

INDEXTab No.

1. Memo for Joint Staff Planners from JCS re the collaboration of JSP with SWNCC Subcommittee on United States policy with respect to Thailand.
2. Memo for SWNCC from JSP re report for reference to the Subcommittee.
3. Memo for SWNCC Subcommittee from Secy, SWNCC, re report of JSP .
4. Memo for SWNCC from Secy, Subcommittee, informing Secy JSP of its concurrence in 1304/2.
5. Memo for Sec'y JCS from Sec'y SWNCC confirming collaboration of the Subcommittee for Far East and JCS in JCS 1304/2. Dated 16 April 1945.

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COPY NO. _____

SWNCC 5/621 April 1945Page 20STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEUNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDReferences: a. SWNCC 5/3
b. SWNCC 5/5Note by the Secretaries

1. By informal action on 21 April 1945 the Committee approved SWNCC 5/5 and the information contained therein was transmitted to the Department of State.

2. Attached as an enclosure is a copy of a memorandum from the Acting Chairman, SWNCC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicating State Department concurrence in the proposals presented in the Appendices of SWNCC 5/5.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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NNO 750065
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By CD/LE NARS, Date MAR 17 1976

~~TOP SECRET~~E N C L O S U R E

20 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Aid to Resistance Groups in Thailand.

In accordance with your memorandum of 16 April 1945, to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, JCS 1304/2 was referred to the State Department with the request that this Committee be advised whether the Secretary of State concurs in the transmittal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Appendices "B", "C" and "D".

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is authorized to advise you of the concurrence of the Secretary of State in the transmittal by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of these three communications.

The State Department states that it will advise the Thai Regent and the Free Thai that such OSS assistance to the Free Thai resistance movement will be extended with the understanding that the action contemplated will carry no United States commitment to provide military assistance as distinguished from incidental supplies and personnel necessary for OSS operations.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

/s/ H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
Acting Chairman

SWNCC 5/6

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COPY NO. _____SWNCC 5/517 April 1945Pages 16-19 Incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEUNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THAILAND
Reference: SWNCC 5/3Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, a draft of a letter to the Secretary of State from the Secretaries of War and the Navy, as proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East collaborated in the preparation of the report submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1304/2) and concurs in the recommendations and conclusions thereof, with the understanding that the action contemplated will result in no additional commitments for increased supply of material from the United States or any additional burdens on United States shipping to that area.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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NND 750065

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

By CD/LF NARS, Date MAR 17 1976SWNCC 5/5~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRETENCLOSUREDRAFTLETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE SECRETARIES OF WAR AND THE NAVY

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations contained in JCS 1304/2, pertaining to aid to resistance groups in Thailand.

Since the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is now considering this same matter and in view of the political considerations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, and we agree, that concurrence of the Secretary of State should be obtained prior to the transmittal of Appendices "A", "B", and "C" attached.

~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX "A"D R A F TREPLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

With reference to your memorandum of 26 March 1945, copies of the directive dispatched to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater, and the memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff are enclosed.

SWNCC 5/5

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Appendix "A"

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APPENDIX "B"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO GENERAL SULTAN
(Information to Wheeler and Wedemeyer)

OSS has requested guidance on aid to Thailand.

U.S. policy is to provide aid to resistance forces in Thailand, consistent with other theater commitments, and within the resources available to you.

Provisions of WARX 34942 apply.

This message being passed to OSS in answer to request for guidance.

SWNCC 5/5

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Appendix "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX "C"D R A F TCOMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFAID TO RESISTANCE GROUPS IN THAILANDMemorandum by the United States
Chiefs of Staff

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) has requested guidance from the United States Chiefs of Staff on the scope of OSS activities to aid resistance groups in Thailand.

In answer to this request, the United States Chiefs of Staff informed General Sultan and the OSS that they favor the provision of aid to resistance forces in Thailand, consistent with other theater requirements, and within the resources available to General Sultan. In enunciating this policy, the United States Chiefs of Staff reiterated that over-all operational control of OSS activities in Thailand is vested in Admiral Mountbatten.

