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for Mr. Hardin

J. Tomishige,
Sept. 27, '46.

天保租界問題
件 (之ニ付
榎入林
止)

有田外務大臣
在天津田代總領事宛

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EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2383 A (?)

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2 Letters 15-25 June 39-
Craigie to Anita
Ex 1003

Signature B. G. Slavov

Recm # 357

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION
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TO : *Mr. Harbin*
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IPS

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2383

Date 3 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Folder of carbon-copied typed telegrams, entitled "The TIEN TSIN INCIDENT"*
(collection of telegrams)

Date: 1939-1940

Original (X) Copy ()

Language: *Japt*
Englsh

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc Sec.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *Foreign Ministry*

PERSONS IMPLICATED. *Hachiro;* ARITA, TASHIRO, ABE; SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

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*Japanese - American, Japanese - British Relations,
Economic aggression and domination, China.*

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

This document contains telegrams as follows:

P. 2. From ~~the~~ Foreign Minister ARITA to ^{the} Consul-general at TIEN TSIN (TASHIRO) re: the delivery of the criminals who assassinated CHENG, Hsi-king. 14 Aug 1939.

P. 5 From TASHIRO to ARITA re: ^{non-}the delivery of the four criminals 26 Aug 1939

P. 8 From TASHIRO to ABE, Foreign Minister re: the actual delivery of the four assassins from the British to the Chinese to the Japanese who will court-martial the quartet. 6 Sept 1939

P. 9 From SHIGEMITSU, ambassador to London, to ABE. ^{Same subject as above.} ~~to ABE.~~

P. 13 From ABE to HORINOUCHI re: the re-opening of ~~the~~ negotiations

Analyst: S. G. Komizo
[Signature]

Doc. No.

and the agreement of tangible problems after the ~~summary~~ ^{details} of the Tokyo meeting. 5 Sept 1939

P. 17 From ~~Shigemitsu~~ SHIGEMITSU ~~to~~ ^{to} Ambassador, ~~Mr~~ ^{Mr} ABE Foreign Minister re: the conference discussing the European situation, ^{and} the Chinese problem. 14 Sept 1939

P. 28. From SHIGEMITSU to NOMURA re: the TIENTSIN Incident 24 Oct 1939

P. 37. From NOMURA to SHIGEMITSU in London, KADOWAKI in PEKING and MUTO in TIENTSIN. re: managing for negotiation between Japan & Britain relating to the TIENTSIN incident. 11 Nov 1939

P. 78. From SHIGEMITSU to ARITA re: the problem of improving the Anglo-Japanese relations 24 Jan 1940

P. 80. From SHIGEMITSU to ARITA re: the problem of establishment of the ^{Chinese} New Central Govt. 24 Jan 1940

P. 118 From ARITA to SHIGEMITSU re: result of four meetings with CRAIGIE. 4 June 1940

{note: ~~the following pages~~, ~~there are~~ ^{extensive} English translations ^{included in the original document} on the following pages:
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400, 404, 410, 419, 422, 429, 440, 447, 451, 457, 480,
485, 517, 578, 559, 578, 585. Extensive translations
by scanner are attached to document)

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Proj No. 134

S.A. NO. 15039.

Sack No. 7.

Item No. 6.

14 Aug 1939

Title, The Tien-tsin Incident.
(collections of telegrams)

I. The delivery of the criminal who assassinated
Cheng Hsi-keng.

A. From ARITA, Foreign Minister; to TASHIRO,
consul-general at Tien-tsin.

When Minister KATO had a private meeting
with Craig, Craig said "we wish
to deliver the four criminals as soon as
possible, at the place where the inci-
dent arose, and I think there may be
a plot by which they will overturn
the decision of the delivery by an
anti-delivery movement and by the
person protection order. So the
British Government intend to settle

~~down~~ this as soon as possible, and they do not want to make this a policy of the negotiation as the Japanese presses suppose. This delivery is apt to proceed in parallel with the negotiation, but the four criminals should be formally delivered to the Japanese side. I think it may be good to accept frankly the British proposal on this occasion.

