

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

15171

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
 Intelligence Division

APO 500
 8 February 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Report Identification Number 2-SE-1

SUBJECT: Bridge or Tunnel Connection between Sakhalin and the Mainland

TO: Document Research Section

1. Background: Reports indicate that for some time the Soviets have been exploring the possibility of constructing a land connection between Sakhalin and the mainland. The status of this project (whether or not it has been initiated and what progress may have been made toward its completion) is unknown.


2. Specific Request: The following information on this subject is requested:

- a. Is there a bridge or tunnel connecting Sakhalin with the mainland in the De Kastri - Nikolaevsk area?
- b. If so, what are its location, dimensions and characteristics?
- c. Is it utilized for railway and/or highway traffic?
- d. Does it include oil pipelines?

3. Special Instructions:

- a. This is a continuing requirement.
- b. All replies to this Specific Request will be identified by Control Number 2-SE-1.
- c. In the absence of affirmative data on this subject, negative reports are desired.

For Director of Intelligence Division:



ROBERT R. GLASS

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
 Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch

Distribution:

Doc Res Sec (3)
 COMNAVFE (Info) (2)
 FEAF (Info) (2)
 G2 (Info) (2)
 Strat Est Section (Info) (2)
 Intel Div (Info) (2)
 Operations Br (Info) (5)
 P&E (File) (1)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY
INFORMATION

Capt Curry - 265-988

Cancellation of SRI No 2-SE-2

G2

Chief, Doc Res Sec

7 Oct 1952

1. Specific Request for Information No 2-SE-2, dated 6 February 1952, subject: "Bridge or Tunnel Connection Across Anur River", is cancelled.

2. It is requested that significant information relative to this subject, which may become available in the future, be forwarded to G2 Estimates Branch, this Headquarters, without reference to the Control Number.

-----R. F. E.-----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Subj SRI cancelled per verbal request of originator to Capt Steadman, in regards to revision of ICD No 1.

PRC mc 265-388

G2 file




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SECURITY
INFO

Capt Gandy - 365-388

Cancellation of SRI No 2-28-2

7 Oct 1952

Chief, Liaison Sec

02

1. Specific Request for Information No 2-28-2, dated 5 February 1952, subject: Bridge or Tunnel Connection Across Kuro River, is cancelled.


2. It is requested that pertinent information relative to this subject, which may become available in the future, be forwarded to CS Liaison Branch, this headquarters, without reference to the Control Number.

MEMO FOR RECORD:
SRI cancelled per verbal request of originator to
Capt Stebbins, in regards to revision of IOD No 1.

ENC 365-388

OS 1110


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G2 HQ FEC ROUTING SLIP
(Do Not Detach)

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SECURITY INFORMATION
1952

7 Oct

SUBJECT: Cancellation of SRI No 2-SE-2

ACofS, G2 _____ ()	Adm Officer _____ ()	Intelligence Div _____ ()
Deputy _____ ()	Mil Pers _____ ()	Security Div _____ ()
Secretariat _____ ()	Civ Pers _____ ()	441st CIC Det _____ ()
Dep for Adm & Ex O _____ (X)	Pers Sgt Maj _____ ()	500 MISG _____ (XX)
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Planning Group _____ ()	T/S Control O _____ ()	503d MIS Co _____ ()
Dep for Navy _____ ()	Message Center _____ ()	FEC/LG _____ (XX)
Sety Div G1 _____ ()	Supply _____ ()	Doc Res _____ ()
Asst SIA _____ ()	_____ ()	SSO _____ ()
Spec Asst Radio _____ ()	_____ ()	Japanese Liaison _____ ()
Spec Asst 441st CIC _____ ()	_____ ()	FBIS _____ ()
Spec Asst Fiscal _____ ()	_____ ()	Signature _____ ()
Spec Asst Comd Rpt _____ ()	_____ ()	Initials _____ ()
Action _____ ()	Comment _____ ()	Dispatch _____ (X)
Draft Reply _____ ()	Concurrence _____ ()	File _____ ()
Info for Reply _____ ()	Approval _____ ()	
Brief _____ ()	Info _____ ()	

(REMARKS)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
9 February 1952

ID/P&E

SUBJECT: Specific Requests for Information

TO: Flag Intelligence Officer
Naval Forces Far East
Navy No. 1165

15186

Enclosed herewith are two information copies each of
Specific Request for Information No. 2-SE-1 "Bridge or Tunnel
Connection between Sakhalin and the Mainland" and No. 2-SE-2,
"Bridge or Tunnel Connection Across Amur River."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy


2 Incls: a/s

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INFORMATION SECURITY

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

9 February 1952
APO 500

ID/P&E

SUBJECT: Specific Requests for Information


TO: Navy No. 1188
Naval Forces Far East
Flag Intelligence Officer

Enclosed herewith are two information copies each of
Specific Request for Information No. S-SE-1 "Bridge or Tunnel
Connection between Sakhalin and the Mainland" and No. S-SE-2,
"Bridge or Tunnel Connection Across Amur River."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:


R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
9 February 1952

ID/P&E

SUBJECT: Specific Requests for Information

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

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Enclosed herewith are two information copies each of Specific Request for Information No. 2-SE-1 "Bridge or Tunnel Connection between Sakhalin and the Mainland" and No. 2-SE-2, "Bridge or Tunnel Connection Across Amur River."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

2 Incls: a/s


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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
13 February 1952

ID/P&E

SUBJECT: FEAF SR 2-2-5-H "Specific Locations of SAF Command Posts"

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

1. Owing to its continuing nature and breadth of subject the request for locations of SAF command posts as embodied in FEAF SR 2-2-5-H is being incorporated in a basic collection directive to be published in the near future. For this reason it will not be served as a specific request at this time.

2. It is requested that future similar requests include or have attached lists of specific headquarters, pertinent orders of battle, including names of commanders and other important personalities, or other similar detailed guidance for collecting agencies.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

(S) R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

C.C.H. cm 26-6068

[Handwritten signatures and a circular official stamp]

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G2 File

CCH/en

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

ID/P&R

APD 800
13 February 1952

SUBJECT: REAP SR 2-2-5-H "Specific Locations of SAR Command Posts"

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APD 928

1. Owing to its continuing nature and breadth of subject the request for locations of SAR command posts as embodied in REAP SR 2-2-5-H is being incorporated in a basic collection directive to be published in the near future. For this reason it will not be served as a specific request at this time.

2. It is requested that future similar requests include or have attached lists of specific headquarters, pertinent orders of battle, including names of commanders and other important personnel, or other similar detailed guidance for collecting agencies.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:

W. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.


C.C.H. 26-6088



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Authority 813541
By BC NARA Date 3/5/12

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FEAF SR 2-2-5-H

8 February 1952

Specific Locations of SAF Command Posts

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters, Far East Command
APO 500
ATTN: Theater Intelligence

Headquarters
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

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Per Authority
Commanding General
FEAF APO 925
8 Feb 52 ml
Date Initials

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20 March 1952

FEAF SR No. 2-2-5-H



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3. This headquarters has continuing priority requirement for pinpoint location (street address and geographic co-ordinates) of command post of each Air Army, Long Range Air Force, PVC regions and districts, and military districts of U.S.S.R.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Intelligence

*Lil
Jr.*



G-2 ACTION

Suspense Date 19

(Suggest covert sources be exploited to obtain this information.)

PLAF AG NO. 13243

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Authority 813541
By BC NARA Date 3/5/12

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FEAF SR 2-2-5-H

Specific Locations of BAF Command Posts

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters, Far East Command
APO 500
ATTN: Theater Intelligence

Headquarters
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

20 March 1952

KX

FEAF SR No. 2-2-5-H

3. The headquarters has continuing priority requirement for pinpoint location (street address and geographic co-ordinates) of command post of each Air Army, Long Range Air Force, FVO regions and districts, and military districts of U.S.A.R.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES Y. RAWWILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Intelligence



G-2 ACTION

Suspense Date _____
(this information.)

(Suggest covert sources be exploited to obtain

SECURITY INFORMATION


FEAF AG NO. 13243

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Per Authority
Commanding General
FEAF APO 925
Date Initials



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SECURITY INFORMATION

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
OUTGOING MESSAGE

GB/ID/HVV/cbs
2 February 1952

039446
proofread
JPR

FROM: CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN
TO: DEPTAR WASH DC. ROUTINE

Urmsg DA 93313. Credibility subject report cannot be ascertained. Originator basic report evaluated source as "fairly reliable"; information as "truth cannot be judged". Recommend report not be declassified nor exploited in view dubious nature and possible adverse effect from exploitation.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

- Copies to:
- Chief of Staff (3)
- G3
- Psywar
- G2 Return
- G2 ID Return (3)
- G2 ID OPNS Return

REFERENCE MESSAGE DA 93313.

MEMO FOR RECORD:
Radio DA 93313, 31 Jan 52 (AG #46723) from (Psywar) DA to CINCFC (Green) with Action G2 requested FEC to estimate credibility of a report contained in FEC INTSUM 3407 pertaining to Sino-Soviet-NK Military Treaty, and further, the advisability of declassification and exploitation. Instant radio advises against declassification and exploitation.


GHH 26-8338

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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G2 File Copy
GHH/cbs

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for
HVV



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

F

INCOMING MESSAGE

RHS/raa

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(SECURITY INFORMATION)

PRIORITY

31 Jan 52

FROM : DEPTAR (PSYWAR) WASH DC
TO : CINCFE (GREENE) TOKYO JAPAN
NR : DA 93313

As result State Dept cable from Muccio Nr 698 dtd 17 Jan 52, State Dept has queried DA ref alleged secret Sino-Soviet-North Korean Treaty outlined in FECOM intel summary Nr 3407 dtd 7 Jan 52. Rqst FECOM est of credibility of rept and advisability of declassification and exploitation.

MCCLURE

ACTION : G-2 INT DIV S-1120
INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, AG, PSYWAR

NOTE : Ref State Dept Msg 698 not held by CINCFE.

46723

PRIORITY

TOO : 302140 Z
MCN : 54799

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

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
CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING



Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

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SECURITY INFORMATION
Lt Col Knox
26-6855

5030

Answers to C-in-C's Questions (9 Feb Briefing)

G2

Secy Gen Staff

9 Feb 52

1. The following information is in reply to the questions contained in attached memorandum.

a. Ref par 1, SGS Memo: The gas mask picked up in the 2nd Division area on 23 Dec 51 was examined by the G2 and Chemical Section Technical Intelligence Detachments, and after an analysis of its characteristics, the matter was not considered to be of sufficient significance to warrant the C-in-C's attention. In the future, particular care will be exercised to bring to the attention of the C-in-C any significant new weapons. Tab 2 contains additional information relative to the improvised gas mask.

b. Ref par 2, SGS Memo: The rail link across the Tumen River in Northeast Korea has been constructed since 27 Nov 50. It is a new line, and not an old line which has been repaired.

c. Ref par 3, SGS Memo: There is, at present, no information which permits definite location of the V Army Group. Intelligence agencies are expediting the collection of data pertaining to this organization. A summary of recent reports concerning the V Army Group is attached as Tab 3.

2. This is for information only.

3 Incls:

- 1 - Memo fr SGS
- 2 - Improvised Enemy Gas Mask
- 3 - Disposition of V CCF Army Group

H/RSB

-R. F. E.-


G2 ID/HWT/PRG/CK/ml1

File PP

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Instant checknote is in reply to C-in-C's query at 9 Feb Briefing.

C.K. 26-6855



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SECRETSECURITY
INFORMATION

9 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff
D CofS, FEC
D CofS, SCAP
G-3
G-2

At the 0900 briefing, this date, the Commander in Chief indicated a special interest in the following points:

1. The gas mask reported as being picked up in the 2nd Division area on 23 December was not called to my attention until several days ago. I desire to know why and desire that appropriate action be taken to insure that matters of this import be brought to my attention at once. (G-2)
2. With regard to the rail line in Northeast Korea, is it a new line, or an old line that has been repaired? (G-2)
3. I desire definite information on the location of the 5th Army Group. (G-2)

/s/ H. E. Lardin

H. E. LARDIN
Colonel, GS
Deputy Secretary General Staff

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

9 February 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Present C/S, LEE, ROKA vs Former C/S, CHUNG

1. Reference is made to C-in-C request for full information on DA G-2 radio to USARMA, Korea 9 Jan 52 (Tab 1) which cited information from various sources, indicating a tendency of the present C/S ROKA (LT. Gen LEE Jung Chung) to eliminate the influence of the former C/S, Lt Gen CHUNG Il Kwon and his followers. DA stated that this could possibly be a detriment to future ROKA effectiveness. Most recent indication of above was the cited replacement of Brig Gen CHANG Do Young, whom DA believed very competent CG 6th ROK Division, by Brig Gen PAIK In Yup. PAIK is reportedly incompetent, having failed previously as CG of the Capitol Division. DA requested the Attache's comments on this specific case as well as other changes in key ROKA personnel, and any further comments to include indications of inside or outside political pressures.
2. By radio 11 Jan 52 to CINCFE, 8th Army cited DA radio, mentioned in paragraph 1, above, and requested sources of the information in order that complete evaluation may be made prior to submitting comments. (Tab 2).
3. CINCFE forwarded 8th Army's request to DA by radio 13 Jan (Tab 3). DA replied by radio 15 Jan 52 that letter with details will follow (Tab 4). On 4 Feb 52, a tracer radio was dispatched to DA requesting dispatch date of letter (Tab 5). DA replied that instant letter was dispatched on 25 Jan 52 to the Army Attache, Korea with an information copy to CINCFE (Tab 5).
4. Subject letter to Army Attache, Korea from G2 DA (Tab 6) furnished a review of past and recent events in the ROKA and requested comments upon this review, by the Attache.
5. G2 has no significant additional information to add to the DA review. Notwithstanding the probable soundness of the review, it is possible that taking issues in the LEE vs CHUNG case might establish an undesirable precedent.
6. In view of 8th Army's expressed interest in this case, recommend dispatch of attached radio (Tab 7) and forwarding of attached copy of DA letter (Tab 6) to 8th Army.