The above is furnished for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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16 April 1945

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Proctor 1/11/45
Clark

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:**Subject: United States Policy with Respect to Thailand.**

- References:**
- a.** SWNCC Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 30 March 1945.
 - b.** Your Memorandum SM-1211, dated 13 April 1945.
 - c.** SWNCC 5/3.
 - d.** J.C.S. 1304/2.

1. This will confirm your understanding stated in the second paragraph of reference **b.** that the collaboration requested in reference **a.** has been accomplished by concurrence of the SWNCC Subcommittee for the Far East in J.C.S. 1304/2 inasmuch as J.C.S. 1304/2 and SWNCC 5/3 are substantially identical in subject matter.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McGARTHY
Secretary

Copy to:

→ Lt. M. E. McDonald

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JCS 1304/2 - 10 April 1945.

OSS Aid to Resistance Groups
on Thailand.

See Amending 1304/2.



JOINT POST-WAR COMMITTEE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR THE FAR EAST~~TOP SECRET~~

12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee:Subject: United States Policy with Respect to
Thailand.References: a. SWNCC 5/3.
b. SWNCC 5/4/D.
c. JCS 1304/2.

1. In compliance with paragraph 2 of your memorandum on the above subject dated 9 April 1945, the Subcommittee for the Far East has informed the Secretary, Joint Staff Planners of its concurrence in J.C.S. 1304/2. A copy of the memorandum sent to the Secretary of the Joint Staff Planners is enclosed for your information.

For the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East:

M. E. McDONALD,
Secretary.

1 Encl.

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By CO/LF NARS, Date MAR 17 1976~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE
FOR THE FAR EAST

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12 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

Subject: Office of Strategic Services Aid to
Resistance Groups in Thailand.

Reference: J.C.S. 1304 Series.

1. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East has noted J.C.S. 1304/2 and particularly Appendix "C" thereof.
2. The Subcommittee for the Far East concurs in this report with the understanding that the action contemplated will result in no additional commitments for increased supply of material from the United States or any additional burdens on United States shipping to that area.
3. Accordingly, J.C.S. 1304/2 may be considered an integrated report resulting from collaboration between the Joint Staff Planners and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East.
4. The Secretary of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is being furnished a copy of this memorandum in connection with the consideration by that Committee of J.C.S. 1304/2 when received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contemplated in paragraph 6 of the recommendations contained in J.C.S. 1304/2.

For the SWNC Subcommittee for the Far East:

M. E. McDONALD,
Secretary.

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**TOP SECRET**THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

9 April 1945

*Thang
Train
Brooks
Clark*MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY
COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE
FAR EAST:Subject: United States Policy with Respect
to Thailand.References: a. SWNCC 5/3.
b. SWNCC 5/4/D.

1. The attached report of the Joint Staff
Planners on reference a is referred to the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far
East for consideration in connection with their
report on reference b.

2. The Subcommittee will inform the Secretary,
Joint Staff Planners, direct of their concurrence
or comment on the attached report.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

CHARLES W. McCARTHY
Secretary

Encl.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT U. S. STAFF PLANNERS
WASHINGTON

9 April 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: United States Policy with Respect to Thailand.

References: a. SWNCC 5/3.
b. SWNCC 5/4/D.
c. SWNCC memo to JCS,
30 March 1945.

1. References a and b were referred to the Joint Staff Planners for:

a. Collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East by presenting the military implications; and

b. The submission of the integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation from the military point of view.

2. The Joint Staff Planners enclose a copy of their proposed report for reference to the Subcommittee of the Far East. It is understood that an integrated report will be prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subsequently, to the Department of State.

C. H. Donnelly
C. H. DONNELLY,

Secretary,

Joint Staff Planners.



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By CD/LE NARS, Date MAR 17 1976

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STAFF PLANNERS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



9 April 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: United States Policy with Respect to Thailand.

References: a. SWNCC 5/3.
b. SWNCC 5/4/D.
c. SWNCC memo to JCS,
30 March 1945.

