, whether voluntary or not, would mean UN defeat in Asia by Communist military power, thus posing the question of the ultimate fate of Japan. Although public sentiment in Japan is now favorable to the US, abandonment of Korea under any circumstances would be interpreted as a Western sacrifice of Asia to save the West. Japan's national security would be jeopardized, the general public will tend to become pro-Soviet, General MacArthur would probably lose authority and power to deal with the Japanese people, and the JCP position would be greatly enhanced. Withdrawal from Korea would retard, or completely destroy, Japan's economic self-sufficiency. Moreover, Communist domination of the nearby Korean peninsula would create apprehensiveness among the people and would present a physical threat to the defense of Japan. In the event American forces withdraw completely from Japan, the following measures would become necessary: 1) a separate peace treaty; 2) unrestricted restoration of industries; 3) general amnesty of war criminals; 4) unrestricted rearming; and 5) a Japanese-American military alliance pact. These measures could result in Japanese membership in the West-Europe camp. Conversely, if these measures are not taken prior to withdrawal, the resulting confusion and unrest may invite a Red Army attack or a Communist revolution. In considering a partial withdrawal of US Forces from Japan, her safety could not be secured merely by maintaining American military bases. A joint defense, including Japanese forces and American air and naval forces based in Japan, would be imperative and most welcomed by Japanese.

3. Part II. - In studying the defense of Japan, her strategical role in the Far East is considered of prime importance in the attack or defense of Asia. Red forces invasion of Japan would precipitate World War III, and conversely, if World War III breaks out, an invasion of Japan by Red forces is inevitable. In the world picture, the Far East would become a secondary battleground. Europe and the Middle and Near East would take priority in military allocations at a ratio of about 1 to 5. Russian war strategy is expected to be one of endurance, while the US adopts the strategy of a short, decisive war. Applying this ratio to total expected US wartime strength of 40,000 planes and 150 divisions, US strength in the Far East would be 7,000 planes and 20 divisions. Assuming USSR's total wartime strength of 200,000 planes and 300 divisions, she would allocate 3,500 planes and 50 divisions in the Far East in addition to 30 CCF and 15 Korean divisions. Estimated military strength necessary to defend Japan is: Wartime - 3,000 planes, 45 divisions, and 150,000 tons of small combat naval vessels, totaling 1,840,000 men; Peacetime - 2,000 planes, 15 divisions and 100,000 tons of shipping, totaling 330,000 men. Of the 45 wartime divisions, 5 would be utilized domestically to guard against Red uprisings, 5 and general reserve, and the remainder would be disposed in Hokkaido and Western Japan, to repulse anticipated Red invasion. During the build-up of Japan's defenses (approximately 2 years), active US aid and support would be a prerequisite in opposing Red invasion and/or Communist uprisings in Japan. Upon regaining her sovereignty, through an early peace treaty, Japan can be counted on to take active countermeasures against national Communism and support Western ideology in the Far East.

Comment: Although some merit can be attributed to this document, it should be noted that these are the views of an individual and do not necessarily constitute a basis for sound planning. Much of Part I is based on speculation, assumptions, and intentions which tend to create bias on the part of the author, perhaps in an effort to stress the necessity for the conclusion of an early separate peace treaty, and a speedy Japanese-American military alliance pact. Part II, although dealing in generalities, indicates good reasoning and an appreciation of Far East strategy which may be of some value in assessing the defense requirements of Japan.

SECRET

G-2 File

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34



SECRET

# G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Study of the Defense of Japan

Following the Withdrawal of

**File No:**

**Subject:** United Nations Forces From Korea

**Date:**

**FROM:**

**TO:**

**PHONE:**

**NAME:**

**Comment  
Number**

From: G-2 Exec

To: T/Intel

CAW 2616/45658/dak  
4 January 1951

Tab 3 finalized and dispatched to G-3/JSPOG. This completes action.

4

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

3 Incls: n/c

Info: Exec Group

FU : Maj Aykroyd/Capt Prichard

CAW

-----J.W.R.-----

THIS COMPLETES ACTION

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

200cm

SEKISUI JUSHI

JDA

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



SECRET

1410  
02141

02141



G-2 file

2. FROM: G-2

TO: G-3

Date: CAW/AB/mg  
26 January 51

1. Forwarded herewith as Incls 2, 3 and 4 is information on land mines which has not been published in Engineer Technical Information Bulletins.

