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S P E E C H

OF THE

HON. STEPHEN R. MALLORY,

OF FLORIDA,

ON THE

Cuba Bill,

Delivered in the Senate of the United States,

24

February, 1859.



BALTIMORE . . . PRINTED BY JOHN MURPHY & Co.

MARBLE BUILDING, 182 BALTIMORE STREET.

1859.

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Ms. B. 1. 4 Oct. 1823

S P E E C H.

Mr. MALLORY. Mr. President, I prefer going on now, late as the hour is, because I perceive that unless the friends of this bill stand by it, we shall not get a final vote upon it. In rising, particularly after the address to which we have just listened, to support a bill which appropriates money for the purchase of the Island of Cuba, my mind is embarrassed and oppressed, not only by the multitude and variety of the topics which cluster around it, and which, as we have seen here at this moment, have, more or less, entered into the discussion, but by the importance and gravity of the considerations which it involves. The honorable Senator [Mr. COLLAMER] who has just taken his seat, has referred to this as a sectional issue, as if the South were supporting this measure to get a few more slave States into the Union, to restore the equilibrium between the North and the South.

Mr. President, I approach this measure in no sectional spirit, and shall discuss it without reference to its northern or southern aspect. The maintenance of the equilibrium between the slave-holding and non-slave-holding States, the equilibrium of numbers, or of population and representation, is a delusive hope, and one which I have long since surrendered. And, thank heaven, sir, we are independent of any such balance of power. Sir, let me assure the northern States here represented, that if I supposed southern rights dependent upon such equilibrium, I would exert every effort to induce at least my own State to withdraw from the Union at once.

No, sir; our rights in this confederacy are not to be held by the permission of a majority of States. They must ever depend, under the Constitution, upon our enlightened patriotism; and, so long as we shall have loyal hearts and strong arms, with the blessing of heaven we will maintain them against all odds,—as those will learn who undertake to invade them.

Mr. President, this is no idle discussion. Whether we shall have a vote or not, the results are to be tangible for good or evil. If this bill shall pass both Houses of Congress, nay, if it shall pass but the Senate, I trust it will appear to Spain at least as a shadow which certainly tells of coming events. Nay, sir, whether it shall pass this body or not, the effect will be, inevitably, that by concentrating and enlightening public opinion, it will prove to Spain that there is a destiny which shapes the ends of this country, to which she, no less than ourselves, must submit. Therefore, sir, I want the discussion; I believe the effect on the main question will be of vital consequence, whether the bill shall pass or not.

I desire to discuss this question fairly, in its broadest national aspect, and hence I avow the opinion, here upon the threshold of the discussion, that Cuba is not for sale for money; that in my judgment she has

acquire dominion and ascendancy in that part of the world. Within seven years after the time when their independence had been established, and finally recognized in 1783, we find them setting up a claim of free navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the Gulf of Mexico; and it is not a little curious to see what was the opportunity which they took of asserting their right against Spain—a power that had materially assisted them in obtaining their independence. In the year 1790, it will be recollected that a dispute had arisen between England and Spain respecting Nootka Sound. Whilst these two countries were arming, and everything appeared to threaten war between them, the United States thought that they saw, in the embarrassment of Spain, an opening to claim the navigation as of right. Whether such a claim could or could not be sustained by any principle of the law of nations, is a question which I will not now stop to examine. The affirmative was at once boldly assumed by America, and her demand proceeded upon that assumption. The right once so affirmed, what does the House think was the corollary which the Government of the United States built upon their assertion of their supposed right? I will give it in the words of Mr. Jefferson himself, not a private individual, but the Secretary of State, conveying the instructions of his Government to Mr. Carmichael, then the American envoy at Madrid: 'You know,' writes Mr. Jefferson, 'that the navigation cannot be practiced without a port, where the sea and river vessels may meet and exchange loads, and those employed about them may be safe and unmolested. The right to use a thing comprehends a right to the means necessary to its use, and without which it would be useless.' I know not what the expounders of the law of nations in the Old World will have to say to this new and startling doctrine. In this instruction, which is dated the 2d of August, 1790, the principle is only laid down in the abstract.

"I will now show the House the special application of it to the claim in question, by quoting another letter from Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Short, the American envoy at Paris, dated only eight days after the former, namely, the 10th of August. It is as follows: 'The idea of ceding the island of New Orleans could not be hazarded to Spain in the first step: it would be too disagreeable at first view; because this island, with its town, constitutes, at present, their principal settlement in that part of their dominion, (Louisiana,) containing about ten thousand white inhabitants, of every age and sex. Reason and events, however, may, by little and little, familiarize them to it. That we have a right to some spot as an *entrepot* for our commerce, may be at once affirmed. I suppose this idea (the cession of New Orleans) too much, even for the Count de Montmorin at first, and that, therefore, you will find it prudent to urge and get him to recommend to the Spanish Court, only in general terms, a port near the mouth of the river, with a circumjacent territory sufficient for its support, well defined, and extra-territorial to Spain, leaving the idea to future growth.'"

He quotes this extract from a letter of Mr. Jefferson to Mr. Monroe, of the 4th of May, 1806:

"We begin to broach the idea that we consider the whole Gulf Stream as our own waters, in which hostilities and cruising are to be frowned on for the present, and prohibited so soon as either consent or force will permit us."

Mr. Huskisson continues:

"If the United States 'broached this idea,' in 1806, they are not likely to have abandoned it in 1819, when, in addition to Louisiana, they procured, by treaty with Spain, the further important cession of the Floridas. That it is a growing, rather than a waning, principle of their policy, I think we may infer from a letter which we find in this correspondence, not written, indeed, by Mr. Jefferson in any public character, but addressed by him, as a person exercising, from his retirement, the greatest sway in the councils of the Union, to the President. This letter, dated so lately as the 24th of October, 1823, discusses the interest of the United States in respect to Cuba and the Gulf of Mexico, and these are the statements which it avows: 'I candidly confess that I ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition that could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering upon it, as well as those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Yet I am sensible that this can never be obtained, even with her own consent, but by war.'"

In connection with this subject, because the opinions of my friend from South Carolina [Mr. HAMMOND] have been quoted here, I looked to his speech and I found that his friends might be misled into the idea

that even Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the acquisition of Cuba. Sir, I believe that he was in favor of the acquisition of Cuba at the very earliest period compatible with the honor of the country. In this body, in 1848, in a speech upon the Yucatan question, he said :

“There are cases of interposition where I would resort to the hazard of war, with all its calamities. Am I asked for one? I designate the case of Cuba. So long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain—a friendly Power, a Power of which we have no dread—it should continue to be, as it has been, the policy of all administrations ever since I have been connected with the Government, to let Cuba remain there; but with the fixed determination, which I hope never will be relinquished, that if Cuba pass from her, it shall not be into any other hands but ours; this, not from a feeling of ambition, not from a desire for the extension of dominion, but because that island is indispensable to the safety of the United States; or rather, because it is indispensable to the safety of the United States that this island should not be in certain hands.”

The remark which is put into Mr. Calhoun's mouth, that “Cuba is to us forbidden fruit,” he never used. As I said before, it is believed that he desired the acquisition of Cuba, at the very earliest day compatible with the honor of the country.

Sir, if authorities can add weight to our Cuban policy, I could cite hundreds of names of leading men of all parties who favored its acquisition. I am yet to learn one who was not in favor of the acquisition of Cuba at the very earliest moment consistent with the interests and honor of the country.

Now, sir, whence comes this general unanimity? Why is it that the varied interests of our country, differing widely as do our States in population, in climate, in soil, in production, have generally concurred in the wisdom and policy of regarding this as a great national measure? Why is it that the pro-slavery cotton-planter of Texas, and the abolitionist manufacturer of Massachusetts, here find a common bond of union and a common platform, and are to-day, while I am speaking, battling together for this very policy? Why is it that the State of Connecticut has adopted a resolution, within a very few days past, in favor of the acquisition of Cuba? Here let me say, that she was the first State to lead off for the annexation of Texas.

MR. FESSENDEN. Does the Senator say the legislature of Connecticut has passed any such resolution?

MR. MALLORY. No sir.

MR. FESSENDEN. It was passed by a Democratic caucus.

MR. MALLORY. That is authority for that State, of course.

MR. BENJAMIN. It was a Democratic State convention; not a caucus.

MR. MALLORY. I ask, whence comes this general unanimity of feeling? It is not confined to the South; it is equally found North, East, and West; and, as this discussion shall progress, it will become, in my judgment, overwhelming, and will shape somewhat the future policy of the country. Sir, this general feeling is not only based upon a conviction that the industrial interests of the whole country are concerned in this measure, but it springs, too, from the conviction that the first blow which the interests of our country is ever to receive, must be from the direction of Cuba. It must necessarily be so. I think I can demonstrate that, if danger ever threaten us at all from abroad, it must be from a point contiguous to our shores, and under the control of another Power; and the most important point of all on the face of the earth, in that view, is Cuba.

