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Government  
and Politics

# Malagasy Republic

August 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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
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# Malagasy Republic

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# Government and Politics

## A. Introduction (C)

Throughout the decade of the 1960's Madagascar stood in marked contrast to most other newly independent countries in that its political life was characterized by continuity and a close, harmonious relationship with the former metropole, France. During the first part of his tenure, which began 2 years before the country became independent in June 1960, the patriarchal Philibert Tsiranana was a genuinely popular and politically adroit leader. Although he steadily increased his own power, he permitted an opposition party and a considerable degree of press freedom. He unabashedly favored a continuing role for France in many facets of Malagasy life, including the armed forces and security organizations, the government administration, and the educational system. Private French firms dominated the relatively small modern sector of the economy, while most Malagasy remained part of a stagnant traditional economy.

Insular, proud, and aloof, the Malagasy people had not always been orderly and uncomplaining in the face of domination by alien forces, even those indigenous to the island. The political consolidation of much of the island in the 18th century by people of the central plateau was fiercely resisted. Toward the end of the 19th century France mounted prolonged and difficult military operations to subdue the outlying tribes. Malagasy nationalists were arrested and imprisoned during World War I, and in 1947 an uprising in widely separate parts of the island was quelled only after considerable bloodshed and prolonged military countermeasures.


Toward the end of his rule, the ailing and increasingly erratic President Tsiranana held the Malagasy Republic on its pro-French course even though signs of profound dissatisfaction mounted. As his political skill waned, he relied more and more on repressive measures. A budgetary crisis in 1969 made austerity measures necessary, and anti-Tsiranana leaflets appeared in the capital. In April 1971 peasants in one of the most impoverished, neglected parts of the

country attacked government posts with primitive weapons and were ruthlessly suppressed.

The character and policies of the government changed with lightning swiftness in May 1972. Tsiranana's ineptitude had permitted a student strike to escalate into a violent confrontation with riot police on 13 May. Late on the evening of 12 May, security forces raided the University of Madagascar and arrested 375 students, who were immediately flown out of the capital. By the morning of 13 May, enraged parents and students were on the streets. After a violent confrontation with the Republican Security Force (FRS) which resulted in over 40 deaths and numerous injuries (Figure 1), Tsiranana made an incoherent speech on national television in which he threatened to kill as many thousands of people as necessary to restore order. Workers and other inhabitants of the capital backed the students with a massive strike which was tolerated by the army and gendarmerie, who openly sympathized with the self-disciplined strikers (Figure 2).

France's announcement on 17 May that its troops, stationed on the island under a defense accord, would not intervene appears to have removed the final obstacle to the strikers' demand that the army oust Tsiranana and assume power temporarily on a caretaker basis. Instead, Maj. Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa, a respected career soldier who had remained aloof from politics, worked out a compromise which permitted Tsiranana to remain as a figurehead. At first, Ramanantsoa ruled at the sufferance of the temporary alliance of students, teachers, workers, and unemployed who had made Tsiranana's rule untenable. Ramanantsoa had skillfully dissuaded the demonstrators from again taking to the streets and in October won popular approval in a referendum to rule for 5 years without a parliament. The Office of the Presidency ceased to exist, and Tsiranana retired to the sidelines.

Ramanantsoa and his military colleagues have been providing the country with an austere and honest administration and have begun to reverse unpopular domestic and foreign policies long pursued by the Tsiranana government, but have had difficulty coping



Demonstrators fleeing after being fired on by Republican Security Force. Overturned vehicle is at top right.



Carrying a fallen comrade

FIGURE 1. Tananarive demonstrators, 13 May 1972 (U/OU)

with the country's economic problems. The sporadic labor troubles and the unruly behavior by secondary and university students which began during the spring of 1972 continued throughout much of the following year. Ramanantsoa has not been able to revive the ailing economy he inherited, largely because political uncertainty discouraged some merchants from importing goods to restock their shelves and prompted other businessmen to send money out of the country. Meat and other foods are more expensive than during most of the Tsiranana era. Although normally able to feed itself, the Malagasy Republic had to import rice in the winter of 1972/73, and labor slowdowns at the largest port, Tamatave, contributed to short supply in many towns. Also, the political decision to cut back Madagascar's extensive ties with France could have severe repercussions because the Malagasy economy has been so closely tied to the former metropole.

Another factor in the overall lackluster performance of the Ramanantsoa government has been its difficulty in placating the country's mutually suspicious and hostile ethnic elements: the better educated, more nationalistic Merina of the highlands; and the more numerous coastal (*cotier*) tribesmen, who fear their former Merina rulers. Generally, the policies favored by the Merina are opposed by the coastal tribesmen and vice versa. Ramanantsoa himself is of aristocratic Merina lineage, but he has

opposed the extreme Merina demands for an immediate and sweeping overhaul of the educational system, for evacuation by the French of their naval base at Diego-Suarez,<sup>1</sup> and for an end to all French assistance in military, economic, and educational affairs.

The government has had to back down from the limited educational changes which it took at Merina urging, as *cotier* student protests set off extensive rioting in Tamatave in December 1972. These disorders also appear to have been rooted in the coastal tribesmen's distrust of the Ramanantsoa government, partly because the political changeover the preceding May had resulted in the replacement of *cottiers* and French in the government by Merina. Even though these personnel changes largely reflected the generally better educational and technical qualifications of the Merina rather than favoritism on Ramanantsoa's part, the Merina character of the regime has made it difficult to win the confidence of the coastal population. In February 1973 rioting erupted in several cities and towns in northern Madagascar, this time in protest partly over educational issues and partly over the possible closing

<sup>1</sup>For diacritics on place names, see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.





FIGURE 2. Gendarmes talking with demonstrators. Mutual sympathy existed between the gendarmes and the demonstrators. (U/OU)

of the base at Diego-Suarez. Closing the base would worsen the already bad economic situation in this city, and in the final analysis the coastal tribesmen would prefer to have French military and civilian advisers in the government rather than the hated Merina.

In December 1972 the government replied to disorders with a minimum of force, but it dealt more sternly with the February 1973 incidents. It changed the law to provide for easier detention of suspected agitators, and made the punishment for inciting a riot death. Some 40 persons were detained in connection with the February rioting, among them several prominent members of Tsiranana's party. The government publicly accused some of the French in Madagascar with fomenting intertribal rioting.

For all its good intentions, the Ramanantsoa government lacks the enthusiastic support of either the Merina or the coastal people and faces the prospect that either the radical Merina of the capital or coastal tribesmen, egged on by old-line politicians, might spark new disorders on a scale requiring a massive use of force in suppression. The efficient, disciplined gendarmerie and army could cope with any such rioting, but Ramanantsoa and most of his military colleagues probably have little stomach for ruling an openly hostile populace at gunpoint.

## B. Structure and functioning of the government (U/OU)

### 1. Background

By the end of World War II, various Malagasy nationalist leaders were demanding that Madagascar become an autonomous state within the French

Union. Paris rejected these demands but agreed to extend French citizenship to all Malagasy people and to permit them to elect representatives to the French Parliament and to consultative bodies on Madagascar. Separate constituencies were maintained for the French and the Malagasy, however, and the franchise continued to be extremely restricted for the latter. The 1956-57 reforms abolished separate French and Malagasy constituencies and established universal adult suffrage. In the referendum of 28 September 1958, Madagascar opted to approve the French constitution and to become an autonomous member of the new French Community.

While heading the autonomous government in 1959, Philibert Tsiranana pushed through a constitution that provided for a strong presidency, even though some other Malagasy politicians strongly preferred the supremacy of parliament. The 1959 constitution was modified in 1960, 1962, and 1969, with the general result that the President's powers were even further strengthened relative to parliament.

By 1972 many politically conscious Malagasy believed that the powers of the President were excessive and that Tsiranana had overstepped his authority by having regime opponents and critics arrested and imprisoned in violation of constitutional rights. Two of the most vigorous demands of the May 1972 demonstrators were for the restoration of individual liberties and the prompt establishment of a genuinely representative parliamentary system of government.

For his part General Ramanantsoa has paid close attention to legality. Shortly after taking control in May he published an ordinance that cited the constitution as one of the government's sources of authority and specified, in brief, that President Tsiranana vested in General Ramanantsoa all governmental authority as Head of Government. On 8 October 1972 a popular referendum gave overwhelming approval to a constitutional law that provides the basis for Ramanantsoa's government. This referendum asked voter approval for a law providing for a 5-year tenure for General Ramanantsoa, during which time he is to reshape the country's institutions according to a statement of principles including the separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the supremacy of the electorate, guarantees of fundamental liberties, and wider authority for local government bodies. The referendum also asked voter approval for a statement of national goals made by General Ramanantsoa in August 1972 and declared that all

parts of the 1959 constitution as amended would remain valid unless superseded by the constitutional law.

The October 1972 constitutional law set forth the national institutions for the transitional 5-year period of Ramanantsoa's mandate. These three institutions consist of the government; the High Council of Institutions, a legislative review body; and the National Popular Development Council, a purely advisory body. An ordinance of 26 December 1972 conferred on the Head of Government all the duties, powers, and prerogatives accorded the President by the constitution of 1959. This ordinance is to remain in effect until a new constitution is adopted by the people and new public institutions are established.

Figure 3 shows the various organs of government as of early 1973.

**2. National government**

**a. Executive**

The October 1972 constitutional law accords Maj. Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa full powers for 5 years as Head of Government. The law also provides that the Head of Government may designate a person to take his place in case of *empêchement* (a French term which appears in this context to mean disability) before the end of the 5-year period of tenure. The law further says that this *empêchement* will be the subject of prior inquiry by the High Council of Institutions.




FIGURE 3. Structure of government, 1972 (U/OU)

These vaguely worded provisions appear to be a partial solution to the problem of succession in the event Ramanantsoa is unable to carry out his functions as Head of Government.

The executive consists of the Head of Government and the Council of Ministers, which in early 1973 consisted of the following portfolios: Agriculture; National Education and Cultural Affairs; Development of the Territory; Finance and Economy; Foreign Affairs; Information; Interior; Justice; Labor and Civil Service; National Defense and Armed Forces; Planning; and Social Affairs.<sup>2</sup>

The government tightened up the executive in various ways. The new Council of Ministers was one-third the size of its predecessor, and the top professional staff of each ministry was reduced. The organization and responsibilities of each ministry were summarized in decrees published in the Official Journal, and inspection and fiscal accountability procedures were strengthened. Salaries of government officials were reduced, from a 25% cut for top officials to a token 1% for persons at the bottom of the professional ladder, and economies were made by reducing the number of official autos. Some foreign advisers were replaced by Malagasy.

The Ramanantsoa government resembled its predecessor in at least one respect, however, in that the Interior Ministry (Figure 4) continued to have extremely broad responsibilities, including some which would appear to fit more logically under other ministries. In addition to the more usual responsibilities for provincial and local government and for internal security, the Ministry of Interior was also responsible for "grassroots" programs. These wide-ranging programs were begun in the early 1960's when the Interior Ministry was headed by the energetic and politically adept Andre Resampa. In 1972 "grassroots" programs included such diverse activities as maintaining livestock immunization facilities, beehives, village drinking water supplies, tree nurseries, reforestation projects, irrigation facilities, roads, and ferries.

The High Council of Institutions (CSI), a legislative review body established by the 1959 constitution, was administratively part of the presidency under Tsiranana and has been continued with functions and personnel intact by the Ramanantsoa government. The CSI consists of five persons named for nonrenewable 7-year terms. The terms of all present

<sup>2</sup>For a current list of key government officials consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.




FIGURE 4. Ministry of Interior building (U/OU)

CSI members expire in 1974. At least three of the five members are selected on the basis of legal competence. The CSI is responsible for reviewing all legislation to insure that it is compatible with the constitution, for supervising the conduct of referendums, and—prior to 1972—for monitoring presidential and legislative elections. In this latter capacity the CSI disqualified an entire provincial slate of opposition National Assembly candidates in 1965 because one of the candidates did not pay his poll tax. During the campaign for the October 1972 referendum, however, Andre Resampa commented that his own arrest as well as the imprisonment of hundreds of other persons by Tsiranana had been contrary to the safeguards of the constitution and that the CSI had not served in these instances as a safeguard for constitutional rights.

#### b. Legislature

Until 1972, parliament consisted of a National Assembly with 107 members and a Senate with 54. Members of the National Assembly were popularly elected for 5-year terms. Two-thirds of the Senators were elected for 6-year terms by provincial, municipal, and rural authorities, and one-third were selected by the President to represent chambers of commerce, labor unions, cultural organizations, and such. The constitution provided that parliament meet semiannually and that its principal business be consideration of the annual budget.

Although in practice parliament's powers were increasingly overshadowed by those of President Tsiranana, the constitution declared that parliament was the major arbiter of such matters as civil rights, national defense, organization of the judiciary, labor, education, and the organization of elections. The constitution also gave the Senate powers to delay legislation. The newly elected Senate took this

deliberative role seriously, but in 1961 Tsiranana rammed through a constitutional amendment which made it powerless.

The National Assembly played a limited role. Almost all seats were held by Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party (PSD), and a large part of the opposition was left without any legislative voice. Had the National Assembly been selected by a more equitable system, the PSD would probably still have received more than a simple majority but several smaller *cotier* parties and the Merina-based Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar (AKFM) would together have won a considerable number of seats. As it turned out, the Marxist AKFM was the only opposition party represented in the National Assembly, and the large PSD delegation rarely differed with Tsiranana.

In June 1972 Ramanantsoa issued a decree suspending the constitutional provision that parliament meet semiannually. The October 1972 constitutional law further provided that the Ramanantsoa government was to legislate by ordinance during its 5-year tenure. The law made no mention of parliament but provided for a National Popular Development Council (CNPD), a consultative body.

During the referendum campaign Tsiranana deplored the proposal for 5 years of military rule without an elected parliament, but the referendum was approved by an overwhelming majority. The main issue of the referendum was the choice between Tsiranana and Ramanantsoa, but the results appear also to reflect a lack of popular regard for the former parliament.

The government's plans for the CNPD, were set forth in a decree in March 1973. The council's competence includes responding to requests by the government for advice on particular social and economic questions and making policy proposals on its own initiative. The council's tenure is the duration of the period General Ramanantsoa has authority to rule by decree, or in other words no later than the autumn of 1977.

The election of councilors is to be based on the new local government units, due to be established in September 1973. The CNPD will consist of 162 councilors, 144 of whom will be elected and the other 18 nominated by the government. Ninety-two seats out of the elected 162 will be reserved for the rural constituencies. Although this does not assure fully proportional representation for the rural population, it does guarantee that there will be a solid rural bloc which can be expected to take a generally more

conservative view of proposed economic and social changes than the representatives of urban centers and the technocrats who will probably constitute the government's appointees to the CNPD. Councilors will not be paid a salary for their services but will draw the equivalent of about US\$15 per diem.

### c. Judiciary

Although the 1959 constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary, it did not define either the framework of the judicial system or the specific guidelines under which the courts should operate. The judicial system is patterned on that of France. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in certain matters and consists of three parts: the Court of Cassation, the Administrative Chamber, and the Chamber of Accounts. When a lower court has made a serious mistake in law the Court of Cassation may annul the sentence but cannot modify it. Individuals and civil servants may bring action against the government in the Administrative Chamber. The Chamber of Accounts annually examines all public expenditures to insure that they have been properly made.

Below the Supreme Court is the Court of Appeal, which reviews decisions of lower courts in both criminal and civil cases. At the next lower level are criminal courts, dealing with crimes punishable by more than 10 years' imprisonment. Lesser criminal cases are heard by Courts of First Instance, which are similar to American grand juries but also have jurisdiction over certain civil cases, land registration, and labor disputes. Each Court of First Instance consists of an examining magistrate (*juge d'instruction*), who may either dismiss charges against a person or send him to trial, a prosecuting attorney (*procureur*), and a president. There is a Court of First Instance in each of the six provinces.

Lower still are 25 section tribunals, found in the chief towns of each province. Section tribunals are organized like the Courts of First Instance and dispose of cases either by dismissing them, by disposing of them if they are uncomplicated, or by passing them up to the Court of First Instance if they are deemed sufficiently serious to require a hearing. At the lowest level are subprefect courts, which handle criminal cases punishable by fines of about US\$90 or a month's imprisonment. Subprefects do not ordinarily have legal training.

The Malagasy people have had long experience with a formal legal system. In the early 1800's the Merina monarchs began bringing together existing customs and usages in the royal chronicles. The Code

of 305 Articles of May 1881 classified the principles of law, arranged them in order, and published them. This code provided that established customs of the diverse people ruled by Merina monarchs had the same force as written law. The several Merina law codes reflected the influence of continental Europe, but the Merina were also influenced by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and especially the important contribution of judicial decisions to the development of the law.

French courts were established in 1896, and for most of the colonial period there was a dual system. Frenchmen and certain educated Malagasy were judged in French tribunals under French law, but the great majority of Malagasy were judged in native courts under Merina law. In 1919 native courts began to apply French law in cases where Malagasy law was insufficient.

A vast judicial reform begun in the early 1960's was still underway in 1973. Accomplishments to that point included the promulgation of three new codes—a criminal code, a criminal procedures code, and a civil procedures code. A civil code was still in process, based on an extensive and systematic inquiry into Malagasy customs. A linguistic commission was also at work preparing a compendium of legal terms in the Malagasy language.

### 3. Provincial and local government

At different times in their history the Malagasy have developed nearly autonomous mechanisms of local government, particularly at the village and tribal level. During the Tsiranana era, however, the central government steadily increased its power at the expense of local and regional authorities.

The powers allowed the provincial and local government authorities by the 1959 constitution were extremely limited. Each of the provinces had an elected general council that functioned as a provincial assembly but had few significant powers. These legislative assemblies had theoretical competence to make decisions regarding primary education, health and welfare programs, and public works, but in fact they had little or no control over the funds necessary to finance even these basic social services. The role of the general councils was further diminished by the fact that all National Assembly deputies and senators were automatically members of their respective provincial assemblies and were generally quite susceptible to pressures from the central authority.

During the 1960's, Interior Minister Andre Resampa developed a system of cooperatives for economic development and produce marketing which paralleled

and tended to dominate local government units. The central government controlled the funds of these cooperatives and thus tightly dominated them.

The Ramanantsoa government replaced the six civilian provincial executives with military officers, who in most cases had already been serving in the provinces and simply combined their military and their new civilian roles. During the first year after they assumed their duties as provincial executives, the performance of these officers in their civilian jobs was better than that of the provincial executives they supplanted. Each traveled extensively over his province and appeared well versed on the province's economy.

The October 1972 constitutional law pledges the government to provide the Malagasy people with a revamped system of local government suited to their needs and traditions. In March 1973 a decree described the new plans for local government units which are to be established—beginning with the lowest level—over a period of about a year. In the interim, parts of the old and new structure will exist side by side.

In 1973 the older units of government consisted of 17 prefectures subdivided into 91 subprefectures. Below these were 36 urban communes, with a considerable degree of authority, and in rural areas either rural communes or cantons, together numbering several hundred and having lesser authority.

The rural government units, the communes and cantons, have sometimes been ineffectual and corrupt. In Tananarive and a few of the larger cities, in contrast, opponents of Tsiranana were strong enough to elect a majority or a sizable minority of the council, and the presence of articulate opposition members tended to improve the efficiency and representative character of these urban communes.

The Ramanantsoa government bases its plan for the new government units below the provincial government level on the *fokonolona*. Rooted in Malagasy history, the *fokonolona* had emerged as a loose system of local government comprising all the elders of a village. The *fokonolona* varied from region to region, but most had headmen, who were usually assisted by a council of elders. At different times powerful Merina rulers or colonial governors had tried to manipulate or control the *fokonolona* but had never succeeded in fully dominating this traditional governing mechanism, largely because it is closely tied to the Malagasy people's strong religious attachment to, and worship of, common ancestors. Tsiranana attempted to supplant the *fokonolona* or to absorb it in modern governmental units, but at the end of his

tenure it continued to exist throughout the island in a diminished or modified form.

According to an ordinance of March 1973 the new *fokonolona* is the basic community unit, which is authentically Malagasy and thus suited to the country. The *fokonolona* gathers together the people of a *fokontany*, or area, which might consist of a village or group of villages. Several neighboring *fokonolona* are to be grouped into *firaisampokonolona*, which are to supplant the existing rural communes or cantons by the autumn of 1973. An official of the Ministry of Interior is to work closely with the *firaisampokonolona*. Higher administrative units, called *fi vondronampokonolona* and *faritany*, are planned to be established in late 1973 and early 1974, respectively.

**4. Civil service**

The Malagasy Republic has a modern civil service system, including tables of organization, personnel grades, and uniform salaries and benefits. There are competitive examinations for appointment and a rating system for advancement. In October 1972 the Ramanantsoa government moved to revamp the civil service by requiring all civil servants to retire at age 55. This had been the retirement age previously, but civil servants with minor children had been allowed to stay on. It would appear that many of the persons being forced to retire got their jobs in the years just after independence, when a large-scale replacement of French with Malagasy took place. Some of these individuals were probably less qualified than recent university graduates who have been unable to find government jobs.

One widespread problem affecting the operation of the entire governmental apparatus is the attitude of the civil servants and the political elite, who consider themselves superior to the rank and file of the population. The civil servants expect to receive above-average wages with numerous fringe benefits, but for the most part they have no compulsion to work hard. Rather, they are interested in comfortable posts, mainly in Tananarive, where they can enjoy their privileged positions.

The division of the society between the Merina and the coastal population is also a serious impediment to the effectiveness of the civil service. Because only a limited number of *cottiers* are sufficiently trained to fill the higher level positions, the bulk of the government employees are still Merina.

**C. Political dynamics**

**1. Political forces (Ü/OU)**

Of the factors which shape Malagasy politics, the dominant one is clearly the longstanding antagonism and distrust between the Merina, the largest single ethnic minority, and the various coastal peoples who together comprise over two-thirds of the population. With the replacement of Tsiranana by Ramanantsoa in the spring of 1972, the political leadership of the country changed from predominantly *cotier* to predominantly Merina. Despite their differing bases of support, both Tsiranana and Ramanantsoa have tried to alleviate ethnically based fears and antagonisms. Indeed, the gradualness with which Ramanantsoa moved Tsiranana off the political stage and his insistence that Tsiranana be treated with respect were prompted by his desire to reassure the *cottiers*.

The division of the Malagasy into two primary sectors dates back to the latter part of the 18th century, when an unusually strong Merina king began systematic raids against neighboring tribes in order to extend his plateau kingdom to the sea. Subsequent Merina rulers continued to expand their empire, subjugating roughly two-thirds of the island's population before the French conquered Madagascar in 1895. During the peak of their military prowess, the Merina gained significant cultural and economic advantages through their early exposure to modern education, Christianity, and new forms of trade and commerce. These advantages bolstered the privileged position the Merina had carved out for themselves and tended to solidify the sharp distinctions between the rulers and the ruled.

Competition between British and French colonizers also played an important role in the crystallization of the Merina and coastal communities that now form the principal political bases in the country. The British, who arrived before the French, looked upon the Merina political dominance as an acceptable mechanism of control over the island, and accordingly provided the ruling group with military training and exclusive opportunities for trade and commerce. Protestant missionaries, who were among the early British arrivals, proselytized actively among the Merina but deliberately ignored the coastal tribes. Likewise, the British missionaries provided modern schools and education for the Merina alone. In contrast to the important advances of the Merina, the coastal peoples did not have much contact with external influences until the arrival in the mid-1800's of a small group of French Jesuit missionaries. These

French missionaries worked principally among the *cotiers*, but they did not provide the same educational and economic advantages that the British had brought to the Merina. Thus the differentiation between the two communities grew steadily, and even with the advent of direct French political control in 1895, the coastal tribes, although comprising a majority of the people, remained essentially subordinate to the Merina minority.

The *cotiers* did not acquire political control until shortly before independence. Convinced that the Merina had instigated the bloody 1947 insurrection, the French decided to give their support to the *cotiers*, and this, coupled with national elections based on universal suffrage, provided the latter with their eagerly sought opportunity to take over the reins of government. Once in control, the *cotier* leaders under President Tsiranana took a number of steps aimed at insuring their permanent possession of power, including manipulation of the electoral system.

More Westernized and better educated, the Merina had a higher proportion of persons qualified to fill government jobs, but if no suitable *cotier* was available, the Tsiranana regime often preferred Frenchmen to Merina. Ramanantsoa's shakeup of the government has resulted in the departure of a number of *cotiers* and French and their replacement to a large extent by Merina. Ramanantsoa has attempted to strike a tribal balance within the government, and *cotier* ministers outnumber Merina, but the key ministries—with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Ministry—are held by Merina, and most of the general's personal advisers are Merina. Although these changes have probably been made primarily on the basis of competence, the addition of Merina to the government machinery has aroused *cotier* fears and suspicions.

Merina and *cotiers* themselves, however, are far from unified. The Merina among the leaders of the present government, for example, tend to be conscious of class and caste differences that are rooted in the past. Some officers are from aristocratic families, others of peasant background, and still others of intermediate status. Furthermore, the Malagasy intelligentsia consists mostly of urbanized, Westernized Merina who have little in common with today's Merina peasants. Among the *cotiers*, primary loyalty is to family, clan, and tribe, and generally poor transportation and communications facilities and the unevenness of economic development have fostered a sense of regional particularism.

