




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300606

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF GTMO-CG

06 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue, Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000184DP (S)

### JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

#### 1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Ali Ahmad Salih Ba'awda
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Othman Ahmed Othman Al-Omairah; Ali Ahmed Mubarak Baawda; Uthman Ahmed Uthman Umair Al Ghamidi
- Place of Birth: Taif, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 1973
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9YM-000184DP



2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

#### 3. (S//NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Transferred With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Retain in DoD (DoD) on 13 March 2004. Based upon information obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he be Transferred With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC).

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES  
REASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20300606

S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20300606

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000184DP (S)

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a jihadist. After the 9/11 attacks on the US, detainee was influenced to go to Afghanistan to get trained to fight in Chechnya against Russia. He was able to enter Afghanistan, possibly as late as October 2001 and trained at Al-Farouq for over a month. Detainee's trainer at Al-Farouq was a known explosives trainer. It is assessed this detainee is a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary:** Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

**a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee served in the Saudi military as a soldier and received training on military tactics. While serving, the military made a mistake and paid him approximately 9,400 Saudi riyals excess. About a year went by when the military discovered its mistake and demanded that he return the money, which he had already spent. He requested to leave the military, but because he had not repaid the money, he was not permitted to leave. Therefore, he deserted the military. He worked in Steel and Iron construction in Jeddah, SA from 2000-2001.

**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** Detainee traveled to Mecca, SA to visit the mosque; his taxi driver was Ehmoud Al-Noufait. Allegedly, Al-Noufait was a corporal in the Saudi army serving as a guard at the Taif Saudi Arabian airbase and was a recruiter and sponsor for fighters to Afghanistan and eventually to Chechnya. Al-Noufait told detainee about the sufferings of the Muslims in Chechnya and encouraged detainee to fight there. Al-Noufait showed detainee videotapes on Chechnya and then spoke to him regarding routes of travel for foreign fighters going into Chechnya. Al-Noufait fought in the jihad in Kashmir and had contacts that would facilitate entry into Afghanistan, and eventually into Chechnya. Detainee's plane ticket to Afghanistan was funded by Al-Noufait, but detainee claims to have financed the rest of his trip with 3000 Saudi Arabian riyals. Al-Noufait helped detainee coordinate acquiring a new passport in order to leave Saudi Arabia. Detainee drove to Bahrain, and then flew to Karachi, PK via Qatar.

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee trained at Al-Farouq from October to November 2001 (Analyst Note: He was there after the 9/11 attacks, but before the bombing of Al-Farouq by coalition forces). He received training on the Kalashnikov, the PK machine gun, and the Makarov pistol.

**d. (S//NF) Capture Information:** Detainee was captured by Pakistani police near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border without documentation. When first captured, and for several months thereafter, detainee claimed to be a Yemeni named Ali Ahmed Salih Ba'awdah

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000184DP (S)

before providing another name when confronted with information to the contrary. Detainee was transferred to US custody on 31 December 2001.

**e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO:** 14 January 2002

**f. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO:** To provide information on the following:

- Military training conducted by Taliban instructors at Al-Farouq to include small arms training and physical fitness training.
- Location, security, and physical layout of Al-Farouq

**5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** It is assessed the detainee poses a MEDIUM risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:**

- (S//NF) Detainee stated that he hates America. He also believes all fatwas (religious declarations) which state that Americans should not be in the Arabian Peninsula.
  - (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks on the US. He then trained at Al-Farouq. (Analyst Note: This shows detainee's intention of participating in hostilities toward US forces in Afghanistan.)
    - (S//NF) Detainee stated that Mujajir Reemi aka Abd Al-Rahman Al-Muhajir, from Yemen, was his trainer at Al-Farouq. Al-Muhajir was an explosives instructor. (Analyst Note: Other detainees, who had military experience in their home countries, like detainee, have been able to pass over basic training at Al-Farouq, unless they were going to receive advanced training, such as explosives training. While detainee admits to training, it was possibly more advanced than he is willing to admit.)
    - (S//NF) Detainee trained on the Kalashnikov, the PK machine gun, and the Makarov pistol.
    - (S//NF) Detainee confirmed his training at Al-Farouq by naming its commander. Detainee stated that Abdul Qadus was the leader of Al-Farouq during his training.
    - (S//NF) Muhammad Al-Qahtani, US9SA-000063DP (ISN 63), identified detainee as a Saudi mujahid (jihadist) he met in Kandahar, AF.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000184DP (S)

- (S//NF) Detainee's identity has been in question. Detainee initially claimed he was Yemeni, and then later claimed Saudi citizenry. He also admitted to giving the false name to interrogators, Ali Ahmad Salih Baawda, but has since stated his name is Othman Ahmed Othman Baawda.
  - (S//NF) The Yemeni delegation, during a July 2005 visit reconfirmed that detainee was a Saudi. In talking with ISN 183, the delegation learned a new name for detainee: Uthman Ahmed Uthman Umair Al Ghamidi. (Analyst Note: It is still undetermined if this is his real name.)
  - (S//NF) During a May 2002, joint US-Yemeni debriefing of detainee, it was confirmed that detainee was not Yemeni, but likely a Saudi national. Detainee claimed he was from Yemen, but knew nothing about Yemen and the tribe with which he claimed affiliation. The Yemeni delegation research in Yemen further supported their conclusion.
  - (S//NF) Abdul Rahman Al-Amri (ISN 199) recognized detainee as a Saudi.
  - (S//NF) It should be noted that the name and cover story detainee initially gave was the same as ISN 178.
    - (S//NF) Both detainees were detained in Kohat, PK, at the same time and were transported in the same airplane to Kandahar on 31 December 2001 when transferred to US custody.
    - (S//NF) ISN 178 has been assessed by JTF-GTMO as a member of Al-Qaida and/or it's global terrorist network with close ties to UBL, Tawfiq Bin Attash and other significant Al-Qaida members.
- (S//NF) Detainee has not been cooperative and has been hostile since being at GTMO. Detainee has determined that he will be in prison whether in American custody or Saudi custody, but prefers the former. By keeping his potential intelligence to himself and remaining a hostile-appearing detainee, he believes the US will see it as a requirement to keep him out of need to exploit him due to his threat level. The following corroborate detainee's actions:
  - (S//NF) Detainee went AWOL from the Saudi military and fled to Afghanistan, which he believes will lead to severe punishment in Saudi Arabia.
  - (S//NF) According to detainee, the Saudi delegation told him that if Saudi Arabia gets him, he would not go home. Detainee later restates that he will be in prison whether it is at GTMO or in Saudi custody.

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee's overall behavior has been hostile and non-compliant. Detainee is often reported using refusals, harsh/threatening language and major/minor assaults in order to intimidate the guard force into getting what he wants. Detainee currently has eighty Reports of Disciplinary Infractions with nine in the last three months.

JTF GTMO-CG

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Transfer With Conditions to the Control of Another Country (TWC) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9YM-000184DP (S)

**6. (S//NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**


**a. (S//NF) Assessment:** JTF GTMO determined detainee is of LOW intelligence value.

- Detainee has some information about ingress routes into Afghanistan as well as training at Al-Farouq, which occurred after the 9/11 attacks, which is not common information. In contrast, detainee was not in Afghanistan for any extended period of time that would provide much significant intelligence.

**b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Al-Farouq training
  - Trainers, i.e. Mujajir Reemi aka Abd Al-Rahman Al-Muhajir
  - Available training
- Ingress routes into Afghanistan
- Detainee's recruiter in Saudi Arabia, Ehmoud Al-Noufait

**7. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 9 November 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.

  
JAY W. HOOD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding