

Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, on 11 February 1946, pages 63 and 64:

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"Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you first discussed the matter with SHIRATORI.

"A. I first met SHIRATORI at San Remo, Italy, in January 1939. We had arranged to meet at some pleasant spot in order to talk over the progress in the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.

* * * * *

"Q. General, this meeting with SHIRATORI in Italy took place very soon after your return from Italy to Berlin, that is correct, is it not?

"A. It was not much over two or three weeks.

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(And on pages 65 to 68):

"Q. General, can you tell us when the ITO Commission left Tokyo enroute to Berlin?

"A. They must have left about the beginning of January, as they came by a fast Italian ship and it takes about four weeks, so that it would follow that it would be the beginning of January, as they arrived in Berlin early in February.

"Q. And it would also follow that that was after you had been to Italy and had been unsuccessful in persuading the Italian Government to come along and join in the Tripartite Pact?

"A. Yes, that is correct.

"Q. And while that Commission was enroute to Berlin they stopped in Italy?

"A. Yes, on the road.

"Q. And while they were in Italy they discussed this matter with the Italian Government and also with Ambassador SHIRATORI, is not that correct?

"A. No. They did not speak with the Italian Government - only with SHIRATORI. The events chronologically are more or less as follows: I went to Rome, then later after SHIRATORI arrived, we met at San Remo and discussed the Tripartite Pact. Later, after the ITO Commission arrived in Berlin SHIRATORI came there to speak to me again.

"Q. What was the reason for stopping three or four days in Italy to talk with SHIRATORI when immediately upon the arrival of the Commission in Berlin they had SHIRATORI come up to Berlin to talk about it. Why could not this all have been done in one place?

"A. I believe he ^{had} wished to hear further details, as the ITO Commission only spent three or four days in Italy on the first meeting.

"Q. General, as a matter of fact this Commission called on SHIRATORI for the same purpose as they called on you, to make it clear to both SHIRATORI and to you exactly what the Japanese Government in Tokyo would do; how far they would go or not go, is that not true?

- "A. That is correct. I intended to speak to you a little more on this point and if you will permit me to continue my narrative, it will come out, but perhaps you would wish me to tell you about this particular matter now.
- "Q. I was about to suggest that you proceed with your narrative from the point at which we left off at the last meeting, but I think it would be helpful if you would make such comments now with respect to this particular matter just referred to, as you care to make.
- "A. As you asked me the other day what the ITO Commission had come for I thought it over and tried to recollect what the communication from Japan stated relative to sending this Commission. As I remember it, the main reason given was that there would be danger of a leak if communications were continued and it would be best to send spokesmen. Of course, later, I heard rumors, which I can not say are either right or wrong, but which you may also have heard, so that I wish to pass them on to you. They were in effect that this Commission had come to make very clear to SHIRATORI and myself the Japanese Government's changed stand upon the Tripartite Pact. Of course, they did not say that this was the reason in talking to me, but I repeat I have heard rumors to this effect.
- "Q. General, tell us a little bit more about how and where you heard those rumors, where they came from?
- "A. I heard of these matters from some of my subordinates who had probably received the rumor in the mails from Japan - from their friends in the Foreign Office, or their family, or something - I do not know exactly from whom.
- "Q. Why do you call them rumors if they emanated from Japan?
- "A. There was nothing on the surface and nothing official, so that they would have to be called rumors.
- "Q. You call them rumors then because you were not officially told of these things?
- "A. Of course, I wondered why in answer to a simple telegram they would send three men, but the official reason given was that it was a security measure. Your questioning me upon this point is quite natural, as it does seem strange, but I can only say that I know nothing beyond these rumors that I just related.
- "Q. General, it is a fact, is it not, that the views of Mr. SHIRATORI and the views of yourself with respect to this proposed pact at this stage of the negotiations were somewhat different from the views of your Government in Japan?
- "A. No, I would not say that our views were different from the Government; rather it would appear that the Government's ideas changed about the time they sent the ITO Commission.
- "Q. That is my point, General, the Government in Tokyo had changed somewhat in its views, but you two gentlemen, one in Italy and one in Berlin, there where you were in communication with those Governments constantly, your views did not change automatically with the change in Tokyo; as a matter of fact you did not even know about it until ITO arrived, did you?

- "A. We knew of the fact that they wished Russia to be the prime object and all other countries secondary, but we did not know of the point being brought up that other countries would only be included if their Governments became Communistic, until the ITO Commission arrived.
- "Q. So that actually the Ambassadors in Italy and Germany from Japan were more enthusiastic for the views that had been advanced by RIBBENTROP, because you had been working along that line all this time?
- "A. I would not say it was any specific individual's ideas, as up to that time we had been working on the premise that the pact was to be concluded naming Russia as the principal object and other countries as secondary, and details were to be left until later.
- "Q. So that then when your Government in Japan changed its position they sent the ITO Commission over to make it clear to SHIRATORI and to yourself of this changed position so that you would not go too far in your suggestions to RIBBENTROP and to MUSSOLINI, is not that correct?
- "A. I would not say that they were sent so as to be a check on us, for up until this time we had been working as the Government desired - that is to say on this point of naming Russia as the principal object and the other countries as secondary. It is only later, as I told you, through rumor that I heard that the real reason the ITO Commission came was to make clear the change of views of the Japanese Government.
- "Q. There was no rumor about the fact that the ITO Commission made it clear to you, General, and to SHIRATORI of the changed attitude of the Government in Tokyo?
- "A. The ITO Commission never stated that these were the changed views of the Government, but that these had been the Government's views all along.
- "Q. And those views were somewhat different than the course Ambassador OSHIMA and Ambassador SHIRATORI had been pursuing, for you, the two Ambassadors had been concerned with Russia as the prime object and the other nations as secondary objects without any reference to Communism in so far as the secondary nations are concerned. Now it is changed?
- "A. Essentially, my point is that was this a change that had taken place then or had the Japanese Government always held these views? Officially, there had been no change; it was only that I felt that this was a point that had not been brought up before, so, weighing all the rumors and my own thoughts on the matter I reached the conclusion that it must have been a change.
- "Q. So that in fact, General, ITO and his associates brought with them to you and to Ambassador SHIRATORI the then views of your Government and said that you must work within these views?
- "A. That is correct.

* * * * *

Interrogation of 12 February 1946, pages 74 and 75:

- "Q. General, if I understood you correctly yesterday when we were discussing the time RIBBENTROP mentioned to you the idea that Germany might seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at HITLER's birthday party, you stated that you had also received information regarding that matter from your intelligence sources. Now tell us, if when you received this information from your intelligence sources, which I assume was before RIBBENTROP told you about it, you communicated the information to your Foreign Office in Tokyo?
- "A. The information that I said I received from intelligence sources was not concrete at all and was simply rumors which abounded around Berlin at the time that Germany and the U.S.S.R. were entering into negotiations regarding an economic pact (trade pact). These rumors I did not pass on to my Government in Tokyo. Further, I wish to make it clear that when RIBBENTROP spoke to me at the time of a party in celebration of HITLER's birthday, which was held at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin, RIBBENTROP did not state that he was entering into negotiations with Russia. When he spoke to SHIRATORI and me around one or two A.M. in the morning following the party, he said that if the matter of a pact between Germany and Japan continued in the stage of talks for too long a period it might become necessary for Germany to clasp hands with Russia in one way or another. That was all.
- "Q. General, I understood you to say yesterday that RIBBENTROP was very definite in stating that it might become necessary to seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at the time of this party.
- "A. Yes, he did say non-aggression pact."

* * * * *

Doc. 2157 Evid.

Folder 1

(2/11)

問、君ハ秘密協定ニ就イテ我々ニ語シテキタ。
 ソシテ君ハ其レガ防共協定ガ結バレタ際ニ、
 日獨間ニ調印サレタコトニ語イテ可ナリ良ク
 我々ニ陳述シテキタト私ハ思フ。
 尙私ハ其レト同時ニ或ハ其ノ前後ニ日獨間ニ
 結バレタコトニ語シテ君ガ我々ニ未ダ語シテ
 イナイ、何カ他ノ秘密諒解事項ガ有ルノデハ
 ナイカト思ツテキル。

答、條約ニ關シテデハナク、此ノ點ニ關シテ若干
 申上ゲタイコトガアリマス。尙何カ特ニ疑問
 ガアリマシタラ遠慮ナクオツシヤツテ下サイ。
 私ガ申上ゲタヤウニ、昭和一一年（一九三六
 年）ニハ、秘密協定ト防共協定ハ完成シテ居
 リマシタ。此ニ續イテ昭和一二年（一九三七
 年）ニハ秘密協定ハ無カツタガ、ドイツ陸軍
 ト日本陸軍トハロシヤノ陸軍ニ關スル情報ノ
 交換ヲ協定シマシタ。此ニ關シテ此迄ニホン
 ノ少シデハアルガ利用シテヲリ、ワルソーヤ
 バリノヤウナ場所デ接續シテキタ白系ロシヤ
 人ノ利用ノ強化ヲ決定シマシタ。此等ノ審議
 ガナサレタ時——私ハ昭和一三年（一九三
 八年）ノ九月カ十月ダツタト思ヒマスガ——
 文書ノ形式ノ協定ハアリマセンゴシタ。獨露
 不可侵協定ノ調印ヲ以テ此ノヤウナ活動ハス

2157B-2

ベテ一時停止シマシタ。
此等ノ事ハ義務的ナ協定デハナクテ、寧口覺書
ノ形式デアリマシタ。

(大島浩ノ訪問、昭和二十二年(一九四六年)二月四日、三二頁)

2157D-

一九四六・二月二十六日

大島浩ノ訊問

(抜萃)

同、大將、此等ノ事柄ニ關シテ訊ネ致シ度イ問題
ガアリマスガ暫ク之等ヲ延期シテ貴方ノ陳述
ヲ進メテ下サイ

答、單獨和平締結協定ハ一九四一年（昭和十六
年）十二月一日又ハ二日頃ニ亘リ日本政府ヨ
リ私宛電報ニヨツテ初メテ進展シマシタ。右
電報ノ要旨ハ次ノ如クデアリマシタ、即チ日
本政府ハ日米紛争ノ場合ニハ此ノ戦争ニ獨逸
ノ参加ヲ希望シマシタ。又日本政府ハ單獨
和平締結協定ガ調印サレルコトヲ希望シマ
シタ。此ノ件ニ關シ私ハ、デイトリツヒト云
フ男デライヒス新聞ノ社長（ゲツベルス宣
傳相ノ下ニアル獨逸新聞ノ社長）カラ日米紛
争ガ開始サレタ場合ニハヒットラーハ紛争
ニ参加スル事ニ賛成ナル旨ヲ聞イタノデ其ノ
ニユースヲ日本ニ送達シマシタ。此ノ情報ニ
基イテ日本政府ハ日米紛争ノ場合ニハ獨逸ノ
介入ニ關シ私ヲヒットラーニ交渉サセル様
希望スル旨此ノ私宛ノ電報ニ於イテ述べマシ
タ。

X X X

2157A-2.

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）二月二十七日

大島浩ノ訊問

問、大將、昨日貴方が止メタ所ヨリ陳述ヲ願ヒマス

答、陳述ヲ更ニ進メル前ニ此件ヲ明確ニ致シマセウ

米日合談が殆んど開始シテ以來私ハ日本政府ヨリ右ノ経過ニ關スル情報モ、ソヴェート關係情報モ全ク受取りマセシタ。是ノ主ナ原因ハ此ノ種ノ情報ノ送達ニハ以前ハ傳達者ヲ利用シテ居タノガ爲・ソ戦ニヨル困難ノ爲メニ是レモ不可能トナリマシタ。ソコデ秘密保持上此種ノ通信モ送ラレナクナツタノダト思ヒマス。一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十九日カ三十日頃ニ、日本ノ申入レニ對スルハル國務長官ノ十一月二十六日ノ回答ハ極度ニ苛酷ナ語調デアツタトノ意味ノ知ラセヲ日本ヨリ受取りマシタ。交渉ガドンナ内容ヲ網羅シテ居ツタカ多クヲ知リマセンノト此レガ私が受取ツタ米日交渉ニ關スル最初ノ通信デアツタノデ情勢ノ分析ヲ行フ事ハ出來マセシタ。其後十一月ノ末頃カ或ハ十二月ノホンノ初メ頃ト思ヒマスガ私ハ日本政府ガ米國合衆國內ノソノ領事ニ極少部分ノ暗號帳

2157A-3

ノ外ハ凡テヲ焼却スベシト云フ命令ヲ出シタ
ト云フ意味ノ通信ヲ受取りマシタ

問、總テ此等ノ電報ハ外務省カラ來タノデスカ

答、ソウデス、私ガ前ニオ話シタ單獨和平不締結
協定ニ關スル政府ノ訓令以前ニ私ガ入手シタ
二ツノ通信ガ是デアリマシタ

問、昨日貴方言及シタ一九四一年（昭和十六年）
十二月一日カ二日ニ受取ツタ此ノ通信モ亦外
務省カラ來タノデシタカ

答、單獨和平不締結交渉ニ關スル之ノ電報ガ暗號
帳ヲ燒却スベシト命ジタ事ヲ私ニ知ラセタモ
ノヨリ前デアツタカ、後デアツタカ全ク確カ
デアリマセン

兎角私ノ日付ニハ一兩日ノ隔リガアルカモ知
レマセン。單獨和平不締結ニ關スル此ノ電報
ハ十二月三日頃デアツタ様ナ氣ガ致シマス
私ハ此ノ日付ノ件ヲ明ラカニ致シ度イト思ヒ
マス

問、外務省ヨリ貴方ガ受取ツタ此等ノ電報及通信
ハ皆 松岡ノ署名ガアリマシタカ、ドイデスネ

答、松岡ハ其ノ當時最早外務大臣デアリマセン

21578-4

デシタ。署名ガ有ツタカ無カツタカハ兎ニ角
是等ノ總テノ電報ハ外務省カラ來マシタ。此
時ノ外務大臣ハ東郷デアリマシタ

Document No
2157-B

RUSH

EXCERPTS FROM INTERROGATION OF

Translated by Sada Sueta
Checked by T. Fujimoto
Gen OSHIKI 4/Feb/46
(pages 31-32)

P. 31

大島浩大使ノ訊問 一九四六年二月四日
貴方ハ伊太利ノ~~英~~英~~共~~共~~産~~産~~同~~同盟~~加入ニ伴フ~~事情ヲ

♀

知ツテ居リマスカ。ト云フハ、誰ガ誰ニ對シテ提案シタノテアルカヲ知リタムノテス。

答A. 如何ナル事情カ私ハハツキリ知リマセン。只ソノ條約ガ

成立スルニハ 独伊兩國間ニ對談が行ハレタコトト

信ジマス。

(三頁)

ソノ時~~ニハ~~ノ件ハ私~~ハ~~關係~~外ニアツタモノナシ~~

スカラ。私ハソノ條約ニ伊太利ガ加入スル様~~独逸側~~

カラ話カアツタコトヲ思出ストイフコトヲ申

上ゲラレルダケデアリマス。

問 貴方ハ~~私共ニ~~秘密條約ニ関シテオ話し下サシマシタガ、大妻又ヨク

シテ~~私ハ~~貴方ガ~~私共ニ~~友~~共~~共~~産~~産~~同~~同盟カ

説明シテ下サツト思ヒマス

締結サレタ當時、日独兩國間ニ於テ署名ナシ

事柄ニ関シテカオリヨリ説明シテ下サツト思ヒマス。

其ノ外ニ未知我々ニオシテシニツテナシ。

サテ、私ハ貴方カ私共ニオシテ他ノ締結

其ノ際

密約カ、或ハ其項、日独間ニ締結

ハイリマスマイカ。

カカテ、疑問ニ思ヒマス。

答條約ハアリマセン。然シテ、莫ニ関シ私ハ

多ク事カアリマス。

申上テ、テ若シ特殊ノ質問カアリマ

シテラ私ノ話ヲ遮ツテ下サイ。既ニ申上

シテ様ニ一九三六年ニ秘密協定ト防共協定

カ成立シマシタ。之ニ引續キ、一九三七年ニハ秘

條約

密約等ハアリマセンデシタガ、日独兩國

露軍ニワイテハ ~~謀報ヲ~~ 謀報ヲ供給シ合フコト ~~同~~ 同

是ニ關シ白系露人ノ使用ヲ強

意ニシマシタ。 ~~中~~ 中件ニ關シテハ又トセシム

化スル事ニ決定シタガ既ニホシム

使用サレテワルルコトハ等ノ地トテ接觸 ~~サレテ~~

自由軍露人ノ使用ヲ強化スルコトヲ決

ニワイテハ何モ書イタ協定文等ハ

アリマセシメタ。 コノ様ナ議論が起ワタハ九

月カ十月クワタト記接シテオマス。 独

不可侵條約ノ署名ニ ~~之~~ 之等ノ活動ハ比日

一時 ~~中止~~ 中止イタシマシタ。 之等 ~~ノ~~ 義

務的ニ協定デハナク ~~覺~~ 覺書ノ様ナ

形ノモノデシタ。 2

Doc 2157 1

Translated by
HATATE, Khei

一九四六年二月二十六日

大島浩ノ訊問

2157D
J. P. ...
K. ...

