




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


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
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BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN ASSOCIATION.

A LETTER

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

C. B. ADDERLEY, M. P.,

ON

THE RELATIONS OF

ENGLAND WITH HER COLONIES.

BY

THE HON. JOSEPH HOWE,

PREMIER OF NOVA SCOTIA.

HAMILTON:

PRINTED AT THE "EVENING TIMES" STEAM JOB OFFICE.

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TO THE
RIGHT HON. C. B. ADDERLEY, M. P.

London, Dec. 24, 1862.

DEAR SIR,

Just before leaving England in January last, I read a letter addressed by you to the Right Hon. B. Disraeli, on the present relations of England with her Colonies.

A short time ago a friend put into my hands a second edition of that letter, prefaced by some observations suggested by the rejection of the Militia Bill submitted by the late Ministry to the Parliament of Canada.

While I acknowledge that this *brochure* has been written with great skill and ingenuity, and in a spirit of commendable moderation, I regret to be compelled, by a sense of duty to the North American Provinces, and to the Empire at large, to question the soundness of the conclusions at which you have arrived.

If I understand your argument, drawn from the History of the old Thirteen Colonies, it is this: All those Colonies provided for their own defence, and kept up standing armies, or maintained a well-disciplined militia, wherewith to fight the French and Indians, with little or no cost to the mother country; and, therefore, the five existing colonies of British America, and all the other outlying portions of the Empire, ought to do the same.

Granting, for the moment, the accuracy of your historical research, and the entire premises on which you found this argument, ought not every British statesman and every right-thinking man to whom you appeal in these islands to ask, what were the results of that system? Read them in the early history of those thirteen Colonies. From their first foundation down to the Revolution, they can hardly be said to have belonged to the Empire at all,—or to have been ruled or guided upon any system offering the slightest hope or promise of the perpetuity of amicable relations.

Founded by grasping speculators, who desired to enrich themselves at the expense of the colonists and of the mother country, or planted by Englishmen fleeing from religious persecution at home, they knew but little of the fostering care of a maternal government from the first. Their early history is the history of backstairs influence and intrigue—the rights and interests of the colonists being eternally perilled or sacrificed by the mischievous interference of the prerogative. They rarely knew the majesty of England in any of its graceful or benignant aspects. The people of England, in those days, had but little liberty themselves. The Colonies had no responsible government. The transatlantic Britons had no faith in the British

bayonet as a symbol of order, freedom, and civilization. They had seen it, but too recently, red with the blood of martyrs for opinion sake, and bristling round every form of despotic usurpation. Indians in the wood, and Frenchmen on the frontier, were dangerous enemies, but those the early settlers of New England had braced themselves to encounter and subdue. Those perils were external, but what they most feared was the internal danger of the arbitrary exercise of the power of the Crown, backed by British soldiers in their midst. The red coat was ever an object of suspicion and distrust in the New England States, and, as the Governors sent out from home were continually menacing their charters, coming into collision with their general courts, and trying every variety of sap and mine by which the peculiar framework of those democracies might be shattered and overthrown; and as the British soldiers were the janizaries of the Governors, rather than the guardians of public liberty, the prevalent feeling of the old Colonies was this—the fewer soldiers the better; and this feeling of suspicion and distrust, visible to the eyes of all men in all the legislation, correspondence and military organization of the period, finally culminated into armed resistance; and, when blood was shed, and tea destroyed, and minute men and soldiers were shooting each other all along that country road which is now a beautiful carriage drive from Lexington to Boston, the Provincials reaped the advantage of their military training, and justified the policy which you approve; but, strange to say, without perceiving that they had objects in view the very reverse of those which you profess to have at heart.

That you are a loyal gentleman I know, but if I did not know it, I should certainly be at a loss to discover evidence of a desire to keep this Empire together, in your strong recommendation that Her Majesty's Government should pursue towards those noble groups of Colonies which make up, what the *Times* aptly styles, "that mysterious unity called the British Empire," the very policy which always perilled the allegiance of, and ultimately lost to us, the splendid provinces which now form the United or Disunited States.

But, if we had only lost those Provinces by tolerating or encouraging the system you advocate; if, when they had established their Independence, the genial influences of a common origin and of old fraternal relations had been re-established, if they had treated the Revolutionary war as Englishmen do the Wars of the Roses, or as Englishmen and Scotchmen do the old Border Conflicts, as the common treasury of History, Poetry, and Romance, but not of bitter feeling; if they had carried into practice the wise saying of a gallant American Commander in China, now a Confederate Chieftain, and remembered on all occasions, or even on great occasions, "that blood is thicker than water;" if they had given us, what our Colonies invariably give us, their moral support to our diplomacy and their material aid, to the extent of their means, in times of peril, then I will freely admit that your argument would be divested of half its danger. The Colonies could not be preserved by your system, but, if they were friendly nations when they were gone, to part with them might only be a question of dignity and convenience. England

might still, in her isolation, be regarded as the mother of nations, and be treated with all courtesy and respect. The Empire would be gone but, if secure of the chivalrous support of the outlying Provinces, the Islands might be safe.

But let us borrow again the stern lessons of History. Did the Thirteen Colonies cease to chew the old roots of bitterness? Did they turn to Old England, as a lady turns to her mother after an elopement, when she is married and settled and all is forgotten and forgiven? Is it not almost incredible with what persistent suspicion and mistrust every movement of the Imperial Government has been regarded in that country ever since the recognition of its Independence? Have the people of the United States ever been without a grievance? Has not their diplomacy been most aggressive? Did they not fall upon the rear of England in 1812, when her front was presented to the powerful armies and skilful European organization of the first Napoleon? Were not their sympathizers flung across our frontiers during the political disturbances of Canada in 1837? Was not their whole moral support given to Russia during the Crimean War? Were we not, last year, openly insulted and defied, and only saved from the cost of another conflict by the vigour of the British Cabinet, the divided condition of their country, and the pre-occupation of their forces by land and sea? Does not every organ of public opinion in the Northern States come to us by every mail charged with menace and hostility to England? What have we gained, then, by the Independence of the United States, that should induce us to train the Colonies that remain to follow their example and prepare for separation? Is it not clear that, under the system you advocate, the old Thirteen Colonies maintained a doubtful allegiance to this country? Is it not also equally clear that the troops they trained, when the struggle came, were, to a man, enemies to the British Crown? And is it not painfully apparent that, as the results of the system you advocate, the Mother Country lost all the advantage of her early colonization, and trained rich and flourishing communities to regard her with feelings of hostility more implacable and undying than those which her government is called to confront in any other part of the world.

I am truly amazed that a gentleman of your keenness of perception and great political experience, can be so self-deceived as to press, at this time of day, the adoption of a policy that, in every aspect in which we view it, has proved so disastrous.

Let us examine it in relation to finance. The cost of the first American War was £104,681,218, simple interest at 3 per cent. on this sum would amount to £240,021,996. £50,000,000 were spent in the Second American War. The interest from 1815 to 1862 would be £117,500,000. Here we have then, in round numbers, the enormous sum of £616,784,432 which Great Britain has lost by training Colonies in the mode which you recommend. Even if this country had assumed the task of defending the old colonial frontiers, of beating off the French, and occasionally chastising the Indians, enormous sums of money might have been saved. It is, perhaps, vain to speculate, at this late period, as to what might have been the

results of a different system. Had timely concessions been made, had self-government been frankly conceded, had the British soldier been presented to the Colonial mind as the representative of order, and the friend of freedom, who can doubt that the first American War would never have occurred,—that the second, which grew out of the bitter feeling engendered by the first, might have been avoided. Even had a period arrived when political separation became a convenience or a necessity, it might have been arranged by friendly negotiation; and an alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon family, would probably have insured freedom of commerce and perpetual amity and good will. The British troops might have been withdrawn, marching to their places of embarkation to the sound of merry music, and followed by the acclamations of the self-reliant communities whose early struggles they had shared, whose industrial development they had protected, whose liberties they had never menaced, whose blood they had never shed. Though it may be too late to speculate on what might have resulted from applying to the old Thirteen Colonies the system which now obtains, no man can deny that the old one, which you would substitute for the modern, bore nothing but bitter fruit, and is condemned by every page of our old Colonial History.

