


014.33 REPORTS "1947"

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By NARA Date 10/1/98



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By SEC NARA Date 11/1/4

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS G-2 FAR EAST COMMAND

FILE NO. 014.33 *REPEATS*
LINE NO. _____ TO _____
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

CIS

APC 500
19 DEC 1947

SUBJECT: Former Japanese Military Personnel on Okinawa

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Philippines-Ryukyus
Command, APO 707

1. Forwarded herewith as matter of interest to your
command are:

a. News story suppressed by the Civil Censor-
ship Detachment, General Headquarters, Far East Command.
(Incl 1)

b. Inclosed report of interrogation of newspaper
reporter's informant by Allied Translator and Interpreter
Service, General Headquarters, Far East Command, enlarges
upon and substantiates suppressed news story. (Incl 2)

2. In the event it is desired that he assist in the
physical location of the hold-out area or assist in
persuading the "hold-outs" to surrender, the interrogatee
can be sent to Okinawa.

3. Request General Headquarters, Far East Command be
notified of any action taken.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

RUSSELL G. DUFF
Col GSC
Asst. Executive Officer

- 3 Incls:
- 1. News Story
 - 2. ATIS Interrogation
 - 3. Map Sheet 3625-11
Tamagusuku, Ryukyu-Retto

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

19 DEC 1947
APO 500

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Philippines-Ryukyus
Command, APO 707

1. Forwarded herewith as matter of interest to your
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b. Inclosed report of interrogation of newspaper
reporter's informant by Allied Translator and Interpreter
Service, General Headquarters, Far East Command, attached
upon and substantiates suppressed news story. (Incl 2)

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physical location of the hold-outs or assist in
persuading the "hold-outs" to surrender, the interrogatee
can be sent to Okinawa.

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notified of any action taken.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

RUSSELL G. DUFF
Col
Asst. Executive Officer

DISPATCHED
DEC 30 1947
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3 Incls:
1. News Story
2. ATIS Interrogation
3. Map Sheet 3632-11
Tamaoanbu, Ryukyu-Retna

19 DEC 1947
G-2

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UNSURRENDERED JAPANESE SOLDIERS STILL REMAIN IN OKINAWA

SASEBO:---The news telling that, at the present moment when more than two years have elapsed since the termination of hostilities, over two hundred Japanese soldiers still remain in the depth of the mountains of the island and, "rather than suffer the hard life in Japan", are determined to continue their cave life for a few years more, and are leading the life of nomads, has been brought by Mr. Yu YAMAMOTO, former civilian in the military service, who, the 13th, came home by the train, leaving Minami Kazasaki Station to his native place, Odamura, Iwami-gun, Tottori Prefecture.

The following is the detail:

The fact that, in some natural caves in the mountain of Yamashiro-da ke (400 ft. above sea level), Osato-mura, Shimajiri-gun, about 8 miles away from Naha City, Okinawa Island, about one hundred Japanese soldiers with some eight native females are still leading a life of seclusion, has been brought into the open by two former warrant officers, who, tired of the simple life in the cave and suffering from malnutrition, in November last year came from their mountain abode. It has been told by them that those remaining in the mountain are still possessed of food stock for over three years. They are generating electricity by profiting the stream, but they are suffering from the lack of matches, miso (bean paste), soy, etc.

The cave they live in is so spacious that it can accommodate 400 persons, with precipitous walls surrounding the room. They are, moreover, in possession of a considerable number of machine guns and rifles and threaten to shoot at those who approach them, so it is impossible to approach them. They know of the defeat in war, but "they will stay there, in spite of everything, for a few years more rather than suffer the hard life of the war-defeated country", and would, by no means, come out of the mountains.

Another party of five or six Japanese soldiers, headed by Col. Mida, former chief of the 1616 unit, an infantry regiment called "tama" unit, armed with machine guns appear in various places to seek food and are leading a life of wanderers. Though they do not inflict any danger to the people, a reward of 100,000 yen is offered for the arrest of this party. Besides, about one hundred Japanese soldiers, who have been reported to have been killed in battle, still remain, being married with natives of Okinawa and engaged in normal callings in the country.

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UNRECORDED JAPANESE SOLDIERS STILL REMAIN IN OKINAWA


SASEBO:--The news telling that, at the present moment when more than two years have elapsed since the termination of hostilities, over two hundred Japanese soldiers still remain in the depth of the mountains of the island and, "rather than suffer the hard life in Japan", are determined to continue their cave life for a few years more, and are leading the life of nomads, has been brought by Mr. Y. YAMAMOTO, former civilian in the military service, who, the 13th, came home by the train, leaving Minami Kazasaki Station to his native place, Odamura, Iwami-gun, Tottori Prefecture.

The following is the detail:

The fact that, in some natural caves in the mountain of Yamashiro-da ke (400 ft. above sea level), Oaso-mura, Shimajiri-gun, about 8 miles away from Naha City, Okinawa Island, about one hundred Japanese soldiers with some eight native females are still leading a life of seclusion, has been brought into the open by two former warrant officers, who, tired of the simple life in the cave and suffering from malnutrition, in November last year came from their mountain abode. It has been told by them that those remaining in the mountain are still possessed of food stock for over three years. They are generating electricity by profiting the stream, but they are suffering from the lack of matches, also (bean paste), soy, etc.

The cave they live in is so spacious that it can accommodate 400 persons, with precipitous walls surrounding the room. They are, moreover, in possession of a considerable number of machine guns and rifles and are able to shoot at those who approach them, as it is possible to approach them. They know of the defect in the cave, but "they will stay there, in spite of everything, for they are more rather than suffer the hard life of the war-torn country", and would, by no means, come out of the cave.

Another party of five, headed by Col. Mida, former chief of the 10th Infantry Regiment called "Tama" unit, in various places to seek food and are leading a life of wanderers. Though they do not inflict any danger to the people, a reward of 100,000 yen is offered for the arrest of this party. Besides, about one hundred Japanese soldiers, who have been reported to have been killed in battle, still remain, being married with natives of Okinawa and engaged in normal callings in the country.



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SECRETA.M.S. INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 8478

<u>YAMAMOTO, Isamu</u> (NAME)	<u>TOTTORI-KEN, IWAMI-GUN, OYASAN ARAKANE No 263</u> (ADDRESS)
<u>Unemployed</u> (OCCUPATION)	<u>32nd Army Hq. (TAMANO 1616 Unit)</u> (UNIT)
<u>Civilian Attached to the Army (Intendance)</u> (WHAT)	<u>(127°43'E-26°13'N)</u> <u>SHURI, OKINAWA</u> (WHERE)
	<u>August 1944 to</u> <u>October 1947</u> (WHEN)
<u>Central Interrogation Center</u> (WHERE INTERROGATED)	<u>17 Nov 47</u> (WHEN)
	<u>S/Sgt MURAKAMI</u> (INTERROGATOR)

1. PREAMBLE

Informant was co-operative

2. CHRONOLOGY

Education - Elementary school (8 years)

30 Jul 44 - Arrived at NAHA (127°39'E-26°12'N)

2 Dec 45 - Surrendered to U.S. forces at KINSON (127°50'E-26°27'N),
Ishikana, Kunigami-Gun, OKINAWA

7 Oct 47 - Left INOMIYA (127°49'E-26°16'N) KUBAZAUI, NAUAGAMI-GUN, OKINAWA

10 Oct 47 - Arrived at SASEBO

3. MAP REFERENCE ON JAPANESE HOLDOUTS ON OKINAWA

OGUSUKI-DAKE (mountain) near OGUSUKU-MURA, OSATO-SON, SHIMAJIRI-GUN, OKINAWA.
A.M.S. TAMAGUSUKU, RYUKU-REPTO 1:50,000 sheet 3625 II
Co-ordinates 108 3200 - 3166.1

4. JAPANESE SOLDIERS HIDING OUT ON OKINAWA

3 - 5 Jan 47. OGUSUKU-MURA, OSATO-SON, SHIMAJIRI-GUN, OKINAWA

Informant was working at U.S. Army mess hall, 66th TC Hq. in NAHA, OKINAWA. He heard from SHIMA, a fellow worker in this mess hall, and native of OGUSUKU-MURA, that an unknown girl, OSHIRO by name, had come out from hiding in OGUSUKU-DAKE, a mountain on which OGUSUKU-MURA, is located. SHIMA told informant this girl had said a number of Japanese were still hiding out on OGUSUKU-DAKE. Thinking he might get news of former Japanese comrades, informant took advantage of a five-day holiday for New Years and went to OGUSUKU-MURA. He met the girl OSHIRO in evening of 3 Jan 47, talked with her three hours. OSHIRO was living in a tent with about 30 other persons near burnt out remains of her home. Informant also talked with her five or six hours next day, returned to NAHA early the next morning.

Description: OSHIRO (FNU) - girl, OKINAWAN. Age 23; height 4' 11".

~~Japanese Soldiers Hiding out on OKINAWA:~~ Weight - 125 lbs. Stocky build; black eyes; black hair, worn long; round face; white, even teeth. Marital status - single.

In April 1947, informant heard from SHIMA the girl had left the village and gone into hiding shortly after 5 Jan 47 out of fear of reprisals from those with whom she had been hiding out. SHIMA did not tell informant when OSHIRO went as informant was Japanese. Informant believes her place of hiding could be gotten easily from headman (name not known) of OSATO-SON who knows OSHIRO well. In addition she has a younger brother, YASUO OSHIRO, a former merchant seaman, engaged as of October 1947, in farming at OGUSUKU-MURA.

Description: OSHIRO, Yasuo, age 21; height 5'5"; weight 140 lbs; Stocky build-rolling walk; black eyes; black hair - worn long; Long oval face - dark complexion; marital status - single.

When informant first met the girl OSHIRO, she was terrified, thinking he might be from the group hiding out and was taking her back. Only after he produced

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INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 8478

YAMAMOTO, Isamu (NAME)	TOTTORI-KEN, IWAMI-GUN, OTSUNO ARAKAWA No 288 (ADDRESS)
Unemployed (OCCUPATION)	32nd Army Ho. (TAMANO 1st Unit) (UNIT)
Civilian Attached to the Army (Intelligence) (WHAT)	SHURI, OKINAWA (WHERE)
General Information Center (WHERE INTERROGATED)	17 Nov 47 (WHEN)
	2/Sgt MURAKAMI (INTERROGATOR)
	August 1944 to October 1947 (WHEN)

1. PREMIERE

Informant was co-operative

2. CHRONOLOGY

Education - Elementary school (8 years)

30 Jul 44 - Arrived at WAKA (127°38'E-26°13'N)

2 Dec 45 - Surrendered to U.S. forces at KINOH (127°30'E-26°27'N)

7 Oct 47 - Left ICHONIA (127°49'E-26°18'N) KURASAWI, NAGAMAMI-GUN, OKINAWA

10 Oct 47 - Arrived at SASHO

3. MAP REFERENCE ON JAPANESE HIDEOUTS ON OKINAWA

OGUSUKI-TAKE (mountain) near OGUSUKI-MURA, OZATO-SO, SHIMAJIRI-GUN, OKINAWA.


A.M.S. TAMAGUSUKU, HUKU-RETO 1:50,000 sheet 3822 II

Coordinates 108 3300 - 3166.1

4. JAPANESE SOLDIERS HIDING OUT ON OKINAWA

3 - 5 Jan 47. OGUSUKI-MURA, OZATO-SO, SHIMAJIRI-GUN, OKINAWA

Informant was working at U.S. Army mess hall, 68th TG Hd. in WAKA, OKINAWA. He heard from SHIMA, a fellow worker in this mess hall, and native of OGUSUKI-MURA, that an unknown girl, OSHIRO by name, had come out from hiding in OGUSUKI-TAKE, a mountain on which OGUSUKI-MURA, is located. SHIMA told informant this girl had said a number of Japanese were still hiding out on OGUSUKI-TAKE. Thinking he might get news of former Japanese soldiers, informant took advantage of a five-day holiday for New Year and went to OGUSUKI-MURA. He met the girl OSHIRO in evening of 3 Jan 47, talked with her there. OSHIRO was living in a tent with about 30 other persons. OSHIRO returned to WAKA early the next morning. Also talked with her five or six days later.



Description: OSHIRO (FNU) - 4'11", 125 lbs, black hair, eyes, black hair, worn long; round face; white, even teeth. Marital status - single.

Japanese soldiers hiding out on OKINAWA - 125 lbs. Stocky build; black eyes; black hair, worn long; round face; white, even teeth. Marital status - single.

In April 1947, informant heard from SHIMA the girl had left the village and gone into hiding shortly after 5 Jan 47 out of fear of reprisals from those with whom she had been hiding out. SHIMA did not tell informant when OSHIRO went as informant was Japanese. Informant believes her place of hiding could be gotten easily from her name (name not known) of OZATO-SO who knows OSHIRO well. In addition she has a younger brother, YASUO OSHIRO, a former merchant seaman, engaged as of October 1947, in farming at OGUSUKI-MURA.

Description: OSHIRO, Yasuo, age 31; height 5'5"; weight 140 lbs; stocky build; rolling walk; black eyes; black hair - worn long; long oval face - dark complexion; marital status - single.

When informant first met the girl OSHIRO, she was terrified, thinking he might be from the group hiding out and was taking her back. Only after he produced

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identification papers, calmed her down, and other villagers assured her of his identity, did she begin to talk - and then very reluctantly. (Attitude Okinawians take toward Japanese should be taken into account. Okinawians talk more freely to Americans than to Japanese). Informant did not press OSHIRO for too many details.

Following is OSHIRO's story: She escaped from cave where group of 170 was hiding out about 0100 hours 4 Dec 46 when sentry at mouth of cave was momentarily absent and arrived at village of OGUSUKU-MURA about 0300 hours same morning.

Group of 170 consisted of:

1. 70 Japanese military personnel
 - a. An army captain who headed the group and two other army officers
 - b. About 30 N.C.O's
 - c. Rest were army privates and a few civilians attached to the army and a few navy men.
2. About 100 Okinawans
 - a. About 25 men - conscripted during the Okinawan campaign
 - b. About 70 - 80 women - conscripted during the Okinawan campaign as nurses and supply service workers.

OSHIRO said she did not know any of the names of the Japanese. She was very guarded in her speech when informant asked her this repeatedly. She said the Okinawans and Japanese lived in separate parts of the cave. Informant did not ask her about names of Okinawans or whether the Okinawans were from the vicinity of OGUSUKU-MURA. All she said was that some of the Japanese were from units of the 3rd army. Group had several MG's, about 40 rifles and plenty of ammunition. Most of the Japanese and many of the Okinawans were determined not to come out, that they were prepared to stay there indefinitely. About 2 - 3 years supply of food, mostly rice and canned goods were stored in the cave. Informant did not press girl as to motives of why these people were continuing to hide out. Majority in the cave were aware the war was over. Those in control warned that those who escaped would be hunted down and killed. Informant had not heard of any other escapes from this group.

OSHIRO said hiding place was a large natural cave able to hold 400 persons. Informant believes from size of cave and distance from village this must be a cave of which he and the local inhabitants of OGUSUKU-MURA know about. This is located a little over half way up the slope of OGUSUKU-DAKE. Mouth of cave faces north. OGUSUKU-DAKE is the tallest mountain (about 350' high) in this area, a rocky formation covered with heavy brush. OGUSUKU-MURA lies on its southern slope. Cave can be reached by a single-lane dirt road leading east out of OGUSUKU-MURA about one mile. Road becomes trail at foot of mountain, distance by trail to mouth of cave 300 yards. Mouth of cave is a natural fissure in the rock, about 2' 6" wide and 10' high, located on right hand side (south side) of trail going up. Mouth of cave is not visible from trail due to heavy brush in between but narrow trail leads through brush toward a large bare rock formation where mouth of cave becomes visible after going through brush.

(Informant was in this cave during May 1945 and cave has been used by local Okinawans during air raids, naval gunfire, and the Okinawan campaign). Behind entrance of cave is a two-foot deep pool of water about 10' wide. Beyond pool is gentle slope leading 20' to wide level space. OSHIRO said a sentry was always standing guard by the inside of the mouth of the cave. Cave has this entrance only. Cave is a natural rock cave, one single large space with no obstructions or obstacles. Occupants stayed in all day, cooked, ate, slept. Light was from candles which were being used sparingly but of which there seemed to be a good supply. A small generator with gasoline motor had been used to generate electricity and to purify water till fuel ran out. Trusted Okinawans went out at night to forage for matches, Miso (bean paste) and vegetables, apparently their only shortages.

Informant has not talked about this matter to U.S. military personnel on Okinawa. Very strong possibility group may have changed hideout following escape of girl should be taken into account.

5. SURRENDER OF TWO JAP. NAVY MEN

November - December 1946, No 9 Hospital (U.S. Army) OYAMA (127°45'E-26°16'N) NAKAGAMI-GUN OKINAWA. During above period, informant was hospitalized in same room as:

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identification papers, calmed her down, and other villagers assured her of his identity, did she begin to talk - and then very reluctantly. (Attitude) Okinawans take toward Japanese should be taken into account. Okinawans talk more freely to Americans than to Japanese. Informant did not press OSHIRO for too many details.

Following is OSHIRO's story: She escaped from cave where group of 170 was hiding out about 0100 hours 4 Dec 48 when entry at mouth of cave was momentarily absent and arrived at village of OOSUKU-MURA about 0300 hours same morning.

- Group of 170 consisted of:
1. 70 Japanese military personnel
 - a. An army captain who headed the group and two other army officers
 - b. About 30 W.O.'s
 - c. Rest were army privates and a few civilians attached to the army and a few navy men.
 2. About 100 Okinawans
 - a. About 25 men - conscripted during the Okinawan campaign
 - b. About 70 - 80 women - conscripted during the Okinawan campaign as nurses and supply service workers.

OSHIRO said she did not know any of the names of the Japanese. She was very guarded in her speech when informant asked her this repeatedly. She said the Okinawans and Japanese lived in separate parts of the cave. Informant did not ask her about names of Okinawans or whether the Okinawans were from units of the OOSUKU-MURA. All she said was that some of the Japanese were from units of the 3rd Army. Group had several MG's, about 40 rifles and plenty of ammunition. Most of the Japanese and many of the Okinawans were determined not to come out, that they were prepared to stay there indefinitely. About 2 - 3 years supply of food, mostly rice and canned goods were stored in the cave. Informant did not press girl as to motives of why these people were continuing to hide out. Majority in the cave were awake the war was over. Those in control warned that those who escaped would be hunted down and killed. Informant had not heard of any other escapes from this group.