2. The following documents also contain information on land mines which is supplementary to information published in Eighth Army and X Corps Engineer Bulletins:

a. ATIS Supplement Enemy Documents, Issue No. 4, 16 Dec 50, a copy of which has previously been furnished G-3 in normal distribution, is a full translation of a captured Chinese document which describes types, uses, construction tactics, detection and disposal of land mines.


b. ATIS Captured Document No. 201660, which is currently being processed for publication in ATIS Enemy Documents, is a blue print of mine detonators with instructions for their use.

c. ATIS Captured Document No. 201661, which is currently being processed for publication in ATIS Enemy Documents, is a chart which explains use of anti-personnel and anti-animal land mines.

d. A report on description, use and employment of land mines based on review of ATIS Interrogation reports will be published about 1 Feb 51 in ATIS Research Supplement Interrogation Reports, Issue No. 94.

SECRET

350.09 (32)





SECRET

Land Mine  
Usage

CAW/AB/mg

G-2

G-3

26 January 51

2.  
(Cont'd)

e. Par 7, Page M-2, Daily Intelligence Summary 3028, dated 24 Dec 50, gives location and date of installation of a mine field.

3. It has been determined that a forthcoming Eighth Army Engineer Bulletin will contain additional information on this subject.

4 Incls:

1. Ltr ORO-G3: Land Mine Usage, undated
2. Supplemental Reply to SRFI, CN CE 745, 9 Nov 50
3. X Corps Engr Rept: Mines and Mine Fields, undated
4. Rept No. 6, HQ 533 Engr TI Team (Research), 12 Jan 51

*RSB/S*

C.A.W.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

26 Jan 51

Coordinated with ATIS (Maj Van Tassell, Maj Toth, and Mr. Shelton) to obtain all info available in ATIS Enemy Documents and PW interrogations. MIS Div Tech Intel files searched by Capt Blake for any info not published in Engineer Technical Information Bulletins. GHQ Engr Sec (Maj Anderson) has no info on land mines available other than that already published in Engr bulletins. Maj Lovelace stated in phone conversation on 20 Jan 51 that Eighth Army Engr Sec (Maj Ball) is publishing bulletin containing info requested by ORO. ATIS (Maj Van Tassell) states ORO has GHQ, G-2 authority to conduct interrogation of PW in coordination with and under operational supervision and control of ADVATIS and that ORO field teams in Korea are so doing. Coordination with Th/Intel (Col Cole) secured no additional information.

C.S.M.

26-8578

FILE  
*jm*

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



SECRET

COPY

9 November 1950

## SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY TO SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, CONTROL NO CE 745

1. Indicated below is additional information pertaining to types of enemy mine and demolition equipment encountered in Korea since transmittal of the initial Reply to Specific Request for Information, Control No CE 745:

## a. Mines

- (1) Engineer Technical Intelligence Bulletin No 4, issued by the Engineer, EUSAK is attached herewith as Inclosure.
- (2) The Engineer, X Corps reported the following enemy mine action in the Inchon-Seoul Area:
  - (a) The enemy employed mine warfare in a limited and haphazard manner throughout the area, using mines for their nuisance value rather than to further his tactical situation. An exception to this rule existed in the City of Seoul, where both AT and AP mines were extensively employed in the defense of road blocks and barricades. All major street intersections were heavily mined and these mines were covered by anti-tank and anti-personnel weapons.
  - (b) The beaches to the South of Inchon were mined with both AT and AP mines, anti-personnel mines predominating. These fields consisted of POMZ-2 AP mines laid in rows parallel to the beach. Normally, the enemy laid three (3) staggered rows of mines with about fifteen (15) yards between rows and ten (10) yards between mines, giving his field a depth of about forty-five (45) yards and a density of approximately one (1) mine per three-and-one-third (3-1/3) yards of front. Trip wires extended completely across the front, going from one mine, past the next.
  - (c) Likely crossing sites on the Han River in the vicinity of Seoul were mined with wooden box mines and POMZ-2 AP mines. These mines were apparently laid in a great hurry and were poorly camouflaged.
  - (d) Some roads in the Corps area were mined, but no definite pattern could be ascertained. Some of these mine road blocks were defended, but the majority were merely laid in the open, on the roads, and then abandoned.