In the report which the Committee on Foreign Relations have presented us with, we have important statistics of the trade, commerce, and resources of the Island of Cuba.

Now, sir, whatever influence these considerations may have upon the minds of gentlemen as to the price to be paid for Cuba, they can certainly have none whatever on the question of whether we ought to have it or not. That is a preliminary question. When that is decided, the statistics will furnish us with information to guide us as to the price; and in connection with this we must also consider the amount which the public property of Cuba herself can contribute.

I said that the first blow which this country is ever to receive, in any contest, will, in all probability, be from the direction of Cuba. The Gulf of Mexico is emphatically an American sea. Its waters wash the shores of five of our States. All the rivers of Texas and Alabama, and part of those of Georgia and Florida, flow into it, together with the Mississippi, and all its tributaries, exposing at least twenty-five thousand miles of internal navigation. The products of fifteen States of the Union seek a market over its waters, and upon its bosom floats a commerce which to-day is worth \$300,000,000; and all this commerce passes between a narrow strait ninety-four miles wide, presenting some seventy-eight miles of available navigation.

This space six steamers may bridge across, and speak each other every fifteen minutes by signals; and by an enemy possessing a naval superiority this would be done, and the Gulf of Mexico would be sealed up as securely as if nature had reared a wall from the bottom of the ocean to the top. There, at the mouth, you may say, a hostile power would lie in wait, and sink or capture everything that pretended to enter it. In form it may be regarded, to use a familiar illustration, as a demijohn on its side; and through its mouth, between Cuba on the south and Florida on the north, floats this vast commerce, upon which the hills of Cuba, like sentry boxes, look down.

Are we not justified then in asserting that the first contest—and this must be a naval contest—in which we shall ever become involved, will be here? It must necessarily be so; because no sea upon the habitable globe offers such a temptation to a maritime enemy against our commerce, as the Gulf of Mexico.

A war with either of the great maritime powers would necessarily find us unprepared; and though the wonderful resources and matchless creative powers of our country would eventually provide for any emergency, the Gulf of Mexico,—with Cuba in the hands of Spain,—would be to us a closed sea.

There is another outlet to the Gulf of Mexico that ought not to be lost sight of, between the west end of Cuba and Yucatan, between Cape Catoche and Cape San Antonio. That outlet is one hundred and four miles wide; but from the adverse winds and currents which prevail there for eight-twelfths of the year, and that portion of the year, too, when the great cotton crop and the products of the West are upon the sea, no sailing ship ever attempts it. They go through the other way. From the prevailing winds and currents there and the circuitous passage through the Caribbean sea and out through the Mona Pass, it would prolong the voyage to New York to twenty-five days, when in fact it ought only to take twelve days; and under no circumstances will commerce seek that path.

The mouth of the Mississippi, and the Gulf terminus of the Tejuantepec road, are here at this strait, and not at the Balize or at St. Juan de Nicaragua.

If a bale of cotton be cast adrift at New Orleans and left to the action of winds and currents, it passes out at the Balize, takes a south-eastwardly course, doubles the Tortugas, and reaches the open Atlantic through this strait; and from the lone and distant fortification of Tortugas fleets of merchantmen are daily seen, in the freighting season, making their way to or from the Gulf through this pass.

The importance of a position like Cuba, a natural fortress at our very doors, has never been, and can never be disregarded by a statesman; and by all parties, for fifty years, its acquisition has been an admitted necessity.

Our language to Spain upon this subject has heretofore apprised her that while we would never permit any other power to acquire Cuba, we would remain satisfied with her tenure of it, and take no steps to dispossess her. And, sir, this is the language held to-day, even by the opponents of this bill.

The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. DOOLITTLE] speaking of (if not for) his party, says:

“These letters of the Secretaries of State of the United States show clearly what the policy of this Government is in relation to the acquisition of the island of Cuba. That policy is based, as I have stated, upon three foundations, the first of which is, that we will never consent, cost what it may, to the transfer of that island by Spain to any other European Power. Such a transfer would be resisted by the unanimous voice of the American people, and especially by the Republican party, as against its policy, and against all our history. We would resist the transfer to England or to France, if need be, resist it to the very death, cost what it might of treasure or of blood.”

I am free to express the opinion, Mr. President, that the period of voluntary acquiescence in Spain's possession of Cuba, has passed. We have heretofore respected it because we believed that Spain was both able and willing to govern and maintain the Island in a manner consistent with the safety of our country,—an ability and a willingness to which she can no longer pretend, as I am prepared to show.

Have gentlemen reflected, when they talk about being satisfied with Cuba remaining in the hands of Spain, that this language was used by our fathers in our infancy, and in the day of Spain's strength when she occupied a position before the nations of the earth that she no longer occupies?

In the event of war between ourselves and any maritime Power tomorrow, what would be the condition of Cuba? The policy of Spain would be to remain strictly neutral, to declare the ports of Cuba open to both belligerents alike. She undoubtedly would have the right to treat both belligerents alike, and neither would have the right to complain. In that case, the numerous ports of Cuba, many of them excellent, would be at the very points where the enemy would place them. And the enemy would have all the advantages of ports of refuge, resort and repair, without the responsibility of defending them.

During the late war between Russia and the allies, we were perfectly neutral, and made powder and guns for both parties, our ships transported the troops of the allies to the Crimea, and would have been just as ready to transport the troops of Russia.

Now, sir, if I am correct in my views of the matchless geographical position of Cuba, and the perils to us which it involves as a military, strategic point, does it not fully justify, nay, does it not demand from us prompt, energetic, and decisive action? Can we wisely delay action?

When I say that Spain is at this time more unwilling to part with Cuba than she has ever been, I keep in view the fact that her revenue from it directly, and her commerce with it, have not only greatly augmented, but that its importance and value in her eyes have been greatly enhanced by the light in which we regard it, and the price which we have signified our readiness to pay for it.

Her unwillingness to part with it has also been sustained by the active and unceasing influence of Great Britain and France, an influence prompted not by any special interest of theirs in this quarter of the Globe, but by a desire to thwart and embarrass the policy and progress of our country. While she has persistently opposed our Cuban policy, and even interfered elsewhere to prevent our acquisition of simple coal deposits for our navy in other seas, Great Britain has taken, with a strong hand, islands, countries, empires, and millions of people; and on this continent, from the Orinoco river up along the Spanish Main to the Caribbean Sea, and thence through the Yucatan Pass to Honduras and the Bay Islands, out by the Bahamas to the distant Bermudas, she has seized upon salient and strategic points wherever a gun could be planted or a standard reared.

Now, sir, I am for proclaiming to her and to the world, that this question of Cuba is an American question, and that this Government looks forward to the time, and that not a distant one, when the Gulf of Mexico shall be a closed sea, as much under our jurisdiction and control as is the Irish Channel under those of England; and that no foreign flag shall then float upon its bosom but by the permission of the United States.

Britain, amongst other pretences for interference in Cuban affairs, sets up her right to suppress its African slave trade, and this brings me to the consideration of this branch of the subject, and I shall dispose of it briefly.

AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE.

I am indisposed, Mr. President, to connect, in any manner the question of slavery with our Cuban policy; for they have never been in any manner connected by any of the leading statesmen of our country who have advocated the acquisition of Cuba.

We have discussed this question of domestic slavery for twenty years, and the results have been sectional divisions and alienations where a common interest demanded union.

It has certainly not advanced the interests of the negro race in the way in which the false philanthropy of its false friends desired; for it has not freed a single slave; but it has proved, beyond all question, that the condition of the negro slave in the United States is pre-eminently superior to that of the free negro in any part of the earth, and that the negro's greatest happiness and greatest usefulness are best secured under our system of domestic servitude.

Inasmuch as I am prepared to show, as an inducement to some gentlemen to vote with us on this measure, that the African slave trade

in Cuba would cease with the transfer of the Island to the United States, I will briefly state how it is at present conducted.

It will be remembered that Spain relinquished, by the treaty of 1817, all right to engage in the African slave trade, and received from Great Britain two millions of dollars mainly for this concession. The trade, however, did not in the least abate. In 1835 Britain forced Spain to make another treaty, whose provisions were more stringent, and by the instructions under which, it was supposed, the trade would be broken up; but still it continues, though upon a more limited scale, while the "horrors of the middle passage" have been greatly augmented by the increased risks of capture.

The manner in which this trade is conducted, though more or less a mystery to the world, may be readily understood, and it may be briefly stated thus.

Under the instructions of the Spanish Government, issued with the apparent design to prevent the trade, slaves on the island of Cuba are registered, and to their owners are issued what are called in Spanish *cedulas*,—which may be translated permits,—and these *cedulas* are printed in books uniformly, one hundred in each, and issued under the authority of the Captain General; and it is made the duty of owners to have *cedulas* for their slaves.