OSHIRO said hiding place was a large natural cave able to hold 400 persons. Informant believes from size of cave and distance from village this must be a cave of which he and the local inhabitants of OOSUKU-MURA know about. This is located a little over half way up the slope of OOSUKU-MURA. Mouth of cave faces north. OOSUKU-MURA is the tallest mountain (about 250' high) in this area, a rocky formation covered with heavy brush. OOSUKU-MURA lies on its southern slope. Cave can be reached by a single-lane dirt road leading east out of OOSUKU-MURA about one mile. Road becomes trail at foot of mountain, distance by trail to mouth of cave 300 yards. Mouth of cave is a natural fissure in the rock, about 3' 8" wide and 10' high, located on right hand side (south side) of trail going up. Mouth of cave is not visible from trail due to heavy brush in between but narrow trail leads through brush to a large bare rock formation where mouth of cave becomes visible after going through brush.



(Informant was in the cave during the Okinawan campaign.) Behind entrance of cave is a pool of water about 10' wide. Beyond pool is gentle slope leading 30' wide. OSHIRO said a sentry was always standing guard by the entrance of the cave. Cave has this entrance only. Cave is a natural rock overhang, large space with no obstructions or obstacles. OSHIRO stated that she, along with other women, cooked, etc. Light was from candles which were being used sparingly but of which there seemed to be a good supply. A small generator with gasoline motor had been used to generate electricity and to pump water till fuel ran out. Escaped Okinawans went out at night to forage for matches, Misc (bean paste) and vegetables, apparently their only shortages.

Informant has not talked about this matter to U.S. military personnel on Okinawa. Very strong possibility group may have changed hideout following escape of girl should be taken into account.

8. SUBSEQUENCE OF TWO JAP. NAVY MEN

November - December 1948, No 9 Hospital (U.S. Army) OYAMA (137°45'E-26°18'N) HAKAGAMI-GUN OKINAWA. During above period, informant was hospitalized in same room as:

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KAWAKAMI (FNU) - Navy Warrant officer
SHIMADA (FNU) - Civilian attached to the Navy

These two said they had been hiding out at NAGA-SUKU TAKE (mountain) (127°36'E-26°18'N), gave themselves up on 2 Oct 46. They were among 12 - 13 survivors of the OKKON Unit, a Navy marine unit of 400 - 500 men. Survivors had only a few hand grenades which they later threw away. In August 1946, group broke up into two's and three's. KAWAKAMI and SHIMADA said they saw no one in MAGASU TAKE area hiding out during August 1945 to October 1946. Two were returned to Japan, leaving OKINAWA 24 Dec 46 on a hospital ship.

6. CONCERNING COL. MITA AND HIS BAND

Informant has no direct knowledge concerning Col MITA and his band of 5 - 6 soldiers. Case of Col MITA is well-known to Okinawans and the U.S. Army authorities on Okinawa.

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KAWAKAMI (YNU) - Navy warrant officer
SHIMADA (YNU) - Civilian attached to the Navy


These two said they had been hiding out at MASA-SUKU TAKE (mountain) (137°38'28" 18'W). They were among 13 - 15 survivors of the OKON Unit, a Navy marine unit of 400 - 500 men. In August 1946, group only a few hand grenades which they later threw away. In August 1946, group broke up into two's and three's. KAWAKAMI and SHIMADA said they saw no one in MASA-SUKU area hiding out during August 1945 to October 1946. Two were returned to Japan, leaving OKINAWA 24 Dec 46 on a hospital ship.

8. CONCERNING COL. MITA AND HIS BAND

Informant has no direct knowledge concerning Col MITA and his band of 8 - 9 soldiers. Case of Col MITA is well-known to Okinawans and the U.S. Army authorities on Okinawa.



SECRET



17805

18 September 1947

SUBJECT: Request for interrogation of Lt. Gen Tanaka Shinichi

TO: General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.

ATT: ATIS, G-2 Section

Request that answers to the attached questionnaire be obtained from Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi whom we understand is available in Japan.

HARRY J. MALONY
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Historical Division

1 Incl
Questionnaire

1st Incl

ARMY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 18 December 1947

TO: Historical Division, Army Department Special Staff, Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: Brigadier General H. J. Malony

1. Transmitted herewith as Incl 2 are answers to Department of Army Historical Division questionnaire inclosed with basic communication above.

2. Additional information of possible interest and value developed during the course of interrogation is attached as Incl 3.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. H. F. SVENSSON
Colonel GSC
Director, ADI Div

FILE

3 Incls:
Incl 1 - Report
Incl 2 - Answers to Questionnaire
Incl 3 - Additional Information

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G-2 Admin File
ADID/EHFS/CFM/GIJ/ss

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17802

18 September 1947

SUBJECT: Request for investigation of Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi

TO: General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, Calif.

ATTN: ATIS, G-2 Section

Request that answers to the attached questionnaire be obtained from Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shinichi whom we understand is available in Japan.

HARRY J. WALTON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief, Historical Division

1 Incl
Questionnaire

1st Incl

ARMY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 18 December 1947

TO: Historical Division, Army Department Special Staff, Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: Brigadier General H. J. Walton

1. Transmitted herewith as Incl 2 are answers to Department of Army Historical Division questionnaire enclosed with basic communication above.

2. Additional information of possible interest and value developed during the course of investigation is attached as Incl 3.

The assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. E. F. SWANSON
Colonel
Director, ADI Div

Incl 3 - Additional Information
Incl 2 - Answers to Questionnaire

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G-5 Admin File
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ARMY DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
~~G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 16 December 1947~~

TO ~~X~~ Army Department Special Staff, Historical Division, Washington 25, D.C.
 ATTN: Brigadier General H. J. Malony

1. Transmitted herewith as Incl *2* are answers to Department of Army
Historical Division
 questionnaire inclosed with basic communication above.
2. Additional information ^{*of possible interest and value*} developed during the course of interrogation
 is attached as Incl *3*.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. H. F. SVENSSON
 Colonel GSC
 Director, *ADID*

- 3* Incls: *1* - *N/C*
 Incl *2* - Answers to Questionnaire
 Incl *3* - Additional Information

FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

INTERROGATION # 2
25 October 1947

Interrogatee: TANAKA, Shinichi

Interrogator: Lt IKEMOTO, Mr OKURA

Interpreter: OKURA, Masuo

NOTE: In this interrogation, ex-Gen TANAKA was asked to answer Department of Army questions in order in which questions originally received.

1. Answers to questions in para I of Department of Army questionnaire.

- a. It was an annual operational planning which had been standard several years prior to 1941.
- b. January 1941.

2. Answers to questions in para II of Department of Army questionnaire.


a. They were part of the annual operational planning made during the following dates:

- January 1941: Routine operational planning
- July 1941 : Specially directed operational planning against U.S., Great Britain, and USSR.
- September 1941: Specially directed defensive planning against U.S., Great Britain, and USSR.
- October 1941: Specially directed defensive and aggressive planning against U.S., Great Britain, and USSR.
- 15 Nov 1941 : Plans for attack completed, but date of attack was not set. Order for launching of attack was given in mid-November by the Imperial Headquarters because of the unfavorable atmosphere existing between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES.

- b. There were no previous plans for an attack on Singapore. This operation was the result of a special conference in early November 1941 in the presence of the Emperor with General SUGIYAMA, Admiral NAGANO, General TOJO, Admiral SHIMADA, and others.
- c. The objectives and scope of plans were to protect commerce and to gain natural resources for JAPAN.
- d. An attack could have been launched as early as first of December 1941 if the peace negotiations in WASHINGTON fell through. There was no talk of an attack on PEARL HARBOR at this conference at all, although the navy personnel must have had this attack in mind.
- e. Only basic agreement at this stage was to work together.

3. Answers to questions in para III of Department of Army questionnaire.

- a. No other plan of attack had been formulated prior to July 1941, except that if GREAT BRITAIN or the UNITED STATES should attack, key areas such as SINGAPORE, PHILIPPINES, etc., had to be taken by JAPAN. They were not only directed against GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, but the UNITED STATES as well.



4. Answers to questions in para IV of Department of Army questionnaire.

- a. The army did not participate in the war games held by the navy in September 1941 in TOKYO as it only concerned naval operations in the Pacific. There were no concrete plans for the army to go into SINGAPORE, PHILIPPINES, etc., as yet.
- b. Army basic plans which were drawn up in October 1941, such as food, clothing, weapons, etc., were not disclosed to the navy, but important information of interest to the navy, such as landing points and number of escort vessels necessary, was forwarded to the navy.
- c. The army accepted navy's plans as elaborated in September war games without change. There were no delineation of territories at this time since it was a purely naval show. Army, however, as well as navy, agreed to the plan.
- d. A joint decision was reached in April 1942 that the navy was to take over east of CELEBES, and the army, west of the PHILIPPINES.
- e. General SUGIYAMA negotiated the Basic Agreement.

5. Answers to questions in para V of Department of Army questionnaire.

- a. There was no basic overall plan.
- b. On the basis that RUSSIA had an estimated strength of 33 divisions on the Siberian front, the Japanese put up 14 divisions against the Russian front in MANCHURIA.

Estimated Russian strength as of September 1941 was 24 divisions.

Estimated strength of Russian strength as of the spring of 1942 was 20 divisions.

- c. 10 Japanese divisions were considered necessary to occupy the islands in the South-Pacific Area.
- d. 25 Japanese divisions were necessary on the CHINA Front.
- e. The Russian Front was considered the most important.

6. Answers to questions in para VI of Department of Army questionnaire.

- a. After a long joint talk, it was decided not to advance into AUSTRALIA due to necessity of sending a large army which could not be supplied.
- b. The same reason was given for not making an advance into INDIA.
- c. This was the responsibility of the navy. There were no large plans as far as subject knew.
- d. There were no plans with the German army as far as linking in the Near East was concerned. However, there were plans for the German submarines to aid Japanese submarines in the Pacific Area. This did not take place.

7. Answers to questions in para VII of Department of Army questionnaire.


This is what the subject heard from General SUGIYAMA re decisions reached:

- a. To continue to hold all occupied territories then held by JAPAN. This included necessary additional operations against small outpost islands, such as NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI, SAMOA, and the ALEUTIANS for strategic reasons.

- b. No east or west moves were planned.
- c. Determination to avoid war with RUSSIA was emphasized.
- d. To make special effort to terminate the war in the CHINA Front.
8. Answers to questions in para VIII of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. They were the results of the March 1942 Liaison Conference.
- b. The Battle of the Coral Sea and especially the Battle of MIDWAY had a decisive effect on this planning.
- c. Japanese planned to hold on to what they had.
- d. There were no intentions of further advance into the Pacific.
9. Answers to questions in para IX of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. The Imperial Headquarters planned an offensive against CHUNGKING in April 1942. (Planned by the Army General Staff). The strategic feature of this plan was to get a stronghold on the capitol of CHUNGKING and to bring about an early end to the war in CHINA.
- b. An attack from GISHO on the east, and SEIAN from the north was planned, but not from BURMA. No forces were withdrawn from MANCHURIA for this plan because of the failure at GUADAICANAL.
10. Answers to questions in para X of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. A German government request to the Japanese government to attack Russia may have been received by the Imperial Headquarters, but no great importance was placed on it. Subject was not informed as to these matters. Only heard talk of it in July or August 1942.
11. Answers to questions in para XI of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. The informant did not know whether such attempts at mediation were actually made, but had heard that the Japanese Foreign Office had such attempts in mind. Informant did not know whether Ambassador OSHIMA participated in the said attempts.
- The Foreign Office could not have made very serious efforts at mediation, as it, in conson with the army, was certain that neither GERMANY nor RUSSIA was in mood to listen to peace talk.
12. Answers to questions in para XII of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. There were no major operations planned either by the army or the navy, although there were three or four Japanese small naval ships in Western MALAY and BURMA.
13. Answers to questions in para XIII of Department of Army questionnaire.
- a. The fall of GUADAICANAL was the turning point in the defeat of JAPAN, and had following consequences:
- (1) CHUNGKING offensive was dropped
- (2) Supply lines were cut off

- (3) Defensive strength was greatly weakened (i.e. U.S. thus broke through outer ring before vital inner defensive ring well established). Subject was transferred to SINGAPORE in December 1942. and attached to the army headquarters. Does not know. Subject does not remember what units were withdrawn from southern theaters for the southeastern sector except some air strength.

- (4) Informant does not know, because he was transferred before the fall of GUADAICANAL.



Additional Information Obtained From TAMURA, Shinichi

1. The attack on PEARL HARBOR was planned entirely by the Navy; the Army had nothing to do with it.
2. It was decided to attack SINGAPORE for the first time on 1 Dec 41. The plans decided upon at that time covered the MALAY PENINSULA, SINGAPORE, the PHILIPPINES, GUAM, JAVA, SUMATRA, and the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. NEW GUINEA was not included in the plans at that time.
3. General Staff Headquarters had not fixed any date for the execution of the above plan, which was drawn up so that it could be carried out at any time the government decided or determined to go to war. The plan was decided upon on the basis of consultations between Army General Staff Headquarters and the Naval General Staff.
4. The January 1941 plan was not an operations plan against AMERICA or against BRITAIN specifically. It was a long standing practice with the Japanese Army to draw up plans every year against the SOVIET UNION, AMERICA or any other countries with which JAPAN stood in a certain relationship, not that it was actually intended to go to war. That was the plan which was ready in January 1941, although relations between JAPAN and AMERICA were becoming more strained at that time, this plan was not drawn up with that in mind; it would have been drawn up regardless of the state of those relations. This had been the usual practice for years. As far as AMERICA was concerned, it dealt with what JAPAN would do if attacked. It contained very rough plans for attacks on the PHILIPPINES and GUAM as initial defensive measures. There were only these two attacks, the PHILIPPINES and GUAM, planned against AMERICA. There was no plan to attack HAWAII. The Army planned to attack the British in SINGAPORE and HONGKONG. This was an idea, rather than a plan. It was not actually worked out as a plan. There were no plans against JAVA and SUMATRA in the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES nor against the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO or AUSTRALIA -- that is, none in January 1941 -- nor against NEW GUINEA.
5. We started further study around July 1941. In the past, General Staff Headquarters had not conducted any studies with a view of operations in the PHILIPPINES.
6. Relations between the SOVIET UNION and JAPAN had not been good for many years. That was because JAPAN feared attack by the SOVIET UNION ever since the Russo-Japanese war. Relations with the SOVIET UNION would never have improved. It was generally believed that there was no possibility of friendly relations after the present Soviet Government came into power and after the Manchurian Incident of 1931. Since all plans in regard to the SOVIET UNION were also defensive, there was no plan to take SIBERIA.
7. The following opinion was very prevalent in the Japanese study; that it would be better not to go to war against BRITAIN or AMERICA; that it would be best to buy oil from the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES without going to war; that to avoid war was most important, but that it probably couldn't be avoided. It was believed impossible to obtain oil from the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES without going to war with BRITAIN and AMERICA.
8. Oil was the most important thing. Iron was obtainable from CHINA and the island of HAINAN. Rice came from FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It's probably true that oil alone was the cause of the war.
9. The total military strength at the disposal of the Japanese Army when it started the war was 48 divisions. That was the grand total -- for RUSSIA, CHINA, and the south. Of those, about 20 divisions had to be assigned to CHINA and about 15 or 16 had to be stationed in MANCHURIA. There were needs of more than 10 divisions for ENGLAND and AMERICA.
10. The Navy insisted on taking the BISMARCKS and PORT MORESBY because they would be of great importance in the future when AMERICA should attack with a large navy. Actually, the Army did not want to go into those areas because of the great distances and the problem of supplies. The Navy wanted to take PORT DARWIN in northern AUSTRALIA. The Army, on the other hand,

claimed that military operations against AUSTRALIA would be very difficult from the point of view of supplies. It absolutely refused to agree to the operation.

11. The effect of the Guadalcanal battle was very great. That was the peak of the battle in the PACIFIC. The best divisions facing RUSSIA were taken from MANCHURIA, as well as the airplanes, therefore, the defenses against RUSSIA became very weak. This was the greatest effect of GUADALCANAL.

12. Only one battalion from the Army went on the transport ship to MIDWAY so as to land as soon as the Navy occupied the place. There were no plans for MIDWAY on the part of the Naval General Staff. It was the plan of YAMAMOTO, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

13. The industries that were to support the war in JAPAN were affected greatly by the battle for GUADALCANAL. Bauxite to make aluminum and duralumin, rubber, and oil were all brought from the south, Japanese industry depended on that. But the ships that were sent to GUADALCANAL were being rapidly sunk. Due to the sinking of these ships, the supply of raw materials decreased greatly.





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Due to the sinking of these ships, the supply of raw materials decreased
greatly.



CONFIDENTIAL

1674

Repatriation of American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry Resident in Japan

G-2

Diplomatic Section
Yokohama Division

CIS/OD/JJS/meh
6 NOV 1947

1. Investigation has been conducted as requested above, and the following information obtained:

a. KATO, Eisei, brother of KATO, Yusui, stated he (KATO, Eisei) placed the advertisement in the Mainichi Shinbun at the request of KATO, Kosei (Japanese-American), another brother, presently residing at 120 E. Poplar, San Mateo, California. (See Inclosure 2.)

b. KATO, Eisei, stated KATO, Yusui, was in no way connected with the advertisement. Subject's name appeared in advertisement merely as a reference for applicants, because KATO, Eisei expects to return to the United States in November 1947 and cannot be contacted thereafter.

c. KATO, Yusui is at present a student at Yuku-shima Commercial School and will graduate in March 1948. Subject has no political affiliation nor a military record.

d. A check with prefectural police revealed no adverse information pertaining to KATO, Yusui.

2. Reference is made to Inclosure 2 of excerpts from letter postmarked 17 July 1947, addressed to KATO, E., Tatsukawa Co., 5-5 Kooiki Chukka, Tokyo, Japan, from KATO, K., 120 E. Poplar, San Mateo, California.

3. Case considered closed unless further investigation is desired.

2 Incls:
1. n/e
Added 1 Incl
2. Excerpts of ltr to KATO, E.,
dtg 23 Oct 47

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MEMO FOR RECORD:

DS (Yokohama Div) in C/S file 310
General, subj: "Repatriation of
American Citizens of Japanese Ancestry
Resident in Japan," dtd 23 Sep 47, re-
quested investigation of KATO, Yusei,
to determine legitimacy of his enter-
prise. It was alleged subj inserted
an ad in Tokyo Mainichi Newspaper in
which he guaranteed payment of passage
to U.S. for those who requested it and
would help them obtain employment after
reaching America. Interim rpt submitted
to DS on 4 Oct 47. CIC investigation
initiated on 30 Sep 47. 441st CIC Memo
Rpt File No. 700594, subj as above, dtd
30 Oct 47, received 1 Nov 47. Final rpt
submitted hereon.

