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CURRENT DOCUMENTARY LITERATURE



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中國文化服務社印行

Published by

CHINA CULTURE SERVICE

Shanghai



英漢對照

# 當代文獻

本刊係不定期刊物，選譯聯合國規程，國際重要文告，中外條約，各國領袖關於國際重要問題所發表講演，宣言及聲明書等，英漢對照，並附有文法，修詞方面之註解及例句，可作文獻保存，可作研究資料，可作外交官考試參攷，可作國際政治

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中華民國三十六年六月滬初版

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每冊定價 二元一角

主編人 施端履  
發行人 劉百閱

發行所 上海福州路六七九號  
中國文化服務社  
電話九一七〇五  
印刷所 中國文化服務社印刷廠

# MOLOTOV'S LETTER TO MARSHALL ON USSR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CHINA

*In reply to a letter of U.S. Secretary of State Gen. George C. Marshall*

## 莫洛托夫致函馬歇爾申述蘇聯對中國 國內情勢之態度

覆馬歇爾函

The following was said in the *agreement on China*<sup>1</sup> reached among the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in December, 1945:

"The Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs exchanged views on questions concerning the situation in China. They have agreed on the necessity of the unity and democratization of China under the leadership of the National Government, on the broad invitation of democratic elements to all organs of the National Government and on the cessation of civil war.

"They reaffirmed their loyalty to the policy of non-interference into the internal affairs of China."

I herewith confirm that the Soviet government continues to maintain the views formulated in the above agreement of the three Ministers.

Believing that implementation of the unity and democratization of China, which call for a broad invitation of democratic elements to participate in all organs of the

一九四五年十二月間，美、英、蘇三國外長間達成的關於中國的協議

中說過下列各節：

「三國外長會就有關中國局勢的諸問題交換意見。他們同意：中國必須在國民政府領導下實行團結與民主化，必須廣泛容納民主份子參加國民政府的一切機構，並且必須停止內戰。

「他們重新確認：他們忠實遵守

對中國內政不干涉的政策。」

我在這裏確證：蘇聯政府當繼續保持上述三國外長協議中所簡明陳述的見解。

蘇聯政府相信：中國遂行團結與民主化，須要廣泛延攬民主份子參加國民政府的所有一切機構，這是中國

National Government of China, is the concern of the Chinese people itself, and believing that interference of foreign states in the internal affairs of China and particularly the participation of foreign armed forces in the civil war in China can but lead to the fanning of the civil war and to the creation of additional difficulties in the restoration of the national unity of China, the Soviet Government in its relations with China had maintained and is maintaining a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

The Soviet Government believes that the Moscow agreement on China would be really fulfilled *only*<sup>2</sup> provided that the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union do not ignore the agreement which had been reached about non-interference in the internal affairs of China and actually implement this agreement.

*The Moscow agreement*<sup>3</sup> also said:

"Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet armed forces disarmed the Japanese troops in Manchuria and evacuated them from there, but that the withdrawal of Soviet troops was postponed until February 1 on the request of the Chinese Government.

"Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the American armed forces are staying in northern China on the request of the Chinese Government and referred to the fact that the United States bears the chief responsibility for the implementation of the terms of surrender regarding the disarmament and withdrawal of Japanese troops. He declared that the American armed forces would be removed

人民自己關心的事情，並且相信：外國干涉中國的內政，尤其是外國軍隊參加中國內戰，徒然會煽動內戰，並且在恢復中國全國團結方面造成另外的困難，蘇聯政府在對中國的關係上，曾經保持，而且仍舊保持着不干涉中國的內政的政策。

蘇聯政府相信，只要美國和蘇聯兩國政府不把那關於不干涉中國內政一節曾經達成的協議置之度外，而在實際上履行這種協議，那麼，莫斯科關於中國的協議會真正地貫徹起來。

莫斯科關於中國的協議又說過：

「莫洛托夫先生聲明：蘇軍把滿洲日軍解除武裝，並且把他們從那裏撤出，不過蘇軍的撤退，應中國政府的請求，要延期到二月一日。

「貝爾納斯先生指出：美軍留駐華北，係應中國政府的請求，並且提出美國對於履行投降條款中關於日軍解除武裝與遣送一節，負着主要責任。他聲明：一俟這些義務履行完

as soon as these obligations are fulfilled or when the Chinese Government is able to fulfil these obligations without the help of the American armed forces.

“There is full accord between the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs as to the desirability of the withdrawal of Soviet and American armed forces from China at the earliest possible date compatible with the fulfilment of their obligations and with their responsibilities.”

Thus both the Soviet Union and the United States of America undertook obligations in regard to the “withdrawal of Soviet and American armed forces from China at the earliest possible date compatible with the fulfilment of their obligations and with their responsibilities.”

The Soviet government attached and continues to attach great significance to the precise fulfilment of these obligations. On its part the Soviet Government had in time fulfilled its commitment to withdraw Soviet troops from China. The evacuation of Soviet troops from Manchuria was completed on May 3, 1946.

Approximately one year passed since then, and the evacuation of American troops from China had not only not been completed, but it is generally unknown when the United States of America shall fulfil the obligations to withdraw American troops from China.

With the view of such a situation the Soviet government deems it desirable, as it did before, that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs which participated in the Moscow conference now staying in Moscow ex-

畢，或當中國政府無須美軍幫助就能履行這些義務的時候，美軍馬上撤退。

「兩國外長間完全一致，願望蘇

軍和美軍，當與履行義務和責任符

合，儘可能於最早的日期退出中國。」

由此可見，關於「蘇軍與美軍，當與履行義務與責任符合，儘可能於最早的日期退出中國」一節，蘇聯與美國都曾保證履行義務。

蘇聯政府曾經認為，而且繼續認為：精確履行這些義務，是具有極大的意義。蘇聯政府方面，已及時履行義務，把蘇軍退出中國。蘇軍從滿州的撤退，已於一九四六年五月三日完成。

自從那時以來，已快過去一年了，而美軍從中國的撤退，不但沒有完成，而且大家都不知道美國什麼時候才會退出中國。

鑒於這一種情況，蘇聯政府，和以前一樣，認為曾經參加過莫斯科會議，而目前正逗留在莫斯科的各該國外長，允諾把關於中國的協議之履行

change information regarding the fulfilment of the agreement on China. Such exchange of information would be useful as it would help to clarify the actual situation regarding the fulfilment of the Moscow agreement on China inasmuch as the existing situation in this respect is not satisfactory, evoking the doubts of public opinion as to the willingness to fulfil the obligations undertaken under the above agreement.

情況交換情報。這一種交換情報是有用處的，因為會幫助澄清莫斯科關於中國的協議之履行的實際情勢，而關於這一方面的現存情勢，是不能令人滿意的，引起輿論界懷疑是否願意履行上述協議所保證履行的義務。

## NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. 全文見「當代文獻」第四合訂本「三外長會議公報全文」之 69 至 70 面。
2. “only” (= adverb) 此處係形容 “provided that” (adverbs 除不能形容 noun 及 pronoun 外其餘各詞類皆可形容)。
3. 見 1.

# MOLOTOV'S REPLIES TO AMERICAN JOURNALIST ON THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

*Made on April 4, 1947, to Johannes Steel in an interview*

## 莫洛托夫關於德國及其他問題 答美記者問

一九四七年四月四日與美記者斯蒂爾談話

Question 1: Do you believe that the American proposals for the political organization of Germany will lead to the dismemberment of that country?

Answer: Such a danger *does*<sup>1</sup> exist.

Question 2: What in your opinion would be the consequences of such a development?

Answer: The consequences of such a development would be undesirable, as they might give an opportunity to German militarists and elements dreaming of revenge to take up the case of the unification of Germany as was the case, for instance, under Bismarck.

Question 3: Do you believe that compromise is possible between the Russian proposal for German unity and the American proposal for the "federalization" of Germany?

Answer: I do not preclude such a possibility if it would be possible to reach an agreement about letting the German people itself decide the question of federalization by plebiscite.

Question 4: Will the US\$10,000,000,000 reparations from Germany cover

問題一：你相信，美國關於德國政治組織的提案，會引起德國國家分裂嗎？

答：這一危險性的確存在。

問題二：照你的意見看來，這一種發展的後果如何？

答：這一種發展的後果不是所願望的，因為那會使德國軍國主義份子和復仇份子獲得機會來繼承德國統一事業，例如，在卑斯麥治下就曾發生過這樣情形。

問題三：你相信，俄國關於德國統一提案和美國對於德國「聯邦化」的提案之間，有妥協的可能嗎？

答：我並不以為沒有這一種可能性的餘地，如果能夠達成協議，讓德國人民自己用公民投票方式來決定聯邦化的問題。

問題四：由德國支付一百億美元

any substantial part of the damage suffered at the hands of the German invaders?

Answer: Of course this would be too little for the Soviet Union, but still, it could give some satisfaction to the Soviet people.

Question 5: Are reparations primarily an economic or moral question?

Answer: Reparations are important in both respects.

Question 6: Who had received more reparations so far, Great Britain and the United States or the Soviet Union?

Answer: Undoubtedly the Soviet Union received much less than the Allies.

Question 7: How can German peacetime production best be raised so that the reparations may be paid out of current production?

Answer: By means of a certain rise of the level of Germany's peacetime industry so that a part of the production (metal, coal, etc.) be directed to the payment of reparations to the victim countries.

Question 8: How can democracy be best restored in Greece?

Answer: The best way is the renunciation of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Greece.

Question 9: Do you believe that President Truman's proposed American policy on Greece will restore democracy to Greece?

Answer: I doubt this very much, just as do many others.

Question 10: Do you believe that the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers has served a useful purpose and will bring

之賠款，會彌補在德國侵略者手中所受到的一部份實質的損害嗎？

答：這筆賠款對於蘇聯當然是太少了，不過總算還可以使蘇聯人民獲得相當滿足。

問題五：賠償主要是一個經濟問題呢，還是一個道義問題？

答：賠償在兩方面都是重要的。

問題六：迄今那一個國家收到了較多的賠款，是英國和美國呢，還是蘇聯？

答：毫無疑問，蘇聯已收到的，比盟邦少得多。

問題七：德國和平時期的生產怎麼樣才能以最好的方式予以提高，以便可以從現行生產中提取賠款呢？

答：把德國和平時期的工業水準相當提高，一部份的生產品（五金，煤斤）就可抵充支付給受犧牲的各國的賠款。

問題八：怎麼樣就能夠以最好的方式恢復希臘的民主呢？

答：最好的辦法，便是拋棄對希臘內政的外來干涉。

問題九：你相信杜魯門總統建議的美國對希臘政策，會使希臘恢復民主嗎？

答：正和許多別的人一樣，我對這一點懷疑得很。

問題十：你相信莫斯科外長會議對於一種有效目的已有所貢獻了麼？



some concrete results?

Answer: It is desirable that the Moscow conference be of Maximum use for our common cause, but this depends not on the Soviet delegation alone. In any case, the Soviet delegation will *do* everything in its power that the conference *bring*<sup>3</sup> beneficial results.

會產生一些具體的結果嗎？

答：但願莫斯科外長會議對於我們的共同事業有最大的裨益。不過，這不是單靠蘇聯代表團而定的。無論如何，蘇聯代表團必將就權利所及作一切努力，以便會議能產生有利的結果。

## NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. “does” 爲強調動詞 “exist” 語氣之用，即“的確”之意。強調現在時間式之動詞用 “do”，第三人稱用 “does”，如：I do like it, He does like it, Do come please。過去用 “did”，如：I did see him, She did see him。未來將動詞根字調在句首，如：Go I shall, Go he must。2. 此 “do” 字爲代表動詞用法，以免重覆，如：Write as he does (= writes)。3. “bring” 爲 subjunctive verb (第三人稱，單數，現在時不加 “S”) 表示願望。

# PRESIDENT OF TURKEY REPLIES TO THE UNITED PRESS ON THE UTILIZATION OF U. S. LOANS

*Made by cable by Turkish President General Ismet Inonu to questions submitted him on May 12, 1947, by the vice-president of the United Press, Virgil M. Pinkley.*

## 土總統關於貸款用途答合衆社問

一九四七年五月十二日土耳其總統伊斯美將軍電答合衆社副經理賓克萊向彼所提出之問題

Question 1: Can you say how you would propose utilizing the money which United States proposed to advance, that is, whether for economic or military developments?

Answer: The aid to be given by the United States will be used for military purposes. For the purpose of economic development, a loan will be requested from the International Bank for reconstruction and development.

Question 2: The world has noticed closely that Turkey has left the one-party system and introduced the multi-party system. Are any further democratization programs planned at present and would you be able to say what they are?

Answer: Endeavors made in Turkey to develop democratic institutions and democratic way of life are earnest and sincere. Great accomplishments have already been achieved. The democratic evolution will continue its course without interruption until it reaches its ideal form.

Question 3: How do you envisage the

問題一：閣下能否說明如何利用美國所提議支付之款項，換言之，即該款項供經濟發展之用抑供軍事發展之用？

答：美國所予之援助，將作為軍事目的之用，至於為經濟發展將另要求自國際銀行貸款，以為復興與開發之用。

問題二：世界密切注意土耳其尙有待於放棄一黨制，而採取多黨制，在目前，是否有作更進一步之民主化計劃，閣下能否見告該計劃究為何者？

答：土耳其所作之發展民主制度與民主生活方式之努力，乃屬熱烈與懇摯者，偉大之成就業已完成，民主之演進將繼續不間斷進展，直至其達成其理想之形式。

問題三：閣下對達達尼爾海峽之

future of Dardanelles and does Turkey propose to submit to any future conference any specific plan on the question of passage through the Straits?

