

所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ニ達スル迄其不足額ニ相当スル金額ヲ補給ス(昭和一八三二五法律第六三号ヲ以テ改正)

一、投資、融資及自營事業資金ノ總額中政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニヨリタル部分ニ百分ノ七ヨリ收入ノ割合ヲ減ジタル差ヲ乘ジテ得ベキ金額

ニ、投資、融資及自營事業資金ノ總額中社債收入金(社債前借金ヲ含ム以下同じ)ニヨリタル部分ニ百分ノ五ヨリ收入ノ割合ヲ減ジタル差ヲ乘ジテ得ベキ金額

毎營業年度ニ於ケル配当し得ベキ利益金額が政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ヲ超過スルトキハ其超過額ハ先ヅ之ヲ前項ノ補給金ノ償還ニ充ツベシ

第一項ノ投資、融資及自營事業ニ因ル收入、投資、融資及自營事業資金ノ總額並ニ其ノ中政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニヨリタル部分及社債收入金ニヨリタル部分ノ計算方法ハ命令ヲ以テ之ヲ定ム

第二十八條 中支那振興株式會社ノ毎營業年度ニ於ケル配当し得ベキ利益金額が政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ヲ超過スル場合ニ於テ政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ニ對シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ヲ超工利益配当ヲナサントスルトキハ其超過スル利益金額ハ利益金額ガ總株式ニシテ拂込ミタル株式金額ニ對シ均一ノ割合ニ達スル迄政府以外ノ者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額及政府ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對



シト五トノ割合ヲ以テ之ヲ配当スベシ

第七章 罰則

第二十九條 中支那振興株式會社が本法又ハ本法ニ基  
キテ発スル命令又ハ之ニ基キテナス處分ニ違反シタルト  
キハ總裁又ハ總裁ノ職分ヲ行ヒ若ハ代理スル副總裁ヲ  
百円以上二千円以下ノ過料ニ處ス副總裁又ハ理事ノ分  
掌業務ニ係ルトキハ副總裁又ハ理事ヲ過料ニ處スルコト  
亦同ジ(昭和二七・三・七、法律第七十七号ヲ以テ改正)

附則

第三十條 本法ハ公布ノ日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

第三十一條 政府ハ設立委員ヲ命ジ中支那振興株式會  
社ノ設立ニ関スル一切ノ事務ヲ處理セシム

第三十二條 設立委員ハ定款ヲ作成シ政府ノ認可ヲ受  
クベシ

政府前項ノ規定ニヨル認可ヲサントスルトキハ政府ノ  
出資ノ目的タル金錢以外ノ財産ノ價格及之ニ對シテ  
與フル株式ノ數ニツキ政府出資財産評價委員會ノ  
議ヲ經ズ(昭和二七・三・七、法律第七十七号ヲ以テ改正)

第三十三條 前條ノ認可アリタルトキハ設立委員ハ株  
式總數ヨリ政府ニ割キツク株式ヲ控除シタル殘餘  
株式ニツキ株主ノ莫分集ヲスル

第三十四條 株式申込證ニ定款認可ノ年月日並ニ  
商法第百二十六條第二項第二号、第四号及ビ第  
五号ニ規定スル事項ヲ記載スル

第三十五條 設立委員ハ株主ノ莫分集終リタルトキハ

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株式申込證ヲ政府ニ提出シ其ノ検査ヲ受ケルベシ  
第三十六條 設立委員ハ前條ノ検査ヲ受ケタル後遅  
滞ナク各株ニラキ第一回ノ拂込ヲサシムベシ前項ノ拂  
込アリタルトキハ設立委員ハ遅滞ナク創立總會ヲ招  
集スベシ

第三十七條 創立總會ニ於テ第十條ノ規定ニ準ジ  
理事又監事ノ選任ヲ行フベシ

第三十八條 創立總會終結シタルトキハ設立委員ハ其ノ  
事務ヲ中又那振興株式會社總裁ニ引渡スベシ(第三

十八條ノ六昭和十七年七月法律第七十七号ヲ以テ削除)

第三十九條 政府ハ中又那振興株式會社ニ對スル出資ノ  
目的ニ充ツルモノ帝國鐵道特別會計ヨリ其ノ所屬

物件ヲ無償ニテ政府出資特別會計ニ保管換ラサルト  
ヲ得(昭和十五・三・二七、法律第十号政府特別會計法ヲ以テ改  
正)

本書ノ内容正確ナルコトヲ證明ス

外務省管理局 經濟部 大陸課長

鈴木政勝 (鈴)



Doc. 433

聯合軍總司令部國際檢察部

一九四六年一月十五日

茲に添附の書類は日本の法令の翻譯であり、  
日本政府により翻譯せられ、經濟、科學部法律  
課に手交されたるものと更にこの檢察部に交附さ  
れたるものなり

ジェームス・J・ゲイン エヌニア (自署)

歩兵大尉



# 中支那振興株式會社定款

## 第一章 總則

第一條 本會社ハ中支那振興株式會社法ニ依リ設立シ中支那振興株式會社ト稱ス

第二條 本會社ハ中支那ニ於ケル經濟復興及開發ヲ助成スルヲ以テ目的トス

第三條 本會社ノ資本ハ一億五千七百四十萬圓トス但シ政府認可ヲ受ケテ之ヲ增加スルコトヲ得

第四條 本會社ノ資本ノ内半額以上ハ政府之ヲ出資スルモノトス  
(昭和十七、四、三〇臨時株主總會決議因改正)

第五條 政府所有正株式ノ數ハ政府以外ノ者所有正株式ノ數ヲ超スル場合ニ於テハ政府ハ其ノ超スル數ノ株式ニ付議決權ヲ行使スルコトヲ得  
(昭和十七、四、三〇臨時株主總會決議因改正)

第六條 本會社ハ本店ヲ上海ニ支店ヲ東京都麹町区三丁目  
第七條 本會社ハ公告官報又ハ上海本店及東京支店所在地ニ於テ時事關スル事項ヲ掲載スル邦字新聞紙ヲ以テ之ヲ爲ス

## 第二章 株式

第八條 本會社ノ株式ハ三百萬圓トシ一株ノ金額ヲ五十圓トス

第九條 本會社ノ株式ハ記名式トシ政府ハ左ノ財産ヲ出資シ本會社ハ其ノ財産價格



第十條

七百六十四萬圓ニ付シ全額拂込ノ株式十五萬二千  
 八百株ヲ與スルモノトス  
 一 機關車、貨車、客車其他ノ車輛  
 一 軌道並ニ軌條及枕木  
 一 其他鐵道施設及之ニ附帶スル物件  
 取價格 七百六十四萬圓  
 本會社株式券ハ一株券、十株券、五十株券、百株券、  
 千株券及一萬株券ノ六種トス

第十一條

第一回株金拂込ハ政府以外者、所有スル株式  
 ニ付テハ一株ニ付十二圓五十錢トシ政府、所有スル株  
 式ニ付テハ一株ニ付十三圓ニテ七錢トス  
 第二回以後、株金拂込ノ事業、必要ニ應ジ總裁  
 其、拂込金額、期日及方法ヲ定メ、少クモ三十日前  
 ニ各株主ニ之ヲ通知ヲ後スルモノトス  
 政府、所有スル株式、株金拂込ハ其他、株式、株  
 金拂込トシテ之ヲ異ニスルコトヲ得ルモノトス  
 政府、所有スル株式、第二回以後、株金拂込ハ金額  
 以外、財産ヲ以テ之ヲ充ルコトヲ得ルモノトス  
 (昭和十四年七月二日臨時株主  
 總會ノ決議ニテ改正)

第十二條

株主拂込ノ期日ニ株金、拂込ヲ爲サルトキハ其、拂  
 込ハキ金額ニ付シ拂込期日、翌日ヨリ拂込當日迄  
 百日ニ付一日ニ錢、割合ヲ以テ違約金ヲ徵收ス  
 株主又、其、法定代理人、株式取得、トキ質權者  
 又、其、法定代理人、質權、登錄ヲ受ケントスルトキ  
 其、氏名、住所及印鑑ヲ本會社ニ届出スベシ其、

第十三條



変更アリタルトキ亦同シ(昭和十六、三、二七、臨時株主  
總會ノ決議ニ因リ改正)

帝國内ニ住所又ハ居所ヲ有セザル株主及債權者又ハ其ノ

法定代理人ハ帝國内ニ假住所又ハ代理人ヲ定メ之ヲ本

會社ニ角ケ置クベシ其ノ変更アリタルトキ亦同シ(昭和十五、三、二八、臨時  
總會ノ決議ニ因リ改正)

第十四條 本會社株式ハ總裁承認ヲ受クルニ非ガバ之ヲ外

國人又ハ外國法人ニ讓渡スルコトヲ得ザルモノトス

第十五條 株式ノ讓渡ニ因リ株式ノ名義書換ヲ爲サントスルトキ

本會社所定ノ書式ニ依リ債權者、記名捺印セル書

面ヲ作成シ之ニ株式及本會社ニ於テハ字ト認シ証

據書類ヲ添ヘ本會社ニ其ノ請求ヲ爲スベシ但シ株式

ノ重書ニ依リ讓渡ニ在リテハ取得者ノミニテ之ヲ請求

スルコトヲ得

債權、登録、信託財産ノ表示者ノ之等ノ抹消ヲ求

メニトスル場合前項ニ準ジテ本會社ニ其ノ請求ヲ爲

スベシ

改氏名相續其他ノ事由ニ因リ名義書換ノ場合モ右

ニ準ズ(昭和十五、三、二八、及昭和十六、三、二七、  
臨時株主總會ノ決議ニ因リ改正)