JJS 26-5752 11/6/47

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EXHIBIT I

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23 October 1947

The following are translations of excerpts from a letter addressed to KATO E., Tatsukawa Co., 5-5 Kobiki Chuoku, Tokyo, Japan from KATO K., 120 E. Poplar, San Mateo, California, letter postmarked 17 July 1947. The following form is to be used by an applicant.

1. Name of applicant (Japanese and English)
2. The last address of residence in Japan (permanent domicile and address at time of application)
3. Age and date of birth of applicant (place born, number of the citizenship papers)
4. Destination and address in America
5. Name and address of the parents of applicant, also age (name and address of brothers and sisters, also age)
6. The date of the last time they came to Japan and the name of the boat. (it does not matter how many times he has returned before. I wish to know the date and name of boat of his last return)
7. Is help required in getting employment after coming to the States?
8. Do you wish to be met on your arrival at the American port?
9. School graduated.
10. Recent employment.
11. Health conditions (present and past and old ailments)
12. When you would like to have the boat ticket sent?
13. Have you started taking procedures in coming back to America?
14. The number of your citizenship papers
15. One photograph

On receiving a letter from an applicant I wish to have you send him the above form and have him fill it out. And to also send the following English and Japanese written form, and have him fill in the vacant spaces. And be sure to have the applicant sign his name.

This means that two forms will be sent to me, and for every set (two forms) I will pay you fifty cents in American money, for your troubles, and I will have Kimi (an older sister residing in California) keep the money for you until you come over to the states.

I _____ of _____, this day _____ agree to borrow the sum of two hundred dollars (\$200.00) with an interest rate of one per cent a month for one half year. The year begins from the time when my creditor remits the money for the purchase of the exchange order for my passage. If necessary the creditor will arrange for an easier payment term upon request.

Six months after the date when my creditor Mr. Kosei Kato remitted the money for the purchase of the exchange order for my passage to the United States of America, I will make the payment of both principle and interest in cash to my creditor. When an easier payment term is arranged before the end of the sixth month, the latter payment term will be applied.....

EXHIBIT I

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Incl 2
COPY

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CONFIDENTIALD R A F T484
33049/647Subject: Repatriation of American citizens
of Japanese ancestry resident in
Japan by KATO, Yusei

From: G-2

To: Diplomatic Section,
Yokohama DivisionDate:
CIS/OD/JJS/mh

2.

1. Investigation has been conducted as requested above, and the following information obtained;

a. KATO, Eisei, brother of KATO, Yusei, stated he (KATO, Eisei) placed the advertisement in the Mainichi Shimbun at the request of KATO, Kosei (Japanese-American) another brother, presently residing at 120 E. Poplar, San Mateo, California. (See Inclosure 2)

b. KATO, Eisei, stated KATO, Yusei was in no way connected with the advertisement. Subject's name appeared in advertisement merely as a reference for applicants, because KATO, Eisei expects to return to the United States in November 1947 and cannot be contacted thereafter.

c. KATO, Yusei is at present a student at Fukushima Commercial School and will graduate in March 1948. Subject has no political affiliation nor a military record.

d. A check with prefectural police revealed no adverse information pertaining to KATO, Yusei.

2. Reference is made to Inclosure 2 of excerpts from letter post-marked 17 July 1947, addressed to KATO, E., Tatsukawa Co., 5-5 Kobiki Chuoku, Tokyo, Japan, from KATO, K., 120 E. Poplar, San Mateo, California.

3. Case considered closed unless further investigation is desired.

2 Incls;

1. n/c

Added 1 Incl

2. Excerpts of ltr to KATO, E.,
dtd 23 Oct 47

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23 October 1947

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle
TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. References:


- a. Letter, subject, "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoner of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.
- b. Letter, subject, "Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 16 October 1947, which forwarded interrogation of YAMADA, Masami.

2. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogation of GISHI, Shoichi, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.

3. Captain William C. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEAF, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.

4. Other interrogations, subject project, will be forwarded in the near future.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



FILE

E. H. F. SVENSSON
Colonel GSC
Director, WDI DIV

- 2 Incls:
- Japanese transcription of report of GISHI, Shoichi (in duplicate)
- English translation of report of GISHI, Shoichi (in duplicate)

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23 October 1947

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SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle
TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. References:

a. Letter, subject, "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-prisoner of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.

b. Letter, subject, "Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 16 October 1947, which forwarded interrogation of YAMADA, Masami.

2. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogation of OICHI, Shochi, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.

3. Captain William G. Linton, Jr., A-2 WFAF, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.


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For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:


FILE

E. H. F. SWINSON
Colonel
Director, WDI DIV

English transcription of report of OICHI, Shochi
(in duplicate)
Japanese transcription of report of OICHI, Shochi
(in duplicate)



014.331 Report



G-5
WDID/WHF/2/PSM

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, forwarded list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.

2. Informants are being called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt. Wm. Linton Jr., A-2 FEAF, is notified by telephone. Capt. Linton conducts the interrogation with the aid of an interpreter. A Japanese stenographer takes a verbatim report which is translated and forwarded to A-2 FEAF in Q and A form.

3. The first of these interrogations (YAMADA, Masami) was forwarded by letter dated 16 October 1947. Four other interrogations are this date being processed in ATIS Translation Section. Interrogation of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle should be completed about the end of October.

EHFS [Signature] 26-5368



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MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, forwarded list of survivors of Biak-Bak Sea Battle and requested interview of returnees who are available.

23 October 1947

2. Informants are being called in for interview and upon reporting to Central Intelligence Center, Capt. Wm. Linton Jr., A-2, is notified by telephone. Capt. Linton conducts the interview with the aid of an interpreter. A Japanese stenographer takes a verbatim report which is translated and forwarded to A-2 TRAK, A-2 and A form.

3. The first of these interviews (YAMADA, Masami) was forwarded by letter dated 10 October 1947. Four other interviews are this date being processed in ATIS Translation Section. Interview of survivors of Biak-Bak Sea Battle should be completed about the end of October.

4. Letter, subject, "Interview of Lt Gen Whitehead" dated 10 October 1947, from the Department of Defense, AFM 100-2388, to the Far East Air Force, dated 10 October 1947, is being forwarded to ATIS, A-2.

5. The attached interview and the (2) copies of interview report and the (2) copies of English translation of interview report are being forwarded to ATIS, A-2.

6. Interview of Lt Gen Whitehead, 10 October 1947, was conducted during the interview and requested interview report is attached to this memo.

7. Other interview reports, subject matter, will be forwarded as they are received.

The attached report of Capt. Linton, 10 October 1947.

FILE

W. L. LINTON
Capt.
AFM 100-2388

Interview of Lt Gen Whitehead, 10 October 1947.

Interview of Lt Gen Whitehead, 10 October 1947.

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APD 500

18 OCT 1947

CIS/OD

SUBJECT: Delay in Repatriation of Japanese from Soviet Areas

TO : Director of Intelligence, Intelligence Division, General Staff, United States Army, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Chief, Intelligence Group

Forwarded herewith for your information is a study on subject with particular reference to Soviet propoganda attempts to place the blame for delay in repatriation of Japanese on the United States.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:
S/I, subj: as above,
16 Oct 47

RUSSELL G. DUFF
Colonel, G.S.C.
Ass't Executive Officer

File ①
MAYNARD E. LEE
CWO, USA
18 Oct 47

MEMO FOR RECORD:
Subject rpt was originally prepared for Dip Sect. on 17 Oct 47 when original rpt was fwded to Dip Sect. Gen Willoughby requested that a cpy also be fwded to MID.
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FOR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

18 OCT 1947
APO 500

TO : Director of Intelligence, Intelligence Division, General Staff, United States Army, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Chief, Intelligence Group

SUBJECT: Delay in Repatriation of Japanese from Soviet Areas

Forwarded herewith for your information is a study on subject with particular reference to Soviet propaganda attempts to place the blame for delay in repatriation of Japanese on the United States.


For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

HUSSELL G. DUFF
Colonel, G.S.C.
Asst's Executive Officer

1 Incl:
S/L, subj: as above,
16 Oct 47

WAYWARD E. LEE
OWO, USA
File

MEMO FOR RECORD: Subject rpt was originally prepared for Dip Sect. on 17 Oct 47 when original rpt was typed to Dip Sect. Gen Willoughby requested that a copy also be typed to MID.



FILE

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OIA 337 Report



20940

Army XXXX

24 November 1947

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle

TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. References:

a. Letter, subject: "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.

b. Letters, subject: "Interrogation of Survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 16 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of YAMADA, Masami, 23 October 1947, interrogation of GISHI, Shoichi, and 25 October 1947, interrogation of YANAGISAWA, Takeo.

2. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogations of YAMAMOTO, Bunroku, and of HOSODA, Tetsuo, survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle.

3. Captain William C. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEAF, was present during interrogations and requested interrogation reports be submitted in this form.


4. These are the last of the interrogations of survivors of the Bismarck Sea Battle.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. H. F. SVENSSON
Colonel GSC
Director, ADI DIV

4 Incls:
As indicated, par 2 above

MD
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G-2 Admin File
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Army XIX

24 November 1947

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle
TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 952
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. References:

a. Letter, subject: "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.

b. Letters, subject: "Interrogation of Survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 10 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of YAMADA, Masami, 23 October 1947, interrogation of GISHI, Shohshi, and 25 October 1947, interrogation of YAWAGISAWA, Takeo.

2. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogations of YAMAMOTO, Bunroku, and of HODODA, Tetsuo, survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle.

3. Captain William G. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEAF, was present during interrogations and requested interrogation reports be submitted in this form.

4. These are the last of the interrogations of survivors of the Bismarck Sea Battle.
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. R. F. SWENSON
Colonel GSC
Director, ADI DIV

FILE

As indicated per 2 above



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G-5 Admin File
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MEMO FOR RECORD:


1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, forwarded list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.

2. Informants were called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt Wm Linton, Jr, A-2 FEAF was notified by telephone. Capt Linton conducted the interrogations with the aid of an interpreter. Verbatim report was taken by a Japanese stenographer and was translated and forwarded to A-2 FEAF in Q and A form.

3. The first of these interrogations (YAMADA, Masami) was forwarded by letter dated 16 October 47, the second (GISHI, Shoichi) dated 23 October, and the third (YANAGISAWA, Takeo) dated 25 October.

4. This letter, forwarding interrogations of YAMAMOTO, Bunroku and of HOSODA, Tetsuo, brings this project to conclusion.

[Handwritten Signature]
EHFS 26-5368



MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, forwarded list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.
2. Informants were called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt Wm Linton, Jr, A-2 FEAR was notified by telephone. Capt Linton conducted the interrogations with the aid of an interpreter. Verbatim report was taken by a Japanese stenographer and was translated and forwarded to A-2 FEAR in G and A form.
3. The first of these interrogations (YAMADA, Masami) was forwarded by letter dated 16 October 47, the second (OISHI, Shochi) dated 23 October, and the third (YAMAGISAWA, Takeo) dated 25 October.
4. This letter, forwarding interrogations of YAMAMOTO, Bunroku and of HOSODA, Tetsuo, brings this project to conclusion.

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25 October 1947

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle

TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2.

1. References:

a. Letter, subject: "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.

b. Letters, subject: "Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 16 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of YAMADA, Masami and 23 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of GISEI, Shoichi.

2. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogation of YANAGISAWA, Takeo, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.

3. Captain William C. Linton, Jr., A-2 WMAF, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.

4. Other interrogations, subject project, will be forwarded in the near future.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

M. H. F. SVENSSON
Colonel, GSC
Director, WDI Div

2 Incls:

- Japanese transcription of report of YANAGISAWA, Takeo (in duplicate)
- English translation of report of YANAGISAWA, Takeo (in duplicate)

FILE

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WDID/MSB2/P

25 October 1947

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle

TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 922
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2.

1. Reference:

a. Letter, subject: "Interrogation of Japanese K-Prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.

b. Letters, subject: "Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle" from War Department Intelligence Division, G-2, Far East Command, to Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, dated 15 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of TAKADA, Masami and 25 October 1947, forwarding interrogation of OISHI, Shoji.

5. Transmitted herewith are two (2) copies of Japanese transcription and two (2) copies of English translation of interrogation of YAMAGISHI, Takeo, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.

7. Captain William G. Linton, Jr., A-2 USAF, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.

8. Other interrogations, subject project, will be forwarded in the near future.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

M. R. F. BARNES
Colonel, GSC
Director, WDI Div

2 Incls:
Japanese transcription of report of YAMAGISHI, Takeo
(in duplicate)
English translation of report of YAMAGISHI, Takeo
(in duplicate)

FILE

WDID
25 OCT 1947
187

MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, forwarded list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.

2. Informants are being called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt Wm. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEAF, is notified by telephone. Capt Linton conducts the interrogation with the aid of an interpreter. A Japanese stenographer takes a verbatim report which is translated and forwarded to A-2 FEAF in Q and A form.

3. The first of these interrogations (YAMADA, Masami) was forwarded by letter dated 16 October 1947 and the second (GISHI, Shoichi) dated 23 October 1947. Three other interrogations are this date being processed in ATIS Translation Section. Interrogation of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle should be completed about the end of October.

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FAR EAST COMMAND

File

16 October 1947

G-2 Admin File

WDID/EHFS/ml

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle

TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 925
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. Reference is made to letter, subject, "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.
2. Transmitted herewith are four (4) copies of interrogation report of YAMADA, Masami, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.
3. Captain William C. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEAF, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.
4. Other interrogations, subject project, should be completed about the end of October.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl:
Report of YAMADA, Masami
(in quadruplicate)

E. H. F. SVENSSON
Colonel GSC
Director, WDI DIV

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, submitted list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.
2. Informants are being called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt Wm. Linton Jr., A-2 FEAF, is notified by telephone. Capt. Linton conducts the interrogation with the aid of an interpreter. A Japanese stenographer takes a verbatim report which is translated and forwarded to A-2 FEAF in Q and A form.
3. Interrogation of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle should be completed about the end of October.


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FAR EAST COMMAND

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16 October 1945

G-S Admin Files

WDID/EHE2/MT

SUBJECT: Interrogation of survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle
TO : Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, APO 922
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2

1. Reference is made to letter, subject, "Interrogation of Japanese Ex-prisoners of War" from Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Far East Air Forces, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Far East Command.
 2. Transmitted herewith are four (4) copies of interrogation report of YAMADA, Masami, survivor of Bismarck Sea Battle.
 3. Captain William G. Linton, Jr., A-2 FEA, was present during interrogation and requested interrogation report be submitted in this form.
 4. Other interrogations, subject project, should be completed about the end of October.
- For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

E. H. P. SWANSON
Colonel
Director, WDI DIV


1 Incl:
Report of YAMADA, Masami
(in duplicate)

MEMO FOR RECORD

1. Lt Gen Whitehead, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, submitted list of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle and requested interrogation of returnees who are available.
2. Informants are being called in for interrogation and upon reporting to Central Interrogation Center, Capt W. Linton Jr., A-2 FEA, is notified by telephone. Capt. Linton conducts the interrogation with the aid of an interpreter. A Japanese stenographer takes a verbatim report which is translated and forwarded to A-2 FEA in G and A form.
3. Interrogation of survivors of Bismarck Sea Battle should be completed about the end of October.

EHE's 26-2368

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

AFD 500
SEP 18 1947

CIS/OD

SUBJECT: Concealment of Soviet Citizenship

TO: Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff,
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Chief, Intelligence Group



1. The following data obtained from page 3 of newspaper Russkoye Slovo, dated 26 June 1947, No. 28, is forwarded for your information. The Russkoye Slovo is a Russian language paper published in Shanghai. The article in point is titled "Only Five Percent of Russian Emigrants Took Out Soviet Passports". It deals with the problem of the reinstatement of Soviet citizenship by former Russian nationals with particular reference to those residing in France. The significant portions of the article relate the advice by Soviet consular officials to those having a stateless status or those who have French citizenship that they should not advise the French police of their change in citizenship status but should continue to be registered under their former documents.

2. It may thus be considered that: (a) the French officials do not know who have regained Soviet citizenship; (b) the Soviet authorities are in a position to blackmail individuals concealing their Soviet citizenship into doing undercover work for the Soviets by threatening to expose them to the French authorities.

3. To date no definite evidence has been uncovered in the Far East Command, as to actual concealment of Soviet citizenship, although it has been reported that Soviet officials have instructed new Soviet citizens to conceal their citizenship in the future.

4. It is believed possible that instructions similar to those issued in France may have been issued to newly reinstated Soviet citizens residing in the United States.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



RUSSELL G. DUFF
Col GSC
Ass't Executive Officer

MEMO FOR RECORD

18 Sept 47

A summary translation by G-2 Gen. Lia. of an article in the newspaper Russkoye Slovo of 26 Jun 47 reveals instructions by the Soviets to new Sov citizens in France to conceal their citizenship status. Similar

instructions may have been issued in the US. Accordingly, this info is forwarded to the WDGIID.

WLM 26-5662

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
WAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

SEP 18 1947
APD 800

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SUBJECT: Concealment of Soviet Citizenship

TO: Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff,
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTENTION: Chief, Intelligence Group

1. The following data obtained from page 5 of newspaper Russkoye Slovo, dated 26 June 1947, No. 28, is forwarded for your information. The Russkoye Slovo is a Russian language paper published in Shanghai. The article in point is titled "Only Five Percent of Russian Emigrants Took Out Soviet Passports". It deals with the problem of the reinstatement of Soviet citizenship by former Russian nationals with particular reference to those residing in France. The significant portions of the article relate the advice by Soviet consular officials to those having a stateless status or those who have French citizenship that they should not advise the French police of their change in citizenship status but should continue to be registered under their former documents.

2. It may thus be considered that: (a) the French officials do not know who have regained Soviet citizenship; (b) the Soviet authorities are in a position to blackmail individuals concealing their Soviet citizenship into being undercover work for the Soviets by threatening to expose them to the French authorities.

3. To date no definite evidence has been uncovered in the War East Command, as to actual concealment of Soviet citizenship, although it has been reported that Soviet officials have instructed new Soviet citizens to conceal their citizenship in the future.

4. It is believed possible that instructions similar to those issued in France may have been issued to newly reinstated Soviet citizens residing in the United States.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2



WILLIAM C. BURT
Executive Officer

18 Sept 47


MEMO FOR RECORD
A summary translation by G-2 Gen. Lia. of an article in the newspaper Russkoye Slovo of 26 Jun 47 reveals instructions by the Soviets to new Sov citizens in France to conceal their citizenship status. Similar instructions may have been issued in the US. Accordingly, this info is forwarded to the WDCID.
WLM 26-5662

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HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 925


SUBJECT: Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War
TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500

1. Attached hereto is a list of Japanese ex-prisoners of war who participated in the Battle of the Bismark Sea, were later captured at Goodenough Island, and eventually repatriated.
2. Although these individuals were previously naval personnel it is believed that selected ones could provide considerable information desired by the Army Air Forces as to the effects of the United States air attacks on the Japanese Naval units concerned.
3. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Translator and Interpreter Section, G-2, contact and conduct an interrogation of a sufficient number of the Japanese nationals listed to exploit all possible details of the subject contained in paragraph 2 above as may be known by these repatriates. An officer from the Intelligence Section, A-2, is available to assist in this interrogation if such services are desired.