Please reply your opinions, arranging with the military leaders. Aug. 14, 1939.

B. From ARITA, to TASHIRO.

When Minister KATO met Craigie, Craigie said "There was an anti delivery movement in Shanghai in regard to the four criminals, and they sued to the British consular court. But I have given the instruction to Tien tsin that the suit should be rejected and the

criminals should be delivered."

Aug. 26, 1939.

C. From TASHIRO to ABE, Foreign Minister.

On the 5th the police of the British government informed suddenly to the Chinese local law court that the four criminals would be delivered at the police Department at 5 P.M. and the officials in charge, 6 policemen, M.P. Maj. ŌTA and 2 others, and one official went by the military boats. But they could not reach by the appointed time, 5 o'clock, because the flood rendered them unable to go easily. Their reach was delayed two hours and half. Two British police men were waiting for them bringing the criminals at the border of the settlement. The delivery was finished at 8 P.M. The Criminals was at once escorted to the Chinese police-station and confined. They will be delivered to the Japanese

military police and put on a court-martial. / Sep. 6, 1939.

II p. 13 The re-opening of the negotiation and the agreement of ^{tangible} the concrete problems, after the stoppage of the Tokyo meeting.

A. From ABE, Foreign Minister to HORIUCHI, councillor at Peking and to Tientsin.

When Craigie called on the Vice-minister, SAWADA, they talked about the European situations and came to the the Anglo-Japanese negotiation for the Tientsin Problem. and Craigie said, "It is very regrettable that the negotiation stopped half-way. The British government were attacked by the public opinions because of the illegal concession of the British Government in regard to the general negotiation rules and the delivery of the criminals. The government seem to expect the hot opinions will become cold and silent. As for me, I hope the negotiation will be re-opened and we will make the

prospect of the success by the private meetings between the vice-minister and I, because I am duly authorized by my country." The vice-minister answered, "The Japanese government's opinions must be understood by Britain since the minister, KATO had the meeting and he delivered the documents to the British authorities at the meeting. Unless we know the reliable opinions of the British Government, we will not re-open the negotiation. So there is no need to have a private meeting I think. In regard to this matter, it is a first question that the British Government will show their concrete opinions clearly for our request." Sep. 5, 1939.

P17. B. From SHIGEMITSU, ambassador, to ABE, Foreign Minister. at London

When I met the British Foreign Minister Aug. 28 we talked about the European situation. When our talk

came to the China Problems, he said, "It is very regrettable that the Tokyo negotiation has never gained ~~the~~ suitable results. The negotiation went smoothly at the beginning, but various economical problems came about on the way (at the negotiation of the Tien-tsin Problem, ~~we~~ we wished to settle ~~down~~ ^{it} regarding ^{it} as a simple local problem). The British government came ^{was} to be unable to decide themselves only because the problem affected to the other countries. The world situations have lately changed rapidly ~~promptly~~, ~~But~~ in the Anglo-Japanese relation, we can retrieve the situation in amity and this is very important, I think. I will make efforts in this connection." And I said, "There is a great difference between Japan and Britain in regard to the contents of the negotiation of the Tien-tsin Incident. The British government showed their attitude clearly in their documents, and replying to Britain, the Japanese

government clarified their standpoints.

So at present I do not want to discuss it by spending our Foreign Minister's precious time. I have been making efforts with my same thinking as I had at the beginning.

As you said, there are sudden changes in our international relations, and I have no objection to it, that taking advantage of the mental process of the both countries' nations. We will endeavor to improve the grave situations of the Anglo-Japanese relations. I think it is very important that the supreme responsible persons of both countries will frankly exchange their opinions with each other and try to realize it. If we improve in this manner, I think such a local problem as this will be naturally resolved." Sep. 14, 1939.

P.28 C. From SHIGEMITSU at London to NOMURA, Foreign Minister.

When I met the British Foreign Minister, the following speeches were ex-

changed.

Foreign Minister (hereafter written F. M.)

"I have ~~recently~~ ^{recently} received some reports which are not ^{in accord} agreeable ^{with} for us. Can you find any ^{way of} ~~way of~~ resolution regarding the Incident of Tien-tsin blockade?"

§ (means SHIGEMITSU)

"As you know, there are unresolved questions in this Incident. They are chiefly of the delivery of silver ingots and the currency of the Chiang's regime. In regard to these problems the situations are very different at present from at the Tokyo negotiation. I think the British government can easily accept the Japanese claims. Talking of the problem of silver ingots they are not Britain's possessions, but the Britain rejects the delivery on account of a political reason. Their rejection means their saying

that Britain has only commercial profits in China. Regarding the problem of currency, it will affect the maintenance of peace and order that the British authorities assume their bearing against the administration of the region in a tiny spot of the British settlement, as is stated above, these questions are resolved, the blockade will be naturally abolished. In the questions like these, I can imagine Britain will be able to understand very easily."

F.M.

"I hope we will compromise as much as possible regarding the problem of silver ingots. Cragy stated his opinion to NOMURA, Foreign Minister in order to resolve the question, but there was little echo. Of course, this does not mean the re-opening of the Tokyo negotiation."

§

"I have never received any reports regarding Cragy's proposals, but I think NOMURA thought there was no room to compromise

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for his proposal and thereafter there has not been any change in the problem. But I think this is ^a very clear question and as I said just now, if you don't take this into a political consideration, you can easily accept the Japanese desires.
F.M.

We will not think politically. We should deliver the silver ingots to China, the owner. But there are many discussions about the owner, and so, the delivery will not go so simply."

"The owner is China, if it ^{is} not clear who is the owner, the owner will be, at any time, clarified, because there is a Chinese court in Tien-tsin. Britain regards the owner as the Chumking Regime, which has no sovereignty in this region. In other words Britain will not accept the Japanese claims because of her political consideration that she will actually aid the Chumking Regime, and in this manner,

this problem is accompanied by the fundamental questions of the China problems, which lie between Japan and Britain. Britain states her neutrality in the Sino-Japanese conflict but it is naturally that the Japanese are apt to think Britain aids the Chanking Regime."

F. M.

"I have made efforts to resolve from the beginning, and I will study the problem of silver ingots and consider any proposals willingly, but we don't think over politically."

(He requested Han, head of the section of Far East to say)

Han.

"All silver ingots are in the possession of the Chanking Regime by the law issued by the Regime. Accordingly, we can't deliver them to any Chinese allied banks. We don't consider politically. The Britain attitude has been clearly shown in the agreement, which was decided at

the beginning of the Tokyo negotiation."

~~S,~~

"What do you mean by the Chinese government?
Do you mean the Chungking government?"

Hau,

"Yes, we have acknowledged this as the
legal government and we have never
denied."

~~S,~~

"Do you know the Chungking government are
hostile to Japan. The actual Chinese
government are established in the area
occupied by the Japanese forces and the
Tien-tsin settlement is situated in this
area. But you reject the delivery of
the silver ingots which are in the area,
but this is the claim of the government
in this area. You insist if that is
not a claim of a government which
is situated in the long distance, you
can't deliver. But you state you don't
think over politically. What do you
mean by this? According to their

Custom the actual government in the region have managed their local problems in the light of the Chinese history, is not it? I think when we obey the custom our rights and interests can be kept in safe. You said you have shown your attitude in the agreement of the Tokyo negotiation, and if you manage this problem according to the principle of the agreement, the problem will be at once resolved, I think."

Han,

"The Japanese government has never recognized the Peking Government, and Britain has never denied the acknowledge of the Chumking government."

I,

You have aided the Chumking government which has been hostile to Japan, on the strength of superficial law argument. This means that you consider politically. Japan is

actually hostile to the Chanking Government at present, and we are supporting the Peking Government. Why don't you decide your position by understanding the circumstances correctly?" (To F. M.)

Japanese many people have had the question, namely Japan has maintained neutrality for the European war and understood the British standing.

But nevertheless, why has Britain aimed Japanese enemy in the Chinese problem and why has Britain opposed against Japan in everything. This is a interrogation they have. There are basic reasons in these feelings. We have reported to Japan that Britain wishes to re-gain the friendships between the two countries, and we have endeavored to make Japan understand this fact. But it is very regrettable that Britain will not understand the Tien-tsin Problem."

F. M.,

"I could understand your opinions and the development of the both countries' relations have been in my mind. So I will take any compromises into consideration, as I said just now, in the Tien-tsin Incident. I will hope that these principles of the various problems will be put into practice. Thinking of the questions regarding U.S.S.R., which we talked about at the beginning of this meeting, we will attach importance to the friendship between Britain and Japan."

Hereupon, the meeting came to an end. I met Butler, vice-Foreign Minister and we talked about the principles of the problems, which we negotiated at the meeting. And I asked for his services in order that accepting the Japanese claims Britain may resolve the problems of Singapore. Oct. 24, 1939.

P37

D. From NOMURA, Foreign Minister to SHIGEMITSU, Ambassador in London, to KADOWAKI, Secretary at Peking and to MIITO, Consul-general

at Tien-tsin.

The main points of the management for the negotiation between Japan and Britain regarding the Tien-tsin Incident.

The settlement must be due to the following regarding the Tien-tsin Problem.

1. The maintenance of peace and order.

Regarding the problem of the maintenance of peace and order, excepting the matters already resolved such as the delivery of criminals, we must try to compromise with Britain according to the result of the Anglo-Japanese meeting, which will be held in Tokyo in this summer.

2. The question of the silver ingots.

Regarding the question of the silver ingots as the first management, we must stick to our assertion that Britain shall admit the Chinese Temporal government's conveyance of the silver. (because the owner is that government.) But we must not obstruct their understandings for the

fact that the silver ingots will be earmarked for the relief fund of the Chinese residents from famine and flood-disaster.

In case we can't carry through the above assertion after finishing the first management, as the second measure we must make them admit that the custody of the silver should be transferred to the Yokohama Specie Bank because the bank is the custodian bank of the customs, and we will not touch upon the problem who is the owner of the silver.

3. The problem of the currency.

If Britain admits our claim regarding the problem of silver ingots, we will ^{a little} mollify our assertion that the circulation of the Chiang's currency must be prohibited regarding the currency problem and we must be contented with the fact that Britain will co-operate with Japan for the circulation of the Chinese allied bank notes. And we will understand fundamentally each other about the

co-operation according to the negotiation at Tokyo. And the concrete measure of the co-operation must be due to the negotiation at Tien-tsin.

4. The inspection and supervision of the Chinese Temporal Government for the Chinese banks and organs of monetary circulation and the government's control over riotous deeds of the economical disturbance in the settlement. Regarding the co-operation for these matters (above) we will make Britain understand, in order to carry out our aims actually as something formal - - - for example, a measure in a way of police.

Note: The negotiation of the Tien-tsin problem shall be done according to the plan by which we may induce to the general negotiation of the Anglo-japanese political adjustment.

P78

Nov. 11, 1939.

E. From SHIGEMITSU to ARITA, the Foreign

Minister.

I said to Halifax, Foreign Minister, "In relation to the problem of the improvement of the Anglo-Japanese relation, it is very regrettable that the Tientsin Incident has not developed. But I think the resolution of the Incident is the barrier for the improvement of the Anglo-Japanese relations. If we overcome this barrier, the road to the future will be opened, I think. And we have taken every means available in order to settle the problem and we have been only waiting the British reaction for our settling measures." He answered, "I understand the importance of this Incident, but to tell the truth, in order to get the approval of the Chungking Regime we sent Kerr, the Ambassador to Chungking, but he can't negotiate because Chiang is now absent, so we can't get his answer. Of course I wish from the bottom of my heart that this problem will

be speedily resolved, the barricade of Tientsin and other obstructions will be eradicated and the road will be opened for our future. So I will try and make efforts." Jan. 24, 1940.

P. 80

F. From SHIGEMITSU to ARITA.

"When I met Halifax we talked about the Tientsin Problem, and next, we referred to the problem of the establishment of the Chinese New central government, which has been lately materials of newspapers. Halifax said "I have no knowledge of the problem of China, but I have heard the Chinese general nationals depend entirely upon Chiang Kai-shek, and without Chiang it will be very difficult to restore the real order in China. How do you think? What sort of a man is Wang Chao Ming?" I answered, "Chiang is strong now because he has his army. Taking part in the National Party, he succeeded in establishing the Nanking Government by the

aid of U.S.S.R. afterwards he has gradually lost a tendency to communism, but since the Sino-Japanese hostility he has completely co-operated with communism. On the contrary, Wang Chao-ming was a member of the National Party and has been regarded as a successor of Sun Wen. The career of his party is superior to the one of the Chiang's, and the members are many. But Wang is weak in that he is a politician who has no army. As is stated above he is a representative of the moderates of the National Party and wish to co-operate any countries except U.S.S.R. In this connection, contrary to Chiang's, his knowledge and nature are very excellent. He intends to re-adjust the diplomatic relations between China and the other countries, especially China and Japan, and to establish true China for the Chinese, understanding the world situation and rejecting U.S.S.R. I believe his position will be certainly understood and he

will not fail to succeed." He said, "Is there any means for a compromise between Chiang and Japan." I think, Wang has spent much time to prepare to establish the new regime in order to make the foundation of the regime and to gain Chiang. If Chiang understand the situation it is not impossible to compromise so far as there is no obstruction.

P. 118.

Jan. 24, 1940.

G. From ARITA, to SHIGEMITSU.

Afterwards the negotiations were held four times, May 17, 25, 28, June 1, between vice-minister and Cragg. And Cragg admitted almost our assertions. So we are negotiating the detailed points (regarding the terms written in the documents) and the draft of the joint communique (we intends to make simple) June 4, 1940.

NOTE: The other documents have almost their English translations

by KOIZUMI Junji.

2383A

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 號
國際 檢 察 部 第ニ三八三號

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、林馨 ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省
文書課長 トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ル
モノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラ
レタル、八 頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十九年ノ昭和
十四年ノ六月 附、下記題名、即チ天津租界問題
ニ関シ在京英國大使申入ノ件 (六月十五日附)ノ文書ノ
保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類
及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又
ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名
稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

一外務省

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格外務省文書課長

證

人 尾長春

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、Richard H. Larsted、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令
部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ
余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタ
ルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 Richard H. Larsted

右ノ者ノ公的資格検査局調査員

證

人 J. Japuchin

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2383

5 July 1946

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Document Division

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PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARITA, Hachiro, TASHIRO; ABE; SEIGEMITSU, Mamoru

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Page 1

Doc. No. 2383 - Page 2 - SUMMARY Cont'd

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Extensive translations by scanner are attached to document)

天津租界問題ニ關シ英公大使ヨリ申入ノ件

(昭和四、六一七、五二)

