

Misc. Interrogations
Miscellaneous Files

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(107)

CHEN SIU-SHEN, after being sworn, testified at the Meiji Building, Tokyo, on 23 August, 1948, as follows:

Q Will you state your name, age and address?

A My name is CHEN SIU-SHEN and my address is 1 Chome 4 Jo Toyohira-Cho, Sapporo-Shi, Hokkaido, Japan.

Q Are you a Chinese citizen?

A Yes

Q Were you ever a member of the Chinese Army?

A Yes, the 29th Chinese Army.

Q Were you captured by the Japanese during the war?

A Yes.

Q After your capture, where were you interned?

A At LO YOUNG, CHINA..

Q How long did you remain there?

A About a month.

Q Where were you then sent?

A Then I was sent to the Prisoner of War Camp in SHIMING (SHI CHIA CHUONG).

Q Did you receive any type of training while you were incarcerated there?

A Yes, I received a special thought training.

Q Will you describe briefly what this special thought training is?

A The Japanese told me that I must have my mind changed because I was not a Chinese soldier any more, and they also told me that China and Japan were going to become one country and I must work hard, if I didn't, I would be killed.

Q How long did you remain at this camp before you were shipped to Japan?

A More than three months.

Q How large was the group that was sent to Japan with you?

A From Shi Chia Chuong I was further sent to TONG KOO for about eighteen days. During that period eighteen died and twelve were taken away by the Japanese out of a group of about three hundred, so at the time we were put on board the ship there were two hundred seventy of us.

Q Then only two hundred seventy were put on the ship, was that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And, did all of these two hundred seventy arrive in Japan?

A During the voyage two were suffering from diarrhea and were thrown into the sea by the Japanese, the first one was TIEN YEE HAI and the other one was CHANG SIN-KOU.

Q Then two hundred sixty-eight of the original three hundred Chinese arrived in Japan, is that true?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q Where did you disembark upon arrival in Japan?

A Osaka Port.

Q And is Osaka the place where you were put to work?

A Yes.

Q What type of labor did you perform in Osaka?

A My job was loading and unloading ships and carrying material into warehouses.

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Q Where were your living quarters at Osaka while you were interned?

A I was quartered at the Yahataya Kita Primary School from my arrival in September, 1944, until the first of June when there was a big air raid and the school was burned.

Q Who were the supervisors in charge of the Chinese laborers at Osaka?

A The names I can remember now are KOIZUMI, TAKEUCHI, KIMURA, HORIE, YAMASHITA and a crippled Japanese whose name I do not remember.

Q Do you know who was the chief supervisor?

A KOIZUMI was.

Q What was TAKEUCHI's duties?

A KOIZUMI was the Chief of the Chinese Laborer Control Office while TAKEUCHI, working under KOIZUMI, was in charge of the dormitory.

Q Was TAKEUCHI the one responsible for issuing food and clothing to the Chinese laborers?

A Yes.

Q What kind of food was furnished the laborers?

A We were furnished mantos made from inferior flour.

Q Were you ever given any rice?

A While we were working at the work site we received one or two rice balls mixed with squeezed beans. When we were working we received three meals every day. The lunch used to be a rice ball mixed with squeezed beans. If the laborers were not working, they received two meals a day, both of which consisted of ²black mantos.

Q What did your breakfast consist of?

A In the morning we received two mantos, each about 3" in diameter, and besides that sometimes we received vegetable soup or warm water with some rotten vegetable leaves.

Q Was this sufficient for your needs?

A The food was not only poor in quality, but insufficient to furnish the energy necessary to perform our hard work. We were always hungry and weak, and as for food, during my entire stay at the Harbor Transportation Company, it was bad, and as a consequence most of us workers were in ill health all the time.

Q At what time did you start work in the morning?

A We used to start working at 6:00 o'clock and sometimes we started working earlier. This was after we had already had our first meal.

Q And how long did you work before you received more food?

A I worked until 11:30 and then received lunch.

Q How long did the lunch period last?

A About thirty or forty minutes, and then we went back to work and worked until 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock. When we were compelled to perform long work, we used to work until 6:00 o'clock and then we had dinner and after dinner we had to continue work until the next morning.

Q How many days a week was your working schedule?

A Seven days a week.

Q Did the food situation ever change during your stay at the Harbor Transportation Company?

A Close to the end of the war our inferior flour became worse, our mantos smelled rotten.

Q Did many of the laborers become ill due to this hard work and bad food?

A Yes, many became ill, and the bad beatings also contributed to their illness.

- Q Before we get to the beatings, I would like to ask you about your clothing. What clothing was issued you after your arrival in Japan?
- A We never received any clothing after we got to Japan. We did not even receive shoes. While we were working, we used to wrap our feet with torn pieces of straw bag.
- Q What type of medical attention did the sick laborers receive?
- A We seldom received any medical treatment except those who were suffering from skin diseases, such as scabbies; they received some liquid medicine. On three occasions I was given this medicine, but it was not sufficient to cure it.
- Q Who prepared the food that the laborers ate?
- A These Chinese laborer cooks were selected by TAKEUCHI. The bread that they baked for us had a very bad taste and I feel sure that the flour was not used as issued but was adulterated. I did not see this done, but the taste of the food indicated that the flour was either of a very inferior quality or was mixed with inferior food other than flour.
- Q To whom would the laborers report when they were too ill to work?
- A If one of the laborers felt he was too ill to work, he would usually report to a group leader, who in turn would report to the squad company leader, Captain YEN KUNG JIN. Captain YEN would then report to the battalion commander, Captain LIEU CHEN CHI. Captain YEN was not called upon to work. His duties were chiefly concerned with the supervision of the other Chinese. Sometimes Captain YEN would ask TAKEUCHI to increase the food ration and shorten the working hours because the men were too weak to perform the work, but nothing was changed after the complaint was made.
- Q When a laborer became sick, did TAKEUCHI increase his food ration?
- A No, he decreased the food ration. He used to decrease a sick patient's ration to one quarter of those who were working.
- Q In case a worker became seriously ill, would he be taken to a hospital and be treated?
- A No, not until after the war.
- Q Was there a doctor in the camp?
- A No, there were only two Chinese medical orderlies and the Japanese did not furnish us with any doctor whatsoever.
- Q Was it difficult to obtain permission from the Japanese to be released from work because of illness or injuries?
- A Yes, it was difficult and would always take one or two days to obtain such permission. In the meantime, if one were ill he was forced to continue to work until he fell to the ground from sheer exhaustion. When this happened, it amounted to "permission". The laborers who fell to the ground were left to lie there until the other men had finished working and then a Chinese laborer would carry the sick or unconscious person to the dormitory and administer what medical assistance he could give.
- Q Did any deaths occur from mal-nutrition?
- A There were many such cases.
- Q What were the chief causes of death within the camp?
- A The most causes were insufficient food, bad beatings and long hours of work.
- Q How many of the laborers died during the ten months that you worked at Osaka?
- A Forty-six died.

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Q Did you know these forty-six laborers who died at Osaka by name?
A Yes, I did.

Q I hand you a list of forty-six men and ask you if these are the Chinese laborers who died in the Osaka Labor Camp.
A Yes. (The witness read the following forty-six names and said that he knew all of them:

- | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. CHANG NAI MIN | 24. SUN MING CHI |
| 2. CHANG WHY CHING | 25. SUNG PAO SUEH |
| 3. CHANG WONG PEI | 26. TIEN SHIEN LEE |
| 4. CHANG YUNG FU | 27. TONG YEE SHI |
| 5. CHING YEE CHUEN | 28. TSIAO FU KWANG |
| 6. DWAN CHING WEN | 29. TU CHEN MEI |
| 7. FAN PAI KUI | 30. WEI WU SIN |
| 8. HAO TSONG SI | 31. WONG LIEN |
| 9. HO KUI CHI | 32. WONG SHONG YUAN |
| 10. HO PAO ER | 33. WU CHIEN CHI |
| 11. HO YEN CHUN | 34. YAO KUANG CHUN |
| 12. HO WU INN | 35. YOUNG CHEN FONG |
| 13. LEANG CHUNG LING | 36. YOUNG LAO HO |
| 14. LEE CHING KUI | 37. YUAN CHIAO SHIN |
| 15. LEE CHIO MING | 38. YEN, KUNG-JIN |
| 16. LEE LAN TSU | 39. DWAN MEI |
| 17. PAI TUNG YUAN | 40. FAN YUN-KUNG |
| 18. SHAO WHY CHUNG | 41. CHU TSING-YUAN |
| 19. SHAO YUNG SIU | 42. FAN PAI-WA |
| 20. SHEE LAO TUNG | 43. CHEE SHONG-INN |
| 21. SHING CHIN KUI | 44. AN SHAW-SIN |
| 22. SHING SHANG CHIA | 45. WONG GO-SHIN |
| 23. SHIN TSON WEN | 46. WONG CHENG-HAN |

Q Did you ever have occasion to see the part of the dormitory where the seriously ill workers were kept?

A Yes. Sometime around the end of 1944 I had a stomach disease which required my becoming a bed patient for a short time. During that time I was in the patients' part of the dormitory. I had the opportunity to observe the general treatment of these patients. I noticed that many of the patients were beaten and their rations cut to one quarter of the former amount. We were told that if we wanted more food or enough sufficient to live, we would have to work for it.

Q What person or persons administered these beatings?

A TAKEUCHI administered many of them.

Q Did any other Japanese employees abuse the sick laborers?

A Yes. After I was released from the patients' barracks, I inquired about these beatings and was told by many of the men, I would say all of the men who were there, that they were beaten by five or six Japanese civilians, including TAKEUCHI, HORIE, YAMASHITA, one Japanese who had a crippled leg and two Japanese policemen.

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Q Do you know any of the Chinese laborers who were beaten while they were patients?

A Yes. Another time in about April, 1945, I was in the patients' ward for several days when LEE CHING-PO and WEE CHIN-CHUNG were in the ward at the same time. They were very weak and unable to work. While in the ward for several days they had been severely beaten about the buttocks and thighs so that many lumps and wounds appeared on their bodies. Their eyes were badly swollen and their faces had many black, blue and red marks on them. At the same time I had also been beaten about the face and my face was similarly marked.

Q Did any of the Chinese laborers suffer from mistreatment other than beating?

A Yes. Many cruel tortures and punishments were inflicted upon us. One of the laborers, YOUNG LAC HO, showed me his burned face, his beard having been burned off by the Japanese. In January, 1945, I saw TAKEUCHI burn the beard off one of the laborers, and although the laborer's face was severely seared, TAKEUCHI laughed and treated it as a joke.

Q Was any protest ever made about this treatment?

A Yes. Around February, 1945, Captain YEN KUNG-JIN petitioned TAKEUCHI in behalf of all Chinese laborers, asking that working hours be decreased and the food increased. TAKEUCHI not only ignored his request but became enraged and beat Captain YEN severely about his head and body until Captain YEN fell down. Then TAKEUCHI kicked him about the head and body so that Captain YEN was seriously injured. Captain YEN cried for several days thereafter because he was very ashamed to be beaten by a Japanese civilian only because he made a reasonable request.

Q Did Captain YEN receive any permanent injury as a result of this beating?

A Yes. He lost his eyesight. Although he was in such bad shape, he received no medical attention from the Japanese. Two Chinese laborers acting as medical orderlies did what they could for him, but without medical supplies they could do very little. TAKEUCHI cut Captain YEN's food ration because he was not on a "working basis", and as a result of starvation and injuries Captain YEN died about ten days after the beating by TAKEUCHI.

Q Will you describe the manner in which DWAN MEI died?

A In or about April, 1945, DWAN MEI, a man I had known from China, had become weak and hungry and asked for some additional food. He was refused and he stole a roll "manto". He was caught and strung up by his wrists which were bound together by metal handcuffs. In that position he was severely beaten in the presence of most of us laborers. TAKEUCHI was the first to slap and beat him and later YAMASHITA helped beat him with wooden clubs for about forty minutes after which DWAN lost consciousness. As a result of this severe beating, he was unable to eat anything thereafter or do any work and he died about a week or so later. I did not see him again before he died, but I was told by the Chinese medical orderly, UYU SHU-TEIN, that DWAN was put into a wooden coffin after he died. I saw the coffin at a funeral ceremony performed in front of most of the Chinese laborers. The ceremony was performed by the Chinese Commander LIEU CHEN-CHI and we were told that DWAN's body was taken away for cremation.

Q Then it was the practice for the Japanese to allow a ceremony for the diseased?

A Yes. There were many funeral ceremonies similar to DWAN's and most of them were performed by the Chinese Commander. I did not witness all of these ceremonies, since on some of the occasions I was compelled to work during the funeral ceremony.

Q Do you know of any other occasion when the Chinese laborers were beaten?

A Yes. Some time in April, 1945, LEE CHENG-FO, WEESHIN-CHUNG, CHU TSING-YUANG, FAN YUIN-KUNG, FAN PAI-WA and I, all Chinese laborers, were working on a ship. At another place on the same ship were some American prisoners of war engaged in similar work. The six of us tried to talk to the American and were discovered by a Japanese civilian guard YAMASHITA. He immediately started to beat CHU TSING-YUAN, FAN YUIN-KUNG and FAN PAI-WA very severely. These three were carried back to the dormitory by fellow laborers and

TAKEUCHI was there when they were brought in. They were so badly injured that they were unable to eat and died a few days later.

- Q Will you describe to me the manner in which CHEE SHONG-JEN met his death?
- A On or about the 4th of May, 1945, CHEE SHONG-JEN was working on one of the ships and tried to reach the top deck latrine. TAKEUCHI saw him and began to beat him in and around his head, using a club. CHEE, trying to shield himself from the beating was forced back so that he fell into the hold of the ship. CHEE sustained severe injuries about his head and ribs and had to be carried back to the dormitory where he died a few hours later. I didn't see the incident, but I saw him brought back to the dormitory and noticed his condition at that time. I heard this from two squad leaders, FEN CHI MING and CHEE CHIN.

- Q Have you, yourself, ever seen TAKEUCHI administer serious beatings?
- A Yes; in July, 1945, one of the Chinese laborers, YUANG CHAO-SIN, was late for roll call after one of the air raids. TAKEUCHI beat him so severely with a club about his head, body and eyes that he became unconscious, falling to the ground with blood streaming from head and eyes. He died soon thereafter. I saw the whole incident from a window of the dormitory.

- Q Do you know of any other instances in which TAKEUCHI beat the Chinese laborers?
- A Yes. In the summer of 1945, I believe it was July, TAKEUCHI ^{LINED} rounded up about thirty of the Chinese laborers and beat most of them with an iron rod about 1" thick and 4' long. Among the Chinese laborers were **陳** SUNG SHUANG NU and **SUEH** CHEN-HAI. Some of the group were so severely beaten, the blood flowed from their faces and lumps were visible on their heads. I heard about this incident from some of the group and recently heard an employee of the Japan Harbor Transportation Company, a Miss HARA, admit she had been present and had seen the beating herself.

On another occasion, just before the end of the war, AN SHAW-SIN and WONG GO-SHIN became so weak and exhausted that they were unable to keep up with the work. TAKEUCHI beat them so severely with iron bars and wooden clubs that plainly their condition became very critical. Lacking proper medical attention and food, they died soon thereafter.

- Q Was Osaka subjected to air raids in 1945?
- A Yes

- Q Did the Chinese laborers have air raid shelters provided for them?
- A No. By order of TAKEUCHI and HORIE, Chinese laborers were not permitted to leave the work site or enter the air raid shelters. Although KOIZUMI knew of the situation, he made no attempt to alter the rules.

- Q What would the Chinese laborers do during these air raids?
- A **陳** The Chinese laborers were forced into fire fighting units and their duties in fighting fires during the raids gave them little chance to obtain any protection from the bursting shells.

- Q Were any of the Chinese laborers injured by the American bombs?
- A **修身** Yes. There were cases where their injuries were so great that they could not walk back to the dormitory and would have to be carried by the other Chinese.

- Q Did any of these injuries from bomb fragments ever result in the death of a laborer?

- A Yes. Once I recall that the injured were bleeding severely and I looked for some cloth and tied their open bleeding wounds as best I could. **陳** Later Captain LIEU CHENG-YO applied some mercurochrome to the wounds.

One of the injured, TIEN CHIEN-LEE, received an injury from a bomb fragment which struck him in the back and made a very large hole. The next day the wound was swarming with maggots. He died three days later without having received any medical attention whatsoever.

Q How often did these air raids occur?

A During April and May, 1945, there were only two or three air raids in each month, but after the first of June, 1945, there were two or three air raids every day. The American flyers were trying to destroy the ships in the harbor and the shipping facilities. Most of these ships on which we worked came from China and were loaded with boxes of silver Chinese dollars and boxes of copper coins; also scrap iron, gold ore, tin ore and bronze. Some ships brought food and those were unloaded by Japanese help.

Q Were you, yourself, ever injured by bomb fragments?

A Yes, I was injured at 11:00 A.M. in the first of June, 1945. About ten Chinese laborers were working in a Japanese warehouse when the raid started and six of them, including CHANG CHENG-SHING and myself, were severely injured by the fragments. CHANG was hit in the right thigh with such force that the fragments completely penetrated the thigh. Another one of the men was similarly struck by fragments completely penetrating his ankle. Others were struck by fragments on their backs and bodies. Four of the six died.

The injury that I received in that June 1st raid was very painful. The wound was on the front of the upper part of the left arm between the elbow and shoulder and had been caused by an American bomb fragment which hit me. I never received any treatment for it from the Japanese. The bomb fragment hit me with such force that it broke the bone between the shoulder and elbow of my left arm. A bomb hit the roof of the warehouse and it started to burn. I ran out of the warehouse and as I reached the entrance I was hit. I was taken to the patients' barracks but received no first aid or bandages of any kind. Two or three days later the arm got much worse because maggots appeared in the open wound. After I got into the American hospital the army operated on it and I believe some bone was removed from the shin of my right leg and used in the upper part of my left arm. As a result of the beatings I had received and the starvation diet we were kept on it was very difficult to recover my health and I was in the care of the Americans for about sixteen months trying to effect a cure.

Q Generally speaking, what was the condition of the laborers when they arrived in Osaka?

A Most of them were weak because it had been a long time since they were arrested by the Japanese and they had suffered a lot from insufficient food and bad treatment.

Q Upon your arrival at Osaka, were all of the Chinese laborers able to go to work?

A At the time when they arrived at Osaka all of us could work.

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Q Approximately what length of time elapsed before some of the laborers became too ill to work?

A About two weeks later many sick patients appeared.

Q How many times did the guard HORIE beat you?

A About once or twice; I remember definitely twice, and TAKEUCHI beat me many times.

Q With what did HORIE beat you?

A With a split bamboo stick about four or five feet long and about two inches in diameter.

Q I believe you told me that you had seen HORIE beat other Chinese laborers, isn't that true?

A Yes, that's true.

Q I would like for you to name the laborers that you personally have seen HORIE beat.

A I saw him beat many Chinese laborers. Of them I remember AN SHAO SIN and DWAN MEI.

Q Is there anything that you would like to add to this statement?

A The place where we worked was surrounded by Kempei-Tai guards and there was usually one guard in charge of every ten Chinese prisoners, but only civilians, including TAKEUCHI, HORIE and YAMASHITA, took part in the beatings. If any of us stopped working, we would be severely beaten by the Japanese supervisors. I, myself, was beaten many times - to the best of my recollection, over two hundred times. If I walked too slowly, if I got up too slowly, it was always an occasion for a severe beating. Many times I was so severely beaten that I became unconscious. On one of these occasions I was beaten about the head so badly that blood flowed from my scalp and I still have a scar on the back of my head as a result of the beating. TAKEUCHI beat almost every man many times on the slightest pretext and usually without any provocation whatsoever. He used a wooden club and also used an iron bar about one inch thick and four feet long and several times beat men so severely with it that he broke their bones.

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- Q I don't care what channels - just what did you hear? What exactly did you hear regarding this? A. Only that the way of collecting laborers was not entirely the same as in Central China. I don't know whether it was forcing laborers but the method was not exactly the same so I suppose that some administrative methods had been used - I suppose in North China. In many villages, especially instances for collecting cotton and rice they used administrative force - I mean they used agents of the China administration so I suppose that in North China some such method may have been used.
- Q Actually, did you not hear that the laborers were being forced? A. No, I have not heard that.
- Q When did you hear this - that they were being procured differently? A. Well, after the end of the war I think. I heard that some judicial case had been brought against an agent who used Chinese laborers in Japan and I think it was in connection with that story that I heard about the method of Chinese laborers being collected in North China.
- Q What would you call administrative force? Do you mean each locality was assigned a quota and they were required to produce that? A. This is only my supposition.
- Q But you used the term administrative force? A. Take the example of collecting all cotton - they assigned to the different administrative districts the amount to be collected so that if they had employed the same method, they may have assigned a certain number of laborers to be collected to different administrative districts and the administrative local authorities made efforts to get the number assigned.
- Q Well, what led you to suppose that they might have been using that method to secure laborers? A. Because the number to be collected was rather big so it is possible that they had to take such measures.
- Q Do you mean they required so much laborers - such large quotas that they had to resort to that method - is that what you mean? A. Yes.

- Q Then the GEAM office in Peking would be charged with the responsibility of controlling this, would they not? A. Yes.
- Q Who was the minister at Peking at that time? A. It was SHIOZAWA - a military man - Lt. Col.
- Q By the way, where is he now? A. I don't know.
- Q Was he captured by the Russians? A. I think so but at any rate he has not come back to Japan. He was appointed commander of a ~~mix~~ division in Manchuria. I think he was staying somewhere in Heilar.
- Q At any rate, they always had a military man in charge of the GEAM Office at Peking, did they not? A. Yes - they always had a military man in charge of the office.
- Q. Do you know Gen. MORIGOHJI? A. Yes, he was ambassador.
- Q. They had another general too, did they not? A. Yes, after SHIOZAWA - but I have forgotten his name - also a general was appointed as his successor.
- Q Do you know why they did that - what was the reason for that?
A. Before the establishment of the GEAM there was an agent of the China Planning Board and at the time of the China Planning Board the heads of the office in China were military men and when the GEAM was formed some posts, for instance, the Shanghai Post was given to the Foreign Office men. The Peking and Kalgan offices were regarded by the army as very important posts for the army because North China and Mongolia were regarded by the army as having special important interest from the army point of view so they insisted on keeping these posts for military men.
- Q Well, if the so-called administrative force was used - A. I said administrative method not force -
- Q Well if administrative methods were used would you say that SHIOZAWA was responsible? A. Of course as chief of the Peking Office, he is responsible - yes. But of course I don't know exactly how he handled the matter.