/s/
EDWARD H. PORTER
Colonel, Air Corps
Asst. C/S, A-2

WDID 1st Ind
G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 9 September 1947
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

1. Your request for the interrogation of certain Japanese survivors of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea has been received.
2. Arrangements for securing the personnel to be interrogated are being made with the appropriate Japanese authorities.



FILE

File L
MAYNARD E. LEE
GWO, USA

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Authority **795006**
By **CEC** NARA Date **11/1/4**

HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST AIR FORCES
APO 500

SUBJECT: Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters
Far East Command
APO 500

1. Attached hereto is a list of Japanese ex-prisoners of war who participated in the Battle of the Bismark Sea, were later captured at Goodenough Island, and eventually repatriated.

2. Although these individuals were previously naval personnel it is believed that selected ones could provide considerable information desired by the Army Air Forces as to the effects of the United States air attacks on the Japanese Naval units concerned.


3. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Translator and Interpreter Section, G-2, contact and conduct an interrogation of a sufficient number of the Japanese nationals listed to exploit all possible details of the subject contained in paragraph 2 above as may be known by these repatriates. An officer from the Intelligence Section, A-2, is available to assist in this interrogation if such services are desired.

/s/
EDWARD H. PORTER
Colonel, Air Corps
Asst. G-2, A-2

WDID
G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 9 September 1947
TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2, Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 500

1. Your request for the interrogation of certain Japanese survivors of the Battle of the Bismark Sea has been received.

2. Arrangements for securing Japanese prisoners to be interrogated are being made with the appropriate Japanese authorities.




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SEP 11 1947



G-5 Admin Files
WDID/EHES/WJ

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BASIC: Ltr, Far East Air Forces, APO 925, subject: Interrogation of Japanese Ex-Prisoners of War, dated 2 Sept 47

3. It is estimated that interrogation of the entire list of survivors furnished may take as much as 6 weeks. Interrogations will start in the immediate future. It is requested that you furnish this office with the name of the officer who will be available from the Intelligence Section, A-2, to assist in the interrogation. He will be notified by phone when the informants arrive.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

C. S. MYERS
Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer, G-2



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G-2 BRIEF

BRIEF

CAW/mvb/ap 3779
22 August 1947

G-3 Comments on Interrogation Reports

CS

1. I circulated a type ATIS Interrogation Report in order to acquaint the staff with current intelligence procurement, on direct War Department orders, through repatriates from Russian-held territories: Manchuria-Siberia. The resultant enormous range of coverage is self-evident in the statistical number of intelligence topics, as listed. (Tab A)

2. Note G-3 comment as of 8 July (Tab B), particularly par 3, recommending "that publication of interrogation report be eliminated."

Note G-2 reply of 11 July (Tab C), pointing out that the terrain study of "Military Geography: Manchuria," could never have been published without the new information derived from the interrogation process; this process is completely analogous to wartime-method of interrogating and screening prisoners of war. Interrogations, at this time, are the only activity that produces information on Russian-held territory.

3. The attitude expressed by G-3 is both shocking and discouraging to me, as indicative of the complete indifference or lack of understanding of one of the most fruitful current intelligence enterprises in FEC or in any other theater.

4 Incls

- 1. Tab A - C/S fr G-2 to G-3, 1 Jul 47
- 2. Tab B - C/S fr G-3 to G-2, 8 Jul 47
- 3. Tab C - C/S fr G-2 to G-3, 11 Jul 47
- 4. Inter Rpt No 24, 14 Aug 47

C.A.W.

File
FILE

File
MAYNARD E. LEE
CWO, USA

G-2 Admin

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
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CONFIDENTIAL

The following Scribblings were found on the walls of latrines in the Maizuru Reception Centre of repatriates from Siberia, during the period from 1st to 30th June 1947. This is the collection of all the Scribblings for the month.

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Scribblings by Repatriates from
Soviet Russia

1. Down with the Traitor - the Japan Communist Party!
Assassinate Sanzo Nosaka!
(A repatriate from Shimushn Island, North Chishima)
(A repatriate from Chosen)
2. Down with the Communist Party!
Look at the life of the Soviet people!
3. Even Soviet workers speak against the Communists
behind their back. (Siberianicus)
4. Drive out Communists from Japan! Don't you let
them fool you!
5. Knock out the Communist Party! Kill Tokuda, Shiga
and Nosaka!
6. Down with Communist bandits! Pull down the red
flag! Down with the Communist Party!
7. Knock out the Communist Party!
Knock out Nosaka and Shiga!
8. Don't forget the agony of Nakhotka. Let's go
and beat the Japan Communist Party!
9. Strangle the Nokhotka Youths' Alliance! Kill Nosaka!
10. Acknowledge with thanks the benefits of homeland!
Overthrow the reds!

Don't be a disgrace to the war dead!
11. To repatriates arriving later on! Let us march to an-
nihilate the Japan Communist Party!

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

12. The Communist Party is the enemy of us farmers.
Hate the Youths' Alliance! Throw them out, for
the sake of our old comrades in arms!
13. Exterminate the Communist Party - the Youths' Alliance
that tortured us!
14. Down with Sanzo Nosaka - Down with the Communist Party!
15. What's of downing the Emperor, you Fool? - Down the
Communist Party!
16. In order to rebuild Japan, overthrow the Communist
Party, and the Soviet Russian with it!
17. Down with the Communist Party, the enemy of all the
600,000 of us!
18. 600,000 fellow repatriates from Siberia. As an answer
to that agony, let's beat down the Communist Party!
19. Japan's rebuilding cannot be accomplished but by the
power of workers. Labor Unions are the friends of
working masses. Don't be deceived by Capitalists!
But judge correctly, and do not turn Red to repent
later!
20. Communism will not necessarily bring happiness to the
worker ... nor to the people. See the actual condition
of Soviet workmen!
21. Beat to death those connected with that Japanese
Language Newspaper!
22. The Voice of the Japanese in Russia: "Don't become
a Red, even if you have to turn white."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

23. Fellow repatriates, from now on our flag is the Rising Sun. Down with Nosaka and Tokuda!
24. Friends, don't forget the wrongs we suffered at the hands of Nakhodka Communists! They are the enemy of mankind, and a disgrace to the Japanese nation.
25. Is the Communist Party good or bad? You can tell if you eat that black bread.
26. Heroes of the 17th Repatriation Ship from Soviet Russia; What's the Communist Party? the Red Flag? the International? Look at those fools! Have we not found fellow love and compassion in our defeated country? Don't forget this kindness we have received, and let us join hands and rebuild this country of ours!
27. Communists, die at once for the good of the country! Upon landing in Japan we find the country even today unsurpassed in fellow-love. Open your eyes wide, you fools, agitating at Nakhodka! How can you land here without blushing?
28. Fools shouting about a democratizing Japan at Nakhodka, What is Communism? You're the ones who stand in the way of Japan's reconstruction.....The burden of rebuilding great Japan falls upon our shoulders.
29. Communists, what good is there in Communism? Have you eaten Soviet bread? Is it good, or is it bad? Just taste it, fools!

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- 4 -

30. At long last the day is here when I can go home. I have rediscovered the beauty of my homeland and the love of my fellow countrymen. What a difference from Nakhotka! The Communist Party must be a bunch of fools.
(A Repatriate on the 19th Ship)
31. Who are they that tortured us? Beat to death those fools of the Nakhotka Youths Alliance!
32. Let not those who shout democracy in the Soviet camp set foot on our home soil!
33. Banish from our shores Nakhotka's New Japan Youths' Alliance members who have tortured us ex-officers and men of the Kwantung Army!
34. Communist Alliance, how you treated Japanese at the Port of Nakhotka! Let us drive out the scoundrels of the Youths' Alliance if they return! Put out also Takanobu Kobayashi of 150th Company and his gang!
35. Nakhotka! It at once reminds me of the way we repatriates were treated by the Youths' Alliance. Japanese are torturing Japanese. I am sorry for my 500,000 comrades who still have to undergo the same ordeal. The members of the Youths' Alliance who have been repatriated should apologize in one way or another.
36. Nakhotka Youths' Alliance men, don't you see now that you are back? Are we not treated so well?
37. Fools of the Youths' Alliance, how could you return to Japan, having behaved as you have?

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38. Down with the Youths' Alliance that has bullied us!
39. Let us not forget the wrong of the Youths' Alliance men who mentally tortured us to the very moment of our departure! Let's keep them out of Japan!
40. Let us repatriates punish those members of the New Japan Youths' Alliance organized under Russian auspices for their manner of living and for their abuse of privileges!
41. Down with the Youths' Alliance which is preventing the return of our compatriots in Siberia!
42. Russians are ignorant and illiterate - and unintelligent. But they are good-natured and did not discriminate much against us. After all, they are mostly stupid enough to submit willingly to oppression from above. What is wrong is their ideology. They are a pitiable lot. I am against Communism. The Soviet Union is behind other countries in every respect. It has no progressive character.
43. These fellows of the "Democracy" group eat their fill, allowed independent living and -- (?) at the expense of the rest of us. They are murderers.
44. I say to the New Japan Youths' Alliance working under Soviets: "Down with the Communist Party that so tortured us, demobilized soldiers!"
45. Tell your children, if you have any, that in your camp..... numberless people were starved to death /.....
In the near future we will seek for strength and pull down that Red Flag (the International).

World

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World War III will break out before your eyes. With America we'll overthrow Soviet and starve Stahlin to death - Remember that!

46. Kill Kitano, head of Camp No. 1, Uladiostock. He is the Communist ringleader. Down with the Association of Friends members. Down with the Traitors! Down with the fellows who tortured our comrades by forming the Special Squad, etc! (A Patriot)
47. Dogs of Nakhotka Youths' Alliance, you shall die when you return.
48. Kill the Nakhotka Youths' Alliance!
49. How did you dare make us work without letting us eat, Russian crooks?
50. Let's not forget the hardships of our one and a half years' in Siberia! Let's not forget tens of thousands of our comrades in arms who died of mal-nutrition! Blood is thicker than water, fellow repatriates, Look, what fellow-love we find here!
51. The first step on the home shore awakens thousand thoughts! No love for the Soviet Union.
52. Fillows, don't forget how we suffered in Siberia. Build up a new Japan at once - one day the sooner, the better! Don't be deluded by Russian lies! Down with the Russians!
53. Are there not Soviet spies among us?
54. Get even with the Russians who made us work for two years for 10 days' fighting! But mind you, be careful yet! Mind you, be on your guard until you get home!

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55. Overthrow the Soviet Union! Construct a happy Japan!
56. Soviet Russia - let's beat it down!
57. Remember, repatriates, our days in Siberia!
58. Remember, repatriates, our life in Siberia, our comrades who died of cold, hunger and hard labor, -- indeed who were killed by unseen weapons!
59. Now we are back in Japan. But mind you, be careful yet! Mind you, be on your guard until you get home!
60. Practice American ways that are adapted to Japanese! But realize that a superficial modern culture does not suit our Japanese home life! A new-born Japan does not mean superficial adoption of American culture!
61. Trials and tribulations ahead of us!
62. Don't you worry. We are Japanese.
63. If Masayuki Shinozuka of Unit 83 turns up here, don't let him go home scot-free! This fellow is a big robber we could never forget.
64. Young men, cooperate toward the reconstruction of Japan with a resolute conviction. I tell this to the youths who are to shoulder New Japan.
65. Comrades in arms who have died in Siberia, do not grieve! Some day it will be ours. Be patient and wait!
66. Young men, don't be rash! Grasp true democracy. Don't be taken in by Soviet political propoganda of self-praise!
67. Who are they, who have robbed us of our good cloths, who are eating their fill, who will not return to our home land, and who will fight us? Answer: Fellows in Nakhotka

CONFIDENTIAL

youths!

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Youths' Alliance.

- 68. Men who have survived the storm of life, let us stand firm. Time will come when we can control the world.
- 69. Let us work from tomorrow on for the sake of resurgent Japan! We'll make a strong and military Japan.
- 70. The Japanese Language Paper in Soviet Russia is the kernel of the Soviets.
- 71. Autumn leaves, the buds that remain after you are scattered and gone, will wait for the spring to come.

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

BRIEF

APD 500
5 August 1947

SUBJECT: Communist Indoctrination of Demobilized and Repatriated Personnel

TO: The Chief of Staff

I. THE PROBLEM:

Control of Demobilized and Repatriated Personnel who have been indoctrinated with communistic principles while prisoners of war in Soviet or Chinese communist areas.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. Ninety-four percent (94%) of all personnel remaining to be repatriated will come from communist controlled areas. There is potential danger that the demobilized soldier may "go underground" or fall under an undesirable political philosophy: Communism. Communistic doctrines are being expounded daily to Japanese people by Soviet-trained and inspired agitators. Repatriation from Soviet area aggravates this situation. We have evidence of systematic communist indoctrination in Prisoner of War Camps and the dispatch of communist agents through repatriation channels.

B. United States and B.C.O.F. Occupation Forces, approximately 78,000, and Japanese police numbering 84,000, largely unarmed, are the only personnel available in Japan for the control of a nation of 73,000,000, of whom 5,000,000 are demobilized soldiers. The demobilized soldier, if led into path of Communism, will exert an influence beyond numbers because of inherent discipline and organization.

C. Occupation Forces, as presently constituted, cannot alone cope with the problem. Utilization of Local Assistance Bureau personnel is necessary to offset and eliminate this threat. The Local Assistance Bureaux, by furnishing advice and counselor service to repatriates and by acting as propaganda agencies for spread of democratic ideals, can combat communistic influences and prevent their spread.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Utilization of former and discharged officer personnel now in the Local Assistance Bureaux is the only method by which Occupation Forces can hope to influence, in indirect and unpublicized manner, the thoughts, philosophy and actions of former members of Japanese forces, and cause them to be directed into democratic channels. This has been a matter of paramount interest to Occupation Forces in view of reduced strength and the questionable effectiveness of Japanese police. Eighth Army and Division Commanders concur.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Recommended that selected, qualified Local Assistance Bureau personnel of unquestioned loyalty be placed on salary status and be utilized to constitute a nerve center for the following purposes:
(1) to exert control and influence over entire personnel of Local Assistance Bureaux and through these bring about the control of the repatriates;
(2) to report information regarding subversive activities endangering the occupation.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2

BRIEF
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G-2 File Copy

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*See Jan 48 files 01433 (23) See separately - same subject - Brief (Brief)
See Jan 48 files 01433 (23) See separately - 2a Demob Trouble (Memor)*

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
EAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APD 500
5 August 1947

BRIEF

SUBJECT: Communist Indocination of Demobilized and Repatriated Personnel

TO: The Chief of Staff

I. THE PROBLEM:
Control of Demobilized and Repatriated Personnel who have been indoctrinated with communist principles while prisoners of war in Soviet or Chinese communist areas.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:
A. Ninety-four percent (94%) of all personnel remaining to be repatriated will come from communist controlled areas. There is potential danger that the demobilized soldier may "go underground" or fall under an undesirable political philosophy: Communist. Communist doctrines are being expounded daily to Japanese people by Soviet-trained and inspired agitators. Repatriation from Soviet areas aggravates this situation. We have evidence of systematic communist indoctrination in Prisoner of War Camps and the dispatch of communist agents through repatriation channels.

B. United States and B.O.O.F. Occupation Forces, approximately 78,000, and Japanese police numbering 84,000, largely unarmed, are the only personnel available in Japan for the control of a nation of 73,000,000, of whom 5,000,000 are demobilized soldiers. The demobilized soldier, if led into path of Communism, will exert an influence beyond numbers because of inherent discipline and organization.

C. Occupation Forces, as presently constituted, cannot alone cope with the problem. Utilization of local assistance Bureau personnel is necessary to offset and eliminate this threat. The local assistance Bureau, by furnishing advice and counselor service to repatriates and by acting as propaganda agencies for spread of democratic ideals, can combat communist influence and prevent their spread.

III. DISCUSSION:
A. Utilization of former and discharged officer personnel now in the local assistance Bureau is the only method by which Occupation Forces can hope to influence in indirect and unpublicized manner, the thoughts, philosophy and actions of former members of Japanese forces, and cause them to be directed into democratic channels. This has been a matter of paramount interest to Occupation Forces in view of reduced strength and the questionable effectiveness of Japanese police. Right Army and Division Commanders concur.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. Recommended that selected, qualified local assistance Bureau personnel of unquestioned loyalty be placed on salary status and be utilized to constitute a nerve center for the following purposes:
(1) to exert control and influence over entire personnel of local assistance Bureau and through them bring about the control of the repatriates;
(2) to report information regarding subversive activities endangering the occupation.

O. A. WILCOX
Rising Star General, U.S.A.
Asst Chief of Staff, G-2

BRIEF
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G-2 File Code


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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

AFPO 500
 5 August 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

I. THE PROBLEM:

Control of Demobilized and Repatriated Personnel who have been indoctrinated with communistic principles while prisoners of war in Soviet and Chinese communist controlled areas.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities there were, exclusive of Manchuria, approximately 1,600,000 Japanese nationals in Soviet controlled areas. These were distributed geographically approximately as follows:

Dairen	220,000
Karafuto & Kuriles	370,000
Korea	320,000
Siberia	700,000

Out of the original total of 1,600,000 approximately 860,000, or better than 53% remain to be repatriated. Not included in this 53% are 91,000 held in Manchuria, of which 67,000 are under Russian or Chinese communist control. Personnel in Russian and Chinese communist controlled areas constitutes 94% of all personnel remaining to be repatriated. Seventy-one percent (71%) of the 94% will come from Siberia, 7% will come from Manchuria, giving a total of 78% coming from the communist areas where more forceful emphasis has been placed on indoctrination and propaganda than in other such areas.

B. The interrogation of repatriates, as indicated in the Interrogation Reports, has proven that 100% of the personnel held by the Russians and Chinese communists have been subjected to communist propaganda and indoctrination in one form or another. This indoctrination consists of: lectures by Russian officers and known Japanese communist leaders; Russian sponsored schools and classes on the benefits of communism; compulsory reading of Russian sponsored newspapers and pamphlets containing derogatory remarks concerning the United States and its Occupation policies; communistic flavored plays and motion pictures and radio broadcasts which deride the United States and its Occupation policies, and the formation of special labor groups or special "Assault" units for communist activity in the internment camps whose members, after accepting the communist doctrine, receive special pay and privileges and the promise of employment upon their return to Japan.