第十六條 株式ノ種類ノ変更又ハ消損若ハ毀損ニシテ株式ヲ引

換ヲ爲サントスル株式ハ株式ヲ引換請求書ニ株式ヲ添

ヘ之ヲ本會社ニ提出スベシ

株式ヲ喪失シ若ハ本會社所定ノ書式ニ依リ請求

書ニ除權判決、謄本ヲ添ヘ之ヲ本會社ニ提出シテ株

券ノ再發行ヲ請求スルコトヲ得(昭和十五、三、二八、臨時株主  
總會ノ決議ニ因リ改正)

第十七條 株式ノ名義書換及株式ヲ引換其他新株式ノ

交付ニ關スル事務ハ東京支店ニ於テモ之ヲ取扱フモノトス



第十八條 株券、名義書換手數料、質權登録並之が抹消、手數料、信託財産表示並之が抹消、手數料、株券一通、付し銀トレ株券、引換其他新株券、交付手數料、新株券一通、付し銀トス(昭和十五、三、二八及昭和十六、三、二七、臨時株主總會決議因り改正)

第十九條 本會社、六月一日ヨリ定時株主總會、終結ニ至ル期間株式、讓渡ニ因ル株券、名義書換質權登録及其抹消、信託財産、表示及其、抹消、停止ス(昭和十七、四、二、臨時株主總會決議因り改正)

前項、外特ニ必要アルトキハ、豫メ公告上一定期間右停止ヲ行フコトアルベシ(昭和十五、三、二八、臨時株主總會決議因り改正)

第三章 株主總會

第二十條 本會社、定時株主總會、毎年六月臨時株主總會、必要ニ毎總會之ヲ招集ス(昭和十六、三、二七、臨時株主總會決議因り改正)

總會、上海又ハ東京市内ニ之ヲ招集ス

總會、日時、場所及會議ノ目的タル事項ハ、總裁之ヲ定ム總會、招集、戰時ニ限リ株主ニ對スル通知ハ、會日ヨリ三週間前總會ヲ開クヘ旨及會議ノ目的タル事項ヲ公告シテ之ヲ為スベトス

第二十一條 總會議長、總裁之ニ當ル總裁、事故アルトキ、副總裁之ニ當リ總裁、副總裁共ニ事故アルトキハ、業務ヲ分掌スル理事中、一人之ニ當ル總會議長、株主トシテ其ノ議決權ヲ行使スルコトヲ行フ

第二十二條 株主ハ本會社、他、株主ニ委任シ其ノ議決權ヲ行フコトヲ得此、場合ニ於テハ、其ノ代理權ヲ証



明スベキ本任状ヲ本會社ニ差出スベシ

第三十三條 總會、決議、出席、株主、議決權、過半数

ヲ以テ之ヲ爲ス、可符同數トシ、議長ノ決スル所ニ依ルモノトス

定款、変更、其他尚法第三百四十三條ニ定ムル決議ヲ

要スル事項ハ、戰時ニ限リ資本ノ半額以上ニ當ル株主出席

ニ其ノ議決權、過半数ヲ以テ之ヲ決スルモノトス

第三十四條 現定ニ依リテ行使スルコトヲ得ル議決權ノ數ハ

前二項ノ議決權ノ數ニ之ヲ算入セザルモノトス (昭和十七年四月二日臨時株主總會決議因改正)

第三十五條 定款、変更、合併及解散ノ決議ハ政府ノ認可ヲ受クルニ非カバ其ノ效カヲ生ゼザルモノトス

第三十六條 一、左ニ掲グル事項ハ戰時ニ限リ總會ノ決議ニ依

ルコトヲ要セザルモノトス

一、支店ノ新設、廢止又ハ移轉ニ因ル支店所在地ニ同

ズル定款、変更

二、資本ノ十分ノ一ヲ超エタル對價ヲ以テスル營業一部讓受

三、資本ノ十分ノ一ヲ超エタル對價ヲ以テスル他ノ會社ノ營

業全部讓受

四、役員ノ任状ハキ報酬ノ決定

第三十七條 總會ノ議事經過ノ要領及其結果ハ之ヲ議

事録ニ記載シ議長並ニ出席スル副總裁、理事及

監事ノ記名捺印スベシ (昭和十七年三月二十八日及昭和十六年三月十七日臨時株主總會決議因改正)

第三十八條 本會社ニ總裁、副總裁各一人、理事三人以上及

監事二人以上ヲ置ク

第三十九條 總裁ハ本會社ヲ代表シ其ノ業務ヲ總理ス

NO. 14



副總裁、總裁を輔佐し總裁事務を代理し總裁缺員トキハ其職務ヲ行フ  
 理事、總裁ヲ輔佐し總裁定止ル所ニ從ヒ本會社ノ業務ヲ分掌ス又ハ之ニ參與ス

第三二條 總裁及副總裁、勅裁ニ經テ政府之ヲ命ジ其ノ任期ヲ五年トス

理事、株主總會ニ於テ之ヲ選任シ政府ノ認可ヲ受ケルモノトシ其ノ任期ヲ四年トス  
 監事、株主總會ニ於テ之ヲ選任シ其ノ任期ヲ三年トス

理事又ハ監事ノ員數ガ其ノ任期ノ滿リニ因リ第三十條ニ定ムル員數ヲ欠クニ至リタルトキハ任期ノ滿リセル理事又ハ監事ノ任期ヲ其ノ任期滿リ後最初株主總會ニ終結ニ至ル迄伸長ス(昭和十七年三月三日株主總會決議ヲ以テ改正)

第三九條 總裁、副總裁及業務分掌スル理事ハ他職務又ハ商業ニ從事スルコトヲ得ズ但シ政府ノ認可ヲ受ケタルトキ此ノ限リニ在ラズ

第五章 業務  
 第三十條 本會社ハ左ノ事業ニ對シ投資又ハ融資ヲ爲スモノトス

- 一 交通及運輸ニ關スル事業
- 二 通信ニ關スル事業
- 三 電氣、瓦斯及水道ニ關スル事業
- 四 鑛産ニ關スル事業
- 五 水産ニ關スル事業



六前各号外中支那ニ於ケル公共利益又ハ産業振興ノ爲ニ必要ナル事業

本會社ハ特殊ノ事情アル場合ニ於テハ政府ノ認可ヲ受ケ前項各号ニ掲グル事業ヲ自ラ經營スルコトヲ得

第三十條ニ本會社ハ政府ノ命令アリタルトモ前條ノ業務ノ外當該命令ヲ履行スル爲ニ必要ナル業務ヲ經營スルコトヲ得

第六章 中支振興債券

第三十一條 本會社ハ政府ノ認可ヲ受ケ中支振興債券ヲ發行スルコトヲ得

中支振興債券カ發行スル場合ニ於テハ商法第三百

四十一條ニ定ムル決議ニ依リテラ要セザルモノトス(昭和五

定時株主總會ノ決議ヲ以テ)

第三十二條 本會社ハ拂込株金額ノ五倍ヲ限リ中支振興債券カ發行スルコトヲ得

本會社ハ中支振興債券借換ノ爲一時前項ノ制限ニ依ラズ中支振興債券ヲ發行スルコトヲ得此ノ

場合ニ於テハ發行後一月内ニ其ノ發行額面金額ニ相當スル舊中支振興債券ヲ償還ス

第三十三條 中支振興債券ハ無記名式トス但シ應募者又ハ所有者ノ請求ニ依リ記名式ト爲スルコトヲ得ルモノトス

第三十四條 中支振興債券ノ所有者ハ本會社ノ財産ニ付他債權者ニ先ケテ自己債權ノ辦済ヲ受ケル權利ヲ有スルモノトス

第三十五條 第三十六條第三項ノ規定ハ無記名中支振興



債券を喪失したる場合ニ準用ス

記名中支振興債券を喪失したルトキハ其事由ヲ詳記シタル書面ヲ作成シ本會社ニ於テ適当ト認め保証人ニ人以上ノ連印ヲ以テ本會社ニ新債券交付ヲ請求スルコトヲ得

前項ノ請求アリタルトキハ本會社ハ請求者ノ費用ヲ以テ直ニ其旨ヲ公告シ六十日ヲ経ルモ異議ヲ申立ル者ナキトキ限り新債券ヲ交付ス(昭和十五年三月二十八日臨時株主總會ノ決議ニ依リ)

第三十條 記名中支振興債券ノ名義書換ノ場合ニハ

第十五條第一項ノ規定ヲ中支振興債券ヲ消損又ハ毀損シタル場合ニハ第十條第一項ノ規定ヲ中支振興債券種類ノ変更又ハ名義書換債券ノ引換其他債券ノ交付ニ關スル事務ニ第十七條ノ規定ヲ中支振興債券ニ關スル平教料ニハ第十八條ノ規定ヲ準用ス(昭和十五年三月二十八日臨時株主總會ノ決議ニ依リ改正)

第七章 計算

第三十七條 本會社ノ營業年度ハ毎年七月ヨリ翌年三月三十一日迄トス(昭和十六年三月二十八日臨時株主總會ノ決議ニ依リ改正)

第三十八條 本會社ノ利益金ハ當該營業年度ノ總

益金(政府ヨリ補助金ヲ含ム)ヨリ總損金(政府ノ償還金ヲ含ム)ヲ控除シタル残額トス

第三十九條 本會社ノ利益金ハ左ノ方法ニ依リ政府認可ヲ受ケ之ヲ處分スルモノトス

- 一 法定準備金 利益金ノ百分ノ十以上
- 二 従業員退職給與積立金 利益金ノ百分ノ一以上



三 役員賞與金

四 株主配當金

五 特別積立金

六 後期繰越金

第四條 本會社は毎營業年度ニ於テ配當之得ベキ利益金額が政府以外者所有スル株式拂込金額ニ對シテ年百分六割合ニ達スル迄政府所有スル株式ニ對シテ利益配當ヲ爲スコトヲ要セザルモノトス

