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SPEECH
OF
HON. ROSCOE CONKLING,
OF NEW YORK.

Delivered in the House of Representatives, January 6, 1862.

Mr. ROSCOE CONKLING said :

Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of privilege.

On the second day of the present session a resolution was adopted by the House in relation to the battle at Ball's Bluff. The resolution proposed no investigation whatever. It did not require the disclosure of any fact or circumstance which had been ascertained by any investigation already had. It simply requested the Secretary of War to inform the House whether any, and if any, what measures had been taken to ascertain who was responsible for a disastrous battle. It did not demand the name of the person, nor even ask whether there was any such person.

The resolution was referred by the Secretary of War to the Adjutant General, and was by him submitted to the General-in-Chief, as appears by the report of the Adjutant General laid upon our tables. The General-in-Chief, I am willing to believe, did not read the resolution, because I would not impute to any one concerned an intention to trifle with the House, or to return an evasive answer. If he did read it, he entirely mistook its point and purport. He seems to have received the impression that the resolution proposed a future investigation, and that of a very general character; and laboring under this misapprehension he expressed an opinion to the Adjutant General, upon which that officer made to the Secretary of War a report in no sense responsive to the resolution, and the Secretary, in accordance, no doubt, with the practice of his office, simply transmitted that report to us, and refers us to it.

To a resolution asking simply whether an investigation has been had upon a particular point, the answer is that the General-in-Chief of the army is of opinion that an inquiry on the subject of the resolution would at this time be injurious to the public service. If the

answer had been that it would be injurious to the public service to say whether any steps or proceedings had been taken to ascertain who was at fault, the answer might have been incredible, but still it would have been an answer, in form at least.

The SPEAKER. The Chair thinks he must submit the proposition which the gentleman claims to be a question of privilege to the House, to decide whether it is a question of privilege which they will entertain, before any discussion can be had.

Mr. ROSCOE CONKLING. I was endeavoring to pave the way to a decision of the question of privilege, by bringing to the House and to the Chair the knowledge that to an appropriate resolution, an answer has been sent here, perhaps inadvertently, which is wholly evasive and non-responsive to the resolution.

The SPEAKER put to the House the question whether they would entertain as a question of privilege the matter stated by the gentleman from New York, and it was decided in the affirmative.

Mr. ROSCOE CONKLING. I was about to say that if the resolution had called upon the War Department to disclose the name of the person culpable, and an answer had come here that it would not be compatible with the public interest to disclose the name, the answer might have been preposterous, but still it would have been an answer in form, and responsive. But here comes a communication professing to be an answer, which neither answers the interrogatory, nor informs us that in the opinion of any person it would be injurious to the public service to answer it. The reply does not, indeed, refer at all, or relate at all, to the point of the inquiry. To a question whether a particular thing has been done, the Adjutant General reports that, in the opinion of the General-in-

Chief, it would be injurious to do some other thing.

This, however inadvertent it may have been, raises a very high question of privilege. We sit here as the Representatives of the people; we sit here as their only Representatives. In our organism this is the only place to which the people can come, or in which their voices can be heard, and among the most undeniable and sacred of their prerogatives is the right to inquire into their own affairs. When they do inquire they are entitled, if not to an answer, at least to have the servant of whom the inquiry is made say that in his opinion it is ill-timed and injudicious; and until we desert our trusts and become accomplices in trampling upon popular rights, we cannot pass over an instance like this, even in an ordinary and unimportant case. A precedent of this sort once established, such a practice once tolerated, and particularly from the military element in the Government, and from that hour the most robust of our instincts would languish; the most vital of our reliances would decay. I say that in case of an ordinary matter such a practice is not to be endured, but that even in common-place and trivial concerns, the right of inquiry ought to be jealously preserved.

But this is no ordinary matter. The resolution relates to a great national concern; it relates to an event which I believe to be the most atrocious military murder ever committed in our history as a people. It relates to a lost field; to a disastrous and humiliating battle; to a decisive triumph of rebellion. It relates to something more; it relates to a blunder so gross that all men can see it, and no man has ever dared deny or defend it—a blunder which, besides position, besides defeat, besides arms and munitions of war, cost us confessedly nine hundred and thirty men, many of them the very pride and flower of the States from which they came.