C. The appearance of communist agitators in the repatriation stream is an established fact. The recent CIC nation wide investigation disclosed that in April 1947 alone, 180 members of a special "Assault" unit for communist activity (TOTSUGEKI TAI) arrived in Japan as repatriates from Soviet controlled areas. All of these had voluntarily signed a pledge to join the Japanese Communist Party upon arrival in Japan. These people, all Soviet trained and inspired agitators, are daily expounding communistic doctrines to the Japanese people.

D. Continuation of the repatriation program from Communist controlled areas greatly aggravates this situation through a vast increase in the said number of Soviet trained and inspired agitators. The absorption of the principles of communism seems to be the pre-

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Memo to Chief of Staff, dtd 5 August 47.

requisite to securing a repatriation ticket by those prisoners of war held by the Soviet government. Those prisoners, after repatriation, if uncontrolled may become a threat to security and a hazard to the aims of the occupation.

E. For occupation there is available at the present time the following approximate total of personnel: 72,000 organic divisional troops of all branches, including the B.C.O.F. Fighting Forces, 700 C.I.C., 3,500 M.P., and 1,900 Military Government, a total of approximately 78,000, to which may be added with reservations the Japanese Civil Police of approximately 84,600 (Tab A). This constitutes a grand total of 162,000 and represents the force with which the occupation authorities must control a nation of 73,000,000.

F. There is a great danger that the demobilized soldier will choose to "go underground", or will fall under an undesirable political philosophy such as communism.

G. Use of the Local Assistance Bureaux is a means of maintaining a controlled contact which will influence the actions and thoughts of demobilized personnel into channels not inimical to the objectives of the Occupation Forces. This control would stem from the medium of a soldier's firm faith and willingness to accept guidance from a former superior officer and from that officer's understanding of current problems.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. The facts and figures appearing in II, above, in themselves present a lurid picture and tell rather tersely and concisely a story of great import to the occupation.

B. With the advent of the Occupation Forces those precepts which the Japanese nation followed politically prior to and during the war were completely destroyed and a new political thought introduced. Indoctrination into this new political thought leaves Japan at a cross-roads which bears two signs: one reading, Communism; the other, Democracy.

C. At the present time Russia is doing her utmost to grasp and utilize to her advantage this encouragement of new political thought. Agents highly trained in propagandizing communistic ideals have been sent into Japan. They are conducting an intensified campaign among the disaffected element of Japan and are rapidly gaining followers. The Japanese, especially the lower element, in his present state of mind cannot evaluate or differentiate between the two roads. This is evident by the present tendency toward chaos and disorder with its accompanying welfare problem, and underground agitation with its outward manifestation in the form of strikes, general unrest and disturbances.

D. The rapid inroads already made by communism in the labor unions of Japan is indicative of the preliminary victory by communism over democracy and is fast becoming a matter of serious concern from the security angle - this, the more so, since it presages its infiltration into repatriation groups through the ex-soldier presently being repatriated from Soviet-controlled areas.

E. It is rather significant that repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas has begun to get underway at the eleventh hour. The reason behind the Soviet repatriation program, a program marked by procrastination and delay, is quite transparent. No Japanese ex-soldier is ready for repatriation until he has gone through a period of indoc-

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Memo to Chief of Staff, dtd 5 August 47.

trination into communist ideals sufficient to qualify him as an apostle of communism and enable him to go out and preach its gospel. In fact, he has been taught to believe that communism is the "New Shinto" of Japan. At the reported rate of 25,000 repatriates from Soviet-controlled areas per month, it is clear that even the most stubborn of the 860,000 ex-soldiers now awaiting repatriation from said areas cannot help but become converted to this "New Shinto". Needless to say, the most stubborn will be the last to return to Japan.

F. One can readily visualize the consequences if these monthly quotas are allowed, like so many apparently harmless streams and rivulets, to flow uncontrolled through the several prefectures. Thoroughly indoctrinated in communism the individuals involved will convert to their creed their relatives, friends and acquaintances in their several communities. These, in turn, will exert their influence for evil upon relatives, friends and acquaintances. The vicious cycle will increase with the rapidity of a geometrical progression. The apparently harmless rivulet becomes a raging torrent, the torrent soon overflows its banks and leaves havoc and destruction in its wake. This situation will seriously thwart our efforts if the guidance and counsel offered to these misguided individuals by the Local Assistance Bureaux is removed today.

G. The problem presented by the demobilization and repatriation program, when analyzed in relation to the present potential strength of the Occupation Forces and the strength which would be actually needed should the ex-soldier decide to go underground, presents an unwholesome picture. We have on one side of the picture approximately 72,000 United States troops and B.C.O.F. Fighting Forces aided by approximately 6,000 scattered C.I.C. and Military Government Teams giving a total of 78,000 effective troops, or an average of 936 persons to one effective soldier (Tabs A and B). Additional aid, from which we can hardly hope to obtain 100% cooperation in an emergency, is the rather limited and just as widely scattered Japanese police force of 84,646 which gives an average of one policeman to 864 Japanese (Tabs A and C). The combination of military force available and Japanese police gives a ratio of security forces to the population of Japan of one security force personnel to 449 Japanese (Tabs A and D). On the other side of the picture, we have the demobilized army, a giant octopus, at present 5,000,000 strong and daily increasing in strength to approximately 6,100,000 (Tabs E, F and G) with a density by prefecture varying from 50,000 to almost 300,000 (Tabs E and F), whose tentacles spread through every corner of Japan, and concentrate at all important points.

H. The Local Assistance Bureaux with the ex-officers therein employed in authoritative capacities represent to the ex-soldier an organization to which he, who has no organization, can turn to for sound guidance and counsel. Control of said organizations, numerically small and located one in each prefecture (Tabs E and F), is all that is necessary and is based on the fact that an ex-soldier, if he has in fact been a real soldier, will always consider and comport himself as one, even after returning to civilian life. Military training will cause the ex-soldier to place his trust in his ex-officer and cause him to look to said officer for counsel and advice, which he will generally abide by. It is at this critical reorientation stage that such counsel and advice will be of most value in combating the influence of communism. It follows axiomatically that control of the Local Assistance Bureaux is control of the ex-soldiers. This the Occupation Forces have thus far accomplished.

I. It is futile to claim that we can alone cope with the problem of adequate over-all security with the present Occupation Forces. The

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Memo to Chief of Staff, dtd 5 August 47.

proper coverage could not be obtained even if the entire Japanese police were included. In the detection of subversion, CIS through its investigative agency, CIC, is handicapped not only by the numerical deficiencies now existing within its ranks, but by the ever present language difficulty. With the limited investigative experts available, the best which one can ever hope to accomplish is to scratch the surface when dealing in terms of over-all security.

IV. CONCLUSION:

A. The depleted ranks of the Occupation Forces as shown above, with the M.P., the C.I.C., and the Military Government Teams numbering all together 6,000 and scattered throughout Japan, are in themselves ineffective at present for complete security coverage. This condition still holds true even if 100% cooperation from the Japanese police can be relied on, inasmuch as these average only one for 864 population, and in the more densely populated areas this ratio is perceptibly higher. Our security is threatened. The demobilized Army is a potential threat to security unless proper safeguards are put into operation which will partially fill the gap caused by our depleted ranks. The ex-soldier improperly guided, counseled, and oriented during the initial stages of rehabilitation, his survivors, the relatives of the missing, disregarded or neglected, form a fertile soil for the seed of unrest and discontent, with its attendant riotous manifestations, strikes, crime, demonstrations and underground activities to take root. It was just such fertile soil which prevailed in Russia during the period 1914-1918 which caused communism to take root and to grow into a mighty tree. The safeguards for the prevention of the seed of discontent to be sown is the Local Assistance Bureau with its ex-army officers and ex-army personnel. They, under occupation supervision and control, constitute an organization to which the demobilized soldier turns for proper reorientation at the most critical period of his life. It is, therefore, axiomatic that occupational control of the Local Assistance Bureaux is control of the demobilized soldier himself.

B. The Local Assistance Bureaux can and should be utilized by the Occupation Forces as part and parcel of the "Main Line of Resistance" to the importation of communistic doctrines into Japan by the repatriated soldier. This may be accomplished by using the Local Assistance Bureaux as points for disseminating democratic propoganda to returned and demobilized soldiers. This dissemination must be continuous and so planned that it will impress the former soldier with the benefits to be derived from a democratic form of government and make him realize that the only solution to the current Japanese situation is to follow democratic principles and teachings.

C. The Occupation Forces can further utilize these Local Assistance Bureaux as intelligence agencies charged with the mission of reporting not only communistic trends but any other subversive tendencies that may be apparent in the repatriated soldier. From such reports information will be derived which will enable the Occupation Forces to forestall the spreading of any contemplated radical doctrine or action and will further enable them to place under surveillance the individuals involved. By such action the Occupation Forces will be able to more accurately forecast political developments in Japan and will likewise be able to take corrective steps to counter undesirable situations before they gain sufficient momentum to become uncontrollable forces.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. That steps be initiated through intelligence channels to ascertain those members of each Local Assistance Bureau that are sympathetic to the ideals of a democratic form of government for Japan.

SECRET

Memo to Chief of Staff, dtd 5 August 47.

B. That those members found to be sympathetic to the democratic form of government be utilized as propaganda agents for the dissemination of democratic principles and ideals to the demobilized soldiers.

C. That in addition to acting as propaganda agencies these individuals be actively cultivated as intelligence sources to report information regarding activities which would adversely effect the aims of the occupation. Such information would include (1) the formation of subversive groups; (2) importation into Japan of Soviet inspired literature and ideals by repatriated soldiers; (3) organization of former military personnel into any type of a club or group having militaristic tendencies, and (4) the acts of any individual that would lead to the conclusion that his conduct was not to the best interests of the occupation.

D. That the proposed plan (Tab H) be approved and placed in effect immediately.

Tab A: Ratio of Military and Japanese Police Strength - by prefecture
 Tab B: Ratio of Population to One Allied Soldier - by prefecture
 Tab C: Ratio of Population to One Japanese Policeman - by prefecture
 Tab D: Ratio of Population to One Military or Japanese Policeman - by prefecture
 Tab E: Analysis of Population, Demob. Personnel, etc., in Local Assist. Bureaux
 Tab F: Density of Demobilized Soldier
 Tab G: Geographic Table of Population, Demob. Pers. etc., Empl. in Local Assist. Bureaux
 Tab H: Proposed Plan

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
 Brigadier General, G.S.C.
 Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2

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LOCAL ASSISTANCE BUREAUX UTILIZATION PLAN

1. The basic step is the employment of certain individuals in each Local Assistance Bureau who are in sympathy with the aims of the occupation and are willing, for a consideration, to report subversive actions and trends to the Occupation Forces and, in addition, act as agents for the dissemination of anti-communistic propaganda furnished them by the Occupation Forces. This latter could be printed material as well as verbal.
2. The number of paid Local Assistance Bureau personnel so employed in each prefecture should be at least in the proportion of one Local Assistance Bureau employee to 20,000 demobilized personnel residing in the prefecture, with a plus or minus correction factor to be arbitrarily applied to certain prefectures to compensate for known or suspected potential sensitivity to acceptance of communistic doctrines or the tendency to commit acts of a subversive nature.
3. The ratio of 1:20,000, weighted according to the comparative sensitivity table, (Tab H/1) will result in ratios varying from 1:12,400 in Kochi prefecture, to 1:38,600 in Ehime prefecture (Tab H/1). This will cause the percentage of present Local Assistance Bureau personnel to be employed by the Occupation Forces for intelligence and propaganda purposes to vary from 3.1% in Saga prefecture to 29.9% in Hyogo prefecture, with a national average of 7.7%, as indicated in Tabs H/2 and H/3. The total number of Local Assistance Bureau personnel who are former military personnel employed in Japan would be 292 as compared to the present total of 3811 former military personnel employed in the Local Assistance Bureaux. This number would be distributed by prefecture as indicated in Tabs H/2 and H/3.
4. In order to make this type of service to the Occupation Forces attractive to members of the Local Assistance Bureaux and to compensate them properly, the figure of ¥1,500. per month was selected as an equitable pay for the intelligence and propaganda services to be performed. This would result in a cost of ¥438,000. per month for the whole of Japan, or an average cost of ¥0.070 per demobilized individual. The cost varies from ¥0.039 per individual demobilized in Ehime prefecture to ¥0.121 per demobilized individual in Kochi prefecture as indicated in Tab H/2 and Tab H/4.
5. In the event the cost of the plan, based on the ratio of 1:20,000, is too costly, the cost of the plan under ratios of 1:30,000 and 1:40,000, with the number of people to be employed, by prefecture, is indicated in Tab H/5.
6. The Commanding Officer, 441st C.I.C. Detachment, should also be provided with an additional sum of ¥10,000. per month with which to purchase a stock of material gifts "in kind", such as 10-in-1 rations, cigarettes, American whiskey and similar items greatly appreciated by the Japanese to be used as gratuitous payments for information received from that class of individuals motivated by patriotism, loyalty and personal integrity to whom a proffer of money would be offensive.
7. Control and utilization of Local Assistance Bureau personnel employed should be the responsibility of the 441st C.I.C. Detachment who could integrate these special informants into the present intelligence coverage net in whatever manner is believed most practical by the Commanding Officer, 441st C.I.C. Detachment.
8. Information and Education Section should make available to the Commanding Officer, 441st C.I.C. Detachment certain printed matter of a propaganda nature favorable to the aims of the Occupation Forces to be

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Tab H


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Tab H - cont'd:

distributed in the manner and proportions judged by him to be most advisable to the personnel of the Local Assistance Bureaux employed under the plan. These employees will in turn make the final distribution to demobilized personnel.

9. According to the plan hereinabove set forth, the paid workers and the recipients of "tokens" would constitute the nerve center for exerting control and influence over the entire personnel of the Local Assistance Bureaux who in turn would influence, control and guide the repatriates.

- Tab H/1: Ratio of Local Assist. Bureau Personnel to Demobilized Personnel; Comparison of Potential Sensitivity
- Tab H/2: Ratio & Cost Analysis of Plan
- Tab H/3: % Analysis of Former Officer Personnel to be Utilized
- Tab H/4: Cost Analysis in Yen per Demobilized Individual
- Tab H/5: Cost Comparison of Various Ratios for Plan



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Tab H - cont'd:


distributed in the manner and proportions judged by him to be most
advantageous to the personnel of the Local Assistance Bureau employed
under the plan. These employees will in turn make the final distri-
bution to demobilized personnel.

9. According to the plan hereinafter set forth, the paid workers
and the recipients of "tokens" would constitute the nerve center for
exercising control and influence over the entire personnel of the Local
Assistance Bureau who in turn would influence, control and guide the
recipients.

- Tab H/1: Ratio of Local Assist. Bureau
Personnel to Demobilized Personnel;
Comparison of Potential Sensitivity
- Tab H/2: Ratio of Cost Analysis of Plan
- Tab H/3: Analysis of Former Officer
Personnel to be Utilized
- Tab H/4: Cost Analysis in Yen per
Demobilized Individual
- Tab H/5: Cost Comparison of Various
Ratios for Plan



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German Repatriation: Jakob FISCHER

G-2

G-1

5 AUG 1947
CIS/OD/RPW/mh

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1. Reference Check Note, G-2 to G-1, dated 6 February 1947, Subject: Repatriation of Jakob FISCHER.

2. In view of the nature of work that Subject was performing for the CIC, a deferment was requested in his case. G-1 concurred and deferment was granted.

3. Insofar as objection to Subject under controlling JCS directives is concerned, there has been no change. He was a member of the Nazi Party, joining in 1934, and at one time (1931-32) taught French and German to Japanese Army officers.

4. It is our understanding that Subject's Japanese wife and four (4) children, the youngest of which is about 2 years of age, plan to remain in Japan.

5. Since Subject's initial deferment, he has shown himself capable and willing in all tasks assigned to him.

6. In view of the Subject's value to CIC, CIS, G-2, it is requested that this case be given favorable consideration for a second deferment.

C.A.W.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Maj Cannon, CIC Area 25, approached me on this subject, explained Fischer's work and asked what could be done. Maj Cannon and I consulted informally with Maj Wilderman, G-1, to see if there was any possibility of a second deferment. Maj Wilderman stated that if the CIC really needed Fischer, he felt G-1 would go along. After discussing the case with Col Brown and Col Holman, I again contacted Maj Cannon. ~~This draft C/N is the result and is forwarded for G-2 approval.~~ *and approved by G-2*

RPW

26-5660

8/4/47

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German Requisition: Jacob FISCHER

5 AUG 1947
GIA/OD/HR/W

G-1

G-2

1. Reference Check Note, G-2 to G-1, dated 8 February 1947, Subject: Requisition of Jacob FISCHER.

2. In view of the nature of work that subject was performing for the GIG, a deferment was requested in his case. G-1 concurred and deferment was granted.

3. Insofar as objection to subject under controlling JCS directives is concerned, there has been no change. He was a member of the Nazi Party, joining in 1934, and at one time (1931-32) taught French and German to Japanese Army officers.

4. It is our understanding that subject's Japanese wife and four (4) children, the youngest of which is about 2 years of age, plan to remain in Japan.

5. Since subject's initial deferment, he has shown himself capable and willing to do all tasks assigned to him.

6. In view of the subject's value to GIG, G-2, it is requested that this case be given favorable consideration for a second deferment.

G.A.W.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Maj Cannon, GIG Area 25, approached me on this subject, explained Fischer's work and asked what could be done. Maj Cannon and I consulted informally with Maj Wilderman, G-1, to see if there was any possibility of a second deferment. Maj Wilderman stated that if the GIG really needed Fischer, he felt G-1 would go along. After discussing the case with Col Brown and Col Holman, I again contacted Maj Cannon. This draft G-1 is the result and is forwarded for G-2 approval.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

AFPO 500
1 AUG 1947

CIS/OD

SUBJECT: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Eighth Army, APO 343

1. The attached summary report of SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea is forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary.

2. Investigation conducted by CIC Area No. 3 and CIC Area No. 2 (Sasebo) revealed that 118 Koreans were repatriated from Sasebo to Konan, Korea. Information received from an informant suggests that the Japanese Customs officials did accept bribes from the Korean repatriates permitting them to smuggle essential materials, such as ball bearings, etc., into North Korea without regular routine inspection procedure.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Incl:
1 S/I, dtd 23 Jul 47

C. S. MYERS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

470 500
1 AUG 1947

CIS/OD

SUBJECT: SOAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Eighth Army, APO 943

1. The attached summary report of SOAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea is forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary.

