

Information on matsukuma


⑨

(49)



Information from  
MATSUGAMA - Matsubara

31 Oct 1947





①

## Curriculum Vitae

Kichiro MATSUKUMA

Born on July 10, 1895

Age 53

Birth place: SAGA Prefecture

Present Address: BEPPU City.

Occupation: Staff of the ARIMA Laboratory

Religion: Buddhism

Education: Graduated from WASEDA University. (Political Economy)

Professional Experience:

<u>Period of work</u>	<u>Employed by</u>	<u>nature of work</u>	<u>direct superior</u>
April 1919 ) June 1921 )	YAMASHITA Mining Co., Ltd.	supply	Y. Miyarawa
July 1921 ) June 1922 )	Foreign Ministry (Bureau of Commerce)	China affairs	H. SAKO
July 1922 ) Dec. 1922 )	Jap. Legation in Peking, China	Business relative to Shantung Conference	E. AMO
Jan. 1923 ) Apr. 1925 )	Foreign Ministry (Bureau of Commerce)	Commerce with China	H. SAKO
June 1925 ) Oct. 1930 )	Jap. Consulate General, Hamburg	Commerce shipping Japanese personnel general affairs	S. KAWASHIMA S. KURUSU S. MURAKAMI



(2)

Nov. 1930 ) Dec. 1931 )	South Manchuria Railway Co. Ltd Mukden Branch	Secretary to a Director	E. KIMURA
Jan. 1932 ) April 1933 )	General Affairs Bureau of the above	general affairs	M. YAMAZAKI
May 1933 ) Jan 1934 )	Showa Steel Works, Ltd.	Establishment of new factory	K. TOMINAGA
(three transferred to different sections of the same company. (until June 1941)			
July 1941 ) Nov. 1941 )	Manchurian Laborers Association	Control and guidance of labor in Mukden Province	KONDO
Nov. 1941 ) June 1943 )	Mukden Province Association for Flourishing the Nation by Labor (ROMU KOKOKU KAI)	"	F. HIRAYAMA
July 1943 ) Sept 1944 )	North China Labor Association	direction, control and supervision of enlistment of laborers. Their transportation, etc.	Chinese name (CHO KI)
Oct. 1944 ) June 1945 )	"	"	Chinese name (CHI SO BOKU)



(3)

Aug 1945 )  
Dec 1945 )

Japanese Legation  
Peking

Business concerning  
to transportation of  
Chinese laborers in  
Japan back to  
China

K. KASHIMABARA

Jan, 1946 )  
April 1946 )

Chinese Government  
Social Bureau

Business concerning  
clearance of the  
North China  
Labor Association

Chinese

Above is written out of my memory,  
and so there may be some slight  
deviation from the fact

October 31, 1947

Signed by

K. MATSUKUMA



期	由	勤務先	官職	担当業務	上級者
自十一年七月至十一年十月		湘州勞工協會	理事 奉天協理	奉天省二九〇〇勞務統制指導	理事 近藤
"		奉天省勞務興國會	常務理事	"	理事 平山復三郎
十一年七月		華北勞工協會	管理部長	工人勞務指導系統制指導 統制指導及幹施子	理事 趙 樵
" 十月		"	部長	工人勞務指導系統制指導 統制指導及幹施子	理事 池田守墨
十一年六月		在北京日本大使馆	無	在日本華工 運送業務	主任者 相原幸次
" 七月		中華民國政府社	委員	華北勞工協會 後援者	主任 戴(?)
" 八月		高津事務所	委員		

右職歴中記憶ノ確ト云ハルモノアリ  
Pルヤ元不詳、即合置記ノ相違

昭和十二年十月廿一日

松隈吉郎



# 履 正 書

姓名

松隈 吉郎

生年月日

明治廿八年七月十日

年令

五十三才

出生地

在青森縣三原郡基山町高島

現住所

別府市電川町北中七番

職業

有家研究所九州出張員

字

佛 教

學

早稲田大學 政治經濟科卒業

職

正 正 教

期 間	勤 務	先 官 職	担 当 業 務	上 級 者
昭和廿四年四月	山下勲業株式會社	事務員	田舎事務	課長 宮澤 祐
昭和廿四年七月	外務省通商局監理課	外務局	支那内務通商事務	課長 酒向 秀一
昭和廿四年七月	在北京日本公使館	"	山東令渡事務	課長 天羽 英二
昭和廿四年七月	外務省通商局才課	"	支那内務通商事務	課長 酒向 秀一
昭和廿五年十月	在漢堡日本領事館	外務省通商局才課	通商、船舶、戶務	總務課 川島 隆太郎 課長 村上 茂
昭和廿五年十一月	南滿洲鐵道株式會社	事務員	木村隆平秘書事務	理事 木村 健市
昭和廿五年十二月	在東京市役所	事務員	庶務	課長 山崎 元幹
昭和廿六年一月	在東京市役所	事務員	鐵道事務	部長 岡本 健雄
昭和廿六年二月	在東京市役所	事務員	社會局庶務(倉庫務)	" 中山 重市
昭和廿六年七月	"	事務員	死傷事務(倉庫務)	"
昭和廿六年七月	"	事務員	死傷事務(倉庫務)	"
昭和廿六年七月	"	事務員	死傷事務(倉庫務)	"



C

Info from NOGI 21 Oct

on

MATSUGAMA

~~1. Handwritten notes on page 1.  
 2. Handwritten notes on page 2.  
 3. Handwritten notes on page 3.  
 4. Handwritten notes on page 4.  
 5. Handwritten notes on page 5.  
 6. Handwritten notes on page 6.  
 7. Handwritten notes on page 7.  
 8. Handwritten notes on page 8.  
 9. Handwritten notes on page 9.  
 10. Handwritten notes on page 10.~~



~~HOMMA Furutachi~~

1. HOMMA First name is FURUTACHI (not ~~Hideshira~~)

2. Attachment (A) tends to confirm KUBO's affidavit on Homma

3. Attachment (B) = Information on MATSUMURA Kichiro

A.

WH. 2004. 11. 11

am

info from 1901 is of





NOGI, RYOHEI

TOKYO-TO, ŌTA-KU, MAGOME-MACHI,  
HIGASHI - 1 CHŌ-ME 1160

AGE 57 - 1891

67  
24  
101

11

Wartime Reconstruction Organization

~~SEN~~

\* (DOBOKU KENCHIKU TOSEI KUMIAI)  
( SENJI KENSETSU DAN )  
Joint before ended

Dept of Comm.

( SHO KŌ SHŌ )

( KŌ SEI KA )

Eng.

SHO

Committee

H  
22

Matsumura,  
Kichiro

foundational  
juridical  
person



Nogi said: He was a private, not  
a govt employee, but his agency  
the \_\_\_\_\_ was  
Coordinated with & ruled by  
the Govt. Its income was  
derived from the gunis,

via the \_\_\_\_\_ (insert)

to the \_\_\_\_\_ (insert)

me

Afternoon  
21 Oct



100 13  
Falconer  
21 Oct

Ministry of Welfare 厚生省 (1)  
Ministry of Comm. 商工省 (2)  
Eng. Dept. 工務局 (4)  
Engineering Bureau (5)  
Labor Bureau 労働局 (3)  
Adm. 行政

Organized Corporation under Law of Industry & Commerce Association  
Law of Industry & Commerce Association  
Law of Industry & Commerce Association

商工組合法 (法律) 二二〇一  
建設省 図体

Labor Sec. Dept. 労働課 (7)

任務 労働 指導 労働 指導 労働 指導

Civil Engineering organization 土木建築業団体 (6)

資材 materials

土木建築法及業者 土木建築法及業者 Civil Engineering Contractors (8)

建設省


7 or instance  
日本土木建築統制協会 (戦時中) 1  
戦時建設団 (戦時中) 2  
日本建設工業統制協会 (戦後) 3  
日本建設工業会 (現在) 4  
Japan Civil Eng. Adjustment Assoc.  
Wartime Construction Corporation  
Japan Construction Industrial Control Association  
Japan Industrial Construction Society  
after (war ended) (wartime)  
(Present)

AM 21  
Oct

△



① Agreement Jap + Nanking Govt



\* Welfare allocates so many Ch's will be imported

# Re 6-8-9 = NCHA - makes contract - with Contractor

# Prisoners, former Prisoners, Surrendered (Soldiers), Farmers, etc. will be collected from #6

Taken on 21 Oct



CL Labor Pool (Man)

number of Labors  
at its time  
of war ended  
29,748

中國人勞務志  
使役產業

② 港灣荷役業

③ 造船業

④ 土木建築業

⑤ 金屬鑛業

⑥ 石炭業

NC Educ Comm

① NCELH  
華北勞工協會

② 理事長  
③ 趙琪

Chairman or  
General Manager  
Exec Directo

Chinese characters

CHAO-CHI (verified by Capt Chan CLDir 22 Oct)

Chief of Genl Affairs  
Shigeru ISHIKAWA

Chief of Collecting, Mobilizing,  
Personnel Labor Procurement  
MATSUKUMA Kichiro

Control Mgr  
I don't know  
his name

These were all in  
China - at Peiping

日本駐華公使  
堀内干城

HM  
21 Oct



(9)

NCLE  
T  
Mat

Mat - NCLE

(B)

NOGI, Ryohy stated this  
on 23 Oct 47 -

Re Matsuguma, Kichiro

was not technically a govt man,  
but got his orders via this chain -  
① GEF - Jap Embassy (Peiping) - to Matsuo ③  
as advisor/coordinator with/for vs in/under NCLE  
also N. China at that time was sub Jap  
& control though puppetly Chinese "adm Comm"  
Hearsay: As he heard, not an Army man.  
Think he was an ex-Labor Boss at  
some Manchurian Coal Mine -

Re (14) Burned Papers -

~~I not only burned my "own" papers  
- papers in my possession. We all were ordered  
to destroy all papers -~~

In the SHIBA SAKURADA GRAMMAR Building  
SCHOOL (Tokyo)-TO.