Answer: As stated in notes to the Soviet Government on August 26, Turkey is convinced the present regime of the Straits is the most just and best balanced system that can be devised to give satisfaction to all parties. Should any power find some reason of complaint about this regime, that power can always ask for a conference to be convened in order to make alterations according to the procedure established by the Montreaux Convention.

Question 4: Does an Armenian problem exist in Turkey at present?

Answer: There is no Armenian question in Turkey because, in this country, every citizen enjoys equal rights without any distinction as to religion or race.

Question 5: Remembering Turkey's great role in the development of the Balkan States, can you say whether Turkey can see any resumption of such role in the future?

Answer: Turkey is ready to cooperate within the frame of United Nations' Charter, also with her Balkan neighbors, towards consolidation of peace.

Question 6: Do you see the possibility under the present circumstances of closer cooperation with Greece?

Answer: The strengthening of cooperation in every field with our friends, the Greeks, is one of the principles of the Turkish policy.

Question 7: Would Turkey be willing

未來，作何見解，土耳其對未來會議，關於通過此一海峽問題，是否擬提交任何特殊方案？

答：土耳其正如上年八月致蘇聯政府所聲明者，深信海峽之現行政制仍為歷來辦法中最公正與最良好之均衡制度，能令各方滿意者。如有一國對此政制發現某項不滿理由，則該國隨時可要求根據蒙德婁條約所規定之程序，召開一次會議，以便實行修改。

問題四：土耳其目前是否有一阿美尼亞問題存在？

答：土耳其現無阿美尼亞問題存在，因在敝國內，每一公民不分宗教或種族區別，一律享受同等權利。

問題五：閣下憶及以往土耳其在巴爾幹各國所擔負之開發重大任務，能否見告，土耳其在將來能否重見其擔負此一任務？

答：土耳其準備與他國以及巴爾幹之各鄰國在聯合國憲章之結構內合作，以達成鞏固和平。

問題六：閣下在目前形勢下，與希臘密切合作，認為有可能否？

答：在各方面與吾人之友人希臘人加強合作，乃為土耳其政策之各項原則中之一。

問題七：土耳其是否願對任何外

to grant any outside power a base in the Dardanelles?

Answer: No question touching on Turkey's territorial integrity or sovereignty can be discussed.

Question 8: Future cooperation with the Arab world by Turkey has been subject of considerable comment in diplomatic capitals. Can you comment on the prospects?

Answer: Turkey wishes to cooperate, always within the frame of the United Nations Charter, with her Arabic neighbors, who for centuries shared common life with her. Turkey's friendship for Arab countries is incontestable. Her most sincere desire is to increase her cordial relations every day, in every field and with everyone of the countries of the Arab league, who are heirs to one of the world's greatest civilization.

國，在達達尼爾海峽予以一根據地？

答：任何涉及土耳其領土完整或主權之問題，皆在不能加以討論之列。

問題八：土耳其與阿剌伯世界之合作，在各國外交首都中，早為紛紛評論之題目，閣下對於其展望，有何評論？

答：土耳其願永遠在聯合國憲章之範圍內，與其數世紀以來參加共同生活之阿剌伯鄰國，共同合作。土耳其對阿剌伯國家之友好乃無可爭議者，其最誠懇之欲望，乃在每日的各方面，以及作為世界最偉大文明之一之繼承人，阿剌伯聯盟各國中之一人，增加其密切關係。

# MARSHALL'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

## 馬歇爾向美人民報告莫斯科會議經過

*Made in a nationwide radio address on April 28, 1947*

一九四七年四月二十八日由無線電播送全國

Tonight I hope to make clearly understandable the fundamental nature of the issues discussed at the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers.

This conference dealt with the very heart of the peace for which we are struggling. It dealt with the vital center of Europe—Germany and Austria—an area of large and skilled population, of great resources and industrial plants, an area which has twice in recent times brought the world to the brink of disaster. In the Moscow negotiations all the disagreements which were so evident during the conferences regarding the Italian and Balkan treaties came into sharp focus and remained, in effect, unsolved.

Problems which bear directly on the future of our civilization cannot be disposed of by general talk or vague formulae—by what Lincoln called “pernicious abstractions.” They require concrete solutions for definite and extremely complicated questions—questions which have to do with boundaries, with power to prevent military aggression, with people who have bitter memories, with the production and control

今晚我希望能把莫斯科外長會議所討論的各種問題的基本性質，使各位能完全明瞭。

這一次會議是討論我們所正在爭取的和平的心臟。這次會議是討論歐洲的重要中心——德國和奧國，這裏是一個有很多受過技術訓練的人口的區域，有很大的資源和工廠，這裏近來前後曾有二次幾乎使世界瀕於浩劫。在莫斯科談判中，所有會議中關係義大利和巴爾幹條約的一切很顯明的異議，都被提出來，而實際上仍未獲得解決。

概括的談論和空泛的方案，如林肯所稱爲「毒害的抽象理論」，並不能處理那些未來文明有直接關係的難題。爲了處理這種問題，我們必須具體解決各種極端複雜的問題，諸如有關疆界，有關防範軍事上侵略，有關深恨過去之民衆，有關生產並管制萬千

of things which are essential to the lives of millions of people. You have been kept well informed by the press and radio of the daily activities of the Council, and much of what I have to say may seem repetitious. But the extremely complicated nature of the three major issues we considered makes it appear desirable for me to report in some detail the problems as I saw them in my meetings at the conference table.

There was a reasonable possibility, we had hoped a probability, of completing in Moscow a peace treaty for Austria and a four-power pact to bind together our four Governments to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany. As for the German peace treaty and related but more current German problems, we had hoped to reach agreement on a directive for the guidance of our deputies in their work preparatory to the next conference.

In a statement such as this, it is not practicable to discuss the numerous issues which continued in disagreement at the conference. It will suffice, I think, to call attention to the fundamental problems whose solution would probably lead to the quick adjustment of many other differences.

COAL—It is important to an understanding of the conference that the complex character of the problems should be understood, together with their immediate effect on the people of Europe in the coming months. To cite a single example, more coal is most urgently needed throughout Europe for factories, for utilities, for railroads, and for the people in their homes.

