

HONDA, Kumataro Dossier
Case File No. 198

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(27)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION

5 March 1948

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Chief, Legal Section, SOAP
SUBJECT: HONDA, Kumataro

I. PRESENT STATUS:

Subject has been under house arrest since 1 December 1945 as a Class "A" war crime suspect. His address is 1102, 7-Chome, Kamime-Guro, Meguro-Ku, Tokyo, Japan.

II. PURPOSE OF MEMORANDUM:

This report is based on the oral request of the Chief, Legal Section, to examine all available evidence against the twenty (20) Class "A" war crime suspects now held in custody to determine whether or not they can be indicted for "B" or "C" war crimes.

III. SOURCES OF MATERIAL EXAMINED:

1. All files and information available in Legal Section.
2. The complete G-2 report, dated 17 May 1947, with reference to subject.
3. All files, records and reports available at the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that subject be released from custody immediately.

Note: It is possible that the Chinese Government may be interested in subject due to his service as Ambassador to the Nanking puppet government.

Memo: HONDA, Fumataro (Cont'd)

V. DETAILS UPON WHICH THE RECOMMENDATION IS BASED:

1. Pertinent curriculum vitae:

Born 18 December 1874.

Served in various capacities in the Foreign Ministry and diplomatic corps of the Japanese Government. 1895 to 1926

Retired. 1926

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Nanking puppet government. Dec. 1940 to Jan. 1941

Diplomatic Advisor to Foreign Ministry. May 1944 to May 1945

2. Subject had what appears to be a long and honorable career in the Japanese foreign service prior to his retirement in 1926.
3. During his retirement, from 1926 to 1940, he held no official position and devoted most of his time to writing and lecturing on diplomatic subjects as a member of the Kokuhonsha (National Foundation Society). Nothing that he wrote or said in this interim could in any sense be construed to constitute a possible "B" or "C" crime.
4. There is no evidence that any of his activities as Ambassador to the Nanking puppet government were of such a nature as to make him suspect to "B" or "C" crimes. The reviewing authorities at the International Prosecution Section were of the opinion that the evidence was wholly insufficient to sustain a Class "A" indictment against subject. It was further believed that additional investigation would be of no value.
5. There is a possibility that the Chinese Government might be interested in subject for his activities in China during 1940 to 1942, but it is this writer's opinion that intense investigation of the subject during this period could not develop evidence of "B" or "C" crimes that would justify subject's prosecution before an American military commission.

Memo: HONDA, Kumataro (Cont'd)

6. Subject's relationship to the Foreign Ministry as Advisor in 1944 and 1945 did not place him in the Ministerial or Cabinet level and he could not have had any part in decisions on the formation of policy and the execution thereof. It is not believed that subject could have possibly committed any "B" or "C" crimes during this period.

L. P. B. LIPSCOMB
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

DOSSIER

HONDA, Kumataro (Case File No. 198)

In House Custody

I. STATUS OF SUBJECT:

- A. Arrest was ordered by a letter to the Imperial Japanese Government of 1 December 1945, GHO, SCAP, AG 383.7 CI, Subject: "Apprehension of Japanese Personnel."
- B. Placed in House Arrest in February 1946, subject to re-examination, upon recommendation of 8th Army's Medical Officers, dated 1 February 1946 (* Serials 11, 19, 20 -page 3).

8th Army Medical Report in detail as to the physical condition of HONDA, contained in Serial 16, a copy of which is attached hereto as Tab "A".

(NOTE: Serial 23, a copy of Serial 19, bears notation dated 18 April 1946 as follows: "Not to be re-examined. JBA"

II. DIRECT AND IMPLIED CHARGES AGAINST THE SUBJECT:

- A. Memorandum of 11 December 1945 signed by Captain James J. Gaine, Jr., setting forth information obtained from CIS files on 4 December 1945, a copy of which is attached as Tab "B", contains information as to the implied charges as follows: (Serial 3)
 - 1. The proposed charge is that the subject planned, prepared, initiated and waged aggressive warfare, and conspired to perform the same in that he:
 - a. Was Ambassador to Nanking Government in 1940-1942 where he participated in carrying out the policies of aggression in China.
 - b. Was Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters in 1944 and in that capacity participated in such conspiracies and acts of aggressive warfare.
 - c. That as a trusted associate of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA he was active behind the scenes in working for the Axis alliance.

* All Serial numbers referred to are in Case File #198.

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- d. He played an active and important part in the 1939 purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese Foreign Service who were opposed to the Axis alliance.
- e. Was one of the Army's agents within the Foreign Service and particularly contributed to Japanese aggression by his close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination in China.

III. FACTS REFLECTED FROM THE FILE:

A. Curriculum Vitae shows following pertinent information:

BORN : 18 December 1874. Now 72 years old.
ADDRESS : 7 Chrome, Kami-Meguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo.
EDUCATION : Studied Chinese classics.

Attended Wasada University, Tokyo, where he majored in English law and studied sociology and theology, at Chuo University.

RANK : During his diplomatic career in public life, subject was promoted from 7th up to 1st Rank, Official of Higher Civil Service, and from Junior 5th to Junior 3d Grade of Court Rank.

MAJOR POSITIONS:

1895 Passed examinations of Foreign Ministry, appointed Chancellor of Consulate and attached to Genzan, Korea.

1896 - 1899 Served in diplomatic positions in Newchang, Manchuria, Korea, and Peping, China.

1899 - 1901 Assigned to Belgium.

1901 - 1906 Secretarial positions in Foreign Ministry, Japan, during which time he attended Peace Conferences of 1905 in New York, was member of Ambassadorial Suite at Treaty of Portsmouth, and became 2d Secretary of Legation.

1906 - 1908 Served in Peking, China, and London, England.

1909 - 1914 Appointed First Secretary of Legation and served in Peking, China, then as Consular General in Harbin.

HONDA, Kumataro

1914 - 1920 Appointed Councillor of Embassy and served in England and Switzerland, during which time he served as member of Ambassadorial Suites to 1917 and 1919 Paris Peace Conferences.

1920 Spent three months in Shanghai studying the political situation.

1921 - 1926 Served in Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Germany, during which time he attended General Disarmament Committee in Paris and third meeting of League of Nations.

NOTE: CIS Files reflect subject retired in 1926 and was inactive as a diplomat until 1940. (Serials 3, 8)

1940 - 1942 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Nanking, China.

1944-1945 Diplomatic Advisor to Foreign Ministry.

DECORATIONS RECEIVED:

25 Dec 1901 Authorized to wear "Chevalier de l'orde de Leopold" granted by the Belgian King.

5 Mar 1902 Decorated with 6th Class Order of Rising Sun.

1 Apr 1906 Decorated with 5th Class Order of Rising Sun.
Decorated with Service Medal of 1904 War.

9 Feb 1907 Authorized to wear Order of "Second Double Dragon Star" granted by the Emperor of China.

11 Oct 1909 Decorated with 4th Class Order of Sacred Treasure.

1 Apr 1916 Decorated with 3rd Class Order of Rising Sun and granted ¥ 2,000 in recognition of service rendered in War of 1914-1915.

26 Dec 1919 Authorized to wear 1st Class Order of Victoria granted by the King of Great Britain

1 Nov 1920 Decorated with 2nd Class Order of Sacred Treasure and granted ¥ 2,000 in recognition of service rendered in war of 1915-1920.

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21 Nov 1925 Authorized to wear Order of "Grosse Goldenes Ehrenzeichen am Bande fuer Verdienste um die Republik Oesterreich" granted by Republic of Austria. Authorized to wear "Grand Croix d'Order Polskie" granted by Republic of Poland.

11 May 1926 Decorated with 1st Class Order of Sacred Treasure.

B. G-2 Memorandum (Info copy, Serial 40), attached hereto as Tab "C", reflects the following pertinent facts:

1. Charges direct and implied as set out in Paragraph II above.
2. Information contained in sub-section A above, and the fact that since the Russo-Japanese War HONDA appears to have been anti-Russian and believed in increasing Japan's greatness by means of aggressive, diplomatic strategy. His concept of Sino-Japanese relations appears to have been that of a growing Japanese political and commercial sphere of influence in China.
3. During his retirement from 1926 to 1940, his position was an unofficial one in the field of writing and lecturing, and as a member of the KOKUHONSHA (National Foundation Society) delivered lectures on diplomatic issues, which were printed in the Society's organ, the KOKUHON.

The report states that "No proof has been uncovered that his influence during this period was other than indirect and ideological."

4. The statement (Tab "B", Serial 3) that for many years before the war he (HONDA), together with TANI (Masayuki), and SHIRATORI, was one of the Army's agents within the

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Foreign Service is patently an exaggeration because of HONDA's retirement from Foreign Service from 1926 until exactly one year before Pearl Harbor. His "particular contribution - to the Axis alliance" (Tab "B", Serial 3) was unofficial for the alliance was concluded in September 1940, three months before his recall to the diplomatic service. His "particular contribution" of "close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China" was, by the same token, editorial and perhaps advisory until he was appointed Ambassador to China on 7 December 1940. His seasoned diplomatic career qualified him for the China post, and he was apparently satisfactory to the Army because of his policy toward the Chiang Kai-Shek Government.

5. HONDA could have played no official part in the "purge of highly placed liberals in Japanese Foreign Service" (Tab "B", Serial 3) because it took place in 1940, not 1939, while he was in retirement.
6. He was probably "one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates" (Tab "B", Serial 3) in the sense that it was MATSUOKA who recalled him from retirement.
7. His writings indicate that he favored the Axis alliance and his opposition toward conciliatory measures with the United States and Great Britain are explained as being part of his diplomatic strategy and occasioned by his interest in the China question.
8. His post as Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters was so-called because he became one of the KOMON (advisors) of the KOA-SHONOBU (Rise-Asia Headquarters) of the TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association), referred to above. This appointment is not considered of importance with respect to the charges, as it was a nominal one assumed in the third year of the war. HONDA's appointment as advisor to Foreign Minister SHIGEMISTU on 23 May 1944 was because of his experience.
9. G-2 makes a provisional recommendation that HONDA be released from House arrest without preference of charges.

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C. Summary of Interrogation of subject suspect on 30 May 1946 by Lt. James W. McEwen (Serial 26 - A summary):

On 4 December 1940 Foreign Minister MATSUOKA (now deceased) went direct from the Emperor's palace to the home of HONDA, told him he intended to renovate the Japanese diplomatic service, take everything out of the Army's hands and place within the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, and desired that HONDA go as Ambassador to Nanking, China. HONDA accepted the mission "because it was the Emperor's wish," although he was surprised by the selection "because he was a free-lance person with no military, political, or financial backing." His desire was to act as sort of a "brake" on army activity.

He had been trying to persuade Admiral NOMURA not to take the assignment to America as he thought he would not be successful because of the Tri-partite Pact. HONDA was not opposed to this pact in principle, but he was to its final form for the reasons that Article 5 exempted the Japanese - Russian problem as far as Germany was concerned and Article 3 precluded Japan from making decisions for its own interest in case it had to declare war on the United States should Germany and America come to blows.

HONDA's aim was to eliminate the measure of excessive control of China economy for he felt that the most costly mistake in Manchuria had been the enforcement of a planned and controlled economy. Conditions were so bad that there was no free movement of commodities in China and economy was rapidly becoming strangled. He found that the Japanese Army was living on rice from the occupied territory and arbitrarily buying it at half the market price. In January 1941, the situation was worse, and Wang Chin-Wei told him his government would assume the difference in price to the people (thereby hoping to gain public favor for himself). Wang called his attention to the severe regulation for control of traffic and commodities in China. HONDA considered Wang as a "wrapper" (FUROSHIKI) around occupied Chinese territory. Japan wanted to strengthen Wang, not intending to increase his arms or give him more territory, but to make him a more impressive figure so that people would recognize him as the formal government, thereby impressing the Chinese so that a "headway" could be made with Chiang Kai-Shek.

In May 1941, Wang approached him "to review the all important question whether to continue the Nanking Government is worthwhile." After that discussion, HONDA returned to Tokyo to discuss it with the Japanese Government for he feared that Wang's government was toppling.

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- D. Subject suspect has not been produced as witness by either the Prosecution or Defense.
- E. HONDA is quoted in a book review of his book "TAMASHII NO GAIKO" (The Japanese Spirit and Diplomacy), 1938, relative to his attitude toward diplomacy (Serial 36, page 1), as follows:
"It is absurd to hope that the realization of major policies can be assured by such diplomatic accessories as alliances or ententes; in view of the present day fear in Japan of isolation, I want especially to stress the importance of the nation's self-reliance."

HONDA wrote many books and articles (Serial 35, listing them), but apparently these writings were of the ordinary patriotic tenor, so far as the case file reflects they hardly reach the tenor of jingoism, and do not connect him with any conspiracy to commit the implied charges against him.

The Japanese press hailed HONDA's appointment as Ambassador to China as an outstanding diplomatic event, remarking it had been unfortunate that so great a diplomat had been in retirement from 1926 to 1940 (Serial 33).

In August 1940, HONDA wrote some articles which were published in TOKYO NICHU NICHU SHIMBUN in which he discussed the revision of Japan's diplomacy as a mission of the KONOYE Cabinet, and turned his attention to Japanese diplomacy regarding the United States and Great Britain (Serial 32). He mentions that (page 1, paragraph 1) "As long as the United States sticks to her aggressive policy toward the Far East, she can never agree with Japan's national policy of establishing a New Order in the Far East." He says (page 1) "America is crazy with a nightmare -- attack by three axis countries," and that "sentiment of American people toward Japan, Italy and Germany is getting worse;" that "Japan is in a position to hit America in a vulnerable spot." He says it is not too late for Japan to utilize belligerent rights in the war with China, and that if she did by blockading the Chinese coast and getting control of the South Seas the United States could not import oil and tungsten from China or rubber and tin from the Southern islands, thereby critically deadlocking American industry. His attitude toward Great Britain was that she had no intention of fighting Japan for the sake of preventing her interests in the orient from falling into Japanese hands, and predicted that the downfall of the British Empire would create a radical change in the economic order of the world, and in that event Japan must form the Far Eastern economic bloc to include all territory east of the Bay of Bengal; that if Japan missed

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this best chance to form the Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere she would regret it for a thousand years to come.

HONDA discusses pro and con (Serial 31) the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States and Great Britain. His conclusion is that the Japanese people and government had been victims of wishful thinking in these negotiations.

HONDA's attitude was interpreted by Otto D. Tolischus in his "Tokyo Record," 1943 (Serial 30). It was to the effect that HONDA desired to enforce the terms of the treaty with the National Chinese Government, using that as an axis around which to build up the New Order in the Far East, using in conjunction therewith, and for the same purposes, the Tri-partite Pact; that he had the backing of the Army and Navy in this attitude, and was the most powerful statesman in Japan, having powerful influence over Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

F. There is no pertinent information concerning subject suspect in SAIONJI's diary.

G.