問 大將、此等ノ^{事柄}問題ニ関シテオ訊ネ致ス度イ^題尋問^カアリマス

ガ暫ク之等ヲ延期ニテ貴方ノ陳述ヲ進メテ下サイ。

答 單獨和平不締結協定ハ、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月

一日^{又ハ}及二日^頃ニ亘リ日本政府ヨリ私宛電報ニヨツテ初メテ

進展シマシタ。右電報ノ要旨ハ如クデアリマシタ。即チ

日本政府ハ日米紛争ノ場合ニハ此ノ戦争ニ独乙ノ参加ヲ

希望シマシタ。又日本政府ハ單獨和平不締結協定ガ

調印サレルユトヲ希望シマシタ。此ノ件ニ関シ私ハ「デイトリツヒ

ト云フ男」ライヒス新聞ノ社長(ゲツパルス)宣傳相

ノ下ニアル「独乙新国ノ社長」カテ「日米紛争ガ開始」

Doc 2157

場合ニハ ヒットラーハ 喜望ニテ 紛争ニ参加スル旨ヲ聞イタ

申ニ積成ナリ

ノデ其ノニユスタヲ日本ニ送達シマシタ。此ノ情報ニ基イテ日本

政府ハ米日紛争ノ場合ニハ独乙ノ介入ニ関スル私ヲヒットラー

ニ交渉サセル様ヲ希望スル旨此ノ私宛ノ電報ニ於ケテ

述バマシタ。

x x x

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)二月二十七日 大島浩ノ訊問

閣 大將、昨日貴方ガ止メタ所ヨリ 陳述ヲ款ヒマス。

答 陳述ヲ更ニ進ム前ニ此件ヲ明確ニ致シマセウ。

米日會談ガ殆ント開始シテ以來私ハ日本政府ヨリ

右ノ経過ニ関スル情報モ、ソヴエート關係情報モ

全ク受取りマセンデレタ。是ノ主ノ原因ハ此ノ種ノ情報ノ

送達ニハ以前ハ傳達者ヲ利用シテ居タノが独ノ戦ニ

ヨル困難ノ為メニ是レモ不可能トナリマシタ。^{ソコデ}秘密保持上此種ノ

交通^信モ送ラレナクナツタノダト思ヒマス。一九四一年(昭和十六年)

十一月二十九日カ三十日吹ニ日本ノ申入ニ対スルハル國務長官

ノ十一月二十六日ノ回答ハ極度ニ苛酷+詰調デアツタトノ意味

ノ知ラセヲ日本ヨリ受取りマシタ。交渉がトシテ内容ヲ細目

シテ居ウタカ多クヲ知リマセン^ト。此ノ^トが私が受取ウタ米日

交渉ニ関スル。最初ノ通信デアツタノデ情勢ノ分析ヲ行フ事ハ

出来マセンデレタ。其後、十一月ノ末吹カ或ハ十二月ノ初

メ知リ思ヒマスが私ハ日本政府が米国会衆國ノ領事ニ

極少部方ノ暗号帳ノ外ハ凡テヲ燒却スベシト云フ

命令ヲ出シタト云フ意味ノ通信ヲ受取りマシタ。

問 總テ此等ノ電報ハ外務省カラ来タノデスカ。

答 ソレヲ知ス、私が前ニオ話シタ 單獨取手不締結 協定ニ関スル

政府ノ訓令以前ニ私が入チシタニハ通信カ是レ

アリマシタ。

問 昨日貴方が ^{モロ} 参照シタ 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月一日カニ

ニ受取ツタ此ノ通信モ亦外務省カラ来タハデシタカ。

答 單獨取手不締結交渉ニ関スルノ電報ガ 暗号帳ヲ

燒却スベシト 命ジタ ^{事ヲ知ラセタ} モノヨリ 前デアツタカ、後デアツタカ

全ク確カテアリマセン。

兎角私ノ日付ニハ
一函
報日ノ隔リカアル
カモ知レマセシ
様ヲ思ヒカス

筆独知平不締結ニ関スル此ノ電報ハ 十二月三日付テマツ

夕棟ノ氣ガ 致シマス。 | 私ハ此ノ日付ノ件ヲ 明ラカシ

致シナイト 思ヒマス。

問、 外務省ヨリ 貴方ガ受取ツタ 此等ノ電報及 双葉信ハ

皆 松岡ノ署名ガアリマシタカ。 トーテスネ

答、 松岡ノ其ノ當時 最早外務大臣デハアリマセニテシタ。

署名ガ有ツカ、 五カツタカハ兎ニ角 是等ノ總テノ電報ハ

外務省カラ来マシタ。 此~~時~~時、 外務大臣ハ 東郷デ

アリマシタ。

2157-B

- Q. You have told us about the secret pact and I think you have described it pretty well to us - that was signed between Japan and Germany at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was entered into. Now, I am wondering if there were any other secret understandings you have not told us about that were entered into between Japan and Germany at or about the same time.
- A. Not as treaties, but on this point I would like to tell you some things and if you have any specific questions, please interject them. In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this - I believe it was in September or October 1938 - that these discussions came about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda.

(Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 4 Feb 1946, p. 32)

Handwritten notes at the top right, including a signature and the date "1919".

①

Doc. 2157-6

Translated by you

明治三十八年

問、君ハ秘密協定ニ就イテ我々ニ話シテキタ。私ハ防共協定ガ結バレタ際ニ日獨間ニ調印サレタコトニ就イテ可ナリ良ク我々ニ陳述シテキタト思フ。尚私ハ其レト同時ニ或セハ其ノ前後ニ日獨間ニ結バレタコトニ關シテ君ガ我々ニ來ダ話シテナイ、何カ他ノ秘密諒解事項ガ有ルノデハナイカト思ツテヤル。

答、條約ニ關シテダテハナク、此ノ桌ニ關シテ

若干申上ゲタイコトガアリマス。尚何カ特ニ疑問ガアリマシラオツシヤツテ下サイ。

私が申上ゲタヤウニ、昭和二年（一九三六年）ニハ、

2157-6

(2)

秘密協定ト防共協定ハ完備シテ居リマシク

此ニ續イテ昭和一二年(一九三七年)ニハ秘密

協定ハ無カッタガ、ドイツ陸軍ト日本陸軍トハ

ロシヤノ^{陸軍}完備ニ関スル情報ノ交換ヲ協定シ

マシク。此ニ関シテ此迄ニホシノ少レデハアルガ

利用シテヨリ、ワルソーヤパリノヤウナ場所ヲ

接觸シテキタ。白系ロシヤ人ノ利用ノ強化ヲ

決定シマシク。此等ノ審議ガナサレタ時

私ハ昭和一三年(一九三八年)ノ九月カ十月

ダツタト思ヒマスガ
文書
正
協定ハアリ

マセンデシク。獨露不可侵協定ノ調印ヲ以テ

2157-6

(2)

此ノヤウナ活動ハスベテ一時停止シマシタ。

此等ノ事ハ義務的十協定デハナクテ、寧ニ

覺書ノ形式デアリマシタ。

(大島浩ノ訊問、昭和二十一年(一九四六年)二月四日、三二頁)

Document 2157C, Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, on 11 February 1946,
pages 63 and 64:

* * *

"Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you first discussed the matter with SHIRATORI.

"A. I first met SHIRATORI at San Remo, Italy, in January 1939. We had arranged to meet at some pleasant spot in order to talk over the progress in the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.

* * *

"Q. General, this meeting with SHIRATORI in Italy took place very soon after your return from Italy to Berlin, that is correct, is it not?

"A. It was not much over two or three weeks.

* * *

(And on pages 65 to 68):

"Q. General, can you tell us when the ITO Commission left Tokyo enroute to Berlin?

"A. They must have left about the beginning of January, as they came by a fast Italian ship and it takes about four weeks, so that it would follow that it would be the beginning of January, as they arrived in Berlin early in February.

"Q. And it would also follow that that was after you had been to Italy and had been unsuccessful in persuading the Italian Government to come along and join in the Tripartite Pact?

- "A. Yes, that is correct.
- "Q. And while that Commission was enroute to Berlin they stopped in Italy?
- "A. Yes, on the road.
- "Q. And while they were in Italy they discussed this matter with the Italian Government and also with Ambassador SHIRATORI, is that correct?
- "A. No. They did not speak with the Italian Government - only with SHIRATORI. The events chronologically are more or less as follows: I went to Rome, then later after SHIRATORI arrived we met at San Remo and discussed the Tripartite Pact. Later, after the ITO Commission arrived in Berlin SHIRATORI came there to speak to me again.
- "Q. What was the reason for stopping three or four days in Italy to talk with SHIRATORI when immediately upon the arrival of the Commission in Berlin they had SHIRATORI come up to Berlin to talk about it. Why could not this all have been done in one place?
- "A. I believe he wished to hear further details, as the ITO Commission had only spent three or four days in Italy on the first meeting.
- "Q. General, as a matter of fact this Commission called on SHIRATORI for the same purpose as they called on you, to make it clear to both SHIRATORI and to you exactly what the Japanese Government in Tokyo would do; how far they would go or not go, is that not true?
- "A. That is correct. I intended to speak to you a little more on this point and if you will permit me to continue my narrative, it will come out, but perhaps you would wish me to tell you about this particular matter now.
- "Q. I was about to suggest that you proceed with your narrative from the point at which we left off at the last meeting, but I think it would be helpful if you would make such comments now with respect to this particular matter just referred to, as you care to make.
- "A. As you asked me the other day what the ITO Commission had come for I thought it over and tried to recollect what the communication from Japan stated relative to sending this Commission. As I remember it, the main reason given was that there would be danger of a leak if communications were continued and it would be best to send spokesmen. Of course, later, I heard rumors, which I can not say are either right or wrong, but which you may also have heard, so that I wish to pass them on to you. They were in effect that this Commission had come to make very clear to SHIRATORI and myself the Japanese Government's changed stand upon the Tripartite Pact. Of course, they did not say that this was the reason in talking to me, but I repeat I have heard rumors to this effect.

- "Q. General, tell us a little bit more about how and where you heard those rumors, where they came from?
- "A. I heard of these matters from some of my subordinates who had probably received the rumor in the mails from Japan - from their friends in the Foreign Office, or their family, or something - I do not know exactly from whom.
- "Q. Why do you call them rumors if they emanated from Japan?
- "A. There was nothing on the surface and nothing official, so that they would have to be called rumors.
- "Q. You call them rumors then because you were not officially told of these things?
- "A. Of course, I wondered why in answer to a simple telegram they would send three men, but the official reason given was that it was a security measure. Your questioning me upon this point is quite natural, as it does seem strange, but I can only say that I know nothing beyond these rumors that I just related.
- "Q. General, it is a fact, is it not, that the views of Mr. SHIRATORI and the views of yourself with respect to this proposed pact at this stage of the negotiations were somewhat different from the views of your Government in Japan?
- "A. No, I would not say that our views were different from the Government; rather it would appear that the Government's ideas changed about the time they sent the ITO Commission.
- "Q. That is my point, General, the Government in Tokyo had changed somewhat in its views, but you two gentlemen, one in Italy and one in Berlin, there where you were in communication with these Governments constantly, your views did not change automatically with the change in Tokyo as a matter of fact you did not even know about it until ITO arrived, did you?
- "A. We know of the fact that they wished Russia to be the prime object and all other countries secondary, but we did not know of the point being brought up that other countries would only be included if their Governments became Communistic, until the ITO Commission arrived.
- "Q. So that actually the Ambassadors in Italy and Germany from Japan were more enthusiastic for the views that had been advanced by RIBBENTROP, because you had been working along that line all this time?
- "A. I would not say it was any specific individual's ideas, as up to that time we had been working on the premise that the pact was to be concluded naming Russia as the principal object and other countries as secondary, and details were to be left until later.

"Q. So that then when your Government in Japan changed its position they sent the ITO Commission over to make it clear to SHIRATORI and to yourself of this changed position so that you would not go too far in your suggestions to RIBBENTROP and to MUSSOLINI, is not that correct?

"A. I would not say that they were sent so as to be a check on us, for up until this time we had been working as the Government desired - that is to say on this point of naming Russia as the principal object and the other countries as secondary. It is only later, as I told you, through rumor that I heard that the real reason the ITO Commission came was to make clear the change of views of the Japanese Government.

"Q. There was no rumor about the fact that the ITO Commission made it clear to you, General, and to SHIRATORI of the changed attitude of the Government in Tokyo?

"A. The ITO Commission never stated that these were the changed views of the Government, but that these had been the Government's views all along.

"Q. And these views were somewhat different than the course Ambassador OSHIMA and Ambassador SHIRATORI had been pursuing, for you, the two Ambassadors had been concerned with Russia as the prime object and the other nations as secondary objects without any reference to Communism in so far as the secondary nations are concerned. Now it is changed?

"A. Essentially, my point is that was this a change that had taken place then or had the Japanese Government always held these views? Officially, there had been no change; it was only that I felt that this was a point that had not been brought up before, so, weighing all the rumors and my own thoughts on the matter I reached the conclusion that it must have been a change.

"Q. So that in fact, General, ITO and his associates brought with them to you and to Ambassador SHIRATORI the then views of your Government and said that you must work within these views?

"A. That is correct.

* * *

~~Document 2157.~~ Interrogation of 12 February 1946, pages 74 and 75:

"Q. General, if I understood you correctly yesterday when we were discussing the time RIBBENTROP mentioned to you the idea that Germany might seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at HITLER's birthday party, you stated that you had also received information regarding that matter from your intelligence sources. Now tell us, if when you received this information from your intelligence sources, which I assume was before RIBBENTROP told you about it, you communicated the information to your Foreign Office in Tokyo?

