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FINAL REPORT

Sigma II-64

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PREPARED BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CM-140-64
5 October 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PARTICIPANTS IN SIGMA II-64

SUBJECT: Game Documentation

Enclosed is the final documentation of the politico-military game, SIGMA II-64. It is being provided to all participants in order that those who contributed to its development and execution may have a complete file of all memoranda published during the exercise as well as comments made at the Critique.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Earle G. Wheeler".

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

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Sigma II-64

8-17 SEPTEMBER 1964

FACT BOOK

PREPARED
BY
JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON DC 20301

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SIGMA II-64

FINAL REPORT

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SIGMA II-64

GAME DIRECTOR'S REMARKS

This report contains general information regarding the conduct of SIGMA II-64, as well as copies of the scenarios used and messages generated during that exercise. It also includes the remarks made at the final Senior Critique, a Game Summary and a Game Commentary. It is hoped that the report will prove useful to planners and other governmental officials who have responsibility for formulating or executing United States policies applicable to Southeast Asia.

For the best understanding of the game, close examination of the basic documents used during the exercise is recommended. However, the reading of the Director's Remarks, the Game Summary, and the Game Commentary will provide an overview to the highlights of the exercise.

Although actual data used for the game was the best available, and every effort was made to assure realism, no claim is made that the actions taken by either side during the exercise would lead, if taken in real life, to the same results depicted in the game. At the same time the exercise did serve to isolate questions and problem areas that appear to be of continuing interest. A number of these questions by area follow:

Level of Provocation - Should policy planners support a large scale deployment of US forces to SEA in the absence of some specific provocation by either the DRV or Communist China? What kind of act on the part of Communist China or North Vietnam should it take to trigger a significant US deployment of forces in SEA; is a generally deteriorating situation enough? Or should "nibbling" tactics result in continued "piecemeal" US buildup?

Public Opinion - Is it politically feasible to launch US air and naval attacks against the DRV/CPR prior to overt military actions by these nations? On a tit-for-tat basis under our own judgment of severity of strike appropriate to "hostile act"? What preparatory measures could be taken in advance of the attacks to "pin" support of the VC insurgency on Hanoi/Peking? Is a White Paper required? Can such attacks be undertaken without any more preparation than US and world public opinion have now? Must the attacks be sharp and highly successful to

lessen adverse reaction?

Massive Deployments - If we deploy a large force to SE Asia, what do we do with these forces if the provocation for deployment subsides and the DRV/CPR return to a "nibbling" posture, follow a policy of non-confrontation, and of continued guerrilla warfare? Does the defensive deployment of forces in this area set up an impossible military situation if faced with communist "nibbling" and guerrilla warfare? Would offensive actions better support US objectives? Might overt threats of escalation have the desired deterrent effect on Hanoi/Peking if accompanied by obvious military moves (SAC deployments, naval harassment, overflight, the deployment of US logistical forces to expand bases, airfields, etc.)? If not, is disengagement/negotiation the answer? What is the minimum politico-military situation that should be attained before going to the conference table?

Response to Air Strikes - One of the most interesting questions coming from the game was how to judge the effect of air strikes on North Vietnam. Would Ho order the suppression or the stopping of Viet Cong operations? Would the Viet Cong respond to Ho's direction if told to cease operations in SVN? Would industrial bombing of NVN have real effect on a primarily rural agrarian population? Would North Vietnam be politically stable after a bombing campaign? Would the regime gain or lose support from the people, including the armed forces? (Historic examples, ex-Germany, Italy and Japan in WW II.) Would US air attacks against Communist China, if accompanied by public statements that no effort would be made to overthrow the communist government of the country, result in USSR support for the Chicoms? If so, what form would this support take? Materiel only? Troops and materiel? Nuclear?

Logistic Capabilities - Can the US provide the combat and service support units that would be needed in the event of a Presidential decision to deploy, on a crash basis, large contingents of US armed forces to SEA? How might this affect commitments to a NATO emergency? Could the required transportation and necessary logistical support be provided? Would a declaration of national emergency be required?

Command Relationships - When and how should agreements be made regarding command arrangements for combat operations undertaken by the US and others, but outside

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the SEATO framework?

In summary, the discussions summarized in the commentary represent the professional opinion of a broad cross-section of military and political officials. Control inputs represent judgments as to the interplay of opposing team strategies and may or may not have been the most probable, since they were influenced by the need to further the purpose of this study.

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SIGMA II-64

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. GAME SCHEDULE

a. Dates of Play:

Senior Policy Teams - 10, 15 and 17 September
Blue and Red Action Teams - 8, 9, 10, 15 and 17
September
Control Team - 8, 10, 11, 15, 16 and 17 September

b. Place: Room BC942A, The Pentagon

c. Daily Schedule: See Tab B, Procedures

2. SECURITY

a. The over-all security classification for the play of the game is TOP SECRET. However, to ease administrative handling, it is desired that message originators keep the classification to SECRET - NOFORN and below insofar as practicable.

b. All documents generated during the play of the game will be treated as classified working papers. None are to be removed from the game rooms. At the conclusion of the game all documents will be reproduced and incorporated in a final game documentation volume. Each participant will be issued a copy of the final game documentation. Distribution of this volume will be in accordance with appropriate security regulations.

c. The JWGA gaming rooms are within an area that is sealed at the end of the day (Red Seal Area). Therefore, classified maps and other classified material can be left in place at the termination of each day's play. In addition, combination safes are available for safeguarding TOP SECRET matter that participants may desire to leave in the JWGA area between periods of game play.

3. TELEPHONES

During the conduct of the game and the critique, participants may be reached on Code 11, Extension 79860 or 57683.

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B
PROCEDURES

SIGMA II - 64

GAME ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES

BASIC SCHEME

SIGMA II-64 is a politico-military game involving a crisis situation in Southeast Asia. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the game sponsor; the Joint War Games Agency is providing necessary facilities and overall supervision for the exercise. The game will enable senior policy makers of the United States Government to study a potential future crisis situation concerning Southeast Asia for the purpose of:

a. Determining United States objectives in that area and the strategy which should be followed to achieve those objectives;

b. Estimating probable CHICOM and DRV objectives in Southeast Asia and the strategy which those countries can be expected to follow in pursuing their objectives;

c. Considering those major political and military constraints applicable to each side which will tend to shape and influence strategy;

d. Determining actions that should be taken by the United States in the event that large scale, overt aggression by the DRV and/or the CHICOMs is imminent or actually occurs;

e. Considering the major political and military questions that should be answered prior to making the decision to commit substantial contingents of US Armed Forces to combat in Southeast Asia. These questions include but are not limited to:

(1) What are possible USSR and CHICOM reactions?

(2) Should the US act within the SEATO framework or unilaterally?

(3) What should the US do regarding this issue in the United Nations?


(4) Can the US Armed Forces in being halt enemy aggression or is partial or total mobilization required?

(5) What commitments can the US logistically support with present logistic capabilities?

(6) Will CINCPAC be authorized to employ tactical nuclear weapons in the event of overwhelming attack?

(7) Should CHINAT troops be employed on the mainland?

The organization for play of the game is as indicated on the following chart:



For game purposes the teams represent the following:

a. BLUE - The governments of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, except for highest executive authority.

b. RED - The governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Peoples Republic of China, except for highest executive authority.

- The Viet Cong.
- The Pathet Lao.

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- c. CONTROL - The highest executive authority in the countries represented by the Blue and Red Teams.
- All countries other than those represented by Blue and Red Teams.
 - SEATO and the UN.
 - Other representation as required.

The starting "problem time" for the game is 12 April 1965. A scenario has been prepared which depicts the events which are assumed to have occurred between 1 September 1964 and 1 April 1965. These events provide the basis for the crisis situation and furnish a framework wherein plausible, challenging actions can be taken by each team. These actions and the team deliberations and estimates which precede their adoption play a major part in the accomplishment of the game objectives.

In addition to the initial scenario, Fact Books have been prepared to provide players with brief, pertinent information regarding the countries and geographic area that are central to the game. Players are also invited to bring any papers, studies, or memoranda from their offices which they may desire to use during the game. Secure storage will be provided for such documents within the game rooms. Players are requested to be familiar with the Southeast Asia objectives, policies, and directives of their respective agencies. Players should also be familiar with the number and type of personnel which their agency has committed in Southeast Asia and the financial outlays that are being made in the area.

The success of the game depends, to a large extent on the ability of the player teams to devise strategems and to take plausible realistic actions in the interest of the governments and groups that they represent. Although neutral, Control is vitally interested in insuring that game objectives are fulfilled. Therefore, Control will attempt to guide the game along lines which clearly contribute to game objectives.

Individual players on each team must be team players in the broadest sense. It is not intended that action players assume the role of an agency head, or that they limit their expressions of opinion to the subject or the area in which they have particular "expertise." Instead, each player is expected to serve as a generalist, but to also give expert advice in those areas where he has special qualifications.

The security level for play of the game is TOP SECRET;

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however, it is hoped that written communications can be held to the SECRET level.

DOCUMENTATION OF GAME PLAY

Required reports from the Blue and Red Action Teams are held to a minimum in order that participants may have the maximum time in which to discuss the situation depicted in the scenario and, based on their analysis, to arrive at the specific actions which they believe the countries they represent would take under similar circumstances. It is not desired that the game become a "message writing exercise." Instead, it is desired that messages prepared by action teams and forwarded to the Control Team be limited to those necessary for accomplishment of game objectives. Three types of messages will be used during the exercise. They are:

a. Broad Objective and General Strategy Message. On Thursday, 10 September, as part of Move I each action team must turn in to the Control Team after discussion with their respective Senior Policy Team, a final "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message." This message states in succinct terms the broad objectives which the reporting country has with respect to the area of crisis and the general strategy which the country plans to follow in achieving its broad objectives. For example, the Red Team based on the initial scenario might include the following statements in its message:

"RED BROAD OBJECTIVE AND GENERAL STRATEGY MESSAGE

* * * * *

"a. Broad Objectives:

(1) Bring all of Southeast Asia under the control of Peking.

(2) * * * * *

"b. General Strategy:

(1) Covertly support indigenous national liberation movements, answerable to Peking, in each non-Communist state within Southeast Asia.

(2) * * * * *"

Subsequent to 10 September, player teams do not need to submit another "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" unless there are changes, additions or deletions, to the original message. In such an instance, only the change need be reported. The purpose of the "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" is to insure that the Control Team has a firm understanding of each team's objectives and strategy so that in evaluating opposing actions, it can provide realistic projections.

b. Move Message. A "Move Message" will be prepared by each action team on 10 and 15 September and, depending on game developments, a final move message may be required on 17 September. If a third move is indicated the Game Director will make an announcement of the fact. A preliminary "Move Message," together with the Broad Objective and General Strategy Message, is first discussed with its respective Senior Policy Team. A final revised "Move Message" is the medium through which each action team informs the Control Team of the specific actions that it is taking with respect to the crisis situation. In addition, it includes the actions that the team desires to have taken in the event that certain enumerated contingencies occur. Each action listed in the message must include information as to who, what, when, where, how, and why, if the why of the action is not self-evident. When a team desires to take covert actions, such actions must be so identified to permit Control to properly handle the intelligence aspects of the action. An example of specific actions by the Blue Team is shown below:

"BLUE MOVE MESSAGE

* * * * *

"a. Advise the PRC Ambassador to Poland that US aircraft will pursue and destroy any PRC aircraft that violate the airspace of the RVN.

"b. Instruct Ambassador Stevenson to request an immediate meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the PRC action of moving combat forces into Laos in violation of the Geneva Accord. The objective of the Security Council meeting will be to cause world attention to focus on the Communist aggression occurring in Southeast Asia and to bring pressure on the PRC to remove their combat forces from Laos.

"c. Direct CINCPAC to bring his forces to DEFCON 1, at

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once." (PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION)

* * * * *

c. Miscellaneous Message. This type message may be used by action teams to pose questions to Control and, in exceptional cases, to address other action teams. All "Miscellaneous Messages" will be processed through Control even though addressed to another team. An example is shown below:

"0001 1101 BLUE MISCELLANEOUS MESSAGE

Request information as to exact date on which the US discovered that PRC was moving combat forces into Laos."

DETAILS OF GAME PLAY

The game will be conducted in Room BC942A, the Pentagon. It will start at 1300 on 8 September. All members of the Blue and Red Action Teams as well as the Control Team are requested to assemble in their respective game rooms at that time. The Senior Policy Teams do not meet on either 8 or 9 September; they assemble for the first time at 1700 on 10 September. Sigma II-64, unlike most games previously conducted by the JWGA, provides intervals between the meeting dates of the action level participants. Due to these intervals and to the varying requirements for the several groups of participants, a detailed description of the activity on each day is provided below:

a. Tuesday, 8 September, 1300 to 1700. The action and Control Teams meet in their respective game rooms to study and discuss the initial situation. There is no meeting with the Senior Policy Teams on this date and no requirement for written input from the action teams. Similarly, the Control Team does not prepare a scenario projection.

(1) Blue and Red Action Teams. The purpose of this meeting is to permit the action level participants to study in depth the implications of the crisis situation in Southeast Asia; also, to insure sufficient time prior to first meeting with the Senior Policy Teams for participants to discuss the existing plans and policies applicable to the situation depicted in the scenario. Following these discussions, the action teams start work to determine logical broad objectives for the countries that they represent and a realistic strategy to accomplish those objectives. After deciding on the objectives and strategy to be recommended to the Senior Policy Teams, the action

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teams decide on the specific actions which they think their side should adopt. It is not expected that this work will be completed on 8 September; time has been provided on both 9 and 10 September for these tasks. However, prior to 1700 on 10 September the Blue and Red Action Teams should have prepared in draft form their initial "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" and their "Move Message." By that time team captains must be prepared to brief their Senior Policy Team on the situation and on the action team's recommendations.

(2) Control Team. The Control Team, under the supervision of the Game Director, is oriented on its duties. The team studies the initial situation and exchanges ideas with regard to the implications of the scenario. Following these discussions, team members monitor the discussions of the Red and Blue Action Teams.

b. Wednesday, 9 September.

(1) Blue and Red Action Teams. The action teams meet at times specified by the team captains. Work on objectives, strategy and specific actions is continued.

(2) Control Team. The Control Team does not formally meet. However, team members may monitor discussions of the Red and Blue Action Teams if they so desire.

c. Thursday, 10 September.

(1) 1300-1700.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams complete work on objectives, strategy, and specific actions; prepare the "Broad Objective and General Strategy" and "Move Message" in draft form. Team captains prepare to brief the members of their Senior Policy Team.

(b) Control Team. Team members assemble at 1300 for a brief meeting with the Game Director and thereafter monitor the action team discussions.

(2) 1700-1830.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Brief senior participants on situation depicted in the scenario and on team recommendations as to objectives, strategy and specific actions. Insure that Senior Policy Team makes positive decision with regard to action team recommendations and

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that necessary guidance is provided as to future action to be followed.

(b) Blue and Red Senior Policy Teams. Based on the briefing and recommendations of the action team captain, the senior participants make necessary decisions and provide guidance as to future action.

(c) Control Team. Monitor the meetings of the Blue and Red Teams.

(3) 1830-1930.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Based on decisions and guidance provided by the Senior Policy Teams, the action teams revise and turn in to JWGA Monitors their final "Broad Objective and General Strategy Message" and "Move Message."

(b) No requirement for other participants.

d. Friday, 11 September, 0900-1200.

(1) Control Team. The Control Team studies the opposing actions and makes necessary decisions and determinations regarding the probable outcome of such actions. Concurrently, decisions are made regarding probable third country reaction, the attitude of public opinion and the world press and the general developments that could be expected to occur. The Control Team then establishes the date that will be used in the scenario projection for the start of the next sequence of actions and provides the scenario writers such other guidance as may be required.

(2) No requirement for other participants.

e. Tuesday, 15 September.

(1) 1300-1700.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Based on their analysis of the scenario projection, the teams decide on the specific actions that they will recommend to their Senior Policy Team.

(b) Control Team. The Control Team monitors the discussions of the action teams.

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(2) 1700-1830.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Brief senior participants on the situation and present recommendations as to specific actions to be taken.

(b) Blue and Red Senior Policy Teams. Each team meets with its action level team and follows the same procedure and performs the same function as on 10 September.

(c) Control Team. Monitor the meetings of the Blue and Red Teams.

(3) 1830-1930.

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Based on decisions and guidance provided by the Senior Policy Teams, finalize and turn in to JWGA Monitors the team's "Move Message."

(b) Control Team. The Control Team meets briefly to discuss the actions being taken by the opposing teams and to determine if a second scenario projection is required in order to accomplish game objectives. Concurrently the Control Team will decide whether or not a third move by the player teams is to be scheduled. If a second scenario projection is required the Control Team will meet on 16 September to decide on its content.

f. Wednesday, 16 September, 0900-1200.

(1) Control Team. If a decision is made to prepare a second scenario projection, the Control Team will perform the same functions during this period that it did on 11 September.

(2) No requirement for other participants.

g. Thursday, 17 September.

(1) 1300-1430.

(a) Blue and Red Action Team. If a third move is to be made the action teams will determine during this period the specific actions that their country will adopt. If a third move is not indicated the action teams will be given this time to study and discuss opposing actions taken during the game and developments of the exercise.

(b) Control Team. Monitor action team discussions. Discuss critique points with Game Director.

(2) 1430-1600 (Action Level Critique).

(a) Blue and Red Action Teams. Team captains explain final moves if a third move was made. All team members participate in the critique.

(b) Control Team. Participate in critique.

(3) 1700-1830 (Senior Level Critique). Active participation in this critique is primarily by the members of the Senior Policy Teams and by the team captains of the Blue and Red Action Teams. However, all participants are authorized to attend the critique.

(4) 1830. Exercise terminates.

GAME ADMINISTRATION

Personnel from the Joint War Games Agency will be present throughout the play of the game to assist players and to provide administrative support. A JWGA officer will be present in each action team game room as a Monitor to provide information needed by players, to accept communications directed to Control or other teams, and to generally help the players in the mechanics of the game. All outgoing messages should be given to the respective Monitors to insure that they are properly logged and are expeditiously reproduced and distributed.

To facilitate documentation of the game, the following color code will be used with respect to written documents:

White Paper - All communications from Control to include scenario projections.

Blue Paper - Messages originated by the BLUE team.

Pink Paper - Messages originated by the RED team.

Message blanks in the above colors will be available in each game room. The blank forms are in sheafs of four carbon-prepared sheets, to permit making an original and three copies of each message. Drafters of messages are requested to keep one copy of each message prepared and to immediately deliver the original and two copies to their JWGA Monitor. Typewriters are provided in game rooms.

However, hand-written messages, if legible, are perfectly acceptable. During the play of the game players will receive copies of only those messages affecting their team. To prevent players from becoming inundated with papers, only two master files of messages will be maintained in each game room--one for the Team Captain and one for the Monitor. An exception to this will be that each action player will receive a copy of each of his team's daily "Move Message" and a copy of the scenario projection.

Message blank headings should be filled in completely. The "FROM" and "TO" blanks should indicate the originating team and the team to whom the message is to be delivered. For example: Blue to Control. The daily "Move Message" will incorporate in different paragraphs of the single message each of the actions, directives and queries that the team desires to announce to Control at the end of the day. The date shown should be the actual calendar date in September. The message numbers will run in sequence for each team for each move. For example, there will be for BLUE a Message No. 1--Move I, Message No. 1--Move II, etc. If continuation sheets are necessary, the message number should be entered on each continuation sheet followed by "(Cont'd)." The "Reference" blank should be completed if the message is referring to a particular previously written query or statement. The reference should be identified by its message-move number.

Blackboards and easel-type chart holders together with chart paper and colored flow pens (Magic Markers) will be available in each of the game rooms for use by participants. These items are valuable in recording ideas that arise during the discussions. In addition, they should be utilized by the Team Captains to prepare visual aids for use in briefing the Senior Policy Teams.

At the conclusion of the game, copies of all game-generated documents to include messages, scenario projections and such other memoranda which might have been prepared will be provided to each player as a package. A Final Report will be published which will include a complete game message section.

C
PARTICIPANTS

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JWGA GAME STAFF

CONTROL TEAM:

Rear Admiral C. J. Van Arsdall, Jr.,
USN, Game Director

Col Wyley L. Baxter, USAF
Lt Col Thomas J. McDonald, USA
Lt Col Paul J. McClure, Jr., USA

BLUE Team Monitor:

Cdr Harold A. Willyard, USN

RED Team Monitor:

Cdr Russell E. Brown, USN

Secretariat:

Maj LeRoy A. Wenstrom, USAF
TSgt Haywood Vaughn, USAF
SP5 G. F. E. Mysel, USA
A1C Curtis T. Clark, USAF
Mr. Amos Good
Marion Boland
Lee Brooks
Cecile Evans
Ann Hilgenberg
Carolyn Kercheval
Donna Reno

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D
GAME SUMMARY

SUMMARY OF SIGMA II-64

During the period 8-17 September 1964, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, sponsored an inter-agency politico-military game titled SIGMA II-64. The game provided senior policy makers of the United States Government an opportunity to:

- a. Re-examine United States objectives in South-east Asia and the strategy which should be followed to attain those objectives;
- b. Estimate probable CHICOM and DRV objectives in that area and plausible strategy which those countries might follow to attain their objectives;
- c. Consider those major political and military constraints applicable to each side which will tend to shape and influence strategy;
- d. Explore actions that should be taken by the United States in the event that large scale, overt aggression by the DRV and/or the CHICOMS is imminent or actually occurs;
- e. Consider the major political and military questions that should be answered prior to making the decision to commit substantial contingents of US armed forces to combat in Southeast Asia.

The game structure provided for two teams consisting of both senior and action level participants, and a control team. The governments of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, less the highest executive authority, were represented by the Blue Team. The Red Team represented the governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Peoples Republic of China, except for the highest executive authority; plus the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao. The Control Team represented the highest executive authority of the governments played by the Blue and Red Teams plus all other countries, the UN, SEATO and provided other required representation.

The initial scenario assumed Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam and Pathet Lao insurgency in Laos was supported and directed from Hanoi and Peking.

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During the early fall of 1964, the number of RVN air, naval and ground raids on targets in NVN mounted with mixed results. The Viet Cong was reinforced from the DRV to a level of 40,000 PAVN regulars in South Vietnam. The Chinese Communists established a military mission in Cambodia and increased the level of support to Hanoi and to the Pathet Lao. The introduction of Chinese materiel and technicians into North Vietnam strengthened North Vietnamese air and air defense capabilities. Road construction was stepped up from the Chinese border into Northern Laos.

The political situation in South Vietnam was shaky. Premier Khanh accomplished little to stiffen the war effort; programs to boost troop strength, improve administration and streamline the "oil slick" effort lagged badly.

Premier De Gaulle stated the only hope for Southeast Asia was in negotiated neutralism.

Peking was attempting to influence the Japanese to curtail US ties and it was implied that the Japanese Communist Party could interdict the US line of communication from Japan to southeast Asia. In Burma, the Chinese were attempting to coerce the Ne Win government into a policy of passive cooperation.

While attempting to decide how far it was ready to go in Southeast Asia, the US was sending more advisors and Special Forces personnel to South Vietnam in the face of increasing numbers of Americans wounded or killed in action. The US allies were, at the best, providing only token contribution of non-military aid to Southeast Asia. Chiang Kai-shek offered a force of up to three divisions for use on the mainland, an offer which was rejected for the time being. US/RVN air and ground strikes were being conducted against the Viet Cong lines of communication in the Laos Panhandle and several arms caches were destroyed. Interrogation of DRV prisoners captured in SVN resulted in the identification of their parent PAVN units.

During the winter of 1964-65 (as presented in the initial scenario) the Chinese introduced MIGs, flown by "volunteer" pilots, into Laos and North Vietnam; and three brigades of PAVN infiltrated into the six northern provinces of South Vietnam. In November, announcements of joint Chinese-North Korean maneuvers were followed by a series of division size exercises south of the Yalu.

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In December, in a major ground engagement, ARVN forces supported by US air were seriously defeated. On Christmas day the Viet Cong shelled Saigon for half an hour. In January the National Liberation Front announced the establishment of a Provisional Peoples Government in South Vietnam, which was immediately recognized by all Socialist countries. The UK blocked action by the Poles, Russians and Indians for a reconvened Geneva-type conference.

The US increased the tempo and scope of actions in the Laotian Panhandle and in North Vietnam and additional US anti-aircraft units were brought into Thailand and South Vietnam. In early February the RVN high command announced the mining of three harbors in North Vietnam with delayed action mines, (an action which was carried out by the US Seventh Fleet).

Despite the warning, a Polish freighter sank in Haiphong harbor following an explosion in the entrance channel.

In late February a US destroyer was sunk by a DRV-planted mine while entering Saigon harbor.

On 26 February, in the face of these developments the President of the United States announced the debarkation of a US Marine expeditionary force and the establishment of permanent US base facilities at Da Nang together with the planned airlift of one US Army Brigade to the Mekong River in Thailand. He also stated that in the future the United States would strike selected industrial, as well as military targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for major Viet Cong terrorism and sabotage in South Vietnam. He stated intelligence showed that Chinese Peoples Army Forces were building up in the vicinity of Nanning and that extensive road and airfield construction in Northern Laos was paving the way for Chinese "invasion." He also stated US intelligence had reports that a Chinese light division was moving into Laos surreptitiously. (This was erroneous intelligence never denied by Red.) The President also stated that Chinese bomber aircraft were being moved to fields in South China and six Whiskey class Chinese submarines were in waters off Hainan Island.

The United States immediately commenced a build-up of logistics support personnel in Saigon and Bangkok, and construction of a POL pipeline from Bangkok to Korat.

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The Soviet Ambassador to the US stated the Soviet Union had no alternative but to provide moral and some materiel support to Hanoi.

A joint Soviet-East German announcement on 15 March, of a full scale peace treaty sometime in May, was followed by an Ulbricht statement that the GDR would assume control of the Berlin access routes on 1 May.

On 1 April, Buddhist rioting in South Vietnam precipitated a sharp division among the military and Minh demanded Khanh resign his powers.

The President, based on a potential threat to US access to Berlin, dictated a hold on three STRICOM divisions and appropriate supporting units to permit rapid deployment to Europe if this becomes necessary.

The Blue Team was confronted in the scenario with several specific proposals for consideration in their first move:

- a. That the President announce that the defense of freedom in SVN was a shared responsibility of all free peoples, that Saigon and Berlin be declared co-equal symbols of Western determination and that the United States was undertaking partial mobilization.
- b. The immediate and rapid deployment of additional US logistical support units to Thailand and South Vietnam to prepare for further combat deployments.
- c. The immediate alert of the 11th Air Assault Division for deployment to SEA.
- d. The authorization of CINCPAC to use limited tactical nuclear weapons to preclude the destruction of major US or friendly forces in an emergency.
- e. The US objective in SEA will be to compel the enemy to cease support of insurgencies, to assist local forces as necessary in the elimination of the insurgents who thereafter persist, to reunify Vietnam and to achieve the independence and security of friendly nations in the area.

Based on the initial scenario, the Blue Team reacted strongly. They determined their objective was to maintain the independence and security of allied and neutral nations in Southeast Asia. They agreed

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privately they would accept a divided Laos which would keep the Communists out of the Mekong Valley and deny continued use of the Laos Panhandle for the support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam to the Communists.

The Blue strategy included use of political, economic and military measures against NVN and the Chicoms. They would, assisted by the GVN, undertake punitive strikes on military and industrial targets in NVN to cause the NVN to make a political decision to cease support of the insurgency in Laos and SVN.

Specifically, the Blue Team presented their case against the North Vietnamese and Chicoms to the UN Security Council and SEATO Council in an effort to secure international support for their actions, while proceeding with a Presidential declaration of a national emergency and large scale military deployments to South-east Asia. They determined the US would not go to an international conference until the Communists complied with the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. Efforts were continued, and intensified where possible, to bolster the Khanh regime in South Vietnam while a US Army Task Force was deployed to the Saigon area to help provide stability to the government there. Force deployments included commencing to move three US divisions plus one Fighter Interceptor Squadron and two Tactical Fighter Squadrons to Thailand. These division forces were, together with Thai Divisions, to take up positions along the Mekong River. A US Army Airborne Brigade and an Infantry division plus a full Marine Expeditionary Force consisting of a division/wing team and appropriate Air Force units were started towards South Vietnam with an outside closure date of D+60. An additional attack Carrier Group and an ASW Carrier Group were deployed to the western Pacific. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, requested delegation of authority for use of tactical nuclear weapons if necessary; however this delegation of authority was denied.

The Red Team's primary objective was to insure the security of mainland China. They also wanted to eliminate US presence and influence in SEA.

Their strategy was two-pronged and was designed to attain their objectives at least cost to themselves. They planned to avoid direct US confrontation while collapsing the South Vietnamese political base and at the same time apply pressures on the Thai government in an effort to weaken US/Thai relations.

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The Chicoms planned to move one infantry division, three AAA regiments and two fighter regiments into North Vietnam by 10 April. Three additional Chicom divisions were alerted for possible movement to NVN. An additional DRV division was to infiltrate into SVN by 1 May. Viet Cong and Pathet Lao insurgency and sabotage of US forces would be intensified but acts of terrorism were to be avoided. Direct confrontation with US military forces against US personnel was to be avoided. Strong pressures were to be applied against Thailand through Burma and within Thailand itself.

A mission was sent to the Soviet Union in a effort to obtain communist support for their actions and to procure military supplies if possible.

At the direction of Mao, the RED Team prepared an operation plan designed to seize Southeast Asia and to establish pro-communist governments in the countries of that area.

After US airstrikes on North Vietnam airfields on 2 April, enemy air was no longer seen in that country. COMUSMACV assumed the title and functions of COMUSSEASIA with headquarters in Bangkok on 3 April. In the UN Security Council, the US was only able to reiterate its objectives in Southeast Asia. SEATO talks were equally unrewarding but Australia and New Zealand agreed to furnish assistance up to their SEATO commitment if satisfactory command arrangements could be worked out. Souvanna was reluctant to agree to US/Thai/ARVN forces moving into the Laotian Panhandle and the Thais would not cross the Mekong until after US forces had closed Thailand. Chiang Kai-shek reiterated his offer of forces for employment in either Southeast Asia or against the Chinese mainland and apparently was stepping up his raids against the mainland.

On 6 April, the USSR, through the British Ambassador told the US that the Soviets had no alternative but to support both the DRV and the Chicoms. Viet Cong and Pathet Lao operations were stepped up with at least minimal degrees of success. Sabotage operations against the US Army depot in Korat, Thailand were partially successful. US naval air attacks in North Vietnam destroyed nearly 90% of the POL storage tanks at Hanoi and Hai Phong. Viet Cong shelling of the Da Nang airfield and airfields at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa resulted in destruction of 12 aircraft on 10 April. US and GVN air attacks were continued against Viet Cong military targets in the

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Laotian Panhandle with varied results. Shipping continued to use North Vietnamese ports which had been mined, however a second Polish ship was damaged on 13 April after detonating a mine. On 14 April the US launched a major air attack against military and industrial targets in North Vietnam. Within South Vietnam, Khanh appeared to be gaining control and morale of the GVN troops was improving, however, there was turmoil beneath the surface. The situation in Germany was relatively quiet. The Soviets had indicated they would provide materiel support to the Chicoms and North Vietnamese. In addition, to the Chicom division deployed north of Hanoi, the Chicoms had commenced deployment of forces (2 divisions each) to positions in proximity of the DRV, Laotian and Burmese borders, in accordance with contingency plans for rapidly overrunning those countries.

