

EXHIBIT No. 3027

(60)



ERRATA SHEET

Defense Document No. 1661

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>LINE</u>	
2	3rd line fr. bottom	Add "Burma" before "India"
3	9th line fr. bottom	change "defense plan" into "defensive operational plan; strike out (This sentence is not clear)
3	last line	insert "had" between operation and not.
9	14	Change "occupation of" to "advancement of troops into"
12	last line	Change "resolve to fight" to "not to evade war".
11	end of first paragraph	insert (Exhibit 588)
13	6th line fr. bottom	delete "the territories of"
14	11-12	"material oil is great change completely different" shall read "strategic material, oil is completely different"
16	Para #4 line 2	delete "advance" add "attained"
14	15	"Lee IV" should be stricken out.
15	9	Change "complition" to completion"
17	1st line	delete "initial"
18	6	change "very" to "vary"
20	1st	change "occupational) to "go ahead"
21	4th	change "its Sub-divisions" to "High Command"
22	7th fr. bottom	change "fine" to "time"
24	2nd	insert after "in" "Formosa"
24	5	change . . . "camouflaging and arriving" to "fitting out and equipping"
25	7	change "selfs" to "self"
27	2nd fr. bottom	insert after "were" "to" and delete "made" and insert "out"



PAGE LINE

29 3

change "attached" to "attacked"



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: TANAKA, Shinichi

1. Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

My name is Tanaka, Shinichi. I am an ex-Lieutenant-General and now live at 2042 Yokoseko, Mizusawa-mura, Miye-gun, in Miye Prefecture.

I was on duty as chief of the first section (operational planning) in the General Staff Office from 12 October 1940 to 7 December 1942. Now I shall depose here about the operational plan and preparations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in which I took part in the past.

2. First I shall explain the operational plan and preparations for the year 1941. In the conference for the 1941's peace-time operations plan held in the winter of 1940, the Chief of the General Staff adopted a draft for the Southern operations, which was almost the same in contents with that of the previous year. In other words, the draft was a purely technical provision for defensive operations, a program which the Supreme Command used to make annually as a part of general peace-time national defence plan. This draft has been burned and is not available for the present. However, I am sure I can tell the following facts according to my recollections.

a. A major part of the peacetime operations plan for the Japanese army consisted of defensive preparations against the Soviet Union, in point of quantity as well as quality.



Therefore in deciding upon an annual peacetime operational plan, the thing to be done first of all was usually to define an outline of the anti-Soviet defensive plan (its rough projects, forces and materials needed for it, etc. laying aside all other considerations for the time being. It was only after this was finished that the operational plan for the South came up for consideration.

It was as if it were secondary and supplementary in importance. No stress was laid upon it, sometimes it was nothing more than a paper plan in rough and abstract form. It was not too much to say that nothing concrete was found in the operational preparations for the South. The plan projected for the year 1941 was also of the same nature.

b. According to the design in the above program, if a war should break out between Japan and the United States, measures to be taken were limited to the occupation of the Philippines and Guam and in consequence the capture of American military bases in the Far East. It never contained in any sense detailed plans or preparations against possible attack from the mainland of the United States which might have been expected to follow as a necessary consequence in such an event.

An Anti-American operational plan would have been projected as against a possible over-all attack by the main forces of the United States. If it were so, the extent and scope of the plan would have been wider and more complicated in anticipation of a protracted war. In this case the question when and where would be the end of the war would have been a key point to decide beforehand.

The Japanese operations plan, however, never referred to this essential point and touched only upon operations against the American military bases in the Far East. Even offensive actions against Hawaii, not to speak of the mainland, was not taken into account in the plan. The reasons were that priority was given to the defensive plan and moreover that our national power could not stand such operations. Another important reason was that Japan's sole aim was to drive away the imminent threats. It was entirely unnecessary further to wage war with the United States. This was the fundamental attitude of the Japanese army in making up the year 1941's plan and had been so in the annual programs that preceded it. As to Britain the following was the measures to be worked out by 1941's plan, in case a war should break out with her: It is true that we had the idea, in case of war to capture first her military bases in the Far East, such as Singapore or Hongkong, but no concrete plans were prepared for that. India, Australia and other British territories were never contemplated in the plan. It was the same also with the Netherlands East Indies. The actual conditions did not



allow Japan to plan simultaneous operations against more than two countries including the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as she had not sufficient military forces and national resources to venture such a war. On the other hand, inasmuch as it was very difficult to foresee the development of such a many-sided war it was admitted that in such a case we should have somehow to combine the separate plans originally designed as against individual nations into an over-all plan of operation. The Supreme Command, however, had of course an idea to take some political measures as far as possible not to launch such simultaneous operations.

c. The above mentioned strategy meant that we should, at the outset of war, check their attack in a passive way for a while and afterwards take an offensive and thus maintain defensive attitude. Of course, we expected that, according to the progress of operations, in some cases it might be necessary to cope with the offensive of the enemy, to give up fruitless passiveness and to turn to an effective counter attack as soon as possible.

However, in view of the insufficiency of operational preparations that could be expected within 1941, it was quite clear at the beginning of that year that not only in the earlier months but also as late as at the end of the year we would be still unable even to carry out the passive formulae of operation, not to speak of checking at once an offensive attack from some country. In this connection, detailed accounts shall be given in a later paragraph.