COPY

SECRET

Incl #2



SECRET

COPY

Supplemental Reply to Specific Request for Information, Control No. CE 745,  
9 November 1950

- (e) The enemy used some booby traps in connection with his AT and AP mine fields. The POMZ- a AP mine, with the pull fuze MUV, was used for this purpose. Enemy dead, helmets, canteens, etc. were connected to these mines with trip wires.
- b. Igniters - Data on igniters are contained in Inclosure.
- c. Mine Detectors - Data on a Russian-made mine detector are contained in Inclosure.
- d. Demolition Equipment - Data on demolition equipment are contained in Inclosure.
2. In the event additional information is received on material listed in "Specific Request for Information, Control No CE 745," a second Supplemental Reply will be prepared.

NOTE: This supplemental reply was forwarded by GHQ, Engr Sec to G-2, GHQ by check sheet, subject as above, file CE 350 (10 Nov 50) I, dated 10 Nov 50.

SECRET

COPY



SECRET

COPY

## MINES AND MINEFIELDS

The following additional information is furnished regarding the enemy's use of mines and booby traps in the area of operations of X Corps.

1. The enemy has used mines in the Wonsan-Hamhung area to a very limited extent. Large quantities of antitank mines were discovered on the beach at Wonsan and were removed by ROK forces. Large stocks of partially completed mines were found in a factory in Wonsan. They were the Wooden antipersonnel mine PMD-6 or "Shu-mine". No other minefields of significance were uncovered until I Corps ROK Engineers located a large antipersonnel mine field on the beaches north of Songjin. Over 800 POMZ-2 AP mines were removed in this area. Some mines have been discovered on road shoulders and in ditches along main routes of advance. Late engineer situation reports indicate that the enemy is making wider use of mines on routes of advance and several new types of mines have been encountered north of Hamhung in the vicinity of Pungsan. Mine road blocks have been infrequent and ineffective due to lack of camouflage and covering fire. Attached Appendix No 1 shows a typical pattern employed by NKPA forces in the mountains to the northwest of Chigyong for road blocks.

NOTE: This is a portion of a X Corps Engineer report which did not appear in an Engineer bulletin. Appendix 1, above, published in X Corps Engineer Information Bulletin No 8, 26 Nov 50.

SECRET

COPY

Incl # 3



02141  
1410

SECRET

# G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) MISD/CSM/GWP/ac

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** Land Mine Usage **Date:** 21 Jan 51

**FROM:** MIS Div **TO:** T/Intel **PHONE:** 26-8578  
**NAME:** Col Power

Comment  
Number

1. Reference is attached G3 Check Sheet (Incl 1) which forwards ORO request for information.
2. Request that any pertinent information available in T/Intel be forwarded to this office for inclusion in reply to ORO.

1

1 Incl:  
Check Sheet G3 to G2, subj:  
Land Mine Usage, 13 Jan 51,  
w/1 Incl

----- C.S.M. -----

From: T/Intel To: MIS Div TI/ECE/CCB/RHC/db

The questions in Tab 1 were presented to T/Intel informally by ORO late last week. A search was made of Opns files in an effort to satisfy the request, but results were negative, except for that information appearing in ATIS interrogation and captured enemy document reports. It is suggested that Army 8 be queried as nearer the source of the available information.

*[Handwritten signature]*

1 Incl  
n/c

----- /i/E.C.E. -----

From: MIS Div To: G2 MISD/CSM/RTB/dd  
25 January 1951

1. Ref is attached G3 Check Sheet (Incl 1) which forwards ORO request for information.
2. Incl 2 is draft C/N 2, G2 to G3 which:
  - a. Forwards copies of reports (Incls 3, 4, and 5) which contain land mine info not previously published in Engineers Technical Information Bulletins.
  - b. Refers to information on land mines in ATIS Enemy Documents, ATIS Interrogation Reports, and Daily Intelligence Summary, publications which G3 receives from G2 in normal distribution.
3. Recommend approval and dispatch of Incl 2.

3

- 5 Incls:
1. C/N G3 to G2, 13 Jan 51, w/1 Incl
  2. Draft C/N 2, G2 to G3, 25 Jan 51
  3. Supplementary rply to SRFI CE 745, 9 Nov 50
  4. Extract fr X Corps Engr Rept, undated
  5. Rept Nbr 6, 533 Engr Tech Intel Team, 14 Jan 51

----- C.S.M. -----

SECRET

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

SEKISUI JUSHI

JDA

(15)

1級

8

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28



SECRET

# G-2, GHO INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) MIRD\GSM\GWP/ag

File No: Subject: Land Mine Usage Date: 21 Jan 51

FROM: MIS Div TO: T/Intel  
NAME: Col Power PHONE: 26-8278

1. Reference is attached G3 Check Sheet (Incl 1) which forwards ORO request for information.  
2. Request that any pertinent information available in T/Intel be forwarded to this office for inclusion in reply to ORO.