A party wishing to engage in the slave trade usually purchases a fast sailing vessel,—generally an American vessel, and pays for her at Havana or in the United States, upon the condition of her being delivered on the coast of Africa. She sails for Cabinda or some other point of the slave coast with the few articles required for a return slave voyage,—under the command of her American master or mate, with a crew to bring her back; and on her arrival on the coast of Africa, she is turned over to her new owners, the master pockets his vessel's register, returns home, delivers it to the Custom House to cancel his registry bond; and upon it is written "vessel sold abroad."

The Spanish owner, the moment he takes command, offers so many of the American seaman as he wants, liberal wages, varying from three to five hundred dollars for the return voyage, and not unfrequently secures their services. The water casks are then filled, the slave deck laid, the caboose and coppers arranged, and when a favorable off-shore breeze springs up the slaves are taken on board, in two hours if necessary, and the vessel, with her new owners and cargo, is off for Cuba.

The place of landing in Cuba is previously arranged, and as the time for the arrival of the vessel approaches those interested in the enterprise are at their posts. *Cedulas* have been obtained from the officer who does this part of the dirty work of the Captain General, for the number of slaves expected, two and a half ounces (or forty two dollars and fifty cents) being paid for each as the Captain General's fee.

The slaves are landed, the *cedulas* being exhibited to the chief authority, and to the Captain of the Partido of the District, to each of whom handsome gratuities are paid for their connivance.

This is the ordinary course of proceeding when the affair is successful, and the profits it yields are enormous; the bozal costing the trader about seventy dollars and selling for from eight to twelve hundred in Cuba.

But it not unfrequently happens that Mr. Crawford, the British Consul General at Havana, learning of the intended importation,—spiritedly

remonstrates and demands the Captain General's interference; and this officer, in appearance at least, adopts active measures to prevent it; but it rarely amounts to anything. If any slaves are taken, the affair is so managed that the trader is suffered to escape with enough to make a fair profit; and if any participant has to be imprisoned for a few days, it is usually the Captain of the Partido, who runs this risk and charges accordingly. Thus is the slave trade conducted; and while it is manifest that the trade could not exist a day without the connivance of the Captain General, it is equally obvious that it is impossible to obtain accurate information as to the number of slaves annually introduced. I have examined all the received authorities upon this point, and I have reason to believe the number generally overstated.

Lippincott says, that in 1844 when the trade was uncommonly active, the importation reached ten thousand; but General Crawford, whose means of obtaining correct information, entitle his statements to great consideration, does not estimate it at over six thousand.

Mr. President, I totally dissent from the assertion that the plantation slaves of Cuba are replaced by importations every seven years, and from the assertion of my friend from South Carolina, [Mr. HAMMOND,] that the climate of Cuba is adverse to the African. Cuba is but a degree south of Florida, where our statistics show the negro is healthier than in any other portion of our country.

The Southern Keys of Florida are in $L. 24^{\circ} 33'$, and Cuba lies southeast about ninety-four miles from them; and while Florida is but little elevated above tide-water, a back-bone of mountains traverses Cuba from East to West.

With similar treatment the plantation negro in Cuba would be what he is in Florida, the freest from disease and care, the happiest and the most enduring of his race on the face of the earth.

But it must be remembered that so long as the slave trade exists, increase by births is discouraged not only by the interest of the planters, but by the prejudices of those in cities owning domestics.

The trader finds the expense and trouble of bringing females equal to that of bringing males from Africa; and as the female is worth only about one-half or three-fifths as much as the male of the same age, but few females are brought, the proportion being about one to six.

Hence we find scarcely a female on some plantations except a few domestics about the houses.

Now, sir, annex Cuba and abolish the trade, and the females would be sent from the cities and towns to the plantations, their places would be supplied by the Coolies or the *Islanias*, and the domestic slavery of Cuba, like the Island generally, would soon be Americanized.

I trust that I do not shock the prejudices of any of my friends when I say, that the continuance of the African slave trade is the greatest curse that could have been inflicted upon Cuba; for to that and that alone is she indebted for the deathly pall that wraps her in despotism to-day.

Spain has violated her treaty obligations to encourage it,—because she deliberately adopted the horrible policy of ever keeping a large number of negroes, fresh from their jungles in Africa, ready to turn upon the people; savages, with whom slaughter is pastime; and one of her ministers, with a cold-blooded forecast unsurpassed, has calculated that

the ability of Spain to turn these negroes upon the people, is equal, in controlling Cuba, to an army of one hundred thousand men.

It has kept the people in constant terror of insurrection, and afforded a plea to the crown for keeping amongst them a standing army of soldiers, spies, and informers. Upon this point General Concha's authority will be admitted. Upon the expiration of his first term of service in Cuba, he published a memoir, in which he comes to the conclusion that to the balance between the white and colored races is Spain indebted for her tenure of the Island, and for the failure of Cuba to go off with the other American provinces in 1823, when Spain had but three regiments there.

The existence of this slave trade has moreover furnished to Great Britain a pretext for interfering, from time to time, in the affairs of Cuba in a very remarkable manner; and I think we are justified in believing, nay, I think we would be culpably incredulous were we not to believe, that England's stern and settled policy is to attain the liberation of every negro imported into Cuba since 1820, and thus to reduce it to the condition of St. Domingo.

From the following dispatch of Mr. Crawford to Lord Clarendon in 1855, written at Havana, we can infer the rate of bribery in this trade :

"Your Lordship will be able to form some idea of the nature of such arrangements, by the details I am enabled to furnish of what was effected at Santa Cruz, on the south side of the island, when 500 Bozals were landed near that place in August last, viz :

| | Gold—Ounces. |
|--|--------------|
| To the Commanding officer | 468 |
| To the Captain of the Port | 234 |
| To the Collector of the Port | 200 |
| To the Tide-Surveyor | 200 |
| Total | 1,102 |

This arrangement was made upon 468 slaves, the rest being weak and sickly, (rather over 40 dollars a head) which must be considered a remarkably cheap bargain of its kind."

AFRICANIZATION OF CUBA.

I trust, sir, that it may not be deemed unbecoming in me, or violative of any courtesy which this body, and which I, as an American Senator, owe to a friendly power, to stand here in my place and denounce to the world my conviction, as I now do, that this cold blooded and barbarous policy is being pursued by that Government.

The views entertained in the past as well as in the present, by Great Britain and ourselves, upon the present and future condition of the African race on this continent, are well determined by the course and action of each. She, partly induced by a spurious philanthropy, partly moved by a desire to develop her Indian Empire and to injure the United States, adopted the emancipation measure, and prostrated the most productive, prosperous and valuable colonies that ever an empire owned, to beggary, ignorance and barbarism; and in this condition she maintains them that the negro may be free,—free to violate all his duties to himself, to his fellow and to his God,—a freedom which reduces him to a hellish slavery, and conducts him back to his original barbarism. And having done this with her own colonies,—and her

objects yet unattained, are we to suppose she will pause in her career with the colonies of Spain?

To hamper, crib, cabin and confine the progress of our country, she bestows unceasing vigilance. Why, sir, I remember that you yourself, [Mr. MASON in the chair,] not two years ago, as the head of our Committee on Foreign Relations, brought to the notice of this body not only her encroachments on this continent, but her active interference to prevent us from acquiring simple coal deposits for our navy.

Her trade with Cuba now is considerable, but if it were Africanized it would pass at once, as a free black colony under her protection, at the doors of our Southern States; and she would not only have a monopoly of its trade, but the regulation of its tariff.

But let us look at the direct evidence before us. Great Britain's tone and language upon our Cuban policy have been uniform for a half a century, always expressing her determination against its transfer to us.

I will not go over the evidence so ably presented by my friend from Louisiana, [Mr. BENJAMIN,] to show that she has twice attempted to get Cuba secretly. She values Gibraltar as a possession beyond all price because it is the key to the Mediterranean; but what is Gibraltar in comparison to Cuba, where she could not only command *our* Mediterranean, but where she could, for all time to come, plant a free negro soldiery upon our borders, and within a night of our shores?

But I will pass on to the direct proof of her policy.