## 2. The military (C)

The leaders of the Malagasy armed forces are predominantly Merina and until May 1972 had concerned themselves primarily with their jobs and kept aloof from politics. As was the case in Malagasy society as a whole, the military who were of Merina background tended to be better educated and more Westernized than the coastal peoples and predominated in the upper military ranks. The Merina aristocracy had a military tradition, and Merina tended to volunteer for the French forces. When the Malagasy Army was formed at independence, it had a cadre of personnel who had proved themselves in the French Army, and the close cooperation envisaged by the Malagasy-French accords provided opportunities for Malagasy officers to increase their military skills and to maintain high professional standards.

Tsiranana, aware of the political potential of the army, established several security organizations and balanced each against the other. He formed new organizations led and manned predominantly by *cotiers* and gave the lion's share of the security budget each year to these rivals of the armed forces. These security organizations—the gendarmerie and the now discredited Republican Security Force—together were larger than the army and were better equipped.

The armed forces and gendarmerie had French advisers in key positions, and Tsiranana relied on these officers to keep an eye on the organizations they were attached to and to report any political activity to him via his top French military advisers. Tsiranana also probably felt that the security forces would be deterred from assuming a political role by the possibility that the regular French contingent, consisting of about 2,000 troops, would come to his aid in the event of a challenge to his rule.

General Ramanantsoa has brought the armed forces and internal security organizations under his close control. Potential differences within the officer corps between those of Merina and those of *cotier* background may be offset by professionalism, discipline, and the increased prestige and importance of the corps. A precedent for cooperation was established during the May 1972 disorders when both the *cotier*-led gendarmerie and the predominantly Merina army officers refused to order strong action against demonstrators.

General Ramanantsoa and his top colleagues (Figure 5) appear to have assumed their political roles pretty much as a civic duty. Nonetheless, they have quickly become accustomed to the deference shown political figures and the sense of importance and



Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa, Head of Government (C)



Minister of Interior Richard Ratsimandrava (C)



Foreign Affairs Minister Didier Ratsiraka (U/OU)

FIGURE 5. The military leaders

stimulation in those new roles. Newspaper photos of General Ramanantsoa in the early summer show him to be stiff and unsmiling, while during the October referendum campaign he had the broad smile and expansive gestures of the political campaigner. Didier Ratsiraka, formerly a deskbound lieutenant commander in a navy with little operational capability, has unexpectedly become Foreign Affairs Minister. During his first year in this prestigious office he has visited several African capitals as well as Moscow, Peking, Pyongyang, Bucharest, and Paris. He has met several times with top French Government officials—on occasion treating them tactlessly and disdainfully. Ratsiraka makes the headlines in the Malagasy press and draws good crowds upon his arrivals and departures from Madagascar.

### 3. Civilian political factors (C)

When Tsiranana began his tenure in 1958, his Social Democratic Party was the leading party, and it became even more powerful after independence in 1960. Opposition parties were able to win few elective offices, and from the late 1960's on they were subject to stern, repressive measures. Students, workers, and intellectuals also tended to be disorganized and easily intimidated by government pressure. Arbitrary arrests of opponents characterized the later years of the Tsiranana regime and added to popular discontent.



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The government's harsh repression of the May 1972 student demonstrations shocked the disparate opposition groups into at least temporary cohesion and militancy, with the eventual result being the ouster of Tsiranana and his followers from power by the army (Figure 6).

*a. Joint Struggle Committee*

After the sudden collapse of the Tsiranana regime, parliament and most old-line politicians were discredited, and the rest were still in prison. The resulting political vacuum was filled by an impromptu, loosely structured organization called the Joint Struggle Committee (KIM). Made up of students, teachers, blue and white collar workers, and the urban unemployed, it aspired to reform all aspects of Malagasy life. In the political discussions which took place in Tananarive and to a lesser extent in other cities in the ensuing months, the workers' component of KIM aired grievances and considered political action to further the workers' interests. The workers were militant, radical, and anxious for a further test of strength with the government.

Youthful unemployed persons from the slums of Tananarive also took part in the May demonstrations and, like the workers, continued to hold political meetings and became a distinctive part of the KIM organization. The unemployed young persons referred to their component of KIM as ZOAM, an acronym derived from the Malagasy words for unemployed Malagasy youth. The seminars of the youthful unemployed, which took place in other cities as well as Tananarive, increased the political consciousness of the participants. Like the other KIM components, the unemployed youth prepared manifestoes, apparently drafted by worker or student components of KIM, which voiced the grievances of the unemployed slum dwellers. Among other things, the youth maintained that the sorry condition of uneducated, untrained jobless persons was part of the neocolonial French conspiracy to keep all Malagasy in subjection.

Student organizations in the Tsiranana era had tended to be adjuncts of political organizations and to be ineffectual and easily overawed and neutralized by the police. A strike of university and secondary students in Tananarive in the spring of 1971 had limited effectiveness, as the students were cowed by stern government countermeasures, including the arrest of their leaders.

In May 1972, however, the deaths of several of their fellows steeled the students to effective and unified action (Figure 7). Exhilarated by their unexpected success in precipitating the fall of Tsiranana, the

students engaged in extended seminars as part of KIM, focusing their demands on reform of the whole educational system.

Once the tempo of demonstrations began to accelerate in the spring of 1972, it was clear that they would not stop until some alternative to Tsiranana had been found, and during his first weeks in office General Ramanantsoa ruled at KIM's sufferance. The general avoided provoking KIM into sparking renewed demonstrations, and gradually he undercut the militants by promising to adopt many of the reforms they were demanding. Apparently he considered that KIM was unable to provide any alternative to his leadership and would exhaust itself in debating and manifesto writing.

From June to September 1972 KIM members maintained a strong sense of purpose, even though their internal deliberations verged on anarchy. After years of intimidation and repression by the government, the students and other KIM members luxuriated in endless discussions, and the mystique developed that from discussions at the lowest level of KIM would come solutions to all of the country's problems.

The practice of rotating membership in the KIM higher committees appears to have been adopted as a defense against a possible government arrest of the KIM leadership. The students had suffered from arrests of student leaders at Tsiranana's hands and wanted to be on the safe side should the Ramanantsoa government also take repressive measures against them. At various KIM meetings over the summer some participants also tended to adopt a defensive attitude toward persons associated with existing political organizations, and contended that KIM's objective of reforming Malagasy society would best be served by remaining aloof from the discredited preexisting political parties, labor unions, and the like.

KIM's loose structure was topped by a large committee consisting of representatives of students, workers, teachers, and the unemployed which met at frequent intervals in Tananarive. The membership of the top committee changed frequently, and there was no permanent executive. After meetings started in the capital, KIM extended its activities to all parts of the country, generally maintaining its division into student, worker, teacher, and unemployed segments, with each holding separate meetings. In some provinces KIM encouraged the peasants to hold their own political meetings.

Chance played a large part in how KIM was structured. Once it was clear that Tsiranana would be shorn of power, the Ramanantsoa government



Demonstrators in Tananarive, May



An organized KIM meeting in a rural area in October

FIGURE 6. Political gatherings. Literally thousands of these took place in Tananarive and in various parts of Madagascar from May through October 1972. (U/OU)



**FIGURE 7.** Enraged students set fire to a police vehicle. This occurred sometime prior to the mass bloodshed which occurred on 13 May. Later, when all of Tananarive turned out to protest the killings, the demonstrators were impressively disciplined. (U/OU)

encouraged the various elements among the demonstrators to keep off the streets of the capital, making space available to them in schools which had been closed by the disorders. Secondary and university students began meeting at the University of Madagascar, and university professors and lecturers sometimes joined them. Workers—blue and white collar—met at the Ampefiloha secondary school complex in the capital. Elementary and secondary school teachers were also provided space for meetings at Ampefiloha. ZOAM youths also held meetings throughout the summer.

After several postponements KIM held a 2-week national congress in Tananarive in September attended by over 10,000 delegates from all parts of the country. As KIM had little talent for administration, it willingly let the government assist with the formidable tasks associated with such a large undertaking. Meetings were usually held in school facilities, with plenary sessions in a stadium. The government assisted by providing transportation, tents, and field kitchens, and, according to the press, on one day the government supplied over 3 tons of mimeograph paper. High government officials attended the opening plenary session of the congress, and paid tribute to the motives and accomplishments of the May demonstrators.

The major elements of the program which emerged from the KIM national congress included elimination of French military bases and the U.S. NASA facility, repatriation of uncooperative individual foreigners, nationalization of mineral, lumber, and energy

resources, establishment of Malagasy as the only official language, and initiation of far-reaching constitutional and educational reforms.

After the national congress KIM was outmaneuvered by General Ramanantsoa and lost momentum. Nevertheless, the organization has had the lasting result of increasing the political consciousness of many segments of Malagasy society after over a decade of paternalistic, one-man rule.

Since the September 1972 national congress, KIM has held occasional meetings in Tananarive and in other cities. Such meetings have been well attended and orderly, at least through April of 1973. In March 1973, as tension mounted in the capital in the aftermath of renewed anti-Merina riots in northern Madagascar, KIM held a meeting in the presence of augmented security forces. The KIM spokesman's demand included transfer of the French-Malagasy talks to Tananarive, ejection of French Ambassador Delauney, free education for all, and abolition of all forms of imperialism and capitalism. KIM spokesman also denounced the instigators of the riots in the north and the pro-Soviet AKFM party, whose members they castigated as being representatives of the upper bourgeoisie. Later in May 1973, the government arrested several persons associated with KIM in order to prevent demonstrations on the first anniversary of Tsiranana's overthrow.

#### *b. Political parties and leaders*

Over the last quarter century the Malagasy Republic has had a large number of political parties, varying widely in character and vigor. In the mid-1940's the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal (MDRM), a cohesive Merina-led party, rallied a considerable segment of politically conscious Malagasy and led the fight for autonomy. The MDRM was blamed by the French for instigating the 1947 uprising, even though the party had emerged victorious in various electoral tests of strength and would appear to have had little to gain by extralegal activity. The French therefore suppressed the MDRM and encouraged the activities of parties formed by *cotier* politicians, including the PSD, led by Tsiranana.

Just prior to independence there were about 30 parties, many of which were little more than temporary alliances of aspiring politicians. Buoyed by French support and aided by his considerable political skill, Tsiranana won over some opposition party members and outmaneuvered the others, bringing the PSD to a position of overwhelming dominance.

For several months after the May 1972 uprising, political party activity was minimal. Leading members of the PSD avoided appearing in public for fear of violence at the hands of the student-labor demonstrators. Partly because of their antiauthority outlook, the demonstrators distrusted most existing political parties, youth organizations, and labor unions, and most of these bodies therefore derived little advantage from the PSD's collapse. Moreover, all political activity was inhibited by General Ramanantsoa's statement that he wanted the political life of the country to be "put to sleep" for a while and by the government's ban on party meetings. In the summer of 1972, however, the various political parties warily held meetings and issued political statements, and the government looked the other way. Political parties took a limited part in the campaign for the October 1972 constitutional referendum, but as the Ramanantsoa government's troubles increased in the winter of 1972/73 the leaders of the various parties became increasingly bolder in their criticisms of it. In March and April 1973 the government arrested several prominent PSD politicians for allegedly inciting disorders, and in June briefly arrested another leading *cotier* politician, Andre Resampa, on charges of corruption. The government thus moved against its most dangerous adversaries among the politicians but stopped short of a proscription of all party activity.

In early 1973 the vigorous and diverse Malagasy press reflected the existence of several established and several new political parties, but the cohesiveness and popular appeal of many of these associations were extremely difficult to gauge. New parties sprang up, and others went into limbo. The statements of principles of the various parties were couched in vague language. All identified with the cause of Malagasy nationalism, but they defined nationalism in different terms. Parties tended to be cliques centered around certain leading individuals (Figure 8) or interest groups based on regional and tribal bases.

During the winter of 1972/73 the press reported meetings in various localities of committees to support the Ramanantsoa government. None of the persons identified in these press stories as officers of this organization was a well-known individual. It is possible that these local committees may later be drawn together into a new progovernment political party.

(1) *Social Democratic Party*—By the spring of 1973, former President Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party had begun to recover from its earlier disarray. Tsiranana, who had continued to live in the

Mahazoarivo presidential residence, said in a press interview that he had solutions to the country's mounting problems and was ready to be recalled to the presidency. In February 1973 he made political trips to his home province of Majunga in the north and to southern Madagascar as well. The government was reluctant to make a martyr of Tsiranana either by ejecting him from the presidential residence or by restricting his political activity. It did, however, arrest several other prominent PSD politicians, including former cabinet minister Rene Rasidy, a close associate of Tsiranana who was also a member of Tsiranana's Tsimihety tribe, Paul Ramahavita, a leading politician from Diego-Suarez Province, and Loda Abdou Lambert (known simply as Loda), the PSD secretary general. These three were among 40 persons held for investigation in connection with the disorders which broke out in February 1973.

