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INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

DOC. NO. 2154

Date 20 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Exhibit #478 Report of Interrogation  
of Admiral HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi on Chinese Affairs 1937

Date: Feb 46 Original (X) Copy ( ) Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes ( ) No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also Witness if applicable)  
Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: (Our case file 367)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi; SHIMADA, Shigetaro

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Aggression, China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references)

Interviewed by E. H. Dell. Gives Japanese version of  
incident of 9 August 1937, Shanghai.

Analyst: W. H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2154



2154

File No. 367

Re: HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi (Admiral)

Date: 6 March 1946

Report of Interview By:

Edward H. Dell

International Pros. Sect.

Status: Pending

On 7 February, 1946, hours 1400 to 1645, at the Meiji Building, Tokyo, I interviewed HASEGAWA, Kiyoshi, (Admiral), in the presence of William A. Hardy, Special Agent, C.I.C., concerning his participation in the "Shanghai Incident" of 1937. I interviewed subject further on 8 February, 1946, hours 1400 to 1645, 11 February 1946, hours 1345 to 1645, 14 February 1946, hours 1330 to 1630, 16 February, 1946, hours 1330 to 1645, 18 February, 1946, hours 1400 to 1630, 19 February, 1946, hours 1345 to 1630, and 20 February, 1946, hours 1400 to 1645.

Subject stated that he had been mistaken as to certain dates given by him in his interview with Special Agent Hardy (File No. 367 Serial 1) and requested that his statement, wherein he said that he left Shanghai, on the 27th or 28th of July 1937, to go to maneuvers, be changed; that on further consideration, he recalled that he left Shanghai late in June or early in July of 1937. Subject also stated that he was mistaken in his estimate of the size of landing parties at Shanghai and requested that those estimates be corrected.

HASEGAWA then made the following statement:

"Late in June or early in July of 1937, I left Shanghai and proceeded to Tsingtao, a Chinese port which was originally opened by the Germans. The Japanese had large mills at Tsingtao, which manufactured cloth and we maintained a naval garrison of about 500 men there, which had been stationed at Tsingtao for about two years. I stayed at Tsingtao for four or five days to inspect our garrison and also to secure information about the Chinese from our operatives in the Tokumu Kikan (S.S.O) who were included in the personnel stationed at Tsingtao. We also had a Tokumu Kikan organization at that time at Shanghai, of which Naval Attache Captain HONDA, who is now a Rear-Admiral, was the head. The chief of the Tokumu Kikan at Tsingtao reported that things were quiet in that city but that the Chinese were very excited about the situation in North China."

When questioned about the existence of a plan for "keeping the coast of China quiet" in case of trouble, which was his particular assignment as Commander of the Third Fleet, Admiral HASEGAWA stated:

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"My particular assignment as Commander of the Third Squadron made me responsible for keeping things quiet along the China coast, in case of trouble. The larger cities along the coast over which my responsibilities extended were Peiping, Tsingtao, Shanghai and as far south as Hong Kong.

Before I was sent to China to take over command of the Third Fleet a plan had been devised and formulated for operations in case of trouble in China; this plan, which had been put on paper, was devised and drawn up, in Tokyo, by the Navy Operations Board (Navy General Staff); Prince FUSHIMA was the Chief and Vice-Admiral SHIMADA was the Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff, in Tokyo, when I left for Shanghai to take command of the Third Fleet; the Vice-Chief SHIMADA was the real head of the General Staff; I was appointed Commander of the Third Fleet on December 1st, 1936; before going to Shanghai to take over the command of the Third Fleet I talked with SHIMADA about the general plan for the defense of the China coast and I saw the complete plan but I did not take with me a complete copy of the plans because the only one that existed was retained in the Navy General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo; I was furnished with charts showing the constitution of squadrons and these charts were the only documents that came into my possession;

Prior to being appointed Commander of the Third Fleet I had been Vice-Minister of the Navy continuously from April 1934 to December 1936. I was first appointed Vice-Minister under Mineo OSUMI, Navy Minister in the SAITO Cabinet; I continued as Vice-Minister under OSUMI in the OKADA Cabinet and when that Cabinet fell because of the February 26th Incident, Admiral Osami NAGANO, who took over the Navy Ministry in the HIROTA Cabinet asked me to continue as Vice-Minister because I was familiar with the duties of the office."