"A. The information that I said I received from intelligence sources was not concrete at all and was simply rumors which abounded around Berlin at the time that Germany and the U.S.S.R. were entering into negotiations regarding an economic pact (trade pact). These rumors I did not pass on to my Government in Tokyo. Further, I wish to make it clear that when RIBBENTROP spoke to me at the time of a party in celebration of HITLER's birthday, which was held at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin, RIBBENTROP did not state that he was entering into negotiations with Russia. When he spoke to SHIBATORI and me around one or two A.M. in the morning following the party, he said that if the matter of a pact between Germany and Japan continued in the stage of talks for too long a period it might become necessary for Germany to clasp hands with Russia in one way or another. That was all.

"Q. General, I understood you to say yesterday that RIBBENTROP was very definite in stating that it might become necessary to seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at the time of this party.

"A. Yes, he did say non-aggression pact."

* * *

21579e-1

Document No 21579e

Translated by Teikichi YAMAMOTO.

21579e
Office of the Director of the
War Relocation Authority
7/19/46.
(52-11-11)

文書番号ニ一五七〇

大島渡訊問 一九四六年二月廿日

第六三頁、六四頁

問 貴下が白鳥トコノ年ニ孰テ初メテ相談シタ時ノ事情

事情ヲ以テ話レ下サイ

答 昭和一九三九年一月に伊右利ノサレモテ初メテ白鳥トコ

ノ合ワタ、吾々ハ三國同盟ノ交渉ヲ進捗状況ニツイテ

談ル為メアル快送ナ場所ヲ合フ斗ニシタ

問、コノ白鳥トコノ伊右利ノ合ハ貴下が伊右利カウ伯林

ニ帰ラレタ直後ニ行ケシタノ合ハナカワタハテスカ

答 ソレハニ三週 間ヨク多クハ経過シテソノ合マセシメシタ

第六五頁、六六頁



問、貴下は伊勢使節が向伯林、とあり、何日に出発したか

知つて居るか

答、同使節團は、快達、伊右利船で、早タテ約四週間、間カルノ

ころ、彼等が伯林に着いたのは、一月、初メにアツタカ

ソレから推して、早タテ及ツタ、一月、初メにアツタカ

問、ソラス、トソレハ、貴下が伊右利、行々、同國政府、三國協定、

を、おこなう、と、勅メ、タテ、成切、し、カ、ツ、タ、後、ソ、ト、早、タ、ア、ツ、タ、ト、ラ、

事、ト、ナル、テ、ス、カ

答、ソラス、ト、ソ、通、ラ、シ、ス

問、コノ使節團ハ、伯林へ、途、中、伊右利、に、滞在、し、マ、シ、タ、カ

答、ソラス、其、途、中、ト、ス



問、而して彼等の伊右利に滞在本年此年と聞し伊右利政府並に白鳥大使に相談するなり

答、否、彼等の伊右利政府に話せしむれば白鳥の口話せしむる

と云ふ事より日附然るにハ大佐佐藤ノ通リシス 即チ私カ四遊

馬へ行つた、其後白鳥が平と云ふハサレモ合フテ三國

協定ニ就テ相談シタ、其後伊右藤健節團が伯林に

着イタ後、白鳥が再び私に相談するメ、伯林に平タテス

問、白鳥に相談する為メニ三四日間伊右利に滞在シテ居タノコ

健節團が伯林に到着直後白鳥が伯林に来テソノ事

ニ就テ相談スル理カ、何チカアタリシカ、
何故
コレ等ノ相談ハ

了場所ヲ用ガサキヤナカアタリシカ

4

(4)

答、伊藤使節團の最初、今令ノ為メニ、伊右利ノ只之四白鳥

シテ計ラシラカウ白鳥ハ一層減シテ事情ヲ聞キタカクソノ如ク

思ヒマラス

同、安藤ノ處コト使節團ハ本意ノ日モ政府カ切望ノ所

正續ノ即チトノ限、必ズ進ム事ヲソシテ止イ進ムカラサレカト

シラ本々下井ノ白鳥ニ期カシテ知ラセム為メ、同じ使節ノ下

ニ事下及ハ白鳥ノ令ニシテ下ノダトテ解キ同建リアリマセシカ

答、其通りシラス、コノ点ニ就テハ私ラモウサシテ強シ、及イテ思フ

シテ、シラソノ事者シ私ノ設ルテ、繞ル事カ詳サシムルハ、
此レハ大ハ

知れ、~~解~~事々モウ然シテ、多分事下ハコノ点ヲ、今直知、
此レハ大ハ

ライト云ハシルノテモウ

5

(5)

同、初ハコノ前ニ目コカニ折残シテ處カラノ少話ヲ續ケテ頂ク

ヤウニシテイト思フニ是タノシス 然レ今書下カニハ通テ又ハ

考通テコノ特定ノ事ニ就テハ後下サレハ好却今ハ口ト思ヒ

ス

答、先ヨリ不ニタタ伊丹使節團ノ使命ニ就テ此ノ使節ヲ送ル

ニ就テ日カカラノ通信トシラテ軍カ書カシテアツカノ記憶ヲ送ラ

テ考ヘテ見マシメ、私ノ記憶ニ依レハ最モ大ニ理セハ通信ヲ継

續ルニ牛ノ漏洩ノ者後カアツタニ代希者ヲ送ルカハ何止ノコ

法ヲムトシテ事テアリマシメ 勿論其後其ニ不ハ私モ判ラヌ

ノシラカ私ノ噂ヲ耳ニシテ 然レシハ事下ニ聞キナツタカモ知シメト

思ヒマスカラゴニテハ誤シマセウ

嗚呼此侯爵國ハ日暮政府おの國愾定に對する

トト事ヲ白鳥及和の明カニ知るる為メト事ヲト下ララ事ヲ

アツタ 勿論彼等の和ハココが僕余シアツトハハナカラタガ

和ラ事ヲユウシラ事ヲ耳ニシタト事ヲ申上ゲン

問、ソノ事ヲ如何シテ、何處ニ^キカシタカ出處ハ何處ニシラタ

カニツイテモウサレ~~解~~リテサレナイ

答、和ハ此等ノ事ヲ和ノ下^{系ナノ}に條カラ聞タノシス女^達人ハ多クハ日也カ

ラ事ヲ和信テ、和ハ正確ニ何人カラカハ判ラマセヌガ 外語者

ニせん友人カ、家族^ヲカ^ヲち他者カラカニ^カ事ヲ入^レテシタト思

ヒヨク

問、ソレカハ事ヲカ^ラ事ヲカ^ラ何故^ニ事ヲト^シレルテスカ



主裁にナラシムル故メニコミニ自標トナリ得んトシテ本年ニミテ

ナラシムル伊府使節が到着するに依りナカワタ

答レシハ即チ秋迄と伊方利及種送、駐劄を日本国、大使達

ハンノ島と松崎に於てシテ為メリフベト口ワカニ依リ

提出サレシメ意人ニモ増シテ乘リ気シラハト云ワテヨイノカ

同和のソレハトノ特定スル物ノ意人シラハト云ヒマセ又何故ナ

らんちの対出老人ハ一冊在無クモ其ノ目標トシテ持病シト

條約ヲ締結シテ他ノ國ニシテ其ノ義的トシテ其後

通シスルトシテ方針ニシテ其ノシラカク

同、ソコニ日本軍も政府が事進ラシタリシテ其ノ下及ビ

白鳥ガリスズレト口ワカニシテ對シ餘クニ深クシ

後、~~伊藤~~伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

伊藤使節團が中から下及び白鳥三對し、東京政府ノ

11

能く及変更の閣内閣 ~~閣内閣~~ 通知シトシテ梯ノ橋の金ナカワ

タテアリマヌカ

答伊海使部周此事ハ政府ノ意見ノ変更下ニ云クス也

来政府終始其考テアワタトシマシク

内、政府ノ意見ハ大島白鳥兩大使が持テ居ル方針下何カ

相違シテ居タ。即チ兩大使ハ露西並テ予ノ目標トシテ他

ノ諸國ノ間ニ限リ其主義義ハ無関係トシテ我

ニ考テ慮シテ居タガソノ以テガ変更サシメテスカ

後、結局和 ~~事~~ 下シテハ本年ハ右方射ハ概ニタシスルノ

善化シテタカクハ政府ハ概ニ持テ居ルニ意スルシテタカ

トシテ申ス。公式ニ何事ノ変更モナカワタガコト也ガ



(12)

これ迄示サレカフタト感シタ計ヲテス即チ其ノ時ニ鑑ミ

私ガ考テ其處ニシテ終業ソシム言及ノ事又テ其ノ相違

ナイトニテ終論ニ達シタノコト

問 ソレニ事ウケテ伊藤及古一行ニ由リ下及白鳥ノ方使

對シテ其ノ意見ヲ察シ其ノ下達ニコトニ及ルノ公乳用

内ニ行キサレシト云フ事ヲミワタノコトカ

答 ソノ通リテス

× × ×

五十四年一月十日ノ訊問 七四及七五頁

問 昨白以合ヒミテ折リリツベトコトカヒツトテ一証ま日ノ官人云

折、独使ノ語西垂ト不~~可~~得~~ト~~云フ~~コト~~カ

意スル事ト云フコトナク証ニテ其レガ 古ノ時

用始ニ夕トハ云ヒマセシニシタ
リフベトロフガ女羽上日ノ午系

一対ノニ時頃ニ女ノ後ゾ初ト白鳥ト云ヒモ日独同

全リ時同ガ掛ル

協定ノ件ガ交後ニ暇ハ有ルヤラナラバ独逸ニ

テキハキトニ然西無ト云ラ推シ女安メ道ルシカニ知シナイ

ト云フタ、ソレキリテス、

同昨日ノ水話ハリフヘトロフコハソノ旨女ニ折ニ然西無

可侵

ト不~~可~~協定ヲ弦フ事ガ女安メナルカモ知シナイト云ラ

キリテ

此事~~ノ~~様々ニ云ラソ様々伺ヒマシタガ

可侵

答ソラテス、彼ハ不~~可~~協定ト明言シシメ、

× × ×

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2156, 2157

21 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogations of OSHIMA, Hiroshi,
5-7 March 46 and 1 Feb 46

Date: As above Original (x) copy ()
Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: OSHIMA, Hiroshi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Doc. No. 2156. Transcript of original notes on
interrogation of Gen. OSHIMA, Hiroshi by G.O. Hyde and
Capt. Robinson at Sugamo 1 Feb 1946. (Exhibit #271,
Case File #247)

Doc. No. 2157. Transcript of original notes on
the interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 5-7 Mar 1946 by
Mr. Hyde. (Exhibit #455, Case File #247.)

Analyst: Lt. Wilds

Doc. No. 2156
2157

INTERROGATION OF

General Hiroshi OSHIMA (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 4 February 1946, 1000-1150 hours
1355-1600 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hiroshi OSHIMA
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde.

OATH OF INTERPRETER

Mr. Hyde:

"Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding."

Lt. Comdr. Huggins:

"I do."

- Q. General, at the conclusion of our last meeting we were discussing the secret pact entered into between Germany and Japan at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed. I want to discuss that a little more at this time. You stated according to my memory, when Italy became a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, there was no separate secret pact signed with Italy. I mean no separate secret pact, such as was signed by Germany and Japan co-incident with the Comintern Pact.
- A. Not only was Italy not in the pact, but it was not discussed with Italy.
- Q. And by that you mean the secret pact?
- A. Yes.

#2157-B

OSHIMA Hiroshi 2/4/46

- Q. Who was the Japanese Ambassador to Germany at the time the Comintern Pact was signed?
- A. Ambassador MUSHAKOJI. This may take two or three minutes in regard to what we were talking about the other day - there is something I feel is fairly important and I would like to speak about it now.
- Q. Any time, General, you have something of importance you want to tell us, I want you to know that we are anxious to be fair and give you those opportunities.
- A. The first point is that it was not Nuernberg, as I thought the other day - Bayreuth, that I first saw Hitler, when they delivered to me the first official outline of the pact. The second matter is that I told you it was either May or June that Dr. Hack first came to see me from Herr Ribbentrop, but I believe this was earlier, around April. The third point is that I stated when I saw Ribbentrop in October 1935, that that was the first time I had met him officially and that I had seen him socially before. In order to keep the records exact, I think it would be better if I definitely stated that it was the second time, but the first time in a political way. The last point is that in the period between July 1936, and October 1936, I stated, I believe, that our Ambassador and Ribbentrop met several times to talk over the proposed treaty. I believe that they met definitely ~~over~~ ten times and I was present at quite a few of these meetings.
- Q. Would you tell us the substance of these discussions?
- A. Although I am not definitely sure of details, the discussions were mainly concerned with changes in the original German draft and went into the technical aspects of the treaty or writing, such as changes in the wording of the preamble, etc., based on communications that had come from Japan, requesting certain changes and additions.
- Q. These communications from Japan, to which you refer, were they communications from the military authorities, that is, the General Staff, or were they communications from the Foreign Office?
- A. They came from the Foreign Office. All communications from this time forward were from the Foreign Office, as all dealings in this treaty were handled by the Ambassador.
- Q. Then this refers to the period of time after the military had handled their negotiations and they had been ~~turned~~ over to the Foreign Office for conclusion?
- A. Yes, the military stepped out of the discussions upon the

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return of Ambassador MUSHAKOJI on 1 May 1936. I would like to request that, as I do not wish to have any mistakes down on the record and as I feel that in some cases as to dates, etc., exactitude is extremely difficult on the spur of the moment, that I believe I should be shown the transcript if you wish me to get it absolutely exact.

Q. If it appears that there is some uncertainty as to these dates, and that it is material to be made definite, we will be glad to discuss it with you after the transcript is available.

A. The next point that I would like to have put down is that when you were asking me about my personal history the other day there was one date I was not too sure of. I went to General Staff Headquarters in August 1931. Another point is that I am not sure of my date of promotion to Major General, although I believe it was March or April of 1935 - it might possibly have been 1936. One other point is that I became Ambassador in October 1938, and at the same time was put on the inactive list, and as such severing all connections with the military.

Q. I believe, General, that you were promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in March of 1938. Is that correct?

A. I believe it was April 1938.

Q. And when you were named Ambassador you became a retired Lieutenant General. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct. However, I wish to stress the point that as a Reserve in the Japanese Army I have no connections with the military. This is definitely a Japanese rule.

Q. Then, if I understand you correctly, you went on the inactive list rather than retiring as we would use the term "retired" in the American Army. You were still available to be called into service?

A. It means that I was retired and put on the inactive list and would only be called back in case of war. However, in the late War I was not called back as I was an Ambassador and evidently the Army had no particular use for me. That is all. Please go ahead.

Q. General, tell us, please, who the Japanese Ambassador to Italy was at the time Italy became a party to the ^{Anti}Comintern Pact.