The PSD was founded in 1956 by Tsiranana with encouragement from the top French colonial officials and with the assistance of experienced party organizers provided by the French Socialist Party. In spite of its socialist label, however, the PSD was little concerned with ideology and had as its main purposes retaining and expanding its power and authority.

During the late 1960's PSD membership was estimated to be between 800,000 and 1,000,000. The lowest level of party organization was the section, of which there were over 3,000. Sections were grouped into federations, whose officers composed the 30-man executive committee. The PSD's top organ was the 108-man Political Bureau. As president of the PSD, Tsiranana dominated the party organization.

Even when it had the advantage of control of the national government and all but a few lower government units, however, the PSD was organizationally flaccid. The Confederation of Malagasy Workers (FMM) and the Union of Malagasy Socialist Students (UESM), the PSD's labor and youth affiliates respectively, had little genuine popular appeal.

Very little information is available concerning the organizational situation of the PSD and its affiliates in the aftermath of Tsiranana's downfall. In the summer of 1972, Tsiranana announced that the Political Bureau would be supplanted by a 12-man Provisional Political Bureau, half of whom would be members of the PSD youth organization, and that this provisional bureau would select a party secretary general from its ranks. For some reason, however, a new secretary general was not named, and party wheelhorse Loda continued in this post in early 1973.



Philibert Tsiranana



Andre Rasampa



Richard Andriamanjato

FIGURE 8. Civilian political figures (C)

The PSD appears to be strongest in Majunga and Diego-Suarez provinces, especially among Tsiranana's Tsimihety tribe. The PSD has its own newspapers, including the weekly *La Republique*, which appears in French and Malagasy.

(2) *Malagasy Socialist Union (USM)*—The USM was formed in the autumn of 1972 by Andre Resampa, one of Tsiranana's leading associates until the two had a falling-out in early 1971. Very little information is available concerning the extent of which the USM is organized and the support it enjoys. The newspaper *Basy Vava* provides Resampa and his party with a press voice.

Resampa, who is in his late forties, is a member of the Sakalava tribe and is from the west coast city of Morondava. For most of the 1960's Resampa served in the dual capacity of PSD secretary general and Minister of Interior. His political power was further enhanced by his exclusive control of an elite paramilitary organization, the Republican Security Force, which Tsiranana permitted him to recruit, organize, and control.

Resampa was the best administrator among the top figures of the Tsiranana regime and served Tsiranana loyally, though the two differed on key policy questions. For example, Resampa opposed the favored position enjoyed by France, and he did not like the

conciliatory attitude Tsiranana took toward the Merina up until the late 1960's. But from 1969 on, Tsiranana drew closer to persons from his own Tsimihety tribe and became suspicious of Resampa. In February 1971 Resampa was relegated to a minor government post, and in June of that year he was arrested and imprisoned as a subversive.

Upon his release by the Ramanantsoa government in June 1972, Resampa received extensive favorable publicity in the Malagasy press, partly because he had been a victim of Tsiranana's illegal repression of political adversaries and partly because as an effective and articulate politician he made good copy. After resigning from the PSD in June 1972 and forming the USM, Resampa visited Europe and enrolled the USM in the Socialist International, an action which made the USM rather than the PSD the Malagasy affiliate in that organization.

Resampa has been unsuccessful in his attempt to get General Ramanantsoa to form a coalition government with the USM and other parties. Ramanantsoa probably considers Resampa a particularly dangerous adversary. In April 1973 the government took steps to discredit him for allegedly engaging in corrupt activities when he held high office. In June he was arrested for fraud but released the same day because of insufficient evidence.

(3) **MONIMA**—The National Movement for the Independence of Madagascar (MONIMA) is an ultranationalist party which adamantly opposed French colonial rule and the pro-French Tsiranana regime. MONIMA bore the brunt of repression by the French and by Tsiranana and was favorably regarded by the student and labor demonstrators who overthrew the President.

MONIMA was founded in 1958 by Monja Jaona, a Protestant schoolteacher and a member of the Antandroy tribe. Jaona was an outspoken advocate of independence, with the result that he was imprisoned by the French from 1947 to 1950. He was elected mayor of Tuléar city in 1959, but was removed from this post in 1961 by the Tsiranana Ramanantsoa of alleged misconduct, and the MONIMA-controlled city council was replaced by a central government administrator. Monja Jaona reportedly visited Tanzania, Albania, and the Chinese People's Republic in 1970.

For the first decade of its existence MONIMA was a peasant party limited to parts of Tuléar Province. In 1969 it began to proselytize among the slum-dwellers of the capital and among workers on the European-owned rice plantations in the vicinity of Lac Alaotra. This same year, as opposition to the Tsiranana

government mounted while the economic situation deteriorated, some intellectuals in the Marxist AKFM party became dissatisfied with AKFM leader Andriamanjato's insistence on legal rather than violent methods and joined MONIMA. One such person was Charles Ravoajanahary, an assistant professor on the Faculty of Letters at the University of Madagascar. Ravoajanahary, who had been an AKFM member for a decade, is reported to have been the animating force behind an uprising in Tuléar Province in April 1971. After this uprising was squelched he fled to Paris to escape arrest. Granted amnesty by the Ramanantsoa government, he returned to Madagascar in the summer of 1972, at which time he was reported to be trying to persuade KIM to adopt MONIMA's radical nationalist ideology.

Another urban intellectual who joined MONIMA in 1969 was Manandafy Rakotonirina, who had been a leading AKFM theoretician. Manandafy claims to have left MONIMA for a new party, the MFM (see below), but it is possible that he is covertly still a member of MONIMA. Whether or not this is so, he continues to be a supporter and ally of Monja Jaona. Other MONIMA leaders include Andre Razafindrabe, the secretary general of the party, and Jaona Ramanandry, party youth secretary.

Monja Jaona and some 500 MONIMA members were arrested and imprisoned after the government put down the Tuléar Province uprising, which was rooted in the discontent and resentment felt by some Antandroy, Antanosy, Mahafaly, and Bara tribesmen native to this arid and neglected part of Madagascar. Peasants attacked police posts with spears and other primitive weapons. After his arrest, Jaona took credit for the uprising on MONIMA's behalf, although he had been under restriction when it broke out. Released by the Ramanantsoa government at the urging of the student-labor demonstrators, Jaona asserted that the 1971 uprising was an entirely internal Malagasy affair and that MONIMA had not received aid from either the People's Republic of China, as Tsiranana had claimed, or the United States, as AKFM leader Andriamanjato had asserted.

MONIMA held a national congress in Tuléar in July 1972, at which it set forth the party's objectives. One of these called for the earliest possible restoration of a popularly elected parliament. Other party objectives which were announced included the abrogation of supposedly unequal agreements Tsiranana made with foreign nations, the establishment of relations with all nations except the white-ruled southern African countries, and nationalization

of large agricultural enterprises, agricultural processing plants, minerals, and commercial establishments. MONIMA urged a program of service in the countryside as a prerequisite to university graduation—a program which appears to echo Peking's practices. The party further advocated a vast expansion of educational and health services for rural areas, higher prices for agricultural production, higher wages, and expanded family allowances. MONIMA has demanded that no new taxes be passed without referral to the public, but it has remained silent on the problem of how the increased services and benefits it proposes would be paid for.

In the year since his release from prison in June 1972, Monja Jaona has vigorously supported the Ramanantsoa government, the only old-line political figure to do so. During the troubled autumn and winter Jaona made several trips throughout the country and made frequent statements to the press urging reconciliation between *cottiers* and Merina and the ending of disorders. During the winter of 1972/73 there were no disorders in Tulear Province, the geographic base of Jaona's support.

Monja Jaona's advocacy of violent revolution and anarchy and his extreme antiforeign tendencies would seem to make him a logical adversary of the Ramanantsoa regime, which calls for order and an extensive, if less visible, relationship with France. Offsetting Jaona's apparent lack of compatibility with the government, however, is his greater antagonism to such *cotier* politicians as Tsiranana and his henchmen from northern Madagascar, and Resampa from the west-central part of the island. One of Monja Jaona's main concerns appears to be the development of his native southern Madagascar and a concomitant raising of the living standards there. The Ramanantsoa government is concentrating its roadbuilding and community amenities programs in this long-neglected part of the country, and it may be that this fact partly explains Jaona's support for the government.

(4) *Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar*—The Marxist AKFM, which is led by a Merina Protestant clergyman in his middle forties, Richard Andriamanjato, was the leading opposition party during the Tsiranana era. The AKFM's following is limited largely to Westernized urban dwellers in and near the capital. It long advocated radical internal programs and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China. It also has been an adamant opponent of the U.S. NASA installation on Madagascar, and in November 1972 an AKFM

spokesman argued that U.S. influence was a greater threat to Madagascar than was French influence.

AKFM leader Andriamanjato has consistently urged his supporters to pursue the party's objectives by peaceful and legal means rather than by violence. Just prior to the confrontation which toppled Tsiranana, Andriamanjato publicly advised the student demonstrators to avoid violence. But it was violence that catapulted the students into a strong political position, and the AKFM was bypassed in the crucial events following Tsiranana's overthrow in May. The student-labor demonstrators tended to distrust the AKFM because they considered it part of the old political system and a party of bourgeois intellectuals who engaged in endless ideological controversies of little interest to most ordinary Malagasy. The AKFM and its auxiliary organizations did have some influence on individual student activists, however, because of the financial support it provided them.

The AKFM was formed in 1958 as a result of the merger of several opposition parties. The party leaders deliberately chose to keep the party small—an organization of cadres that could be more easily controlled—and it has never claimed more than 20,000 members. The party's national congress, held approximately every 2 years and attended by delegates from each branch, is considered the supreme policymaking authority. In the period between these national gatherings the AKFM is directed by an 11-man Political Bureau that includes and is dominated by the party officers. On occasion the Political Bureau will call into session an intermediary body, the National Council, consisting of the Political Bureau plus two delegates from each of the six provinces. In Tananarive, the AKFM has been able to maintain partial control of the local government, despite the manipulation of elections and other pressures exerted by the national government.

The AKFM has a full panoply of militant youth, labor, peace, journalist, and other subordinate front groups: the Madagascar Press Union; the Madagascar Committee of Solidarity; the Federation of Trade Unions of Madagascar; and the Association of Democratic Youth of Madagascar. These AKFM affiliates have little popular appeal, but they do maintain contact with international Communist labor, student and other organizations.

Even though the number of Communists in the AKFM is small, elements of this group—many trained in Paris, Prague, or Moscow—have captured the key posts in the party organization in both Tananarive and the provinces. Among the hard-core Communists in the AKFM are Secretary General Gisele

Rabesahala, assistant secretary general and labor leader Remi Rakotobe, first vice president Maurice Rajofera, editor Arsene Ratsifehera, and Ravhan-tavololona Andriamanjato, wife of the AKFM head. The party receives financial support from external Communist sources, particularly for the numerous publications printed by the AKFM and its ancillary organizations. In its propaganda and public policy statements, the AKFM follows the Communist line in its advocacy of "scientific socialism," but the party's main emphasis has been to exploit Merina antipathy toward the coastal peoples.

(5) *Malagasy Communist Party*—Founded in 1958 by Rene Anselme Randrianja, a Malagasy journalist, the PCM reportedly was established under the auspices of the French Government to serve as a decoy in order to attract Communists so that they might be identified. The party has always been overshadowed by the AKFM and appeared moribund in 1972, with only an estimated 20 card-carrying members.

The official PCM newspaper, *Ady Farany*, was subsidized at one time by the TASS agency's bureau in Paris, the New China News Agency office in Paris, and the International Organization of Journalists in Prague. Soviet subventions appear to have halted after the Sino-Soviet rift, and by 1970 even the Chinese subsidies stopped.

(6) *Militant Group to Establish Proletarian Rule (MFM)*—One of the urban intellectuals who deserted the AKFM to join the more radical peasant party MONIMA in 1969 was Manandafy Rakotonirina, a young sociologist. Manandafy reportedly became a leading theoretician of MONIMA and participated extensively in the meetings of both the student and worker components of KIM, attempting to persuade the other participants to adopt an ultraradical program. In December 1972 the press reported that Manandafy had formed a new political party, the MFM. The press reported that this party was separate from MONIMA but would cooperate with it. Manandafy was quoted as saying that the MFM's "basic principle" calls for the abolition of "class inequality," which he reportedly said stems from the power of the rich and the landed gentry.

In a press interview in January 1973, Manandafy said that he did not mind being called a Maoist, if the term was used to denote an advocate of all power emanating from the mass of ordinary citizens and a "burning adversary of all bureaucracy." He maintained that government should be limited to popular village and neighborhood councils and that higher levels of government should be swept away.

Manandafy added that the real issue was the seizure of power by the people and that the issue of ethnic disunity and tribal division was a false one sustained by the propaganda of the "bourgeoisie in the pay of imperialism." On 12 May 1973, Manandafy was arrested, along with about 50 sympathizers from the leadership of the MFM and KIM, in order to forestall demonstrations in the capital on the anniversary of Tsiranana's overthrow.