~~We were ordered to do so to the Wartime Coastal  
Organization ( SENJI KENSETSU DAN 戦時建設團 )  
by the Munitions Ministry ( 軍需省 GUNJU-SHO  
Jap word  
It took 3 days to destroy them. This was~~



(C)

Chinese Labor

Construction Co's  
defend selves +  
blame govt but  
implicate selves



*Free Translation  
of the Jap. Copy.*

20.12.1

英人ブーズ氏譯

The Construction Contractors 14 in number, employing Chinese

Contract Labor; as well as 35 such companies using Korean Labor, were charged by the Japanese Government, upon cessation of hostilities, with the custody of and responsibility for the welfare of some 12,364 Chinese nationals and 22,500 Koreans to be held at their respective work sites pending their repatriation.

After the lapse of one hundred days of night-mare strain these Contractors, here-in-after referred to as DOBOKU KENCHIKO-SHA, find themselves at the very limit of their resources and endurance; their urgent tasks of reconversion or dissolution hampered or held up; their most valuable Japanese staff members assigned to this task, terrorised and either deserting or demanding damages for their extra-hazardous duties - with the result that a number of the firms are on the brink of insolvency on account of their forced outlays.

At the same time they cannot for a moment shut their eyes to the social implications of the rising tide of violence and the menace to the community threatened by the crimes perpetrated by their charges. These crimes their staffs have no power or means to check - while the local police do but demonstrate their incompetence whenever challenged. Whether as "Victor" Nationals or "Liberated" people these Contract Laborers are a law unto themselves. Their criminal elements manifestly regard themselves as immune, however outrageous their conduct, because of the political complications that might arise through any show of force in resisting their depredations. This fear evidently paralyses the police on their part, while they plead in mitigation of their helplessness, that they are crippled by dismissals and resignations from their ranks.

After having experienced over one hundred cases of violence, arson, theft, destruction of property, beating and kidnaping of their officials



and having met with no response to their appeals to the Japanese Govern-  
ment for release from their intolerable position, these DOBOKU KENCHU  
SHA <sup>conceive</sup> ~~conceive~~ it to be no loss than a public duty to put the situation  
factly and plainly before the Occupation Authority, while confessing  
their own impotence and that of the police to prevent disorders that may  
lead at any moment to more serious breaches of the peace.

They find themselves with no alternative but to implore the good  
offices and directive of the Supreme Command to the end that priority  
may be established (and sufficient transportation provided, to remove  
these widely scattered bodies of Contract Laborers from their present  
sites and speedily effect their return to their own countries. Most  
urgently they hereby petition that the responsibility for their watch  
and ward may be removed immediately from the afore-said DOBOKU KENCHU  
SHA.

In support of the above plea they beg respectfully to submit the  
accompanying memoranda describing the origin and character of the con-  
tract labor involved, and the status and present location of the resi-  
due left on their heads, pending arrangements for their return home.



HISTORICAL SUMMARY:CHINESE CONTRACT LABOR.

The traditional reservoir for Heavy & <sup>Un-skilled</sup> ~~Unskilled~~ Labor - the husky surplus youth from farm and fishing villages - on which the Doboku Kenchiku-sha had always depended, speedily dried up due to military conscription with the on-rush of the Far Eastern war. The Governmental measures to channel the whole labor potential of the country into "necessary" i.e. "War" work, soon fell short of filling a great void in the field of heavy labor consequent to insatiable demands for construction in the expending munitions industries and the multiplication of military establishments.

It was only in this crisis that the Japanese Cabinet took up as a partial means of relief, the possibility of procurement of group contract labor for a specified range of industries from the North China area. A Cabinet resolution at the end of 1942 directed the Planning Board to investigate the feasibility of getting suitable labor for the specified industries of Coal Mining, Mining, Doboku Kenchiku and Stevedoring. The Planning Board arranged for a delegation from these industries to meet with officials of the Ministries of Commerce, Welfare, Home and Far Eastern Affairs at the Japanese Embassy in Peking, where this group was brought into touch with the North China Labor Association - a body supervising the supply of contract labor from Shantung to Manchukuo.

The co-operation of this body assured, the terms of a trial contract were drawn up whereby in the following spring a small number of contract laborers were engaged to be tried out by the Coal Mining and Stevedoring industries. The satisfactory implementing of this contract having been reported to the Cabinet, resulted in Cabinet action in February 1944, which authorized the employment of 30,000 contract laborers to be limited to the four industries of Coal Mining, Mining, Ship-building & Doboku Kenchiku with the addition of ~~that~~ ~~unskilled~~ ~~under~~ ~~group~~ ~~labor~~ ~~contracts~~ ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~distributed~~ ~~then~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~Stevedoring~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~various~~ ~~ports~~ ~~in~~ ~~Japan.~~



Kenchiu with the addition of 5000 semi-skilled, under group labor contracts, to be distributed amongst the Stevedores at the various ports in Japan. The control of the allocations of the laborers received is vested in the Welfare Ministry. The contracts were thereupon entered into through the North China Labor Ass'n under the auspices of the Japanese Embassy. and the allocations were performed by the Welfare Ministry.

When the war ended, out of the 13,500 allotted to the Doboku Kenchiu Sha, there were 12,364 contract laborers in Japan.

The number was reduced by 1164 through repatriation in October. Cessation of work was immediately ordered by the Japanese Government; and the Doboku Kenchiu-sha, here-in concerned, were instructed to undertake their sustenance and care, the Government stipulating extra rations and especially of oil and meat (which involved black market purchases running as high as  $\text{¥}5$  to  $\text{¥}7$  per head per day); and otherwise providing for their being treated with consideration pending their return to China.

On September 20th the Joint Conference of the Ministries concerned passed a resolution to the effect that these groups should be repatriated during the remainder of September and before the middle of October. It also ruled upon the amount of Allowances in lieu of wages during the period of suspension of work; this payment is fixed at not less than 60% based on the ~~wage~~ <sup>wage</sup> earnings of the last three months of work.

The Government were not able to carry out the program of returning the laborers, for lack of transportation and ~~so~~ <sup>so far as</sup> the Doboku Kenchiu-sha are concerned only 1164 have actually left in October, leaving 11,200 at the various localities, shown on the accompanying map shown on the accompanying map.



Their spirits exalted and inflamed with the exhilaration of victory, the demands of the trouble makers in various of the groups all bounds, and despite every effort to placate them the responsible managers of the Doboku Kenchiku-sha have been set upon, beaten or imprisoned, abducted and held for ransom - or have had to see the companies, ware-houses broken into and contents pillaged, or property destroyed and office buildings set fire to - the acts of violence have extended to the country-side even to train-robberies, where trains standing in a station have been boarded and the passengers relieved of their purses, wrist watches and other valuables. Claims for compensation for all these depredations have mounted up and added to the direct losses sustained; and the police, in many cases, if they tried to restore order, were beaten for their pains or shut up in their own stations.

Without going into full details but just glancing back over the police record from the beginning of September to the end of October the following sample cases are submitted, to indicate the nature and seriousness of the disturbances which have reduced the Doboku Kenchiku-sha employees to a state of despair, leading them to insist upon release, - or to join in the chorus demanding damages for their own injuries. --

- Oct. 29 Lgr. of Tsuchiyagumi Head Office Sapporo Hokkaido Kidnapped and held for ransom of 150,000 (released on pay't of 95,000)
- Oct. 27 Lgr. at Nagamigahara Military Construction, of Kumayagumi threatened and forced to hand over ¥250,000 under duress.
- Oct. 25 Nishimatsugumi paid over ¥300,000 to the Yasuno Nippon Electric Transmission Construction Chinese laborers under threats of violence.



- Oct.17 Laborers at Kagurigahara Military Construction forced the Keshingumi to hand out ¥70,000.
- Sep.24 150 Chinese laborers at O-yubari Hokkaido broke into the police sub-station and company office, locked up the manager and the police chief, did much damage and in the fighting killed their own Chinese leader... next day attacked the Tokiwazawa police substation injured two policemen and damaged company premises.
- Sep.13 At Omuta station gang boarded train standing in station and robbed passengers of money, valuables and wrist watches etc. (similar incidents of almost daily occurrence)
- Sept.7 Chizaki-gumi office at Sorachi gun Hokkaido forcibly entered by a gang of their workmen demanding immediate distribution of 470 pair working tabi; disbelieving the manager who declared that because such a quantity was not in stock & despite assurances that before their departure they would all be provided with foot gear the gang broke into the godown looted it of clothing, sake and food and returning to the office inflicted grave injuries on the manager leaving him half dead.



CHARGES AND LOSSES.

The costs and losses for which the Deboku Kenchiku-sha are perforce looking to the Government for re-imboursement, naturally fall into two classes or groups

before August 15, 1945

(1) Those that were incurred/under the stipulations of the contract all whose details were made under the scrutiny of the Japanese Authorities and as directed by them. Some of these losses were due to the termination of the war before the amortisation period (granted in which to write off the payments) had transpired. Or payments guaranteed by the Government. Such outlays totalled ¥ 32,891,773. The largest item, as shown below is for the advance payments made for hiring labor, to the North China Labor Ass'n (originally agreed at ¥ 400 per head but raised to ¥ 600 from the start and increasing to ¥ 1000 in subsequent contracts, the earliest of which had six months yet to run while the latest were interrupted within the initial period of 2 months training (stipulated by the contracts) Total losses of course were those advances made against which no labor was forthcoming. Special types of housing, built under police supervision, had to be provided which were to have been written off over the two years of the contracts; while the Government undertook to re-imburse the contractors for the special food stipulated, to the extent of 50 sen per day; and to be responsible as well for the difference in basis pay represented by the contract figure of ¥ 5 per day and the current rates for Japanese or Korean labor.

BREAK-DOWN OF LOSSES PRIOR TO AUGUST 15, 45

Unamortised portion of Bargain Money payments

and for payments made without receiving laborers ¥ 15,663,344



Government guaranteed difference on basis wages	8,398,382
do. do. portion of extra provision of meat & oil etc. 50 sen per day(Actually cost ¥2/¥3)	1,995,198
Un-amortised part of cost of special demiciles	5,718,600
Other losses(death gratuities hospitalisation etc).	
	<u>2,116,249</u>
Total	32,891,773

(2). Losses and payments incurred since August 15th through the destruction of property and the compensation demanded of the companies, together with the costs of allowances stipulated by the the unproductive labor gangs, pending repatriation as calculated up to November 20th.

DOWN DOWN OF LOSSES BETWEEN AUG. 15 & NOV. 20

Losses of cash, property, and for compensation to victims of Chinese violence and theft	¥ 24,338,184
Wages and gratuities	6,436,738
Gov't guaranteed extra food allowance	<u>5,923,610</u>
Total	¥ 36,698,532



ENCLOSURE No. 6.

To: Prefectural Governors;  
Chiefs of the Munitions Supervision Branches;  
Chiefs of the District Mining Bureaus.

From: Director of the Labor Bureau, Welfare Ministry;  
Director of the Mobilization Bureau, Munitions Ministry.

February 24, 1945.

Kin Hatsu No. 228.  
Do Kyoku No. 388.

Re: Pay Regulations for Chinese Laborers and  
Enforcement Regulation.

With regard to the wage standards for Chinese laborers, measures were taken on wage standards in Japan through instructions under the communication Kin Hatsu No. 2,523 of December 14 of last year. However, in view of the fact that a report was made to the Vice-Ministers' conference concerning the Outline of Pay Regulations for Chinese Laborers and the Outline of Enforcement of February 5, as per attached sheets, it is requested that all necessary measures be taken from the standpoint of guidance in enforcing the above regulations.

With regard to the method of payment of the National Treasury subsidy in Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a), of the Outline of Pay Regulations, instructions will be issued later after further deliberations with the Ministries concerned. However, the advancing of funds for the said subsidy in Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (b), of the said Outline shall be enforced immediately, retroactively from April 1, 1944.



Explanatory matters  
concerning the North China  
Labor Association.

1. Status
2. Fund (capital)
3. Nature of work
4. Organization of work
5. Revised Organization of work  
from autumn, 1944

Stated by Kichiro MATSUKUMA  
out of his memory.



(十一年秋坎子)

任務部——人事、經理、文書、庶務子

(部員日人  
五山英)

一 勸業部——工人募集、統制指導子

(部員日人  
松隈吉郎)

特定務工作、物運計畫  
及幹施子

一 管理部——勞工就業、食糧、幹施

(部員華人  
鳥澤聲)

簡易宿泊所、職工養成所  
勞工訓練所、福利施子  
改善指導子

華北  
事務  
總務  
局長  
局長  
局長  
局長  
局長

華北勞工協會  
(理事長華人  
池田宗重)

以上、組織及事務分擔之圖、之元記、確  
十三年八月、買少、相違、下、中、元、不、新、

所、合、出、也、

昭和十一年十月廿一日

松隈吉郎



# 華北勞工協會

性格

華北、法律、依、設立也、華北政務

資金

華北政務委員會及北支那南華會社

事業

華北、折半、資、(四〇五分)

## 組織及事務分擔

(十人、林、坂、古)

總務部——人事、經理、文書、庶務

(部長、見、石、川、茂)

管理部——工人、萬、果、統、制、指、導、輸、送

(部長、見、大、林、計、画、幹、事)

(部長、見、松、隈、部)

神學部——勞工、紀、律、統、治、所

(部長、見、鳥、澤、部) 職、工、表、成、所、勞、工、訓、練、所、協、助、學、生、進、修、政、策、指、導、所

局長

局長

局長

局長

局長

趙、樵

趙、樵



Date: 9 October 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.

2691

CRD No.

Report by: Robert M. Patterson  
Major, Cavalry

Title:

Ryohey NOGEM, Kyojito HOMMA, Hideshiro OKAZAKI.  
(Misreatment of Imported Chinese Laborers)

Synopsis of facts:

The three Subject named individuals were official agents and personal participants in the criminal IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR (ICL) enterprise perpetrated by the Japanese Government in which: (1) the national policy was to exploit Chinese Manpower in the aggressive interests of Japan; (2) the official Plan was to procure Chinese Nationals in China and expend them as Labor in Japan on heavy-duty high-priority war-industrial work projects; and (3) the coordinated Program cleared via sundry Ministries, bureaus, sections, agencies and agents, all duly designated, empowered, and responsible for results, which were as atrocious as the ways and means employed were criminal.

Altogether, there were some 135 "ICL" groups in Japan. The 'CHUSAN-RYO' case, Hanaoka Copper Mine, Akita Prefecture, was one. There, approximately 1000 Chinese were deprived of the barest vital material necessities, through the brutal neglect, mismanagement and man-handling of the responsible authorities with the result that over 42% of the victims died of starvation, exhaustion and disease. Such was the situation and conditions, and the consequences, which these 3 Subject named suspects helped to create and accomplish. Specifically - NOGI Ryohey, as Chief, Labor Div, Eng. & Constr. Works Control Assoc. (Munitions/Welfare Mins.) was a Contracting and Procurement agent, who shanghai'd Chinese many of whom, already famished, ill, old, died in China or en route and kept on dying in Japan. NOGI knew, helped perpetrate, ways and means and deeds and results.

HOMMA Kyojito, as Home Office Advisor on Chinese, worked with Foreign Affairs and Special Police sections and with the so-called "Special Chinese Counter-Measure Committee" of that Ministry; he did much field-inspecting and agent-training and championed brutality to Chinese as 'SOP'.

OKAZAKI Hideshiro, as a high-level Thought-Policeman, Chief of both the 'Peace Preservation' and Foreign Affs sections, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, did much practical policymaking and actual enforcing; he knew, helped form, backed up, the 'big picture' and its consequences.

Owing to the key posts and doings of these 3 suspects, the full investigation and prosecution of their cases should uncover much

Distribution:

- 1 Prosecution (Mr. FAISON)
- 1 CRD
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④ Chinese Labor (Homma/Nogi/Okazaki)



DETAILS:

evidence on other persons who are also specifically implicated in the Japanese governmental, strikingly war-crimes-related, IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR tragedy as a whole.