第四十條 本會社毎營業年度ニ於テ投資融資及自營業事業ニ依ル收入、投資、融資及自營業事業ノ資金總額ニ對スル割合(以下收入割合ト稱ス)が年百分六ニ達セザルトキハ政府ヨリ第十ニ營業年度迄左ノ各号ノ金額ノ合計額ヲ限度トシ配當之得ベキ利益金額

が政府以外者所有スル株式拂込金額ニ對シテ年百分六割合ニ達スル迄其ノ不足額ニ相當スル金額ノ補給ヲ受クルモノトス  
(昭和八、六、二九定時株主總會ノ決議ニ因リ改正)

一 投資、融資及自營業事業資金總額中政府以外者所有スル株式拂込金額ニ依リタル部分ニ百分七ヨリ收入割合ヲ減シタル差ヲ乘ジテ得ヘキ金額

二 投資、融資及自營業事業資金總額中社債收入金(社債前借金ヲ含ム以下同ジ)ニ依リタル部分ニ百分五ヨリ收入割合ヲ減シタル差ヲ乘ジテ得ヘキ金額

毎營業年度ニ於テ配當之得ベキ利益金額を政府以外者所有スル株式拂込金額ニ對シテ年百分六割合ニ超過スルトキハ其超過額ハ先ツ之ヲ前項ノ補給金



償還ニ充ツルモノトス

第一項ノ投資融資及自営事業ニ依ル収入ノ投資融  
資及自営事業資金ノ總額並ニ其中政府以外者  
ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ依リテ  
リタル部分ノ計算方法ハ命令ニ依ルモノトス

第四十三條 本會社ノ毎營業年度ニ於ケル配當ニ得ヘキ  
利益金額ガ政府以外者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對  
シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ヲ超過スル場合ニ於テ政府以外者  
ノ所有スル株式ニ對シ年百分ノ六ノ割合ヲ超ス利益配當  
ヲ爲サントスルトキハ其ノ超過スル利益金額ハ利益配當カ  
總株式ニ付拂込ミタル株式金額ニ對シ均一ノ割合ニ定ムル  
迄政府以外者ノ所有スル株式ノ拂込金額及政府所  
有スル株式ノ拂込金額ニ對シ一ト五トノ割合ヲ以テ之ヲ配  
當スルモノトス

第四十二條 株主配當金ハ一月一日現在ノ株主名簿ニ登錄  
セシタル株主又ハ質權者ニ之ヲ支拂フモノトス  
(昭和十五年三  
月十六日三三七號法律ニ  
依リテ改正)

配當金ノ拂渡期日及場所ハ總裁之ヲ定メ株主ニ  
通知スルモノトス

附則

第四十條 本會社ノ負擔歸スベキ設立費用ハ十萬圓ヲ限  
度トス

前項ノ金額中政府ノ立替ニ係ルモノハ政府之ヲ返納  
スルモノトス

第四十條 昭和十六年一月一日ヨリ同年三月三十一日ニ至ル



No. 20

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期間の特ニ營業年度ニ看做シ昭和十五年ニ  
稱ス(昭和十五年三月二十七日付株主  
總會決議因リ追加)



433-21

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 四 三 三 號

典據及び公正ニ翻スル證明

余、高橋ミチトシハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ、  
内閣書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノ  
ナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタ  
ル、九頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十八年ノ昭和十三年ノ  
四月三十日附、下記題名、即チ、中文開發株式會社  
契約書（追加覺書ハ外務省附加）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任  
ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ綴番  
號又ハ引用、真ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ） 内閣



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千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／七月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 M・高橋（署名）（印）

右ノ者ノ公的資格 内 田 書 記 官

證 人 R・フリヤマ（署名）

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、エドワード・モナガンハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／七月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 エドワード・P・モナガン（署名）

右ノ者ノ公的資格 卷 三 者

證 人 ウィリアム・C・プラット（署名）



Pencilled note: Appendix 4/

Circumstances Under Which Chinese Laborers Were  
Imported and Details As to Their Employment

Drafted on July 30, 1946.

By NOGI, Takayuke,

Policy and Measures Committee on Chinese and Korean Laborers,  
the Japan Construction Industry Control Association.

Circumstances under which Chinese laborers were imported  
and details as to their employment.

1. Foreword

Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, there has been an acute shortage of heavy-duty laborers throughout Japanese industries (such as in coal and metal mines, in civil engineering and construction works, in harbor stevedore works, etc.).

Of the various causes of this situation, the main cause is the conscription of men to military services, requisitions of manpower, etc. As a result of which the cream of the youths and men who had experience and high efficiency in these industries were lost. Such a situation, however, is an inevitable phenomenon due to the prevailing domestic conditions.

Prior to this, from the beginning of 1942, it was decided that a source of labor-supply would be available in KOREA, and a substantial number of heavy-duty laborers were imported from KOREA to substitute for the local laborers. The most outstanding instances of this replacement were in the coal mines and in civil engineering projects, where Korean laborers were employed almost exclusively in the whole mining industry, except for certain skilled laborers.

There was, however, a definite limit in the importation of these Korean laborers, for various circumstances arose which made it increasingly difficult to import them indefinitely. In other



words, the conscription system that came in effect in Korea, the marked development seen in Korean industries, the rapid increase of requisitions in Korea, measures for an increased food production, etc.; all these conditions arose in rapid succession causing a drastic cut in the importation of Korean laborers to Japan proper and causing discrepancies in the labor mobilization program.

This was the labor situation in the early months of 1943.

In the light of the foregoing situation, the Planning Board which at the time was administering labor mobilization program and the materials and commodity mobilization program, had to study the ways and means to obtain a source of labor-supply in NORTH CHINA, CENTRAL CHINA and the MENGKIANG areas. For this purpose, they appointed KUMAGAI /T.N. or KUMAGAYA/ Ken-ichi, ex-Director of the Social Welfare Bureau who was then in retirement from governmental service, on a non-regular service status, and assigned him the job of investigating the labor situation in those areas. According to his report as a result, there were a large number of unemployed persons in the peace and order zone in NORTH CHINA; in addition to which, the food situation there was intensely critical due to the crop failure; and judging from these circumstances, it was said that it is the best time as it is possible to obtain a source of labor-supply in those areas.

Meanwhile, Dr. AKEMICHI /phonetic/ of the NAGOYA Medical College, an authority in the medical science of labor, making an inspection tour of the same areas, expressed his views on the suitability of using Chinese laborers for labor in Japan. He made it clear that such alien laborers cannot necessarily be considered unfit for labor in Japan proper. This was around the fall of 1942.

The Government then considered in length as to the advisability of importing such laborers. As a result, a Planning



Board sponsored inspection mission comprising of a number of officers in government offices and various industrial bodies concerned was formed. I was led by YAMANOUCI, Chief of the Planning Board, Section 2, Division 3 as head of the mission which consisted of ten odd persons, including the officials concerned of the Home Ministry, the Greater East Asia Ministry, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Transportation and men selected from the control bodies in the fields of coal, mining, civil engineering and construction work, harbor-conveyance and stevedore work. This mission was dispatched, assembling in Peking, toward the end of December, 1942, where it was to be under the direction of Japanese Embassy there.

Upon their arrival in Peking, they attended a meeting sponsored by the Embassy's Labor Section to hear explanations about the labor situation in NORTH CHINA and the innate quality of the Chinese laborer. They then had intimate conferences lasting for several days, and after about forty days of local inspection tours investigating the living conditions of the populace there and of the situation of labor-training in prisoners of war camps in various places, they returned to Tokyo in the early part of March, 1943.

## 2. Experimental Importation.

The members of the inspection mission then presented reports to their respective superiors regarding the possibility of importing Chinese. The government, thus, in dealing with this matter, had SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board report the matter to a Cabinet conference. A decision was then made to import experimentally for the time, a certain number of laborers for coal mines as well as for stevedoring jobs, and contingent on the result consider the importation of an adequate number of Chinese laborers. As a result, 300 and 400 persons were imported respectively to each of these places: the Port of FUSHIKI in April 1943 for stevedoring jobs, and the MITSUI-operated MIIKE



mine in August of the same year as coal miners. The government endeavored to leave nothing to be desired in labor administration.

As to its success, each of the enterprises which hired the laborers reported the possibility of further importations. Thus, it was decided at a Cabinet conference to import in the fiscal year of 1944, a total of 30,000 persons for coal and metal mining industries, shipbuilding, civil engineering, construction work industries, and 4,000 more for stevedore work.

3. Establishment of various conditions concerning the Importation.

a. Food problem

At first when the authorities decided to import Chinese laborers the local authorities in China (mainly, the China Affairs Board) took into special consideration Chinese customs and manners of living, and insisted on furnishing these laborers with 37 kgs. of wheat flour per person per month as staple food. The government officials in Japan (chiefly, the Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry), however, insisted on a supply of 22 kgs. of staple food per month, in view of the domestic food situation. Conferences were held several times between these two offices, and in the end it was decided that the government would allocate 22 kgs. of staple food for every imported Chinese to the local offices in prefectures, where those Chinese were imported, and the local governments would supplement it with 8 kgs. with cereals and other staples. Thus, it was agreed upon that each Chinese laborer be supplied with 30 kgs of staple food per month; and the prefectural governments were instructed to this effect. (It is certain that official documents were sent as regards this instruction, but they haven't been located) yet due to confusion of documents after the war. They are being searched for by all quarters at our request.)