In continuing his background and career Admiral HASEGAWA made the following statement:

"I was born at Fukui Province, on May 7th 1889, my actual age being 66 years, according to Japanese method of calculating age I am 64; my father was not a military or naval man but was a doctor in a small country province; I entered the Naval Academy in December of 1903; upon my graduation I served in the Japanese Navy, on seaduty, as amidshipman for one year; I served in the Navy during the Russo-Japanese war, at Port Arthur; I was commissioned a sub-lieutenant in September, 1904 and was promoted to First Class Sub-Lieutenant September, 1905; I was promoted to Lieutenant in 1908 and Lieutenant Commander in 1913; during World War I I was attached to a Japanese naval vessel as a staff officer to Admiral KATO and participated in the capture of Tsingtao. In 1918 I went to the United States as a language officer and, during the summer of 1918 attended a summer course in American History, which lasted one month, at Harvard University; while in the United States I was promoted to Commander; in September of 1918, through the influence of Admiral BENSON, I travelled aboard a United States Army transport



from New York to Brest; while in Europe I visited Paris and London and returned to New York in 1918 aboard another United States Army Transport.

I was assistant Naval Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Washington, during 1919; I returned to Japan in April of 1920 and went to sea as a staff officer to Admiral SHIMANOUCI, who was then in command of a destroyer division; in 1922 I was promoted to Captain and was placed in charge of the promotion division of the Bureau of Personnel in the Navy Department, during 1923; on December 1st 1923 I was appointed Naval Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington; HANIHARA, who has since died, was Japanese Ambassador at that time; I remained in Washington, as Naval Attache for two years; I returned to Tokyo in December, 1925 and was assigned to command the Cruiser Nissin, which command I held for six months, after which I commanded the battleship Nagato, for one year; I was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1927 and became Chief Staff Officer of the Yokosuka Naval Station during 1927 and 1928; in 1929 I became Commandant of a submarine squadron for one year and in 1930 became Chief of Division for submarine construction of the Board of Construction of the Navy Department; in 1931 I was head of the Kure Naval Arsenal, which position I filled for ten months; in 1932 I was sent by the Japanese Government to the Geneva conference of the League of Nations on naval limitations, as a representative of the Japanese Navy; I remained at the conference for one year, the conference engaged in much discussion but no agreements were reached and nothing was accomplished; while attending the conference at Geneva I was promoted to Vice-Admiral and after the conference ended I went on a sight-seeing trip to England, France, Belgium, Holland and Italy, after which I returned to Geneva for one day and then returned to Japan; my trip through Europe was just a sight-seeing trip and I met no political leaders or personalities in the countries I visited; I came back to Japan at the end of 1933, travelling the Eastern route and visited Cairo but no other place en route, our ship making short stops at Cairo, Singapore and Hong Kong and Shanghai, before docking at Yokohama; I arrived in Tokyo late in 1933; Admiral Mineo OSUMI, who is now dead, was Navy Minister at the time of my promotion to Vice-Admiral.

In April of 1934 I was appointed Vice-Minister of the Navy under Navy Minister OSUMI in the SAITO Cabinet and remained as Navy Vice-Minister for a period of two years and eight months. I would like to explain that in the Navy Ministry it was the custom to appoint two Vice-Ministers, one of whom was the political Vice-Minister, chosen from civilian life, the other a professional Navy man. I was the professional Vice-Minister."

Admiral HASEGAWA made the following observations on Japanese politics and events, which he emphasized were his own private opinions:

"About the time of the Incident of 1931 in Manchuria (Mukden Incident)



Japan began to build up her Navy, by modernizing her ships and equipment, placing special emphasis upon the construction of small cruisers, destroyers and submarines; this was done because Japan considered it necessary, at that time, after 1931 and the Manchurian situation, because she expected trouble with the United States, England and France over the Manchurian policy; in my opinion, the Mukden incident and the actions of the Kwantung Army and Japanese policy in Manchuria were aggression on the part of Japan; the rightist group in the Army and also among the civilians advanced this aggressive policy; General ARAKI was one of the leaders most active and eloquent in this group; General Shigeru HONJO, who committed suicide, was Commander in Chief of the Canton army at that time; his Chief of Staff was General MIYAKE; Colonel, now General ITAGAKI was Senior Staff Officer under General MIYAKE and Colonel Konji ISHIHARA was also a Staff Officer; these two ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, who collaborated, were leaders, in the aggressive group.