It was generally admitted that the preparations had to be completed only through steady and continual efforts over a long period, because of Japan's poor condition in strategic resources war funds and munitions production. It was because we had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis, if once it happened, with drastic measures on a grand scale. So the incompleteness of preparations meant complete impossibility to make operations. These facts clearly show that the plan for the year together with its preparatory programs could not meet even the requirements of the defense plan for 1941. (This sentence is not clear)

d. The peacetime operations program for 1941 was drafted and decided upon by the General Staff Office as stated in the foregoing explanations, but a further study was never attempted for framing a concrete policy. No permanent army headquarters had yet come into being standing on a permanent foothold to be in charge of execution of Southern operations in case of a crisis. Even divisions necessary for the operation not yet been designated.



3. Here I am going to explain some facts in relation to the drafting of peacetime operational plan for 1941.

a. The care of the peacetime operational plan for 1941 lay in the basic policy of Japan to: avoid, in view of the current state of things both within and without, any over-all war with other countries so that Japan might devote all her efforts to the solution of the China Incident; to try to bring the South Problems then pending between Japan and other countries to a prompt settlement by some means short of war; and above all to block the so-called Aid-Chiang routes of the Third Powers. These were the points which General Sugiyama Gen., Chief of the General Staff, who was in charge of command over the General Staff Office as whole and of national defense and tactics pointed out as essential to the drafting of operational plans, when he gave an instruction to me, chief of the first section (in charge of operations) as well as to Lt.-General Tsukada, Osamu, vice-chief of the General Staff Office (who was in charge of controlling general affairs and of adjusting policy and strategy).

b. Why war should be averted from strategical points of view was clear from the following circumstances: In the winter of 1941 at the drafting conference of the plan for the following year, the number of forces needed for war-time emergency was estimated by the War Ministry at forty-eight divisions in total. If they were divided into a few groups which would be dispatched each for one quarter, namely about thirty divisions for anti-Soviet defence, about ten divisions for the China operations five divisions for guarding against the United States and Britain and a few divisions in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters, there would have been no doubt big shortage of forces in every quarter. It was true especially with regard to the amount of tanks, motor-cars, communication facilities and liquid fuels. Further, in anticipation of a crisis with the United States and Britain in the future, considerable increase was required above all in the number of army corps for defensive purposes in this direction, amounting to at least a little more than ten divisions in the early period of emergency. Therefore, there should have been prepared about ten divisions for the China operations, a little more than twenty divisions for the anti-Soviet defense and a few in reserve for the Imperial Headquarters. The Chief of the General Staff recognized that, in such a case, shortage of armed forces and war materials would be much more acute and such a war would compel us to leave the China Incident completely fruitless. The chief further concluded that Japan should keep up a policy to avert a wholesale war from the viewpoints of both politics and strategy. In this respect, I understood, the War Minister also had agreed in opinion with the chief..



(c) Besides, in framing the plan, the following matters underwent special examination in an interview I had with the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff. The question was in what the strategy of the Japanese Army would be affected by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. The discussion was held in November of 1940, and the result was as given below:

The general view held by the Vice-Chief was mainly that Japan should by every means avert any resort to arms in so far as the justice and fame of our nation be maintained, however imminent the compulsion of the Tripartite Pact. I agreed with him on this point. The conclusion, of course, was a result of consideration from a purely strategical point of view. The final decision whether to resort to arms or not was a matter left to our state policy. The question whether or not any of the contracting parties to the Tripartite Pact was really attacked by the United States, was a matter for future judgment which was to be decided in relation with the circumstances at that time and from a fair and independent viewpoint. We ought to keep up this attitude with a firm belief and make a due judgment in view of the whole destiny of our nation. In case Japan should be attacked from the United States, Germany would, of course, give us a military aid of some sort. However, considering the fact that Germany was then absorbed in the European wars and that her military power was never limitless and besides in view of the circumstance that Germany was not a big naval power and situated remote from East Asia and the Western Pacific, (an expected battlefield in case of a war between Japan and the United States), the Japanese Army could not expect a strategical aid from Germany. On the other hand, in case Germany should be attacked by the United States, Japan would be obliged to give aid to Germany by arms. Japan, however, could not afford to engage in military operations against the United States exclusively for the purpose of aiding Germany. On the contrary, she had to devote herself to her own independent operations in order to complete a general national defense. In case a war should break out between the United States and Germany, we should find out some measures or other to meet the circumstance. It was especially the case at that time when the Japanese Army had no surplus in armed forces.

These were the gist of the conclusion.

The Chief of the General Staff approved the above conclusion and made clear his views in agreement with the Vice-Chief that the 1941 peacetime operations plan should be designed and established from an independent viewpoint; that it should not be restricted or given any support from outside; and that it should not be influenced in strategy by the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance Pact. The 1941 peacetime operations plan was founded upon this principle.

C. As to preparations accompanying the 1941 peacetime operations plan, I recognized that they were lacking in thoroughness, for the Southern operations (for defense) were left out of consideration in the plan and therefore these areas remained untouched or without defense.

(a) For the South, even the study prerequisite for the defense of that area was left incomplete or untouched as to organization, equipment, materials and training of forces to be employed for landing and tropical operations.

For although the most urgent and immediate need of the time was to reform the organization and equipment of a part of army forces and give them special training so that they might be used for the Southern operations against the United States and Britain as provided in the peacetime national defense plan, it could hardly be expected that



these preparations would be finished even in their crude form by the summer of 1941, if it be set about at once.

In the 1941 mobilization plan, emphasis was laid on the completion of defense in Manchuria against the Soviet by reorganizing each division so as to adapt it to operations in continental climate, especially in the cold wildernesses of North Manchuria. The organization and equipment thus prepared for the troops were entirely opposite in nature to those for the South. Particularly, transport goods to be accommodate for each division was of a great amount, and a majority of horses for transport and communication was expected to be Manchurian ponies. From this it was clear that the Japanese Army laid greater stress upon the defensive operations against the Soviet Union than upon those against the United States and Britain, even at the beginning of the period covered by the 1941 operations and mobilization plan, that is, in April 1941. As for the equipment of army airplanes, only sixty or seventy percent out of the original mobilization plan was expected to be reached before August, 1941. Among them, especially, heavy bombers which had been originally designed for defensive purposes for the Manchurian-Soviet frontier, had but a small flying range and were not well fitted for Southern operations. As stated in the above paragraph, aviation facilities on the whole were not available for Southern operations.

(b) As regards the stock of ammunitions for operational purposes, only a small amount was piled up for the Southern operations during the period between the spring and the summer of 1941. At the end of September and later in October, there was accumulated an additional amount and afterwards, until December, it reached in total barely to the amount available for some ten divisions at the most. The accumulation, however, had not been calculated in the aforesaid preparations which had been based upon 1941's peacetime operations plan, but it was carried out chiefly after the determination of national policy.

(c) As mentioned before, the preparations in the 1941 plan meant chiefly: reorganization and training of several divisions so as to fit them for the guard and defense in the South; study of tactics in the tropics; study of landing tactics; collection of information and strategical materials. They were essential matters of study for framing a peacetime national defense and were not the prerequisites for the execution of wars against the United States, Britain and Holland. Moreover, it was too late in commencement and was not rapid in progress. In addition to this, information concerning the South, particularly military conditions, weather, topography, land and marine meteorology were found incomplete and no bases were prepared for aviation, sea-transport and communication activities.

(d) In view of the actual condition as above stated as well as the expected progress of preparations within the designated year, even passive and defensive operations were hard to put into effect. Much more difficult was the plan to make a responsive attack after defensive actions or an instant counter-attack against the enemy's offensive.

We tried, however, to meet at least the minimum requirements of defensive preparations in an effort to make up for such shortages in the preparations.

There were many difficulties found in the way of execution due to the want of military funds and materials in the Army Ministry and the insufficiency of investigation by the Supreme Command. It was not before September of the year that preparations in organizing armed forces and war materials were first launched. They were to a greater extent



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applications from those originally prepared for the defense against the Soviets, or some such modifications for meeting an emergency.

III. I shall state here about the plan and preparations which were adopted after the decision on a national policy was arrived at as a result of the Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, (Exhibit 588).

A. On 2 July, immediately after the decision of a national policy, the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff gave the following explanations to the chiefs of all sections in his staff in connection with the problem of the United States and Britain, which had been fully discussed at the Conference. Above all, he stressed the need of propelling the once-fixed policy and accordingly the study and preparations for moving into South French Indo-China.

(a) The fixed principles should not be changed fundamentally as to the solution of the China Incident. We should however, strengthen pressure upon Chungking from the South and check up the routes for helping Chiang Kai-shek. While, on the other hand, if circumstances admit, we should exercise belligerent rights against Chungking and take over hostile foreign settlements into our hands. We must pay utmost vigilance to every circumstance, especially to the United States and Britain, in taking up such measures. The pressure upon Chungking from the South had to be effected also by the practical application of policies already established toward French Indo-China. It was an urgent need to dispose of the hostile foreign settlements in China, as they were presenting a great obstacle in the way of settling the China Incident. It was more desirable to solve it through diplomatic means, but, if circumstances do not admit, we should have to take them over by force through the New Central Government of China. In that case, there would be some danger of strained relations with the Anglo-Americans. Something more serious than the occupation of South French Indo-China might happen in diplomatic relations with those countries. Therefore, we must never be in haste in the solution. This was the reason why foreign settlements in China were decided to be taken over, if the case required it. Anyhow we must be ready, if the worst comes, not to evade a defensive war against the Anglo-Americans.

(b) The Southern policy was made up generally on the basis of the once-fixed national policy and aimed at the advancement of troops into South French Indo-China. The policy especially confirmed the need of maintaining readiness for a war against the United States and Britain. Nevertheless, it did not mean Japan was determined to make a war. It only admitted that, if Japan should suffer a military interference from the United States and Great Britain in the way of executing her policy toward Siam and French Indo-China through peaceful and diplomatic means, she would never shun operations for self-defense in those areas. In that case, every effort was to be paid to avoid armed forces entering Siam. As to the real purport of the expression of "not to evade war towards Britain and America" in the above decision, it has been understood from the atmosphere of the Imperial Conference itself and the real intention of the Navy, that by them it was expected that Japan would successfully carry out her policy in peace toward French Indo-China and Siam, without causing any trouble with the Anglo-Americans, if she paid possible efforts for the cause. The expression that Japan was not afraid of war with the United States and



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Britain meant only that we would not be in danger of stimulating a war by taking a policy toward French Indo-China; however, any interference or challenge from Anglo-Americans, if they were turned toward us, might cause an unexpected situation; thus, we should make a careful preparation for carrying out a policy toward French Indo-China and should have a firm determination to get ready for the worst. We also foresaw a future time on the side of the Army, when our defensive activities would be greatly enlarged to permit us a more careful consideration of Southern problems, as our preparations were not ready as compared with those against the Soviet Union and China. Anyhow, in view of the situation where Japan's sphere of defense was enlarged up to French Indo-China, the first step to be taken was a practical study of operations plan against the United States and Britain from various points of view.



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(c) The outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union was making extremely pointed the relations between Japan and the Union. In addition American aid to the Soviet Union and the construction of military bases by the United States in the Soviet territory in the Far East were making the Japanese-Soviet relations more intricate and serious. In this respect, special consideration must be given in connection with the Anglo-American problems.

(d) In the conference held on 2 July, every member in attendance expressed the same desire to carry out a peaceful advancement following the international treaties as far as possible. The War Minister also disclosed his intention to do his best in order not to cause any trouble at the time of advancement, as had happened formerly in North French Indo-China last autumn. The Supreme Command, calculating on this intended to dispatch the Imperial Guard Division then stationed in South China to French Indo-China in order to complete the advancement. For this cause, we decided to make good use of the results of investigation made last June and establish and intimate cooperation and communication between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff, especially in adjusting the relations between politics and military operations.

(a) The Chief of the General Staff, who had agreed in view with the Government and the Army General Staff late in June 1941, pointed out that the aim of advancement of South French Indo-China, was both to cut the Chiang Kai-Shek route formerly established there and thus to contribute to the establishment of economic autonomy of Japan. He further stressed that with this in view, we should first of all secure friendship and reliance from French Indo-China. Moreover, he stated to the following effect:

F. Both the Central authorities of the Army and the troops on the spot should pay full respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity and other rights of France with and understanding that the Japanese Embassy in French Indo-China and the troops on the spot must not fail to make control and communication between themselves, and in connection with this a decisive measure for control must be taken among the stationed troops. Even common soldiers must be fully aware that every misunderstanding or disagreement should be avoided by both peoples due to the difference in manners, customs and languages of the two nations. This he emphasized at the conference for the mapping out of the advancement program.

B. I give the following as a supplement to the above statement in relations to the stationing of troops in South French Indo-China.

(a) As to the possibility of peaceful advancement into South French Indo-China, General Sugiyama, the Chief of the General Staff, clarified his view early in July that Japan did not take French Indo-China for an enemy and the advancement was not of a military occupation. He concluded that there as a favorable prospect on the side of France to admit a peaceful advance, on condition that we could convince them of the purpose of our stationing of troops, though it would not be an easy task. Early in July, it was informed that Britain might march into French Indo-China beforehand, as she was aware of our intention to make advancement there. Anxiety would prevail among us if this would cause any untoward accident at the time of our occupation. The Chief believed that our attitude, if maintained just, fair and firm, would not give rise to any trouble by the conduct of British Armies.



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(b) The invasion of Chinese Armies into North French Indo-China was at this time a matter of great concern for the Central authorities of the Army and for the dispatched forces stationed in South China and French Indo-China. Early in July, information reached us that three divisions of Chungking's Army, hitherto stationed near the border



between China and French Indo-China, received an order to enter into French Indo-China. In order to meet this situation, the first section of the General Staff made a secret study of a plan of reinforcing one regiment of infantry, if needed temporarily, and moreover even to despatch one division then stationed in Canton. On the other hand, early in 1941, the General Staff gave out information to the effect that Chinese forces amounting to four armies or about 16 divisions were stationed in face of French Indo-China, in the districts of Lungchow, Tsinghsi and Mengtze, Chinese territories adjacent to the districts of Langson and Laokay, situated at the northeast border of French Indo-China.

C. As already mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff asked on 2 July 1941, shortly after the Imperial Conference, to make a thorough investigation upon the strategy toward the United States and Britain. Following this, at the end of July, when the occupation of South French Indo-China was put into operation, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the first section were urged by the Chief of the General Staff for the promotion of the study. The results of the investigation at that time were like below:

(a) The preparations generally required at the time, were put into practice within the limits of the already-fixed plan established early in the year. They were: -- studies in various fields of operations, studies of defensive plans to meet a critical situation on the basis of the peacetime annual plan; and new investigations and preparations for the defense of French Indo-China on the principle of Franco-Japanese Mutual Defense Agreement.

Detailed accounts of preparations were made also within the scope of the established policy including the promotion of training, equipments, supplies and sanitation. It was an urgent need to make up for the loss suffered in the operations in China.

(b) The decision of national policy reached on 2 July and its consequent result, the Franco-Japanese military cooperation for the mutual defense of French Indo-China, had its aim in the protection of that area from the United States and Britain. The matter had never been imagined in the past annual operations plans. It was a new theme claiming a totally different study and preparations on the part of the General Staff. Our armed forces stationed in French Indo-China after the occupation of the Southern part of that area amounted to one brigade and one flying corps (two companies) for North French Indo-China and one division (in order not to interfere with the Japanese-American diplomatic negotiations, no forces except the airdrome engineers corps were stationed there in addition to the above one division) were assigned for the defense of French Indo-China from the threat of invasion by the United States, Britain and De Gaulle regime or the invasion or other aggressions by the Chinese forces. The General Staff, not going farther beyond the limit of an informal study on the reinforcement of units which had been reserved for crisis in China and Formosa, left further measures to the Army on the spot. While, construction of air bases and installation of communication facilities were going on according to the provisions of official agreement reached between Japan and France, other measures were also taken into consideration as shown in the above statement.

(c) It was likely that Japanese operational measures for self-defense against the United States and Britain which might follow the mutual defense agreement with French Indo-China or other similar circumstances, would naturally cover the main areas (such as Malay, the Philippines), and would develop into military operations necessary for defending the Japanese homeland. Therefore, it became a pressing need to propel a further study in the operational plan in anticipation of a future situation. The Chief of the General Staff then requested the Vice-Chief and the Chief of the First Section to promote the study on the plan,



including the study of operations in the tropics, on the sea, in the air and of landing in areas such as the Philippines, Malay, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Bismark Islands, Guam, etc. Likewise, the Chief of the Second Section was asked to collect informations and materials on military affairs in the South and the Chief of the Third Section was given an instruction to speed up a study on the war materials for ocean and landing operations.