2. Investigation conducted by CIC Area No. 3 and CIC Area No. 2 (Saeko) revealed that 118 Koreans were repatriated from Saeko to Korea, Korea. Information received from an informant suggests that the Japanese Customs officials did accept bribes from the Korean re-patriates permitting them to smuggle essential materials, such as ball bearings, etc., into North Korea without regular routine inspection procedure.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

O. S. MYERS
Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer

Incl:
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

CIS/OD

APO 500
 23 July 1947

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea

Investigation initiated by CIC Area No. 3, APO 24, revealed that one hundred and eighteen (118) Korean passengers carrying their light baggage, boarded the vessel, SHINYO MARU, and left for the port of Moji, Fukuoka ken, 1600 hours, 23 June 1947, where other baggage of some of the passengers was to be put aboard.

The SHINYO MARU entered the port of Moji at 1000 hours, 26 June 1947, and departed for Konan, Korea, 0700 hours, 27 June 1947 after loading the baggage of fifty six (56) Korean repatriates. None of the passengers were permitted to debark once the ship docked in the bay at Moji.

On 7 July 1947, an informant, who was placed aboard the SHINYO MARU to observe and report upon return all items of interest, was interviewed. The following information was received from this informant:

1. A plot in North Korea to smuggle personnel and goods into Japan:

a. Date of planning:

This plot originated in Konan, Konan area, during the month of March 1947.

b. Purpose:

To dispose of cargoes from Korea to obtain money for the purchase of essential materials, such as ball bearings, etc., for utilization in the civilian factories in North Korea.

c. Responsible persons:

The promoters of this scheme are the Konan officials of the RODO TO (Labor Party) supported by the government and approximately ten Japanese. One of the Japanese is HASEGAWA, Chojiro (長谷川長次郎 formerly of Yamagata ken, whose younger brother, HASEGAWA, Jikichi (長谷川治吉), Katakokezawa, Toyo-mura, Nishida-gun, Yamagata ken, is allegedly the main contact for the said smugglers once they reach the shores of Japan safely. HASEGAWA, Chojiro is responsible for the founding of the Sea Salvaging Department (KAIJO KYUNAN BU) (海上救難部) in North Korea.

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BASIC: S/I, dtd 23 Jul 47, to AC of S, G-2, 8th Army, APO 343,
subj: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea.

d. Possible landing point in Japan:

Plans have been formulated to land in the vicinity of SAKATA Port in Yamagata ken due to the strict water patrol enforced along the coast between Sasebo and Shimonoseki.

e. Ship and cargo to be disposed of upon arrival in Japan:

Name of ship: Unknown
Size of ship: 30 to 60 tons
Number of smugglers: Approximately ten (10) consisting of both Koreans and Japanese.
Port of departure: Konan and/or West Koshin, Korea
Cargo: Sulphuric ammonia (fertilizer) 25 to 30 Kg.

f. Date of departure and return to Korea:

The date of departure from Korea has been tentatively set as between 25 June 1947 and 31 June 1947. The return date has been set for the latter part of July after the essential articles have been purchased in Japan.

Informant further stated that some of the Korean repatriates intended to illegally re-enter Japan and buy necessary goods to smuggle into Korea for utilization in civilian factories.

2. After crossing the 38th parallel, some of the Korean repatriates celebrated their return to North Korea with a drinking party, at which time the fact that a large quantity of ball bearings had been smuggled into North Korea was disclosed. The Captain of the SHINYO MARU was congratulated at this time for his timely assistance, by these smugglers.

The ball bearings were transported to Korea in fifty (50) Japanese straw woven packages, approximately two by three feet in size. These packages were carried aboard by the above passengers as personal baggage. A few of the Korean repatriates had these packages inspected and confiscated by the Japanese officials.

It is the opinion of this informant that most of the repatriates have or had previous contacts with the Customs officials in Sasebo and had offered bribes to them. In this manner, all Koreans that smuggle themselves into Japan can, upon deportation, take back large quantities of essential items to Korea.

The main discussion and topic aboard the SHINYO MARU among the passengers was the difference between the Soviet and United States

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BASIC: S/I, dtd 23 Jul 47, to AC of S, G-2, 8th Army, APO 343,
subj: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea.

systems of governing Korea. General contention indicates that these passengers favored the Soviet system and a communistic form of government for entire Korea. A majority expressed their intentions of continuing communistic activities upon their arrival in North Korea.

As the SHINYO MARU entered the port of Konan, Korea, the vessel was met by the citizens of Konan headed by the mayor. An elaborate ceremony was held for these people with an opening address by KIM, Il-sung, head of the North Korean Government. Other speeches were also given by the vice-chief of the Konan-do and the mayor of Konan. KIN, To Yo spoke in behalf of the Korean repatriates thanking the assembly for their warm reception. It was observed at this time that the flags of the Soviet Union and the North Korea Labor Party as well as the pictures of STALIN, KIM and MOLOTOV were carried by some of the students and others among the reception party.

The SHINYO MARU left the port of Konan on 1 July 1947 for Japan with approximately five hundred and ten (510) Japanese repatriates. Among them were some one hundred and thirty (130) technicians.

EXHIBIT I

COPY OF PASSENGER LIST OF THE SHIMIZU MARU

Name in Romaji		Name in Kanji	Sex	Age	Occupation	Destination	Residence in Japan
Korean Pronunciation	Japanese Pronunciation						
1. <u>KIM Sung Su</u>	<u>KIM Ki Hyak</u>	(金木百)	(M)	45	Clerk	Heinannan-do Yamaguchi-ken Geigen-gun, Ei-Ube-shi.	
2. <u>KIM Yong Kuk</u>	<u>KIM Yo Kiok</u>	(金庸極)	(M)	45	Rennel Member	Jai-men Kannando, Hoku Tokyo, Hontama-sei-gun, Gesha shi, Yuki-mura sho-men, Shin Nakayama #538 kori	
3. <u>ZU Okun Chan</u>	<u>CHOGHO O Kin</u>	(趙張於金)	(F)	44	Nil	Kankyonan-do Tokyo Hokusei-gun, Kasha-men	
4. <u>KIM He Za</u>	<u>KIM Toshiko</u>	(金 敏 子)	(F)	11	Nil	Same as above	#538
5. <u>KIM Hi Min</u>	<u>KIM Ki Kei</u>	(金 照 敬)	(M)	9	Nil	"	"
6. <u>KIM To Za</u>	<u>KIM Do Shi</u>	(金 道 子)	(F)	6	Nil	"	"
7. <u>KIM Sa Za</u>	<u>KIM Su Shi</u>	(金 香 子)	(F)	4	Nil	"	"
8. <u>CHE Yun Za</u>	<u>Sai Zen Sai</u>	(崔 烈 在)	(M)	46	Nil	"	"
9. <u>ZO Zankun Sun</u>	<u>SHO Chokin Sen</u>	(趙張今先)	(F)	44	Nil	"	"
10. <u>CHE Kiung Suk</u>	<u>SAI Kei Suk</u>	(崔 慶 淑)	(F)	20	Nil	"	"
11. <u>CHE Siung Chung</u>	<u>SAI Sei Ten</u>	(崔 性 天)	(M)	28	Nil	"	"
12. <u>KIM Ok Kum</u>	<u>KIM Gyok Kin</u>	(金 玉 金)	(F)	22	Nil	"	"
13. <u>KIM Hi Ok</u>	<u>KIM Ki Giok</u> (Member of Rennel)	(金 照 玉)	(M)	34	Nil	"	"
14. <u>KIM Mik Za</u>	<u>KIM Kei Shi</u>	(金 惠 子)	(F)	11	Nil	"	"
15. <u>BAK Ziun Kua</u>	<u>BOK Sei Kin</u>	(朴 正 金)	(F)	32	Nil	Kankyonan-do Tokyo, Honta-Hokusei-gun mashi, Yuki-Geshasho-men mura, Nakayama Gatsukinshiri #538 #606	
16. <u>KIM Ching I</u>	<u>KIM Tadavoshi</u>	(金 忠 義)	(M)	7	Nil	Same as above	Tokyo
17. <u>KIM Kuk Za</u>	<u>KIM Kikuko</u>	(金 菊 子)	(F)	4	Nil	"	"
18. <u>KIM Chi Giun</u>	<u>KIM Ji Gon</u> (Member of Rennel)	(金 滋 權)	(M)	38	Nil	"	"
19. <u>BAK Ziunsi Siun</u>	<u>BOK Teimi Tan</u>	(朴 正 韋 蟾)	(F)	38	Nil	"	"

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Tab C

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
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20.	<u>KIM Song Ir</u> <u>KIM Matsuko</u>	(金全)	王	(F)	11	Nil	"	"
21.	<u>KIM Giun Za</u> <u>KIM Kyoko</u>	(金全)	王	(F)	9	Nil	"	"
22.	<u>KIM Song Ir</u> <u>KIM So-Ichi</u>	(金全)	王	(M)	6	Nil	"	"
23.	<u>KIM Zuk Za</u> <u>KIM Takeko</u>	(金全)	王	(F)	2	Nil	"	"
24.	<u>WON Hiu Wan</u> <u>GHN Hiu Wan</u>	(金全)	王	(M)	25	Student	"	"
25.	<u>KIM Hak Sin</u> <u>KIM Kan Jun</u>	(金全)	王	(F)	38	Nil	"	"
26.	<u>KIM O Siun</u>	(金全)	王	(F)	38	Nil	"	"
27.	<u>KIM Kang Un</u> <u>KIM Ko Yu</u>	(金全)	王	(M)	3	Nil	"	"
28.	<u>KIM Pa Kiuk</u> <u>KIM Fai Kyok</u>	(金全)	王	(M)	26	Laborer	Kankyonanodo Hokusei-gun Geshasho-men Getsukinshiri #606	"
29.	<u>KANG Bong Sum</u> <u>KYO Ho san</u>	(金全)	鳳	(F)	24	Nil	Same as above	"
30.	<u>KIM Hi Za</u> <u>KIM Sho Shi</u>	(金全)	鳳	(F)	3	Nil	"	"
31.	<u>KIM Hi Na</u> <u>KIM Sho Bai</u>	(金全)	鳳	(F)	2	Nil	"	"
32.	<u>HAN Hin Ku</u> <u>KAN Hin Kyn</u>	(金全)	鳳	(M)	19	Student	"	"
33.	<u>HI Yeng Ki</u> <u>HI Hyn Ki</u>	(金全)	鳳	(M)	47	Shop	"	"
34.	<u>HI Hinn Iur</u> <u>HI Ko Reisu</u>	(金全)	鳳	(M)	30	Employee	"	"
35.	<u>KANG Rie Mak</u> <u>KYO Rei Moku</u>	(金全)	鳳	(M)	23	Student	Kankyonan-do Teihei-gun, Shinjo-men, Shinjo-ri #46	"
36.	<u>ZIN Vi Uk</u> <u>GHIN I Ink</u>	(金全)	陳	(M)	25	Nil	Kankyonando Kogen-gun Jojan-men, Bochiku	Yamaguchi
37.	<u>HI Za Inl</u> <u>HI Sai Riten</u>	(金全)	陳	(M)	36	Merchant	Kankyonando, Hokusei-gun, Shinohokusei-sen	Osaka
38.	<u>HI Riun Gak</u> <u>HI Ren Gaku</u>	(金全)	陳	(F)	28	Nil	"	"
39.	<u>AN Fong Chun</u> <u>An To Chu</u> (Member of Rennel)	(金全)	陳	(M)	35	Employee	"	Yokohama
40.	<u>NIUM Si Inn</u> <u>MIJUHARA Tokihiko</u>	(金全)	水	(M)	14	Nil	Kanhoku Zen Mei-mura, Ko Jan-do	Fukuoka
41.	<u>KIM Ki Ink</u> <u>KIM Ki Oku</u> (Member of Rennel)	(金全)	金	(M)	26	Nil	Kankyohoku-do Kyojo-gun, Kyo Jo-men, Juchi	Ishikawa
42.	<u>Zu San Son</u> <u>SHU San Son</u>	(金全)	朱	(M)	40	Nil	Kankyohoku-do Seshin-fu, Arai wa-cho, #72	Osaka



43.	<u>RI Siang Chun</u>	<u>RI Sho Shan</u>	(李承春)	(M)	24	Student	Kankyochoku-do Soshen-gun To- men, cho Junai	Tokyo
44.	<u>ZANG SI Bak</u>	<u>CHO JI Haku</u>	(張時伯)	(M)	40	Nil	Heianando Heigen-gun, Hijai-men	Saitama
45.	<u>RI Kna Siuk</u>	<u>RI Kin Shaku</u>	(張金錫)	(F)	34	Nil	"	"
46.	<u>ZANG Chiun Ok</u>	<u>CHO Shun Giok</u>	(張春王)	(F)	13	Nil	"	"
47.	<u>ZANG Chiung Siuk</u>	<u>CHO Ju Seki</u>	(張重石)	(M)	11	Nil	"	"
48.	<u>ZAN Hun Siuk</u>	<u>CHO Kun Seki</u>	(張訓石)	(M)	10	Nil	"	"
49.	<u>ZANG Ma Siuk</u>	<u>CHO Bu Seki</u>	(張武石)	(M)	8	Nil	"	"
50.	<u>ZANG Chun Ok</u>	<u>CHO Ken Giok</u>	(張勳王)	(F)	6	Nil	"	"
51.	<u>ZANG Bin Za</u>	<u>CHO Fu Shi</u>	(張豐子)	(F)	4	Nil	"	"
52.	<u>RI San Bong</u>	<u>RI San Ho</u>	(李三峯)	(M)	30	Employee	Heinando Heijo- fu Shinri #237	Tokyo
53.	<u>BAK In Gil</u>	<u>BOK Jin Kichi</u>	(朴仁吉)	(M)	27	Employee	"	"
54.	<u>SANZIUN Kazuko</u>	<u>YAMADA Kazuko</u>	(山田加壽子)	(F)	25	Nil	"	Niyasaki
55.	<u>KIM Ziun Kuk</u>	<u>YAMADA Masaiku</u>	(山田正郁)	(M)	2	Nil	"	"
56.	<u>KIM Ha Siun</u>	<u>KIM Wa Sun</u>	(金和諱)	(M)	20	Student	Heijo-shi Rinhori #125	Ibaragi
57.	<u>KIM Biung Riun</u>	<u>KIM Sei Jun</u>	(金成樹)	(M)	44	Nil	Kankyonando Kanko-fu Hon Machi, #2-55	Yamaguchi
58.	<u>AN Ziung Hi</u>	<u>KO Sho Sei</u>	(金宝成)	(M)	29	Nil	Kokaido Ho Zan-gun, Shin Jo-men	"
59.	<u>KIM Iung Su</u>	<u>KIM Ho Sei</u>	(波金童聲)	(M)	35	Nil	Heiannando Teishu-gun Teishu-mura Seikyori	"
60.	<u>KIM So Siun</u>		(金一秀)	(F)	35	Nil	"	Fukushima
61.	<u>KIM Ir Iun</u>	<u>KIM Kazuhiko</u>	(金一彦)	(M)	6	Nil	"	"
62.	<u>KIM Sumiko</u>	<u>KIM Sumiko</u>	(金澄子)	(F)	3	Nil	"	"
63.	<u>KIM Kum In</u>	<u>KIM Kin Jo</u>	(金錦女)	(F)	28	Nil	"	Guma-ken
64.	<u>KIM Sun I</u>	<u>KIM Jun I</u>	(金順尹)	(F)	2	Nil	"	"
65.	<u>ZO Kum Zu</u>		(金有吉)	(F)	32	Nil	"	Kagoshima
66.	<u>KIM In Kil</u>	<u>KIM Yu Kichi</u>	(金有吉)	(M)	42	Nil	"	Hiroshima
67.	<u>KIM Bun I</u>	<u>KIM Fun In</u>	(金粉伊)	(F)	43	Nil	Heianhokudo Tetsuzan-gun Seirin-men	"
68.	<u>KIM To Hiu</u>	<u>KIM Do Ki</u>	(金道光)	(M)	34	Nil	"	"

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
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69.	<u>KIM To Siu</u>	<u>KIM Do Shu</u>	(金道宇)	(M)	17	Nil	"	"
70.	<u>KIM To Chiun</u>	<u>KIM Do Chin</u>	(金道項)	(M)	10	Nil	"	"
71.	<u>KIM Han Riun</u>	<u>KIM Kou Ren</u>	(金道項)	(F)	20	Nil	"	"
72.	<u>KIM Siung Za</u>	<u>KIM Kaatsuko</u>	(金道勝)	(F)	7	Nil	"	"
73.	<u>KIM To Ban</u>	<u>KIM Michi Tomo</u>	(金道勝)	(M)	5	Nil	"	"
74.	<u>KIM To Ir</u>	<u>KIM Michi Hi</u>	(金道道)	(M)	3	Nil	"	"
75.	<u>KIM Akira</u>	<u>KIM Akira</u>	(金道アキラ)	(M)	2	Nil	"	"
76.	<u>KIM Cho Ho</u>	<u>KIM Sho Ko</u>	(金道初)	(M)	1	Nil	"	"
77.	<u>HIUN Ki Chiul</u>	<u>GUN Ki Tan</u>	(玄道基)	(M)	37	Nil	Heihoku Ryu Sen- gun, Gaijo-men, Shokado	Hiigata
78.	<u>KIM Ri Iung</u>	<u>KIM Ri Bi</u>	(金利英)	(F)	35	Nil	"	"
79.	<u>HIUN Ziung Sink</u>	<u>GUN Sho Shuku</u>	(玄利正)	(F)	13	Nil	"	"
80.	<u>HIUNG Tong Su</u>	<u>GUN To Shu</u>	(玄正東)	(M)	11	Nil	"	"
81.	<u>HIUNG Ha Un</u>	<u>GUN Kai Wan</u>	(玄東海)	(M)	9	Nil	"	"
82.	<u>HIUN Ziung Man</u>	<u>GUN Sho Man</u>	(玄海正)	(M)	11	Nil	"	"
83.	<u>HIUN Ziung Riong</u>	<u>GUN Sho Ryn</u>	(玄李正)	(M)	6	Nil	"	"
84.	<u>RI Tong Wan</u>	<u>RI To Gen</u>	(李東元)	(M)	27	Student	Heianhokudo Hokusen-gun Tokuen-men Hodo	Hiroshima
85.	<u>GIUN Chiun Siuk</u>	<u>GON Ju Seki</u>	(權重石)	(M)	30	Miscian	Heihoku Shingishu Rohaku-cho, #4	Tokyo
86.	<u>GIUN Chiun Za</u>	<u>GON Toshiko</u>	(權俊子)	(F)	23	Nil	"	"
87.	<u>HO Tak Riong</u>	<u>HO Taku Yo</u>	(高重)	(M)	40	Nil	"	"
88.	<u>CHO Iun Bong</u>	<u>KO Ju Gen</u>	(高重鉞)	(M)	22	Student	Kokaido Shoka-gun Shingetsu-men, Gerhari	Yamaguchi
89.	<u>ZO Biung Mik</u>	<u>SHO Bi Mon</u>	(趙朱玫)	(F)	47	Nil	"	"
90.	<u>BIUNG Giun Ki</u>	<u>KIM Haku Zen</u>	(金朱善)	(M)	28	Tailor	Kankyonando Kogen- gun, Unkoku-men	"
91.	<u>KIM Ung Wiun</u>	<u>KIM O Gen</u>	(金應元)	(M)	38	Employee	Kokaido, Zuiko-gun, NokuKan-men, Kosui-Ri	Tokyo
92.	<u>CHO Iung Siun</u>	<u>SAI Bi Shun</u>	(崔英舜)	(M)	31	Turner	Kokaido, Hozan-gun Okuzai-men, Kadenri	Saitama
93.	<u>KO Chiung Hiun</u>		(安貞)	(M)	23	Turner	"	Hiroshima
94.	<u>HONG Zong Siun</u>	<u>ON Tai Ho</u>	(安貞姬)	(F)	29	Nil	"	Tokyo
95.	<u>BAK Sang Ho</u>	<u>RI Sho Sho</u>	(李尚松)	(M)	29	Turner	Kokaido Zuiko-gun Zuiko-men, Kakokuri	Hiroshima
96.	<u>RI Kang Hiun</u>	<u>RI Ko Kun</u>	(李康勳)	(M)	25	Nil	Heianhokudo, Bekijo gun, Toko-men	Niyasaki
97.	<u>HONG Hiun Ho</u>	<u>KO Jia Wo</u>	(黃賢橫)	(M)	37	Turner	Heianhokudo Anshu gun, Anshu-mura, Kenjinri #19	Tokyo