Let us see, now, how the modern system works. Great Britain, to maintain her position as a first-rate European power, is compelled to keep up a respectable standing army. While Russia maintains a standing army of 486,000 men—and France, England's nearest neighbour, with a chief of unrivalled enterprise, sagacity, and soaring ambition at her head, can call into the field in a few days 680,000 men—could England, if she had not a Colony in the world, hold any but a very inferior European position with an army of less than 100,000 in peaceful times? Could she defend her soil from intrusion and insult, in case of war, with less? If she could not, then the Army Estimates would not be much reduced even if she threw off her colonies to-morrow. The legions might come home, and the outlying portions of this great Empire might be left to drift into new alliances and hostile connexions, but the legions would be wanted to defend the British Islands, without the moral support or material aid of millions of human beings, ruthlessly severed from all active interest in their success, by being told that their friendship was not worth preserving.

It is, then, folly to suppose that the Provinces, having no power to protect their interests by diplomacy, and no voice in determining the policy out of which hostilities may arise, would ever consent to keep up standing armies, to waste their revenues, and to assume the burden of their own defence in any wars that England might provoke. To enforce your policy would engender ill feeling, and ultimate separation. The boy who is asked to do a man's work, and is driven from the homestead because he lacks the strength, may still love the scenery which charmed his eye, and the old trees that shaded the threshold from which he has been driven, but to expect him to love very much the brethren who expelled him, would be to hope rather

more from human nature than is warranted by our experience of the world. The Provinces, once separated upon such an issue, there would be an end of friendship, of mutual sympathy, and co-operation.

"To be wroth with those we love
Doth work like madness in the brain."

The greater the affection the more intense the hatred. The Colonies, whose pride had been thus wounded—whose birthright had been denied—whose friendship had been undervalued—who had been cast, like Ishmael, without the charmed circle of home-thoughts and filial obligation—would form new ties, and contract Transatlantic, Asiatic, or European alliances. Friends and sympathisers enough, believe me, they would soon find; and they would grow and flourish, but with their growth would grow also the root of bitterness; and at least one generation of Englishmen would have to die, perhaps twenty, before this national eviction was forgotten or forgiven.

Take the group of Provinces which I know best. For a century their inhabitants have lived under the Crown of England, but for only twenty years of that long period have they had constitutional control over their internal affairs. Over their relations to the rest of the world they have at this moment no control. Though California, three thousand miles away, is represented at Washington—though Algeria is represented at Paris—the noble North American Provinces, with their boundless territory and resources, and four millions of people, have no representation in London. You admit us to representation in your Industrial Exhibitions, but from that great arena of intellectual display, on which the finer minds of North America and of all the Colonies might occasionally shed some lustre, you carefully exclude us. Our columns of gold and our pyramids of timber may rise in your crystal palaces, but our statesmen in the great councils of the Empire, never.

Our courts may exhibit the boundless resources and advanced civilization of the Colonies, but the men they produce you regard as inferior at all times, except when the Empire is to be defended; then they are to be tasked beyond their strength, and are expected to rise to the dignity of citizenship, from which at all other times they are carefully excluded. Is this fair? Is it just?

You will not deny that Norway and Wirtemberg, with their million and a half of people—Saxony, with its two millions—even Oldenburg and Brunswick, with their quarter of a million, are treated in England with a deference and distinction never accorded in this country to the North American Provinces, with their four millions. The people of these States are foreigners; we are only Englishmen on the wrong side of the Atlantic. Does it never occur to you that you ought to elevate us to the full dignity of citizenship, before you call upon us to assume all its burthens?—that, before you ask us to share with you all the perils and cost of Empire, you should share with us its honours and distinctions? In the simple French ballad, Jeannette expresses her opinion—

"That those who make the war
Should be the men to fight."

Whenever the war is made Mr. Adderley makes it, and Mr. Howe is called upon to shoulder his rifle and do duty upon the frontier where Mr. Adderley is never seen. Is this fair? Yet, if I understand your argument, it is this: Whenever war is declared by this country the North Americans must defend their own. Let us change places for a year and your hasty judgment would be corrected by your own feelings and experience.

But we are told the old Colonies did this, and where is the hardship? I have already shown you what became of the old Colonies, but will now show you what, in all human probability, would become of the North American group if your advice were to prevail.

The old Thirteen Colonies had to fight Indian tribes scattered through the woods, and the French on the frontiers, without roads, and hundred of miles from the settlements. These wars were wars of outposts and excursions. Their enemies—brave and savage enough, I admit—rarely made their appearance in any very large numbers. If the whole Six Nations, or Philip's subjects, *en masse*, were paraded to-morrow, the State of Maine would crush them all; and the militia of Nova Scotia ought to be a match for all the soldiers that New France could have mustered at any period in our old Provincial history. But when you ask us to defend ourselves against thirty or even against twenty millions of people of our own race, whose settlement and civilization precedes our own by a hundred years—who, forty years ago, were sufficiently numerous to maintain war and land and sea for three years against the whole power of Great Britain—you ask us to do that which is simply unreasonable and unjust. If this be expected or asked, it is quite clear that the Queen's name is to us no longer a tower of strength—that the Imperial Government abdicates dominion in North America. Shall it be said that the diplomacy of England is to involve us in foreign quarrels, and that the arms of England are not to be employed in our defence? It is most unfair to tell us that because the old Thirteen Colonies defended themselves against a few thousand French and Indians, the five Provinces of British America are to fight twenty or thirty States, with a population of thirty millions. The idea is preposterous, and can never be seriously entertained by the Government and Parliament of England.

Should the Northern and Southern States settle down under separate forms of Government to-morrow, it is clear that, though our danger may be diminished, the odds will still be fearfully against us. We shall even then have twenty millions of people, active, enterprising and sagacious on our flank, with a navy only inferior to that of Great Britain and France, and an army familiar with war of at least two or three hundred thousand men.

I do not mean to say, that, in a struggle for the sanctity of our soil and for the freedom of our homesteads, we could not now make a gallant defence even against this mighty power.

The people of the Southern States have taught us, even if we had not learnt before in the history of Scotland, of Holland and of Switzerland, what may be done by a high spirited and determined people, fighting on their own soil, against fearful odds and vastly

superior numbers. If driven to do it we could fight and die in unequal combats on our frontiers. We could retire to our river heads, thick forests and mountain fastnesses, we could even fall back upon our frozen regions; and we might, if our arms were blessed by Providence, in the end weary out the enemy and win an honourable peace and secure our independence. But is it not apparent that what has happened to the Virginians would happen to us? Our cities would be captured, our fields laid waste, our bridges would be blown up, our railways destroyed. The women of British North America, as remarkable for their beauty as for their purity of thought, would become a prey to a soldiery largely drawn from the refuse of society in the old world and the new. Our commerce would be destroyed, our improvements stopped, our whole society disorganized. But, whatever its issue, when the war was over, trust me that that portion of the British family who had sought our subjugation, who had shed our blood, traversed our country and outraged our women, would stand higher in our estimation, than that other branch of the family, who, from craven fear or calculating selfishness, had left us to contend with such fearful odds, who, false to the fraternal traditions of a hundred years, to the glorious unity of our common history, to the dead Englishmen and British Americans, lying side by side at Chrystlers Farm and Chateaugay, at Bloody Creek and Queenston, false to the modern union of hearts, not pens, ratified in the sight of Heaven in every large city of British America, when Queen Victoria's son, the future sovereign of this Empire, accepted the homage of our people, who hailed His Royal Highness as the representative of our Empire's unity, and who believed that protection and allegiance were reciprocal obligations.