人民生活必需品等等的問題，外長會議的日常活動，諸君已由報紙和無線電的報導得悉，我毋庸多說以免重複。然而由於我們所考慮的三個主要問題的性質至為錯綜複雜，我們認為有詳細報告的必要，以抒述我在議席上對於各項問題之所見。

我們在莫斯科有理由可達成對奧和約和防德協定，我們早希有這種的可能，至於對德和約及其他有關德國之當前之各種問題我們曾希望獲致原則上的協議，俾使我們的代表在他們於下次會議舉行前所進行工作中有所遵循。

在今天的這種廣播中，要討論外長會議懸而未決的種種問題，實際上是不可能的。我想請國人注意於若干基本問題，這種問題一旦解決，其他異見亦可隨之得以調整。

煤斤問題——會議上不但要顧到某些問題在幾個月內對歐洲人民立即生產的影響，而且要顧到問題的複雜性。舉一個例來說，全歐洲迫切需要更多的煤斤，以供應工廠，公用事業，鐵路，家庭的需要。但是盟國

More coal for Allied countries cannot be mined and delivered until the damaged mines, mine machinery, railroad communications and like facilities are rehabilitated. This rehabilitation, however, depends on more steel, and more steel depends, in turn, on more coal for steel making. Therefore, and this is the point to be kept in mind, while the necessary rehabilitation is in progress, less coal would be available in the immediate future for the neighboring Allied states.

But less coal means less employment for labor, and a consequent delay in the production of goods for export to bring money for the purchase of food and necessities. Therefore, the delay necessary to permit rehabilitation of the mines so vitally affects France that the settlement of this matter has become for her a critical issue. All neighboring states and Great Britain and the Soviet Union are directly affected in various ways since coal is required for German production of goods for export sufficient to enable her to buy the necessary imports of foods, etc., for much of which the United States is now providing the funds.

Moreover, in the background of this coal issue, which is directly related to steel production, is the important consideration of the build-up of heavy industry in Germany, which could later again become a threat to the peace of the world. I cite this single example to illustrate the complications which are involved in these negotiations.

GERMANY—The Allied Control

許多的煤礦無法開採，除非那些損壞的煤礦，採煤機械，鐵路交通以及其他設備工具都完全復員，然而這類復員工作需要更多的鋼鐵，而更多的鋼鐵又反過來需要更多的煤斤來製造它。因此，我們必須記住一點：當必要的復員工作正在進行的時候，盟國鄰邦在最近的將來所可能獲得的煤斤會更少。

更少的煤斤就是說更少的勞工的就業，其結果，為換取金錢，用以購買糧食和必需品的貨品生產就滯緩了。因此使煤礦得以復員所必有的滯緩，影響法國重大。於是煤斤問題的解決便成為法國一項嚴重的難題。其他鄰國和英，蘇各方面都受到直接的影響，因為德國必須利用煤斤從事生產然後將產品輸出，換取必要糧食等物的進口，德國的生產大部分費用正由美國接濟。

而且，在直接關係鋼鐵生產的煤斤問題的背後有考慮如何建立德國重工業基礎的重要問題，這個問題，今後可能再度對世界的和平發生威脅。我們述這一個例子，目的在說明這些談判中所牽涉的種種複雜情形。

德國 —— 柏林的盟國管制會提

Council in Berlin presented a detailed report of the many problems concerned with the political, military, economic, and financial situation under the present military government of Germany. In connection with these matters, the Ministers considered the form and scope of the provisional organization for Germany, and the procedure to be followed in the preparation of the German peace treaty.

The German negotiations involved not only the security of Europe and the world, but the prosperity of all of Europe. While our mission was to consider the terms of a treaty to operate over a long term of years, we were faced with immediate issues which vitally concerned the impoverished and suffering people of Europe who are crying for help, for coal, for food and for most of the necessities of life, and the majority of whom are bitterly disposed towards the Germany that brought about this disastrous situation. The issues also vitally concern the people of Britain and the United States who cannot continue to pour out hundreds of millions of dollars for Germany because current measures were not being taken to terminate expeditiously the necessity for such appropriations.

The critical and fundamental German problems to which I shall confine myself are:

- (1) The limits to the powers of the central government;
- (2) The character of the economic system and its relation to all of Europe;
- (3) The character and extent of re-

出在目前德國軍政府之下有關政治、軍事、經濟和財政情形的許多問題的詳細報告。關於這些問題，各外長曾考慮到德國臨時政治機構的形式和範圍，以及籌備對德和約應循的程序。

德國問題的談判不但牽涉歐洲和世界的安全，而且涉及整個歐洲的繁榮，我們的使命原為討論一種長期生效的條約的條件，同時我們面臨着各種對歐洲貧苦人民具有重要的關係的直接問題，他們正在呼求援助，呼求煤斤，糧食和大多數生活必需品，他們多半痛恨造成這種災難情形的德國。這些問題對於英、美人民，也有重要的關係，英美人民因為目前沒有採取措施，迅速終止這種撥款。不能繼續為德國解囊，拿出數萬萬元來。

我所有陳述僅限於幾個的嚴重而且基本的德國問題：

- (一) 德國中央政府的權限；
- (二) 德國經濟組織系統的性質及此組織及歐陸各國的關係；
- (三) 賠償的性質及範圍；



parations;

(4) The boundaries for the German state; and

(5) The manner in which all Allied states at war with Germany are represented in the drafting and confirmation of the treaty.

All the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers are in apparent agreement as to the establishment of a German state on self-supporting, democratic basis, with limitations imposed to prevent the re-establishment of military power.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT—This issue of the degree of centralization of the future German state is of greatest importance. Excessive concentration of power is peculiarly dangerous in a country like Germany which has no strong traditions regarding the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to control the exercise of governmental power.

The Soviet Union appears to favor a strong central government. The United States and the United Kingdom are opposed to such a government because they think it could be too readily converted to the domination of a regime similar to the Nazis. They favor a central government of carefully limited powers, all other powers being reserved to the states, or Laender as they are called in Germany. The French are willing to agree only to very limited responsibilities for the central government. They fear a repetition of the seizure of power over the whole of Germany carried out by the Hitler regime in 1933.

(四) 德國的疆界；

(五) 所有對德作戰國家參與擬

定並簽訂對德和約之方式問題。

外長會議與會人員顯然都贊同建

立一自足自給而且民主之德國，並加

以種種限制，防止德國重新建軍。

中央政府問題——德國未來政府中央化的程度，是一個極其重要的問題。在德國這樣的國家，關於個人與社會控制政府運用權力的權利，既沒有傳說上的力量，權力過度集中自是特別危險的。

蘇聯似乎贊成强有力的中央政府。美、英兩國反對這類性質的政府，因為他們認為這太容易轉變為類似納粹的政體。英、美贊成中央政府的權力範圍有嚴密的限制，其他權力由各州各省保留着。法國祇同意中央政府只具有非常有限的責任，他們害怕希特勒政權在一九三三年攫奪國家大權把戲，會重演於明日。

Under ordinary circumstances, there are always strong and differing points of view regarding the character of a governmental reorganization. In this case, there are great and justifiable fears regarding the resurrection of German military power, and concern over expressed or concealed desires for quite other reasons.

GERMAN ECONOMY—Regarding the character of the German economic system and its relation to all of Europe, the disagreements are even more serious and difficult of adjustment. German economy at the present time is crippled by the fact that there is no unity of action, and the rehabilitation of Germany to the point where she is self-supporting demands immediate decision.