Q And he was representing GEAM in Peking? A. Yes. Of course for these matters he must have collaborated with the Chinese organizations and supposing some instructions were given to the local authorities in this matter these instructions must have been given from the Chinese authorities....Chinese local authorities. So instructions must have been given from the Peking Chinese authorities.

Q Yes, but the Peiping Chinese authorities would get their instructions from the Japanese foreign office in Peking - would they not?

A Not instructions - SHIOZAWA or his office may have asked the Chinese authorities to develop necessary measures to attain the object. He had no power to give instructions to the Chinese authorities. The Chinese authorities did not like to be forced to do something by the Japanese authorities.

Q But when they ^{were} requested or asked to do something by the Japanese Foreign Office they diplomatically always granted the request, didn't they? ~~Yes, but not always.~~ A. Beg pardon?

Q Let me put it this way. There never was a case when the Chinese authorities refused to grant a request of the Japanese Foreign Office, was there? A. There certainly have been many cases in which they refused ~~to grant~~ a request from the Japanese. In that case there were negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese and they reached some conclusion.

Q There were always negotiations? A. Yes.

Q In other words, if the Chinese authorities refused a request from the Japanese Foreign Office, the Japanese authorities would see to it that formal negotiations were had, is that what you mean?

A. Yes, these negotiations were on a different level - if it was an important matter negotiations were made in Nanking but if it is a matter of minor importance negotiations were then held locally. The negotiations were sometimes difficult and the Chinese were not always so easy to handle.

Q That is about all I can think of right now - A. I am sorry

I cannot give you concrete information but I am always at your disposal at any time I can come again if you need me.

Affidavit of TSUCHIDA, Utaka

Questions by Mr. Elliott:

14 October 1948

Q What is your Tokyo address, Mr. TSUCHIDA?

A Setagaya-ku, Kamisumo-machi, 2-chome, No. 1.

Q How old are you?

A 51.

Q What school did you graduate from and when?

A I graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1922.

Q What did you specialize in at the University?

A French law.

Q Did you enter the Government service immediately after you left school?

A Yes, I entered immediately and continued there up to the present time.

Q What have your foreign tours been?

A I went twice to Europe, first in 1923 to 1925, and second in 1932 to 1934.
I was twice in China.

Q What countries did you serve in in Europe?

A France and Switzerland, and in Asia, China.

Q Did you testify in behalf of anyone at the trial out here?

A I was called once to the Yokohama Court and I testified by submitting my telegram from Shanghai concerning the question of Chinese laborers.

Q Did you testify for prosecution or defense?

A Defense, I think.

Q When did you first hear of the plan to draft labor from China to Japan?

A When I was in Peking, I do not remember the exact date - perhaps in 1942-3.

Q How did you hear about it?

A We received several telegrams from Tokyo and from instructions from the GEA Ministry.

Q What were these instructions?

A I do not remember the exact contents. On the whole in Japan the Government and military circles wanted to have Chinese laborers imported from China so they instructed our Minister to make approach to the North China State Council to let them gather the laborers and so our Embassy in Peking was in charge of communications with the Chinese authorities about all things.

Q Did they communicate with the authorities?

A So the Minister, after receiving instructions from Tokyo went to Tokyo with the Chairman of the Council and he communicated the contents of the instructions to the Chinese authorities to gather the required numbers of laborers in China.

Q They were procured and sent to Japan?

A Yes.

Q Was this on an experimental basis at first?

A Yes.

Q How many laborers did they receive - did they ask for?

A I do not remember the numbers - around 1 or 2,000.

Q Later on did they ask for laborers on a more or less wholesale basis?

A No, I do not think so. It was done several times, I think.

- Q Now, don't you know that they secured in the neighborhood of between 30 and 40,000 laborers in North China?
- A It is possible, I think - I do not remember the number.
- Q It was your office that acted as liaison between the North China Labor Association and the Japanese Government, wasn't it?
- A Yes, the North China office was under the North China Political Council.
- Q How did the North China Labor Association procure the laborers?
- A The details of the procurement I do not know exactly.
- Q What do you know about it?
- A From time to time my Minister sent telegrams to Tokyo to report to the GEA Ministry and I saw the telegrams, and from seeing them, I know about it.
- Q What do you know about it?
- A I know from what I said just now when I appeared in the Yokohama...
- Q I am speaking of what you know about procurement of laborers.
- A We had in the Peking Embassy a non-official staff who was in charge of the collaborating toward procurement of these laborers together with the officials of the Army Headquarters and he went to this Association and collaborated with him in the procurement.
- Q How do you mean he collaborated with him?
- A The principal organization responsible to this procurement was naturally this labor association and especially you know there was occupation of the Japanese army and the army was very heavily responsible so the army officers went to this association to supervise or collaborate in the procurement of these laborers. So on the Embassy side we sent this non-official staff to collaborate with these army officials. A man named KASHIWABARA was in the Army and at that time he went on to the Embassy as part of the non-official staff, and still he held the rank of Lt. Colonel.
- Q What was your position in the Embassy?
- A The Embassy was divided into five directions and I was Chief of the Administration of Japanese residents. At the same time I was concurrently director of the General Affairs Office.
- Q Do you know how the North China Labor Association actually procured the laborers?
- A Yes, I know the fact by the telegram that my Minister sent to Tokyo that the procurement was going on, with difficulty.
- Q What was the difficulty - tell me about it?
- A The number of laborers required from Tokyo was large, and it was very difficult to get the number desired, so, especially the Army officials went to encourage or supervise strictly the action of the Labor Association.
- Q How did you supervise them - how were the laborers actually procured?
- A The members of the Association went to the various cities in North China, for instance Tientsin, Tsingtao, etc. and...
- Q You mean they went to these various districts in North China and gave them a quota to furnish?
- A Yes, with the collaboration of the municipal authorities, I think.
- Q And how did the municipal authorities gather this quota?
- A At this time the municipal authorities were under the direct control of the North China Political Council and when they received instructions from this Council, they acted accordingly, I think.
- Q You say the Army went to the various cities and districts and told the Mayor or head man that he was to procure so many laborers on such and such a date?
- A That is possible.

- Q How did these districts, cities and towns and various political sub-divisions furnish these laborers?
- A The details of those measures I do not know.
- Q Weren't you interested in finding out how these laborers were being procured?
- A Required numbers were so great that in China it was very difficult to meet the demand from Japan, so the Association, in order to do its duty, collaborated with military officials supervising them. I do not know the details of it.
- Q You said it was very difficult, and almost impossible to get the large number of laborers they wanted to come voluntarily, is that right?
- A So my Minister sent telegrams to Tokyo and the GEA officials recognized that fact, so I think there were many conferences in Tokyo to reduce the first mentioned number.
- Q What was the first mentioned number?
- A I do not know anything about it. The GEA Ministry were very careful to send many telegrams during this time with instructions to be careful not to force these Chinese laborers. That was the general feeling of the GEA Ministry. The requirement was very great in Japan in military circles, so I think in Tokyo there were many conferences and they discussed it.
- Q In order to procure this great number of laborers it was necessary to resort to force, is that correct?
- A Not to resort to force - that was the plan of the GEA Ministry and they sent us many telegrams in that sense, so we were eager to be faithful to those instructions and we always instructed the contact with that Council or Army officials not to be forceful.
- Q I am not asking how concerned the GEA Ministry was about the matter, what I want to know is to get the quota, was it necessary or not to resort to force?
- A I think there were some instances in China when it was necessary to use force, so the GEA Ministry was very careful so they sent telegrams again. I think some forceful measures were taken.
- Q As a matter of fact, most of the laborers sent were by force, weren't they?
- A They were under contract so they came to Japan and force was used to some extent.
- Q You said awhile ago that it was impossible to supply this number of laborers. Now, they were sent - how were they procured. Were they or were they not forced against their will?
- A I am very sorry I do not know the fact, and it is possible that there were some forced to come.
- Q What did you mean that it was impossible to get the laborers in such large numbers? I want to know, is it not true that these laborers were forced to go to Japan against their will?
- A There were some portion of the laborers that were willing to come to Japan.
- Q A pretty small portion, was it not?
- A I do not know exactly, but some portion of them.
- Q You say the Army was responsible?
- A Yes.
- Q Didn't the officials in Tokyo know this to be true?
- A About forced laborers? Yes, I think they knew. When the laborers came to Japan they said they were unwilling to come to Japan. So Tokyo had information about that. Several telegrams they sent said not to use forceful measures.

- Q Was not the Minister of your office in Peking an Army man?
 A At the Embassy the Minister was the responsible man. He was an actual Lt. General and he was very intimate with Headquarters.
- Q He made no effort to stop this forceful procurement, did he, being an Army man?
 A On the one side he was actually an Army general, but on the other side he was a minister, head of the Embassy, so he received many instructions from Tokyo. I think he urged the Ministry headquarters not to use forceful means.
- Q Did you learn how these laborers were being procured through your official position in the Japanese Embassy in Peking?
 A All documents were circulated to me, and when documents were sent to the Minister, I was aware of this news and documents.
- Q Actually, the Japanese officials did not care how the laborers were being procured as long as the quota was being met, isn't that true?
 A On that point I think there were discussions in Tokyo and from what I heard at that time, GEA Ministry was very opposed to their using forceful measures in procuring laborers.
- Q On what level were these discussions? Were they Vice-Minister conferences?
 A I do not know. This labor question concerned the War Ministry, Navy Ministry, GEA, Munitions, Welfare and Home Ministries. When laborers came to Japan they were under the Home Ministry.
- Q On what level were these conferences? Were they Vice-Ministers' conferences or Cabinet meetings, or what?
 A Sometimes Vice-Ministers or competent directors or officials of various ministries, I think.
- Q Were they known as liaison conferences?
 A Yes.
- Q You say the GEA Ministry took the position against forceful procurement of labor. What happened at these meetings then - were they overlooked?
 A The result is not clear to me, but at any cost the laborers were required for Japan, so at this conference there were two courses - one was to obtain the laborers at any price and the other was that even in getting the quota of laborers no forceful measures should be taken, but I do not know the results.
- Q But you do know that they continued to procure the laborers through forceful means?
 A Yes, there were some, I think.
- Q Did they continue to procure laborers through force in North China?
 A I am very sorry but I cannot recall the facts, but I was told that there were some instances of that.
- Q A great many instances?
 A I do not know about that, but there were at least some cases.
- Q You say the GEA Ministry was very much concerned about this matter. Did they take any action to rectify the matter either in China or in Japan? What means did they take?
 A The Tokyo office had warned us not to take the forceful measures in procuring the labor.
- Q What did you do about this warning?
 A I told the Minister Plenipotentiary SHIOZAWA and also informed the Council and Headquarters and officials not to take forceful measures.

- Q SHIOZAWA being a high-ranking army man, having been in the army all of his life, and he was in the army following his post, he thought along military lines, did he not?
- A No, in fact he argued against the army.
- Q The fact remained that the laborers were forced to come to Japan to the very last, is that correct?
- A There were many discussions in China and towards the latter part of this procuring the laborers, I think the forceful measures were curtailed.
- Q Why do you think so?
- A Because in discussions we talked that such measures should not be used and later on even the Army officials understood that.
- Q Then how did you get laborers to come to Japan?
- A I think the local authorities in China supplied them on a voluntary basis.
- Q Did the GEA Ministry take any steps to have those who were sent to Japan forcibly released?
- A I do not know what kind of steps were taken.
- Q You say they had many conferences here in Tokyo regarding the matter. That would indicate that the top officials in the Ministry knew what was going on wouldn't it?
- A Yes, I think so.

Questions by

- Q How did your instructions come to your Embassy from the Headquarters in Tokyo?
- A From GEA Ministry. They sent us telegrams in the name of the GEA Minister.
- Q Who received those telegrams first? Did you handle them or did you take them to your superior?
- A We made four or five copies - one to the Minister, one to me, etc.
- Q Did you know each time that information was sent to your Embassy concerning laborers that were to be procured in China? Did you know each time a telegram was sent?
- A Yes, I would know that.
- Q After each wire or telegram was sent, was there a conference or discussion held by your superior and his subordinates concerning the contents?
- A There was not always a conference concerning the matter, and after the Minister it went to the Political Council to the Headquarters and minor officials and then went to the Association.
- Q In other words there were no representatives sent from Tokyo to you at the Embassy who were to take care directly of the procuring of laborers?
- A I remember there were none.
- Q Your Embassy assumed full responsibility for procuring the laborers?
- A On the Japanese side the responsibility was with the Army headquarters.
- Q Did you receive instructions from Tokyo on how to procure them, or was that policy established at one time?
- A How to procure them was not mentioned in the telegram. I remember the question was charged to the local authority in North China.
- Q Did you receive at any time any instructions on how to procure these Chinese laborers?
- A No.

- Q There were certain agencies in China who procured labor for importing to other countries, is that true?
- A I only know the Laborer's Association - that is the only one, I think.
- Q When was the first time that you yourself personally knew that Chinese were being procured against their will and forced to go to Japan?
- A I remember that this question was getting tense and in the course of 1943 or 1944 the situation was very tense and at that time we had....
- Q Did you hear this through official channels at the Embassy or through outside sources?
- A We heard it through Chinese veterans or laborers who came to the Embassy to complain.
- Q Then your Embassy, a conquering nation's Embassy, is in the enemy's territory. You would take into cognizance the fact that some of the enemy's veterans would complain that the Japanese are using force in sending Chinese laborers to Japan. Do you mean to tell me that is what happened?
- A Yes, the veterans were on very good terms with us and on occasions they came to see us and they were very honest. When they saw that this method was wrong, they came to protest.
- Q Was there any investigation made by your Embassy to verify the statements made by the Chinese veterans who complained that forceful measures were being used?
- A We had a man who was in charge of this matter, and when he went out to see the procurement question he came back to the office and told us that some were using forceful measures and it was very regrettable, and they asked the Headquarters of the Political Council to rectify the matter.
- Q Was this reported by your Embassy to Tokyo?
- A Yes, I think so.
- Q How many times did you investigate the situation?
- A He was always in collaboration with that question - he was acting as liaison and was in charge of this question as Embassy personnel, so he was aware.
- Q Do you know whether or not he was present when the Chinese were procured?
- A Perhaps, he was there.
- Q Who gave him his instructions on how to proceed with liaison in procuring Chinese laborers?
- A That was the order of the Minister in Peking.
- Q What instructions were given him, do you remember?
- A I do not know exactly, but I think he must go somewhere to collaborate the procurement of the laborers.
- Q Could you tell me without fearing that you are wrong, whether or not KASHIWABARA was present every time Chinese laborers were procured throughout North China through the North China Labor Association or through any other labor association. Can you tell me definitely and positively that he was present everytime labor was procured?
- A I think it was impossible to be at one time in every place, so I cannot say that he was present every time.
- Q But his sole duty was to act as liaison man of the Labor Association, therefore, he would have knowledge as to how the labor association procured laborers?
- A Yes.
- Q Perhaps sometimes he was present when they picked out laborers and would know whether they used forceful measures, is that true?
- A Yes, it is possible that he was present when they procured these laborers.
- Q Did you ever make any report to your superiors as to the number of Chinese laborers that had been recruited, or how they had recruited them?
- A He made report every time to my Minister.

Q After you had reported the information from these Chinese veterans concerning the method used in procuring Chinese labor, was KASHIWABARA called in and reprimanded for the methods used in securing Chinese laborers?

A He was against the methods.

Q However, he continued to secure labor using forceful measures. He continued to do that in spite of the fact that your Embassy had protested to the headquarters, is that correct?

A His job was to collaborate.

Q It certainly must have been with the permission of the Embassy to continue getting Chinese laborers regardless of how they secured them.

A However, in spite of his position he wanted to collaborate so he continued.

Q Do you realize that it is a known fact that in almost all cases Chinese laborers were lied to as to how much they would be paid, about their destination, their hours, the work, and in most cases they were not even told anything; they were more or less kidnapped and placed in stockades like prisoners and brought to Japan. All this was being done under the eyes of the Embassy. You as the representative of the Japanese Government in North China are responsible for the behavior of all Japanese citizens, is not that true?

A Yes.

Q Let me be more specific. Any man who is in the employ of the Embassy is acting for the Embassy. If he is acting under orders of the Ministry and goes out into different areas and conscripts labor for the Japanese government, he is working in an official capacity and is responsible to the Embassy, and the Embassy is responsible for what he does.

Can you state as a positive fact that KASHIWABARA was not told to use forceful measures in recruiting Chinese labor?

A He was not actually told..

Q Was he told to use any method that he felt like?

A He was told not to resort to forceful measures. Although he was non-official staff, he was a member of the Japanese Embassy and he must obey orders of the Minister, and the Minister must obey instructions from the GEA Ministry.

Q How do you know he was told not to use forceful measures?

A He read the telegrams received from Tokyo, so he must know.

Q Why do you suppose he continued to use forceful measures?

A I think he endeavored to satisfy the officials in spite of the warnings.

Q Was any representative from your Embassy ever dispatched to the Tokyo headquarters to discuss this labor situation?

A KASHIWABARA himself came to Tokyo. He was summoned from Tokyo.

Q By whom?

A By the GEA Ministry, the competent authority in Tokyo.

Q Was that after the protests had been lodged?

A I do not know.

Q You do not recall why he was summoned?

A At that time I think the GEA summoned all competent officials from Shanghai, etc.

Q To discuss the protest against using forceful methods of procuring laborers?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any idea ^{where} ~~how~~ these Chinese were quartered before being sent to Japan? Were they ever brought to Peking?

A I have no idea.

- Q In other words, no member of the Embassy with the exception of KASHIWABARA had seen any of these laborers who were forcibly taken to Japan?
- A I think we had another Army man in the Embassy named NAKAMORI who was Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Embassy. He was KASHIWABARA's superior and directed him.
- Q If he was superior to KASHIWABARA, why did not the latter transmit the orders for procuring laborers instead of going to KASHIWABARA directly?
- A The Minister almost always communicated the orders to them at the same time.
- Q Do you recall what actually was in those telegrams from Tokyo. Did they specifically ask for a certain number of laborers?
- A I do not recall exactly, but it is quite natural that the telegram mentioned the numbers, and the numbers were fixed in Tokyo liaison conferences.
- Q How many times, if you recall, were telegrams received by your Embassy to supply Japan with laborers?
- A I do not remember the exact number of telegrams.
- Q Approximately how many different times?
- A I cannot make a correct answer.
- Q If they had requested between 30 and 40,000 laborers for Japan, it must have been a great many times.
- A Yes. The question was tense at the end of 1943 and beginning of 1944.
- Q To what length was the correspondence between the Tokyo Headquarters and your Embassy carried on as to protests against the forceful methods used in recruiting Chinese labor. How many times in one month did you receive instructions from Tokyo not to use forceful methods?
- A At least twice. We received them.
- Q At least twice on different occasions - were they widely separated times?
- A I do not know.
- Q Was the Embassy very much concerned over the problem?
- A Yes. We had from time to time the complaints of Chinese veterans so we were very eager to rectify the matter.
- Q The original request that was sent from Tokyo headquarters for recruiting Chinese labor was when?
- A The first instructions were sent after the war began.
- Q These instructions that you received from Tokyo to use extreme care in procuring laborers - was that sent to the Embassy also?
- A I think so.
- Q Did your Embassy ever get in touch with any of the other Embassies concerning the protests of the Chinese veterans?
- A When these telegrams were sent to Tokyo we sent the same telegrams to the various Embassy offices at Shanghai, Nanking, etc.
- Q When the protests was lodged by the Chinese veterans did the Embassy get in touch with the other Embassies?
- A I remember that we did not communicate with them. The telegram sent to Tokyo was distributed to the other Embassies, so they knew about it.
- Q But you had no communication from other Embassies concerning the labor problem?
- A No.

AFFIDAVIT OF YAMADA, Makoto

I swear that I state the truth in accordance with my conscience without keeping anything in secret and also adding anything whatsoever.

14 July 1948

/s/ YAMADA, Makoto

REPORT ON CHINESE LABORERS

YAMADA, Makoto

Present address: Official residence, Nishi 7-chome, Kita-Ichijo, Sapporo City. Telephone: 1830

Name and age : YAMADA, Makoto, born in 1910.

Occupation : Head of Police Districts in Hokkaido, National Rural police.

Brief Personal History : Finished the law department of Tokyo Imperial University July, 1934. Adopted in the Home Ministry and served as an official on probation in the Police Department of Hokkaido Prefectural Government in April the same year. Transferred from a service in the police department of Okayama Prefecture to serve as Secretary of the Home Ministry in the Minister's Secretariat, and ordered to take a duty in Southern Islands area as Navy's administrative personnel in January, 1942. Relieved of the post of Navy's administrative personnel, ordered a service in the Police Bureau and took charge of the business of Foreign Affairs Section on Aug. 25, 1943. Appointed a Secretary in the Welfare Ministry, ordered to take a duty of Allowance Section, Labor Administration Bureau, Welfare Ministry on 27 Oct. 1945, and remained in the same post until the end of the same year.

Re names of competent superiors (Aug. 1943 - Oct. 1945):

A. Those who were at the posts of Minister, Vice-Minister

and Director of the Police Bureau:

<u>Dates</u>	<u>Minister</u>	<u>Vice Minister</u>	<u>Director of Bureau</u>
Aug. 1943-July, 1944	ANDO, Kisaburo	KARASAWA, Toshiki	MACHIMURA, Kingo
July, 1944-Apr. 1945	ODACHI, Shigeo	YAMAZAKI, Iwao	FURUI, Kimi
Apr. 1945-Aug. 1945	ABE, Genki	NADAO, Hirokichi	MIZUIKE, Ryo
Aug. 1945-Oct. 1945	YAMAZAKI, Iwao	FURUI, Kimi	HASHIMOTO, Masami
Oct. 1945-	HORIKIRI, Zenjiro	SAKA, Chiaki	KOIZUMI, Goro

B. Those who were at the post of Section Chief:

Aug. 1943-Aug. 1944	OKAZAKI, Eijo (Foreign Affairs Section Chief)		
Aug. 1944-Apr. 1945	NIWA, Kyoshiro	"	
Apr. 1945-June 1945	KAWAGUCHI, Shojiro	"	
June, 1945 - Sept. 1945	OKAZAKI, Eijo (Peace Section Chief)		Because of merger of the Foreign Affairs Section into the Peace Section at that time.
Sept. 1945-Oct. 1945	KAWAGUCHI, Shojiro (Foreign Affairs Section Chief)		Foreign Affairs Section was revived.