六月十五日附クレイヤー大使祇有田大臣

宛至急半公信要訳文

拜啓陳者昨日ノ会谈ニ関シ本使ハ更ニ天津英公總領
事ヨリ英公租界ニ因スル交通ニ対シ課セラレ居ル軍事的
制限ハ決定的ニシテ且重大ナル反英差別待遇ナルカ如ク
施行セラレ居ル旨ノ報告ヲ受領シタルコトヲ茲ニ通報セサル
ヲ得サルヲ得サルモノニ候右報告ニ依レハ英公臣民ハ總テ
半時間ヨリ一時間ニ亘リ止メラレタル上租界ヲ出入スル際支
那人ト同列ニ且支那人ト同列ニ嚴重ニ取調ヘラルル趣
ニ候更ニ軍人ヲ含ム英公臣民ノ一部ハ租界ヲ出スルコト
ヲ拒絶セラレタルヤニ認めラレ候、

如何ナル論理ヲ以テスルモ斯ノ如キ英公臣民ニ対スル差別
待遇ハ目衛措置又ハ昨日会谈シタル四名ノ支那人ニ因聯
セシムルモ正當化スル能ハサルモノニ候本使ハ斯ノ如キ措置
カ日本政府ノ權威ニ依リ又ハ具ノ許可ノ下ニ行ハレ居ルモノ
ト信スル能ハサレモノニシテ仍テ本使ハ閣下ニ対シ英公臣民

No 2.

Doc 2383A

ニ対スル凡工ル形式ノ差別待遇カ直于ニ停止セララルル様天
津並該日本官憲ニ訓令ヲ發セラルルヘク措置セラレ度キ
旨要請スルモ一ニ候

御承知ノ如ク本件ハ緊急ナルヲ以テ本使カ本ニ政府
ニ対シ本件ニ対スル日本政府ノ態度ニ関シ正確ナル情報
ヲ通報シ得ル様今日中ニ本翰ノ回答ヲ得ル幸甚ニ候

敬具

#2383 A

Letter from Craigie to Arita dated 15 June 1939

BRITISH EMBASSY
TOKYO.
15th June, 1939

Immediate

My dear Minister,

With reference to our conversation yesterday I am sorry to say that I have now received news from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tientsin indicating that the military restrictions now being imposed on communications with the British Concession are being applied in such a way as to constitute definite and grave anti-British discrimination. According to this report all British subjects are being held up for from one-half to one hour and rigorously searched on entering and leaving the Concession in the same manner as, and together with, all Chinese. Other foreigners are being allowed to pass without stoppage or examination. It further appears that some British subjects, including military in uniform, have been refused exit.

By no process of reasoning can such discrimination against British subjects be justified by the Japanese authorities on the plea either of self-defence or in connection with the case of the four Chinese which we discussed yesterday. I cannot believe that such action has the authority or even the approval of the Japanese Government and I must therefore ask Your Excellency to be good enough to arrange for instructions to be despatched to the proper Japanese authorities in Tientsin to ensure that every form of discrimination against British subjects is at once discontinued.

The matter being, as you will see, very urgent, I should be most grateful if Your Excellency would, if possible, let me have a reply to this letter today in order that I may give His Majesty's Government precise information as to the attitude of the Japanese Government in the matter.

Believe me,

my dear Minister

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) R. L. Craigie.

His Excellency
Mr. Hachiro Arita,
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Letter from Craigie to Arita, dated 25 June 1939.

BRITISH EMBASSY
TOKYO.
June 25th, 1939

Your Excellency,

Under instructions from His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice a case of gross indignity inflicted on the 23rd instant by agents of the Japanese Army upon Mr. Cecil Davis, honorary New Zealand Government agent at Tientsin. The facts of the case are set out in the enclosed memorandum and, in accordance with my instructions I desire to protest in the strongest possible manner against this insulting behaviour to an official of the New Zealand Government and a well-known and highly respected member of the British community. This act, following on numerous other cases which I brought to Your Excellency's attention on June 15th, 16th, 18th and 20th, leave no doubt as to the deliberate nature of the provocation now being offered by the local Japanese authorities. A further instance of similar inexcusable behaviour which has since come to my notice is shown in the second enclosure to this note.

2. In an interview with representatives of the press on the 21st instant the official Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that he could state categorically that no indignities as reported were being inflicted on British subjects entering or leaving the blockaded British Municipal Area at Tientsin, and that no discrimination was being made against them. This statement is not in accordance with the facts disclosed in the accompanying documents.

3. Your Excellency has informed me that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to discriminate against British subjects, to restrict their food supplies or to subject them to abuses and indignities. Nevertheless, these intolerable outrages continue and, as stated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in London on the 23rd instant, are arousing great indignation in Great Britain. I have accordingly received instructions to request that Your Excellency will ensure that immediate steps are taken to put a stop to these acts and to provide that proper respect be given to the rights under which British subjects are entitled by treaty to live and trade peacefully in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

His Excellency
Mr. Hachiro Arita
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure No. 1 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Mr. Cecil Davis, Chairman of the Tientsin Country Club and honorary Agent of the New Zealand Government when he attempted to pass the barriers on the night of June 23rd was told when he reached the inspection shed to take off his clothes. He demurred and stated if that were to be the proceeding he would not pass the barriers at all but would stay the night in the Concession. The inspecting officer promptly struck Davis on the face and told him he would have to go. At this stage three other Japanese who were abetting rose up and Davis felt in the circumstances he had no alternative but to submit to whatever treatment was given him. He was then made to remove all his clothing except his briefs and spent fifteen minutes in full view of the passers-by including women, during which time his clothing et cetera were subjected to dilatatory examination. On leaving his passport was left on the ground.

Enclosure No. 2 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Substance of a Statement Regarding the Treatment of

Mr. Lord and Mr. House at the barrier at Tientsin.

1. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were placed on a straw mat in a hut in full view of all persons passing through, irrespective of sex or nationality. The Chinese police were detailed to search them whilst one Japanese soldier stood in front to watch. There were four other Japanese sitting around.

2. The Chinese police were considered by Japanese to be too inoffensive in their search so they were slapped in the face and the Japanese took charge. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were forced to remove all their clothing and pile it on the muddy floor and all articles were removed from their pockets and placed likewise on the floor. Mr. House was standing absolutely naked for at least five minutes. Mr. Lord still had briefs on which he was not obliged to remove, but he stood clothed in them alone for the best part of ten minutes.

3. Each article of clothing was inspected and thoroughly examined.

4. After examining the men's clothing the Japanese took their passports, which he had thrown on the floor, and ruffled the hair of both men. He made signs for Mr. Lord to open his mouth and being dissatisfied that it was sufficiently widely open he deliberately took Mr. Lord's passport and forced his mouth open with it. He then made both men stand with their legs apart and examined their crutches. This completed the search except that the Chinese police were made to take hold of Mr. Lord's ears and examine them.

5. The whole proceedings lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes, during which time both men were in full view of the public and women were passing through the hut.

Enclosure No. 3 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 127Tientsin: Interference with food supplies.

The Japanese military spokesman at Tientsin stated in an interview given to the press on the 19th June that the Japanese had no intention of stopping foodstuffs entering the Concession as such a prohibition would be most inhuman. In connexion with this statement the following facts were noted:-

1. The Japanese authorities have turned back boats bringing food up the river for the British Concession.
2. On the 19th June a "Domei" report from Tientsin stated that "three trucks loaded with fresh vegetables were admitted yesterday to the French Concession to ease the vegetable famine there". An arrangement was consequently made by the French authorities with the Japanese authorities that normal supplies should be brought into the French Concession by French Military lorries and the existence of this arrangement was confirmed by a "Domei" report appearing in Tientsin on the 23rd June. Both these reports of special arrangements with the French authorities are admissions that food supplies entering the British Concession are subject at least to interference and obstruction.
3. As a direct result of the Japanese measures perishable foodstuffs are very short in the British Concession. For example it is understood that on the 21st June 10 per cent of the usual quantities of vegetables were available in the Concessions, while no ice was available to the British market at all.