IV. I shall now explain matters in connection with the operations plan and preparations after the decision on national policy made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941.

A. In early September 1941 the Chief of the Army General Staff at a meeting attended by the Vice Chief of Staff and chiefs of departments explained the items in the above-mentioned national policy which related to the United States and Great Britain, the gist being as follows:

In short, it was a request for reconsideration of the operations plan and the furtherance of or the making of a new start in the operational preparations in order to cope with the situation.

1. The national policy decided on 6 September reflects a strong consciousness of the critical importance of national defense. In other words, the question of how to cope with the present critical situation, especially the offensive actions of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands toward Japan and of how to cope with the reality of the daily diminishing resilience of our national strength in the face of the Anglo-American freezing of our assets, especially the embargo on oil, the complete loss of which is now but a matter of time -- how to cope with this critically grave situation and how to save the fate of the nation -- these are questions



which our country must answer. In order to solve these questions and in crying need as our country is of measures to surmount the difficulties, even in the event of our falling into the worst possible situation, it has been decided to pursue our diplomacy in all seriousness on the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations with an attitude of making efforts for peace, but ready to fight if peace fails. This is what the national policy decision provides for. For this purpose it was decided that, while seeking the attainment of the objectives of the negotiations with a time limit on the one hand, completion of war preparations with a time limit shall be made with a resolve to meet possible eventualities when war against the United States (Great Britain and the Netherlands) is unavoidable from the standpoint of self-preservation and self-defense. The nation's position on peace or war is to be decided in the early part of October (1941). These are the matters the aforementioned national policy decision provides for. In short, the decision on national policy both in name and in fact is not a decision resolving on war, but a decision whose object is to bring about a new turn in the situation through diplomacy. The hastening of defensive war preparations is directed against the offensive actions of the Powers against Japan with a will and resolve to fight in case war cannot be averted.



It should be emphasized that the primary principal of the decision is to attain our objective through diplomacy.

2. In comparing the decision of 2 July and that of 6 September there are differences in the fundamental points.

(a) With respect to what might be the cause for conflict between Japan and the United States and Great Britain the earlier decision was limited to the problem of Siam and French Indo-China, especially the latter, where as the later decision reflects the fact that the area and actuality of friction between Japan and the United States and Great Britain have become greatly enlarged and far more serious as a result of the American-British-Dutch offensive against Japan, the embargo and the situation with regard to the resilience of Japanese national strength. In other words, Japan was to demand by sheer force of circumstances that the United States and Great Britain refrain from interfering in and obstructing the solution of China Incident, and from threatening Japan's national defense, and offer their cooperation in acquiring raw materials. She further was to demand of the United States and Great Britain recognition of the special relations between Japan and French Indo-China, the non-establishment of military interests in the territories of Siam, the Netherland East Indies, China and the Soviet Far East, and confirmation that there will be no military reinforcements in the Far East. Moreover, the later decision also provided that Japan naturally would agree to concessions to a considerable degree in return for the foregoing demands.



(b) Should by any chance military operations be undertaken under the earlier decision, the objective was to carry out measures concerning French Indo-China, while in the later case, the nation's self-preservation and self-defense would be the motive.

(c) Whereas the former decision considered French Indo-China as essentially the center of the area of operations, the area of operations under the latter would expand widely.

(d) Accordingly, it is only natural that there should be differences in the strategical concept.

(e) The situation regarding the strategic material oil is great change completely different from what it was at the time of the July decision. Now the much feared danger signal that our national defense would be rendered powerless can be seen in this single item. (See IV. refer to IV, F).

3. As this decision on national policy is a demand for acceleration of operational preparations directed toward the South, the General Staff is required urgently to complete the actual plan on an overall basis. In connection with operational preparations the fixed annual peacetime plan and the supplementation made after 2 July, shall be further accelerated and perfected. In addition necessary operational preparations shall be begun anew. The Supreme Command feels especially the need for a deep reconsideration of the fact



that the annual plan for the year 1941 is insufficient, incomplete and impractical and the accompanying preparations for defense betrays weakness and lack of thoroughness, In view of the situation, the chief of the General Staff have given directions to the Vice-Chief and the chief of the First Division on the following matter as an operational formula to be newly adopted. It is, in substance, that the national policy decision of 6 September is an order for the completion of operational preparations on a general scale regardless of whether or not they are offensive or defensive in nature. As the first operational formula to be adopted, Japan shall in the early stage counter passively the attacks of the American, British and Dutch forces singly or severally and then after completing operational preparations turn to the offensive to secure the defense of our land. In such a case we must recognize that we cannot avoid carrying out continuously operations necessary for our self-preservation and defense, and preparations toward this end shall be completed. As to the second operational formula, although we shall counter the attacks of the opposing party, we shall without falling into a defensive position undertake repulsive actions by counter-attacking from the very outset and then carry out the strategy indicated in the first formula, as to which of the above two we should rely on or whether other plans



(such as special defense in some particular spot) should be adopted, the choice would naturally be determined by the situation within and without our country at the time of the commencement of hostilities and the degree of completion of our national policy in meeting that situation as well as the state of our military and naval preparations. At such a time the various conditions surrounding the navy would have a decisive importance. As for the army Supreme Command, it was directed that whatever may be the circumstances, the army's objective was to carry out operations which, if possible would immediately repulse the opposition's initial attack and that various studies and preparations be carried forward with this in view.