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
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98.	<u>O Iung Siun</u>	<u>GO Ei Jen</u>	(吳 永善)	(F)	30	Nil	"	"
99.	<u>HONG Iun TO</u>	<u>KO Yu Do</u>	(洪 雄道)	(M)	11	Nil	"	"
100.	<u>HON Iun Hang</u>	<u>KO Yu Ko</u>	(洪 雄幸)	(M)	9	Nil	"	"
101.	<u>HON Iun Si</u>	<u>KO Yu Shi</u>	(洪 雄志)	(M)	4	Nil	"	"
102.	<u>HON Iun Sang</u>	<u>KO Yu Sai</u>	(洪 雄生)	(M)	2	Nil	"	"
103.	<u>ZIUN Tong Gang</u>		()	(M)	50	Nil	"	Hiroshima
104.	<u>HAN Biung Ki</u>	<u>KAN Hei Ki</u>	(韓 柄基)	(M)	35	Nil	Kogendo Junyo	Tokyo
							Kongo Selsen-	
							okudo	
105.	<u>HI Ha Za</u>	<u>HI Ka Shi</u>	(李 和子)	(F)	39	Nil	"	"
106.	<u>HAN Chiung Ir</u>	<u>KAN Cha Han</u>	(韓 忠一)	(M)	3	Nil	"	"
107.	<u>HAN Cheng Siuk</u>	<u>KAN Sho Shoku</u>	(韓 昌淑)	(F)	1	Nil	"	"
108.	<u>BAK Tong I</u>	<u>BOK Do I</u>	(朴 同尹)	(M)	36	Nil	Kogendo Tetsukyo-	Hiege
							gun, Shaso-men,	
							Shidenri	
109.	<u>BAK Bok Tong</u>	<u>BOK Fuku Do</u>	(朴 福同)	(M)	42	Nil	"	"
110.	<u>BAK Za Gun</u>	<u>GOK Zai Shi</u>	(朴 在珍)	(M)	19	Turner	"	"
111.	<u>GUN In Bok</u>	<u>GON Jin Fuku</u>	(權 仁福)	(M)	38	Nil	Kogendo Heiko-gun	Hineji
							Kensei-men, Zaikori	
112.	<u>HIU Sang Hina</u>	<u>RYU Sho Gen</u>	(柳 尚鉦)	(M)	29	Nil	Kogendo, Tesugen-	Sumbra
							gun, Korai-men	
113.	<u>KIM Bok Siun</u>	<u>KIM Gaku Shin</u>	(金 學信)	(M)	28	Nil	Kankyonando Hoku-	Tokyo
							sei-gun, Katoshon-	
							men, Getsukin	
114.	<u>LI Zong Tai</u>	<u>HI Sho Dai</u>	(李 鐘台)	(M)	25	Student	Heinanhokudo, Ryu	"
							sen-gun, Yura-men	
115.	<u>LI U Zai</u>	<u>HI Sha Sai</u>	(李 又才)	(M)	26	Laborer	"	"
116.	<u>KIM Zeung Sig</u>	<u>KIM Sei Shoku</u>	(金 政植)	(M)	27	Laborer	Heinanhokudo, Ryu	"
							sen-gun, Yura-men	
117.	<u>LI Zai Shuk</u>	<u>HI Zai Seri</u>	(李 在石)	(M)	24	Laborer	"	"
118.	<u>CHO Yang Huc</u>	<u>CHO Ryu Kaku</u>	(趙 龍赫)	(M)	25	Laborer	"	"

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BASIC: Ltr/Tr., CIC Area No. 3, dated 7 July 1947
Subject: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea

1st Ind

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST CIC REGION, (I CORPS), APO 713, 9 July 1947

TO: Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Detachment, GHQ, FEC, APO 500

1. Forwarded.

2. Attention is invited to the fact that Area 3 was able to set up the operation in connection with the inclosed investigation in a very limited space of time. Accordingly, this headquarters believes that the excellent results reported herein were achieved due to the efficient and energetic efforts of agents of the 3rd CIC Area.

WILLIAM T. SANDALLS
Major CAC
Commanding

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Tab D

SECRET30644
3

HEADQUARTERS
 AREA 3
 441st COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 APO 24

7 July 1947

SUBJECT: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea

TO : Commanding Officer, 441st CIC Det., GHQ FPC APO 500
 (THRU: Commanding Officer, First CIC Region (I Corps) APO 713)

1. The attached report of investigation of subject conducted by this headquarters is forwarded.

2. The following data are supplied for your information:

- a. Controlling Office: CIC Area 3
- b. File Number in requesting office: 441-300502
- c. File Number at this headquarters: M/R-KOR-1.40
- d. Date investigation requested: 19 June 1947
- e. Period covered: 23 June 47 - 7 July 47
- f. Case Classification: Misc. (11)
- g. Status of case: Closed
- h. Remarks: None

NICK BARISKI
 Captain, OMC
 Commanding

2 Incl.

Covering CI-R1, 7 July 1947, 4 copies
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HEADQUARTERS

AREA 3
441st COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO _____

TITLE SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea	INVESTIGATION MADE AT CIC Area No. 3 (Moji) and CIC Area No. 2 (Sasebo)
FILE No. M/R-KOK-1.40 (11) 441-300502	CONTROLLING OFFICE CIC Area No. 3 PERIOD COVERED 23 June 47 - 7 July 47 CASE CLASSIFICATION Misc. (11)
DATE 7 July 1947	STATUS OF CASE Closed

REASON FOR INVESTIGATION:

Investigation was initiated by CO, CIC Area No. 3, APO 24, pursuant to receipt of 441st CIC Det., L/S No. 300502, dtd 19 June 1947, Subject: as above, to determine and comply with the following RSI:

- a. Attempt to have an individual placed aboard the vessel to observe and report upon return, all items of interest.
- b. Obtain a certified copy of the passenger list, showing all Koreans who leave Japan. If not possible, obtain a list of these persons.
- c. Observe and report whether appropriate regulations regarding the amount and type of baggage authorized for repatriates are complied with.
- d. In the event these regulations are being violated, inform appropriate 8th Army authorities as expeditiously as possible.
- e. If possible, check baggage to see if any items of CIC interest are being carried.

SYNOPSIS:

Investigation revealed that 118 Koreans were repatriated from Sasebo to Konan, Korea. There were no violations of 8th Army Directives, or Japanese Customs Laws, but information received from an informant of this headquarters indicated that the Korea repatriates must have had contacts and bribed the Officials of the Japanese Customs of Sasebo, in order to get by with some of the essential materials such as ball bearings and etc., without regular routine inspection procedure. (2), (4), (6).

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HEADQUARTERS
AREA 3
441st COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 34

M/R-KOK-1.40
441-200502
7 July 1947

SUBJECT: SCAP Repatriation of Koreans to North Korea

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICER IN CHARGE:

Investigation was initiated by CO, CIC Area No. 3, APO 34, pursuant to receipt of 441st CIC Det., L/S No. 200502, dtd 19 June 1947, Subject: as above, to determine and comply with the following EBI:

- a. Attempt to have an individual placed aboard the vessel to observe and report upon return, all items of interest.
- b. Obtain a certified copy of the passenger list, showing all Koreans who leave Japan. If not possible, obtain a list of these persons.
- c. Observe and report whether appropriate regulations regarding the amount and type of baggage authorized for repatriates are complied with.
- d. In the event these regulations are being violated, inform appropriate 8th Army authorities as expeditiously as possible.
- e. If possible, check baggage to see if any items of CIC interest are being carried.

1. On 23 June 1947, Special Agent 4911, CIC Area No. 3, interviewed 1st Lt. GIFUNE, Frank P., ASN O-13302054, Commanding Officer of the Harie Detachment 34th Infantry Regiment, located at Sasebo Repatriation Center, who stated in substance:

It is standard operating procedure for the Harie Detachment to supervise the checking by Japanese Customs Officials of all light baggage, including currency, belonging to all out-going repatriates.

2. On the morning of 23 June 1947, Special Agent 4911 was present to observe the checking of the baggage. There were no violations of 8th Army directives of Japanese Customs Laws, but a small quantity of medicine such as sulphadiazine, vitamin B-1 in powder form, torison, and metabolin; syringes, electric light bulbs, pencils and radios were noticed among the baggage.

SECRETM/R-KOK-1.40
441-200502 (11)
7 July 1947

3. At 0730 hours, 24 June 1947, the one hundred and eighteen Korean passengers, carrying their light baggage, boarded the vessel, "SHINYO MARU" and left for the port of Moji-shi, Fukuoka-ken, 1600 hours, same day, where other baggage belonging to some of the passengers was to be put aboard the vessel.

Agents Notes:

A copy of the passenger list of the "SHINYO MARU" was obtained and is shown as EXHIBIT I.

4. On 24 June 1947, this agent was present to observe the checking of the baggage located at the Moji Customs Office, Moji-shi, Fukuoka-ken. The baggage inspected belonged to some of the Koreans being repatriated to Konan, Korea, and consisted of one hundred and twenty-two (122) pieces. There were no violations of the 6th Army Directives, SCAP Directives or the Japanese Customs Laws.

Agents Notes:

A list of the articles confiscated by the Japanese Customs Officials is shown as EXHIBIT II, and will be disposed of according to Memorandum, dtd 8 November 1946, upon approval from Military Government.

A list of the passengers who had baggage at the Moji Customs Office is shown as EXHIBIT III.

Articles, thought to be of CIC interest, were confiscated and are being forwarded without translations due to the fact that some of these articles are written in Korean and a great deal of time would have to be taken to translate all of the articles. Articles confiscated are shown as EXHIBIT IV.

5. The "SHINYO MARU" entered the Port of Moji, at 1000, 26 June 47, and departed for Konan, Korea, 0700, 27 June 1947, after loading the baggage belonging to the fifty-six (56) Korean passengers, aboard the vessel. None of the passengers were allowed to come ashore once the vessel docked out in the bay at Moji.

6. On 7 July 1947, this agent interviewed an informant, utilized by this headquarters, who was placed aboard the "SHINYO MARU" to observe and report upon return, all items of interest, and received the following information:

(1) A plot in Northern Korea to smuggle personnel and goods into Japan:

a. Date of planning:

Planning took place in the Konan, Korea area, during the month of March, 1947.

- 2 -
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SECRET

N/R-KOK-1.40
441-200503 (11)
7 July 1947

b. Purpose:

Dispose of cargo from Korea in order to obtain enough money to purchase essential material for civilian factories located in Northern Korea, such as ball bearings etc.

c. People responsible for such plans:

The main planners are Korean officials of the HODO YO or Labor Party, who are supported by the government, and also about ten Japanese. One of the Japanese is: HASEGAWA, Chojiro, (長谷川長次郎), (Japanese), formerly of Yamagata-ken, whose younger brother is believed to be the main contact for the said smugglers once they reach the shores of Japan safely. HASEGAWA's younger brother is HASEGAWA, Jikichi, (長谷川治吉) (Japanese), Yamagata-ken, Nishida-gun, Toyo-mura, Katakokezawa. HASEGAWA, Chojiro is responsible for the founding of the Sea Salvaging Dept., (KAIJO KYUNAN BU), (海上救難部) in Northern Korea.

d. Possible landing point in Japan:

Plans are in order to land in the vicinity of SAKATA Port, Yamagata prefecture, due to the strict patrol watch along the coast between Sasebo and Shimonoseki.

e. Ship and cargo to be disposed of upon arrival in Japan:

Name of ship: Unknown

Size of ship: 30 to 60 tons

No. of smugglers: Approx. ten (10) consisting of both Koreans and Japanese.

Port of departure: Konan and/or West Hoshin, Korea

Cargo: Sulphuric ammonia (fertilizer) 25 to 30 Eg.

f. Date of departure and return to Korea:

Plans are underway to leave Korea between 25 June and 31 June 1947.

Plans are also underway to return to Korea during the latter part of July 1947, after purchasing essential material to be brought back to Korea.

g. Remarks:

The reason for landing in the vicinity of the SAKATA Port, Yamagata-ken, is because HASEGAWA's younger brother is living in the Yamagata prefecture at the present time and will act as a contact man for the smugglers.

Informant also stated that some of the passengers aboard the vessel were planning to smuggle back into Japan later on and buy essential materials to smuggle to Northern Korea to be used in the civilian factories.

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SECRETN/R-KOK-1.40
441-200502 (11)
7 July 1947

After crossing the 38th parallel, some of the passengers began to celebrate by drinking, and stated that they had smuggled large quantities of ball bearings and congratulated the Captain of the "SHINYO MARU" for helping them to smuggle the material into Northern Korea. The ball bearings were in fifty (50) Japanese straw woven packages, approximately two feet by three feet in size. These same passengers stated that they carried these packages with them as personal baggage and had their personal baggage shipped to the Japanese Customs Offices. When the passengers boarded the vessel at Sasebo with these packages of ball bearings, they were questioned as to the contents of the packages. They explained to the Customs Officials that it was only personal clothing. A few of the passengers boarding the vessel had these packages inspected and confiscated by the Japanese Officials, but most of them did not even have their packages inspected, and were allowed on board without the proper inspection.

Agents Notes:

It is the opinion of this informant, that most of the repatriates have or had contacts among the Customs Officials in Sasebo and paid off bribes to them prior to boarding the vessel. In this manner, all Koreans that smuggle themselves into Japan and are fortunate enough to purchase essential materials while in Japan, can, when being deported to Korea take back a large quantity of materials from Japan.

The main discussion and topic on board the "SHINYO MARU" among the passengers was the difference between the Soviet and United States system of governing Korea. Everyone seemed to believe that the Soviet System was far better and that the Communistic form of government is the only government for the whole of Korea. Most of the passengers aboard were well educated, and were connected with the Japanese Communist Party while residing in Japan prior to repatriating to Korea. Most of these expressed their opinion of continuing in the communistic fields, upon arrival in Korea. Opinions expressed by some of the passengers were that the Korea League of Japan is gradually being dominated by Communist in Japan.

As the ship entered the port of Konan, Korea, approximately six hundred (600) people, including the mayor of Konan, officials of the city of Konan, members of the public peace corps, college students and middle school students and the general public assembled on the dock headed by a brass band to greet the repatriates. Songs that were sung by those assembled and those on board the vessel were: "Song of General KIM, Hissel", "North Korea Labor Song" and the "North Korea National Anthem". After singing the various songs and listening to ceremonial addresses, the passengers and members of the crew of the "SHINYO MARU" came ashore and attended the ceremony prepared for them.

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SECRETN/R-KOK-1.40
441-200502, (11)
7 July 1947

Ceremony consisted of an opening address by KIM, Nissai, head of the Northern Korean Government, an address by the vice-head committee man of the Konan-do, and an address by the mayor of Konan. Repatriate representative, KIM, To Yo gave an address of thanks for welcoming the repatriates arriving in Konan. Ceremony ended by shouting "banzai", cheers to the Soviet Government, General KIM, Nissai, and the North Korea Labor Party. Flags of the Soviet and the North Korea Labor Party, as well as pictures of STALIN, KIM, Nissai, and MOLOTOV were carried by some of the students and general public that appeared to greet the repatriates. *ll-sung*

Three Russian officers boarded the boat before docking time. Their names were: APANASHEP (spelled in Romaji) 1st Lt (Navy); ARADKEN (spelled in Romaji), 1st Lt (Navy) and HARREN (spelled in Romaji) 2nd Lt (Army) who spoke Japanese quite fluently. All serve under the command of the General Commander of the Konan Area: SKURBA (spelled in Romaji) a Lt Col.

On or about 25 June 1947, while the "SHINYO MARU" was in dock at the port of Konan, Korea, a Russian ship, "POLTAVA" (spelled in Romaji), entered the port. This ship was known to have left the city of Odessa, Russia, and was unloading munitions. The intended return cargo for the "POLTAVA" was a load of ammonium sulphate.

On 1 July 1947, as the SHINYO MARU was leaving the port of Konan, another Russian ship "SARATOVU" (spelled in Romaji) was entering the port. This ship was also thought to be loaded with munitions; as in March of this year, this same ship unloaded ammunition, trucks, oil, paper, sugar and other materials, and took on a load of ammonium sulphate for its return trip to Odessa, Russia. Both of these vessels are believed to be approximately five thousand (5,000) tons.