Far better would it be, if this were to be the result of the amended relations which you propose, that England should at once say to North America, assume the management of your own foreign relations. Send your own Ministers to London, to Washington, or wherever else you please. We will admit you to the status of the most favoured nation, but we can no longer burthen our Treasury with your defence or hazard the contingencies of a more intimate union. When this was said, of course no Englishman could confront the world with the calm self-respect which marks his demeanour now. The Russian woman, who, to save her own life, flung her babes to the wolves, was slain by her friends and neighbours. This people might escape the punishment, but their turpitude would be none the less. On this point I speak strongly, but I speak as I feel. My life has been spent in developing the principles and policy by which this great Empire may be kept together; and, just when the Provinces, content with well regulated self-government and honourable imperial relations, are, perhaps for the first time in the world's history, proving that British Institutions as well as a British population may safely be transplanted, that an Englishman may go abroad anywhere, and carry with him veneration for his Sovereign, affection for his brethren, and love for his native land, and yet enjoy all the privileges of self-government under the old flag, is it not hard to see this magnificent system, of which the "Colonial Courts" and the Lan-

cashire subscriptions are but the first-fruits, rudely shaken by speculative politicians, or perilled by such taunts and dissensions as have been of late too rife in England?

Talk of defending the Colonies,—I hope to live to see the day when the outlying Provinces of the Empire will as freely send their contingents for the defence of these Islands, as they have this year sent their treasures to your Crystal Palace and their cheerful contributions to your distressed manufacturing towns. The anti-colonial feeling has been assumed to be strongest among those who, in this country, are known as the Manchester School of Politicians. If this be so, and I do not assert that it is, then what a pregnant answer may be drawn from the noble manifestations of national feeling, as contradistinguished from mere local obligation, by which our country's annals have been illustrated within a month.

When Lancashire is invaded by the Republicans, who, at a distance of three thousand miles have power to stop their looms and close their factories, when gaunt famine stalks through her streets, when hunger makes wan faces and weak frames which pestilence threatens to devour, does all England fold its arms and say to the Lancastrians, defend yourselves, protect yourselves, feed yourselves? Does Scotland or Ireland say this? Do the outlying Provinces say so? No! Thanks be to Almighty God that this has been nowhere said. The whole Empire has rushed to the relief of Lancashire, and that noble Principality is saved. With such an example before him will any Manchester Man or any other Englishman say to three hundred and fifty thousand Nova Scotians or New Brunswickers, or even to three millions of Canadians, defend yourselves against twenty millions of Republicans, whenever our diplomacy, over which you have had no control, fails to avert a war. No! this will never be said, until the Britons of the present hour are as abject as those whose "groans" for more Roman soldiers provoke our laughter in the pages of ancient history. I grant you that all England has assumed that Lancashire should help herself; and I at once concede that, to the full extent of their ability, any of the Provinces that have or are likely to become the seat of war, should, to the utmost extent of their means, provide for their own defence.

I shall, by and bye, show that whatever may have been done in other parts of the Empire, the British Americans have never flinched from the performance of this duty; but before touching this branch of the subject let me correct a very prevalent error that seems to prevail in this country, that it is the interest of North America that binds her to England. This is a popular error, and may mislead a good many people if it is not corrected.

Suppose that your Scottish border was fifteen hundred miles long, and that Scotland contained thirty millions of people, with a powerful army and navy, and the second mercantile marine in the world. Suppose British America to contain your population and England ours, would you not, under such a condition of your relations, laugh at any body who told you that it was your interest to adhere to us, at the

risk of the hatred and hostility of Scotland. But such is our position and yet we adhere to you. Why? Because it is a question of honour and not of interest. Is it from any special regard we have for the Manchester cotton spinners, the cockneys of London, or even for the very enlightened individuals who now wear the Coronets of England, or divide the rhetorical distinctions of the House of Commons? No! By the Beard of the Prophet, no, we have heard and seen you all, and we go back to our North American homes, conscious that the race we are training there are worthy to be classed as your equals. What then binds us to this country? Our interest? God forbid. Let Nova Scotia throw herself behind the Morrill tariff to-morrow and shut out the manufactures of England, there would be cotton mills upon her magnificent water powers in less than two years; and the whole consumption of thirty millions of people for her manufactures, as well as for her raw products, would be open to her at once. Her fishermen would immediately share the national bounties which are given by the Republic to foster a National Marine. The coasting trade and the free navigation of the rivers of the United States would be open to our vessels; we could coast from Maine to California. Every Gubernatorial chair, every department, every diplomatic office, on either continent, would be open to us; and yet, with all these temptations to desert you, we still adhere to England. Why? Because, as I said before, it is a question of honour and affection, and not of interest. Our allegiance has never been divided, but has come down to us, in an unbroken stream, from the earliest records of the monarchy. We have never been anything else but Britons. Why should we now? Don't tempt us, by unworthy suspicions, and political hypercriticism of our every act, to desire to be anything else. Not only our blood but our thoughts have been mingled for centuries. Our fathers fought on the same fields, died on the same scaffolds, burnt at the same stakes, struggled for the same principles; won the Great Charter, built the great Cathedrals and castles, cleared up the face of England and made her what she is; and shall you, because you happen to be left in possession of the homestead, and because we have gone abroad to extend the territory of the Empire, to people the earth and to subdue it, to illustrate and reproduce our civilization under new forms and in distant regions—shall we, I ask, forfeit our inheritance, be deprived of our birthright, and hear our brethren plead that their interest is no longer promoted by the connexion!

Why, you think little of your interest where your honour is concerned in your transactions with foreign nations. You do not repudiate your treaty with Portugal, or your moral obligations to the Turk. Shall your own brethren be treated worse than foreigners? When you violate your compact with the descendants of those Englishmen whom Cornwallis led to Halifax, with the descendants of the loyalists who stood by you when the old Colonies deserted, with those British and Irish emigrants who have gone to the Provinces with their shamrocks in their bosoms and their thistles in their hats, fondly believing that they were not going from home. When England does this, then let the holders of the National Scrip

look out, for she may be expected to do anything. When John Bull stoops to this humiliation, when he

“ ——— grows so covetous,
To lock his rascal coffers from his friends,
Be ready, Gods, with all your thunderbolts,
Dash him to pieces.”

I have promised to prove to you that, upon all trying occasions, the North American Provinces have not shrunk from the perils or the cost of war. When the old Colonies revolted, every effort was made to induce the Northern Provinces to declare their independence. The few persons who were disaffected were sufficiently active. A slight demonstration was made upon the Common of Halifax, and the standard of rebellion was raised by a few thoughtless young men in the County of Cumberland, but these disturbances were promptly put down, and the Maritime Provinces remained firm to their allegiance.

In 1775 the British Government had but one weak battalion in Canada,* numbering not much more than 500 men. The Republicans, under General Montgomery, invaded Canada in the direction of Montreal, preceded by proclamations offering the most tempting inducements to shake the loyalty of the inhabitants. The Canadian Militia rallied to the support of the Royal authorities on every point of the frontier.

At Fort St. John, Chambly, Sorel, they did duty with the regulars, and might have successfully defended this part of the Province, had not Sir Guy Carleton's strategy been seriously at fault.

Arnold led a force of 1,200 men up the Kennebec and down the Chaudiere; Montgomery, who had taken Montreal, joined him with the bulk of his force at Quebec. "The garrison of that city consisted only of one company of regulars, with some seamen and marines from a sloop of war lying in the St. Lawrence." Of the 1600 bayonets that confronted this formidable American invasion, 1400 at least must have been wielded by the strong arms of the Canadian Militia. Four simultaneous attacks were made by the combined Republican armies, gallantly led and directed by Arnold and Montgomery. At every point the enemy was foiled and driven back by these sixteen hundred men, four-fifths of them being those raw Canadian Militia, whom it seems to be the fashion, in this country, just now to depreciate and undervalue.

This time, at all events, the Province was saved by the steady valour of the Canadians, as it was impossible for the British Government to send any efficient succour till the spring.

In 1776, Arnold, still encamped before Quebec, was reinforced by a strong column of 3000 men, "with some heavy artillery." 4000 Republicans occupied St. John, Chambly, and Montreal. Help came from England on the 6th of May, and the invading armies were compelled to evacuate the Province, and, in the following year, the war

* See Sir James Carmichael Smith's "Precis of the Wars in Canada," an admirable work, just published by his son.

was carried into the enemy's country, and then followed that disastrous campaign which ended in the surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga.