7 Incls:

1. CinC Note 11 Jan 52 on
Radio DA 91467
2. 8 A radio GX 4055 TAG KCS
3. CINCFE Radio GX 61358
4. Radio DA 91919
5. CINCFE Tracer GX 62844
6. G2 DA ltr, 25 Jan '52 w/incl
7. Radio to 8 A

15/RSB
R.F.E.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

9 February 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Present U/S, LEE, ROKA vs Former G/S, CHUNG

1. Reference is made to G-in-G request for full information on DA G-2 radio to USARMA, Korea 9 Jan 53 (Tab 1) which cited information from various sources, indicating a tendency of the present G/S ROKA (Lt. Gen LEE Jung Chung) to eliminate the influence of the former G/S, Lt Gen CHUNG Il Kwon and his followers. DA stated that this could possibly be a detriment to future ROKA effectiveness. Most recent indication of above was the cited replacement of Brig Gen CHANG De Young, whom DA believed very competent G2 8th ROA Division, by Brig Gen PAIK In Top. PAIK is reportedly incompetent, having failed previously as G2 of the Capital Division. DA requested the Attache's comments on this specific case as well as other changes in key ROKA personnel, and any further comments to include indications of inside or outside political pressures.

2. By radio 11 Jan 53 to GINCHW, 8th Army cited DA radio, mentioned in paragraph 1, above, and requested source of the information in order that complete evaluation may be made prior to submitting comments. (Tab 2).

3. GINCHW forwarded 8th Army's request to DA by radio 13 Jan (Tab 3). DA replied by radio 15 Jan 53 that letter with details will follow (Tab 4). On 4 Feb 53, a tracer radio was dispatched to DA requesting dispatch date of letter (Tab 5). DA replied that instant letter was dispatched on 25 Jan 53 to the Army Attache, Korea with an information copy to GINCHW (Tab 5).

4. Subject letter to Army Attache, Korea from G2 DA (Tab 6) furnished a review of past and recent events in the ROKA and requested comments upon this review, by the Attache.

5. G2 has no significant additional information to add to the DA review. Notwithstanding the probable soundness of the review, it is possible that taking issues in the LEE vs CHUNG case might establish an undesirable precedent.


6. In view of 8th Army's expressed interest in this case, recommend dispatch of attached radio (Tab 7) and forwarding of attached copy of DA letter (Tab 6) to 8th Army.

1/11/53
R.F.A.

- 7 Incls:
1. Ginc Note 11 Jan 53 on Radio DA 81487
 2. 8 A radio GX 4085 TAG KGB
 3. GINCHW Radio GX 81358
 4. Radio DA 91919
 5. GINCHW Tracer GX 82844
 6. G2 DA ltr, 25 Jan '53 w/incl
 7. Radio to 8 A

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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INT DIV/TB

APQ 500
7 February 1952

SUBJECT: Japanese Scientific Information; request for

TO: Commander
United States Naval Forces, Far East
Navy No. 1165
F.P.O. San Francisco, California
ATTN: Naval Intelligence

1. Reference is made to letter File ONFE/A8, Serial 002023, subject as above, dated 17 December 1951.
2. Information in answer to ONI Requirements on Japanese Scientific Information is in the process of formulation and available information is expected prior to 29 February 1952.
3. When subject information becomes available, it will be forwarded immediately.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

DISTRIBUTION:
1-COMNAVFE
1-G-2 ADM
1-INT DIV
1-Tech Intel
1-INT DIV, Targets Br

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. Subj ltr from COMNAVFE forwarded ONI requirements on Japanese scientific information and requested information be made available, if possible, prior to 11 February 1952.
2. These requirements were passed by Tech Intel to ESS and Sig Sec for available information.
3. Check reveals that info from ESS will not be ready until after 14 Feb and from Sig Sec until about 27 Feb.

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G-2 ADMIN
HW/HSE/MS

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SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET

SUBJECT: Japanese Scientific Information, request for 7 February 1952


MEMO FOR RECORD: (Continued)

4. This ltr to COMNAVFE fwds interim reply and states that available info is expected prior to 29 Feb.

HSH 1000 26-8800

HVW _____ 26-6021

SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

AG 092 (3 Jan 52)GB

SUBJECT: Specific Request for Information - SR 1-2-1-X

TO: Commanding General
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

14129

1. Reference to your Specific Request for Information, Control No. FRAP SR 1-2-1-X dated 3 January 1952.

2. The exact boundary between Korea and Manchuria is not known. For the purpose of operations in the vicinity of UJU the boundary shown on the inclosed map may be utilized.

3. This is an interim reply. Continuing efforts are being made to obtain clarification of the boundary.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

MAILED 1300 9FEB52 AG GHA

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel AGC
Asst. General

1 Incl:
Map, Scale 1:50,000, AMS L741 and L751
Sheets 6134 IV, 6034 I and II.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CG FEAF had requested official location of boundary between Manchuria and Korea. This is interim reply.


H.H.M. 26-6340

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G2 File Copy HHM/en



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SECURITY INFORMATION
Lt Col Mauz
Tel: 26-6340

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Specific Request for Information

ID/HVW/RRG/HHM/en
7 Feb 52

G2

AG

1. For signature and dispatch.
2. Approval by Chief of Staff is on file in Intelligence Division, G2.

1 Incl:
Ltr to FEAF w/Map

hand/s

----- R. F.E. -----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

This is an interim reply to FEAF on boundary between Korea and Manchuria vicinity UIJU, North Korea.


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A. C. OF S. G2

GHQ

4 Feb 52

SECURITY
INFORMATION

C/S

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14129

1. Proposed reply to CG, FEAF has been revised per Memo C/S to G2 dated 2 Feb 52.

2. Recommend approval.

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
R. F. E.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CG, FEAF has requested official location of boundary between Korea and Manchuria. This memorandum transmits reply revised per memorandum from C/S to G2 dated 2 Feb 52.



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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 813541

By BC NARA Date 3/6/12

SECURITY
INFORMA

A. C. OF S. GS

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2 FEB 52

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


1. Proposed reply to CG, WFAP has been reviewed
and found OK to be dated 2 Feb 52.

2. Proposed approval.

E. S. S.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

CG, WFAP has requested official location of
boundary between Korea and Manchuria. This
memorandum transmits reply revised per memorandum
from CGS to GS dated 2 Feb 52.



SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
A. C. of S. G-2
GHQ

Date 28 Jan 52

MEMORANDUM For: CHIEF OF STAFF

C of S xxx	G-1	ADC
SGS	G-3	D C/S SCAP
C of S ROK	G-4	JSPOG

Information & your file _____
 Note & Return to _____
 Appropriate Circulation _____
 Necessary Action _____
 Process Action to G-2 _____
 By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) _____
 (order) _____
 Comment to G-2 _____
 By memo _____ Orally _____

Noted _____
 Suspend to _____
 Return with reference _____
 paper _____

NOTED
CINC

1. Reference is made to query fr CinC re G2 Press Summary Brief of AP Dispatch #46 from Moscow, 26 Jan 52 which was referred to G2 for action on SGS Line #1696 (Incl 3).
 2. The complete text of the AP Dispatch including the original Teletype Strip is attached as Incl 2.
 3. The Pravada comment is evaluated as propaganda (based on Sino-Soviet Treaty of Feb 50) threatening Japanese rearmament and warning the US and/or UN against violating Chinese Communist territory. Detailed G-2 evaluation and discussion is attached hereto as Incl 1.
 4. This completes action on SGS Line #1696.
 5. Inquiry sent to Washington for their reaction
- 3 Incls soonest concerning statement in question.
 A/S Supplemental report will be prepared when answer to inquiry is received.

1696

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 18375-FEC P&PC-10 51-5M

During the past six weeks Radio Moscow has referred to Japanese rearmament 106 times, however, Radio Peking used this subject only once during the same period. In the same vein, with the two subjects probably being adjunctive, Communist efforts to block the Japanese Peace Treaty have been manifest and manifold.

Conclusion: The PRAVDA reaffirmation of this pact coincides with the current Communist campaign apparently aimed at preventing conclusion of the Japanese treaty with the United States; it is probably aimed also at conclusion of a Japanese pact with Nationalist China. It is believed to be propaganda, but it may have much broader implications.

It has been apparent for some time that intimidation of the Japanese Government to prevent rearmament of the country and conclusion of assistance pacts with non-Communist nations has been a high priority in Soviet geopolitical planning.

A broader strategic import also could be implied. Under the purported terms of Article 1 of the Mutual Assistance pact any violation of Chinese Communist territory by the United States or Nations signatory to pacts with Japan could be construed as sufficient provocation to invoke the military assistance of the USSR. In view of public statements in the United States regarding use of strategic air and naval forces against Manchuria and the Chinese mainland, this could also be construed as a direct warning to the United States.

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 Asia.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

1. Specific reference to Japanese aggression is made in the reported text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of Feb 50:

Article 1: The high contracting parties undertake that they will undertake jointly all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the agreeing parties being subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her, thus finding itself in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military or other aid with all the means at its disposal. (extracted from the Nippon Times 16 Feb 50. This was a Moscow release).

2. The same text, with only a slight variation in terminology was published in the English version of the Cominform Bulletin, For a Lasting Peace, for a Peoples Democracy, for 17 Feb 50. This bulletin was printed in Bucharest.

3. Other reports indicate Communist concern with an economically re-surgent and rearming Japan which will conclude or has concluded mutual defense and economic alliances with nations currently outside the Communist bloc.

At a reported meeting of the "Sino-Soviet Joint Aid Commission" in Peking 4 Jun 51 one of the resolutions purportedly adopted stated: "It is the American plan to expedite the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan in order that the Japanese be free to rearm and thus conquer Asia".

A reported communication from MAO Tse-tung to the USSR during May 51 listed Japan as the only Communist enemy in Asia.

During the past six weeks Radio Moscow has referred to Japanese rearmament 106 times, however, Radio Peking used this subject only once during the same period. In the same vein, with the two subjects probably being adjunctive, Communist efforts to block the Japanese Peace Treaty have been manifest and manifold.

Conclusion: The PRAVDA reaffirmation of this pact coincides with the current Communist campaign apparently aimed at preventing conclusion of the Japanese treaty with the United States; it is probably aimed also at conclusion of a Japanese pact with Nationalist China. It is believed to be propaganda, but it may have much broader implications.

It has been apparent for some time that intimidation of the Japanese Government to prevent rearmament of the country and conclusion of assistance pacts with non-Communist nations has been a high priority in Soviet geopolitical planning.

A broader strategic import also could be implied. Under the purported terms of Article 1 of the Mutual Assistance pact any violation of Chinese Communist territory by the United States or Nations signatory to pacts with Japan could be construed as sufficient provocation to invoke the military assistance of the USSR. In view of public statements in the United States regarding use of strategic air and naval forces against Manchuria and the Chinese mainland, this could also be construed as a direct warning to the United States.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

1. Specific reference to Japanese aggression is made in the reported text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of Feb 50:

Article I: The high contracting parties undertake that they will undertake jointly all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly or indirectly with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the agreeing parties being subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her, thus finding itself in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military or other aid with all the means at its disposal. (extracted from the Nippon Times 16 Feb 50. This was a Moscow release).

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3. Other reports indicate Communist concern with an economically re-urgent and rearming Japan which will coincide or has coincided with the Communist defense and economic alliances with nations extremely hostile to the Communist bloc.

At a reported meeting of the "Sino-Soviet Joint Aid Commission" in Peking 4 Jan 51 one of the resolutions purportedly adopted stated: "It is the American plan to expedite the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan in order that the Japanese be free to rearm and thus conquer Asia."

A reported communication from MAO Tse-tung to the USSR during May 51 listed Japan as the only Communist enemy in Asia.

During the past six weeks Radio Moscow has referred to Japanese rearmament 106 times. However, Radio Peking used this subject only once during the same period. In the same vein, with the two subjects probably being adjacent, Communist efforts to block the Japanese Peace Treaty have been manifest and manifold.


Conclusion: The PRVA rearmament of this past coincides with the current Communist campaign apparently aimed at preventing conclusion of the Japanese treaty with the United States; it is probably aimed also at conclusion of a Japanese pact with Nationalist China. It is believed to be propaganda, but it may have much broader implications.

It has been apparent for some time that intensification of the Japanese Government to prevent rearmament of the country and conclusion of assistance pacts with non-Communist nations has been a high priority in Soviet geopolitical planning.

A broader strategic import also could be implied. Under the purported terms of Article I of the Mutual Assistance pact any violation of Chinese Communist territory by the United States or Nations signatory to pacts with Japan could be construed as sufficient provocation to invoke the military assistance of the USSR. In view of public statements in the past regarding use of strategic air and naval forces against Manchuria and the Chinese mainland, this could also be construed as a direct warning to the United States.