NOTE: In conformity with the Memorandum since 4 Oct. 1945, the Peace Section and Foreign Affairs Section were dissolved.

Re nature of duty while in office:

At that time the duty of Foreign Affairs Section, which was in charge of the protection and control of foreign nationals, aimed chiefly for direction and control pertaining to prevention of espionage. It was generally divided into the following matters, and two Secretaries, over ten junior clerks, etc. performed their allotted task under the Foreign Affairs Section Chief.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECTION CHIEF

"A" Secretary (Senior)

Matters concerning budget and personnel affairs of foreign affairs police. Matters concerning laws and regulations and established rules of foreign affairs. Matters concerning peoples' prevention of espionage. Matters concerning investigation and study of circumstances of foreign countries. Matters concerning internment of foreign

nationals (equipment, expense, etc.). Matters concerning exchange ship (temporarily). Matters concerning dispersion and removal of foreign nationals. Besides, matters concerning general affairs.

"B" Secretary

Matters concerning British and American nationals. Matters concerning internment of foreign nationals (except for equipment, expenses, etc.). Matters concerning travelling of foreign nationals, etc. Matters concerning people of neutral powers. Matters concerning people of our allied countries. Matters concerning nations of Greater East Asia. Matters concerning Chinese laborers.

And at the time when I arrived at my post, Secretary ODAGIRI, Kiyoshi had held the post of "A" Secretary, which afterwards was succeeded by Secretary HAYASHI, Kazuo. Therefore, from Aug., 1943 to Jan., 1945, I was in the position of "B" Secretary. After that, due to Secretary HAYASHI's transfer to the Peace Section, I, in succession to him, continued to hold the position of "A" Secretary until the end of the war.

Therefore, it was from Aug. 1943 to Jan. 1945 that I as a "B" Secretary was in charge of the duties of Chinese laborers.

Note 1. Those who succeeded my position as "B" Secretary were:

FUJIWARA, Shigemasa, from about Jan. to April, 1945

OTA, Masaaki, from about April to June, 1945

KIMURA, Kozo, from about June to Oct., 1945.

2. He who had engaged consistently and exclusively in Chinese laborer's affairs as a junior clerk while I was holding the post, was Mr. MIYAGAWA, Isao (the present chief of Crime Prevention Section, Fukuoka District Police HQ.

Re oral or documentary orders, instructions or actions based thereupon pertaining to Chinese laborers' affairs during my service in the office:

(Preface)

What I am going to state hereafter is a fact of more than three years ago, of which I have a very dim recollection. Besides, it is lacking in any foundation to rely upon, for I have no reliable materials at hand and all

the documents of my office relative to the case had been burned up at the time of the surrender. Therefore it is impossible for me to give a clear and exact reply to the matters you asked me. With all my intention to write it down recollecting my memory at that time as hard as I can, my statement may contain some mistakes in time or facts, misunderstandings or lapse of memory. I beg your consideration about this point beforehand.

1. I took over the position in Aug. 1943, when Chinese laborers had already been brought in several parts of the country tentatively: (Fukuoka Prefecture, Toyama Prefecture and Hokkaido).

With regard to bringing in Chinese laborers, a basic policy had been fixed by the Cabinet's decision on Nov. 27, 1942 and by the decision made at the 3rd Dept. of Planning Board, based upon which each Ministry concerned was necessarily to share the business with each other to carry it out.

As for the Home Office, it issued a notification entitled "Matters Pertaining to the Chinese Laborers to be brought in Japan and the Way to Treat Them," on March 2, 1943 in the name of the Director of the Police Bureau to every government offices and prefectural governors, instructing the prefectures concerned to transact the business for bringing in those laborers according to this policy.

2. I had heard that the Home office was strongly opposed to bring in the Chinese laborers from the first (i.e. since the days of my predecessor), holding consistently a refusing attitude. The main reasons for it according to my view, were:

1. That the enterprisers in home had absolutely no experience in employing foreign laborers; and that we couldn't expect any favorable results, if they should employ those laborers regardless of the foreign customs and manners, of which they were quite ignorant.
2. That we were afraid of any frictions and rivalry that might be caused between Koreans and Chinese. Then those workshops, whereto the Chinese laborers were scheduled to bring in, had been already employing many Korean laborers and the both laborers seemed to have a feeling looking down with each other. Therefore, we were afraid

of any frictions, rivalry or unexpected serious situations between the both that might be brought about owing to joint working in such workshops.

3. That an enormous number of laborers, including even students, were being generally mobilized within the country at that time, under a slogan of concentration of total power, we had forecast that we could manage the shortage of labor with home laborers without aid of such small number of Chinese laborers as thirty to fifty thousands to be brought in Japan from the Continent after an elaborate effort, if the home labor mobilization plan should be scientifically examined and drafted and should be carried out and put in force smoothly and effectively.
4. Shortly after I took over the position, (probably in about Sept. 1943) cases of espionage plot, runaway and others occurred among the Chinese laborers brought in Fukuoka Prefecture tentatively. On the whole they fell far below the home laborer in their results of working and were not satisfactory, with the exception of those in Fushiki, where skilled laborers were brought in. As such, I, too, took over the former policy and by order of my section chief I took a negative, dissentient attitude on the bringing in of Chinese laborers on every occasion such as consultation conference among the departments concerned.
5. While thus the Home Ministry, from a view of keeping peace and order, was assuming consistently an attitude standing against the plan to bring in those laborers, the national labor mobilization plan devised by the Welfare Ministry often ended in a paper plan, ran into a blind alley and didn't work well. Besides the munitions production planned by the Munitions Ministry did not develop satisfactory. Therefore these

Ministries and the military authorities behind them took a leading part in fomenting an atmosphere blaming the Home Ministry for its objection to carrying out a national policy of developing the wartime production in those days of an emergency. Probably towards the end of 1943, such surrounding situation did not permit it for the leaders of the Home Ministry to strongly give a further opposition and it seemed that a compromise was reluctantly made. I have heard of this then from Chief of Foreign Affairs Section OKAZAKI. Consequently I thereafter acted, based on this policy, too.

6. As the Home Ministry which had been firmly opposed to bringing in Chinese laborers, made a concession as stated above, the Food Control Bureau of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, that had not welcomed those laborers from the viewpoint of supply and demand of domestic food, followed the instance and kept chime with it along with some other offices. After all every department came to unanimous in bringing in Chinese laborers regularly and understanding for it made progress. Meanwhile our fighting power was more and more reduced to great straits, so that "Matters concerning Chinese Laborers to be brought in Japan" and "Essential Principles in Bringing Chinese Laborers in Japan" were decided at the Vice-Minister's Conference on Feb. 28, 1944 to carry out rapidly the plan of bringing in Chinese laborers regularly.

NOTE: The numbers of the Chinese laborers to be brought in regularly were seemed to be scheduled at first for about 100 thousands, which were reduced to about 30 thousands due to objection of the Home Ministry and the circumstances of the Continent.

7. According to this decision, it was decided that each Department concerned was respectively to inform its own subordinate offices of the contents of the decision and to instruct them in necessary matters to related business. Consequently the Welfare Ministry and the Home Ministry issued an order to each prefectural

governors, which was dated April 4, 1944, numbered KOSEISHO-HATSU-KIN No. 103 and NAIMUSHO-HATSU-KEI No. 6, signed by the both Vice-Ministers of Welfare Ministry and Home Ministry and entitled "Matters concerning the Chinese laborers to be brought in Japan - a notification by order of the Minister,"

NOTE: I remember that in getting sanction to this document, as for the Ministry of Home Affairs I, under an order of the Section Chief, went to the Vice-Minister and the Bureau Chief to make an explanation, and that thus it was sanctioned.

After that, in a note to every prefectural governor entitled, "Matters Concerning the Control over Chinese Laborers brought in," the Police Bureau GAI HATSU KO No. 18, dated 6 April 1944, signed by the Bureau Director, the Police Bureau instructed to attain perfection in the control over them and keep a close connection with the government offices concerned.

8. In a period from that time to about July or August of the same year, Chinese laborers were vigorously brought into various places at a time. As to enterprisers, however, not only were they not accustomed to labor administration and some improvement was necessary, but also there developed a tendency towards successive occurrence of thought offence cases, run-away cases, etc. Therefore, in order to make a positive contribution to the increase of war strength by aiming at reasonable labor administration and laboring for the prevention of such cases, the Home Ministry, playing the most active part, had held conference since the end of June with the ministries concerned, especially with the Welfare Ministry, the Munitions Ministry, the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc. Thus, the conference came to an agreement in August and the notification on "Matters Concerning the Guidance of Chinese Laborers Brought into Japan," under the joint signature of the bureau chiefs of three ministries, the

Home Affairs, the Welfare and the Munitions, was sent to every prefectural governor, the Chief of the Munitions Management Section and the Chief of the Local Mines Bureau. (The gist to be mentioned).

NOTE: Also, as to the sanction of this matter, I remember that I mainly took charge of and was busily engaged in the matter.

9. It seems to me that among the written instructions I treated during my term of B Secretary, there were no other document than the above-mentioned.

Secondly, as to oral directive, instructions, etc., I remember that I did not fail to communicate the policy of our Ministry to the all-Japan conference, or the block conference, of the Heads of the Foreign Affairs Branches, Special Higher Police Section, which were held from time to time, and also in time of the actual place inspection, and that warning and instruction were at each time given by me to officials in charge, respective to what came to my notice.

10. I remember that the date and places I visited for the inspection of the labor conditions of Chinese laborers were as follows:

Towards the end of 1943 - Fukuoka Prefecture (Experimental bringing in)
 About June, 1944 - Kanagawa Prefecture
 July, 1944 - Hokkaido and Akita Prefecture.
 December, 1944, or Jan., 1945 - Toyama and Niigata Prefectures.

11. Outline of the conferences of Ministries during my term of B Secretary.

1. At first at the time when there had existed the Cabinet Planning Board, Section Chief YAMAUCHI of the Second Section, Third Dept. Cabinet Planning Board, played leading part and had presided over the conferences. (However, the Planning Board was abolished on Oct. 31, 1943.)

2. After the abolishment of the Cabinet Planning Board, there was no center and so the conference was not held for some time, however, pressed under necessity later and under the viewpoint that Mobilization Section, Labor Bureau, Welfare Ministry, with

regard to the affairs of labor mobilization, and the Greater East Asia Ministry with regard to allowances, have great influence upon the guidance of Chinese laborers to be brought in from the Continent and upon the service of remittance for China laborers, Economic Section Chief AICHI (now director of the Bank Bureau, Finance Ministry, and Investigator WATANABE of the same section (now Finance Ministry official) and others, took the initiative to take up the problem. It seems that after then, thus, the Greater East Asia Ministry and the Allowance Section, Labor Bureau, Welfare Ministry, came to manage the matter respectively.

3. As for the Home Ministry, generally, MIYAKAWA, junior clerk, or I attended these conferences, and the contents of our speeches were as follows:
 - a. According to the results of the experimental bringing in of Chinese laborers carried out in the beginning, i.e., before about the end of 1943, they were not satisfactory on the whole, and so I emphatically expressed my opinion against the practical bringing in to be made after that. However, since the policy for the regular bringing in of Chinese laborers was decided, I had requested from the viewpoint of public peace that the number of Chinese laborers should be kept as few as possible, and that they should be made to labor in a group and should not be too widely allocated to every prefecture of the country.
 - b. I explained from time to time the conditions of the public peace and order and the state of accidents occurred upon Chinese laborers, awakened the concerns on the part of the officials concerned of each Ministry, and at the same time made clear the position of the Home Ministry.

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c. After the start of the regular bringing in of Chinese laborers, their death rate increased suddenly in the course of their transportation and immediately after their arrival at mines. This is partly because of the unreasonableness in the choice of men and transportation, that was caused by the fact that in time of their bringing in, many of sickly laborers were made to embark on board freighters or other ships irrespective of their weak constitution, and partly because there were such men unsuitable to labor as minor youngsters, deformed persons, old men, etc. among them. Such circumstances were to be against fundamental policies including those decided by Cabinet conferences and at the same time run counter to the essential requirement for the increase of war strength. Therefore, some reports made in conformity with those from each prefecture that had taken in Chinese laborers were offered to two Section Chiefs, OKAZAKI and NIWA. And many times I myself sternly urged the Greater East Asia Ministry and the Welfare Ministry to call attention to those circumstances.

NOTE: I remember that as the state of the regular bringing in was contrary to the original policy and very unsatisfactory, Section Chief NIWA gave some warning at meeting.

I remember that at that time the main officials concerned of the Welfare Ministry were Chief of the Mobilization Section ANNAKA (now Governor of Miyazaki Prefecture), Chief of the Mobilization Section KUNISHIO (now chief of the Inspection Bureau, Economic Stabilization Board, and, however, retired halfway from government service), Secretary ESHITA (now section chief of the Employment Security Bureau, Labor Ministry), Senior Clerk KIDA (now, section chief of the Repatriation Relief Board; that the Greater East Asia Ministry officials

concerned were the above mentioned chief of the Economic Section AICHI and Inspector WATANABE, and besides a certain unknown Senior Clerk (who, wearing a pair of spectacles and being of a small stature, returned to the Finance Ministry after the end of the war and was working at a room on the fifth floor of the Hypothec Bank) and KIMURA, non-regular official, (a member of the staff of the Tokyo office of North China Laborers Association); and that as to the Transportation and Communications Ministry there were Secretary KABA (now probably serving in the Marine Transport Bureau, Railways Ministry) and others.

- d. Besides, concerning clothes and medical supplies, each time they are reported by prefectures to be extremely insufficient, I informed and advised the Ministries concerned to take proper steps.

NOTE; I made prefectures give proper flanking cooperation on the spot.

12. Concerning the conditions of Chinese laborers business in Foreign Affairs Section. -- Besides the Chinese laborers business, as I engaged in, as I have stated above, in a fairly wide scope of business, I entrusted routine business entirely to junior clerk MIYAKAWA through whose reports I directed. And most of the routine business, as far as I can remember, were matters stated next: The Welfare Ministry, when it allotted Chinese laborers brought in, informed it to each prefectural governor and the routine business of the Home Ministry when it received the report of the allotment was to inform the prefectural police departments concerned, as it was necessary to dispatch policemen to guard Chinese on the way, to make them guard Chinese laborers in transit, to make them report of it when the Chinese arrived safely, to make them report of general accidents, to put these matters in order and report to the superior. Besides, when an actual problem arose, local police departments of prefectures asked for directives from procurator's

of respective district and, furthermore, it reported the matter to the home office, which, if circumstances demand, working no close cooperation with the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Justice Ministry, give under the command of the same bureau instructions to the local authorities.

I remember that drafts of documents were made by junior clerk MIYAKAWA, and as for an important document, I usually took it to the Section Chief or the Chief of the Bureau and got his approval after giving explanation on the document.

Re the basic attitude and policy of the Home Ministry concerning the control over Chinese laborers:

1. It has been decided by the Cabinet Council that since the Chinese laborers are neither prisoners of war nor internees, they shall be treated as law abiding foreign laborers, that is to say, as a people of a friendly nation they shall be treated as well as possible.
2. Chinese laborers are laborers by contract and they have been brought in according to the bilateral agreement between an enterpriser and the North China Laborers Association. Therefore, the employer of them is, differing from the employer of prisoners of war, an enterpriser who himself is responsible for the management of laboring. It is confirmed that the authorities in charge of the management of laboring is the Welfare Ministry or the Munitions Ministry.
3. The Home Ministry, mainly based upon the viewpoint of public order, took charge of the protection and the control of them. Therefore, the main emphasis was laid on matters such as the maintenance of public order and prevention of espionage; as for general management of laboring, it interfered from the viewpoint of public order and within the limit of necessity, in the matters which might affect public order, and guided Chinese laborers.

NOTE: From this point of view the Home Ministry exercised great

care in prevention of disputes between Chinese laborers and Koreans, of their escape and of their espionage.

4. The Home Ministry, following such basic policy, made the prefectural authorities concerned thoroughly understand this purport and at the same time severe warning was given to the enterprisers in regard to the following:
 1. Enterprisers shall fully understand that the Chinese is a people of a great friendly nation, have a long history of 5,000 years and different customs and manners and language, and make much of their faces especially. ?
 2. Whatever grounds may exist and also under any circumstances, enterprisers shall abstain from inflicting bodily punishment on Chinese laborers.
 3. Enterprisers shall pay special attention to prevent disputes between Chinese laborers and Koreans and escape of Chinese laborers. I believe that it was only natural to take these steps at that time. Particularly as to the prevention of escape, if Chinese laborers, who worked in a group in a strange country where there were different customs and manners and was spoken a language which they could not understand, escaped and become missing it could not be neglected not only from the standpoint of employer but from the viewpoint of public peace at large; and also from the point of the protection of the Chinese laborers, it could not be left as it was. Therefore, deep concerns were shown to the matter and several notifications entitled "Matters concerning policy respective to the bringing in of Chinese laborers into Japan" decided in Vice-Minister conference in Feb. 1944, "Matters concerning policy respective to the bringing in of Chinese laborers into Japan" signed by Labor Bureau Chief, Welfare Ministry in April, 1944

and "Matters concerning control over Chinese laborers brought in" signed by Director of the Police Bureau, were made to arouse the attention of enterprisers.

NOTE: As the Chinese fugitives ran away in spite of their unfamiliarity with the country, their ignorance of language and with no money, they would soon want food and clothing, get into the villages nearby and were apt to cause such criminal acts as theft, robbery, and murder. Moreover, many youths and men were out to the front and the Chinese greatly frightened those children, women and the old people who were looking after the houses in their absence.

After the regular bringing in began the escape cases in transit and in the various prefectures they were brought in were too many to be enumerated. In the Hanaoka Mine, Akita Prefecture, for instance, during the period of only two months from May to June, 1945, there were five cases at one workshop.

Re the important cases during my term of office:

I think there were various other cases, but the few cases which still remain in my memory are as follows; but these cases seem to have increased with the acute situation of the war, especially after 1945:

1. MITSUI's Tagawa Coal Mine and Futase Factory of Nippon Seitsetsu Co., Ltd., Fukuoka Prefecture. Sept. 1943.

Attempted cases of detection of the national conditions and blowing up of the coal mine by members of the Chinese Communist Party.

2. Fushiki Pa t, Toyama Prefecture, probably end of 1944.

A Chinese Communist, upon detecting the national condition and military secrets, escaped by a freight boat but was found out on the way. Destruction also plamed.

3. Escape and murder cases in Fukuoka Prefecture.

After escape, attacked a country house in the mountains, killed an old man, extorted clothes, money and food.

Then went out to the sea-side and wait for the opportunity to make a connection with Chinese Communists.

After these, cases of this kind occurred in succession. On July 1, 1945, in Akita Prefecture, there occurred a group escape case involving the killing of the guardian but at that time we had already nothing directly to do with the affairs.

Re sending back home:

Those whose contract expired or those who are too weak or too deformed to bear labor, have been decided to be sent home in group at any time by sea or by land.

NOTE: In Shimonoseki City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, a house was specifically built for those people to be sent home; but the intensification of air raids and interruption of transportations since 1945 seem to have kept it from being practically used.

OKAZAKI: First name Eijo. One of my immediate superiors at the time when I was a secretary in the Police Bureau. I served under him who was the Section Chief from Aug. 1943 to Aug. 1944, and from June 1945 to Sept. 1945.

NIWA: First name Kyoshiro. I also served under him who was the Section Chief during my office as secretary from Aug. 1943 to April 1945.

HONMA: First name Fusakichi. As for me, I have no personal intercourse with him. About April, 1944, I was introduced to him by Chief OKAZAKI as "an excellent man who has been in North China for a long time, with many experiences of using Chinese laborers. A man expected to give us side cooperation in the affairs of Chinese laborers as a non-regular member of the staff." In early July, 1944, I accompanied him only once to Hokkaido and Akita for local inspection.

SEKIGUCHI: First Name, Terusato. If I am not mistaken, he came from the Police Bureau about the end of 1943, and was in charge of information affairs as a secretary of the Foreign Affairs Section. Concerning Chinese laborers, by Section Chief OKAZAKI's order, he sometimes made inspection trips to various places with Mr. HOMMA. He has retired from the office.

NOGI: I do not know him very well. I wonder if he was connected with some public works and construction.

RE FUSHIKI:

I was told a story that at Fushiki the first place where the Chinese laborers were brought in tentatively, the labor efficiency was mostly so high that the functionaries from Ministries concerned, who had come there to make a joint inspection, returned to their Ministries satisfied in general. But taking office on about August of 1943, I know nothing of the beginnings. One year after, with the term of their contract expiring, the skilled laborers returned home safely. I cannot remember any trouble ever arose during that period.

Towards the end of 1944, I made an inspection trip to the port of Fushiki. It seemed to me that the working of the laborers, already replaced by that time by those brought in in full-scale, was relatively satisfactory. Later, however, I remember I received a report from the Toyama Prefectural Government which said that a case of espionage plot had taken place with the Chinese Communist Party involved. Beyond that, I have nothing particular in my memory. Therefore, inquire Mr. MIYAKAWA of further details.

RE HOMMA DOCUMENT:

1. That was not one Mr. HOMMA neither had particularly produced not privately inspected.

2. The circumstances in which that document was produced were thus:

After Mr. HOMMA was appointed an non-regular official in the spring of 1944, accompanied by Senior Clerk SEKIGUCHI, he made inspections of several workshops where the Chinese laborers were working. On those occasions,

Mr. SEKIGUCHI wrote down the gist of what Mr. HOMMA had aimlessly and un-systematically told about how he saw the Chinese laborers, and the mental preparation of the policemen in charge. Afterwards, one day when at a conference of Chiefs of Special Higher Police Sections and Foreign Affairs Sections in charge of Chinese laborers, Mr. SEKIGUCHI in the stead of Mr. HOMMA, read the recorded gist in connection with the mental attitude of police officers, (because Mr. HOMMA was at his home in Kyushu, he did not always stay in Tokyo), a wish was expressed by section chiefs that it should by all means be distributed in print since it was informative. Therefore, I, together with Mr. MIYAKAWA, modified it to some degree, and with consent of our Section Chief, we had it mimeographed. Then, at the next conference of Section Chiefs or at some other conference it was distributed as 'restricted' and 'referential data' only to the prefectural governments having relation to the bringing in of the Chinese labor.