The reason I was transferred from the Navy Ministry to active duty as Commander of the Third Fleet at Shanghai, on December 1st 1936, was because I had been on shore duty for many years and I requested sea duty. Admiral NAGANO, Navy Minister, ordered me to Shanghai where I replaced Admiral OIKAWA as commander of the Third Fleet. OIKAWA was placed in charge of Naval Aviation; I was selected by Admiral NAGANO because he knew of my acquaintance with many British, American and French naval officers and considered that I could preserve friendly relations with the officers of these navies if trouble came up at Shanghai.

At the time I was transferred to Shanghai, Prince KAN-IN was Chief of the Army General Staff in Tokyo, Prince FUSHIMA was Chief of the Navy General Staff and Admiral SHIMADA was Vice-Chief; in drawing up the plan for the defense of the China coast, which I saw before I left Tokyo, it would, in my opinion, have been necessary to hold conferences between the Army and Navy General Staffs to agree upon the plans of co-operation and collaboration; I did not attend any of these conferences and cannot tell you who did or where it was held; I was instructed by Navy Minister NAGANO to keep down trouble on the China coast and was told by him to exercise my own judgment, in case of trouble, as to what steps to take and measures to employ.

I boarded my flagship, the cruiser Izumo, at Tsin-tao on the 8th or 9th of December 1936, and there took over the command of the Third Fleet: The atmosphere in Tsin-tao at that time was bad, the Chinese were hostile to the Japanese and incidents, involving Japanese residents of North China and the Chinese happened frequently; it was not the custom to increase our garrisons or send extra landing parties ashore in the case of each incident in which Japanese and Chinese were involved; the Japanese policy was to settle all troubles with the Chinese diplomatically and to deal with the local authorities. I left Tsin-tao and took my ship back to Shanghai.

During the last of June or the first of July 1937, I do not remember the exact date, I left Shanghai and went to Tsing-tao to conduct the inspection of the naval garrison there; on the 4th or 5th of July, 1937, I



proceeded to Formosa, as I explained before, to conduct the maneuvers which had been arranged in advance and while there I received a coded wireless message from Tokyo, instructing me to proceed to Shanghai because trouble was anticipated. I arrived in Shanghai on the 11th or 12th of July 1937, a few days after the Tien-tsin (Marco Polo Bridge) incident, which took place on the 7th of July 1937; when I left Shanghai, to go to Tsing-tao we had about 3000 men in our naval garrison at Shanghai, under the command of Rear-Admiral OKOCHI (Admiral HASEGAWA located the position of the Japanese garrison in Shanghai by a small pencilled circle on a map, 492A, which was presented to him, and which is attached hereto as an Exhibit); this garrison was located in the Chapei District of Shanghai, near the International Settlement and the Japanese Consulate; at that time, July 1937, my available ships were two cruisers, one of which was my flagship, the Izumo, which carried two sea-planes, four destroyers and thirteen river gunboats; the flagship was not equipped with a catapult, the planes being lowered, by crane, to the water to take off and were raised from the water, by crane, after landing. In July 1937, there were no airplane carriers attached to the Third Fleet.

On the 9th of August 1937, one lieutenant and a seaman of our landing party were shot and killed, while driving in an automobile, by Chinese members of the Air Corps who were guarding an air field just outside of Shanghai, where the Chinese had bombing planes concealed; in our opinion they were killed because they had discovered the presence of the air field and the bombers and the Chinese did not want this information to reach the Japanese; the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai admitted, in a conference with Vice-Admiral OKOCHI and Japanese Consul OKAMOTO that the lieutenant and seaman had been killed by Chinese.

After I returned to Shanghai, from Formosa, during the last half of July and the first nine days of August, 1937, I was constantly increasing the garrison at Shanghai until by the 9th of August, 1937, it consisted of a force of approximately 5000 men under the command of Admiral OKOCHI. My reason for increasing the garrison was the information I received from our Intelligence that Chinese armies in the vicinity of Shanghai were constantly increasing in number. Immediately after the incident of the 9th of August, I further increased the garrison by landing parties of between 300 and 500 men. On the 16th or 17th of August a landing party of approximately 500 men, originally intended for Tsingtao, were added to the Shanghai garrison, making our total garrison there about 6000 men.

I wish to correct my statement about the size of the landing parties and garrison at Shanghai. On the 11th or 12th of August 1937, I landed 1500 additional men at Shanghai, which added to the garrison already there, increased our landing parties to about 6500 men. These landing party



personnel were doing guard duty in the City of Shanghai, wherever Japanese nationals lived or conducted businesses, in addition to the Japanese Consulate and the International Settlement. In 1932, after the settlement of the first Shanghai trouble a line had been agreed upon by China and Japan, within which the Japanese military and naval personnel would confine their activities and the Chinese agreed to keep their troops, not including police to maintain order, outside of this line. Since 1932 the Chinese had respected that line.

Lt. OYAMA and Seaman SAITO, at the time they were shot, were outside the line set up by the agreement of 1932 and were beyond the defense positions and lines which we had set up in our line to defend Shanghai in case of trouble from the Chinese armies which were assembling outside of Shanghai. They were in uniform but not on duty and were taking a pleasure drive.

On the 10th of August, 1937, I reported, by coded wireless message to the Navy Department in Tokyo that trouble had come up in Shanghai and that I needed additional naval forces there. A torpedo division of the First Squadron was dispatched to my assistance. These reinforcements arrived and came under my command on the 12th or 13th of August. The torpedosquadron consisted of one light cruiser, sixteen destroyers. After these ships were added to my command on the 12th or 13th my total naval forces in Shanghai waters and the vicinity consisted of three (3) cruisers, one of which was patrolling the coast in the vicinity of Tsingtao, twenty (20) destroyers and thirteen (13) gunboats. The 1500 men added to the Shanghai garrison on the 12th were from these ships.

On the 14th or 15th of August a light cruiser division from the First Squadron arrived to reinforce my command. This consisted of three light cruisers.

On the 13th or 14th an airplane carrier division reported to my command, having been dispatched by orders from Tokyo. The carrier division consisted of two (2) airplane carriers and four (4) destroyers.

By the 15th of August, my command consisted of four (4) cruisers, twenty-four (24) destroyers, thirteen (13) gunboats and two (2) airplane carriers, a total of forty-three (43) ships.

About the 16th or 17th of August, another airplane carrier division arrived to reinforce my command. It consisted of one (1) airplane carrier and two (2) destroyers. I cannot remember but I believe they came from the Second Squadron or Fleet. My total force was then forty-six (46) ships, not including the cruiser which was patrolling near Tsingtao.



All of the ships that were sent to me were dispatched by the Navy Staff Board in Tokyo and had to be with the knowledge of the Navy Minister who had to be consulted before the ships were dispatched to me.

On the 17th or 18th of August one (1) seaplane tender reported in the Yangtze River and was attached to my command.

On the 18th of August, the naval forces under my command consisted of four (4) cruisers, twenty-six (26) destroyers, thirteen (13) gunboats and three (3) carriers and one (1) seaplane tender.

On the 23rd of August, two divisions of troops, numbering between 40,000 and 45,000 men, under the command of General MATSUI arrived. Until the 23rd of August, when MATSUI arrived, the responsibility for keeping the sea lanes to the China coast and the Yangtze River open were mine and any operations or orders were issued on my sole responsibility. I considered the Yangtze up as far as Fusan as my zone of operations and proceeded to keep the coast and the Yangtze open and free from mines. The intention of the Japanese government and cabinet, at that time, was to keep the Shanghai incident localized and to attempt to settle it by conference with the local authorities.