1. Prosecution Exhibit #869 (Record page 8816) contains, among other things, a list of LECTURES AT THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR. This reflects that Ambassador HONDA, Kumataro, delivered a lecture on "State of Affairs in China," but gives no further information.
2. Prosecution Exhibit #1327 (Record page 11,915) is an intercepted telegram from Consul-General YOSHIZAWA, in Batavia, to Tokyo, dated 2 September 1941, reporting unpopularity of the Nanking Government under Wang throughout the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly among the 1,500,000 Chinese residents there. YOSHIZAWA asked that in order to strengthen Japanese influence there the Government send influential persons, in which the Nanking Government had confidence, and who could command a large following among the Chinese and by informing them in meetings of large and small groups. He requested that the message be transmitted to Ambassador HONDA in China, and other competent officials who might use the information. The records do not reflect whether or not HONDA received this message or acted upon it.
3. Prosecution Exhibit #628 (Record page 6975) is a statement of Japanese foreign policy dated 28 September 1940. It contains, among other things, drafts of instructions from

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Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to Ambassador HONDA, Kumataro, on 11 December 1940, for the carrying out of his duties as Ambassador to the Nanking Government. They stated that the Imperial Government had recognized the new National Government and entered into formal diplomatic relations, but that as the Incident was still going on, HONDA should exert himself for the attainment of the purpose of the Incident and follow the established policy of the Empire, especially the "Outline For The Management Of The China Incident" which was decided at the Council in the presence of the Emperor on 13 November 1940. HONDA was directed to cooperate positively with the military operations and to always negotiate with and follow the directions of the commanders-in-chief of the Army and Navy in the area, and allow no gap to exist in respect to their cooperation. A separate paper on policy of decisions was to be annexed for his guidance. As to management of various departments of politics, economics and culture relating to the Incident, HONDA was referred to "Collection of the Important Decisions" to be given him in a separate volume. He was instructed to lead third powers so as to save the current situation as a whole, following the decisions made in the past, especially "The Outline For the Management Of The China Incident." A copy of these instructions is attached hereto as Tab "D".

IV. DISCUSSION

There is very little evidence of value in the Case File and IPS records concerning the activities of HONDA, the diplomat, or which would tend to connect him in any way with a conspiracy, or common plan to initiate and/or wage wars of aggression such as is here under consideration. This may partly be accounted for by the fact that from 1926 to December 1940 he was completely out of public life and so far as the record discloses took no active part in Government affairs. Though it was said (Tab B) that he was extremely active behind the scenes during this period, there is no proof in the records to substantiate this statement. This is also true of the statement that he was one of the Army's agents within the Foreign Service. In fact, the records are silent as to any of his activities during this period except as to his writings which were indirect and ideological, with no information of any act on his part in connection with either a conspiracy or the actual aggressive acts of the Japanese.

The fact that he was selected and called from retirement as Ambassador to the National Chinese Government does not appear to have any

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particular significance when considered in the light of the fact that he had had a long and highly successful career in international diplomatic relations (Paragraph III, above). This career had involved a large amount of experience in China. The only evidence that might connect HONDA with the conspiracy and with the actual waging of aggressive warfare in China is the rough draft of proposed instructions (Tab "D") which Foreign Minister MATSUOKA intended to give HONDA. These, in effect, were that HONDA was to carry out the policy of the Japanese Government in China and that he should closely cooperate and work with the commanders-in-chief of the Army and Navy there. However, there is nothing in the records to indicate that these instructions were in ~~effect~~ ^{fact} delivered to HONDA, or that he acted upon them.

The statement that along with TANI and SHIRATORI he was one of the Army's agents within the Foreign Service appears exaggerated because of the fact that he was out of the Foreign Service from 1926 until one year before the Pearl Harbor attack. This would be equally true with reference to any participation in the Axis Alliance, for the Alliance was concluded in September 1940, three months before his recall as Ambassador to China. This would also be true of the charge that he was active in MATSUOKA's "purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese Foreign Service," for it took place at a time when he could have played no official part in it.

The statement that he was one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates (Tab "B") appears to be a conclusion based on nothing more than the fact that MATSUOKA called him from retirement to accept the Ambassadorship at a time when the Japanese Government needed his seasoned experience, particularly Chinese, in the Foreign Service. Throughout the record, HONDA appears to be a sincere student of diplomacy, and of having as an ideology the use of diplomacy in settling his country's international differences. His opposition toward conciliatory measures with the United States and Great Britain sprung, according to his writings and his own interrogation (Paragraph III, C, above), from a desire for the settlement of the China Incident, and to prevent the isolation of the Japanese nation.

HONDA's role as diplomatic advisor to the Foreign Ministry was a natural choice because of his experience with Chinese affairs. There is no evidence that during this period he gave any advice or participated in governmental affairs such as to bring him into the Class A criminal category. In fact, there is no evidence at all concerning this, except that he was appointed in such capacity.

HONDA was placed in House Arrest because of his multiple infirmities, to be re-examined at a later date. Subsequently, physical examinations were abandoned and notation made (Serial 23) that he was not to be re-examined. This is indicative of an intention not to pursue the

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investigation further, and it is borne out by the state of the Case File which reflected that active investigation ceased for some reason.

Taken as a whole, it is believed that the evidence is of so little value that it is wholly insufficient to sustain an indictment.

TAB A - Eighth Army Medical Report
TAB B - Implied Charges
TAB C - G-2 Analysis
TAB D - Draft of Instructions

EIGHTH ARMY MEDICAL REPORT

C O P Y

FILE NO. : 198

REPORT BY: L. H. Barnard
Major, Infantry

RE : HONDA, Kumataro

DATE : 8 March 1946

STATUS: Pending

In compliance with the radio from SCAP to the Commanding General EIGHTH Army, dated 18 December 1945, HONDA was examined by a medical officer of the EIGHTH Army and the following report submitted:

HONDA, Kumataro, 7 Chome, Kami-Meguro, Meguro-ku, Tokyo. This 71 year old man who has a history of jaundice six or seven years ago and severe dysentery four years ago while in China and who developed the symptoms of an upper respiratory infection on 1 December 1945, began to vomit, became jaundiced and developed what his physician termed "enlargement of the liver" on 20 December 1945. Significant physical findings on 24 December 1945 included clinical jaundice, a blood pressure of 164/80, beefy red tongue, tenderness in the left posterior cervical triangle without lymphadenopathy, tenderness in the right upper quadrant of the abdomen, enlargement of the liver to three finger breadths below the right costal margin, and excessive dryness of the skin. This man is under treatment by a Japanese physician. Recommend that he remain at home and re-examined on or about 1 February 1946/evidently meant to be 1 March 1946/.

PENDING

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3 File 198

INTL PROS SECTION

CENTRAL FILES

FILE NO. 198

SERIAL NO. 16

B

IMPLIED CHARGES AGAINST THE SUBJECT

C O P Y

11 December 1945

CASE NO. 198

RE : HONDA, Kumataro

STATUS: Pending

MEMO FOR THE FILES:

On 4 Dec 1945, CIS files reflect the following information on personnel indicted as War Criminals and ordered apprehended 3 December 1945:

"Career diplomat who retired from the service in 1926. Ambassador to Nanking Government 1940-42. Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters 1944. He was one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates and was active behind the scenes in working for the Axis alliance. According to State Department sources he was a vigorous advocate of Axis orientation who blocked efforts at reaching an agreement with the U. S. and Britain. He played an important part in the 1939 purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service who were opposed to the Axis alliance. Because of his unscrupulous and cynically ambitious character he has made bitter enemies in the foreign service.

"For many years before the war he, together with TANI and SHIRATORI, was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service. His particular contributions to Japanese aggression in addition to working for the Axis alliance has been his close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China.

"He appears on the U. S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments."

s/James J. Gaine Jr.
t/James J. Gaine Jr.
Capt., Inf.

COPIES: 3 File
1 Capt. Robinson

CASE NO. : 198

SERIAL NO. : 3

C

G-2 ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE

C O P Y

"HONDA Kumataro, Internee under House Arrest.

"G-2

Legal Section 17 May 1947
(Attn: Lt Col R. E. Rudisill GB/CIS/OD:AG/TFD/mk
Investigation Division)
Info copy to IPS
(Attn: Mr. E. P. Monaghan
Investigation Division)

"1. Curriculum vitae of HONDA Kumataro (TAB A) shows him to have been one of Japan's most distinguished career diplomats, who retired from the service in 1926 to be recalled to activity in 1940 for appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China.

"2. Evaluation of HONDA as per MID Washington's publication "Japanese Government Officials 1937 - 1945" of 21 July 1945 appears as TAB B.

"3. Evaluation of HONDA at time of internment (December 1945) appears as TAB C.

"4. Charges direct and implied in TAB B and TAB C are:

"a. "Extremely active behind the scenes after his resignation from the diplomatic service in 1926."

"b. "For many years before the war he, together with TANI (Masayuki) and SHIRATORI (Toshio), was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service. His particular contribution to Japanese Aggression in addition to working for the Axis alliance has been his close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China."

"c. "Selected as Ambassador to Nanking by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA Yosuke because the latter considered him an expert on Chinese affairs. The press recognized the appointment as of first rate importance because of HONDA's forceful qualities, relations with the fighting services and imperialist opinions. Was an ardent supporter of a strong, uncompromising policy in China."

"d. "He played an important part in the 1939 purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service who were opposed to the Axis alliance. Because of his unscrupulous and cynically ambitious character he has made bitter enemies in the foreign service."

"e. "A vigorous advocate of the pro-Axis policy and a ruthless opponent of efforts to conciliate United States and Britain."

"He was one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates and was active behind the scenes in working for the Axis alliance. According to State Department sources he was a vigorous advocate of Axis orientation who blocked

Copy of MEMORANDUM from G-2

"HONDA Kumataro, Internee under House Arrest

"G-2

"Legal Section

17 May 1947

"Info copy to:IPS

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'efforts at reaching an agreement with the U. S. and Britain.'
f. 'Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters, 1944.'

"5. CIS research shows that:

a. HONDA resigned from the foreign service in 1926 at the age of 52, after 32 years in the Japanese consulates, legations, and embassies in Korea, Manchuria, China and Europe, crowned by appointments as ambassador to Turkey and then to Germany. His service encompassed the years between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Nine-Power Treaty, the years in which Japan grew from an insular Pacific kingdom to a great world power. From the time of early apprenticeship to Marquis KOMURA (during KOMURA's Foreign Ministry at the time of the Russo-Japanese War) HONDA appears to have been anti-Russian (TAB D). Based on his experience in Europe, HONDA's concept of Japan's position in the world appears to have been one of increasing greatness by means of aggressive diplomatic strategy. Based on his experience in China, HONDA's concept of Sino-Japanese relations appears to have been that of a growing Japanese political and commercial sphere of influence in China.

After his retirement in 1926, HONDA held no official position until his recall to active duty in 1940. However, he wrote a number of books on foreign affairs, and as a member of the KOKUHONSHA (National Foundation Society) delivered lectures on diplomatic issues, which were printed in the society's organ the KOKUHON. The list of titles of HONDA's works (TAB E) illustrates his continuing interest in Japan's diplomacy.

Thus HONDA's "extreme activity behind the scenes after his resignation from the diplomatic service" was an unofficial one in this field of writing and lecturing. That he was a highly respected influence in this field of foreign affairs is attested by his association with the dignified and elite KOKUHONSHA (TAB F). No proof has been uncovered that his influence during this period was other than indirect and ideological.

b. The statement that "for many years before the war he (HONDA), together with TANI (Masayuki) and SHIRATORI (Toshio), was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service" is patently an exaggeration because HONDA was out of the foreign service from 1926 until exactly one year before the Pearl Harbor attack. His "particular contribution--to the Axis alliance", if such it may be called, was certainly unofficial, for the alliance was concluded in September 1940 three months before his recall to the diplomatic service. His "particular contribution" of "close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China" was, by the same token, editorial and perhaps advisory, until he

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HONDA Kumataro, Internee under House
Arrest

G-2

Info Copy To:

Legal Section
IPS

17 May 1947
GB/CIS/ OD:TPD/mk

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Was appointed ambassador to China on 7 December 1940.

c. In December 1940 HONDA was a natural choice for the ambassadorial post in China. He was a seasoned diplomat and a China expert despite his 14 years of retirement. He was apparently satisfactory to the Army because of his support of an uncompromising policy toward the Chiang Kai-shek government. HONDA held the post until 19 December 1941.

A fair evaluation of HONDA's qualifications for the China post are given in articles printed at the time of the appointment by the Japan Weekly Chronicle (TAB G), which always spoke its mind without fear of the censor.

d. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA Yosuke's so-called "purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service" took place in August 1940, Not 1939. HONDA could have played no official part in this affair because he was in retirement at the time.

It is probable, that he had bitter enemies in the foreign service, because there were many in the service who opposed his ideas and because he is apparently a self-opinionated individualist who gives small quarter to his adversaries. One source has described him as "an extremely egotistical person, very ardent in his opinions and quite excitable," who "for this reason--is not well liked by others in the Foreign Office."

e. HONDA was probably "one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates" in the same sense that it was MATSUOKA who, as Foreign Minister recalled him from retirement.

HONDA's writings indicate that he favored the Axis alliance as a phase of his aggressive diplomatic strategy, as shown in articles printed in the NICHU NICHU in August 1940 (TAB H) and in his article "The Anglo-American Common Front" (TAB I). His opposition toward conciliatory measures toward the United States and Great Britain was relative to and motivated by his interest in the China question. His official attitude toward the China debacle was shown by reports of his visit to Tokyo in May 1941 (TAB J).

f. HONDA became one of the KOMON KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) on 20 September 1944. It is this appointment which is described in the accusation as "Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters, 1944." This appointment is not considered of importance with respect to the charges, inasmuch as it was a nominal one assumed in the third year of the war.

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C O P Y

HONDA Kumataro, Internee under House Arrest

G-2

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6. Unless HONDA's attitude toward foreign affairs as expressed in his writings during his retirement and/or his activity as 12-months ambassador to China from 7 December 1940 until 19 December 1941 are considered a legal basis for trial, G-2 recommends that the 73-year-old HONDA be released from house arrest without preference of charges.

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-----C.A.W.-----

DRAFT OF INSTRUCTIONS
TO AMBASSADOR HONDA
FROM FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA

D

Excerpt From Prosecution Exhibit #628
(Record 6975)-A Statement of Japanese
Foreign Policy

"Instructions to be given to Envoy Extraordinary and
Ambassador Plenipotentiary, HONDA, By the Foreign
Minister (draft)

"In carrying out your duty as Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in China, I should like to ask you to pay special attention to the following points:

- "I. The Imperial Government has now recognized the New National Government and has entered into formal diplomatic relations with it. However, in view of the fact that not only is the Incident still going on but also that we have decided, at last, to adopt the state for a long term warfare, I hope that in carrying out your duty, you will, noting this point, exert yourself for the attainment of the purpose of the Incident, and that you will follow the established policy of the Empire, especially the "Outline for the Management of the China Incident" which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor on November 13, 1940.
- "II. You should, needless to say, co-operate positively with the military operations, and in regard to public peace follow the directions of the commanders-in-chief of the army and navy in the area. As to the management of important policies, you should always negotiate with them frankly, and I hope that you will pay utmost consideration not to allow any gap whatsoever to exist in respect to the co-operation between the political and the military strategies.
- "III. In order to adjust and organize the various organs dealing with China and synthetically unify the policies towards China, we have now reached such decisions as are given in the plan of the annexed paper, and I hope that you will exert for the systematic management of the departments under your control, while attaining a still closer contact with the organs concerned in accordance with these decisions.