At Tokyo:

This report arises from evidence first uncovered in the notorious "Chusan-Ryo" Chinese Labor Camp case. The basic matter involved is Importation of Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government as a part of the national program in the interests of the aggressive Greater East Asia (GEA) War. The related evidence against the Japanese authorities ranges from local atrocities to atrocious national policies. The train of consequences is revealed by the known facts. That cause-and-effect chain of criminal responsibility is linked up by the available evidence with the official governmental chain of authority and responsibility at all levels. Specifically implicated agencies and agents are indicated. Not only are NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI implicated but a number of other suspects as well, including a number of higher-ups a long way beyond and above them in the central government as well as other suspects at the Prefectural levels.

Accordingly, while the mission of this report is primarily to state the situations relating to the three subject named suspects mentioned above it will be an aim also, in stating the details, to indicate the basis for further investigations leading to the eventual prosecution of other suspects who participated in the pernicious program of importing Chinese Nationals and who hence are implicated in the matter of war-crimes-related misdeeds as relating to Chinese laborers in Japan.

The "Chusan-Ryo" case above referred to concerns the Imported Chinese Laborers (hereinafter termed ICL's) who were located at the Hanaoka Copper Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture. Certain perpetrators in that case are now facing trial. The information contained in the present Report arises initially from that case and is available in the Prosecution Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP. The sources of information available in that Division include the following--

1. Four Ltrs, dtd 15 June, 19 July, 15 and 30 Nov 1946, To Legal Section, From HIROBAYASHI Shinichi, Atty for Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
2. Twenty one written exhibits (various) incl Item #3 below.
3. Ex. B-1, Affidavit dtd 12 July 1946 by KUBO Seichiro.
4. Japanese Govt Order dtd 4 April 1944 re Chinese Labor Importation Program, To Governors of Prefectures, From the Home and Welfare Ministries jointly, incl written Policy and Compendium rules to be enforced by responsible agencies.
5. Contract dtd 8 May 1944 between NOGI Ryocho for Kajima-Gumi Co. and CHI-CHAO, Exec. Dir., North China Labor Association.
6. Statement dtd 24 April 1947 by KAJIMA Morinosuke, President of the Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
7. CLO Ltr #6570 (RF) dtd 21 August 1947 and CLO Memorandum #4019 (RF) dtd 14 August 1946 listing and locating the Chinese Labor groups and so-called Employers in Japan.
8. Inv Div Case #419 (Chinese Labor at Summimoto Mine).

Copies of items Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 enumerated above are filed with the CRD copy of this report. Pertinent details from all of the above sources as relating to this investigation are summarized in the present text.



For purposes of this report, significant details in connection with the above-mentioned "Chusan-Ryo" case proper include the following. The statistics shown are approximately exact.

(1) During the period Aug 1944 through June 1945 there were 981 ICL's delivered to the immediate custody of a branch office of the Kajima-Gumi Company at the Hanacka Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture, segregated, quartered and guarded as one "Chusan-Ryo" group, and there, until mid-October 1945 when relieving Allied Forces took charge of them, during a period of about 15 months of Japanese mis-management, under atrocious conditions and circumstances ranging from brutal mistreatment of their persons to equally brutal neglect, were bullied, beaten, starved, tortured, deprived of anything like enough food, clothes, shelter, fuel, sanitation or medical care adequate to support life adequately for anybody, let alone able-bodied men at work, while at the same time they were kept remorselessly at hard labor on a work-project to which they had been allocated because it had a high-priority rating in the all-out, national, aggressive GEA war-effort in Japan, with the result that, today, 413 (over 42%) of that one ICL group alone are known to be dead.

(2) The mere statistics are as appalling as the physical details and are pertinent to this report as illustrating, what will be shown below, that all this occurred under Government control by designated responsible agencies and persons.

(a) During the 9-months period from August 1944 through April 1945 from an initial strength of 296 there were 88 deaths or 30% in that time.

(b) The monthly death rate rose from the start. There were 4 deaths in August, the 1st month; 16 in April, the 9th month. In May and June 685 ICL's arrived, but fresh blood didn't help the figures: there were 19 and 24 deaths in May and June respectively, as the worn-out survivors of the ICL's already on hand continued to die off.

(c) On 1 July 1945 the traditionally docile Chinese revolted in desperation and were caught, tied, herded, beaten, exposed to sweltering heat and sunlight without water or food for upwards of 3 days, by the Police. Score for July: 100 deaths, 12% of the ICL survivor-strength as of 1 July.

(d) To proceed: During the remainder of the period of Japanese control, for the 3 months, August through October, the deaths by months were 49, 68 and 51; total 168, or 27% of the survivor-strength as of 1 August -- but in the ensuing 5 months, under Allied control, from November 1945 through March 1946 the deaths by months were 9, 3, 1, 0 and 1; total 14, or 2.5% of the strength as of 1 November.

(e) To sum up: For the 11-month period before the "July Incident" there were 131 deaths (13% of the total original ICL strength); for the 9-month period after and including the incident there were 282 deaths (33% of the survivor strength as of the time the 3-day Police tortures occurred); for the entire 20-month period from August 1944 through March 1946 the overall figures are: ICL's 981, dead at Chusan-Ryo 413 or about 42%.

Certain local perpetrators in the "Chusan-Ryo" case now face trial. The summarized details on it stated above suffice to bring out the war-crimes-



relationship at the ground level. But the defendants in that case are not the only offenders, and the "Chusan-Ryo" group of approximately 1000 ICL's is only one of many such groups in Japan. The CLO sources referred to above list 135 ICL groups at as many locations worked by 33 industrial organizations. All of the many thousands of Chinese Nationals who were imported to Japan, survivors as well as dead, and for the reasons shown below, were victimized by the Japanese government officially as such.

(1) On 4 April 1944 the central government sent an Order labelled Welfare Ministry No. 103/Welfare Ministry #6, signed jointly by the two Vice-Ministers indicated, "To: the Governors of Prefectures, Subject: Importation Into Japan of Imported Chinese Labor".

(2) The Order stated: "Pursuant to the Cabinet decision made on 27 November 1942 we have been experimenting on importing Chinese Laborers for some time and ... have now come to a decision made at a Vice-Ministers' conference on the Policy respecting the Importation of Chinese Labor into Japan, as per attached Paper #1, also upon a Compendium thereof, as per attached Paper #2. Since we have launched upon regular importation ... having regard for the acute shortage of labor, you will do all in your power to accelerate the handling of the various matters involved in the materialization of the problem."

(3) The Policy and Compendium were explicit. They stated a Plan. The basis was that the Government would rule the ICL Program in all essential respects. Official approval and supervision and control of Work Projects, of Employers, of ICL Care and Welfare, and of the ICL's themselves were all prescribed. Particular standards and specifications and procedures were laid down, and the responsible governmental agencies were designated. Some significant details contained in the written Policy and Compendium follow.

(4) ICL's were 'in principle' to be worked for 2 years at heavy labor on high-priority war-industry work-projects, as approved by the Ministry of Welfare. The same Ministry allocated a quota of ICL's to each Prefecture.

(5) Employers filed an 'Application Invoking Assistance of Chinese Labor'. The National Labor Mobilization Bureau checked the applications. Governors of Prefectures forwarded these as requisitions on the Welfare Ministry, for approval. Division of that ministry passed on them. The Welfare Ministry notified the Greater East Asia Department. The GEA Dept in turn attended to the overseas procurement.

(6) In China, laborers were collected by the Japanese army, or by the puppet Chinese Government, or, in North China, by the N. China Administrative Commission or by the N. China Labor Association (NCLA), acting under instructions of Japanese Embassy.

(7) ICL's were supposed to be forty years old or less, sound in health and mind. Wages, hours of work and rest, to be on the basis of the average for Japan. Special security measures were directed, to prevent runaways and spies. Food was to be as per prescribed ration for ICL's. Foodstuffs to be provided by the Ministry of Commerce & Agriculture.

(8) "The Employer, acting under the instructions of the Police, the Natl Labor Mobilization Office and other relevant organs, shall



provide the necessary equipment for the training, education, amusement and examination of health" of the ICL's. Employers might be "barred from the privilege" of having ICL aid if they were "found to be incompetent ... or do not obey instructions of the competent authorities", and, if need be, should be made to "submit an oath pledging themselves ... to obey the control and instructions of the Police and the East Labor Mobilization Office (ELMO).

(9) The chain of control from the ground up was: Employer - ELMO and Police - Governors of Prefectures - Welfare and Home Ministries - GEA Dept. (Other responsible agencies were the Foreign Affairs and Police bureaus, Home Ministry).

In addition to the significant details contained in the Order, Policy and Compendium, the exact phraseology of the form of Contract undertaken between "Employers" and the North China Labor Association (NOLA) is interesting: The authority invoked for making contracts is "In accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire of February 2, 1944." The stated purpose is "having regard to the delivery of laborers by the North China Labor Association", and it was specified that "The terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement".