On the evening of August 9th, 1937, the Commandant of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps notified the Commandant of the Japanese Naval landing party that two members of the landing party had been killed. He notified me and I issued orders to conduct an investigation but gave no order to advance our lines. I immediately notified Tokyo that Lieutenant OYAMA and Seaman SAITO had been killed. This was communicated to Tokyo by wireless. I also reported that an investigation was being conducted and that I would report details when the investigation was finished. A conference was held at Shanghai on the next day, August 10th, 1937, between Rear-Admiral OKOCHI, Consul General OKAMOTO, our Consul at Shanghai, the Mayor of Shanghai and the Commander of the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps to try and settle the matter. The Chinese wanted time to investigate, which was agreed on but our Intelligence reported that Chinese armies outside Shanghai had assumed fighting positions.

The Consul-Generals of the other nations at Shanghai offered to assist in trying to settle the incident but I refused their offers because the matter was a simple one and I thought it could be settled between the Japanese and the Chinese.

On the night of the 13th of August, 1937, firing took place between Chinese troops and Japanese landing party personnel firing at each other across the line which had been agreed upon in the Truce of 1932 as the



dividing line. One side would start firing with rifles or machine guns and the other would return the fire. This kind of firing happened often and I think it was done by troops without orders from their officers. Neither side tried to advance its lines.

On the 14th Chinese planes attempted to bomb the Izumo and the barracks of the Japanese naval landing parties. They secured no hit on either but struck two hotels and a theatre, just as the audience was leaving the theatre, in the International Settlement killing about 1000 people. The Izumo responded with anti-aircraft guns and one of the seaplanes aboard the Izumo went up and shot down one of the Chinese planes.

After the bombing, Admiral YARNELL of the United States Navy and the French and British Admirals requested that I move my flagship from where it was tied up near the International Settlement. I refused to comply with this request because if I removed my cruiser it would have left 30,000 Japanese residents and the 6500 men then in the landing party in despair.

The fighting at the line separating the Japanese zone from the Chinese zone increased on the 14th and 15th of August and I radioed Tokyo, the Navy Department, to send additional personnel to increase the naval landing party and if these could not be sent that one unmobilized regiment of soldiers about 2,000 men be sent. The Navy Department replied that an unmobilized regiment could not be sent but that 500 navy men to increase the landing party were being sent from Tsingtao. These arrived on the 16th or 17th.

On the 23rd of August, General MATSUI arrived with two divisions of troops, about 40 to 45 thousand men, aboard transports escorted by another squadron than my own, the 3rd. I had been notified in advance that they were on their way and when they would arrive.

The two divisions landed at Wusung and at landing points along the Yangtze up the river as far as Fusan.

In order to send troops overseas the consent of the Premier, Foreign Minister, Navy and Army Minister would be necessary.

The first invasion of China, in the Shanghai area, by Japanese troops took place when the troops landed at Wusung and along the Yangtze on the 23rd.

I have no recollection of any offer, by the neutral nations represented at Shanghai, to protect Japanese nationals and property if the Japanese and Chinese withdrew their lines as to establish a neutral zone and I have never heard that such an offer was made or rejected by Japan on the 19th of August.



On September 20th 1937, two more divisions of Japanese soldiers landed as reinforcements, making our total forces in the Shanghai area on that date 90,000 troops, 7000 men in the naval landing party and 39 ships in my naval command.

In my opinion the attempt to bomb my ship on the 14th of August was an Act of War and war existed between Japan and China from that time. This war was funny because there never was a declaration of war by either side.

On the 25th of August, the Navy Department suggested to me that a blockade of the China coast be declared. The longitudinal and latitudinal limits were fixed by the Navy Department and communicated by the Navy Department to me by wireless message and I declared the blockade the same day. I, as Commander of naval forces in China made the declaration that the blockade existed and I enforced it.