In this regard, it is not known whether or not the prefectural offices actually supplied the laborers with this supplementary amount (8 kgs.). But/is <sup>it</sup> said that some of the places of work



were not provided with this additional supply, and the managers had to purchase foodstuffs at high costs to supplement this shortage.

It is said, also, that subsidiary foodstuffs, seasonings, etc., too, were not furnished as set forth in the written contracts. The managers made requests for supply of these items to the prefectural offices to no avail, and were able with difficulty to furnish these foodstuffs to the Chinese laborers only by expending a huge amount of money.

Regarding the food problem, HOMMA, a non-regular member of the Home Ministry (who calls himself an authority on China in connection with Chinese laborers), stated in the reference data in employing Chinese laborers, as follows:

"When we take a look at their food today, we find that it is so fine that they have never tasted anything like it before. Especially the amount of the ration is so large that it seems that many of them are unable to work well because of stomach dilation caused by over-eating." In spite of this at places of work, they reported shortages. I do not know which is true. In order to examine the actual conditions I made inspections of several work sites and heard the views of persons in charge. I had prepared for further inspections to form my own opinion about the matter, when the war ended, and I could not carry out the plan to my regret. But, that the supply was always insufficient is fully proved by the fact that the government, after the termination of the war, issued instructions to supplement an additional ration of 4"GO" of white rice to the aforesaid ration.

The above-mentioned labor management policy of HOMMA was the golden rule of the Home Ministry officials, who instructed local governments along this line and dispatched HOMMA to various places to see that that instructions are carried out fully.



(b) Problem of Supply Expense and Pre-Payment.

All measures regarding the supply of Chinese laborers, their collection in China, transportation, labor management during employment, their repatriation, etc., were to be handled solely by the NORTH CHINA LABOR ASSOCIATION /TN: "KAHOKU RŌKŌ KYŌKAI"/. (China Affairs Board). Accordingly, the expenses necessary to collect laborers and to transport them to the embarkation ports were to be paid in advance by owners of enterprises who are to receive these laborers. As to its sum, the Planning Board, in close contact with the China Affairs Board, set at first a figure between 550 and 600 yen per capita. Since this figure was recognized as being appropriate, in view of the local market prices in those days, it was formally decided upon. However, prices in North China gradually rose around May and June of 1944 when Chinese laborers were actually imported, the prices were three times as high. During July and August of the same year, the prices spiralled extraordinarily and became two or three times higher, amounting to twenty or thirty times as high as that in Japan.

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Such being the case, the North China Labor Association found out that more than one thousand yen were needed per a laborer, in August 1944, when it settled the pre-payment accounts for the laborers supplied at first. Thus, interested officials from the Ministries of Greater East Asia, Finance, Interior and Welfare deliberated over the matter and decided to set the sum of the prepayment to one thousand yen(per capita)as from the third quarter of 1944 (October, November and December of 1944).

As it seemed, however, that two or three thousand yen were needed as a matter of fact, it was decided that employers should furnish one thousand yen, and the rest should be disbursed from the National Treasury.



(c) Problem of Wages.

According to the plan which were first presented by the China Affairs Board to the offices concerned in Japan proper, it was decided that the same rate of wages for Japanese laborer be paid (at that time the wages for a Japanese laborer was ¥ 2.50 per day) and that the ¥1.00 per day be reserved for living costs of families whom the laborers left behind, and to reserve a sum of ¥ 1,500.00 in two years to be taken home by the laborers.

However, when I was dispatched to China from Japan at the beginning of 1944 for the importation of laborers (I went over to China in Feb. of the same year at the request of the representative employers), the directors of the North China Labor Association and the staff members of the Japanese Embassy at Peking stated that no one will apply for work at the same rate of pay as that for Japanese laborers, as had been previously decided; that a sum of ¥ 1500.00 "take home money" after two years of labor is not even sufficient to cover the monthly cost of living in North China. I was asked if it might be possible to pay ¥ 5.00 per day per laborer, to make the laborers save some money out of their wages to send to their families, and to take back home.

After consulting my colleagues, I promised them that I shall follow the advice of the various Control Association leaders in Japan, and that after going through due formalities, I may promised to pay ¥ 5.00 per day per laborer. Further detailed consultations, were carried out on the family support clause, and the contracts were signed after consenting to all employment conditions in view of the situation of those days, although it was disadvantageous to Japan.

Incidentally, the above-mentioned wages do not include cost of food. Meals were to be supplied as daily rations by the employers apart from wages.



(2) Other problems concerning the contract.

Besides the above-mentioned matters, there were many problems concerning employment conditions, such as fixing of public holidays, working hours, term of employment; ages, ideologies, and physical strength of laborers who are to be supplied, clothes, beddings, cooking utensils, personal effects and hobbies at the time of supplying laborers; organization of units, wages and treatment to be accorded their leaders and to other managers; advisability of allowing comfort girls to accompany the labors; disposition of cases of injuries or deaths while on official or off-duty status, etc. However, all these questions were settled appropriately as shown in the contract and all the provisions described in the contract were carried out.

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4. Those concerned at the time.

Quite a number of people were connected with the importation of Chinese laborers and owing to changes of administrations, the turnover of personnel was large. Since 1943, the Cabinet Planning Board was the nucleus of this project; the Welfare Ministry (took charge of allotment and placement of laborers to the work sites) the Home Ministry (control of public peace and supervision administration after importation), and the Foreign Ministry (direction of the work of importation, liaison with North China and direction of the operation of the North China Labor Association), were the Governmental offices concerned. On the other hand, as the inception side, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (coal, mine, construction and building) - afterward the business was transferred to Ministry of Munitions - Ministry of Transportation (loading and unloading in port and harbor, shipbuilding) - at the beginning under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Communications - were concerned. Furthermore, those who were concerned in this project



held (a) conference relating to inception (b) a conference relating to subscription and payment in advance, (c) a conference relating to labor control after inception to Japan, (d) a conference relating to counter-measures for accident, (e) a conference relating to transportation and other conferences relating to Chinese frequently; some of these conferences were preliminary meetings of the Governmental side, while in some of them civil corporations joined, consequently sometimes only the civil corporations held preliminary meetings among themselves and exchanged their opinions; therefore conferences were held twice or three times a month in order to discuss matters prudently.

Many persons were present at the said conferences and arranged matters, but those who were concerned all the time are as follows:

- (a) Planning Board : 3rd Section of the 2nd Department.  
Secretary YAMANOUCHI, Head of the said Section.  
Administrative Officer TSURUSHIMA.
- (b) Welfare Ministry: Mobilization Section, Labor Bureau.  
Administrative Officer: ESHITA  
Senior Clerk: NISAWA  
Senior Clerk: KIDA  
Clerk: KONO
- (c) Home Ministry: Foreign Affairs Section, the Police Bureau.  
Administrative Officer HARA, Head of said Section.  
Administrative Officer: YAMADA.  
Senior Clerk MIYAGAWA  
Administrative Officer OTAKE  
Clerk KOBAYASHI
- (d) Foreign Ministry (at that time Greater East Asia Ministry): General Affairs Section, Economic Bureau.  
Investigator: WATANABE  
Investigator: KOJIMA  
Senior Clerk MATSUKI



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Administrative Officer KUWABARA

Councillor MORISHIGE

(e) Ministry of Commerce and Industry:

Mine Bureau

Administrative Officer OKUMIYA

"So and So" (not clear) (sic)  
(unknown)

(f) Ministry of Munitions: Labor Section, General  
Mobilization Bureau

Administrative Officer MUTO

Administrative Officer KANAZAWA

Administrative Officer KIKUCHI

Administrative Officer HASUMI

(g) Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry:

General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau:

Administrative Officer KIMASA

Rice and Barley Section, Rice and Cereals Control Bureau:

Administrative Officer: "So and So" (unknown)

General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau

Administrative Officer TAKEDA

(h) Japanese Embassy in Peiping:

Ambassador, Sanwaka KUSUMOTO

Chancellor, Fukumatsu KATAGIRI

Non-regular official, Koji KASHIWABARA

(i) North China Laborers Association:

Director of the General Affairs Department: Shigeru ISHIKAWA

Director of the Mobilization Department, Yoshiro MATSUKUMA

Head of the Supply Section, Yoshiaki NAGOE

Director of the Tokyo Administrative Bureau, Naoji MORI.



Vice Director of same, Kazuyoshi KIMURA.

Those who are listed above were concerned in the present matter for a long time and must know the details of the matter, but owing to the change of the administrative system or purge, after the cessation of the war, some of them were either transferred or retired; especially those who served in the Japanese Embassy in Peiping and North China Laborers Association are missing now and no chance could be got to see them.

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5. Some Matters for Further Information.

A) Cause of Death of the Imported Laborers.

Since the Chinese laborers to be imported into Japan were procured in North China, a considerable number of them have died. The circumstances which brought about the death are complicated, but, generally speaking, the following may account for the high death rate. Those who were in charge of procuring laborers by an administrative measure in North China neglected to observe the two important conditions instructed previously by the Government: namely the laborers should be

- (1) those who have a sound body, strong enough to do labor.
- (2) those who are not younger than 20, and not older than 45 years.

Those who were actually sent included weak people, people with chronic diseases, deformed or disabled persons, and from little boys of 12 or 13 to old men of 50 or 60. To make the matter worse, it was kept as a strict secret from them when they were commandeered that they were going to Japan to be put to labor, and accordingly by the time they reached the embarkation port, Tangku or Tsingtao, they were already exhausted, both physically and spiritually, and many of them had fallen ill and weak.