4. Although the formula of operations to be adopted and the aim of preparations to be advanced are, as stated above, there is no alternative at present than to undertake defensive operations at first. In other words, while on the one hand we must undertake to perfect all emergency measures in planning and preparing our strategy of defense, we must, on the other as operational preparations are gradually pushed to completion make it our principle to plan and prepare urgent matters in an orderly manner so that there will be no miscarriage in the execution of our defensive or offensive strategy whichever it may be. This, from this day on ward, has become the important subject of study especially of the



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Supreme Command. At the same time, the possibility of initial an initial attack by the opposition before the completion of Japanese preparations by the latter part of October, is a matter worthy of deep caution and prudent consideration on the part of the operation authorities.



B. About the middle of September, the General Staff decided upon a plan of defensive strategy to be adopted for the time being in the South, based upon the September national policy decision and prepared according to the following mental attitude:

1. The defensive strategy for the South to be taken by the Japanese army shall vary according to the stage of progress of operational preparations, but on the whole, it shall be on a very small scale. In the final analysis its primary object will be the defense of French Indo-China itself from the attack of the opposition. From the actual state of our present operational preparations we cannot engage in operations in other areas in the Southern region. Hence, in such an event grave difficulties would arise in the defense of Japanese territory and protection of our marine transportation.
2. As such operations as the foregoing amounts to a great failure from the standpoint of national defense, we should quickly abandon such a passive and harmful operational formula and turn from a purely defensive position to a passive offensive. This requires speedy progress in our operational preparations such as would permit a change over to emergency operational command for our self-preservation and defense.
3. In case such operations are unavoidably given rise to, much



against our wishes, the principle of operational command and other methods as are deemed proper shall be established in accordance with the actual state of progress of operational preparations. In this connection, no directions in advance are deemed necessary to be given to the forces on the spot (forces stationed in French Indo-china). This is regarded as disadvantageous to us.

C. Since about this time, the General Staff, was constantly apprehensive lest there be a possible attack initiated by the United States and Great Britain, considered it highly necessary to prepare fully against it. Hence there was great concern in our defensive operational command in this period when preparations for operations in the South were incomplete. On 6 November, 1941, the Imperial Headquarters sent to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army an order to prepare for the capture of strategic points in the Southern Region.

This order permitted him, in the event of an initial attack by the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands or one of them, to meet the attack with the forces under his command for purposes of self-defense. In an order issued on 1, December, 1941 the Imperial Headquarters directed that in the event of a serious initial Anglo-American attack the Supreme Commander shall, in cooperation with the navy, commence

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offensive (occupational) operations at a proper time. As can thus be seen, these orders were issued out of a deep concern over a possible initial attack by the United States and Great Britain. There were also grave apprehensions over a possible British invasion of Siam.



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D. The state of operational preparations about the middle of September was generally as follows: In connection with the preparations both under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and the joint jurisdiction of the Ministry and its Sub-divisions all matters were vigorously advanced through cooperation between them, but delay could not be avoided. This was principally due to lack of materials and shipping.

1. Although it was the plan of the General Staff to gradually to release units of the 5th and 18th divisions from the China operations for employment in the French Indo-China area, their education, training and equipment having recovered to some extent about this time to enable them to engage in operations, yet their recovery and perfection, especially preparations which would accord with the requirements of operations in the South were far from sufficient. (These divisions were at first being concentrated for return to Japan and demobilization, but in view of the situation in the South, Their return home was called off and they were made to stand by in China.)

These divisions had been on duty maintaining public peace and safety in China (near Shanghai and Canton). In addition, they were primarily engaged in military training. Even in case an incident with the United States and Great Britain should suddenly occur and these divisions are dispatched to cope with it, they would require nearly two months before they could actually engage in defensive actions, the time being necessary to complete concentration, transportation and other various preparations.



In addition, to the above, several more divisions engaged in the China operations were scheduled to be transferred to the Southern operations in accordance with future requirements, as well as three additional divisions in Japan proper and Formosa.

2. Ammunition for the Southern operations for approximately 10 divisions to engage in battle was scheduled to be stocked up in Formosa and French Indo-China and it was planned that as a part of the scheme the first stock pile be created in Formosa about the end of September, but its execution was extremely doubtful because of the shortage of shipping. Conditions were such that even if all difficulties were overcome in transporting and accumulating the entire stock, the accumulation could not be completed until the end of December. The ammunition to be stocked up was for general operations and not as equipment for the forces. My subordinates were able to learn of the above from their contacts with the various bureaus of the War Ministry which were concerned with these matters. Moreover, about this time the Standard amount of ammunition to be used for the Southern operations was considered to be one and one-half times the general standard and it was on this standard that the basis for the stock-piling of ammunition was set up.

3. After the middle of September, 1941, a part of our forces was despatched to the South from Manchuria and the Japanese Homeland. The newly despatched forces were: One division a tank regiment an independent anti-tank unit, air force ground crews, signal corps, and



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supply forces for South China, a tank corps headquarters, a tank regiment, an independent anti-tank-unit, an air corps, artillery corps, signal corps, and supply forces for Formosa; and an independent mixed regiment, air force ground crews and supply forces for French

Indo-China.



4. Since about this time, aviation and shipping installations were being reinforced or newly created in French Indo-China and South China: supply bases were being established in South China, Formosa and French Indo-China; the requisitioning of shipping and the camouflaging and arming of ships were begun or their effectuation being facilitated; and necessary training of army corps and air forces intended for use in the operations was being accelerated.