The war of 1812-15 was neither sought nor provoked by the British Americans. It grew out of the continental wars, with which we certainly had as little to do. Whether a Bourbon or a Buonaparte sat upon the throne of France, was a matter of perfect indifference to us. We were pursuing our lawful avocations—clearing up our country, opening roads into the wilderness, bridging the streams, and organizing society as we best could, trading with our neighbours, and wishing them no harm. In the meantime British cruisers were visiting and searching American vessels on the sea. Then shots were fired, and, before we had time to recall our vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or to make the slightest preparation for defence, our coasts were infested by American cruisers and privateers, and our whole frontier was in a blaze.

You count the cost of war by the Army and Navy Estimates, but who can ever count the cost of that war to us? A war, let it be borne in mind, into which we were precipitated without our knowledge or consent. Let the coasts of England be invaded by powerful armies for three summers in succession; let the whole Channel, from Falmouth to the Nore, be menaced; let Southampton be taken and burnt; let the South-downs be swept from the Hampshire hills, and the rich pastures of Devonshire supply fat beeves to the enemy encamped in the Western Counties, or marching on Manchester and London; let the youth of England be drawn from profitable labour to defend these great centres of industry, the extremities of the island being given up to rapine and to plunder; fancy the women of England living for three years with the sound of artillery occasionally in their ears, and the thoughts of something worse than death ever present to their imaginations; fancy the children of England, with wonder and alarm on their pretty faces, asking for three years when their fathers would come home; fancy, in fact, the wars of the Roses or the Civil wars back again; and then you can understand what we suffered from 1812 to 1815. Talk of the cost of war at a distance; let your country be made its theatre, and then you will understand how unfair is your mode of calculation, when you charge us with the Army Estimates, and give us no credit for what we have done and suffered in your wars.

Though involved in the war of 1812 by no interest or fault of our own, though our population was scattered and our coasts and frontiers almost defenceless, the moment it came we prepared for combat without a murmur. I am just old enough to remember that war. The commerce of the Maritime Provinces was not a twentieth part of what it is now, but what we had was almost annihilated. Our mariners, debarred from lawful trade, took to privateering, and made reprisals on the enemy. Our Liverpool "clippers" fought some gallant actions, and did some service in those days. The war expenditure gave to Halifax an unhealthy excitement, but improvement was stopped in all other parts of the Province; and, when peace came,

the collapse was fearful even in that city. Ten years elapsed before it recovered from the derangement of industry and the extravagant habits fostered by the war.

A few regiments were raised in the Maritime Provinces, their militia was organized, and some drafts from the interior were brought in to defend Halifax, whence the expeditions against the French Islands and the State of Maine were fitted out. Canada alone was invaded in force.

General Smith describes the conduct of the Canadian militia in the few but weighty words that become a sagacious military chieftain pronouncing a judgment on the facts of history.

In 1812 the Republicans attacked Canada with two corps, amounting in the whole to 13,300 men. The British troops in the Province were but 4,500, of which 3,000 were in garrison at Quebec and Montreal. But 1,500 could be spared for the defence of Upper Canada. From the capture of Michelimacinae, the first blow of the campaign, down to its close, the Canadian Militia took their share in every military operation. French and English vied with each other in loyalty, steadiness, and discipline. Of the force that captured Detroit, defended by 2,500 men, but a few hundreds were regular troops. Brock had but 1,200 men to oppose 6,300 on the Niagara frontier. Half his force were Canadian Militia, yet he confronted the enemy, and, in the gallant action in which he lost his life, left an imperishable record of the steady discipline with which Canadians can defend their country.

The invading army of yeomen sent to attack Montreal were as stoutly opposed by a single brigade of British troops, aided by the Militia. In the only action which took place the Canadians alone were engaged. The enemy was beaten back, and went into winter quarters.

In 1813, Canada was menaced by three separate corps. The Niagara district was for a time overrun, and York, the capital of the Upper Province, was taken and burnt. The handful of British troops that could be spared from England's European wars, were inadequate to its defence, but in every struggle of the campaign, disastrous or triumphant, the Canadian Militia had their share. The French fought with equal gallantry in the Lower Province. At Chateaugay, Colonel de Salaberry showed what could be done with those poor undisciplined Colonists, who, it is now the fashion to tell us, can only be made good for anything, by withdrawing them from their farms and turning them into regular soldiers. The American General had a force of 7000 infantry, 10 field pieces, and 250 cavalry. De Salaberry disputed their passage into the country he loved with 1000 bayonets, beat them back, and has left behind a record, of more value in this argument, than a dozen pamphlets or ill-natured speeches in Parliament. Of this action, General Smith says: "The affair upon the Chateaugay river is remarkable, as having been fought on the British side, almost entirely by Canadians. The Republicans were repulsed by a very inferior number of Canadian Militia, and of troops raised in Canada, thus affording a practical proof of the good dispo-

sitions of the Canadians, and the possibility, to say nothing of the policy, of improving the Canadian Militia, so as to be fully equal in discipline and instruction, to any American troops that may be brought against them at any future opportunity."

But why need I multiply illustrations. It is apparent that but for the steady discipline and gallant conduct of the Militia, who are now held so cheap, the small British force which the mother country, fighting Napoleon on the Continent, could safely spare, would have been overpowered, and that Canada would have been lost before Waterloo was won, as it would have been before the arrival of the British troops in 1775, but for the gallant defence of Quebec.

But, you may say to me, all this has changed. The year 1862 presents more formidable combinations to confront than the year 1812. The United States have grown and thriven, are populous and trained to war, have railroads pointing to your frontiers, and a powerful navy on their coasts.

I grant all this, but will shew you presently that there are some elements of hope and progress at the other side. But first let me shew you that if the forces are so unequally balanced, British Statesmen and Legislators are themselves to blame. When the Independence of the United States was established in 1783, they were left with one half of the continent and you with the other. You had much accumulated wealth and an overflowing population. They were three millions of people, poor, in debt, with their country ravaged and their commerce disorganized. By the slightest effort of Statesmanship you could have planted your surplus population in your own Provinces, and, in five years, the stream of emigration would have been flowing the right way. In twenty years the British and Republican forces would have been equalized. But you did nothing, or often worse than nothing. From 1784 to 1841, we were ruled by little paternal despotisms established in this country. We could not change an officer, reduce a salary, or impose a duty, without the permission of Downing Street. For all that dreary period of 60 years, the Republicans governed themselves and you governed us. They had uniform duties and free trade with each other. We always had separate tariffs, and have them to this day. They controlled their foreign relations—you controlled ours. They had their ministers and consuls all over the world, to open new markets, and secure commercial advantages. Your ministers and consuls knew little of British America, and rarely consulted its interests. Till the advent of Huskisson, our commerce was cramped by all the vices of the old Colonial system. The Republicans could open mines in any part of their country. Our mines were locked up, until seven years ago, by a close monopoly held in this country by the creditors of the Duke of York. How few of the hundreds of thousands of Englishmen, who gazed at Nova Scotia's marvellous column of coal in the Exhibition, this summer, but would have blushed had they known that for half a century the Nova Scotians could not dig a ton of their own coal without asking permission of half a dozen English capitalists in the city of London. How few Englishmen now reflect, when riding over the rich and populous states of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Arkan-

sas, that had they not locked up their Great West, and turned it into a hunting ground, which it is now, we might have had behind Canada, three or four magnificent Provinces, enlivened by the industry of millions of British subjects, toasting the Queen's health on their holidays, and making the vexed question of the defence of our frontier one of very easy solution.