A. HOTTA.

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- Q. I was under the impression, I could be wrong, of course, that it was Mr. SHIRATORI.
- A. No. Definitely not.
- Q. Who was the Foreign Minister at the time you were named Ambassador to Germany?
- A. I believe it was ARITA.
- Q. Are you sure that it was not UGAKI?
- A. No. It was after UGAKI had resigned. I shall look into it, but I am pretty sure it was ARITA.
- Q. According to my records UGAKI was named Foreign Minister on 26 May 1938, and Prince KONOYE succeeded UGAKI as Foreign Minister on 30 September 1938.
- A. Please look up your records. I think that they are incorrect. I believe that ARITA became Foreign Minister before January 1939.
- Q. General, it was my understanding that soon after the time UGAKI was unable to form a Government, because the military would not give him a War Minister, he became the Foreign Minister in another Government and while he was Foreign Minister he named you, General OSHIMA, as Ambassador to Germany, and Mr. SHIRATORI Ambassador to Italy, at or about the same time.
- A. No. I do not believe that is correct. SHIRATORI may have been named during the time UGAKI was Foreign Minister and there might have been talk of naming me while he was in that position, but I believe it was after ARITA became Foreign Minister that I was named Ambassador to Germany. Please look this matter up at the Foreign Office. This is my recollection.
- Q. We can correct this by looking at the records and if we find my records are not correct we can talk about it again. General, at the time Italy became a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact, do you remember who the Military Attache in the Japanese Embassy in Italy was?
- A. I believe it was Lt. Col. or Col. ARISUE.
- Q. General, how do you know as a fact that at the time Italy became a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact there was not a separate secret pact entered into with Italy similar to the one entered into with Germany?
- A. I have definitely heard that when Ambassador MUSHAKOJI and Ribbentrop talked over the matter of letting Italy into the

Anti-Comintern Pact that they definitely decided not to ask her into any secret treaty. If I need to go any further I might add that when the Anti-Comintern Pact with Italy as a signatory was consummated in Rome Ambassador MUSHAKOJI and Ribbentrop went to Rome and I was definitely told later that the only pact entered into was this Anti-Comintern Pact.

Q. Who told you that?

A. I heard it from the Ambassador and also from Ribbentrop.

Q. What was the occasion under which Ribbentrop told you about that?

A. In any case I am absolutely certain that there was no such pact. I spoke to Ribbentrop in Berlin before he went to Italy when we had been discussing the matter of Italy's joining the Anti-Comintern Pact and at that time, as later, when the Ambassador returned from Italy, it was definite that she had not been a signatory to any secret pact.

Q. Did you discuss it with Ribbentrop after he returned from Italy?

A. Frankly, I do not recall the exact times when I spoke to Ribbentrop about this, but I reiterate that I am absolutely certain that there was no such pact.

Q. Was there any other type of secret pact and by that I mean a pact between Italy and Japan that might be different in some respects from the secret pact between Germany and Japan?

A. To the best of my knowledge there was no such pact. This, of course, is not within the ken of my responsibility, but to the best of my knowledge there was none.

Q. Tell us this, if you can, General, why did Japan not enter into a similar secret pact with Italy when Italy became a third party signatory to the Anti-Comintern Pact?

A. There would be no occasion in which Italy would be involved in this matter. That is to say, of aiding Russia in any way at all.

Q. Do you know the circumstances incident to Italy becoming a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. By that I want to know who suggested it and to whom?

A. I am not sure of what the circumstances were, but I believe that there were talks between Italy and Germany which brought it about.

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By this time it had gone out of my hands and I can only say that I recollect that there was talk from the German side of recruiting Italy in the pact.

Q. Did you participate in those negotiations with respect to Italy in any manner?

A. No connection at all.

Q. You have told us about the secret pact and I think you have described it pretty well to us - that was signed between Japan and Germany at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was entered into. Now, I am wondering if there were any other secret understandings you have not told us about that were entered into between Japan and Germany at or about the same time.

A. Not as treaties, but on this point I would like to tell you some things and if you have any specific questions, please interject them. In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this - I believe it was in September or October 1938 - that these discussions came about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda.

Q. How was it that after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded Japan's friendship enabled Germany to arm. What was there about this Anti-Comintern Pact or possibly the secret pact you have mentioned that enabled Germany because of Japan's friendship to arm?

A. I do not believe that this can be named as a factor in Germany's ability to arm. I do not believe that was the reason Germany was able to arm.

Q. General, was there then some other understanding between Japan and Germany, secret or otherwise, about which you have not yet told us, that enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed?

A. No. There was not. In this regard I once again requested that you look at the secret treaty because it was not a very concrete

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thing - rather it was simply an agreement not to help Russia in case of a war. To give a concrete example, in case of a war starting between Germany and Russia, Japan would not mass troops at the Siberian border or conversely, would she tell Russia that she would never attack. In regard to this secret pact also there was never any agreement between the German and Japanese Army or any discussions relative to tactics to be used in case of a war.

- Q. General, do you remember a meeting you had with Ribbentrop, then German Foreign Minister, at Fuschl on 13 February 1941? At that meeting Ribbentrop discussed with you the fact that it was Japan's friendship which enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed, and according to my information you agreed with Ribbentrop. Does that refresh your memory sufficiently to enable you to tell me how or why this was true?
- A. I do not recall any such statement on my part. Where did you get your information? I did not meet Ribbentrop on 13 February 1941. I arrived back in Berlin from Japan on 16 February 1941.
- Q. General, I have written evidence and positive proof in my possession that you met Ribbentrop at Fuschl on 13 February 1941, and discussed this matter.
- A. Definitely not. There was no such meeting on such a date. It is either a fabrication or a mistake. I definitely remember that on Kigensetsu (Constitution Day) I was crossing the Urals - that is February 11th, I was drinking champagne on that night and I recall the time. I could not have been in Germany on the 13th of February.
- Q. General, I want you to think about that a little more. I have observed that you have been skillful in your recollections of dates when you have had time to think about them. Bear in mind that I have in my possession written evidence and I want to give you time to think about it. It may be you are confused about your dates. We can talk about this matter at another time. I believe this will save time and will also enable you to think this matter over, and it won't be so difficult for you to remember after you have thought about it some more. We can talk about it at another meeting.
- A. I will speak about this to you some other time, but in regard to this treaty it might be of interest to you to know that in a sense this treaty was rather a nuisance to Germany in her dealings with Russia and in bringing about the non-aggression

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pact. I have heard from Ribbentrop's men that Ribbentrop had great difficulty because of this pact in consummating the non-aggression pact.

- Q. Let us proceed with some other matters and we will come back to this at some later date. I want to go a little more in your family history.
- A. Yes.
- Q. I believe your father was a Lieutenant General in the Army, was he not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was his name?
- A. OSHIMA Kenichi.
- Q. He was finally retired as a Lieutenant General, was he not?
- A. Yes, as a Lieutenant General in 1919, I believe.
- Q. Did your father engage in any diplomatic activities with Germany during his lifetime?
- A. He was strictly an officer and had no diplomatic dealings.
- Q. Was your father a wealthy man?
- A. No, I would not say that, although he was not a poor man, as he had risen to General rank.
- Q. From what sources did the family derive its income?
- A. Mainly from land.
- Q. Did you inherit any property or other wealth from your father?
- A. No. He is still alive.
- Q. From what sources do you obtain your income?
- A. I had no income apart from my Army salary.
- Q. Did the Japanese Government pay its Ambassadors a sufficient salary or provide sufficient funds for necessary expenses in order to make it unnecessary for the Japanese Ambassadors to have independent and large incomes to enable them to serve in those capacities?
- A. Yes. I believe the Japanese Foreign Office paid very well and gave an entirely sufficient sum, depending on the country to which the diplomat was sent.

- Q. Referring specifically to you as the Ambassador to Germany, did your Government pay you sufficient to enable you to perform all your duties and meet your social obligations?
- A. Yes, and particularly as it was wartime, social expenses were negligible.
- Q. Then while you served as Ambassador you had no income other than what you indicated to us?
- A. No.
- Q. General, as you have recited to us the story of your military life, I am impressed by the continuous rapid advancement you made in rank and responsibility during the years you were in that service. In March 1938, at the age of 52, you were a Lieutenant General, and later during that same year you were your country's Ambassador to Germany. To me, this is an unusual story of advancement, and from what you have already told us you were a successful diplomat. This could hardly happen unless you were a man of ability and enjoyed the confidence of your friends and superiors, and naturally, as you progressed and advanced in your chosen field of endeavor you must have become affiliated with certain political groups and Army groups and organizations. Tell me about that phase of your political and army life.
- A. To start with I would like to explain to you that my Army promotions were not particularly fast, and of those who graduated from the War College at the same time I did and prior to that from the Military Academy, there are many who have advanced faster than I have. For example, there is Lt. Gen. INABA, Lt. Gen. SAKAI, and Gen. YAMASHITA. I would say that of War College graduates I am either around the middle of the group or a little lower. Also, as another example, Lt. Gen. SAWADA, who is now here for some reason or other, is a classmate of mine. As you might not believe me, I suggest that you examine this matter and ask other Army people or the War Department, and you will find that I have never been mixed up in any Army group, such as General Mazaki's or Araki's, or some such other one.
- Q. Did you not belong to any Army group whatsoever?
- A. I have never been a member of any Army group.
- Q. It is rather puzzling to me that you could become a Lt. General and not become a member of any Army group.
- A. No; I would say that there were more who were not members.

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- Q. You were active in the Japanese-German societies in both Japan and Germany, were you not?
- A. Not in Japan, except as a member.
- Q. What Japanese-German society in Japan were you a member of?
- A. It was known as the German-Japanese Society.
- Q. Who was the leader of that society?
- A. Marquis OKUBO (now deceased).
- Q. Who were some of the others who were prominent in the leadership?
- A. I do not recall many names of leaders of this society; it was a particularly inactive society so far as politics went. There was one other leader named SONODA, who, I believe, was a bank president or something of the sort. SONODA was a banker and lived in Tokyo five years ago.
- Q. Is it not a fact that you sponsored the inauguration of the German-Japanese Society in Germany?
- A. No, it was already in existence when I went there in 1934 for the first time.

Questions by Mr. Hyde - 1355-1600 hours.

- Q. General, how long had the German-Japanese Society in Germany been in existence before your arrival there in 1934?
- A. The German-Japanese Society goes back into the 1800's. However, it was dissolved during the World War and started up again, and when it started up I don't know.
- Q. What was the purpose of this society in Germany?
- A. It was strictly a social organization and had nothing whatsoever to do with political matters either in Germany or Japan.
- Q. Was that to foster social relationship between Japanese and Germans?
- A. To promote cultural interests in the two countries, such as art, literature, etc., and to disseminate the same.
- Q. After the Nazi Party grew in prominence and their ideologies and doctrines reached a dominant place in German life, did this German-Japanese Society in Germany also study the doctrines of Nazism?

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- A. No. Furthermore, there was very little liaison between the German-Japanese Society in Germany and the same organization in Japan.
- Q. General, did you ever believe in state-controlled economy?
- A. Depending on the country, I feel there is much to be said for it. It may be good in some places and bad in others. And in countries which are lacking in natural resources I believe it is necessary to have a certain degree of state-controlled economy - that is, it can not be helped. Furthermore, I believe it can only succeed in a country where all statistics are accurately kept.
- Q. Name some countries in which you think it would be a success.
- A. It must be in a country where state control is complete, in other words, a totalitarian nation, such as Germany, and I feel it might have been necessary in Japan to a lesser extent, the difficulty being that Japanese statistics were not complete, e.g., it did not work well in Italy.
- Q. Do you believe in the absolute power of the State as compared to parliamentary process of government?
- A. I believe in a middle road.
- Q. What do you mean by a middle road?
- A. I believe that in a country like England where the parliamentary system has been in operation for many years and the best men of the country stand for Parliament, that it succeeds, but in a country where the system has not been proved, I believe there should be a curb on the Parliament and, as in the case of Japan, power should be held under the Constitution by the Emperor. I do think that some seven or eight years ago the Japanese Parliament had too much of its power taken from it.
- Q. What do you think of the system that prevailed in Germany while you were there?
- A. I believe they did away with the Parliament too severely. It was all right in the beginning, but as things started to go badly I felt that there should have been an organ to voice the wishes of the people.
- Q. In so far as your own nation was concerned, did you believe that the end justifies the means, even to the extent of breaking

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- treaties if necessary to achieve your nation's objectives?
- A. I do not believe that treaties should be broken.
- Q. What is your attitude with respect to Japan's foreign policy of expansion and enlargement of its political powers?
- A. I do not believe in physical expansion, but I feel that the spread of culture should be fostered and that nations with a lower standard of civilization should be helped and aided. I do not believe that one country should annex another by military force. When I was in the United States I read an editorial in the New York TIMES regarding the rights of the people of French-Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies to determine their own future course, and I think that this is the way it should be everywhere.
- Q. Prior to the time you were named Ambassador to Germany, what special training, if any, did you have to particularly equip you for that office?
- A. As long as you know the language I do not feel that an Ambassador needs much further training. I had experts in many fields to assist me when needed and as in your country, where many varied types of men become Ambassadors, the same applies in my case.
- Q. You did have one special training at that time and that was your military training?
- A. Yes. I did have that training, but I do not feel that it is particularly important to have it, because the military and naval attaches handle all matters relative to their special fields.
- Q. But, is it not a fact that you were named Ambassador to Germany with the approval of the military authorities?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Is it not a fact that the military authorities urged your appointment as an Ambassador?
- A. Yes. I think so.
- Q. Will you tell us what military officials urged or suggested your appointment?
- A. I do not know any particular individuals, but I believe it was General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry.

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- Q. And can you tell us any other organizations or individuals who urged your appointment to that position?
- A. No. I do not know of any others. Those that advocated my appointment were the Army in particular. In the fall of 1938, without my knowledge the Army in Japan had apparently put forward my name for the Ambassadorship, and I received a telegram from General Staff Headquarters requesting me to take the post. I refused to do this saying that I was a soldier and not a diplomat, but they urged me time and time again and I refused as often, until finally I was more or less forced to take the job. At this time General TADA was Chief of Staff and General Staff Headquarters had such men as Major General KASAHARA and General HOMMA.
- Q. Were they the men that finally persisted and insisted that you accept the offer of Ambassador?
- A. Not as individuals, but in their official capacity.
- Q. Why do you distinguish between individuals and official capacity?
- A. Because they were not particular friends or acquaintances of mine and they must have picked me because they thought I was the right man for the job.
- Q. Why did they think you were the right man for the job?
- A. Because I believe they thought I knew more about Germany than any man at the time. I had been expecting to return to Japan in 1937, and upon orders had been held over.
- Q. At that time, is it not true, that you had a feeling of admiration for Germany and the German military system?
- A. I did have an admiration for the German Army as such, but I opposed certain of their political ideologies, such as their stand on the Jewish matter and the Nazi Party's part in the Army set-up.
- Q. You were on friendly terms with the ranking military authorities in Germany at the time, were you not?
- A. Yes. As Military Attache I was.
- Q. You were probably closer to the military authorities or more friendly with them than any other of your countrymen?

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- A. Yes. Because of my position I naturally had more to do with them than anyone else; particularly, I would like to stress the fact that this was part of my job as Military Attache.
- Q. You had, therefore, demonstrated that as Military Attache you could accomplish the things for Japan in Germany that your superiors in Japan wanted you to accomplish.
- A. Yes. I believe that is correct, and while they did not give me specific orders they wished to better the understanding between the two military organizations, and as I knew Germany well from my long stay there I was able to accomplish this over-all mission.
- Q. By this time in Japan in so far as the affairs of Government are concerned, the military was pretty much the dominating influence, was it not?
- A. While I was outside the nation and did not know for certain I do not believe they had reached the peak of their power yet as shown by the Three-Power Pact, for example, where we had difficulty in realizing it at first.
- Q. You indicated the other day that in the preliminary conversations relative to the Anti-Comintern Pact that Ribbentrop through your mutual friend, Hack, started conversations with you as the Military Attache because, if I remember correctly, he knew that in order for that pact to be brought into being the military had to be sold on the idea, and you indicated then to me, I thought, that the power of the military was growing, and I assumed by the time you were named Ambassador the power of the military was still in its growing stage, but greater than when you were Military Attache.
- A. Yes, that is correct. However, it was simply becoming stronger all the time and had not reached its zenith yet.
- Q. It had, however, reached a sufficient place of prominence to be in a position to dictate to the Foreign Ministry that the Ambassador in Germany should be a military man?
- A. Yes. But even outside of the military, I believe, there were those who wanted me as Ambassador.
- Q. Who were they?
- A. Although I have not heard it from the man himself, I believe GODO, Takuo, for example, wanted my appointment.