I have just seen an able article in *La Patrie*, (published in Paris,) of the 17th ult., in which this language is used:

"To protect Cuba against the covetous Americans, Spain ought, above all, to count on England, who has also Jamaica and so many other important islands to defend; but the former intimate relations between Spain and England have greatly changed during the last twenty years; and the principal cause, not to say the only cause, of this coldness is the undeniable continuance of the Cuban slave trade and the tolerance, but little disguised, that the Spanish authorities afford to this inhuman traffic. This continuance of the trade, in obliging England to maintain, from self-esteem, a squadron in the sea of the Antilles, is the source of continued difficulties which spring up periodically between England and the United States. * * *

"The Spanish Ministry knows well—and that is the chief motive that determines its present conduct—that the abolition of slavery is the most infallible means of assuring to Spain the possession of Cuba. Independence would suit certain planters who have daily business relations with New Orleans and New York. The most solid aid of Spanish rule are the two hundred thousand mulattoes of Cuba, who are to-day free men, in possession of every civil and political right, and who would, the day following its annexation to the United States, fall back to the level of the slaves. To fortify this class by the addition of all the negroes still in the bonds of slavery would be to raise an insurmountable barrier to American invasion. Free them, and they would sooner perish under the banner of Spain than submit to the re-establishment of service by the hands of Americans. Thus has it always been believed that the Governors General have received, in their secret instructions, the authorization to proclaim their emancipation the day in which the authority of Spain in Cuba would be in peril. It is much better for Spain to gradually prepare the emancipation than have recourse to such an extreme measure.

"Cuba, peopled by mulattoes and free blacks, would no longer be the prey that to-day the Americans aspire after. The Southern States urge the acquisition of that island because they could divide it into two States, and could thus re-establish in the Senate and House the equilibrium of votes, which now stand to their disadvantage. Cuba, besides, would serve them as a depot, to which they could draw the negroes of Africa, and to give a great impetus to the slave trade. With the perspicacity and the vigilance of which the American Custom House officers have given evidence, it would not be difficult to land at Charleston or Baltimore, as coming from Cuba, negroes brought directly from Guinea or Mozambique; and thus they could put an end to the period of high priced slaves, this plague which ruins the producers of sugar and cot-

ton. But Cuba, peopled with free men; Cuba, bringing as citizens into the great republic of men a people of mixed blood, and of veritable negroes, would be no more the aim of the men of the South; she would, on the contrary, be a dangerous example and a source of continual apprehensions.

"Spain is, therefore, well inspired, in seeking in the emancipation of the blacks the salvation of her finest colony. May the efforts of the O'Donnell Cabinet be crowned with success. * May brilliant experience show once more that true policy is that which serves best the interests of humanity."

This extract is significant.

Now, sir, let me ask the attention of the Senate to a few extracts from dispatches of British ministers touching this question; and first I will read from a dispatch addressed by Mr. Crawford, at Havana, to the Captain General of Cuba, dated 31st March, 1855.

The "emancipated" here alluded to are those who had been captured on being imported and farmed out with a ticket as emancipados.

"I am also instructed to refer your Excellency to the assurance given by the Conde de Alcoy to Lord Howden, in March, 1853, that all the captured slaves in Cuba—whose liberty the Spanish Crown bound itself, by the Treaty of 1817, to guarantee—should receive their freedom before the end of 1853; and at the same time those captured negroes to whom immediate liberty was promised by Spain, under Article XIII of the Treaty of 1835, should be liberated as soon as they had completed a term of five years, to be reckoned from the date of their last assignment.

"I am therefore instructed by the Earl of Clarendon to state these views to your Excellency on the part of her Majesty's Government, and to remind your Excellency of the contents of the despatch from General Valdez of the 30th of April 1842, which was communicated officially to Her Majesty's Government, and in which General Valdez promised that, on the completion of five years from that date, all the emancipated negroes were to enjoy perfect freedom."

Here is the British Consul-General writing a diplomatic note to the Captain-General of Cuba, under instructions from Lord Clarendon, announcing to him the failure of the promise made by General Valdez, *that every negro imported into Cuba since 1820 should be free*. If our authority for the position which we take rested only here, it would certainly be sufficient to arouse the attention of this country. Who can contemplate this condition of things in the Island of Cuba calmly? I ask is there a patriot who does not shrink from the Africanization of Cuba—a term which vividly recalls the unutterable horrors of St. Domingo,—and which embraces within its ample signification murder, rapine and desolation;—and lives there a man, honored by the American people by their confidence here, who would for a moment hesitate to interpose all the power of this government to avert from Cuba, from our age and our race, so dark, so sad a fate?

In 1841 England endeavored to establish a British tribunal in Cuba, with power to decide the *status* of the negroes making application to it. Lord Aberdeen, in a dispatch of 31st December, 1843, to Mr. Bulwer, then British Minister in Spain, holds the following language in relation to this attempt, and its temporary abandonment:

"In 1841 the draft of a Convention was transmitted to Madrid, by which it was proposed to institute, by the aid of British functionaries, an examination into the *titles by which the slave population of Cuba is held in servitude*. Encouraged by the novel appearance of good faith on the part of the Government of Cuba, as it was then administered, her Majesty's Government admitted the weight of certain objections raised against that proposal by the government at Madrid, and forebore for the time to press it."

The "draft of a convention" here referred to had for its object an agreement between Spain and Great Britain, that British functionaries

should proceed to Cuba, go upon the plantations, call the negroes before them and determine for themselves the titles by which they were held, with the view of liberating all introduced since 1820; and to this humiliating proposal Spain lent a willing ear, and sent it to Cuba to ascertain public sentiment there upon it.

It produced an indignant remonstrance from the Cabans, and it was temporarily laid aside, but not abandoned.

The Count Villanueva (who was then Intendente) said :

“It is not to be presumed that any white man will be disposed to submit to so hard a fate. They will prefer to emigrate to foreign countries to earn their livelihood and save the lives of their children, if they do not previously adopt the course which a state of desperation would prescribe. * * * * There has been but one feeling or opinion since the arrival of the publications in question from Madrid, which is that the Island would be irrecoverably lost by it to the mother country, and to its inhabitants, who would prefer any extreme to the calamity of sacrificing their fortunes, endangering their lives, and remaining in a state of subordination to the negroes.”

In 1850 and 1851, these demands were again pressed by England with great energy and warmth, but were now resisted by Spain. On the 23d March, 1851, Señor Bertan de Lis writes to Lord Howden :

“But it seems impossible that the well known perspicuity of the Cabinet of London should have overlooked in its turn the immense responsibility imposed upon the Queen’s government by the present circumstances of the Spanish Antilles, and the stringent duty in which it is placed, of proceeding with the greatest prudence and circumspection, in all matters which may exercise either directly or indirectly any influence upon the social and political situation of those colonies.

“You are aware of the dangers by which these colonies are menaced. You know that for the prevention of these dangers, for the consolidation of the security and preservation of its transatlantic possessions, her Majesty’s Government, hitherto, unfortunately, reduced to its own means, cannot as yet rely upon the decided protection of its most important allies.”

In reply to this, on the 10th of July, 1851, Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Howden :

“The Spanish Government will do well to consider that if such a course of proceeding shall continue, the people of this country, instead of looking with displeasure at attempts which may be made to sever Cuba from the Spanish monarchy, may be led to view with satisfaction the accomplishment of an event, which, in consequence of the conduct of the Spanish colonial authorities, will have become the only means of putting an end to the commission of crimes which the Spanish crown solemnly bound itself, many years ago, utterly and for ever to prevent any Spanish subject from committing.”

On the 7th of August, 1851, Lord Palmerston to Lord Howden :

“Her Majesty’s Government deem it due to the frankness which ought to characterize the intercourse of friendly governments, to let the Spanish Government know, that if, as seems to be the case, the Government of Madrid is unable to cause its subordinate officers in Cuba to carry into execution the treaty engagements of the Spanish crown for the suppression of the slave trade, and to enforce the laws promulgated by the crown of Spain in execution of those engagements, the British Government must deem itself obliged to take the matter into their own hands, and to have recourse to such measures in relation to it as may appear to Her Majesty’s Government best calculated to accomplish the purpose in view.”

In another dispatch, Lord Palmerston says :

“With reference to that passage in M. Miraflores’ note, in which he states that the Spanish government cannot understand how her Majesty’s government can seriously recommend a measure which would prove very injurious to the natives of Cuba, when they also recommend that the Spanish government should conciliate the affections of those Cubans, I have to instruct your lordship to observe to M. de Miraflores that the slaves of Cuba form a large portion, and by no means an unimportant

one, of the population of Cuba; and that any steps taken to provide for their emancipation would, therefore, as far as the black population are concerned, be quite in unison with the recommendation made by her Majesty's government; that measures should be adopted for contenting the people of Cuba, with a view to secure the connexion between that island and the Spanish crown; and it must be evident that if the negro population of Cuba were rendered free, that fact would create a most powerful element of resistance to any scheme for annexing Cuba to the United States, where slavery still exists."

Here I will close my review of British dispatches on this point, observing only that in 1853 England and Spain seem to have arrived at a conclusion mutually satisfactory, suddenly and unexpectedly; for conflicting dispatches were written on the same day by the ministers of both.