I parade these pictures of disparity in no spirit of querulous complaint, but to shew you that if the British Provinces are not stronger, the people who have struggled against all these disadvantages, and made them what they are, are not to blame. There is a British Statesman, now rendering good service in another department, who in 1839 had the sagacity to see through the rottenness of this old Colonial system, and who had the boldness to try an experiment, which has been crowned with the most signal success. Lord Russell's despatches, written in that year, conferred self-government on the North American Provinces. Not self-government, in the sense in which some shallow politicians in this country advocate it now, and who, if permitted, would destroy this Empire. But self-government to the full extent that it was then demanded. Self-government, which did not change our allegiance, that guarded every Treaty and every prerogative of the Crown, but which left us free to change our cabinets, dispense our revenues, control our officers, open our lands, and regulate our trade. Above and beyond all that Lord Russell has ever done, or said, or written, not excepting his services in passing your own Reform Bill, when he dies, his fame will rest upon his despatches, and on his colonial policy of 1839. The system then established has spread to the Eastern and African Colonies, and it will continue to spread, wherever hereafter our people occupy the waste portions of the earth, and establish a British community.

Under that system the North American Provinces, for the last twenty years, have grown and thriven. Old controversies have been settled, old grievances redressed, old abuses swept away. We have no disputes with England, except when you send us a Governor deficient in constitutional training, tact, and common sense. The authority of the Crown is everywhere sustained by a parliamentary majority. If we do not govern ourselves well, we have nobody but ourselves to blame.

Here lies our first great source of strength, in any future contest with the Republicans across the border. Our future is assured, and it includes every element of hope, every security for rational freedom. The advancing enemy can no longer hope to find, in any of the Provinces, a divided population. His proclamations, offering us the benefit of Republican institutions, would produce even less effect than the droppings from a flock of wild geese flying over the soil. We have been guided by experience, they by theory. We have clung to institutions which have borne the test of centuries, their's have been tried in the recent contest, and have yielded to the simplest strain. We have secured, in combination, the largest personal liberty with a strong executive. They appear to be unable to protect their country without sacrificing the guards of public and social life.

We will defend our country, then, because our institutions are a part of it, and our institutions are worth preserving. In any future contest with our Republican neighbours, trust me, that the concessions made to us by England in 1839 will be worth an army upon the frontier. You seem to be half repentant for the share you have had in urging these concessions. Be re-assured. Do not lend your fine talents to those who mean what you do not mean, who would go further than you, who would pollard the British oak that you would only trim; who, not having themselves the wit to guide the glorious ship of Empire, in which we are all embarked, would put her under jury masts, and hug the shore to disguise their ignorance of navigation.

But I admit that when fighting is to be done, there is something more required even than enthusiasm in a good cause. I have not lived all my life in a garrison town without knowing the difference between discipline and the want of it; between a soldier and a civilian.

But a great mistake prevails in this country as to the amount of discipline which our North American Militia would require, in order to make them, if not quite equal to your crack regiments, quite as good as the ordinary rank and file in conducting defensive warfare in a new country. Let us see what our young men know that many of your old soldiers do not. In the first place they are trained to field work and field sports. They can row, swim, fish, shoot, ride, walk on snow shoes, and camp in the woods in half an hour without the aid of canvas, but themselves in the winter anywhere where wood is to be had. These are fine accomplishments, as your Guards would have discovered last winter, had two or three thousand of our young fellows, with their rifles and snow shoes, and a week's provision on their backs, chosen to have disputed their passage anywhere between Bic and Montreal. But suppose that war had been declared last year, and that the youngsters had joined the Guards, as they would have done to a man, how long would they with their hearts in the business, have been learning, in addition to what they knew, all that a disciplined soldier has to teach; and how rapidly would they have taught the Guardsman what, for his own preservation and efficiency in such a country, it is indispensable that he should know? It is on this admirable combination of qualities, on this reciprocal interchange of services, sympathy, and instruction, that, in the second place, I rely on any future wars which we may be compelled to wage in defence of our Provinces in North America. Your troops will always have the highest discipline, the most perfect knowledge of a profession, in its elementary stages not difficult to learn, and our young men, who cannot afford to leave their farms and play at soldiers in time of peace, will be apt scholars, and not bad teachers to the soldiers in time of peril. It was this admirable combination of the finest qualities required to make an army, that told upon the combats of 1812-15, and that will tell upon any future contests into which we may be driven. We ought to have good leadership and good drills from the first apprehension of hostilities, and, having these, it must be confessed that our materials wherewith to work are in quality unsurpassed.

But you will naturally ask, may they not be improved? and should not the youth of the Colonies be trained to arms that they may be better able to co-operate with British troops in defence of our common country?—and I answer, that we are training, and preparing to train them in a mode suitable to the condition of our country—in a mode that, while it is but little burdensome, and excites no ill will in the Provinces, can give no offence to our neighbours.

Let me illustrate this part of the subject by facts drawn from Nova Scotia, with which I am best acquainted. During the long peace which followed the Treaty of Paris our Militia laws were very rarely revised, the Militia were never called out, and our population, busy with the arts of peace, “studied war no more.” Matters continued in this state till the Volunteer movement began in this country. Almost simultaneous with that movement, under the personal superintendence and guidance of Lord Mulgrave, we began to raise Volunteer Companies in Nova Scotia; and there are now between three and four thousand young men, in the flower of life, who have selected their own officers, approved and commissioned by the Commander-in-Chief, purchased their own uniforms, and, under the sharp training of efficient drill sergeants, taken from the British army and paid by the Province, have become, in a marvellously short time, very effective troops. We have one battalion that brigades with the garrison, strong companies at Pictou and Sydney for the defence of the coal mines, and many others, formed and forming, in the seaport towns and rural districts. Taking the number at 4,000 and our population at 350,000, this would be equal to 86,000 Volunteers to be raised in this country. Taking the cost of uniforms and amounts expended in ammunition and organization at £25,000, and, comparing our revenue with yours, it can be shown that our expenditure is, in proportion to our means, equal to an outlay of £9,733,000 for this country. Should we be scolded for doing this in the short period of three years?

But we have done more. We have set seriously about re-organizing our Militia. The whole force is being enrolled. Old officers are retiring with their rank. Those who are young enough and still desire to serve are told to qualify or resign. No young officer is appointed who has not qualified. The military spirit has revived with the apparent necessity, and is fast spreading all over the Provinces. Half the members of the Legislature last winter earned an appetite for breakfast in the drill-room, and used to pass my window on the coldest mornings with their rifles over their shoulders. The crack of the rifle is as common a sound as the note of the Bob Link, and intercolonial shooting matches are becoming an institution.

Our Militia Laws had not been revised since that rather memorable period when Governor Fairfield called out the militia of Maine to settle the north-eastern boundary question by an invasion of New Brunswick. What took place then finely answers the argument that in the Provinces we wait for British troops to defend us.

On that occasion there were but a regiment or two in all the maritime Provinces. The Canadian garrisons were too far off, and, it being winter, could only come to us by the road the Guards traversed, or through the enemy's country. But we did not wait for

troops from England or from Canada either. Our Militia Law was revised in a single day, and ample powers given to the Governor to spend every pound of revenue and call out every man in Nova Scotia for the defence of our sister Province. Fancy Scotland or Ireland menaced and every man in England ordered to turn out for her defence, and you have a parallel to what took place in Nova Scotia. Had we hesitated, had we waited, there might have been collisions, perhaps war, but the promptness of our demonstration astonished Governor Fairfield; and the three cheers for the Queen and for New Brunswick, given by the members of our Legislatures standing in their places, with the Speaker in the chair, however unparliamentary the outbreak of feeling may appear, proved to the militia of Maine that if they crossed the Border, a loyal and high-spirited people were ready to confront them.

The territory in dispute was given away, Canada and New Brunswick were almost split in halves. The provincials laid down their arms, and accepted peace on such terms, with shame and sorrow, not much relieved by the subsequent discovery of an old map, which showed how our diplomatist had been practised upon. From that period till the occurrence of the Trent affair, last winter, the prevalent belief in all the Provinces was this, that for no North American interest, or no North American question, would Great Britain go to war. In this belief our militia laws were neglected, our training ceased. Our officers grew old and obese, or died, and nobody would take their places. No Government would spend a pound upon defence, and, after the withdrawal of the guarantee to the Intercolonial Railroad in 1851, the impression deepened that the people of this country were indifferent to our prosperity or defence.