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Q. Why?

A. He was one of those that wished to bring German technical developments to Japan and wished me to work toward that end.

Q. What, if any, political parties and what, if any, groups urged your appointment as Ambassador?

A. I do not believe there was any political group or military group - rather I prefer to have it said that it was General Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry.

Q. Do I understand then that in so far as your appointment as Ambassador was concerned the only authorities or only people that urged your appointment and wanted your appointment were the General Staff Headquarters and War Ministry?

A. To the best of my knowledge from my distant vantage point in Berlin there were no others, but the ones I named before. I reiterate that I am not a member of any Army group.

Q. Who was the War Minister that urged your appointment?

A. General ITAGAKI, I believe.

Q. If my memory serves me correctly, Friday you told us at the time you were named Ambassador you just changed positions from Military Attache to Ambassador without going back to Japan?

A. That is correct.

Q. Did you receive any special instructions from your Government at that time on any particular military matters to which they wanted you to give special attention?

A. No. I repeat again that the Ambassador can not be concerned with military matters.

Q. But we have an Ambassador now who was a military man who was selected by the War Department and by General Staff Headquarters because of that fact.

A. No. I had no connection with military matters.

Q. Do you mean to tell us now that the War Ministry and the Chief of Staff, after insisting that you, who had performed your duties well as Military Attache, and who at their insistence was named Ambassador because of your military information and because of your ability to get along with the military people of Germany - that that means nothing and that you stepped right out of the military picture?

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- A. I do not mean to say I had no connection whatsoever with military matters; I am pointing out that no direct recommendations or direct negotiations could be made by me as Ambassador. To give a concrete example, I could not recommend to the Japanese Army that we purchase certain types of cannon from Germany. However, if the Military Attache comes to me and says "we would like to buy such and such guns but are having a hard time carrying out the negotiations," I can then carry on and try to obtain them. I am telling you the truth about this matter and wish you to understand that.
- Q. I do not doubt that, but you are evading my question.
- A. I definitely received no instructions on military matters. I quite understand that this is very hard for you to fathom. However, I want to point out that under no circumstances would General Staff Headquarters or the War Ministry issue me any instructions as to what to do upon becoming Ambassador.
- Q. The question is: is there any reason why the War Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters could not ask the Foreign Minister to issue you some instructions?
- A. No. Instructions on military matters would come directly to the Military Attache.
- Q. Now, General, tell us in what capacity you acted, that is, whether you were Military Attache or Assistant Military Attache, or Ambassador, when you commenced your conversations relative to the Tri-Party Pact?
- A. Military Attache.
- Q. In what year was this?
- A. Beginning of July 1938.
- Q. You have indicated, General, that you would like to recite the story relative to the Tri-Power Pact. I believe it would be helpful for all of us concerned if at this time you proceed with what you care to say about it and then later I may have some questions to ask about it.
- A. Before I start on my story on the Tri-Party Pact, I would once again like to briefly give you the story of the responsibilities of the Military Attache and the Ambassador, as this is very important and will probably crop up again in discussing this Three-Power Pact.

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- Q. You may proceed with that.
- A. We in the Embassy have the Ambassador and the Naval and Military Attaches. However, because in Japan we have the Supreme Prerogative, and as a retired officer (or reserve) loses this Prerogative, and further, as no regular officer can become an Ambassador, it becomes necessary for the Military Attache to deal directly with the General Staff Headquarters on military matters. If the General Staff wishes to approach the Ambassador it goes through the Foreign Office first. Why then would the military wish to have a former officer in the post of Ambassador? The reason for this is that when and if the Ambassador must carry negotiations upon the request of the Military Attache or of General Staff Headquarters through the Foreign Office, it is very much to their advantage to have a man who is not only sympathetic toward the military, but who knows the problems thereof. In conclusion, the only two countries that ever had this set-up were Prussia and Japan - Prussia, of course, doing away with it following World War I.
- Q. You may now proceed with your story regarding the Tri-Party Pact.
- A. I shall give you the rough overall picture of how this pact came about. Later, if you wish to question me on specific details, please do so. To start with, I would like to tell you that, as you know, in July 1937, the China incident started. Following this, at one time, you may not be aware, that Japan attempted to use Germany in order to bring this incident to a close. At the time I received orders from the General Staff in Tokyo to try and approach German military leaders and have them in turn approach the German military advisors of Chiang Kai-shek with a view to bringing to a close an incident which was rapidly taking on gargantuan proportions and leading only to a stale-mate. As an initial step, I wish to relate how, I believe it was in January 1938, although I am not certain of the date - only that it was early in January, I called upon Ribbentrop at his villa in Sonnenburg, to pay my New Year's respects, and at the time he asked me if there was not some way in which Germany and Japan might be brought closer together by means of a treaty or otherwise. I recall that Ribbentrop spent his Christmas Holidays at his villa and my recollection is that I called upon him around the New Year, and I recall passing on the general story of this meeting to

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General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo. In the same year in June I received a communication from the Division concerned, SHUNINBU, of the General Staff Headquarters, informing me that only in so far as the Division was concerned and not speaking for the General Staff as a whole they approved the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation. Although I do not remember the details of this communication, I remember that the main point was that in this cooperative movement the thing to be kept uppermost in mind should be an agreement to act in accord in dealing with Soviet Russia. At the beginning of July sometime Ribbentrop was preparing to go to Sonnenburg again for the summer and before he left I saw him at his request and we talked over various matters. At this time without referring to the matter of the communication from Japan - which had come by courier - I asked him what he thought of an agreement of some sort promising to consult with each other before any action was taken in case of an attack by the U.S.S.R. Ribbentrop asked me to let him have time to think it over - and we parted for the moment. As the next step in these talks I recall that a few days later Ribbentrop returned from Sonnenburg for the express purpose of talking to me. To the best of my knowledge the following is more or less what he said on this occasion: (1) that what he said was not based on talks with Hitler or any other official, and (2) that he felt that Germany would not particularly approve or like a treaty agreeing to consult only, as this was somewhat one-sided and not strong enough, and (3) that he suggested a mutual aid treaty instead aimed not only at the U.S.S.R., but all countries. In other words, what he meant was that a German-Japanese pact would, if strong enough, hope to preserve world peace. Germany was particularly fond of statements of this sort at the time.

- Q. At this time in what capacity was Ribbentrop in the German Government - the Foreign Minister or an official in the office of the Foreign Minister?
- A. He was Foreign Minister at the time and had been for several months. I told Ribbentrop that I thought it would be extremely difficult for Japan to agree to expand her objectives to a place where she would agree to a mutual aid pact aimed at the world in general, as she was only prepared to act against Russia. Ribbentrop in return stated that he did not wish Japan to do anything that was outside her power to do, but that a strong pact was vitally necessary for the preservation

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of peace and hence urged me further upon this point. Ribbentrop then asked me to find out how the Japanese Army would feel about such a treaty, and secondly, requested me to maintain absolute security - in this regard there had been some leaks in the previous negotiations leading up to the Anti-Comintern Pact - and to not communicate by wire or wireless with Japan, but to send someone back. Because of this I communicated with the General Staff, simply to get its O.K., and having received it sometime around the end of July, I despatched Major General KASAHARA to Japan by air. This was not all decided at one meeting. It actually was during two or three meetings.

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 7 February 1946, 1345-1600 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, you may continue with your recital of your story of the Tri-Party Pact from the point where you left off when we adjourned yesterday.
- A. In regard to what I spoke to you about yesterday, I would like to have you read back to me the portion of the transcript following my despatching the first communication to Japan as Ambassador.
- Q. The reporter will read that portion of the transcript. (Same was read by Miss Brunner).
- A. The first telegram was sent to Japan after I took office as Ambassador. While I am not certain what its date was, I believe it was in the beginning of November 1938. The answer did not arrive and I sent another one as I told you. Finally, after I sent the second telegram in December 1938, I received the answer which in general stated that because differences might arise between Japan and Germany upon the question of naming Russia as the principal concern and the other nations as secondary, in order to clarify this they

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would send a Commission from Tokyo. The Germans spoke to me in December 1938, regarding their wish. They had approached the Italians also. My communication to the Foreign Office requesting permission to proceed on this mission was sent in December 1938, and the answer was received from Foreign Minister ARITA in the same month.

Q. You may continue, General.

A. The ITO mission first went to Italy, as it was on their road, and after staying there for two or three days proceeded to Berlin, arriving around the beginning of February 1939. A few days after this Ambassador SHIRATORI also came to Berlin from Italy. ITO had with him the Government's plan and wishes on this proposed treaty. Now, this is a very important point and while I do not remember all the details, I wish to outline the principal wish of the Japanese Government as brought by ITO. That was that, while Russia would be the prime object of this pact the other countries, while remaining secondary, would enter into the matter only if they had gone Communistic. In other words, for example, if Japan were to go to war with England, say, this pact would become effective only if England had also gone Communistic.

Q. General, will you clarify what you mean by other countries - do you mean any other country?

A. I say other countries, because before this pact was drawn up fully in regard to specific nations other than Russia, negotiations ceased. To explain more fully, while there was the intention to go into the matter of specific nations fully at a later date, before we got around to it negotiations were broken off.

Q. Actually, Germany had in mind the entire world, did they not?

A. Yes, that is true, although Germany also agreed to delete the Americas in the first statement in the preamble.

Q. But when the conversations took place between you as representative of the Japanese Government and the German representatives in the very beginning the conversation then pointed to a pact that would be against the entire world, and subsequently these deletions of nations were made?

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- A. Yes, the deletions were requested by Japan. Another point was that if Japan were to accept the treaty as proposed by Germany the aid proviso would not work to Japan's advantage because, for example, in case of a U.S.-Japan war, what particular aid could Germany give? Whereas, in case of a German-United States war, as another example, Japan would have to throw in her whole might in the Pacific. These are, of course, only examples that I am giving, and not to be construed as having come from the Japanese Government. Both SHIRATORI and I said that we well understood this feeling upon the part of Japan, but we felt that there would be a danger of rupturing negotiations if at this point Japan were to bring up the matter of it being against nations that had gone Communistic only. After all, up to now, there had been no talk such as this. This matter and my thoughts as given above were communicated to the Foreign Office in a despatch during February 1939.
- Q. Was that despatch sent while the ITO Commission was still in Germany or Italy?
- A. Yes, while they were in Berlin.
- Q. You may continue.
- A. The answer to this communication arrived around the end of February or the beginning of March, and was roughly as follows: the matter of Russia remained the same; however, in regard to the other countries they would go further than simply stating that the pact would only be aimed at nations embracing Communism, but this aid to be given would consist of military advice - by this I mean the trading of intelligence, the temporary leasing of bases if necessary, export of fuel oil and other commodities, and in general all aid outside actual participation. In other words, this was something like the aid that the United States later gave to England before she actually became involved in the war in 1941.
- Q. Continue.
- A. This answer was passed to Ribbentrop and the German Government, and I imagine by SHIRATORI to the Italian Government. To digress a moment - in the future, unless Italy looms in the picture as an important figure, I shall confine my narration to Germany. I believe that I was in error when I said the

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answer came around the end of February - I believe it was the end of March. In any case, Germany through Ribbentrop told me that there was no argument in so far as Russia was concerned, and also in so far as making the other nations secondary, but that they wished to have a meeting with the Japanese representatives and get down to brass tacks regarding measures to be taken and naming specific nations. To put it differently, they stated that the time for generalities had passed, and they wished to settle details. The Germans also stated that they wished when drawing up the treaty to make no mention of it being primarily against Russia, but to keep it absolutely general, to leave out any details such as non-military aid, etc., which would weaken the pact. They said that some other means could be found to decide upon details.

Q. General, when you say Ribbentrop said some other means could be found to decide upon details, what did the two of you have in mind?

A. To go into this a little further, this means that when the treaty is drawn up it would simply state that in case of an unprovoked attack by any other nation not a signatory to the pact mutual aid would be given by the signatories. On the surface, therefore, this would appear to the world to be a strong and binding treaty. Of course, certain details of the treaty, or for that matter, the whole treaty would be published, but what Ribbentrop meant was that in regard to Japan's desire to not give more than non-military aid, if the country concerned was not Russia, the Germans wished to hold a meeting and to mutually agree upon this without including it in the actual treaty. Essentially, it becomes impossible to write up a treaty containing such clauses as what will be done in case it would be Russia or in case it would be some other nation, etc.

Q. Now, Ribbentrop's views, his actual views, were to the effect that he wanted military, as well as the other type of aid from Japan in case of an attack, is that correct?

A. I will speak to you a little more fully about that now. To go over this once more so that there will be no errors, and so that the matter will be entirely understood by you: (1) In so far as the actual pact to be published goes, there was no argument. This was to be simply a mutual aid pact, with no strings attached. (2) Japan wished in this regard to

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settle the matter either by secret pact or other means in regard to the other nations besides Russia. That is to say, that the aid to be given then would stop short of military aid. (3) Germany objected to this on the grounds that should such a secret pact be signed and should there be a leak and the existence of this secret pact or agreement become known it would seriously weaken the actual pact. Therefore, her counter-suggestion was that as there would naturally be meetings between the two nations should such a pact be consummated, the matter of deciding what to do against what country should be left until such a moment, and no binding pact modifying the overall treaty be signed.

- Q. General, we have been talking about Ribbentrop's views and we have been talking about the views of your Government. I am wondering with respect to how you personally felt about the matter.
- A. I felt it was simply a question of the approach and that the bridge between the two ideas could be easily built.
- Q. Actually, General, you were there on the ground and you knew Ribbentrop well; you worked very closely with him; were you not as a matter of fact firm in your feeling that the ideas that he advanced were probably the more desirable?
- A. I could not go so far as to say that.
- Q. How far can you go? The other answer seems to me to be extremely general. I want to know what you personally felt.
- A. I repeat that I felt that there was no basic difference; it was simply in the means to be followed. And then arose the problem of what type of treaty or agreement would suit both nations. In order to draw up a plan that would be satisfactory to both Japan and Germany, two men from my Embassy by the names of USAMI and TAKEUCHI met with Gaus from the German Foreign Office and drew up various plans. None of these was entirely satisfactory to either the German or Japanese Governments, but I was continuously trying to find a bridge over which the two might come together and meet. I believe, although, of course, these were only my own thoughts, that Germany began to get suspicious that Japan was attempting to weaken the treaty by a separate secret pact, of which she might in turn inform certain nations of the proposition. Japan on her part might have felt that Germany was attempting to drag her into matters outside the ken of her interests.