I Incl:  
Check Sheet G3 to G2, subj:  
Land Mine Usage, 13 Jan 51,  
w/ Incl

From: T/Intel To: MIS Div  
TI/ICE/CGB/RHC/AB C.S.M.

The questions in Tab I were presented to T/Intel informally by ORO late last week. A search was made of Ops files in an effort to satisfy the request, but results were negative, except for that information appearing in ATIS interrogation and captured enemy document reports. It is suggested that Army 8 be queried as near the source of the available information.

I Incl  
n/c


From: MIS Div To: G2  
MIRD\GSM\RTB/ag 22 January 1951

1. Ref is attached G3 Check Sheet (Incl 1) which forwards ORO request for information.  
2. Incl 2 is draft C/W 2, G2 to G3 which:  
a. Forwards copies of reports (Incls 3, 4, and 5) which contain land mine info not previously included in Engineers Technical Information Bulletins.  
b. Refers to information on land mines in ATIS Enemy Documents, ATIS Interrogation Reports, and Daily Intelligence Summary, publications which G2 receives in normal distribution.  
3. Request and approval and dispatch of Incl 2.

2 Incls:  
1. C/W G2 to G3, 13 Jan 51  
2. Draft of report, 13 Jan 51  
3. Supplemental report to G2, 9 Nov 50  
4. Extract of report, undated  
5. Rept of T/Intel team, 14 Jan 51



Permanent Record—Do not Detach  
SECRET





**SECRET**

**COPY**

THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
FAR EAST AIR FORCES  
APO 925

4 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

SUBJECT : Continuation of "Project Wringer"

1. Attached is material supporting General Vandenberg's letter requesting continuation of "Wringer" which you may wish to glance through. Essentially his plea for continuation is based on four main reasons:

a. The interrogation programs, both in Europe and in Japan, of Soviet repatriates provide the Air Force with well over fifty per cent of all basic intelligence on the Soviet Union.

b. The "Wringer" interrogation program is also a principal source of information for the Departments of Army, Navy, State, CIA, Atomic Energy Commission and other national intelligence agencies. These agencies have indorsed the Air Force request for continued interrogations. (See attached Inclosures #1, copy of Appendix C to Summary of Wringer Briefing).

c. The Air Force interrogation program in Japan provides information on areas that are not available through European sources. The most serious deficiencies in air information concern Siberia and Central Asia, where Japanese repatriates were employed on a wide range of industrial, construction and other projects.

d. Although repatriation from the USSR has ceased, the ex-POWs now in Japan have information that is vital to the target program. General Vandenberg feels that exploitation of this source should be continued until we have the fullest possible picture of target areas.

2. The importance of "Wringer" to Washington is demonstrated by recent acceleration of its operation in Europe. The interrogation effort in that theater has recently been doubled to a present strength of 710 persons.

23 D

350.09

**SECRET**

**COPY**

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



**SECRET  
SECRET****COPY**

Memorandum for General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 4 January 1951  
Subject: "Continuation of 'Project Wringer' "

3. The indorsing remarks of Washington agencies to continuation of "Wringer" in Japan are appended hereto. (See Inclosure #1).

4. With reference to General Vandenberg's letter to you of 26 December 1950, the following measures are recommended to fulfill the requirements contained therein:

a. Call-in of repatriates on a 100% voluntary basis for interrogation and reinterrogation with payment of costs from Air Force funds.

b. Authorize FEAF "Wringer" liaison officers with the Japanese Demobilization Bureau, to include access to the Japanese Demobilization Bureau files.

/s/ George E. Stratemeyer  
/t/ GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Air Force  
Commanding

**SECRET****COPY**



SECRET

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
APO 500

14 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General George E. Stratemeyer  
Commanding General, Far East Air Forces  
APO 925

SUBJECT : Continuation of "Project Wringer."