There is a declared agreement in the desire for economic unity in Germany, but when it comes to the actual terms to regulate such unity, there are wide and critical differences. One of the most serious difficulties encountered in the effort to secure economic unity has been the fact that the Soviet-occupied zone has operated practically without regard to the other zones and has made few, if any, reports of what has been occurring in that zone. There has been little or no disposition to proceed on a basis of reciprocity, and there has been a refusal to disclose the availability of foodstuffs, and the degree or character of reparations taken out of this zone.

This unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to cooperate in establishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed

在尋常情形下，各國對政府改組的性質，總有強烈和意見不一的看法。但是在這種情形下，又參雜了一些對德國軍事力量再生的大而合理的恐懼，以及對別有居心的公開或隱蓄的慾望的焦慮。

德國的經濟——關於德國經濟制度的性質及其對歐洲的關係，各種異議甚至更為嚴重而難以調整。目前德國的經濟，因為沒有統一的行動，所以弄得殘廢不全，而且欲使德國重建到自給自足的地步，也需要立即決議。

對於德國統一的願望，各方一致宣佈同意，可是等到討論管理這種統一的實際條件的時候，又各執一見了，在覓取經濟統一的努力中所遭遇到最嚴重的困難之一是蘇軍佔領區內的行動，毫不顧慮到別的佔領區，而且蘇軍佔領區內所發生的一切情形，即使有報告，也很少，他們幾無根據彼此合作採取行動的意向，而且拒不宣佈糧食的情形和由其佔領區內取走的賠償的程度與性質。

蘇方無意按照波茨坦協議建立一平衡的德國經濟，而從事合作，是自

upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self-supporting Germany, and a Germany capable of providing coal and other necessities for the neighboring states who have always been dependent on Germany for these items. After long and futile efforts to secure a working accord in this matter, the British and American zones were combined for the economic situation, meaning the free movement of excess supplies or produce available in one zone to another where there is a shortage. Our continuing invitation to the French and Soviets to join in the arrangement still exists. This merger is bitterly attacked by the Soviet authorities as a breach of the Potsdam agreement and as a first step towards the dismemberment of Germany, ignoring the plain fact that their refusal to carry out that agreement was the sole cause of the merger. It is difficult to regard their attacks as anything but propaganda designed to divert attention from the Soviet failure to implement the economic unity agreed at Potsdam. Certainly some progress toward economic unity in Germany is better than none.

The character of the control over the Ruhr industrial center, the greatest concentration of coal and of heavy industries in Europe, continues a matter of debate. It cannot be decided merely for the purpose of reaching an agreement. Vitally important considerations and future consequences are involved.

**REPARATIONS**—The question of reparations is of critical importance as it affects almost every other question under

足自給德國的發展上和使它能以煤斤及其他必需品供應其毗鄰各國的最大阻力，各鄰邦的煤斤及其他必需品原多仰給於它的。英美兩國曾爲此而極力爭取蘇聯合作，結果是徒然的，英美兩佔領區遂爲改善德國的經濟局面而合併，就是允許兩佔領區物資及生產品自由流通，以收調劑之效。這種合併曾遭蘇方無情的抨擊，認爲這是違反波茨坦協議和分裂德國的步驟。蘇聯拒絕實施該協議，就是促成合併的惟一原因，但是蘇方竟未瞭解此點。我們很難把蘇方的抨擊認爲是他們並非蓄意藉此掩飾他們未能履行波茨坦統一德國經濟協議的事實。對德國經濟統一的所獲得的許多進步，一定比完全沒有要好得多。

管制歐洲產煤及重工業中心的魯爾工業區的性質的問題，仍是辯論的題目。我們不應僅僅爲了獲致協議就對之有所決定。因爲極重要的考慮點和因此引起的未來後果都和它有關。

**賠償問題**——此一問題極具重要性，因爲其他問題幾乎都將受其影

discussion. This issue naturally makes a tremendous appeal to the people of the Allied states who suffered the terrors of German military occupation and the destruction of their cities and villages.

The results of the Versailles Treaty of 1919 regarding payment of reparations on a basis of dollars, and the difficulties encountered by the reparations commission appointed after Yalta in agreeing upon the dollar evaluation of reparations in kind convinced President Truman and his advisers considering the question at Potsdam that some other basis for determining reparations should be adopted if endless friction and bitterness were to be avoided in future years. They succeeded in getting agreement to the principle of reparations to be rendered out of capital assets—that is, the transfer of German plants, machinery, etc. to Allied powers concerned.

It developed at the Moscow conference that the Soviet officials flatly disagreed with President Truman's and Mr. Byrnes' understanding of the written terms of this agreement. The British have much the same view of this matter as the United States.

We believe that no reparations from current production were contemplated by the Potsdam agreement. The Soviets strongly oppose this view. They hold that the previous discussions and agreements at Yalta authorize the taking of billions of dollars in reparations out of current production. This would mean that a substantial portion of the daily production of German factories would be relied on for

響。若干身受德軍佔領和家園市鎮受德軍蹂躪的盟國人民，對此一問題關心極切。

一九一九凡爾賽和約以現款作賠償基礎的經驗，以及雅爾達會議後賠償委員會討論實物賠償的現款的價值時所遭遇的困難，使杜魯門總統和他的顧問們在波茨坦會議上相信：若要避免中止未來的摩擦和惡意的話，必須對賠償的決定採擇他方面的基礎。他們商議的結果，同意一項賠償原則，就是從資本性資產中支付賠償，也就是把德國的工廠，機器等搬移到有關的盟國。

但是在莫斯科會議上，蘇聯官員完全不同意杜魯門總統與貝爾納斯先生對此項協議文字條文上的瞭解。關於這一點，英國的意見大半和美國相同。

我們相信，波茨坦協定的原意并不包含從現有生產獲取賠償的意思在內，蘇聯極力反對這個看法。他們認為前此雅爾達會議協定上，曾經准許蘇聯從現有生產中取得數十億元的賠償。這時候德國境內一部份經常生產

reparation payments, which in turn would mean that the recovery of Germany sufficiently to be self-supporting would be long delayed. It would also mean that the plan and the hope of our Government that economic recovery by the end of three years would permit the termination of American appropriations for the support of the German inhabitants of our zone, could not be realized.

The issue is one of great complications, for which agreement must be found in order to administer Germany as an economic whole as the four powers claim that they wish to do.