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- Q. Where is the ITO Commission during all of this?
- A. They were around for sometime and were still there when the Japanese answer was received, but I believe they left sometime after this.
- Q. Had they left before the two members from your Embassy commenced preparing proposed drafts of the treaty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. It is not exactly clear to me now just what the ITO Commission did?
- A. They simply brought me the wishes of the Japanese Government and following that had no duties, although they stayed around in Berlin for a time watching developments.
- Q. Seems to me rather strange it should require that number of men to bring that message.
- A. I believe they were particularly desirous of explaining their position fully, and wished me to understand their ideas completely before proceeding.
- Q. Did it take three men to do that instead of just one?
- A. One could do it, but in Japan it seems to be the thing to send along an Army and Navy man.
- Q. So that actually then they came over to bring the message from the Japanese Government and to also make it definite and clear to you exactly what the Japanese Government wanted and how far they would go, is that correct?
- A. They did not say how far I could go or how far I could not go, but simply said to try to carry out negotiations along this line.
- Q. Do I understand that they wanted you to understand definitely what the views of the Army and the Navy and the Foreign Office in Tokyo were and you were to be governed accordingly?
- A. Yes.
- Q. General, can you tell us what happened to the personnel from your Embassy that were brought back to Japan with you?
- A. Some are back at the Foreign Office, some in the Central Liaison Office.
- Q. Can you tell us who was your secretary?
- A. My personal secretary is a man named KIMOTO, who should be at the Foreign Office now.

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- Q. Was he your personal secretary at the time of these negotiations?
- A. No, my secretary at that time was a man named SUGIURA, who, I believe, is now in Berne. Another man, also a secretary, named OSATO also should be here now in Tokyo.
- Q. Is he presently in the Government service?
- A. Probably.
- Q. Would he be in the Foreign Office?
- A. Probably.

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 34 pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14 day of February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 4th, 6th, and 7th days of February, 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan.

G. Osmond Hyde

February 14, 1946
Date

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 11 February 1946, 1400-1640 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

Q. General, I want to make sure that the record shows the correct name for ITO who headed the ITO Commission. You gave me a name the other day which I do not think is correct.

(Note by Comdr. Huggins, interpreter: We now come into the peculiarities of the Japanese language whereby a character can be read in about eight different ways.)

A. The name I gave you was Jusshi, but this can also be read Nobufumi.

Q. General, will you tell us where the members of the ITO Commission that we have referred to in this interrogation are at the present time, if you know?

A. I believe ITO is in Tokyo; either that or he is at his country home in Zushi or Hayama. Admiral ABE, as I told you the other day, is in Sweden, I believe. Col. TATSUMI's whereabouts, I do not know, but you should be able to locate him through the Central Liaison Office.

Q. General, in our previous meeting you stated that you went to Italy around the middle of December 1938, to talk with

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Mussolini after Ribbentrop had not been successful in persuading Italy to come along. I don't believe you told us when you returned to Berlin from your trip to Italy?

- A. I do not recall the exact date, but I went to Rome around the middle of December and returned after a short stay of three or four days.
- Q. General, was SHIRATORI, who was named Ambassador to Italy a military man?
- A. No. He is a career diplomat.
- Q. But he was supported by and had the confidence of the military authorities, did he not?
- A. Yes; he was a man who had many friends among the military.
- Q. And he was sympathetic to the views of the military, was he not?
- A. Yes, I believe so. He was well thought of by the Army following the stand he took during the Manchurian incident, when as a member of the Foreign Office he stated that he felt that the Manchurian incident was a natural outbreak.
- Q. The other day you told us that he was the Japanese Minister to Sweden at the time he was named Ambassador to Italy. That is true, is it not?
- A. I do not recall making that statement, but he was Minister to Sweden.
- Q. Now, did the military authorities in Japan urge his appointment as Ambassador to Italy?
- A. I do not believe that the case could be stated in this manner, for as you say he was Minister to Sweden, but had returned to Japan and was without portfolio at the time that he was named Ambassador to Italy. This was before any question of the Tripartite Pact had come up, and, therefore, it is my personal belief that the Army did not have much to do with his appointment.
- Q. You have known Mr. SHIRATORI for a long time, have you not?
- A. No. As a matter of fact I met him for the first time abroad in 1936.

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- Q. What were the circumstances under which you met him in 1936?
- A. He was Minister to Sweden at the time and he came to Berlin on a pleasure trip and I met him at this time.
- Q. Is it not a fact that often, while you were conducting your negotiations with respect to the Anti-Comintern Pact, that SHIRATORI came down from Sweden to Berlin and met with you incident to those negotiations?
- A. He did speak to me one or two times, but contrary to what is generally publicized in magazines and newspapers he did not have a great deal to do with the consummating of this pact.
- Q. But during those days you and he exchanged ideas relative to this matter, did you not?
- A. Naturally, we did discuss the Anti-Comintern Pact, but there were no deep discussions on the matter. If you will ask SHIRATORI about this I am sure he will tell you the same story.
- Q. Will you tell us, General, if you know, who was responsible for his appointment as Ambassador to Italy?
- A. I was in Berlin, as you know, at the time, and hence do not know what the actual goings on were, but I believe, as I told you, that the Army did not have anything to do with his appointment. I believe that it was simply a regular rotation of duty within the Foreign Office. It is my remembrance that it was during the period when UGAKI was Foreign Minister, but I am not sure at all of the exact date.
- Q. General, did you ever go to Sweden to confer with SHIRATORI while the negotiations with respect to the Anti-Comintern Pact were going on?
- A. No.
- Q. When and under what circumstances did SHIRATORI first learn about the proposed Tripartite Pact?
- A. I believe he knew about it before leaving Japan, as he arrived in Rome toward the end of 1938. It was after his coming to Italy that I first discussed the matter with him.
- Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you first discussed the matter with SHIRATORI.
- A. I first met SHIRATORI at San Remo, Italy, in January 1939. We had arranged to meet at some pleasant spot in order to talk

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over the progress in the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.

- Q. How long prior to that was it that SHIRATORI left Japan?
A. I am not certain, but I believe it must have been about a month before our meeting.
- Q. Did he send for you to come to see him or did you send for him, or how was this meeting arranged?
A. I do not recall which one of us called the other. We both wished to meet to discuss what I had done so far and what the latest feeling in Japan was in regard to the pact.
- Q. General, this meeting with SHIRATORI in Italy took place very soon after your return from Italy to Berlin, that is correct, is it not?
A. It was not much over two or three weeks.
- Q. You had been to Italy at the request of Ribbentrop with the approval of your Government for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mussolini to become interested in this Tripartite alliance. That is true, is it not?
A. Yes, that is correct. In other words, Germany, as I told you, had approached Italy about this matter in September, and later asked me to get Japan to urge Mussolini to join so that after receiving the sanction of my Government I went to Rome in December.
- Q. Now, early the following month, that is, early in January 1939, SHIRATORI was named Ambassador to Italy. That is correct, is it not?
A. No. He was named Ambassador to Italy in the autumn of 1938, I believe - it was before I was named Ambassador to Germany. However, there is always quite a period between the time the Ambassador is named in Japan and the time he takes up his duties in the country to which he is accredited, so that he did not actually arrive in Rome until December 1938.
- Q. Now, General, my information is that he was named Ambassador to Italy in January 1939?
A. To the best of my knowledge that is incorrect.
- Q. Is it not a fact, General, that SHIRATORI was sent to Italy as Ambassador for the express purpose of trying to persuade

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Italy to come along with this Tripartite Pact.

- A. I do not believe that this was the reason. However, he was named Ambassador in September or before perhaps, and while I am not certain of the reasons behind his appointment, it is my personal belief that the Tripartite Pact was not the principal reason. Of one thing I am certain and that is that he was named Ambassador before I was, as he took precedence over me at functions.
- Q. Does it not seem strange to you that he should arrive in Italy within about two weeks after you had been unsuccessful in persuading Mussolini to come along with Japan and Germany in this Tripartite Pact?
- A. That is a natural conclusion to draw, but the fact is that SHIRATORI's coming was not certain and, as I remember it, I went to Rome not knowing when he would arrive in Italy.
- Q. General, can you tell us when the ITO Commission left Tokyo enroute to Berlin?
- A. They must have left about the beginning of January, as they came by a fast Italian ship and it takes about four weeks, so that it would follow that it would be the beginning of January, as they arrived in Berlin early in February.
- Q. And it would also follow that that was after you had been to Italy and had been unsuccessful in persuading the Italian Government to come along and join in the Tripartite Pact?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. And while that Commission was enroute to Berlin they stopped in Italy?
- A. Yes, on the road.
- Q. And while they were in Italy they discussed this matter with the Italian Government and also with Ambassador SHIRATORI, is not that correct?
- A. No. They did not speak with the Italian Government - only with SHIRATORI. The events chronologically are more or less as follows: I went to Rome, then later after SHIRATORI arrived we met at San Remo and discussed the Tripartite Pact. Later, after the ITO Commission arrived in Berlin SHIRATORI came there to speak to me again.

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- Q. What was the reason for stopping three or four days in Italy to talk with SHIRATORI when immediately upon the arrival of the Commission in Berlin they had SHIRATORI come up to Berlin to talk about it. Why could not this all have been done in one place?
- A. I believe he wished to hear further details, as the ITO Commission had only spent three or four days in Italy on the first meeting.
- Q. General, as a matter of fact this Commission called on SHIRATORI for the same purpose as they called on you, to make it clear to both SHIRATORI and to you exactly what the Japanese Government in Tokyo would do; how far they would go or not go, is that not true?
- A. That is correct. I intended to speak to you a little more on this point and if you will permit me to continue my narrative, it will come out, but perhaps you would wish me to tell you about this particular matter now.
- Q. I was about to suggest that you proceed with your narrative from the point at which we left off at the last meeting, but I think it would be helpful if you would make such comments now with respect to this particular matter just referred to, as you care to make.
- A. As you asked me the other day what the ITO Commission had come for I thought it over and tried to recollect what the communication from Japan stated relative to sending this Commission. As I remember it, the main reason given was that there would be danger of a leak if communications were continued and it would be best to send spokesmen. Of course, later, I heard rumors, which I can not say are either right or wrong, but which you may also have heard, so that I wish to pass them on to you. They were in effect that this Commission had come to make very clear to SHIRATORI and myself the Japanese Government's changed stand upon the Tripartite Pact. Of course, they did not say that this was the reason in talking to me, but I repeat I have heard rumors to this effect.
- Q. General, tell us a little bit more about how and where you heard those rumors, where they came from?
- A. I heard of these matters from some of my subordinates who had probably received the rumor in the mails from Japan - from their friends in the Foreign Office, or their family, or something - I do not know exactly from whom.

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- Q. Why do you call them rumors if they emanated from Japan?
- A. There was nothing on the surface and nothing official, so that they would have to be called rumors.
- Q. You call them rumors then because you were not officially told of these things?
- A. Of course, I wondered why in answer to a simple telegram they would send three men, but the official reason given was that it was a security measure. Your questioning me upon this point is quite natural, as it does seem strange, but I can only say that I know nothing beyond these rumors that I just related.
- Q. General, it is a fact, is it not, that the views of Mr. SHIRATORI and the views of yourself with respect to this proposed pact at this stage of the negotiations were somewhat different from the views of your Government in Japan?
- A. No, I would not say that our views were different from the Government; rather it would appear that the Government's ideas changed about the time they sent the ITO Commission.
- Q. That is my point, General, the Government in Tokyo had changed somewhat in its views, but you two gentlemen, one in Italy and one in Berlin, there where you were in communication with those Governments constantly, your views did not change automatically with the change in Tokyo; as a matter of fact you did not even know about it until ITO arrived, did you?
- A. We knew of the fact that they wished Russia to be the prime object and all other countries secondary, but we did not know of the point being brought up that other countries would only be included if their Governments became Communistic, until the ITO Commission arrived.
- Q. So that actually the Ambassadors in Italy and Germany from Japan were more enthusiastic for the views that had been advanced by Ribbentrop, because you had been working along that line all this time?
- A. I would not say it was any specific individual's ideas, as up to that time we had been working on the premise that the pact was to be concluded naming Russia as the principal object and other countries as secondary, and details were to be left until later.

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- Q. So that then when your Government in Japan changed its position they sent the ITO Commission over to make it clear to SHIRATORI and to yourself of this changed position so that you would not go too far in your suggestions to Ribbentrop and to Mussolini, is not that correct?
- A. I would not say that they were sent so as to be a check on us, for up until this time we had been working as the Government desired - that is to say on this point of naming Russia as the principal object and the other countries as secondary. It is only later, as I told you, through rumor that I heard that the real reason the ITO Commission came was to make clear the change of views of the Japanese Government.
- Q. There was no rumor about the fact that the ITO Commission made it clear to you, General, and to SHIRATORI of the changed attitude of the Government in Tokyo?
- A. The ITO Commission never stated that these were the changed views of the Government, but that these had been the Government's views all along.
- Q. And those views were somewhat different than the course Ambassador OSHIMA and Ambassador SHIRATORI had been pursuing, for you, the two Ambassadors had been concerned with Russia as the prime object and the other nations as secondary objects without any reference to Communism in so far as the secondary nations are concerned. Now it is changed?
- A. Essentially, my point is that was this a change that had taken place then or had the Japanese Government always held these views? Officially, there had been no change; it was only that I felt that this was a point that had not been brought up before, so, weighing all the rumors and my own thoughts on the matter I reached the conclusion that it must have been a change.
- Q. So that in fact, General, ITO and his associates brought with them to you and to Ambassador SHIRATORI the then views of your Government and said that you must work within these views?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Now, let us proceed for a little while with the continuation of your narrative from the point at which you left off when we were here last time.
- A. I believe we stopped on Thursday somewhere around here: as I said, essentially, there were not any great differences

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between Japan's views and German's, but as time went on I believe that suspicions began to arise in both parties' minds. That is, Germany began to wonder whether Japan really intended to consummate the pact or not, and Japan in turn worried about the possibility that should the pact be consummated Germany would use it to her advantage in places where Japan was not prepared to act. To sum up, because of rumors and the changing conditions of the times relations began to get worse as time went on.

- Q. General, it was at this time that you were drafting proposals of the treaty and you indicated at the close of the meeting that you named two men from your staff and they were drafting proposals, and I think then you also mentioned the fact that these fears that you have just explained were also beginning to arise in the two Governments concerned, that is, Japan and Germany.
- A. It is hard to name an exact time when relations began to get bad, but if you will look at the newspapers of the period you will see what I mean. The other day I went a little ahead of my story because of your questions so that I must now retrace my footsteps. Now, if you will include this in the record it should assist us in proceeding with the story: the KONOYE Cabinet went out and the HIRANUMA Cabinet came in around the beginning of January 1939. The 5-man "Inner Cabinet" with the exception of the Prime Minister and, I believe, ISHIWATA taking the position of Finance Minister, otherwise remained the same. That is to say, YONAI, Navy; ITAGAKI, Army; and ARITA, Foreign Minister. As you asked me the other day - there was at this time, I believe, a great deal of change of ideas taking place in Japan - why the Inner Cabinet had met 82 times. Of course, it is only rumor that has it that they met 82 times, but I have this story also. In any case, it is my own personal opinion and belief that if they did meet this number of times it was because it was in this period that the Government's views were changing. In this regard it is logical to believe that they did meet many times, for I did not receive orders from Japan regularly and that would indicate that there was some difference of opinion.
- Q. General, it is my understanding that the 75 or 80 meetings of the 5-man Inner Cabinet were meetings of such Inner Cabinet of the HIRANUMA Government?