The Blue Team reassessed the situation of 15 April and decided to continue its efforts to bolster its position in the international arena through contacts with individual friendly governments while continuing its deployment of four army and two marine division forces and stepping up military operations. They restated their objectives in Southeast Asia wherever and whenever possible, while continuing to study and resolve their logistic problems which were becoming more pressing. They also prepared contingency plans for a division size landing around Vinh and a Corps landing in the Haiphong-Hanoi area.

The Red Team, after reassessing the situation, also thought it was winning. They began infiltration of another DRV division into South Vietnam, provided augmentation for air defense forces in North Vietnam and solicited more concrete support from the Soviet Union.

By 25 May (final scenario projection) it appeared both sides were moving about as before. US force deployments had proceeded generally according to plan. Transportation problems had plagued the US but the international situation permitted deployment over an extended period of time. US strikes against military and industrial targets in North Vietnam continued. On 21 April, fighter aircraft bearing DRV markings were encountered over North Vietnam, but with the passage of time it became apparent they were not violating the air space of other countries although they were coming from airfields in South China and on Hainan Island. The US continued to restate its objectives in Southeast

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Asia and the Thais finally agreed to joint operations east of the Mekong, with or without Souvanna's concurrence. Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam continued and US air attacks on North Vietnam resulted in destruction of all targets of any consequence. Despite the damage, the North Vietnamese government retained control of the populace.

On 23 May two ChiCom light infantry divisions crossed the border into Northern Laos and other ChiCom units continued to move towards the Laotian and Burmese borders. US/Thai operations east of the Mekong, which commenced on 15 May resulted in ambush of/and severe losses to a US Infantry battalion in the Tchepone area on 24 May. By this time the Soviet Union was providing substantial aircraft, SAM units and POL to the ChiComs. Earlier, sabotage acts in northwest Thailand forced the Thais to deploy a regiment to that area. During 20-24 May the Viet Cong were increasingly successful in their efforts in South Vietnam and the people were openly discussing neutralization. On 25 May, the French Government announced the convening on 5 June of an International Conference in Paris to arrange a cease-fire and negotiated settlement to the problems of Southeast Asia. On the same date, Premier Khanh informed Ambassador Taylor that he thought the situation in SVN was hopeless and he wanted to leave. Ambassador Taylor persuaded him to remain as Premier for the time being.

The Blue Team, after again assessing the situation, saw only three courses of action available to it. They could go to the conference table but had little to bargain with so did not recommend that move.

Another course of action was to bolster the Khanh regime by every means available and take military command in South Vietnam. Then the US could step up coordinated military operations in that country, using US military forces as necessary when GVN forces were engaged by PAVN units. Also, military operations could be undertaken by the US/Thai/GVN to engage ChiCom forces in Laos and air strikes could be conducted against military and industrial targets in China using either conventional or nuclear weapons. The earlier planned landings at Vinh and in the Haiphong/Hanoi area could be undertaken.

A third course of action was to execute general war plans against Communist China with conventional or nuclear weapons.

The Blue Team did not understand why the ChiComs were willing to risk strikes on their mainland since Blue had made every effort to communicate their objectives in Southeast Asia to the Chinese communists.

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The Red Team, after again assessing the situation, decided to continue their previous efforts. They would continue the southern advance of the two divisions in Laos towards Vientiane, instructing them to retire in the face of US/Thai advance. The Pathet Lao/DRV were also instructed to avoid direct confrontation with US/Thai forces while harassing the flanks of those forces. They would move two divisions of ChiCom forces into northern Burma and continue covert sabotage operations in northeast and northwest Thailand. They would press for an international agreement for neutralization of the entire area guaranteed by all participants of the conference convened by the French, withdrawal of all foreign forces from the area, immediate cease fire and freezing of present areas of administrative control.

The game was concluded at this point with a critique attended by all participants. An account of the remarks made at the critique is contained in Tab G.

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SIGMA II-64

GAME COMMENTARY

Background and Introduction

As a part of continuing studies of the situation in SEA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed an analysis of logistics aspects of military operations under conditions of overt Red Chinese aggression. To obtain required political and military insights into possible US/Red Chinese objectives and strategies under this situation and especially the constraints which might limit decision-making, a national level politico-military game was prepared with help from interested agencies. This included Headquarters, Pacific Command.

By casting political, operational and logistic planners on both Red and Blue Teams, and by obtaining assistance of knowledgeable officials in preparation of the game scenario, it was hoped to obtain a variety of useful opinions including possible third country political reactions.

The over-all game approach focused on development of a credible Red Chinese strategy for overt aggression within their economic/logistic constraints while concurrently examining future US military planning.

The politico-military game was preceded by a J-4 analysis of recent studies bearing on logistics in and to SEA. This analysis identified certain assumptions upon which military contingency plans depend. These assumptions were directly or indirectly introduced into play of SIGMA II.

It was recognized that it is impossible to completely validate or invalidate assumptions through an exercise of this type. However it was hoped that further insights might be derived into the degree of plausibility associated with each assumption.

Although unstated as a specific objective of the game a further expected benefit was the exchange of ideas between individuals and agencies during preparation and play.

Finally, it was hoped that the SIGMA II politico-military game would provide a logical and useful frame of reference and point of departure for a possible follow-on military war game or staff study to thoroughly explore logistic and operational problems in a SEA war.

Game Setting

SIGMA II-64 initially was a partially guided game in that it assumed a level of overt military belligerence in the Red Chinese attitude which exceeded that found in real life or in any US intelligence estimate. This was done purposely to assure a look at situations involving high levels of Chicom intervention (although very few members of the Red Team seemed to feel that such escalation would be necessary to achieve Red China's strategic ends).

In order to assure high conflict levels, Control exercised the highest level of national authority over the Red and Blue "governments." The initial scenario began the game after border crossing operations, "tit-for-tat" US air raids against military targets in the DRV, aerial mining of DRV ports, diplomatic threats and persuasion, and further beefing up of the internal RVN "oil slick" program. All these efforts had failed to halt VC insurgency, and the DRV was stated to be infiltrating major PAVN units into SVN.

SIGMA II confronted Blue with the question of what to do since escalation of the war into NVN had failed to achieve desired results in SVN, and the enemy appeared to be raising the ante toward major ground warfare.

Objectives, Strategies and Constraints

The majority of officials assisting in development of the initial scenario or playing the game as Reds, felt that Communist China would probably avoid commitment of her own military forces in SEA, and would continue the present "nibbling" process through proxies; that the VC, DRV and Pathet Lao would present serious enough military problems for the US without overt Chicom intervention. The theoretical rationale provided in the script for overt use of Chicom forces was "Mao's" decision that large Chicom ground intervention in Burma, Laos and Vietnam, coupled with the deteriorating political situation in SVN, would convince the Americans of the futility of further escalation in the air and naval war. "Mao" considered this would influence the US toward a negotiated solution even as it forced Khrushchev into either following the Chicom lead--in effect allowing Soviet foreign policy to be shaped in Peking--or of failing to support a "fraternal socialist nation in its death struggle against capitalism." Either position could lower Moscow's prestige in the communist and neutral camps.

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There was some opinion among participating officials that the Red Chinese recognize clearly the prospects of US attacks against Red China itself if provocation became too high or Peking's machinations became too transparent. There seemed to be at least as many on the Red Team who felt Peking would accept the dangers of US air attacks on mainland China (hopefully iron bombs rather than nuclear), instead of knuckling under, and that they would sacrifice the embryonic industrial structure of Vietnam with even less reluctance.

Nevertheless to assure availability of a logical Red strategic plan for a follow-on war game and for possible use if Control decided to push the game to higher levels, the Red Team was required in their first move to draft a plan for overrunning SEA with ground forces.

In spite of such unsubtle pressures from Control, the Red Team could see very little to be gained by involving Chicom forces overtly in the conflict. They regarded the progress of their programs as satisfactory and saw little profit in directly provoking the United States. They felt that Burma could be coerced into a more passive (and perhaps actively useful) role in their strategy and that political pressures on Thailand could be raised to a level where Bangkok would become less willing to cooperate with the United States. Red move messages indicated that they would be prepared to move their ground forces over the border into Laos if United States/Thai elements crossed the Mekong, but the movement of Chinese divisions into Laos was actually ordered by Control (in the capacity of Mao). In short, the Red Team felt events in SVN were moving in the right direction. They continued to resist direct confrontation with the American forces because they felt they didn't need to and it would destroy their "cover."

A question was raised during the critique as to the impact the commitment of US ground forces made on Chinese strategy in this game. The answer appears to be "not very much." This perhaps resulted from the Red strategy of "no major push," the relatively modest strength of the American force (six plus divisions), and the massive Chinese ground capabilities should they be used. Further, Red recognized that both weather and terrain would severely handicap US deployments in Thailand and Laos. Red assumed other limitations on the use of US forces in SVN such as reluctance to

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use US troops as counterinsurgents, or "white" western forces against "brown men." But, had Red planned to overrun SEA, the American divisions would have constituted an important deterrent. From a Red standpoint, it appeared that the US capability to deploy one or more divisions into SVN and/or Thailand in fairly short order would preclude the possibility of swiftly overrunning the peninsula. Movement time for Chinese divisions advancing to Bangkok through Laos was roughly estimated at ninety days during the rainy season and it was felt that United States ground forces could be in defensive positions in strength within sixty days.

The Red strategy as it appeared in team decision-making was to continue along present lines, i.e., hope that the US would not attack mainland China, but if such raids did occur, that the damage could be absorbed. The Reds felt that there were a number of reasons why the US would refrain from using nuclear weapons against China. These included (hopefully), the protective umbrella of Soviet nuclear force as well as US domestic and world revulsion toward the use of nuclear weapons. It was pointed out that the Red Chinese leadership had sustained and expanded their power under the most adverse conditions for a generation including a major invasion by the Japanese and could probably maintain its well established control over China's vast population.

Considerations mentioned to support Soviet encouragement of a SEA war were the tremendous costs to the US in the event the United States did become involved in ground conflict and the consequent drain on the US economy. The length of the ocean lines of communication, the difficult terrain and weather conditions in SEA, and current costs of military operations might require as high a percentage of the US GNP as prevailed during the fighting in Korea (in the neighborhood of 15%) at a time when (unlike 1950) there is little slack in the US production base.

From a Soviet viewpoint US commitment to a major war in Asia might weaken Western European confidence in NATO, accelerate pressures on US allies toward compromise with the USSR, and reinforce the image of US colonialism among neutrals, particularly underdeveloped countries.

Blue strategy was influenced by the scenario toward higher military commitments which reflected US frustration

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with the chaos in SVN. Several Blues felt further annoyance during the game that the air attacks against the DRV had not yielded more positive results and voiced resentment against the scenario and Control. Since this was the "name of the game," (SIGMA II was a look at the situation if such measures fail to work) Control accepted the comments philosophically.

A few Blues (and they did seem to be in the minority), were anxious to continue trying to force the DRV out of the war through air attack, but the majority of players and Control tended toward belief that industrial and military bombing in the DRV would not quickly cause cessation of the insurgency in South Vietnam. There were several reasons stated for this, including US inability to win the war in Korea despite air strikes against North Korea (albeit there were none against the source of supply in Red China), and the tendency for air attacks under some conditions to stiffen civilian determination, i.e., the Battle of Britain, and the bombing of Germany in WW II. The fact that the French had an air monopoly in their struggle with the Viet Minh was mentioned but apparently this was close support of ground operations rather than a serious bombing program (no appropriate targets).

Neither the stoic attitude of a regimented oriental population with its philosophic view toward life and death, nor the racial undertones of war in which US pilots kill women and children was over-looked in estimating the effect of a major bombing program. It was also recognized as most unlikely that US game participants had a real insight into probable reactions of a country where self-immolation is practiced to "sell" a point. Cited were more than a few historical examples of oriental determination in the face of Western pressure, including the Kamikaze defense of Japan in WW II.

Most important perhaps, was the feeling that the Viet Cong might well be able to continue operating in SVN for a considerable period of time using existing stockpiles, captured stores and weapons, and levies on the country, despite destruction of major military and industrial facilities in NVN. Cited were examples of VC provisioning from the larder of RVN villages. The fact that US air attacks on military and industrial targets in SIGMA II

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might have but minimal effect on the (low) living standard of the people also contributed to this opinion. It might be noted this was an opinion of Red and Control Teams on the SIGMA I and IOTA games as well.

Blue followed through with the scenario decision to deploy troops and marines to SEA, influenced largely by the intelligence report concerning Chicom forces in Laos. Red did nothing to dissuade them from this effort.

The Blue Team ordered deployments and military actions which closely parallel those in existing contingency plans, in line with Blue statement of national objectives. They rejected the objective of reunifying Vietnam, settling for maintaining the independence of friendly nations-- (and possibly a partitioned Laos) although the JWGA monitor with the Blue Team feels that they really deferred consideration of the reunification idea until the situation had developed further. (The final statement of options which Blue evolved at the end of the game did include the possibility of amphibious landings in North Vietnam.)

Actually, Blue's attention to possible alternate strategies such as to negotiate or to continue at current conflict levels, was minimal. They followed through with escalation of pressures against North Vietnam to include wiping out all DRV industrial targets. Blue was well on the way to deploying six plus division forces (the 1st, 2nd and 25th Infantry Divisions and the 82d Airborne Division into Thailand; a Marine Division Wing and an airborne brigade into SVN; another airborne division headed out to Hawaii; and a second Marine division moving toward Okinawa). They extended division size US/Thai ground probes eastward into the Laos Panhandle to reduce PAVN/VC movements from the DRV to SVN and prepared to take on Chinese ground forces which seemed to be heading toward Vientiane..

On the subject of constraints, both Red and Blue were impressed with the massive difficulties presented by terrain, weather (the SW monsoon was beginning), and distances from their support bases. Red decided after reviewing the transportation nets in South China and North Vietnam that only eleven divisions (six of which were Chinese) could be effectively supported

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during the next several months and had little interest in ground offensive action. (The JWGA monitor felt that this subject could have been profitably discussed at greater length.)

Red constructed a plan for invasion because it was requested by Mao (Control), and finally did decide that one division of the PLA should enter the DRV with accompanying AA and air support. (The air support was quickly pulled back to Chinese bases under the impact of American air attack. That decision was actually made for Red in Control but seemed to be acceptable to them.) This confronted Blue with the question of air sanctuaries similar to those during the Korean conflict and no decision was made by Blue during the game to adopt a policy of "hot pursuit." Blue apparently accepted the enemy's interpretation of the "rules."

There were several members of the Red Team who felt that the use of massive numbers of CCF divisions might become important at some later point in a major Sino-US confrontation; that the six hundred million or more Chinese population (150 divisions) could easily sustain such an effort; that massive ground campaigns might be an important counter to US air strikes against the mainland. Although transportation from southern China into Burma, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam was difficult and would offer many serious problems, a really determined Chinese effort which preceded major US deployments might create a psychological climate in the target countries which would facilitate Chinese penetrations and impede implementation of US plans. If the Chinese moved first the US might only be able to commit a few divisions before the peninsula was overrun.

This raised once again the question of possible US air strikes against Red China and the effects such strikes would have if many PLA divisions were already well on their way south. It highlighted the need for possible quick decisions regarding the timely use of tactical nuclear weapons against the mountain passes and principal defiles from China into SEA.

On Blue's side the question of airlift, sealift, POL and lighterage received some attention as did the problem of obtaining adequate numbers of combat and logistics support units to accompany the divisions being deployed.

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Considerable discussion ensued during action level meetings but little of this was carried into the Blue Senior discussions. In fact during the Action and Senior critiques, the Blue Action Team Captain indicated that the US forces portrayed in SIGMA II could be deployed and fully supported under the game conditions based on a study just completed by the Army. It was noted that game conditions and the study assumed a Declaration of National Emergency and at least partial mobilization.

There were a number of participants, particularly logistics planners, who had grave reservations on this particular point based on studies and appraisals in which they had been involved. They were concerned that the new study may have dealt with reduced levels of weapons, materiel and backup units, and voiced particularly strong feelings that major transportation and logistics shortcomings would exist and would likely be limiting factors in a fast-moving situation involving present units and their TO&Es.

The problem of communicating from one team to the other a determination not to give in, or of intent to escalate the conflict, was evident in SIGMA II as it is in all games (and in real life). Blue attempted to convince Red of its total commitment by mobilizing forces and wiping out all available air targets in the DRV. Red kept signaling its undaunted determination to prevail by continuing the fighting in SVN and Laos and by various political gambits aimed at Burma, Thailand and third nations. Both sides felt that they were making themselves clear to the opposition in such a way that the futility of the opponent's action should be evident. In the limited time of game play, neither seemed to "read" this message.

It was evident that some Blues firmly believed that US air, sea and ground forces equipped with modern weapons could be moved rapidly from present locations into action against an enemy in SEA and could, while the enemy was moving and particularly when he had stretched his logistics support capabilities to the maximum, inflict murderous punishment on his forces. The ground forces that were being shifted into SEA exceeded the present strength of the US Army in Europe and amounted in effect to a small field Army.

The US forces were distributed widely in Thailand, the Laos Panhandle and Vietnam. Only one division was actually committed to combat. This raised questions of just what so

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large a force would do if the enemy were reluctant to become engaged. The Red Team in SIGMA II certainly didn't want to confront US forces and give the US an excuse for bombing China.

A question was raised regarding how long the American public, with the current flavor of press coverage, would support the commitment of ground forces in such strength. One possible answer suggested by a Blue Team contingency plan was an amphibious operation against the DRV itself, as perhaps a better use for conventional forces than fighting in areas dictated by the Enemy.

Propositions

Phase I of the logistics study requested by the Chairman, JCS, resulted in the formulation of five assumptions bearing significantly upon current contingency plans. Stated as propositions, they are as follows:

a. The President will declare a national emergency prior to or concurrent with the introduction of major US forces in Southeast Asia; authority for implementation of selective or partial mobilization will be granted, based on the Presidential declaration or on special legislation by the Congress.

b. Conditions short of general war will exist.

c. Allied and communist blocks will remain "as is" and neutral nations will remain neutral.

d. The US objective in Southeast Asia will be to eliminate the communist aggressors from Southeast Asia, to reunify Vietnam, and to establish the independence and security of friendly nations in the area.

e. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in the event of overwhelming Chicom attack will be authorized from the outset.

With regard to proposal a, the Blue Team with some influence from the initial scenario proceeded to take emergency measures to include mobilization of necessary units, including civilian air and maritime fleets.

In general discussion, it seemed a consensus that a decision to take military actions of the magnitude stated

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in the game would most certainly be paralleled with a decision to declare a national emergency. There was no thought that the US should engage in a war, declared or undeclared, with Communist China with only our present peacetime capabilities. (Control noted that there was no discussion by Red of possible mobilization or emergency measures by either Hanoi or Peking.)

An important part of mobilization and deployment seemed to be its anticipated psychological impact upon Hanoi and Peking. These actions were designed to be a message of US determination and resolve which hopefully would settle the issue short of actual military engagement. It is interesting that the Red Team proceeded as if it was not impressed by this raising of the ante--hoping Blue would soon come to the conference table.

This raised the question of whether a more effective "signaling" device is required to impress Peking with US determination than those proposed--deployment of several ground divisions, possibly the shift of SAC wings to Pacific bases, the introduction of surface-to-surface missile units to Taiwan, or escalatory air and naval actions in Chinese coastal waters.

Proposition b, dealing with the question of general war, was touched on several times by both teams and revolved around probable Soviet strategy. Control, which represented the USSR, determined that under game conditions the Soviets would provide moral and material backing to the Red Chinese and other Communist forces in SEA but would seek to avoid direct involvement of Soviet forces. How this would have worked out in real life if Soviet and Bloc shipping continued to run the mine fields is problematical. In the game two Polish ships only were sunk by mines, while in probability the mining effort should have effectively closed the ports. The cover under which US aircraft laid these mine fields was comparatively thin and it seemed inevitable that dangerous emotional forces would build up in the USSR and East European satellites if these losses continued.

In SIGMA II the Soviets avoided reiterating previous real life statements indicating that an attack on Red China would be regarded as an attack on the USSR.

There seemed to be general agreement that any Soviet actions would be carefully tailored to avoid danger of escalation to general war.

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Proposition c, regarding the status of allied or neutral powers under game conditions, was handled primarily in Control. Based on past experience, it was assumed the Thais would demand concrete and major military commitments and considerable material assistance before cooperating fully or even allowing major US deployments into Thailand.

Cambodia was portrayed as vacillating a bit as US forces began moving, and of resisting CPR pressure for establishment of the PPG government in Phnom Penh. As US forces arrived at their widely scattered points of deployment and Red Chinese force deployments appeared imminent, Sihanouk was judged not to deviate from his pro-Red Chinese neutrality.

Control depicted Japan as being cooperative with the US in spite of serious pressures from internal leftist groups. (This may be optimistic.) It was recognized that serious disorders in Japan could be a major handicap in the event of a SEA war since important stocks of US ammunition, vehicle replacement and industrial back-up are centered there. A Japanese embargo on shipments to SEA could have a damaging effect. In this game there was an implied Chicom threat to Korea which might well have stiffened Japanese governmental support of the US. Probably this attitude would be less cooperative without the Korean danger. (It would appear useful to examine the game situation with an assumption of strict Japanese neutrality in order to explore alternative US logistics means.)

Control had France and Pakistan oppose SEATO action in SEA with France taking the lead in calling a major conference to halt the fighting. Blue proceeded with military operations without actually using SEATO's apparatus, although indicating that the command structure should be generally patterned along agreed SEATO framework.

Proposition d, dealing with US objectives was discussed above under "Objectives, Strategies and Constraints."

Proposition e, on the subject of nuclear authority was discussed at length by Blue Seniors and Action level players. The indication seemed clear that it is extremely

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unlikely that the President would authorize the employment of nuclear weapons in advance, unless the most critical circumstances exist and the psychological climate is drastically different from that prevailing today.

From a strictly military standpoint, it seemed evident that the prompt use of nuclear weapons against the CCF might be the only means available to prevent a major overrun of much friendly territory even with several US divisions deployed in key defensive positions.

There was no general discussion regarding the impact on the world political scene of using nuclear weapons, the distinctions between low yield weapons versus larger ones, or battlefield versus strategic bombing. Several players voiced opinions that recent top level US policy statements regarding nuclear restraint indicated that their use for any purpose was extremely unlikely. Other players felt that the loss or threatened loss of major US forces engaged in SEA would be decisive in favor of Presidential authority.

These discussions indicated that present policies in contingency planning are correct; i.e., plans should be militarily and logistically feasible based on no use of nuclear weapons, but with alternate plans which assume authority for their use.

On balance, the odds favor a "no-nuclear" decision under all conditions examined in the game.

In addition to the propositions discussed above, a number of additional items were inserted in the initial scenario to provoke discussion and focus attention on problem areas.

These were addressed by the teams with varying degrees of interest. One, the suggestion that the President himself publicly assert that Saigon and Berlin were co-equal symbols of Western determination was rejected by the Blue Team on the basis that Saigon was vulnerable to enemy capture or internal take over by dissidents, and this strong a US commitment would lead

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to greater prestige loss if negotiation became necessary. Further, the great difference in the solidarity of Berlin with West Germany and NATO versus the muddy situation in Saigon makes Saigon a questionable symbol.

The proposal that US logistical units be immediately deployed to SEA was picked up by Blue as part of their overall deployment rather than as a signal to the enemy that major force deployments were in the offing. Whether the move of engineer, transportation, signal and other supporting forces into Thailand and the RVN would indicate Blue determination to Red as effectively as a major tactical deployment was never seriously discussed.

A scenario suggestion that the US Army's 11th Air Assault Division be alerted for deployment to SEA was rejected by the Blue Team. The suggestion had been made in view of the apparent suitability of this organization for rapid deployment over extended distances (its total cubage is four million cube feet compared to six million cube feet; 9.5 thousand short tons versus 38.4 thousand short tons for a ROAD infantry division; equipped with 459 aircraft rather than the infantry division's 103 aircraft; and only 1,150 wheeled vehicles versus the ROAD infantry division's 3,200). Proponents of its use feel that it would have an added measure of mobility against a numerically superior enemy in the face of adverse weather and terrain conditions during the SW monsoon. However, since this division will not conclude its unit tests until November, Blue did not consider a deployment in "game time" advisable.

In the Blue Team Captain's summary to the Critique it was apparent that the forces he visualized being deployed would be tailored Army forces similar to those projected in the current STRATMOVE Study. These forces would undoubtedly lessen the logistical requirements now under study based on current TO&E formations, which pose a formidable lift problem, particularly with out-size equipment.

Other Problems Recognized

Should Red China adopt a policy of overt aggression in SEA with little warning, using over thirty PLA divisions to back up DRV, Pathet Lao and VC forces to invade Burma, Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam, the situation

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might be quite different than that depicted in SIGMA II. In this game Blue had ample time to make unopposed deployments on a fairly extended schedule. It would not be sound to predicate actual contingency plans on so favorable a set of conditions.

Should a score of enemy divisions make deep penetrations along the main avenues of approach, they may be extremely difficult to find or to stop. This is particularly true during the periods when motor vehicle movements are halted by mud, air operations are complicated by poor visibility, and amphibious landings could be prevented by turbulent seas. A sudden Chinese air attack has a good probability of knocking out key logistics centers such as the pre-stockage at Korat; the sinking of a ship in Saigon harbor is within Viet Cong capability. The rapid movement of Chicom and DRV divisions along carefully prestocked routes could force the piecemeal commitment of US Army and Marine units under conditions similar to Korea in 1950. The initial confrontations would probably consist of a series of small meeting engagements. Studies and assessments indicate a steady US withdrawal until a large part of Thailand and RVN are overrun before firm defensive lines can be established and forces in contact effectively equalized. Certainly the logistics limitations on the enemy would mount tremendously the further his columns progressed toward the south, but until he was forced to expend major quantities of ammunition against really significant defenses, his light infantry, supported by draft animals and porters could probably continue moving, fanning out and by-passing pockets of resistance, taking advantage of the poor visibility to reduce losses through air attack.

(One planner cited the fact that in 1950-51, the Chicoms moved six Army corps into Korea and penetrated 250 miles south from the Yalu under continuous US air attack; that in October 1952, three Vietnamese Peoples' Army Divisions crossed the Red River and in six weeks covered 180 miles despite French air superiority--without using roads or vehicles. He stressed this to underline the importance of decisions which would permit strikes against mainland China before such forces have been launched.)

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A national decision to oppose massive Chicom intervention with a defensive plan on the ground points up the fact that at least partial mobilization would be required without delay. There is concern over the current shortage of logistic support units during the early period of mobilization. (Realistic tailoring of units and modifications in support requirements is an active project now.)

It was also pointed out that the Chicoms may have the capability of aggression on a substantial scale in two areas such as Southeast Asia and Korea plus a fair-sized demonstration against the off-shore islands. (Assessment of US interdiction capability against these contingencies is an active project now.)

One of the key considerations for planners on both sides and for the SIGMA Control Group was that of movement speeds for ground forces, opposed, unopposed and under varying conditions of terrain and weather. There is a wide diversity of opinion on this point between knowledgeable planners. It seems certain however, that Chicom forces heavily backed by human bearers and pack animals will be able to move if unopposed in SEA under any conditions that can be visualized, at speeds ranging from two or three miles a day through heavy mud to forty miles a day under ideal weather and terrain conditions. They have a limited air supply capability and can use certain inland waterways for logistics purposes.

Excellent data on the effect of weather on different areas of SEA is contained in PACOM WID #19-64, 8 May 1964. It points up graphically the variety of concurrent weather conditions which sometimes prevail throughout the area and underlines such things as the lag between the beginning of the monsoon and the actual deterioration of the road net due to clayey soil conditions and the consequent delay while the countryside dries out after the monsoon had ended.

It was suggested that the absence of special dredges and skilled port clearance teams could impose frustrating delays on the delivery of vitally needed ammunition and other supplies.

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A side-light during discussion dealt with problems the US would face in maintaining a presence in SEA if Khanh were replaced by another government which "invited us out." This has many ramifications, one of which might be the idea of negotiating some kind of "base rights" in return for military aid with the present regime as a form of insurance, although the public opprobrium that might accompany such a move would probably dictate close wraps.

Health questions were touched on briefly. It is significant to mention that there are currently no hospital ships on duty with the fleet. One which might be used is employed on a UNESCO humanitarian mission and would not be quickly available in SEA. Related questions involve the effect of extreme heat and humidity on stored rations which would be a limitation on prestockage as well as fungus and other difficulties in maintenance and repair of equipment--especially complex electronic equipment.

The suggestion was made that the Army consider testing the new GOER vehicle family in SEA as well as in Europe, as the off-road, muddy country capability of this high-payload vehicle could supplement the limited airlift available for up-country delivery.

Logistics command and control problems are also envisioned in the event of ground operations by US forces in SEA. Unlike the logistics situation in Europe, where a major communications zone is in position close behind the tactical forces, the logistics position on mainland Asia would be extremely tenuous for the first months of a major war. Dependence on bases as far removed as Clark Field, Okinawa, and Japan would present problems of communication and coordination which were hardly touched upon during the play of SIGMA II. The early introduction of logistic commands into Thailand, and the RVN as operating elements under a central command, functioning directly under the senior ground commander might be required in a hurry. Such a move would have "signaling" connotations to Peking however, which should be carefully examined.

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A number of thought provoking ideas were offered regarding the kinds of action which would create major problems for Blue in the field of operational logistics. They included suggestions for:

Air or sea attacks against the floating depots at Subic Bay. These depots might be vulnerable to sabotage or attack by frogmen.

VC mining of critical beaches, harbors and rivers.

Guerrilla terrorist strikes against logistics and other support units to impede their operations.

Other logistics touched upon were:

Fact that quantities of artillery and other ammunition now on hand in Thailand and RVN are based on MAP agreements and quantities available are related to current usage rates. If major US forces were introduced into SEA in a combat environment, the requirement for artillery ammunition would vastly increase. With no substantial prestockage available, the present lift and through-put capacity could result in shortage of ammunition in the engaged battle zones. (In Korea the use of intense fires to withstand a determined Chicom ground assault resulted in the expenditure of fifty thousand rounds of light and medium artillery in one infantry division in a little over a day.)

Lest the foregoing commentary sound unduly pessimistic it is emphasized that the fundamental purpose of this game was to look ahead into a grey future colored by assumptions of lack of success in present and intervening programs in order to anticipate some of the situations and decisions which may have to be faced.

The future viewed through Red colored glasses undoubtedly is less than rosy.

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APPENDIX A
HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS - VIETNAM

- 111 B.C. Vietnam conquered by the Han begins a thousand years of Chinese Domination.
- 939 A.D. Chinese driven out.
- 1406 Vietnam conquered by the Ming.
- 1427 Chinese driven out. Formal suzerainty maintained with China.
- 1500 Beginning of period of Vietnamese conquest of the south overrunning the Kingdom of Champa and parts of Cambodia.
- 1615 First permanent Catholic mission established.
- 1630 Beginning of period that saw country divided along almost the same lines as at present the Trinh lords in the north, the Nguyen in the south. The Dutch backed the northern regime. The Portuguese backed the south with artillery and advisors.
- 1772 Tay-son rebellion leads to defeat of both Trinh and Nhuyen but begins period of bloody civil war. This ends when Nguyen Anh backed by superior French artillery opens era of European military and political intervention in Vietnamese affairs.
- 1800 Begins period of reunification, xenophobia and persecution of Christians.
- 1840 Extensive massacres of Catholic priests and followers.
- 1858 French capture Taurane.
- 1873 French capture Hanoi.
- 1884 French protectorate established.
- 1913 End of last effective Vietnamese resistance to France.