The resolution proposed, in respect to the memory of the lost, in sympathy to the multitude of mourners who lament them, in deference to public propriety and self-respect, that the nation should be assured that the military authorities had taken some notice of this prodigal and needless slaughter of the sons of New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania; it proposed that the nation should know that some proceeding had taken place, something open or secret, formal or informal; if not all that military usage requires, then something or other, or an apology for something.

Now, sir, if there is any objection to this; if there is any objection to our knowing whether the 21st of October has been passed over as a mere ripple in the current of events, then, in the name of my people, I demand that those whose business it is to answer, should stand up and stand out and say so. With that view I have prepared a resolution which I propose to submit, and although this question

of privilege may not allow me to do so, I shall feel grateful to the House if I may be indulged in going into the subject of the resolution, and assigning my reasons for pressing an inquiry. We have a committee appointed to investigate the conduct of the war, and if it is known, and known at this time, that the disaster at Ball's Bluff is likely to be embraced in their inquiry, facts and witnesses will be presented to the committee.

The House is no doubt aware that the battle of Ball's Bluff, like many other things, has been made the subject of an issue between the regular army and the volunteers. Brigadier General Stone, who was at the time commanding the division from which the detachment came, which fought the battle, or attempted to fight it, is an officer of the regular army, and Colonel Baker, to whom, after a time, the command, or a part of the command, was assigned, was a volunteer. The friends of these two officers have indulged in much angry controversy as to which should bear the blame; and on the one side the cause has been espoused as if its appropriate office was to fasten some stigma on the volunteer service, and to determine certain questions of precedence and merit between West Point and the volunteers for the Union. A writer in the New York Times stated, some time ago, that the friends of Colonel Baker would move an investigation but that they had better not, for if they did the friends of General Stone would retaliate, and make it recoil upon Baker and damage his memory. Mr. Speaker, I have no sympathy with this controversy to indulge in here. I have no patience with it as an obstacle to investigation; I have no toleration for it as far as it has been used to trade upon the affections and to hush and scare off, with the friends of either party, discussion and inquiry. The effect on either of these officers or on both of them, of disclosing the truth, ought not in my judgment to weigh one feather against an investigation being had. Hit whom it may, I believe the truth should be known. Suppose its revelation shall shorten the plume of a dead Senator—what then? Is that a reason, in a great public concern like this, why we should hush investigation, or falsify the truth of history? Suppose, on the other hand, it turns out that a brigadier general, bred at West Point, an officer of the regular army, holding the acting position of a major general, commanding a division containing thousands of our countrymen, charged with their safety, their honor, and their lives; suppose, I say, it turns out that such a brigadier general is a martinet and not a soldier; suppose he turns out to be half-way, either in his soldiery or his loyalty: is that a reason why investigation should be muzzled or throttled out of regard to his feelings or the feelings of his caste? Shall we proclaim indulgence for ignorance and incompetency, immunity for

barbarous negligence, silence for military crimes, even though a revelation of the truth would soil the glittering plumage of the highest officer in the armies of the Republic? No, sir; whoever is responsible for that fatal field, if he yet lives, ought to be nightly on his knees imploring forgiveness for the mighty murder he there committed. If Baker did it, 'twas a grievous fault, and grievously hath Baker answered it." If Stone did it, he bears a weight of guilt greater, far greater, than many a man has atoned for with his life, who suffered under the judgment of military tribunals, whose moderation and impartiality have never been denied. What is the personal fate or the personal fame of a dozen generals when compared with the preservation, the security, the maintenance of that great army now standing in the field. With six hundred thousand men—more men, I will hazard the assertion, than any man knows what to do with—with sixty-three thousand cavalry—although we were told in July we needed none—more cavalry than any man will ever find a place for: with an outgo of \$2,000,000 a day, we have been for months guarding a beleaguered city. We have been doing something more. We have been making, now and then, an advance; and almost as often as we have made one we have been outnumbered and ignominiously defeated. I have no doubt, sir, that results of this sort sometimes occur when human foresight cannot prevent them; but when they occur from gross negligence or ignorance, and we all know it, I say it behooves us to investigate them, and to hold them up, in order that we may see round and round, who is responsible for them. If we cannot have indemnity for the past, in the name of humanity let us have security for the future. If we are to preserve the military principle at all, let us preserve the whole of it. If not, introduce into the army the democratic principle, and when an order is given put it to a vote whether it shall be obeyed or not; but if orders are to be implicitly obeyed, let us have responsibility, rigid responsibility, on the part of those who give them.