On the 16th of March the Earl of Clarendon writes to Lord Howden (at Madrid) that the position of Spain "*endangers the friendly relations between the two countries;*" and on the same day Lord Howden writes to the Earl of Clarendon that the "*Spanish government has agreed to a settlement of a question which has so long been a matter of painful dispute.*"

As yet we know not the details of this "*settlement,*" but Lord John Russell, on the 4th of May following, showed that they were satisfactory to England; and from the course adopted towards us, we are justified in believing that they embraced France. When we rejected the overtures of England and France to become a party to the Tripartite Treaty, Lord John Russell directed the British minister here to say, that

"While admitting fully the right of the United States to reject the proposal made by Lord Malmesbury and Mons. de Turgot, Great Britain must at once resume her entire liberty, and upon any occasion that may call for it, be free to act either singly or in conjunction with other powers, as to her may seem fit."

And subsequently, Lord Clarendon, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced in Parliament that "there is no portion of the two hemispheres with regard to which the policy of the two countries, however heretofore antagonistic, is not now in entire harmony."

And now, sir, can we, in justice to ourselves, hesitate to act promptly upon this long cherished Cuban question? Are we to await the final act of the tragedy progressing in Cuba, the emancipation of the negroes and the revival there of the scenes of St. Domingo?

Are we to fold our arms and permit England and France to erect Cuba into a free negro colony?

Sir, I am aware that men still live,—nay, some may be found even within these halls, who profess to regard the negro's ability to govern himself as a question yet to be solved, and who affect not to see this question in the light which historic truth has shed upon it. Let me invite their attention to the present and prospective condition of the British colonies.

CONDITION OF BRITISH COLONIES.

Great Britain has shown no little solicitude to ascertain the real state of things in her West India colonies. For this purpose, she appointed, in 1842, a select committee, consisting of some of the most prominent members of Parliament, with Lord Stanley at their head. In 1848, another committee was appointed by her, with Lord George Bentinck as its chairman, to inquire into the condition of Her Majesty's

East and West India possessions and the Maurities, and to consider whether any measures could be adopted for their relief. The report of both committees show, beyond all doubt, that unexampled distress existed in the Colonies. The report of 1848 declares :

“That many estates in the British West India colonies have been already abandoned, that many more are in the course of abandonment, and that from this cause a very serious diminution is to be apprehended in the total amount of production. That the first effect of this diminution will be an increase in the price of sugar, and the ultimate effect a greater extension to the growth of sugar in slave countries, and a greater impetus to slavery and the slave trade.”

From the same report, we also learn that the prosperity of the Maurities, no less than that of the West India Islands, had suffered a fearful blight, in consequence of the “glorious act of emancipation.”

A third commission was appointed in 1830, to inquire into the condition and prospects of British Guiana. Lord Stanley, in his second letter to Mr. Gladstone, the Secretary of the British Colonies, has furnished us with the following extracts from the report of the committee :

Of Guiana generally they say—“It would be but a melancholy task to dwell upon the misery and ruin which so alarming a change must have occasioned to the proprietary body ; but your commissioners feel themselves called upon to notice the effects which this wholesale abandonment of property has produced upon the colony at large. Where whole districts are fast relapsing into bush, and occasional patches of provisions around the huts of village settlers are all that remain to till of once flourishing estates, it is not to be wondered at that the most ordinary marks of civilization are rapidly disappearing, and that in many districts of the colony all travelling communication by land will soon become utterly impracticable.”

Of the Abary district—“Your commission find that the line of road is nearly impassable, and that a long succession of formerly cultivated estates presents now a series of pestilent swamps, overrun with bush, and productive of malignant fevers ?

“Nor are matters,” says Lord Stanley, “much better farther south.”

“Proceeding still lower down, your commissioners find that the public roads and bridges are in such a condition that a few estates still remaining on the upper west bank of Mahaica Creek are completely cut off, save in the very dry season ; and that with regard to the whole district, unless something be done very shortly, travelling by land will entirely cease. In such a state of things it cannot be wondered at that the herdsman has a formidable enemy to encounter in the Jagnar and other beasts of prey, and that the keeping of cattle is attended with considerable loss from the depredations committed by these animals.

“It may be worth noticing,” continues Lord Stanley, “that this district—now overrun with wild beasts of the forest—was formerly the very garden of the colony. The estates touched one another along the whole line of the road, leaving no interval of uncleared land.

“The east coast, which is next mentioned by the commissioners, is better off. Properties, once of immense value, had there been bought at nominal prices ; and the one railroad of Guiana passing through that tract, a comparatively industrious population—composed of former laborers on the line—enabled the planters still to work these to some profit. Even of this favored spot, however, they report that it “feels most severely the want of continuous labor.”

The commissioners next visit the east bank of the Demerara river, thus described :

“Proceeding up the east bank of the river Demerara, the generally prevailing features of ruin and distress are everywhere perceptible. Roads and bridges almost impassible are fearfully significant exponents of the condition of the plantations which they traverse ; and canal No. 3, once covered with plantains and coffee, presents now a scene of almost total desolation.”

Crossing to the west side, they find prospects somewhat brighter : “a few estates” are still “keeping up a cultivation worthy of better

times." But this prosperous neighborhood is not extensive, and the next picture presented to our notice is less agreeable :

"Ascending the river still higher, your commissioners learn that the district between Hobaboe Creek and 'Stricken Heuven' contained in 1829, eight sugar and five coffee and plaintain estates, and now there remain but three in sugar, and four partially cultivated with plaintains, by petty settlers; while the roads, with one or two exceptions, are in a state of utter abandonment. Here, as on the opposite bank of the river, hordes of squatters have located themselves, who avoid all communication with Europeans, and have seemingly given themselves up altogether to the rude pleasure of a completely savage life."

The west coast of Demerara—the only part of the country which still remains unvisited—is described as showing *only* a diminution of fifty per cent. upon its produce of sugar; and with this fact the evidence concludes as to one of the three sections into which the colony is divided.

Again hear the report :

"If the present state of the county of Demerara affords cause for deep apprehension, your commissioners find that Essequibo has retrograded to a still more alarming extent. In fact, unless a large and speedy supply of labor be obtained to cultivate the deserted fields of this once flourishing district, there is great reason to fear that it will relapse into total abandonment."

Describing another portion of the colony, they say of one district :

"Unless a fresh supply of labor be very soon obtained, there is every reason to fear that it will become completely abandoned.' Of a second, 'speedy immigration alone can save this island from total ruin.' 'The prostrate condition of this once beautiful part of the coast,' are the words which begin another paragraph, describing another tract of country. Of a fourth, 'the proprietors on this coast seem to be keeping up a hopeless struggle against approaching ruin.'" Again, "the once famous Arabian coast, so long the boast of the colony, presents now but a mournful picture of departed prosperity. Here were formerly situated some of the finest estates in the country, and a large resident body of proprietors lived in the district, and freely expended their incomes on the spot whence they derived them." Once more, "the lower part of the coast, after passing Devonshire Castle, to the river Pomeroun, presents a scene of almost total desolation."

"Berbice," says Lord Stanley, "has fared no better. Its rural population amounts to 18,000. Of these 12,000 have withdrawn from the estates, and mostly from the neighborhood of the white man, to enjoy a savage freedom of ignorance and idleness, beyond the reach of example and sometimes of control. But on the condition of the negro I shall dwell more at length hereafter; at present it is the state of property with which I have to do. What are the districts which together form the country of Berbice? The Corentyne coast—the Canje creek—east and west banks of the Berbice river—and the west coast, where, however, cotton was formerly the chief article produced. To each of these respectively the following passages, quoted in order, apply : "The abandoned plantations on this coast, which, if capital and labor could be procured, might easily be made very productive, are either wholly deserted, or else appropriated by hordes of squatters, who of course are unable to keep up their own expense the public roads and bridges; and consequently all communication by land between the Corentyne and New Amsterdam is nearly at an end. The roads are impassable for horses or carriages, while for foot passengers they are extremely dangerous. The number of villages in this deserted region must be upward of 2,500, and as the country abounds with fish and game, they have no difficulty in making a subsistence. In fact, the Corentyne coast is fast relapsing into a state of nature."

"Canje Creek was formerly considered a flourishing district of the country, and numbered on its east bank 7 sugar and 3 coffee estates, and on its west bank 8 estates, of which two were in sugar and six in coffee, making a total of 18 plantations. The coffee cultivation has long since been entirely abandoned, and of the sugar estates but 8 still now remain. They are suffering severely for the want of labor, and being supported principally by African and Coolie immigrants, it is much to be feared that if the latter leave and claim their return passages to India, a great part of the district will become abandoned."

"Under present circumstances, so gloomy is the condition of affairs here, that the two gentlemen whom your commissioners have examined with respect to this district, both concur in predicting 'its slow but sure approximation to the condition in which civilized man first found it.'"

"The negroes, who, in a state of slavery, were comfortable and prosperous beyond any peasantry in the world, and rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent serfs of Europe, have been by the act of emancipation irretrievably consigned to a state of barbarism."

Surely it is no wonder that the hurraing of the English people has ceased.