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- 1940 France surrenders to Nazi Germany. Request by French commander in Indochina to United States for release of aircraft and other equipment already purchased by French Government denied.
- 1941 Beginning of Allied assistance to Vietnamese nationalists and Vietminh in resistance against the Japanese.
- 1944 Vo Nguyen Giap's guerrillas cross from China into Vietnam.
- 1945 Japanese overrun Vichy French forces in Indochina with brutal effectiveness. Requests for American assistance were not met. Channault wrote "The American government was interested in seeing the French forcibly ejected from Indochina so the problem of post-war separation from their colony would be easier...while American transports in China avoided Indochina the British flew aerial supply missions for the French all the way from Calcutta..." Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai repudiates protectorate agreement with the French.
- 1945 Vietminh seize power in Vietnam after Japanese withdrawal. Arrive with victorious Chinese armies and American advisors and quickly collect large quantities of arms and ammunition. A "Peoples Democracy" is established while country is still occupied by Chinese Nationalist, British, and French forces as well as American observers.
- 1946 French and Vietminh negotiate fruitlessly. Fighting begins spurred by massacre of several thousand civilians by guns of French cruiser. Indochina war begins. "Oil Slick" method of pacification followed.
- 1947 Operation Lea launched to destroy Vietminh forces and capture Ho Chi Minh. Major military offensive is ineffective and exposes countryside to extensive infiltration by guerrillas.

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- 1949 Red China becomes important sanctuary for support of Vietminh forces.
- 1950 Major Vietminh offensive with well armed, trained forces leads to greatest colonial defeat for French since Montcalm died at Quebec.
- 1951 Series of tactical errors by Giap results in defeat by de Lattre and encourages US support of the French. Vietminh strategy shifts to capture of the highlands.
- 1952 Salan mounts largest offensive of the war at Giap's bases but fails.
- 1953 Giap invades Laos. Dulles promises major US aid and talks about breaking Communist aggression "by end of 1955 fighting season." French commander secretly informs his government that best that could be hoped for under circumstances was "a draw." End of Korean fighting releases CPR resources for commitment in South Vietnam.
- 1954 French commander in Indochina informs US government that defeat is likely unless massive US help is provided. Consideration given to committing US forces in air strikes but Congressional views are divided. Dien Bien Phu falls. Geneva agreement signed. Country divided along 17th parallel.
- 1955 United States agrees to provide aid to South Vietnam. SEATO organized. Economic crisis in North Vietnam leads to request for aid from USSR and CPR. Ngo Dinh Diem comes to power in RVN.
- 1956 French withdraw from Vietnam. North Vietnamese intellectuals purged in "Hundred Flowers Campaign." Peasants ruthlessly suppressed by DRV troops in Truong Chinh's home province.
- 1957 French trade with Vietnam has risen sharply since military withdrawal in 1956. In 1939 only 32.2% Vietnamese exports went to the

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1957 French franc area while 55.7% of all imports were from France. Vietnamese exports to the US amounted to 12%; imports 4.2%. By 1957, three years after French defeat, exports to France amounted to 50.8% (an 18.6% increase); exports to US were 13.7% (up only 1.7%). Imports from France were 29.3%, from the US 22.7%.

Satisfactory economic progress being made in South Vietnam. US advisory group building powerful conventional force to oppose DRV military.

1958 "Spontaneous" liberation movement initiated in South Vietnam against Diem regime actually sparked and supported from Hanoi by the DRV, which now sees small chance for reunification under Geneva agreement and needs resources of the south.

1959 Viet Cong movement gains strength controlling several areas of the country, commanding important support from peasants.

1960 USSR-DRV economic and technical assistance agreement.

1961 CPR-DRV economic assistance agreement. Massive famine in DRV sees peasants storming the granaries and a compromise in rigid government policies allowing farmers to retain larger share of their produce.

High level US survey groups recommend shift in RVN military orientation toward coping with guerrilla warfare rather than major conventional forces.

1962
Jan Hanoi radio announces founding in South Vietnam of Peoples Revolutionary Party.

Feb US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam created.

Jun DRV Central Committee announces 10-year-program shifting emphasis from agriculture to heavy industry.

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1962

Aug Articles critical of Diem regime appear in US press.

Sep Viet Cong activities continue to expand in South Vietnam.

1963

Jan Top level US survey team recommends tightening of command structure in RVN; effort to improve relations between Diem regime and US press.

Feb Increasing Viet Cong willingness to stand and fight sometimes in battalion strength.

May RVN government forces fire volley into Buddhist crowd demonstrating in Hue against religious persecution.

Jul RVN forces inflict major defeat against VC 514th Bn in northern Delta area. 80 KIAs estimated.

Aug RVN Special Forces storm pagodas arresting Buddhist monks and students.

Sep President Kennedy makes TV reference to fact that Diem is losing touch with people.

Oct McNamara visit in South Vietnam.

Nov Diem government overthrown in coup by military junta headed by Maj Gen Duong Van Minh.

Dec Khrushchev predicts United States will be expelled from Vietnam "with even less ceremony than the French."

McNamara visits South Vietnam.

1964

Jan Ostensibly to head off a French instigated plot, coup by forces headed by Gen Nguyen Khanh. Defense Minister and Commander in Chief arrested, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Head of the National Police and others.

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1964

Jan

The NEW YORK TIMES asserts that a joint US-Vietnamese report warned that the government should stop relocating people into hamlets because of bitter resentment among the peasants.

Viet Cong reported to be better organized and equipped with foreign weapons, RVN troop morale low in wake of coups.

Mar

US Congressmen Laird states that he favors step up in war effort to include accepting troops from nations willing to contribute and under same rules as used by North Vietnamese.

Khanh asserts that French agents are plotting to assassinate him, overthrow his government and obtain a neutralized settlement in Vietnam.

NEW YORK TIMES says "The political and military offensive during the last month has shown just how effectively the Viet Cong controls developments. In a series of battles during February, it inflicted defeat after defeat on the government despite Gen Khanh's urgent striving to achieve just one victory that would give his regime the lift in morale it so desperately needs...enemy propaganda is now calling for peace on basis of ill-defined neutralism." "Big Minh" the head of state is not wholly supporting Khanh's efforts.

NEW YORK TIMES article quoted Dean Rusk as saying "that if President de Gaulle's advocacy of 'neutralization' for Southeast Asia meant the eventual independence and security of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the United States could agree...Talk of neutralization which merely implies that the United States should withdraw its support from South Vietnam tends to undermine the morale of the South Vietnamese."

NEW YORK TIMES says, "US defense chiefs have agreed in principle to proposal by Khanh to extend guerrilla harassment to North Vietnam,

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Mar

qualified sources said today. The degree to which the US will participate is to be decided by President Johnson. An informed source said that Mr. McNamara urged priority for (clear and hold) program in South Vietnam rather than letting enthusiasm be diverted to action against North Vietnam which he said would not decide the basic issue of the South Vietnamese insurgency."

NEW YORK TIMES says that, "Communist guerrilla movement in South Vietnam is striving to develop its own political identity and to give impression that it is operating a full-fledged government. High point was second Congress of South Vietnam National Liberation Front in January."

Saigon's DAILY NEWS states war will be won when the government is able to convince the Vietnamese peasant that it can give him a better deal and protect him against the Communists.

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1964

Mar "Withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster," President Macapagal of the Philippines said in an Associated Press dispatch. But he cautioned the United States against intervention in Asian affairs and said the current crisis between Malaysia and Indonesia could be settled by Asians. He said that loss or neutralization of SEA could lead to a disaster, especially for those countries near Vietnam. Asked what the United States should do his eyes twinkled and he said, "There should be more projection of American aid. It should be made clear that aid would not be used as a club, as a weapon to constrain the secondary country to act as the first country desires."

Apr President Johnson told interviewers that things were looking up again in Laos with the reinstatement of neutralist Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma and expressed hope for more support from other nations for the war in Vietnam. Administration officials state that Australia now has a 30 man military advisory team and Great Britain has an eight man unit advising on police and counterinsurgency. Malaysia has trained some RVN jungle fighters, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand have provided equipment and training for technicians. France is furnishing economic and cultural assistance and doctors for Saigon hospitals. West Germany and Nationalist China are providing some technical or economic aid and Philippine technical assistants are working under US contract.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has met with Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek on problems of security in SEA. Chinese sources said strategy for barring Red China from the UN was also discussed. It is understood that Nationalist China would like to become an active member of SEATO but the US feels this is not presently desirable.

May Two Pathet Lao columns aided by strong detachments of North Vietnamese troops were reported driving toward the town of Muong Soui in an effort to trap neutralist forces driven from the Plain of Jarres. Western sources also said that the communists had renewed their offensive in the Paksane area, 70 miles east of Vientiane in a campaign of

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1964

May extermination against the Western Meo tribesmen. The communist offensive overran the headquarters town of Kong Le's armored regiment. Tank forces succeeded in withdrawing and Kong Le's forces were driven off the Plain of Jarres.

Jun Pro-Communist Pathet Lao troops attacked a neutralist position breaking a five day lull in the civil war. Vientianne sources said that air support from US-supplied T-28 aircraft could not respond because of bad weather. Cloud cover prevented observation and accurate targeting.

Souvanna Phouma stated the US reconnaissance flights over Laos and US air strikes against Pathet Lao emplacements were perfectly legal and that his government had agreed to them. Kao Yun-peng a Chinese communist official was killed in the 11 June bombing of Khang Khay which Peking alleges was carried out by US planes.

A ranking US military advisor in Vietnam was quoted by AP as saying that the communist threat in South Vietnam was far more serious than it had been when he arrived three years before. He stressed that the biggest problem was getting the government of the RVN to accept US advice. He said that the Vietnamese need dedicated, competent leaders and must raise their standards of discipline to levels the Viet Cong have achieved. Politics, corruption and nepotism are the main Vietnamese vices he said. Another US officer was quoted as saying that 90% of the weapons used by the VC came from US military assistance to the RVN.

An article in the Manchester Guardian outlines the amazing complacency which characterizes most of the thinking in Bangkok. "By Asian standards there is a good bit of prosperity rooted in peasant ownership of the land and there is the passivity of the Buddhist people who feel that the best way to preserve their independence is to act like a rubber ball," the writer states. There is very little apprehension apparently over the trend events are taking in SEA.

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Jun

The Washington Post reported that Washington is now determined to keep Hanoi and Peking from thinking that their current policy of military force in SEA will pay them dividends. It was pointed out that the US now has over 200,000 men in uniform west of Alaska and Hawaii and far greater mobility than in past times to move them long distances in a hurry. The Johnson administration is attempting to convince the enemy that it is as determined to stand up for freedom in SEA as it was in Berlin during the Blockade. It has been announced that the US is boosting the level of combat materiel and supplies pre-stocked in Thailand to meet possible contingencies.

Accusing the Democratic Administration of timidity in the Far East, the Republican Critical Issues Council has proposed assigning substantial armed forces near Asian areas threatened by communism. The statement was prepared by a number of prominent Republicans including Admiral Radford. It said that recent US policy in the Far East was "one of timidity, fear or involvement and quest for popularity in place of respect."

Reuters quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying Peking wanted the US to subordinate itself to the communists before engaging in negotiations and that he had learned much from the American John Foster Dulles whose brinkmanship policy was directed against (China). He said that "We have learned it and are using it."

The Soviet Union's drive to oust China from the World Communist camp ran into a snag according to another Reuters dispatch when several nations indicated a reluctance to go along, notably Italy and the Poles.

General Harkins retiring US commander in South Vietnam said that "For the last nine months it has been almost impossible to wage an effective guerrilla war against communism in SEA." He said that up to just recently there had been no effective government in Saigon but that Khanh now appeared to be taking hold. The general commented that "running a complicated war was difficult enough even where there was a good,

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Jun strong government."

US air recce over Laos indicates that communists have been improving their road network in southern Laos and have considerably stepped up the pace of their supply convoys there stretching the network from Techepone the previous terminus on to the south. This will facilitate the movement of large forces across the Laotian border into the central Vietnamese highlands while the RVN was busy fighting guerrillas near Saigon.

As US sources emphasized the possibility of a major war in SEA if the Chinese and DRV did not desist in support of insurgency there a statement appeared in Pravda which said that the Chinese leaders could no longer be assured of Moscows's support in a world conflict although another version of the article held that it was the Russians who held they could no longer count on Chinese support.

The basic disagreement between France and the US was aired following a discussion between French President DeGaulle and Under Secretary of State Ball. It appears that the French believe that Chinese foreign policy is in a consolidating stage and the US feels that it is in a period of expansion. Nevertheless there were areas of agreement between France and the US according to the NEW YORK TIMES.

In ending his task in Vietnam Ambassador Lodge concluded that the formula for success there had at last been found without a general war in Asia. He said that there were a number of developments which made him think things were on the right track and that the effort would be successful.

Speaking at a Swedes Day picnic in Minneapolis President Johnson said that the United States "when necessary" would not hesitate "to risk war" to preserve the peace. This was believed, said the NEW YORK TIMES, to be one of a carefully prepared series of statements designed to convince Red China that the US would go to war rather than see SEA overrun.

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Jun

Marshal Chen Yi the Red Chinese Foreign Minister was quoted in an article in the NEW YORK TIMES that "nobody should have any misunderstanding" that the "Chinese will not sit idly by while the flames of war spread to their side."

A proposal by UN Secretary General for an international parley over Vietnam was not accepted by the United States in view of repeated and continuing violations of the existing agreements. That thought the affair should be resolved by revival of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

Jul

More than 300 US Special Forces troops are being sent to Vietnam to help seal the borders against infiltrators. Another 300 are being sent to act as advisors to the RVN according to a Washington Post article.

Jack Raymond in a NEW YOUR TIMES special said that Maxwell Taylor the new US Ambassador to South Vietnam is likely to step softly as the US military is wary of getting pinned down in an Asian ground war. He pointed out that the Army felt the same way before WW II when it sought to withdraw the old 15th Infantry from China rather than become involved in a major struggle there. At that time General Wheeler, the new Chairman of the JCS was a lieutenant in that regiment and U. Alexis Johnson was a young diplomatic associate of Taylor, who was then a captain stationed in Tokyo. The article goes on to point out that the Army has been consistent in this stand and that Taylor repeatedly has pointed out that the bombing of the North Vietnamese would not necessarily result in driving the Viet Cong from the jungles of South Vietnam. Instead he feels the main problem is one of security and development in the RVN.

The article also states that in recent years the "tiger" of US foreign policy has been in the State Department rather than the Pentagon.

The NEW YORK TIMES says that Viet Cong strikes at US/RVN outposts at the terminus of the Ho Chi Minh trail were linked with the arrival in

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Jun

South Vietnam of Ambassador Maxwell Taylor. For many months the main CV attacks had been limited to the area south of Saigon on the Mekong Delta.

According to a Reuters dispatch, Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai promised support for Vietnamese guerrilla forces before a rally of 100,000 people in Peking. The statement obliquely threatened to send troops to Indochina if the Americans extended the war there. It said that China "Would not sit idly by while the US extends the war of aggression in Vietnam and Indochina." It went on to say that three fourths of South Vietnam had already been liberated by the Viet Cong although there were no foreign military bases or a single foreign soldier in North Vietnam.

There was speculation in Saigon according to the NEW YORK TIMES that the Reds may be planning a major assault to sever the northern provinces or to seize the vital city of Hue. Hanoi is reported to be sending more and more regular army members into combat beside the Viet Cong.

The US announced that it intends to enlarge its advisory force in South Vietnam by an additional 5,000 men, and more military equipment.

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
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INITIAL SCENARIO

E

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SIGMA-II-64



**INITIAL
SCENARIO**

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

SIGMA II-64

INITIAL BLUE SCENARIO

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-1-BLUE

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

During the summer of 1964 the situation in Southeast Asia went badly. The number and size of Viet Cong attacks mounted, increasing casualties among the RVN and raising the level of Americans killed in action to 200 with over 2,000 wounded as well as scores of non-battle losses. As more civilian and military advisors arrived and reinforcements joined US Special Forces upcountry, the grim toll continued to climb.

Morale among the RVN deteriorated as one baited ambush after another pointed up failures of leadership and motivation in the ranks while rumors of intrigue plagued high levels of the RVN hierarchy.

In Saigon, business continued as usual in spite of Premier Khanh's efforts to stiffen the war effort; programs to boost troop strength, improve administration and streamline the "oil slick" effort lagged badly.

It was natural when the Gulf of Tonkin incident erupted for Khanh to use that opportunity to consolidate and strengthen his control. Enjoining the Americans to back him in attacking North Vietnam, he tried to rally the fragmented groups constituting the South Vietnamese power-structure. His elbowing aside of Minh, curfews and proclamations succeeded primarily in alarming the Buddhists who are sensitive to anything smacking of Diem style autocracy. Many Americans were apprehensive that Khanh might take a unilateral action which would involve them in a full-scale war with North Vietnam.

Washington hoped that the US naval air-strikes against DRV bases would convince the enemy of US determination and when a sharp DRV or Chinese reaction was delayed, there were many who felt this signal had been read and understood. There were some analysts who felt withdrawal of US naval patrols from the Gulf of Tonkin after the torpedo boat incidents had been interpreted in Hanoi and Peking as an admission that the US had no heart for expanding the war and would be reluctant to do so regardless of the level of Viet Cong attacks.

So the argument went in Washington, Honolulu and Saigon as American and European newspaper pundits delivered varied interpretations. Peking responded by shifting MIGs to airfields in the DRV.

While Pentagon discussions went on about the subtleties of communicating with an enemy, top American leadership

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struggled to make up its mind how far it was ready to go in SEA--considering the sorry state of affairs in the RVN.

Although the Buddhists riots inspired by fears of renewed persecution were quieted through compromise with help from Buddhist and Catholic leaders and something approaching stability was achieved in the ruling junta, time was obviously running out in South Vietnam. Morale among the population was extremely low and the next report coming in might announce a military debacle. Nevertheless the internal political picture somewhat straightened out during September even though Khanh's power had been diluted.

In Europe, DeGaulle told Lodge that with many more times the number of troops than the Americans had in Vietnam, France had been driven out of Indochina. He felt that the only hope now was negotiated neutralization.

Estimates by intelligence agencies and by scientific organizations indicated that Red China was planning its first nuclear test for mid-1965.

During the fall of 1964 Peking, Hanoi and the Peking oriented factions of Communist parties throughout the world made a concerted effort to portray the United States as an imperialist troublemaker in SEA. While accusations of colonialism and exploitation were leveled in the United Nations and communist press, the level of Chinese assistance to Hanoi and to the Pathet Lao continued to rise and a Chinese military mission was established in Cambodia. Air and air defense capabilities in the DRV were strengthened by the introduction of Chinese materiel and technicians. Road construction was stepped up from the Chinese border into northern Laos.

In Communist councils the rift between Peking and Moscow became ever wider, culminating during October in a weak show of socialist "solidarity" that lost Peking's bid for United Nations membership. The only vestige of unity between the USSR and Red China lay in similar calls for reconvening Geneva Treaty conferees to deal with the crisis in SEA.

Fighting in Laos diminished as clear weather favored the recently expanded Laotian Air Force; the Pathet Lao dug in and consolidated summer gains. In South Vietnam the Viet Cong continued to receive reinforcements from the DRV, swelling the ranks of regular forces engaged against

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E-3-BLUE

the RVN to some 40,000. The pattern of attacks, particularly baited ambushes, continued to favor the Viet Cong as more and more battalion size VC units were engaged.

In November, announcements of joint Chinese-North Korean maneuvers were followed up by a series of division-size exercises south of the Yalu.

The Indonesian-Malaysian struggle oscillated indecisively with Indonesian incursions into Sarawak triggering a US assistance program involving weapons, helicopters and Stateside training for the Malaysians and an upsurge of Soviet arms assistance to Djakarta.

US/RVN air and ground strikes against VC lines of communication in the Laos panhandle resulted in the destruction of several arms caches and the capture of a number of DRV prisoners who identified their parent PAVN units.

Prior to the American fall elections, the Johnson Administration continued to "signal" its determination to Peking that communist aggression in SEA would be a costly business. The number of RVN air, naval and ground attacks aimed at targets in North Vietnam mounted with mixed results. Some succeeded, most failed and a number deflected.

United States leadership in South Vietnam continued trying to achieve the kinds of changes in direction, attitude and organization of the RVN government that would broaden popular support, but political and psychological fragmentation and Viet Cong terrorism cut deep. The so-called "oil slick" program was hampered by fear and inefficiency as one administrator after another was executed by the VC. One bright spot in an otherwise dismal picture was the willingness of leaders in the main political groups to defer major reorganization of the government and to continue temporary arrangements for directing the war.

More American advisors and Special Forces personnel were dispatched to South Vietnam and the ranks of civilian technicians were augmented by Philipinos, Australians and other foreign nationals. The Chinats sent a mission to assist with development of a political organization within the military. An offer by Chiang of three divisions for employment on the mainland was considered but rejected at the time. Nevertheless disintegration continued in the RVN.

American efforts to enlist wider support among their

allies were met with various forms of indifference ranging from suggestions that SEA should be "written off" to mild contributions of non-military aid.

With Johnson's re-election and the emergence of a Labor government in Britain, pressures grew for negotiations. A trial balloon floated by Peking through the Poles suggested Red China's willingness to work out an Austrian-type solution separately for both North and South Vietnam. The Americans reiterated demands for restoration of the status quo ante the Pathet Lao drive of last summer.

Pressure was also applied by Peking through Communist Parties and front organizations in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines to restrict and inhibit the US use of important base facilities in these countries.

With the upsurge in trade between Japan and China, businessmen in the Land of the Rising Sun were becoming acutely aware of commercial opportunities in a growing relationship with Red China. The Japanese were coming to realize that if SEA falls under Communist influence even their important economic ties in that area would depend on Peking's good graces. Although the Japanese government was reluctant to curtail US ties, Red Chinese suggestions regarding Japanese logistic involvement in the US SEA effort were being carefully examined in Tokyo.

It is probable that a communist organized strike could be employed in Japan to hamper shipment of automotive vehicles and parts (most of the RVN military fleet is Japanese made). Further, the LST fleet on which the US depends in SEA is operated by Japanese contractors.

In the Philippines, a resurgent Hukbalahap movement was believed to be laying plans for widespread disorders and sabotage against the government and American facilities in the event the war in SEA is expanded.

In Burma, Chinese efforts to subvert and coerce the government of Ne Win into a policy of passive cooperation with Peking appeared to be bearing fruit. It was increasingly likely that the Red Chinese Army would be welcomed by important members of the Burmese government in the event of war in SEA.

During the winter of 1964-65 developments occurred rapidly in Southeast Asia as Peking countered US/RVN air strikes against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam by the

introduction of MIGs into Laos and North Vietnam flown by "volunteer" pilots, supported by Chinese technicians. As the number of American advisors in South Vietnam increased to over 25,000 with ten foreign flags providing token assistance in Saigon the DRV proceeded with the buildup of regular PAVN forces in South Vietnam. Moving across Laos, over the DMZ and by junk along the coast, three brigades of PAVN infiltrated the six northern provinces of South Vietnam. In December a major ground engagement occurred in which PAVN and VC units employed antiaircraft, light artillery and recoilless weapons to inflict a major defeat on the RVN.

In a pitched battle north of Hue, government forces, supported by US air, were forced into a retreat resulting in over a thousand casualties and loss of several hundred weapons. Concurrent terrorist activity in the southern delta region took a heavy toll among district and province leaders and American advisors with the RVN. A number of RVN and Farmgate air strikes against military targets in the DRV were interdicted by MIGs flying from North Vietnamese fields.

On Christmas day the VC used pack-howitzers for a half hour shelling of Saigon from across the river.

RVN leadership continued to be riven by apathy, disunity and jealousy. An increasing number of intellectuals and military commanders favored a negotiated settlement and some kind of collaboration with the National Liberation Front; the majority of the generals were believed to lean strongly toward major US air strikes against North Vietnam.

In January under guidance from Peking and Hanoi, the National Liberation Front announced the establishment of a Provisional Peoples Government (PPG) in South Vietnam which was promptly recognized by the CPR, the USSR and all other Socialist nations. Nguyen Van Hieu, the PPG Foreign Minister, announced from the PPG Embassy in Prague that he was assured of the backing of all responsible factions in South Vietnam "except the Fascists" and was prepared to sit down at a reconvened Geneva Conference. The Poles, Russians and Indians were anxious to convene the meeting but the UK blocked action.

In spite of urgings from the French and many neutrals, the United States resisted pressures toward the conference table and accelerated the tempo and scope of attacks

against infiltration routes and camps in the Laos panhandle and against military targets in North Vietnam, mainly training camps, storage depots and communications centers. At the same time additional US antiaircraft units were introduced into South Vietnam and Laos, although no communist aircraft had as yet been employed against targets in these countries. In early February the RVN high command announced that mines had been laid in the approaches to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha. These mine fields were sown with time delay mines by planes of the US Seventh Fleet.

Sufficient time was afforded shipping to quit the blockaded ports after the warning. Despite the warning, a Polish freighter delivering a cargo of machine parts to Haiphong sank following an explosion in the entrance channel.

Communist response to this move took similar form. In late February a US destroyer entering the port of Saigon was holed by an electric mine planted by DRV frogmen and sunk, partially blocking the harbor to shipping. There were twenty-two casualties and a tremendous hue and cry in the American press.

On 26 February the President of the United States addressed a special joint session of Congress to announce debarkation of a US Marine expeditionary force and the establishment of permanent US base facilities at Da Nang in South Vietnam, the planned airlift of a US Army brigade to the Mekong River in Thailand and the fact that in the future the United States would strike selected industrial as well as military targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for major VC terrorism and sabotage in South Vietnam. He stated that these actions were being taken under emergency powers granted him by the US Congress, Article 51 of the UN Charter and protocol agreements of the Southeast Asian Treaty.

The President used aerial photographs to prove that Chinese Peoples Army Forces were building up in the vicinity of Nanning, that extensive road and airfield construction was underway in Northern Laos paving the way for Chinese "invasion" and asserted his intelligence had reports that a Chinese light division was in the process of moving into Laos traveling by night, digging in under camouflage by day. He further asserted that the buildup of Red Chinese bomber aircraft on fields in south China and the recent movement of six Whiskey Class Chinese

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

submarines into waters off Hainan Island were considered to be provocative and threatening.

The United States was beginning a buildup of logistics support personnel in both Vietnam and Thailand as well as the construction of a POL pipeline from Bangkok north using materials which had been previously stockpiled at Korat. Lighterage of various types suitable for discharge under unimproved beach and harbor conditions was being shifted from Okinawa, the Philippines and the United States to SEA.

The Soviet position in SEA continued to be ambiguous as intelligence from Hanoi indicated delays in the delivery of promised Soviet industrial and electronic equipment from the USSR. The consensus of intelligence from European sources indicated that Khrushchev was planning a political move in conjunction with the GDR which would reopen the question of control over the access routes to West Berlin. This would pose serious problems for the United States and its NATO allies.

It would appear that the Soviets are preparing a series of diplomatic moves designed to seize the limelight from Peking in the eyes of Communist and neutral nations while avoiding direct involvement in the SEA confrontation. In private conversations with the American Secretary of State the Soviet Ambassador explained that in spite of the schism between Moscow and Peking, the USSR has no alternative but to provide moral and some materiel support to Hanoi or see Ho's government swing even further into Peking's orbit. He advised that Moscow could be expected to assume a harder propaganda line in relations with the United States in spite of recent trade, disarmament and cultural agreements. On 15 March a joint Soviet-East German announcement was made involving the signing of a "full-scale" peace treaty "sometime in May" with the concurrent withdrawal of three Soviet divisions from the European satellites. Ulbricht stated that the GDR would assume complete control of the Berlin access routes on May Day. On 20 March a United States military train carrying dependents was halted "due to track damage" between Frankfurt and Berlin and the passengers held for two days during negotiations. On 25 March a Pan American passenger flight into Berlin had a near collision in the air corridor with a Soviet MIG. These incidents served to arouse US public opinion.

Reactions in the world press are mixed with a mounting wave of apprehension particularly in the European area,

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-8-BLUE

that the United States may be preparing to embark on the hazardous road toward World War III.

The enemy apparently believes that the buildup of DRV forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, the escalation of terrorist tactics by the Viet Cong against government administrators, US advisors, continued subversive efforts among opposition factions within South Vietnam and the threat of Chicom intervention will gradually create an environment for fruitful negotiations. The United States is under pressure in this direction from the French and other Western powers.

During the early morning hours of 1 April it became evident that rivalry and jealousy among the RVN leadership and between the countless political factions of that country have been exacerbated by the mounting SEA crisis. Tensions which have been suppressed since the riots last summer have given way to violence and thousands of Buddhists are again rioting in the major cities. It is rumored that Minh has withdrawn from the ruling triumvirate and with backing from Khiem has demanded that Khanh resign his powers. The military are sharply divided and good prospects exist for conflict between the two factions.

In view of the possible crisis in Berlin the President has dictated a hold on three STRICOM divisions and appropriate supporting units to permit a rapid deployment to Europe if this becomes necessary.

Public opinion in the United States seems willing to support a more positive commitment by United States forces. Prospects for obtaining concessions in SEA through negotiation which would improve the present tenuous situation appear remote. The following proposals have been advanced for consideration by the National Security Council:

The State Department has suggested that the President announce that the defense of freedom in South Vietnam is the shared responsibility of all free peoples, that Saigon and Berlin are co-equal symbols of Western determination and call for immediate partial mobilization of US forces.

A Defense Department suggestion calls for the immediate and rapid deployment to Thailand and South Vietnam of logistical units and personnel, particularly engineer units to accelerate the development of a logistical base capable of supporting Thai, RVN and other national and US forces of up to five divisions.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

A second Defense Department proposal advanced by the Army calls for immediate alert and possible deployment of the Army's 11th Air Assault Division which is completing organizational tests.

These suggestions all relate to creation of the necessary psychological and military posture required to convince friends as well as foe of US determination.

A Defense Study Group has formulated the following statement of US objectives in SEA:

"The US objective in SEA will be to compel the enemy to cease support of insurgencies, to assist local forces as necessary in the elimination of the insurgents who thereafter persist, to reunify Vietnam and to achieve the independence and security of friendly nations in the area."

The President has requested that this statement be reviewed by the NSC with a view to making recommendations regarding adoption of this statement as the premise for national planning.

A message has been received from CINCPAC requesting advance authority for the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons as may be required in SEA to preclude the destruction of major US or friendly forces if enemy ground or other forces are suddenly introduced under conditions which preclude effective communication with the Washington Command Post.

It is now 1 April 1965.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-10-BLUE

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

SIGMA II-64

INITIAL RED SCENARIO

The following scenario outlines events which transpire in Southeast Asia between summer 1964 and spring 1965. The rationale and actions depicted here are those of a Communist China which has surveyed all aspects of its position on the world stage and elected a highly aggressive and dangerous military strategy.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-1-RED

During summer 1964 cold war signals from Washington were garbled and somewhat contradictory. By shifting the leadership in Saigon from Lodge to Taylor and by increasing the effort within South Vietnam itself to build a more stable base of political support among the population, it appeared that the imperialists had foresworn ambitions to extend the conflict toward Hanoi. Nonetheless, certain extreme elements among the Khanh clique in Saigon and in the United States, notably among the opposition party, continued loud clamoring for escalation of the war.