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SECURITY INFORMATION



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SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Col Hipp
26-6855

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13829

(North Korean Hydroelectric Systems as a Target)

G2

G3

3 Feb 52

1 In accordance with your informal request relative to the above subject, the following G2 comments are furnished:

a. The designed maximum capacity, reported capacity as of 1950, and reported operating level (June 1950) of each of the four major complexes: (Per cent figures are of total output of North Korean power plants)

	Designed Max Capacity	Reported Capacity 1950	Reported Operating Level June 1950
SUIHO	561,600 KW (35.1%)	195,360 KW (24%)	194,016 KW (32%)
KYOSENKO	352,000 KW (22%)	260,480 KW (32%)	151,575 KW (25%)
CHOSHINKO	336,000 KW (21%)	195,360 KW (24%)	145,512 KW (24%)
FUSENKO	228,800 KW (14.3%)	97,680 KW (12%)	84,882 KW (14%)

(Plate 5, Special Report #39, Electric Power Resources, North Korea, GHQ, FEC, 6 Nov 1950)

b. Major areas served by each system are indicated below. However, it should be noted that these installations are mutually supporting which permits power to be diverted from any of these plants to service other major areas in North Korea. The destruction of these facilities would result in a reduction of the enemy's military potential.

- SUIHO DAIREN
AN-SHAN
MUKDEN
SINUIJU
PYONGYANG
CHINNAMPO
CHONGJU
- CHOSHINKO TAICHON
PYONGYANG
HUNGNAM
WONSAN
- KYOSENKO CHONGJIN
HUNGNAM
- FUSENKO HUNGNAM
CHONGJIN

c. It is believed that the primary factor to be considered at this

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G2 ID/HWM/RRC/LH/ml1



SECRET

Lt Col Hipp
26-6855

North Korean Hydroelectric Systems as a Target

G2

G3

3 Feb 52

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(Cont'd)

time in recommending approval or disapproval of the request by Fifth Air Force is the effect such an attack will have on armistice negotiations. Inasmuch as the SUIHO complex is the major power source in area and is located on the Yalu River, attack on this system will undoubtedly cause a greater reaction by the Communists than attack on the remaining three systems.

d. Recommend that Admiral Joy be queried as to possible effect on armistice negotiations, such an attack would create.

1 Incl:
Ltr fr 5th AF, dtd 6 Jan 52,
w/1st Ind

5/1 RSB

----- R. F. E. -----

*file
H/C By
Lutes*

MEMO FOR RECORD:

G3 Opns (Lt Col Boye) informally requested G2 comment on a FEAF/5th AF recommendation that CINCFE request JCS approval to bomb NK hydroelectric facilities, including the Suiho power plant on the Yalu River.

Instant action provides G2 comments and recommends that Adm Joy's views be obtained relative to effect on armistice negotiations.

L.R.H.
L.R.H. 26-6855

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Secret
*Security Information*GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section
Operations Branch

(K)

INFO on ENEMY ACTIVITIES

7 February 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Distribution

Pass to FEC Ln Gp and Intelligence Division only.

Source: Nbr 273. Evaluation: C-6.

1. On 13 January 16 trucks carrying 400 Chinese troops and 1 jeep with 3 Russians arrived Sariwon (YC 3965).

Source: CCRAK Nbr 275. Evaluation: C-6.

1. Supply depot of Chinese 65th Army located Songjong-ni (BT 8735) 9 kilometers northeast of Kuechon.

Source: CCRAK Nbr 276. Evaluation: C-6.

1. 1 regiment and division headquarters of Chinese 118th Division, 40th Army located at Hwasong-ni (B? 6600) area.

2. This regiment planning surprise attack on islands in area. Approximately 25 boats are held at Oksan-po (B? 6407).

Date above information: 28 January.

Source: CCRAK Nbr 277. Evaluation: C-6.

1. On 26 January source reports no evidence of 50th Chinese Army in Hwang Hae, Pyongan-nando or Pyongan-pukto provinces.

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

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Authority 813541

By BC NARA Date 3/5/12



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SECURITY INFORMATION
Capt Steadman
26-6068

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Medical Intelligence

G2

GHQ Medical Section

6 Feb 52

1 Forwarded herewith are two (2) information copies of Specific Request for Information, Report Identification No. 2-Med-1, subject: "Medical Intelligence" with one inclosure.

Incl:
Rpt No. 2-Med-1
with incl

-----R. F. E.-----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

J.M.S. 26-6068


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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Intelligence Division

APO 500
5 Feb 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Report Identification Number 2-Med-1

SUBJECT: Medical Intelligence

TO: MISG/FE; Security Division

1. Background: A requirement exists concerning the existence of various diseases in North Korea.
2. Specific Request: It is requested that the following information be reported concerning serious outbreaks of communicable diseases in North Korea:
 - a. Nature, symptoms, and (if possible) diagnosis of the disease.
 - b. Areas in which the disease is prevalent.
 - c. Extent of outbreak (e.g. epidemic stage), including age and sex incidence, percentage mortality, etc.
 - d. Control measures instituted by the enemy.
3. Special Instructions:
 - a. This is a continuing request.
 - b. It is recommended that interrogators consult the attached sheet for symptomatology of various diseases of both medical and military significance in Korea.
 - c. All replies to this Specific Request will be identified by identification number 2-Med-1.
 - d. This request supersedes IOM on this subject, Theater Intelligence to FEC/LG and Civil Intelligence Division, dated 10 October 1951. Requirement placed on FEC/LG for information on this subject by above IOM and by IOM, Theater Intelligence to FEC/LG, dated 10 October 1951, on subject Medical Intelligence, is herewith cancelled.

For Director of Intelligence Division:

Robert R. Glass
ROBERT R. GLASS

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch

- Distribution:
- MISG/FE (5)
 - Security Division (5)
 - FEC/LG (Info) (10)
 - Medical Section (Info) (2)
 - Operations (Info) (2)
 - G2 (Info) (2)
 - Intel Div (Info) (2)
 - P&E (File) (1)

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DISEASES OF MILITARY-MEDICAL SIGNIFICANCE
WHICH MAY OCCUR IN KOREA

CHOLERA: Acute onset with profuse diarrhea ("rice-water stools"), vomiting, extreme dehydration, muscle cramps, and collapse. 50% fatal unless treatment is given. Transmitted by direct or indirect fecal contamination of water or food by soiled hands or by flies. Immunization available.

DYSENTERY: Fever with diarrhea. Stools contain blood and mucous. Prostration. Transmitted by contaminated food and water and by flies. Immunization not available.

ENCEPHALITIS: Japanese B Encephalitis prevalent in Japan, Korea, and China. Acute onset with high fever, stiff neck, drowsiness, stupor, and convulsions. Up to 60% die. Transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. Immunization available.

LEPTOSPIROSIS: High fever, severe headache, small dark-red rash, muscular pains, vomiting, reddened eyes. About $\frac{1}{2}$ of 50% develop jaundice. Transmitted by coming into contact with water polluted by the urine of rats. Immunization not available.

MALARIA: Chills and fever. Liver and spleen may enlarge. Transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. Immunization not available.

MENINGITIS: May start out like a common cold. Sometimes sudden onset with violent chills, headache, sleepiness, painfully stiff neck, fever, and reddish rash on body. Death may occur within 24 hours in extreme cases. About 80% fatal without treatment. Immunization not available.

PLAGUE: High fever, extreme weakness, swollen lymph glands, and hemorrhages. High mortality. Human epidemics usually preceded by epidemic in rats and, therefore, many dead rats should be found in an area of the epidemic in humans. Transmitted from the rat to man by the bite of a flea. Immunization available.

RELAPSING FEVER: High fever for 2-3 days alternating with periods of 3-4 days without fever. Usually about 2-3% fatal. Transmitted by the body louse. Immunization not available.

SMALL POX: Fever for 1-5 days, then a red rash which turns into blisters filled with watery fluid, later becoming filled with pus. Transmitted by direct contact with persons sick with the disease or with articles of clothing or bedding contaminated by them. Immunization available.

TYPHOID FEVER: Fever continuous. Swollen spleen, pink rash (rose spots) on body. From feces or urine of infected people. May contaminate food or drink. Immunization available.

TYPHUS FEVER: Headache, chills, fever, and general pains. A dark red rash appears on the body about the 5th or 6th day of the disease. Transmitted by the bite of an infected louse. Immunization available.

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Security Information

2 February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF (for your information)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Operations - Korea

12420

1. Two analyses have recently been made covering the usefulness of information reported by clandestine collection agencies to the "estimators" or "users" of the information. One was prepared by G2 Eighth Army, the other by G2, GHQ.

2. Eighth Army made the following comments:

a. Total number of reports declined slightly during the period, this was primarily due to the non-inclusion of shallow penetration reports which are furnished to division and lower units.

b. Enemy unit identifications in December increased measurably during the month. The CCF identifications accounted for most of the increase while NKA identifications remained relatively static.

c. Most errors in identification of enemy units occurred in two ways: garbled identification of CCF units and the continued reporting of I NK Corps in Hwanghae Province after these units had moved to the East Coast in mid-November.

3. The analysis made within the G2 Section, GHQ, disclosed the following:

a. On the theater level the information produced was used for developing QB files and establishing trends. The reports covered the front line areas and a portion of the west coast. Except for isolated bits of information, little intelligence was received from the Korea-Manchuria border. However, continuing emphasis is being placed in this important area to establish agent nets. Winter months and tightened security by the enemy along his coastal areas have made penetration extremely difficult.

4. Due to the recent loss of several operational islands off the northwest coast of Korea FEC/LG dispatched during December additional arms, communications, personnel, and supplies to strengthen presently held bases. Closer coordination with Air and Naval Forces operating in the area to prevent surprise attacks was also effected.

5. The evacuation of indigenous refugees from operational islands began on 23 December 1951. Approximately 800 refugees from SOK-to, 6000 from CHO-do and 3500 from PAENGYANC-do were evacuated during the period. The evacuation of the refugees cleared the operational areas for personnel engaged in offensive and defensive action against the enemy.

6. The Guerrilla Division during December trained partisan personnel in parachute technique, demolitions and communications at its school located in Pusan. Under the supervision of one U.S. officer and two enlisted men, field exercises were conducted and maneuvers were carried out against friendly United Nations forces (Thailand) training in adjacent areas. Practice drops were made and specialized courses were taught to selected personnel.

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R. F. E.

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Security Information

3
February 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF (for your information)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Operations - Korea

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b. Enemy unit identifications in December increased measurably during the month. The GCP identifications accounted for most of the increase while NKA identifications remained relatively static.

c. Most errors in identification of enemy units occurred in two ways: early identification of GCP units and the continued reporting of I NK Corps in Kwangju province after these units had moved to the East Coast in mid-November.

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a. On the theater level the information produced was used for developing GB files and establishing trends. The reports covered the front line areas and a portion of the west coast. Except for isolated bits of information, little intelligence was received from the Korea-Manchuria border. However, containing emphasis is being placed in this important area to establish agent nets. Winter months and tightened security by the enemy along his coastal areas have made penetration extremely difficult.

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
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2 FEB 1952
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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMANDMilitary Intelligence Section, General Staff
Intelligence Division

APO 500

1 February 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

No. 2 AF 1-2-15-H

Report Identification Number 2 AF 1-2-15-H

SUBJECT: Unidentified Explosion, 29 December 1951

TO: Security Division

1. Background: A requirement exists for information on an unidentified explosion which took place on 29 December 1951 at 1545Z hours on an azimuth of 309 to 310 degrees from Kyoto, Japan. This information apparently was obtained from scientific instruments at a Kyoto laboratory and transmitted to U.S. Coast and Geodetic authorities. Additional details are unknown.

2. Specific Request: The following information is requested.

a. The nature, cause, location or other data on the above referred to explosion.

b. The nature, cause and location of any known explosions or acoustic disturbances on or near the above cited azimuth and time.

3. Special Instructions: a. This is not a continuing requirement.

b. A suspense date of 15 February 1952 is placed on this requirement. Further information will be reported as obtained.

c. It is suggested that, if possible, further details on the explosion be obtained from the initial sources.

d. All replies to this specific request will be identified by identification number 2 AF-1-2-15-H.

For Director of Intelligence Division:


ROBERT R. GLASS

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch

Distribution:

Scty Div (5)
G2 (Info) (2)
Intel Div (Info) (2)
Target Br (Info) (1)
P&E (File) (1)


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G2 Info

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SECURITY INFORMATION

11152

Capt Luckfield, 57-8339

Collection of Markings and Nameplate Data

Ord 0

G-2

28 Jan 52

1. In accordance with a recent request from your office a letter was forwarded to Ordnance Officer, 8th Army to investigate and correct the discrepancies which have been noted in reports submitted by Technical Intelligence detachments. The original letter and 1st Ind from Ordnance Officer, 8th Army is forwarded for your information.

2. Request the inclosed correspondence be returned to this section.

2 Incls
a/s

-----R. W. D.-----

FROM: G2

TO: Ord 0

Lt Witts/als 26-7007

FEB 4 1952

2. Returned herewith as requested in para 2 above, are original letter and 1st Indorsement from Ordnance Officer, Eighth Army.

2 Incls
a/s

IS/AAM

-----R.F.E.-----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Self-explanatory.

KER.
KER

26-6025

W. G. S.

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T.W.W.

26-7007

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

Ordnance Section

12 January 1952

350.09 (12 Jan 52)OR

SUBJECT: Collection of Markings and Nameplate Data

TO: Ordnance Officer
Eighth Army
APO 301

1. The efforts expended to date by the Ordnance Technical Intelligence detachments have resulted in the receipt of much valuable information. Difficulties which have been encountered in the past and reoccur from time to time are due to the fact that the markings information reported, in many instances, contains errors, omissions, and discrepancies. In the preponderance of these cases, the information reported could have been of greater value had the collection agency followed the available guidance.