3. Therefore, undoubtedly that document was an informative document restricted to Police Departments, and not one intended to be shown to enterprisers as notices.

4. Since even the policemen in charge themselves were unaccustomed in treating foreign laborers, the Home Ministry was trying to collect the data as information materials from every possible quarter and distribute them. For instance, they distributed a written opinion of Mr. KASHIWARA, an in-the-spot non-regular official of the Greater East Asia Ministry on the method to treat Chinese laborers, which had been served by the Greater East Asia Ministry. After that, since there was a suggestion under a joint project of the Greater East Asia and the Welfare Ministries to compile the informing data for treatment of Chinese laborers, we were gladly prepared to use them as a guide. But this seemed to have not been materialized.

Thus, so-called HOMMA Document was one which had been distributed as one of informing data. Even the Home Ministry had no particular intention to direct prefectural governments to live up to it dutifully.

5. I hear that HOMMA Document has been much distorted in the world. Especially, caution must be given to what Mr. KUBO, Seiichiro (Fujita-Gumi),

Akita Prefecture, wrote, which seems to me to have much taint of the sort.

As far as I read and can remember, the document is rather a little short of explanations in expression, and some points may possibly be liable to invite misunderstandings. I remember, however, taught by his personal experience, he opined thus:

The Chinese are a great nation having a history of five thousand years, and the Japanese are no match for them. That the Japanese nevertheless employ these great people who have different language, manners and customs, requires much determination and scrupulous attention. Then, mentioning their remarkable difference in manners and customs, especially emphasizing the affairs of face, he warned that in employing Chinese laborers, the method flatly similar to that of employing Japanese should be avoided, and that much should be made of their manners and customs and face, lest radical change of their environment be invited.

RE INSPECTION IN JULY, 1944 OF THE CONDITIONS OF CHINESE LABORERS WORKING
IN THE AREAS OF HOKKAIDO AND AKITA:

1. On the occasion of this inspection, which we had arranged to make jointly with Ministries concerned, officials concerned from the Munitions Ministry could not attend on account of urgent business. Therefore, accompanied by Senior Clerk SEKIGUCHI, Junior Clerk MIYAKAWA, and non-regular official HOMMA, I, together with a junior clerk (name forgotten) from the Labor Bureau, Welfare Ministry and Secretary SASAKI from the General Affairs Section, Greater East Asia Ministry, departed in early July. I spent about ten days inspecting the conditions of the Chinese laborers working in Hokkaido and Akita areas, and submitted the Ministry with a report after returning (incinerated at the time of the surrender, this document is non-existent).

2. Though not clear in my memory, the places inspected were:

In Hokkaido: A ship yard in Hakodate, the Okedo and the Itokamu Mines, an iron ore sulphide mine in the vicinity of Kutchan (name of place forgotten), etc.

In Akita Prefecture: The Hanaoka Mine (Fujita-Gume), probably on the 13th of July.

3. Thus, it was a joint inspection. Respectively, therefore, the officials concerned from the Greater East Asia Ministry inspected arrival and habitation of Chinese laborers, those from the Welfare Ministry, the management of laboring and other general affairs, and our object was to grasp a real picture of peace and order there and the operation of the labor. Accordingly, we made inspections by seeing or hearing about matters mostly concerning:

1. Whether the location and conditions of their accommodation facilities accorded or not with the principles decided by the Cabinet Council or by the Third Dept. of the Cabinet Planning Board.
2. Conditions of transportation of Chinese laborers (whether there was or was not any trouble in transit) the number of transported Chinese laborers classified by month.
3. Conditions of health
4. Diet, clothing, etc.
5. Conditions of communication.
6. Whether there were escapes and other troubles or not.
7. Attitude of the leaders in the spot (from both sides, the North China Laborers Association and the enterprisers) and others.

In addition, in inspecting the conditions of the operation of the laborers, we examined whether or not the place of work and kind of work were arranged contrary to the fundamental principle, and further, listened for information to other general conditions.

NOTE: The Agriculture and Commerce Ministry insured that they should get 22 kilograms of food per head and even the invalids were provided with food of the same amount. Therefore, no food shortage was foreseen. On the other hand, in each prefecture, as a result of the efforts of the authorities concerned, each one was given about 25 to 28 kilograms as average. It must be mentioned for your information that in July, 1945, Japanese hard manual laborers were provided with 20 kgs., manual laborers, 14 kgs., and general adults, only 9 kgs. a month. But since rationing to the Chinese laborers was not cut^{down}/to the end, there is no question to take up, in regard to their provisions. In the meantime the officials concerned of the Greater

East Asia Ministry and the Welfare Ministry made inspections and asked questions respectively. After that, the persons concerned with the office of the enterpriser (persons in charge, on-the-job guides, etc.) were requested to meet there. SASAKI, secretary of the Greater East Asia Ministry, reported on how Chinese laborers had been raised in China, explaining the rules concerning the working of the Chinese laborers, and making his wishes known. I cautioned against an accident, their dispute with Koreans and their escape. Next, Mr. HOMMA made an address, with a preparatory remark that as a non-regular member of the Home Ministry he would tell merely for reference, about his personal experiences. Afterwards, the meeting ended with general question-and answer made. Accordingly, as regards these matters, I simply recorded very briefly in the report what I noticed, by classifying the workshops which we had inspected. Chiefly from the view-point of the public peace, I told the persons in charge and the on-the-job guides of every workshop, the points of which are as follows: This was not my personal opinion, but the controlling policy of the then Police Bureau. That is:

1. At that time the tide of war already turned against Japan and the situation was acute, while the intelligence activities of the hostile countries became more and more lively. Most of imported Chinese laborers are law-abiding citizens, but as there happen to be spies among the Japanese, so there may be the enemy's spies among the Chinese laborers. Therefore, we must be much careful of them.

2. The management of laboring of the Chinese laborers was generally under the jurisdiction of the Welfare Ministry or the Munitions Ministry, but in actuality the jurisdiction was often became so irregular at the workshops, sometimes the laborers were led by the officials directly dispatched to the spots from the Greater East Asia Ministry, or sometimes interfered in by the members of the North China Laborers Association that the control was apt to be lax and the leadership was disordered, which was going to exert bad influence upon the public peace. Therefore, so far as the matters affecting the public peace directly were concerned, the Home Ministry had already made the Police cooperate from the outside in the management of laboring. Accordingly, I told at the

meeting that in regard to the following specially designated points the chiefs of the local police stations were soon expected to assume leadership:

- a. The location and equipment of the Chinese laborers' boarding houses.
- b. The places and classes of their working.
- c. Provisions and other measures for them.
- d. The cooperation and unification of the leaders, and I added that the other matters were to be managed individually in conformity to the instructions of the Ministries concerned, and, then the Ministries concerned were negotiating on a concrete way.

3. Moreover, I told the leaders that in support of the maintenance of public peace, they were required to carefully observe the movement of Chinese laborers and a ^{report} prompt/ to a police station was hoped if suspicious persons were found.

4. I told that in order to avoid unnecessary stimuli the police should not station uniformed policemen but full-time plain clothes men in the same way as in the case of the Korean laborers.

NOTE: Judging from the police force of those days I am sure that it was hard to station full-time policemen there. But their stationing was necessary on the grounds that Chinese laborers were unable to understand Japanese; that they were not accustomed to things Japanese; that friction between Chinese and Korean laborers was feared; besides, it was not merely necessary from the point of view of the prevention of escape and espionage, but also it had the phase of protection of Chinese laborers greatly.

Re the gist of "Matters Concerning the Guidance of the Brought-in Chinese Laborers," a notification jointly signed by three bureau chiefs of the Home, the Welfare and the Munitions Ministry, dated 11 August 1944.

Under these circumstances, as aforesaid, the negotiations between the Ministries were rapidly advanced after my return to office and a joint note was issued at last on August 11. Its essential points are as follows:

1. Concerning determination of the location and equipment of boarding houses for Chinese laborers: In spite of the rules already established by the direction of the Third Department of the Planning Board, entitled, "Outline for the Execution of Bringing North China laborers to Japan," dated November, 1942, and the decision at the Vice-Ministers' Conference on February 28, 1944, entitled, "Policy Concerning the Bringing of Chinese Laborers to Japan," that as regards the boarding houses, attention shall be paid to the prevention of damp and that they shall not adjoin with the houses of Korean laborers, enterprisers do not always observe these rules, so that there is a fear of friction between Korean and Chinese laborers arising from the discontent with their conditions. In addition, in view of prevention of espionage, escape and other accidents, the police also shall direct in flank, that no such thing may occur.

2. Concerning the deterioration of place and kind of work: According to the established policy as aforesaid, it was decided that the place of work should strictly be separated from that of Koreans and POW's and that as to the work, Chinese laborers should be put to work in a group; nevertheless, enterprisers often set the rules not only for the convenience on the spot. Again, according to the notification of the Chief of Labor Bureau of the Welfare Ministry on April 4, 1944, it was decided that "as regards the work, Chinese laborers should in principle be engaged in simple hard manual labor;" nevertheless, enterprisers sometimes assign dangerous hard manual work to them on purpose and cause them injuries and other accidents. As thus the measures for the prevention of espionage and accidents leave something to be desired, the police shall guide in flank from this point of view.

3. Concerning rations and other treatment of Chinese laborers: Inadequate rations cause directly the commotion, grievance and discontent of Chinese laborers, which threaten to become so severe that the public peace would be disturbed. In view of these facts the police also shall strive for the prevention of accident by directing to supply them as adequate rations as possible and, as for other conditions, by giving guidance in

INTERROGATION OF

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Interrogators: Mr. Richard Elliott
Maj. Robert Patterson
Interpreter: Hiroshi Matsuda
Stenographer: Nina O. Briggs
Place: War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan
Time and Date: 1515 hours, 13 July 1948

Questions by Mr. Elliott:

Q. What is your name?

A. HOMMA, Fusakichi.

Q. What is your address?

A. S^aga-ken, Karatsu City, Miyojin, Koji, Kyushu.

Q. What is your occupation and marital status?

A. At present I am a farmer. I am married and have four children.

Q. Give us a brief sketch of your early experiences in China.

A. When I was a young man I was interested in the revolution movement in China. I went to Shanghai in 1918 for the first time. I stayed in Shanghai for about a week and returned to Japan. In the spring of 1919 I went to China to stay. I went this time to Tsingtao with the purpose of joining the Chinese revolutionary group. Tsingtao at this time was leased territory of the Japanese Government and the Japanese ^{Military} police were after me for joining the Chinese revolutionary group. So I made myself scarce among the Japanese and joined a Chinese coolie gang. I worked as a coolie for about six months and then I went into a business of my own. I bought some carts and had several coolies working for me. In 1921 I was conscripted into the Japanese army and returned to Japan. I joined the cavalry at Kurume, Kyushu. Because of sickness I was discharged from the army after eight months. I again returned to Tsingtao and returned to my former business up until 1937 when I had to return to Japan by order for evacuation by the Japanese government.

In January 1938 I went back to Tsingtao. This time I worked for the Navy doing transportation work with trucks. At the same time I was doing intelligence work for the Navy. After four or five months I quit this job and went back to my old carting business, using coolies. Up to this time I still was connected with the Navy as a special agent for gathering information. This time business was very poor and in 1939 I began taking steps to close my business in China and took a trip to Japan. After I bought a house I went back and made my final disposals and returned to Japan with my family in the spring of 1941. I have never been to China since 1941.

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- Q. When you went to work as a coolie, did anybody order you to work?
- A. I joined the coolies to work under a Chinese called Chang, because NAKAMURA, the Japanese with whom I was staying and who was connected with the Chinese revolutionary faction, disappeared and I had no place to go. I had a choice at that time to join the ~~independent~~ ^{revolutionary} group under the Japanese YAMAMOTO. But since it was very dangerous to remain as I was Chang helped me to pose as a coolie.
- Q. This was back in 1919, is that correct?
- A. Yes, way back in 1920. At that time the only safe place for Chinese who were with the revolutionary party was Tsingtao. The Peking Government at that time was arresting all revolutionists and hanging them without trial.
- Q. All right. This business that you operated at Tsingtao, was that a contracting business or was it in the nature of a drayage or trucking company?
- A. The Navy transportation work was under the Navy. I was hired as a civilian to be in charge of Navy transportation after they made the landing at Tsingtao. Thirty trucks were acquired at Dairen by the Navy. When we landed at Tsingtao, there was no opposition; and since the soldiers were not fighting, they took over the operation of the thirty trucks; and so we civilians were out of a job after a few months.
- Q. When was this?
- A. We landed at Tsingtao in January of 1938.
- Q. Did you procure coolie labor for the Navy?
- A. No. I did not procure any coolies for the Navy. The original plan of my going with the Navy was that I help the Navy in procuring coolie labor but since there was no fighting in this area there were a lot of independent procuring agents operating and I was not needed for the purpose. The thirty trucks that the Navy had were distributed among the various transportation groups. I had to go back and start a business of my own again using coolies as my private enterprise.
- Q. Well, just what sort of transporting did you do?
- A. My transportation business was done by means of push carts only. I once tried trucks, but it did not pay. Since coolie labor was cheap, it was more profitable using hand carts. My work was doing the transportation part for the merchants. My business was to accept the merchandise at the warehouses and deliver it to the port and vice versa. I also did the paper work as to shipping and paying of tariff.
- Q. Did you ever run a labor procurement agency?
- A. No. I did not have any labor procuring agency.

- Q. What method did you use to secure labor for your business?
- A. I had from thirty to fifty regular employees; but whenever I needed more, I always got the extra coolies from coolie labor contractors.
- Q. Do you know when the North China Labor Association was founded?
- A. I think the North China Labor Association was organized during the war with China, but while I was in Tsingtao I never heard of it. After I returned to Japan I heard a lot about it.
- Q. Didn't the North China Labor Association have a branch in Tsingtao?
- A. While I was in Tsingtao there was no such branch office.
- Q. What was your first affiliation with the North China Labor Association?
- A. I never had any affiliation with the North China Labor Association.
- Q. What was your first contact with the Government with reference to the importation of Chinese Labors into Japan?
- A. I first learned about importation of Chinese labor into Japan in 1944 at the Home Ministry. It was about recruiting Chinese Labor to be used in Japan on an experimental basis but the importation took place after this.
- Q. Well, aren't you mistaken about that? Weren't the first laborers imported on a trial basis in 1943, and in 1944 wasn't it decided to import them on a wholesale basis?
- A. When I was called in for the first time they told me that they were going to import Chinese labor on a trial basis. They had never tried it before. But later when I was called in by the Home Ministry a second time I was told that they had an experimental group the year before.
- Q. Well, tell us how you first became connected with this labor deal?
- A. This is how I became connected with the Home Ministry concerning Chinese labor. HAYASHI, a friend of mine, knowing that I had been in China for a long time called me into Tokyo and introduced me to OKAZAKI, who was the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry. The story was that since they were importing Chinese labor into Japan they wanted me to help in matters concerning Chinese coolies. Although I refused to have anything to do with Chinese coolies because I felt that conditions in Japan would not suit the Chinese, later I had to agree because of the general mobilization law of Japan where everybody had to do some kind of work for the Government. I was then put on an unofficial status with the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry. What they wanted me to do was to make inspections of the labors as they came into Japan and advise the office as to their status.
- Q. That will be a good place to stop for today.

(Interrogation adjourned at 1625)

INTERROGATION OF

HOMMA, Fusakichi (Continued)

Interrogator: Mr. Richard Elliott
Interpreter : Hiroshi Matsuda
Stenographer: Marian A. Linhart
Place : War Ministry Building, Tokyo
Time and Date: 1015 hours, 14 July 1948

Q What was your connection with HAYASHI?

A HAYASHI was just a friend of mine, as he comes from the same vicinity as I do. I was introduced to him by one of my friends and that is how I knew him.

Q Was he with you in China?

A No.

Q What was HAYASHI's connection with the Home Ministry?

A I do not think he had any connection with the Home Ministry except he had friends at the Home Ministry.

Q By the way, what is his full name and address and occupation now?

A I think he still lives in Tokyo, but since I have not seen him for a long time, I do not know where he lives.

Q Do you know what his occupation is, and what is his full name?

A His full name is Masayoshi HAYASHI. Formerly he was in the pig raising business, but lately I heard that he started some kind of business firm which failed, and at present I do not know what he is doing.

Q Didn't you say that he was from your part of the country?

A Yes, he comes from Kyushu, and Kumamoto is his birth place.

Q Well, what was his connection with OKAZAKI?

A I do not know how OKAZAKI and HAYASHI were connected, but it seems to me that they were just friends. HAYASHI had no connection with the Home Ministry.

Q What means of communication did you receive when you were called to Tokyo the first time to see OKAZAKI on this labor deal?

A I received a wire from HAYASHI asking me to report to Tokyo because he had some important business.

Q When was this?

A It was in February of 1944.

Q Tell us about your first meeting with OKAZAKI.

A When I came to Tokyo, HAYASHI told me that the Home Ministry was looking for somebody who knew Chinese labor, and wanted me to take that job with the Home Ministry. Also, he asked me to meet a certain friend of his who was in charge of this section. I refused but he gave me a party at a tea house in Akasaka and he called in a friend to join us and this man was OKAZAKI. This is how I met OKAZAKI.

Q Was that the first you heard of the importation of Chinese laborers to Japan?

A Yes. This was the first time I heard of the Chinese labor being brought to Japan. Back in 1939 while I was in China there were rumors that Japan was planning to import Chinese labor, but nothing happened because there was a law in Japan at that time prohibiting foreign labor from being imported to Japan.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

- Q Did you accept the position at the time of the first meeting with OKAZAKI?
- A No, I explained to him that it was impossible to use Chinese labor in Japan. I refused to have anything to do with it, and returned to Kyushu.
- Q Did OKAZAKI tell you whose decision it was to import Chinese labor to Japan?
- A No, he did not go into too much detail, but he was very much interested in getting information concerning coolie labor from me.
- Q Was he introduced to you as an official of the Home Ministry?
- A Yes, he was introduced to me as the Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry.
- Q When were you next contacted regarding this project?
- A A few weeks after I returned to Kyushu I had a wire from Tokyo. I do not remember at present if it was signed by OKAZAKI or the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry, but it was more or less of an official telegram. I left it go for two or three days, then the police of my locality called on me and said that they had a telephone call from the Home Ministry in Tokyo asking for me to report to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry. Realizing that this was an official call, I went to Tokyo for the second time.
- Q What did you do when you arrived here the second time?
- A I reported to OKAZAKI and he told me that they had to have my services since I was familiar with Chinese labor. Although I was reluctant, he put the proposition to me that they could get me even if I refused because of the general mobilization law. I was told that there was a shipment of Chinese laborers arriving at Fushige in Toyama Prefecture and they wanted me to make an inspection of the laborers. I accepted the mission, but it was to be the only one, and I would return to Kyushu again. Then I was introduced to YAMADA, Makoto, who was OKAZAKI's subordinate, and I was to make a trip to Fushige together with this YAMADA. Then it happened that YAMADA could not make the trip and I made the trip with SEKIGUCHI, Terusato who was also under OKAZAKI.
- Q Then you were ordered, or forced, to take this position by the Home Ministry?
- A Yes. Later I got into an argument but could not get out of it, so they made me just an employee on an unofficial status.
- Q Do you know who the Home Minister was?
- A I think it was ANDO, Kisaburo.
- Q Do you know whether or not OKAZAKI was directly under the Home Ministry?
- A The Foreign Affairs Section of which OKAZAKI was Chief was under the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry, and the Police were directly under the jurisdiction of the Home Minister and the Vice Minister.
- Q What was SEKIGUCHI's title and position?
- A I do not know the exact position, but SEKIGUCHI was under YAMADA, and there was another man above YAMADA, and the Chief of the Section was OKAZAKI. SEKIGUCHI was formerly police officer and went up in rank.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

- Q Who was your immediate superior?
A I was on an unofficial status and could come and go as I pleased. When I reported to the Section, I usually went with YAMADA or SEKIGUCHI and acted under their direction.
- Q What was the nature of the inspection that you and SEKIGUCHI went to Fushige for?
A On this visit with SEKIGUCHI, we inspected the laborers working as stevedores at Fushige. We visited their working places and also their barracks.
- Q This was in March or April of 1944?
A Yes, this was either in March or April, right after I reported to Tokyo.
- Q What was the purpose of the inspection?
A The inspection was for me to make a report on what I thought of the conditions under which the laborers were working.
- Q Just the conditions, not the efficiency of the laborers?
A I was to state what I thought of the whole matter concerning Chinese labor as I saw it. SEKIGUCHI made the report. After I visited Fushige I left for Kyushu without returning to Tokyo.
- Q Was it on that occasion that you reported that the Chinese laborers were being treated too good?
A Yes, this was the time when I talked to SEKIGUCHI of the good treatment they were having and SEKIGUCHI made this report.
- Q What was the amount of food they were receiving at that time?
A I am not sure of the exact figures, but I think they received 36 or 38 kilograms of main staples per person per month. Some of the things I saw at the barracks was a lot of waste, and the food that was given to the animals like dogs was not even eaten, and it was rice. During the inspection I saw a number of Japanese women ~~and children~~ receiving the left-overs of the lunches of these laborers. FH
- Q Was this one of the experimental groups?
A Yes, this was one of the experimental camps. I also learned that these people had been there from the year before.
- Q These were the laborers who were contracted for one year, is that right?
A I do not know the term of their contract, but these were the group who were brought for experimental reasons.
- Q Was this part of the group that was sent back after one year to spread propaganda about the good conditions that existed in Japan for the purpose of recruiting more labor?
A I do not know if that was the group that was sent back after one year, but I know there were other groups that came to Japan before this group was returned to China, because later I visited a couple more camps in Kyushu where they had Chinese labor.
- Q What amount of food did you suggest that they receive? Did you suggest that 22 kilos a month would be sufficient? I am not asking you to figure out what would be sufficient now; I am asking what you recommended?
A Yes, I recommended about 22 kilos for light work, and 27 for heavy work.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Q Did you also report that their quarters were too good and that they should not have barracks with wooden floors; they should have cave-like huts?