In the soul searching which had taken place among the imperialist leadership, much of it reported and analyzed in the US and European press, it was apparent that many American military men were reluctant to risk a ground war in SEA which would tie down the bulk of US ground forces and consume resources that could be used in other areas of capitalist exploitation. Other military leaders felt that a few bombs and some salvos of naval gun-fire against North Vietnam would end Hanoi's part in South Vietnam permanently.

By mid-summer it was apparent that the "contain the war in South Vietnam" soft-line group was winning the Washington argument. If Washington had been sincere in threats to carry the war into Vietnam, the torpedo attacks in Tonkin Gulf provided an ideal excuse and opportunity. Instead, relatively mild US air reprisals only indicated a willingness to reply when American ships were attacked. Withdrawal of the ships shortly afterward was the clearest possible proof of US reluctance to escalate the conflict in spite of the innuendoes made in the American press.

Results within South Vietnam were to stimulate Khanh to strident calls for war against the North while attempting to seize and extend his personal power. This abortive and transparent attempt almost ended in disaster for the premier. Occurring at the anniversary of the Diem oppressions against South Vietnamese Buddhists, Khanh's elbowing aside of Minh and his grab for dictatorial power stirred violent reactions among the Buddhists. Riots and demonstrations caused Khanh to resign as president and content himself with a more obscure public role behind the facade of a new junta which included Minh as well as Khanh's military henchman, Tran Thien Khiem.

The Buddhist leader Tri Quang, who was probably the prime influence over the Buddhists in this internal struggle, is not sympathetic to the National Liberation

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

Front and is in fact somewhat pro-American since it was the Americans who saved his life from Diem two years ago. Urged by the Americans, he sought to quell the disorders.

By September the internal political picture in South Vietnam was precarious at best but it appeared that a patched over coalition regime might hold together, giving the Americans a chance to bolster Khanh or to groom a more effective and reliable vassal.

It was evident from the speeches which marked the beginning of the American election campaign that Johnson had no thought of employing nuclear weapons in SEA or any intense desire to expand the conflict there while South Vietnam was only a few steps from anarchy.

Although the American Congress provided Johnson with emergency powers to deal with the developing crisis, the tone of the press provided a better indication of the real temper of the capitalist leadership. These articles stressed the war-weariness of the South Vietnamese people, the mounting momentum of Viet Cong attacks, the dubious value of attacking military and industrial installations in North Vietnam with air and sea power when these resources had so little bearing on the actual war in South Vietnam. It was equally apparent following the Tonkin Gulf incident that the Americans were waiting for a communist military reaction. Apprehension was high that masses of Communist ground forces would sweep into SEA--a development as unthinkable for the Americans as a full-scale war with the USSR.

DeGaulle was rumored to have told former US Ambassador Lodge, who was seeking European support, that the French had many more times the number of ground forces committed in the Indo-Chinese war than the United States had in Vietnam but had been forced to withdraw by the Viet Minh and that the west's only hope was for a neutralized SEA.

On the scientific front, major break-throughs occurred in Red China's nuclear development program in late summer and plans were tentatively laid for a full scale nuclear test during the summer of 1965. If it is successful, two or three air deliverable weapons should be produced within twelve months after the test.

During the fall of 1964 Peking, Hanoi and the Peking oriented factions of Communist parties throughout the world made a concerted effort to portray the United States

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E-3-RED

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

as an imperialist troublemaker in SEA. While accusations of colonialism and exploitation were leveled in the United Nations and communist press, the level of Chinese assistance to Hanoi and to the Pathet Lao continued to rise and a Chinese military mission was established in Cambodia. Air and air defense capabilities in the DRV were strengthened by the introduction of Chinese materiel and technicians. Road construction was stepped up from the Chinese border into northern Laos.

In Communist councils the rift between Peking and Moscow became ever wider, culminating during October in a weak show of socialist "solidarity" that lost Peking's bid for United Nations membership. The only vestige of unity between the USSR and Red China lay in similar calls for reconvening Geneva Treaty conferees to deal with the crisis in SEA.

Fighting in Laos diminished as clear weather favored the recently expanded Laotian Air Force; the Pathet Lao dug in and consolidated summer gains. In South Vietnam the Viet Cong continued to receive reinforcements from the DRV swelling the ranks of regular forces engaged against the RVN to some 40,000. The pattern of attacks, particularly baited ambushes, continued to favor the Viet Cong as more and more battalion size VC units were engaged.

In November announcements of joint Chinese-North Korean maneuvers were followed up by a series of division size exercises south of the Yalu.

The Indonesian-Malaysian struggle oscillated indecisively with Indonesian incursions into Sarawak triggering a US assistance program involving weapons, helicopters and Stateside training for the Malaysians and an upsurge of Soviet arms assistance to Djarkarta.

US/RVN air and ground strikes against VC lines of communication in the Laos panhandle resulted in the destruction of several arms caches and the capture of a number of DRV prisoners who identified their parent PAVN units.

Prior to the American Fall elections, the Johnson Administration continued to "signal" its determination to Peking that communist victory in SEA would be a costly business. The number of RVN air, naval and ground attacks aimed at targets in North Vietnam mounted with mixed results. Some succeeded, most failed and a number of so-called "commandos" defected to report sagging morale among

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-4-RED

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

the RVN government's forces.

The United States leadership in South Vietnam continued trying to achieve the kinds of changes in direction, attitude and organization of the RVN government that would broaden popular support, but political and psychological fragmentation and Viet Cong terrorism cut deep. The so-called "oil slick" program was hampered by fear and inefficiency as one administrator after another was excuted by the VC.

More American advisors and Special Forces personnel were dispatched to South Vietnam and the ranks of civilian technicians were augmented by Philipinos, Australians and other foreign nationals. The Chinats sent a mission to assist with development of a political organization within the military and there were rumors Chiang had offered several divisions of troops. Nevertheless disintegration continued in the RVN.

American efforts to enlist wider support among their allies were met with various forms of indifference ranging from blunt suggestions that SEA should be "written off" to listless contributions of non-military aid because the allies were unconvinced the US is capable of stopping our liberation technique.

With Johnson's re-election and the emergence of a Labor government in Britain, conditions seemed to be developing for negotiations. A trail ballon floated through the Poles suggested Peking's willingness to work out an Austrian-type solution separately for both North and South Vietnam. The Americans reiterated demands for restoration of the status quo ante the Pathet Lao drive of last summer.

Trade and diplomatic discussions with the Government of Japan pointed up the perils involved in allowing the United States to use bases in Japan and the Ryukus to conduct colonialist activities in SEA. Pressure was also applied through Communist Parties and front organizations in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines to restrict and inhibit the use of important base facilities in these countries.

With the upsurge in trade between Japan and China, businessmen in the Land of the Rising Sun were becoming acutely aware of commercial opportunities in a growing relationship with Red China. The Japanese were coming to realize that when SEA falls under Communist influence even their important economic ties in that area will depend on

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

E-5-RED

Peking's good graces. Although the Japanese government was reluctant to curtail ties with the Americans, subtle Red Chinese suggestions regarding Japanese logistic involvement in the US SEA effort were being carefully examined.

It is probable that a communist organized strike could be employed in Japan to hamper shipment of automotive vehicles and parts; most of the RVN truck fleet is Japanese made. The LSTs on which the Americans depend in SEA are operated by Japanese contractors.

In the Philippines, a resurgent Hukbalahap movement was laying plans for widespread disorders and sabotage against the government and American facilities in the event the war in SEA is expanded.

In Burma, efforts to subvert and coerce the government of Ne Win into a policy of passive cooperation with Peking continued to bear fruit. It appears likely that the Red Chinese Army would be warmly welcomed by important members of the Burmese government in the event it becomes expedient to make such a move. Individuals who might oppose Chinese entry could be quickly disposed of.

During the winter of 1964-65 developments occurred rapidly in Southeast Asia as Peking countered US/RVN air strikes against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnam by the introduction of MIGs into Laos and North Vietnam flown by "volunteer" pilots, supported by Chinese technicians. As the number of American advisors in South Vietnam increased to over 25,000 with ten foreign flags providing token assistance in Saigon the DRV proceeded with the buildup of regular PAVN forces in South Vietnam. Moving across Laos, over the DMZ and by junk along the coast, three brigades of PAVN infiltrated the six northern provinces of South Vietnam. In December a major ground engagement occurred in which PAVN and VC units employed antiaircraft, light artillery and recoilless weapons to inflict a major defeat on the RVN.

In a pitched battle north of Hue, South Vietnamese forces, supported by US air, were forced into a retreat resulting in over a thousand casualties and loss of several hundred weapons. Concurrent terrorist activity in the southern delta region took a heavy toll among district and province leaders and American advisors with the RVN. A number of RVN/US piloted air strikes against military targets in the DRV were interdicted by MIGs flying from North

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

Vietnamese fields.

On Christmas day the VC used pack-howitzers for a half hour shelling of Saigon from across the river.

RVN leadership continued to be riven by apathy and disunity, and the dispute between Buddhists and Catholics continued to smolder. An increasing number of intellectuals and military commanders favored a negotiated settlement and some kind of collaboration with the National Liberation Front; the majority of the generals were believed to lean strongly toward major US air strikes against North Vietnam.

In January under guidance from Peking and Hanoi the National Liberation Front announced the establishment of a Provisional Peoples Government (PPG) in South Vietnam which was promptly recognized by the CPR, the USSR and all other Socialist nations. Nguyen Van Hieu, the PPG Foreign Minister, announced from the PPG Embassy in Prague that he was assured of the backing of all responsible factions in South Vietnam "except the Fascists" and was prepared to sit down at a reconvened Geneva Conference.

The Poles, Russians and Indians were anxious to convene the meeting but the UK blocked action.

In spite of urgings from the French and many neutrals, the United States resisted pressures toward the conference table and accelerated the tempo and scope of attacks against infiltration routes and camps in the Laos panhandle and against military targets in North Vietnam, mainly training camps, storage depots and communications centers. At the same time additional US antiaircraft units were introduced into South Vietnam and Laos, although no communist aircraft had as yet been employed against targets in these countries. In early February RVN high command announcements that mines had been laid in the approaches to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gay and Cam Pha were confirmed by observers and intelligence sources which indicated that extensive mine fields had been sown from the air by planes of the United States Seventh Fleet. The mines were equipped with delay fuzes, allowing sufficient time for shipping to quit the blockaded ports after the warning. Despite the warning, a Polish freighter delivering a cargo of machine parts to Haiphong sank following an explosion in the entrance channel.

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

E-7-RED

Communist response to this new imperialist aggression took similar form. In late February a US destroyer entering the port of Saigon was holed by an electric mine planted by ~~ORV~~ frogmen and sunk, partially blocking the harbor to shipping. There were twenty-two casualties and a tremendous hue and cry in the American controlled press.

On 26 February the President of the United States addressed a special joint session of Congress to announce debarcation of a US Marine expeditionary force and the establishment of permanent US base facilities at Da Nang in South Vietnam, the planned airlift of a US Army brigade to the Mekong River in Thailand and the fact that in the future the United States would strike selected industrial as well as military targets in North Vietnam in retaliation for major VC terrorism and sabotage in South Vietnam. He stated that these actions were being taken under emergency powers granted him by the US Congress, Article 51 of the UN Charter and protocol agreements of the Southeast Asian Treaty.

The American President used aerial photographs to "prove" that Chinese Army Forces were building up in the vicinity of Nanning, that extensive road and airfield construction was underway in Northern Laos paving the way for Chinese "invasion" and asserted his intelligence had reports that a Chinese light division was in the process of moving into Laos traveling by night, digging in under camouflage by day. The American intelligence is wrong for in fact, only Chinese construction units are currently in the area. Johnson further asserted that the buildup of Red Chinese bomber aircraft on fields in south China and the recent movement of six Whiskey Class Chinese submarines into waters off Hainan Island were considered to be provocative and threatening.

Our intelligence indicated that the United States was beginning a buildup of logistic support personnel in both Vietnam and Thailand and construction of a POL pipeline from Bangkok north using material previously stockpiled at Korat. There was also evidence that lighterage of various types suitable for discharge under unimproved beach and harbor conditions was being shifted to SEA from Okinawa, the Philippines and the United States.

There were no signs that the United States had begun mobilization of additional ground forces or that any major

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

augmentation had occurred in air or mercantile fleets.

The Soviet position in SEA continued to be ambiguous as reports from Hanoi indicated delays in the delivery of promised POL, industrial and electronic equipment from the USSR. Intelligence from European sources indicated that Khrushchev was planning a political move in conjunction with the GDR which would reopen the question of control over the access routes to West Berlin. This would pose serious problems for the United States and its NATO allies.

It appeared that the Soviets were preparing a series of diplomatic moves designed to seize the limelight from Peking in the eyes of Communist and neutral nations while avoiding direct involvement in the SEA confrontation. On 15 March a joint Soviet-East German announcement was made involving the signing of a "full-scale" peace treaty "sometime in May" with the concurrent withdrawal of three Soviet divisions from the European satellites. Ulbricht stated that the GDR will assume complete control of the Berlin access routes on May Day. On 20 March a United States military train carrying dependents was halted "due to track damage" between Frankfurt and Berlin and the passengers held for two days during negotiations. On 25 March a Pan American passenger flight into Berlin had a near collision in the air corridor with a Soviet MIG. US public opinion was emotionally aroused over the incident.

Reactions to date in the world press have been mixed with a mounting wave of apprehension, particularly in Europe, that the United States may be embarking on the hazardous road toward World War III.

This view is not shared by Comrade Mao who is of the opinion that the Americans will come to the conference table before the danger of general war or even of limited war in SEA becomes much greater. Using air and naval forces, the United States may well escalate the level of attacks against North Vietnam; however, the imperialists will consider long and hard before becoming embroiled in a ground struggle against both the DRV/VC and the CPR. This is the certainty they face as the level of DRV/VC forces rises in South Vietnam and the RVN sustain defeat after defeat.

It is believed that the progressive buildup of DRV forces in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, the escalation of terrorist tactics by the Viet Cong

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-9-RED

against government administrators, US advisors and continued subversive efforts among the opposition factions within South Vietnam will gradually create the environment for fruitful negotiations. The United States is under pressure from the French and other Western powers who are anxious to develop full commercial relations with Peoples' China.

Nevertheless, recent developments make it appear that the criminal elements in Washington and Saigon are fascinated with the idea of expanding the civil war with a blow against North Vietnam. Reactionary Vietnamese interests who direct the conflict have evidently convinced the Americans that such an offensive policy will shift world attention away from failures in South Vietnam and rally Western support for a crusade against Hanoi and Peking. This will turn out to be an unprofitable enterprise for the capitalists.

While it is true that the spread of communism is inexorable and that eventually the present strategy will prevail, it is also apparent that the potential gains from a more overt and aggressive military strategy outweigh the risks.

If the imperialists back down in the face of increased military pressure rather than risk the commitment of major ground forces, possibilities are immediately opened for negotiation from strength--thus validating past Communist gains and strengthening the image of Peking at the expense of Moscow and Washington.

If the United States continues to escalate the war centrifugal fears and forces will shake the Western alliance; the emerging nations will be alienated from the West by such a policy and Khrushchev will be forced either to follow Peking's initiative or to expose the full extent of Soviet revisionism. In either case Peking will be strengthened in the eyes of communists throughout the world. The air and submarine fleets of Peoples' China are not improving as they become older and the cadres of battle trained ground fighters are not enlarging. Adequate petroleum and other resources are available to support initial phases of a major ground war in SEA if this becomes necessary.

During the last several days it has again become evident that rivalry and jealousy among the RVN leadership and between the countless political factions of that

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

country is unresolved. Tensions which have been surprised since the riots of last summer have given way to violence and thousands of Buddhists are once again rioting in Da Nang, Saigon and Hue. It is rumored that Minh has withdrawn from the ruling triumvirate and with the backing of Khiem has demanded that Khanh resign his powers. It is believed that the military are sharply divided and good prospects exist for civil war.

Based on events of the past eight months and the current volatile situation, Mao Tse-tung reached the conclusion that further deterioration of conditions in Southeast Asia makes it advantageous for the CPR to overtly intervene in Southeast Asia with ground, sea and air forces to terminate permanently the imperialistic influence there. Accordingly, he announced that the current situation required a review of Red Chinese objectives and strategy applicable to the Western Pacific, particularly Southeast Asia and directed on 1 April that the following actions be accomplished at once:

a. Review and record the broad objectives of the CPR in Southeast Asia and the general strategy that should be followed to accomplish these objectives.

b. Determine the specific actions that the CPR and the DRV should take regarding the existing situation in Southeast Asia in the near term.

c. Prepare for possible future use a broad strategic plan for the employment of CPR, DRV, Pathet Lao and Viet Cong forces in over-running and liberating all of Southeast Asia. Also determine the time of year that would be most advantageous for the execution of this plan.

It is now 1 April 1965.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

E-11-RED

F
PROJECTIONS AND
MESSAGES

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

SIGMA II-64

GAME MESSAGES

The game messages contained in this Tab are shown in chronological sequence by Move and by color team within each Move. The Blue Team messages appear first, followed by the Red Team messages. Control Team messages, including Scenario Projections, are interspersed among the respective color team messages chronologically as they were generated.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

F-0

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Blue initial scenario

DTG 8 September 1964

1. Request info concerning numbers and categories of targets struck by aircraft clearly identifiable as US during the winter 1964 and spring 1965.
2. If US aircraft were not used, except Farmgate, list the use of VNAF and Farmgate aircraft.
3. We assume the attacks on targets in NVN were retaliatory in nature and that those against targets in the Laos panhandle were designed to impede the flow of supplies into SVN. Is this assumption correct?

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM Control TO Blue

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Blue Message 1

DTG 8 Sep 1964

1. a. During fall 1964 all 15 air strikes against NVN were flown by Farmgate/RVN. The three most successful were

(1) HAMRONG and railroad bridge north of Vinh (17° 39'; 106° 32'E.) Out of service for three weeks. Restored on 50% basis.

(2) MU GIA PASS military camp near NVN/LAOS border (17° 40'; 105° 46'E). Estimated ten blgs destroyed with some personnel casualties and three trucks.

(3) Tchepone Complex - Damage to outside storage, personnel and estimated eight vehicles.

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F-1-Blue ;

b. During the winter, there were 18 strikes against targets in NVN and Laos by RVN and US marked aircraft. Principal successes were achieved at:

(1) Xaun Mai (20° 53'N; 105° 35'E) 338th Inf Bde 200 bldgs numerous personnel casualties.

(2) Six US air attacks at night against troop locations in NVN. Planes probably not identified as US.

(3) US sorties against targets of opportunity supporting PAVN brigades engaged in SVN north of HUE.

(4) RVN aircraft continued periodic strikes against troop and communications targets in Laos with poor to negligible effect. Three aircraft lost.

2. MIG air defense was relatively ineffective. 1 RVN aircraft was destroyed over NVN, three were damaged severely by ground fire. Two MIGs were damaged by US aircraft. No US losses.

3. All attacks except those aimed at targets of tactical opportunity were in retaliation for terrorism and sabotage by VC/DRV in SVN.

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Blue initial scenario

DTG 8 Sept.

Request size of the US Marine Expeditionary Force which the President announced had gone ashore at Da Nang. The announcement was made on 26 February.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Your Msg No. 2
Move No. I

DTG 8 September 1964

The force ashore at DANANG is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade. It is composed of one regimental landing team, one Marine Air Group and necessary supporting troops. The total personnel strength of the force is 12,000.

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Blue Initial Scenario

DTG 9 Sept 1964

1. How many and what kind of US anti-aircraft units are in SVN and Laos? Where are they?
2. What is the status of build-up of logistic support personnel, how many units of what kind? Is this continuing according to a plan? What is the plan?
3. How much lighterage of what kind has been, and is being sent to SEA?

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Your Msg No 3, Move I

DTG 9 Sep 64

1. Reference page E-7 Blue Scenario, line 5 ; please delete Laos and substitute Thailand therefor.

2. US antiaircraft units deployed as of 1 April were as follows:

- a. 1 Marine AA Bn (HAWK) to DANANG.
- b. 1 Army AA Bn (HAWK) to SAIGON.
- c. 1 Army AA Bn (HAWK) to KORAT.

3. The units listed below closed in Thailand by 1 April 1965. This completes the planned deployment, as of 1 April. (See Control Message No 3, Move I, for tactical and support personnel deployed to Vietnam.)

1 Terminal Service Company

1 Engineer Combat Bn

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- 2 Army Security Agency Platoons
- 1 Hq and Hq Det, Signal Group
- 1 Signal Bn, Corps
- 1 Radio Relay Platoon, VHF

9th Logistical Command Augmentation:

- 1 Engineer Det, GG, Water Purification
- 1 Provisional Medical Service Unit
- 1 Medical Det, Helicopter Ambulance
- 1 Military Police Det
- 2 Military Police Platoon
- 1 Ordnance Company, Dir Spt
- 1 Ordnance Company, Field Supply
- 1 Ordnance Det, Explosives Disposal
- 1 QM Co, Division Support
- 1 Sig Bn, Sup and Maint
- 1 Hq and Hq Det, Sup and Maint
- 1 Signal Co, Fwd
- 1 Signal Co, Depot
- 1 Transportation Corps Light Truck Co
- 1 TC Helicopter Co (H 37)
- 2 TC Det, Movement Control
- 1 AG Postal Unit

4. Nineteen (19) LCM 8s closed at BANGKOK prior to
1 April. Four (4) LCU 2s closed SUBIC BAY by same date.

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE BLUE Initial Scenario DTG 10 Sept 1964

What is air order of battle in NVN?

What fields are used?

What is control mechanism used?

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MESSAGE NO. 6

FROM Control TO Blue

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Your Msg No. 4, Move I DTG 10 Sept 1964

1. The air OB of NVN is as listed on page E-5 of the Fact Book with augmentation as shown below:

August 1964 - 36 MIG 15s at PHUC YEN

Winter 1964-5- 36 MIG 17s at CAT Bi Airfield at HAI PHONG

2. All airfields listed on the North Vietnam Terrain and Transportation Map (28545 CIA 4-60) are being used by the GVN plus the new field at PHUC YEN. The fields at PHUC YEN and HAI PHONG are the major fields now in use.

3. Prior to 1 April the CHICOMs deployed sufficient TOKEN and ROCK CAKE radars to NVN to provide for minimal requirements. Intelligence indicates that GCI Control equipment at PHUC YEN is adequate for tactical operations.

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MESSAGE NO. 5

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 10 Sept

US OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

OBJECTIVES

General

1. To maintain the independence and security of allied and neutral nations in the area.

2. To prevent Communist take-over in SE Asian countries by seeking to compel Hanoi and Peiping to cease aggressive activities in this area, and by assisting local forces in the elimination of any insurgents who thereafter persist.

Specific

South Vietnam: To establish and maintain the authority and the effectiveness of the government in Saigon throughout the territory south of the 17th parallel.

Laos: Our publicly declared objective should continue to be the restoration of the authority of the Royal Lao Government over all of Laos through complete implementation of the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1962. However, we recognize privately that we may have to settle for a de facto partition of Laos which would keep the Communists out of the Mekong Valley and deny the Communists the continued use of the Laos panhandle for the support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Objectives of Friendly Countries in Potential Conflict with US Objectives

GVN Objective: The GVN may not share the US objective of prosecution of the guerrilla war to a successful conclusion but may prefer either heightened action against the North or negotiation as complete solutions in themselves.

RLG Objectives: The objective of the Lao Government under Souvanna Phouma is to bring all of Laos under the control of the central Government of National Union. However, militarily the US can accept a de facto partition of Laos, provided the Mekong Valley and the Laos Panhandle are under non-Communist control.

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STRATEGY

1. To use political, economic and military measures against the NVN and CHICOMS in line with the stated objectives. This would include political negotiations after the proper climate is established. Employ in SEA US military forces, including combat units, against NVN or the CHICOMS as necessary. Specifically, the US will:

a. Deter major communist military action by the deployment of selected military units into the area.

b. Assisted by the GVN, undertake punitive strikes on military and industrial targets in the NVN to cause the NVN to make a political decision to cease support of the insurgency in Laos and SVN.

c. Continue those actions necessary to assist the GVN in establishing a viable, effective government, greatly expanding the counterinsurgency operations in SVN and eliminate the VC as a threat to internal security.

d. Assisted by the GVN, and the Lao and Thai Governments as appropriate, deny the flow of VC support into SVN.

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MESSAGE NO. 6

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____ DTG 10 Sept

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SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

POLITICAL ACTIONS

International Political

1. Request a meeting of the UN Security Council at which US then presents case against DRV and CHICOMS (e.g., evidence of long history of violation of accords, of infiltrated PAVN brigades and their involvement in December engagement, CHICOM involvement in Laos, etc). Request Security Council condemnation of Communist aggression in Laos/SVN. Indicate US/GVN intent to continue military pressures in North as long as DRV aggression in SVN and Laos continues - that mining operations will be continued until Communists stop mining of roads in SVN; also determination to deal with infiltration problem and to meet any CHICOM or DRV thrust on the ground. If necessary veto any attempt by Communist side to turn tables by seeking condemnation of US "aggression". If US resolution vetoed, as we presume, but UN tactical position seems favorable, we would take case to UNGA under "Uniting for Peace Resolution," seeking to obtain broad UN sanction under which international force might be organized. (These actions are premised on the assumption that there was real prospect of at least mildly favorable compromise UN action which would provide at least minimum UN coloration for US actions. If it is determined (by Control) that UN situation is not favorable to even this minimal outcome, US action should be confined to presentation of case and justification of actions being taken or to be taken.)

2. Stimulate GVN and RLG request for SEATO assistance. Present case to SEATO Council. Seek formal SEATO action endorsing individual action by SEATO members to come to the aid of SVN and Laos if it appears that such action would not be vetoed by French and/or Pakistanis. On the basis of attitudes displayed in SEATO discussion approach appropriate members bilaterally for contributions to international force to be introduced when US forces introduced.

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3. Urgently seek Souvanna's support for introduction of US (ARVN and Thai) forces (alternatively, an international force) into the Tchepone area to reduce infiltration into SVN.

4. Resist all pressures for an international conference arguing that a new situation has been created by Communist actions, that US recourse in first instance is to UN and to existing regional security arrangements, but that if necessary the US and the GVN will continue to take unilateral action. Only after international or unilateral defensive actions have caused Communist side to comply with Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 will US be willing to participate in an international conference.

5. Conduct major diplomatic campaign with US allies and important neutrals to convince them of correctness of US case, limited character of US objectives, and need for unity in face of possible major overt aggression by Communists. Also conduct major international information campaign along these lines.

6. Communicate privately to the DRV the warning that military pressures will rise; that attacks on industrial installations will begin and will be continued until the DRV ceases its support for the insurgency in Laos and SVN and withdraws its military forces from the two countries.

7. Communicate privately with Communist China at Warsaw warning against CHICOM introduction of forces into Laos or SVN pointing out that in such an event it would be most unlikely that the military struggle would be long confined to the Indochina mainland. Point to dangers involved in mounting exchange between DRV and US/GVN which may soon involve all major participants in the area, including Communist China, in a war of major proportions involving the Chinese mainland. Indicate that we have noted military exercises in North Korea and warn CHICOMS that in the event of renewal of hostilities in Korea they can anticipate that the US response will include utilization of all weapons required to counter the aggression. Warn that if CHICOMS should introduce forces into Cambodia, US will not stand idly by. In these discussions, and otherwise as appropriate, make clear that the US cannot accept an "Austrian-type" solution for North and South Vietnam. (Such a solution would preclude outside military assistance to the GVN.)

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8. Send message to USSR reiterating that US has no quarrel with USSR in SEA and describing limited character of US objectives. Expressing hope that it will refrain from sending its shipping into mined DRV ports and use influence with other East European countries to do the same. Request USSR to counsel DRV to cease the dangerous course upon which it is embarked.

9. Warn Cambodians that if they permit CHICOM military forces to be deployed to their territory, US will not stand idly by.

10. Give private assurance to Burmese Government that if CHICOMS move, they can expect US military assistance, but imply a threat that if the RUGB welcomes CHICOM forces into its country, it can expect that the US will take necessary military action on Burmese territory to deal with the threat.

11. Advise all governments with which US has diplomatic relations privately that the US would view recognition of the PPG (NLF "government") as an unfriendly act to which the US may respond by severance of diplomatic relations; further that we would reserve the right to take other actions as appropriate.

US Domestic Actions.

1. The President will immediately declare a national emergency in a major speech in which he also reiterates the US intention to attack industrial targets in the DRV. (This declaration would be preceded by consultation with leaders of both parties in and out of Congress.)

2. While we seek maximum international support for US position and actions, we have rejected proposal that the President "announce that the defense of freedom in South Vietnam is the shared responsibility of all free peoples and that Saigon and Berlin are co-equal symbols of US determination" (as proposed in original Blue Team scenario). (Note: This proposal rejected for two basic reasons: (a) would involve connotation that military planning and action to deal with SEA situation would be basically similar to that for Berlin; and (b) in the shaky situation in SVN by which we are faced under the scenario, there is some danger that we might, at least temporarily, lose Saigon; this would by no means mean loss of SVN and should not carry any such implication.)

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Actions to Provide Political Stability to SVN Govt.

1. Conciliate diverse anti-Communist groups by urging effective participation of these political elements in appropriate government processes.

2. ACTION: Message to Embassy Saigon.

Infuse Americans, both military and civilian, as well as acceptable third country nationals more deeply into the Vietnamese Governmental structure at all levels in order to improve the efficiency of GVN operations (both military and civilian). These advisors must operate tactfully and behind the scenes, but they should become actual partners in the decision-making and implementing process at all levels from the central government to the district. In addition, they will also serve in an on-the-job instructional capacity.

3. ACTION: Message to Country Team Saigon and implementing instructions to Washington Departments; messages to US Embassies in appropriate third countries.

After obtaining from the SVN Government with maximum celerity a request for the introduction of US ground combat military forces into the Saigon area for security purposes, announce publicly this fact and the US agreement to this request. This task force, the 187th BDE, will be deployed to Tan Son Nhut without delay, from Okinawa with the use of massed airlift. First elements will arrive on D+1 and air lifted echelon (1200 men) will close D+3. Unit will act as a security and reserve force. In addition, this unit will be available to provide political stability to the government by bolstering the anti-Communist forces and politically intimidating any potential neutralist coup group.

4. ACTION: Messages to CINCPAC, Embassy Saigon and COMUSMACV.

Secure the lives of the Senior RVN officials.

Political, Economic and Psychological Actions Within South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Continue and intensify where feasible, all political, economic and psychological actions within South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand to strengthen the prospects for viable, stable, pro-Western oriented governments and to insure that these governments can control and receive the support of the peoples of the respective countries.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY ACTIONS

1. Logistics build-up in SEA.
 - a. Prepare base for units now deployed.
 - b. Support expanded operations, if necessary.
2. North Vietnam
 - a. Increase intensity of air attacks on military targets.
 - b. Be prepared to attack selected industrial targets.
 - c. Continue and increase tempo of Mar Ops.
3. Laos
 - a. Continue FAR/NEUTRAL operations.
 - b. Prepare for combat operations in Panhandle.
4. Thailand
 - a. Army forces
 - One US Abn Div closes D+35 days.
 - One US Army Inf Div closes D+30 days.
 - One US Army Inf Div closes D+60 days.
 - Four Thai Div in place.
 - One Philippine BN closes D+30 days.
 - b. Air Force
 - One FIS (-) closes D+1 day.
 - Two TFS close D+2 days.
5. South Vietnam
 - a. GVN forces continue operations as at present.
 - b. US forces presently in country will continue operations at present scale.
 - c. US Army forces
 - One Abn BDE
 - First echelon closes D+1 day.