1. References a and b were referred to the Joint Staff Planners for:
 - a. Collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East by presenting the military implications; and
 - b. The submission of the integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation from the military point of view.
2. The Joint Staff Planners enclose a copy of their proposed report for reference to the Subcommittee of the Far East. It is understood that an integrated report will be prepared for submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and subsequently, to the Department of State.

C. H. DONNELLY,
Secretary,
Joint Staff Planners.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES AID
TO RESISTANCE GROUPS IN THAILAND

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. To furnish guidance and instruction for OSS (Office of Strategic Services) activities to aid resistance forces in Thailand as requested in a memorandum from the Director of Strategic Services dated 26 March 1945 (Appendix "E," page 14).

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Facts bearing on the problem and discussion are set forth in Appendix "D," pages 12 to 13.

CONCLUSIONS

3. From a military point of view, assistance and support by OSS for the resistance groups in Thailand is desirable, providing such assistance and support is obtained from theater resources without interfering with operations of greater importance in the China theater and the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC).

4. Since OSS operations in SEAC are under the operational control of Admiral Mountbatten, and since U.S. and British policy toward Thailand diverge, British control over increased OSS operations in Thailand might not result in the advancement of U.S. aims.

5. In view of the political implications involved and since the State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee is now considering the same matter, reply to the Director of Strategic Services and instructions to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater as to the U.S. policy in this matter should have concurrence of the State Department.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

6. That the Secretaries of War and the Navy be requested to forward the letter in Appendix "A" (page 9) to the Secretary of State, enclosing a copy of this report.

7. That, subject to the concurrence of the State Department:

a. The reply in Appendix "B," page 10 be forwarded to the Director of Strategic Services.

b. The directive in Appendix "C," page 11 be dispatched to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "A"D R A F TLETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE SECRETARIES OF WAR AND THE NAVY

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendations contained in the attached study* pertaining to aid to resistance groups in Thailand.

Since the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee is now considering this same matter and in view of the political considerations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, and we agree, that concurrence of the Secretary of State should be obtained prior to dispatch of the proposed reply to the Director of Strategic Services (Appendix "B," page 10) and the proposed directive to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (Appendix "C," page 11).

* Enclose a copy of this paper.

~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX "B"D R A F TREPLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

With reference to your memorandum of 26 March 1945, a copy of the directive dispatched to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater, is enclosed.*

* Enclose a copy of Appendix "C," page 11.

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APPENDIX "C"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO GENERAL SULTAN
(Information to Wheeler and Wedemeyer)

OSS has requested guidance on aid to Thailand.

U.S. policy is to provide aid to resistance forces in Thailand, consistent with other theater commitments, and within the resources available to you.

Provisions of WARX 34942 apply.

This message being passed to OSS in answer to request for guidance.

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APPENDIX "D"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. In WARX 34942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that all OSS activities in SEAC are under the over-all operational control of Admiral Mountbatten (SACSEA). This message forbids the use of OSS personnel from India-Burma in Indo-China.
2. The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater, controls the allocation of all supplies to, and, under SACSEA, the operations of OSS within SEAC. He can, therefore, without further authorization, allocate to OSS any supplies available to him which are necessary to arm resistants in Thailand, provided the program has the over-all approval of SACSEA.
3. The Assistant Secretary of State has indicated that British and U.S. policy toward Thailand are not in harmony, and he recommends extension of operations by OSS (either under SEAC or independently) as a manifestation of U.S. desire to assist Thailand.
4. In consideration of a similar request for assistance and support of forces in Indo-China (J.C.S. 1200/8), it was concluded that all practicable assistance and support should be given to the resistance movement, provided such assistance and support could be obtained from theater resources without interfering with approved or planned operations that were of greater importance in the war against Japan.

DISCUSSION

5. Thailand is a focal point for Japanese communications to Malaya and Burma. Any interference with or information about these lines of communication is of value in the war against Japan. OSS operations to this end are therefore desirable.