E. In the meantime, I learned from the Replenishment Bureau of the War Ministry about the actual situation relative to preparations pertaining to liquid fuels, the gist being as follows:

Assuming that Japan would continue the China Incident through 1941 and 1942 generally under the international situation now prevailing, her holdings of aviation gasoline and heavy oil in 1943 after dedicating the amount expected to be consumed in these two years would be extremely small and sufficient to meet the requirements of no more than one year of military operations. The reserve of heavy oil especially is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Navy to conduct decisive operations for no more than half a year. The foregoing estimates are based on the total reserves within Japan. Furthermore domestically produced crude oil, synthetic crude oil, alcohol etc., are far from sufficient to have any effect on the general situation, while with respect to synthetic oil there was no prospect of obtaining them in great volume. In other words if the present conditions remained unchanged during the two years, it was clear that our defensive strength would



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diminish as a matter of course to a state of complete powerlessness..

F. In the Army department of the Imperial Headquarters an overall operation plan against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands was being formulated on the basis of past studies, experience and collected data, but the chief of the General Staff conceived of the plan of operations to capture strategic points in the Southern Region in order to establish Japan's position of self preservation and defense by breaking through and severing the ABCD encirclement immediately in the event Japan is provoked and challenged after the early part of October 1941 and on this basis issued directions for the formulation and study of initial operations against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands. This draft plan obtained the approval of the General Staff late in October, and in the middle of November, was definitely established as a plan both in name and in fact. The foregoing does not mean, however, that the Japanese army, had after the early part of October, the intention to capture key points in the Southern Region or that there was such a possibility. It merely indicated the course of development of the study of plans of operation. At the same time, it was but a natural expression to cope with the situation caused by extreme difficulty of adjusting Japanese-American relations and the strengthening of the encirclement of Japan in East Asia. Moreover, it was but a result of a study of means by which to meet a situation in which Japan might be compelled unavoidably



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to act for her self defense even at the risk of throwing herself into the very jaws of death.

G. The preparations started on the basis of decision of 6 September, 1941, were to be suspended, in the event peace was decided as the national policy on the occasion for the decision for peace or war which was scheduled to be made in early October. If, on the contrary, a decision for war was adopted at that time, formal preparations were to be vigorously pushed forward and completed by the end of the same month. However, the preparations actually did not progress as rapidly as had been expected. This was because the decision for peace or war as a national policy had not been made on early October as scheduled and a period of indecision continued until the advent of the TOJO Cabinet in the middle of October. Then from shortly after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet until early in November, Japan's policy vis a vis the United States and Great Britain had been returned to a clean slate. Meanwhile operational preparations in this period were unavoidably slowed down or their effectuation held in obedience. In this period the mobilization of troops, the requisitioning of shipping, and the establishment of military bases were greatly retarded. However, as I will state, later, operational preparations proceeded on a full scale after the Liaison Conference in early November indicated the outline of national policy.



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H. Japanese foreign policy and operational preparations based upon the decision made as a result of the Imperial Conference on 6 September, 1941, were coordinated according to the following consideration:

1. On the day before the Imperial Conference on 6 September, a complete mutual agreement was reached between the Prime Minister and the Army and Navy chiefs of the Supreme Command on the point that the first principle of the National policy decision was to obtain Japan's objectives through diplomatic negotiations and therefore from the theoretical standpoint Clause Two of the decision should come before Clause One and that war was not desired but was to be resorted to only if absolutely unavoidable, that the essence of the decision lied in diplomatic negotiations.

2. Full consideration should be paid in the carrying out of preparations so as not to hinder the diplomatic negotiation. With this in view the armed forces to be sent into South French Indo-China in addition to those already stationed there should be limited only to ground crews of the air force.

3. Necessary mobilization to follow the decision on national policy of 6 September was, even after it was put into effect, to be suspended, if the diplomatic negotiations made a turn for the better. The foregoing items, 1 and 2, were to be decided by the consultation between the chief of the General Staff and the War Minister.

4. All operational preparations were to be carried made on the principle that it will not to impede or obstruct the diplomatic negotiations.



V. I shall now speak of matters relating to the operational plan and preparations after the adoption of Proposals A and B, vis a vis, the United States reached after the Imperial Conference of 5 November, 1941.

A. The explanations made by the Chief and Vice Chief of the Army General Staff on the same day, 5 November 1941, to the chiefs of various divisions of the General Staff Office, were in substance as follows:

At the Liaison Conferences held daily from the latter part of October to the early part of November, prior to the decision of 5 November, it was recognized that the relations between Japan and the United States were at last approaching the final stage where a choice had to be made between peace or war, but it was agreed that efforts will be continued to effect a diplomatic settlement while maintaining, as heretofore, the two-fold policy of diplomacy and war preparations as a means of tiding over the critical situation. However, there was a time limit on both the diplomatic steps and war preparations. Operational preparations were to be carried forward with the resolve that if a settlement could not be reached through diplomatic negotiations, then an appeal to arms would be made as a last resort and preparations hereafter were to be on a full scale. The decision was explained as being the same as that of 6 September in that a resolution for war was not made. With regard to when operational preparations should be completed, the Chief of Staff on this same occasion, expressed the view that that goal should be set for the end of November or beginning of December.