Air echelon closes D+3 days
Sea echelon closes D+20 days
One Inf Div closes D+60 days

d. US Marine Corps

MEF (full) closes D+35 days

e. US Air Force

Two TBS close D+3 days
One TRTF closes D+1 day
Three TCS (M) in place
One FIS closes D+1 day

6. Hawaii

One US Army Abn Div closes D+45 days

7. WESTPAC

a. US Marines

One Marine Div/Wg Team closes D+50 days.

b. US Air Force

Ten TFS close D+18 days

8. US Navy

a. Conduct ASW operations to search for and track six CHICOM subs.

b. Additional Attack Carrier Gp close South China Sea D+16 days.

c. ASW carrier group to Japan area closes D+20 days.

9. Authority to use tactical nuclear weapons not given to CINCPAC.

MILITARY ACTIONS

1. On 1 April we would initiate measures through the Department of State to explain to our Allies and friends the dangers to us all of

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the military crisis in SVN and Berlin, and in the Far East, and assure our use of bases in Japan and the PI. We would also consult with the Thai and SVN governments about our logistic plans and force deployment; we would keep them adequately advised at every important turn.

In pursuing these measures of mobilization and deployment we would be guided in this phase by the basic philosophy of making a very strong show of force. Proposed US moves described below are designed to deter invasion of SEA by the CHICOMS, and to provide proper posture for operations against DRV and CHICOMS as may be required.

PHASE I. After the political moves abroad and at home as listed in paragraph 1, we would:

A. Institute logistic measures beyond those in the scenario:

1. Institute mobilization as required. Recommend increases in active forces required..

2. Authorize services to procure combat support (materiel and supplies) for SEA countries.

3. Continue base development build-up in Thailand and South Vietnam on expedited basis, with emphasis on transportation and engineer support.

4. Deploy additional lighterage as determined necessary to SEA area; with accompanying crews.

5. Accelerate production of war material. As for military forces proper, consideration should be given to getting international representation, weighing this against the complications of control and coordination. Generally a SEATO force seems desirable, with more than a UN token force doubtful of obtaining and of doubtful utility.

B. See summary sheet for deployments of major combat units.

C. Laos - The US, Thailand and Laotian forces would help deter Communist advances toward the Mekong. We would continue to support the present RLG military forces under Souvanna's Government, increasing air capability. The main new effort in Laos would be directed against the Panhandle. The Pathet Lao has controlled the Panhandle for over 10 years and administers the area. It is a very difficult target, and should be

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approached both from the west and east simultaneously. This infiltration route is important, especially in terms of personnel. We would immediately step up harassment operations using US and Thailand forces to harass the road network. Cross border operations might be run into this area from the SVN side, with the idea that they would only harass and perhaps be useful to ARVN morale.

In the air, daily bombing runs would be made by the Lao Air Force also to harass the road network. This effort would be supplemented by Farmgate or US attacks from SVN if needed. This would include bombing CHICOM forces in Laos.

Increase air recce all over Laos, especially in view of the reports on the CHICOM presence, would be accomplished.

D. North Vietnam - Bombing of NVN would be accomplished by plainly marked US planes for the political effect. Our international and domestic position should be strong enough after the political measures on page 1 to allow this. The targets would be attacked in the following priority:

1. Air defense
2. Airfields
3. POL
4. Military installations
5. Industrial targets

These attacks would be on a selected basis using RVN/US aircraft with sufficient intensity to achieve 80% destruction. Industrial targets, which presumably would be the real leverage on NVN, would be attacked by US and RVN aircraft on a phased basis. Successive attacks on specific industrial targets will continue until the DRV withdraws its forces from the RVN and Laos and ceases to support the insurgency in SEA.

In addition to the bombing, we would intensify 34 A operations of marops, psychological warfare, including use of sabotage and propaganda teams as psychological effort to harass the authorities and cause them to institute harsher control measures on the populace. This might help create an attitude of non-cooperation, which could be exploited in a passive, disorganized resistance sense.

In regard to the specific queries of the scenario (D-9, 10), we will:

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- a. Advise CINCPAC of decision not to delegate authority for use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- b. Make no deployment of the 11th Air Assault Division.

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FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MESSAGE NO. I

MOVE NO. II

ACTUAL DATE 14 Sep 64

BLUE SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 15 April 1965.

After discussing the planning groups recommendations with Congressional leaders of both parties, and receiving their backing, the President on the evening of 1 April approved the group's recommendations. Concurrently, he directed the Cabinet to start taking the actions required for immediate implementation. On the evening of 2 April he announced his decision to the nation pointing out the continuation of the Communist led aggression against the free countries of Southeast Asia and the threat it constituted to free men everywhere. He announced the declaration of a national emergency and that necessary mobilization would be accomplished. He stated that large contingents of US air, ground and naval forces had been alerted for early movement to Southeast Asia. The President declared that US naval aircraft were, even then, in the process of attacking enemy airfields and that such attacks would continue until Hanoi and Peking ceased their support and direction of operations against their neighbors.

Based on the President's decision all elements of the government immediately swung into action. Early on 2 April CINCPAC initiated movement of the 173d Brigade from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhut. Other movements commenced and plans for the movement of other forces were finalized. (See Annex A, Deployment Information)

CINCPAC on being advised of the President's refusal to delegate authority for the immediate employment of tactical nuclear weapons sent the following message to the JCS:

1. The movement of CHICOM ground forces toward their southern border would place them in position to make rapid massive cross-border moves. Should these

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moves commence, our capability to stop them effectively prior to deep penetration into Laos, Thailand or Burma lies in the timely use of tactical nuclear weapons. I will make specific request to you for Presidential authorization upon first definite indication of such movement.

'2. In view of necessity to maintain suitable general war posture already degraded by movement of attack carriers to SE Asia area, feel it imperative that my theater airlift withheld for general war purposes not be committed to SE Asia deployments.

"3. I intend to direct COMUSMACV to assume title and functions of COMUSSEASIA and establish headquarters at Bangkok on 3 April."

As announced by the President, aircraft from the US Seventh Fleet struck the NVN airfields at HAI PHONG and PHUC YEN together with their air defense installations on 2 April. The enemy was successful in launching some of his aircraft prior to the arrival of US aircraft over the target but many were caught on the ground. Post-strike reconnaissance revealed that 21 MIG aircraft had been destroyed and that major damage had been inflicted on the fields. Airfield reconnaissance on 3 April revealed no aircraft on any of the DRV fields other than those destroyed or damaged on previous raids. Further reconnaissance was unsuccessful in locating the enemy air. The US lost 5 aircraft during the attacks on 2 April.

Concurrent with its military action the US initiated diplomatic actions around the world. Ambassador Stevenson called for an immediate meeting of the Security Council and sought to have the DRV and the Chinese Communists condemned for their aggression in Laos and SVN. After several days of debating and parliamentary maneuvering the USSR employed its veto power to kill the action. The UK supported the US in its efforts but France abstained. Although unsuccessful over-all, the UN action gave the US a platform to reiterate its ultimate objectives in Southeast Asia and the fact that it would continue military pressures on NVN so long as aggression against SVN and Laos continued. Following the defeat of the US motion, the USSR attempted to have the SC condemn the US for its "deliberately provocative acts against the DRV." The Soviet motion was defeated without requiring the use of a US veto. Further

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action within the UN was not considered to have a chance for success. Therefore, the US did not carry the case to the UNGA.

Discussions within SEATO were unrewarding. The US, RLG and GVN informal proposal that the SEATO Treaty be invoked found both France and Pakistan opposed. The latter recommended that a formal proposal not be made as they would be forced to decline. Both Australia and New Zealand indicated a willingness to furnish assistance up to their SEATO commitment if satisfactory command arrangements outside the SEATO framework could be agreed upon. The UK due to other commitments stated it could be of little assistance.

Talks on 2 April with Souvanna found him reluctant to agree to Thai/US/ARVN forces moving into the panhandle. He stated this, as a direct violation of Accords, would probably result in renewed Pathet Lao activity in all areas. He agreed to cross border operations from SVN and continued armed reconnaissance. He requested assurance of support for holding the existing positions in the PDJ area.

On the same day talks with Thai officials revealed that they were not ready to agree to joint US/Thai operations across the Mekong. They would consider such action only if US deployments and combat operations in NVN and Laos were unsuccessful in causing the DRV to stop its support of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao and only after US forces deploying to Thailand had closed. The Thais requested support and equipment for new units that are to be organized and trained by GOT.

Following the Presidential declaration and the US air strikes against NVN, Chiang Kai-shek advised the US Government that he was prepared to place substantial forces at US disposal for employment either in Southeast Asia or against mainland China. Reports of US advisors during the period 3-15 April indicated that Chiang was stepping up his raids against the mainland although he gave no inkling of this to the US in his official communications.

US efforts to obtain international support for its actions were embarrassed by France and India as well as others of the neutralist bloc. The French renewed their

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earlier demands for a conference on Southeast Asia. As a first stage the French, supported by India, proposed an immediate foreign minister conference of the nations most affected by the conflict in Southeast Asia. This conference would be designed to work out a cease fire and to make necessary arrangements for a large Geneva type conference. As of 15 April the French proposals had received little support among western countries but were strongly supported by the communist and neutralist blocs. The US threat of a possible severing of diplomatic relations with countries that recognized the PPG appeared to do more harm than good. Due to the statements of resentment which followed in its wake, it was not stressed in subsequent US bilateral negotiations.

US-CHICOM discussions at Warsaw during the period 3-6 April produced nothing new. The CHICOMs continued to label the US the aggressor and to disclaim responsibility for events in SEA. US warnings with regard to the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea were quickly leaked to the press in Japan and other countries within Asia. The CHICOMs stated this was typical of white imperialists; they stressed the racial theme. The problem was widely discussed in the Japanese press and various groups, both Communist and non-Communist, held public meetings to protest against the US use of nuclear weapons. Demonstrations were conducted outside all US bases. Within the Diet, Socialist/Communist elements proposed that US combat forces be required to leave Japan. A workers strike at US bases scheduled for 11-12 April was recognized by approximately forty percent of the workers. On 15 April the GOJ delivered a note to the US stating that the employment of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia or Korea could place an unbearable burden on US/GOJ relations and would imperil US base rights in Japan.

Reaction from the USSR followed close on the heels of the 2 April actions. Pravda on 3 April published a lengthy denunciation by Khrushchev of the US action. The article quoted the Soviet Premier as stating that the USSR stood side by side with the DRV and would provide it assistance in order that it might defend itself. On 6 April, Secretary Rusk was advised by the British Ambassador that the USSR had made a secret appeal to the UK pointing out the extreme danger in the SEA situation. The Soviet representative stated his country desired to continue

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advances made between East and West but that progress was now jeopardized. He stated the USSR had no alternative but to support both the DRV and the CHICOMs. He implied strongly that the USSR would prefer not to be forced into this closer cooperation. The Soviet representative requested that the UK intercede with the US in the interest of "world peace and future humanity."

Following the air strikes of 2 April indicators were constantly watched for evidence that Hanoi was halting its offensive. There were none. On the contrary VC activity within SVN immediately increased and from its dormant position the Pathet Lao suddenly came alive. On 3 April the PL renewed operations against the territory gained by the rightist Operation Triangle in 1964. The US supported Souvanna's forces by making numerous air attacks against the PL.

In Saigon the VC suddenly changed its tactics with regard to the passage of POL products and non-attack of POL storage tanks. On 4 April the VC attacked the POL bulk storage tanks at Saigon using mortars, pack howitzers and recoilless rifles. Approximately 25 percent of the storage capacity was destroyed. Simultaneously, the VC started attacking and destroying both barges and highway tank cars. A temporary disruption of POL distribution resulted and after 4 April it was necessary for an armed escort to accompany each POL transport vehicle.

Throughout SVN the VC stepped up its activity with emphasis on acts of sabotage against the US forces. The assassination of GVN administrators continued. Roads were mined. Ambushes made it increasingly difficult for anything to move outside the cities. Company and battalion size engagements with GVN forces became almost a daily occurrence at widely separated points within SVN. On 5 April a GVN battalion was ambushed in the Mekong Delta with heavy losses. Over 100 government troops were killed and 150 weapons lost; VC losses were light. The tables were turned on 8 April when GVN forces engaged a large VC forces in the same area and killed or captured 73 of the enemy and secured a large number of weapons.

Despite its lack of apparent effect on the VC, the US action slowed Sihanouk in his flirtation with the CHICOMs.

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On 5 April, Sihanouk leaked to the US Ambassador that he had been approached by the CHICOMs with a request to permit the Provisional Peoples Government of South Vietnam (PPG) to establish its headquarters in Phnom Penh. The request was refused. Similarly, efforts by the CPR to establish a military mission to Burma met with rebuff at Rangoon. However, intelligence reports indicate that CPR-Burmese talks continue on the subject.

US photo reconnaissance of NVN picked up evidence of substantial vehicular movement from Red China on 7 April. Intensive reconnaissance efforts during the period 7-15 April revealed that an estimated CHICOM division had moved by infiltration into NVN. The division by 15 April was widely dispersed northeast of Hanoi. Enemy AAA in the area has been intense indicating the possibility that the division was accompanied by CHICOM AA units.

Due to the failure of the DRV to halt its aggression the US, on 7 April, launched heavy naval air attacks against the POL storage tanks at Hai Phong and Hanoi. The attacks succeeded in destroying approximately 90 percent of the capacity at each location. Losses of US aircraft to enemy AA were heavy with 4 aircraft being lost at Hanoi and 3 at Hai Phong.

During the night of 8-9 April, the US supply installation at Korat, Thailand was the object of sabotage. Infiltrators eluded the guards and succeeded in destroying by fire approximately 10 percent of the POL stored in the area. A substantial number of vehicles were made inoperative by placing sugar, dirt and trash in vehicle gas tanks.

The following night in Da Nang the US Marines' air strip was subjected to long range, but accurate, mortar fire. The attack resulted in major damage to three fighter aircraft and 5 helicopters. By the time US Marines and SVN soldiers reached the firing site, the VC had vanished into the night. The only thing found was empty cartons for US 4.2 inch mortar shells. On the same night the VC also placed long range mortar and recoilless rifle fire on the air fields at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. A total of 12 aircraft were damaged by these attacks.

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F-23-Blue

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After the second US air strike the watch was again increased for evidence that Hanoi had "received the message." However, no such evidence was found. Again, the contrary seemed to be true. VC activity did not diminish; instead, it appeared to increase. Activity in the two northern provinces of SVN which had been heavy for some time now became even more intense. Interrogation of prisoners captured in the area indicated that the DRV was infiltrating a DRV division into these provinces and that it was scheduled to close by 1 May. Documents taken from enemy dead tended to confirm these statements.

During the period 1-8 April there were no additional developments with regard to US access to Berlin. However, the East German press continued to gloat over the forthcoming peace treaty and the subsequent power that the GDR would have to control traffic through its territory. On 9 April a Pan American pilot reported that he had sighted large quantities of heavy construction equipment on the autobahn northwest of Magdeburg. The equipment was in the vicinity of the Elbe River bridge and it appeared that pieces of the bridge had been removed although the flooring was still intact.

During the entire period the US and GVN have conducted repeated air strikes against arms caches, VC camps and VC personnel within the Laos panhandle. The effects have varied from zero to 100 percent for individual attacks but reconnaissance indicates that infiltration through the area is continuing. Despite this and the renewed activity of the Pathet Lao, Souvanna has not agreed to the movement into the Tchepone area of US and Thai ground forces. He continues to request US air support for his efforts against the PL and this has been provided.

Intelligence reports and aerial reconnaissance indicates that shipping has continued to move into NVN ports despite the US mines. The DRV has conducted minesweeping operations but, reportedly, with little success. The previous warnings as to the mined areas were repeated but on 13 April a Polish ship disregarding the warning struck a mine while entering Haiphong.

On 14 April the US launched a third major attack against NVN. This effort was aimed at the ammunition depot and barracks at Phu Van and at the power plant at Hanoi. Both attacks were successful but again the cost

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F-24-Blue

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to the US was high. These attacks, like the previous ones, were made by naval aircraft. Five aircraft were lost to enemy AA fire over Hanoi and two over Phu Van. No enemy air was encountered and, since 2 April, no aircraft have been found within NVN.

The Communist press world-wide screamed of the US "atrocities" following the latest US air raids and the damage to the Polish ship. Hsinhua stated flatly that the CPR would not stand idly by while the US committed open aggression against its socialist neighbor. The CPR representative at Warsaw advised the US Ambassador that his government considered the matter to be most serious and that it would not be intimidated by US demands and "fantastic lies" regarding a poor underdeveloped state. He demanded that the "US leave Asia to the Asians" and quit its illegal and reckless raids against Laos and NVN. The Soviet press and the press of other Communist states also charged the US with aggression and called for the US to withdraw from SEA. On 15 April the US Ambassador to Poland was given a strong note of protest over the damage to Polish shipping. Reparations were demanded and assurance that US interference with "peaceful shipping" would cease.

The press in other parts of the world, even in some of the neutralist areas, by 15 April was strangely quiet with regard to the conflict. In some ways it appeared that much of world opinion had reached the conclusion that the matter had to be settled and that it might as well be now.

Within SVN the domestic situation had quieted down considerably during the period 1-15 April. Early in the period Khanh employed troops to control large demonstrations by both the Buddhists and the Catholics. As the seriousness of the international situation became apparent Khanh was successful in having further demonstrations by the religious factions cancelled. On the surface there is calm; beneath the surface the turmoil continues. The morale of the GVN troops was bolstered by the US actions during the period. A propaganda move by the VC on 10 April offering amnesty to government forces that joined the VC was met with jeers and had no effect on troop loyalty.

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F-25-Blue

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During the period 1-14 April rumors persisted of CHICOM troop movements in the direction of Southeast Asia. The US exploited all its resources to determine if such movements were taking place. By 15 April the fragments appeared to have jelled. At a special USIB meeting, the Board determined that:

a. Elements of the 54th Army, estimated to consist of at least one infantry division had closed in the YUNG CHANG area on the Burmese border. (25°N; 98°E)

b. Elements of the 14th Army, consisting of an infantry division plus elements of a second division were located at SZEMAO on the Laotian border. (22°N; 101°E)

c. Elements of the 13th Army, estimated to be reinforced infantry division were located in the Kaihwafu area on the DRV border. (23°N; 104°E)

d. Previous reports of a CHICOM infantry division within Laos were incorrect. The only CHICOM troops located within Laos proper to date have been engineer and other construction troops. These troops have been engaged on road building and similar construction projects.

It is now 1200 on 15 April 1965.

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F-26-Blue

DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION

1. As of 15 April the following deployments have been accomplished:

a. Thailand

- (1) Army
 - 2 Bdes (5 BN) of the 25th Inf Div
 - 1 Bde (3 BN) of the 82nd Abn Div
- (2) Air Force
 - One FIS (-)
 - Two TFS

b. South Vietnam

- (1) Army
 - 173rd Abn Bde (Air echelon)
- (2) Marine Corps
 - 1 RLT/MAG of 3rd Mar Div
- (3) Air Force
 - One TRTF
 - One FIS

c. WESTPAC

Six TFS

2. The schedule for deployment of the remaining forces is as follows:

a. Thailand

- (1) Army
 - 25th Div Sea Echelon will complete unloading at Bangkok on 5 May
 - 82nd Abn Div 15 May
 - 1st Inf Div 30 May
 - Spt forces for 1st Inf Div 20 June

b. South Vietnam

- (1) Army
 - 173rd Abn Bde Sea Echelon 20 April
 - 2nd Inf Div 25 May
 - Spt forces for 2d Inf Div 15 June

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(2) Marine Corps
MEF (-) 5 May

c. WESTPAC

(1) Marine Corps
One MEB 10 May
One MEB 20 May
One MEB 20 June

(2) Air Force
Four TFS 20 April

d. Hawaii

101st Abn Div 20 June

3. To facilitate required movements the following augmentation for MATS and MSTS was authorized immediately after the Presidential decision of 1 April:

a. MATS:

268 Aircraft of Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(66 available, Stage I within 48 hours)
216 Aircraft from USAF Reserve and Air NG

b. MSTS:

9 Commercial passenger ships (requisitioned)
240 Commercial cargo ships (requisition/charter)
13 Troop transports (to be activated from
NDRF - available D plus 60)

4. The following problems were encountered soon after the Presidential decision was made and deployment to Southeast Asia was initiated:

a. Prestockage of POL at Wake Island not adequate for support of a deployment of the size required by the Presidents' decision.

b. A shortage of POL in Vietnam due to high usage rate and losses to VC action.

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F-28-Blue

Annex A

c. Lack of space for air units at airfields in Vietnam and Thailand. The construction programs underway since fall of 1964 have not yet provided space for forces allocated.

d. Shortage of organized combat and service support units in being within CONUS to meet needs as expressed by USARPAC and CINCPAC. For example there is an expressed need for a total of approximately 47,000 Army medical, aviation maintenance, engineering and construction, transportation, ordnance, signal and AG troops to support not only US forces but also indigenous allied forces - Thai, RVN and Lao.

e. Outsized cargo shift from airlift to sealift found necessary. The arrival time for phasing in was therefore upset.

f. The added time required for some sea movements due to actual availability of merchant ships for loading and the speed of the ships involved make it appear that adjustments in closing times will be unavoidable.

g. The shortage of lighterage in the debarkation area can be a serious problem if the US is denied the use of adequate civilian lighterage.

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 Sep 64

The VC during the period 1-15 April conducted a number of small raids and ambushes within SVN that were very close to the Cambodian border. On two occasions during the period SVN forces in "hot pursuit" of the VC crossed the Cambodian border and were intercepted by Cambodian forces. Each instance resulted in a fire fight between KRG and GVN forces with casualties on both sides. Sihanouk lodged bitter protests with the GVN over the incidents and hinted at reprisals if they continued.

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F-30 Blue

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM Blue TO Control

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Blue Message #6
Pertains

DTG 15 Sept 1964

1. What happened to the 2 TBS deployed to SEA?
Request advice.

2. What happened to the Navy Deployment? Request
advice.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 5

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 Sept 1964

Reference your Msg No. 1, Move II.

1. The 2 TBS in question are located at Tan Son Nhut.

2. Navy deployment is progressing in accordance with
your deployment schedule.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-31 Blue

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 Apr 64

Have there been any reactions concerning the impact of the air attacks on 14 April?

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MESSAGE NO. 6

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Blue Msg No 2, Move II

DTG 15 Sep 64

During the period since the US air attacks of 14 April there has been no reaction from the DRV to indicate a change in its previous policies.

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F 32-Blue

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM Blue TO Control

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 September 1964

1. In real life, elements of two (2) Chicom Divisions already were located in the SZEMAO and MENG-TZU (KAIHWAFU) areas as of 14 September 1964.

2. On page 9 of the Blue Scenario Projection, the implication is made that Chicom "troop movements" were underway towards SE Asia. The USIB determined that a Chicom inf div plus was now "located at SZEMAO" and a reinforced inf div was "located in the KAIHWAFU area".

3. Request information as to whether the two divisions referred to in paragraph 2 above are the same divisions that have been in these locations for a long period of time, or are in addition to them.

REASON: Our assessment of Chicom intentions will be governed by the evidence that the Chicoms are redeploying troop units toward SE Asia. If two of the three divisions mentioned on page 9 of the Blue Scenario projection have always been in the locations listed, relatively little movement has in fact occurred.

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MESSAGE NO. 7

FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Blue Msg No 3, Move II DTG 15 Sep 64

The intent of the scenario was to indicate that the CHICOMs have moved the forces in question to the border areas during the approximate period 1-15 April 1965.

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F-33-Blue

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MESSAGE NO. 4

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 September 1964

BLUE

SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION - MOVE II

INTERNATIONAL MOVES

1. General. Recognizing that the attack on the power station in Hanoi may provoke a more serious international political reaction than prior attacks on the DRV, a special effort should be made to restate the US objectives and to justify the US action. The President and the Secretary of State will make statements explaining that the attacks were in response to recent acts of sabotage against US forces and attacks on GVN forces and for attacks on POL storage in SVN reiterating that such attacks will continue so long as the DRV continues aggression against SVN. We surface our information on the DRV forces in SVN as a part of the case we make against the DRV.

International Moves on the Political Front

2. Communist Countries:

a. USSR. We would make three (3) points to the Soviets on the ambassadorial or secretarial level both through the British and US channels.

(1) In regard to East Germany, we believe that the Soviets are embarked on a dangerous course which, taken in conjunction with developments in the Far East, could create the greatest danger for world peace.

(2) In regard to the Far East crisis, we do not intend to overthrow the NVN Government nor to conquer their territory; our objectives are limited to stopping their attacks on SVN and Laos and support of insurgency there.

(3) In regard to Communist China, we have no intention of attacking her unless we or our allies are first attacked by her.

b. Communist China. We would reiterate through the US Ambassador in Warsaw our basic defensive position in

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F-34-Blue

responding to Communist attacks and our limited interests in NVN, i.e., stopping aggression. This limited objective, however, would change if NVN and Chicom policies require us to change our objective.

c. NVN. We would continue to probe through the Canadians and British in Hanoi for signs that NVN was willing to negotiate because of our pressures, and to get across US determination to apply sufficient pressure to get this result. They should be advised of our basic conditions again, i.e., stop supporting insurgency in SVN and Laos, or accept the consequences.

d. Poland. The US would deal with it in a very low key, pointing out that the Poles had been advised that the waters were mined.

2. Countries Directly Involved on our Side:

a. Thailand. We should continue to emphasize to the Thais the benefits of joint military actions and encourage their full participation in them with neighboring countries and the US. More specifically, this would be aimed at getting Thai agreement to position troops in Laos and in the Laos panhandle in joint operations with the US and other troops.

b. Laos. Negotiations should continue by the US Ambassador with Souvanna Phouma to underscore the need to root out Communist forces in the Panhandle, in line with his desire that his government of National Union govern all Laos, and gain his acquiescence, if not approval, of all necessary US and allied military actions in the Panhandle and elsewhere in Laos as required. Use US support of his forces in the Plain of Jars area as an argument to persuade him. If Souvanna refuses to agree to allied military actions in the Panhandle, tell him we must proceed with them in view of the use made of this area for infiltration into SVN.

c. Explore with the Thai Government, the GVN, and the Royal Lao Government the possibility of setting up a Supreme Allied Commander. At a minimum, seek their agreement to establishment of a US commander for operations in the Lao Panhandle. Endeavor to use the SEATO command relationships as a guide during these negotiations.

3. Other Related Third Countries:

a. Japan. The Japanese would be assured diplomatically that, as a matter of US national policy, the use of

nuclear weapons will not be lightly considered. They would, of course, be used only under conditions of obvious necessity to protect the Free World and the US in some extreme situation. This statement would be aimed at getting Japanese cooperation in the use of bases in Japan and would not restrict any future US military decisions on use of nuclear weapons.

b. Cambodia. We would express our appreciation and understanding of Sihanouk's refusal to grant a governmental seat in Phnom Penh for the PPG. He would also be told again that cross border attacks were military mistakes and that we and our allies would continue to do all in our power to prevent these unfortunate mistakes. ("Hot pursuit" operations by the SVN into Cambodia would not be officially approved by the US, but the border violations would of course be expected to continue.)

c. India. The US Ambassador will remind the Indians of the October 1962 Chicom invasion, and the troops now noted near the Burma/NEFA border. The Indians will be urged to take an additional close look at the situation and the adverse consequences which would flow from the Chicom success in SEA altering the present balance of power. At a minimum, the Indians would be persuaded to take a "neutral" position on the conference and cease supporting the French.

d. Australia. Seek commitments from Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to supply military forces for use in Vietnam, Thailand, and/or the Laos Panhandle. During these discussions endeavor to include national logistics support as a part of the force commitment.

e. UK. Keep the UK informed of all moves the US is taking in this area, and seek a token UK military contribution if the Malaysia situation permits it.

f. Republic of China. Publicly announce that the US was initiating political and military contingency talks with the Chinats in view of the situation in SEA.

Finally, indicate to CINCPAC that the President will continue to reserve his decision on employment of nuclear weapons and will make the decision in the light of the situation as it evolves. CINCPAC should not, in his planning, assume automatic availability of nuclear weapons under the circumstances he describes.

MILITARY ACTIONS

1. Increase the intensity of air attacks on military and lines of communications targets (the 94 targets less industrial) in North Vietnam, including critical railroad bottlenecks and all POL and port facilities as soon as possible, using all available assets on a daily strike basis, step up mining of approaches of all NVN ports.
2. Continue progressive program of destruction of industrial targets by hitting another target with air attack on 21 April. This will permit time for a DRV reaction to develop from the 14 April attack.
3. Using up to two US/Thai divisions, establish bridgeheads across the Mekong from Thailand to secure the major communications centers such as Savannakhet and obtain bases for further tactical deployments. This action would also tend to put political pressure on NVN.
4. From the Mekong bases conduct mobile warfare in the Laos Panhandle using battalion and brigade size task forces in rapid, fluid offensive operations to disrupt the VC supply system into Laos, destroy supplies, and hamper the flow of personnel to the RVN. Another objective would be the threat of invasion of NVN and thus increase the pressure for an NVN political decision.
5. Continue MAROP's in the Tonkin Gulf and expand their scope where feasible.
6. Continue surveillance of Chicom submarines in Tonkin Gulf and harass shipping in the Gulf with all measures short of blockade. (CINCPACFLT will develop the details of the harassing plan.)
7. Conduct strong military operations against the DRV forces (1+Div) in northern RVN, using initially GVN forces made available through employment of US forces on security missions. VNAF/FARMGATE and US air will be used in support. In the event of large scale ground action, use US ground forces as necessary in coordinated operations.
8. Speed the arrival of US forces, i.e., the US Army units to Thailand and SVN, the remainder of the MEF to Danang, air deployments to RVN and the MEF to Okinawa. As soon as practicable concentrate amphibious lift at Okinawa to provide capability for amphibious operations. Deploy one additional GVA from EASTPAC to North Pacific area for

a total of two CVA groups in north and four in SEA area.
(See logistic actions.)

9. Continue intensive counterinsurgency actions in RVN.

10. Increase air reconnaissance efforts and armed reconnaissance on DRV troop movements and dispositions in North Vietnam and Laos, and if possible, on Viet Cong forces in SVN.

11. It is not certain that the program of these and other pressures being applied will actually succeed in forcing the DRV to make a political decision favorable to our objectives. For this reason, planning for several options to include the following should be initiated now:

Expansion of military operations into NVN using US and SVN troops in division size landing around Vinh and a Corps or larger landing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

1. Problem

Prestockage of POL at Wake Island not adequate for support of a deployment of the size required by the President's decision.

Solution

Intercept the closest point to point tanker and change destination to Wake Island. ETA 3 to 5 days. Provide continuous re-supply by tanker.

2. Problem

A shortage of POL in Vietnam due to high usage rate and losses to VC action.

Solution

There is no POL shortage in the tidewater area. Shortages are due to the problem of internal distribution. CINCPAC will be queried as to what assistance he may require to meet this situation.

3. Problem

Lack of space for air units at airfields in Vietnam and

and Thailand. The construction programs underway since fall of 1964 have not yet provided space for forces allocated.