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- A. Yes, that was the Hiramuma Cabinet - however, I do not know whether it was actually 82 times or not.
- Q. And in your recital of events you have now come to the point where the HIRANUMA Cabinet assumed office, is that correct?
- A. Yes, we have come to this point in my narrative. I say that I believe they must have been having differences of opinion because while I would hear that the 5-man Committee had met, over the radio orders would not be forthcoming after each meeting.
- Q. As a matter of fact, General, these differences of opinion were rather prevalent during the Cabinet that preceded the HIRANUMA Cabinet, namely, the KONOYE Cabinet?
- A. All went well through the start of negotiations, but after that differences arose.
- Q. Continue.
- A. Because of a situation such as I have just told you about, we could not proceed to a point where we could discuss details of the treaty or what to do in case of an attack by a specific nation. In other words, because of indecision on the part of Japan it became difficult to continue in negotiations. As I told you the other day I appointed two men from my Embassy, USAMI and TAKEUCHI to meet with Gaus of the German Foreign Office with a view to drawing up a treaty which would be acceptable to both nations, but this plan also met with no success. At this point in May 1939, Germany concluded the German-Italian Pact which, as you know, was a very strong treaty - and which, I believe, was brought about by Japan's dilly-dallying. And so this sort of thing went on until August 1939. Sometime around the end of August 1939 - I believe it was the 22d, although I am not sure - Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R. The Japanese Government protested the signing of this pact, stating that it was not in accord with and a repudiation of the Anti-Comintern Pact; at the same time she stated that because Germany had concluded this pact while discussions were in process regarding a Tripartite Pact that she now felt obliged to break off all further negotiations.
- Q. General, did you personally have any advance information or any advance knowledge regarding the negotiations between Germany and Russia that led to the signing of the non-aggression pact between those two nations?

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- A. Sometime around the end of April 1939, at a reception held in honor of Hitler's birthday, at which all the Ambassadors and Ministers of Japan in Europe were invited to, Ribbentrop spoke to SHIRATORI and me, saying that should negotiations be delayed too long, it might become necessary for Germany to think over a non-aggression pact with Russia. In addition I did hear from time to time from my intelligence sources that discussions were going on.
- Q. Following this reception in honor of Hitler's birthday, which all of you Ambassadors and Ministers attended, did you then communicate the information that you received from Ribbentrop to your Foreign Office in Tokyo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you receive any reply or comment from your Foreign Office in Tokyo relative to this?
- A. As I recall it, they said that they thought this was a move on Ribbentrop's part to hurry us and, therefore, not too much credence should be placed upon his statements. I myself felt the same way.
- Q. General, are you sure that at no time prior to Hitler's birthday party you ever discussed the possibility of such a pact between Germany and Russia with Ribbentrop or any of Ribbentrop's associates?
- A. No. That was the first time. Hitler's birthday is around the 20th or 21st of April. However, a day or perhaps two, before the actual signing I was notified that it would take place.
- Q. General, at the time Ribbentrop told you of his intentions in this regard at the birthday party, what did you say to him?
- A. As it was at the scene of the reception and not a place to raise a fuss and, further, as I thought it was simply a move to hurry us, I do not recall making any special comment.
- Q. You must have said something, General.
- A. Of course, I must have said that we would hurry proceedings or that we would think it over, but as it was at a reception it was certainly not the place to start discussing international affairs.

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- Q. Did you ever following that reception and before sending your despatch to Japan meet with Ribbentrop and talk this matter over?
- A. No, not in regard to that. You must realize that later after the non-aggression pact was signed, what he had said took on great importance, but at the time it seemed to be just a maneuver to speed us up.
- Q. It seems to me that this maneuver or threat or pressure move on the part of Ribbentrop, anything you want to call it, was of such importance that it is unusual for you not to at least have talked to him a little bit about it before sending a despatch to Tokyo. Are you sure you did not talk to him about it?
- A. No, I did not.
- Q. It is now time for us to recess for today. Just let me make this observation: You have told us today about the time the Hiranuma Cabinet came in. You have now told us events that transpired immediately before the Hiranuma Cabinet fell, and the Hiranuma Cabinet did fall immediately after this non-aggression pact was signed. It seems to me there must be considerable detail between the start of the Hiranuma Cabinet and the fall of the Hiranuma Cabinet that made it necessary for them to have these 75 meetings of the Inner Cabinet, that you have not told us. When we come back tomorrow, maybe you can tell us more about the events of this period before we pick the story up after the signing of the non-aggression pact.
- A. Essentially, all details were concerned with how to reach a half-way point where we might meet and our sole concern with exceedingly small matters, that it is very difficult for me to relate them, unless I have the text of my communications and those from the Foreign Office before me. That is the first point, and the second is that apart from these small matters, no major things were discussed.

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 12 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 day of
February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 11th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

G. Osmond Hyde

Feb. 16, 1946
Date

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 12 February 1946, 1400-1615

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, if I understood you correctly yesterday when we were discussing the time Ribbentrop mentioned to you the idea that Germany might seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at Hitler's birthday party, you stated that you had also received information regarding that matter from your intelligence sources. Now tell us, if when you received this information from your intelligence sources, which I assume was before Ribbentrop told you about it, you communicated the information to your Foreign Office in Tokyo?
- A. The information that I said I received from intelligence sources was not concrete at all and was simply rumors which abounded around Berlin at the time that Germany and the U.S.S.R. were entering into negotiations regarding an economic pact (trade pact). These rumors I did not pass on to my Government in Tokyo. Further, I wish to make it clear that when Ribbentrop spoke to me at the time of a party in celebration of Hitler's birthday, which was held at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin, Ribbentrop did not state that he was entering into negotiations with Russia. When he spoke to SHIRATORI and me around one or two A. M. in the morning following the party, he said that if the matter of a pact between Germany and Japan continued in the stage of talks for too long a period it might become necessary for Germany to clasp hands with Russia in one way or another. That was all.

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- Q. General, I understood you to say yesterday that Ribbentrop was very definite in stating that it might become necessary to seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at the time of this party.
- A. Yes, he did say non-aggression pact.
- Q. Now, General, had you before that evening heard through your intelligence sources that Germany might seek such a pact with Russia?
- A. No. I did not. I honestly believe that there was no thought of such a pact at the time and that only after Germany and Russia entered into economic negotiations did the matter first come up.
- Q. Now, yesterday, General, you indicated that when you communicated to your Foreign Office in Tokyo the substance of what Ribbentrop had told you at the party, your Foreign Office indicated to you in reply that this was just a little threat or pressure or talk and did not take it very seriously, is that correct?
- A. Yes, that was what they thought, especially as it was contrary to the provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
- Q. After you sent this despatch to your Government and before the non-aggression pact was signed, during that period of time, even before Ribbentrop told you that it was going to be signed, did you hear about it through your intelligence sources?
- A. Following this talk with Ribbentrop, in which he stated what I have told you previously, Germany in June or July, 1939, entered into trade pact negotiations with Russia. At this time we were also drawing up a trade pact with Germany. There were rumors which, while they were not definitely based on any specific intelligence, said that Germany was hiding these non-aggression pact discussions under the cloak of the discussions for the trade pact. I recall seeing Ribbentrop once during the discussions relative to our trade pact and at this time I asked him if it was true whether Germany was contemplating a non-aggression pact. He said such stories were simply rumors and that Germany had no such thought in mind. I particularly wish to point out to you that these so-called bits of intelligence that I received were not definite, but simply very loose rumors. As you are now interrogating me on details, I think I should bring up a few further points here in order to clear up matters which may be vague in your mind. Sometime around the 20th of August 1939, I

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received a phone call from Ribbentrop, who was in South Germany at that time, at Fuschl. He stated that Germany was about to sign a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R., so please let the Japanese Government know about it and explain to them as best I could. I said that I thought that this was contrary to the provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact and that I felt very hurt about it. Ribbentrop said that he did not feel it was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact, as Germany's position at the time was such that it was inevitable.

Later, I again met Ribbentrop after the treaty had been signed and I asked him at that time why he had not let me know about the matter long beforehand. His answer was that discussions regarding the non-aggression pact had come up suddenly during the trade pact negotiations and that he did not have any time in which to let me know.

- Q. General, yesterday in response to my question as to whether or not you had received information regarding this non-aggression pact from sources other than Ribbentrop on the night of that birthday party, you said this: "In addition I did hear from time to time from my intelligence sources that discussions were going on." Now, yesterday, when you told me that, you put no strings on it; now today, you change that somewhat. Now it is not clear to me what you meant yesterday if what you say today is true.
- A. I am not changing my story from that which I told you yesterday. In the first place I had no actual intelligence organization and the intelligence (Joho) that I received came from various public sources. I could use the word "rumor" (Uwasa), but that might be too weak, so I say "intelligence" - this is not, however, meant to mean actual intelligence sources.
- Q. Now, General, tell me this, did you communicate to your Government in Tokyo the information that you received from the sources that you have just explained to us?
- A. I did not, for two reasons: first, that I did not believe this information was very creditable, and secondly, while today it certainly appears that I should have paid more attention to it, at the time I did not feel that Germany would carry on negotiations that would lead to what I thought was a violation of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

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- Q. General, you indicated a little while ago that you had a conversation with Ribbentrop in which he told you about the discussions going on between Germany and Russia relative to a trade pact, and if I understood you clearly, you stated that at that time you questioned Ribbentrop if they were also doing this as a method of covering up discussions relative to a non-aggression pact. Am I correct in that?
- A. There is not much actual difference in the way you put it and what I actually did - the trade pact was being negotiated with officials of the Foreign Office and not Ribbentrop directly, but when it was drafted and signed provisionally Ribbentrop made an appearance, and at this time I said to him that there was some talk of German-Soviet negotiations relative to a non-aggression pact, but was this true. He definitely said that no such thing was contemplated and that they were simply discussing a trade treaty.
- Q. General, were you there when this document was signed provisionally, or where were you that Ribbentrop put in this appearance to talk with you?
- A. I was at the Foreign Office to sign the provisional trade pact for my Government and Ribbentrop came to witness the ceremony.
- Q. General, the trade pact that you are talking about is the trade pact between Germany and Japan, and Ribbentrop put in his appearance at the time that document was provisionally signed as between those two countries, is that correct?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. And while Ribbentrop was there on that occasion you had this discussion with him relative to his negotiations with Russia concerning a trade pact between Germany and Russia and then you inquired if there is anything to this story that they were actually contemplating a non-aggression pact. Am I correct?
- A. That is essentially correct, except that I made no mention of the trade pact (between Russia and Germany), as I was already aware that these negotiations were going on.
- Q. General, you evidently were somewhat suspicious of the negotiations between Germany and Russia. By that I mean, you personally evidently were of the opinion that maybe these negotiations relative to a trade pact were in fact a

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means of covering up negotiations for a non-aggression pact. I am wondering whether you passed on those suspicions to your Government in Tokyo, or whether you just waited to see what happened.

- A. I was not suspicious as an individual. I simply brought up the matter of these rumors, as there was an opportunity to do so when I met Ribbentrop at this provisional signing. In this regard I might point out that had there been or had we thought that there was any credence to be placed on these rumors the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. also should have heard about them and passed on the word to Japan.
- Q. General, did you not think it rather unusual for Germany to negotiate a trade pact with Russia during a period of time when Germany and Japan were attempting to negotiate a pact that had Russia as its primary objective?
- A. There was absolutely no reason why they should not negotiate trade pacts. This right was definitely put down in the secret pact that we had signed previously.
- Q. That is the secret pact signed at the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact?
- A. Yes.
- Q. General, are you absolutely positive that you never had any suspicions regarding negotiations between Germany and Russia relative to this trade pact, even though Ribbentrop on the occasion of Hitler's birthday party had suggested to you that Germany might discuss a non-aggression pact with Russia?
- A. I had no such suspicions whatsoever.
- Q. Now, General, to clear up one or two more points: yesterday and before yesterday we have been talking about the ITO Commission. According to my information HIRANUMA became the Head of the Cabinet on January 5, 1939, and it was after HIRANUMA became Prime Minister that the ITO Commission left Tokyo, was it not?
- A. Yes, I believe it was after HIRANUMA took office.
- Q. Now, yesterday you made reference to the pact that was signed between Italy and Germany in 1939. I believe you indicated that was in May 1939, is that correct?
- A. Yes. It was in May.

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- Q. Now, General, the pact that was signed between Germany and Italy in May 1939, was the pact that Germany wanted Japan to join in, was it not?
- A. No. It is an entirely different pact. In the first place it was a very strong treaty and had nothing to do with mutual aid in case of unprovoked aggression, but went much further; that is point number one. Secondly, this is something I can tell you absolutely without any equivocation: Ribbentrop told me definitely that the contemplated treaty with Japan was of an entirely different nature and had nothing whatsoever to do with the German-Italian pact. Further, I know this to be a fact. I had this written down as I intended to tell you of it later.
- Q. General, my information is that Japan was urged to join the pact that was signed on May 1939, but they elected not to, - to remain aloof.
- A. No, that is not correct.
- Q. I have information also, General, that both you and SHIRATORI were reluctant to communicate to the German Government the fact that Japan would not join in the pact and that for a time there you even stayed away from Hitler and from Ribbentrop?
- A. No, that is not correct. It is absolutely false.
- Q. Did Hitler at any time threaten to renounce the Anti-Comintern Pact?
- A. No.
- Q. I have information to the effect that at the time Italy and Germany entered into the pact on May 1939, and Japan refused to do so, that Hitler became very angry and that at that time he threatened to renounce the Anti-Comintern Pact. Do you deny that?
- A. That is entirely untrue. What I heard from Ribbentrop later was that this treaty was signed primarily because Italy wished it, and that the plans for the three-power pact remained exactly the same as previously.
- Q. All right, General, let us pick up your story at the point where you left off yesterday.
- A. I have already spoken to you today about the telephone conversation with Ribbentrop in which he told me of the non-aggression pact. I was intending to speak to you of this in

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any case. I was very hurt and also felt bad about the way in which it had come about and immediately sent a despatch to Japan about the matter. So, actually, not only did negotiations regarding the Tripartite Pact cease with the signing of the non-aggression pact by Germany, but actually it broke up the Anti-Comintern Pact also. This, of course, also includes the secret pact which, for all practical reasons, was as dead as the other. Naturally, later when the Tripartite Pact was actually consummated it follows that the anti-Comintern Pact was resurrected also. One point - there was a provision within the Anti-Comintern Pact, which spoke of a joint commission being set up, but this was also never actually put into effect and I believe personally that Germany wished to have provisions of this sort in order to make a good front and nothing else. I heard later from Luther, an Under-Secretary in the German Foreign Office, that Ribbentrop had great difficulty in consummating the non-aggression pact when the Anti-Comintern Pact was still in effect. Now, in regard to your statement of the other day that the Anti-Comintern Pact helped Germany to rearm - I might say that during the China incident Germany had been sending a good deal of arms to China, not to mention military advisors. After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact we requested Germany to stop sending arms, but this was a period of economic depression in Germany and it was a means for her to get rid of her old arms, so that a stop was not immediately put to this trade. It would seem that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not a popular pact in Germany among a certain group. I particularly wish to ask that you be very careful in your analysis of this pact (the Tripartite Pact) for the following reasons: (1) the negotiations leading up to the pact were going on for a period of about one year, and (2) they were terminated before discussions of small details had come about. For this reason, many wild stories and rumors regarding it were current - in other words, people would make surmises without having anything to base their facts upon. I do not think there was any pact that had quite so much talk connected with it as this one. I have tried to tell you as accurately and as honestly as is within my power and recollection of the events relative to the Tripartite Pact, from my standpoint as Ambassador in Germany. However, I do not know of some of the events that might have transpired in Japan, so I suggest that you examine that side of it carefully. I would like to

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state here that if you wish to question me upon details I will try and dig back into my memory and give you the facts as I know them. Further, if there are any documents upon which you wish to question me I shall do all I can to clear up any matters.