Particularly , those who were imported at the beginning of 1944 had been detained, on account of interrupted navigation, in the camp at the embarkation port for a considerable period, during which the camp was operated by the minimum appropriation fixed by the North China Laborer's Association (About 15 yen was spent per capita per day, it is said), restricting the consumption of the staple foods to the minimum. Shortage of foodstuffs at the place of commandeering plus this extremely aggravated treatment at the camp produced many sufferers from mal-nutrition among them. Moreover, they were embarked on the top of other loads on coal transport-ships which were to sail in the face of danger such as air-raid and mines, and the food on board the ships was also insufficient, so that many of the laborers were found in a state of unconsciousness when the ships arrived at the disembarkation port (SHIMONOSEKI or SENZAKI-KŌ). Consequently, some of them died on board the ship, or during the transportation by land from the disembarkation port to the place of working.

In view of these circumstances, the laborers were given a considerable time for rest as well as medical treatment after they had arrived at the place of working, but it is most regrettable that they had been too exhausted to recover and from 20 to 30 percent of them died. This may be due to lack of good faith of the organs in charge of procuring laborers as well as to the fact that proper steps were not planned during the transportation, we believe.

(B) **Situation of Food Supply and the Change of Circumstances and Mode of Living for the Laborers.**

The outline of the food situation was given previously. It is well known that the food situation in Japan in those days was so aggravated that the authorities could not arrange any special ration for the Chinese laborers. However, it was not altogether impossible for the employing parties to obtain considerable amount of foods outside the scope of control, if they used all possible means. Thus the camp, the director of which took some precautionary



measures to procure some extra food, succeeded in continuing their work without any grievance and with good result, whereas the camp which was indifferent to such precaution and wholly depended on the rationed foods met, after the termination of the war, various kinds of confusion by the laborers' demand for the fulfillment of the contract.

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Another fact which must be taken into consideration as well as the food condition is that the mode of living in Japan was entirely different from what they had been accustomed to in China. Not to speak of climate and nature, their living quarters were just like a prisoner in Japan in which they were not allowed to go out of the high-walled circles, constantly kept under surveillance of guards and they were completely deprived of their freedom. These precautions originated in the special instruction given by the Home Ministry for security sake. The police authorities of the respective prefectural government adhered to the instruction and carried out their direction and instruction in the same way as would have been carried out upon criminals of a dangerous nature, about the accommodation of living quarters, methods of surveillance and daily life. For this purpose they usually posted seven or eight police, at least a few, and the chief of the police authority concerned, used to make a tour of inspection and gave instructions. Such a remarkable change of circumstances must have had considerable influence over men who had been used to free work and living in China.

It was merely the explosion of the above mentioned office oppression that, after the surrender when they were notified of their freedom, special ration of food and increase of the ration, they acted so freely for joy, specially, of victorious people that they caused several ominous incidents everywhere.

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Procurement of labor in North China and procurement through administrative measures.

When it was first decided to import Chinese laborers, it was planned to make use of Chinese POWs consisting of soldiers of the 8th Route Army, for the purpose of engineering and construction works. But only 2,000 were available for this purpose, and the rest were procured through administrative measures by the Japanese Army in China.

The business was taken by camps of POWs (in Peiping, Tsinan, Shihmin, etc.) established <sup>by</sup> the Japanese Army. The POWs who were recognized to have sound mind and body were trained for a few months as laborers at the training camps managed by the North China Labor Association. After being so qualified, the POWs were sent for fatigue duty of the Japanese Army and chief industries in Manchuria and the Labor Association sent many trained prisoners who were given medals of peaceable people, successively to Japan. However, as the Japanese Army in China came to require more and more laborers according to the progress of battle, the procurements for Manchuria or Japan could not be carried out so well as it was expected.

Then, the North China Labor Association devised means of procuring the laborers through the administrative measures such as assignment of supply of laborers for each prefecture under North China Security Area, even compulsorily.

This resulted in recruitment of infant laborers those in their dotage and even disabled to meet the required number by any means.

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Although the crop in North China was short at that time and foodstuff condition was very bad, it was not difficult to get wages of 15 to 20 yen daily and even

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rikisha-men could get 30 yen daily with ease. Such was the condition of labor demand and supply on the spot, nobody applied for such work as to emigrate to Japan and to get wage of 5 yen daily.



Therefore those who were supplied politically were either those who could not labor or those who were brought compulsorily without knowing the actual conditions, so presumably such happenings cannot be helped.

I have more to state in connection with Chinese laborers but conclude this writing leaving them for some other day.



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TRANSLATION

REPORT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF CHINESE LABOREES

*Hideki Okazaki*

By Hideki Okazaki

Tokyo, ~~July~~, ~~1948~~

*14 August, 1948*



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Matters of Policy Pertaining to the Introduction  
of Chinese Laborers

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A. Summary

The following report is a description of matters relative to the Introduction of Chinese Laborers which came to my attention in the following periods: 1) Immediately following my appointment as chief of the Foreign Affairs branch (Gaijikkacho); 2) as chief of the Foreign Affairs branch; 3) as chief of the P.P. branch (Hoankacho). It is based on memory, refreshed by research into various fields, but owing to the fact that certain documents are unavailable, there may be errors due to faulty recollection and dates may be incorrect. However, I believe, that what I propose to state is accurate as a whole.

1) Period Immediately Following my Appointment as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch.

I assumed the post of chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, on April 30, 1943. By then, a number of Chinese Laborers had already been introduced to Fushiki Harbor on an experimental basis. Their admission had taken place in March 1943 on the basis of a proposal made by the Planning Board on November 27, 1942, to bring laborers from North China in order to meet a manpower shortage in Japan proper.

2) Period as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch.

After I became chief of the Foreign Affairs branch, a second group of Chinese laborers was introduced on an experimental basis. In December, 1943, the Ministry of Welfare called the first of a number of conferences of the various ministries concerned with the introduction of Chinese laborers and on February 28, 1944, a Vice-Ministers' Conference approved the "Policy on the introduction of Chinese Laborers to Japan Proper and Principles Governing the Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Japan Proper", on the basis of a draft proposal submitted by the Ministry of Welfare. On April 4, 1944, the Vice-Ministers of both Welfare and Home Ministries issued a notification relative to the introduction of Chinese laborers to the various prefectural governors. This was done in order to let them know the decision on policy and principles reached at the Vice-Ministers' Conference. On the basis of the decision reached at the aforesaid conference, the various ministries also issued instructions to their subordinate branches. For instance, the Ministry of Welfare, in its capacity of controlling labor management, issued a notification on the subject of the introduction of Chinese laborers under name of labor Bureau Director. Similarly, the Home Ministry issued a notification, signed by the Director of the Police Bureau, pointing out the matters to be noted by the police concerning the treatment of Chinese laborers introduced, to various prefectural governors.



Chinese laborers were introduced to more than 10 prefectures. In order to discuss various problems relating to the procedure for issuing laborers' licenses, security, accident prevention and the maintenance of peace and order, a conference of prefectural foreign branch chiefs was held towards the end of May 1944. This conference was devoted to an explanation of the Cabinet decision, the principles adopted at the Vice-Ministers' Conference, the joint notification issued by the Vice-Ministers' of both Welfare and Home Ministries, the notification issued by the Director of the Police Bureau and other subjects, while opinions expressed by various prefectural representatives were also discussed in the course of the meetings. In addition, I occasionally directed prefectural officials in charge of these matters to report themselves to the Home Ministry to express their views to secretary Yamada. I also directed secretary Yamada and other officials to take field trips in company with officials of other ministries interested in the matter in order to acquaint themselves with the situation.

I was engaged in discussions over a joint notification, entitled "Matter Pertaining to the treatment of Chinese Laborers", to be jointly issued by the Director of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry; Director of Labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare, and the Director of General Mobilization, Ministry of Munitions, when I was transferred to another post in August 1944. The purpose of this notification was to co-ordinate the operations of various ministries dealing with Chinese labor and also to heighten co-operation among various local offices.

3) Period as Chief of the Branch for the P.P.B.

I became chief of the branch P.P.B., Bureau of Police, Home Ministry, in April 1945. In June of the same year, the Foreign Affairs branch was abolished with the result that my branch had to deal with matters related to Chinese laborers. This continued until Sept. 7, when the Foreign Affairs branch was restored. It was during this period that the Akita case took place. Towards the end of July 1944, inter-ministrial "Council on Policies Dealing with Chinese Laborers" was established for the purpose of better supervising the employment conditions of these laborers, while special measures were taken to control various employers using Chinese labor and to prevent incidents. The Home Ministry increased its collaboration with other Ministries with a view to maintain peace and order and also to afford full protection to the Chinese. This continued until the surrender, and after the termination of war we co-operated with other ministries concerned in the prevention of disputes between employers and Chinese laborers and also in expedition of their repatriation.

B. Policy Decisions and Details on Their Application.

- 1) Period Immediately Following my Appointment as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch. (Following is based on statements made by my predecessor, Mr. Miyata, and on a report submitted to me by secretary Hara).



When the Chief of the Third Section of Planning Board proposed in October 1942 that laborers from North China be introduced to Japan in order to solve the existing manpower shortage, few Ministries expressed their approval.

The Home Ministry, in particular, was opposed to it from the standpoint of the maintenance of peace and order and security. The proposed admission of 100,000 Chinese laborers, in addition to the large number of Korean laborers then entering the country and the presence of prisoners of war in various parts of the country, was regarded as prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and order. Besides, it was the view of the Home Ministry, that manpower conditions in Japan were such that, by means of judicious allocations, shortages could be met with indigenous resources. However, employers kept on insisting upon the need for additional manpower and the Planning Board, without fully consulting the Home Ministry, on Nov. 28, 1943, tabled the issue at a Cabinet meeting where it was approved the same day.