Solution

Expedite construction of temporary facilities. Materiel for parking mats (PSP) on hand in SEA. CINCPAC will be queried as to his ability to effect necessary temporary construction

4. Problem

Shortage of organized combat and service support units in being within CONUS to meet needs as expressed by USARPAC and CINCPAC. For example there is an expressed need for a total of approximately 47,000 Army medical, aviation maintenance, engineering and construction, transportation, ordnance, signal and AG troops to support not only US forces but also indigenous allied forces--Thai, RVN and Lao.

Solution

The US Army lacks sufficient service units to reinforce Europe and to support large force commitments in SEA. Some required units do not exist in active reserves. To provide proper combat service support units for our deployments, a calculated risk is taken by utilizing about 10% of the units scheduled for Europe. In addition required AUS units will be created with increase in active Army strength as approved in steps approved 1 April by President Johnson. A temporary change in Medical evacuation policy will be made in order to reduce pressure of shortage of Medical units.

5. Problem

Outsized cargo shift from airlift to sealift found necessary. The arrival time for phasing in was therefore upset.

Solution

Agree. Estimate that final close-out date remains the same for the sea echelons (i.e. D+60 for shipments from CONUS to SEA).

6. Problem

The added time required for some sea movements due to actual availability of merchant ships for loading and the

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speed of the ships involved make it appear that adjustments in closing times will be unavoidable.

Solution

Agree. Adjustments to the operation plan will continually be made. Forces will be tailored by time-phasing to get critical units in the area as needed.

7. Problem

The shortage of lighterage in the debarkation area can be a serious problem if the US is denied the use of adequate civilian lighterage.

Solution

Shortage of lighterage can be a serious problem if adequate civilian lighterage is not available. There is no reason to assume that civilian lighterage of our allies would not be made available. At any rate, available ports and airfields will be used to maximum effectiveness. In addition, lighterage was moved into the area by 1 April, and the President approved on 1 April dispatch of additional lighterage. The 50 LCM 8's at Charleston, South Carolina, for example, can be broken out and delivered to SEA by about D+65. That in the West Coast can arrive sooner. Also US Navy landing craft in the area can be utilized in emergency.

8. Problem

Logistics support of MEF.

Solution: Query CINCPAC and Department of the Navy as to actions to be taken to provide logistics support ashore for the MEF if required inland.

9. Problem

CINCPAC requested (#2, page 2, Control Message #1, Move II) reservation of SIOP support airlift.

Solution

Approved.

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FROM CONTROL TO BLUE

MESSAGE NO. 1

MOVE NO. III

ACTUAL DATE 16 Sept 64

BLUE SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 25 May 1965.

The deployment of US forces to Southeast Asia has proceeded generally according to plan. However, during the period many difficulties have been experienced, particularly with regard to both inter and intra-theater transportation requirements and with respect to fulfilling other logistical requirements. Fortunately, the international situation permitted the US forces to be deployed over an extended period of time. If these forces had been required on a crash basis a much more serious situation would have developed.

Based on policy decisions made on 15 April, the US continued to apply military pressures against North Vietnam. On 21 April, NVN cement plants and its only machine tool factory were leveled. Concurrently, earlier air attacks against the NVN transportation system and military installations were continued. The rail lines from Nan-ning and Kunming to Hanoi were struck repeatedly, south of the Chinese border, with emphasis on the critical bridges. As before, the US maintained a constant watch to see if VC and PL activity ceased as a result of the action taken in the north. It did not.

The air raids of 21 April brought a new development. For the first time fighter aircraft bearing DRV markings were encountered over NVN. It was subsequently discovered that the aircraft were flying from airfields in South China and on Hainan Island. The aircraft continued to be encountered in small numbers at infrequent intervals. They were not effective against the US attacks and many were lost in their attempts to interfere with US raids. The aircraft flew directly from base to positions over NVN but were careful

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not to violate the airspace of neighboring countries. In the same manner, they did not follow US aircraft beyond the NVN borders.

During the latter half of April, the US again communicated its over-all objectives to the USSR, the CPR and the DRV. The USSR, in a rather restrained private reply, reiterated its desire to see the SEA situation brought to a conclusion and proposed a reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference. The latter proposal was also made publicly. Conversations with the CPR Ambassador to Warsaw resulted in a renewal of the previous ChiCom diatribe and accusations of US aggression against the "peaceful, freedom loving people of Southeast Asia."

Contact with the DRV through the Canadians and British at Hanoi was equally unrewarding. Both intermediaries reported that Ho Chi Minh refused to admit responsibility for the "civil war" in progress in South Vietnam. Ho deplored the "acts of aggression" committed by the US against NVN and asked that the Canadian and UK representatives use their influence to have the US halt its attacks against his "peaceful country." Ho charged that the US had replaced the French as the colonial ruling power in SVN and was now intent on extending its rule to the north.

Late in April it became evident that the CPR was putting considerable pressure on Burma to accept the CPR military mission which it had previously refused. At the same time the CPR published a white paper regarding the continued threat to China's security posed by the KMT irregulars based on Burmese soil. The implied threat to enter Burma with CPR forces to dispose of these irregulars was clear. On 1 May, Rangoon announced that it had requested the CPR to establish a military mission to Burma for the purpose of assisting in training Burmese Defense Forces.

Discussions with the Thais resulted in agreement for combined operations east of the Mekong, with or without Souvanna's concurrence. Concurrent, private conversations with Souvanna regarding the movement resulted in agreement that he would not oppose the move nor would he publicly approve it. Preparations were finalized prior to the

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closing of the 25th Inf Div in Thailand on 5 May. It was agreed that one Thai Division would secure the major cities in the area and the 25th Inf Div would operate from the Savannakhet area. It was further agreed that while the divisions would closely coordinate their activities that, for the immediate future, there would not be a single commander. Also, initially, each nation would be responsible for the logistical support of its division. By 15 May the two divisions had crossed the Mekong and were in position. The US division immediately initiated mobile operations in the Laos Panhandle to disrupt the VC supply system and to halt the flow of personnel into SVN.

Despite the protestations of Ho Chi Minh, the VC activity in SVN continued. In the same manner, evidence was found that the infiltration of elements of DRV regular units was still in progress. Emboldened by their successes, the VC expanded their operations and seemed determined to eliminate all local administrators and to completely disrupt transportation. Assassinations continued and it became increasingly difficult to find a competent person willing to accept a government position. The VC directed most of its effort against the ARVN but did exploit opportunities to attack small American units. The US base at Da Nang was harassed by long range mortar and recoilless rifle fire but with little damage. Other US bases were subjected to similar harassment but due to stringent security measures casualties and materiel losses were negligible.

During late April and early May, air attacks against NVN continued on a regular basis. Although hampered by torrential rains, the prepared target list of 94 targets was exhausted and new targets were located and struck. During staggered raids the DRV's single chemical plant, its two phosphate plants and its remaining power plants were destroyed. The "show-case" steel mill was leveled before it could be completed. The NVN "industrial base" was by now destroyed. Similarly, railroad bridges, POL stocks and troop installations were left in shambles. Never-the-less, the insurgency in SVN continued.

The North Vietnamese made every effort to disperse their supplies and equipment and profitable targets became progressively more difficult to locate. The AAA fire, especially in the vicinity of major cities, increased steadily and losses of US aircraft mounted. Early in

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May, signs of the construction of SAM sites at Hanoi, Haiphong and Yen Bay was observed. The prospective sites were attacked and neutralized before they could become operational. Reconnaissance of these and other possible sites was made a continuous operational requirement. Attacking US aircraft encountered DRV air defense aircraft on infrequent occasions. The enemy air, while having little effect against the US aircraft, did serve to make the US attacks less effective. By 25 May, 40 US aircraft had been lost or damaged by enemy air and AAA. The DRV had lost at least 90 aircraft and probably many more. During the entire period the "DRV" aircraft religiously avoided violation of the air-space of either SVN or Laos. They continued to fly from fields in South China and on Hainan Island. Combat with US aircraft was initiated only over the territory of the DRV - never over international waters.

As US mobile operations in the Laos Panhandle became more effective the PL stepped up their activity. The US continued to support Souvanna's forces with air attacks; however, the PL made progress. Continuous reconnaissance was maintained of Northern Laos and on 19 May conclusive evidence of the existence of substantial supply installations was discovered. Intelligence reports indicated that the supplies had been positioned by the CPR and that they were far in excess of the needs of the Pathet Lao. On 23 May evidence was obtained that two ChiCom divisions were crossing the border into Phong Saly province. Subsequent poor flying weather in the area precluded visual or photo reconnaissance of their progress. On 24 May, other intelligence sources reported that the divisions had definitely closed into Laos and were still moving south.

Simultaneously with the receipt of information regarding the CPR movement into Laos, intelligence was received that confirmed further massive movements of ChiCom forces toward the borders of Burma, Laos and NVN. Firm evidence of the movement of at least six divisions toward these borders was received by the night of 23 May with unconfirmed evidence of additional movements in the same direction.

Early in May acts of sabotage began to occur in north-west Thailand. After the Thai/US forces entered Laos these acts increased and small guerrilla bands began to range the area. As a consequence, the GOT found it necessary to move a reinforced regiment into the area to secure the inhabitants.

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Operations by the US/Thai forces in the Laos Panhandle have inhibited action by the PL toward the southeast. However, in the Operation Triangle area they were successful in retaking the terrain captured by the Rightists in 1964. The US mobile patrols were successful in disrupting the smooth flow of men and materiel from NVN into Laos and SVN. As the patrols progressed they met successively heavier resistance and US casualties, while not heavy, did mount. On 24 May this changed. That morning, a US battalion task force was ambushed on the highway about 10 miles west of Tchepone. It was a disaster. Approximately 350 men were killed before the survivors were able to regroup and break out, leaving the bulk of their wounded and many weapons. A relief force found that the enemy had murdered approximately 25 of the US wounded and had desecrated their bodies. The enemy secured the abandoned weapons and then faded into the hills.

During the afternoon of 24 May a US destroyer operating in the South China Sea about 50 miles east of Da Nang observed a CPR BEAGLE aircraft approach from direction Hainan Island. The aircraft, operating at approximately 5,000 feet, changed direction to over-fly the destroyer. Fearing a bombing run the destroyer captain ordered a TARTAR missile fired at the aircraft. The aircraft was destroyed.

During the period 20-24 May, GVN forces took a pounding from the VC. Military leaders became more and more depressed and reported deteriorating morale among their troops. Earlier elation at the increased US presence and the US air raids against NVN was no longer apparent. Many senior officers requested diplomatic posts abroad saying they could see no end to the fighting within SVN and that they desired relief. The people, in many instances, gave the appearance of dejection. Publicly, for the first time there was open talk among the people and among the religious leaders that neutralism was perhaps the best course of action for the GVN.

On the morning of 25 May two highly significant actions took place in widely separated parts of the world. In Paris, the French Foreign Office announced that an International Conference would be held on 5 June in the French capital for the purposes of arranging a cease fire and a negotiated settlement of the SEA problem. The announcement stated that the French were acting at the request of the USSR, CPR, DRV, Cambodia, Burma and Poland all of whom had expressed a desire for the conference. France also expressed a desire

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for the conference. The Foreign Office expressed the hope that the US, Canada, the UK and India would join the conference and would assist the effort to solve a problem that was a threat to world peace. In Saigon, General Khanh held a conference with Ambassador Taylor. Khanh was very discouraged and expressed the desire to get out from under the quagmire of an impossible situation. He stated flatly that air operations alone against NVN would not cause them to halt their support of insurgency within SVN. He no longer seemed confident of his ability to hold the people together or even of his own ability. It was with difficulty that Ambassador Taylor persuaded Khanh to retain his position as Premier at least for the time being and to not accept neutralism.

It is now 1200 on 25 May.

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F-46-Blue

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM BLUE TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. MOVE III

REFERENCE _____

DTG 17 Sept 1964

BLUE

SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

(Note: The Blue Team did not finalize their action proposals during the short period available because of the complexity of the problem facing them. The following is a resume of their discussions.)

POLITICAL

South Vietnam: In view of the possible collapse of the Khanh government the team discussed US desires in that respect. They seemed to feel that Khanh, as an individual, should be retained in power since replacement of him would further destroy any political stability that might be building up. Also, the government should be completely responsive to US direction. To further US objectives, Khanh should be persuaded to immediately invite the US to assume military command in South Vietnam at the top levels. The US did not want to assume open political control at this time, although this might become necessary at a later date. US military forces still would not be committed to combat until such time as organized PAVN units were in open contact with ARVN units.

MILITARY

Assessment of the situation in North Vietnam indicated the Communist government was still in full control of the country, the PAVN was still intact and retained approximately 50% of their former capability for conventional warfare in neighboring countries. The basic economy (primarily agricultural) remained intact even though the eight primary industrial targets (5-10% of the total worth of the country) had been destroyed.

The Chinese Communists were moving sizeable forces (2 divisions each) toward Burma, Laos and North Vietnam in addition to already having 2 division forces in northern

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F-47-Blue

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Laos and 1 in North Vietnam.

To counter the threat as now evaluated and to continue the efforts to achieve our objectives, 3 general courses of action were discussed.

1. The first general course of action: To accept the DeGaulle proposal for an international conference. However, the US had no strong points to bargain with and thus could not gain anything towards her objectives in the area. (This course of action was not recommended.)

2. The second general course of action: Continue moves which had been initiated earlier. This course of action does not contemplate military operations directly against Chicom forces. Specific actions are:

a. Continue force deployments and secure the Mekong line, relying on Thai forces to protect Northwest Thailand from the Chicom threat there.

b. Increase the tempo and scope of raids and patrols by ground and air units in the Laotian panhandle. Up to the equivalent of two divisions (US/Thai) would be used in this effort, however, extreme care will be taken to ensure that the combat units do not get pinned down in a fixed defensive position within Pathet Lao-held territory.

c. Increase maritime control measures in the Gulf of Tonkin and off Camau peninsula. (The purpose of b and c above is to deny to the Viet Cong the flow of supplies and personnel from North Vietnam by land and sea.)

d. Continue air strikes on North Vietnam.

e. Consider, as the next major step within this course of action, an amphibious landing of a division at Vinh which could be started in approximately 72 hours, and/or landing (amphibious and airborne) a corps plus in the Haiphong/Hanoi area starting in about six days.

3. The third general course of action: This course of action contemplates direct military operations against Chicom forces and against the Chinese mainland.

a. Moving US forces north in Laos, or let Chicom forces move south to extend their LOC before engaging them.

b. Concurrently, to bomb selected military and

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industrial targets in China, with or without nuclear weapons.

c. Attack the Chicom nuclear facilities with or without nuclear weapons.

d. Another action within this course of action would be to execute a general nuclear attack against China.

One of the problems bothering the Blue Team was whether the Reds, i.e. Chicoms had seen enough of the Blue signals as yet to correctly evaluate and interpret their meaning. They didn't believe the Chicoms deliberately wanted war with the US, still Chicom forces were moving in a manner interpreted to be aggressive. This was being done in the face of US mobilization and deployment of major forces into SEA while the US was repeatedly restating its objectives in that part of the world.

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F-49-Blue

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario
(Additional Info.)

DTG 8 September 1964

1. a. During Fall 1964, 15 air strikes against NVN were flown by US/RVN. The three most successful were:

(1) HAMRONG and railroad bridge north of Vinh (17° 39'; 106° 32'E). Out of service for three weeks. Restored on 50% basis.

(2) MU GIA PASS military camp near NVN/Laos border (17° 40'; 105° 46'E). Ten bldgs destroyed with some personnel casualties and three trucks.

(3) Tchepone Complex - Damage to outside storage, personnel and eight vehicles.

b. During the Winter there were 18 strikes against targets in NVN and Laos by RVN and US marked aircraft. Principal successes were achieved at:

(1) Xuan Mai (20° 53'N; 105° 35'E) 338th Inf Bde 200 bldgs numerous personnel casualties.

(2) Six air attacks at night against troop locations in NVN.

(3) Sorties against targets of opportunity supporting PAVN brigades engaged in SVN north of HUE.

(4) Aircraft continued periodic strikes against troop and communications targets in Laos with poor to negligible effect. Three aircraft lost.

2. MIG air defense was relatively ineffective. 1 RVN aircraft was destroyed over NVN, three were damaged severely by ground fire. Two MIGs were damaged by US aircraft. No US losses.

3. The US and RVN announced that certain of the attacks were in retaliation for terrorism and sabotage by VC/DRV in SVN.

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F-1-Red

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MESSAGE NO. 5

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE Initial Scenario

DTG 9 September 1964

Reference Page E-7-Red, paragraph 5, line 7, which reads:
"At the same time additional US antiaircraft units were
introduced into South Vietnam and Laos, . . ." Please
delete LAOS and substitute THAILAND therefor.

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MESSAGE NO. 7

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 10 Sep 64

1. The air OB of NVN is as listed on page E-5 of the
Fact Book with augmentation as shown below:

August 1964	-	36 MIG 15s at PHUC YEN
Winter 1964-5	-	36 MIG 17s at CAT Bi Airfield at HAI PHONG

2. All airfield listed on the North Vietnam Terrain and
Transportation Map (28545 CIA 4-60) are being used by the
GVN plus the new field at PHUC YEN. The fields at PHUC
YEN and HAI PHONG are the major fields that have been used
by NVN up to 1 April.

3. Prior to 1 April the CHICOMs deployed sufficient TOKEN
and ROCK CAKE radars to NVN to provide for minimal require-
ments. The GCI Control equipment at PHUC YEN is adequate
for tactical operations.

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F-2-Red

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MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM RED TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 10 Sept. 1964

OPERATION PLAN

1. Situation

a. General

A Provisional Peoples Government has been established in South Vietnam. Minority groups in Thailand are responding favorably to our overtures and the National Liberation Front for Thailand is forming among these people. We expect little or no resistance from the Burmese. The government of Cambodia, although favoring neutralism, is inclined to our side.

b. Intelligence

(1) Political

The US is faced with serious opposition at home and abroad in its patent attempt to impose its will upon Southeast Asia by military force. The atmosphere is one in which we can function as liberators of the oppressed and demonstrate the correctness and acceptability of our system of government in unifying all of the area under the banners of Communist peace and freedom from imperialism.

(2) Military

(a) Enemy Forces

There are insignificant US ground forces in Southeast Asia, up to 1,000 US Marines in Da Nang, with a few Special Forces in peripheral areas. US build-up of logistic support for air operations is evident in Thailand and South Vietnam. The US Seventh Fleet is capable of significant contribution to overall US air and naval operations against our key bases and installations. Country indigenous forces cannot successfully resist advances by the ground forces of the Peoples Liberation Army.

(b) Friendly Forces

Forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

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F-3-Red

The Pathet Lao and Viet Cong.

Sympathetic groups in Burma and Thailand.

(c) Strength Factors

Experience of our forces in jungle and guerrilla warfare and conventional ground operations.

Loyalty of the Peoples Liberation Army.

Weakness of the US political position.

(d) Weakness Factors

If this plan is executed, we must expect the Americans to exploit the vulnerability of our country to attack by modern air and naval forces.

Inability to support maximum effort in Southeast Asia for more than three to four months during the dry season. (October through April)

Dependence upon external sources (The USSR) for some military supplies.

c. Assumptions

(1) The US will not intervene with sizeable ground forces prior to D+50.

(2) The US may use tactical nuclear weapons if faced with defeat of their forces in SEA.

(3) The USSR may cease to provide current logistical support.

(4) No support will be provided by USSR military forces.

(5) No prior coordination with the USSR will be attempted.

(6) The attack will be initiated two weeks prior to the beginning of the Southwest monsoon.

2. Mission

a. Conduct large-scale military operations throughout Southeast Asia to:

- (1) Eliminate the US from Southeast Asia.
- (2) Establish governments oriented to our ideological principles.

3. Execution

a. Liberate SEA by occupying Thailand and SVN by employing two Chinese armies of 6 divisions and DRV forces of 6 division/brigade equivalents supported by PL and VC forces.

b. The operations against Thailand will be conducted by 2 Chinese armies with a total of 6 divisions attacking through Laos and Northern Burma. The first phase of this attack will be conducted to seize Northern Laos and Northern Thailand along the line Chiengmai-Muang Nan-Vientiane-Savannakhet.

c. After a logistic buildup the second phase of this attack will seize Bangkok in a three pronged attack from the directions of Lampang-Vientiane, employing 6 Chinese divisions.

d. The attack on SVN will be conducted by 6 DRV divisions. This attack will be a two-pronged effort conducted in two phases simultaneously with the attack on Thailand. The first phase will seize Quang Tri by an attack across the DMZ with 2 DRV divisions and a seizure of Southern Laos by 4 DRV divisions. The second phase of this attack will be conducted by 6 DRV divisions attacking down the coast and from southern Laos to seize Saigon.

e. One Chinese army will be moved into the DRV as strategic reserve; 5 DRV division/brigade equivalents will be retained in the DRV for defensive purposes.

4. Miscellaneous

a. Logistics

(1) The equivalent of ten CHICOM combat divisions with artillery can be supported logistically in Laos during the dry season against US/SEATO opposition. Two infantry division/brigade equivalents can be supported into South Vietnam. Eight divisions can be supported into Thailand.

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(2) Against indigenous opposition an additional nine divisions can be supported.

(3) During the wet season three plus divisions can be supported in Laos, three into Thailand and six into South Vietnam.

b. Timing

The optimum time for launching the operation is 30 days prior to the beginning of the wet season, i.e. about 1 April.

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F-6-Red

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MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM RED TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 10 Sept 1964

RED OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

OBJECTIVES

1. Ensure the security of mainland China.
2. Eliminate US presence and influence from Southeast Asia.
3. Bring all Southeast Asia under the control of governments responsive to Peking.
4. Avoid a US nuclear attack on mainland China.
5. Demonstrate the superiority of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine as opposed to revisionist-capitulationist doctrine.
6. Avoid Soviet collaboration with the West in opposition to our objectives in Southeast Asia.

STRATEGY

1. General. To create a situation, at least cost to ourselves, in which the US will be forced to withdraw from Southeast Asia.
2. Render the US-GVN position in SVN progressively more hopeless by:
 - a. Augmenting VC strength by moving additional DRV ground units into SVN covertly.
 - b. Using the augmented VC strength to (1) inflict further defeats on GVN forces, (2) continue the nibbling process against GVN-held rural areas and towns, and (3) aggravate the base security problem for US forces, while avoiding large-scale clashes with those forces.
 - c. Stimulating increasing disorders and neutralist sentiment in GVN-held areas.

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F-7-Red

3. Stimulate US fears of expanded ground warfare by deploying additional ground, air and naval units into South China and possibly into NVN.
4. Mount a pressure campaign against Thailand, possibly supplemented at an appropriate stage by inducements, designed to move the Thais toward neutralism.
5. Using DRV-Pathet Lao forces, occupy additional territory in Laos, stopping short of the Mekong.
6. Encourage Cambodia to prosecute its border conflict with the GVN.
7. Covertly increase popular agitation and disorders against the Government of Malaysia as a means of minimizing UK military and diplomatic support for the US in Southeast Asia.
8. Arouse popular opposition in Japan to US using its bases in Japan and the Ryukus to support its military operations in Southeast Asia.
9. Take necessary defensive precautions opposite the USSR and prepare to conduct holding operations against Korea and opposite Taiwan.
10. Exploit French and Pakistani proclivities to meddle diplomatically in Southeast Asia.
11. Mount an intensive diplomatic and propaganda campaign designed to:
 - a. Mobilize international opinion against the US and in favor of the liberation struggles in Southeast Asia.
 - b. Convince international opinion of the CPG's desire for peace.
 - c. Facilitate reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference at a time advantageous to us.
12. Appeal for the support of all socialist states in the struggle to drive the imperialists from Southeast Asia and refrain from actions which would unnecessarily aggravate our dispute with the USSR, but at the same time do not base our plans on the expectation of any substantial or reliable Soviet support.

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13. Defer nuclear weapons tests until they would clearly contribute to our objectives in Southeast Asia.

14. Be prepared on a contingency basis to mount a general military offensive which would end imperialist influence in Southeast Asia.

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F-9-Red

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MESSAGE NO. 3

FROM RED TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. I

REFERENCE _____

DTG 10 Sept. 1964

RED
SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

1. On April 1st, the CPR National Defense Council directed the Ministry of National Defense to move one (1) infantry division, three (3) AAA regiments and two (2) fighter regiments into NVN by April 10. Three (3) additional divisions are to be alerted for possible movement to NVN. The CPR Embassy in Hanoi has been directed to make appropriate arrangements with the DRV after delivering the message set forth in paragraph 2 below.

REASON: To intimidate the US, protect lines of communication, and prepare for possible operations into SVN.

2. On April 1st, the Prime Minister of the CPG sent the following message to the Prime Minister of the DRV:

a. The time has come for a final, intensified drive to eliminate imperialist influence in SVN.

b. We urge that you infiltrate an additional DRV division into SVN piecemeal by May 1. On April 20, the PPG should declare an amnesty for all members of the GVN forces who rally to the liberation front.

c. We therefore propose to move certain ground and air units into NVN to augment your defenses and prepare for combined operations.

d. The PPG should be established as a government in exile in Phnom Penh by April 15. This action will have the useful side-effect of worsening relations between the RKG and the GVN. Our Embassy in Phnom Penh will be instructed to make appropriate arrangements with the RKG.

e. As VC strength is augmented:

(1) Battalion-sized attacks on GVN forces should be stepped up,

(2) GVN movements of POL by road should be stopped and,

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F-10-Red

(3) Sabotage operations against US forces should be intensified. Acts of terrorism should be avoided.

(4) VC should be prepared, on order, to conduct simultaneous mortar/recoilless rifle attacks on all main airfields in SVN with the object of destroying the maximum number of aircraft parked thereon.

(5) Operations along the border of Cambodia should be increased to provoke RKG-GVN clashes.

(6) A particular effort should be made to expand VC control over the two most northern provinces of SVN, in order to provide a secure territorial base in which the PPG should be established as soon as possible.

f. Concurrently, the NLFSV should be directed to continue and intensify religious and other disorders and demonstrations, emphasizing agitation for peace, neutralization of SVN and withdrawal of US forces.

g. Pathet Lao forces, with appropriate DRV support, should take the immediate offensive with the objective of taking the following localities by not later than April 15:

(1) All of the territory gained by the rightist operation Triangle in 1964 and

(2) Attopeu, Saravane and Seno.

3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has instructed the CPR Embassy in Rangoon to press the GOB to agree to the establishment of a Chinese military mission in Burma by April 15.

4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed by the Prime Minister to act promptly to:

a. Issue through appropriate public and private channels expressions of concern over the activities of the KMT irregulars in the Burmese and Thai border areas; and

b. Initiate frank private talks with the Thai authorities on the developing situation in Southeast Asia and its implications for Thailand. The dangers of continued cooperation with the US should particularly be emphasized.

5. Appropriate CPG and DRV authorities have begun to stir up limited insurgency in NE Thailand.

6. On 1 April the CPR intelligence authorities directed an all-source intelligence alert world-wide with emphasis on the following EEI:

a. US, USSR and KMT military deployments on ballistic missile alerts directed toward the Western Pacific or on the borders of China.

b. US/USSR consultations.

c. Attitudes of US allies toward support of US military moves.

7. The Central Committee has requested the Japanese Communist Party to step up agitation against the use of American bases in Japan and the Ryukyus to support military operations in Southeast Asia.

8. The Central Committee has also requested Communist organs in Malaya to exert their full efforts to promote communal disorders.

9. The CPG Prime Minister has directed appropriate organs to mount a broad diplomatic and propaganda campaign designed to:

a. Mobilize international opinion against the US and in favor of the liberation struggles in Southeast Asia, playing up the atrocities committed by the US imperialists against the Asian people.

b. Convince international opinion of the CPG's desire for peace.

c. Facilitate reconvening of the 1954 Geneva Conference at a time advantageous to us. Supporting rallies are to be organized throughout the CPR on a scale exceeding that in the Fall of 1950.

10. The National Defense Council has directed the Ministry of National Defense to:

a. Alert forces opposite the USSR and prepare to conduct holding operations against Korea and opposite Taiwan.

b. Begin deployments within China preparatory to possible execution of the plan for overrunning Southeast Asia.

11. The Central Committee has ordered the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs to communicate the following positions to the US through the French, Pakistanis and British and directly at Warsaw:

a. The CPG is firmly committed to a policy of peace in Southeast Asia through negotiation.

b. Peace in Southeast Asia must be based on self-determination of peoples, elimination of foreign forces and neutralization.

c. Current US policy runs grave risks of military escalation.

12. The Central Committee has addressed a message to all fraternal parties requesting full support for the national liberation struggle in Southeast Asia and emphasizing the importance of Socialist unity in this critical period.

13. The Foreign Ministry has directed the CPR Embassy in Moscow to inform the Soviet Government that the DRV is determined to step up its support of the liberation struggle in SVN and have asked for help which we feel obligated to provide. We hope the USSR will also help.

14. The CPR Ministry of National Defense has dispatched military purchasing missions simultaneously to the USSR, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Japan and France to buy avgas, air defense equipment of all types, coastal shipping, railway equipment, pipelines, and whatever missiles (tactical or otherwise) may be available.

REASON: To test Soviet intentions and possibly to procure items listed.

15. Contingency. If the US/GVN launches air attacks against Chinese military units entering NVN:

a. Deployment into NVN would continue on more widely dispersed front.

b. CAF units in S. China and Hainan would participate in defense against US/GVN attacks.

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FROM CONTROL TO RED

MESSAGE NO. 2

MOVE NO. II

ACTUAL DATE 14 Sept 64

RED SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 15 April 1965.

On 2 April 1965 the President of the United States shattered hopes for early peace in Asia with a demagogic TV address declaring a "state of national emergency," calling for "necessary mobilization." While he was reasserting US intentions of attacking industrial targets in North Vietnam and announcing the entry of US troop units into SVN, US jets were bombing and strafing DRV airfields at Hai Phong and Phuc Yen. Twenty-one MIGs were destroyed while taking off. The United States lost 5 aircraft.

Simultaneously US airborne troops were being flown from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhut, South Vietnam to provide security for American officials and installations and stiffen the backbone of war-weary RVN forces. Their usefulness in preventing an anti-Khanh coup was not lost on Tri Quang and other dissident leaders.

In SVN American "advisors" moved rapidly to seize firmer, behind-the-scenes control over the RVN government at all levels--military and civilian. Doubtful or ineffective officials were removed.

RVN military forces moved between Buddhist and Catholic mobs and political leaders of all groups were informed of American determination to support the Khanh government with whatever force was necessary.

The Americans attempted to camouflage this colonialist takeover with a facade of "cooperation" but it was apparent much firmer control would henceforth be exercised from Washington.

The celerity of these US moves, in addition to the landing of over 12,000 US marines at Da Nang, deployment of additional air units to Thailand and Vietnam and the stepup in air strikes lent credence to the American President's statement that US ground, air and naval units would be

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deployed in strength to SEA.

On 2 April, intelligence confirmed that two American airborne and two infantry divisions had been alerted in the United States and that the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii was already being moved by air into Thailand.

In private discussions between CPR and US representatives in Warsaw on 3-6 April the American made a thinly veiled threat saying that the mounting exchange between the DRV and US/GVN might soon lead to a war involving the Chinese mainland and the possibility that the US "might have to use all weapons to counter aggression."