"IV. As to instructions concerning the management of various departments of politics, economy and culture relating to the management of the Incident, you are requested to refer to "Collection of the Important Decisions" given in the separate. I hereby give you the above instructions.

Very Secret

Instructions to be given to Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, HONDA, by the Foreign Minister (draft)

(December 11, 1940, Asia No. 1)

"In negotiating with the National Government as Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in China, I should like to ask you to pay special attention to the following points:

- "I. The Imperial Government has now recognized the National Government and has entered into formal diplomatic relations with it. However, in view of the situation that not only is the Incident still going on, but also that we are, at last, going to adapt the state for a long term warfare, you should try to rapidly bring up and strengthen the National Government, in accordance with the established policy of the Empire and the provisions of the New China-Japanese Treaty. At the same time, leading the third powers, you should exert yourself to save the current situation as a whole, in accordance with the changes of ~~the~~ the world situation. Regarding the matters mentioned above, you should follow the decisions made in the past, especially "The Outline for the Management of the China Incident" which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor on November 13, 1940.
- "II. In order to adjust and organize various organs dealing with China and attain the unified management of our policies towards China, we have now reached such decisions as are given in the outline of the annexed paper, and I hope that you will exert yourself for the systematic management of the departments under your control, while attaining a still closer contact with the organs concerned in accordance with these decisions.

"III. The co-operation between political and military strategies being particularly important, I hope that you will maintain close contact with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy in China, and frankly negotiate with them in regard to the matters concerning the management of the important policies and the public peace.

"IV. As to instructions concerning the management of the various departments of politics, economy and culture related to the conduct of the Incident, you are requested to refer to "The Collection of the Important Decisions" given in the separate volume. I hereby give you the above instructions."

LEGAL Section - Honda Kumataro
(2532)

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(64)

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File No:

Subject: HONDA Kumataro, Internee under House Arrest

Note
No.

From: G-2

To: Legal Section
(Attn: Lt Col R.E. Rudisill
Investigation Division)

Date:

17 MAY 1947

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(Attn: Mr. E.P. Monaghan
Investigation Division)

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1. Curriculum vitae of HONDA Kumataro (TAB A) shows him to have been one of Japan's most distinguished career diplomats, who retired from the service in 1926 to be recalled to activity in 1940 for appointment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China.

2. Evaluation of HONDA as per MID Washington's publication "Japanese Government Officials 1937 - 1945" of 21 July 1945 appears as TAB B.

3. Evaluation of HONDA at time of internment (December 1945) appears as TAB C.

4. Charges direct and implied in TAB B and TAB C are:

a. "Extremely active behind the scenes after his resignation from the diplomatic service in 1926."

b. "For many years before the war he, together with TANI (Masayuki) and SHIRATORI (Toshio), was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service. His particular contribution to Japanese aggression in addition to working for the Axis alliance has been his close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China."

c. "Selected as Ambassador to Nanking by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA Yosuke because the latter considered him an expert on Chinese affairs. The press recognized the appointment as of first rate importance because of HONDA's forceful qualities, relations with the fighting services and imperialist opinions. Was an ardent supporter of a strong, uncompromising policy in China."

d. "He played an important part in the 1939 purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service who were opposed to the Axis alliance. Because of his unscrupulous and cynically ambitious character he has made bitter enemies in the foreign service."

e. "A vigorous advocate of the pro-Axis policy and a ruthless opponent of efforts to conciliate United States and Britain."

"He was one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates and was active behind the scenes in working for the Axis alliance. According to State Department sources he was a vigorous advocate of Axis orientation who blocked

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"efforts at reaching an agreement with the U.S. and Britain."
f. "Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters, 1944."

5. CIS research shows that:

a. HONDA resigned from the foreign service in 1926 at the age of 52, after 32 years in the Japanese consulates, legations, and embassies in Korea, Manchuria, China and Europe, crowned by appointments as ambassador to Turkey and then to Germany. His service encompassed the years between the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Nine-Power Treaty, the years in which Japan grew from an insular Pacific kingdom to a great world power. From the time of early apprenticeship to Marquis KOMURA (during KOMURA's Foreign Ministry at the time of the Russo-Japanese War) HONDA appears to have been anti-Russian (TAB D). Based on his experience in Europe, HONDA's concept of Japan's position in the world appears to have been one of increasing greatness by means of aggressive diplomatic strategy. Based on his experience in China, HONDA's concept of Sino-Japanese relations appears to have been that of a growing Japanese political and commercial sphere of influence in China.

After his retirement in 1926, HONDA held no official position until his recall to active duty in 1940. However, he wrote a number of books on foreign affairs, and as a member of the KOKUHONSHA (National Foundation Society) delivered lectures on diplomatic issues, which were printed in the society's organ the KOKUHON. The list of titles of HONDA's works (TAB E) illustrates his continuing interest in Japan's diplomacy.

Thus HONDA's "extreme activity behind the scenes after his resignation from the diplomatic service" was an unofficial one in this field of writing and lecturing. That he was a highly respected influence in this field of foreign affairs is attested by his association with the dignified and elite KOKUHONSHA (TAB F). No proof has been uncovered that his influence during this period was other than indirect and ideological.

b. The statement that "for many years before the war he (HONDA), together with TANI (Masayuki) and SHIRATORI (Toshio), was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service" is patently an exaggeration because HONDA was out of the foreign service from 1926 until exactly one year before the Pearl Harbor attack. His "particular contribution--to the Axis alliance", if such it may be called, was certainly unofficial, for the alliance was concluded in September 1940 three months before his recall to the diplomatic service. His "particular contribution" of "close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China" was, by the same token, editorial and perhaps advisory, until he

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was appointed ambassador to China on 7 December 1940.

c. In December 1940 HONDA was a natural choice for the ambassadorial post in China. He was a seasoned diplomat and a China expert despite his 14 years of retirement. He was apparently satisfactory to the Army because of his support of an uncompromising policy toward the Chiang Kai-shek government. HONDA held the post until 19 December 1941.

A fair evaluation of HONDA's qualifications for the China post are given in articles printed at the time of the appointment by the Japan Weekly Chronicle (TAB G), which always spoke its mind without fear of the censor.

d. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA Yosuke's so-called "purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service" took place in August 1940, not 1939. HONDA could have played no official part in this affair because he was in retirement at the time.

It is probable, that he had bitter enemies in the foreign service, because there were many in the service who opposed his ideas and because he is apparently a self-opinionated individualist who gives small quarter to his adversaries. One source has described him as "an extremely egotistical person, very ardent in his opinions and quite excitable," who "for this reason--is not well liked by others in the Foreign Office."

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HONDA's writings indicate that he favored the Axis alliance as a phase of his aggressive diplomatic strategy, as shown in articles printed in the NICHU NICHU in August 1940 (TAB H) and in his article "The Anglo-American Common Front" (TAB I). His opposition toward conciliatory measures toward the United States and Great Britain was relative to and motivated by his interest in the China question. His official attitude toward the China debacle was shown by reports of his visit to Tokyo in May 1941 (TAB J).

f. HONDA became one of the KOMON (Advisors) of the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise-Asia Headquarters) of the TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) on 20 September 1944. It is this appointment which is described in the accusation as "Advisor to East Asia Development General Headquarters, 1944." This appointment is not considered of importance with respect to the charges, inasmuch as it was a nominal one assumed in the third year of the war.

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C.A.W.

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-----C.A.W.-----



Curriculum Vitae of HONDA Kumataro

Curriculum Vitae of HONDA Kumataro

- 1874 (Dec)
1887 (Jan)
- Born in Wakaganea Ken
 - Entered Kyoshu Gakusha School in Wakayama Prefecture; studied English, Mathematics, and Chinese Classics
- 1889 (Jun)
1889-1891
- Left above school
 - Attended TOKYO SEMMON GAKKO (now Waseda University) in Tokyo, majoring in Political Science
- 1892-1893
- Attended TOKYO HO GAKUIN (now Chuo University) in Tokyo, majoring in English law; concurrently attended SENSHIN GAKUIN (a Unitarian school now defunct), to study sociology, Theology, etc.
- 1894 (May)
- Passed Language Student Examination of Foreign Ministry
- 1895 (8 Aug)
- Passed Legation and Consulate Chancellor Examination of Foreign Ministry
- 1895 (2 Oct)
1895
- Appointed Chancellor of Consulate
 - Granted 8th Class Salary of Ordinary Civil Service
 - Attached to Genzan
 - Granted salary ¥ 370 for Service in Foreign Country
- 1895 (23 Oct)
1895 (7 Nov)
1896 (7 Apr)
- Left for Genzan
 - Assumed office
 - Attached to Newchwang
 - Granted salary ¥ 420 for Service in Foreign Country
- 1896 (1 Jun)
1896 (5 Nov)
- Left for post
 - Appointed Accounting Official of Honorary Consulate at Newchwang
- 1897 (30 Jun)
1897 (1 Oct)
- Relieved of Accounting Officialship
 - Title of Chancellor of Legation and Consulate revised as Chancellor
- 1898 (7 Jan)
- Granted salary ¥ 500 for Service in Foreign Country
- 1898 (31 Mar)
- Granted 7th class salary of Ordinary Service
- 1898 (2 May)
1898 (15 Jul)
1898 (26 Jul)
1898 (2 Aug)
- Ordered home
 - Left for home
 - Returned home
 - Appointed Clerk in Foreign Ministry
 - Granted 7th class salary
 - Attached to 2nd Section, Commercial Affairs Bureau
- 1898 (Oct)
- Passed Diplomatic and Consular Officer Examination
 - Appointed 7th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Granted 5th class salary

HONDA Kumataro

- 1898
1898 (22 Dec)
1899 (14 Feb)
1899 (1 May)
- 1899 (30 Sep)
1899 (1 Nov)
1899 (27 Nov)
1899 (10 Dec)
1899-1901
- 1901 (31 May)
- 1901 (21 Sep)
1901 (30 Sep)
1901 (3 Oct)
1901 (14 Nov)
1901 (20 Nov)
- 1901 (25 Dec)
- 1902 (5 Mar)
1902 (31 Mar)
1902 (4 Nov)
- 1902 (28 Dec)
- 1903 (5 Dec)
- 1903 (8 Dec)
1904 (16 Feb)
- 1905 (20 Apr)
- 1905 (30 Jun)
- Assigned to Korea
 - Granted Junior 7th Class of Court Rank
 - Assigned to Peiping, China
 - Granted salary ¥ 1,200 for Service in Foreign Country
 - Granted 4th class salary
 - Ordered home (telegraphic)
 - Left for home
 - Returned home
 - Assigned to Belgium
 - Granted salary ¥ 3,100 for Service in Foreign Country
 - Granted salary ¥ 3,200 for Service in Foreign Country
 - Ordered home
 - Granted 3rd class salary
 - Left for home
 - Returned home
 - Appointed Private Secretary of Foreign Minister and concurrently Secretary in Foreign Ministry
 - Promoted to 6th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Granted 7th class salary
 - Assigned to Telegraphic Section, General Affairs Bureau and concurrently to Political Affairs Bureau
 - Authorized to wear "Chevalier de l'ordre de Leopold" granted by the Belgian King
 - Decorated with 6th class Order of Rising Sun
 - Granted Senior 7th Class of Court Rank
 - Appointed Secretary in Foreign Ministry and concurrently Private Secretary of Foreign Minister
 - Granted 7th class salary
 - Assigned to Political Affairs Bureau and concurrently to Telegraphic Section, General Affairs Bureau
 - Granted ¥ 600 in recognition of service rendered in Incident of 1900
 - Concurrently assigned to Telegraphic Section of Secretariate in accordance with amendment of Official Organization and Office Division
 - Granted 6th class salary
 - Appointed Member of Provisional Report Committee
 - Promoted to 5th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Granted 5th class salary
 - Granted Junior 6th Class of Court Rank

HONDA Kumataro

- 1905 (4 Jul) - Dispatched to U.S.A. as Member of Suite of Plenipotentiaries to Peace Conference
- 1905 (8 Jul) - Left Tokyo
- 1905 (25 Jul) - Arrived in New York
- 1905 (26 Oct) - Returned to Tokyo
- 1905 (4 Nov) - Appointed Member of Suite of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (Treaty of Portsmouth)
- 1905 (6 Nov) - Left Tokyo
- 1906 (7 Jan) - Appointed 2nd Secretary of Legation
- Appointed 5th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- Granted 2nd class salary
- Ordered home
- 1906 (9 Feb) - Decorated with 5th class Order of Rising Sun and granted ¥ 120 in recognition of service rendered in War of 1904
- 1906 (1 Apr) - Decorated with Service Medal of 1904 War
- 1906 (13 Apr) - Dispatched to China
- 1906 (12 Jun) - Left Tokyo for destination
- 1907 (28 Mar) - Granted 1st class salary
- 1907 (30 May) - Ordered home
- 1907 (16 Jun) - Left Peking
- 1907 (23 Jun) - Returned to Tokyo
- 1907 (3 Jul) - Appointed 2nd Secretary of Embassy
- Appointed 5th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- Granted 1st class salary
- Assigned to Great Britain
- Ordered home
- 1907 (23 Jul) - Promoted to 4th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- 1907 (3 Sep) - Granted 3rd class salary
- 1907 (9 Nov) - Arrived at England
- 1907 (20 Nov) - Granted Senior 6th class of Court Rank
- 1907 (9 Feb) - Authorized to wear Order of "Second Double Dragon Star" granted by the Emperor of China
- Ordered home
- 1907 (29 Aug) - Appointed Secretary in Foreign Ministry and concurrently Private Secretary of Foreign Minister
- 1908 (7 Oct) - Appointed 4th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- Granted 2nd class salary
- Appointed Chief of Archives Section, Secretariate and concurrently Chief of Records Section, Secretariate
- Appointed Official in Charge of Reports for Gazette and Affairs of Statistics
- 1909 (14 Jun) - Appointed 1st Secretary of Legation
- Appointed 4th Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- Granted 1st class salary

HONDA Kumataro

- 1909
1909 (4 Jul)
1909 (11 Jul)
1909 (11 Oct)
1909 (28 Dec)
1910 (22 Mar)
1910 (1 Apr)
1910 (22 Jun)
1910 (30 Jun)
1910 (6 Jul)
1910 (21 Jul)
1910 (23 Jul)
1910 (27 Dec)
1911 (12 Apr)
1911 (1 May)
1911 (8 May)
1912 (16 Mar)
1912 (23 Apr)
1912 (29 Apr)
1912 (30 Jun)
1913 (9 Jul)
1913 (16 Jul)
1913 (28 Jul)
1913 (5 Aug)
1914 (26 Jun)
1914 (12 Aug)
1914 (20 Aug)
1914 (10 Sep)
1916 (1 Apr)
1917 (21 Nov)
1917 (24 Dec)
1918 (29 Jun)
- Assigned to China
 - Left Tokyo
 - Arrived in China
 - Decorated with 4th class Order of Sacred Treasure
 - Promoted 3rd Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Granted 2nd class salary
 - Granted Junior 5th class of Court Rank
 - Granted 2nd class salary in accordance with revised Ordinance of Salaries of Higher Civil Service
 - Ordered home
 - Left Peking
 - Returned to Tokyo
 - Ordered to proceed to Changsha enroute to Peking
 - Left Tokyo for Peking
 - Granted ¥ 300 for Special Application in Service
 - Ordered home
 - Left Peking
 - Returned to Tokyo
 - Appointed Consul-General
 - Appointed 3rd Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Granted 2nd class salary
 - Assigned to Harbin
 - Left Tokyo
 - Arrived at Harbin
 - Granted 1st class salary
 - Left Changchun
 - Returned to Tokyo
 - Left Tokyo for Harbin
 - Arrived at Harbin
 - Appointed Councillor of Embassy
 - Promoted to 2nd Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
 - Assigned to Great Britain
 - Granted 3rd class salary
 - Left Tokyo
 - Granted Senior 5th class of Court Rank
 - Arrived at England
 - Decorated with 3rd class Order of Rising Sun and granted ¥ 2,000 in recognition of service rendered in War of 1914-1915
 - Appointed Member of Suite of Plenipotentiaries to Allied Nation's Peace Conference held at Paris
 - Granted 2nd class salary
 - Promoted to 1st Rank Official of Higher Civil Service