It is obvious from the above details that the Chinese Labor Importation Program was an official thing over which the Japanese Government held full jurisdiction and dominated through designated official agencies; also obvious where, in the last analysis, the responsibility lies for the mistreatment and death of ICL's in Japan. Off hand the arrangement may not seem particularly objectionable, but from the facts in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case the following considerations emerge:-

(1) Nominally, the ICL's were "contract laborers" but actually they were unfree, supposedly they were able-bodied but actually they were, many of them, in poor physical condition or diseased -- originally POW's, vagrants and the like who were caught and deported by Japanese rounding-up agencies operating in China, including the Army. As one coolie put it: "I hail from Shantung, was grabbed, and brought here" to Japan.

(2) The private "Employers" were held responsible by the Government for ICL care and welfare, etc; actually, they were handicapped by the so-called "competent authorities" - deprived by them of sufficient power or means or facilities or supplies or relevant official aid of any sort to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them;

(3) The Government, as represented by its own designated and responsible official agencies and personnel, broke its own rules, violated its own standards and specifications, failed to meet its own obligations of supervision and control and facilitation or to comply with its own procedures.

In a word, the responsible authorities were not "competent" in an efficient sense. The facts prove that it was the Government, not Industry, that brought about an intolerable situation in the first place, and then not only failed to correct but actually contributed to the criminal conditions and actions and consequences that resulted -- in the course, incidentally, of failing in the avowed official mission of "having regard for the acute shortage of labor." In substantiation of this, the following are some illustrations of what happened in Government circles:-

(1) The authorities violated their own rules by importing laborers who were in many if not in the majority of instances in weakened



or diseased condition -- as evidenced by the affidavit of KUBO Sei-chiro and by there were deaths enroute to Japan in all 3 of the drafts of ICL's shipped to the 'Chusan-Ryo' location.

(2) The Governor of Akita Prefecture and his rationing agents refused to furnish foodstuffs to the starving ICL's although repeatedly begged for the same by the local Kajima-Gumi employees and as ordered by the central governmental authorities to do -- and the central Government failed to enforce its order to do so.

(3) The mistreatment of ICL's appears to have been instigated as a sort of get-tough-with-the-Chinese policy and practical working-principle by at least one Welfare agent (HOMMA), while the Police, including the Special Higher Police of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, actually perpetrated some of the known crimes.

(4) Similarly; the Foreign Affairs Section, Home Ministry, was another relevant if otherwise incompetent agency which shares in the responsibility for the neglect and mistreatment of ICL's, a fact which implicates OKAZAKI.

(5) Above all, the incredible deeds and statistics in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case are a sort of muster-roll of murder which tends to prove how the Government which dominated the situation failed to control it - an odd exhibition of efficiency by the competent authorities bent upon conserving manpower and a startling degree of 'labor turnover' even in the case of such a cheap and expendable commodity as ICL's.

The foregoing information serves to establish the major war-crimes-relationships existing in the matter of Japanese national program for the importation of Chinese nationals and indicates the train of consequences and the corresponding, implicated official agencies. NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI were tied-in with this matter in the manner stated below.

A key factor as regards all three of these individuals is that the ICL Program in which they mutually participated, in different ways but as fellow team-workers, was a highly coordinated program involving specialized functions, various bureaus, different Ministries. General facts in this connection as pertaining to the three individuals here concerned are, that they are alike, in that each held a key job and performed one or more significant functions; that NOGI and HOMMA are alike in that, as functional specialists at an intermediate level, each performed a subordinate though potent role; but that, beyond that, all three cases are different. NOGI was a contract-maker on the Munitions Ministry payroll; HOMMA was an alleged expert on the Chinese, on the HOME Office books. OKAZAKI headed up two highpowered Sections under the HOME Office, nearer the top and with much more authority than the other two. For all of these reasons, the details on any one of these individuals are peculiarly significant, not merely as implicating them, or only in the light they throw on the 'big picture' but specifically in their farther implications as pertaining to other suspect individuals.

Details re NOGI Ryohey - On 8 May 1944 a contract was entered into between the "North China Labor Association" (NCLA) and "Kashima-gumi Limited" whereby, "in accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire, the NCLA undertook the delivery of laborers to Kashimagumi Ltd provided that that Company in turn undertook to employ the laborers for a term of two years and provided further that "the terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement", which were attached.



The contract was duly executed as a document. The 'Chusan-Ryo' victims of it were delivered as a consequence of it. An English translation of the Contract and of the Particulars of Enforcement is available in the Prosecution Division.

The contract was signed, for the NCLA, by one "CHI CHAO, Executive Director of the North China Labor Association", and for the Company by "Ryohey NOGI, Attorney for S. Kajima, Vice-President, Kashimagumi Limited."

Pertinent considerations as relating to NOGI individually are:

- (1) that he personally signed as Attorney for S. Kajima and the Company;
- (2) that the Particulars of Enforcement specified that the laborers would be selected in China on the basis of qualifications which were also specified, it being specified, further, that the Company would participate in their selection, in China. These two considerations implicate NOGI in a number of ways.

(1) As to NOGI being Attorney for the Kajima-Gumi interests, the President of that Company, KAJIMA Morinosuke, in a sworn statement dated 24 April 1947 testified: that whenever the Company needed laborers it put in a request to the Labor Department of the Engineering & Construction Works Association; that that Association made a contract with the KANOKU BOKOKYOKAI (NCLA) at Peiping and imported the Chinese Laborers; that the ECWCA was supervised, then, by the MUNITIONS Ministry (and is now, since the War, known as the NIPPON KENCHIKU KOGYO KYOKAI -- Japan Construction & Industry Association); that neither 'SUENAGA' (a Kajima-Gumi employee) nor the Chief of the Labor Section of that Company went to China after Chinese laborers; that although the contract was drawn up between KAJIMA-GUMI and the NCLA, it was concluded through NOGI, "who was then Chief of the Labor Department of the ECWCA" and that the contract was not signed by KAJIMA himself or any other higher executive but, instead, was signed by NOGI "who was not even a member of the Company", "for" the Vice-President of KAJIMA-GUMI.

(2) As to what terms NOGI the contract-signer agreed to as binding in respect to laborers in China, Section VII of the Particulars of Enforcement reads in full as follows: "The Employment Standard shall be: (a) One who is physically strong enough to bear heavy labor; (a) Age shall be sixteen years and above; possibly young men shall be given preference; (c) One who is free from contagious diseases or other despicable diseases; (d) One who is deemed by the NCLA not to be the possessor of unhealthy thoughts and ideas; (e) Selection in China shall be made on the above-mentioned basis, to be participated in by Kajima-Gumi."

Evidently NOGI was a Governmental rather than an Industrial agent, and a responsible one, in a key job, actively engaged in the procurement and delivery of ICL's. He should know much about what the situation really was, what conditions were, what happened, in China and Japan both. That there was serious neglect and abuse of ICL's and that their ill-treatment in both respects was due to the failure of the responsible Japanese authorities to maintain standards or enforce them or otherwise effectually control the ICL Program and its operations which they insisted on dominating is evident from the Chusan-Ryo case; the implications against NOGI start with that general fact: he comes through as a suspect "ex-officio" on that point alone. More specifically, that procurement standards specified by the Particulars of Enforcement as to the physical qualifications of the ICL's were violated from the very start, in China, and that this factor contributed materially to the subsequent high death rate of ICL's in Japan is a well-attested point to which NOGI is closely related, and is evidenced by these



supporting details: KUBO Seichiro (Reference No. 3, listed at the beginning of this Report) describes the diseased and weakened condition of outward-bound ICL's in China before their departure; the records of six, only, shipments of ICL's checked by this Investigator show that there were deaths of ICL's enroute from China in all six instances; two Industrialists, officials of Companies which worked ICL's in Japan, report that the ICL's were in wretched physical condition when they arrived at the work-projects, and state that this factor helped kill off the ICL's after they got there. The evidence in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case substantiates these considerations, which obviously implicate NOGI in more ways than one.

Details re HOMMA Kiyohito:- According to the letter dated 19 July 1946, of HIRABAYASHI, Shinichi, an attorney for KAJIMA-GUMI (See Reference No. 7 listed above, at the beginning of this Report), HOMMA was appointed Advisor to the HOME Office on Chinese Labor on or about 10 February 1941 and was still in office in May 1946. The following additional information on HOMMA is taken from a sworn statement dated 12 July 1946, by KUBO Seichiro, Chief of the Labor Division at the HANAOKA Mining Office of FUGITA-GUMI Ltd, near ODATE in AKITA Prefecture from May 1943 to May 1946, where the 'Chusan-Ryo' Group of ICL's was located, and worked by KAJIMA-GUMI Ltd which had a construction contract with FUGITA-GUMI. (See Reference No. 3, above). KUBO, a Labor management official for a large corporation, was technically and practically familiar with the ICL situation and conditions in general and with the happenings at the Hanaoka Mine in particular. His testimony concerning HOMMA Kiyohito is summarized below:-

HOMMA lived in TSINGTAO, China, for 20 years or more, returned home in the early planning stages of the Japanese Empire's Chinese Labor Importation scheme, and by the HOME Ministry was appointed Advisor on ICL Affairs. As such he collaborated with the CHINESE LABOR COUNTER-MEASURE COMMITTEE, (which was managed by the Foreign Affairs and Police Sections of the HOME Office). Thus, and in every way, HOMMA participated actively and influentially in the official, practical planning and field supervision of the ICL Program. KUBO states that--

"He (HOMMA) was thus occupying a leading post ... and from time to time toured and lectured around the entire (field of the) contractors working camps where Imported Chinese Laborers were allocated; he also worked as a lecturer for all meetings of the leaders ... throughout this country (Japan) thereby directly instructing and leading the people in regard to the disposition of Chinese Labor."