The Planning Board's proposal was as follows:

- a) Admit contract labor hired in North China (Former prisoners of war and former deserters from the Chinese armies who had undergone a period of training, provided they gave their individual assent.)
- b) The contract to run for two years.
- c) Employ them as miners, harbor stevedores and laborers on military construction work.
- d) The hiring to be done by a control organ such as the North China Labor Federation (Kahoku Roko Kyokai).
- e) Supply them with quarters and food compatible with Chinese customs.
- f) Take measures to prevent them from coming into contact with Koreans.
- g) Take special measures to prevent epidemics and to maintain military security. Detailed measures to be worked out by the various interested ministries.
- h) Carry out an experimental admission and decide mass admissions on the basis of the results achieved.

I recall that in taking over the office from my predecessor, Mr. Miyata, he told me that although the Home Ministry was opposed to this proposal, it gave in on the administrative level at the insistence of the Planning Board which pointed out that the Chinese admitted would be contract laborers and that mass admissions would not take place until appropriate control measures of working conditions and for the prevention of incidents had been worked out on the basis of experience acquired by experimental admissions.

Following a series of conferences called by Branch Chief Yamanouchi, Third Section, the Planning Board, to discuss experimental admissions, the first such test group of 200 men was brought over in March 1943 and assigned as stevedores at Fushiki Harbor, where operations were conducted under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Transport. At this juncture, the Director of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, issued a notification dealing with entry procedure, working permits, (Under an Imperial Ordinance issued in 1889, Chinese nationals have to obtain a



permit to be laborers) and the procedure to be followed when changing domicile. According to the Cabinet decision employers should be responsible for management of labors and ministries concerned should supervise them. This, I recall, is what my predecessor told me when turning over his office to me.

2) Period as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch.

Assuming office on April 30, 1943, I was informed of the foregoing by my predecessor Mr. Miyata and by Officer Hara.

a) Period of Trial Introduction.

The period of trial introduction lasted from the time I assumed office until about December 1943. The main developments during this period were:

1) Second and Third Trial Introduction.

The Ministry of Welfare having proposed that the second and third trial introduction be made in mining areas of Kyushu, a total of about 800 Chinese laborers were assigned to Futase and Tagawa in July and November.

2) Petition from Private Employers.

Private employers, urged by various ministries to carry out their commitments as rapidly as possible, sent in petitions for the introduction of Chinese labor in order to have as many men as possible on the job. Several employers visited the Home Ministry to plead their cases. This, I believe, was due to the fact that it was rumored that the Home Ministry opposed the introduction of Chinese laborers.

3) Introduction Carried Out in Disregard of the Cabinet Decision.

A shipyard in Hakodate, the name of which I do not recall, brought over about 200 Chinese laborers in May 1943 from the Shanghai area under a private arrangement concluded between the shipyard and the Japanese Navy. Only the Ministry of Welfare was aware of this, other ministries being kept in the dark. Following discussions among various ministries, under Welfare Ministry auspices, it was agreed to recognize this transfer as another trial introduction.

4) During this period, there were flights as well as cases of espionage at Fushiki, Futase and Tagawa, but order and security were not seriously endangered. However, in view of the fact that these incidents occurred when there were only about 1,000 Chinese laborers in the three areas, both the Director of the Police Bureau and myself were opposed to further introduction because such an influx would put a severe strain on the facilities of the various ministries. In particular, since these Chinese laborers were to be brought to mines and construction sites where there already were large groups of Koreans, officials of the Home Ministry felt that they would be unable to vouch for the maintenance of security and the prevention of disputes and other incidents.



b) Circumstances Leading to Actual Introduction.

In planning for manpower mobilization in 1944, the mobilization branch of the labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare, decided in December 1943 that the Introduction of Chinese laborers was imperative. A conference of various interested ministries having been called, I sent secretary Yamada to attend as representative of the Home Ministry. He later reported that the Ministries of War, Navy, Munitions, Transports and Communications asked for an early introduction of Chinese labor in order to complete various projects under way; the Ministry of Welfare said that actual introduction were necessary to attain the proposed manpower level, while the Ministry of Greater East Asia urged that the introduction be effected on the basis of the Cabinet's decision. Only the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce and the Home Ministry were opposed.

I had instructed secretary Yamada to oppose actual introduction at this conference by pointing out the difficulties in maintaining security and public peace measures when only 1,000 such Chinese laborers were in the country. However, with a majority of the ministries in favor of mass introduction, and the Ministry of Welfare stating that the desired manpower level could be attained only by introducing Chinese labor, it became increasingly difficult for the Home Ministry to continue its opposition, which already was being criticized by some extremists as an attempt to sabotage war-time construction plans and therefore constituted interference with accepted national policies. Meantime, private employers increased their agitation in favor of mass introduction, so that the Home Ministry was compelled to accept the original plan.

I am not cognizant of nature of the conversations on this subject that were carried on between the Director of the Police Bureau and the Minister and Vice-Minister of Home Office, but I believe that the latter had to agree to the Ministry of Welfare's original plan being oppressed by the great numbers.

Thus, on Feb. 28, 1944, the drafts proposed by the Ministry of Welfare dealing with "Policy on the Introduction of Chinese Laborers into Japan Proper" and "Principles on the Introduction of Chinese Laborers into Japan Proper" were adopted at a vice-ministerial conference. The principle dealt with the general rules, employment conditions, admission and repatriation.

The general rules provided that:

Chinese labor be supplied by a local labor control agency (The North China Labor Federation in North China) under the joint guidance of the (Japanese) Embassy, the local Japanese Army Authorities in North China and the Kuomintang Government. Males under forty years of age be admitted to Japan after a period of training in the locality where they were hired. The laborers be employed in groups in mines, as harbor stevedores and in construction projects for national defense. Contracts to run for two years. Chinese laborers be treated with due consideration for their national traits without discrimination in the kind or the place of work assigned to them.



Employment conditions were stipulated as follows:

Chinese laborers shall be employed in groups with the Ministry of Welfare stipulating the nature of their work and their place of employment

Employers, in controlling their labor, shall take into account the following and avoid changing the habits of the Chinese too violently:

- a) Living quarters shall be constructed so as to avoid dampness and will form a block distant from the quarters of Korean laborers.
- b) Food shall be in keeping with the eating habits of Chinese laborers.
- c) Provision shall be made for rest and recreation.
- d) Attention shall be paid to employ intelligently the formation of groups, leaders and chiefs of the Chinese labor groups.

Order of introduction and processing - The laborers shall be under the leadership of guides provided by the North China Labor Federation and shall be met by a representative of the employer who is dispatched to China.

Contracts shall be signed at the place of hiring and the employer shall assume the responsibility of bringing them over to Japan.

Repatriation was provided for those found unfit for work and for those who had completed the term of their contract.

Other provisions stipulated that the employer would conscientiously carry out measures to prevent espionage and accident.

"The Principles of Introduction of Chinese Laborers into Japan Proper" dealt with general rules, admission, procedure for employment, transport, measures after debarkation, measures for transfers and measures for repatriation.

They stated that:

In Japan proper, the Ministries of Welfare was primarily responsible.

The Ministry for Greater East Asia was charged with liaison among the various agencies in China and for communications between the North China Labor Federation and its representatives in Japan proper.

The Ministry of Welfare should allocate and designate the place of private employment of the Chinese laborers, decide on wages and other conditions of employment, and supervise and guide the employers with regard to management of labors and maintenance of health.

The Ministry of Munitions was to decide wages and supervise the labor of Chinese laborers in installations under its direct control.

The Ministries of Transport and Communications were responsible for transport and for the supervision of Chinese laborers in installations directly under their control.

them



The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce should provide Chinese laborers with staple foods, clothing and other rationed goods.

The Home Ministry should deal with the admission of entry the issue of permits to engage in labor and the supervision of this procedure as well as security measures, the prevention of incidents and the maintenance of public peace and order. Also stipulated were regulations for matters to be dealt by various ministries and their subordinate organs, and subjects that should be reported in keeping with the spirit of the above division of duties.

The Home Ministry, on the basis of the decision reached by the Vice-Ministers in conference, stressed that:

1. Chinese laborers having freely entered into a contract, were neither prisoners of war nor internees and should be treated as common laborers entering the country in a group.
2. In view of the above, entry procedure, procedure for transfer of domicile and procedure for labor permits should follow domestic laws and regulations.
3. The Home Ministry should deal with various questions arising in this connection from the standpoint of security and the maintenance of peace and order.
4. It being wartime, measures should be taken to prevent disorders involving Chinese laborers and Japanese. Special care should be taken to prevent disorders between the Chinese and Korean groups when both are quartered in large groups in adjacent areas.

c) Notification Relative to the Introduction of Chinese Laborers into Japan Proper.

The Vice-Ministers of both Welfare and Home Ministries on April 4, 1944 issued a Notification to all prefectural governors stating:

"In view of the fact that the introduction of Chinese laborers will now begin on actual scale, measures should be taken that there shall be no laxity in supervising employers' labor management (Welfare Ministry) and maintenance of peace and order (Home Ministry). This, notification, issued at the suggestion of the Ministry of Welfare, was sent out by the vice-ministers on the orders of their respective ministers.

This was in harmony with various measures taken by several ministries on the basis of the decision reached by the vice-ministerial conference of Feb. 28, 1944.

d) Notification Sent by the Director of the Police Bureau with Reference to the Manner in which Chinese Laborers should be Treated.