(7) *People's Liberation Movement*—In the autumn of 1972 another fledgling political organization offered itself as a rallying point for persons formerly associated with KIM. This party, the People's Liberation Movement, was established by a youthful intellectual, Regis Rakotonirina. Rakotonirina, a young university instructor, was employed as a researcher for the French Government-sponsored ORSTOM (Organization for Scientific and Technical Research Overseas) program in Madagascar. In September 1971 he was arrested for allegedly being a ringleader of a plot to overthrow the government, but he was released from prison by the Ramanantsoa government in June 1972. Rakotonirina's personal power base is in rural areas around Antsirabe, in the central highlands.

Rakotonirina probably hopes his new party will appeal to intellectuals associated with the Catholic Church—especially the Jesuit order. The Tsiranana government referred to the ORSTOM affair as a Maoist-Catholic plot, and in investigating it security officials searched the residences of several Jesuit priests. The Jesuits, who publish one of Madagascar's few newspapers of international standard, the weekly *Lumiere*, were indefatigable critics of Tsiranana's autocratic methods, corruption, and profligacy. As the educators of many of today's young civil servants and professional people, the Jesuits are influential among intellectuals.

(8) *Christian Democratic Party of Madagascar*—A pro-Roman Catholic populist party based in the Tamatave area, the Christian Democratic Party of Madagascar (PDCM) is headed by Alexis Bezaka, who led an earlier grouping of religiously based parties which appeared to have some promise in the late 1950's but which was absorbed by Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party. The importance of Bezaka and the PDCM in the present political picture is difficult to gauge.

For over a century the clergy has been active in politics. In the mid-1950's the Roman Catholic Church sided with the nationalists against the colonial authorities, and since independence most non-



Malagasy priests have come from French-speaking countries other than France, in order to avoid an identification between the church and the continuing French presence. As Madagascar approached autonomous status, political activity stepped up and the Jesuit order, the church element most deeply involved in politics, supported several aspiring politicians, one of whom was Bezaka.

A member of the coastal Betsimisaraka tribe and a journalist, Bezaka first won elective office in 1945 as a Tamatave municipal councilor and 2 years later was elected as one of the Malagasy representatives to the legislature in Paris. A member of the Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal, the preeminent nationalist organization at the time, Bezaka was alleged to have taken part in the 1947 insurrection and was sent to prison, serving several years before being amnestied in 1956. The following year Bezaka was made Minister of Health in Tsiranana's transitional government, but he was soon dropped because he demanded immediate independence rather than autonomous status for Madagascar. In 1960 Bezaka was elected to the National Assembly as the candidate of a grouping of small religious parties, the Malagasy National Renewal (RNM), which he had earlier founded. Bezaka and the RNM attempted to play a balancing role between the government and the Marxist AKFM opposition, but in 1961 Bezaka's RNM colleagues deserted him and joined Tsiranana's PSD. Bezaka remained in political eclipse for over a decade, partly because of obstacles Tsiranana erected to hamper the activities of small regional parties.

Today the PDCM favors a program of development of the countryside, social progress, and development of a sense of national identity based on the contributions not just of the Merina but of all ethnic groups. As did most politicians, Bezaka came out strongly against the instigators of the 1972 Tamatave disorders and urged the government to move slowly and carefully in educational reform. Bezaka has excellent nationalist credentials and was a persistent critic of the Tsiranana regime, but he probably is handicapped by being part of the older generation—he was born in 1916—in a country with a predominantly youthful population, much of which is politically conscious and distrustful of established political organizations.

**4. Elections (U/OU)**

**a. October 1972 referendum**

The Ramanantsoa government, having established the referendum as a key device to demonstrate its worthiness to rule, has announced that additional

referendums will be held in order to determine popular views on important issues. The October 1972 referendum was fairly and competently administered, and most of the public responded to the campaign with interest and enthusiasm.

Following Malagasy practice, the campaign was limited to a brief period, in this case 15 days. The referendum was conducted using the electoral lists from the January 1972 presidential elections. The Ramanantsoa government lowered the minimum voting age from 21 to 18; prospective voters under 21 had to journey to the place where their births were recorded, get a chit from the custodian of the records, and take it to the voting registrar prior to election day to be placed on the list. According to the press, considerable numbers of young persons made the effort to be registered.

The referendum question was: "Do you accept the attached draft law, which will permit Major General Gabriel Ramanantsoa and his government of national unity to carry out for 5 years the structural transformations indispensable for renewal and to establish in public life a climate that conforms to the will of the people?" In effect, the referendum assumed the character of a contest between Ramanantsoa and Tsiranana. Some 84% of the nearly 3.5 million registered voters went to the polls, and of the 2,875,988 who cast valid ballots, 96% voted "yes."

The Ramanantsoa government apparently did not wish to trumpet its victory too loudly, however, at a time when some opposition to its rule was evident. It attempted instead to enhance its credibility by emphasizing as the main result of the referendum what it called the "constitutional law acceptance ratio," which consisted of the number of "yes" votes divided by the total of registered voters, or about 80% for the country as a whole. By voting areas this rate was as follows: Tananarive city and environs, 79%; Tananarive Province, 83%; Fianarantsoa Province, 88%; Diego-Suarez Province, 69%; Majunga Province, 77%; Tamatave Province, 82%; and Tulcar Province, 75%.

Within these large voting divisions anti-Ramanantsoa feeling manifested itself in the form of attempts to disrupt the polling. Some local officials who were holdovers from the Tsiranana era destroyed electoral registers and harassed voters. False reports of curfews and of martial law were circulated. Efforts were made to keep voters away from the polls by rolling boulders onto mountain roads and by setting brush fires. The government held the polls open late in some areas and managed to thwart these localized attempts to disrupt the referendum.

**b. Electoral irregularities under Tsiranana**

One factor in the popular dissatisfaction which led to Tsiranana's violent ouster in May 1972 was his blatant debasement of the electoral process. The country's first elections after independence were held in September 1960. In the National Assembly which was formed following these elections, the PSD held 81 seats, with the remaining 26 seats held by three small political groupings. Within 2 years, however, Tsiranana had persuaded nearly all of the opposition legislators except the three AKFM deputies to support the PSD.

In the presidential, legislative, and provincial elections held in 1965, the ruling PSD virtually crushed all political opposition. In March of that year President Tsiranana was reelected by an overwhelming majority, receiving 97% of the roughly 2.5 million votes cast. The AKFM did not put up a candidate in the presidential race. In August the PSD completed its election triumph, winning 104 of the 107 seats in the National Assembly and all but 2 of the 94 seats in the provincial general councils. Control over the general councils, which comprised a primary component of the Senate electorate, also gave the PSD renewed domination over the membership of the Senate.

During the 1965 elections the government, in spite of its commanding advantage which never left the outcome in doubt, did not hesitate to use chicanery or outright dishonesty to increase its final tally of votes. Just prior to the 1960 elections, and at the instigation of the PSD, the government had the election laws changed so that the entire slate of any party that polled 55% of the total vote in a province would automatically be declared elected. This rule was continued in 1965. But in Tananarive city, an AKFM stronghold, the 55% rule was not applied, and proportional representation was used. The overall result was that the minority parties won no seats in the provinces, whereas in Tananarive city the PSD was able to pick up a few seats although it was in the minority.

To further harass the opposition, the Tsiranana government developed a maze of complicated election regulations which were difficult for candidates and voters alike to understand. By applying these rules in an arbitrary and pernicious manner, the government was able to void election results and disallow AKFM slates on meaningless technicalities. In the 1965 National Assembly elections more than four times as many votes were invalidated in Andriamanjato's AKFM stronghold of Tananarive Province than in the rest of the country combined. Where legal measures were not considered sufficient to intimidate opposition

groups, the government used extralegal measures—such as blocking the roads to the polls or preventing political gatherings—to achieve its goal. Opposition complaints of irregularities received no hearing whatever, and PSD spokesmen generally voiced the view that the continuing demise of the small opposition parties was probably a good thing.

After its landslide national victory, the PSD attempted to oust the opposition from its few remaining municipal offices. The PSD suspended the AKFM-run city council in the plateau city of Antsirabe, briefly governed the city directly and provided a markedly higher level of services for the inhabitants, and then called a special election in August 1966, which it won.

In nationwide municipal elections in December 1969, however, the PSD was unable to displace the AKFM from the Tananarive Municipal Council and won less than a majority on the city council of the country's largest port, Tamatave. Chastened by the PSD's lackluster performance in the municipal elections, Interior Minister Andre Resampa sparked a more vigorous campaign for the September 1970 National Assembly elections. Able candidates were substituted for some of the least effectual incumbents, and the PSD once more won all but three of the National Assembly seats, despite considerable anti-PSD feeling in Madagascar.

The January 1972 presidential elections were a triumph for Tsiranana, who won over 99% of the vote, and a rude shock to his critics, who were convinced that the President would be hurt by the growing signs of dissatisfaction, which included an uprising in the south the preceding year. The PSD's handling of this campaign, nevertheless, was less effective than in earlier ones because Resampa was in prison and the campaign was left to the erratic Tsiranana.

**D. National policies (C)**

**1. Domestic**

One of the major goals of the Ramanantsoa government is to hold in check the traditional rivalry between Merina and non-Merina. Because of the country's potential for civil strife, Ramanantsoa has placed considerable emphasis on maintaining national unity and has attempted to assuage *cotier* fears of a Merina political resurgence. He has attempted to maintain a tribal balance in making government appointments, and in his public statements he has appealed for tribal harmony and stressed the government's role as an instrument of national unity that serves no one group, tribal or political.

Ramanantsoa's dilemma derives from the fact that many of the reforms being pursued to develop Malagasy nationalism exacerbate tribal rivalries, because programs advocated by the Merina sometimes conflict with the desires of the coastal peoples. This conflict is particularly evident regarding educational reforms, which the coastal tribes view as working to the benefit of the Merina. In addition, not all Merina share Ramanantsoa's concern for *cotier* sensibilities, and some probably see in Tsiranana's overthrow a chance to settle old scores and reassert Merina authority. Many *cotiers* point to their exclusion from key ministerial and advisory posts as indicating that the government is Merina dominated. But if Ramanantsoa decides to give the *cotiers* more power in the government, he risks a reaction from his fellow Merina.

Another objective of the Ramanantsoa government is to create a system in which the state has the prime responsibility for planning and directing economic development while still allowing an important role for free enterprise and private business. Previous Malagasy development planning, as spelled out in the first and second economic development plans, stressed the need for increased and diversified agricultural production, the establishment of small-scale industry for processing raw materials, and the growth of cooperatives, but skirted the issue of the government's role in this process. The new government is pledged to assist the private sector and encourage both foreign and domestic investment, but the ground rules for investment will be very different than in the past. The investment code will be revised to provide benefits only for those investments that are truly beneficial to the economic growth of the country and will initiate a more effective system of control over such investment programs. Furthermore, priority will be placed on the development of domestic industries as a means of reducing imports and providing employment. Ramanantsoa has also recognized the need to create labor-intensive industries, both in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. He has designated the agricultural sector as a primary concern and has promised that the government will be directly involved in both the production and marketing of certain key commodities, such as rice.

Increased emphasis will be placed on the development of Malagasy entrepreneurship and the replacement of foreign personnel by Malagasy employees in both the public and private sectors. Ramanantsoa is aware of the inadequacy of Malagasy cadre, however, and wants more effort to be directed toward having foreign technicians train their

Malagasy replacements to staff the bureaucracy. The replacement of French administrators is a sensitive issue between the Merina and the coastal peoples. Although the National School for Administration has attempted to train *cotiers* as well as Merina, more often than not the Merina are the only ones trained and available to take over positions held by Frenchmen.

Reform of the educational system is an important objective of the Ramanantsoa government. Student dissatisfaction over continuing French influence on Malagasy education set in motion the chain of events that led to the downfall of the Tsiranana government. The students were particularly critical of the technical cooperation agreements with France, viewing them as the main instruments of maintaining French cultural dominance. The criticism was largely justified. Twelve years after independence, the educational system remained patterned closely after that of France, with a curriculum that provided students with a classical, European-oriented education. This was reinforced by an agreement specifying equivalency between Malagasy and French diplomas that required students to meet the same standards as their French counterparts. The academic calendar suited French teachers rather than Malagasy students. The students demanded a system geared to Madagascar's needs, with less dependence on the French examination system and a curriculum emphasizing Malagasy culture.

Ramanantsoa has promised reforms to make the system more relevant to the needs of the country and to expand educational opportunities for all Malagasy youth. As an important if largely symbolic indication of its intent, the government in July 1972 appointed the first Malagasy rector of the University of Madagascar, a post previously held by a Frenchman, and also appointed Malagasy nationals to key director posts formerly held by French technical assistants in the Ministry of National Education and Cultural Affairs. For the future, the government will attempt to hasten the replacement of French teachers with Malagasy nationals, increase the use of Malagasy as the language of instruction, and change the curriculum to place greater emphasis on economic, vocational, and technical courses.