HONDA Kumataro

- 1918 (10 Jul) - Appointed Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
- Appointed 1st Rank Official of Higher Civil Service
- Assigned to Switzerland
- 1918 (31 Jul) - Granted Junior 4th Class of Court Rank
- 1918 (22 Oct) - Left London
- 1918 (25 Oct) - Arrived at Switzerland
- 1919 (30 Jan) - Ordered to Paris
- 1919 (5 Feb) - Appointed Member of Suite of Plenipotentiaries to Peace Conference
- 1919 (9 May) - Left Berne
- 1919 (7 Mar) - Ordered to call at London enroute home
- 1919 (7 Jul) - Arrived at Tokyo
- 1919 (26 Dec) - Authorized to wear 1st Class Order of Victoria granted by the King of Great Britain
- 1920 (9 Feb) - Ordered home
- 1920 (11 May) - Ordered to China for about three months.
(For inspection of political situation)
- 1920 (21 Jun) - Arrived at Shanghai
- 1920 (18 Aug) - Granted yearly salary ¥ 5,700 in accordance with revised Ordinance concerning Rank and Salary of Higher Civil Service
- 1920 (1 Nov) - Decorated with 2nd class Order of Sacred Treasure and granted ¥ 2,000 in recognition of service rendered in war of 1915-1920
- 1921 (3 Feb) - Relieved of assignment to Switzerland
- 1921 (3 Feb) - Assigned to Austria
- 1921 (18 Feb) - Ordered to call at London and Paris enroute to Post
- 1921 (7 Mar) - Left Tokyo
- 1921 (20 Apr) - Arrived at Paris
- 1921 (24 Apr) - Arrived at London
- 1921 (19 May) - Arrived at Vienna
- 1921 (30 Jun) - Granted 1st Class salary
- 1921 (24 Oct) - Concurrently assigned to Hungary
- 1922 (27 Jan) - Authorized to proceed to Budapest
- 1922 (29 May) - Left Vienna on leave
- 1922 (11 Jun) - Returned home
- 1922 (29 Jun) - Left for Paris (to attend at General Disarmament Committee)
- 1922 (14 Jul) - Returned to post
- 1922 (22 Aug) - Appointed Member of Suite of Delegates to 3rd Meeting of League of Nation's General Assembly held at Geneva
- 1922 (28 Aug) - Left Vienna
- 1922 (30 Aug) - Arrived at Geneva
- 1922 (4 Oct) - Returned to post
- 1923 (9 May) - Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
- 1923 (29 May) - Ordered to Turkey
- Started
- Assumed office

HONDA Kumataro

- 1923 (4 Jun) - Appointed Member of Committee for Enforcement of Peace Treaty
- 1923 (11 Jun) - Granted Senior 4th class of Court Rank
- 1923 (24 Dec) - Assigned to Germany
- 1924 (5 Feb) - Left Vienna
- 1925 (21 Sep) - Left Berlin
- 1925 (14 Nov) - Arrived at Tokyo
- 1925 (21 Nov) - Authorized to wear Order of "Grosse Goldenes Ehrenzeichen am Bande fuer Verdienste um die Republik Oesterreich" granted by Republic of Austria. Authorized to wear "Grand Croix d'ordre Polskie" granted by Republic of Poland
- 1926 (11 May) - Decorated with 1st class Order of Sacred Treasure
- 1926 (30 May) - Relieved of office at own request
- 1940 (7 Dec) - Granted Junior 3rd class of Court Rank
- 1940 (23 Dec) - Appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
- 1941 (14 Jan) - Assigned to China
- 1941 (15 Jan) - Left Tokyo
- 1941 (20 Jan) - Arrived at Nanking
- 1941 (18 Feb) - Ordered home
- 1941 (1 Mar) - Left Nanking
- 1941 (30 Apr) - Arrived in Tokyo
- 1941 (7 May) - Left Tokyo
- 1941 (14 May) - Returned to Nanking
- 1941 (15 Aug) - Ordered home (Temporarily)
- 1941 (22 Aug) - Left Nanking
- 1941 (18 Dec) - Arrived at Tokyo
- 1941 (11 Nov) - Left Tokyo
- 1941 (23 Nov) - Returned to Nanking
- 1941 (19 Dec) - Ordered home
- 1944 (23 May) - Left Nanking
- 1945 (23 May) - Arrived in Tokyo
- 1945 (12 Dec) - Relieved of office at own request
- 1945 (12 Dec) - Appointed Diplomatic Adviser to Foreign Ministry
- 1945 (12 Dec) - Relieve of office of Diplomatic Adviser to Foreign Ministry at own request
- 1945 (12 Dec) - Placed under house arrest

Extract from "Japanese Government Officials
1937 - 1945" -- published by MID, Washington,
D. C., on 21 July 1945 -- HONDA Kumataro

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
BY *JET*, NARS Date *8-18-75*

Extract from "Japanese Government Officials, 1937-1945"
Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D.C.
dated 21 July 1945

"Kumataro HONDA: Advisor to East Asia Development Headquarters of
Imperial Rule Assistance Association

1874 Dec	Born Wakayama Prefecture. Son of Uhei Honda. Married sister of Kisaku Mino.
*	Graduated Tokyo Semmon Gakko, Chuo Hogakuin and later University of Brussels.
1891	Passed examination for chancellor of Foreign Office.
1898	Passed consular and diplomatic service examination.
*	Second Secretary, Legation at China.
*	Second Secretary, Embassy in Great Britain.
*	Secretary to Foreign Minister.
1909	First Secretary, Legation at China.
1912-14	Consul General at Harbin, Manchuria
1914 June	Counselor, Embassy in Germany
1921	Minister to Austria.
*	Minister to Sweden
*	Ambassador to Turkey
*	Ambassador to Germany
*	Retired from Service
1940-42	Ambassador to China
1944 May	Advisor to Foreign Office
1944 Sept.	Advisor to East Asia Development Headquarters of IRAA.

"Extremely active behind the scenes after his resignation from the diplomatic service in 1926. A vigorous advocate of the pro-Axis policy and a ruthless opponent of efforts to conciliate United States and Britain. Selected as Ambassador to Nanking by Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka because the latter considered him an expert on Chinese affairs. The press recognized the appointment as of first rate importance because of Honda's forceful qualities, relations with fighting services and imperialist opinions. Was an ardent supporter of a strong uncompromising policy in China. Close friends of General Shunroku Hata. (61.62)"

~~SECRET~~

Evaluation of HONDA Kumataro at time of Internment

~~SECRET~~

Evaluation of HONDA Kumataro at time of internment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JET, NARS Date 8-18-75

"Career diplomat who retired from the service in 1926. Ambassador to Nanking Government 1940-42. He was one of MATSUOKA's most trusted associates and was active behind the scenes in working for the Axis alliance. According to State Department sources he was a vigorous advocate of Axis orientation who blocked efforts at reaching an agreement with the U.S. and Britain. He played an important part in the 1939 purge of highly placed liberals in the Japanese foreign service who were opposed to the Axis alliance. Because of his unscrupulous and cynically ambitious character he has made bitter enemies in the foreign service.

"For many years before the war he, together with TANI and SHIRATORI, was one of the Army's agents within the foreign service. His particular contribution to Japanese aggression in addition to working for the Axis alliance has been his close cooperation with the Army in regard to working out methods for Japanese penetration and domination of China.

"He appears on the U.S. War Crimes list prepared by State, War and Navy Departments."

~~SECRET~~

HONDA's book TAMASHII NO GAIKO

Extract from "Book Reviews" Section of "Contemporary Japan"
of April 1939

"TAMASHII NO GAIKO (The Japanese Spirit and Diplomacy).
by Kumataro Honda. Chikura Shobo, Tokyo, 1938. pp.358. Yen 1.60

"The title of this book is somewhat misleading, for it is mainly concerned with the diplomacy of the late Marquis Jutaro Komura, Foreign Minister at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. This great conflict, the author believes, was "The most brilliant chapter in the history of the Japanese nation," and exercised a most profound influence upon the history of the world in general. Mr. Honda, formerly in the diplomatic service himself, apparently chose the present moment to write this book with the hope that an account of the remarkable diplomatic triumphs of the Komura era would serve as a shining example to his less worthy successors at the Gaimusho. In other words, he feels that the long series of military victories in China should be complemented with equally distinguished successes in the field of diplomacy.

"In view of the fact that the author was the private secretary of Marquis Komura at the time of the Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth Conference, his book shows some new light on this Foreign Minister's diplomatic career. By the turn of century, Komura was firmly convinced that that war with Russia was inevitable, and when he became Foreign Minister in Count Katsura's Cabinet in 1901, he directed his energies toward preparing Japan's diplomatic front for this unavoidable eventuality. Thus he threw his influence on the side of the Anglo-Japanese alliance negotiations then in progress with the result that this treaty was one of the first-fruits of his realistic diplomacy.

"Yet it is significant to note that Mr. Honda does not idealize this celebrated alliance as has been the habit among many Japanese before more recent events clouded Anglo-Japanese relations. Although the alliance at that time constituted the axis of Japan's foreign policy, it was an axis only in the sense that the primary objects stipulated in the treaty itself were the pivotal point of Japanese diplomacy. "It is absurd," he notes, "to hope that the realization of major policies can be assured by such diplomatic accessories as alliances or ententes; in view of the present day fear in Japan of isolation, I want especially to stress the importance of the nation's self-reliance."

"The first half of the book is devoted to a vivid and inspiring delineation of Marquis Komura's background and personal character. Hitherto there has been no account of his personality and career as complete as this one. Being a diplomat, Komura was from his youth placed in an atmosphere which was almost completely Occidental. Yet he remained thoroughly Japanese in spirit and manner, and while others in the diplomatic service were prone to overestimate and to be influenced by the importance of the particular countries to which they were accredited,

Extract from "Book Reviews" Section of "Contemporary Japan"
of April 1939

ne retained a typically Japanese outlook, and was a nationalist in the best sense of the word. Once he verbally trounced a high standing advocate of the romanization of the Japanese language, a fitting illustration of his strong nationalism. Nevertheless, his purely Japanese outlook did not blind him to the realities of the international situation, which accounts in part for the balanced course of his diplomacy.

"The second half of the book is concerned with his diplomatic manoeuvres vis-a-vis Russia. The author strongly refutes the oft-repeated charge that the late Prince Ito was a Russophile. At the same time, however, he takes pains to point out that in formulating a policy toward the Continent, Komura was much more comprehensive than Ito. Unlike most other leaders, he viewed Manchuria, not Korea alone, as the bone of contention. It was this firm conviction that guided Komura's diplomacy through the Russo-Japanese War, at the Portsmouth Conference, and again at Peking where he negotiated the special treaties with China which confirmed Japan's new position in South Manchuria. It was also this conviction that led him to reject Count Katsura's tentative agreement with the American railway magnate, E. H. Harriman, whereby Japan would have shared with an American syndicate the ownership and operation of the South Manchuria Railway.

"There can be no doubt that Marquis Komura played a most important role in the making of modern Japan, but this account of his career-- although the most comprehensive yet written--is by no means a completely objective study. Through his personal contact with a great man, Mr. Honda has been too profoundly influenced to view his idol with impartiality, and all subsequent history is accordingly interpreted in the light of the brilliant era of which he was a moving force. Thus in holding this statesman up as an example for present-day Japan, Mr. Honda overlooks the fact that the Marquis' successful strokes of diplomacy were partially conditioned by the favourable circumstances of the age in which he lived. The Russo-Japanese War period was Japan's great moment, and, thanks to the leadership of the day, she made good."

--Shuko Shirayanagi

List of Titles of HONDA Kumataro's writings

List of Writings of HONDA Kumataro

I. Books

"Oshujo to Shina Jihen"--(European Conditions and the China Incident)
Published by Chikura Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1939

"Gunshuku Kaigi to Nihon"--(The Disarmament Conference and Japan)
Published by the Gaiko Jiho Sha, Tokyo, 1930

"Kokusai Renmei Gunshuku Kaigi to Nihon"--(The League of Nations
Disarmament Conference and Japan)
Published by the Gaiko Jiho Sha, Tokyo, 1931

"Shina Jihen kara Dai Toa Senso e"--(From the China Incident to the
Greater East Asia War)
Published by Chikura Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1942

"Jinbutsu to Mondai"--(People and Problems)
Published by the Chikura Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1939

"Sekai no Ugoki to Nihon no Tachiba"--(Japan's Position and the
Course of the World)
Published by the Chikura Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1931

"Senjin wo Kataru"--(Memories of Late Great Men)
Published by the Chikura Publishing Co., Tokyo, 1939

"Tamashii no Gaiko (Nichiro Senso ni Okeru Komura Koh)"--(Spiritual
Diplomacy, 'Marquis Komura of the Russo-Japanese War')
Published in 1938

"Nisshi Jihen Gaiko Kan"--(A Review of the Diplomacy in the Sino-
Japanese Incident)
Published in 1938

"Nihon wa Naze Renmei Dattai wo Hitsuyo to Shita Ka"--(Why Japan Had
to Secede from the League)
Published March, 1933

"Beikoku no Datsubo, Beikoku Soku no Rondan Kaigi Kaisetsu"--
(America with its Hat off; America's Explanation of the London
Conference)
Published by the Tenjin sha, 1930

"Renmei Zetsu En wo Mae ni Shite"--(Before the Severance of the
Relations with the league)
Published February, 1933

II. KOKUHON Articles

- Sept. 1928 - "Wilson-Lenin-Mussolini"
March 1931 - "Fuon No Kokusai Seikyoku"
(Uneasy International Political Situation)
Oct. 1931 - "Kokusai Nihon No Kankyo"
(Status of International Japan)
Dec. 1931 - "Komura Jutarō Ko"
(Marquis Komura Jutarō)
April 1935 - "Nichiro Senso To Komura Ko"
(Russo-Japanese War and Marquis Komura)

KOKUHONSHA

KOKUHONSHA
(National Federation Society)

The KOKUHONSHA was founded in 1921 and reorganized in 1924 by Baron HIRANUMA Kiichiro for the ostensible purpose of combatting left-ist and liberal trends in Japan by arousing interest in Japanese nationalistic concepts of the state and society. The society thus sought to promote a revival of nationalistic Shinto ideology and the doctrine of the Emperor's divinity and omnipotent position as head of the state. These doctrines are summed up in the expression "Kodo", the Imperial Way, which in the years up to the war became the guiding principle of Japan's political indoctrination, education, and propaganda. The KOKUHONSHA accordingly was a strong expression of reaction against the rising tide of liberal and radical thought which appeared in Japan after World War I.