On 13 July 1944 there was a formal visitation at the Hanaoka Mine by a party of Government officials numbering "altogether about 20 officials, chiefly from the Special Higher Police" (the TOKKOKEA, Home Office Secret Police Bureau), who inspected the Mine and instructed the Management. Official representatives of the Akita Prefectural administrative and police authorities, other Police, and representatives of the Welfare and Home Ministries were in the party, including HOMMA Kiyoko. KUBO testified that "On that occasion they fully explained the Official Policy", - which was laid down specifically by HOMMA himself, in his role as a Government expert on Chinese Labor. Under the heading: "Resumes of The Said Policy, KUBO presents a page of testimony which he concludes by stating is "the gist of Advisor HOMMA's lecture at the Hanaoka Mining Club on 13 July 1944".

According to KUBO, the keynote of HOMMA's speech was that the local policy at Hanaoka toward ICL's, of "over-indulgence" and "non-interference" in their daily lives, would be taken advantage of by the Chinese, who, deceptive in manner, treacherous by nature, prey upon the weaknesses of others and cheat them. The quarters and bedding were too good for coolies used to sleeping in crude huts or in the open. Staple rations of 22 kg.



flour per head per month was too much. Furthermore, work output should be stepped up, as at the ITMUKA Mine in HOKKAIDO, where the ICL's ate less and produced more than at Hanaoka. Henceforth the principle at Hanaoka must be stringent control of ICL's.

Toward the beginning of September 1944, HOMMA, accompanied by Police and HOME Office officials, visited the KAJIMA-GUNI ('Chusan-Ryo') Work Project at the Hanaoka Mine. - "HOMMA there fully explained the management and control of Chinese Laborers along the same HOME Office principle as was expounded in the lectures made at the Hanaoka Mining Club on July 13th 1944" and added that instructions re ICL's would come downward through the Special Higher Police (TOKKOKA - Home Office) from that time on and must be obeyed by the local staff and all others concerned. KUBO testifies further that--

"Again, HOMMA delivered a lecture at the short-course Class sponsored by the HOME Office for Policemen in charge of Chinese Laborers held in the OTARU Higher Commercial School in HOKKAIDO and on that occasion he expounded the guiding principle of the Government ... According to Asst Police Inspector NARITA of Akita Prefecture, who was a student there at that time, HOMMA's conclusion in regard to the Chinese laborers was exactly the same as his lecture made at the Hanaoka conference on July 13th." KUBO's own conclusion, and he was an industrial labor boss, is: "It would seem that the opinion of HOMMA was virtually made the official instructions of the HOME Office transmitted to all Contractors' Working Camps throughout the country, and enforced".

Evidently HOMMA was indeed, as previously stated in this Report, a Government specialist in a key, influential job, and an individual suspect in his own right, like NOGI; and here again, as in NOGI's case, the implications arising from the above details, immediately as relating to HOMMA, as implications go a long way beyond HOMMA himself. Considered as a source of evidence, HOMMA should be able to throw much light on the ICL picture as a whole and on other implicated parties, including on OKAZAKI, his superior in the HOME Ministry, who is reported upon below.

Details re OKAZAKI Hideshiro: - (Reference: CIS File #806042, Book V.(5), Serial #2193-C (Statement by OKAZAKI) dated 25 March 1946). According to OKAZAKI's own statement, he was a career public official who entered the service of the HOME Ministry two years after his graduation from college in 1928. In the course of the ensuing 15-year period 1930/1945 the major posts he held were: Chief of the #3 Section, Special Thought Police, AIICHI Prefecture; Chief of the #2 Section, Special Thought Police, Metropolitan Police Board; Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry; Chief of the Special Thought Control Section, Metropolitan Police Board; Chief of the Public Peace (Peace Preservation) Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry. He was suspended from office by the Allied authorities on 12 October 1945, and in March 1946 was connected with the Japan Railway and Auto Works, Tokyo.

Thus OKAZAKI, a career man, specialized in the public safety field, and, within that field, as a Policeman, he specialized in policing peoples' thoughts as a matter of peace-preservation, etc. Considered either as a suspect, which he is, or as a potential witness, he is a promising specimen: his specialized career, and the positions he held and the times and levels at which he held them obviously implicate him in the 'big picture' of the ICL tragedy, from the standpoints of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of HOMMA's doings and vice-versa, and on other implicated agencies and individuals near the top.



According to HIRABAYASHI Seichiro, the Kajima-Gumi lawyer, OKAZAKI was Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, from 27 April 1943 until 2 August 1944. Just what he did between the latter date and April 1945 is not clear; in 1945, from April until his suspension by the Allied authorities in October, he was Chief of the Public Peace (or Peace Preservation) Section. Furthermore, during most of the latter period, from 12 June until the end, he also acted again as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section which he had headed up before.

The fact that atrocities were perpetrated on ICL's at the ground level is well established; the related evidence in the sources already available in the Legal Section of this HQ is overwhelming in its indications that many of the war-crimes-related happenings at the ground-level are attributable to pressure from above, through official channels to the industrial "employers" locally handling ICL's, and that much of the bullying of "employers" and ill-treatment of ICL's came from the official peace-preservers and thought-controllers, specifically from the agents of the Home Ministry Police Bureau.

To sum up: For the reasons indicated, OKAZAKI comes through emphatically as a high-level official who occupied two specific key-positions at a critical time and actively discharged functions of peculiar significance to the basic, war-crimes-related ICL program as a whole. He is not alone in these respects. From the standpoint of future investigations, he represents a real opportunity. Through him, it should be practicable to trace the farther implications and place them where they belong, on others of his colleagues, some of them higher up the line.

It is concluded, by way of general evaluation, that all three subjects, NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI are prime suspects in the basic matter here concerned. It is believed that they can and should be prosecuted and convicted. They are believed to be truly guilty in the legal sense, in a way that can be made to stick in each case, since it is believed to be inconceivable on the face of the known details that any one of these three could possibly have been a mere functionary in the Japanese machine and not be as it is believed that they were, real participants who were knowingly and actively guilty of concrete, criminal actions.

Their respective cases are obviously correlated with each other and with a larger whole. The latter may be considered as one Subject or prospective 'Case'. In other words, the basic matter which underlies these particular cases both severally and collectively is nothing less than the Criminal Importation and Exploitation of Chinese Manpower and Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government. For the present, it is believed simpler and more practicable, and so recommended, to carry further investigations along on the present basis of Investigating individual suspects. However, it is suggested that consideration be given to the idea of eventually pooling them as one miscellaneous subject or case. This angle will be additionally recommended upon later.

The Japanese authorities have been directed to furnish the Legal Section with copies of the military and biographical histories of NOGI Ryohey, HOMMA Kyohito and OKAZAKI Hideshiro and also to have all three of them report (separately) to the Investigation Division for interview.

The immediate detention in custody as suspected war criminals of the three subject named individuals is not recommended since it is believed that, initially at least, more and better information on the background situation, that is, on the Japanese Government's national policy and formal plan and coordinated program for the exploitation of Chinese manpower by the method of importing Chinese nationals to Japan and there disposing of them as an expendible commodity on war-industrial work projects, all as part of the



Imperial aggressive war effort, and more and better information on other suspect agencies and persons who are likewise implicated in the same war-crimes-related 'ICL' enterprise, can be obtained by treating these three Subjects, for the time being, ostensible as more or less unsuspected and, one hopes, unsuspecting, witnesses, than would be obtained if they were arrested before being questioned. Recommendations as to their eventual arrest and detention will be tendered in due course.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office:

Will review further, and follow up on, leads contained in the References listed at the beginning of this report and in any other sources presently available in the Legal Section or elsewhere in this Headquarters.

Will interrogate locally available witnesses in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case as to any additional testimony they can provide, which will be obtained accordingly, if any, on the present Subjects, NOGI, HONMA and OKAZAKI.

Will open investigations of, and report on, certain already known other suspects whose own cases will no doubt throw additional light on the respective cases of the three above named persons who have here been reported upon.