There is, however, general agreement among the Allies that the matter of the factories and equipment to be removed from Germany as reparations should be re-examined. They recognize the fact that a too drastic reduction in Germany's industrial set-up will not only make it difficult for Germany to become self-supporting but will retard the economic recovery of Europe. The United States has indicated that it would be willing to study the possibility of a limited amount of reparations from current production to compensate for plants, previously scheduled to be removed as reparations to various Allied countries, which it now appears should be left in Germany; it being understood that deliveries from current production are not to increase the financial burden of the occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made to keep the German economy from collapsing. The Soviet Government has made no re-

的工廠，不斷支付賠償，其結果也就是使德國恢復自供自足經濟的時間，為之延長。這也是說美國政府期望和計劃在三年內使德國經濟恢復，結束美國對佔領區內居民的經濟援助一點決不能實現了。

這個問題是極端複雜的，我們必須在這一點上成立協議，才能符合四強所已表明希望德國成為一個經濟整體而治理之。

但是盟國之間也有過廣泛的協議，如重新審查列入賠償項下可從德國搬移的工廠和設備等。他們認為：德國工業組織過度削弱的結果，不但將使德國自給自足的計劃難以實現，而且將阻礙整個歐洲的經濟復興，有些工廠本已劃歸賠償搬移項下，但目前需要把它們留在德國，對於這類工廠，美國曾經表明，願意着手研究從現有生產中取得有限賠償的可能性，但有一項諒解必須成立：現有生產的支付賠償不得增加執行佔領任務各強國的財政負擔，也不得使盟國貸給德國用作避免德國經濟崩潰的借款，因而拖延償還的日期。蘇聯政府對於這

sponse to this suggestion.

**BOUNDARIES**—The issue regarding boundaries to be established for Germany presents a serious disagreement and another example of complete disagreement as to the meaning of the pronouncement on this subject by the heads of the three powers. In the rapid advance of the Soviet armies in the final phase of the war, millions of Germans in eastern Germany fled to the west of the Oder River. The Soviet armies, prior to Potsdam, had placed Poles in charge of this area largely evacuated by the German population. That was the situation that confronted President Truman at Potsdam. Under the existing circumstances, the president accepted the situation for the time being with the agreed three-power statement, "The heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."

The Soviet Foreign Minister now states that a final agreement on the frontier between Germany and Poland was reached at Potsdam and the expression I have just quoted merely referred to the formal confirmation of the already agreed upon frontier at the peace settlement, thus leaving only technical delimitation to be considered.

The U.S. Government recognized the commitment made at Yalta to give fair compensation to Poland in the West for the territory east of the Curzon Line incorporated into the Soviet Union. But the perpetuation of the present temporary line

個建議一直沒有反響。

**疆界問題**——德國疆界問題是  
一大爭端，也是與會人員對於三強首領有關德國疆界宣言的含義完全不能一致的又一實例。由於戰爭末期蘇軍的迅速推進，德國東部人民逃到歐德河以西地區去的為數甚衆，在波茨坦會議前，蘇聯就將這一帶德人撤退的地區交與波蘭。波茨坦會議時，杜魯門總統就面臨這種局面。在當時情形下，總統贊同三強首領的宣言，暫時承認這種局面，宣言謂：「三強首領謹此重申其意見：最後劃定波蘭西疆界綫之問題，應留待和約決定。」

現在莫洛托夫却說波茨坦會議已就波德疆界問題獲致最後協議，並謂上述一段僅為和約應決定疆界之謂，因此他認為目前所應考慮的只有那些劃界的技術上問題而已。

美政府承認在雅爾達會議中所負的義務，對於波蘭在寇松綫以東併入蘇聯的領土，在西部予以公正的補償。但是目前德國與波蘭間的臨時界綫，

between Germany and Poland would deprive Germany of territory which before the war provided more than a fifth of the foodstuffs on which the German population depended. It is clear that in any event Germany will be obliged to support, within much restricted boundaries, not only her prewar population but a considerable number of Germans from eastern Europe. To a certain extent this situation is unavoidable, but we must not agree to its aggravation. We do not want Poland to be left with less resources than she had before the war. She is entitled to more, but it will not help Poland to give her frontiers which will probably create difficulties for her in the future. Wherever the frontiers are drawn, they should not constitute barriers to trade and commerce upon which the well-being of Europe is dependent. We must look toward a future where a democratic Poland and a democratic Germany will be good neighbors.

PEACE TREATY PROCEDURE—  
There is disagreement regarding the manner in which the Allied powers at war with Germany are to participate in the drafting and confirmation of the German peace treaty. There are 51 states involved. Of these, in addition to the four principal Allied powers, 18 were directly engaged in the fighting, some, of course, to a much greater extent than others. It is the position of the United States that all Allied states at war with Germany should be given an opportunity to participate to some degree in the drafting and in the

如果永久存在，將使德國失去一部份領土，而這部份領土在戰前供給德國人民所仰給的糧食五份之一以上。顯然的，德國無論如何，必須在很有限的疆界內，不但須支持和戰前一樣的人口，而且還須供給東歐的大批德人，這種情形固然是無法避免的，但我們決不能任其更形惡化。我們不願波蘭減少其戰前所有的資源，波蘭應得更多的資源，但是把邊界給予波蘭，或許造成它將來的困難，這與波蘭並無裨益。邊界不論劃在什麼地方，不應成爲對貿易和商業的障礙，歐洲的幸福完全繫於這這種貿易和商業，我們必須瞻望有一個民主的波蘭和一個民主的德國成爲良好鄰國的前途。

和約程序——關於對德作戰的各盟國如何參加對德和約的草擬與認可一事，意見各不一致。與此事有關的國家有五十一國。其中除四大盟國之外，直接從事於作戰的有十八國，當然作戰的範圍有大有小，各不相同。美政府的立場認爲對德作戰的各盟國都應該有機會參加和約的草擬與

making of the peace treaty, but we recognize that there would be very practical difficulties, if not impossibilities, in attempting to draft a treaty with 51 nations participating equally at all stages. Therefore, the U.S. Government has endeavored to secure agreement on a method which involves two different procedures, depending on whether or not the state concerned actually participated in the fighting. But all would have an opportunity to present their views and rebut other views, and all would sit in the peace conference to adopt a treaty.

It is difficult to get the agreement of the countries that have suffered the horrors of German occupation and were involved in heavy losses in hard fighting to accept participation in the determination of the treaty terms by countries who suffered no losses in men or material and were remote from the fighting. The United States, however, regards it as imperative that all the states who were at war with Germany should have some voice in the settlement imposed on Germany.

**FOUR-POWER PACT**—The proposal for the four-power pact was advanced by the U.S. Government a year ago. It was our hope that the prompt acceptance of this simple pact, ensuring in advance of the detailed German peace settlement that the United States would actively cooperate to prevent the rearmament of Germany, would eliminate fears as to the future and would facilitate the making of a peace suitable to Europe's present and future needs. It was our hope that such a com-

締訂，但是我們承認：由五十一國全體參加草擬一個條約，雖非不可能，實際上將有不少困難。所以美政府力圖促使各方一致同意於一種方法，這種方法包括兩種不同的程序，視有關的國家是否實際參加作戰而定。但各國都將有機會提出他們的意見和反駁別人的意見，而各國都將出席一次和平會議，以通過一個條約。

曾受德軍佔領恐怖及在堅苦作戰中遭重大損失的國家，很難同意接受未受人力物力損失而離戰爭很遠的各國參加決定和約的條件。但美國認為凡是對德交戰的國家，對於解決德國問題，都應有發言權。

**四強公約**——美國政府在一年前提出四強公約的建議。我們希望各方迅速接受這個簡單的公約，在締造一詳細對德和約之先，保證美國有意和他們密切合作以防止德國重整軍備。這個公約的訂立，將消除對未來的恐懼，使一適合目前和未來歐洲需要的和約便於成功。同時，我們又希



mitment by the United States would relieve the fear of the other European powers that the United States would repeat its actions following the First World War, insisting on various terms for the peace settlement and then withdrawing from a position of any responsibility for their enforcement. It was thought that the compact of the four powers to guarantee the continued demilitarization of Germany would reassure the world that we were in complete accord in our intention to secure the peace of Europe.