A Yes, I recommended the reconstruction of their barracks because I learned that the conditions under which they were living were causing the Chinese laborers to contract pneumonia quite often. I recommended building huts similar to those that they used in China, and having heating systems installed.

Q What kind of sanitary facilities did they have at this camp?

A The sanitary conditions were good for Chinese. Of course, the facilities were quite up-to-date, but actually they kept the place messy. They had medical treatment and it seemed that they got rid of all the skin diseases and sicknesses they brought along with them, but the biggest trouble they were having was with pneumonia.

Q How many laborers were in this camp?

A I cannot recall the figures, but there were probably between 100 and 200 in this group.

Q What was the condition of the living quarters as to their cleanliness?

A In general it was very clean. They were given food in quantity, but the food that they received did not suit the Chinese diet. There were also women that they bro~~ut~~ over from China in this group.

Q What has that to do with the cleanliness of the living quarters?

A Of course, the other things have nothing to do with the cleanliness of the living quarters, but if you looked at it from the Chinese way of living, I think it was very good. When other people look at it, however, including the Japanese, it was not too clean.

Q Just what were the conditions?

A Looking through the latrines and hallways, they were rather dirty. They were not scrubbed often and clothing was always dirty -- they did not wash often. They had a lot of soap, but they did not use soap in washing.

Q Were there any facilities for bathing?

A Yes, they had hot water baths.

Q How many baths did they have?

A There were two bath houses - one for people with skin diseases where they had medicated baths, and another general one where everyone took baths together.

Q Were there any regulations regarding their bathing? Were they required to take a bath periodically?

A I do not know if there were regulations or not, but I understood that they were forced to take baths at certain intervals, which the Chinese did not like very much. I was told that in the beginning they used to take regular baths, but when I visited the camp there was much complaint that they would rather not take hot baths.

Q How many buildings were these laborers quartered in?

A There were barracks in a fenced enclosure.

INTERROGATION OF

HOMMA, Fusakichi (Continued)

Interrogator: Mr. Richard Elliott
Interpreter : Mr. H. Matsuda
Stenographer: Marian A. Linhart
Place : War Ministry Building, Tokyo
Time and Date: 1400 15 July 1948

- Q When we left off yesterday we were discussing conditions you found at Fushige on an inspection tour in March or April, 1944. We were discussing the buildings and the camp that the laborers were quartered in. How many of these buildings were there?
- A I do not recall the number of buildings there were in the compound but there was a lot of room for everybody living in these quarters.
- Q How were the inside of the quarters arranged?
- A It is kind of vague to me now, but I think there were several large rooms. I think the kitchen adjoined the main building as a wing.
- Q One-story buildings?
- A Yes.
- Q How many men slept in a room?
- A I cannot remember how many men were in each of these rooms.
- Q Were they crowded?
- A In these barracks they had an elevated platform, and although I did not see the people actually sleeping there, judging from the bedding that was lined up in rows, they had quite a bit of space for each person.
- Q They slept on the floor?
- A Yes.
- Q You say there was an enclosure around the barracks. Was this a barbed wire enclosure?
- A I do not think that there were any wires, but it was an enclosure with boards.
- Q Did this board fence have barbed wire strung around the top of it?
- A I cannot recall if there was any barbed wire.
- Q Were there any guards in or around the compound?
- A I do not remember of any guards around the enclosure, but at the entrance there was a police box and there were men stationed there.
- Q Were these men free to come and go as they pleased?
- A I think, although I am not too sure, they were not allowed to go out freely from this camp. They had to have a special permit whenever they left the camp.
- Q You said they also had some women in the camp. Were these women sent to serve as prostitutes for the laborers?
- A Yes.
- Q How many women were there?
- A I am not too sure of the number at present, but there were only a few and I think there were only five or six of them.
- Q Where were they quartered?
- A They had a special barracks within the compound.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

- Q Do you know if these women were sent over forcibly or did they volunteer?
- A I understood that they came of their own will to make money, as a business venture, and I remember that there was a man and woman in charge of all these girls.
- Q How were they paid?
- A I am not familiar with how they were paid, but I think this brothel was run like they do in China when each paid his own as he visited the place. I talked to one of these girls and I asked her some questions on how they have been treated, but I did not have any answer, so at that time I thought they were not too pleased with the conditions there. I also realized at that time that these girls were afraid to talk or give me information because of the master, or the contract labor leaders.
- Q Do you know if these girls were brought over by the Japanese Government?
- A I do not know if they were actually brought over by the Japanese Government or by the labor leaders.
- Q Was it the Japanese Government who brought the laborers over?
- A Yes.
- Q And you were sent down to investigate conditions, were you not?
- A Yes, but as to how these girls were brought over, I do not know, but I think they were sent by the company that did the dealing with the Japanese Government in sending the laborers to Japan.
- Q You mean the North China Labor Association?
- A No, it was the North China Transportation Company.
- Q They were controlled by the Japanese Government in China, weren't they?
- A They were connected with the Japanese Government in China, but I think it was an independent company.
- Q Well, controlled by the Japanese Government, though?
- A Yes, like other organs in occupied China, they were run by the Japanese Government. These coolies in Japan were employees of this North China Transportation Company, but as to their arrangements, they were still with the North China ~~Labor~~ ^{Transportation Co.} Association, or had severed their relations and were in Japan on their own, I do not know.
- Q Did you make any recommendations regarding these women?
- A I recommended that these women should be removed because I realized that the leaders of these coolies had the girls all for themselves.
- Q Were they removed?
- A I do not know if they were returned right away, but this practice of bringing women as prostitutes was dropped on later shipments.
- Q Was this the only coolie camp in Japan that had women?
- A This was the only place that they had women prostitutes, because in the rest of the camps I visited there was no such thing.
- Q What did SEKIGUCHI do on this trip?
- A SEKIGUCHI was the head man of this 2-man inspection tour, and after I gave my recommendations, I left for home, and he made the report to the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Q Did he accompany you on your inspection trip of the actual inspection of the installations of this camp?

A The two of us made all of the inspection rounds of this camp.

Q How long did you remain there at the camp?

A This first inspection trip was a very short one and we looked around the same day. In other words, we spent twenty or thirty minutes to look over the barracks and another twenty or thirty minutes at their working places at the harbor and that was about all.

Q You mean to say you felt qualified to make a report on conditions at the camp after only a one hour's inspection tour?

A Besides this inspection we had a conference with the people in charge of the place and got various details of the conditions and set-up of the place. Putting this together I formed my opinion as to the recommendations.

Q Did you give the company representatives at Fushige any advice as to how to handle the coolies or how to get more work out of them?

A In the office of the management I gave them a few pointers as to my experience with coolies.

Q Did you tell them the coolies were being treated too luxuriously?

A In the conference I told the management that the Chinese as a whole were a very thrifty people and would not waste food, but what I saw at the camp made me think they were getting too much food, and I said the right quantity should be 22 and 27 kilos. I also told them to cut down altogether would mean the Chinese people may think they were not needed and it would have a psychological effect, but this system of providing too much staple food should not be carried on with the future shipments, but I do not remember advising the management to cut down the food on this trial group. Also, I advised them that they should treat the Chinese coolies the same from beginning to end, because these laborers were very sensitive to changing of their treatment, and therefore in the future to establish a set system where they know they can carry through for the length of the contract.

Q What did you mean by that?

A In China whenever people are hired and they want to get rid of their laborers or hired men, they never say it in words, they always change their treatment, turning to the worse, and this is a hint that they are not needed, and they quit voluntarily.

Q Could these men have quit voluntarily if they wanted to at any time?

A No, they could not quit and leave the place even if they wanted to.

Q Did you talk with any of the laborers themselves?

A Yes, I talked to some of the laborers.

Q What did you talk to them about?

A My talk with the laborers was, first, as is customary in China, asked him where he came from, then asked him if he was homesick; but on this homesick business, none of them answered that they were homesick, which is customary of a Chinese. They never say the exact thing. Then I asked them about why they were wasting food or giving away food to the Japanese girls ~~and children,~~ and the answer to this was that none of them did ever do such a thing, but I actually saw this happening when I made my rounds. When I heard all this, I realized that these Chinese coolies thought they were better off than the Japanese.

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Q How long had these Chinese been there when you made this trip?

A I do not know the exact time of their arrival, but they were working at this port from a year before.

Q Well, was it your opinion that all of the coolies in the camp were peaceful and happy and content with their lot?

A My opinion after seeing all of this was that these coolies were not very happy about the deal, and were not working to the best of their ability, and also that the so-called leaders of the group were not doing their duties properly and I thought that they were more or less ~~inexperienced~~ ^{selfish} group leaders. Furthermore, I thought that these experimental laborers were not properly planned or organized. With their leaders very inefficient and also that the management on the Japanese side, although they were doing their best, were inexperienced with Chinese laborers and were not pleasing the Chinese.

Q Were the coolies physically mistreated in any way?

A No, I never had any reports on mistreatment of coolies in the camp.

Q What methods of punishment were used for infractions or violations of rules and regulations?

A I was never told of how they punished violators, but I was asked what would be the best way to punish these coolies whenever they got into mischief or broke rules. I advised them that the Japanese authorities should never take the thing into their own hands, but have the Chinese group leaders or the Chinese manager take care of the situation. I also advised them to be careful not to take sides with any of the Chinese groups because that would break up the group as a whole. I also advised them to be careful because some of the laborers were from communist areas, or communists themselves, and they would naturally be a bad influence on the rest of the coolies.

Q Was it the real purpose of your inspection to make recommendations regarding the conditions that would be desirable in order to get the greatest amount of work out of these laborers, and not from the standpoint of the Chinese comfort?

A The main reason of my inspection on this trip was to advise them, after seeing the layout, what would be the best way to keep the Chinese satisfied and there would be no trouble between the Chinese and management.

Q How many hours a day did these men work?

A Their working hours were the same as the Japanese laborers working in Japan at the time, but I forget the exact number of hours it was at that time.

Q How many days a week were they working?

A I do not remember if they had weekly holidays, but they had all of the Japanese holidays, plus the regular Chinese holidays.

Q If you were going down to make an inspection of the conditions that existed in camp, wouldn't it be among the first things to find out how many hours a day they worked and how many days a week they worked?

A All I can remember now is that they had off all the days the Japanese laborers didn't work, and I think this number of days worked did not come under the Home Ministry. I also recall that the working hours were less than the hours the coolies usually worked in China.

Q Are there any other recommendations you made that you have not been asked about?

A One other thing that I was asked by the management was that they were having a hard time in controlling the Chinese, but at present I do not recall the details of the trouble.

FH

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Q Did they have a hospital or dispensary for the laborers?

A There was no hospital or dispensary within the compound, but all medical care was under the Japanese hospital in that vicinity.

Q How many people were hospitalized at the time of your inspection?

A I recall that there were three or four people sleeping in the barracks who were supposed to be sick, but none of them were seriously ill.

Q What was their trouble?

A I do not know what their illnesses were, but one group of two or three were gambling among themselves, and when I asked what the trouble was they said they were just sick. When I entered the room all the people stopped gambling and went to lie down on their beds.

Q How many had died up to that time in this camp?

A I cannot recall the exact numbers, but I learned that several of the Chinese had died up to this time, mostly from pneumonia. I was surprised to learn that the Chinese should die of pneumonia at that time.

Q Was it as a result of your inspection trip that this document which was attributed to you was later written up and sent to various places employing Chinese laborers?

A What section of the Government published this?

Q Home Ministry, I believe.

A This report that I made to SEKIGUCHI was later made into a pamphlet and as I understand it, it was only distributed within the Home Ministry circles. When I returned to Tokyo later after this first visit to the camp, ^{one couple of other trips, CA} SEKIGUCHI had a pamphlet published, but this pamphlet contained several other matters which did not take place in this inspection. So I informed him that I would not approve of it as a recommendation from me. But it was already in printed form, and he told me that it was only for reference within the Home Ministry and it would not be distributed to outside sources. I think this combined report of SEKIGUCHI and me was distributed only to Home Ministry circles, including the Prefectural Government.

Q Did you report that the Chinese laborers were being treated too luxuriously?

A Yes, I reported that this group at Fushige had very good treatment, especially concerning food.

Q Didn't you state that wheat flour was too good for the Chinese because they were not used to it?

A No, I did not say any such thing on this report.

Q Did you make a statement to the effect that the Chinese should be squeezed to the last drop of blood?

A No, I never made such a statement.

Q Have you ever heard this statement before?

A Yes, at the Yokohama trials I was asked if I made such a statement by the prosecuting attorney.

Q Had you ever heard it prior to that?

A I remember one instance when SEKIGUCHI made such a report and recommendation after visiting various camps, which I disapproved.

Q Do you have a copy of the pamphlet that was published as a result of the SEKIGUCHI report?

A No, I do not have any copy of the report that SEKIGUCHI made.

HOMMA, Fushikichi

Q Could you identify a copy of this pamphlet if it were shown to you?

A Yes, because this was the only report that was made by me through SEKIGUCHI.

Q Then you left for your home on the same day that you arrived at the labor camp at Fushige?

A It was on the night of the same day that we reached Fushige that I left for my home in Kyushu.

Q What was your next contact with Chinese labor in Japan?

A About a month later I was called again to Tokyo. Then I made a trip either to Kyushu or Osaka. Every time I made an inspection tour I returned to my home in Kyushu. At intervals I would be called out again and made other rounds to Niigata, Nagano, also to Hokkaido.

Q Who did you see when you came back to Tokyo the second time, and how did they get in touch with you?

A All these calls from Tokyo came through the Police Department and it came from the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry. I reported to the Foreign Affairs Section.

Q Who in the Foreign Affairs Section did you go to each time?

A I reported to OKAZAKI.

Q Do you know from whom OKAZAKI took his orders?

A OKAZAKI was under the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry.

Q Who was his immediate superior?

A I think his immediate superior was MACHIMURA, Kingo who was Chief of the Police Bureau.

Q What is he doing now?

A I do not know.

Q Is he still in the Government service?

A I have no idea whether he is still in the Government service or not.

Q Incidentally, are you eligible to hold an official position in the Government now?

A I do not know if I am on the purge list or not, but I never heard anything about it. According to the rules and regulations of the purge act, I think I am a purgee.

Q Why do you think that is - because of your affiliation with this Chinese labor?

A Because I understand that everybody that was with the Foreign Affairs Section of the Home Ministry were purgees.

FH

INTERROGATION OF

HOMMA, Fusakichi (Continued)

Interrogator: Mr. Richard Elliott
Interpreter : Mr. R. Matsuda
Stenographer: Diane Braun
Place : War Ministry Building, Tokyo
Time and Date: 1400 21 July 1948

Q When you were called back to Tokyo after your first inspection tour at Fushige I believe you said you reported to Mr. OKASAKI. What instructions did you receive from OKASAKI at that time?

A I do not remember the details of his instructions but he ordered me to go to the other camps to make an inspection too.

Q To what camps did you go at this time?

A I went to either Nagano first and then to Kyushu or to Kyushu and then to Nagano. I do not recall which was first. I also recall that at this second meeting with OKASAKI I was to be with the Home Ministry on an unofficial status.

Q What was the purpose of the inspection?

A To accompany either SEKIGUCHI or YAMADA on an inspection of the camps and to be their consultant as to the situation of the camps and I did so.

Q Did the Home Ministry have other inspection teams other than yourself?

A I don't think there were any other teams or groups in the Home Ministry although I am not sure.

Q Did SEKIGUCHI or YAMADA accompany you on all your trips?

A Yes.

Q Altogether how many camps did you visit?

A There were various camps scattered throughout the prefectures. I believe we visited about 20.

Q During what period of time?

A We started making the rounds of the camps about April 1944 and I think it continued up to about November or December of the same year - 1944.

Q What did you do then - were you dismissed by the Home Ministry at that time?

A I returned to my farm in Kyushu and stayed there. As I was always asking for a release it seemed that they never did call me back since then.

Q You had no connection with the Chinese labor after November 1944, is that correct?

A Yes, I never did anything concerning Chinese labor after that time.

Q In your opinion were the Chinese laborers at all the camps treated too luxuriously as they were at Fushige?

A Some of the camps that I visited were almost on a par with Fushige but most of the camps were worse off than Fushige as to food especially. As to the barracks and treatment they were about the same. As to their clothing the labor that was imported later was better clothed. There were some camps that were treated better than what I saw at Fushige.

- Q What was the general physical condition of the laborers?
 A The physical condition of the laborers generally speaking was good. At least they were healthier and better fit for work than at the time of their arrival to Japan. One camp in Akita which later had an uprising seemed to me the worst off of all. In this camp the laborers were very lean and seemed to be underfed.
- Q Did you visit this camp in Akita before the riot?
 A Yes.
- Q How did you hear about the riot?
 A The only time that I heard of the riot was at the trial at Yokohama. I never heard that this camp had a riot until then.
- Q Were you in Yokohama at the time of the trial?
 A Yes.
- Q What were you doing in Yokohama at that time?
 A I was called in by the defense as a witness for the trial at Yokohama last year in November.
- Q You mean the War Crimes Trials?
 A Yes.
- Q Did you ever hear about the trial of the Chinese?
 A No, I did not hear of that trial.
- Q When did you visit the camp at Akita?
 A I think it was in the early fall of 1944 because I remember that this group was a new arrival from China and it was about two months after their arrival.
- Q What were the conditions there at that time?
 A My impression when I visited the camp was that these laborers were very lean and I heard the report that during the voyage to Japan this group had a large number of deaths on the way. I also realized that even after two months the conditions were not good. Also, the persons in charge of this camp were ex-soldiers and had returned from China and they were very rough with the Chinese. I also saw that there were quite a few old people among the laborers. It was the first time I saw laborers that were very lean and weak.
- Q What were the working conditions?
 A I made two trips to this camp and the first trip practically none of them were working. They were more or less recuperating. When I made my second trip I saw some of them working on garden lots but still there were only a few of the stronger ones that were working.
- Q Did you observe any mistreatment of these Chinese by the people in charge of the camp?
 A I did not actually see any mistreatment but one thing I recall now is that in one of the barracks of the guards I saw a club and I asked them what the club was used for and they said it was not used on the Chinese. I reported this matter to the police and I understand that the police took away this club.
- Q Did you report these conditions to the Home Ministry?
 A I talked on these matters with my superiors but on some of the matters I did not have any conversation.
- Q Did they do anything about it?
 A When I talked to the police of the things that I saw at these camps I am sure the police carried out some of my recommendations.

- Q Did the officials of the Home Minister take any action?
A These recommendations were reported by the person in charge of each excursion and I am sure that some of these recommendations were carried out by their orders from the Home Ministry.
- Q Are you sure of that?
A These men that went around were official representatives of the Home Ministry - they made reports and since they were responsible for these trips -although I was a consultant going along with them - some of the recommendations as to the policing were carried out. But as to the conditions of the inside of the camp which were under the jurisdiction of the contractor or the company concerned, I was told that the police had no jurisdiction - such as firing the guards or men in charge of the work.
- Q What action did the Home Ministry take with these companies to improve the treatment of these laborers that you reported were being mistreated or handled roughly?
A I don't know what kind of action the Home Ministry took.
- Q Is it not a fact that they did not take any action at all?
A As I said, I do not know whether this is true or not.
- Q And is it not a fact that they were not concerned with the treatment of the Chinese as long as they produced the work?
A No, that is not so. Our section of the Home Ministry did not care as to how much work they were producing. My acceptance of the job as consultant was to make investigations of these camps and find out if the Chinese laborers were working peacefully and I always advised that the Chinese laborers could not be controlled by police or by force and the way to do it was to treat them according to the way that they liked and have them work with the spirit that they were offering real work to the best of their ability. What the Home Ministry Group was interested in was to prevent any uprisings among these laborers.
- Q We went so far as to establish training schools for the guards and police in handling Chinese labor in Hokkaido.
A Yes.
- Q Of all the camps you visited which was the worst?
A The KASHIMA Camp group in Akita was the worst of all.
- Q Did you ever visit the CHISAKI GUMI Camp in Hokkaido?
A Yes.
- Q What about conditions there?
A This camp was in the quicksilver mining works in Hokkaido and the report was that this camp had the best group of workers and that they were selected men. According to my recollection they were doing all right and were very much better than the KASHIMA GUMI Group. But when I visited this group I sensed that although the report was that the camp was very efficient, the laborers were kind of mysterious and it seemed to me that they did not like the work.
- Q Did you visit the mines in Akita that the laborers worked in?
A No, I did not visit the working conditions in the mines.
- Q Then you were not interested in the men's working conditions - you were only interested in advising the officials how to get along with the Chinese laborers. Is that correct?
A Yes, my position with the Home Ministry was along that line.
- Q And the Home Ministry was not interested in the actual working conditions of the Chinese?
A Yes, that is right.