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6. Summary action by Japan to obtain full control of Thailand would probably result in any event in aid being given to Thai resistants. Prior preparations by OSS to organize and arm the resistants would assist in furnishing that aid.

X 7. No independent action should be undertaken by OSS in Thailand which by ignoring Admiral Mountbatten's operational control of clandestine activities in SEAC would jeopardize present U.S. efforts to require SACSEA to coordinate clandestine activities in China and India-China with General Wedemeyer.

8. Since all OSS operations in SEAC are under operational control of Admiral Mountbatten, the British would be able to utilize their control of OSS operations to advance British policy with respect to Thailand at the expense of U.S. policy and desires.

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APPENDIX "E"

26 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Subject: Aid to Thai Resistance Against Japanese.

Reference: a. Memorandum from Director to J.C.S., dated 22 February 1945 (Appendix "C", J.C.S. 1304).

Present Thai Situation

1. Advice is received from Thailand that there is imminent danger that Thailand will be seized by the Japanese. A representative from Thailand, now in the United States, stated that when he was in Tokyo (February 1944) he had heard the Japanese plans on the ultimate seizure of Indo-China, and the present operations are according to that plan. The Thais feel that this plan will be extended to include Thailand.

2. We are advised from inside Thailand that the Thai officials believe three alternatives are open to them.

a. To combat with force all Japanese assaults, resisting to the utmost.

b. To be on the alert for indications that the Japanese intend to take over control of the country, and to launch a surprise attack, plans for which have been prepared.

c. To pursue a policy of waiting for American or Allied aid before fighting.

3. At a secret meeting of the cabinet of the Thai government it was decided that should pressure take the form of demands such as those made and effected in Indo-China, the Thais would fight. Otherwise, their soldiers would be disarmed and they would lose all power of resistance. Since the French Indo-China incident, all Thai soldiers in Bangkok have carried rifles. The

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Thais feel that no matter how careful the Thais are to avoid provoking summary action, the Japanese in their own good time will create an incident to be an excuse for them to assume full control.

4. In the event that the Japanese take summary action, the Thai forces, according to their own most favorable estimate, could not hold out more than a month without aid. The Thai Government has submitted a request through an OSS representative that antitank guns be dropped at points where safe delivery can be assured. Further, the Thai Government asks that Allies indicate their intentions respecting Indo-China, so that Thai plans may be governed accordingly.

5. The present Thai Government is at the same time the underground movement, the de jure government and the de facto government. The Thai Government has evidenced to the Allied cause cooperation of a very high order.

6. The Japanese make extensive use of Thai communications. They are building roads and improving railroads. Since denial of these communications or a disruption of the service on same will seriously hamper the movement of Japanese troops to and from Burma and Indo-China operations, the Japanese will if possible seize them.

Present American Activities Inside Thailand

7. The primary source of intelligence of the Army, the Army Air Forces, and the State Department is the OSS network in Thailand. This network is also the State Department's sole contact with the Thai Government inside Thailand.

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8. We have previously advised you that this network has developed not only intelligence within Thailand, but has provided the means of exfiltrating important political representatives, as well as infiltrating and exfiltrating American and Free Thai officers (by use of submarine, air drop, and flying boat) who have been made available in Washington for consultation with military officials and the State Department. The agents who were infiltrated were received by the Thai Government, and effective channels of military and political intelligence were made available to them. The Thai Government also cooperated in providing safe conduct for two American officers to Bangkok. One of these officers is organizing an intelligence chain which is supported by the highest government officials. At our instance the Thai Government has undertaken the development of this intelligence system and the use of Thailand as a base for penetration of Japan, through the use of Thais. We are attempting to provide security for the maintenance of this intelligence system even though Japan seizes Thailand and disarms the Thai troops.