Now, sir, let me look a few moments at the battle of Ball's Bluff, in order to see whether those who managed it exercised that care and caution which the law exacts of the pilot of a ship, of the engineer who runs a railroad train, of the captain of a steamboat carrying passengers; or whether it was managed with an absence of care and skill, with a reckless disregard of ordinary prudence.

On the 21st of October, Leesburg, in the State of Virginia, was occupied by insurgents. The force with which they held it amounted to not less than five or six thousand men. At the same time Poolesville, in the State of Maryland, was occupied by Union forces, and was the headquarters of a brigadier general. Between these two positions, thus occupied, there rolled a swift and swollen river, with an island in the

channel, nearest the Maryland side, three miles in length and two hundred yards across. On the same side of the river with Leesburg, and within a day's march of that place, lay General McCall, commanding a division containing fifteen regiments, which marched fully eleven thousand men. If Leesburg were to be attacked, or if a reconnoissance in force were to be made in that direction, one of the first wonders in this case is that the work should have been assigned to General Stone's division, divided as it was from the scene of action by a great river—indeed, by two great rivers—when the division of General McCall was within a day's march of the spot, with neither river, mountain, nor barrier to be traversed. Those who, stimulated by the curiosity not unnatural at a time like this, have refreshed their military history, or dipped into military books, or picked up the current smattering of military knowledge, have not failed to observe that a river unbridged and unfordable is regarded as one of the most formidable and perilous obstacles to military advance. Of all the barriers not absolutely impassable, nothing—if ordinary sources of information are to be relied upon—is to be so much dreaded by an attacking army, so much to be shunned at any cost, as a deep, rapid stream, without wharfage or bridges; and this even when means of floating transportation are abundant and prepared. Common sense has so much to do with this that any man who has ever seen artillery move, may without presumption, assume to know and comprehend it.

Another fact which a civilian may be allowed to state, is that an army or detachment attempting to cross a stream of this sort, in the face of an enemy, should be provided not only with means of transportation sufficient to throw it over to the attack, but to bring it off, and bring it off expeditiously and securely in case of a defeat. A pontoon train, if an intrenched bridge cannot be had, a flotilla of batteaux, boats, rafts, something, is the very least, if we may rely on ordinary authorities, which will suffice to meet the requirements of common prudence. But in this case two rivers seem not to have been considered of much account in hindering the advance of an army; they were held of importance so slight that a division lying on the fighting side of the river was not brought into requisition at all, not even to protect the crossing and the landing, nor to cover a retreat; but the whole work was assigned to the trans-Potomac division of General Stone.

The movement was not an unexpected or impulsive one. On the contrary, crossing the river thereabouts, and crossing at or about that time, had occupied for days the attention of officers and men. The landing-place had been selected before the battle day, for, on the day before, several hundreds of the Massachusetts fifteenth and twentieth had been thrown over

to the island, and from the island to the bluff. The crossing-place was one of the most remarkable—confessedly one of the most dangerous that could have been possibly selected. The landing-place was a bank of clay ten or fifteen feet high, abrupt, almost perpendicular, surmounted by a rugged bluff one hundred or one hundred and fifty feet in height.

The region around about was what lumbermen would call a "wooden country." Timber grew in great abundance in every direction. Within twelve miles of the crossing-place was a saw-mill. From that saw-mill—which was situated some half a mile from the river and canal—to the river and canal ran a railroad, for the purpose of transporting lumber. Round about this mill, on the railroad, and piled on the canal, was an abundance of timber, round, square, and sawed. What could have been done with it, we all know, and we all know how quickly it would have been done. We know what could have been done if nobody but Massachusetts had been there. Not to know that would be to forget that when General Butler called upon the working men of a Massachusetts regiment to step forward, the whole regiment advanced, and that in the regiment were found a plenty of men who could sail the "Ironsides," and build and run a locomotive engine. Boats and rafts enough to float thousands could have been put afloat in a few hours, and a bridge would not, I am informed, have been the work of more than a day and a night.