- A (cont) We visited these camps and had various reports that we looked into on the conditions that existed between the laborers and management or men in charge. For example, when it was reported that the CHISAKI GUMI was the most efficient camp in all of Japan, but when I made my round of the place although looking from the outside it may have been efficient the atmosphere of the place struck me that the Chinese were not satisfied with the management and I knew this by talking with some of them and looking at their attitude towards their work and it happened before I left Hokkaido that we had a lot of run-aways from that camp.
- Q Did you ever talk with any of the workers?
A I did talk sometimes but most of the times I did not talk with them.
- Q Did you know that the guards physically mistreated the laborers?
A Although beating and manhandling the Chinese laborers was prohibited by order of the police department, at some camps I suspect that this was carried on.
- Q Did you report that to the Home Ministry?
A Although I did not make any special reports later, it was one of the recommendations I made at the start and there was a regulation that any trouble had to be taken care of by the police department instead of the guards in charge.
- Q When you were talking with these Chinese did you ever ask them how they came to be there?
A Yes I have asked them that question.
- Q What did they say?
A I talked to some of them who said that they were former prisoners of war of the Japanese Army and were brought over to Japan.
- Q Did you know how these laborers were actually recruited or procured?
A I do not know how they were actually recruited but I could see that a great many of them were prisoners of war brought over by their labor group leaders because I know that in China it was not too easy to recruit coolies in large quantities at any time.
- Q Did you ever hear that these men were forced to come over here?
A I did not hear anything specific but from my experience in China I know that some of them were forced to come to Japan.
- Q How do you know that some of them were forced to come, from your experience in China. Explain what you mean?
A Because of the fact that coolies are not too easy to procure in China and because a lot of these laborers that came to Japan were, as I have said before, POWS. I understand that the North China Labor Assn handled all the contracts for the Chinese and they worked together with the Army and got them out of the prisoner of war camps and just sent them to Japan.
- Q What about the civilians?
A As to the civilians I think they were gathered through Chinese Labor contractors by paying so much per head. Of course I was not in China during these times so I cannot say it was so for sure.
- Q You were not in China, but don't you know that as a matter of fact - was it not common knowledge that these so-called labor contractors in China just picked the men off the streets and took them off to camps to await shipment to Japan?
A From the experience I had in China I saw some Chinese laborers returning from Europe after the first world war and in this group I learned that there were some that were more or less forced to go and during the development of Manchuria there were a lot of laborers being sent to Manchuria from the Chinese area and what I have known is that a lot of these coolies were forced to go because of certain debts

- A (cont) they had or because of certain money that was advanced by these professional brokers - that is very common in China.
- Q Don't you know as a matter of fact that these laborers who came to Japan were forced or tricked into coming?
- A Yes, I think that is quite true - that is how I see it.
- Q Who was it that told you about this?
- A I do not know of anybody telling me anything of that sort- but that is how I think they were brought - from my experiences in China.
- Q Did you ever talk to anybody about how they were procured?
- A I don't recall anybody that told me about it but at the time many rumors were released that this was the way they were brought. Among groups it was said that these Chinese laborers were more or less forced to come to Japan.
- Q Did any of the Chinese ever make any complaint to you as to how they were forced to come?
- A Yes, they did.
- Q At what camps did this happen?
- A I cannot recall which camp it was.
- Q How many of them complained to you that they were forced to come?
- A There were four or five instances when I was told they were forced to come as prisoners of war. Whenever I had a chance to talk to the Chinese the first thing I would ask would be - as is the Chinese custom - where did you come from. I always used to ask that question and also whether he was a member of the Chinese National Party or not and this is why I could tell that they were prisoners of war even though some of them never said they were prisoners of war. I recall now that some of the questions they asked was could they ever go home after two years when the contract was up.
- Q Well, the laborers themselves did not have a contract with them, did they? The contract was between the North China Labor Association and the companies acquiring the laborers - is not that correct?
- A Yes, the contract was between the North China Labor Association and the contractor employing the laborer. I think the individuals had a contract with the North China Labor Association.
- Q Don't you know from your experience with Chinese coolies that they did not give them contracts? If they wanted them to work they just hijacked them and told them to get to work.
- A The labor contractors when they gathered their group of men had a list of their groups and a written document with all their names and seals on it. That is the customary way to do it in China.
- Q But you just said they were tricked and forced to come over - how could they have a contract if they were forced to come over?
- A When they were forced it would not be necessary. What I intended to say was that ordinarily a coolie labor contractor makes a contract for his team or group - that is the procedure in China. All of the Chinese I talked to knew that their contract was for two years.
- Q Well, what that actually meant was that they knew that the North China Labor Association had made a contract with the industry employing them for their services for two years and that they actually had nothing to say about it?
- A Yes it is true that they had no authority individually since the contracts were between the North China Labor Association and the industry employing them, but they all knew that they could go home

- A (cont) in two years and always asked me as I said before and I always said you will be released after two years. I think the contract for two years was to be fulfilled because I recall that according to the original contract they had a set sum to be paid when they went back to China but because of the inflation in China this sum would be just a meager sum and they were having conferences to revise this pay-scale so that the Chinese would have more than the original set amount when they returned to China.
- Q Under the contract were they not supposed to receive a certain amount of money in Japan from time to time?
- A I do not know the details of this payment in Japan but I think they were paid from time to time.
- Q They were supposed to be paid from time to time but actually they were not, were they?
- A From my recollection I think some of the places did pay something to the laborers but as you say, maybe at other places they were not paid at all.
- Q Did any of them ever complain to you that they were not being paid?
- A No, I have not heard of that complaint.
- Q Did you ever report to the Home Ministry that these companies were not paying these laborers?
- A Yes, I remember instances when I talked to OKASAKI that something should be done as to the amount of money that they were going to be paid by the company and also of an instance when I recommended that when the Chinese laborers returned after the expiration of the contract they should be paid in gold or silver. This would be the best way to satisfy the Chinese. OKASAKI said he would take this matter up with the people concerned.
- Q I mean did you report the fact that these laborers were not being paid a small part of their so-called wages on a weekly or monthly basis as they were supposed to?
- A I don't think I ever made such a report. I know we talked about the inflation of China - that we had to have an equivalent raise in the amount of their pay but whether I made reports to the effect that they were not being paid I have no recollection.
- Q Who else accompanied you on these trips besides YAMADA and SEKIGUCHI?
- A There was another man MIYAKAWA whose position was below SEKIGUCHI that used to accompany us on some of the trips.
- Q What was his first name?
- A I cannot recall his first name now.
- Q Did he work with you?
- A He worked below SEKIGUCHI.
- Q Anyone else?
- A There was another man that went with us sometimes - his name was TANABE and he was also on the clerical staff of SEKIGUCHI. I cannot recall his first name. This man went with me probably only once.
- Q What is SEKIGUCHI's full name?
- A Terusato SEKIGUCHI.
- Q What was his official position?
- A He was a senior clerk in the Foreign Affairs Section of the Police Bureau.

- Q This pamphlet identified by the title "MATERIAL FOR REFERENCE WHEN EMPLOYING CHINESE LABORERS AND SOME INFORMATION FOR THE EMPLOYERS OF CHINESE LABOR" - who prepared it?
- A It was prepared by SEKIGUCHI.
- Q Was it based on your recommendations?
- A Yes, what I recommended is the basis of the document.
- Q Who published it?
- A8 I think it was done by the Home Ministry.
- Q Is it an official document of the Home Ministry?
- A It is not an official document of the Home Ministry. That is what I was told when it was first published.
- Q To whom did they distribute this pamphlet?
- A I was told it was to be distributed among the inner circles of the Home Ministry concerned with labor. This also includes the prefectures.
- Q You mean they were distributed to the prefectural governors?
- A I do not know if the governors received them but it must have gone at least to the labor section of the prefectural government.
- Q Was it also distributed to the managers of the industries where the coolies were employed?
- A I don't think they were distributed to that group although I am not sure if they were later distributed.
- Q Did you recommend that they were being treated too good by being able to take a bath?
- A Yes, I said that.
- Q Did you state that the food was too good?
- A Yes, I did. When I was at Fushige and Nagano they were having too much food.

Adjourned at 4 PM
To be continued July 22, 1948, 10 A.M.

INTERROGATION OF

HOMMA, Fusakichi

Interrogator: Mr. Richard Elliott
Interpreter: Mr. Hiroshi MATSUDA
Stenographer: Nina O. Briggs
Place: War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan
Date and Time: 22 July 1948, 1005 hours

Questions by Mr. Elliott:

- Q. We were speaking of this document issued by the Home Ministry, based on your recommendation, which you say was drafted by SEKIGUCHI.
- A. That is right.
- Q. Incidentally, when was this document issued or distributed?
- A. Since it was issued after we made two or three drafts, I think it was either in June or July 1944.
- Q. Do you know whether your recommendations were followed in accordance with this document?
- A. When I looked through this document most of the things I said concerning the camp to SEKIGUCHI and the other people, including the Police Department and people in charge of the camps, were in the report, but I saw that there were some misquotations.
- Q. I am not speaking of that. I want to know if there were any changes made as a result of this document being published?
- A. No, none that I know of.
- Q. What was the purpose of it then? Why did the Home Ministry publish it?
- A. This report was just a reference and I think of some of the orders that came out after this publication - they may have taken some of the suggestions into considerations.
- Q. What orders were published?
- A. I do not recall any special order that was issued because of my suggestions. I was never shown any of the orders that were issued by the Home Ministry.
- Q. For instance, you recommended that they should not be allowed to have hot baths. Do you know whether they were stopped from having hot baths?
- A. No. I do not recall places where they didn't have hot baths, but I remember because of the shortage of fuel some of these hot baths were not in operation in some of the camps. I recall that there was one incident when I heard that all the baths at YOSE Camp in KANAGAWA Prefecture were removed because I said that Chinese laborers did not need any hot water bathing facilities. Later when I made an inspection tour of this place, I did not mean to remove all the baths when I said that, this camp was not in existence and all the laborers removed to another area. I want to add that I went to this camp on my own.
- Q. Did you say that less food creates better work?
Did you also recommend that the food be reduced gradually?
- A. No, I have not said such.
- Q. How do you account for that statement being in this document?
- A. That statement was not what I recommended. It was just opposite to what I said. I recommended - - -
- Q. The question was how do you account for that statement being in the document?

- A. It is a mistake that SEKIGUCHI made when he wrote his report. Because of mistakes like this one, I did not approve the document as a whole.
- Q. Then you attribute that statement to SEKIGUCHI?
- A. Yes. There were several mistakes that SEKIGUCHI made.
- Q. Did you recommend that sick people who were not able to work be given reduced rations?
- A. Yes. I said sick persons, especially suffering from stomach trouble, should have reduced rations because they will never get well. Diarrhea patients, I meant to say.
- Q. Did you recommend the amount they would be reduced?
- A. I did not state the amount of reduction since this would be taken care of by the doctor. This problem of reduction of food for sick patients arose from the fact that food was either being wasted or being misused. So I said if these people are fed according to the doctors' prescription the actual food should be given to the working laborers and not taken away by the people.
- Q. You mean you considered it a waste because the Japanese Government wasn't getting any production from that food?
- A. At that time, I had the impression that any food that was not used by the Chinese would be taken away and diverted to some other channel instead of giving it to the Chinese. Of course, nobody reported it to me that food was being taken away; but I had a feeling that it could be that the Japanese in charge were diverting the food to other places.
- Q. Do you mean to say that because of the food shortage in Japan that the food should not be given to the sick Chinese but that it should be used for the good of Japan - given to the men who were working?
- A. No. My idea was that food that was to go to the Chinese should go to the Chinese group, not into other channels.
- Q. On your inspection tours, did you investigate the diet that was being fed to the patients who were not able to work?
- A. Yes, I have.
- Q. Did you know that they were being given starvation diet?
- A. I saw these sick persons receiving the same food which the working man had. I never saw any instance where the food was lessened. They also received the same amount of food as the working men although they were sick.
- Q. Do you mean to say that they didn't take your recommendations?
- A. Yes. It seemed my recommendation on this matter was not carried out?
- Q. In other words, these camps defied orders of the Government? Is that what you mean to say?
- A. Yes. When I come to think about it, I do not recall any instance where any of my recommendations were carried out to the full extent.
- Q. Well, what about the camp at AKITA? Did the sick patients there get the same diet as the working people.
- A. Where was this camp called Kita located?
- Q. CHUSAN Camp at HANOKA.
- A. I don't know if one of these camps was called KITA, but there were two camps at HANOKA and I visited both camps.
- Q. The place I am speaking of was the place where they had the riot.
- A. If it was the KASHIMA-GUMI Camp, I do not remember going into the food problem of this camp.
- Q. You mean that you know that these people were being starved, don't you?
- A. As I recall, when I visited this camp they had just come in and were very emaciated. I think after their arrival they were given the necessary 22 kilos per month.

- Q. You went up there later, didn't you? You said yesterday that you did.
 A. I visited this camp just once. The other trip was the FUJITA Camp.
- Q. You said yesterday that you visited the camp where they had the riot twice.
 A. Yes, I visited this area twice, but on the first trip there was no KASHIMA-GUMI Camp. On the second trip this KASHIMA-GUMI Camp was in existence.
- Q. Don't you know that at many of these camps a sick laborer was afraid to say he was sick and kept working because he knew that if he said he was sick and couldn't work he wouldn't be given enough food to live on?
 A. No, I have never heard it. As I recall now when I visited this KASHIMA-GUMI Camp the laborers had arrived in a very weak condition and the men in charge told me that they were giving them extra nourishing food so they would get well fast. As I recall, the doctor of this camp did not have enough medicine and he went out on his own and bought medical supplies for himself to treat the laborers.
- Q. Then you consider that the diet was sufficient?
 A. Yes. From the reports that I heard on this visit I thought that they were properly fed; and I remember giving a donation of two or three hundred yen, when I heard this doctor's story.
- Q. That being the case, how do you account for the fact that according to the Japanese records and the Japanese death certificates in the fifteen month period these coolies were there one hundred thirty died of malnutrition?
 A. Yes, that is true. I saw the report that a great number of them had died on their way over.
- Q. I am not speaking of that. I am speaking of dying in the camp of malnutrition.
 A. I think this camp had the greatest amount of deaths, at least because of the fact that they came as a starved group and died after their arrival.
- Q. These coolies arrived in August 1944. In September 1945, fifteen months later, they had nineteen deaths in the one month from malnutrition. Now, how do you account for that if they had an adequate diet?
 A. If that's what the record shows, I think that the food that was given to the Chinese laborers must have been stolen or sold somewhere else by someone in between. My understanding is that they had at least twice the stable food that we Japanese were receiving. All these contractors were receiving food from Government channels for the laborers and it must have been that this food was not given to the Chinese.
- Q. Well, you said that the Government had liaison men visit these camps; didn't they know the conditions?
 A. Yes, it is true that there were liaison men and people who went around to inspect these camps like we did. For this reason I made some of the recommendations when I thought the laborers were not properly treated. When I made my inspection trips I realized that some of the conditions of the contract were not properly carried out.
- Q. Well, the point I am getting to is this: these people were dying from malnutrition and starvation and the officials in Tokyo knew that such conditions existed?
 A. Yes, I think they knew.
- Q. You knew it, didn't you?
 A. During my time with the Home Ministry, I didn't think these laborers were dying of malnutrition. But what happened later I knew only through what I heard?
- Q. What did you hear?
 A. I first heard of the large number of deaths at the YOKOHAMA trials last year.

- Q. You said you made recommendations regarding their quarters. You said the barracks were too good for them and you suggested a room which afforded 2 or 3 inches space above their heads when they sat would be an improvement. Did you make that recommendation?
- A. Yes. I said that from the fact that the buildings in which they live in China as I know were built very small and rooms were made small so that they could use steam heating from their cooking stoves.
- Q. Were these recommendations carried out?
- A. No, they were not carried out. At least I did not see any.
- Q. Did you recommend that they should have been made to produce three times as much work as the Japanese?
- A. Yes, I said it, but there is a special reason for this suggestion.
- Q. Did you say they should be allowed certain volumes of work to be completed within limited hours?
- A. Yes, I said that work should be given to them more or less on a contract basis - do so much work in so much time.
- Q. Did you suggest that if they didn't complete the assigned work they would be beaten?
- A. No, I have never said such a thing.
- Q. Well, didn't you know that was the practice that was followed?
- A. I did not see any such beating incidents.
- Q. But don't you know that's what happened?
- A. I don't know if they were beaten or not. I remember this much that although they were allotted to do a certain amount of work they did not finish that work in the limited time.
- Q. Did they have any method of punishment if they did not finish the work?
- A. No. In my suggestion to let them work I also stressed that whenever the work was done if they did it before time the rest of the time would be free time.

If that statement says that I suggested that these Chinese laborers should produce three times more work than the Japanese do, that is wrong. What I said was that under the present condition in Japan the laborers in Japan were mostly old men, children, and women. I said normally these Chinese could produce three times what these Japanese laborers could produce. I also added at the time that it would be impossible to expect three times as much labor from these coolies than from the Japanese.

(Interrogation recessed at 1135 hours to be resumed
in the afternoon)

Interrogation resumed at 1340.

- Q. Still referring to the pamphlet issued by the Home Ministry and entitled "Reference Material Employing Chinese Labor," did you recommend that armed guard stand off from the laborers while they were working and if they were doing anything wrong or were idling that the guards shoot at them, but that care be taken to miss them?
- A. No. I have not recommended such action.
- Q. Who did? Did you make this statement:

conformity with their racial characteristics and customs.

4. Concerning the close cooperation of leaders on the suppliers side and on the enterprisers' side: Notwithstanding it was decided by the aforesaid notitications that "in employing Chinese laborers, the organization at the time they were supplied shall be employed, that orders concerning work shall be issued through Japanese leaders and Chinese responsible persons and that orders direct to Chinese laborers shall be strictly prohibited," leaders on the enterprisers' side are apt to disregard these decisions and issue orders concerning work directly to Chinese laborers, which causes friction between them and Japanese leaders of the North China Laborers' Association who take charge of custody of Chinese laborers and liaison. As there are cases where the friction exerts very harmful influence upon Chinese laborers, the police shall, from the viewpoint of public peace, give them side direction that no such thing may occur again.

5. Concerning other matters: Each time a concrete problem occurs it shall be dealt with under instructions of the competent department concerned.

REMARK: The Greater East Asia Ministry did not join in this notification because according to the Official Organization Ordinance, the Ministry was deemed to have no positive authority on the management of labor for Chinese laborers brought in Japan, but the prior consultation was made.

I believe that the above is substantially right.

For your information I append to this document charts illustrating business system, classified by items, of the government offices concerning with the affairs of Chinese laborers (which I prepared).

Dated: July 14, 1948

/s/ YAMADA, Makoto

TO: MAJOR PATTERSON

"As much as possible they had better be kept in a secluded place and let them do the work among themselves. If that is impracticable, then, kept surveillance from a distant. In China, guards stand somewhere apart so that they may not be seen by the laborers, and if the laborers do anything wrong, or idle their work, the guards shoot them, using real bullets but taking care not to hit them. This will show them that they are watched from afar, and it serves to let them work hard. Those who decamped are either beheaded or shot to death. If the Japanese people take lenient steps over this point, I am afraid it will cause trouble in the future."

- A. Yes, that is about what I said. That is how I understand how it was done in China.
- Q. Then you did make this recommendation?
- A. Yes. I didn't say to do it what way, but I explained how it was done in China.
- Q. Then you said that if the Japanese were lenient there would be trouble?
- A. Yes. I mentioned that to have Japanese meddle with the affairs would mean trouble.
- Q. Did you recommend as one method of handling the Chinese to occasionally stop their food?
- A. No. I have not mentioned such a thing.
- Q. To whom do you attribute that statement?
- A. If it is in the report, SEKIGUCHI wrote it himself.
- Q. What punishment did they receive for escaping or trying to escape?
- A. I don't remember any set regulation, but whenever these people were caught they were turned over to the Japanese police. I saw some of them kept in jail and understand some of them were returned to their work after being released from jail by the police.
- Q. Don't you know that they were beaten?
- A. I don't know if it is a fact that they were beaten or not.
- Q. That is all for today.

Interrogation adjourned at 1400.

INTERROGATION OF YAMAMOTO, Kumachi

Interrogator: Mr. R. Elliott
Interpreter: Mr. H. Shimojima
Stenographer: Miss L. B. Scott
Time and date: 0930 hours 13 October 1948
Place: 347 War Ministry Bldg.

(Questions by Mr. Elliott).

- Q Mr. YAMAMOTO, the other day you were telling me that you heard that laborers were being procured by force in China, that you took some action concerning this matter. Now do you at this time remember any of the details that you didn't remember on Monday?
- A I don't remember any details but as I told you last time, my subordinate informed me that they had heard such information in China, not on the whole but some part and he informed me that we must take some action about this question. I contacted Mr. AOKI and I remember he issued instructions to the authorities in North China, that means the Japanese Embassy and Consulate saying we must be very careful not to take such action and act in accordance with our policy which which they have already been instructed in. I only remember that but I don't remember any details of the kind of action taken in North China.
- Q You said Mr. TAKEUCHI was the one who informed you?
- A Yes, Mr. TAKEUCHI was my subordinate on my staff and he informed me.
- Q And you also said Mr. TAKEUCHI was the one who informed you?
- A Yes, Mr. TAKEUCHI was my subordinate on my staff and he informed me.
- Q You said Mr. ~~TAKEUCHI~~ ICHI was the one who investigated for Mr. TAKEUCHI?
- A Mr. ~~TAKEUCHI~~ ICHI was Mr. TAKEUCHI's subordinate at that time.
- Q Do you know how this ^{information} ~~question~~ came to Mr. ~~TAKEUCHI~~ ICHI?
- A Mr. ~~TAKEUCHI~~ ICHI knows that information from his subordinate.
- Q Do you know his subordinate and where he got this information?
- A I don't remember who was in charge at that time.
- Q Was this information secured as a result of a personal investigation?
- A Yes, I think so.

Q You mean a report was received from North China?

A Yes.

Q You say you don't know the details of how they were being forced -- do you mean that you don't remember or that you didn't receive the details.

A I was informed about details of the action but I don't remember now the detail.

Q You remember that you were told and you remember as much as you did, you must remember the details. After all, that was a major concern of the GEA Ministry, wasn't it? And you thought enough about it to take action?

A I thought at that time this was a very important thing so after consulting with Mr. AOKI I took action. I remember that in North China some unfair action was taken by somebody in charge.

Q What was the unfair action?

A I don't remember in detail but some force was used by the Labor Association in collecting laborers to come to Japan. At that time they took such action, for instance, # 100 laborers must be collected or something like that. That's what I mean by unfair action but what kind of action it was really I don't remember exactly.

Q Did you ever know what kind of action was used in forcing these laborers?

A At that time the authorities of the GEA, our Minister and I thought that such a collection must be agreed upon in accordance with their free will and a voluntary contract must be made with them. We thought that but my subordinate informed me that some place such a free contract was not being made.

Q You mean you found out they were not being assembled voluntarily?

A Yes.