In addition to changing the basic orientation of Malagasy education, the Ramanantsoa government faces the same problem of providing facilities for a rapidly expanding student population that was never fully solved by the Tsiranana government. Recognizing education as one of the key elements in the advancement of the country, that government

initiated a 10-year educational plan in 1962 calling for greatly expanded school enrollment.

From 1962 to 1970 total primary enrollment in public and private schools rose from 549,000 to about 940,000, an increase in 8 years of 71%. As a result of the rapid increase in the total number of persons of school age, however, the percentage of students to school-age population increased by a lesser amount. By 1972, primary enrollment was only about 50% of school-age population.

In addition to expanding the educational system, the 1962 plan restructured the system in an effort to overcome the longstanding social and cultural division between the Merina and the coastal population. To redress the historic imbalance of educational opportunities between these two groups, the plan provided for the establishment of many new schools in the coastal areas of the country.

The Ramanantsoa government has promised additional measures to improve social and economic conditions and tighten government administration. At its first meeting the new cabinet increased the price paid to coffee producers, raised the minimum wage by 5%, and eliminated several taxes. Ramanantsoa has stated that the government will direct its attention to the needs of the most underprivileged and that special attention will be devoted to the impoverished south. He has inaugurated an austerity policy, decreeing a reduction in the number of ministries, the staffs within each ministry, and the material benefits available to government officials. Following through on Ramanantsoa's pledge to root out corruption, the cabinet has revised civil service statutes to provide severe punishment for civil servants found guilty of irregularities. Periodic inspections and spot checks are to be carried out at all levels of public administration throughout the country.

Madagascar's most serious domestic obstacle to development is its own people, both their increasing numbers and their lack of productive skills. Contrary to the policies adopted by most developing countries, however, Malagasy officials have not favored restrictions on population growth. Under Tsiranana, officials encouraged large families in order to fill up the country's underpopulated rural areas.

The preponderance of young people in the society places a strain on the government's resources by requiring additional social services while not adding to the productive capacity of the economy. In addition, those Malagasy of productive age are, for the most part, either poorly educated or educated in a French-style school system that is ill adapted to the needs of the country. Another acknowledged impediment to

development is the traditional peasant tendency toward lethargy or indifference. During his presidency, Tsiranana regularly harangued the populace on the need for hard work and dedication, but with little apparent effect on the work habits of the people.

In the rural areas, the government will probably try to expand the role of the paramilitary Civic Service, a compulsory program for civic action administered since November 1972 by the Ministry of National Defense and Armed Forces. The Civic Service has two major facets: a corps of rural *animateurs*, individuals trained to go out in small teams to help solve village problems; and cadres of Pioneers, paramilitary units assigned to do larger public works projects. Toward the end of 1972 the service had 2,100 Pioneers.

## 2. Foreign

The swift domestic political changes which took place in May 1972 precipitated far-reaching changes in foreign relations as well. The Tsiranana government had pursued the closest of economic, cultural, and military ties with the former metropole and set itself apart from most of the newly independent African countries by soliciting investment from white-ruled South Africa. It also held aloof from the U.S.S.R. and China. In contrast the Ramanantsoa government has entered into wide-ranging negotiations with France on the accords governing relations between the two countries, and has announced a policy of *diplomatie tous azimuts*, or "opening out in all directions"—establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and radical mainland African countries. The Ramanantsoa government also has worked quietly to restore ties with the United States, which had become badly frayed during the last year of Tsiranana's rule.

For the Malagasy people the central issue in foreign affairs is the tie with France. The special relationship between the newly independent state and the former colonial power was set forth in the Franco-Malagasy agreements, which were negotiated and signed in April 1960, 2 months before Madagascar became independent. The agreements consisted of 12 separate accords and several associated annexes. Relations between the two states have been deeply influenced by certain of the provisions: a joint defense agreement by which France provides military assistance, maintains bases, and stations forces in Madagascar; an accord granting citizens of each country extensive equal rights in the territory of the other; an agreement granting France preferential access to certain strategic materials that might be discovered on the island;

incorporation of Madagascar into the franc zone; and a commitment to cooperate with France on various aspects of economic and financial policy. Other aspects of the accords pertained to economic aid, telecommunications, maritime commerce, and civil aviation. In the educational field, France agreed to assist the Malagasy Republic to achieve a system of higher education of equal quality with that of France, and each country agreed to accept the certificates and degrees issued by the other.

The close official cooperation called for by these accords has enabled France to assume an important role in Madagascar's development and has resulted in a large and visible French presence. From 1960 to 1971 France provided about US\$400 million in grant aid and about \$36 million in military grants. As of mid-1972 France paid the salaries of about 1,300 civilians, including a large number of teachers serving with the Malagasy Government. It also supplied over 200 military advisers, of whom about half served with the gendarmerie and the remainder with army, navy, or air units.

French influence in Madagascar was partly rooted in the long association Tsiranana had with General de Gaulle and his right-hand man in Africa, Jacques Foccard. After de Gaulle's death Foccard continued to hold his post as Secretary General for the Community and Afro-Malagasy Affairs, which was part of the French Office of the Presidency. Foccard's informal links with many French officials and French businessmen in Madagascar contributed to his extensive influence on events there.

In mid-1972 there were about 30,000 French citizens residing in Madagascar, in addition to 45,000 French nationals from the Comoro Islands and 25,000 from Reunion. The French and a few light-skinned Reunionese tend to be more affluent than the Malagasy, while darker skinned Reunionese sometimes have jobs calling for a degree of technical, entrepreneurial, or managerial ability; Comorians are mostly servants. All these groups are resented by the Malagasy.

The Ramanantsoa government announced in June 1972 that it intended to revise the 1960 Franco-Malagasy accords to bring them into conformity with changed circumstances, and it took other steps to reduce France's role in Malagasy affairs. These steps included cutting back the number of French military and civilian advisers and making top French advisers less visible. For example, French advisers were given less resounding titles, the inspector general of the armed forces becoming simply an inspector. The 1960 accords agreed that France and Madagascar would

jointly select the rector of the University of Madagascar, and with French agreement Ramanantsoa appointed a Malagasy to that post, previously always held by a Frenchman.

In June 1973, after 5 months of often acrimonious negotiations, France and Madagascar signed eight revised accords which generally provided for less extensive cooperation in various aspects of bilateral relations. Although agreement was still lacking on the important areas of financial relationships and education, it appeared likely that the degree of cooperation in these fields would be reduced. According to the revised accords, France achieved its major objective of having continuing access to the naval facilities at Diego-Suarez, although after 2 years such rights will be subject to annual renewal by the Government of Madagascar. Some 400 French naval personnel were to remain at Diego-Suarez for the announced purpose of training Malagasy personnel, and France was to continue to have landing rights on Madagascar, also subject to annual renewal. Other accords dealt with justice, fisheries, and posts and telegraph and provided for French military and civilian technical assistance. Included among the accords was one pertaining to diplomatic relationships, and the two countries agreed to "concert" on matters of foreign policy. Earlier, Foreign Affairs Minister Ratsiraka had announced that Madagascar would withdraw from the franc zone and would henceforth manage its own currency and foreign exchange earnings.

The difficulties of reaching an agreement with France were based on complex factors. Ramanantsoa and his senior colleagues have enjoyed rewards and status based on their careers in the French Army, and they are well aware of the extent to which Madagascar depends on military and economic assistance from France. They also understand that the Malagasy economy is so closely tied to French private business interests that a change in this setup would aggravate Madagascar's already difficult economic problems. On the other hand, Frenchmen in Madagascar in official and private capacities do not treat even high-ranking Malagasy as equals, and Ramanantsoa and his top colleagues resent their dependence on France. When General Ramanantsoa in the winter of 1972/73 attributed the anti-Merina rioting in coastal areas to instigation by "foreigners," it was apparent that the thinly veiled warnings were directed at the French. For example, General Ramanantsoa announced that he had expelled a highly placed foreigner, and Malagasy officials confirmed that he was referring to a senior intelligence officer in the French Embassy.

General Ramanantsoa and his colleagues probably are convinced that the clandestine apparatus of Jacques Foccard is being directed at overthrowing them in favor of Foccard's old ally Tsiranana. It has been reported that longtime French residents—perhaps acting on behalf of Foccard's apparatus—provided encouragement and support to the Betsimisaraka rioters in Tamatave in December 1972.

In early 1972 the French Ambassador to Madagascar had made contact with Jacques Rabemananjara—who had been imprisoned by the French for his alleged involvement in the 1947 uprising but who had been the most pro-French of Tsiranana's top associates—and with the opportunistic but formerly anti-French Andre Resampa. It appeared likely that the French were providing thinly veiled subsidies to Rabemananjara, Resampa, and other politicians in the event that any of them might later wind up on top. Nonetheless, the French are probably inhibited from undermining Ramanantsoa for fear that a period of turmoil might follow his departure from the political scene and that his ultimate successor might be worse—from their point of view—than the General.

On the French issue, as on many others, the Ramanantsoa government is caught between the radical Merina of the capital, to whom the French are anathema, and the politically conscious coastal tribesmen, who prefer continuing French influence to the alternative of Merina domination.

Malagasy relations with the United States have been generally good, except for a period in 1971-72. When Andre Resampa, former PSD secretary general and Vice President of Madagascar, was arrested along with some of his close colleagues in May 1971 on charges of connivance in an alleged plot against the government backed by an unnamed foreign power, it was quickly clear that the unnamed power was the United States. In June 1971, the U.S. Ambassador was recalled at the request of the Malagasy Government. A few days later, five members of the embassy were also requested to leave. Diplomatic relations were maintained at the charge d'affaires level. In May 1972, just before the student disorders which brought down his government, President Tsiranana admitted to the charge that the United States had not been at fault in the 1971 Resampa affair. A similar statement was announced publicly the next day. As a result of the statement, and of urgings of the new military government which took power shortly thereafter, a new U.S. Ambassador arrived in Madagascar in the fall of 1972.

The single largest U.S. interest in the island has been the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's satellite tracking station, built near Tananarive in 1965. In return for allowing the United States to operate this station, the Tsiranana regime frequently pressed for increased economic assistance. The Ramanantsoa government favors retention of the facility and has thus far fended off xenophobic and leftist demands for its removal. American investment at present totals about \$21 million, with the possibility of a sizable increase if any of several U.S. firms conducting oil explorations makes a strike.

Since Malagasy independence, the U.S. Government has made loans of over US\$5 million for projects in the transport and communications sectors and has contributed more than \$1 million in grant assistance. AID programs were held in abeyance during the period of strained relations, but in early 1973, with the restoration of normal diplomatic ties, proposals for technical and financial assistance were again being considered.

In contrast to the policy of the Tsiranana regime, the Ramanantsoa government moved swiftly to establish formal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, and North Korea following visits to their capitals by the Malagasy Foreign Minister. Tananarive has also established relations with Hanoi and recognized Sihanouk's Cambodian government-in-exile. The Ramanantsoa government appears to be in no hurry to exchange resident ambassadors with the Communist countries, however, and in early 1973 there were no Communist diplomatic missions in the Malagasy Republic, and vice versa.

Foreign Affairs Minister Ratsiraka's visits to the U.S.S.R., China, and North Korea in late 1972 and to Romania in early 1973 were made for the purposes of securing aid and of demonstrating that the Ramanantsoa government was pursuing policies different from those of its predecessor. These diplomatic overtures emphasized solidarity with African countries such as Guinea and Tanzania, which had received large amounts of Communist aid and which supported the Communist nations on international questions, in contrast to Tsiranana's close association with conservative pro-French African nations.

The Tsiranana regime, as its economic troubles mounted in the late 1960's, had worked quietly to attract aid and investment from South Africa and Rhodesia in order to develop tourism and ship-repair facilities on the northwestern coast of Madagascar. Although committed to boycott South Africa, the

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government entered into an agreement on commercial air flights between the two countries. In mid-1968 the Malagasy and South African governments exchanged visits of economic delegations, and South African investors agreed to provide \$3.25 million for the construction and refurbishing of tourist facilities on the island of Nosy Be. South African and Portuguese firms were also negotiating with the Tsiranana government for an extensive development project at Baie de Narinda which would include a deepwater port and a drydock large enough to serve oil tankers.

The Tsiranana government's interest in attracting investment from the white-ruled African states had led to associations with other African countries which were linked with the white nations or were not opposed to such ties. The government was on cordial terms with countries like Lesotho and Malawi, whose abject poverty left them no choice but to cooperate with South Africa. Tsiranana tended also to make common cause with Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a pragmatist who favored cooperation with South Africa because he believed that efforts to topple the white rulers by force of arms could not succeed and would benefit only the Communist countries.