But timber was not the only means of transportation there at hand. It was not necessary to go to Washington, nor to Seneca Mills, nor even to the forest, to find water craft and materials for bridging. The same canal of which I have spoken, and which ran on the very bank of the river, floated a very large number of boats upon it—so large a number that, in a single day and night, boats enough could have been brought into requisition to float all the troops needed for the expedition, and particularly if a rope had been stretched across to pull them from side to side, in place of their being polled up the current and out into the stream, and then left to drift down and strike the opposite shore. I am informed that at convenient distances there are facilities adapted and intended for the transfer of boats from the canal to the river.

Notwithstanding this, notwithstanding Washington was only about thirty-six miles distant by canal, notwithstanding timber on the canal, at the mill, in the tree, was there in abundance, no one of these means was brought into requisition. No pontoons, no attempt to bridge the river, not a raft, not a bateau, not a boat from the canal or elsewhere, except as I shall state. There was not even a hawser nor rope provided; not even axes.

Two weeks before this, however, an order had been given to construct five flatboats and

two skiffs—to construct them at Edwards's Ferry, a point in the river some four miles below. Three of those boats were brought up from Edwards's Ferry to this fatal crossing-place. Two of them were used in the channel between the Maryland shore and Harrison's island, and one of them was used between the island and the bluff. And in this latter channel was also a single row-boat. These four boats, two in either channel, constituted the whole means of transportation upon which the expedition was based.

These boats have been called scows, and I have taken some pains to know what they were. They were flatboats, made of hemlock stuff, I think, inch and a quarter or inch and a half stuff. My colleague on my right saw them, and can tell me whether I state the thickness correctly.

Mr. SHERMAN. Inch and a half.

Mr. ROSCOE CONKLING. My colleague says inch and a half stuff. They were about twenty feet in length and of corresponding width. They had no oars nor any other means of motion. There was, as I said, no rope or hawser to work them by. They were navigated by being loaded and then polled up stream and out into the current, and then allowed to drift or float down and across until they struck the bank on the other side. Sometimes they would strike at the landing-place, sometimes they would hit the shore far below, and be hauled and polled back to the landing-place.

These boats were of sufficient capacity to carry about half a company, some thirty-five men each, and the average time occupied in crossing from Maryland to the island was about three quarters of an hour, leaving the island and the remaining channel still to be traversed. The House will get some idea of the rapidity with which this transportation could be carried on, from the operations of the night before the day of which I am speaking. Before Colonel Baker is understood to have had command of the expedition, Colonel Devin was ordered to cross four companies of the Massachusetts fifteenth. He did cross them. He commenced at two o'clock in the morning, and it was sunrise before he was ready to take up the line of march, showing that more than an hour was necessary for the purpose of throwing one company from the Maryland shore to Ball's Bluff.

Colonel Baker's orders came to him about two o'clock in the morning, and found him sleeping in his tent. He commenced his crossing at sunrise. Without any wharf to lie to, without any hawser or rope to stretch across the river, the embarkation and transportation of troops, cannon, and munitions of war was of course a slow and tantalizing process. Eleven o'clock had come when only a commencement had been made. At this time a boat was found in the canal, and measures were taken to transfer it to the river. Whether this was observed on the other side is only matter of speculation;

but the time had come when it was too late to mend the matter or correct mistakes, for the rebel fire had opened upon the slender detachment which had crossed. From that time the boats began to pole back with the bleeding and the slain. The house on Harrison's Island had already become a hospital, and every room in it was occupied by wounded and dying men.

But still the crossing went on. Seventy-five hundred men, according to General Stone, were detailed for the expedition; but not more than seventeen or eighteen hundred men ever saw the field, or crossed the river. Those who did cross crawled up the muddy, slippery bank of clay, and from there, by a winding path, they climbed to the summit of the bluff which lay beyond. The guns were dismounted, and dragged and lifted up with great difficulty and delay. All this hard and perilous ascent led to no field of fair fighting, but only to a trap, an ambush, a slaughter-pen, a Golgotha. The bluff was a mile in length up and down the river, and the landing and ascent were made in the middle of it. Behind this point was a six-acre lot, skirted by woods on three sides. Into this burial ground, one by one, as the boat brought them over, went up the devoted seventeen hundred. Their steps, like tracks to the lion's den, all pointed in one direction, from which there was never to be a return. Behind them rolled a river deep, which could never be repossessed. Before them, and surrounding them on every side, was a tree-sheltered and skulking foe of three or four times their number. Their movements had been watched from the start; the rebels had prepared for them a feast of death, and had calculated the number of guests who should partake of it. When that number had been polled and drifted over, the dreadful revelry commenced. It was the refinement of cruelty, and dealt exactly with its victims. They had been sent over too few to remain, and too many to return—a larger number might have held the position, and dispensed with means of retreat; a smaller number might have escaped by the boats; but the seventeen hundred had only to stand fast and perish.