"At the present moment," says the London Times for December 1st, 1852, "if there is one thing in the world that the British public do not like to talk about, or even to think about, it is the condition of the race for whom this great effort was made."

Not so with the abolitionists of this country. They still keep up the annual celebration of that great event, the act of emancipation, by which, in the language of one of their number, more than half a million of human beings were "turned from brutes into freemen."

I will not delay to show the condition of Jamaica and other colonies. The same results of negro self-government, beggary and vice, every where exist.

And here let me say to the Senator from Wisconsin, [Mr. Doolittle,] whom I see in his seat, and to whose novel plan of surrendering the Tropics exclusively to the negroes I listened, that if he can show me a square mile of earth on this Globe which exhibits the negro's ability to govern himself and prosper, I may confess that his notion has some foundation at least. Why, sir, I do not know in what city or town the Hon. Senator resides,—but I will undertake to say that if any negroes are there, it has its negro quarter,—the filthiest and the most shunned in all the city, and that their progress, stimulated as it must be by false philanthropy, has never carried them beyond the menial employments in which they are usually found.

Emancipation, sir, has been a total, a wretched failure; and it has illustrated a singular feature of the negro race, viz: that just as there are certain grains and fruits which the industry of man has redeemed by careful culture from their original and savage nature,—from some wild grass or litter nut, which, if withdrawn from his care, will relapse back to their original type,—just so does the African in these colonies when left to himself, relapse back, stage by stage to the original barbarism of his fathers.

CUBANS.

It is not my purpose to review the grounds occupied by the opponents of this bill at this time, but there is one objection taken, which, considering the time and place in which it is made, is too remarkable to pass over.

It is said that the Cubans are Catholics, and therefore averse to, and unfitted for, liberty; and that the Catholic church is hostile to freedom. An assertion so irreconcilable with the truth of history scarcely merits a serious answer; but, sir, if this charge shall ever be made under circumstances requiring a response, heaven grant that the Church may have the privilege of confronting her enemies here before the freest and greatest forum upon the earth. As one of her humblest followers, and a most indifferent one, I regret to say, perhaps the only one of this body, I stand always ready in her defence,—but, sir, she needs no defence. There she stands, with the historic truth and traditionary lore of eighteen centuries clustering around her head, her annals illustrated and adorned by the proudest names and monuments of earth; her teachings sublime and universal, her morning sacrifices to the ever-living God welcoming the sun in

his coming, and her vesper bells cheering his departure throughout the bounds of earth.

Sir, let this charge be seriously made, and its refutation will be found in every forum and upon every field where freedom has been lost or won.

I am unauthorized, sir, to express upon this subject any opinions but my own; but in my judgment, the enlightened Catholics of the world to-day would regard the transfer of Cuba to this country as a measure well calculated to advance the interests of the church.

It is also alleged that the Cubans are ignorant, that they are satisfied with Spanish dominion, and desire no change. Sir, I profess to know something of the Cubans, and I feel bound to remind those gentlemen who have dealt here in wholesale abuse, and in some inuendos against their indisposition to liberty, against their incapacity for self-government, against their ignorance and superstition, that in a population of about six hundred thousand whites they sustain one daily journal, at least, having nine thousand daily circulation, while in the mother country there is not a single paper that has two thousand, and that daily journal, about the size of our Journal of Commerce, is twice the size of any in Spain.

Let me say that, deprived of every office of honor, trust and profit, not permitted to enter the army or navy, not permitted to enjoy any of the benefices of the church, not permitted to leave the island, or return, without permission, or bear arms, or enter upon a trade, or transfer a residence, without permission; crushed by law, and regarded by habit as an inferior race, they have yet speedily adopted many of our mechanical contrivances, they have shown the most remarkable capacity for managing their own affairs, in the administration of the island, as its unrivalled prosperous commercial and agricultural condition to-day manifest, and they are the planters and mechanics of Cuba, while the old Spaniards are the governing class.

They have sought the United States upon every occasion; and those that you have seen here are fair specimens of the Cubans. In private virtues I do not believe they will compare unfavorably with our own people. The spirit of hospitality rests upon every Creole mansion in Cuba. Most especially does it to an American. The miserable pretense has been set up, and sometimes urged here, that this people, crushed and down-trodden as they are, do not desire a change of government. It is the most preposterous presumption on earth, that a people thus crushed, living almost within hearing of our own bells which celebrate the anniversaries of our independence, coming to our country, educated in our public schools, carrying back with them and spreading the principles of civil and religious freedom, should tamely submit to the rod if they could possibly avoid it.

Why, sir, these people, within my own recollection, have, on five different occasions, organized a well directed revolution; and the existence and maintenance of an army of trained soldiers, usually twenty-five thousand men, never less than seventeen thousand, and numbering with the militia and partidos, twenty-five thousand at all times, besides the government spies,—the very existence of this force shows how much Spain fears the spirit of the people. But for the maintenance of a standing army, a great deal larger than this country ever had, or I hope ever will maintain for years, Cuba would have been free by the exertions of her own sons long ago. On every occasion when manhood and courage could be shown, the people of Cuba have not been backward. But the dawn of that glorious

morn which is yet to rise upon Cuba is already struggling up to our vision. The influence of young Cuba, of a generation educated under free institutions, is beginning to be felt; and Heaven grant that the soil which has been moistened by the blood of the Ageuros, of Lopez, and of Crittenden, may soon cease to afford a resting-place for the oppressor. In that little melancholy affair of her chosen liberator, Lopez, there was one company of forty-three men, commanded by a young Cuban of Cardenas, some of whom went from our shores under my own eyes, some of them were my own friends—they appealed to me whether to go or not; I told them it was going to absolute, certain destruction. But they left their wives, their children, their property, nay, they would not take a suit of clothes with them, because they would have to go back to their houses to pack them up. They elected cheerfully to die, and, they said to me, they would be ashamed to look their countrymen in the face, if they could remain away when there was an expedition on foot to free the Island of Cuba; and I believe, to-day, they but expressed the honest conviction of every Cuban heart in the island. I believe there is not a Creole in the island who would not raise his hand for freedom; and if the island is to be bought, they are ready to assist to raise the money if necessary. Gentlemen here have not entered into a calculation of the fund that may be raised on the Island of Cuba, either by the sale of her public property, the acquisition of her public lands, or the voluntary subscription of her own people.

But, sir, they are habitually crushed by the despotic will of a Captain General at the point of the bayonet—a man who is not unfrequently sent to Cuba because he has become dangerous at home. In illustration of this, I need go no further back than the present reigning Viceroy. All men who have given any attention to the affairs of Spain, will recollect that this same General Concha revolted against his Royal Sovereign in Galicia. They remember very well that he turned over to the Government, and was sent back to murder and butcher his old companions whom he had assisted in rebellion. They remember that, after he returned from the Island of Cuba in 1853 as Captain General, he again raised the standard of revolt against his Queen to depose her, and made his pronunciamiento in the streets of Madrid; that he fled, was pursued, declared a traitor, and condemned to death; but with the tortuous ways of Spanish diplomacy and General Concha's own matchless character and ability for intrigue, he was recalled from France and sent to Cuba, and declared a loyal citizen to govern over that island; and when he got there, in perfect keeping with his character, he seized the very friend who had stood by him in his adversity, and who, it was supposed, was possessed of papers which might compromise him, and he commanded the judges to put that friend to death, because he said he had in his possession sufficient evidence to convict him of treason. Under his dictation, but fortunately spreading the order upon their records, they did condemn him to death; and Pinto was garroted under his orders.

Such men as these are sent to the Island of Cuba with a nominal salary of \$50,000,000 a year, but a despotic power to crush out of the people any amount of money they may think proper. But, in spite of all this, the people of Cuba to-day present a degree of commercial and agricultural prosperity that is hardly to be seen in any similar latitude upon the face of the globe.

The slave trade is encouraged by Spain in direct opposition to the Cre-

ole sentiment of the island, and in no wise can they be held responsible for it.

MR. BRODERICK. Will the Senator from Florida give way for a motion to adjourn? It is now quarter past six. He can go on to-morrow.

MR. MALLORY. I give way.

MR. BROWN. I ask the Senator from California to suspend his motion for a moment. Before the conclusion of this question, which the Senator from Louisiana has given us notice he means to press to-morrow evening, I shall desire to say a word, and that word I desire to say to the northern Democracy.

I say distinctly I desire to say it to them, and whenever, during to-morrow, I shall have an opportunity of speaking, I wish their presence, because what I have to say I design for them especially and separately.

MR. KENNEDY. If the vote is to be pressed to-morrow evening—

Several SENATORS. "No." "No."

MR. BRODERICK. It cannot be pressed then.

MR. KENNEDY. I hope not. I desire to be heard on this question. I am prepared to go on to-night or to speak to-morrow.

Several SENATORS. We will hear you to-morrow.

MR. FESSENDEN. You may depend upon it the vote will not be taken to-morrow night.