Tananarive's policy of close cooperation with the white-ruled nations of southern Africa during the Tsiranana period exacerbated relations with many of the recently independent black African countries. Madagascar was a member of the Organization of African Unity and the African Development Bank but played a minor role in these organizations. It also belonged to the Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), which consisted predominantly of former French dependencies.

Shortly after taking office in May 1972, Foreign Affairs Minister Ratsiraka attended the OAU summit meeting in Rabat and announced that the Malagasy Republic would begin paying on its lapsed assessment toward the African Liberation Committee, which channels funds to guerrilla organizations operating against the white-ruled southern African states. He further demonstrated the Malagasy Republic's new and wider interest in the black African countries by visiting neighboring Tanzania, which has set an example for a number of other states in the region by its policy of nationalizing foreign-owned enterprises in order to insure that control of the national economy does not slip into the hands of foreigners. In addition, diplomatic relations were established with Guinea, a radical nation especially antagonistic to France.

Ratsiraka's various travels have resulted in some economic and educational assistance. In January

1973, at a press conference in Paris prior to the opening of the formal Franco-Malagasy negotiations, Ratsiraka announced that among the first effects of cooperation was a transaction by which China would provide Madagascar with 40,000 tons of rice—10,000 tons as a gift and 30,000 at a favorable price—and a low-interest loan of 2 million Malagasy francs (FCM 256 = US\$1). The Malagasy Government later announced that part of this Chinese loan would be drawn for the purpose of fully reimbursing South African investors, as a followup to Madagascar's termination of economic cooperation with white-ruled South Africa. Both the gesture of independence toward South Africa and the acquisition of badly needed food had a favorable impact on Malagasy opinion, even though the advantage of the rice transaction was partly offset by the government's difficulties in distributing the rice.

The government also announced that 30 Malagasy students would go to the Soviet Union for several years' study on scholarships. The U.S.S.R. is reported to have been willing to provide a larger number of scholarships, but the Malagasy Government offered only 30 candidates.

In the United Nations, of which it has been a member since 1960, the Malagasy Republic under Tsiranana remained aloof from the black African nations and was an implacable adversary of the Communist countries. The new political orientation of the republic has become evident in its tendency to vote with the Afro-Asian countries on major issues. For example, in late 1972 the Malagasy Republic voted with the Communist countries and most Afro-Asian nations to forestall any effective measures against airplane hijacking.

## E. Threats to government stability (S)

### 1. Discontent and dissidence

Stability in the Malagasy Republic is imperiled by pervasive popular discontent, which stems from widespread poverty and deep-seated ethnic antagonisms.

For several years prior to Tsiranana's overthrow in May 1972 the economy was stagnant, and during the ensuing 6 months demonstrations, strikes, and political uncertainty tended to make things worse. Political tensions throughout the summer and fall of 1972 discouraged wholesalers and merchants—who are largely members of the Indian or Chinese minority or Frenchmen—from importing goods to maintain their inventories. By December 1972 widespread

shortages of consumer goods, including meat, caused hardships on persons in the cash economy.

For years many persons in urban areas have been unable to find work they consider suitable. Until recently most educated Malagasy have left commerce and skilled trades to the non-Malagasy minorities and to foreigners and have aspired to positions in the government, where job opportunities are very limited. Discontent in the cities over unemployment and rising costs of living has been growing for years and has been intensified by the marked contrast between the living standards of most of the population and of foreigners and Malagasy lucky enough to have jobs.

Malagasy students also have been deeply discontented, partly because the Tsiranana regime long harassed student leaders and retained a firm grip on schools and the university. The university and many secondary schools are located in Tananarive, and about three-fourths of the students are Merina, who have objected to the extent to which the Malagasy educational system has been geared to that of France. Until 1971, when the government began to make minor changes, the University of Madagascar was essentially a French university on Malagasy soil granting degrees equivalent to those of French universities. When France, which had a surplus of physicians, raised standards for admission to medical schools in order to reduce the future supply, the university medical school in Tananarive kept in step and raised its standards, even though physicians were badly needed in the Malagasy Republic. The Merina students have also felt that the very limited place of the Malagasy language and culture in the curriculum made their education less suited to Malagasy needs. Malagasy students must take the same severe and inflexible examinations as students in France, and they have been handicapped by the failure of some of their French professors to spend the whole school year in Madagascar. Finally, the students have resented the large number of French nationals both in the educational system and in the jobs in government the students have coveted after graduation.

As part of their demands for reform of the educational system, the students in mid-1972 demanded that the government devote a full year to preparing the system for such changes. The government insisted on reopening schools in October, despite student reluctance to return to classes until the government made more progress in carrying out promised educational reforms. Most students eventually decided to go back, but they were more interested in engaging in discussions regarding the reforms than in resuming studies. Discipline among

most secondary and university students deteriorated, and the more radical students did in fact refuse to return to school, spending their time instead in attempting to win additional adherents and in organizing demonstrations against the government.

The Ramanantsoa government introduced some of the reforms urged by the students, including provisions to make government stipends for students more equitable, an increase in the use of the Malagasy language, and replacement of some French faculty members with Malagasy. Student discontent has remained a continuing problem for the Ramanantsoa regime, however, because the proposed changes in the educational system fell far short of what the students were demanding. The government also has continued to provide schools run completely according to French standards for the large number of children of French nationals working in various capacities in government and in private business.

Many of the *cotier* supporters of Tsiranana are deeply hostile to the Merina and angry over the changeover from a predominantly *cotier* regime to a predominantly Merina one. Even when they were the "outs" politically from 1947 through 1971, the Merina were still a social elite and made no effort to hide their disdain for the darker skinned, less educated coastal peoples. Some parts of Madagascar inhabited by particularly loyal Tsiranana supporters had benefited considerably during his rule, and they disliked having the tables turned in favor of the Merina. Ramanantsoa's pledge to treat all segments of the population with respect and his appointment of *cotiers* to many high posts have done little to dispel these age-old ethnic hostilities and rivalries.

Some *cotiers* are displeased with the changes made in the educational system by Ramanantsoa at the urging of predominantly Merina students and others. Steps toward the goal of eventually supplanting French with the Malagasy language is disliked because the form in which the language has been written for over a century is the dialect of the Merina, thus putting *cotier* students at a disadvantage. *Cotier* students in Tamatave demonstrated their opposition in December 1972, but after a period of disorder and riot the students were placated to some extent by a promise from the Minister of National Education and Cultural Affairs that changes in the language of instruction would be made gradually and that a new written version of the Malagasy language would be developed in which the essential features of all the main dialects would be combined.



## 2. Subversion

A sudden violent overthrow of General Ramanantsoa's constitutionally based regime is always a possibility. The armed forces and the gendarmerie are important mainstays of the government, and neither dissension among the upper and middle level officers who now hold key positions in the government nor displacement of these officers by more junior military personnel can be excluded. The government appears in greater danger, however, from at least two distinct groups of civilian adversaries, each of which could use the tactics of instigating civil disorders and Merina-cotier violence. These civilian adversaries—the *cotier* leadership of Tsiranana's Social Democratic Party, and a loose grouping of predominantly Merina intellectuals, students, workers, and unemployed of the capital—work pretty much out in the open, however, and there are no signs that either set of adversaries possesses any effective, well-organized subversive apparatus.

When it became clear that the nationwide public response to the October 1972 constitutional plebiscite would be favorable to General Ramanantsoa, and by implication unfavorable to Tsiranana, PSD supporters attempted to disrupt the polling by blocking roads, circulating false reports of a curfew, and setting fires to buildings and brush. After the plebiscite some schools, government buildings, and the government's prized reforestation projects continued to be set afire—presumably by discontent PSD stalwarts.

The serious disorders which erupted in the east coast city of Tamatave in December 1972 and in Diego-Suarez and three places in Majunga Province the ensuing February followed a pattern and were probably instigated by the PSD, as the government has alleged. The Tamatave rioting followed steadily building dissatisfaction on the part of coastal secondary students over the change from French to Malagasy as the language of instruction in certain courses. These demonstrations may originally have been for the legitimate purpose of redress of grievances, but the coastal students were augmented by unemployed persons, and the disorders soon got out of control, particularly since the authorities were forbidden to use force. The rioters reportedly consulted in groups in order to determine targets, and then dispersed into teams to carry out their plans. Merina shops were broken into and looted, individual Merina were hunted down and mistreated (Figure 9), and the jail was set on fire and prisoners were freed. The disorders in Diego-Suarez and Majunga followed a similar pattern, with systematic attacks on Merina and



FIGURE 9. Merina refugees seeking sanctuary in a military installation near Tamatave after the December 1972 rioting (U/OU)

attacks on the jail. In each of the incidents the crowd was aroused by appeals to the coastal tribesmen's educational grievances and their desire to retain the French naval base at Diego-Suarez.

After the rioting in Majunga Province, which followed a visit by former President Tsiranana, the government held 40 persons for investigation, including several high-ranking PSD officials. The government charged that one of them, Rene Rasidy, had recruited youthful rioters with money. The press reported that in the towns in Majunga Province the rioters were youthful and dispersed rapidly without bloodshed when confronted by the security forces, who by this time were authorized to use their weapons.

It appears likely that the PSD has also attempted to instigate disorders among the Merina population of the capital. Although predominantly a *cotier* party, the PSD also has some support among Merina of lower social status, and Merina party officials could be used to foment disorders among the residents of the capital. In April 1973 the government arrested four PSD members, including an official of the party youth affiliate and a party journalist, who were accused of preparing and distributing tracts announcing that there would be a *rotaka*, (a coined word meaning politically motivated disorders) on a specified date to get even for the mistreatment of Merina in other cities. However, prospective participants in this particular instance were dissuaded by stern government warnings.

The most dangerous potential instigators of violent disorders in the capital are the radical Merina students, intellectuals, workers, and unemployed—the same groups which successfully benefited from violent confrontation with the government in May 1972.

After a year of restraint in dealing with the radical Merina, the Ramanantsoa government arrested about 50 of their leaders in May 1973 in order to forestall hostile demonstrations on the anniversary of the bloodshed which led to Tsiranana's overthrow. Among the persons arrested was Manandafy Rakotonirina, the organizer of the MFM party and an advocate of minimal government authority, nationalization of all productive activities, and the closing down of French military bases and the U.S. NASA facility. The radical Merina of the capital appear to be loosely organized and tend to favor the programs of Manandafy's MFM and those of Monja Jaona's MONIMA party.

MONIMA, which is thus linked with the radical Merina of the capital, has shown considerable capacity for organized subversive activity in the past. (This capability was latent in mid-1973 because Monja Jaona was an ally of the Ramanantsoa regime.) Monja Jaona has long championed the use of violent tactics when necessary, and his supporters were tested throughout years of repression at the hands of officials of the Tsiranana government. After his arrest in April 1971 he took credit on MONIMA's behalf for the uprising in Tulear Province that month. Simultaneous attacks by primitively armed tribesmen on dozens of gendarmerie posts attested to extensive subversive preparation. According to unconfirmed reports this uprising was planned by MONIMA as early as 1969 and Monja Jaona assured his supporters that once the fighting began they would receive aid from a Chinese Communist ship. Monja Jaona himself, after his release from prison in June 1972, insisted that the Tulear uprising was an entirely Malagasy affair.

The military and security services are a potential subversive threat, despite their close identification with the Ramanantsoa government. Although occupying key positions in the government, the military leaders still retain their former responsibilities in most cases, and the resultant competing demands on their time for political and administrative matters mean that decisions on day-to-day military and police matters are often delayed. The increased power and authority may be flattering to the more senior officers who have been tapped to fill positions in government, but for the lower ranking officers who must then conduct the daily routine of the military and security forces, this arrangement has possibly been a frustrating experience. Personnel of the predominantly *cotier* gendarmerie for their part may have had some cause for dissatisfaction because their lines of command and control were made more complex and unwieldy by Ramanantsoa's decision—for political reasons—to administer the gendarmerie through army headquarters.

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The Ramanantsoa government established diplomatic relations with both the U.S.S.R. and China in October 1972, but it has been wary of encouraging the establishment of resident Chinese or Soviet diplomatic missions on the island. The Tsiranana government had refused to establish relations, and attempted to prevent the importation of printed material containing Communist propaganda. One reason the Tsiranana government gave for its extreme anti-Communist stance—which set it apart from France and much of the French Community—was that it was concerned over the presence of some 20,000 ethnic Chinese among the population. (The official census listed no more than 9,000 because only foreign-born Chinese were counted.) Tsiranana appears to have exaggerated the subversive peril of these Chinese, who consisted largely of industrious, conservative businessmen not greatly interested in ideological matters.