## 1. References:

- a. Letter from General Vandenberg to Commander-in-Chief, dated 26 December 1950 (Inclosure No. 1).
- b. Your memorandum to General MacArthur, dated 4 January 1951 (Inclosure No. 2).
- c. "Wringer" file (Inclosure No. 3).

2. Incompliance with General MacArthur's instructions a conference on above subject has been held with Generals Craigie, Banfill and Willoughby. All are in agreement with the recommendations contained in paragraph 4 of your memorandum, reference b, which are hereby approved.

/s/ Doyle O. Hickey  
/t/ DOYLE O. HICKEY  
Major General, General Staff Corps  
Acting Chief of Staff

3 Incl:  
As listed

SECRET

COPY



SECRET

COPY

HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST AIR FORCES  
APO 925

14 January 1951

SUBJECT: Discussion of "Wringer" Project in Office of C/S, GHQ, FEC

## MEMO FOR RECORD

At 1230 hours, this date, I accompanied General Craigie to the office of the Chief of Staff, GHQ. On entering his office, found General Willoughby also present. It then developed that General Hickey wished to discuss the "Wringer" Project.

General Hickey first asked General Willoughby if he had seen the letter from General Vandenberg. Receiving a reply in the negative, he passed the letter over to General Willoughby to read.

Chief of Staff then stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the Air Force request for a continuation of the "Wringer" Project. He stated that it was his belief that the Air Force estimate of its importance was based upon their experience in the European Theater; that the material benefit was undoubtedly greater there, due to the greater proportion of personnel assigned to "Wringer" in that theater. He then asked how many bodies were involved in the local effort, to which I replied approximately 100.

General Willoughby then made a statement that he was not opposed to the project and never had been; that he was only succumbing to pressure brought upon him from ESS that involuntary call-ins for interrogation purposes cease.

The Chief of Staff interrupted at this point to say that there was no argument on that score, that it was apparently agreed by all that further involuntary call-ins would and should cease. The Chief of Staff then inquired as to the method of selecting interrogees. I explained that usually they were first interrogated by G-2 and that the information so obtained was examined to see if matter of interest to the Air Force might be developed by further interrogations.

SECRET

COPY



SECRET

COPY

Memo for Record, 14 Jan 51, Subj: "Discussion of 'Wringer' Project in Office of C/S, GHQ, FEC"

The Chief of Staff then stated that it appeared to him that this was a specialized form of research and that the Air Force should be permitted to determine, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the coverage that they desired.

General Willoughby stated, in general terms, the fact that the field has been well covered and that there was not much use in calling in a man who had been back five years to question him further.

The Chief of Staff stated that he was not prepared to say whether either quantitatively or qualitatively all information that was required had been obtained and, further, that he did not believe that General Willoughby would claim otherwise.

Relative to the question of selection of interrogees, I pointed out that it might be desirable for an Air Force representative to visit the prospective interrogee at his home or place of business to determine whether he had information of value. General Willoughby and the Chief of Staff said there would be no objection to such a procedure. General Willoughby also stated that the procedure for selection, including examination of Demobilization files, was already in effect and that free access to information concerning prospective interrogees had been and would continue to be made available to the Air Force.

General Willoughby seemed to feel that the primary Air Force interest was in airfields. On two occasions during the discussion, he referred to the fact that General Cabell had acknowledged to him the value of the airfield data developed by his activities. The Chief of Staff interrupted to say that he had examined some of these folders and that there was no doubt that this was true; however, that the "Wringer" Project was essentially pointed towards a target selection program and evidence which he had looked over indicated that the information so obtained had helped to relocate some of the targets selected. General Willoughby made the point that he had an interest in the Air Force interrogations because they covered much more than airfields. He said they included political and psychological aspects, etc.

A this point, I asked a direct quest as to whether G-2 was closing out its program of call-ins. General Willoughby answered that in the interest of consistency they had to conform to the restrictions imposed on us; that he did not have the money for call-ins on any scale but would continue voluntary call-ins to a limited extent. I then raised the point that in view of our paramount interest, it might be well if the Air Force assumed responsibility for housing, feeding, etc. General Willoughby said

SECRET<sup>2</sup>

COPY



SECRET

COPY

Memo for Record, 14 Jan 51, Subj: "Discussion of 'Wringer' Project in Office of C/S, GHQ, FEC"

he had a continuing interest in the field and the legally constituted responsibility therefor. He pointed out that their research and interpreter program was continuing and that they were supplying interrogators to Korea. Further, that he was in a position to continue to provide this service now rendered. The Japanese Demobilization Bureau provided overnight housing and, in special cases, interrogees were housed in the NYK Building. They were also provided lunches and occasional gifts, both of which had a favorable psychological effect.