- Q We understand that Mr. YAMAMOTO, but what I want to know is how where they physically collected - ~~where~~^{were} they picked up off the streets or ~~where~~^{were} they called to meetings - just how?
- A I don't know.
- Q TAKEUCHI told you and you told AOKI. Now was it you or AOKI who sent this message to North China?
- A I contacted Mr. AOKI and Mr. AOKI sent the message because our instruction to the authorities outside of Japan is always in the name of the Minister. Never do we send a message in my name.
- Q You did send it in the name of the Ministry, in the name of AOKI as Vice Minister?
- A Yes.
- Q What authorities did you send this message to?
- A I remember it was addressed to the Minister.
- Q What Minister?
- A In China is the Japanese Embassy and under the Embassy is the Ministry. At that time the Minister was Mr. SHIOZAWA and the Consulate General - I forgot his name.
- Q The message was sent to the Minister SHIOZAWA and then the Consul-General in Peiping?
- A Yes.
- Q What is Mr. SHIOZAWA doing now?
- A He is a member of the Army in the custody of Russia I believe. He was-enee-G captured in Manchuria I heard.
- Q Is it General SHIOZAWA?
- A Yes, General SHIOZAWA. He was once GEA Minister.
- Q What was his first name?
- A Seisen Shiozawa, but I am not sure.
- Q Just what was his position.
- A He was a GEA Minister. He was a Minister under the control of the Japanese Embassy.

Q Who was the Chief of the Japanese Consulate at Peiping?

A I forgot.

Q Was it Mr. USAMI?

A Maybe it was Mr. USAMI or TSUCHIDA.

Q When the GEA sent this message, was it acknowledged?

A Yes. I can say rather that it was instruction.

Q Was the instruction acknowledged?

A Yes, of course.

Q What was the instruction.

A I will explain. I don't remember any details of the wire but I do remember the outline of the instruction that composed it. We heard such information that some action was taken with regard to Chinese laborers and this action is contradictory to our instructions issued before so if such is the case, we Japanese authorities must take care not to have such action occur in the future.

Q What date was this?

A I don't remember sir.

Q Do you remember the approximate date?

A I don't remember the exact date but I believe it was in the spring of 1944.

Q What was their report?

A I don't remember whether it was a report or not but I believe they were going to follow the instruction of the GEA. I remember that after our instructions were sent to them they treated this question very fairly after that.

Q How do you know this?

A It is our duty to take care to see whether our instructions were carried out and after sending the instructions we always watch very closely so I remember after the instructions were issued, everything was running more smoothly.

Q I am not talking about what your policies were. Do you mean that they were not forced to come to Japan, that subsequent laborers, that were recruited were ^{not} recruited by force?

A I believe that after our instructions were sent, the collection of laborers was carried on very smoothly and fairly. From the

beginning of this question, the GEA had a policy that this must be carried on very fairly. That means the laborers, the foreigners, and especially since this action was being taken in a foreign country, would be contracted for in accordance with their own free will. The second point as I told you last time: After they are brought to Japan they must be treated just the same as the Japanese.

Q We are not talking about how they were treated in Japan yet. I am asking you how do you know that your instructions were carried out after you send the reprimand to the Ministry in Peiping.

A I believe they carried out the instructions just as they were stated.

Q I am asking you how do you know this?

A I believe they were carried out in accordance with our instructions.

Q Why do you believe that?

A After we sent our instructions to them, we always took care of this question and if it was not acted upon in accordance with our instructions, then we always used to send a message again but I remember after we sent the message we did not send any other message to them repeating this.

Q You say this was the only thing - your office sent messages to China giving them instructions to treat the laborers fairly, is that right?

A There was a time when a wire was dispatched, when it was decided to bring the Chinese laborers to Japan. That is the only other time they dispatched a wire. At that time we instructed the authorities in China for the first time, just after the decision was given in the Cabinet.

Q That was the only time you sent such instructions other than the spring of 1944 that you were just telling us about - is that right?

A The first instructions were sent at the time of the decision and the second were those which I explained to you.

Q That was the only time?

A I think so.

Q In other words, instructions were only sent twice.

A I don't remember the other instructions but in minor details, other instructions may have been sent to them besides the important two.

Q Did you ever send warning to the various ministries who were employing the Chinese in Japan to treat them fairly?

A What ministries in Japan?

Q For instance, the Welfare Ministry and the Home Ministry.

A At that time we had a conference of vice ministers in our government. At that meeting I remember sometime a discussion about this question. At such times I always used to raise up this question and call their attention to this.

Q How often did you have these meetings?

A The Vice Ministers meetings were once a week. However, this question was only raised at several meetings, I remember.

Q Going back to the spring of 1944, when you sent this message to the Minister in Peiping, or whoever it was, what action did he take?

A At that time I think our Minister took such action: At that time collections of laborers in North China were made by the China Labor Association. This organization was under the control of the Chinese Government so our authorities in North China could not control them directly. I think our Minister in North China after receiving our instructions instructed freely to their subordinate and the subordinate keeping in mind this instruction got in touch with the Chinese Government or the Chinese organ, the Labor Association.

Q Mr. YAMAMOTO, don't talk to me about the Chinese Government, that was a puppet state was it not?

A I think so.

Q And the Japanese Government set up the puppet Chinese Government. In other words, the Chinese Government was under the control of the GEA Ministry.

- A No, the Chinese Government was never under the control of the BEA. It was under the control of the Japanese Army. The GEA never had direct control of the Chinese Government at all. It was under the control of the Japanese Army.
- Q In other words, ^{there} ~~it~~ was really no such thing as a Chinese Government. It was just another form of Japanese Government. The Japanese Government could do what they pleased there.
- A The Chinese Government was recognized by the Japanese Government but the Japanese Government did not control directly.
- Q Well, it was controlled by the Japanese Army?
- A Yes.
- Q Isn't the Japanese Army an arm of the Japanese Government?
- A The Japanese Army belonged to the Japanese Government but at that time really the Japanese Army was outside of the Japanese Government. I mean the Japanese Government had several ministries---
- Q The North China Labor Association had only one Chinese in it and the rest of the directors were Japanese and they took orders from the Japanese Consul's office or Embassy, whatever was the diplomatic mission there in Peiping. What action did the Minister take when he received those instructions in the spring of 1944?
- A They instruct all members of the Japanese Embassy and Japanese Consulate. They kept in mind these instructions and got in touch with the Chinese Government or the Japanese Army or the Labor Association. That is the usual steps whenever they receive instructions from our government.
- Q Could it be that the Ministry here in Tokyo sent numerous instructions or sent the instructions you told us about numerous times without your knowing about it?
- A I was in the post since the GEA was founded until August 1944. While I was in that post there could not be any instructions sent which I didn't see.

Q In a statement, I believe it was by Mr. SUGIHARA, he said that the Ministry had sent repeated warnings to North China to secure the laborers legitimately and Mr. AOKI told me that that was right, that the Minister did send out repeated warnings. Now can you tell me what they meant by that if these instructions of which you speak only went out twice.

A The very important instruction which I remember now was sent out twice as I explained before. But as I told you minor instructions may have been sent many times. Many times the Minister in North China and his subordinate came to Tokyo to hear our ideas and policies. Always at such times our staff in charge of this question told them our policy so I think if we include such verbal instructions they may have been sent many times.

Q The way they put it is that they warned repeatedly to recruit them legitimately and to treat them fairly. Do you know why it was necessary to warn them many times unless you had information that they were not being so treated?

A I will speak very frankly. At that time the control by the Japanese Army was strong. Everything received was a warning to let them act in accordance with our GEA Ministry instructions because very often our instructions were broken by the Armed Forces there. This is what we had been fighting for a long time, all the time.

Q How did the Army violate your instructions. Mr. YAMAMOTO don't misunderstand me. I am not trying to involve the GEA Ministry in this. I know what the position of the GEA was at that time that they were charged with the success of the GEA Co-prosperity movement but I do want to find out information whether it was the Army that violated your instructions or regardless of who it is I want to find out about it.

A Well you can find out from the members of the Japanese Consulate in China or the Japanese Embassy who were always watching everything on the spot. Whenever they found any violation of Japanese policy they used to inform our Government. The Army violated our policy in spots. Very often they did not act in accordance with the central Japanese Army authorities.

Q You say it was necessary to repeatedly warn them because the Army was violating your instructions. How were they violating your instructions?

A It is very difficult for me to explain by examples because there were so many---

Q Let me ask you this. Did the Army violate your instructions regarding the recruiting of laborers?

A The Army had their own organization called the Special Service Organ which had direct contact with the Chinese Labor Association. That special organ had very strong power.

Q What was the result? You mean laborers were being forced by them to come to Japan?

A In some places I heard such a thing had happened. But generally speaking, such collection of laborers--

Q Mr. YAMAMOTO, let's quit beating around the bush. I know that out of, between 35,000 and 40,000 laborers who were imported to Japan at least 80% came against their will. I don't know whether the GEA Ministry had anything to do with it or not but certainly they knew about it.

A I think they came in accordance with their free will.

Q Did you know Mr. KASHIBARA?

A No.

Q Do you know what was the various means of recruiting these laborers?

A It was not the policy of the organization to force the laborers. ~~33~~ The only way they could recruit them was by volunteers or individual contracts.

- Q Do you know the method by which various districts were allotted a quota and they were required to produce their various quotas on a certain dates?
- A Do you mean they are treated very severely in some places in Japan---
- Q No. Various political subdivisions such as districts or wards or municipalities or whatever the subdivisions were, were given a quote: For instance; to produce several hundred laborers the first of next week and they were required to produce the laborers at an appointed time.
- A I have no knowledge of that.
- Q Did the Kempei Tai have anything to do with rounding up or procuring any of the laborers?
- A I believe the Kempei Tai did not have any connection in our policy of procuring various laborers.
- Q Now did you say the Ministry in Peiping was under the direction of the GEA Ministry?
- A Yes.
- Q You also said I believe that the GEA had nothing to do with the Army?
- A Yes.
- Q Why is it that all three of the ministers during that time and immediately before and immediately following were Army men? Do you know Lt. Gen'l MORIOKA, Gen'l SHIOZAWA and Gen'l KUSAMOTO? They were all ministers. How do you reconcile the fact that if the GEA had nothing to do with the Army that all the Ministers were high ranking Army officials?
- A When the GEA was founded it had some regulation about GEA organization. At that time in China the Japanese Government could appoint a man who belongs to the Army but if they were appointed, for instance, to the post of Minister of the GEA, then they became a civilian and they can come back again to the Army.

Such a system was taken by the Japanese Government and that is the reason we in the Foreign Office had objected to the organization of the GEA Ministry at that time and our Foreign Office Minister Mr. TOGO resigned owing to such a difference.

Q He resigned when the GEA was formed?

A We were against such a system. After the Minister is appointed he cannot have any direct connection with the Army

Q Tell me this. If the policy of the Army and the policy of the GEA were in such conflict with each other, why is it that they picked a man who had been in the Army all his life as Minister to head their missions.

A This is not the question of the GEA but the Japanese Government. We were all against such a policy.

Q You say, Japanese Government - the GEA was part of the Japanese Government was it not?

A Yes, it was.

Q Now isn't the government made up of Cabinet ministers? Wasn't Mr. AOKI a Cabinet Minister?

A Yes.

Q Then how do you distinguish the Japanese Government from the Greater East Asia Ministry? What is your point of distinction?

A GEA belongs to the Japanese Government.

Q You mean AOKI as the Greater East Asia Minister didn't have authority to appoint his own Foreign Minister?

A Yes.

Q Then who did appoint them?

A The cabinet at that time.

Q AOKI was in the cabinet, wasn't he?

A At that time the Japanese system was that when a high ranking official is appointed, if it is the case of a minister in full charge of GEA, then the Minister of GEA presents a document to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister appoints the Minister on AOKI's recommendation.

Q What I am trying to find out Mr. YAMAMOTO is why AOKI recommended these Army people if the policies of the Army and Ministry were so widely apart?

A It was a regulation in the organization of GEA that a man who belongs to the Army will be appointed as a Minister of some sort in China and before the GEA was founded such a system was originated in the Cabinet. Mr. AOKI did not want to appoint an Army man but really he was pressed by the Army to do so so he took such a step. When an Army man was appointed to this post, then they had no direct connection with the Army, they must obey the GEA Ministry instructions.

Q Do you know where General MORIOKA is now?

A I don't know sir.

Q What about KUSAMOTO?

A I don't know. He came back about two years ago.

Q When the GEA was formed, did it take over the direction of the South Manchurian Railway from the Foreign Office?

A You mean the GEA succeeded the Foreign Ministry in the control of the Manchurian Railway?

Q Yes.

A I think so because the GEA had concern with independent countries in the Far East.

Q Did you know MATSUKUMA, Kiichiro.

A I don't know him.

Q Where you with the Foreign Office before the GEA was formed?

A Yes.

Q How long were you in the Foreign Office?

A 26 years.

Q Did you ever have any China or Manchurian service?

A Yes, I have been in Manchuria about four years from 1934 to 1938 in the Japanese Embassy.

INTERROGATION OF:

USAMI, Uzuhiko

PRESENT:

INTERROGATOR:
INTERPRETER :

MR. R. ELLIOTT

WITNESS
REPORTER :

USAMI, UZUHIKO
D. BRAUN

TIME & PLACE;

WAR MINISTRY BLDG., ROOM 374

BY: MR. ELLIOTT - CONDUCTED IN ENGLISH

- Q What is your name? A. My name is USAMI, Uzuhiko.
- Q Where were you born? A. I was born in Nagano Prefecture, Nov. 27, 1893.
- Q What university did you attend, and when did you graduate? A. I graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. At that time it was called the Legal College but I took the political science course and I graduated in 1918.
- Q Did you take a position with the government immediately after you graduated? A. Yes, at first I entered the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. At that time there was only one ministry for agriculture and commerce and industry, but less than two years later I changed to the Foreign Office and since then I attended the diplomatic service.
- Q What is your present position with the Foreign Office? A. I retired from office in 1945.
- Q Were you purged? A. No. It was last May I think. I was not purged.
- Q What were your foreign tours with the Foreign Office in foreign countries? A. About half of my time - not entirely one half, but partly, in France and Switzerland in connection with the League of Nations Affairs and partly in China. Roughly speaking at first I went to Geneva in 1920 and I stayed in Geneva and Paris for more than six years. During that time I worked in connection with the League of Nations Affairs. Then I came back from Paris to Tokyo in 1927 and served in the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs and after two years I went to Anton (Manchuria) as well. Then I came back to the foreign office and I served in the Bureau of Commercial Affairs and after that I went to Foochow in China as Consul General and then transferred to Mukden also as Consul General. In 1937 I was transferred to Geneva also as Consul General but at this time to take charge of the affairs concerning the League of Nations.

After that I was appointed as Consul to the Embassy in Berlin and then I was appointed Minister in Egypt in 1940. My stay in Cairo was very short and I came back from Cairo to Tokyo in September 1940. At the end of that year I was appointed director of the Economic Affairs in the Koa-In (China Affairs Board). When the GEAM was formed I think it was in 1942 that that ministry was formed and I was appointed director of the Bureau of China Affairs. In 1944 I was appointed Minister in Shanghai and went to Shanghai,..in March 1944.

I stayed in Shanghai until November of that year. I came back from Shanghai in November to Tokyo and I retired from office the next spring - in March, 1945.

Q What were your duties as Chief of the China Affairs Board. In that Ministry, as you know there was a Bureau of General Affairs. The Bureau was in charge of executing the policies decided upon by the Ministry but the field of the contents was very wide - economic, political economy, cultural and all matters concerning China.

Q Do you recall the cabinet decision that was passed November 27 1942 regarding the importation of Chinese laborers into Japan?

A. The 1942 Cabinet Decision?

Q Do you remember that such a decision was passed? A. I am not aware in 1942

Q Do you remember that such a decision was passed? A. Yes, I remember that something was decided at that time. My memory is very vague but I remember that I handled something of that matter ...the importation of Chinese laborers when I was in Tokyo.

Q Do you know who it was that drafted the policy in that matter?

A. I don't remember quite well, but I think it was practically decided by the Cabinet Planning Board. All matters concerning economic mobilization were planned by that board.

Q When did you first hear of the policy? A. I do not remember but I think it was after the formation of the GEAM.

- Q After the decision was passed and it was decided to draft the Chinese laborers what did the GEAM have to do with the carrying out of the plan? A. At that time it was at the experimental stage - to know whether that plan would be workable or not. So I remember that our office transmitted this decision, or I may say perhaps the desire of the Japanese Government to import a small number of Chinese laborers as an experimental process. We transmitted that desire to the Japanese authorities in China and to the Japanese Embassy offices in Peking and Shanghai. But perhaps at that time it was chiefly the Peking - I don't remember whether we transmitted that matter to Shanghai because the chief possible source of Chinese laborers was regarded at that time to be in North China.
- Q The Embassy in China was responsible for the procuring of the laborers. ~~They were responsible for the procuring of the laborers.~~ A. They were responsible in this sense - that they tried to get Chinese laborers - tried to get because it was an experimental process - so they tried to get considerable Chinese laborers in suitable conditions and I think they succeeded to get a certain number. I don't remember the exact number but some two or three hundred - I don't remember.
- Q Was it not 1500? A. Not so many, at any rate when I was in Tokyo not so great a number were imported. Some two or three hundred I think.
- Q The Embassy offices in Peking secured them themselves? A. Not in the office themselves. I remember at that time in North China there was an association - the North China Labor Association. I think that office was formed principally to get laborers for Manchuria and as that association was doing work on labor importation in Manchuria, I think the Embassy authorities in Peking asked that association to do the business.
- Q Well, the North China Labor Association was formed by Japanese, was it not? A. Yes, practically mostly by Japanese. But I think there was also Chinese collaboration. It was not a purely Japanese organization.

- Q But they acted at the pleasure of the Japanese Embassy, did they not? They were very cooperative and would do anything the Japanese Embassy requested?
- A Yes, they were closely collaborating with the Embassy - yes.
- Q Do you know how these Chinese laborers were actually procured?
- A. That, I don't know. ~~But I think~~ I think these laborers were procured by the usual process which the Association used for the laborers to be gotten for Manchuria.
- Q What was that process? A. I am sorry I am not quite aware of the actual process.
- Q When and how was it decided to import the laborers on a full scale - a wholesale basis? A. That I don't know, but as I told you I left Tokyo March 1944 and until I left Tokyo I don't know if there were any.
- Q It was later decided to import them on a wholesale basis, was it not? A. Perhaps later on, yes.
- Q When you went to Shanghai in 1944 who succeeded you as chief of the China Affairs Board? A My successor was SUGIHARA.
- Q In the spring of 1944 were you still with them when Minister AOKI and Vice Minister YAMAMOTA found it necessary to send a wrie to the Embassy in Peking telling them that they heard the laborers were being forced to come to Japan and instructing them to take measures to have these practices stopped? A. I dont remember such matters - perhaps after I left Tokyo.
- Q When you went to Shanghai you went there as Minister? A. Yes.
- Q Did you receive any message from the Ministry in Tokyo regarding the importation of Chinese laborers from the Shanghai Area?
- A. While I was in Shanghai I don't remember any special order was received from Tokyo but for Central China I think a special person was despatched from Tokyo to collect laborers in the ordinary way - so I may have received information about that from Tokyo but I don't remember that I had received special instructions about that.
- Q Did you here of Mr. ITO? A. Yes, it was ITO.
- Q Who was it that commissioned ITO to procure the laborers in Central China?

- A. I think ~~how~~ it was the Ministry - the GEAM.
- Q Do you know why ITO was selected? A. I don't know. I never met ITO. At that time I did not know who ITO was. I thought it rather strange such a person had been appointed or commissioned but personally I did not know him. I only had that feeling.
- Q Did you not head the Japanese Foreign Office in Shanghai? A. Yes. It was a branch office of the Japanese Embassy for Central China. I was head of that branch office under the jurisdiction of the Ambassador.
- Q Who was the Ambassador at that time? A. At that time, TANI.
- Q Where was TANI located? A. At that time in the Nanking Embassy.
- Q Was it the China Japanese Labor Association that ITO formed to procure these laborers? The SINO-JAPANESE LABOR ASSOCIATION?
- A. That I don't know. Perhaps to do that work he may have formed some kind of organization.
- Q Didn't ITO receive orders through your office? A. No, I don't remember that we had given him any instructions.
- Q Perhaps he may have come to some one of my office but I personally never met him and I don't remember that we gave any instructions to him.
- Q Do you mean to say that he got his orders directly from Tokyo?
- A. Yes.
- Q What means would he have of direct communication with Tokyo?
- A. Well, I think he received instructions at Tokyo and he went through them and for connection with them he would have sent telegrams. But there was not much necessity for connection. He may have asked our office in Shanghai to send the information to Tokyo. It may be possible. I don't remember that any such information was sent from him through our office. There were so many telegrams and letters that I did not see all of them - so I don't know exactly.
- Q Mr. USAMI, when some of the former government officials refer to the Shanghai Liaison Office of the GEA Ministry, would that be the same as your office? A. Yes, as I have said it was a branch office

of the Embassy so it is a part of the Embassy. Routine work was done by our office. On principal policies we had to consult the Ambassador. We got the instructions from the Ambassador or from the Ministry in Tokyo.

Q Did ITO go into this procuring of Chinese laborers as a business proposition? A. I think so yes, a business proposition - free contract.

Q What do you mean by free contract? A. To collect only those who wished to come to Japan - no coercion or force.

Q How do you know that? A. Because if there were something like that I should have heard of it in Shanghai.

Q But you just said you did not know much of ITO's activities.

A. That is true, yes. I did not know much of his activities but if there had been something abnormal then I should have certainly heard of it. When I was in Shanghai I heard nothing of such things.

Q Did Mr. ITO run this organization by himself or did he have a partner?

A I don't know the details of his organization. I don't know how it was organized or how it worked etc.

Q When I asked you a while ago if he went into it as a business venture I meant a profitable business proposition - in other words, did he make money out of it? A. I think he was only paid the necessary expenses ~~and for it~~.

Q Who furnished money for the venture? A. Those details I don't know - I am sorry. If there were any special abnormal matters or conditions or difficult questions then I should have certainly heard of it and especially at that time our ministry's policy was to adopt the so-called new China Policy which was based on just and fair treatment of Chinese. If there is something which is contrary to that policy I should have acted to correct those matter.

Q While it was the mission of your ministry to promote friendship among the Chinese, you had quite a bit of trouble among the other ministries' mistreatment of the Chinese? A. Yes.