The society was essentially a "thought" group; that is, it aimed to promote and guide a reformation in national thinking along archaic reactionary lines.

The forerunner of this "thought" movement known as the KOKUHONSHA was really a publishing company was TAKEUCHI Gakuji and OTA Kozo. The company was at that time publishing the magazine, "KOKUHON" which later became the organ of the KOKUHONSHA. TAKEUCHI and OTA got their spiritual inspiration from Dr. UESUGI Shinkichi, a conservative professor at Tokyo Imperial University who exercised a profound influence on the reactionary movement in the 1920's. It is generally agreed that the KOKUHONSHA had a strong anti-communist basis from the beginning.

HIRANUMA's assumption of leadership in 1924 is closely connected with the Imperial Rescript which was issued after the 1923 earthquake. HIRANUMA (Justice Minister, YAMAMOTO Cabinet) was reputedly instrumental in getting the rescript issued. The rescript called upon the people to reject the foreign ideologies which were gaining in popularity in Japan. The hardships suffered as a result of the earthquake had given fresh impetus to this development which threatened the security and power of Japan's ultra-conservative rulers.

Three men dominated the KOKUHONSHA from its inception to its very end: HIRANUMA, who was chairman from 1924 to June 1936; TAKEUCHI, who was the first chairman of the KOKUHONSHA and became managing director when HIRANUMA became chairman in 1924; and OTA, who was the head of the publications section during the entire existence of the KOKUHONSHA.

The society was formally dissolved in June 1936. HIRANUMA resigned the chairmanship of the KOKUHONSHA upon his appointment as head of the Privy Council, and the other officials of the society, faced with

KOKUHONSHA

the prospect of carrying on without HIRANUMA's active support, decided to dissolve the society.

Address: 2 of 2-chome, Hirakawa-cho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo

Establishment: January 1921

Officers: President: HIRANUMA Kiichiro

Directors:	ARAKI Sadao	OGASAWARA Chosei
	ARAKI Torasaburo	OGURA Masatsune
	GOTO Fumio	OSUMI Mineo
	HARA Yoshimichi	SATO Shosuke
	HIRAMATSU Ichizo	SAWADA Ushimaro
	HONDA Kumataro	SHIONO Suehiko
	IKEDA Seihin	SHIRAKAMI Yukichi
	KABAYAMA Sukehide	TAKEUCHI Kakuji
	KAWADA Retsu	TANABE Harumichi
	KAWAMURA Teishiro	UGAKI Issei
	KIKUCHI Takeo	WANI Teikichi
	KOISO Kuniaki	YUKI Toyotaro
	MAZAKI Jinzaburo	

Organs: KOKUHON SHIMBUN (National Foundation News), twice monthly
KOKUHON (National Foundation), monthly

Background: KOKUHONSHA was one of the nationalistic societies organized after the Russian Revolution and World War I to combat the subsequent impouring into Japan of the liberal western ideas which had emerged victorious in those two struggles. The society was composed of men associated with the "ideological right", as compared with "direct actionists". It occupied a background position rather than an active role as exponent of Japanese militarism and ultra-nationalism. As a group, the society encouraged national consciousness, but was too dignified to resort to rabble-rousing. Its prospectus emphasized social, cultural and economic reform within the old framework of Japanese society.

Aims: As quoted in the AIKOKU UNDO NENKAN (Patriotic Movements Yearbook), the society's prospectus was as follows:

"The prosperity of the nation and the peace of the people rely upon promotion of the national spirit and the development of intelligence and virtue. Ever since the Meiji restoration, there have been great strides made in the social sciences and arts. But, degenerate and superficial customs have taken the place of

KOKUHONSEA

simplicity and strength, and strange and radical thoughts have taken the place of quiet and respectful ones. Morality is being destroyed, people's hearts become rough, and their natures become imitative. The spirit of independence and innovation has been lost. Since the great fire of the past year, the national finances have become endangered, the national strength weakened. Unless we nurture the national spirit, make firm the basis of the nation, develop intelligence and virtue, and promote the essence of the national polity, there is no knowing what the future holds for the state or for the people. We humbly keep in mind the teachings of the former Emperor (Emperor Meiji) and make obeissance to the words of the present Emperor (Emperor Taisho). We welcome all spirits who entertain ideas similar to ours, in order to meet the needs of the state and the people today. We therefore desire all men who have the future in mind to co-operate with us."

Excerpts from the Japan Weekly Chronicle
at time of HONDA's appointment as
Ambassador to China (December 1940)

Extracts from The Japan Weekly Chronicle at time of HONDA Kumataro's appointment as Ambassador to China.

I. 12 December 1940

AMBASSADOR TO CHINA

Kumataro Honda, is appointed to post.

A CAREFUL SELECTION

"Mr. Kumataro Honda, a veteran diplomat, has been appointed Ambassador to China, the investiture being held on Saturday afternoon in the Palace.

"General Abe, Ambassador Extra-ordinary and Plenipotentiary, who signed the new Sino-Japanese Treaty, will return home shortly, with his mission fulfilled.

"In view of the great importance of the duties which the first Japanese Ambassador to China following the conclusion of the new basic treaty is called upon to discharge, Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, fixed upon Mr. Honda because he is a man of rich diplomatic experience and great calibre, because he is one of the best informed about things Chinese and because he is on good terms with the military.

"Before approaching him, however, Mr. Matsuoka asked General Abe to continue in his office, and on his request being declined, he sought an understanding with Prince Kono, the Premier, and the Services Ministers on the choice of Mr. Honda. With their approval, the Foreign Minister approached Mr. Honda on the 4th and prevailed upon him to accept the proffered post. On the 5th, the Government wired to the National Government of China asking for its consent to Mr. Honda's appointment, and the latter's favourable reply having been received on the following day, the investiture took place on Saturday.

"Mr. Honda, the new Ambassador to China, is a native of Wakayama prefecture, and is 66 years old. He was private secretary to the late Marquis Komura, the Foreign Minister at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. He held the post of first Secretary of the Japanese Legation in China, Consul-General at Harbin and Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in London. After holding in succession the posts of Minister to Switzerland and Austria, he was appointed Ambassador to Germany, from which office he retired in 1926 when Baron Shidehara was Foreign Minister in the Wakatsuki Cabinet."

Extracts from The Japan Weekly Chronicle at time of HONDA Kumataro's appointment as Ambassador to China.

II. 19 December 1940

AMBASSADOR TO CHINA

Mr. Honda Has Been "Retired" For Fourteen Years

"The Yomiuri hails the appointment of Mr. Kumataro Honda to the Ambassadorship to China, regarding the new Ambassador as the right man in the right place. As every-one knows, it says, Mr. Honda is an elder in Japanese diplomatic circles. His active diplomatic service ended when he was relieved of the Ambassadorship to Germany in 1926 and he has been living in retirement for the past fourteen years.

"It is usual that when Government officials, diplomats especially, retire from active service, they pass into oblivion. Mr. Honda has been an exception to this rule, however, and it may even be said that he has been more before the public in retirement than when in office. It is a stock complaint that there is a dearth of talent at the Kasumigaseki, and this lack of talent is particularly deeply felt at the present time when Japan's diplomacy is beset with many difficulties. One of the causes of Japanese diplomatic inactivity may be found in the fact that due to prejudice, men of ability have been forced into retirement too often in the past, complains the Yomiuri. Mr. Honda was one of them."

Articles by HONDA in NICHI NICHI
from 26 - 31 August 1940 (Summary)

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Summary of Articles in TOKYO NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN, August 26-28,
August 30 and August 31, 1940.

Study on the Establishment of Japan's Diplomacy
By HONDA Kumataro

It is said that the principal mission of the Konoe Cabinet lies in the revision of Japan's diplomacy. There is no doubt that the revision of Japan's diplomacy is what the people are looking for. From this standpoint, I should like to take up here the problem of Japan's diplomacy toward the United States. Mr. Byas, Tokyo correspondent of the New York Times, wrote an interesting article in the paper. "Taking advantage of the downfall of France and Holland, Japan is endeavoring to establish the Monroe doctrine in the Far East." "At the same time Japan wishes to avoid the deadlock of Japan-American relations at all costs." He appears to opine ironically that Japan is chasing two rabbits. The recent development in Europe affords a good chance for Japan to establish a New Order in the Far East including the Southern Islands. In its editorial, the New York Times states regarding the interview of Secretary of State Cordell Hull with press correspondents that if Japan will let the Chinese choose their own course at will and if Japan withdraw her troops from China, Japan should not be afraid of a conflict with the United States. In his book entitled "The Far Eastern Crisis", Secretary of War Stimson says that it has been his policy to check Japanese Militarists by strengthening the stand of Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA at the time of the Manchurian incident. In brief, America seems to look for great expansion of her military powers after the European War is over. At the same time, she wants to have the Japanese moderate to take the lukewarm foreign policy toward the United States. The late President Theodore Roosevelt wisely said that the occupation of the Phillipine Islands was a bridge of American Continent over the Pacific Ocean. The purpose of an American bridge over the Pacific Ocean, of course, means an advancement toward the Chinese Continent. As long as the United States sticks to her aggressive policy toward the Far East, she can never agree with Japan's national policy of establishing a New Order in the Far East.

Since the outbreak of the China Incident, the United States and Great Britain have been assisting China in every plausible way, in order to cause Japan's cause in China to fail. The abrogation of the Trade Treaty was carried out by America as a step preliminary to an embargo on the export of war materials to Japan. America desires to save Britain from defeat in the War. The recent war situation in Europe apparently is adverse to Britain. It seems that there is no way for America to save Britain from German invasion. Even if England falls into the hands of Germany, America hopes to prevent the British Navy being controlled by Germany. America is crazy with a nightmare--attack by three Axis Countries.

Summary of Articles in TOKYO NICHU NICHU SHIMBUN, August 26-28,
August 30 and August 31, 1940.

Naturally, the sentiment of American people toward Japan, Italy and Germany is getting worse.

We do not deny that the American embargo on the export of war materials to Japan proved a heavy blow to Japan. No matter how large the United States is in area or what an abundance of raw materials she may have, she is not yet a self sufficient country. Japan is in a position to hit America in a vulnerable spot. If Japan, making use of the belligerent rights, blockades the Chinese coast and gets control of the South Seas, the United States cannot import oil and tungsten from China or rubber and tin from the southern islands. If Japan resorts to such a measure, the peacetime and munitions industries of America will be critically deadlocked. It is not too late for Japan to take such a measure. To utilize belligerent rights in the war with China is one of the key points, for reestablishing Japan's foreign diplomacy.

Now let us turn our attention to Great Britain. The China Incident is a conflict with Great Britain in some respects. At the time of the OKUMA Cabinet, the British Government presented a written statement to the Japanese Government promising that Britain would not undertake any diplomatic negotiations with China without a preliminary understanding with Japan. Up to the conclusion of the Washington Conference, Britain faithfully lived up to her promise. Since the end of 1935, Britain hastried to grasp leadership in China, thus breaking her promise with Japan. This is one of the great causes for the new troubles in the Far East.

As Secretary of War Stimson said in Congress, if Germany attempts an invasion of the British homeland, Germany will succeed in her attempt within a month. But this does not necessarily mean the British surrender to Germany or the restoration of peace in Europe. In case Germany succeeds in taking over the British Mainland, the British Government will be removed to Canada where, with American protection and assistance, the European war will develop into a conflict of Great Britain and America with Germany and Italy across the Atlantic Ocean.

Anyway, the British Empire will tread her downward path. Japan, which commands the Pacific and Indian Oceans under her Naval control, will play an important role in the World. Great Britain has no power to protect her interests in the Far East against Japan. No matter how great her interests in China or how vital Singapore may be to her strategy, Great Britain has no intension to fight with Japan for the sake of preventing her interests falling into Japanese hands. Together with the downfall of the British Empire, the economic order of the World will undergo a radical change. The World will be divided into four or five economic blocs. Japan must form the Far Eastern economic bloc including all territory east

Summary of Articles in TOKYO NICHI NICHI SHIMBUN, August 26-28,
August 30 and August 31, 1940.

of the Bay of Bengal. This is the best chance for Japan to form the
Far Eastern Co-prosperity Sphere. If Japan misses this chance, she
will regret it for a thousand of years to come.

HONDA's article "The Anglo-American Common Front"
(November 1940)

Article from "Contemporary Japan" of November 1940, page 1384.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON FRONT

By Kumataro Honda

"Since hostilities broke out between Japan and China in July, 1937, the writer has seized every opportunity to bring home to the Japanese nation the important fact that not only the Soviet Union, but Great Britain and the United States as well stand behind China, for both Britain and America are perfectly united, so far as the China affair is concerned.

"Unsophisticated Japanese have a partiality for wishful thinking in international politics, though this failing is not a monopoly of the Japanese alone. A survey of the vicissitudes of relations between Japan, Great Britain and the United States since the first World War shows that Britain and America as well as Japan have fallen an easy victim to wishful thinking. The prevailing impasse in their relations has been caused by a series of incidents, punctuated with short-lived understandings. The Japanese first thought that the Soviet Union was behind China in its conflict with their country. With the development of Japanese military operations in China, however, acts of obstruction, openly committed by British authorities and nationals against the Japanese forces made the Japanese people cast suspicion upon Great Britain. The armed clash between Japan and China was indeed an inevitable outcome of policies, consistently pursued by Great Britain since the latter half of 1935, or to be more exact, since the visit of Sir Robert Leith-Ross to China, which resulted in Great Britain's success in carrying out China's currency reform to her own advantage. Great Britain regards Chiang Kai-shek as a great leader who has succeeded in unifying the so-called Republic. She desires to help China, as unified by Chiang Kai-shek, become a modern State in an effort to make it a bulwark against Japan's advance to the Asiatic continent. An implication to that effect was made by Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an address, delivered in October, 1931. The assistance extended to Chiang Kai-shek is a manifestation of Britain's deep-rooted national policy, not sentimentalism or a local clash of interests.

"This was not appreciated by unsophisticated Japanese. Even many persons who were engaged in politics were not aware of it. But now even unsophisticated Japanese have come to see that Britain's anti-Japanese policy towards China is concerned, but they still fail to see that both Great Britain and the United States have a common position as well as a common objective.

Article from "Contemporary Japan" of November 1940, page 1384.

"The American Government in its notes to the Tokyo Government has charged Japan with violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Anti-War Pact. As pointed out by some Japanese, America is apt to take a legalistic view of the situation, because of her lack of understanding of Far Eastern affairs. It is contended by them that heart-to-heart talks with America will eventually result in her understanding Japan's position, though Britain would seem incorrigible. Both the Japanese people and Government have been victims of such wishful thinking, whereas Great Britain and the United States have a common position and policy in the China affair.

"When hostilities started between Japan and China, the Japanese Government issued a statement--an unsolicited declaration--pledging its respect for the rights and interests of third Powers in China. The British Government responded by addressing an official note to the Japanese Government, demanding compensation for any damage suffered by Great Britain and British nationals as a result of Japanese military operations. A few days later, identical notes were sent to the Japanese Government by France and the United States.