B. With the intensification of a crisis in the relations between the two countries, full scale preparations were launched after 5 November on the two-fold principle of diplomacy and preparations with the intention to leave no stone unturned in the consideration of measures with which to cope with the worst eventuality. I am familiar with these matters as they were in my line of duty and their gist is as follows:

(1) In addition to the vigorous advancement of the preparations, which were hitherto being made, mobilization and deployment of troops, requisitioning of ships and the establishment of military bases were carried out with the utmost effort. The Army's operational preparations for the initial phase of operations were being completed with the end of November as the goal.

(2) The overall plan of operations of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands were under study and discussion parallel with the government's diplomatic efforts. It was late in October that it became a final plan and it was formally adopted both in name and in fact in the middle of November (about the 15th). (See C below). The establishment of the plan of operations for the General Army for the Southern Region and other armies under it in the field took place later.

(3) The organization of operational armies, namely, the order of battle of the Southern Army and the order pertaining to important personnel including the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army and others under him were issued on 6 November, and on the same day an Imperial Headquarters order concerning the operational preparations of the Southern Army was transmitted. The gist was that the Supreme Commander shall prepare for the capture of key areas in the South from bases in French Indo-China,



South China, Formosa and the Southwest Pacific Islands, employing his main forces and in cooperation with the Navy. In case he is attacked by American, British and Dutch forces, he is empowered to meet the attack with the forces under his command.

(4) On 8 November, in Tokyo, an agreement for joint operations was made between the Headquarters of the Southern General Army and the combined fleet.

(5) On 15 November the Imperial Headquarters notified the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army of the outline to be followed in the operations to capture and occupy key areas in the South. The areas to be captured and occupied were the Philippine Islands, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and a part of southern Burma. It was further directed that the stability of Siam and French Indo-China be maintained with all possible effort.

(6) It was after 5 November that operational army corps to serve under the Southern General Army left for their areas of service from Japan, China, and Formosa. These army corps were to be returned home at any time, when the negotiations between Japan and the United States reached a settlement. In this connection, the Chief of the Army General Staff gave direct instructions to Gen. TERAUCHI, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army, and the latter readily acknowledged it.

(7) As to the supply, the necessary preparations were generally nearing completion after the middle of November.

(8) All the full scale war preparations stated above were not the result of a decision for war. Hence, if the Japanese-American negotiations were successfully consummated, all the preparations were to be halted and returned to a clean slate. In this respect there was a complete agreement between the General Staff and the War Ministry as well as the Naval Supreme Command. The suspension of preparations was a matter of considerable difficulty and required coolness and boldness of will and speedy and organized handling of business relating thereto. At that time the Chief of the General Staff was full of confidence in this respect.

C. Although both the original and copies of the operational plan for the Southern Region which was established in the middle of November, 1941, were destroyed by fire, the general outline thereof which I retain in my memory is as follows:

(1) The outline of the plan is given in paragraph 1 and onward, but it is to be borne in mind that it was to be abandoned if the diplomatic negotiations reached a settlement before the outbreak of war.

(2) The areas of operations in the South were to be the Philippine Islands, Guam, Hong-kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismark Islands and Dutch Timor.

(3) Operations were to be commenced simultaneously against the Philippines and British Malaya through close cooperation between the Army and Navy and completed in the shortest possible time.

(4) Armed forces to be employed in the operations were to consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 aviation corps and other units under the army's direct command. The division of these forces into army corps and their areas of assignment were scheduled as follows:

The 14th Army of the Southern Army, consisting of two divisions as its mainstay and assigned to the Philippines area; the 15th Army,



consisting of two divisions was assigned to maintain stability in Siam and operations in Burma; the 16th Army, consisting of three divisions (of which two divisions were to be transferred after the end of other operations) were assigned to the Netherlands Indies area; the 25th Army, consisting of four divisions, was assigned to engage in operations against Malaya and Singapore; the air force was to consist of two air corps as its mainstay; the 23rd Army under the command of the China Expeditionary Forces, was assigned to operations in the Hong-Kong area, with one division as its mainstay; detachments in the Southern sea area under the directed command of the Imperial Headquarters were to consist of three infantry battalions as their mainstay and assigned to operations against Guam, the Bismark Islands, etc., and another division was to be assigned to maintain stability in French Indo-China.

(5) The date for the commencement of operations was to be fixed after the decision for war was made. As set forth above, the operational plan and preparations of the Japanese Army varied in the scale of their objective, the degree of precision and their strength in accordance with the relaxation or intensification of the international situation and the demands of defense during the period between spring and early winter in 1941. In every case it was a stipulation of operational technique and naturally not a war plan. Moreover the Japanese Supreme Command had nothing which can be called a war program in time of peace. The same was the case with the Japanese Government. This concludes my testimony.

On this 16th day of May, 1947, at IMTFE.

DEPONENT

TANAKA, Shinichi (seal)

I, KIYOSE, Ichiro, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date - At Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE, Ichiro (seal)



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, who occupy the post of The Chief of Archives Section, 1st Demobilization Office, Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the following 4 documents were burnt at the termination of War and that they are in the custody of 1st Demobilization Office Documents are as follows:

The plan of Imperial Military Operation of 16th year of Showa. (1941)

The command concerning, "Preparation for attack on Important Southern Regions" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 6th of November 16th year of Showa (1941)

Operational order concerning "Attack on Important Southern Regions with holding plan of Attack" which was issued by the Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army, on the 15th of November 16th year of Showa (1941).

Imperial Headquarter order concerning opening of hostility, on the 1st of December, 16th year of Showa (1941).

Certified at Tokyo

on the 25 day of July, 1947.

MIYAMA, Yozo  
Chief of the Archives Section,  
the 1st Demobilization Bureau.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness:

KIYOSE, Ichiro

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