Indirect US diplomatic contacts with Hanoi threatened that the level of air attacks against the DRV would indeed rise to include industrial targets unless "the DRV ceases support of the insurgency in Laos and SVN and withdraws its forces from these countries."

In the face of these provocations plans already set in motion by Peking were having their effect. Even as Communist parties aided by front organizations in most countries of the world began a clamor against US brutality, a full division of DRV troops began to infiltrate northern provinces of South Vietnam, raising DRV strength there to one and one-half divisions by 15 April. By 1 May a total of two full divisions will have been infiltrated; the VC and Pathet Lao initiated a rash of raids, attacks, probing actions and sabotage in Laos and South Vietnam which had government forces reeling by the 5th of April.

Between 5 and 15 April a division of the PLA moved into widely dispersed locations northeast of Hanoi.

Pathet Lao, supported by PAVN regulars, launched carefully planned and coordinated attacks aimed at capturing the territory seized by the rightists in Operation Triangle as well as Attoupeu, Saravane and Seno. Concurrently the VC were pouring mortar and recoilless shells into vulnerable US/RVN POL storage at Saigon interdicting the movement of civilian as well as military POL transport (which heretofore had been permitted free movement through VC threatened areas). It was estimated that over 25% of available stocks were destroyed and that distribution capabilities were cut by 50%.

One RVN battalion in the Delta region was severely mauled by the VC on 5 April, losing over 100 KIA and 150 weapons.

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VC losses were moderate. It was apparent however, after this engagement, that rumors of American troop reinforcements were raising morale among the RVN forces and in a major ambush against an RVN infantry relief force on 8 April in the same region the VC sustained heavy casualties, lost 15 weapons and were forced to abandon most of their casualties.

On 9 April the VC struck a coordinated blow at airfields in SVN using mortars and recoilless weapons. Attacking from positions set up several thousand yards out on the periphery of the fields the sudden barrage struck crowded runways and service areas without warning causing an estimated 20 aircraft destroyed and numerous casualties among maintenance and security personnel. Reaction by US/RVN security forces was hampered by the fact that fire was received from several directions and VC losses were comparatively light. One 4.2" mortar was lost.

On 9-10 April a carefully coordinated sabotage strike was directed against the prepositioned US storage at Korat in Thailand resulting in destruction to an estimated 10% of the POL stored in the vicinity of the airstrip. A substantial number of vehicles were rendered inoperative by placing sugar, dirt and trash in vehicle gas tanks.

In the diplomatic arena Peking's pressure on Hanoi for a step-up in DRV participation in SVN aroused less resistance than the idea for introducing a Chinese army division into the DRV. It was obvious that the latter proposal caused some soul searching in Hanoi. According to Truong Chinh, Marshal Giap was vociferous in opposition. It was the American declaration of hostilities and rapid troop movements which really persuaded Ho Chi Minh and finally the Marshal gave in. He obviously feared that too many Chinese forces would provide undue leverage in DRV internal affairs. Some of this feeling may have been dispelled by Moscow's announcement on 5 April that the Soviet Union would support "forces fighting imperialism." It was clear that such support would consist of material and not manpower but the USSR invited both Chicom and DRV missions to work out details of Soviet support in Moscow.

This same message carried assurances that a Soviet demarche had been made to the United States through the British that US threats to invade the continent of Asia were "a great concern, and that the USSR would support its Socialist brothers."

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It was evident by this time that French and Pakistani reaction to the US initiative was less than enthusiastic, that fears were rampant in Western Europe either that the US was rushing into a confrontation in Asia which would leave Europe exposed or that it was adopting a course calculated to trigger a third world war.

In Asia the effect of aggressive US moves was predictable. The Thai position was stiffened to a point where private conversations with CPR representatives were abrupt and achieved nothing. Sihanouk became exceedingly difficult to pin down on the matter of setting up the PPG in Phnom Penh citing the imminent danger of the RVN cutting off Mekong River traffic into his country.

The Indians and French were foremost in calling for an immediate cease fire and foreign ministers' meeting setting the stage for a conference on SEA.

Intelligence reports from 2 April forward have indicated KMT forces on Taiwan have been alerted and that amphibious shipping is being assembled. There are indications that there will be a step-up of KMT raids against the mainland but there is doubt whether this plan is known or approved by the Americans.

Communist factions in Japan began demonstrations before all US military and naval facilities in that country on 5 April as leftist members of the Diet began debates aimed at forcing complete US withdrawal from Japan. A strike call for workers in US installations was only partially successful but it was apparent by 15 April that the government was seeking public US assurances that existing treaties would not be violated in order to support the war in SEA. This would present the Americans with problems of logistics.

On 7 April another major US air strike was conducted against primary POL installations at Hanoi and Hai Phong with disastrous results. Approximately 75% of stocks in those locations was destroyed.

Following the earlier attacks against airfields in the DRV all MIGs were dispersed to fields in southern China and the movement of Chinese air regiments suspended. Later American attacks have only been opposed by antiaircraft weapons. Results have been good with seven American planes destroyed and several damaged.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-17-Red

By 14 April it was estimated that the buildup of American forces had reached a level of three brigades into NE Thailand. These were identified as elements of the US 25th Infantry and 82d Airborne Divisions, additional units of which divisions are believed enroute by air and sea. The Marine buildup in the vicinity of Da Nang was estimated at 20,000 troops.

One FIS and two TFS squadrons have been moved into Thailand; one TRTF and one FIS squadron has arrived in SVN.

It is estimated that the remainder of the 25th Division will begin debarking at Bangkok by 5 May and that backup elements of the 82d Airborne Division will arrive later during May.

It is evident that the Americans are making a feverish effort to expand their air and sealift capabilities in the Pacific but the heavy equipment of their army and marine units presents serious logistics problems. It is also evident that combat units being deployed lack many heavy items of artillery and mechanized equipment and are not accompanied by the usual numbers of service support units so vital to them in extended combat.

Newspaper and magazine articles in the American press contained numerous articles pertaining to the military moves into SEA but there were no indications that military reserve or national guard units were being mobilized. It is believed that the US 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions are being deployed to the Western Pacific with shipping limitations precluding their arrival in Thailand or South Vietnam before late May or June.

American efforts to secure a condemnation in the UNSC against the DRV and CPR resulted in a Soviet veto and a French abstention. The UK supported the United States. A counter proposal by the Soviets failed to pass and neither side has as yet made an effective move to push the issue into the General Assembly.

A Viet Cong declaration of amnesty toward RVN forces providing they surrendered without delay was lost in the background of fast moving events in SVN and the scale of fighting erupted to the highest level of the war. In the two northern provinces VC/PAVN control was well established but it appeared that US Marine forces based at Da Nang were preparing to begin probes toward the north.

Soviet and Bloc shipping continues to arrive at North Vietnamese ports with vitally needed supplies and equipment. A second Polish ship was damaged by a mine off Haiphong but minesweeping operations in which four small craft have been lost have been accelerated. The VC has continued mining operations in SVN along roads and railroads with good effect.

The Soviets have not convoyed Bloc merchant ships and appear to be avoiding involvement in the SEA area with submarines or aircraft.

The East Germans are understood to be taking measures aimed at worrying the Americans about possible autobahn blockages.

US warnings to all governments that recognition of the PPG (NLF Front Government) would result in the severance of diplomatic relations and possible further action has resulted in a storm of criticism from US allied as well as neutral nations over this high-handed American attitude although it is apparent that most of these countries have no intention of recognizing the PPG.

On 14 April US air attacks were directed against the power plant at Hanoi and the ammunition depot at Phu Van causing damage estimated at 60% and 25% respectively. Seven aircraft were shot down.

In the DRV the population has stoically assumed that the worst is still to come and continues to improve and expand passive air defense facilities and organization while propaganda agencies make the most out of photographs, eye witness reports and editorials on barbaric imperialist air strikes. Much of this is being picked up in the neutral and western press with some impact but RVN/United States propaganda stressing the DRV link to the war in SVN is having marked counter-effect.

It is obvious the American leadership is determined to push the conflict in SEA to higher levels but now the SW monsoon will soon close on Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and seriously degrade road movement capabilities. This will make it extremely difficult for highly equipped imperialist forces to advance and to support themselves. Furthermore it will be months before they can build up the supplies of POL, ammunition, equipment which they require, or to deploy the hordes of logistical support forces needed to keep the roads open, maintain equipment, care for sick and wounded or assure vital communications.

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With a crisis brewing in West Germany, US concern over a possible outbreak in Korea, and the fact that the USSR is publicly supporting the liberation struggle in SEA the lights must be burning in the White House tonight.

Ground and air elements of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) have begun deployments to positions in proximity to the Burmese, Laotian and DRV borders in accordance with contingency plans for rapidly overrunning these countries.

Headquarters of the Fifty-fourth Army is located at Yung Chang; Hq Fourteenth Army is at Szemao and their six divisions are prepared for immediate movement. The Thirteenth Army is located at Kaihwafu with three divisions prepared to enter the DRV on order.

It is now 1200 hours 15 April 1965.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-20-Red

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM RFC TO CONTROL

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____

DTG 15 Sep 64

Information is requested on Red Move I, the results of nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5 courses of action

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MESSAGE NO. 3

REFERENCE Your Msg No 1, Move II

MOVE NO. II

1. The VC during the period 1-15 April conducted a number of small raids and ambushes within SVN but very close to the Cambodian border. On two occasions during the period SVN forces in "hot pursuit" of the VC crossed the Cambodian border and were intercepted by Cambodian forces. Each instance resulted in a fire fight between RKG and GVN forces with casualties on both sides. Sihanouk lodged bitter protests with the GVN over the incidents and hinted at reprisals if they continued.

2. Efforts to obtain acceptance of a CPR military mission to Burma have not been successful. However, talks are continuing. It appears that the US deployments have given the Burmese second thoughts and they are attempting to maintain appearances of strict neutrality.

3. Expressions of concern issued by the CPR regarding the KMT irregulars in the Burmese and Thai border areas have been overshadowed in the world press by the more serious events that have occurred with regard to SEA.. The increased VC action within SVN, the renewed activity of the PL, the US declarations and actions and information regarding the possible backing of the CPR by the USSR has

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F 21-Red

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 3 (cont'd)

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE Your Msg No 1, Move II

DTG

spotlighted world news agencies. Other items have received little play. Private talks with the Burmese and Thais regarding the KMT were also overshadowed by the more serious events. As a consequence no positive results have been obtained from the discussions

4. The deployment of US forces to the Mekong tended to inhibit insurgency actions in NE Thailand. However, some minor actions of harassment have taken place. Roads have been strewn with nails, some sabotage has been accomplished in supply dumps supporting US and Thai forces on the Mekong and plans have been made for enlarging the activity. As of 15 April the actions taken have had little apparent effect on events in the area.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-22-Red

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM RED TO CONTROL MOVE NO. II

REFERENCE _____ DTG 15 Sept. 1964

RED

SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION

1. On 15 April the Prime Minister of the CPR sent the following message to the Prime Minister of the DRV:

a. The American imperialists and their decadent Saigon lackeys, confronted with the failure of their criminal policies in Southeast Asia, are in their last frenzied death throes. Inevitably, they will be smashed. Meanwhile, their murderous crimes against the Asian peoples are stirring the anger of people all over the world and restoring unity within the Socialist Camps.

b. We therefore urge you to infiltrate an additional regular DRV division into South Vietnam to join the VC as soon as possible.

c. The VC should direct most of its military effort against the ARVN, but should seize opportunities to attack small isolated American units. The American base at Da Nang should be harassed, not attacked in force.

d. The Americans may be expected to respond to the above actions by even more savage attacks on North Vietnam. We will augment your air defenses by providing SAMs and are further prepared to send construction battalions to help repair damage done by the attacks.

2. On 15 April the Prime Minister of the CPR sent the following separate message to the Prime Minister of the DRV on operation in Laos:

a. The PL forces, supplemented as necessary by covert DRV cadres and organized units, should extend their control over the remainder of Laos.

REASON: To increase Communist territorial holdings before a conference, to pull the American forces toward Thailand and away from Vietnam, and to increase pressure on Thailand.

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F-23-Red

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

2. PLA forces will be prepared to enter Northern Laos quickly if the Americans react to the PL-DRV offensive by crossing the Mekong.

3. As measures to increase indirect pressures against Thailand:

a. On 15 April the CPR Foreign Ministry called in the Burmese Ambassador and dressed him down severely for Burma's failure to give a positive reply to the CPR's proposal to send a military mission to Rangoon.

b. On 20 April the CPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs will issue a white paper on the continued threat to China's security posed by the KMT irregulars based on Burmese soil. On the same day, a strong editorial on this subject will appear in the Peoples Daily. The editorial will explicitly note the unsatisfactory performance of the Burmese Government in failing to eliminate a threat to a friendly neighboring country.

c. Covert guerrilla forces have been organized in the China-Burma border area from which they will make raids into NW Thailand.

d. Under cover of CPR road construction teams already in the area, munitions will be stockpiled in northern Laos.

4. The CPR Prime Minister has directed appropriate organs to intensify the existing diplomatic and propaganda campaign and to give special emphasis to:

a. Denouncing the brutal US occupation of South Vietnam and Thailand and the barbaric US air attacks against NVN.

b. Calling on all peace-loving governments to support convening of an international conference which would halt the increasing escalation of the conflict in SE Asia.

c. Proclaiming that the struggle in SVN is no longer primarily a civil one, but is now a war between the American imperialists and all of the Vietnamese people.

5. On 15 April the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was directed to urge the Soviet Government to:

a. Issue before May 1 a formal call for reconvening the 1954 Geneva Conference. A program for restoring peace

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F-24-Red

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

in SEA should simultaneously be proclaimed, which would be built around the neutralization of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, guaranteed by all of the participants in the conference.

b. Issue a clear statement that an attack on China would be viewed as an attack on the Soviet Union.

6. The Chinese purchasing mission in Moscow has been instructed to give highest priority to the procurement of MIG 21's, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles, Komar guided missile coastal defense boats, TU-16 bombers, and increased POL deliveries.

7. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has requested the Communist Party of Japan to redouble its agitation against American use of bases in Japan to support its aggression in SEA.

8. The Minister of National Defense has ordered a heightened state of alert on the part of all CPR armed forces and the acceleration of passive air defense measures in South and East China.

9. The Minister of National Defense has ordered air, surface and submarine units to conduct reconnaissance to determine the locations and current activities of the US 7th Fleet.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-25-Red

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 2

FROM CONTROL TO RED

MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE _____

DTG 16 September 1964

RED SCENARIO PROJECTION

It is now 25 May 1965.

For the last several weeks the level of conflict in both North and South Vietnam has steadily mounted. While avoiding attacks which would inflict heavy casualties on the civil population, US/RVN air strikes have literally destroyed the DRV industrial-military base. Ports, railyards and bridges have been virtually leveled. The iron and steel plant, the chemical plant, three major power plants, the phosphate and machine tool works have all been destroyed. Ammunition and POL depots are charred masses of rubble and major military communications centers have been knocked out.

Air attacks continue around the clock to keep military activities disrupted.

MIGs from South China and Hainan, wearing DRV markings, flown by PLA as well as DRV pilots have assisted DRV/PLA AA units in resisting the imperialist attacks but the quality as well as quantity of the US air effort has been overwhelming. Ninety MIGs including 26 MIG 21s have been lost along with several hundred AA personnel and their equipment.

Efforts to establish SAM installations in the DRV have been suppressed by continuous enemy air action. Aerial mining of the principal ports in the DRV also continues with consequent reduction in shipping to a few hundred tons a day. An estimated 50 enemy aircraft have been shot down or severely damaged.

In spite of difficulties the leadership in Hanoi has maintained iron control over the population and military. Most stocks were well deployed in the countryside before destruction of major facilities and maximum use is being made of civilian labor brigades to repair bridges, operate ferries, clear roads, and to transport supplies--primarily at night, using draft animals and carts where gasoline vehicles cannot be employed.

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

F-26-Red

The enemy's capability for attacking targets of opportunity has been drastically curtailed through use of civilian air raid spotters, camouflage and wide dispersion of military forces. Many units are actually moved in civilian clothes by infiltration rather than in massive convoys or marching columns.

Approximately 4,000 tons of supplies a day continue flowing into the DRV by all means in spite of enemy interdiction and essential support for Pathet Lao and VC operations continue to move by porter, animal and junk, filling requirements which cannot be fulfilled locally.

The equivalent of a DRV division is assisting the Pathet Lao in Laos and during the last month a total of two DRV divisions have been infiltrated into SVN to augment VC guerrilla forces.

These forces, as well as the Pathet Lao and VC, have been living off pre-stocked resources, the local economy and the enemy who continues to provide generous quantities of arms and ammunition--although somewhat reluctantly.

The truth of this assessment is indicated by the continued success of PL/VC/DRV forces which have maintained the initiative in ground fighting in spite of enemy air domination, a condition facilitated by heavily overcast conditions and continuous rain in most parts of Laos.

Pathet Lao attacks in the area of the Rightist Operation Triangle have been completely successful and the level of VC/DRV attacks in SVN has continued to rise with more and more weapons captured or surrendered by RVN irregulars and numerous successful blows against POL, transport and storage facilities in SVN.

Harassing operations against Da Nang have proceeded without precipitating a major US counteraction and to date none of the US forces in SVN have been engaged in other than local security operations. The attempt to bolster Khanh's shaky government has failed badly due to dissension, fear and jealousy between leaders.

Under political pressure and the hint of military action the Burmese acceded to a CPR request that a military mission be established in Rangoon. A 200 man group including political as well as military specialists was flown into Burma during early May and steps are being taken to extend CPR influence over all of the Burmese military.

In the political area the Soviets weasel-worded their statement of Socialist solidarity to a point where the most faint-hearted among the Americans might have some misgivings but it fell far short of a pledge to regard a US attack on China as an attack on the USSR.

By 15 May communist stimulated uprisings in NW Thailand resulted in the deployment of an additional Army regiment into that area.

Neither the Thais nor Sihanouk altered their positions in the face of a continuing American military build-up in Thailand and on 15 May a US/Thai force estimated at two divisions began crossing the Mekong in an effort to seize Savannakhet and other bases preliminary to probes across the Laotian Panhandle.

Moving on a wide front in battalion and larger size elements their progress was impeded by torrential rains and mounting Pathet Lao resistance.

Prior to destruction of the final industrial targets in the DRV, the United States used the UK and Canadians to pressure Hanoi into halting support of the VC and PL insurgencies. As in previous instances they were informed that such conversations were useless. If anything they were more useless than previously since there was very little remaining for the Fascist murderers to destroy in the DRV and all the people of SEA were united in their determination to throw off capitalist shackles.

On 20 May Ho Chi Minh pressed for stronger CPR military commitments aimed at deterring the United States. Even the anti-Chinese groups in Hanoi were satisfied with overall progress of the struggle however, and philosophic regarding damage to their homeland.

Chairman Mao determined that the appropriate time had come, since the Thais and Americans had crossed the Mekong and were obviously expanding the area of the war and directed the PLA to initiate border crossing operations by two light infantry divisions into northern Laos. Accordingly, on 23 May these units began movement at night, utilizing all available cover and concealment during daylight hours, cloaked by rain and fog, using prestocked supplies along the routes, assisted by thousands of local labor as well as porter brigades to reconstruct bridges, clear defiles and otherwise aid their progress. They are advancing at

approximately ten miles a day due to weather and interdiction efforts by the enemy.

Concurrently, six additional divisions of the PLA began shifts from staging positions toward the Burmese and Lao-tian borders; forward command posts of the 54th, 13th and 14th Armies were established close to the frontiers and logistics build-up in these areas was stepped up--all of this being done in a manner calculated to impress the Americans with a new magnitude of threat.

On 24 May a major development occurred which seemed certain to have great impact on American resolve. A battalion size task force of US infantry was trapped by a carefully rehearsed PL/PAVN ambush ten miles west of Tchepone. In a five hour engagement involving light artillery, recoilless weapons and mines along borders of the road three battalions of PIA/PAVN literally destroyed the American column. Over 350 enemy were killed, their bodies abandoned, fifty-five were captured and most of those who dragged themselves away were wounded. Over four hundred weapons were captured including eight 105 artillery pieces and a variety of crew served weapons.

Cut off from air support, communications jammed, the column was pinned down and annihilated before relief forces could arrive. The action was similar to many which had occurred during the final phases of the struggle between the Viet Minh and French in 1953-54.

The uproar in the American and RVN press over this defeat has been tremendous. The warmongers shout for attacks on the CPR, the doomsayers for negotiations and peace. Late intelligence indicates that the United States government is supported by the mass of the population in military steps taken to date.

Also on 24 May, shortly after word of the massacre reached Saigon, it was reliably reported that Khanh convened other members of his government and the American Ambassador to announce his intention of surrendering power. Stating his health was bad and his nerves at the breaking point he indicated that the load was too heavy for him to carry.

While details are lacking it is believed that the conference broke up in confusion, a number of the generals demanding a larger US force commitment in SVN, others asserting that the time had come to negotiate a solution.

The United States' presence in SEA has been steadily increasing during the last weeks. There will soon be five US divisions and supporting troops deployed in Thailand, Laos and the DRV with the apparent objective of creating a defensive line cutting across all three countries although distances and terrain would preclude more than the establishment of strong points and mobile patrols.

It is projected that from eleven to thirty-eight PLA/DRV divisions can be initially committed to operations in SEA without seriously degrading PLA capabilities in other border areas.

While logistical problems for the support of so large a force will be extensive, the total needs of a PLA division are perhaps only a tenth of that of a US division which depends on extensive motorized technical equipment and weapons which are difficult to employ during the SW monsoon season.

By 24 May it was apparent that the withdrawal of Pathet Lao and PAVN forces to deal with US/Thai Mekong crossings had negated early prospects for capturing Attapeu and Seno; that the Soviets were in the process of providing the CPR with 100 MIG 21s, 20 TU-16s, 25 KOMARS, 20 SAM units and more POL; that the situation in Japan was substantially unchanged although the Americans were rumored to have assured the Japanese government that nuclear weapons would be used only as a final resort.

On this date an IL-28 of the PLA while conducting aerial reconnaissance over units of the United States Seventh Fleet in the China Sea SE of Hainan Island was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile. The United States press has asserted that the plane attempted a bombing run on a US carrier.

While these developments were occurring in SVN private discussions between the CPR, the DRV and the French were being concluded.

The French agreed to announce the convening of a multi-nation conference in Paris on 5 June for purposes of discussing a cease-fire and negotiated settlement of problems in SEA. They received from Ho Chi Minh, and agreed to transmit to the Americans a proposal that there be no pre-conditions set for the conference by either side and that discussions should deal with all SEA.

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On 25 May the French Foreign Office announced the conference, indicating that the USSR, CPR, DRV, Cambodia, Burma, and Poland had agreed to participate, appealing to the United States, Canada, the UK and India to sit down at the conference table and discuss a situation which was rapidly becoming a threat to the world.

This proposal was endorsed by U Thant and by principal neutralist leaders. In Washington a prominent US legislator rose in the Congress and made an impassioned plea for negotiations before the United States found itself embroiled in a massive ground war in SEA—confronting a billion orientals who were determined to free their countries of Western influence.

The situation in Germany remains unchanged.

It is now 25 May 1965.

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~

F-31-Red

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MESSAGE NO. 1

FROM RED TO CONTROL MOVE NO. III

REFERENCE _____ DTG 17 September 1964

1. In South Vietnam:
 - a. Continue and intensify Viet Cong efforts.
 - b. Arrange defection of ARVN leaders to coincide with uprising in Saigon on or about 10 June.
2. In Laos:
 - a. Continue southward advance by 2 PLA light divisions in the direction of Vientiane.
 - b. Have PL-DRV forces retire before US-Thai advance and harass flanks of US-Thai forces.
3. Increase pressures on Thailand by:
 - a. Moving 2 PLA divisions and an army headquarters into northern Burma "on the invitation of the government of Burma."
 - b. Intensify covert actions in northwest and northeast Thailand and sabotage rail line supporting US-Thai forces in Laos.
 - c. Reopen private talks with Thais and point out folly of continued Thai support of US aggression.
4. Arrange with Sinanouk to send more MIGs to Cambodia.
5. Approach US at Warsaw and through intermediaries explain sincere desire of CPR to negotiate settlement in Southeast Asia. Explain that we propose settlement on basis of neutralization of entire area guaranteed by all participants in conference convened by French, withdrawal of all foreign forces from area, immediate cease-fire and freezing of present areas of administrative control.
6. Deny charges in US press that IL-28 shot down on 24 May was engaged in bombing run on US destroyer.

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F-32-Red

~~SECRET~~ -- NOFORN

7. Intensify propaganda campaign against US aggression.

8. Prepare for possible US air attacks against military targets and transportation lines in South and East China and against nuclear materials production facilities.

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F-33-Red

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CRITIQUE

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

SIGMA II-64

SENIOR CRITIQUE

DIRECTOR: Gentlemen, I think we have a quorum at the big table. To save you from reading the Scenario Projections I'll give you just a thumbnail sketch of what has happened. The Action Teams met for about an hour and a half this afternoon and decided on courses of action available to both Red and Blue at the end of this projection. Basically the Blue deployments were carried out as planned; the forces are either in place or closing at the times that were indicated. The bombings of North Vietnam continued. Blue was successful in destroying the selected targets including the cement plants, machine tool factories, the unfinished steel mill, and in fact, all of the 94 targets on the list. Profitable targets are now becoming hard to find. The mining has been successful. There are now about 4,000 short tons of supplies reaching North Vietnam daily from China. Antiaircraft fire continues during the strikes, the plane losses have mounted, but over-all are moderate. Aircraft from South China fields and Hainan, bearing DRV markings, have been met sporadically in an air defense role over North Vietnam. Basically, they have been ineffective. There have been some SAM sites under construction. These have been successfully bombed by Blue and effectively taken out. Viet Cong activity in South Vietnam has continued. The ARVN units have been repeatedly hit. There is an obvious Viet Cong campaign to get all local administrators possible and to disrupt transport. US units have only been heckled with no actual organized attacks against them. Chinese Communists have secured an agreement with Burma and have moved a military mission there--two hundred men initially.

The Pathet Lao have opened attacks in Laos. They are gaining ground lost in the Plain de Jars and other areas that were lost last fall. There have been some uprisings in Northwest Thailand, obviously Communist inspired. This has caused the deployment of a Thai regiment into the northwestern area. The cross-Mekong operations of Thai and US forces have generally been successful. Yesterday game time, which is 24 May, a battalion of US troops, about ten miles west of Tchepone ran into a strong ambush and were badly chewed up, with 350 killed. The reaction to the US Thai cross-border operations was the introduction into North Laos of two Chicom light divisions. These

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G-1

threatened toward Vientiane, but they are under orders not to engage US troops face-to-face. There is disaffection within the South Vietnamese leadership. General Khanh is discouraged and ready to quit in an impossible situation, and other generals are seeking diplomatic posts abroad. There is a movement, a confirmed movement of 6 Chicom divisions toward the Burma-Laos, South Vietnamese borders, and other unconfirmed movements in the same direction. None of these are in position to immediately cross. Yesterday, game time, the French Foreign Office announced the call of an International Conference to convene in Paris on 5 June. In this, France is acting at the request of the USSR, Chinese Peoples Republic, the DRV, Cambodia, Burma and Poland. They hope that the United States, Canada, and the UK and India will join to find some solution for the problems of Southeast Asia. Now, may I ask the Blue Action Team to present a short resume of the courses of action the Blue Team considered?

BLUE: I would like to start out by repeating part of the objectives agreed upon by the Senior Team at the start of the game. The first one was to maintain the independence and the security of the Allied and the neutral nations in the Southeast Asia area, to prevent a Communist take-over, and specifically with respect to South Vietnam, to establish and to maintain the authority and the effectiveness of the government in Saigon to help the territories south of the 17th parallel. Specifically, within South Vietnam, based upon the situation that has been roughed out for you here, and in light of a very possible RVN collapse, the Blue Staff came up with several recommendations. We concluded, one, that we do need and we have a continuing need for a strong viable government in South Vietnam; we don't have that at this time. We also need a South Vietnamese government that is completely responsive to US direction. The head of the South Vietnamese government must be amenable to US control. Specifically, we are in a situation right now where the head of the South Vietnamese government must invite the United States to take over active control of the military operations. We do not consider it appropriate at this time for the United States to take over complete control of political operations. Further, we do not believe that this is within our capability at this time. This is a capability that must be developed. On use of US combat forces in South Vietnam, we hold to the same recommendation we made heretofore, that we only use them in combat in South Vietnam when the Viet Cong forces supported as they are by PAVN come into open contact in combat with the South Vietnamese regular forces. With

regard to military actions and other actions outside of South Vietnam, I'd like to point out that the staff had only an hour and a half to consider and come up with specific recommendations. We are unable to come up with a single recommendation. We have ten people on the staff and right now we have ten solutions. I think the best way to present this is to give you the three basic courses of action which were discussed by the staff.

The first one is to accept the proposal made by President de Gaulle to participate in a conference which has as its objective the cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia. We did have general agreement that we would go into this conference with empty hands and empty pockets and come out with nothing that would further our aims in Southeast Asia or on this part of the world.

The second course of action which we might call the middle course of action does not have confrontation or contact with Chinese forces at this time. We would continue the deployments which have already been planned. We would rely upon the regular Thai forces (four divisions) we have at this time to maintain order in Northwest Thailand. We have already deployed one Thai regiment up there and we must continue to depend upon them for this border. We would secure the line of the Mekong in Thailand along the north shoulder and on the east side of Thailand with US and Thai forces as they come in. We're going to increase the intensity and the number of the raids and the patrols and mobile operations that we are now conducting in the Panhandle with the object of denying this as a means of support from North Vietnam into South Vietnam. We're going to increase the maritime control measures off the south coast of the Camau Peninsula and in the Gulf of Tonkin. We are going to continue the air attacks on North Vietnam. You may recall that the '94 target list has been expended. We will consider the next major step within this general course of action which is no contact with the Chinese Communists. There are two aspects of this which we would propose at this time. And this is a major change in the type of pressure that we are putting on North Vietnam. The first one is the landing in the Vinh area, with a Marine element or an amphibious element of up to one division, and using appropriate airborne elements as necessary. The other type of pressure is a corps or larger attack in the Haiphong-Hanoi area using our amphibious and our airborne capability. The first one we considered can be done within 72 hours after the decision is made and the second one in approximately double this time. This is the second

then, of the three general courses of action and within it I've given one step or two steps which would increase the pressure but would avoid confrontation with the Chinese Communists.

The third general course of action is to enter into contact with the two Chinese Communist light divisions in northern Laos either by moving north from the Mekong or letting them come south to meet us. We favor letting them meet us because they're stretching out their limited capability to support their forces as they do this. Concurrently with confrontation, to bomb selected industrial and military targets in China. And there are two options that were discussed here: one to bomb with conventional ordnance and the other to bomb with nuclear ordnance. The third phase of this third general course of action (confrontation with the Chinese Communists) is to attack the Chinese Communists' nuclear facilities. Again, we have two choices here. One is to do it with conventional weapons and the other is to make this same attack using nuclear weapons. And the last step in this general course of action is to execute a general nuclear attack against principal targets in Communist China. I point out Sir, that we had ten people to work on this and in the time allotted we did not reach a consensus. After hearing the Red proposals at the Action Critique, we realized there were certain changes that we might make in this.