2. For your information, up to the present time markings information has been reported on some seven hundred (700) Soviet general purpose vehicles, but a recent review of these data reveals that in many instances incomplete or insufficient data have been collected. This is particularly true in the case of the ZIS 150's and 151's where the nameplate does not carry a date of manufacture such as found on the GAZ 51's, 63's and 67's. In most instances, however, markings on components such as tires, voltage regulators, generators, batteries, carburetors, etc., carry dates of manufacture which include month, year, and, in some cases, the day. The markings on the components should be reported whether the main nameplate does or does not reflect the date of manufacture.

3. In view of the present and continuing need for more detailed markings from general purpose vehicles, it is desired that action be taken to have the Soviet vehicles still available in the Eighth Army area reprocessed for markings data with emphasis upon component markings.

s/ R. P. Wilson
f/ R. W. DANIELS
Brig Gen, Ord Corps
Ordnance Officer

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AG 350.09 KODP
(12 Jan 52)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Collection of Markings and Nameplate Data.

Office of the Ordnance Officer, Hq, EUSAK, APO 301, 17 Jan 52

TO: Ordnance Officer, Far East Command, APO 500

1. Deficiencies discussed in basic letter came to the attention of this office several weeks ago. At that time the action specified in paragraph 3 of basic letter was initiated. Since that time this office has undertaken the preparation of a report form which lists all components on which data will be obtained and which specifies the detailed data to be obtained in each instance. General instructions appear on the form relative to the necessity of obtaining not only the specified data but also all other pertinent information which the operating personnel can detect.

2. Investigation has revealed that inadequate training and lack of field experience of the personnel responsible for the original collection of the data were the primary reasons for the deficient performance record cited in the basic letter.

3. Every effort is currently being made to ensure that accurate, complete and timely records and reports are prepared by the Technical Intelligence Detachments. It is anticipated that the overall performance in this field will show added improvement after school trained replacements are received, assigned, and acclimated.

FOR THE ORDNANCE OFFICER:

s/ John H. Weber
f/ JOHN H. WEBER
Col Ord Corps
Deputy Ord Off

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SECURITY INFORMATION

AG 350.09 KODP
(12 Jan 52)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Collection of Markings and Nameplate Data.

Office of the Ordnance Officer, HQ, EUSAK, APO 301, 17 Jan 52

TO: Ordnance Officer, Far East Command, APO 500


1. Deficiencies discussed in basic letter came to the attention of this office several weeks ago. At that time the action specified in paragraph 3 of basic letter was initiated. Since that time this office has undertaken the preparation of a report form which lists all components on which data will be obtained and which specifies the detailed data to be obtained in each instance. General instructions appear on the form relative to the necessity of obtaining not only the specified data but also all other pertinent information which the operating personnel can detect.

2. Investigation has revealed that inadequate training and lack of field experience of the personnel responsible for the original collection of the data were the primary reasons for the deficient performance record cited in the basic letter.

3. Every effort is currently being made to ensure that accurate, complete and timely records and reports are prepared by the Technical Intelligence Detachments. It is anticipated that the overall performance in this field will show added improvement after school trained replacements are received, assigned, and acclimated.


FOR THE ORDNANCE OFFICER:

/s/ John H. Weber
/t/ JOHN H. WEBER
Col Ord Comd
Deputy Ordnance Officer



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SECURITY INFORMATION



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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
2 February 1952

ID/P&E

SUBJECT: Specific Request for Information No. 1-SA-8

TO: Flag Intelligence Officer
Naval Forces Far East
Navy No. 1165

Enclosed herewith is one (1) information copy of Specific Request for Information, Report Identification No. 1-SA-8, subject: "Aerial Photograph Interpretation, China Coastal Areas."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

Incl:
a/s

(S) R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy




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G2 ID/HWM/RRG/JST/ml1

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APD 500
2 February 1952

TO:

SUBJECT: Specific Request for Information No. I-2A-8


TO: Flag Intelligence Officer
Naval Forces Far East
Navy No. 1162

Enclosed herewith is one (1) information copy of specific
Request for Information, Report Identification No. I-2A-8,
subject: "Aerial Photograph Interpretation, China Coastal Areas."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy
R. S. BRATTON

Incl:
a/s




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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

APO 500
2 February 1952

ID/R&E

SUBJECT: Specific Request for Information No. 1-SA-8

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

Enclosed herewith are five (5) information copies of Specific Request for Information, Report Identification No. 1-SA-8, subject: "Aerial Photograph Interpretation, China Coastal Areas."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

5 Incls:
a/s

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy



File


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SECURITY INFORMATION

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

ARO 500
5 February 1952

ID/RE

SUBJECT: Specific Request for Information No. 1-2A-1


TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
ARO 925

Enclosed herewith are five (5) information copies of specific
Request for Information, Report Identification No. 1-2A-1,
subject: "Aerial Photograph Interpretation, China Coastal Areas."

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:

R. S. BRANTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

5 Incls:
s/s



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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 FAR EAST COMMAND
 Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
 Intelligence Division

APO 500
 1 February 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

Report Identification No. 1-SA-8

SUBJECT: Aerial Photograph Interpretation, China Coastal Areas

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
 Far East Air Forces
 APO 925

1. Background: Photo coverage of various areas of the China coast, including the coastal islands, is received by FEAF from time to time. Such photos may originate with Air Force reconnaissance agencies, with Navy air reconnaissance units, or may be received from other Allied forces. All photos are interpreted and stored at Yokota AFB. It is understood that heretofore these photos have been exploited for target and airfield purposes only. Additional interpretation will provide significant information in other fields.

2. Specific Request: It is desired that all photos of the China coastal areas, including coastal islands, be scanned as received for the following information and reports of findings submitted to G2, GHQ, FEC.

a. Defensive installations, i.e., fortifications, blockhouses, casemates, entrenchments, barbed wire, land mines, anti-tank obstacles, landing beach defenses, marine mines, and other evidence of preparation for defense.

b. Artillery, i.e., coastal guns, field guns, antiaircraft weapons, rocket positions, gun emplacements, dummy positions, fire control equipment and emplacements, etc.

c. Troop bivouac areas, concentrations, and movements.

d. Radar and radio installations.

e. Lines of communication, i.e., highways, railways including possible new construction, telephone lines, power lines, etc.

f. Marine mines and landing beach defenses.

g. Depots and other storage facilities.

h. Concentrations of shipping, both naval and merchant marine.

3. Special Instructions:

a. This is a continuing request.

b. It is requested that mission plots for all photos of the

G2 (Info)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

China coast area be sent to G2, GHQ, as received, regardless of whether scanning reveals any of the above listed information.

c. This request should not be construed as altering in any way existing directives regarding theater strategic reconnaissance responsibilities.

Distribution:


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- COMNAVFE (Info) (1)
- G2 (Info) (2)
- Intel Div (Info) (2)
- Targets Br (Info) (1)
- Operations (Info) (2)
- P&E File (1)

ROBERT R. GLASS

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch

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

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Authority 813541

By BC NARA Date 3/5/12



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Re air operations

1-20-7

Scty Div 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Request from the French Military Advisor -

G2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 20 February 1952

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C.

1. The attached request from the French Military Advisor is forwarded for policy decision.
2. In this connection, your attention is invited to the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, 1st Ind.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

file

1 Incl
n/c

(S) R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

French Military Advisor in Memo dtd 25 Jan 52, to Foreign Mil Liaison, GHQ, states the situation in Indochina looks very near to that in Korea, that French Command in Indochina would like to profit by experience of US forces in Korea, and requests certain information re air operations.

C/N 1 fr Int Div dtd 30 Jan 52, to Scty Div, rqsts a recommendation re release of requested info.

G2, FEC in ltr dtd 2 Feb 52 to FEAF, states it is understood that most of the info rqstd may not be releasable under current policy, and proposes, if FEAF concurs, to refer the matter to State-Defense Mil Info Control Committee thru DA for decision. Requests recommendation for each individual item and security classification.

1st Ind fr FEAF, dtd 15 Feb 52 to G2 FEC concurs in proposal and recommends Hq, USAF be queried by DA for recommendations as to release and classification prior to submission to SD-MIC.


This refers the matter to G2 DA inviting attention to recommendation of FEAF.

Lt Col Wilmuth, Int Div, was advised of proposed action by Scty Div.

Maj Smith - 26-7288

G2 File Copy
Scty Div/P&P/ALS/mfs

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



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Re air operations

Scty Div
SUBJECT: Request from the French Military Advisor -

GS, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 20 February 1952

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, GS, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C.

- 1. The attached request from the French Military Advisor is forwarded for policy decision.
- 2. In this connection, your attention is invited to the recommendation contained in paragraph 2, 1st Ind.

Y.M.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:

(S) R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

1 Incl
n/c

MEMO FOR RECORD:

French Military Advisor in Memo dtd 25 Jan 52, to Foreign Mil Liaison, GHQ, states the situation in Indochina looks very near to that in Korea, that French Command in Indochina would like to profit by experience of US forces in Korea, and requests certain information re air operations.

C/N 1 fr Int Div dtd 30 Jan 52, to Scty Div, rpts a recommendation re release of requested info.


GS, FHC in ltr dtd 2 Feb 52 to FEA, states it is understood that most of the info rptsd may not be releasable under current policy, and proposes, if FEA concurs, to refer the matter to State-Defense Mil Info Control Committee thru DA for decision. Requests recommendation for each individual item and security classification.

1st Ind fr FEA, dtd 15 Feb 52 to GS FHC concurs in proposal and recommends Hq, USAF be queried by DA for recommendations as to release and classification prior to submission to SD-MIC.

This refers the matter to GS DA inviting attention to recommendation of FEA.

If Col Wilmuth, Int Div, was advised of proposed action by Scty Div.


Maj Smith - 26-7288



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Scty Div/Asst/VTG/mf
GS File Code

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APD 500
2 February 1952

Scty Div

SUBJECT: Request from the French Military Advisor

TO: Director of Special Investigations
Office of the Inspector General
Headquarters, Far East Air Force
APO 925

1. Reference is made to the attached memorandum from the French Military Advisor, and the inclosure thereto, which requests information primarily of Air Force interest.

2. While it is understood that most of the information requested may not be releasable under current policy, it is proposed, if you concur, to refer this matter to the State-Defense Military Information Control Committee through the Department of the Army for decision.

3. It is requested that you furnish the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Far East Command with your recommendation in the case of each individual item as to whether it should be released together with its security classification.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

Cyts Sec Div/PP
File
152

1 Incl
Memo dtd 25 Jan 52
w/1 Incl

/s/ H. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD: 2 Feb 52

Memo fr Mil Advisor French Mission, dtd 25 Jan 52 to Fgn Mil Lsn, GHQ, states that recent info shows that the Chinese Forces are preparing an action against Indochina and that situation looks very similar to that in Korea. The French Comd in Indochina would appreciate to profit by experiences of Amer Forces in Korea and would like to receive info on air operations in Korea as indicated in the Incl. (Info desired pertains to methods of attach, use of parachute bombs, effect of certain projectiles on light bombers and fighters, night reconnaissance, air drops, type and number of aircraft, etc).

C/N-1 fr Int Div, dtd 30 Jan 52, to Scty Div, rqsts a rec on release of rqstd info. Lt Col Wilmeth author of C/N-1 was advised of proposed action by scty div that recommendations of FFAF would first be obtained and if FFAF concurred, Scty Div would

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
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MEMO FOR RECORD: Continued

wire DA for approval for ~~release~~ for those items which are not releasable under DA-DCMI.

This ltr requests FEAF comments and requests classification of each item requested.

Maj Smith 26-7288



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
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MEMO FOR RECORD: Continued


item requested. This for requests TEF comments and requests classification of each wire DA for approval for release for those items which are not releasable under DA-DCMI.

Maj Smith 26-7288



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SECURITY INFORMATION



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SECURITY INFORMATION

10609

Lt Col Kolb
26-6066

Destruction of Water Towers

By AF

Trans O

30 Jan 1952

G2

3

G2 concurs in G3 comments contained in Checknote #2.

(S) RLB

R. F. E.

MEMO FOR RECORD:

1. The Trans Officer in CN#1 to G3 recommends that the destruction of rail water towers be included and emphasized in the present air interdiction effort. G3 replies that target analysis groups have periodically considered the feasibility of including water towers as air targets and in addition states the following reasons why these towers have not been included as specific targets.

a. The location of these towers is such as to make them highly vulnerable to damage by medium bombers (B-29s) during attacks on marshalling yards.

b. Normally fighter-bomber strikes against rail lines (apart from the marshalling yards) result in rail cuts which prevent locomotives from reaching these towers.

c. Extensive anti-aircraft defenses have made fighter-bomber strikes against marshalling yards extremely unprofitable.

d. The enemy's proven ability to hand-carry large quantities of supplies in the event of destruction of mechanical facilities.

2. Checknote #3 (G2 to Trans O) has been prepared indicating G2 concurrence with G3 comments.

R. L. K. _____ 26-6066

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Lt Col Kinsella
26-8822

Destruction of Water Towers

Trans O

G-3

25 JAN 1952

1

1. It has been noted in the past that FFAF target status and damage assessment reports do not include rail water towers as air objectives. Subsequent discussions with personnel of the Target Analysis Division, FFAF, developed that operations against water towers were discontinued approximately one year ago in favor of more remunerative targets.

2. Rail intelligence information has established that enemy locomotives presently employed in Korea are predominately of the steam type. It is pointed out that steam locomotives are dependent on water for boilers in order to generate steam and cannot operate without this necessary element.

3. Water towers in Korea are normally spaced about 10 to 20 kilometers apart and are usually located in the vicinity of the yard limits of railroad stations. It would appear that water towers would be quite vulnerable to air attack and the denial of this facility to the enemy would severely handicap his transportation effort.