P E N D I N G



1) Cabinet Decision = <sup>27</sup> Nov 1942 —

~~2) Joint Order to Govs of Prefectures~~

2) Mtg Vice M. Home } 28 Feb 1944  
Vice M. Welfare }

3) 4 April 44 — Joint Order Welfare #103  
to Prefectural Home #6  
Governors

27 Nov 42

Cabinet Decision  
Period of Experimentation

28 Feb 44

V-M Conference  
To Organize Wholesale  
Importation — Policy +  
Details

4 April 44

Joint Order H/W to Pref Gov  
Detailed Order, Policy + J.O.P.  
and mass importations  
followed

11 Aug 44

Joint Order H/W/Munits re direct  
local police super of work, of  
locations, + of relations betw "Gumis" +

KRK





SECTION OR DIVISION

NAME

(A)

(Planning) Policy

B



From File No.:

Receipt is hereby acknowledged for the following listed documents

DATE

GENTRAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
LEGAL SECTION  
RECORDS AND FILES DIVISION

FILE NO.:

FILE NO.:



(9)

JOINT ORDER

w/attached

Compendium

&

Policy

By

Welfare & Home Ministries

Re

Chinese Labor



S. HIRABAYASHI, LL.B.  
Attorney At Law.

ORDER

T R A N S L A T I O N

WELFARE DEPT.No.103.  
HOME OFFICE No.6.

April 4th 1944.

Vice-Minister of Welfare Dept.  
Vice-Minister of Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL (SECRET DESPATCH):

TO ALL PREFECTURAL GOVERNORS:

SUBJECT: Importation into Japan of Chinese Labours.

Communication by order:

Pursuant to the Cabinet decision made on Nov.27, 1942, we have been experimenting on importing Chinese labours for some time and in view of the fairly satisfactory result achieved, we have now come to a decision at Vice-Ministers' conference upon the policy respecting the importation of Chinese labours into Japan ( as per attached paper No.1), also upon the compendium thereof (as per attached paper No.2). Since we have launched upon regular importation, it is requested that having regard to the present acute shortage of labour, you will do all in your power to accelrate the handling of the various matters involved for materialization of the proble

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April 4th 1944.

DIRECTOR of Labour of the WELFARE DEPARTMENT.

TO ALL PREFECTURAL GOVERNORS:

SUBJECT: Importation into Japan of Chinese Labours.

With reference to the operation of the above matter, it shall be guided by the "policy respecting importation of Chinese labours", also by the "Compendium respecting importation of Chinese Labours" as per decision made by the Vice-Ministers' Conference officially communicated today . In addition thereto, the following pointers shall be specially observed in handling the subject matter. Your further attention is called to Instruction No.600 dated March 12th, viz.-

(I) APPLICATION: a) As regards No.2-a of the Compendium, you will have to allow the filing of application for Government service after having thoroughly investigated the standing, business conditions, labour management abilities, etc. of the employers based on the information relating to the allotment of labour according to classification of the enterprises made by the Welfare Dept. and also after being fully satisfied of the unlikelihood of causing any international trouble in the future. If after investigation you are convinced of inadvisability or dispensability of the importation, you shall immediately report the matter to the Welfare Dept. accordingly.

b) As regards No.2-b of the Compendium, you shall make thorough investigation as per the abovementioned direction taking into consideration the degree of urgency according to the nature of the undertaking and shall accept only when you are convinced of the necessity of such importation . The abovementioned applications must be submitted to the Prefectural Office via the National Labour Mobilization Office and the latter office shall submit such applications in duplicate to the Welfare Dept. attaching thereto its specific opinion.

(II) IMPORTATION: a) As regards No.2-e of the Compendium, get the employers to make full preparation for the taking-over, transportation and primary measure after arrival of the Chinese labours, also get them to report the name of the escort for the Chinese. The Prefectural authorities shall report the name of the escorts to the Welfare Dept. immediately.

b) The collection of Chinese labours as also any assistance connected therewith shall all be arranged and handled by the Labour Control Committee (or the North China Labour Association) in China acting under instructions of the Japanese Embassy, the National Government (the North China Administrative Committee if the districts are situated up North); hence, instruct the employers to make immediate arrangements with the aforesaid organs for the taking-over and transportation of the Chinese labours.

c) The collection fee and family allowances for the Chinese labours shall be borne by the employers who shall arrange to remit such expenses to the field collecting organs two weeks in advance of the taking-over of the Chinese labours: collection fee per head shall be approximately



¥600.- in view of the increase in railway fare by ¥50.- since April 1st 1944 (besides expenses for collection, ration enroute, personal effects, transportation, medicine, etc.): Family Allowance per head shall be about ¥55.-.

(III) MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AFTER ARRIVAL: a) Measures as per No.4-a of the Compendium must be taken by the employers immediately on arrival of the Chinese labours along with the supervision and instructions on the part of the authorities to see to it that the items mentioned in the employers' application are adhered to. If the employers violate the terms of their application or do not obey the instructions, warn them that the Chinese labours might be sent back and that no more official assistance might be given. If necessary, get the employers to submit an oath pledging themselves not to violate the terms of their application and that they will obey the control and instructions of the Police and the National Labour Mobilization Office.

b) Always make thorough inspection of the labour management to see if it is in order and get the employers to pay special attention to the following:-

- 1) The imported labours shall in principle be employed in heavy labour.
- 2) The hours for work and recess shall be the same as the average labour; no extension or curtailment of the working hours because of Chinese may be made.
- 3) Specially for prevention of runaways and espionages.
- 4) Japanese labour leaders may be appointed by the collecting organs in China for the purpose of liaison and care-taking. Such leaders may not be appointed due to limitation in the number of personnel, or may be relieved by the personnel of the employers; hence it is desirable that the employers despatch at proper time some of their selected personnel to the collecting organs in China for a couple of months to study the habit of the Chinese.
- 5) Utilize the formation of the Chinese labours as at the time of transportation; any labour instructions shall be conveyed through Japanese leaders or the responsible Chinese (Chinese Commander or Boss), and strictly avoid giving direct instructions.

c) The term of labour shall in principle be within a period of two years from the time of arrival. No extension of the labour term, change in the working fields and in transfer of the labours shall be permitted. If it is absolutely necessary, then apply in advance to the local authorities in charge giving the following particulars (in case of transfer of labours, under joint signatures of the old and new employers):-

- 1) Domicile, abode, name & age in cases involving extension of the labour term, change in the working fields or transfer of the labours; in case of a corporation, the place where office is located, name of directors or persons executing the business of such corporation.
- 2) Reason for extension of the labour term, change in the working fields or transfer of the labours.
- 3) Class of the work in which the imported labours are employed, the place of the working fields and appellation thereof.
- 4) Date of importation, name of the collecting organ, date of collection and number of the labours whose labour term is to be extended, working field and the employer to be changed.
- 5) Particulars to be changed (viz.- if only the labour term to be extended, the term of the contract shall be extended accordingly; if the terms of labour be altered, the term extended as also the altered terms shall be stated; if the working field to be changed or the labours to be transferred to other employers, then class of the work as also the site of the working field subsequent to such change or transfer shall be stated).
- 6) In respect of the change in the working field or the employers to whom the labours may be transferred, state the domicile, abode, name, age and in case of a corporation, its firm-name, place where the principal office is located, its directors and other persons executing the business thereof.
- 7) Those who are about to change the working fields of labours or transfer labours to other employers, state the change in the working fields, the terms of labour and the condition of welfare subsequent to such transfer (state according to the contents of the application for evoking the assistance for the importation of Chinese labours).

d) For inexperienced workers, the employers shall not fail to provide for a definite period of training (generally six months) for the purpose of giving them basic training and education necessary for leading lives in Japan.



e) As for wages, payment thereof, prevention of diseases, sanitation, hygienic measures, we expect to issue instructions later.

(IV) MEASURES FOR REPATRIATION:

In case the employers intend or decide to have the labours repatriate due to expiration of the labour term (including causes due to the curtailment, abolition or termination of the work prior to contractual expiration), or to illness, the labours shall be repatriated in accordance with the provisions relating to transportation under No. 3 of the Compendium provided always that the employers shall obtain instructions from the Welfare Dept. as to the route and date of transportation.

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(Attached Paper # 2.)

COMPENDIUM OF THE IMPORTATION OF CHINESE LABOURS INTO JAPAN.

(I) GENERAL PROVISIONS: The enterprises allowed to import Chinese labours are as per below specified, selected out of the industries for the national mobilization considered as being specially highly tensioned:-

- a) Mining (coal & metal mines).
- b) Civil engineering & building work for the national defense.
- c) Key industries (iron and steel, shipbuilding, light-metal, chemical industry).
- d) Loading & unloading in ports and land-transportation).
- e) Any other work deemed important.

Even the above specified industries may be barred from the privilege if they are found incompetent to manage labours satisfactorily or do not obey instructions of the competent authorities.