O.S.S. Personnel and Supply now in Far East and Available for Thai Operations

9. An estimate of the strength of the Thai Army from the Regent has already been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the plan for joint operations of Thai and American Forces (J.C.S. 1304). We are requesting information of the Regent as to the most recent estimate of the strength of army, police, and civilians in Thailand capable of actively resisting the Japanese, how deployed, the quantities and types of weapons and ammunition on hand, and to what extent this equipment could be augmented by capturing Japanese supplies.

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10. Anticipating such possibilities as now appear to be arising, O.S.S. has warehoused in Calcutta a quantity of supplies earmarked for resistance groups and guerilla bands. There is a lien on these supplies for possible use in China.

11. According to most recent figures, the equipment on hand in Calcutta includes:

36,000 rifles
20,000,000 rounds of ammunition
19 bazookas
2,000 jungle kits
19,000 hand grenades
21,000 rifle grenades
10,000 verylights
4,000 30 Cal. semi-automatics
Substantial demolition supplies
2,600 C rations
900 K rations

The following equipment is en route:

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
1,200	.38 pistols	12/2/45
9,380	30 M 1917 rifles	8/2/45
2,600	Launchers-bazooka (10,000 on requisition)	19/2/45
149,000	Rockets bazooka	3/2/45
15,000	M 3 sub-machine guns	7/2/45
3,500	Hand grenades, fragmentation (on hand in Calcutta drawn from Army)	

17. OSS has 44 officers and men of our operational groups (OG's) in Ceylon. There are 41 Special Operations (SO) personnel in Ceylon, trained in field operations, and 49 men en route.

Request for Guidance and Instructions

18. In order that OSS operations may be coordinated with over-all policy and plans, and so that we may know whether we should extend our operations in Thailand beyond those concerning intelligence, guidance and instructions are requested as to whether:

- a. OSS should supply the Thai Army and other resistance forces with arms, ammunition and other supplies;
- b. OSS should send personnel to Thailand to help organize and train the Thai resistance forces.

/s/ WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

JCS 1304/1

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Appendix "E"

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Washington 25, D.C.

*Project file*SM-1034
31 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS:

Subject: United States policy with respect to Thailand.

Enclosure: Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated 30 March 1945, same subject as above, transmitting 2 enclosures:

1. Cpy 47, SWNCC 5/3.
2. Cpy 47, SWNCC 5/4/D.

In accordance with the request contained in paragraph 2 thereof, the enclosure is referred to the Joint Staff Planners for:

a Collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East by presenting the military implications; and

b The submission of the integrated report to The Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation from the military point of view.

A copy of this directive has been furnished the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

When the enclosure has served its purpose it is requested that it be returned.

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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TOP SECRET THE JOINT CHIEFS STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

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SM-1034
31 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS:

Subject: United States policy with respect to Thailand.

Enclosure: Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated 30 March 1945, same subject as above, transmitting 2 enclosures:
1. Cpy 47, SWNCC 5/3.
2. Cpy 47, SWNCC 5/4/D.

In accordance with the request contained in paragraph 2 thereof, the enclosure is referred to the Joint Staff Planners for:

a Collaboration with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East by presenting the military implications; and

b The submission of the integrated report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation from the military point of view.

A copy of this directive has been furnished the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

When the enclosure has served its purpose it is requested that it be returned.

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
Secretary.

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30 March 1945

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEDIRECTIVEUNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDReference: a. SWNCC 5/3
b. ITEM 4, 15th SWNCC MTG.Note by the Secretaries

1. At their 15th Meeting the Committee directed that SWNCC 5/3 be referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East for study and recommendation as a matter of urgency.