4. It is recommended that the destruction of rail water towers be included and emphasized in the present air interdiction effort.

Copy furnished
c/s
G-2

-H.F.M.-

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION



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LT Col Kincaid
36-8822

Destruction of Water Towers

28 JAN 1952

0-3

Trans 0

1

1. It has been noted in the past that rail target status and damage assessment reports do not include rail water towers as air objectives. Subsequent discussions with personnel of the Target Analysis Division, TAD, revealed that operations against water towers were discontinued approximately one year ago in favor of more remunerative targets.


2. Rail intelligence information has established that enemy locomotives presently employed in Korea are pressure-actuated of the steam type. It is pointed out that steam locomotives are dependent on water for boilers in order to generate steam and cannot operate without this necessary element.

3. Water towers in Korea are normally spaced about 10 to 20 kilometers apart and are usually located in the vicinity of the main lines of railroad stations. It would appear that water towers would be prime candidates for air attack and the denial of this facility to the enemy would severely handicap his transportation effort.

4. It is recommended that the destruction of rail water towers be included and emphasized in the present air interdiction effort.


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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET



SECRET

Lt Col Rosa
26-8538

Destruction of Water Towers

G3

Thru: G-2
Trans O

29 JAN 1952

2

1. Periodically during the past year, target analysis groups of GHQ, FEAF and Eighth Army - Fifth Air Force have thoroughly considered and evaluated the feasibility of including water towers as air targets.

2. Water towers have not been designated as specific targets for the following reasons:

a. The location of these towers is such as to make them highly vulnerable to damage by medium bombers (B-29s) during attacks on marshalling yards.

b. Normally fighter-bomber strikes against rail lines (apart from the marshalling yards) result in rail cuts which prevent locomotives from reaching these towers.

c. Extensive anti-aircraft defenses have made fighter-bomber strikes against marshalling yards extremely unprofitable.

d. The enemy's proven ability to hand-carry large quantities of supplies in the event of destruction of mechanical facilities.

3. In view of the above, G3 contemplates no further action on recommendation contained in para 4, C/N 1.


----- E. K. W. -----



SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

1046



SECRET

Lt Col Ross
28-8538

Destruction of Water Towers

29 JAN 1952

Trans O
Trans G-3

03

1. Periodically during the past year, target analysis groups of GHQ, TRAF and Eighth Army - Fifth Air Force have thoroughly considered and evaluated the feasibility of including water towers as air targets.

2. Water towers have not been designated as specific targets for the following reasons:

a. The location of these towers is such as to make them highly vulnerable to damage by medium bombers (B-26s) during attacks on marshalling yards.


b. Normally fighter-bomber strikes against rail lines (apart from the marshalling yards) result in rail cuts which prevent locomotives from reaching these towers.

c. Extensive anti-aircraft defenses have made fighter-bomber strikes against marshalling yards extremely unprofitable.

d. The enemy's proven ability to hand-carry large quantities of supplies in the event of destruction of mechanical facilities.

3. In view of the above, OS contemplates no further action on recommendation contained in para 4, C/N 1.


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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

~~GENERAL HEADQUARTERS~~
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

AFD 500
30 September 1952

ID/PB

SUBJECT: Biographic Data on Japanese Military Personalities

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to Specific Request for Information, Control No. ID 34-409, subject above, dated 22 January 1952.

2. Forwarded herewith are eight (8) Biographic Reports, DAIR 3000-52 thru DAIR 3007-52, prepared by G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

WRL/Koko
C. V. BROMLEY
Colonel, General Staff
Deputy

8 Incls
a/s

- DISTRIBUTION:
- 1-AC/S G2, GSUSA, w/incls
 - 1-ID file, w/o incls
 - 1-Plans Br, w/incls w/d
 - 2-Sety Div, w/incls w/d ✓
 - 1-G2 file w/o incls

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MEMO FOR RECORD:

These biographic reports prepared by Sety Div., are fwded to DA in response to DA SRI ID 34-409.

RCS pen 265-389


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Feb 6 1953

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G2 file



SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET


Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
FAR EAST COMMAND
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

30 September 1952
APO 500

ID/PB

SUBJECT: Biographic Data on Japanese Military Personalities

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, GS
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.



1. Reference is made to specific request for information, General
No. ID 34-109, subject above, dated 22 January 1952.

2. Forwarded herewith are eight (8) Biographic Reports, DAIR 3000-52
that DAIR 3007-52, prepared by GS, Headquarters, Far East Command.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, GS:

GS file

C. V. BROWN
Colonel, General Staff
Beaufort

8 Incls
e/s

DISTRIBUTION:
1-AG/AS GS, GSUSA, w/incls
1-ID file, w/o incls
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1-GS file w/o incls

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MEMO FOR RECORD:
These biographic reports prepared by Scy Div., are typed to DA in
response to DA SRI ID 34-109.


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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

75274

APD 500
16 September 1952

ID/PB

SUBJECT: Biographic Data on Japanese Military Personalities

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Reference is made to Specific Request for Information, Control No. ID 34-409, subject above, dated 22 January 1952.

2. Forwarded herewith are ten (10) Biographic Reports, DAIR 2757-52 thru DAIR 2766-52, prepared by G2, Headquarters, Far East Command.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

10 Incls
a/s

H. R. Holt
C. V. BROMLEY
Colonel, General Staff
Deputy

DISTRIBUTION:
1-AC/S G2, DA w/10 incls
1-ID file, w/o incls
1-Plans Br, w/10 incls w/d
2-Scty Div, w/10 incls w/d
1-G2 file w/o incls

file

MEMO FOR RECORD:

These biographic reports prepared by Scty Div, are fwded to DA in response to DA SRI ID 34-409.

RGS *W* 265-389


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G2 file



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Security Information

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
Washington 25, D.C.

G-2/PREA/

Date Jan 22 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, CONTROL NO. ID 34-409

SUBJECT: Biographical data on Japanese military personalities

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East
ATTN: A.C. of S., G-2
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Request brief biographical sketches on leading personalities in Japanese National Police Reserve, and biographical data on leading former Japanese military personalities as they come back into prominence.
2. Reply within 60 days of receipt. Unsatisfied portions will be forwarded after suspense date.
3. All replies to the requirement will refer to the above Control No.
4. Collection guidance and special instructions:

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

/s/Garrison B. Coverdale
/t/GARRISON B. COVERDALE
Colonel, GS
Chief, Coll, Dissemination Div, G-2

G2 File


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25 January 1952	
Per Authority	
Commanding General	
FEAF APO 925	
<i>Yo Banfill</i>	
Date	Initials

FEAF SR 1-2-15-H
Acoustic Disturbance

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters, Far East Command
APO 500
ATTN: Theater Intelligence

Headquarters
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

29 JAN 1952

xx

15 February 1952

FEAF SR No. 1-2-15-H

- 3. Any information available concerning an acoustic disturbance which occurred on an azimuth of 309 degrees to 310 degrees from KYOTO, Japan on 29 December 1951 at 1545Z hours.
- 4. Further request information to include any known explosion on or near the above cited azimuth and date time group that would equal that of a 2,000 pound bomb explosion.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

CHARLES Y. BANFILL
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy for Intelligence

Action
13 Feb 52

The explosion could have been in Korea or Manchuria and caused by either friendly or enemy forces. *(36)*


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FEAF AG NO. 12341

SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION
A. C. S. G-2
GHQ

1030

10130

Date 28 Jan 52

MEMORANDUM For: CHIEF OF STAFF

C of S XXX	G-1	ADC
SGS	G-3	D C/S SCAP
C of S ROK	G-4	JSPOG

Information & your file _____
 Note & Return to _____
 Appropriate Circulation _____ Noted _____
 Necessary Action _____ Suspend to _____
 Process Action to G-2 _____ Return with reference _____
 By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) _____ paper _____
 (order) _____
 Comment to G-2 _____
 By memo _____ Orally _____

al Staff
27 January 1952

Lee Sang Cho with "get-
tions for PW exchange

air fourth choice in two
proposing to shelve the

G-2 Admin

1. Reference is made to query fr CinC re G2 Press Summary Brief of AP Dispatch #46 from Moscow, 26 Jan 52 which was referred to G2 for action on SGS Line #1696 (Incl 3).
 2. The complete text of the AP Dispatch including the original Teletype Strip is attached as Incl 2.
 3. The Pravda comment is evaluated as propaganda (based on Sino-Soviet Treaty of Feb 50) threatening Japanese rearmament and warning the US and/or UN against violating Chinese Communist territory. Detailed G-2 evaluation and discussion is attached hereto as Incl 1.
 4. This completes action on SCS Line #1696.
 5. Inquiry sent to Washington for their reaction soonest concerning statement in question.
- 3 Incls
A/S Supplemental report will be prepared when answer to inquiry is received.

26 Protestants and
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Comment to G-2
By memo _____ Orally _____

CinC's remarks

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Greece-Turkey agree-

larmed over anti-west
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military action in
Ismailia, where Egyptian police were disarmed, saying that evidence shows the police have taken an active part in attacks on British forces.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(35) S
35009
1696

/s/ FWM
F. W. MOORMAN
Lt Col., GSC
Secretary of the Gen Staff

2092

JAPAN NEWS

Incl 3 INS 25 TOKYO 26 Jan - The US and Japan will meet Monday as formal equals for the first time since Japan's defeat. They will discuss American Security Forces in Japan after the peace treaty.

AP 46 MOSCOW 26 Jan - The Pravda says Russia would fight beside Red China if ever it felt she was "being attacked by the Japanese or any forces allied with the Japanese.

Any more details on this? i/M B R
565-1696

2082

10130

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FOR THE
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
APO 500

NUMBER 97

27 January 1952

PRESS SUMMARY

ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

AP 154 PANMUNJOM 26 Jan - Rear Admiral Libby charged Gen Lee Sang Cho with "getting a little too big for his britches", as the negotiations for PW exchange "accomplished absolutely nothing".

AP 132 TOKYO 26 Jan - The UNC offered the Communists their fourth choice in two methods to solve the airfield deadlock by proposing to shelve the

CHIEF OF STAFF
~~ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF~~
G-2
GHQ

Date 27 Jan 52

MEMORANDUM For: Gen Ennis

- C of S _____ G-1 _____ ADC _____
- SGS _____ G-3 _____ D C/S SCAP _____
- C of S ROK _____ G-4 _____ JSPOG _____
- Information & your file _____
- Note & Return to _____
- Appropriate Circulation _____
- Necessary Action XX _____
- Process Action to G-2 _____
- By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) _____
- (order) _____
- Comment to G-2 _____
- By memo _____ Orally _____

CinC's remarks

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(35) S
35009

/s/ FWM
F. W. MOORMAN
Lt Col., GSC
Secretary of the Gen Staff

2092

1696

Ismailia, where Egyptian police were disarmed, saying that evidence shows the police have taken an active part in attacks on British forces.

JAPAN NEWS


Anal 3

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any more details on this? i/M B R

2082



10130

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FIDELITY COMMANDMilitary Intelligence Section, General Staff
APO 500

NUMBER 97

27 January 1952

PRESS SUMMARYARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

AP 154 PANMUNJOM 26 Jan - Rear Admiral Libby charged Gen Lee Sang Cho with "getting a little too big for his britches", as the negotiations for PW exchange "accomplished absolutely nothing".

AP 132 TOKYO 26 Jan - The UNC offered the communists their fourth choice in two days of new methods to solve the airfield deadlock by proposing to shelve the dispute temporarily.

US PRESS FROM KOREA

AP 188 MUNSAN 26 Jan - The communist failed to account for 26 Protestants and Catholic missionaries known to have vanished behind Red lines since the war started, while the list included 21 names the UN did not have listed.

OTHER AREAS OF FEC INTEREST

AP 182 HONG KONG 26 Jan - A pro-Nationalist newspaper stated that 1,350 tons of supplies have been shipped from Canton to Chinese Red Armies along the Indo-China border, via sea, in the past month.

AP 142 SAIGON 26 Jan - Jean LeTourneau says France would welcome any chance to settle the indo-Chinese conflict on an international level, but would not negotiate with communist leader Ho Chi Minh.

INS 35 WASHINGTON 26 Jan - The Mutual Security Agency announced allocation of \$43,700,000 to Far East countries for 1 Jan to 31 Mar. The countries include Formosa, Indonesia, Indo-China, and the Philippines.

WORLD PRESS

UP OTTAWA 26 Jan - Member of Parliament were reported to be preparing resolutions for the coming session calling for "the annexation of the US by Canada".

AP 137 BONN 26 Jan - Former aids of the late Marshal Goering are planning a new Luftwaffe for West Germany with 1,500 planes supplied by the US.

AP 45 TUNIS 26 Jan - Violence born of a campaign for increased independence appeared to be waning. Both French and officials of Tunisia said they were optimistic about the prospects for settlement.

UP WASHINGTON 26 Jan The Senate is expected to pledge the US to defend both ends of Asia against a possible communist attack by the Greece-Turkey agreement and a Pacific mutual defence pact.

UP WASHINGTON 26 Jan - American officials are becoming alarmed over anti-west violence in the middle-east, and there seems little chance at the moment of repairing and restoring American prestige there.

INS LONDON 26 Jan - The British Government backed up the military action in Ismailia, where Egyptian police were disarmed, saying that evidence shows the police have taken an active part in attacks on British forces.

JAPAN NEWS

encl 3
INS 25 TOKYO 26 Jan - The US and Japan will meet Monday as formal equals for the first time since Japan's defeat. They will discuss American Security Forces in Japan after the peace treaty.