When the Trent affair aroused the indignant feeling of the empire last autumn, we were, as we were in 1812, utterly unprepared. The war again was none of our seeking.

Nova Scotia and New Brunswick had thousands of vessels upon the sea, scattered all over the world. Canada had her thousand miles of frontier unprotected. Had war come, we knew that our money losses would have been fearful, and the scenes upon our sea coasts and our frontiers, sternly painted as they must occur, without any stretch of the imagination, might well bid the "boldest hold his breath for a time." But, did a single man in all those noble Provinces falter? No! Every man, aye, and every woman accepted the necessity and prepared for war. Again, it was a question of honour and not interest. In a week we could have arranged, by negotiation, for peace with the United States and have kept out of the quarrel. But who thought of such a thing. Your homesteads were safe, ours in peril, a British, not a colonial ship, had been boarded, but what then? The old flag, that had floated over our fathers' heads and droops over their graves, had been insulted, and our British blood was stirred without our ever thinking of our pockets. The spirit and unanimity of the Provinces, no less than the fine troops, and war material, shipped from this country, worked like a charm at Washington. President Lincoln, like Governor Fairfield, saw clearly that he was to be confronted, not only by the finest soldiers in the

world, but by a united and high-spirited population. The effect was sedative, the captives were given up, and the provincials, as is their habit when there is no danger to confront, returned to their peaceful avocations.

We were pursuing these most sedulously, not disturbed by any panic fear of our Republican neighbours, and most unconscious of having done anything to warrant the sudden outbreak of feeling that occurred in this country last summer, and with which we were deeply pained, and perhaps not a little disgusted.

The causes of complaint urged against Canada, in England, are two-fold.

1. Her high Import Duties are objected to, and,
2. She is blamed for defeating a Ministry on a Militia Bill.

As respects the tariff of Canada, let me observe, that, when self-government was conferred upon that Province, the right to construct her own tariff was virtually conceded. By a special despatch, sent to all the Provinces when Lord Grey was Colonial Secretary, the right to impose what duties they pleased was specifically conceded, provided they were not discriminating, and were made to attach alike to importations from all countries. No restriction of the right to protect their own industry was stated. But in none of the Provinces have protective or discriminating duties ever been imposed.

It is true that the import duties of Canada are rather high. But it can be shown that all the duty raised is actually required to pay the interests on the debts of the Province, to carry on its public improvements, and to provide for its Civil List. It cannot be shown that there is much needless extravagance in the administration of the Government. With the single exception of the Governor-General's salary, regarded in this country as too low to secure the higher style of talent, no public officer in that Province receives a remuneration for his services that would not be regarded in England as inadequate, if not parsimonious. The highest judicial officers and heads of departments only receive £1000 sterling per annum.

The debts of Canada were incurred for the construction of canals and railroads, of the highest Imperial and Provincial importance. They were designed to attract through British territory a large portion of the trade of the great West. When the Intercolonial Railway is finished we shall not only control the telegraphic and postal correspondence of the Western States, but secure to the people of Great Britain at all seasons a steady supply of breadstuffs; should unhappily the Atlantic ports of the United States, in war, be closed against them. Who then will venture to assert that these were not elevated objects of the highest national importance, and these objects being secured, surely no man will suggest that the debts incurred ought not to be honourably redeemed.

Those persons, in this country, who desire that Canada should raise her revenue by direct taxation rather than by duties upon imports, do not reflect that there is a wide distinction to be drawn between an old and densely populated country and a new one but thinly peopled. In England the mass of the inhabitants live in cities and villages, even in the rural districts every acre of land is owned and cultivated, and

has a money value. In Canada, as in all the Colonies, a large portion of the population live at great distances from each other. In the remote settlements land has often but a nominal value, and money is scarce. To collect direct taxes in such a country often costs more than they come to. Hence the preference shewn for the system of raising revenue by import duties. They yield more without harassing the people, than could be got, with infinite labour and vexation of spirit, by any system of direct taxation. As the Provinces prosper and population increases, the import duties will come down. In the meantime, as there is not a cotton factory in any of the Provinces, as every year the consumption of British manufactures, in all their varied forms of beauty and utility, steadily increases, and as the consumers and not the producers pay the duty, why should exception be taken to our tariffs? I trust that my explanations under this head, will be regarded as entirely satisfactory. The colonies of England take now £46,000,000 worth of manufactures every year, and I hold, that as the selling price in England includes all that the manufacturer has to pay towards the national debt, and the maintenance of the Army and Navy, the colonists, who honestly pay for and consume these goods, pay now, independently of their own military expenditure, a noble contribution towards the funds dedicated to national defence.

Let us now see whether the great Province of Canada has done, or has failed to do, anything to warrant the sharp Parliamentary and newspaper criticisms with which she has been assailed in this country.

I have shown you that her untrained Militia has twice saved the Province, and I have shewn you that, on the very latest occasion when Great Britain appealed to their patriotism, every man responded to the call. Let me now shew you that, although she may not have quite met the public expectations of this country (not very accurately informed as to the state of feeling in the Province), she has not been entirely neglectful of her defences, but is at this moment much better prepared to resist attack than she ever was at any former period of her history.

In 1855 the Militia Law of Canada was carefully revised; under that law the Government enrolled, drilled, and armed, at the expense of the Province, a very respectable volunteer force. The country was divided into military districts, and the whole sedentary militia, consisting of every man capable of bearing arms, was organized.

In 1862, the law was amended to enable the Commander-in-Chief to make the enrollment more reliable and perfect. The Volunteer organization was rendered more general, arms and clothing were given to all persons who desired to enlist in those Volunteer corps. It is assumed, on good authority, that Canada, at the close of this year, will have 15,000* volunteers, equal, if the population of the two countries are contrasted, to 105,000 for the British Islands.

All the officers of the Sedentary Militia are now required to receive military training and instruction. They are removed if they do not. Hereafter no officer will be appointed or promoted who has not

* Actually 25,000, and others offered who could not be accepted.

acquired a fair knowledge of arms. The number of officers whom it is the design of this system to qualify, will amount to 20,000. Brigade majors have been appointed in all the districts. The Governor-General is, by statute, Commander-in-Chief, and is authorized, at his discretion, or on any apprehension of danger, to call out every man in the Province, or any number that may be required. Under the law, as it stands, at fifteen days' notice, 50,000 men, perfectly organized in companies and battalions, and with all their regimental officers, from a colonel to a corporal, could be placed upon any point of the frontier.

What skill or soldiership have the great armies of the Northern States exhibited, that we should be much afraid to confront them, if the Canadians have not degenerated and if this country shews, as it certainly did last winter, a determination to fulfil its honourable obligations? "A little leaven leaveneth the whole mass," and twenty thousand British soldiers, judiciously distributed and skilfully led, with this fine force at their back or serving in the ranks beside them, ought to be able to give a good account of any invading army which the Northern States can send against them. But I apprehend that when those States emerge from the present disastrous civil war it will be some time before they will madly rush into a war with England. Looking to their mourning households, to the maimed and emaciated soldiers wandering through their streets, to their heavy national debt, to their disordered finances, and to the tremendous power which this Empire can put forth, if we are only true to each other, the day is distant when those States will heedlessly provoke a contest with this country. This is evidently the opinion in Canada, and, so far at all events, it would appear that, in acting upon it, her Government has been sustained.

I have no desire to touch the local politics of Canada. I regret that the late Government elected to fall on the Militia Bill, and that their opponents were good-natured or unskilful enough to let them. I think the Opposition should have recited, by resolution, the reasons for which they turned the Ministers out. Had they done so, a good deal of the misapprehension which has prevailed in this country, which has evidently inspired the debates in Parliament and the criticisms of the press, might have been avoided.