Following the vice-ministerial notification, the Home Ministry through its Director of the Police Bureau on April 6 issued a Notification to various prefectural governors entitled "Treatment of Chinese Laborers introduced to Japan". The gist of this Notification was as follows:



1. By virtue of a Cabinet decision and the decision of vice-ministers in conference, Chinese laborers are neither prisoners of war nor internees and therefore should be treated as foreign laborers.

2. The Chinese laborers are contract laborers admitted to Japan on the basis of contracts concluded between the employers and the North China Labor Federation. The employers are responsible for a adequate supervision of work done by these laborers while the primary governmental control agency is the Minister of Welfare (or the Ministry of Munitions).

With the above as a premise, the Home Ministry being primarily interested in the maintenance of the public peace and order, decided upon principles providing for security, the avoidance of incidents, especially conflicts with Koreans, within the limits laid down in the spirit of the Cabinet and the Vice-Ministers' Conference decisions.

e) Steps Taken by the Home Ministry following the Actual Introduction.

1. Following the decision to allow actual introduction (of Chinese laborers), the Ministry of Welfare allocated manpower according to applications received from private employers. (In requests for manpower made by the Ministries of Munitions, Transportation, and others for use in their directly-controlled installations, freight yards etc., the allocation was made following consultation between the Ministry of Welfare and the agency concerned). On the basis of these allocations, the Ministry for Greater East Asia notified the Japanese Embassy in Peking and other agencies in the field. Employers who had received manpower allocations then proceeded to North China to conclude the necessary contracts with the North China Labor Federation, obtained their laborers, and provided them with transportation. As the result of this activity by governmental agencies and private individuals, approximately 8,000 Chinese laborers entered Japan in the period of April to July 1944 and were engaged in work in more than 10 different places in Japan proper.

In May, the Home Ministry summoned a conference of chiefs of prefectural foreign affairs branches in order to acquaint them in detail with the Cabinet and Vice-Ministers' Conference decisions and the Notification issued by the Director of Police Bureau. On this occasion, the following were distributed as educational data:

A book by Mr. Kashiwabara on Chinese laborers.

A pamphlet published by the Ministry for Greater East Asia.

Information gathered since the start of trial introduction.

At the conference, Secretary Sekiguchi who had inspected several working places with Mr. Honma (part-time official), explained to them what he felt or heard from Mr. Honma about the general condition of Chinese labors during their inspection tours.

2. Officials in charge of foreign affairs in various prefectural offices were frequently summoned to Tokyo to make verbal reports on conditions to officers in my office, while whenever a request was made I sent my official to a specific prefecture to discuss technical details. These conferences were limited in attendance to police officials. Employers never were consulted or



given instruction by the Home Ministry. In July, the view having been expressed that administrative measures should be improved on the basis of findings made during field inspection tours, representatives of Welfare, Greater East Asia, Transport, Communications and Home Ministries, were sent out from Tokyo. Secretary Yamada, accompanied by secretary Sekiguchi, junior official Miyakawa and Mr. Honma (part-time official) proceeded to Hokkaido and the Tonoku region.

3. No special instructions were issued to prefectural foreign branch officers it being held sufficient that they were fully informed of the contents of the Cabinet and Vice-Ministers' Conference decisions and other Notifications. However, in order to enlighten police officials on Chinese problems, a pamphlet issued by the Ministry for Greater East Asia; the book written by Mr. Kashiwabara, a Ministry for Greater East Asia Expert, and the views of Mr. Honma on Chinese laborers, edited by Secretary Sekiguchi, were distributed. These were, of course, distributed under the approval of Director Machimura.

Mr. Honma's observations stated that:

The Chinese, as a people, being wiser than the Japanese and having a longer history than the Japanese, it is very hard for the latter successfully to employ Chinese.

In dealing with Chinese, one should never ignore the element of "face". A Japanese should never order a Chinese laborer directly, but should always use the Chinese group leader to transmit his instructions.

Food, housing and clothing should be adapted to Chinese customs. For instance, a Japanese likes a house with a high ceiling but that is not true of a Chinese. Japanese may think that the Chinese like lots of rice but depending upon their physique and their tastes Chinese may require flour. They must always be given sufficient salt and oil.

Treat a Chinese as you would treat an egg. Treat a Chinese carefully as you would treat an egg lying in the open palm of your hand.

Police officials should not interfere directly with the Chinese.

4. Cases of illness during transport.

In June and July 1944, numerous cases of illness among Chinese laborers occurred while they were on their way to Japan. Several died while others were in serious condition. In view of the possible effect of such illnesses upon the maintenance of peace and order, I ordered Secretary Yamada to demand of the Ministries of Welfare, Great East Asia, Transport and others to take better care of the Chinese laborers. At a conference held under Ministry of Welfare auspices, Secretary Yamada cited the Cabinet and Vice-Ministers' Conference decisions and urged that more strict selective measures be taken when hiring took place in North China.

5. Flights and other Incidents.

As the number of Chinese laborers admitted to Japan increased, cases of flight and disputes arising over food showed a tendency to increase. Attention of the various prefectural police authorities was drawn to this either verbally or by telephone from the peace preservation point of view.



6. Joint Notification Issued by Bureau Directors in the Ministries of Home Office, Welfare and Munitions.

The increase in the number of illness and flight, consequent upon augmented introduction of Chinese laborers into Japan, suggested that employers should show better understanding and make efforts in judiciously utilizing the manpower put at their disposal. This need was confirmed as the result of a joint field tour taken by officials of the various ministries concerned. Need for co-operation in achieving a better distribution of food and to forestall flights and disputes was felt. It was particularly noted that better coordination would be desirable among the low-level agencies concerned. Consequently, a joint Notification was drawn up by the Director of Labor Bureau, Ministry of Welfare; Director of General Mobilization, Ministry of Munitions, and the Director of Police, Home Ministry, following a series of consultations and addressed to prefectural governors, regional directors of munitions control and regional directors of mines. This was entitled: "Notification on the Guidance of Employers of Chinese Laborers". While this Notification was being drawn up, I was transferred to another post on August 2, 1944. I had however approved the draft of this circular and obtained approval of it from Director Furui of the Police Bureau. This Notification was issued on August 11, 1944 after my successor, Mr. Niwa had taken over the post of chief of the Foreign Affairs branch.

As stated previously, the Home Ministry was opposed to the introduction of Chinese laborers and this feeling was increased by various occurrences that were prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and order in wartime. However, in as much as the Home Ministry did not deal directly with the introduction of Chinese laborers, nor had it control over their distribution or their work, it could only express an opinion but was unable to take decisive action. This was clearly shown at the time the decision was reached finally to introduce Chinese laborers on an actual basis. Nevertheless, the Home Ministry could not ignore the possibility of a breach of the peace arising from the inexperience, carelessness and clumsiness of employers in dealing with Chinese labor. The need to take preventive measures to forestall such breaches of the peace was acutely felt, for such incidents were matters for the police, i.e. the Home Ministry, to deal with once they arose. Unfortunately, it was beyond the power of the Home Ministry or the police to effectively enforce preventive measures that would forestall all breaches of the peace. The above-mentioned Notification was issued because the Home Ministry and the police authorities felt that they were in an extremely difficult position.

3) Period as Chief of the Peace Preservation Branch.

I assumed the post of chief of the P.P. branch, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, in April 1945. In June, the foreign affairs branch was abolished in keeping with a simplification of the central administrative organization that was coupled with the establishment of regional inspectorates. This required a transfer of personnel, with the result that Chief Kawaguchi of the foreign affairs branch, became my subordinate together with other officers of his branch. However, as the work of the foreign affairs branch differed entirely from that of my branch, they continued to carry



on under the direction of Secretary Kawaguchi under an autonomous status. The foreign affairs branch was revived in September 1945. I dealt with problems concerning Chinese laborers from the middle of June to the beginning of September 1945 in my capacity of chief of the F.P. branch.

a) Introduction Suspended.

Introduction of Chinese laborers to Japan were suspended in June 1945 as the result of an increase in aerial bombings and difficulties of transportation between China and Japan.

b) Council on Policy Pertaining to Chinese Laborers.

Chief Kawaguchi, of the foreign affairs branch, who had succeeded Mr. Niwa, had regularly drawn the attention of prefectural officials to the need of seeing to it that Chinese laborers be justly and fairly treated, that measures be taken to prevent panic among them in case of air raids and the precautionary measures be taken against breaches of the peace.

On July 1, the Akita case broke out. I dispatched officials to the scene for an investigation which was carried out in collaboration to the scene for an investigation which was carried out in collaboration with other interested government agencies, such as the Ministry of Welfare, etc. The situation settled down about three days later, but investigations revealed that the cause of the disturbance was carelessness on the part of the employer. On July 10, a conference on the subject was called under the auspices of the Ministry for Greater East Asia. Secretary Kawaguchi represented the Home Ministry at this meeting. Two meetings were subsequently held in July. As a result, the formation of a council of interested agencies was decided upon in order to give joint guidance to employers, as it had become clear that there was the need to improve the manner in which various employers were dealing with their Chinese labor.

In August, a joint field trip was carried out in Nagano and Gunma prefectures with the local authorities taking part. Local consultations on measures how to improve the manner in which Chinese laborers were being treated also took place. Additional trips into the provinces were being planned in order to improve the situation throughout the nation but the surrender on Aug. 15, 1945, caused the abandonment of the project.

In the latter part of July 1945, Secretary Kimura made a full report on the Hanaoka (Akita) case at the first conference of First Section chiefs of the various regional inspectorates. Verbal instructions were then given to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

c) Co-operation in Repatriation Operations Following the War.