"At that time, Captain Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that it was extremely fortunate in the Sino-Japanese conflict that the British Government was keeping in constant touch with the United States, by taking parallel, if not joint, action with the latter, and furthermore that Great Britain would be ready to go not only to Brussels but to Melbourne or any other place with the United States in regard to this question. In the China affair, the Anglo-American positions and views are identical. Great Britain has strenuously endeavoured since the very beginning of hostilities to involve the United States in the affair or to influence the American Government and people on her behalf. Such an analysis may offend most Americans, but it has been the national policy of Great Britain, based on the consensus of British opinion since the first world war, to win over the United States to her side, to secure American co-operation in all her vital international issues, to involve the United States in all important international complications, and, if possible, to make the United States take the foremost place, by casting away her own traditional isolation.

"The first manifestation of such a British policy appeared at the Washington Conference. As revealed in an article written a few years ago by an official who held a responsible post in the British Foreign Office, the Washington Conference represented the joint efforts of Britain and America to dispose of Far Eastern issues to their own advantage. The rewards of Anglo-American diplomacy show that co-operation

Article from "Contemporary Japan" of November 1940, page 1384.

and joint action between the two countries have never been so well achieved as at the Washington Conference. The conference resulted in the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had so displeased the United States. Japan was bound by the Nine-Power Treaty. She was forced to waive all her claims to interests in Shantung, which had been recognized by the Versailles Peace Treaty. Under the supervision of Great Britain and the United States was held a subsequent conference between Japan and China at Washington, with the result that Japan was compelled to return Shantung outright to China. Furthermore, Japan was tied down to an inferior naval ratio of 5 : 5 : 3. The British Foreign Office official concluded that the Anglo-American joint programme had worked splendidly.

"Since the first World War, Great Britain has consistently followed her policy of friendship and co-operation with the United States, or speaking more plainly, or utilization of the United States, which she has believed to be essential for the maintenance of the status quo. She realized it was impossible to protect her vast territorial and economic interests in the Far East or east of the Suez single-handed even before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Hence, her conclusion of an alliance with Japan.

"After the termination of the Russo-Japanese War, which ended in a signal victory for Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still necessary to Great Britain for securing her Empire's defence against Germany. After the war, Japan entered into a convention with Russia. In 1907, Great Britain followed suit. Now that Russia had been defeated by Japan, Great Britain turned her attention to Germany, whom she wanted to crush by utilizing her alliance with Japan. Therein lay the raison d'etre of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for Britain.

"This fact was frankly but innocently admitted by Sir Edward Grey, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the third time in 1911. He told Baron Kato, Japanese Ambassador, that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not so popular as before, but it was very useful in Great Britain's defence against Germany. This point was recognized by British political circles and therefore the Foreign Secretary added that Great Britain was extremely agreeable to a renewal of the alliance, by revising its provisions so as to conform with the new situation before its term expired. The new situation, as referred to, concerned relations between Great Britain and the United States. And it was the intention of Great Britain to revise the provisions of the alliance so as to free her from obligations as ally in case Japan came into an armed clash with America.

Article from "Contemporary Japan" of November 1940, page 1384.

"Great Britain had hitherto protected her vast territorial and economic interests in India, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, mainly by means of her alliance with Japan and to some extent by diplomatic operations based on friendly relations with the United States. During the first world war, a Japanese naval detachment proceeded as far as the Mediterranean Sea to protect British shipping. But still Britain sacrificed the alliance with Japan for co-operation with the United States, which she regarded as essential for maintaining her national existence in view of a change in the world situation. By terminating her alliance with Japan, Britain sought to tighten her friendship with America, which was absolutely necessary even from domestic considerations. This accounts for her joint action with the United States at the Washington Conference.

"Great Britain is ready today to sacrifice Japan's interests in order to secure co-operation with the United States. She is driving hard for joint action with America, which she now finds is absolutely necessary not only in the Far Eastern question, but in world issues.

"The United States, however, feels somewhat shy of this vigorous British approach. America does not have such a large interest in the Far East as Great Britain. To be sure, it is the fixed policy of the United States since her war with Spain in 1898-99, which resulted in her acquisition of the Philippines, to advance to the Far East, but her Far Eastern interests are comparatively small and to many do not warrant the assumption of unnecessary obligations across the Pacific Ocean.

"American investments in China, including the property of missionaries, barely comes to \$200,000,000, one-tenth of British investments. The United States thus takes a strong legalistic position, as observed by Hachiro Arita during his tenure of office as Foreign Minister, but she possesses no large material interests in China to defend. American interest in the Far Eastern question is based on ideals with an eye to future developments. Great Britain is realistic, as she desires to maintain her large interests in the Far East. It is obvious that she is defending these interests against Japan, whom she regards as her hypothetical foe in the Far East. Japan is a formidable rival in British eyes. Even during the Manchurian incident, the British were inclined to rely on America. At the meetings of the League of Nations, Sir John Simon, Britain's chief delegate, was evasive at every crucial moment. He was anxious to find a meeting-ground with Japan, so that he took a likewarm attitude toward the question. When economic sanctions were proposed against Japan during the League discussions, Great Britain failed to support them on the ground that the United States would

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not give her support. On a later occasion, Foreign Secretary Eden admitted that Great Britain was not in a position to support economic sanctions against Japan, because the two great nations interested in the Far East were not resolute enough and in a position to enforce such a measure in connection with the Manchurian incident. Through a realization of her weakness in the Far East, Great Britain is eager that the United States protect her interests there.

"During the Manchurian incident, Lloyd George and General Smuts made memorable addresses, advocating the vital necessity of co-operation between Great Britain and the United States. Stanley Baldwin, then Prime Minister, on one occasion went the length to declare that peace in any part of the world could be safeguarded, if the two Powers joined together.

"Such appeals from British statesmen failed to elicit any favourable response from the United States, who had an unpleasant remembrance of the likewarm attitude taken by Great Britain in the early stages of the Manchurian incident, contrary to American wishes.

"The situation between the two Powers, however, has presented an entirely different picture since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The United States has fallen in line with Great Britain, who on her part has done everything possible in her power to involve America in the China affair in order to restrain Japan in accordance with her China policy, vigorously pursued since 1935. President Roosevelt apparently takes more easily to British ideology and propaganda than Woodrow Wilson did, as was pointed out by a certain American writer. It took President Wilson a full two years to make the United States enter the World War, but a large section of American opinion today fears that President Roosevelt might involve the United States in war at any moment.

"In short, Great Britain has achieved a fair success in forming a joint Anglo-American front against Japan. The writer has taken every possible occasion to point this out in his writings and lectures, but the general public has failed to appreciate fully the close co-operation between Great Britain and the United States in the China question. Even now there is a considerable animosity towards Britain in Japan, but singularly enough, no patriotic organization or association advocating vigorous diplomacy has ever adopted such a stiff attitude toward America. Some Japanese are still labouring under the notion that the United States may be alienated from Great Britain or that a definite split may occur in their joint camp.

Article from "Contemporary Japan" of November 1940, page 1384.

"In this connection, it must be noted that neither Great Britain nor the United States has ever made secret of what they wanted to seek in their policies toward the Far East. Secret diplomacy does not prevail in those two countries. Look at British newspapers or discussions in the Houses of Lords and Commons, and the policies and attitude of Great Britain will be clearly seen. So it is with the United States to an ever greater extent. From the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the United States has brought continuous pressure to bear upon Japan. But no form of pressure has been enforced without notice. A warning of several months or several weeks at least has been given in each case. The American abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was described here as a surprise measure taken without notice, but if one had taken the pains to read American newspapers, the American action would easily have been foreseen.

"In terminating this treaty, the United States was actuated by the desire to ban exports of war materials to Japan with a view to rendering it impossible for her to keep up military operations in China, because the United States believed that Japan had been dependent upon her for the supply of her war materials. Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, who represented the Administration, first introduced an anti-Japanese war materials embargo bill in the Senate, which, however, was opposed by Senator Vandenberg, a Republican leader, as a violation of the Commercial Treaty with Japan. Expert opinion in the State Department was in favour of a resolution for denunciation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

"These circumstances were not known to Japan, where a strong desire was voiced for the conclusion of a commercial modus vivendi with the United States. It was a foregone conclusion, however, that the United States would never enter into such an arrangement as would defeat the aim of the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty.

"It must be noted too that America's action was also designated as a demonstration against Great Britain's alleged submission to Japan in the Tientsin issue, whereas the Tientsin arrangement was not an agreement at all, but a mere formula, as pointed out by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons. The Arita-Craigie formula, which was reached in July, 1939, recognized that large scale military operations are being conducted in China and that the Japanese forces find it necessary to take certain measures for their own safety in the occupied areas. This formula did not recognize Japan's belligerent rights as stipulated by international law, nor did it affect Great Britain's pro-Chiang policy at all. Even after the conclusion of the Arita-Craigie formula, Great Britain continued extending financial assistance to the Chiang

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Kai-shek regime, as evidenced by the active traffic which has been going on along the Burma route since the Tokyo conference of July, 1939. Nevertheless, some Japanese rejoiced over the Anglo-Japanese arrangement which they regarded as a diplomatic victory, while the American and British press denounced it as a Far Eastern Munich. The bitter tone of press comments stirred the American Government to action. The result was the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was carried out to curb Japan's action in China. A member of the British Embassy staff in Tokyo reported to have regretted that the American action had come two weeks later according to an article published in Britain. The British official apparently implied that Great Britain would not have made such a concession as the Tientsin formula if the United States had denounced her Commercial Treaty with Japan a fortnight before. Every time Great Britain has made a concession evidently in favour of Japan, the United States has stiffened her attitude toward the Island Empire.

"A few months before the outbreak of the war in Europe, the United States made a gesture toward the European Powers, to impress them that she would hold Japan in check should hostilities occur in Europe. Since war started in Europe, the United States has persistently looked upon any concession granted Japan by European Powers, including Great Britain, with disfavour, and has urged Great Britain, France and others to go ahead with their joint punitive expedition against Germany, with implied assurances that there would be no occasion for worry about Japan.

"The first action which the United States took in this direction was, as mentioned before, her denunciation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. The second one was her mammoth rearmament programme, adopted immediately after the spectacular success of Germany's Blitzkrieg, which resulted in the easy collapse of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. When France entered into an arrangement with Japan for the closure of the French Indo-China route, Great Britain was obliged to follow suit, by closing the Burma road for three months, from July 18, in view of the sudden turn of the European situation. The United States was chagrined at the alleged weak-kneed attitude of Great Britain and France, and taking advantage of the heavy shock dealt the world, including the United States, by Germany's brilliant Blitzkrieg, President Roosevelt launched his gigantic rearmament programme which called for a 70 per cent. increase in American naval strength within six years in addition to the naval building plans already approved, an expansion of the army and navy air forces, to 40,000 or 50,000 planes, and the organization of a standing army of 2,000,000 strong. This mammoth rearmament plan is predicated upon industrial mobilization on an unprecedentedly large scale, and

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thus national resources must be used primarily for rearmament and secondarily for Britain's assistance. Such a situation now looks the United States in the face, and it must be remembered that her gigantic rearmament plan also serves to bring pressure upon Japan.

"Legislation has been enacted by the American Government for conserving national resources in connection with the rearmament programme by enforcing a licence system for exports of aviation gasoline, highgrade heavy oil for making aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, iron, steel and scrap iron and steel. This legislation has been effective since August 1. It is ultimately intended to bring economic pressure on Japan in such a way as to render it impossible for her to continue military operations in China. This is a manifestation of American dissatisfaction with the Anglo-French submission to Japan in connection with the closure of the Burma and French Indo-China roads as well as of the American assumption of a selfimposed talk to hold Japan in check for herself, Britain and France. If the situation continues, Japan must be prepared for a total ban on all American exports of not only aviation gasoline and ordinary gasoline but petroleum as well. Thus the more pressure Japan brings to bear upon Great Britain, the stiffer will be the American attitude toward Japan.

"The Anglo-American front against Japan is not limited to the China Affair alone, but is also extended to the South Sea question. Germany's successful Blitzkrieg in Europe has imparted a powerful impetus to Japan's southward policy, which, in the eyes of Great Britain and the United States, has been deliberately pursued, by taking advantage of Great Britain's difficult position. Indeed, Britain's plight is very grave. The British Isles are virtually besieged by the Germans. As recently voiced by a responsible American statesman in Congress, it is apparently the consensus of opinion in the United States that there is no hope of holding the British Isles and that the British Government must ultimately flee to Canada. The United States is now concerned not so much over the rescue of Britain as over the fate of the British fleet. America believes that everything in her power must be done to prevent the British fleet from falling into German hands, because of a serious possibility of Germany's penetrating into Latin America following her successful conquest of the British Isles.

"The intelligent classes of the United States have long seen the relations between the United States and Great Britain in a correct light. They have appreciated the strength of the British fleet which has enabled the United States to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. With the Atlantic dominated by the British fleet, the United States is in a position to send all her naval forces to the Pacific to bring pressure

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against Japan and even to menace Japan with the possibility of trans-oceanic operations. In other words, Great Britain, or rather the British fleet, is the sentinel or first line of American defence. In assisting Great Britain, the United States has so far been animated by kinship, mingled with ideas of justice and chivalry. Now, however, an entirely different idea stimulates the United States to action for the sake of Great Britain. Germany conquered France in less than a month, with the result that even the British Isles are now in imminent danger. Should the British fleet fall into Germany's hands, it would seal the fate of not only Great Britain, but that of the United States. Both the American Government and people have now fully realized that the United States and Great Britain are bound to stand or fall together. America's generous assistance to Great Britain, the Anglo-American union, is now a self-defence measure for the United States, not a manifestation of mere American chivalry, friendship or kindness.

"On the part of Great Britain, she is fully prepared to sacrifice everything to save herself. Even if the European war ends in a victory for Great Britain, the British Government will be in the hands of the working classes, rather than men of high class or the intelligentsia as in the past. Indeed, within two hours of the start of the battle in Flanders, Great Britain turned into a totalitarian State of a leftist complexion, by requisitioning through unanimous Parliamentary action the entire resources of the country, private property and personal freedom for the prosecution of the war. Again, on the eve of France's collapse, the British Government submitted to the French proposals for an Anglo-French union. The proposals, however, were rejected by the French Government, which regarded them as reducing France to the status of a subject nation. Now, Prime Minister Winston Churchill openly declares in Parliament that he is ready to discuss proposals for an Anglo-American union. In order to escape defeat in the current war, British statesmen assert that they are prepared to reduce their Empire to the status of a dominion under the leadership of the United States.

"Just as Winston Churchill has handed over leadership at home to the Labour Party, he will hand over leadership of the Anglo-Saxon Empire to the United States, which, forming a scion of the Anglo-Saxon family, as it were, has grown stronger and richer than Great Britain. For the past several centuries, Great Britain has been mistress of the world, but she is now prepared to acknowledge American leadership in the envisaged Anglo-Saxon bloc, one of the four blocs, into which the world is likely to be divided.