MR. BRODERICK. I renew my motion to adjourn.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate adjourned.

FRIDAY, February 25.

MR. MALLORY. Mr. President.—When I had the honor of last addressing the Senate on this bill, I took the broad ground which has been assumed by every statesman of our country who has ever had this question under consideration, that the Island of Cuba is essential to the general welfare of the United States and to its military defences; I endeavored to show its remarkable geographical position in a strategic military point of view. I further endeavored to show why it was that the statesmen of our country, from Mr. Jefferson to the present day, including all complexions of political parties, Whigs as well as Democrats, have uniformly used the language that the United States would not seek to disturb Spain in the possession of the island. It was when Spain was comparatively, as compared with the rest of the powers of Europe, a strong nation, and we were relatively weak. It was said with the understanding that Spain could maintain her *status* in Cuba, and would govern it in such a manner as to be compatible with our interests. Who supposes for a moment that any of these leading men, most especially Mr. Calhoun, would have used such language if the alternative of the Africanization of Cuba had been submitted to him? If it had been seen in 1845 that Spain was taking measures to turn the slave population of Cuba free, and to reduce it to the condition of Jamaica or San Domingo, does any man suppose that Mr. Calhoun would not have been in favor of adopting immediate measures for the acquisition of Cuba, if necessary in the manner he pointed out, by the alternative of arms? Yes, sir, he would have felt then as many of us do now, that it is our duty openly and in the face of the world to take Cuba and talk about it afterwards.

In this connection also I endeavored to show the weakness of Spain and her inability to maintain her neutrality in the event of any difficulty

between her and any of the European powers, and I will do it more fully to-day. It is manifest that in a war between ourselves and Great Britain or France, it would be impossible for Spain to pretend to neutrality; or if she did, she would have but to open her ports to both belligerents alike, and to offer the same facilities to ourselves and to our enemy, to ensure to the enemy the greatest possible advantages and to us the greatest possible detriment; and if it did not, experience has taught us that Britain, as an enemy, has never regarded the rights of neutrals. In our own brief naval career in the last war, we saw that at Valparaiso she attacked our fleet when lying under the guns of a neutral port, and she did the same at Fayal, and if we wanted further assurance we might take her conduct at Copenhagen. It is fallacious to proceed on the ground that we can recognize longer a continuation of Spain's authority over Cuba on the presumption that she can if she would govern it in a manner compatible with our interests in the event of difficulty. In the event of war she could not so govern it, and in peace as we are now she is so governing it as to show the very worst possible aspect to our interests.

GOVERNMENT OF CUBA.

Mr. President, Spain has a written constitution, and under its provisions life, liberty and property find general security. In her national assembly, or Cortes, the people, no less than the State and the Church, are represented; but from the provisions of this constitution, and from the Cortes also, unhappy Cuba is excluded. She sent her deputies there in 1837; but they were ignominiously excluded. They published an indignant remonstrance to the Spanish nation; but it had no effect, and Cuba was turned over to the tender mercies of royal ordinances and special edicts. Governed by a viceroy, under the title of Captain General, who is clothed with all the powers usually devolved on the commander of a besieged city; who exercises power over life, liberty and property; who, trained in the camp, and at the head of an army, recognizing no divided authority, enforces a despotic will at the point of the bayonet; who, not unfrequently found a traitor or a troublesome character in his own country, is sent to Cuba to govern her people, to burnish up his own reputation, and recruit his fortunes; Cuba stands out to-day as the most appalling instance of mis-government on the face of the earth—a despotism to which the misrule of Japan is absolute freedom. I will say to my friend from Vermont, who deprecated any allusion to the Government of Cuba, that I am surprised at him. I am surprised that, in this nineteenth century, here in the American Senate, we should not be permitted to speak of a despotism within almost hearing distance of our own shores, which has existed under our own eyes, to which our citizens are compelled to submit, and which we have yet made no effort to obviate. The Senator says they are under no compulsion to go there. We have a treaty of amity and commerce with Spain, of 1793, under which our people go there, and they go there with the understanding that they are entitled to all the rights, and subject to the laws and usages of Spanish citizens. To an American the shield of the law means something; it conveys, at least, the idea of some protection; but let me tell him that in Cuba, where the supreme power is the will of the Captain General, no such protection is found. A very intelligent English traveler, (Phillips,) who cannot be supposed to be biased, says of the Government of Cuba:

"The Government of Cuba, though, as already said, similar to that of the parent State, is much more oppressive. It is a kind of military despotism, or, rather, an oligarchy, in which the love of dominion is carried to a species of fanaticism, and degraded into meanness. As nothing is too large for its ambition, so nothing is too small for its cupidity. Its appetite is insatiable, and its digestion omnivorous. There are no limits to its rapacity. Both the legislative, judicial, and executive power are almost entirely in the hands of the Governor. Indeed, the power with which he is invested is almost equal in extent to that granted to governors of besieged towns. Even the higher classes may be said to have no civil rights; neither those of personal liberty, personal security, nor personal property; immunities declared by Blackstone as the inalienable birthright of every man.

"The taxation is said to exceed in variety and extent that of any taxation imposed by any Government in any country of its size upon earth, viz: Upwards of twenty million dollars collected by the order and for the uses of the Spanish Government alone, independently of those appropriated to the wants of the country itself, or for social purposes.

"The Creole population are excluded from almost all influential and lucrative offices and positions. The judges and most of the officials are from Spain; and, being without salaries, like so many vultures they prey upon the unprotected within their jurisdiction. There are no means, dishonest, tyrannical, or cruel, which the Spanish authorities have left untried in their apparent endeavors to ruin the colony. Bribery and corruption seem to be recognized as necessary methods of this Government."

The natural fruits of such a despotism are visible to every eye in Cuba; they are making themselves manifest everywhere, and every department of her Government exhibits, habitually, in all its intercourse with our citizens, a degree of corruption that can hardly be imagined—a corruption that extends from the highest officer to the lowest, from the Captain-General, who receives his bribe in ounces for violating the faith of his country, for violating her treaty obligations, for admitting slaves knowingly, down to the humble tide-waiter, who receives his bribe in dollars for making a false custom-house return. All is corruption, all is bribery in their officials, and integrity is the exception to the rule.

OUR COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

I will now briefly review our commercial relations with Cuba, so far as they bear upon the question of annexation, for I hold that if we had in this respect pursued a wise policy, the acquisition of the island would have been an easy matter to-day.

But if our worst enemies had devised some cunning scheme for alienating the Cubans and driving their trade from our ports, they could not have performed the task better than we have done it for ourselves.

As Cuba's nearest neighbors, and as the cheapest producers of all the staples of life, we ought naturally to engross a very large share of her trade; and such would be the natural result, did we permit Cuban vessels to purchase in our ports. But I will undertake to say that if our ports, from Maine to Texas, were examined to-day, you would find no Spanish vessel in them bound to Cuba; and I remember that the last time, some four years ago, I examined this subject, our exports to Cuba in Spanish bottoms amounted to twelve thousand dollars, while those from Great Britain reached nearly three millions. Cuba sells to the United States double the value of what she receives in products, but under no wise system could this possibly exist. For example, if our imports from Cuba this year shall be \$15,000,000, our exports in value will be seven and a-half millions, leaving us her debtor seven and a-half millions—a debt which we do not pay directly to Cuba, but which we pay through exchange on England and France to Spain, to equalize her balance against Cuba. Cuba

sells to England either directly or through "Coves and a market" as much as she receives, and the commerce between them is about equal. Spain takes \$3,600,000 of Cuban products, and she sells to Cuba \$9,000,000, or nearly three times as much; but of this \$3,600,000 much is not consumed in Spain, but in the ports of the Levant and the Adriatic, going first to Cadiz and Barcelona. France sells to Cuba two and a-half millions and Cuba sells to France two millions; or, if the value of Cuban produce which goes through Spain into France be considered, their trade is about equal. Under the American flag, Cuba would receive from us sixteen-twentieths of all the articles she now imports from France and England, and to illustrate the commercial change which her incorporation into the American Union would work, let us look alone at the article of flour.

Cuba consumes 300,000 barrels of flour per annum, only 9,000 of which are American, and I estimate her population at 1,600,000, a grade higher than it has been placed on this floor. I have reason to believe this to be correct. On Spanish flour the duty is \$2.50 per barrel, and on American it is \$10.81 per barrel, a discrimination of \$8.31 or more than the first cost of the article against us; and the consequence of this enormous protection to Spanish flour has been to confine its use mainly to the wealthy classes. Were flour admitted free, they would consume three-fourths of a barrel each per annum, or 1,200,000 barrels of American flour, which would sell in Cuba at \$5 per barrel for \$6,000,000 instead of the \$45,000 worth of flour we now sell them. Lying, as Cuba does, at the very doors of the flour and rice market, these articles would be carried there in the small Spanish vessels, which would make short voyages and supply the market upon a sudden demand at all the ports of Cuba.