AP 46 MOSCOW 26 Jan - The Pravda says Russia would fight beside Red China if ever it felt she was "being attacked by the Japanese or any forces allied with the Japanese."

any more details on this? i/M B R
565-1696

2082

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

AP 46

Moscow, Jan 26 (AP) - The Communist Party's official organ Pravda says Russia would fight beside Red China if ever it felt she was "being attacked by the Japanese or any forces allied with the Japanese".

Pravda was commenting on Japanese Premier Shigeru Yoshida's recent disclosure that Japan was prepared, when possible, to conclude a treaty with the Chinese Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, now in refuge on Formosa.

The Chinese Reds have pledged themselves to wipe out Chiang's island center of resistance. That is why diplomats here regarded the Pravda statements with concern.

(The Reds have their own way of construing who makes an initial attack. In both Moscow and Peiping, the official view is, for instance, "that the south Koreans attacked the North Koreans and started that conflict".)

The Soviet Union would intervene under terms of a 1950 treaty of alliance and mutual aid with Communist China, Pravda said.

Pravda said the "shameful" attitude of Japan in wishing to make peace with the Chinese Nationalists instead of the Communists was a "frank expression of a hostile attitude toward the Chinese people and a serious threat to peace in the Far East and throughout the world".

Another article which drew immediate attention of foreign diplomats appeared in Red Star, organ of the armed forces. It accused the Americans, British and French of planning aggression against Red China. Red Star said recent talks by the three western powers' military chiefs in Washington dealt with "ways and means for suppressing the National Liberation Movement of Southeast Asia, turning these countries into a springboard for aggression against the Chinese People's (Communist) Republic".

"The negotiations by the three Chiefs-of-Staff were directly connected with practical measures which the American imperialists already are taking against the Chinese People's Republic and the countries bordering it".

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

1. Specific reference to Japanese aggression is made in the reported text of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of Feb 50:

Article 1: The high contracting parties undertake that they will undertake jointly all necessary measures at their disposal to prevent any repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression. In the event of one of the agreeing parties being subjected to attack by Japan or any state allied with her, thus finding itself in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military or other aid with all the means at its disposal. (extracted from the Nippon Times 16 Feb 50. This was a Moscow release).

2. The same text, with only a slight variation in terminology was published in the English version of the Cominform Bulletin, For a Lasting Peace, for a Peoples Democracy, for 17 Feb 50. This bulletin was printed in Bucharest.

3. Other reports indicate Communist concern with an economically resurgent and rearming Japan which will conclude or has concluded mutual defense and economic alliances with nations currently outside the Communist bloc.

At a reported meeting of the "Sino-Soviet Joint Aid Commission" in Peking 4 Jun 51 one of the resolutions purportedly adopted stated: "It is the American plan to expedite the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan in order that the Japanese be free to rearm and thus conquer Asia".

A reported communication from MAO Tse-tung to the USSR during May 51 listed Japan as the only Communist enemy in Asia.

During the past six weeks Radio Moscow has referred to Japanese rearmament 106 times, however, Radio Peking used this subject only once during the same period. In the same vein, with the two subjects probably being adjunctive, Communist efforts to block the Japanese Peace Treaty have been manifest and manifold.

Conclusion: The PRAVDA reaffirmation of this pact coincides with the current Communist campaign apparently aimed at prevent^{ing} conclusion of the Japanese treaty with the United States; it is probably aimed also at conclusion of a Japanese pact with Nationalist China. It is believed to be propoganda, but it may have much broader implications.

It has been apparent for some time that intimidation of the Japanese Government to prevent rearmament of the country and conclusion of assistance pacts with non-Communist nations has been a high priority in Soviet geopolitical planning.

A broader strategic import also could be implied. Under the purported terms of Article 1 of the Mutual Assistance pact any violation of Chinese Communist territory by the United States or Nations signatory to pacts with Japan could be construed as sufficient provocation to invoke the military assistance of the USSR. In view of public statements in the United States regarding use of strategic air and naval forces against Manchuria and the Chinese mainland, this could also be construed as a direct warning to the United States.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

File
H/By Lt. Falls
1020 29 Jan 1958

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

10183

1st Ind

G2, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND, APO 500, 28 January 1952

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Department of the Army, Washington
25, D. C.

1. Attention is invited to basic communication.

2. In view of the highly classified nature of the information desired by the Armored School guidance is requested as to the advisability of furnishing it as requested.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2:

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

G-2 File

BRATTON


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HEADQUARTERS THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky

9 January 1952

AICBB-E

SUBJECT: Intelligence for Armor by Partisans

TO: Commanding General
GHQ, FECOM
APO 500 c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
ATTN: G2

1. In connection with a research project, The Armored School is desirous of obtaining information regarding the collection of information through the use of partisans or related clandestine means. Of particular interest is the technique of collection of information and the value of the intelligence thus produced at corps and division level.

2. If any examples are known where clandestine sources, especially partisans, were used to collect information which was, or could have been used by tactical units, The Armored School solicits your knowledge and comments. In the case of incidents, a brief history will be appreciated. The location of any pertinent documents or references is also desired.

3. It is requested that you complete the attached questionnaire at your earliest convenience, sign 1st indorsement, and return both to this headquarters in the self-addressed franked envelope inclosed.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:


- 2 Incls
- 1. Questionnaire
- 2. Envelope

THOMAS J. ROGERS
Colonel, Armor
Secretary

1st Ind

TO: Headquarters The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
ATTN: AICBB-E

Incl
Questionnaire



Authority 813541
By BC NARA Date 3/5/12

HEADQUARTERS THE ARMORED SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky

9 January 1952

ALCIB-E

SUBJECT: Intelligence for Armor by Partisans

TO: Commanding General
G-2, AFMAG
APO 500 e/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California
ATTN: G2


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FOR THE COMMANDANT:

THOMAS J. ROGERS
Colonel, Armor
Secretary


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1. Questionnaire
2. Envelope

1st Ind



TO: Headquarters The Armored School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
ATTN: ALCIB-E

Incl
Questionnaire



06247

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Lt Witt/als 26-8711

DA SRI Control No. ID-15-27

G2

Cml

28 January 1952

1. Reference is GHQ, SCAP, FEC Staff Memo No. 56, "Technical Intelligence," dated 8 December 1951.
2. Inclosure one is a DA Specific Request for Information (Control No. ID-15-27) which states a requirement for a one pound sample beryl-concentrate as reported in 51st Cml TID report #35, dated 28 August 1951.
3. In accordance with the procedures outlined in par 1, above, this request is referred to you for action as a matter pertaining to the Chemical Section. It is requested that this sample be forwarded to G2, Attention: Technical Intelligence Branch, to reach G2 by 8 March 1952.
4. Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

1 Incl

DA SRI ID-15-27, subj as above, dtd 8 Jan 52

am/s

-----R. F. E.-----

MEMO FOR RECORD:

DA, SRI ID-15-27, subj: Captured Mineral Ore-Beryl, dtd 8 Jan 52, was recd in Tech Intel Br fr Tgt Br, Intel Div, on 21 Jan 52.

GHQ, SCAP, FEC Staff Memo 56, dtd 8 Dec 51 places the responsibility of rendering expert tech advice and assistance on matters related to tech and scientific intel, as required by the ACofS, G2 this Hq, upon the tech svcs. Accordingly this SRI is being fwded to Cml Sec, GHQ for action. A copy was handcarried to Cml Sec on 26 Jan 52 to facilitate action.

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
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WGS
W. G. S.

TWW *JWW*


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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

It Witt/als 26-8711

DA SRI Control No. ID-15-27

28 January 1952

Cml

G2

1. Reference is GHO, SCAP, FHC Staff Memo No. 26, "Technical Intelligence," dated 8 December 1951.
2. Inclosure one is a DA Specific Request for Information (Control No. ID-15-27) which states a requirement for a one pound sample beryllium concentrate as reported in 21st Cml TID report #35, dated 28 August 1951.
3. In accordance with the procedures outlined in par 1, above, this request is referred to you for action as a matter pertaining to the Chemical Section. It is requested that this sample be forwarded to G2, Attention: Technical Intelligence Branch, to reach G2 by 8 March 1952.
4. Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated.

1 Incl

DA SRI ID-15-27, subj as above, dtd 8 Jan 52

Handwritten initials

MEMO FOR RECORD:


DA, SRI ID-15-27, subj: Captured Mineral Ore-Beryllium, dtd 8 Jan 52, was recd in Tech Intel Br fr Tgt Br, Intel Div, on 21 Jan 52. GHO, SCAP, FHC Staff Memo 26, dtd 8 Dec 51 places the responsibility of rendering expert tech advice and assistance on matters related to tech and scientific intel, as required by the AGO's, G2 this Hd, upon the tech svcs. Accordingly this SRI is being fwded to Cml Sec, GHO for action. A copy was handcarried to Cml Sec on 26 Jan 52 to facilitate action.

26-8711


TWJ:mjw

26-6025

KEB
KFR



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SECURITY INFORMATION



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SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2
Washington 25, D. C.

G-2/CDRC/

Date: Jan 8 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION, CONTROL NO, ID-15-27

SUBJECT: Captured Mineral Ore-Beryl

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East
ATTN: A.C. of S, G-2
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Requirement: A one pound sample of beryl concentrate.
2. Reply within 60 days of receipt.
3. All replies to the requirement will refer to the above Control Number.
4. Collection guidance and special instructions:

Reference is made to Technical Intelligence, G-2, GHQ, FEC, report TB-2107-51, which concerns the investigation of 91 boxes of beryl concentrate, which were recovered at Seoul and in the vicinity of Kumhwa, Korea.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

s/ Garrison B. Coverdale
t/ GARRISON B COVERDALE
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Coll, Dissemination Div

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH

F

CINCOMING MESSAGE

REL/dlh

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

ROUTINE

11 Jan 52

FROM : DEPTAR (G-2) WASH DC
TO : CINCFE (G-2) TOKYO JAPAN
NR : DA 91693

URMSG C 60061 and specific rqst SC 1978. Titles of documents in question as follows:
"A Rept to CCS Visitors", Niigata TELECOM Div, Mar 15, 1950.
"Statement for the Present Status of TELECOM Svc Offices", 3 copies dated Mar 1950, 1 each from the Toyama TELECOM Div, the Ishikawa TELECOM Div and the Fukui TELECOM Div.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-2



31151

ROUTINE

TOO : 102310 Z
MCN : 50074

(SECURITY INFORMATION)


CONFIDENTIAL

CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 4lc(2)(3) and g(1), AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

32^D



A. C. S. G-2
GHQ

04672

Date 21 Jan 52

MEMORANDUM For: Chief of Staff

22 January 1952

C of S	G-1	ADC
SGS	G-3	D C/S SCAP
C of S ROK	G-4	JSPOG

Information & your file _____

Note & Return to _____

Appropriate Circulation _____ Noted _____

Necessary Action _____ Suspend to _____

Process Action to G-2 _____ Return with reference _____

By draft (letter) (radio) (plan) _____ paper _____

(order) _____

Comment to G-2 _____

By memo _____ Orally _____

January 1952

C in C briefing 15 Jan
le Branch, Intelligence
ions pertaining to 02

1. Reference C-in-C queries, 15 Jan 52 concerning the following:
 - a. Acceptance of a rocket launcher division.
 - b. Receipt of counter-battery fire by UN units.
 - c. Estimate of enemy's artillery strength.
2. Attached hereto are completed studies of acceptance of a rocket launcher division and estimate of the enemy's artillery strength. Par 3 attached memorandum answers lb above.
3. Substance of this information will be presented to the C-in-C orally by the G-2 briefing officer at the earliest opportunity.

and intelligence source
identified CCF rocket
(ined), subordinate to
valuation of PW state-
Rocket Launcher (Katyusha)
ed of the 201st, 202d and
mate strength of 3,900

forward areas opposite
rocket fire in either X
have been PW statements
also have some rocket
the exact disposition
at this time, it would
CCF Armies as determined
control is maintained to
y before the launchers

R.F.E. File

Launcher, standard in
the Soviet Army, is a truck-mounted weapon, the purpose of which is to
provide a relatively cheap substitute for artillery. The weapon simul-
taneously fires 16 rounds of 132mm fin stabilized rockets from a multi-
rail rocket launcher usually mounted on a 6 x 6 truck but which may also
be mounted either statically or on other types of vehicles. The maximum
range is approximately 9,700 yards. (Tab 2)

3. Re Question No. 2:

a. There has been no change in the artillery complex. We have
been receiving some counter-battery fire all along, but nothing EUSAK has
seen indicates a change or conversion to an all out CB effort. There are
no indications of a change from the defensive to the offensive.

4. Re Question No. 3:


a. Active Enemy Artillery Across EUSAK

- (1) EUSAK Estimate (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No. 2a) - Approxi-
mately 41 (+) bns of 75/76mm and upwards for a total of 504 pieces.
- (2) GHQ T/E Estimate of Units in Contact (1-10 Jan 52)
(Chart No. 2a) - Approximately 49 (+) bns of 75/76mm and upwards for a
total of 600 pieces.

b. Present Total GHQ T/E Estimate of CCF-NKA Artillery in
Korea. (Chart No. 3a)

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G-2 File Copy



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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

04672

22 January 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff.

SUBJECT: Replies to C in C Queries of 15 January 1952

1. Reference is made to questions raised at C in C briefing 15 Jan (Tab 1). Based on information from Order of Battle Branch, Intelligence Division, G2, GHQ, replies to the indicated questions pertaining to G2 are submitted.