General Willoughby pointed out that "Wringer" was a newcomer into a field that had been war-tested and had been in operation since 1942, and was a continuing responsibility of his. I then pointed out that I had raised the question concerning housing and other services now provided "Wringer" inasmuch as during his illness we had been served notice to give up 1/3 of the "Wringer" space. General Willoughby said that this was an unauthorized action not approved by him and that they would continue to provide the service now rendered.

The sense of the meeting was that:

- a. "Wringer" would continue as at present.
- b. Call-ins would hereafter be on a voluntary basis, and paid for from Air Force funds.
- c. G-2 would continue to provide the services presently rendered.
- d. The Air Force would have freedom of selection of interrogees.
- e. The details of implementation would be worked out between G-2 and D/I.

The Chief of Staff closed the meeting by stating that we appeared to be in agreement on all essential points and that he would so advise General Stratemeyer by indorsement to his letter. General Craigie commented that this would please General Stratemeyer greatly. The meeting was adjourned at 1255 hours.

CHARLES Y. BANFILL  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy for Intelligence

SECRET

COPY



SECRET

COPY

# G-2, GHQ

## INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

ATIS-Geo Br Jap Repat  
Interrogations

File No:

Subject:

Date: 11 Jul 51

FROM: MIS Div

TO: G2

PHONE: 36-7489

NAME: Col Stark

Comment  
Number

1

## 1. References:

- a. IOM series CAW 2258, Oct 50, wherein G2 notified interested agencies of Gen MacArthur's directive terminating call-ins of Japanese repatriates after 31 Dec 50.
- b. IOM series CAW 2495, Dec 50 - Feb 51 (16 comments), which states that repatriates called in for TIS and Town Plan Sec, Geo Br, will be under the guise of CIC call-ins, and cost borne by allocated TOW funds.
- c. Memo Gen Stratmeyer to Gen MacArthur, 4 Jan 51, which referred to Gen Vandenberg's letter to CinC (subject "Wringer") and recommended call-in of repatriates on 100% voluntary basis and cost paid from AF funds.
- d. Memo Gen Hickey, CofS, to Gen Stratmeyer, 14 Jan 51, which approved recommendations reference memo, sub par c, supra.
- e. Gen Banfill's Memo for Record of meeting, 14 Jan 51, between Gens Hickey, Willoughby, Craigie, and Banfill to discuss Gen Stratmeyer's memo to Gen MacArthur (reference sub-par c, supra) which resulted in approval referred to in sub-par d, supra.

2. Reference actions par 1 a thru e, above, obligated USAF (FRAF) Project "Wringer," and G2, to underwrite their complete programs for interrogation of Japanese Repatriates from appropriated funds. It is assumed FRAF is so doing. However, G2 estimate for TOW allocation for JFY 1951 (¥30,000,000) which was approved, included cost of estimated Japanese Repatriate call-ins for TIS and Geo Br, and is being utilized for that purpose.

3. CinC directive regarding repatriate call-ins does not effect normal counter-intelligence, and other occupational requirements, which are fully justified under TOW allocations.

4. Following are the estimated repatriate call-ins for remainder of JFY 1951 for TIS and Geo Br, T/Intel with estimated cost:

|                | <u>Est Call-ins</u> | <u>Cost approx ¥10,000 ea</u> |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIS - T/ Intel | 180                 | ¥ 1,800,000                   |
| Geo Br         | <u>1,125</u>        | <u>¥11,250,000</u>            |
|                | 1,305               | <u>¥13,050,000</u>            |

This will average approx \$4,055.55 per month, ¥3,296,111 has already been obligated for this type call-in since 1 Apr 51.