However, the Soviet Government met our proposition with a series of amendments which would have completely changed the character of the pact, making it, in effect, a complicated peace treaty, and including in the amendments most of the points regarding the German problem concerning which there was, as I have pointed out, serious disagreement. I was forced to the conclusion by this procedure that the Soviet Government either did not desire such a pact or was following a course calculated to delay any immediate prospect of its adoption. Whether or not an agreement can finally be reached remains to be seen, but the United States, I think, should adhere to its present position and insist that the pact be kept simple and confined to its one basic purpose—to keep Germany incapable of waging war.

**AUSTRIAN TREATY**—The negotiations regarding the Austrian treaty resulted in agreement on all but a few points, but these were basic and of fundamental importance. The Soviet Union favors and

望美國方面簽訂此項公約，可消弭歐洲其他強國懼疑美國重採第一次大戰後的步驟：先堅持和約中若干條文，然後又忽然退出，把執行和約的責任完全推脫。我們認為四強訂立公約，保證繼續使德國解除武裝會再度昭示全世界，我們對謀取歐洲的和平安全係完全一致。

但是，蘇聯政府針對我們建議提出一連串的修正案。這些修正案足以使整個公約的性質為之更改，使它實際上成為複雜的和約，而且蘇方把許多對德問題基本上絕難獲致協議的要點，也包括在修正案內。蘇聯這種措施使我不得不下一個結論，認為蘇聯政府不是不願意這個公約的實現，就是蓄意採取拖延時日使這個公約一時不能採納的途徑。至於這個問題的最後協議能否達成尚待證明，但我相信美國方面一定會固守目前的立場，堅持公約的簡單化並使它限於一個基本的目的——那就是德國不能再度發動戰爭。

**對奧和約問題**——對奧和約談判的結果為大部問題均達成協議，惟尚有基本並根本重要之數點仍無法解決。蘇聯對於付給賠償及割讓卡林

the other Governments oppose the payment of reparations and the cession of Carinthia to Yugoslavia.

But the Soviet Government attached much more importance to its demand that the German assets in Austria which are to be hers by the terms of the Potsdam agreement should include those assets which the other three powers consider to have been taken from Austria and the citizens of the United Nations by force or duress by Hitler and his Nazi government following the taking over of Austria by military force in March 1938. The Soviet Government refused to consider the word "duress", which in the opinion of the other three powers would be the critical basis for determining what property, that is, business, factories, land, forests, etc. was truly German property and not the result of seizures by terroristic procedure, intimidation, take business acquisition.

The Soviet Union also refused to consider any process of mediation to settle the disputes that are bound to arise in such circumstances.

All efforts to find a compromise solution were unavailing. The United States, in my opinion, could not commit itself to a treaty which involved such manifest injustices and, what is equally important, would create an Austria so weak and helpless as to be source of great danger in the future. In the final session of the conference, it was agreed to appoint a commission to meet in Vienna on May 12 to reconsider our disagreements, and to have a committee of experts examine into the

西亞與南斯拉夫，表示贊同，惟其他與會國家均表反對。

蘇聯對奧境德資產問題極其重視，按照波茨坦協定，奧境德資產應歸與蘇聯，蘇方認為凡在奧境之德國資產應一律視為奧境德資產，而其他三強認為這些資產是一九三八年三月德軍攻陷奧國後由希特勒和納粹政權以武力強佔之奧人及聯合國僑民之資產。蘇方拒絕考慮『強佔』一辭，其他三強則認為『強佔』一辭厥為一重要根據藉以決定何者確為德國資產，如，商業經營，工廠，土地及森林等，而非由恐怖措施，威脅及捏造由商業手段取得之結果。

蘇聯並拒絕考慮任何折衷辦法，以解決在此環境下必然產生之爭端。

一切覓取折衷解決的努力，都沒有結果。依我的意見，美國決不能承認這種顯然有欠公允的條約，而且，同樣重要的，是這種條約將造成一個佳弱而無援的奧國，足為將來重大危險的根源。在會議的最後一次，大家同意指定於五月十二日維也納召集一個委員會，以便對我們的異議重加考慮，並建立專家小組會，查驗德國在奧的資產。我們如欲履行我們的義

question of the German assets in Austria. Certainly prompt action on the Austrian treaty is necessary to fulfill our commitment to recognize Austria as a free and independent state and to relieve her from the burdens of occupation.

SUMMARY—Complicated as these issues are, there runs through them a pattern as to the character and control of central Europe to be established. The Foreign Ministers agreed that their task was to lay the foundations of a central government for Germany, to bring about the economic unity of Germany essential for its own existence as well as for European recovery, to establish workable boundaries, and to set up a guaranteed control through a four-power treaty. Austria was to be promptly relieved of occupation burdens and treated as a liberated and independent country.

Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government adapted to the seizure of absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union. In another form, the same mortgage upon Austria was claimed by the Soviet delegation.

Such a plan, in the opinion of the U.S. delegation, not only involved indefinite American subsidy, but could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany

務，承認奧國是一個自由獨立的國家，並解除它佔領區的負擔，那末我們對於對奧條約，當然應採取迅速的行動。

摘要——這些問題雖然很複雜，但其中關於中歐的特性和管制，尚存有輪廓。各外長同意：他們的任務要奠定一個德國中央政府的基礎，促成德國的經濟統一，設立可能實行的邊界，並通過四強條約而成立有保證的管制應迅速解除奧國之佔領負擔，而以解放國與獨立國的地位對待它。

莫斯科會議欲求意見一致是不可能的，因為照我們的看法，蘇聯是在堅持各種建議，在德國設立一個中央政府，以便對於這個經濟必告崩潰的國家抓住一種絕對的管制權，此一政府在經濟上的崩潰是注定了的，因為它地域不廣人口過多，並將以大部份生產，抵償賠款之用，主要的是對蘇聯的賠款。蘇聯代表團對奧國也要求同樣的抵償，不過採取另一種方式而已。

據美國代表團的意見，這樣的計劃不但牽涉要美國的無限期的津貼，而且結果僅能造成德國和歐洲經濟生

and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship and strife.