Nobly did they fulfill their destiny. Desperate stubbornness and heroic courage served only to gild with tints of glory the bloody picture of their fate.

In an hour, in less than an hour, the field was a hell of fire, raging from every side. The battle was lost before it had begun. It was from the outset a mere sacrifice, a shere immolation, without a promise of success or a hope of escape. It was worse than the charge of the Light Brigade, and as England's poet has said of the six hundred,

"Canon to right of them,
Canon to left of them,
Canon in front of them
Volleyed and thundered."

Well might the historian here ejaculate with the poet there,

"Some one had blundered."

We all know the result. Those who did not die upon the field were forced down the steep bank behind them to the brink of the river. Here, to save their arms from the enemy, they threw them into the stream, and many sought, and more found, a watery grave. The last act of this terrible tragedy of blunders, if not the saddest, was the most sickening and appalling of them all. The flatboat, which by poling and drifting had been made to ply between the island and the bluff, was now laden with the mangled, the weary, and the dying—too heavily laden, and the quick and dead, in one struggling mass, went down together in that doleful river, and never rose again. Leesburg was illuminated that night, illuminated by paricides and rebels, and bloody treason added another laurel to Big Bethel, Bull Run, the blockade of the Potomac, and the tame surrender of arms in the navy-yards and arsenals.

Such, Mr. Speaker, was the battle of Ball's Bluff. Such it stands to-day upon the page of history. The chief mourners for that battle—those who snffered most severely in it—are the States of New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. To those States it was the battle of Cannæ, for the very pride and flower of their young men were among its victims. No wonder that the army and the country burn with indignation at

"The deep damnation of their taking off."

No wonder that twenty millions of people and their presses, are yet discussing whether the battle was fought on orders issued by General Stone, or on forged orders, or on no orders at all. No wonder that weariness, distrust, and paralysis is settling upon the public heart. We have seemingly no thorough system of accountability, and we need to commence one now. I hope we shall begin with the subject now before us. Let the army and the Government know that the people and the Representatives of the people are in grim earnest. Let mismanagement and drowsiness tremble and wake up. Ball's Bluff cries aloud for scrutiny, and I hope the war committee will think so, and probe it thoroughly, unrestrained by any statement that the public interest does not require it, come from what quarter it may. Since the publication of the report of the Adjutant General respecting the army of the West and the division of General Fremont, no man ought to be asked to believe that the publication of anything can be injurious to anybody. Whoever sanctioned or consented to the publication of that extraordinary and anomalous document, would be estopped in a court of justice from objecting to giving publicity to anything under Heaven relating to the army as calculated to do harm. At all events, we shall be safe in exposing and branding the author or authors

of a monstrous mistake, which has already been told in Gath, and published in the streets of Ascalon.

Now, sir, I mean to be explicit in what I say about the battle of Ball's Bluff, and therefore I will make several plain points upon it which I say call loudly for explanation, if they can be explained.

I assume that an attack on Leesburg, or a movement upon it, was justifiable at the time, and then I direct attention to the following propositions, in the light of the facts at which I have glanced.

In the first place, the division of General McCall, numbering eleven thousand men, was on the same side of the river with Leesburg, and within a few hours' march, uninterrupted by any formidable barrier; and yet these troops were not employed in the attack, nor made use of at all, but another division was selected lying on the opposite side of the Potomac.

In the second place, the point of crossing selected was one of the worst and most dangerous to be found for many miles.

In the third place, there was a want of transportation, inasmuch that means of crossing absolutely indispensable were wholly unprovided, although they might easily have been procured.

In the fourth place, the number of men sent over to Ball's Bluff was wholly insufficient, and this though more than the needed number were close at hand.

In the fifth place, no reinforcements came to the rescue, although, aside from the command of General McCall, there were troops and artillery on both sides of the river, while the engagement was progressing, and within four miles of the field of battle.