2. The Far East Subcommittee will collaborate with the appropriate Joint Chiefs of Staff agency in the preparation of an integrated report to be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SWNCC.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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The enclosure, a study presented by the Assistant Secretary of State, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

CHARLES W. McCARTHY

ALVIN F. RICHARDSON

RAYMOND E. COX

Secretariat

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NND 750065
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By CO/LE NARS, Date MAR 17 1976

~~TOP SECRET~~E N C L O S U R EUNITED STATES POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THAILANDTHE PROBLEM

1. To consider the desirability of expanding the scope and the extent of the activities of OSS in Thailand.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The American Consul at Colombo has advised the Department (Colombo's no. 73 of March 22) that reports from within Thailand indicate that the present situation there is of the utmost urgency; that any action to be taken in regard to Thailand cannot await diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Great Britain; that the American position could be seriously affected if the impression were given the Thai that all possible assistance was not being rendered by the United States; that the United Nations' position in the Orient could be greatly strengthened if Thailand were able to resist the Japanese with force of arms supplied by the United Nations; and that, therefore, it might be desirable to authorize independent OSS action or to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge the Combined Chiefs of Staff to direct immediate OSS action under the SEAC.

3. A subsequent telegram from Colombo (no. 75 of March 23) stated that loss of OSS separate identity in SEAC might jeopardize the present favorable American position in connection with the Thai Regent's group.

4. OSS reports which have been made available to the Department indicate that the Thai resistance movement has been well organized and is steadily increasing its activities; that this movement has been of substantial assistance to the OSS which believes it can increase the scope and effectiveness of its operations through the medium of the Thai resistance movement;

SWNCC 5/3

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that at a recent secret meeting of the Thai Cabinet it was decided that Thai forces would fight if the Japanese took action in Thailand similar to that taken recently in Indochina; that Thai forces with available equipment and resources would be able to hold out against the Japanese for a month; and that with anti-tank guns and other light equipment dropped to them by air they could hold out for a longer period.

5. The Department delivered a note to the British Embassy on March 16 suggesting that the British, Chinese and American Governments agree to the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad at this time as an initial step to encourage a Free Thai resistance movement. It was also stated in the note that Chiang Kai-shek had expressed his willingness to the American Ambassador at Chungking to support such a committee with its venue at Washington.

DISCUSSION

6. It is the policy of this Government to assist Thailand to reestablish itself as an independent and sovereign nation. This Government has attempted through diplomatic channels to persuade the British to harmonize their policy toward Thailand with our own and as indicated in paragraph 5 recently suggested to the British that they agree to the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee. Although no official answer has been received from the British Foreign Office to the Department's suggestion an unofficial and informal expression of views by an official of the British Foreign Office implies that in all probability the British will not support the idea of the establishment of a Free Thai Liberation Committee abroad and that they are unlikely to agree to the measures we desire to take with respect to Thailand. The failure of the Free Thai to secure any representation abroad and the failure of the

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British to modify their policy toward Thailand which at present is based on the concept that Thailand is an enemy might well discourage the Free Thai within Thailand and affect the American position there unfavorably. On the military front an important American contribution to the Free Thai in their opposition to the Japanese is being made by the OSS. It seems, therefore, that one point at which American assistance and good will can be demonstrated to the Thai is through the OSS.

CONCLUSION

7. It may be, therefore, that American goodwill toward Thailand and our desire to be of assistance can only be manifested for the present through the activities of the OSS. Consequently we favor not only a continuation of such activities but an increase in their scope to the extent compatible with military plans. We are of the opinion that the extension of increased aid to the Thai will not only encourage Thai resistance to the Japanese but will give substantial support to the political objectives of this Government with respect to Thailand. We feel, however, that such assistance should be given only on the basis of a clear understanding on the part of the Regent and of the Free Thai that it would carry no American commitments to provide military assistance as distinguished from incidental supplies necessary for OSS operations. Thus, there would not be involved diversion to Thailand of supplies needed for operation in the Pacific against Japan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:
- a. Within the limitation imposed by U.S. military plans and strategy, the scope and extent of the activities of OSS in Thailand (extended under SEAC or independently) be expanded to provide maximum U. S. assistance to the Free Thai Resistance Movement as soon as practicable.

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b. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff be requested to so direct OSS.

c. That appropriate steps be undertaken to make it clear to the Regent and the Free Thai that the foregoing assistance will be provided only on the understanding that it will carry no U. S. commitment to provide military assistance as distinguished from incidental supplies and personnel necessary for OSS operations.

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