The following information on the form of government in effect in Northern Korea was obtained by this informant:

- a. Foreign Affairs
- b. Home Affairs
- c. Projects Bureau
- d. Agriculture and Forestry Bureau
- e. Industrial Bureau
- f. Laborers Bureau
- g. Communications Bureau
- h. Jurisdiction Bureau
- i. Transportation Bureau

SECRET

SECRETM/R-KOR-1.40
441-200502 (11)
7 July 1947

- j. Commercial Bureau
- k. Health Bureau
- l. Financial Bureau
- m. Education Bureau
- n. Monopolist Bureau
- o. Peoples Inspection Bureau
- p. Laborers Staff Bureau
- q. Food Section
- r. Propaganda and Agitating Section
- s. Culture Section

The Industry Bureau which is headed by RI. Rundan, former head of the trading section of the Combination Electric Company, and a graduate of the Southern Manchuria Industrial College, is broken down into the following sections:

- a. General Affairs
- b. Laborers Staff Section
- c. Management Section
- d. Fuel Section
 - e. (1) Soft coal - Approximately 130 tons produced per year
 - (2) Hard coal - " " " 140 " " " " " " " " " "
- e. Black Metal Section
 - (1) Steel Materail * App. 60,000 tons produced per year
 - (2) Pig Iron - App. 30,000 tons produced per year
- f. Colored Metal Section
 - (1) Gold * 130 kilograms per day
 - (2) Silver - quantity unknown
 - (3) Copper - 250 tons per month
 - (4) Zinc - 200 tons per month
 - (5) Lead - 10 tons per month
- g. Chemical Industry Section (Konan an vicinity only)
 - (1) Ammonium sulphate - 240,000 tons per year
 - (2) Caustic soda - 9,000 tons per year
 - (3) Sulphuric Acid - 200,000 tons per year
 - (4) Carbide - 70,000 tons per year
 - (5) Kerosene - quantity unknown
- h. Building Material Section
 - (1) Cement - 300,000 tons per year
 - (2) Glass - plenty of materials, but shortage of machinery
- i. Light Industry Section
 - (1) Fabric Materials (low grade) - 3,000,000 yds per month(?)
 - (2) Cotton Spinning - 1,200 yds per month
 - (3) Wool Materials - 72 yds per month
- j. Electric Section

There seems to be an abundant supply of electricity, and rumor has it that in Northern Korea, approximately 400,000 kilowatts are used daily, while in Southern Korea, only 100,000 kilowatts are being used daily.

Comment: MP

1. This is biggest hydroelectric
concentration in Far East. Was
built by Japs.

2. S. Korea gets its power from here by lines.

- 6 -
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M/R- KOK-1.40,
441-200502, (11),
7 July 1947

*amused
WCM*

The political aspects of Northern Korea show that there are three main political parties, namely: "Northern Korean Laborers Party", to which ninety (90) per cent of the Koreans of Northern Korea belong; the "Democratic Party", to which eight (8) per cent belong; and the "Tondo-Kyo Youths Friendship Party", of which two (2) per cent are members. The North Korean Laborers Party is made up of members belonging to the Communist Party in Northern Korea.

Organization of Northern Korea Laborers Party

CENTRAL LABORERS PARTY

Chairman: KIM, Nissel (金日成) *Kim Il-sung*
Ass't Chairman: KIM, Ryotai (康良輝)

Labor Section	Financial Section	Propaganda and Agitation Section	Culture Section	Organizational Section
---------------	-------------------	----------------------------------	-----------------	------------------------

Province (do) Party Members
District (gun) Party Members
Area Party Members

Organization of the Soviet Army Political Section

---Civil Administration Section: Maj Gen ROMANENKO
(spelled in Romaji)
and 1st Lt RAJIONOPU
(spelled in Romaji)

Korean Army
Corps:
Gen. STEIKO
(spelled in
Romaji)

---Industry Section: Brig Gen KARUKURENKO
(spelled in Romaji)

---Guarding Section: Name unknown (stationed in guns and prefectures)
Kyung Bidai (K)

---Railway Guarding: Name unknown (stationed in guns and prefectures) (along main railway lines)
(Part of Kyung Bidai)

*Kim
This is Soviet
M.G.*

Other Parties:

- a. Central Employment League
- b. Farmers League
- c. Womens League
- d. Democratic League

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W/R-KOK-1.40
441-200802 (11)
7 July 1947

- e. Art League
- f. Civilized Peoples' League
- g. Technique League
- h. Korea and Soviet Culture Association

Military aspects in Northern Korea

- a. Regular Korean Soldiers
Uniforms and equipment is similar to that of the Soviet Army. Although actual strength is unknown, it was estimated that between 50,00 and 100,00 are being trained under Soviet supervision.
- b. Public Peace Corps
This corps works in conjunction with the Korean Police Force and its estimated strength is said to be approx. 10,000. The corps is equipped with rifles, bayonets and swords, formerly of the Japanese Army.
- c. Railway Guarding Corps
This corps although carrying the above mentioned name is also equipped with rifles, bayonets and swords, formerly of the Japanese Army.
- d. Self-Defense Corps
No information could be obtained on this Corps
- e. Sea-Service Public Peace Corps
No information could be obtained on this Corps

Note: Regular Soldiers of the Korean Army are also supplied with machine guns, cannons and tanks.

On the return trip to Japan, approximately five hundred and ten (510) Japanese repatriates repatriated from the port of Konan, Korea. Among these were some one hundred and thirty (130) technicians. Conversation among these technicians was in regard to the North Korea Industrial Technique General League, Japanese Section (Kita Chosen Kogyo Gijutsu so-Kenmei Nipponjinbu), (北朝鮮工業技術總聯盟日本人部)

Location:

North Korea, Heijo-Fokubetsu-shi, Ogonri, #18. (Pyeng yang)

Leaders:

TSUNETSUKA, Hidetsugu, (常塚秀次), (Japanese)
Head of Headquarters

SATO, Foshitana, (佐藤俊雄), (Japanese)
Assistant head of Headquarters

INAGAKI, Kakuichiro, (稲垣鶴一郎), (Japanese)
Head of Propaganda Section

and eight (8) others: Names unknown

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SECRETW/R-KOK-1.40,
441-200502, (11),
7 July 1947.IRIE, Yuriko, (入江由理子) Japanese,
Employed as an interpreter

Gist of the conversation:

-- The above mentioned Japanese leaders of the organization, have made a contract with KIM, Nissel, head of the Northern Korean Government to have all Japanese technicians remain in Northern Korea for the benefit of the Government. Most of the Japanese in Northern Korea are quite anxious to return to Japan, but when these leaders hear that the General Commander of the Konan Area, Lt Colonel SKUBA (spelled in Romaji), intends to repatriate some of them, the leaders visit the Commander, and "snow" him under with stories and rumors that no technicians are to leave Northern Korea for at least two (2) years. SKUBA, who is afraid of losing his position, is inclined to believe these stories and rumors, and as a result cancels the orders for the technicians to return to Japan. For feasts such as these, the leaders of this organization receive large sums of money from KIM, Nissel, from which they have been able to enjoy a fabulous living.--

Information was obtained regarding one SATO, HIDGORO, (佐藤秀五郎) (Japanese), who repatriated at Sasebo, March 1947, from a repatriation ship which came from Konan, Korea. While in Korea, he was a constant companion of HASEGAWA, Chojiro, planner of the "smuggling" to run between Korea and Japan. SATO is presently living in the Yamagata prefecture, and is also believed to be a contact man for the smugglers in Japan.

AGENTS NOTES: On the way to Korea, many of the passengers wrote letters and postcards which they handed to the informant utilized by this headquarters to mail upon his return to Japan. Due to time element, these letters and post cards were not opened and translated, and are shown as EXHIBIT V.

Evaluation of information received from informant:

--of source
Reliable--of information
Probable true

APPROVED:

N. B.

Special Agent
4574

- 9 -

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EXHIBIT II

List of Articles Confiscated by Japanese
Customs Official, Moji-shi

Name of Article	Quantity	Consignee
Leather band (4 feet each)	4	RI, Ryu Ki (李龍基) o/o RI, Shaku Kin, I-ku, Tori, Hokusei-yu, Hokusei- bu, Kannan, Korea
Pencil	4 gross	same as above
Rubber eraser (30 pieces per box)	4 boxes & 16 pieces	same as above
Colors	one dz.	same as above
Sketch Book	10	same as above
Note book	60	same as above
Silk thread (for sewing machine)	10	same as above
Thread	9 reams	same as above
Injection medicine (zuluphamin solution)	40	same as above
Pencil	15 dz.	SAI, Nen Zai (崔然在) Korea, Kankyo-nando, Hokusei- gun, Shimo-shashomen, Kami- shinko-ri, 359

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EXHIBIT III

List of Individuals who had Baggage at Moji-shi

Name	Address in Japan	Destination
1. ASHIZAWA, Shigematsu	Tokyo-to, Edogawa-ku, Higashi-komatsugawa, 1-5727	Korea, Hainoku, Senzangun, Tammen, Tobuko
2. AN, To Chu	Yokohama-shi, Nishi-ku, Nishi-hiranuma-sho, 1-9	Korea, Kannan, Hokusei-gun, Joshashomen, Gentori, 208
3. KIN, Yo Gyoku	Tokyo-to, Minami-tama-ku, Yukimura, Nakayama, 538	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- sei-gun, Joshashomen, Gekkintanri, 1057
4. NIYASU, Sanson	Osaka-fu, Sakai-shi, Imaike-machi, 391	Korea, Kankoku, Seishin-fu, Shin- Iwamachi, 2-chome, 72
5. KIN, Haku Ei	Yamaguchi-ken, Ube-shi, Fujiyama-ku, Ino-machi, 140-ku, 12 Group	Korea, Hainan, Heigen- men, Ganryuri, c/o KIN, Chiku Ei
6. SAI, Zen Zai	Tokyo-to, Minami-tama- gun, Yukimura, Nakayama, 800	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- sei-gun, Geshashomen, Joshinkori, 359
7. KIN, Ki Gyoku	Tokyo-to, Minami-tama- gun, Yukimura, Nakayama, 538	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- sei-gun, Geshashomen, Gekkintanri, 606
8. SAI, Jun Ho	Yamaguchi-ken, Yamaguchi- shi, Ogori-machi, Shincho	Korea, Hainoku, Shingishu, Oko Pulp Factory, c/o CHO, Jo Ten
9. KIN, Ji Ken	Tokyo-to, Minami-tama- gun, Yukimura, Nakayama 104	Korea, Kannan, Hokusei- gun, Geshashomen, Gekkintanri, 620
10. KIN, Sei Jyu	Tokyo-to, Shinjuku-ku, Totsukamachi, 4-756	Korea, Kannan, Kankofu, Asahi-machi
11. RI, Ko Retsu	Tokyo-to, Suginami-ku, Kogetsuji, 3-258, c/o Taiyo-so	Korea, Kannan, Kogen- gun, Fukemen, Gyo- inri, 646

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EXHIBIT III (CONT'D)

Name	Address in Japan	Destination
12. KAN, Hei Ki	Tokyo-to, Chiyoda-ku, Iida-machi, 1-23	Korea, Kegendo, Junyo-gun, Kon- gomen, Shukiri
13. KIN, Tai Gyoku	Tokyo-to, Shinjuku-ku, Nishi Ochiai, 2-543	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- seigun, Geshashomen, Gekkintanri
14. RI, Ryu Ki	Tokyo-to, Shinjuku-ku, Kami Ochiai, 1-452	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- seigun, Hokuseiyu, Tori, 1-ku, e/o RI, Yo Kin
15. KIN, Gaku Shin	Tokyo-to, Shinjuku-ku, Nishi Ochiai, 2-543	Korea, Kannan, Hoku- seigun, Geshashomen, Gekkintanri
16. KIN, RISEI	Niigata-ken, Sado-gun, Hatanomura, Oaza Hata- no, 303-2	Korea, Anhoku, Ryusen- gun, Saijomen, Shoka- do, 225, e/o GEN, Ko San
17. HIRAMATSU, Hiroe	Fukushima-ken, Soma-gun, Hidachigimura, Akagi, Aza Komizawa, 19	Korea, Heinan, Anshu- gun, Anshuyu, Seikyo- ri

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
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2 September 1947

SUBJECT: ATIS Interrogation Report No. 17

TO : Commander-in-Chief, Far East
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Attn: A.C. of S, G-2



G-2 Admin File
PWMDID/EHFS/ml

1. Reference is made to your letter dated 1 July 1947, subject as above, wherein comments regarding ATIS reports were requested.

2. ATIS reports receive wide distribution in the Intelligence Division, Navy Department, Central Intelligence Group and State Department.

3. The above agencies are unanimous in the view that ATIS Interrogation Reports are valuable and have suggested improvements as follows:

a. Arrangement of the material under subject and geographic headings would facilitate its use.

b. Furnish more detailed information on topography. (It is felt that the information forwarded to date in this category has been too general in nature for the purposes of the War Department.)

c. Obtain more detail on Soviet order of battle. (The information forwarded to date has been valuable only for furnishing clues as to the situation of the Soviet Army in the areas reported upon.)

d. Obtain, when possible, exact locations of prisoner of war camps.

4. It is felt that most of the improvements suggested above can be effected by increasing the value of interrogators through:

a. Frequent briefings on the current situation in areas covered by interrogations, and

b. Detailed training on military intelligence appreciation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

R. F. ENNIS
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Intelligence, Group

Filed
MAYNARD E. LEE
CWO, USA

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
WAR DEPARTMENT
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
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
b. Detailed training on military intelligence appreciation.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE:

R. F. FRENCH
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Intelligence Group

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
MAVHARD E. LEE
CWO, USA



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G-S Admin File
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1st Ind

G-2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 19 September 1947.

TO: Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff, Washington 25,
D. C.

Attn: Col. R. F. Ennis

1. Reference your comments on ATIS Interrogation Report #17, it is only within the last three months that the Soviet Union has commenced large scale repatriation of former Japanese Army personnel held in Siberia. Since that date, the quality of information obtained from repatriates has improved markedly but except for such highlights as Order of Battle information, which is abstracted and sent to Director of Intelligence through bi-weekly telecom conference, shortage of personnel makes it impossible to publish interrogation reports as fast as individuals are interrogated. As a result of this lag between interrogation and publication, the improved quality of information now being obtained is not yet visible to the War Department. This lag will continue to plague the entire repatriate interrogation program until adequate personnel for processing and publishing intelligence are obtained from either theater or War Department.

2. In this connection, theater continues to be extremely reluctant, in view of its heavy commitments elsewhere, to authorize the transfer of additional spaces from bulk allotment to the repatriate interrogation program. The request for an allotment of 201 spaces from War Department overhead appeared, at the time it was made, to be the last and only remaining solution to the personnel shortage which has persistently hamstrung the interrogation effort. The most recent WD radio on this subject, WAR 86185 dated 13 Sept 47, which withdraws the 201 spaces previously authorized in radio WAR 83224 dated 1 Aug 47, will almost certainly compel

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BASIC: Ltr, MID, WDGS, Washington, D. C., subject: ATIS Interrogation Report No. 17, dated 2 Sept 47

G-2 to conduct the interrogation program without substantial increase in personnel. Without such an increase in personnel, neither the full exploitation of repatriates nor the rapid processing and dissemination of intelligence obtained therefrom will be possible to the degree considered desirable and necessary.

3. The following refers to your detailed comments under para 3, in same order:

a. Commencing with Vol 27 (Incl 1), material in ATIS Interrogation Reports is arranged under headings indicating subject matter. On the question of geographic headings, each ATIS Interrogation Report is itself a grouping of material by geographic area. Thus Vol 27 is Russia; Vol 26 - Port Arthur and Dairen; Vol 25 - Russia; Vol 24 - Dairen and Port Arthur; Vol 23 - Kamchatka and N. Korea, etc.

b. Those informants who, in the course of normal ATIS interrogation, give promise of having detailed terrain information on any "critical area" are called back for more detailed interrogation by ATIS Geographical Section. The terrain information thus obtained is not published as such, being coordinated instead with other available source material for final publication in terrain studies on certain "critical areas". Copies of these terrain studies will be distributed to Director of Intelligence upon completion.

c. As pointed out in para 1 above, more detailed information on Soviet Order of Battle, particularly identification, is now being obtained from informants.

d. ATIS Research Report #147, dated March 1947, and distributed to Director of Intelligence, gave information available at that time on location of Prisoner of War Camps. A more detailed report on the same subject is now in preparation to fulfill War Department Specific Request, Control #F610. This report will reach Director of Intelligence by 31 October as requested.

4. Reference suggestion in para 4, sub-paras (a) and (b), all interrogators are given approximately two weeks orientation course prior to use in the repatriate interrogation program. This course covers geography, targets, security, EEI, recognition charts, interrogation technique and report writing. Once assigned, interrogators receive a weekly briefing of approximately one hour's duration. This weekly briefing emphasizes the current situation, EEI, and any special targets of opportunity that have been requested.

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BASIC: Ltr, MID, WDGS, Washington, D. C., subject: ATIS Interrogation Report No. 17, dated 2 Sept 47

5. The statement that ATIS Interrogation Reports are of value is appreciated, as are the comments. Every effort will be made to increase the value of the interrogation reports along the lines suggested. No marked improvement upon Vol 27 (Incl 1) is possible, however, until the fundamental and crucial problem of personnel shortage is solved.

C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Brigadier General, GSC
Ass't Chief of Staff, G-2

1 Incl:
Vol 27, ATIS Interrogation Report

File *(D)*
MAYNARD E. LEE
GPO, USA

MEMO FOR RECORD

This is first indorsement reply to ID letter 2 Sept 47 subj: ATIS Interrogation Report #17 which suggests:

- a. Rearrangement of material
- b. More detailed information on topography
- c. More detailed information on USSR OB
- d. Obtain exact locations of PW camps
- e. Training of interrogators used on repatriate interrogation project.

EHFS *(signature)* 26-5368

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APO 500
11 July 1947

WDID

SUBJECT: Interrogation Reports

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Eighth Army, APO 343

1. A recent letter from Director of Intelligence, War Department, commended the results of the program for interrogation of Japanese repatriates from Soviet Dominated Areas. Regarding reports received by him derived from interrogations, he stated "consider that these very tangible sources of information have accomplished a great deal toward fulfilling the collection requirements enunciated in War Department letter, 3 October 1946, subject: 'Intelligence Coverage in Soviet Dominated Areas in the Far East'."

2. The Director of Intelligence, while acknowledging the fact that intellectual limitations of repatriates and their lack of factual knowledge is probably the basic reason for any deficiencies, indicated the following:

- a. Information on strengths and locations of Japanese units still in Soviet hands is lacking.
- b. Political opinions of repatriates appear to be of low level and not truly reflective of Soviet attitude.

3. In view of the importance placed on the interrogations by the War Department, it is requested that special effort be made to secure information on strengths and locations of Japanese units in Soviet hands and that port screening to secure intelligent informants on political situation in USSR be intensified.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:



C. S. MYERS
Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Personal letter to General Willoughby from General Chamberlin dated 27 May 47 stated that ATIS Interrogation Reports, Bulletins, etc, were of considerable value to MID, but that information as stated Par 2 of above letter was deficient. This letter calls deficiencies to attention & of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Eighth Army.

EHFS ESH 26-5368

G-2 Admin File
WDID/EHFS/IWA/ml
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014.33 Repatriation + Interrogation
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