(II) DISPOSITION OF THE APPLICATION FOR LABOUR:

a (1) When the Prefectural authorities have been advised of the allotment of Chinese labours according to each specific undertaking, the employers shall be requested to submit in quadruplicate application (as per Form 1) for evoking assistance for the supply of Chinese labours via the competent Prefectural Offices.

b (2) Even where no allotment is made by the Welfare Dept. if the proprietor of the enterprises specified under (I) above desires to import Chinese labours, he may take the matter up with the Welfare Dept. in the manner mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.

c (3) When the Welfare Dept. has decided allotment in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, it shall notify same to the Greater East Asia Dept. by attaching copy of the "Application Evoking Assistance for the Importation of Chinese Labours", simultaneously submitting to the Home Office a list shewing the allotment of the labours according to different undertakings.

d (4) When the Greater East Asia Dept. has received the notification mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, it shall decide upon the taking-over of labours and the date of transportation thereof and shall inform the Welfare Dept. on each occasion.

e (5) When the Welfare Dept. has received the above information, it shall notify the proprietor of the undertaking accordingly via the relevant Prefectural authorities with the view of thoroughly going over the taking-over, transportation, post-arrival measures of the import labours; it shall also inform the Greater East Asia Dept. the person selected to escort the labours.

(III) TRANSPORTATION

(1) The chief of the National Labour Mobilization Office exercising jurisdiction over the working field shall write and certify on the reverse side of the "Passport for China" issued by the competent Police Chief that the holder thereof is labour escort.

(2) Transportation of the taken-over labours shall be conducted in a battalion formation.

(3) In going over to China to attend to the transportation of the taken-over import labours, sufficient previous arrangements shall be made with the Police in charge of the port of sailing and arrival as also with other relevant organs so as to ensure security.



(IV) POST-ARRIVAL MEASURES:

(1) Immediately after arrival of the import Chinese labours, have the employer file an application with the Prefectural Governor for "Labour Permits" (Imp. Ordinance No. 352 of 1899), also report the general condition of the transportation to the National Labour Mobilization Office exercising jurisdiction over the working field accompanied by a list of the imported labours giving native country, name & age.

(2) Said National Mobilization Office shall, immediately on receipt of the aforesaid papers, report to the Prefectural Office giving the number of the imported labours as also the number of labours arrive, date of arrival, conditions covering any change en route; the Prefectural Office in return report accordingly to the Welfare Dept.

(3) Simultaneously with the occurrence of any change, accident &/or trouble in the imported labours, special attention shall be paid to the maintenance of secrecy relating to search, prevention of espionage, etc., also get the employer report immediately the matter to both the Police and the National Labour Mobilization Office. The Prefectural authorities shall report to the Welfare Dept., Home Office and the Greater East Asia Dept. after having collected the report from the Police and the National Labour Mobilization Office.

(4) Get the employer report to the National Labour Mobilization Office the labour condition of the imported Chinese labours as at the end of each month (as per Form No. 2) so that such report shall without fail reach the Prefectural Office by the end of the following month. The Prefectural Office in turn shall arrange such report according to the different class of undertaking and, after having given statistical computation, submit same to the Welfare Dept., the Home Office and the Greater East Asia Dept.

(5) The employer shall, acting under instructions of the Police, the National Labour Mobilization Office and other relevant organs, provide necessary equipment for training, education, amusement, examination of health, living training, etc.

(V) MEASURES RELATING TO CHANGE OR TRANSFER.

Any change or transfer of the imported Chinese labours such as extension of the working term, change in the working field and employer are not permitted in principle, but where unavoidable circumstances prevail such may be permitted by taking the matter up with the Welfare Dept.

(VI) MEASURES RE REPATRIATION DUE TO TERMINATION OF THE LABOUR TERM.

When the labour term has expired (including the curtailment, abolition and termination of the undertaking) and the repatriation has been decided, the matter shall be dealt with as follows:

(1) The Prefectural authorities shall cause the employer to submit via the Police and the National Labour Mobilization Office a list of the labours to be repatriated (giving the native country, name, date of migration, cooperative organs), port of discharge, approximate date of arrival; at the same time report the matter to the Welfare Dept., the Home Office and the Greater East Asia Dept. as per Form No. 3.

(2) Get the employer arrange to repatriate according to the method of transportation provided under (III) in the formation of a nattalion, led by labour escort, and report via the National Labour Mobilization Office and the Police general information relating to the completion of handing the labours over to the competent organ in China.

(3) The trip to China and the certificate of escort of the labour leader shall be made according to the method provided under III (1).

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POLICY RELATING TO THE IMPORTATION OF CHINESE LABOURS INTO JAPAN

(I) GENERAL PROVISIONS:

(1) The collection and servicing of Chinese Labours (hereinafter referred to as CL) shall be undertaken by the labour control organ (the North China Labour Association at North China) acting under instructions of the Japanese Embassy, the Armed Forces in China, as also the Chinese Government (up in North China, by the North China Administrative Commission).

(2) CL shall be collected from ex-POW or ex-allegianced soldiers or by means of application. CL shall be selected from men of forty years or less having excellent character and sound in health and mind, possibly prefer to pick up bachelors of less than thirty years of age.

(3) CL shall shall, prior to migration, be subject to training for a certain period (less than one month) by the competent organ in China.

(Attached Paper # 1.)



For inexperienced CL, necessary training for a certain period shall be given in Japan by the factory or the working place where they are to be employed.

(4) CL shall be employed by such undertaking as mining, stevedoring, defense civil engineering, key industries and other undertakings deemed important that are specified under the national mobilization planning enterprises; care must be taken not to employ them in dispersed and scattered working fields.

(5) The term of labour shall in principle be two years (excluding the days of transit); if the same labours are to be employed continuously, they shall temporarily be sent home on request after expiration of the contract term.

(6) CL shall be statistically considered every year in accordance with the national mobilization plan and shall be planned to import regularly. The handling and treatment of CL shall be done paying due regard to their national traits, care being taken not to create appreciable discrimination according to the class of business or the working locality, no restrictions in principle shall be placed on their remittance or money to be carried home.

(II) TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT .

(1) Factories or working fields where CL are permitted to be employed (hereinafter referred to as F & WF) shall be selected by the Welfare Dept. in consultation with other relevant authorities on condition that they shall get CL work collectively. Importation procedures shall be determined separately.

(2) The management of CL shall be done having special regard to the following points so that nothing tending to bring about excessive change in their habits shall be enforced.

a) F & WF shall hold the Japanese leaders who have accompanied the CL from China directly responsible for liaison and service.

b) In employing the CL care shall be taken to utilize the group formation as at the time of their collection and transportation and that instructions in respect of their work shall be given through the Jap. leaders and Chinese leaders (Commander or Boss), care being taken not to give direct instructions.

c) The working field for CL shall be distinctly separated from that of Koreans or POW.

d) Sufficient rest shall be given after arrival at the working field before they are sent out for regular work.

e) Dwelling shall be guarded from humidity and shall be built entirely remote from those of Koreans.

f) Food shall be served on the basis of the usual rations of the CL and the foodstuffs therefor shall be specially provided by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce.

g) Necessary facilities for setting up recreation and amusement quarters shall properly be considered by the F & WF.

(3) Wages for the CL shall be based on the average wages in Japan, but in view of the existing difference now prevailing covering the wages and prices in China and Japan, proper steps shall be taken to secure their remittances to home and money to be carried back home. Separate provisions shall be made covering the particulars of wages, allowances and other prestations, modes of payment thereof, prevention of espionage, sanitation, protection, aids, etc.

(4) Working hours shall be governed by those prevailing in Japan.

(5) Besides the four major holidays, January 1st, May 5th and the Mid-~~autumn~~ autumn shall be made official holidays.

(III) METHOD OF MIGRATION AND REPATRIATION.

(1) Expenses in respect of migration and repatriation shall not be deducted from the wages and shall in principle be borne by F & WF. For the present, such expenses may be defrayed on the basis of national compensation or like appropriate means.

(2) Transportation of CL shall be attended to by the relevant organs of Japan, Manchuria and China.

(3) After expiration of the contract term, F or WF shall in principle undertake to send the CL back to the place of collection; the same shall apply where, due to illness or other



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ATTORNEY AT LAW:

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reasons, the CL cannot continue their work.

(IV) OTHER ITEMS

- (1) Special care shall be taken in regard to the prevention of espionage and runaway of the CL in the F or WF.
- (2) Proper steps shall be taken so that the personnel of F or WF shall be trained in China as leaders. Leaders having completed the training shall relieve the Japanese leaders who previously accompanied the CL from China.
- (3) Separate provisions shall be made concerning the trustee education in Japan for the juvenile Chinese.
- (4) Separate provisions shall be made concerning the national compensation and its limit.