Since I have made the statement that the policy of the Japanese government was to localize the Tientsin Incident and the Shanghai Incident and to attempt to arrive at a peaceable settlement of the China trouble, I have consulted some books and given this statement further thought and I believe at this time that my previous statement with reference to the Japanese policy was not entirely correct. A book that I have with me entitled "Reflections on Japan" by Yoson HARIUCHI states that the policy of local settlement was abandoned by the Japanese government on the 15th of August 1937. I do not wish to state that this date is exactly correct but it is approximately correct and I remember that the Premier announced at about this time that the Cabinet had decided that the China Incident should be settled by a quick and decisive victory over Chinese forces. I received news of this change in policy by wireless message from the Navy Department. At about the same time that I received news of this change of policy I was informed that instead of the three battalions of sailors or, if these could not be sent, one unmobilized regiment of troops that I had requested, two divisions of troops, under the command of General MATSUI were on their way to Shanghai.

MATSUI and the two divisions of troops arrived on the 23rd of August, 1937 and from that date MATSUI was in command over all land operations in the Shanghai area. Troops and reinforcements to both the army forces and my naval forces continued to arrive. By the time Shanghai fell on the 27th of October, 1937, General MATSUI had seven divisions of troops in the Shanghai area and my naval forces numbered about sixty (60) ships.

I wish to correct the statement that I have previously made that Lt. OYAMA and Seaman SAITO were not on duty when they were killed. On further thought and after talking to some Japanese naval officers, I recall that they were on their way to deliver a despatch from the garrison headquarters to a Japanese cotton mill which was located within the line established by



the instrument I have previously given to you. Instead of going by a direct route which would have kept them inside of the line limiting the zone where Japanese forces were permitted under the agreement of May 5th, 1932 they took another route outside that line and were outside of that line when they were killed."

(Note: Admiral HASEGAWA marked upon A.A.F. Aeronautical Chart Shanghai 492 A with an indistinct pencilled circle indicating the location of the cotton mill to which Lt. OYAMA and Seaman SAITO were despatched. Said chart is attached to this statement. A larger circle in pencil, also marked by Admiral HASEGAWA, was placed there by him when asked to indicate the location of the Chinese airfield which Lt. OYAMA and Seaman SAITO were reported to have accidentally discovered. This chart, which was secured from Captain Haffey at the Map Section of the Fifth Air Force, Meiji Building, Tokyo, is attached to this statement and marked Exhibit "A".)

"The document that I furnished on Feb. 18th, 1946, printed in Japanese, is a copy of the Truce Agreement of May 5th 1932, establishing the line agreed upon by the Chinese and Japanese governments, as the line within which Chinese troops should not be moved and outside of which Japanese forces should not be stationed or operate." (Admiral HASEGAWA when requested to mark the location of this line upon Chart which is attached hereto and marked Exhibit "A" refused to mark the line upon said chart.)

"I cannot recall any offer or proposal made by Britain and the other neutrals, on or about August 18th, 1937, offering to undertake the protection of Japanese lives and property at Shanghai if a neutral zone would be established from which both Japanese and Chinese troops would be withdrawn. I never heard of such an offer being made or that Japanese authorities rejected such an offer on the 19th of August 1937. I do recall that Admiral YARNELL of the United States and officers of other neutral ships stationed at Shanghai requested that I move my flagship from its position in the Hwang Pu River, before the International Settlement. This request I refused."

"The terms and extent of the blockade that I proclaimed on August 25th, 1937, were transmitted to me by Navy Minister YONAI and the proclamation was issued over my signature. Before a matter like that would be acted upon by the Navy Minister it would be discussed between Navy Minister YONAI, War Minister SUGIYAMA and Foreign Minister HIROTA."

"I know nothing about the seizure of the Pratas Shoals by Japanese Naval forces on Sept. 8th, 1937. I do not know where or what they are but believe they are small islands which were used by Japanese fisherman and collectors of sea weed which is used to manufacture medicine. They were not included in the waters assigned to the Third Fleet and I do not know to which Division these waters were assigned."



(The Pratas Shoals are 180 miles S.E. of Hong Kong and East of the regular steamship lane to Manila.)

"When Shanghai fell, on Oct 27th 1937, the naval landing party personnel engaged numbered about 10,000 men and MATSUI had seven divisions engaged; these were the 3rd Division, and the 11th Division, both regular Army divisions, which arrived on 23 August 1937; the 9th Division, a regular army division and the 101st Division which was a division which had been called up since the trouble in China started; the 9th and the 101st arrived on the 20th of September; the 6th, a regular army Division, and two other divisions, the names and numbers of which I cannot remember; these divisions landed on the 19th-20th of October. In all there were about 140,000 army troops and 10,000 navy landing party personnel engaged in the battle for Shanghai.

