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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO 234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 347

PLACE: TOKYO  
DATE: 5 Nov 45

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: Ordnance, Signal, and Communications Equipment.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Lt General KAN, Haruji, Army Ordnance Bureau.  
Maj General ITO, Raeiski, Army Ordnance Bureau.  
Major HAYASHI, Hajime, Vehicles, Army Ordnance Bureau.  
Major SUZUKI, Hideei, Arms, Army Ordnance Bureau.  
Major NOSE, Shigeo, Ammunition, Army Ordnance Bureau.  
Major KAWADA, Ichiro, Communications, Army Ordnance Bureau.

Where interviewed: Room 238, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Colonel J. F. RODENHAUSER

Interpreter: Mr. HOTTA, Masasuke, Army Ordnance Bureau.

Allied Officers Present: Lt Colonel D. W. SWIFT  
Lt Comdr W. J. McCLUSKY

Summary:

1. Lt General KAN submitted written answers to Questionnaires that had been filed 27 October 1945.

2. Discussion of answers elicited following information: Investigation and study of the supply problem of the movement to the South was commenced October 1941 because of the inter-national situation. However, the realization that production capabilities were inadequate precluded proper planning. They tried to expand but were hampered by lack of raw materials and insufficient number of factories. Consequently, as the war progressed, they could supply only a per centage of front line requirements.


From 1943 on, emphasis was placed on anti-aircraft weapons and the manufacture of divisional and corp artillery was cut back. Because raw materials were diverted to the air force in 1943, the production of small arms was cut back. There was then only sufficient production to equip newly mobilized units. The small arms used at training schools were called in to relieve the shortage.

3. There were never adequate supplies of spare parts and production was not sufficient to meet requirements. Whenever possible, complete units were shipped for cannibalization for parts.

4. Although field depots were planned, direct shipment to the front was often carried out because of the shortage of reserves.

At Rabaul, sufficient supplies for one operation were maintained until August 1943. Thereafter, ships could not get through, so in October, submarines were used. However, this method was not very satisfactory. Singapore was maintained until October 1944 (Leyte landing), but only 10% of demands were supplied.

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6. It had been decided to increase the Kaisenbun of 1937 three fold, but it could not be put into practice because of shortages. However, in the spring of 1943, the number of Kaisenbun for South was increased to two to offset losses in transit.

7. Signal and Communications Equipment:

At no time was there a surplus of signal and communications equipment. In 1941, there were sufficient factories to produce planned requirements which generally would have been sufficient to meet actual requirements even though raw materials were difficult to obtain. In 1942, production was insufficient principally because factories had been diverted to production of radio locators.

About January 1945 began collecting equipment for warfare of the homeland. Planned to collect three months supply and succeeded in collecting between 30 to 40 per cent.

The bombing in May 1945 of Toyohashi Branch of Nagoya Depot destroyed about 1000 large vacuum tubes representing about twenty per cent of the accumulated supply of this critical item. The bombing of Kawasaki in April of 1945 reduced production of vacuum tubes by 60 to 90% causing a severe shortage.

8. Allied air attack resulted in:

Interception and confusion of transportation due to damage of traffic routes.

Imperfect transmission of supply orders due to damage of communication lines.

Bomb Damage to accumulated weapons.

Slow speed of supply due to extreme dispersion of war materials which was carried out to diminish danger of destruction by bombing.