In summary, I believe that each one of us as individuals were too preoccupied and too concerned with the total force, political and military, that we might have some time in the future rather than the usable power we presented to the North Vietnamese and to the Chinese Communists. Secondly, I feel that the Red Team understood most of the things that we did and when we tried to communicate something to them, they read our communication and interpreted it exactly the way we wanted them to interpret it. I would present for your consideration however, they all speak English. They went to the same schools that we went to. They have the same background that we have, and the same pressures on them. But I do question whether we have gone far enough into this. This is a concern of mine, whether we have gone far enough when we say we are going to make a certain action and hope that they will take, draw this conclusion from it, have we gone into this far enough at this time to assure ourselves that this could happen.

DIRECTOR: Thank you. Red Team, would you present your resume?

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RED: I believe that the speaker for Blue has completely undermined our credibility by pointing out that we were really no better than the Blue Team. Our general strategy throughout the game had been to cave in South Vietnam under the American feet, and to exert pressure on Thailand which is so important to the Americans. Along with this, to move so as to avoid provoking an American nuclear attack against the Chinese mainland. Of course the situation that Control helped us create was quite favorable in carrying out this strategy. We are not sure about the American intentions, we think they are not quite ready to come to the conference table and so we must push their tottering house a bit more. But in South Vietnam we will continue almost the same efforts.

I am a little confused about your feelings that we had not been attacking the ARVN forces as that is what we thought we were doing. We would also arrange for a defection by certain leaders of the South Vietnamese Army to coincide with an uprising in Saigon about the 10th of June. In Laos, we would continue the southward advance of our two light divisions in the direction of Vientiane, but as the Director indicated we have no intention of coming into contact with American forces. In the south, we would have the Pathet Lao-DRV forces retire before the US-Thai advance and harass the flanks of the US-Thai forces. We would increase our pressures on Thailand by moving two Chinese divisions and an army headquarters into Northern Burma. We would get the Burmese Government to invite this move. We have no doubt this can be done. The Army headquarters, of course, will suggest that there is more of this to come. We would not cross the border into Thailand with regular forces but we would conduct covert operations into both northwest and northeast Thailand and we would attempt to sabotage the rail lines supporting the US-Thai forces in Laos. We would reopen the talks that we unsuccessfully tried to have with the Thais earlier in the Spring and point out the folly of their continued support of US aggression. We feel that in the developing situation they would be more receptive to our position. We would arrange with Sihanouk to receive more MIGs in Cambodia. These MIGs are not much good for fighting but we could display a few. At Warsaw, we would approach the US and explain our sincere desire to negotiate a settlement in Southeast Asia. We would explain in general terms the nature of the settlement that we would accept. We would contemplate neutralization of the entire area and, as a footnote to head off a question, this would not include North Vietnam. Neutralization would be guaranteed by all the conferees at the conference convened by

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the French. The conference should also produce the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the area, an immediate cease-fire, and the freezing of present areas of administrative control. Additional courses of action would be to try to head off any Gulf of Tonkin-like episode by denying that the IL-28 which was shot down by a US destroyer had been on a bombing run. We would of course intensify our world-wide propaganda campaign against US aggression. And we would prepare as best we could for the possibility of US air attacks against military and transportation targets in Southeast China and against nuclear materials production facilities. We feel that these moves would rapidly bring the game to a close.

DIRECTOR: Thank you, Sir. It is obvious from the two opposing evaluations of the situation that we are not likely to have time enough to decide what is to be done either way here. This just presents what the teams thought of this last scenario projection. Going back to the reasons for having the game--the game purposes--one of them was to look at possible USSR and Chicom reactions to a US decision to commit substantial forces to the area. Therefore, we had to start with an initial scenario which would get the forces in motion. And we had to take the liberty of announcing the Presidential decision that they were on the way. We recognize that the rationale for such a decision is sketchy and that it probably could be refuted. However, it does bring up the question that we talked about in the game and in Control as to whether or not the United States must have specific acts of provocation to put such a movement in force, or will a generally deteriorating situation have to be turned into cause for a power play. It was our consensus in Control that Blue moves in this were basically a huge power play designed to force the hand of the Reds in a way that would still not get our US ground forces committed over there. The question that I would like for someone to discuss is will we ever be in a position where a decision would be made to get this many US forces going over there without a direct act on the part of the other side where we could say, "All right, you crossed the border with X number of divisions--here we come." In other words, was our initial scenario completely beyond belief?

BLUE: Or something like the Gulf of Tonkin again?

DIRECTOR: Yes, a Gulf of Tonkin incident can be parlayed into something that would require a national reaction.

RED: Would there be a move to impeach the President for

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taking action of this sort from the Secretary of Defense in the absence of a declaration of war? And the row in Congress not...

BLUE: I would think under the Joint Resolution you can go a long way. That is my own feeling. Undoubtedly the President would probably want to go back to the Congress again but I think that with the Joint Resolution and with sufficient provocation, he could start to move everything that the Blue Team has moved here.

SECOND BLUE: - and more.

DIRECTOR: Yes, but the type or degree of provocation is the thing that gets us. In other words, the Red strategy, which we have no reason to doubt, is in line with intelligence estimates and everything. The last thing they want is to provoke the United States by any act, which would cause a massive deployment into the area. One of the things we wanted to do here was to find out if our plans were reasonable. Can we get the forces moving that we have written down and studied. The group of forces that Blue deployed here is not actually in plans, but in magnitude is very close to the magnitude of the deployment that is planned. Now, it has been determined that it will take a declaration of national emergency or its equivalent to generate all the forces that would let this thing be done. The question is, "What is going to have to happen--how bad is the situation going to have to be, to justify such a thing?"

RED: I would suggest two things. I would suggest that you are not going to have a single stage operation. I would suggest that we would have to have a minimum of two stages of operation. Stage one would be a clearly defensive deployment designed to dry up or chop the lines of communications into South Vietnam. Stage two would be a counter blow. This would be the progression that I think would be more likely. But I think it is unlikely that you are going to get a political acceptance or a public sentiment acceptance of either stage. I think that you would get the opposite view--we're not doing so well, so why not just let it die on the vine and pull out of there?

BLUE: I don't know. We had 350 troops killed yesterday in one engagement. That's a sizeable fracas. Multiplied by four, then the whole damn battalion would have been wiped out.

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RED: Now what I suggest is that precisely this 350 troop killing is exactly the kind of thing that would trigger the next step.

BLUE: Right.

RED: You're there, you're committed. Your honor is at stake, now you've got to do something.

DIRECTOR: It is evident that the Reds all along kept their eye very closely on the situation in South Vietnam and were trying to pull the rug out from under the US so there wouldn't be anything for the United States to support. We could not go into all of the US actions that go into the support of the GVN. These are long range actions and this is the fallacy of a game like this. If these long range actions are successful, we wouldn't have to have the military actions that follow on. Recognizing this, we wondered whether or not sticking to South Vietnam, taking military or other actions there would be more productive than trying to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam by taking action everywhere else but within South Vietnam. Of course we did go in there, but the fact remains that the Reds considered that they'd be quite successful in keeping the situation in South Vietnam where it would not get any better regardless of the deployment of US troops.

RED: I'd like to point out that the battalion that was slaughtered was slaughtered by Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam--North Vietnam had no regular units in there overtly. The US was put in the position of being in there with regular units, but with no regular units to combat. And in the eyes of the world, the US would be branded the aggressor for using regular units to fight the people of Vietnam.

BLUE: I would say that if you believe, if you want to believe regardless of what we do against North Vietnam, that the North Vietnamese would continue to penetrate, and act, and resupply, and ambush, and win engagements, and go all over South Vietnam--if you believe that this is possible--then the obvious conclusion is that there's no use in doing it. But I don't happen to believe that this would be true in real life. I think that the kinds of things that we have been planning to do, and in real life plan to do, will in fact seriously disrupt the capability of the North Vietnamese to do all the things that they are doing now or that they plan to do. And I think that they would stop. If we do not dry them up completely we will just create so many

problems for them that they will have to really reduce their activities in South Vietnam instead of intensifying them. This is my personal opinion. Otherwise we really are out of our class. I don't think they're really that kind.

DIRECTOR: Well, this came up in the critique of the last game. As I remember it, we had almost equally divided sides. About half felt the DRV would throw up their hands and stop, and the others said they wouldn't stop. I don't know that we have the answer to that one yet. Since that game was played, reconnaissance has given greater knowledge of what's to be hit and there are some appraisals of what such hits would do. And it would hurt them, there are no two ways about it. It gets down now to a value judgment of how much does this affect the leadership. It is recognized, I believe that 88 percent of the people up there are out in the boondocks and probably would not be affected too much by this. But the leadership certainly will be, and it is a value of judgment as to whether or not they are going to stop support of the people down south.

BLUE: I would say, "How does it affect the individual North Vietnamese soldiers who are trying to go to South Vietnam while their families are being killed and their whole country is being devastated up north?" I think this is the guy who is going to lose his desire rather than his leader.

RED: You don't understand the Red side. We operate on the proposition that where ignorance is bliss, it's folly to be wise. We just don't tell them.

DIRECTOR: Well, I'll admit that I don't know the answer to this one.

BLUE: That's the great unknown.

DIRECTOR: We did have another interesting situation. It was that the Red Team in general didn't seem to be too worried about the troop commitment of the United States in Southeast Asia. What they were really worried about was whether Blue was going to come up and start clobbering China. And their movements of troops and everything else were designed not to provoke this. Had the bombing of North Vietnam been carried out as laid out in the plan, without the deployment of ground forces, it apparently wouldn't have made much difference in the action the Red Team took. I would like to know from the Red Seniors, "Is this the feeling?"

RED: I guess that's a fair statement.

DIRECTOR: Well then, would we say, putting on our Blue hats again, that we can initiate such a campaign without a build-up of ground forces before we start?

BLUE: Red, what did you figure they were there for?

RED: Defense. And we weren't sending anything against them. We operated on the principal, I would say, to give them nothing but feathers to confront.

BLUE: What would have happened if they hadn't been there? Let's say if there were a deployment of considerable air strength just across the Mekong River, US and so on, would this present a lucrative guerrilla target? Would you still have gone down and tried to chew up the rail lines and so on. In other words, suppose that some ground forces were not there to provide some protection against guerrilla action. Would you have then withdrawn from airfields for example?

RED: Well, I am not sure that I can speak for the group. But I think that there was on each day a proposal to introduce larger numbers of troops into the South, both into Laos and into North Vietnam. There was also a proposal on the first day to introduce appreciable Chinese into North Vietnam. We cut that back to a division infiltrated and spread out. On each day the senior team diverted or cut back the force which was committed into the South. As very little rationale was discussed at the table, I couldn't say what was in the back of peoples' minds but basically we were reinforcing success. Does anyone have a different view on that?

RED: I think that that is a fair summary. All I would add is that the projection of US ground forces did have a temporary stiffening effect in both South Vietnam and in Thailand. Particularly in Thailand as it temporarily frustrated our pressure tactics.

RED: I say we must bear the Blue Action Team's injunction in mind. We have all been Western trained.

DIRECTOR: One of the things that we had as a written objective was to take a look at the need for possible recommendations to the President on the use of tactical nucs. It seemed that on the part of the Reds that this is one of the things which certainly would have made a difference in

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their actions--a real threat for the open use of them. We tried to throw in yesterday a situation where organized Chinese divisions did cross the border. We had two divisions coming into Laos. In discussion with the Blue Team today, it didn't seem that this force would be enough to cause Blue to make such a recommendation. However, this wasn't discussed. Which brings up the question, "Is this or is this not a good way to get around the threat of making a nuclear attack--just to send in a division at a time?" By sending in comparatively small size forces could the enemy deter the US Commander from recommending the use of nuclear weapons?

BLUE: It was discussed, Sir. I did not cover it here.

RED: I'm sorry I missed the second day of this, we had a crash order from the White House we had to take care of. However, it seems to me that the great fear on the Red side was that the US would attack China with nuclear weapons. You had to plan to avoid that and we would assume on the Blue side they would have been concerned about the Soviet Union backing up China in such an event. And if I had been there the other time I would have had a few thoughts to try to stimulate some concern about this. For example, I think our Chairman, Mao, might have proposed to the Soviets a meeting on the problem that the Chinese and Russians are quarreling about--proposed a meeting to settle it in return for Soviet threats to back them up, something of that sort.

RED: We had a commitment from the Soviets that they were backing the socialist state. We had it publicly and we had it passed to us by way of the British in a little bit stronger way.

RED: This says their statement was weasel-worded.

RED: Well, in the preceeding scenario, the Soviets gave a commitment in two different ways and we discussed at some length an increase in our propaganda campaign to take advantage of their commitment. In other words, reading more into it than they perhaps had actually meant. But it would put them in a position of hardly being able to back away once having stepped up along side of it.

RED: This Scenario today backs away a little bit from what happened the other day.

BLUE: Were you concerned only about being hit with tactical

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nucs or were you concerned about being hit with conventional ordnance as well?

RED: Well, any attack on China I think as far as that's concerned...

BLUE: Then the crucial thing wasn't tactical nucs or not, the crucial thing was hitting the Chinese troops. Or do I misread you?

RED: That's true. The important thing was hitting China proper.

BLUE: O.K., that's the next thing I wanted to get to-- was it troops or China proper?

RED: No, I think it was bombing China, as far as I was concerned.

DIRECTOR: Well, the team estimates that even though there was not a Red military plan to go down and overrun the whole area, the Action Team did consider this and came up with a military plan which Chairman Mao told them to prepare. In looking at the time and distance factors, it appeared that the US deployments would have made it to where there would have been a confrontation somewhere in mid-Thailand. The Reds considered that they could not get to Bangkok before the United States had a sufficient force on the ground to make a fight in Thailand. Red, what was your consideration on the move down through Laos and Cambodia?

RED: According to the situation, the maximum troops we could employ were six divisions and we would also require according to our estimates, 90 days to get there. We could not support them in combat against American forces. And as was mentioned earlier we wanted to keep American forces out of South Vietnam.

DIRECTOR: It does appear that a force of this size could be moved in in time to keep the whole area from being overrun, but if the US did so, it would be mixed up in a war that we don't want to fight. From a military judgment of the two forces, the time and distance factors would not permit the Chinese to get all the way down to the key points of Saigon and the Mekong area before they were met effectively. We recognized, but didn't try to solve the problem which we all know is with us today. And that is, if this is not done under SEATO auspices in accordance with the plans that are laid out under SEATO, some arrangements

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would have to be made for bilateral agreements between the countries involved and ourselves for command and control. We didn't try--we didn't ask for and don't want really to try to address this problem, except to recognize that it is a problem. This gets all the points that we came up with in Control which we would like to have discussed and I would like to open it now for some comment, criticism or discussion.

BLUE: I'd like to follow a previous Blue question to Red. Why weren't you concerned about the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese troops?

RED: I didn't say we weren't concerned about it. I think our feeling was that if you've got to face the US with the business of fighting a war they didn't want to fight, this would be added to the pressure of what we are trying to do in South Vietnam and might make them decide to cut their losses and get out. But we would certainly want to avoid nuclear engagement of any kind.

RED: We started out with three important objectives: to secure mainland China (which is to protect the homeland), eliminate US presence and influence in Southeast Asia, and avoid a US nuclear attack on mainland China. We attempted to keep the provocation low enough throughout so that we wouldn't get this kind of a reaction.

BLUE: Red, did you mean an all-out nuclear attack when you said avoid "nuclear attack"?

RED: Any nuclear attack.

BLUE: Any?

RED: Any nuclear attack on mainland China.

BLUE: Did you assume that the United States was going to come to the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons against the troops, in fact come to the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons on the Chinese mainland?

RED: The Senior Team hasn't discussed it; I'm going to turn the question over to the Action Team.

RED: We didn't think that we were providing a military target, but psychologically Blue might well have considered doing this. We had the general estimate of US policy that they would be reluctant to cross the nuclear threshold. We had quite a bit of room for maneuver.

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DIRECTOR: There was some discussion as to whether or not all of the Blue assets were used. One Blue Senior feels that we could have gotten some more action along the coast, blocked off everything that was going in to the Viet Cong and maybe chased those submarines that are up there down, to find out whose they are, and then done something about that. Were we looking too much at the ground action in this case? Were there other things that could have been done?

BLUE: Well, our feeling on that was, as I recall it--we tried to block off all access by mining all the ports. But for some reason or other this didn't seem to work so we had to do it a second time. But we thought we had done that insofar as North Vietnam was concerned.

DIRECTOR: Well, this got the major traffic that was coming in. The question is what about all the rest of it?

BLUE: Bridges...roads...

BLUE: Well, we tried to take out traffic coming out of China by air and then mine it from the sea.

BLUE: We did take it all out according to the scenario.

BLUE: It didn't seem to have much effect.

DIRECTOR: Well then, the real moot question we have raised here is "What will the effect be of knocking out all of those targets and mining the ports and really cutting them off from everything but a trickle from Communist China?"

BLUE: I agree with my Blue colleague. I would think it would have more effect than it had here.

BLUE: I'd like to find the secret of how you develop a force that can keep on fighting and advancing in spite of having no supplies, no ammunition, getting their rear devastated, their home country, so forth.

RED: I think the answer to that is the eight year war against the French when the Viet Minh didn't control any of the cities or have the industrial, small industrial complex that they have now. They still proceeded to progress during the eight years and eventually win the war.

BLUE: So the French didn't do very well.

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RED: But on the ground the French had a large force.

BLUE: But they had no air and they had a whole population against them, they were the hated colonialists. I think this is really quite a different situation. In here we had a real powerful attack, by air, primarily by air, against the base of these people and it didn't seem to affect them.

RED: The more you attack us the less we have to lose. And just as you said now, you don't have anything left in the way of targets, really.

BLUE: Well, perhaps then we have to go to China. This is why I think the effect is on the soldiers, the effect of this type campaign was largely on the individual soldiers that had to do the fighting.

RED: Now we Reds have written off Hanoi as a city in rubble. They've taken to the countryside; now what do you do?

BLUE: I think you would consider very seriously, Course of Action Number Three or some variation of it, as recommended by the Blue Action Team.

BLUE: You mean you have a ground attack?

RED: No, you start making contact with the Chinese, and perhaps first you start with hitting their forces in Laos and so on. Gradually escalate.

RED: I'm not sure the Chinese would respond. Our whole effort has been to try and stay out of this thing. Present no targets, present no excuse, present no provocation or justification. Without adequate justification, Blue actions have raised the international sound level and pressures for international conferences. And meanwhile the Sino-Soviet rift has been closing. So you've been losing a great deal internationally too. This we recognize as great assets from our viewpoint and are important as long term gains. Our general philosophy is that the situation in South Vietnam is totally rotten and it's going to collapse. It's going to fall into our lap like a ripe plum, to quote our Comrade Mao. And we don't have to do anything but keep up this kind of incidious pressure and present no target for you to go after. We think this strategy is going to win. This is what Red was trying to do, although Control sometime interfered a little bit. We were surprised that the

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Americans were capable of committing such heinous crimes. Their persistence did cause us a little bit of worry, particularly when the Americans on the second day were willing to go after our cities the way they did without any justification. That did raise some concern that they might do this against China. This was the one thing that gave us cause to worry. We were not concerned about nuclear war.

RED: We were also concerned though that Mao might order us to take actions we did not want to take.

RED: Our concern about nuclear war was to get the Russians to make some kind of a thunderous declaration so that the Americans would realize that they would be struck by the socialist camp--that they didn't have an open opportunity here to go after us without nuclear retaliation. That was our principal concern. We didn't see how the strategy we were trying to pursue, less Control's interference, could ever justify any nuclear action against the Chinese.

BLUE: Did you consider at anytime pressing for negotiations and making some concessions in order to save the rest of North Vietnam?

RED: Oh yes, we'd be willing to come to a negotiating table because we've got all our people in place.

BLUE: I said to make some concessions.

RED: Oh yes, we'd make some concessions. I don't know what concessions you would have in mind, but we're always very reasonable in these matters.

RED: We deliberately instigated action in Northwest Thailand so that we would have something to trade at the conference table. This was the basic purpose for going in there.

BLUE: But I mean, did you consider trading the rest of the targets in North Vietnam at an earlier stage?

RED: No, because by the time we got to the targets of North Vietnam they had all been struck.

BLUE: I've got two questions here that I would like to pose. I don't know if there are any answers to them but I would like to ask Father Ho how stable his regime is now

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that his country has been pretty well beat up--how responsive and loyal his armed forces are. And, secondly, I would like to ask Father Ho whether he really believes that the Soviet Union would risk the destruction of the Soviet Union in order to preserve Red China, North Vietnam or any other conceivable area that you could mention.

RED: I think the first question is easier to answer than the second. We develop pretty good techniques for making basically hostile people perform regardless of what's happening to them. The second question is more difficult to answer because Ho doesn't really control this thing any more. We've started moving Chinese divisions in there and I think he's pretty well our puppet.

BLUE: This may be--but what I was really talking about here though was in the sense of just how much support does the regime in North Vietnam now have from the people, which would include the armed forces? Now one of our individuals has been sowing one-shot pistols all over North Vietnam. Have any of those been used to knock off leading citizens by the enraged populace who have seen their good life going away from them by the courtesy of the United States Air Force and Navy?

RED: Well, the people's rage has been turned against the American murderers. Not against any of their own leaders. And as far as we leaders are concerned, of course, we're Mao--we're Chinese. And our whole life has been one of struggle, the days of the long march, and the fighting against the Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists. We've been outlaws in the international community--unrightfully of course--and so we're used to this sort of thing. This has been our life. We have brought all of China under one roof through this policy. This is the policy that is going to prevail. Our people understand this well. We're surprised you don't.

BLUE: I wonder if they do understand it. This is the heart of my question you see. How stable is a police state when the police state is under heavy attack? And you can say that it could be reasonably stable--take Nazi Germany in World War II, where they took some rather sizeable blows and heavy destruction. As we all know, they retained a remarkable cohesion very late in the game. That wasn't true in Italy. I don't know how you Chinese fit in between the Germans and the Italians.

RED: We're twice as tough and elemental as even the

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Germans were.

RED: At the outbreak of the last war, the Soviets were quite concerned about this. Molotov told our Ambassador that he was very worried about defections.

BLUE: And they had trouble too, didn't they?

RED: They did until the Germans told the people that were on their side in Russia that they were an inferior race, then they began to turn...

BLUE: I must admit the second question is a far more difficult question to answer. But I always had the view--I certainly would be glad to hear my Blue colleague speak on this--that the Soviets are anything but blue-eyed idealists. They are rather realistic and elemental in their approach to problems and the facts of life. And how much would they really risk, I wonder, to preserve the integrity of a place like North Vietnam? And even laying aside the recent doctrinal differences between themselves and the Chicoms, how much would they really risk if they themselves were safe and would continue to be safe, in order to preserve Red China?

RED: I don't think they give much of a damn about North Vietnam or South Vietnam, or any of that part of the world. Khrushchev, when the Laos thing first started said that this is no risk of ours--we're not risking anything on this. We're going to get it anyway. It's just a question of a few years. We can wait. And I think that's his attitude. But on the question of whether or not they would lose Communist China, I think there is a far harder question. These people are still Communists. A lot of us who profess to know a little something about them don't all hold the same view on this. But I am convinced that Khrushchev is a real believing Communist, and that China is important to him. The loss of China to Communism would be pretty tough on him. He once said that if Communism didn't prevail in the world, his life would have had no meaning. So when it gets to the point where he feels he is responsible for China being lost, I don't think that anyone knows how he would react. But on South Vietnam I think their whole attitude in a situation of this kind would be pressure for a conference and not to have to face that dilemma. They would work very hard for that, on everybody. I was surprised at the Blue Team's trouble over putting these as three rather separate courses of action. I wouldn't think that you would ever just accept a conference. You'd take some steps

such as this landing in North Vietnam at the same time that you accepted the conference, so that you would have something in your pocket...

BLUE: We tried to educate our people that this would not be an acceptable course of action. We had to have something to negotiate with.

BLUE: If you're going to land some troops there's no use fooling around with Vinh, you rascal. Go into Haiphong and Hanoi. It's more comfortable. There is one observation I would like to make if I may. It seems to me that Blue is just as justified in assuming that the effects of the actions taken by Blue would create a disintegration in the fabric of the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh as Red is in assuming that their actions will result in the collapse of the fabric of South Vietnam. Actually the situation that we have in South Vietnam is not as bad as one might think. After all we have had plenty of evidence that the armed forces of South Vietnam are rather reliable when organized. It is quite a different situation, say from the days of the French and the native armed forces. There is a history of quite a bit of resistance against the Viet Cong by the population whenever they could resist and get away without being subject to reprisals. I think the tremendous religious feeling in part of the population of South Vietnam would prevent their defecting in any case. These factors lead me to believe that they would not be as susceptible to falling apart as Red might think. On the other hand, I think that there are some inherent weaknesses in the Viet Minh position and population which could probably indicate that they might be susceptible to collapsing under the kind of attack that the Blue have mounted on them. It is easy in real life to see the bad things around us and to magnify them. It is one of the things we do generally. We highlight all the problems we're having and we tend to forget that the enemy has the same problems just because we can't see them. They're not very obvious to us but I think we must recognize that they have the same kinds of problems that we do.

RED: For example, as I understand it, the economic position of North Vietnam a year ago was terrible. It didn't seem to affect their effort any. In fact they stepped it up. Our clients always seem to be in a bad economic condition.

RED: Either that, or too many capitalists.

RED: One other comment on this bombing problem. I would have thought that if we were going to undertake the bombing of China the first targets would be the nuclear installations, but this...

BLUE: That is precisely what I was going to say.

RED: Much less reaction from the Russians.

BLUE: Then you really get something worthwhile.

BLUE: Yes.

RED: I think that ties in with my thought that the thing that really worried us was the tendency for the US to overreact, acting in a rather irrational way. As long as we could count on Blue acting the way we thought they would react without going too far, without doing something, this fitted right into our strategy. But to go after our nuclear facilities, for example, doesn't fit into that pattern. We've been working hard on this for years, and denied our people much to produce this. To have it knocked out is something that is so shattering that we might not even mention it to our own people.

RED: As a member of the Red Team, may I make a comment? I thought that the first question you put to the conferees was the most interesting one I've heard, that is, "Will a specific act or general deterioration be sufficient to trigger major US participation in this problem?" I was rather surprised, as one of the Comrades, to see the US so easily influenced into committing large troop units into this country. I don't recall whether Blue mobilized or not.. Did they--did they start mobilization?

BLUE: Yes.

RED: Well, looking at this problem from where I sit, in Communist China, it looks to me as if this war in Southeast Asia is going to be fought by the people of the US and my estimate of the situation was that the US didn't have any stomach for an all-out war in Southeast Asia--that any commitment of large troop units there which would involve mobilization and the giving up of things as they had to give them up in World War II and started to have to give up during the fighting in Korea would not be a very palatable dish unless there was some good reason, some major incident which would trigger a willingness on their part to send troops and to mobilize. I think that's one of the most

important questions that's come up during this war game.

BLUE: Well then, you would disagree with your Red friend who said you weren't impressed with the fact that we mobilized all these people and sent them over there.

RED: I was surprised. I mean that we have fairly good evidence. I would think that the situation today is a partial answer to your question. We certainly have a general deterioration taking place in South Vietnam and we're committing our forces piecemeal up to a limited amount.

RED: I can't say we weren't impressed. We were impressed, because initially we took several courses of action. First, we didn't send anybody out of China except one division. And we sent it in piecemeal to diverse locations so that it couldn't be identified as a division entity. Second, we took precautionary defensive moves opposite Taiwan and Korea in the event that something might be triggered there. But I would say we had a wait and see attitude. What are we going to do with these forces that you're moving? When you began to come into Thailand, we said, "Well, they're not going anywhere. We just won't give them any cause to do anything."

DIRECTOR: Well, I will try to summarize from the game standpoint that the United States, if it wants to, can get its hands on the wherewithal manpower, support and so forth--to deploy rather massive forces into Southeast Asia in time to meet an aggression if it occurs. In the absence of such aggression it appears questionable to me whether such a massive deployment would be made. And if it were made, it probably would not be effectively used because of a lack of a military threat to meet it. We have no consensus on what would happen if we initiated a bombing campaign on North Vietnam. The situation in South Vietnam seems to be a real tease and that without an effort that has some success in the distant future--the immediate future--we have no reason to be supporting the South Vietnamese. Politically right now, and in the situation as portrayed here, the other side seems to be in the driver's seat. They can continue, under the cover that they now have and which is more or less accepted by the world, all of the actions that they are now doing and it is probably not going to get anybody but us upset. As is usual in these games, we do not come to any specific conclusions. We make no definite recommendations. There will be a game report which will summarize the moves that have been made and



the discussions of both the Action Teams and the Senior Teams. The report will be sent to you for whatever use that it may have. We hope that this has been an interesting and useful forum of discussion. Our shop is happy to be at your service to put on such a show for the Chairman or for any of you that would like to have something looked into. We would try to be the fall guy who has to make up the interactions and to take the knocks from both sides. I think that the Chairman would be happy to support a request from any outside agency for any sort of a game or a forum like this that you might think useful. It has been a great pleasure to be at your disposal for this.

██████████ Of course I desire to thank all of the participating agencies and individuals, and I certainly wish to thank the laborers in the vineyard who made this particular problem go. I must say that about three weeks ago I had grave doubts as to whether we should go ahead and have this particular game at this time. The events were moving so rapidly in South Vietnam and contiguous areas that I thought we might better spend our time figuring out what to do on the scene of battle rather than in the conference room. However, after listening to the Director and his troops explain what they were trying to do, the degree with which they were updating the material to be made available, and the aspects of the problem to be considered, I came, I think, to the proper decision that we should go ahead. I believe that--I offer this only as a thought, not as a decision or judgment on my part--that perhaps all players were influenced to a considerable degree on what happened here, by actual events. I'm not sure whether this is good or bad. I'm inclined to think it is good, because when you're playing one of these games concerning an area where there really is nothing at stake, players are inclined to be just a little bit casual as to the stakes they throw on the table. In this particular case I noticed a very definite caution and thoughtfulness, at least on the Blue Team. I think I detected rather less caution on the Red side. Maybe that's an unfair comment. I noticed a very considerable degree of reflection and thought being given to the various moves proposed. The Blue Senior Team on a couple of occasions restrained the Action Team and on a couple I believe the Seniors were more fiery than the Juniors which I must say surprised me a little bit. All in all though, I have the feeling that this was a valuable exercise. I certainly have derived several questions which I want to go home and chew over a little bit, one of them being the one the Director first posed. I agree with my fellow Blue Senior, it's a very interesting question. And

the others are along the lines of the ones I posed myself as being pertinent. I agree with previous speakers, including the Director, that there appeared to be a wide variation in the judgment as to what would really be the effect on military operations of devastating air strikes on North Vietnam. I suspect, as is usually the case, that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Several people here have cited what has happened in the past--with the French war and so on. I would think, as a military judgment, that strikes against military targets or even industrial targets are not going to cut off the Viet Cong activity suddenly. They will have too much in hand, too much in stock piles. Their needs are quite primitive in any event. They are too primitive for such strikes to have the same effect on their society and their armed forces that similar strikes would have on ours. We have gotten too sophisticated and we need too much, as the J-4 would be the first to testify, in order to exist and even more to operate.



So, with no more of a speech, I will merely thank all of you for participating, for what you have lent by your presence and for your efforts to this war game. And I propose at an appropriate time to have other exercises of this kind. I am sure we will all benefit from them and perhaps next time we can come up with some hard and fast judgment that will guide our policymakers at the highest level. Thank you very much.

ADDED GAME BENEFITS



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