"The United States flatters herself that she must be leader of the

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Anglo-Saxon bloc. The Americans contend that totalitarianism, as represented by Germany and Italy, is a morbid phenomenon, because the true aspect of European civilization lies in liberalism and democracy, democratic government and free economy. It is further contended that the struggle now going on in Europe is not a war, but a revolution. From such an ideological viewpoint, the envisioned Anglo-American union is not limited to a joint front between Britain and America in the China question, but on the contrary is extended to the entire world situation. The United States may thus attempt to protect the vast British territorial and economic interests not only in the Straits Settlements and the Netherlands East Indies, but throughout the entire Pacific area east of the Suez, by using Hongkong, Singapore, Australia and New Guinea as naval and air bases jointly with Great Britain.

"Should the British Government flee to Canada, failing to defend the home country before the German onslaught, the British fleet would not surrender to Germany or be scuttled. Recently a number of British islands in the Atlantic were leased to the United States for ninety-nine years as naval and air bases, while the American Government has entered into joint defence arrangement with Canada. It would thus appear that the British fleet will undertake to defend the Atlantic, while the Pacific will be left to the defence of the America fleet. Should the British fleet be compelled to flee from the British Isles, however, the writer has a presentiment that its main force will move to Singapore instead of seeking refuge in Canadian ports, for in Europe there is no German navy sufficiently strong to meet the British fleet, while the Italian navy has not succeeded as yet in securing mastery of the Mediterranean, though it may harass and has often harassed the British fleet with attacks from the air as well as by special service craft.

"Both Great Britain and the United States now think they feel a direct menace from Japan's southward advance. They fear that Japan may attempt to create a Greater East Asiatic sphere of common existence and prosperity, including not only French Indo-China, but the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya, other British possessions in the South Seas and even Australia. Should Japan be successful in creating such a Greater East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity, they fear that Japan would set up an imperialistic bloc, far greater than any imperialistic one ever established, for that part of the world produces all resources necessary for modern Powers, including oil, tin, rubber, iron and bauxite.

"One of the writer's friends calls that part of the globe the "Mediterranean of Asia". Europe has an old saying that any country which has obtained mastery of the Mediterranean will become mistress

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of Europe. The "Mediterranean of Asia" lies at the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, surrounded by continents and groups of islands, which are rich in natural resources. The writer's friend believes that any Power which has dominated the "Mediterranean of Asia" will become mistress not only of Asia but of the whole world. The writer himself also subscribes to his view. No wonder that the Japanese people are so much interested in their southward advance, which both Great Britain and the United States are making frantic efforts to thwart. It should be remembered, too, that, with the exception of Singapore, there is no naval port in the British Empire, excluding the British Isles, large enough to accommodate the largest fleet in the world. This consideration alone will be a strong inducement for the British fleet to concentrate at Singapore rather than flee to Canada.

"It is because of these world-wide considerations that Japan views with something more than casual interest the Anglo-American-union now in process of formation. Indeed, time and circumstances have brought Japan to a great turning point in her history."

HONDA's attitude toward Sino-Japanese relations
in the spring of 1941

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino*Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

I. HONDA's attitude as interpreted by Otto D. Tolischus in his "Tokyo Record" published in 1943. Pages 87 - 91.

"May 10. A voice, coming 'out'er China 'crosst the Bay,' cried out to-day against all Japanese attempts at direct peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek. It not only gave official confirmation that such peace negotiations were going on, but it also denounced them as 'foolish dreams' and an 'unpardonable mistake,' which disregard the reality of American aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

"The voice was that of Kumataro HONDA, senior Japanese statesman and Ambassador to Wang Ching-wei. It was announced that he was en route to Tokyo with a 'new plan' for settling the 'China Incident,' which had grown into an 'Affair' and even a 'China Emergency.' And Honda made it quite plain that he was speaking for the Japanese Army and Navy in China, as well as for the 'representatives of the Foreign Office in China'--meaning the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, headed by himself. 'Complete agreement,' he announced, 'has been reached between them with regard to the plan I am carrying with me to Tokyo.' Once again, as in 1931, the world was witnessing the spectacle of a Japanese expeditionary force to the continent attempting to dictate the policy of the home Government. And it was quite clear against whom Honda was shooting. An active Ambassador on duty was assailing his Foreign Minister in public. For Honda launched his attack in an interview with the NICHU NICHU at Shanghai, and all papers of the organization played it up as a big sensation. I cabled the interview to New York in full.

"The 'new plan,' it appeared from Honda's statement, was to fight Chiang Kai-shek to the end, and give all-out support to Wang Ching-wei. For that purpose, Honda demanded that the so-called basic treaty between Tokyo and Nanking, hitherto a dead letter, be put into effect and implemented in practice. Said Honda:

"The Sino-Japanese Pact, is, so to speak, a plan for the construction of new Sino-Japanese relations as an axis of a New Order in East Asia. The plan will remain a piece of paper and a castle in the air unless the foundation is consolidated in accordance with the plan. To argue about the future of the National (Wang Ching-wei) Government without trying to put the plan into practice reveals ignorance of Japan's fundamental policy."

He declaimed:

"If there is anyone, who, over-eager for early termination of the China Affair, hopes to conduct direct negotiations with Chungking, and to set aside Japan's fundamental policy in this respect, he dreams a foolish dream."

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"Nor was there any chance, said Honda, to realize peace with Chungking through other Powers, Germany for instance. 'Chungking,' he said 'does not feel menaced by Germany, but the influence of Great Britain and the United States over Chungking is firm and immovable.'

"The Japanese Army, whose generals were waxing rich on the spoils of the continent, was not going to get out of China for anybody. Not even for Matsuoka. The pledge which he thought he could give President Roosevelt was already being repudiated. A conquered China was to be part of the Asiatic Axis, and that meant expulsion of the 'red-haired barbarians,' as Toyama had demanded a short while ago. It was going to be an interesting showdown."

"May 11. The State Secrets Defence Law went into effect yesterday, and an anti-spy week, designed to 'diffuse the anti-spy thought among the people,' began to-day. The Home Ministry issued a warning to the people to be careful in their daily speech and avoid being utilized by spies. In an age of total war, said the Ministry, spies concern themselves not only with military matters, but with various kinds of state secrets which might be found on the street. And spies, the Ministry explained, are not the romantic figures portrayed in novels, but might be anybody. That meant that the Japanese were going to be even more tight-lipped than ever. But the problem of a newspaper correspondent was not so much getting news, which could not be kept away from him; the problem was what to do with the news when he got it. Especially in view of the explanation of the new law as given by Tizo Ohta, director in the Justice Ministry. He said:

"There are laws to protect military secrets, but diplomatic and other state secrets have not been protected sufficiently in the past. Hitherto, international trouble was often caused in examining foreigners on suspicion of espionage because of lack of proper legal endorsements to do so. The new law was made to correct this situation. State secrets, as defined in the law, are items discussed and the proceedings of all Imperial Conferences and Supreme Council and Cabinet meetings, items discussed and the proceedings of secret sessions of the Diet, and other items concerning administration. The people are requested to refrain from commenting in public or in newspapers and magazines on what their common sense tells them is unfavourable to the country if known by foreigners.'

Yet, here was Honda broadcasting to the world what was, at the moment, Japan's greatest state secret. How, under these circumstances, did one handle the story? I decided, more than ever, to let the Japanese tell the story themselves.

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"Matsuoka wined and dined the German and Italian Ambassadors at Atami. He had had no contact with either Grew or Craigie since his return from Europe.

"The KOKUMIN declared to-day that American public opinion seemed to have gone 'crazy.'

"The outrageous opinions recently expressed in Congress that the United States should give Japan one week's notice to walk out of the Axis, and that the American Air Force should bomb Tokyo, should not be passed over as merely instances of American irresponsibility. Strictly speaking, these statements are a desecration of the honour and the dignity of Japan, and can at once become a casus belli."

"May 12. Arriving at Kobe, Honda issued another blast along the same lines as his Shanghai interview. The JAPAN TIMES ADVERTISER said in a banner headline: "Peace Talk Blasted!"

"Another barrage against the 'New Bureaucrats' and their 'New Economic Structure' (backed by Matsuoka) was fired to-day from the business camp. At a round-table discussion between government and business leaders, presided over by Konoye himself, business submitted these demands to the Government:

"Establishment of the Fuhrer principle in officialdom, not to run business, but to remove a tendency among junior officials to disobey senior officials, so that the orders of the latter will be carried out.

'Co-ordination of the work of government offices and reduction of the entire administrative mechanism.

'Limitation of government control to general supervision, and turning over the practical economic control administration to private business organizations.

'Prompt disposal of all requests for necessary permits, which are to be considered granted if not acted upon within a specified period.

'Simplification of many laws and regulations to facilitate uniform interpretation by government officials.

'Selection of government officials according to their administrative ability rather than according to their educational careers, and their re-education by assignment to civilian concerns or factories, where they could study business affairs and social problems from the practical side.'"

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"May 14. Dropping all diplomatic innuendoes, Honda to-day issued a virtual ultimatum to Matsuoka in the name of the Army and the Navy, calling on the Foreign Minister to 'co-operate' with them in their China policy as embodied in a document which he was carrying with him and which he had not yet been submitted to the Foreign Minister. This was a remarkable procedure; but it was made even more remarkable by the fact that this ultimatum was issued at Kyoto, the ancient capital where for centuries Japanese Emperors had been confined by military dictators--Shoguns--and restricted to their purely spiritual duties as godheads of the nation who should not pollute their hands with sordid, mundane affairs. Matsuoka was seeing the Emperor so frequently, in obvious efforts to enlist Imperial support for his own China policy, that the frequency of the audiences was beginning to arouse comment in the press, and Honda's choice of place for issuing his ultimatum was too pointed to be overlooked in a country where meanings are implicit, not explicit. Said Honda:

"Japan should fulfil the terms and conditions stipulated in the Sino-Japanese basic agreement to the letter. This conclusion has been arrived at after an exchange of views among General Shunroku Hata, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in China, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, and the Ambassador to China. Needless to say, officers of both the Army and the Navy are of one mind with us. Inasmuch as the Japanese Army is so enthusiastic about strengthening the National Government (of Wang Ching-wei), it is only natural that the Foreign Minister should co-operate with the Japanese Army. At one time, some political brokers seem to have made manoeuvres in Shanghai aimed at direct negotiations with the Chungking regime ...but now that the way for Japan and China to tread has been fixed by the Sino-Japanese Pact, both the Government and the people should summarily withdraw their hands from such manoeuvres. There is no need to make undue haste in bringing about general peace.

"Moreover, he called on Matsuoka to 'exercise the power of the Tripartite Pact' (with Germany and Italy) to obtain Axis recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime.

"Tojo expressed approval. In a speech to a conference of chiefs of staff of the Japanese armies, including those on the continent, he said:

"The Army must form the basis for Japan's national policies, the aim of which is the attainment of the full objectives of the China Incident and the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.' Colonel Mabuchi added, as Army spokesman, that the China hostilities would be long drawn-out and difficult.

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"And the HOCHI, usually regarded as subsidized by the Nazis, but directed by Army circles, denounced any advocacy of Japanese entrance into war against America merely to aid Germany, irrespective of consequences (as advocated by Matsuoka under the Triple Alliance) as 'German fifth-column work,' 'We love our friend German,' said this paper, 'but we love our own country more.'

"Perhaps the flight of Rudolf Hess to England, which came as a stunning sensation to the Japanese, had something to do with this. But Matsuoka to-day received Grew and Craigie for the first time since his return."

"May 16. Honda and Matsuoka held a two-hour conference to-day. An official communique said that it proceeded 'in a most cordial atmosphere.' No attempt was made any longer to disguise their differences. And who would win was obvious. Ishii explained to the correspondents that Honda was Japan's senior statesman, outranking even Matsuoka. And Honda had the backing of the military besides.

"A YOMIURI comment seemed to confirm to-day that the reason for Matsuoka's efforts at peace in China was not peace as such, but the 'Southward Ho!' policy which might bring Japan into conflict with the United States. And reports from China indicated the reasons for the sudden flare-up. Wang Ching-wei, hearing of the peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, was getting worried. He demanded to know where he stood. He had gone so far as to issue an interview with the ASAHI, saying:

"I am appealing to the Japanese to abandon their traditional idea of China as a country ripe for conquest, and their traditional feeling of contempt for the Chinese, and to establish an educational policy of friendship for China, so that both states may be placed a foundation of everlasting peace.

The puppet was presuming to chide the master; there was danger that he might jump off entirely and retreat to the position of patriotism which has served as refuge for many scoundrels. To placate him, something had to be done. And the something was to be a state visit by Wang to Tokyo.

"The attention of the public was being distracted from the quarrels by great publicity given to the Empress's pilgrimage to the shrines at Kyoto."

"May 22. A Tokyo publisher sent me two complimentary copies of a Japanese translation of my book on Germany, THEY WANTED WAR. The two copies were my royalties on the Japanese edition. The Japanese press was at times rather indignant about the Shanghai practice of pirating books without so much as 'by your leave' but Japanese publishers did not mind doing the same. There was, in fact, a regular guild of

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"translator and the publisher knew that I was in Japan, it would have been only polite to ask my permission before issuing the book. But then, the Shanghai pirates, who also republished my book, did not even send me complimentary copies.

"I took note that there was no objection in Japan to a book the contents of which had caused the Nazis to expel me from Germany."

II. HONDA's Attitude as interpreted by the Newspapers

A. NICHI NICHI report as translated in 10 May 1941 AM edition of JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER

"We are in full accord with Ambassador Honda and General Hata who declared that not bemused by a favorable turn in Japan's diplomacy, they would go ahead with the task of consolidating the National Government of China.

"Japan's policy to support and develop the National Government is already fixed, and we must carefully consider the circumstances which have made it necessary for the Japanese leaders in China to make such a declaration at this time.

"... Unless Japan wins confidence the Greater East Solidarity Sphere cannot be realized. Japan should show in conduct that Japan's policy to extend the fullest support to the Wang Regime will not be shaken in the least by any change in the domestic or international situation."

B. Article in the KOKUMIN SHIMBUN as translated in 10 May 1941 AM edition of JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER

"It is reported that Ambassador Honda is leaving Shanghai today aboard the Tatsuta Maru for the purpose of making recommendations to the Government in connection with increasing Japan's aid to the Wang Regime. A report further has it that Ambassador Honda has arrived at concrete measures after consultation with General Shunroku Hata, Supreme Commander of Japanese Expeditionary Forces to China, and Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet in China waters. Recommendations of this nature coming from the spot, as they do, when the Neutrality Treaty has been concluded with the Soviet Union and a new situation in the Pacific is about to develop, are most timely and appropriate, and it is only natural that great hopes are being pinned to his recommendations.

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"The new developments in the European war and the superior position of the Axis Powers have led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Neutrality between Japan and the U.S.S.R. This has in turn apparently altered the position of Japan in the Pacific, and needless to say, Japan is now faced with the most urgent necessity of ending the China Affair. It is most important and imperative that Japan should reap the harvest of the four years of war before the European war comes to an end.

"The European war has now reached a stage where American participation is inevitably imminent. Apparently, the United States in the nightmare of her own danger has no time to think whether she is too late or not. Sooner or later, America will follow the fate of the small nations in the Near East and Europe, who have cracked. Uncle Sam is going mad viewing peaceful Japan with prejudice and groaning under the Nemesis of a war-picture of her own drawing, while Japan's peaceful economic policy is in a close-up before the eyes of the world. If Japan's peaceful policy should be further clarified by Ambassador Honda's recommendations to the Government, the future of East Asia will become very bright."