The right of the Parliament of Canada to turn out a Ministry, even upon a Militia Bill, cannot be questioned. Had Lord Palmerston's Government been overthrown last winter upon the question of the fortifications, nobody would have denied the right of the majority to aim a hostile vote, and certainly no British American, even if it had prevailed, would have fancied that there was one loyal Englishman the less.

I have shewn that 15,000 volunteers in Canada is equal to a force of 105,000 if raised in this country. To complete the contrast it should be remembered what boundless resources are in an old kingdom like this, compared with all the visible means of taxation to be found in a new country like British America. You have the accumulated results of the labours of countless generations of men, running over a period of some two thousand years. You have all that

your fathers and ours toiled for and made from the Roman Conquest to the departure of the "Mayflower." All that your fathers have created since, and all that in your own day and generation, having this enormous capital to work with, you have been enabled to earn for yourselves. To say nothing of the labour of your people, it is asserted that the machinery of this island performs the work, every year, of 800,000,000 men.

With untold treasures upon the surface and beneath it, with an annually accumulating capital that an actuary can hardly estimate, and this tremendous mechanical power in your hands, you can bear an amount of taxation which would sink any new country, with a limited population and a history of a hundred years, if she attempted to impose upon her people proportional burthens. I grant that we have less poverty, and that the property we have is more equally distributed, but we have not a tithe of your accumulated capital and productive power, and the contrast which the two countries exhibit, in this respect, should ever be borne in mind by candid reasoners whenever this class of questions is discussed.

Let me now direct your attention to the state of your defences, at a period of your history when England and British America may be more fairly contrasted than they can now.

In 1588, the population of England was 5,000,000. She was in as much peril as we are now, or ever were, from the armies of the United States. The subtle policy of Parma and Philip was closing around her: the Armada was in the Channel, and two of the best appointed armies of veteran troops that Europe ever saw were preparing to land upon her shores.

That they did not land was owing to the protection of an overruling Providence, to the liberality of her merchants, and to the heroic achievements of those glorious seamen who left the land forces little to do. But had England been invaded, how was she prepared? Mottley, in his History of the Netherlands, tells us the story of her defences, the condition of which ought certainly to have overthrown the Ministers, had England possessed responsible Government in those days.

The Spanish armies were estimated at 116,000 men. "In England," says Mottley, "an army had been enrolled, a force of 86,016 foot and 13,831 cavalry, but it was an army on paper merely." Even of the 86,000 men (not one-fifth of the militia of Canada) only 48,000 were set down as trained, and it is certain that the training had been of the most meagre description. "Of enthusiasm and courage there was enough, but of powder and shot there was a deficiency."

Sir Edward Stanley thus describes the militia he was sent to inspect in Cheshire and Lancashire:—"They were appointed two years past to have been trained six days by the year, or more, at the discretion of the muster-master, *but as yet they have not been trained one day, so that they have benefitted nothing, nor yet know their leaders.*" "There was a general indisposition" (in England then as in Canada now) "in the rural districts to expend money and time in military business until the necessity should become imperative."

Even in August, when the Armada was on the wing, "The camp was not formed, nor anything more than a mere handful of troops mustered about Tilbury to defend the road from Dover to London. The army at Tilbury never exceeded sixteen or seventeen thousand men."

About as many as Nova Scotia could, with her two railroads, have drawn around the citadel of Halifax from her eastern and western counties in a week, had their services been required last winter; not half as many as Canada, in twenty days, can now plant upon any point of her frontier. The aggregate tonnage of the whole Royal Navy was 11,280 tons, less than the tonnage of the vessels built in our port of Yarmouth in a single year.* Of the land forces Mottley states that "A drilled and disciplined army, whether of regulars or militia-men, had no existence whatever."

The Commissariat arrangements were in keeping with the discipline and organization. Leicester, writing to Walsingham, says of his raw levies:—"Some want the captains showed, for these men arrived without one meal of victuals, so that on their arrival they had not one barrel of beer or loaf of bread; enough, after twenty miles' march, to have discouraged them and brought them to mutiny." On the 6th August the Armada was in Calais Roads, and up to the 5th no army had been assembled, not even the body guard of the Queen; and Leicester, with four thousand men, unprovided with a barrel of beer or a loaf of bread, was about commencing his entrenched camp at Tilbury.

These are the facts of history, and it sometimes strikes me that British legislators and politicians would act more wisely if they were gravely pondered, before they undertook to criticise too severely nascent but vigorous offshoots of that sound old stock that, when passing through the stages of advancement which we have just reached, when the population of England was about the same as ours is now, thought themselves able to face a disciplined army with the limited amount of preparation that Mottley so quaintly describes. They should not compare small things with great, but things which bear some proportion to each other, and they ought not to expect us to be less averse to expensive standing armies than our ancestors were when their necessities were quite as great.

But let me turn your attention to another period of English history. Let us come down the stream of time from 1588 to 1685, and inquire in what condition the army and militia of England were when her

* A forcible and vivid idea of the rapidity with which the shipping of Yarmouth is increasing will be derived from the perusal of the subjoined figures, shewing the amount of tonnage owned in this port at the various decennial periods since 1822:

In the year 1822	- -	3,000 tons.
" " 1832	- -	4,318 "
" " 1842	- -	13,765 "
" " 1852	- -	18,880 "
" " 1862	- -	45,198 "

We very much question if there is another port on the face of the globe, with the same extent of territory and population, that can boast of equal increase in the same period.—*Yarmouth Tribune*, Nova Scotia.

population was nearly double that of Canada. First, read what Macaulay says on the subject of direct taxation:—"The discontent excited by direct imposts is, indeed, almost always out of proportion to the quantity of money which they bring into the Exchequer, and the tax on chimnies was, even among direct imposts, peculiarly odious, for it could be levied only by means of domiciliary visits, and of such visits the English have always been impatient to a degree which the people of other countries can but faintly conceive."

It is hoped that some allowance will be hereafter made for our hereditary impatience of direct taxation.

After describing the powerful, well appointed and finely disciplined armies kept up by the leading powers of Europe in the reign of Charles the Second, Macaulay says:—"In our island, on the contrary, it was possible to live long and to travel far, without being reminded by any martial sight or sound that the defence of nations had become a science and a calling. The majority of Englishmen, who were under twenty-five years of age, had probably never seen a company of regular soldiers. The only army which the law recognized was the militia. The whole number of cavalry and infantry thus maintained was popularly estimated at a hundred and thirty thousand men." (Not half the militia of Canada.)

These militiamen received no pay, except when called into actual service. Macaulay describes them as:—"Ploughmen officered by justices of the peace."

By degrees Charles got together a few regiments of troops; but the regular army, as late as 1685, did not consist, all ranks included, of above seventeen thousand foot, and about seventeen hundred cavalry and dragoons, not agre at many more, it would appear, than the militia officers of Canada. The discipline was lax, and could not be otherwise. "The common law of England knew nothing of courts martial, and made no distinction in time of peace between a soldier and any other subject; nor could the Government then venture to ask the most loyal Parliament for a Mutiny Bill. A soldier, therefore, by knocking down his colonel incurred only the ordinary penalties of assault and battery, and by refusing to obey orders, by sleeping on guard, or by deserting his colours, incurred no legal penalty at all."

Let us trust that the discipline of our despised militia in the Provinces is not worse.

Macaulay's description of the Navy is almost as ludicrous:—"The naval administration was a prodigy of wastefulness, corruption, ignorance and indolence, no estimate could be trusted, no contract was performed, no check was enforced."

But to return to the Army. There was "no regiment of Artillery, no Sappers and Miners."

Surely we are not much worse than this in the Provinces? Hear Dryden's description of the militia of England in the reign of James the Second:—

"The country rings around with war's alarm,
And now in fields the rude militia swarms.

Mouths, without hands, maintained at vast expense,
 In peace a charge, in war a weak defence;
 Stout once a month they march, a blust'ring band,
 And ever, but in time of need, at hand.
 This was the morn, when hast'ning to the guard,
 Drawn up in rank and file they stood prepared
 Of seeming arms to make a short essay,
 Then hast'ning to be drunk, the business of the day."