2. Re Question No. 1:

a. On 22 Dec 51, based on PW statements and intelligence source reports, the presence in Korea was accepted of unidentified CCF rocket launcher units (strength and composition undetermined), subordinate to Hqs, CCF in Korea. On 13 Jan 52, based on a re-evaluation of PW statements and intelligence source reports, a u/1 CCF Rocket Launcher (Katyusha) Division - possibly designated the 21st - composed of the 201st, 202d and 203d Regts, was accepted in Korea with an approximate strength of 3,900 troops and 72 - 132mm M-13 rocket launchers.

b. The regts are believed disposed in forward areas opposite I and IX US Corps; there have been no reports of rocket fire in either X US Corps or I ROK Corps sectors, however, there have been PW statements indicating that the NK units on the eastern front also have some rocket launcher units. Although information relative to the exact disposition of elements of the Katyusha Division is limited at this time, it would appear that the regts are employed in support of CCF Armies as determined by GHQ, CCF in Korea. It is believed that this control is maintained to the extent that prior approval of GHQ is necessary before the launchers may be fired in any specific engagement.

c. The 132mm (5.2 inches) Soviet Rocket Launcher, standard in the Soviet Army, is a truck-mounted weapon, the purpose of which is to provide a relatively cheap substitute for artillery. The weapon simultaneously fires 16 rounds of 132mm fin stabilized rockets from a multi-rail rocket launcher usually mounted on a 6 x 6 truck but which may also be mounted either statically or on other types of vehicles. The maximum range is approximately 9,700 yards. (Tab 2)

3. Re Question No. 2:

a. There has been no change in the artillery complex. We have been receiving some counter-battery fire all along, but nothing EUSAK has seen indicates a change or conversion to an all out CB effort. There are no indications of a change from the defensive to the offensive.

4. Re Question No. 3:

a. Active Enemy Artillery Across EUSAK

(1) EUSAK Estimate (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No. 2a) - Approximately 41 (+) bns of 75/76mm and upwards for a total of 504 pieces.

(2) GHQ T/E Estimate of Units in Contact (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No. 2a) - Approximately 49 (+) bns of 75/76mm and upwards for a total of 600 pieces.


b. Present Total GHQ T/E Estimate of CCF-NKA Artillery in Korea. (Chart No. 3a)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

22 January 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Replies to C in C queries of 12 January 1952

1. Reference is made to questions raised at C in C briefing 12 Jan (Tab 1). Based on information from Order of Battle Branch, Intelligence Division, GS, GHO, replies to the indicated questions pertaining to GS are submitted.

2. Re Question No. 1:

a. On 22 Dec 51, based on PW statements and intelligence source reports, the presence in Korea was accepted of unidentified GCP rocket launcher units (strength and composition undetermined), subordinate to Hqs, GCP in Korea. On 13 Jan 52, based on a re-evaluation of PW statements and intelligence source reports, a GCP Rocket Launcher (Karyusha) Division - possibly designated the 21st - composed of the 202d and 203d Regts, was accepted in Korea with an approximate strength of 2,900 troops and 75 - 135mm M-13 rocket launchers.

b. The regts are believed disposed in forward areas opposite I and IX Corps; there have been no reports of rocket fire in either US Corps or I ROK Corps sectors, however, there have been PW statements indicating that the NK units on the eastern front also have some rocket launcher units. Although information relative to the exact disposition of elements of the Karyusha Division is limited at this time, it would appear that the regts are employed in support of GCP armies as determined by GHO, GCP in Korea. It is believed that this control is maintained to the extent that prior approval of GHO is necessary before the launchers may be fired in any specific engagement.

c. The 135mm (5.2 inches) Soviet Rocket Launcher, standard in the Soviet Army, is a truck-mounted weapon, the purpose of which is to provide a relatively cheap substitute for artillery. The weapon usually launches three 16 rounds of 135mm fin stabilized rockets from a rail rocket launcher usually mounted on a 6 x 6 truck but which may also be mounted either statically or on other types of vehicles. The maximum range is approximately 2,700 yards. (Tab 2)

3. Re Question No. 2:

a. There has been no change in the artillery complex. We have been receiving some counter-battery fire all along, but nothing EUSAK has seen indicates a change or conversion to an all out GH effort. There are no indications of a change from the defensive to the offensive.

4. Re Question No. 3:

a. Active Enemy Artillery Across EUSAK

(1) EUSAK Estimate (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No. 2a) - Approx-
mately 41 (+) guns of 75/76mm and upwards for a total of 204 pieces.
(2) GHO T/E Estimate of Units in Contact (10/10/52, Tab 2)
(Chart No. 2a) - Approximately 42 (+) guns of 75/76mm and upwards for a
total of 200 pieces.


b. Present Total GHO T/E Estimate of GCP Artillery in
Korea. (Chart No. 2a)



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SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Replies to C in C Queries of 15 January 1952

(1) Immediate Front. (Chart No. 4a)

(a) Organic and non-Organic (75/76mm and upwards
143 bns/1716 pieces.)

(b) Support Weapons* - 109 bns/1336 pieces.

(2) Accepted Total OCF-NKA T/E Artillery Strength in
Korea: (Tab 3)

	<u>75mm & Upwards</u>		<u>Support Weapons*</u>	
	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Pcs</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Pcs</u>
Immediate Front (Chart No. 4a)	143	1716	109	1336
Immediate Rear (Chart No. 5a)	26	312	25	304
Distant Rear (Chart No. 6a)	<u>81</u>	<u>980</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>1452</u>
TOTAL	250	3008	251	3092

* Nbr of pieces per bn varies according to organization

R. F. E.

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INFORMATIONGENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

20 January 1952

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Replies to C in C Queries of 15 Jan 52

1. Reference is made to questions raised at C in C briefing 15 Jan (Tab 1). Based on information from Order of Battle Branch, Intelligence Division, G2, GHQ, replies to the indicated questions pertaining to G2 are submitted.

2. Re Question #1

(a) On 22 Dec 51, based on PW statements and intelligence source reports, the presence in Korea was accepted of unidentified CCF rocket launcher units (strength and composition undetermined), subordinate to Hqs, CCF in Korea. On 13 Jan 52, based on a re-evaluation of PW statements and intelligence source reports, a w/1 CCF Rocket Launcher (Katyusha) Division - possibly designated the 21st - composed of the 201st, 202d and 203d Regts, was accepted in Korea with an approximate strength of 3,900 troops and 72 x 132 mm M-13 rocket launchers.

(b) The regts are believed disposed in forward areas opposite I and IX US Corps; there have been no reports of rocket fire in either X US Corps or I ROK Corps sectors, however, there have been PW statements indicating that the NK units on the eastern front also have some rocket launcher units. Although information relative to the exact disposition of elements of the Katyusha Division is limited at this time, it would

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INFORMATION

appear that the regts are employed in support of CCF Armies as determined by GHQ, CCF in Korea. It is believed that this control is maintained to the extent that prior approval of GHQ is necessary before the launchers may be fired in any specific engagement.

(c) The 132 mm (5.2 inches) Soviet Rocket Launcher, standard in the Soviet Army, is a truck-mounted weapon, the purpose of which is to provide a relatively cheap substitute for artillery. The weapon simultaneously fires 16 rounds of 132 mm fin stabilized rockets from a multi-rail rocket launcher usually mounted on a 6 x 6 truck but which may also be mounted either statically or on other types of vehicles. The maximum range is approximately 9,700 yards. (Tab 2).

3. Re Question #2 - There has been no change in the artillery complex. We have been receiving some counter-battery fire all along, but nothing EUSAK has seen indicates a change or conversion to an all out CB effort. There are no indications of a change from the defensive to the offensive.

4. Re Question #3

a. Active Enemy Artillery Across EUSAK

(1) EUSAK Estimate (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No 2a) - Approximately 41 (-) bns of 75/76 mm and upwards for a total of 504 pieces.

(2) GHQ T/E Estimate of Units in Contact (1-10 Jan 52) (Chart No 2a) - Approximately 49 (-) bns of 75/76 mm and upwards for a total of 600 pieces.

b. Present Total GHQ T/E Estimate of CCF-NKA Artillery in Korea. (Chart No. 3a)

(1) Immediate Front (Chart No. 4a)

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(a) Organic and non-Organic (75/76mm and upwards -- 143
bns/1716 pieces.

(b) Support Weapons* -- 109 bns/1336 pieces.

2) Accepted Total CCF-NKA T/E Artillery Strength in Korea: (Tab 3)

	<u>75mm & Upwards</u>		<u>Support Weapons*</u>	
	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Pcs</u>	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Pcs</u>
Immediate Front (Chart No. 4a)	143	1716	109	1336
Immediate Rear (Chart No. 5a)	26	312	25	304
Distant Rear (Chart No. 6a)	<u>81</u>	<u>980</u>	<u>117</u>	<u>1452</u>
TOTAL	250	3008	251	3092

* Nbr of pieces per bn varies according to organization

R. F. E.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
RADIO BRANCH


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INCOMING MESSAGE

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(SECURITY INFORMATION)

PRIORITY



FROM : DEPTAR (G-2) WASH DC
TO : CINCFE (G-2) TOKYO JAPAN
NR : DA 91437

URMSG C 60920. Str Chinese Nationalist Forces Army
407,000, Navy 40200, Air Force 66600, combined service forces
37400, misc 19,000.

Equip: Navy : Aprx 150 ships of all types; Air Force
121 opn combat aircraft. Status Army equip shown in item RP
4831 China (Nationalist) Page 3 revised 1 October 51 copies of
which have been furn your hq.

Disp: Two Armies (6 Divs) Chin men; 1st Div MATSU; 1 Army
(3 Divs), pescadores; 9 Armies (27 Divs), 1 independent Div,
4 Armd groups (less 2 Tank Bns), Formosa.

Ref your last Para major changes overall Nationalist Mil
Forces reflected our item RP 4831. Rqst for info not contained
item RP 4831 should be submitted DA G-2.

Detailed rept covering pnts your msg will be pouched soonest.

NO SIG

ACTION : G-2

INFORMATION : CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3, G-4, AG, JSPOG

29312

PRIORITY

TOO : 082135 Z
MCN : 99545

(SECURITY INFORMATION)

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CONSULT CRYPTO CENTER BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

Paraphrase not required. Handle as correspondence of classification
carried hereon per paragraphs 17a(1)(2) and 41c(2)(3) and g(1),
AR 380-5, 15 November 1949.

COPY No.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

5059

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
OUTGOING MESSAGE**

GB/ID/HVW/KER/cbs
6 January 1952

070404
proofread ggh

FROM: CINCFC TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DEPTAR WASH DC. PRIORITY
C-60920

For G2. Since information available here on some Nationalist units is fragmentary and out-dated, G2 FEC requests as a matter of urgency a consolidated study on current status of Nationalist forces with particular emphasis on ground forces. Following information desired on ground units of division and above: 1. Command structure; 2. Numerical strength; 3. Commanders; 4. Equipment on hand; 5. Dispositions and 6 relative combat effectiveness. Further request MAAG, Taiwan furnish G2 FEC periodic summations of changes in overall Nationalist military forces, incorporating factors cited above.

OFFICIAL:

APPROVED:

J. P. MAHER
Colonel AGC
Adjutant General

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

RSB

Copies to:
G2 Return
G2 Int Div Return
G2 Int Div OPNS Return

THIS IS AN ORIGINAL MESSAGE

MEMO FOR RECORD:


Above info on Nat ground forces is urgently required for study being prepared by G2. Information available in G2 is not current. The required information should be immediately available to MAAG, Taiwan w/o additional burden. G2 FEC is not authorized to levy request direct upon MAAG, but must go thru D/A.

CHH 26-8238

G2 File Copy

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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CONFIDENTIAL

G-2, GHQ

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

Railroad Information -
Soviet Far East

Date: 23 Jan 52

File No:

Subject:

FROM: Intel Div

TO: MISG/FE

PHONE: 26-6855
NAME: Lt Col Knox

Comment
Number
1

1. This office has received a request which requires the collation of certain data pertaining to the Soviet Far East. Two of the subjects are as follows:

- a. Location and quantity of rail stockpiling.
- b. Location, type and quantity of mobile railway repair facilities, such as wreckers, cranes, etc.

2. It is requested that extracts be prepared on these subjects from material available in your files, with appropriate notations as to date of information, location and source reference. In order to facilitate the usage of this material it would be desirable to subdivide the data under each of the above headings (par 1a and b) into the following military areas:

- a. Maritime Military District
- b. Far East Military District
- c. Transbaikal Military District
- d. East Siberia Military District

3. It is requested that this project be forwarded in triplicate by 1 February 1952.

----- H. V. W. -----

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29


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FM/Ln/JDW/as

F84 Thunderjet and Meteor VIII Planes

G-2

Liaison Sec, UNC

12 March 1952

- 2. 1. Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the Netherlands Liaison Officer in reply to his request, subject: F84 Thunderjet and Meteor VIII Planes, dated 14 January 1952.

Incl: cy of ltr to Netherlands Ln Off ----- R. F. E. -----

MEMO FOR RECORD: Letter from the Netherlands Liaison Officer dated 14 January 1952 requested certain information on F84 Thunderjet and Meteor VIII Planes.

The above letter was sent to FEAF requesting information on which to base a reply to the Netherlands Ln Officer.

FEAF sent 3 Operations Analysis Memoranda of HQ Fifth Air Force which gave the desired information.

Int Div wrote a letter to Netherlands Ln Officer forwarding the FEAF documents and the proposed action was referred to Scty Div for clearance.

Scty Div stated in C/N to G-2 that FEC does not have the authority to release the FEAF documents and has prepared a letter to G-2 DA forwarding material and requesting decision.