Q I want to know the details of some of these troubles you had with some of these various ministries? A. There was especially trouble with the army - there were many conflicts. For instance

the question of collecting rice. At that time the rice situation was very difficult. The army wanted to collect rice in China necessary for the maintenance of the army and to secure the necessary amount of rice the army wanted to use force and collect rice from the farmers. But we tried not to use force and instead to use Chinese organizations to collect the rice.

- Q I am not interested in rice. Did not the Army and other agencies want to collect labor by force too? A. There was no such attempt as far as I know.
- Q. As to the laborers - you mean in Shanghai? A. Yes.
- Q Was there any attempt that you know of in Peking? A. I don't know.
- Q Have you seen or heard from YAMAMOTO recently? A. I met him some two or three weeks ago in the street - just met him.
- Q You know Mr. AICHI, don't you? A. Yes.
- Q Well, both Mr. AICHI and Mr. YAMAMOTO have told me that ITO received his instructions from you and was supervised by you. Do you know why they said that, in view of your statements this morning?
- A I don't know. I don't think we gave instructions to him in Shanghai. But the supervision - since all Japanese activities in Central China were under the supervision of the Japanese Embassy and in Central China I was in that position, so legally he was under my supervision - I think so.
- Q I asked AICHI this question: "Did you ever hear that he caused posters to be displayed in and around Shanghai exaggerating the amount that they would be paid and saying that they were going to Formosa rather than Japan? and he answered by saying "I have never heard that at any time. As I told you, the Minister of GEA gave him some notice that he has to obey everything to the Shanghai Liaison Office of the GEA Minister, so that they did not allow such thing". I asked him who was the GEA Minister in Shanghai at that time and he said he did not remember but it was either TSUCHIDA, Yutaka or USAMI, Urushiko.

an important matter as securing local labor to be imported into Japan? A. Yes, as I have said I did not know the details of the matter but I knew that the matter was going on smoothly. That is why I remember the name of ITO and he had some organization. But I am sorry- I may have heard a little more detail at that time but I don't remember. At any rate at that time I had the feeling that the matter was going on smoothly. Of course the number of laborers to be collected from Central China was not great or not big so as far as the matter was going on smoothly I did not pay much attention to the matter.

Q Did the Army of the KEMPEITAI send any laborers to Japan? A. That I don't know. From Central China?

Q That I don't know because generally the KEMPEITAI or other army organization did not tell us what they were doing.

Q Well, what do you know of the methods that ITO was using to procure Chinese laborers? A. I don't remember - In Shanghai there were many Japanese factories and other businesses who were employing many Chinese - perhaps by connection with these Japanese businesses he could get Chinese laborers - something like that - by the ordinary method of procuring Chinese laborers. Two or three hundred laborers was not a big number.

Q Did they receive any training before they were sent to Japan? A. Training? I don't think so.

Q Why was it that ITO's organization told laborers that they were going to Formosa rather than to Japan? A. I don't know whether ITO told Chinese laborers that they were going to Formosa - that I don't know. Did he tell them so?

Q Did you ever see any posters advertising to be imported to Formosa or Japan? A. No, I did not see any such posters.

Q After ITO secured the laborers what kind of accommodations did he provide as a collecting point before they were shipped? A. Those details I don't know. I am sorry. If you want to know those details perhaps some one who was in charge of these matters in the Shanghai office may give you more accurate information.

- Q You mean one of your subordinates? A. Yes.
- Q. Which one of your subordinates would have been most likely to have handled such matters? A. MR. OKAZAKI Kaheida who was in my office as chief of the Economic Section in my office in Shanghai.
- Q Where is he now, do you know? A. I didn't see him recently but he must be in Tokyo. If you ask the Foreign Office or Central Liaison Office they would get his address. Possibly my successor Mr. FUCHIDA may give you more accurate information. OKAZAKI was chief of the economic section in Shanghai in my office and also under Tsuchida.
- Q When did Mr. ITO first go to Shanghai to set up this labor organization? A. I am sorry I have no accurate memory.
- Q Approximately when? Was it shortly after you took over as Minister? A. Yes, I think so.
- Q And you remained until when? A. Until November 1944- from March to November 1944.
- Q He was only in Shanghai for a short time was he not? A. Yes, I think so. But he himself - I don't know, he may I suppose, ~~have had other business connections in Shanghai~~ have had other business connections in Shanghai - that I don't know but I suppose it is possible and he may have gone to SHANGHAI before - it is possible, but I don't know accurately. That is only my supposition.
- Q Did you ever hear through official channels or in any manner that the GEA was having trouble with the North China Labor Association in that they were forcing the Chinese Laborers to come to Japan? A. I don't know.
- Q What do you mean you don't know - do you mean you don't know whether you heard it or not?
- A At that time I heard nothing about it but afterwards I heard that the method - in vague terms, I don't know the details - but I heard that the method of collecting laborers in North China was a little different from that in Central China -
- Q Different in what respect? A. That I don't know because this is not through official channels -

- Q I don't care what channels - just what did you hear? What exactly did you hear regarding this? A. Only that the way of collecting laborers was not entirely the same as in Central China. I don't know whether it was forcing laborers but the method was not exactly the same so I suppose that some administrative methods had been used - I suppose in North China. In many villages, especially instances for collecting cotton and rice they used administrative force - I mean they used agents of the China administration so I suppose that in North China some such method may have been used.
- Q Actually, did you not hear that the laborers were being forced? A. No, I have not heard that.
- Q When did you hear this - that they were being procured differently? A. Well, after the end of the war I think. I heard that some judicial case had been brought against an agent who used Chinese laborers in Japan and I think it was in connection with that story that I heard about the method of Chinese laborers being collected in North China.
- Q What would you call administrative force? Do you mean each locality was assigned a quota and they were required to produce that? A. This is only my supposition.
- Q But you used the term administrative force? A. Take the example of collecting all cotton - they assigned to the different ~~admin~~ districts the amount to be collected so that if they had employed the same method, they may have assigned a certain number of laborers to be collected to different administrative districts and the administrative local authorities made efforts to get the number assigned.
- Q. Well, what led you to suppose that they might have been using that method to secure laborers? A. Because the number to be collected was rather big so it is possible that they had to take such measures.
- Q Do you mean they required so much laborers - such large quotas that they had to resort to that method - is that what you mean? A. Yes.

- Q Then the GEAM office in Peking would be charged with the responsibility of controlling this, would they not? A. Yes.
- Q Who was the minister at Peking at that time? A. It was SHIOZAWA - a military man - Lt. Col.
- Q By the way, where is he now? A. I don't know.
- Q Was he captured by the Russians? A. I think so but at any rate he has not come back to Japan. He was appointed commander of a ~~division~~ division in Manchuria. I think he was staying somewhere in Heilar.
- Q At any rate, they always had a military man in charge of the GEAM Office at Peking, did they not? A. Yes - they always had a military man in charge of the office.
- Q. Do you know Gen. MORIGOHJI? A. Yes, he was ambassador.
- Q. They had another general too, did they not? A. Yes, after SHIOZAWA - but I have forgotten his name - also a general was appointed as his successor.
- Q Do you know why they did that - what was the reason for that?
A. Before the establishment of the GEAM there was an agent of the China Planning Board and at the time of the China Planning Board the heads of the office in China were military men and when the GEAM was formed some posts, for instance, the Shanghai Post was given to the Foreign Office men. The Peking and Kalgan offices were regarded by the army as very important posts for the army because North China and Mongolia were regarded by the army as having special important interest from the army point of view so they insisted on keeping these posts for military men.
- Q Well, if the so-called administrative force was used - A. I said administrative method not force -
- Q Well if administrative methods were used would you say that SHIOZAWA was responsible? A. Of course as chief of the Peking Office, he is responsible - yes. But of course I don't know exactly how he handled the matter.

Q And he was representing GEAM in Peking? A. Yes. Of course for these matters he must have collaborated with the Chinese organizations and supposing some instructions were given to the local authorities in this matter these instructions must have been given from the Chinese authorities....Chinese local authorities. So instructions must have been given from the Peking Chinese authorities.

Q Yes, but the Peiping Chinese authorities would get their instructions from the Japanese foreign office in Peking - would they not?

A Not instructions - SHIOZAWA or his office may have asked the Chinese authorities to develop necessary measures to attain the object. He had no power to give instructions to the Chinese authorities. The Chinese authorities did not like to be forced to do something by the Japanese authorities.

Q But when they^{were} requested or asked to do something by the Japanese Foreign Office they diplomatically always granted the request, didn't they? ~~They always granted the request.~~ A. Beg pardon?

Q Let me put it this way. There never was a case when the Chinese authorities refused to grant a request of the Japanese Foreign Office, was there? A. There certainly have been many cases in which they

refused ~~to grant~~ a request from the Japanese. In that case there were negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese and they reached some conclusion.

Q There were always negotiations? A. Yes.

Q In other words, if the Chinese authorities refused a request from the Japanese Foreign Office, the Japanese authorities would see to it that formal negotiations were had, is that what you mean?

A. Yes, these negotiations were on a different level - if it was an important matter negotiations were made in Nanking but if it is a matter of minor importance negotiations were then held locally. The negotiations were sometimes difficult and the Chinese were not always so easy to handle.

Q That is about all I can think of right now - A. I am sorry

I cannot give you concrete information but I am always at your disposal at any time I can come again if you need me.

INTERROGATION OF MR. YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi

Interrogator: Mr. R. Elliott
Interpreter: Mr. R. Kawashima
Stenographer: Miss B. Donnell

Q What is your full name?

A YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi.

Q What is your present address?

A No. 9, 3 Chome, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo.

Q What is your business?

A I am President of a very little furniture repair factory and making of small machinery. The name of the company is Yamamoto Seisakysato.

Q When and where were you born?

A In 1889, Yamaguchi Prefecture.

Q Do you have a telephone?

A Yes, the number is 4617, Setagaya.

Q In brief, what is your education?

A I studied in Shanghai, Tang Wen College. After that I passed the Japanese High Civil State Examination.

Q Did you study political science?

A Yes.

Q Give us a brief resume of your government service.

A In 1920 I was appointed Secretary to the Foreign Office. In 1926 I was appointed the Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Turkey. After that I returned to the Foreign Office and was again Secretary to that office. This was in 1927. In 1930 I was appointed Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in London. In 1934 I was Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Shenyang, Manchukuo. In 1938, Secretary of the Foreign Office and Chief of the 5th Section, Investigation Bureau. In 1939 I was the Director of Bureau; In 1940 Director of the Asiatic Bureau and concurrently Director of the American Bureau. In 1942 I was the Vice Minister of the Foreign Office and also in 1942 Vice Minister of the Greater East Asia Ministry. In 1944 I was Ambassador to Siam, retiring from that position in 1946.

Q You became Vice-Minister of the GEA Ministry from the date it was first formed, is that right?

A Yes, it was the first part of November 1942.

Q That was under AOKI?

A Yes.

Q Have you communicated with AOKI recently?

A No, not recently. Not since I left Tokyo four years ago for Bangkok.

Q How was it first decided that Japan would import laborers from China?

A I have no exact memory, but I think it was just after the GEA was established. Prior to this, a Cabinet Planning Board had been concerned with the entrance of Chinese laborers. But at that time I had no connection with this matter.

Q The exact date is 27 November 1942.

A Yes.

Q Who was it who drafted the original policy? Or what Ministry submitted the policy to the Planning Board?

A The Planning Board itself took the initiative. I believe before the GEA was established, there was a planning Board, called the China Affairs Planning Board, which took charge of the Chinese recruitment of laborers.

Q Under what Ministry did this Chinese Affairs Board come? Was it within the Planning Board or one of the Ministries?

A The China Affairs Board was included in the GEA Ministry after it was formed.

Q Did they request the Planning Board to draft a policy on this to submit to the Cabinet for decision?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q Who was in charge of the China Affairs Board regarding Chinese laborers.

A First it was the China Affairs Bureau.

Q The China Affairs Bureau in GEA?

A Yes, they were in charge but the responsibility was with the Ministry.

Q The question is, who was in charge of the China Affairs Board.

A Mr. SUZUKI, Teiichi.

Q You say he was in charge of the China Affairs Board?

A Yes.

Q I thought you said that the China Affairs Board was within the GEA Ministry?

A The Board was first an independent office, but when the GEA Ministry was established it was abolished and its activities of recruiting Chinese laborers for Japan was taken over by the China Affairs Bureau in the GEA Ministry.

Q When the China Affairs Board became the China Affairs Bureau in the GEA Ministry, who was in charge of that Bureau?

A The Chief of the China Affairs Bureau was USAMI, Uzuhiro.

Q Was USAMI's office located here in Tokyo or in Shanghai?

A He was in Tokyo. He had a position in the China Affairs Board prior to his entering the China Affairs Bureau.

Q Do you know where Mr. USAMI is now?

A He is in Tokyo now but I do not know his address.

Q What does he do now.

A His job is not connected with the Government.

Q When did you first learn of the policy to draft Chinese laborers and just what did you have to do with it as Vice Minister?

A I learned of it at the end of November 1942 after the Cabinet decision to bring in Chinese laborers. I had, as Vice Minister of GEA, my own policy to the problem: 1) that since we were bringing in foreign nationals we should only take persons who were willing to come; 2) we should handle these Chinese on an equal basis with the Japanese laborers, and not force them to do hard labor.

- Q What were the GEA Ministry's responsibilities as to procurement of Chinese laborers?
- A The GEA Ministry only had authority to supervise the persons who were in charge of getting laborers, if such persons were Japanese. If they were Chinese, the GEA had no authority. At that time there was a Labor Association in North China which was under control of the North China Government, and we had no authority concerning that association.
- Q As a matter of fact, didn't the North China Labor Association take its orders from the GEA Ministry and the Embassy in China?
- A We had no direct contact with the Association in China, but I understand that the Japanese Embassy and Consulate very often had contact with the Japanese Army and Chinese government.
- Q Didn't the GEA Ministry have control over the consulate officers in China?
- A Yes.
- Q Didn't the Consulate offices have charge of the North China Labor Association.
- A No, they did not.
- Q How else was Chinese labor procured other than through the North China Labor Association?
- A I do not remember exactly, but I do recall that in either 1943 or 1944 there was a Japanese establishment in Shanghai. I do not know the name of the man in charge.
- Q Are you speaking of Mr. ITO?
- A I do not remember the name, but there was one association in Shanghai, under the control of GEA.
- Q How many laborers were imported from the Shanghai area?
- A I don't remember the number of laborers, but there were not many.
- Q You mean a small percentage?
- A There were several hundred.
- Q Where was the headquarters for the procurement of laborers in South China?
- A Do you mean around Canton?
- Q Yes, wasn't there a labor office in Canton?
- A I do not remember at all, but I don't believe there was any importation of labor from southern China.
- Q As a matter of fact, wasn't the North China Labor Association an organ set up by the Japanese consul in Peiping?
- A In North China there was a labor association already established by the Chinese so there was no necessity of establishing any Japanese organ.
- Q Actually, the North China Labor Association was established a year or so before for the purpose of recruiting laborers to go to Manchuria, isn't that correct?
- A I do not remember exactly, but Chinese laborers were imported into Manchuria.

Q The North China Labor Association was really operated by the Japanese; there were labor quotas which the Japanese demanded to be filled (and followed an explanation of this), is this not correct?

A Most of which you have told me is quite new to me. It happened so long ago that I don't remember all of the details, but I know that North China was under the control of the Japanese Army and some times they did carry out extreme acts. I do not remember exactly when it was I sent instructions to the Japanese Embassy and Consulate saying that they must handle this question very fairly and there should not be any extreme acts.

Q Yes, I heard that you did this, but that was as a result of getting information that these laborers were being forced to come to Japan, wasn't it?

A My subordinate gave me the information saying that laborers were being forced to go to Japan. When I learned this I discussed the matter with Minister AOKI and issued an order saying that extreme acts were disallowed.

Q Mr. YAMAMOTO, as I understand it, you received information that the Chinese laborers were not being properly procured and that they were being forced to come to Japan; and you sent an order that such practices should cease, is that correct?

A Yes. The order was issued from the Minister of the GEA.

Q So then, AOKI also heard of this situation?

A Yes.

Q Just what did you hear?

A I do not remember exactly what it was, but I heard that the procedure taken in getting laborers was not a proper one.

Q Did you hear what that procedure was?

A I heard about various things which should not have been done, committed by persons in charge of recruiting laborers.

Q What for example?

A That I don't remember.

Q Did you investigate?

A My subordinate investigated and sent me the report, and after reading this report I issued an order, after talking it over with the Minister.

Q Which subordinate sent you this report?

A TAKEUCHI, Shimpei, Chief of the General Affairs Bureau.

Q Will you tell us, as well as you can recall, what this report contained?

A TAKEUCHI had heard that forceful recruiting had been done; that demands and request of the laborers were not being accepted; and that the conditions of shipping of the laborers to Japan was very bad. This report did not cover the situation as a whole, but instances here and there. Mr. TAKEUCHI had received an investigation from his subordinate.

Q Who was Mr. TAKEUCHI's subordinate who investigated this?

A AICHI, Kiichi, Chief of the Economic Section, General Affairs Bureau.

(Interrogation of Mr. Yamamoto, Con'd)

Q You say Mr. AICHI investigated this?

A I believe so.

Q Do you know where Mr. AICHI is now?

A He is working at the Finance Ministry.

Q When did you last see him?

A I met him several months ago.

Q Hasn't AICHI communicated with you within the last two weeks?

A No.

Q Where is Mr. TAKEUCHI now?

A He died three years ago.

Q Did you know Mr. SUGIHARA?

A Yes.

Q What was his position at that time?

A He was Chief of the General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau, GEA and after that he was transferred to become Director of the China Affairs Bureau. After that he was promoted to become Chief of the China Affairs Bureau. That was about February or March of 1944.

PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF ISHIKAWA, Shingo

1 October 1948

Present address: Setagaya Ward, Setagaya-cho, 4-chome, No.414.

Home telephone : Setagaya 3507

Present occupation: Manufacturer of roofing materials.

Born: January 1, 1894 at Yamaguchi City, Yamaguchi Prefecture.

Marital status: Married and has three children.

Education: Entered the Naval Academy in September, 1911; was graduated and appointed Midshipman in 1914. Since that time he has been on active duty with the Navy, and also concurrently on several Government posts until relieved from active duty September, 1945. He was retired as Rear Admiral. He became Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Mobilization Bureau in the Munitions Ministry 1 November 1943 and served in this capacity until October, 1944.

Questions by Mr. Elliott:

- Q Mr. ISHIKAWA, tell us how you first became acquainted with the China labor situation.
- A In 1944 the coal mining industry was very short of labor, and since at this time no labor could be acquired in Japan proper, I think the Mobilization Section started the plan to make preparation for the importing of labor from China since there was no other source. This came up to me since I had to do the liaison with the other ministries concerned. I believe this is the first time this problem of Chinese labor came up to me. I do not know how this problem was originated, but from what I know of the organization of the ministry with which I was connected, I think this was the reason why I came to know about this Chinese labor problem.
- Q Do you know whose idea it was in the first place to import Chinese labor?
- A I do not know who started this plan, but as the situation was in 1944, anybody would have no other place to go except China for labor.
- Q Who would have to approve any plan for importation of Chinese labor?
- A The real say-so power was held by the Army at that time. They had to OK the matter before anything could be done and organizations like the GEA Ministry would do the work after the decision was made.
- Q Would a decision like that require approval of the Cabinet - sanction from the Cabinet?
- A Yes, it would have to be sanctioned by the Cabinet decision, and I believe the GEA Ministry must have brought out this plan for discussion and decision.
- Q Now, was it the GEA Ministry or was it the Welfare Ministry?
- A Yes, the Welfare Ministry would have a lot to do in that kind of matter, although I am not sure who sponsored the plan, but it would be either one of these ministries, or jointly.

- Q Do you know when the first Chinese labor was imported to Japan?
 A I do not know when the first laborers were brought into Japan. I have heard of the plan but what happened as to the details, I have no idea. The recruiting and bringing in of Chinese laborers would be the work of the Army and GEA Ministries, and after they came to Japan, looking after these laborers would come under the Welfare Ministry and the Home Ministry.
- Q Now, the North and Central part of China were not under the Army at that time, were they?
 A You may say so, but actually they had jurisdiction over all these areas.
- Q Was it the Army or the GEA Ministry?
 A As to the set-up, the organization of the GEA would be in charge of the matters not concerning land affairs, but the actual fact was that the Army had the last say and sole power on all matters.
- Q Was KISHI the Vice-Minister of the Ministry while you were serving in it?
 A Yes.
- Q He was also acting Minister, was he not?
 A Mr. KISHI was, besides Vice-Minister, a State Minister without portfolio, but there was a Minister of Munitions?
- Q That was TOJO, was it not?
 A Yes, at first it was TOJO, and later FUJIWARA, Ginjiro.
- Q Mr. ISHIKAWA, trace the chain of command from you as Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Mobilization Bureau, upward to the Minister.
 A My immediate superior was the Chief of the General Mobilization Bureau; he would be directly responsible to the Vice-Minister and Minister.
- Q Then you were only two steps from the top?
 A Yes, that is right.
- Q I believe you told us awhile ago that you acted as liaison with the other Ministries where the Chinese labor problem was concerned, is that correct?
 A Yes, since liaison was one of the duties of this General Affairs Section, it must have been done through my section.
- Q Just what were your duties or the duties of your Section as far as liaison was concerned -- just what actually did they do?
 A Liaison would be done if it were a minor matter by telephone, or call in at various sections concerned, of other ministries to look over the problem under consideration, and it would be taken over by the section that would have the most responsibility.
- Q What sort of problems did you have - what were the problems and how did they come to your section in the first place - concerning Chinese labor?
 A I do not remember if there were documents concerning Chinese labor at that time, but this plan of brought-in labor from China to ease the labor situation in Japan would be planned by the Mobilization Section of our Bureau. The question may have come from the Coal Bureau, which was one of the bureaus of this ministry.
- Q What industries did the Munitions Ministry have charge of?
 A The bureaus under the Munitions Ministry were: The Fuel Bureau; the Light Metal Bureau; Iron and Steel Bureau; Chemical Bureau; Machine Bureau; Electric Power Bureau; Air Munitions Bureau, concerning all levels of airplanes of both Army and Navy; and, of course, there was this General Mobilization Bureau.
- Q All these other bureaus, the industrial bureaus, were under the Mobilization Bureau, were they not?
 A No, they were on equal status with the General Mobilization Bureau.