Here, then, are the militia of England described by her poets and historians at a time when England had nearly double the population of Canada. With these pictures before us, and remembering what our Provincial Militia have done, and knowing what they are, I do not think we need blush for their history or organization.

At this moment Queen Victoria rules over fifty-one colonies and dependencies, which, with the British Islands, form the Empire that you and I desire to consolidate and improve. How this is to be done is a question of stupendous interest, demanding the highest qualities of statesmanship for its consideration and adjustment. There are those who seem to contemplate the dismemberment of this great Empire with evident delight, and who appear to regard the spread of British institutions and civilization as a misfortune to the world at large, and an injury to the parent state.

But let us see what there is within this charmed circle of Imperial duties and relations that is worth preserving. It is true that every outlying Province, as I have already shewn, may be attacked whenever the mother country is at war, yet war can only come when the plastic powers of astute diplomacy have been exhausted, and when the dread alternative has been deliberately accepted by enlightened public opinion. But into how many wars might not these fifty-one Provinces be dragged if this Empire were dismembered, and if they were left to be overrun by neighbouring States, or drawn into entangling alliances with populations often ruthless or unenlightened?

In the interests of peace, then, we are bound, if we can, to see that this Empire is kept together. We are equally bound, if we regard the interests of religion. Wherever British power is acknowledged and the British bayonet gleams, the missionary of every Christian Church can tread the land in safety, and teach and pray without personal apprehension. That dismemberment is sometimes advocated by persons who call themselves free traders, is to me amazing. Where, on the earth's surface, since barter was first essayed, have so many populous countries been bound together by common interests, and by the mutual interchange of productions, on a basis of such perfect freedom? Strike down the power that binds these communities together, and into how many antagonistic systems and economic absurdities would they not drift? This Empire possesses the noblest schools of law, the purest judicial tribunals, from which our Colonial Courts draw forensic animation and guiding light without stint and without shame. What British or Colonial judge or lawyer would disturb this equable flow of precedents and decisions? Then, again, if we look to literature and the arts, how charming it is to know that while every gifted youth in the most remote Province of the Empire may win the admiration of the community in which he lives, there are

fifty other Provinces to rejoice in his success and to feel the exhilaration of his genius. How charming is it also for the emigrant, pioneering in a new country, too young to have produced a picture or a book, to read Tennyson or Burns by his camp fire at night, or to look at Landseer's dogs over his mantelpiece in the morning, conscious that he can claim kindred with the artist and the author, and that the ballad and the engraving link him with treasures of literature that are inexhaustible, and of art that can never die. Whatever improvements time may suggest for its better organization and further development, this Empire, as it stands, has its uses, and should be kept together.

In this opinion I am quite sure that you and I agree. We differ as to the mode. If I understand your argument, you would have half a hundred little standing armies, scattered all over the globe, paid out of fifty treasuries, and with uniforms as various as were the colours in Joseph's coat, with no centre of union, no common discipline, no provision for mutual succour and support. I would have one army that could be massed within a few days or weeks on any point of the frontier, moved by one head, animated by one spirit, paid from one treasury. Into this army I would incorporate as many of the colonial militia as were required to take the field in any Province that might be attacked, and, from the moment they were so incorporated, they should be moved, paid and treated, as an Imperial force. There would still be work enough for the sedentary militia to do, in defending the districts in which they lived, and if this were done, and if the Provinces, as they would, bore a large part, if not the whole, of the burthen of local defence, they would do all that could reasonably be expected. If the county of Annapolis were attacked, I would not pay a militiaman out of the Imperial Treasury for defending his own county, but if a regiment were drawn from Annapolis to defend the citadel at Halifax, or the coal mines of Pictou—if it were marched into New Brunswick, or volunteered to defend these islands, then it should take its number, draw its pay, and be treated in all respects like any other regiment of the line. So long as this is done we shall have an Empire and an Army. We shall soon cease to have either when the other system is tried. And why should we try it? Why should we reverse Menenius Agrippa's fable, and teach the belly of the Empire—the common treasury and storehouse of all its wealth—to complain? The British soldier is no longer viewed with distrust or apprehension in any part of the Empire; he is everywhere recognized as a citizen with a red coat on, prouder of his citizenship than of the highest grade in the finest regiment in the service. Nor is he viewed with any jealousy or dislike by the Provincial militia. Our young men know that they can study the use of arms from no more gallant exemplars, and they know also that when summoned to the field, they can rely upon the steadiness, the endurance, the discipline, and the humanity of the British soldier. The late illustrious Prince Consort, on presenting the colours to the 13th Light Infantry, in February, 1859, expressed our opinions with great accuracy and force, when he said, "The British soldier has to follow his colours to every part of the globe, and everywhere he is the representative of his country's power, freedom, loyalty and civilization."

So long as these civilized soldiers circulate around the Empire, drawing into their ranks, as occasion may require, the youth of the Province, it is their mission to defend, so long will it be strong and its civilization secure. When they are withdrawn, and the outlying regions are left to drift into new experiments, "shadows, clouds, and darkness" will rest upon the scene, and of the glories of this Empire we shall chance to see the beginning of the end.

A great deal might be said upon some passages of your letter in which you limit the growth of aristocracies and democracies by geographical lines, but I desire to confine my observations to the question of national defence. Aristocracies will grow in every country, with the increase of wealth, the development of mental power, and the grateful recollection of heroic achievement. They are growing now in every state and province on this continent, in most of which you will find families as proud, and circles as exclusive, as any to be found in Europe; but old trees cannot be transplanted, and any premature attempt at aristocratic transplantations would decidedly fail.

You seem to apprehend that the slightest "impact of any fragment from the ruins of the union" would terminate the connexion of these Provinces with the Parent State. I do not think so. Surely if we have resisted the impact of the whole Union, pretty seriously delivered on several occasions, we ought to be able to withstand concussion from a part. Let us look at this matter thoughtfully, and without allowing our nerves to be shaken by the eccentric movements across the line. The Southern States, even if their independence were established to-morrow, are too far off to ever think of invading these Provinces. Their labouring population, being slaves, can never be soldiers or sailors, and though the white men who own them are splendid material for defensive warfare, trust me, it will be a long time before they will march into Canada and leave their slaves behind them.

The Northern States are our immediate neighbours, and, next to the mother country, ought to be our fast friends and firm allies. We claim a common origin, our populations are almost homogeneous, bridges and ferries, stage, steamboat, and railway lines, connect our frontier towns or seaboard cities. Our commerce is enormous, and is annually increasing in value. Every third vessel that enters the port of Boston goes from Nova Scotia. Our people intermarry, and socially intermix, all along the frontier. For one man that I know in the Southern Confederacy, I know twenty in the Northern States. All these mutual ties and intimate relations are securities for the preservation of peace. I admit that a good deal of irritation has arisen out of the civil war, but I rely on the frank admission of the Northern people; when the war is over, that for this they were themselves to blame. The Provinces, at its commencement, deeply deplored the outbreak of that war, and for weeks their sympathies were with the North. The storm of abuse that followed the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, and the demand for the rendition of the Commissioners, naturally changed the current of feeling, and the skill and gallantry of the Southern combatants, have won, in the Provinces as every where else, as heroic achievements always will, whatever

may be the cause of quarrel, involuntary admiration. Still, our material interests, and everyday thoughts and feelings, are in accord with those of the Northern States; and, when they come out of this war, there is no reason why, having shaken themselves clear of elements of internal irritation and disturbance, they should desire to disturb us, merely because we choose to live in amity with our common parent under British Institutions. We are bound to hope, at all events, for the restoration of kindly thoughts, and the continuance of peaceful relations. If war comes, I have already shewn that we are not so ill prepared as you assume, and that, if we do not waste our strength in idle controversy and insane divisions, we can still maintain the power of the Crown and the integrity of the Empire.

In the confident belief that fair and courteous discussion of these momentous questions will have a tendency to steady the public mind, I have been induced to throw off these pages, and have now only to assure you that,

I have the honour to be,

Your very obedient servant,

JOSEPH HOWE.