Scty Div also prepared a letter to the Netherlands Ln Officer, the copy of which is being sent to Liaison Sec, UNC, which was the section that initiated action.

JDW _____ 26-6434

*10 M to FM Ln
file
R.F.E.*


28

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Security Information



G-2 file copy JDW/as



CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

DATE: 6 Mar 52
FROM: R.S. BRATTON
TO : Capt MULLER
SUBJECT: LETTER

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 095 Bratton R. S.

LINE NUMBER: Bratton R. S.

SECRET

(28)
FILE NUMBER 350.09



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36850

APD 500
2 April 1952

Captain J. A. L. Muller, RNN
Naval Advisor to the Chief of the Netherlands Mission
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Captain Muller:

Reference is made to your letter MG 7-52, 14 January 1952 to the Chief, United Nations Command, Liaison Section requesting certain information about F-84 Thunderjet planes, and my letter of 6 March 1952 advising that your request had been referred to the Department of Defense in Washington.

I have been advised by the Department of Defense that appropriate action is being taken to satisfy your request and that the Chief of Staff, Royal Netherlands Air Force will receive the requested information through the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Netherlands.

Sincerely,

*cy 2 x inc Liaison
Lty / P P
file
KO*
/s/ R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Chief of Netherlands Ln Gp, in ltr dtd 14 Jan 52 requested certain info re Thunderjets. FEAF furnished appropriate material but CINCFE did not have authority under DA-DCMI to release it, fwded the rqst and the material to G2 DA for decision and advised Capt Muller accordingly.


Ltr fr SD-MIC, dtd 19 Mar 52, to G2, GHQ states the material fwded is under study for release thru Mil Assistance Advisory Gp, Netherlands and suggests Netherlands Ln Gp be advised as indicated in this ltr to Capt Muller. Info cy fwded to Ch, Un Ln Gp.

Maj Smith 26-7288

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G2 File Copy
Scty Div/P&P/ALS/mfs



SECRET

38820

APR 500
2 April 1952

Captain J. A. L. Muller, RNL
Naval Advisor to the Chief of the Netherlands Mission
Tokyo, Japan

Dear Captain Muller:

Reference is made to your letter MB 7-52, 14 January 1952 to the Chief, United Nations Command, Liaison Section requesting certain information about F-84 Thunderjet planes, and my letter of 6 March 1952 advising that your request had been referred to the Department of Defense in Washington.

I have been advised by the Department of Defense that appropriate action is being taken to satisfy your request and that the Chief of Staff, Royal Netherlands Air Force will receive the requested information through the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Netherlands.

Sincerely,

W. H. C. Bratton
12/19/52

R. S. BRATTON
Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Deputy

MEMO FOR RECORD:

Chief of Netherlands Liaison Group, in letter dated 14 Jan 52 requested certain info re Thunderjets. FEAF furnished appropriate material but CINCPAC did not have authority under DA-DCMI to release it, twed the rpt and the material to GS DA for decision and advised Capt Muller accordingly.


Ltr fr SD-MIC, dtd 19 Mar 52, to GS, GHO states the material twed is under study for release thru Mil Assistance Advisory Gp, Netherlands and suggests Netherlands Liaison Gp be advised as indicated in this ltr to Capt Muller. Info cy twed to Ch, UN Liaison Gp.

Maj Smith 26-7288

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION



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Security Information

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DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE
MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO:
CASE 481
SERIAL 00321-AF
DATE 19 Mar 1952

SUBJECT: Request from Netherlands Liaison Group

TO: Commanding General
Headquarters, Far East Command
Military Intelligence Section
Security Division, General Staff
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California


1. Reference is made to your letter addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Chief, Security of Military Information Branch, dated 6 March 1952, subject as above.

2. The documents attached to the above referenced letter are presently being considered for release to the Chief of Staff, Royal Netherlands Air Force. If the documents are releasable in their entirety, or portions thereof, the information will be released through the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Netherlands, for appropriate transmittal to the Chief of Staff.


3. It is suggested that you advise the Netherlands Liaison Group that appropriate action is being taken to satisfy this request and that the Chief of Staff will receive the information through the channel as outlined above.


Edmund B. Richards
EDMUND B. RICHARDS
Lt Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary
and Air Force Member

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SECRET
Security Information





SECRET
Security Information

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEFENSE
MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE
SECRETARIAT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



IN REPLY REFER TO:
CASE 481
SERIAL 00321-47
DATE 19 Mar 1952

SUBJECT: Request from Netherlands Liaison Group

TO: Commanding General
Headquarters, Far East Command
Military Intelligence Section
Security Division, General Staff
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

1. Reference is made to your letter addressed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., Attention: Chief, Security of Military Information Branch, dated 6 March 1952, subject as above.

2. The documents attached to the above referenced letter are presently being considered for release to the Chief of Staff, Royal Netherlands Air Force. If the documents are releasable in their entirety, or portions thereof, the information will be released through the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Netherlands, for appropriate transmittal to the Chief of Staff.

3. It is suggested that you advise the Netherlands Liaison Group that appropriate action is being taken to satisfy this request and that the Chief of Staff will receive the information through the channel as outlined above.

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20 MAR 1952
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MILITARY INFORMATION CONTROL COMMITTEE


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Ltr, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, subj: Request for Info on U.S. Planes, to D/I FEAF

AG 452.1 (21 Jan 52) IN-REQ 1st Ind

Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

23 FEB 1952

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, APO 500

1. The following Operations Analysis Memoranda are forwarded in response to your request:

a. Memorandum Number 31, "A Brief Comparison of F-84E Aircraft Capabilities and Logistic Problems for Operation from Itazuke Air Base Japan and from K-2 Air Base Korea".

b. Memorandum Number 36, "Combat Operations of F-84E Aircraft".

c. Memorandum Number 40, "Losses and Damage of Certain F-84E, F-80C, and F-51D Aircraft".


2. It is believed that these documents will give the Netherlands Attache the desired information.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

Robert H. Jenkins

ROBERT H JENKINS
MAJOR USAF
Asst Adj Gen

- 4 Incls:
- Added 3 Incls:
- 2. Memo No 31, 26 Jan 51
- 3. Memo No 36, 16 Mar 51
- 4. Memo No 40, 31 Mar 51



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John M

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
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FEAF AG NO. 14395

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

D/I # 01405



SECRET

Mr. GHO, FEC, APO 500, subj: Request for info on U.S. Planes, to
D/1 FBAP

AG 1 (21 Jan 52) IM-1820 1st Ind

23 FEB 1952

Headquarters, Far East Air Forces, APO 925

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East
Command, APO 500

1. The following Operations Analysis Memoranda are forwarded in
response to your request:



a. Memorandum Number 31, "A Brief Comparison of F-84E Air-
craft Capabilities and Logistic Problems for Operation from Iwakura
Air Base Japan and from K-2 Air Base Korea".

b. Memorandum Number 36, "Combat Operations of F-84E
Aircraft".

c. Memorandum Number 40, "Losses and Damage of Certain F-84E,
F-80C, and F-51D Aircraft".

2. It is believed that these documents will give the Netherlands
Attache the desired information.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:




- 4. Memo ...
- 3. Memo ...
- 2. Memo ...
- Added 3 Incls:

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

FBAP AG NO. 17399



NETHERLANDS LIAISON GROUP

~~NEDERLANDSE MISSIE~~

JAPAN

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

TOKYO 14 January 1952

Post Adres:

c/o General Liaison G.H.Q., A.P.O. 500

Post Master San Francisco (Calif.)

Tel. Adres: NETHMIS TOKYO.

No. MG 7-52

Bijlagen:

Onderwerp

SECRET

TO: Chief, United Nations Command, Liaison Section

SUBJECT: F84 Thunderjet and Meteor VIII Planes.

1. A letter has been received by this Liaison group from the Chief of Staff of the Netherlands Air Force, requesting the following information about:

a. The technical and operational performances and shortcomings of the F84 Thunderjet and the Gloster Meteor VIII planes.

b. Detailed reports about the technical maintenances of both types of planes in Korea.

2. As both types of planes are used by the Netherlands Air Force it is most important for this Air Force to be acquainted with the performance and maintenance of both types of planes under war circumstances.

3. It would be highly appreciated by the Chief of Staff of the Netherlands Air Force and by this Liaison group if the above mentioned data could be obtained.

Chief, Liaison Group for the
Netherlands, U.N.C.,

J.A.L. Muller

J.A.L. MULLER.-
Captain, R.N.N.

SECRET

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECRETSECURITY
INFORMATION

06862

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND**
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

GB 452

APO 500

21 January 1952

SUBJECT: Request for info on U. S. Planes

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

1. Attached (Tab 1) is a letter from the Netherlands Military Attache, Captain Muller (R.N.N.), asking for certain information on U. S. planes.

2. Although the Netherlands has no such planes in Korea, their air force does use these planes at home. Information they receive would benefit a NATO member.

3. G-2 has no objection to the Netherlands receiving this information on the F-84, if its release comes within the Department of Air Force and FEAF policy. Of course - information on Meteor VIII planes is a matter for BCOF.

4. Information is requested on which to base a reply to the Netherlands Attache.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl
Ltr fr Netherlands
Attache

A. A. Maykovich
A. A. MAYKOVICH
Lt Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Assistant Executive

01405

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FEAF AG NO. 14395

SECRET

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SECURITY
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

AF0 500
21 January 1952

GB 452

SUBJECT: Request for info on U. S. Planes


TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
AF0 922

1. Attached (Tab I) is a letter from the Netherlands Military Attache, Captain Muller (R.M.N.), asking for certain information on U. S. planes.
2. Although the Netherlands has no such planes in Korea, their air force does use these planes at home. Information they receive would benefit a NATO member.
3. G-2 has no objection to the Netherlands receiving this information on the P-84, if its release comes within the Department of Air Force and FEAR policy. Of course - information on Meteor VIII planes is a matter for DCAF.
4. Information is requested on which to base a reply to the Netherlands Attache.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Lt Colonel
Assistant Executive
General Staff
1st Troop

1 Incl
Ltr to Netherlands
Attache




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FEBR AG NO. 1432

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

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21513Request from Netherlands
Liaison Group

4 March 1952

Sety Div

G-2

26-7288

Maj Smith

1. Security Division is of the opinion that this headquarters does not have the authority to release the attached material to the Netherlands Liaison Group under the provisions of par 8a(1) DA-DCMI, as the information is not considered essential to the Netherlands' support of combat operations in the Far East. The only other information releasable by FEC to the Netherlands, other than that pertaining to combat operations in this area, is information through CONFIDENTIAL pertaining to equipment furnished, or to be furnished, that government. 1

2. DA-DCMI does provide, however, that information through TOP SECRET may be released to NATO countries provided the release has been determined to be essential to the achievement of NATO defense objectives. Although the requested information may appear to fall within this provision, it is not believed FEC could or should make this determination. Such decision can only be made in Washington or SHAPE.

3. In view of the above, this Division has prepared correspondence forwarding this matter to G-2 DA for decision and has prepared a reply to the Netherlands liaison officer advising him of this referral. (Incls 1 & 2)

4. Informal coordination with the officer in FFAF who handles AF-DCMI, and who approved the FFAF 1st Ind transmitting the requested material to GHQ, indicates he agrees with this proposed action.

2 Incls

1. Ltr, G2 GHQ to G2 DA,
Attn: Chief, SMI Br,
subject as above
2. Ltr, G2 GHQ to Netherlands Attache

----- E. C. E. -----

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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRETSECURITY
INFORMATIONGENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

06862

GB 452

APO 500
21 January 1952

SUBJECT: Request for info on U. S. Planes

TO: Deputy for Intelligence
Far East Air Forces
APO 925

1. Attached (Tab 1) is a letter from the Netherlands Military Attache, Captain Muller (R.N.N.), asking for certain information on U. S. planes.

2. Although the Netherlands has no such planes in Korea, their air force does use these planes at home. Information they receive would benefit a NATO member.

3. G-2 has no objection to the Netherlands receiving this information on the F-84, if its release comes within the Department of Air Force and FEAFF policy. Of course - information on Meteor VIII planes is a matter for BCOF.

4. Information is requested on which to base a reply to the Netherlands Attache.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

1 Incl
Ltr fr Netherlands
Attache

A. A. MAYKOVICH
Lt Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Assistant Executive

Memo for Record: Ltr from the Netherlands Military Attache, dated 14 January 1952, requests certain information on F-84 and Meteor VIII planes.

This letter is sent to FEAFF with a request for information on which to base a reply to the Netherlands Attache.

J.D.W.

26-6434

SECRETSECURITY
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SECURITY INFORMATION

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Intelligence Division

08143

APO 500
21 January 1952

SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Social Security Ministry, North Korean Government

TO: MISG/FE, G2, GHQ, FEC, APO 500

1. Background: Information on the Social Security Ministry, apparently the highest intelligence echelon of the North Korean Government, is needed for maintaining the North Korean order of battle.

2. Specific Request: It is requested that the following information on this agency be supplied in detail:

a. Organization and functions of the Ministry from the highest to the lowest level.

b. Mission and functions of the Ministry and of its subsections.

c. Over-all personnel strength of the Ministry and estimated strength of its subsections.

d. Significant personalities within the Ministry.

3. Special Instructions:

a. This is a continuing requirement.

b. It is requested that this office be notified at earliest opportunity what control number the addressee has assigned this request.

For Director of Intelligence Division:


ROBERT R. GLASS

Colonel, General Staff with Troops
Chief, Plans and Estimates Branch

Distribution:

- MISG/FE (5)
- G2 (Info) (2)
- Operations (Info) (2)
- Intel Div (Info) (2)
- Targets Br (Info) (1)
- P&E (File) (1)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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