Freedom of information for which our Government stands inevitably involves appeals to public opinion. But at Moscow propaganda appeals to passion and prejudice appeared to take the place of appeals to reason and understanding. Charges were made by the Soviet delegation and interpretation given in the Potsdam and other agreements, which varied completely from the facts as understood or as factually known by the American delegation.

There was naturally much uncertainty regarding the real intention or motives of the various proposals submitted or of the objections taken to the proposals. This is inevitable in any international negotiations.

However, despite the disagreements referred to and the difficulties encountered, possibly greater progress towards final settlement was made than is realized.

The critical differences were for the first time brought into the light and now stand clearly defined so that future negotiations can start with a knowledge of exactly what the issues are that must be settled. The deputies now understand the precise views of each Government on the various issues discussed. With that they can possibly resolve some differences and surely can further clarify the problems by a studied presentation of the state of agreement and disagreement. That is the best that can be hoped for in the next few months. It makes some progress, however

活的愈趨惡化，而必然引起獨裁和爭鬥。

我們的政府所擁護的報道自由，必然地包括一切須訴諸輿論。但在莫斯科，以宣傳訴諸情感與成見，似乎代替了訴諸理智與瞭解。蘇聯代表對波茨坦和其他協議與其他的指摘和解釋，與美國代表團所瞭解的事實，完全不同。

關於各種建議，或對此種建議所提出的反對，其真正的用意和動機，當然是不能確定的。這是在任何國際談判中不可避免的。

但是不論上述的意見如何分歧，面對的問題如何困難，我們對問題的最後解決所已獲得的進展可能比事先想到的更大。

把各方意見不合之處，一一揭開，這還是第一次。此後問題看得清清楚楚，未來的商談便知道該如何下手去解決懸案。各國外次都已明白各國政府對不同問題的準確觀點。那末，他們或能解決一些異議，或許把協議與不能協議的研究結果，提交報告，使未了的問題更為明朗化。這就是未來幾個月所能有的最大希望。不管進步如何艱苦遲緩，而結果必然會有一些進步。這些事情對全歐人民的

daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay.

Finally, I should comment on one aspect of the matter which is of transcendent importance to all our people. While I did not have the benefit, as did Mr. Byrnes, of the presence of the two leading members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I did have the invaluable assistance of Mr. Dulles, a distinguished representative of the Republican Party as well as a recognized specialist in foreign relations and in the processes of international negotiations and treaty-making. As a matter of fact, the bipartisan character of the American attitude in the present conduct of foreign affairs was clearly indicated by the strong and successful leadership displayed in the Senate during the period of this conference by Senators Vandenberg and Connally in the debate over a development of our foreign policy of momentous importance to the American people. The fact that there was such evident unity of purpose in Washington was of incalculable assistance to me in Moscow. The state of the world today and the position of the United States make mandatory, in my opinion, a unity of action on the part of the American people. It is for that reason that I have gone into such lengthy detail in reporting my views on the conference.

種可能的行動，以對付這些迫切的問題。

最後，我願就一種和我們全體人類都有重大關係的事的某一方面發表意見。正和貝爾納斯際遇一樣地，我不能挽請參院外委會兩位首要委員相偕赴會，可是我却得到杜爾斯氏的極有價值的襄助，杜氏是共和黨衆院卓越的議員和外交問題、國際談判、訂立條約的專家。事實上，在此次會議期間，范登堡、康納利兩參議員於領導參院策劃外交政策新發展的工作聲中，曾明顯表達美對外事務措施態度中的兩黨性質。此種意見一致的跡象對於遠在莫斯科的我顯有莫大幫助。我認爲今日世界的形勢和美國的處境已使美國人民採取一致行動的責任。這也就是我詳盡報告我對外長會議的意見的原因。

painfully slow. These issues are matters of vast importance to the lives of the people of Europe and to the future course of world history. We must not compromise on great principles in order to achieve agreement for agreement's sake. Also, we must sincerely try to understand the point of view of those with whom we differ.

In this connection, I think it proper to refer to a portion of a statement made to me by Generalissimo Stalin. He said, with reference to the conference, that these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Differences had occurred in the past on other questions, and as a rule, after people had exhausted themselves in dispute, they then recognized the necessity of compromise. It was possible that no great success would be achieved at this session, but he thought that compromises were possible on all the main questions, including demilitarization, political structure of Germany, reparations and economic unity. It was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic.

I sincerely hope that the Generalissimo is correct in the view he expressed and that it implies a greater spirit of cooperation by the Soviet delegation in future conferences. But we cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise

生活以及世界歷史的未來都具有極大的重要性。為協議而求達成協議起見，我們不應該在大原則上妥協，同樣地，對不合的意見我們必須誠意地求得瞭解。

在這裏，我想到史太林元帥向我聲明的一段話。他說到這次會議時，認為這些都不過是對這個問題前哨部隊的試探和接觸而已。過去我們有過許多問題，發生過許多不同的意見，但好像已成一個定規，人們在辯論疲倦之後，便明白協調的需要。這次會議上我們或不會有大的成就，但他認為對所有主要問題成立協議仍舊可能。這些問題包括解除德國武裝問題，德國政治組織問題，賠償問題，經濟統一問題等等。我們必須有耐性，而且不要悲觀。

我衷誠地希望史太林元帥之觀點係屬正確，我希望他的意見顯示在未來的會議中，蘇聯代表團將有較大的合作精神。然而我們不能忽視這兒所牽涉的時間因素。歐洲的復興已出於我的意料，遲遲未見實現。分化的力量愈見明顯。醫師正在深思熟慮，而病人却已奄奄一息，因此，我認為我們不應一再拖延而至無可救藥的時刻到臨時才有所行動。新問題的發生實與之俱增。我們應毫不遲疑地採取種

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- 2 羅斯福，邱吉爾，赫爾，斯達林，希特勒重要演詞。
- 3 大西洋憲章，蘇美軍事商洽，羅邱會談，英蘇同盟條約，北非登岸，第二戰場開闢，卡港會議聯合公報，珍珠港被襲報告等國際性要件。
- 4 中美租借協定，英美放棄治外法權，中美新約。
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- 4 我國對美及對國際方面之政治，經濟，商業關係。
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- 2 迫使日本投降文件。
- 3 克利米亞，波茨坦等會議公報。
- 4 關於舊金山聯合國機構之重要演詞。
- 5 聯合國憲章，世界法院組織法。
- 6 美國動員局局長關於美國對日作戰之軍事，經濟，後員詳細報告書。

### 第四卷合訂本

定價十元九角

本合訂本包含日本投降以後中，美，英，蘇對國際問題之立場有關之文獻。

- 1 日本投降及中，美對日政策。
- 2 外長會議中之各國立場。
- 3 美，英，蘇之外交政策。
- 4 中蘇友好條約及有關處理東北日產重要文件。
- 5 關於中美關係之文件。
- 6 外長會議公報，原子能會議公報。
- 7 邱吉爾與斯達林間接舌戰。