Nanking was first bombed from the air by planes from the carriers in my fleet and seaplanes also from ships in my fleet. I do not remember the exact date of the first bombing, it was some time in September. The bombing was ordered by me, upon my own responsibility and was decided upon after I had consulted with General MATSUI. I gave notice that the city of Nanking would be bombed at noon of the day following the day the notice was released. This was the first time in history that the capital of any country was bombed from the air. The main objective of the planes was the airfield at Nanking.

I knew nothing about any protest by the United States over the bombing of Nanking.

Nanking was bombed from the air over ten times by planes under my command."

In answer to questions as to what efforts he made to arrive at a full settlement of the Shanghai Incident and to localize the incident Admiral HASEGAWA said:

"I ordered that men from the naval garrison be instructed not to cause any trouble and to remain within our lines, at night. A conference was held on the 10th of August between the Japanese Consul, the Mayor of Shanghai and the Chinese asked for time to investigate the killing of Lt. OYAMA and Seaman SAITO. Before this investigation could be completed the attempt was made to bomb the Izumo on the 14th of August and on the 15th, before the Chinese had an opportunity to conduct an investigation or reply to the charges, the Japanese Cabinet adopted the policy of settling the Chinese Incident by a quick and decisive victory over the Chinese."

"All guns except light artillery used in the Shanghai campaign were naval guns. These were 4.7 and six inch guns and were manned by naval personnel attached to the landing parties under my command. When engaged in the Shanghai campaign with the Army, these naval personnel were under the command of General Iwane MATSUI. MATSUI was a full General who had been



retired and was called back for active duty in the Shanghai campaign.

The Navy system of organization in Japan is the same as the Army's as to the relative importance of the Chief of Staff and the Minister. The Chief of Staff is directly responsible to the Emperor and in matters relating to command he is not responsible to the Navy Minister and may proceed without the authority of or consultation with the Minister. In matters of administration the Navy Minister is in authority. The Chief of Staff and Navy Minister are of equal dignity and authority, each in his particular field and each may proceed independently of the other."

"Japan's notice of withdrawal from the provisions of the Washington Naval Treaty (Dec 29th 1934) and her withdrawal from the London Naval Conference (Jan 5th 1936) took place while I was Vice-Minister of the Navy. I favored both steps as I was an advocate of a stronger navy for Japan. My attitude was in accord with the position of all navy men and most of the public in Japan at that time. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 was very unpopular in Japan especially among professional Navy men who were of the opinion that Japan should have secured a more favorable ratio than the 5 - 5 - 3 ratio agreed upon. The London Naval Treaty was also very unpopular in Japan."

Admiral HASEGAWA when questioned as to his connection with any militaristic or so called patriotic groups or societies denied that he ever belonged to any such society or group; stated that the only organization to which he had belonged was the Pacific-Cultural League, the name of which was changed in 1945 to the Pacific Association.

HASEGAWA's family consists of his wife, one son, 33 years of age, two daughters, the elder 31 years of age married to a banker who is now employed in the Foreign Office where he has been for the past four years, formerly employed by the Foreign Office at Tsingtao; the younger daughter, 29 years of age, is married to a naval engineer who holds the rank of Commander.

With respect to his financial worth, Admiral HASEGAWA computed his wealth at about ¥100,000. His home is worth about ¥50,000, including the land. He has about ¥50,000, ¥10,000 of which he received from the estates of his father and mother and the balance he has saved from his salary as a naval officer and Governor General of Formosa, which position he held from 1941 to 1945. The salary of an Admiral in the Japanese Navy is ¥6500 per year; a Vice-Admiral ¥5800 per year. As Governor General of Formosa he received a salary of ¥6500 per year, plus 50%. In addition to his salary he received a gift of ¥2000 per annum from the Emperor.

Note: Interviewer's original notes on the above interview have been marked Exhibit and have been made a part of File 367.