C. Extract from 10 May 1941 P.M. edition of JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER.

"PEACE TALK IS BLASTED

"Only Road for Disposal of China Affair Lies in Solidifying Nanking Regime, Says Ambassador Honda

"Bitterly assailing attempts at direct negotiations with the Chiang regime, Kumataro Honda, Japanese envoy to Nanking, declared Thursday, in Shanghai, that the only road for Japan to take toward termination of the China affair was to continue vigorous bringing-up of the Nanking regime under President Wang Ching-wei into a healthy and powerful State

"This statement was made in an interview with a representative of the Nichi Nichi, just prior to his departure for Japan.

"Ambassador Honda drew his conclusions from the following facts:

"1. The so-called 'direct negotiations' are nothing but a wild illusion which will reduce the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty, recently concluded and ratified by His Majesty the Emperor, into a mere scrap of paper.

"2. It is now too late for such a move for Japan has formally recognized the Nanking Government and concluded a treaty with it.

"3. The Chungking Government has no intention of concluding peace although it is now more than tired of continuing war. It is now hoping that prolonging the struggle some development favorable to it may occur

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in the European war.

"4. Chungking places sole reliance on the United States in reference to realization of peace with Japan.

"5. There can be no peace through mediation by third Powers.

"Mr. Honda declared that the stabilization of the people's livelihood and consolidation of the foundation of the National Government should be the only way leading to full peace between Japan and China.

"Appreciating the earnest desire of the National Government, the Japanese Government, should go a step further in supporting the National Government, Ambassador Honda stated.

Fully Determined

"I am an old soldier summoned to the colors. Now that I have gone to China in accordance with the august wishes of His Majesty the Emperor, I am firmly determined to proceed toward disposal of the China affair, the national task of Japan, irrespective of my life.

"The instructions given to me by the Government was to put into practice the Sino-Japanese treaty concluded between President Wang Ching-wei of the National Government and General Nobuyuki Abe, the then Japan's special envoy to China, in November last year, on the basis of the Government's decision, and to proceed toward the goal of complete disposal of the China affair by supporting and strengthening the National Government.

"There is no change in the situation and no need of changing this Government's policy. As for me, since I have not received any instruction from my home Government to alter this policy, I will firmly maintain the program of supporting and strengthening the National Government at Nanking.

"The strengthening and supporting of the Nanking Government is the established national policy of Japan. The object, however, will not be attained unless this Government's policy is put into practice.

"Diplomacy will not bear fruit in a day. Whether conclusion of a treaty is successful or not depends upon results of the observance of the treaty.

"The Sino-Japanese basic treaty concluded Last November is, so to speak, a plan for construction of new Sino-Japanese relations as an axis

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"of a new order in East Asia. The plan will remain a piece of paper and a castle in the air, unless the foundation is consolidated in accordance with the plan.

"The only way to be followed by Japan toward termination of the China affair is to extend support so that the huge structure of the Nanking Government may be completed.

"To argue about the future of the National Government without trying to put the plan into practice reveals the ignorance of the spirit of Japan's fundamental policy..."

D. Extract from 12 May 1941 A.M. edition of JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER, Editorial

"Mr. Honda on China

"The exclusive interview that Kumataro Honda, Japanese Ambassador to China gave to the Tokyo Nichi Nichi at Shanghai on Friday as fully reported in the paper the next day, throws an illuminating light on Japan's China policy, which to no small extent requires to be restated in concrete terms. When Mr. Honda's trip back to Tokyo was announced last week, it was indicated that he was taking the trip on some important mission. This impression is now substantiated by what he has given out for public information.

"Mr. Honda is one of the most stimulating intellects that our diplomatic service has produced. His expressions, if sometimes caustic, are always succinct and to the point. In discussing the China situation he shows that his keen mind has well grasped the ground he has been covering since his assumption of office.

"One of the most important points he takes up in Chungking's attitude toward Japan, and in the course of the discussion he reveals a surprising, if not wholly unsuspected, fact. 'If,' he is quoted as saying, 'there should be anybody who, from impatience, should approach Chungking for direct negotiation, he is a romantic fool.'

"Direct negotiations with Chungking,' Mr. Honda observes, 'would not only have the result of unnecessarily prolonging the Incident but even strengthening the resistance front of the Chungking forces. This fact should be patent even to a three-year-old child. If anybody, because of illusionary hopes from Chungking, should fail to see the real importance of helping the Wang Ching-wei regime, he is committing a most serious error.'

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"The implication is pretty obvious. Evidently there are or were 'romantic fools'. No age has been without them and this can be no exception. While we have no knowledge of their activities in China, our Ambassador must have seen that there are men foolish enough to believe that Chungking would lend an ear to Japan's peace overtures. Such an idea betrays ignorance matched only by naivete.

"Direct negotiation with Chungking, as Mr. Honda points out, would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty concluded with Nanking last year. 'Besides,' says Mr. Honda, 'it is far too late to negotiate with Chungking. Chiang Kai-shek would entertain peace overtures only when they were made through America.' Probably Japan missed a chance when it held itself disdainfully aloof from Chungking, saying that 'it will have nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek'. But such reflections would do no good. The thought of peace entered few minds at the time, and even then it may be seriously questioned if any effective sort of peace was at all possible at any time.

"The Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty that was concluded last November laid the foundation for the new relationship that was to be developed between Japan and China. Mr. Honda compares it to a blue print plan for the new Sino-Japanese relationship which is to be 'the axis for the new East Asia order.' 'This plan,' he remarks, 'would amount only to a scrap of paper unless the structure was built with frames and cement from the foundation upward. The completion, with Japanese aid and support, of a great structure in the form of the revived National Government is the only course that Japan can take for the conclusion of the China Affair. This is the undertaking that should be attended to now, first and foremost. Those who talk of the future of the revived National Government without or before erecting the new structure on the present plan would only betray their failure to grasp the true method of concluding the China Affair. By the growth and development of the Wang Ching-wei regime alone would the conclusion of the China Affair be achieved. Of this I am fully convinced.'

"Mr. Honda's attitude fully bears out the view we recently took in these columns regarding Japan's position toward the Nanking regime. Of the part that Japan played in creation of the new National Government there is no mystery. It marks the first milestone that Japan set up on the road to new peaceful construction in China. It was the first sign of peaceful augury that had emerged from the tragedy of war. It was the first expression of peace that the Japanese nation addressed to its neighbor nation. Japan could never betray its own policy or principle by its failure to support the cause it has openly and ambitiously taken up.

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"Next, referring to the relations between Chungking and Washington. Mr. Honda shows himself under no delusion. The hold of Britain and America, especially America, over Chungking, he says, is firm and unmovable. 'Now that America has made clear,' observes Mr. Honda, 'that its policy is to see Chungking's resistance against Japan continued, Chiang Kai-shek has decided to maintain his double front against Japan and the Communists.' Peace, therefore, with Japan would be impossible unless America so willed.

"Should Chungking make peace against the wish of America' opines Mr. Honda. 'the retaliatory sanctions from America would be swift and severe.' Such danger would never be hazarded. Impossible, says Mr. Honda, especially when America is freezing up foreign credits and Chiang Kai-shek, the Soong family, Dr. K. Kung hold billions of dollars deposited in American banks. These wealthy Chungking statesmen and their families placed themselves under the tyranny of America's dollar diplomacy when they converted their fortunes into American dollars."

E. Extract from 14 May 1941 A.M. edition of JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER

POLICY CONFERENCE ON CHINA PROBLEMS SAID AIM OF HONDA

New Ways to Aid Nanking China
Government May be Aired
At Joint Meeting

Envoy Brings Suggestions
Senior Statesman Recommends Full and Immediate Fulfillment
of Treaty With China

"... Ambassador Honda, who left Kyoto shortly after noon, stopped over at Nagoya. He is due to arrive here this afternoon. He expects to take an early opportunity for laying his plans for a strengthened China policy before Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, War Minister Hideki Tojo, and Navy Minister Koshiro Oikawa.

Army, Navy Approve

"Ambassador Honda's plan was reported to embody the conclusions which were reached at meetings of the highest leaders of the Army and Navy forces on the spot which had been called to discuss ways of augmenting the nation's policy for the disposal of the China affair in the light of developments in the military situation in Europe which have left no doubt about the international character of the affair.

"The confident expectation of informed quarters is that, in event of the materialization of Ambassador Honda's plan, teeth would be put into the policy which has hitherto been followed by the Government toward

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"China since the conclusion of the basic Japan-China Treaty late last year which is one of giving every assistance to the new National Government in its development while putting the utmost armed pressure on the military forces of the Chungking government.

"... Following is the gist of what Ambassador Honda told the press at the Kyoto Hotel.

"Within the short period of six months since the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Basic Agreement on November 30 last, the National Government in Nanking, has made great achievements. First of all, the National Government recognized Manchoukuo and exchanged diplomatic representatives with that country. Perhaps only the Wang Regime could have done that. Only Herculean courage could have cooperated with Japan in the midst of a conflict between Japan and China, and under prevailing restrictions the Wang Regime has fully collaborated with Japan.

Celebrate Nanking Return

"In the military field, at the first anniversary of the return of China's capital to Nanking in March, President Wang gathered in Nanking over 60 generals from Hopeh, Kwangtung and the Wuhan districts and held a military council there. At that time President Wang Ching-wei delivered an instructive speech on the spirit of the formation of the army and made a great hit.

"President Wang Ching-wei also recently organized the Tsing Hsiang Hui or Peace Preservation Council. This has great significance. The formation of the Peace Preservation Council was being studied at the time when General Nishio was the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces to China. The idea is to purge bandits by the Peace Preservation Army in concert with Japanese troops commencing with a certain area and to extend the activity to other territories as soon as the peace and order of that area has been restored and to leave the purged areas entirely in the hands of the National Government. In this way, the responsibility of Japanese forces in China will be gradually reduced, and this should be credited to the military accomplishments of the National Government...

Policy Difficult

"It is the unshakable policy of Japan to give growth and consolidation to the National Government, but in certain cases it is very difficult to harmonize the Japanese military strategy with the policy of bringing up the National Government. For instance, there is the rice problem and the economic isolation between the Japanese-occupied and unoccupied zones by the enforcement of the license system for import from and export

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"to unoccupied territories put into effect since the end of last year. This step was, of course, taken for strategic necessities, but at the same time, it is undeniable that it had an adverse effect upon the life of the people under the National Government. It is, therefore, necessary to relax such controls within the purview of not interfering with the strategy for the purpose of cooperating with the National Government in solving the question of the living of the Chinese people. Whatever promise President Wang may give to the people for the realization of a happy and prosperous life, if the people should be actually facing starvation, the National Government would not be able to win the hearts of the people. At this juncture Japan should fulfill the terms and conditions stipulated in the Sino-Japanese Basic Agreement to the letter.

Views in Accord

"This conclusion has been arrived at after exchange of views among General Shunroku Hata, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in China, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fleet in China waters and the Ambassador to China. Needless to say, officers of both the Army and Navy are of one mind with us. As a matter of fact, the Japanese Army in China has been discussing ways and means of consolidating the National Government with the Wang regime, and some have already been put into effect. Inasmuch as the Japanese Army is so enthusiastic over the strengthening of the National Government, it is only natural that the Foreign Ministry should cooperate with the Japanese Army. For instance, it would be advisable to have the Axis Powers extend recognition to the National Government. I am sure that Germany and Italy will be quite willing to recognize the Wang regime if Japan exercises the power of the Triple Alliance Pact.

"It is also necessary to work out measures for realizing economic cooperation between Japan and the National Government as a means of strengthening the power of the latter. Monopolization of profits by a certain portion of Japanese people under the name of Sino-Japanese joint capital should be shunned. National policy companies have been established in accordance with the governing law, and I wish to refrain from commenting on them, but at least the minds of the people who are running them should undergo a change. One should fully realize that a little movement of the Japanese officers, officials and the people have effects on the Chinese people that cannot be ignored.'

"Turning to the question of the Chungking Regime, Ambassador Honda, said, 'Chiang Kai-shek is a statesman. He knows very well that the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party are incompatible. It looks as if he has confidence in his ability to conduct the anti-Japanese campaign and the anti-Communist war at the same time. The Japanese people are liable to fall into the delusion that the situation has become favorable to Japan on account of the reported split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. One should avoid confusing hopes with realities.

HONDA's attitude as Ambassador to Nanking toward Sino-Japanese Relations in the Spring of 1941

"I am of the opinion that even if there should be a split between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party General Chiang will not give up the anti-Japanese campaign, especially since the United States is going all out to egg on General Chiang in the resistance campaign.

"...Therefore, the key to a general peace is the consolidation of the National Government by Japanese help. There is no need to make undue haste in bringing about a general peace. First of all, set an example of Sino-Japanese cooperation backed by sincerity and faith and extend it gradually to all territory of China. I, for one, am of the opinion that the survival of the National Government or a general peace solely hinges upon the question of strengthening the National Government with the aid of Japan."

SECRET

NAME: HONDA, Kumatoro.

PRESENT STATUS: Detained under House Arrest.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

From 1898 to 1926 held many important posts in the diplomatic service. In 1940 was called back from retirement and appointed as Ambassador to Nanking, and in 1944 was Advisor to the Foreign Office. Gave numerous speeches before the KOKUMONSHA (National Foundation Society) in which he aired his ultra-nationalistic views. Also contributed articles to its publication "KOKUMON". In 1944 was Advisor to East Asia Development Headquarters of IRAA.

Evaluation of the reports on HONDA show him to have been extremely active behind the scenes after his retirement from the diplomatic service in 1926. A vigorous advocate of the pro-Axis policy and a ruthless opponent of efforts to conciliate the United States and Britain. Was selected as Ambassador to Nanking by Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA because considered an expert on Chinese affairs. The press recognized the appointment as of prime importance because of HONDA's forceful qualities, relations with the fighting services and imperialistic opinions. Was an ardent supporter of a strong, uncompromising policy in China. Close friend of General Shunroku HATA, one of the most brilliant Japanese Army Officers, and army preparedness propagandist of wide note. No recommendations regarding final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIS/G-2, FEC.

REMARKS:

The positions held by SUBJECT in the Japanese Government, his connections with political organizations and the nature of his activities in these, show that during the period involved he took an active part in the

"planning, preparation, initiation or waging of war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the foregoing"

within the meaning and intent of paragraph 1.a. of Reference A.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class A war criminal suspect and tried before an International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

SECRET
-1-

HONDA, Kumotaro (2532)

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(3)

HONDA, KUMATARO

NATIONAL FOUNDATION SOCIETY

SEE:

G-2 KIKUCHI TAB. N

HONDA, KUMATARO

JAPANESE SPIRIT ASSOCIATION

SEE:

G-2 MIKUCHI TAB. P

NAME: HONDA, Kunatoro.

PRESENT STATUS: Detained under House Arrest under Internment Order dated 1 December 1945.

POSITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: From 1898 to 1926 held many important posts in the Diplomatic Service. In 1940 was called back from retirement and appointed Ambassador to Nanking, and in 1944 Advisor to the Foreign Office. Gave numerous speeches ~~and~~ before the KOKUHONSHA (National Foundation Society) in which he aired his ultra-nationalistic views. Also contributed articles to its publication "Kokuhon". In 1944 was Advisor to East Asia Development Headquarters of IRAA.

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