All these grounds of censure may be answered and explained. If they can be explained, it is just to the living and the dead that an opportunity should be afforded. If they cannot be explained, then, for reasons higher still, inquiry ought not to slumber. We have had long chapters of accidents for which no one is blamed, though some one is to blame. Battles and positions given away, and no court-martial, no court of inquiry, no one shot, no one disgraced—nothing but promotions growing out of inglorious occurrences. My particular object to-day is to learn whether the military authorities have in any manner looked into the proceedings of the 21st of October on the upper Potomac, and in order to obtain that information I offer the following resolution:

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Whereas, on the second day of the session, this House adopted a resolution, of which the following is a copy:

Resolved, That the Secretary of War be requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to report to this House whether any, and if any, what measures have been taken to

ascertain who is responsible for the disastrous movement of our troops at Ball's Bluff;

And whereas on the 16th of December, the Secretary of War returned an answer, whereof the following is a copy:

WAR DEPARTMENT, Dec. 12, 1861.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a resolution of the House of Representatives calling for certain information with regard to the disastrous movement of our troops at Ball's Bluff, and to transmit to you a report of the Adjutant General of the United States army, from which you will perceive that a compliance with the resolution, at this time, would, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, be injurious to the public service.

Very respectfully,
SIMON CAMERON,
Secretary of War.

Hon. G. A. GROW,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

—
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 11, 1861.

SIR: In compliance with your instructions I have the honor to report, in reference to the resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives, received the 3d instant, "that the Secretary of War be requested, if not incompatible with the public interest, to report to this House whether any, and if any, what measures have been taken to ascertain who is responsible for the disastrous movement of our troops at Ball's Bluff?" that the General-in-Chief of the army is of opinion an inquiry on the subject of the resolution would, at this time, be injurious to the public service. The resolution is herewith respectfully returned.

Respectfully submitted,
L. THOMAS,
Adjutant General.

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington:

Therefore,
Resolved, That the said answer is not responsive, nor satisfactory to the House, and that the Secretary be directed to return a further answer.

The resolution was further debated at length by MESSRS. RICHARDSON, EDWARDS, CRITTENDEN, R. CONKLING, VALLANDIGHAM, LOVEJOY, WICKLIFFE, DUNN, and STEVENS.

Motions to amend and lay on the table were lost, and the resolution passed without amendment by the following vote:

YEAS—Messrs. Aldrich, Alley, Arnold, Babbitt, Baker, Baxter, Beaman, Bingham, S. S. Blair, Blake, Buffinton, Campbell, Chamberlin, Clark, Colfax, F. A. Conkling, R. Conkling, Conway, Covode, Davis, Dawes, Duell, Edwards, Eliot, Fenton, Fessenden, Franchot, Frank, Gooch, Goodwin, Gurley, Hale, Hickman, Hooper, Hutchins, Julian, Kelley, Francis W. Kellogg, William Kellogg, Lansing, Loomis,

Lovejoy, McKean, McPherson, Mitchell, Anson P. Morrill, Justin S. Morrill, Olin, Patton, Timothy G. Phelps, Pike, Pomeroy, Potter, John H. Rice, Riddle, Edward H. Rollins, Sargeant, Sedgwick, Shanks, Sherman, Sloan, Spaulding, Stevens, Benjamin F. Thomas, Trimble, Trowbridge, Vandever, Van Horn, Van Valkenburgh, Verree, Wall, Wallace, Charles W. Walton, E. P. Walton, Washburne, Wheeler, Albert S. White, Wilson, Windom, and Worcester—79.

NAYS—Messrs. Joseph Baily, Biddle, Frau-

cis P. Blair, Jacob B. Blair, George H. Browne, Cobb, Corning, Cox, Cravens, Crisfield, Crittenden, Delano, Diven, Dunlap, Dunn, Fisher, Granger, Grider, Haight, Hanchett, Harrison, Holman, Horton, Law, Leary, Lehman, McKnight, Mallory, Maynard, Menzies, Morris, Nixon, Noble, Pendleton, Perry, Porter, Richardson, Robinson, James S. Rollins, Sheffield, Smith, John B. Steele, William G. Steele, Stratton, Francis Thomas, Upton, Vallandigham, Wadsworth, Ward, Chilton A. White, Wickliffe, Woodruff, and Wright—54.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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