During the Tsiranana era a hundred or so young persons, aided by leftist youth groups, are reported to have gone clandestinely to European Communist countries or to Paris where they lived in a Communist milieu. It appears unlikely, however, that many of those who returned were able to get jobs or serve in positions which would enable them to exert an important influence on behalf of the Communists. The Malagasy security organizations scrutinized such returning persons and in all likelihood continue to monitor their activities.

## F. Maintenance of internal security (S)

### I. Police

Responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is divided among several organizations in a complicated fashion. The Directorate of National Security of the Ministry of Interior is the principal police organization, comprising a civilian police force and the elite paramilitary riot police, the Republican Security Force (FRS). The National Gendarmerie (GN), which is subordinate to the Head of Government, who is also Minister of National Defense and Armed Forces, is responsible for law enforcement in rural areas in normal times, but whenever widespread civil disorders have threatened, the GN has taken the major part in maintaining or reestablishing order in the cities as well. (The paramilitary role of the GN is discussed in the Armed Forces chapter of this General Survey.)

The Ramanantsoa government upon taking office assigned a civilian with legal training and experience to the post of Director of National Security, probably

to underline Ramanantsoa's determination that the law enforcement agencies should observe constitutional limitations. The Directorate is organized into a police training school and three major functional sections: Public Security, Territorial Surveillance, and General Information. The Public Security Section includes the Criminal Brigade, the Judicial Police, and the General Security Service. The Judicial Police gathers evidence in matters such as criminal fraud and crimes against the person, while the General Security Service investigates more serious crimes against the security of the state, such as distributing subversive leaflets and inciting civil disorders. The Territorial Surveillance Section's functions include control of entry and exit of persons at airports. The General Information Section is responsible for maintaining records and files, including identity documents, fingerprints, and other personal data.

The police in the Tsiranana era did not fully exploit modern fingerprinting and other scientific methods, partly because of deficiencies in training, administration, and discipline. For example, fingerprints were not classified but were filed alphabetically, and thus were of limited use in apprehending suspected criminals. Similarly, the police did not make effective use of identity documents, because they tended to view the requirement that each person have such a document as an opportunity for personal aggrandizement; if a policeman apprehended a person for failure to carry an identity card, he was entitled to fine the offender and to pocket one-third of the proceeds. The public had a low regard for the police, partly because they were used to collect taxes and partly because they often could be bribed.

In early 1973 the Directorate of National Security consisted of about 1,800 police personnel and 780 members of the paramilitary FRS. The FRS was formed by former Interior Minister Resampa in the mid-1960's and was under his sole direction until Tsiranana downgraded him in early 1971. Resampa recruited FRS personnel principally from his area of Morondava in southwestern Madagascar and arranged to have the FRS receive paramilitary training by Israeli instructors. Tsiranana permitted Resampa to establish and control the FRS to serve as a counterweight to the predominantly Merina armed forces, and FRS troops were stationed in the Merina highlands. In May 1972 Tsiranana used the FRS in an attempt to quell the student demonstrators, and because of the brutal tactics employed, Tsiranana's successor had to confine all FRS personnel to their billets, partly for their own protection and partly to calm the situation.


Prior to the events of May 1972 the Tsiranana government had been considering disbanding the FRS, and the Ramanantsoa government has also considered this alternative, but both regimes have been dissuaded from doing so because of the danger of augmenting the ranks of the urban unemployed with several hundred paramilitary veterans with ties to Andre Resampa. The Ramanantsoa government reduced the size of the FRS from 1,000 to 780 by transferring some troopers to the police, but as of April 1973 the force was still retained as an elite riot police, even though its personnel were still not being used in public as a unit. Small numbers of armed FRS troopers were being used for such duties as guarding foreign embassies. The commander of the FRS, Captain Augustin Amady, and another FRS officer have received training under U.S. AID auspices at the International Police Academy in Washington.

The GN, which is staffed primarily by persons from coastal tribes, has an actual strength of over 4,000 men and thus is larger than either the army or any other security organization. The GN receives the lion's share of the defense budget; it is well armed, mobile, and has excellent communications. Gendarmerie personnel are well disciplined and maintain a good *esprit de corps*. In contrast to the police, French advisory personnel have played an important behind-the-scenes role in the GN and probably have been a factor in the organization's effectiveness. The GN quelled the uprising of coastal tribesmen in Tulcar Province in April 1971. They were a pivotal factor in Ramanantsoa's ability to maintain order after the May 1972 Tananarive demonstrations (Figure 10), and they were used to restore order in Tamatave in December 1972.

## 2. Intelligence

Very little information is available concerning counterintelligence and countersubversion activities since the Ramanantsoa government took over. It appears unlikely that the new government attaches high priority to achieving a strong capability in modern professional methods to combat espionage and subversion. Although restrained in various ways from moving against its enemies, the Ramanantsoa regime has a clear idea who they are. Moreover, even though numerous contenders for power were engaged in politicking in early 1973, in defiance of the government's attempts at restriction, such activities were extensively covered in the press. The Ramanantsoa government security organs keep tabs on the activities of *cotier* politicians and their French sympathizers, on the one hand and on Merina anarchists, such as Manandafy, on the other.

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and other crimes are to be tried by military tribunals, each consisting of four military officers, two civilians, and a presiding officer who is a judicial official. This legislation was put into effect in December 1972 in the subprefectures of Tamatave and Fenerive.

After the Tamatave disorders in December 1972 the special tribunals tried about 100 persons. Press reports of the sentences give the impression that persons were charged with specific crimes, and sentences varied in accordance with the severity of the crime and the particular circumstances; the most severe sentence was 7 years' imprisonment. Of the persons tried, a fair number were acquitted because reasonable doubt existed as to their guilt.

After the February 1973 disorders in Tamatave, Diego-Suarez, and three places in Majunga Province, the government promulgated decrees providing for more severe penalties for persons convicted of inciting or engaging in civil disorders and for the curtailment of constitutional safeguards. The government amended the penal code in March 1973 to establish the death penalty for persons convicted of inciting or participating in riots; engaging in civil, tribal or religious violence; or destroying public property. The government then promulgated a decree extending from 48 hours to 15 days the period the police could, for investigatory purposes, detain a person not charged with any offense. This latter provision was used in March and April 1973 to arrest 40 PSD members suspected of instigating disorders; apparently these persons were neither turned loose nor charged after the 15 days but continued to be held in custody.

The poorly trained and armed civilian police have a very limited capability to control demonstrations and disorders. During the student demonstrations in May 1972 the police were nowhere to be seen. In contrast, the GN has been the government's mainstay in dealing with serious threats to order, and it has shown the discipline and capability to quell disorders with a minimum of force. During various shows of force army personnel were used to back up the GN, and although not as extensively tested as the gendarmes, they probably would perform creditably in riot-control duties.

In the spring of 1973 the Ramanantsoa government was beginning to prod the traditional local government authorities, the *fokonolona*, to establish self-defense committees to assist in coping with disorders. In March 1973 the press announced that the *fokonolona* of Belo, in sparsely populated west-central Madagascar, had met with security officials and agreed to set up such a committee and had established penalties against townsmen refusing to perform guard duty at night.

## G. Suggestions for further reading (U/OU)

### 1. Books

Cadoux, Charles. *La Republique Malgache*. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1969. An authoritative survey of Malagasy politics, with an extensive bibliography. Provides a useful background on underlying social and political factors.

Heseltine, Nigel. *Madagascar*. New York: Praeger, 1971. Heseltine, an economist and agronomist, served as an adviser to Tsiranana. Although the main focus of this book is on economic planning, it also provides a concise and accurate summary of political, social, and economic aspects of the country.

Thompson, Virginia, and Adloff, Richard. *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today*. 1965. Provides comprehensive and dependable background to Malagasy politics.

### 2. Periodicals

Translations on Africa. Joint Publications Research Service. U.S. Department of Commerce. This serial publication often contains translations of articles in French on Madagascar. Such translations are particularly useful, in view of the dearth of English-language material on the post-Tsiranana era.

*Le Monde*. Paris. From time to time *Le Monde* offers long and detailed articles on the Malagasy Republic. The issues of 3-4 December 1972 and 23-25 February 1973 include several pages of useful background.

## Chronology (u/ou)

1828

The Merina, largest of some 18 ethnic groups on Madagascar, impose their rule and their language on most of the peoples of the island.

1895

Merina authority collapses in the face of French military conquest.

1904

The last of the resisting non-Merina tribesmen are subdued, and France controls all of Madagascar.

1947

August

French quell nationalist uprising which began in April. Official death toll put at 12,000, with unofficial estimates much higher.

1958

October

Madagascar is proclaimed autonomous Malagasy Republic within French Community.

1959

May

Philibert Tsiranana elected President.

1960

April

France and Madagascar agree to wide-ranging cooperation agreements.

June

Malagasy Republic becomes independent state within French Community.

September

Malagasy Republic becomes member of United Nations.

1966

June

President Tsiranana has heart attack, the first of several serious illnesses.

1967

June

Closing of Suez Canal adds to Malagasy economic difficulties.

1968

July

Malagasy economic delegation visits Republic of South Africa.

1969

August

Tsiranana announces belt-tightening economic measures, including reduction of imports in response to deteriorating economic situation caused partly by earlier devaluation of French currency. Clandestine antiregime tracts appear in Tananarive.

1970

January

Tsiranana flown to France after another heart attack, and he is absent from Madagascar until May.

1971

March

Tsiranana closes University of Madagascar in Tananarive following student strike.

April

Uprising in Tulcar Province results in deaths of 30 gendarmes and hundreds of civilians. Monja Jaona and several hundred other members of MONIMA political party imprisoned.

June

Former Interior Minister Andre Resampa arrested as alleged subversive. U.S. Ambassador withdrawn after unsubstantiated Malagasy Republic Government allegations of U.S. involvement with subversives.

October

Malagasy Republic Government announces it has foiled yet another subversive plot, this one led by persons associated with the French research organization ORSTOM.

1972

January

Tsiranana reelected to presidency with over 99% of vote.

May

Inept government response to student strike culminates in over 40 deaths in Tananarive. Pro-student demonstrators force Tsiranana's relegation to figurehead status. Armed forces commander Maj. Gen. Gabriel Ramanantsoa takes charge.

June

Several hundred political prisoners, including Andre Resampa and Monja Jaona, freed.

September

Committee of Protest Organizations, an outgrowth of May demonstrations, holds national convention in Tananarive.

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**October**

Over 80% of voters approve referendum giving Ramanantsoa 5-year rule without a parliament.

**December**

Communal rioting erupts in port city of Tamatave.

**1973**

**February**

Tsiranana makes political trip to northern Madagascar. Disorders erupt in Diego-Suarez, Majunga, and two other localities.

**March**

Several former high-ranking members of Tsiranana's party arrested on charges of inciting February riots.

**May**

Foreign Affairs Minister Ratsiraka announces Madagascar's decision to withdraw from the franc zone.

**June**

Madagascar and France sign wide-ranging accords which reduce France's overall role in Madagascar, provide for evacuation of most French forces by late 1973, but permit continued French use of Diego-Suarez.

### Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	FOREIGN	ENGLISH
AKFM.....	<i>Antokon'ny Kongresin'ny Fahalovan- tenan'i Madagasikara</i>	Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar
CNPD.....	<i>Conseil National Populaire du Devel- oppement</i>	National Popular Development Council
CSI.....	<i>Conseil Superieur des Institutions.....</i>	High Council of Institutions
GN.....	<i>Gendarmerie Nationale.....</i>	National Gendarmerie
KIM.....	<i>Komity Iombonan'ny Mpitolona.....</i>	Joint Struggle Committee
MDRM.....	<i>Mouvement Democratique de Renovation Malgache</i>	Democratic Movement for Malagasy Renewal
MFM.....	<i>Mpitolona ho an'ny Fanjakan'ny Makinika</i>	Militant Group to Establish Proletarian Rule
MLP.....	<i>Mouvement de Liberation du Peuple...</i>	People's Liberation Movement
MONIMA.....	<i>Mouvement National pour l'Indepen- dence de Madagascar</i>	National Movement for the Independ- ence of Madagascar
OCAM.....	<i>Organization Commune Africaine, Malgache et Mauricienne</i>	Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization
ORSTOM.....	<i>Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique des Territoires d'Outre-Mer</i>	Office for Overseas Scientific and Tech- nical Research
PCM.....	<i>Parti Communiste Malgache.....</i>	Malagasy Communist Party
PDCM.....	<i>Parti Democratique Chretien de Madagas- car</i>	Christian Democratic Party of Mada- gascar
PSD.....	<i>Parti Social Democrat.....</i>	Social Democratic Party
RNM.....	<i>Rassemblement National Malgache...</i>	Malagasy National Renewal
SDIE.....	<i>Service de Documentation Interieure et Exterieure</i>	Internal and External Intelligence Service
USM.....	<i>Union Socialiste Malgache.....</i>	Malagasy Socialist Union
ZOAM.....	<i>Zatovo Orin'asa Madagasikara.....</i>	Unemployed Youth of Madagascar

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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