- Q. General, it was my thought that if you continue with the recital of your story of this Tripartite Pact with as little interruption from me as possible it would be helpful. It is my purpose when we are concluded hearing your story to ask you questions about parts not definitely clear to me. I still think it would be helpful if you would continue on with the story. As a matter of fact, we have now reached the stage where the first series of negotiations ended. The Tripartite Pact in your story has not yet come into existence.
- A. There is a final point which I wish to bring up here, which is that while the Tripartite Pact was signed in September 1940, and the German Ambassador, Stahmer, came to Japan - I met him in ^{an} unofficial capacity and we did not discuss the pact - I had nothing whatsoever to do with the final consummation of the treaty.
- Q. General, you don't suggest that Stahmer went to Japan at the time the treaty was signed, do you? It is a fact that he was over there sometime before that, is it not?
- A. Stahmer came to Japan twice - first with Herzog (Duke) Coburg in connection with Red Cross work, and the second time around the end of August 1940, at which time he discussed the Tripartite Pact in Japan. This, I know to be a fact. The Pact, itself, of course, was signed around the end of September in Berlin.
- Q. Now, General, after the first series of negotiations collapsed and Russia and Germany entered into the non-aggression pact, the HIRANUMA Government resigned, did it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What happened to you, General?
- A. I had put in my resignation prior to that on the 20th ^{something} of August following the report from Ribbentrop.
- Q. Why did you resign?
- A. I was extremely displeased with the way Germany had behaved and saw no way of carrying on my duties in Germany.

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- Q. But you did not work for Germany; you worked for Japan?
- A. That is true, but I did not desire to continue dealing with people who could not be trusted.
- Q. On the contrary, General, is not this the fact, that when the Government in Tokyo changed, that you were out of sympathy with those in the Foreign Office in Tokyo, and that is the reason you wanted to resign?
- A. No. It was before the Cabinet resigned.
- Q. Well, General, even before the Cabinet resigned, you knew, you must have known, that the then Prime Minister was not too much in favor of the pact the way you wanted it, is not that a fact?
- A. No, that is not true. I realize that there are stories to the effect that I had some sort of pact of my own in mind, but I was never concerned with anything beyond the orders from my Government. In this regard, if you are able to procure the drafts of some of the proposals which USAMI and TAKEUCHI prepared in conjunction with Gaus of the German Foreign Office, I think you will see that what I am saying is correct, and that we were simply trying to reach a middle point which would be favorable to both Governments.
- Q. But it is not clear to me, General, now, why you should resign in the middle of all of this, unless your views were sympathetic with the views of Germany and not sympathetic with the views of your superiors in Tokyo?
- A. This might be hard to understand, but it is Japanese tradition - I had believed that they would not do anything to violate provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and when they did they had broken confidence with me, and hence it was impossible for me to keep on dealing with them.
- Q. What happened to SHIRATORI?
- A. He resigned also.
- Q. Do you know why he resigned?
- A. For the same reason, I believe.
- Q. Now, General, when you use this word "resigned", what do you mean?
- A. I put in my resignation to the Foreign Office. Of course, my tenure of office as Ambassador does not cease until I reach Japan.

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Q. Where were you going to work after that; you were retired from the Army and you have now resigned as Ambassador. What were you going to do?

A. I did not intend to do anything.

Q. General, this is all very strange to me, and I am wondering why your Foreign Office did not know you resigned.

A. They should know.

Q. The information I have is that you did not resign, but on the contrary both you and SHIRATORI were recalled to Tokyo by your own Government.

A. That is a base lie - a gargantuan falsehood. In fact, I was asked to stay on for sometime, but I flatly refused.

Q. General, I have made it my business since our first meeting to have this matter checked with your Foreign Office, and your Foreign Office no later than this week has informed us that you were recalled from Germany.

A. I can not see why such a statement should have been made. Naturally, the orders for my recall come from the Foreign Office, but it is absolutely true that I sent a telegram around the 21st, or 22d of August, asking that I be relieved of my post.

Q. When was your resignation accepted?

A. October, I believe, 1939.

Q. Now, General, when you returned to Tokyo, what did you do then?

A. I did nothing.

Q. Did you not stay in the employ of the Foreign Office?

A. I arrived back in Japan in December and severed all connections with the Government. SHIRATORI continued as Ambassador without assignment and I believe subsequently became one of the advisors to the Foreign Office.

Q. In what Division of the Foreign Office did SHIRATORI work?

A. I am not absolutely sure of what he did, but I believe, as I stated, that he was first an Ambassador without assignment, and later became an advisor.

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CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, U.S.N.R., Serial No. 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 10 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

F. B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16 day of February 1946.

G. Osmond Hyde

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section,
GHQ, SCAP

CERTIFICATE OF STENOGRAPHER

I, Lucille C. Brunner, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Lucille C. Brunner

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATOR

I, G. Osmond Hyde, certify that on the 12th day of February 1946, personally appeared before me OSHIMA, Hiroshi, and according to Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

February 16, 1946
Date

G. Osmond Hyde

INTERROGATION OF

General OSHIMA, Hiroshi (Cont'd)

Date and Time: 13 February, 1946, 1415-1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : OSHIMA, Hiroshi
G. Osmond Hyde, Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. F. B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Lucille C. Brunner, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Hyde

Lt. Comdr. Huggins, the interpreter, having been duly sworn on previous interrogations of General OSHIMA, now continues to interpret from English to Japanese and from Japanese into English, as required in this proceeding.

- Q. General, as we were leaving yesterday you indicated that there was another pact that you would like to tell us about today. You may proceed with that.
- A. This pact - the no-separate peace treaty - was consummated between Japan, Germany, and Italy on December 11, 1941.
- Q. General, probably we had better defer talking about this pact until a little later because this pact was consummated at a date somewhat beyond the period of time that we are talking about at the present time. Yesterday we were discussing whether you resigned or whether you were recalled as Ambassador from Germany and I indicated to you that I had information from the Foreign Office to the effect that you were recalled and did not resign. I checked this matter when I returned to the office last night and I have since learned that the information I had was not from the Foreign Office, but was from the newspapers and I have since obtained information from other sources to the effect that you did resign. At any rate I have been told by my informant that you sent a telegram of resignation and that you left Germany for Japan without a reply having been received by you to that telegram. I just want to be fair about this and let you know about the information I have received.
- A. I did receive permission from my Government to return, however. There may be some mistakes because of my memory being off, but on the whole I believe that what I have told you is entirely correct.

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- Q. Now, General, in our discussions you have told us about your trip to Italy that you made at the request of Ribbentrop and with the approval of your own Government to discuss with the Italian authorities the matter of Italy joining with Germany and Japan in the proposed Tripartite Pact. Now, I would like you to tell us the details of the conversations that you had in Italy, with whom you spoke and what reasons were advanced by the Italian authorities for not indicating a willingness to join with Germany and Japan at the time you were there.
- A. As I have already recounted to you when Germany approached Italy originally the Italians stated that they were in accord with the overall plan, but that their time for joining was not yet ripe. I also told you how Ribbentrop asked me to go to Italy to urge them further and also I told you how I received the permission of my Government to do so, as there was no bona-fide Ambassador from Japan in Italy at the time. In any case I proceeded to Rome and met Mussolini and Ciano, at the Palazzo Venetia and spoke to them saying that Japan also wished Italy to join in this pact. Mussolini answered that while he was entirely in accord with its provisions the time was not yet opportune for Italy to join in, as he felt that the people of Italy would have to be behind such a treaty - that is to say, feel that it was profitable. Mussolini further said that he was now investigating how the people would feel about it and that as soon as he felt the moment was ripe he would join in. I could not then say much more and the matter was left at this.
- Q. General, do you know or have any information regarding any conversations between the Italian authorities and Ribbentrop on the subject of such a pact subsequent to your visit there and before SHIRATORI went down?
- A. Yes, definitely.
- Q. Do you know what was said in those conversations.
- A. I misunderstood your question - I thought you meant before I had gone to Italy. After my visit and before SHIRATORI arrived I do not believe that Germany and Italy had any talks on this matter. In any case Germany never told me that there had been any such talks.
- Q. In response to my questions you/probably know of some conversations that took place between the Italian authorities and Ribbentrop or his representatives before you went down to Italy. Tell us about those conversations.
- indicated that you

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- A. Those were the talks in which Italy stated that she was not yet ready to join and which resulted in Ribbentrop asking me to work on the matter.
- Q. Now, General, if my memory is correct, it was sometime in January of 1939, that Italy informed Ribbentrop that they were ready to join in the proposed pact.
- A. That is correct. Sometime around the beginning of January.
- Q. Now in May 1939, which is about a little over three months following these conversations, Italy and Germany joined in the pact that you referred to yesterday. That is correct, is it not?
- A. That is correct, in May.
- Q. Would you tell us, if you know, when the conversations between Italy and Germany, looking toward the signing of the pact that they entered into in May 1939, commenced?
- A. That I do not know.
- Q. You told us yesterday that the pact that they entered into, that is, Italy and Germany, in May 1939, was a stronger pact than the pact that it was proposed should be entered into by Italy, Germany and Japan. Now, I am just wondering, General, how and when Italy, after being reluctant to indicate before January their willingness to go along with the three of you in the weaker pact, suddenly decided to go along with Germany in the stronger pact.
- A. Your question is quite natural, Mr. Hyde, as I feel that would be a natural thought in your mind as to why Italy was willing to enter such a strong pact when she had been reluctant to enter into the three-power weaker pact. Naturally, I have my own personal views on the matter, but I know nothing official as nobody told me anything about it. However, if you wish to hear these, I shall gladly tell you.
- Q. I would like to hear them.
- A. As I just stated, this is simply my own opinion. I feel that because Chamberlain was scheduled to come to Rome sometime around the 10th of January to talk over Italo-British Mediterranean problems that Mussolini did not wish to have anything like a three-power pact standing in the way of free talks with Chamberlain. This, I think, was his original idea, but in time he must have come to the conclusion that nothing much would result from the talks anyway, so contrariwise, it would be opportune to have such a pact and hence

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he told Germany in the beginning of January 1939, that Italy was willing to join. Now, following this talk with Chamberlain, which came to naught, and because the three-power pact was dawdling along in a negotiation stage he must have decided that he would enter a strong pact with Germany. Once again, I must repeat that this is simply my own idea.

Q. So that, General, it would appear, would it not, that the Axis pact of May 1939, in fact, grew out of the conversations that in the beginning contemplated the Tripartite Pact?

A. I do not believe you can put it quite that way. I feel that conditions in Europe were such at the time as to inevitably lead towards a German-Italian alliance, and to say that the Tripartite Pact negotiations led to the German-Italian pact would be to confuse the positions of the guest and host. In this connection, I feel that they may have thought that the three-power pact negotiations were a hindrance to signing the other pact, for I recall speaking to Ribbentrop and saying that it seemed rather inopportune for them to sign a separate pact with Italy when we were still in the stage of negotiations on the other. In regard to the conditions that I spoke of at the time, this was the period when the Sudeten Land, Austrian and other matters were at the front of European problems. This was also the time of the Munich meeting and German-Italian relations were very close.

Q. Now, actually, General, the first conversations that you have told us about between Germany and Italy relative to an alliance or proposed alliance were conversations looking to the Tripartite Pact. Then you told us that Italy was reluctant at first for the reasons you have indicated and then later agreed to come along. Then we come into a period of difficulty with the Japanese Government as to the terms and provisions that should go into this treaty and nothing is done and then comes the Axis Pact of May 1939. It would seem logical to me that the conversations that finally resulted in the pact between Germany and Italy in May 1939, must have been the conversations that you told us about that commenced in December 1938. How can it be otherwise?

A. I still do not think you can put it that way. Conditions and German-Italian relations were such that the pact was inevitable and pact or no pact, they were very closely tied up together. In fact, I think that the fact that we were

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discussing a three-power pact slowed up, rather than accelerated, the signing of the German-Italian Pact.

- Q. Now, General, that is just my point. Mussolini, when you went down there was reluctant to sign even a weaker pact and still he came along later, and a very short time later, and signed the stronger pact. I can not see how the stronger one would cause any reluctance with respect to the weaker one. To me it just is not reasonable.
- A. I think it is a very natural consequence and not strange at all. As I said, he was probably reluctant originally because of his forthcoming talks with Chamberlain, but after nothing came of them, he, that is to say, Mussolini, realized probably that he should conclude a strong alliance with Germany, and the natural consequence of this was the May 1939 pact.
- Q. Now, General, yesterday you told us about the party held in April 1939, in honor of Hitler's birthday, at which all the Japanese Ministers and Ambassadors in Europe were present. You told yesterday about the conversation that you then had with Ribbentrop. Now, did you not also, both you and SHIRATORI, at that same party also have a conversation with Hitler?
- A. No. Not at that time.
- Q. At what time did you have a conversation with Hitler on this subject.
- A. I met Hitler along with the other Ambassadors - I should add here that these were the Ambassadors to the nations that had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, and not from all over Europe, at a tea party that he gave on the afternoon of the evening party that I have told you of.
- Q. That is on April 20, 1939?
- A. I am not sure whether it was the 20th or not, but in any case it was Hitler's birthday.
- Q. And on that occasion Ambassador SHIRATORI was present also, was he not?
- A. Yes; in addition there was YANO, the Minister at Madrid, and the Military Attache from the Hungarian Ministry.

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Q. General, will you tell us the substance of the conversation that took place on that occasion?

A. It was at the tea party, where many people were present, and he simply spent a few minutes with different members, so that he did not discuss any special matters.

Q. But is it not a fact that on that occasion, both you and SHIRATORI in your conversation with Hitler agreed to do your utmost with a view to perfecting the Tripartite Pact, which was then only in the stage of negotiations?

A. I have no remembrance of saying anything of the sort.

Q. Do you deny that you said anything of the sort?

A. Yes. Of course, he probably made some ceremonial remark to the effect that he hoped German-Japanese relations would continue on a friendly basis or something of the sort, but on any specific matter we did not speak.

Q. You are positive about that, are you, General?

A. Yes.

Q. General, I have information from what purports to be a reliable source. It is from that information that I knew about this meeting you had with Hitler, so my informants knew you were there and they tell me that you and SHIRATORI had a long conversation with Hitler on the general subject of this proposed Tripartite Pact.

A. I do not believe we spoke about the Tripartite Pact. You say a long time, but it was not a situation where one could speak for a long time.

Q. Now, General, you have recited to us a rather detailed story of the events and negotiations looking to the Tripartite Pact. You have mentioned conversations you have had with Ribbentrop. Is it not a fact that Ribbentrop named Mr. Stahmer or appointed Mr. Stahmer as a sort of go-between to work with you on this matter.

A. As Ambassador.

Q. No. Not as Ambassador; as a representative from the Foreign Office to work with you in Berlin carrying on conversations and discussions with you about the matter you, as Ambassador, and he, as representative from the German Foreign Office, were working out the problem.

A. Yes. He was the liaison man in Berlin.