In the confusion immediately following the defeat, some Chinese laborers took part in acts of violence. This required the issuance of special instructions to various prefectural offices so that special attention be paid in dealing with Chinese laborers. Attention was also drawn to the need of preventing acts of violence by Japanese against such Chinese nationals. Telephonic and



telegraphic instructions were also issued to give proper guidance to various employers in pacifying their Chinese laborers. Simultaneously, consultations were held with the Welfare and Transport Ministries to map out measures for their rapid repatriation. The Home Ministry co-operated fully in promoting and carrying out this repatriation program.

d) Special Instructions were issued on August 20 for the protection of Chinese laborers. These were included in the general directive related to the protection of aliens in Japan.

e) Conference of Block Foreign Affairs and Higher Special Branch Chiefs.

Conferences were held in Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka on September 6, 8, and 9, 1945 for the purpose of preventing popular unrest in order to forestall any difficulties in the occupation of Japan by the Allied Forces and to preclude untoward events arising from the disbandment of the Japanese armed forces. The main purpose of the meetings was to issue instructions regarding control measures to be applied to prevent violence by the military and by super-patriotic bodies, but instructions were also given to foreign affairs branch officers with regard to the repatriation of Chinese laborers.

## II

### SUPERIORS DURING MY TERMS OF OFFICE

- A) Period as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch (April 30, 1943 to August 2, 1944.)  
April 30, 1943 - July 22, 1944  
Minister --- Kisaburo Ando  
Vice-Minister -- Toshiaki Karasawa  
Director of the Police Bureau --- Kingo Machimura
- July 22, 1944 - April 2, 1945  
Minister --- Shigeo Otachi  
Vice-Minister -- Iwao Yamazaki  
Director of the Police Bureau --- Yoshimitsu Furui
- B) Period as Chief of the P.P. Branch  
(April 10, 1945 - October 12, 1945)  
April 2, 1945 - August 22, 1945  
Minister -- Motoki Abe  
Vice-Minister -- Hirokichi Nadao  
Director of the Police Bureau -- Makoto Mizuike
- August 22, 1945 - October 4, 1945  
Minister -- Iwao Yamazaki  
Vice-Minister -- Yoshimitsu Furui  
Director of the Police Bureau -- Masami Hashimoto
- October 5, 1945 - Dec. 29, 1945  
Minister -- Zenjiro Horikiri  
Vice-Minister -- Seiichi Omura  
Director of the Police Bureau -- Goro Koizumi



III

DEALINGS WITH SUPERIORS

A) Period Immediately Following my Appointment as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch.

I received a report on the Cabinet's decision on the introduction of Chinese laborers and on the developments following their first trial introduction from the outgoing chief of the Foreign Affairs branch Miyata and from Officer Hara. I reported on the above in mid-May to Director Machimura of the Police Bureau and made an additional brief report on the Introduction of Chinese to Fushiki.

B) Period as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Branch.

a) I made occasional reports to the Police Bureau director with reference to the trial introductions. In September 1943, when private employers began a campaign for the early introduction of Chinese laborers on a actual scale, I took the matter up with Director Machimura and we agreed that "this campaign is annoying."

b) I recall having made a brief report to Director Machimura on the flights and espionage cases involving Chinese laborers during the trial period and of having directed Secretary Yamada to submit a full report to the director.

c) When the conference was held at the Ministry of Welfare to discuss the admission of Chinese laborers on a actual scale, I obtained Director Machimura's approval to assign Secretary Yamada to it. I said "I intend having Secretary Yamada oppose it as much as possible." The Director replied; "Have him oppose it by all means."

d) Secretary Yamada, in reporting to me on the conference, stated that the representatives of the Ministries of Welfare, Transport, Communications and Great East Asia, although admitting that the trial introductions of Chinese laborers had not given satisfactory results, there were no valid reasons for opposing to actual introduction. The opposition of the Home Ministry that mass introduction of Chinese laborers were unadvisable from the standpoint of security and the maintenance of peace and order was dismissed on the grounds that this could be remedied if adequate security and police measures were taken. All ministries stressed that the manpower shortage could not be met. As a result, the Home Ministry representative was put in a position where it was opposing a Cabinet decision. Continued opposition by the Home Ministry, which did not deal with manpower problems, made it appear as if the Ministry was attempting to impede war production. I discussed the matter with the Director and the Secretary and we finally had to agree to the Ministry of Welfare's proposal. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce also opposed the entry of Chinese laborers from food policy standpoint, but it also finally had to agree. General agreement on an administrative level was reached at the Vice-Ministers' conference approving the original plan. This plan was circulated in the Home Ministry and was shown to the Director of the Police Bureau. I recall



that the matter was taken up with the Vice-Minister, before the Vice-Minister conference, by the chief of the documents branch.

As I remember, Secretary Yamada took the documents to the documents branch chief.

e) Following the vice-ministerial conference, the Ministry of Welfare sent a draft of the proposed joint Notification to the Home Ministry. This previously had been approved by the Bureau Directors and Section chiefs as well as Minister, Vice-minister of Welfare Ministry. Secretary Yamada obtained approval for the issuance of this Notification from the Vice-minister of Home Office and the Director of the Bureau of Police. I obtained the minister's approval after having explained to him the principles agreed upon at the vice-ministerial conference. I do not recall the exact date, but I believe it was towards the end of March. Minister Ando then remarked: "It will be most difficult for Japanese to use Chinese. The Home Ministry and its affiliate agencies, as well as the police, will not employ directly these Chinese, but care should be taken that there is full co-operation with the various ministries concerned as well as their affiliated agencies. See to it that these Chinese are placed with good employers so that trouble will not arise."

f) As I remember, Secretary Yamada drafted the Notification issued by the Director of the Police Bureau. I took it to Director Machimura and obtained his approval, after explaining the reasons for its issuance. I then transmitted it to the various prefectural governors. I remember that Director Machimura directed me to draw the attention of the provincial officials to the need of preventing possible untoward incidents.

g) I reported to Director Machimura in connection with the hiring of Mr. Homma. (part-time official) After obtaining his approval, the matter was referred to the Personnel branch in the Minister's Cabinet and his commission was issued in the name of the Home Ministry.

h) Before convening a conference of foreign affairs and higher special branch officials I obtained the director's approval. I reported to him on such conferences.

i) When Mr. Homma visited Tokyo in the course of a field trip, he called on Director Machimura in company with Secretary Sekiguchi.

j) I instructed Secretary Yamada to report to the Bureau director on all cases arising in various places and on the incidence of illness during transport. I was warned by the Director to draw the attention of the various ministries concerned to the matter.

k) I recall having made reports on the results of field trips taken by various officials to Director Machimura.

l) A joint field trip was taken in July to Hokkaido and the Tohoku areas by officials of various ministries concerned. Secretary Yamada reported to me on his trip. I believe that he made it in writing and that I subsequently submitted it to Director Machimura. The report recommended that coordination of the various field agencies be improved, that employers be encouraged to better



understand the psychology of their Chinese laborers, that improvements be made in labor management, accident prevention and flight prevention.

m) From these recommendations, I suggested to Director Machimura that a joint Notification by three bureau directors to improve the co-ordination among in the field. He said: "That is a good idea." Secretary Yamada and I then visited various ministries to discuss the matter and obtained their approval. I then reported on these results to the Director. When the directive was drawn up, Director Machimura had resigned owing to a change in Cabinets. I was transferred soon afterwards and I believe that Secretary Yamada obtained Director Furui's approval for the issuance of this directive.

C) Period as Chief of the P.P. Branch.

a) I reported to Director Mizuike on the Hanaoka (Akita) case. A detailed report on the subject was made to the Minister, the Vice-Minister, and the Bureau Director by Secretary Kawaguchi.

b) I made a brief report on the council called after the Hanaoka case to the Director.

c) In this period, I had much to do as Chief of the P.P. Branch. Matters pertaining to affairs involving foreigners were reported to our superiors by Secretary Kawaguchi who also obtained their approval on various directives and circulars.

d) I obtained the approval of Director Mizuike to draw the attention of the assembled Chiefs of the First Sections of the Regional Inspectorates to the Hanaoka case.

e) Following the surrender, various directives and circulars were issued by Secretary Kawaguchi. I merely reported on them to the Bureau Director.

f) I called the conferences of branch chiefs of September 6, 8, and 9 after having reported to Director Hashimoto and obtained his approval.

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As of July 1942

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TSUTSUMI, Takeo	Vice-Governor,	Tochigi Prefectural.
SATO, Kensuke	Chief of Second Section,	Trade Division, Economic and Stabilization Board.
TAKAHASHI, Harusada	Staff of Second Section,	Trade Division, Economic and Stabilization Board.
OSHIMA, Kanichi	Financial Bureau,	Ministry of Finance
KATO, Yutaro		
MORI, Hideoto	died	
OKUBO, Takeo	Director-General,	Maritime Safety Board
HAYASHI, Keizo	Imperial Household Office,	Vice-Director-General.
NANDA, Kanetsuchi		
FURUKAWA, Shinichi	Moji Japan Travel Bureau,	Yamaguchi-ken.
HATANO, Shizuo	Fukuoka District Coal Bureau.	
ISHIMURA, Kozo	Died	
UCHIDA, Taigen	Nagoya Regioner Bureau,	Commerce and Industry.
TOYOSHIMA, Kiyoshi	Tokyo Regioner Bureau.	
YUKAWA, Morio	<del>Chief</del> , First Section,	Investigation Division, Foreign Office
KURODA, Toshio		
OMORI, Tatsuo	Industry and Science Association,	(ex Patent Bureau, Commerce and Industry Ministry).



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