5. In the interest of maintaining consistency within the spirit of established policy and to avoid disruption of the established funding program and procedures for appropriated and TOW funds for the USFY 1952 and JFY 1951, it is recommended:

- a. That the Japanese government, upon termination of expenditures of TOW funds (presumably after the signing or ratification of peace treaty) or at the end of JFY 1951 (31 Mar 52) whichever is sooner, be reimbursed from confidential funds for the cost of call-ins of Japanese repatriates for TIS and Geo Br, since 1 Apr 51, for interrogations which were clearly a

SECRET

COPY



SECRET

COPY

# G-2, GHQ INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

ATIS-Geo Br Jap Repat

**File No:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Subject:** Interrogations **Date:** 11 Jul 51

**FROM:** MIS Div

**TO:** G2

**PHONE:**  
**NAME:**

**Comment**  
**Number**

continuation of the TIS Interrogation Center Japanese repatriation interrogation program started in 1946.

b. That action be initiated to obtain the necessary funds for this reimbursement earliest. Approximate total cost until end of JFY 1951, for estimated call-ins involved, is \$45,000.

6. Action will be initiated soonest in an effort to insure the non-interruption of the overall G2 interrogation program upon signing (or ratification) of a peace treaty which would terminate TOW funds, or at the end of JFY 1951 (31 Mar 52, whichever occurs first).

1

-----T.N.S.-----

SECRET

COPY

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

200cm  
SEKISUI JUSHI  
JISA  
①⑤  
1級



~~Handwritten signature~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

18 February 1951

SUBJECT: WRINGER Space Problem

1. G2 (CAR Div, Col Palmer) visited G-2 at 1045, stated that G4 would favor FEAF request for permission to rent office space outside NYK for WRINGER; that the paper would go to G1 Monday for concurrence; that G1 had to concur on office space.

2. G1 (Space Control, Col Kirby) visited G2 at 1100. Col Stark informed him that we needed the space; that FEAF WRINGER wanted to get out, and that we wanted them out now; that there was no time for a long, drawn-out space war. G2 gave Col Kirby pertinent data on increased strength of PsyWar, JSO and TIS now in NYK, and showed him large floor plans of NYK with itemized floor space and personnel, broken down by rooms, thereon; these were correct as of the time WRINGER move into the NYK was first proposed, when the Bus Terminal fight occurred. G2 told Col Kirby that, in view of probable space survey incident to FEAF WRINGER request for space, we were preparing a complete up-to-date, item-by-item justification of G2 space in the NYK; that this would consume many man-hours and would be expensive, but that we had to be prepared.

3. Col Kirby stated that his office was already overloaded with paper work, and that he hoped to avoid the space fight. He said that he would get the FEAF paper from G4 as soon as possible - today, Sunday, if he could - and make every effort to get concurrence; that he would keep G2 informed.

4. If this paper gets G1 concurrence, FEAF WRINGER will move and there will be no need for G2 to submit request to G1 or CofS to get them out. Meanwhile, work on space justification is continuing, in case we have to submit the request.

WMI  
28-8168

Col Patterson  
Matthewson

23 RB

358.09

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



**SECRET**  
**G-2, GHQ**

**INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM**

(For use within G-2 only)

USAF Effort to Continue  
"Wringer" Repat Inter-  
rogation Program

JHP/2568/01615/rep  
Date: 14 January 1951

File No:

Subject:

FROM: G-2 Exec

TO: MIS Div - ACTION

PHONE:  
NAME:

Comment  
Number


1. At a meeting in the Chief of Staff's office at 1230, 14 January, in which the CofS, Gen Willoughby, Gen Craigie and Gen Banfill participated, it was decided that FEAF would continue call-in of Japanese repatriates under project "Wringer," but all such call-ins will be financed by FEAF funds.
2. Gen Willoughby indicated to me that G-2 would continue call-ins for essential projects such as town plans, CIC interrogations, etc., to be financed with intelligence funds or U.S. funds furnished by the Comptroller. It is emphasized that this project will no longer be supported by the Japanese budget.
3. It is desired to inform the CofS of our position as regards "Wringer" and to emphasize the tremendous amount of valuable material we have furnished FEAF in the past. With this aim in view, please revise Tab 1 into a draft memorandum to the CofS and add appropriate inclosures which will indicate the extent of our contribution to air intelligence by both ATIS and the Geog Section. Geog Section should assist in this project.
4. As Tab 1 runs some six pages and will probably have additional information appended, it is desired that Tab 1 include a covering 1 page brief of the memorandum.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

11 Incls: *57*  
n/c

- Capt Barkovich - FU
- Geog Sec - Info
- T/Int - Info
- G-2 Admin - Info
- Exec Gp - Circulate
- CAW

*J.H.P.*



ACTION  
SUSPENSE: 16 Jan 51

Exec Gp - Circulate

23

350.09

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813562

By W NARA Date 1/23/12