When the Independence of her American Colonies was acknowledged by Spain, and privateering under the Columbian and Mexican flags ceased, Spain had not a ton of commercial shipping upon the ocean. Her naval power was insignificant, and she at once adopted a policy to create a school for seamen, and to build up her navy; and her first measure was to discriminate, in levying duties upon ships and merchandize, in favor of her own vessels against those of all the world.

Mr. Van Ness, being then our Minister at the Court of Madrid, was directed to remonstrate against this system. Spain refused to recede, and upon the petition of certain shipping interests, Congress adopted the suicidal policy of retaliatory measures—measures which struck a heavy blow at the agricultural and commercial interests of the country.

With the view of coercing Spain into the abandonment of her policy, we passed the two acts of 1832 and 1834, levying discriminating duties on Spanish vessels; and these acts, directed against the trade of Cuba and Porto Rico, have the following effect:

A Spanish vessel takes on board at New York, or any other American port, a thousand barrels of flour, and goes to the Custom House to clear. If she be destined to any other place in the world than Cuba or Porto Rico, she is compelled to give a bond in double the value of vessel and cargo, that no part of it shall be landed at either of these islands. Here, at once, is a discrimination (not designed by the law,) which effectually throws the Spanish vessel out of the freighting business, for a commission has to be paid to the merchant for giving the bond; and from this vexatious expense all other flags are free.

But if the vessel be destined for Cuba or Porto Rico, then the collector

demands the payment of a sum of money equal to the discriminating duty chargeable in Cuba upon the same cargo as between a Spanish and an American vessel.

If, for example, this cargo of flour landed in Cuba from a Spanish vessel would pay seven dollars per barrel duty, and from an American ten dollars,—then upon every barrel at New York the collector would charge the Spanish vessel three dollars,—and call this a tonnage duty.

A more restrictive measure, or one better calculated to legislate Cuban trade from us, could not have been devised: and this explains the enormous balance of trade against us.

No nation but ourselves pursued this course, and England and France have largely increased their Cuban trade in consequence.

To show how this has ever been regarded by the Cubans, I will request the Clerk to read the following portion of the Report upon the trade of Cuba, made to the Captain General in 1844, and which I have translated for the purpose:

“To show the injustice of the measure, (alluding to the Act of 1834,) let us compare the imports of the two countries, (Cuba and the United States.) Our vessels coming from the United States pay, on the value of their cargoes, from seventeen and one-fourth to twenty-one and one-fourth per cent., and those of the Americans with same cargoes, from twenty-four and one-fourth to thirty and one-fourth per cent.; the difference between the two is from seven to nine per cent., giving a mean difference of eight per cent.”—(p. 283.)

“The Government of the United States has the indisputable right to exercise equal discrimination upon our vessels to protect theirs and the products of their country, as have all other nations: but has it done so by the enactment of this law? No! May it please your Excellency, the American Government has said that, in addition to the contributions common to other vessels, those of Spain engaged in the trade of Cuba and Porto Rico shall pay an additional duty equal to the *difference* imposed on these islands between national and American vessels; that is to say, if foreign vessels pay in the United States twenty per cent. more than American vessels, those of the islands must pay a differential duty of twenty-eight per cent., a duty which augments just in proportion as we decrease the burdens imposed on our vessels, though we do not increase those of the American vessels!”—(pages 283-4.)

“In other words, may it please your Excellency, it is *equivalent to the declaration* of the American Government to that of his Majesty. *In vain you think to protect your shipping*, even at the cost of their public revenue; because just so much as you lighten *your* burdens upon it, just so much will we augment *ours* upon it! Such a violation of the rights of nations can hardly be conceived on the part of a great and liberal Government, and still less that it should be tolerated by Spain—(*Ibid.*)

“This violation is more flagrant and manifest as it respects *exportations*. As to importations, it is very well to levy equal (not different) duties upon cargoes imported into both nations reciprocally, because the productions of the country thus have protection; but with respect to *importations*, what motive can the Government of the United States have to levy this differential duty if it be not the extinction of our shipping, even at the cost of her own productions?”—(*Ibid.*)

“Thus, then, if to-morrow our Government shall deem it right to make a sacrifice of all parts of the imposts upon our marine which it now pays, have strangers the right to receive the same in their ports? Evidently no, your Excellency! all they can rightfully do is to imitate the Government of Spain, and to protect their marine at the cost of the same sacrifice. But to augment the duties on our vessels in proportion as we decrease them, when we do not increase those upon American vessels, and to convert this sacrifice made by the Spanish Government into a means for its destruction, is what has never been pretended to by any other nation, and cannot be tolerated by Spain without disgrace.”

No complaint was ever more just and, so far as we have gone, we have recognized its justice. Two Committees of this body and two Secretaries of the Treasury, Mr. Walker and Mr. Corwin, have recommended the repeal of these laws in elaborate reports.

I venture the opinion, sir, that we can purchase Cuba only by combining with a money consideration certain commercial concessions and advantages to Spain. The commercial spirit of Spain, fostered by her Cuban trade, and in the hands principally of the active, energetic people of Catalonia,—the Yankees of Spain, as they are called,—is steadily advancing.

Spain, in her own tonnage, sends her surplus flour, wines, oils, fruits, &c., &c., to Cuba, to the value of nine millions of dollars, and charges imports on them there, thus concentrating the interests of her producing classes in her retention of this trade. Now the people of Spain know well that whatever sum of money might be paid for Cuba, would be used or squandered by the Government or the Court, the most corrupt in Europe, and that they would derive but little benefit from it commensurate with the loss of Cuba. They know that for the last fifty years Spain has witnessed but a succession of revolutions, and that every ministry ejected from office left an empty treasury to its successors, to be replenished by extra taxes, until the national debt to-day amounts to over seven hundred millions of pounds sterling.

The vice and rapacity of ministers, and the corruptions of her Court, however, have not changed the Spanish people. They are the same,—honest, brave and true,—that they were in Spain's palmy days, retaining their primitive virtues with their primitive customs; and in riding through the roads and beneath the old chesnuts of La Mancha to-day, you will encounter pretty much the same groups of peasantry, dressed in the same style, inviting you with the same salutations to partake with them of the same style of breakfast with which they greeted our old friends, Don Quixote and Sancho.

Connect the offer of money with a right of Spain to preserve her home trade with Cuba for a period,—say forty years,—and it would carry great weight. There would then be apparently no interruption to her commerce by the transfer, and the industrial interests of Spain would sustain no sudden sensation. Nor would her oils, wines or fruits compete with any agricultural interests of ours; and moreover, her carrying trade, which is her principal for her naval seamen, would not be destroyed.

Spain needs money,—she has long been on the verge of national bankruptcy. Lord George Bentick, speaking for the British holders of Spanish bonds in 1846, in Parliament, used the following language :

"The debt due from Spain to British holders amounts to about £46,000,000, the interest on which, at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., is £1,610,000; and this sum deducted from the total revenue of *Cuba* and *Porto Rico* alone, would leave a surplus income to Spain from those sources of £652,500. The annual value of the produce of the island of *Cuba* is about £9,300,000, whilst the revenue of Havana alone increased in twelve years, viz : from 1815 to 1827, from 1,726,963 dollars to 4,383,262 dollars. *Here, then, is wealth to repay the whole debt due by Spain to British bond-holders. Now, as the whole Spanish navy only amounts to three ships of the line, five frigates, and twenty sloops, brigs and smaller vessels of war, so far as the prudence of the case goes, I think the most timid Minister need not be under any apprehension that, whatever course was taken, there would be any very effective resistance on the part of Spain.* I think, then, I have shown that there is capability on the part of Spain, and that it only requires the application of an energetic system on the part of the noble Lord to show her the necessity of placing herself in a position to pay her debts."

* * * * *

"But in what manner are the revenues of Spain wasted? Why, I find that the royal household, one of the most corrupt and profligate in Europe, costs £435,000 a year, being upwards of £140,000 a year more than the Queen of England receives."—(Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, third series, vol. xciii.)

SPAIN'S POWER TO RETAIN CUBA.

It must be admitted that in a war between Spain and any of the great powers of Europe, Cuba would be the coveted prize and would fall from her grasp.

MR. DOOLITTLE. If the honorable Senator from Florida will allow me for a single moment, as he is passing on to another branch of the discussion, I desire to read a single extract, in relation to the condition of the Liberian settlement on the coast of Africa.

MR. MALLORY. I would rather that the Senator would introduce that when he makes his own remarks.

MR. DOOLITTLE. Of course I do not desire to interrupt the honorable Senator.

MR. MALLORY. Spain's future power is to be judged by her past condition and present weakness;—and I will briefly sketch her troubled existence for the last forty-five years.

In 1814, on the fall of Napoleon, that wretched and imbecile creature, Ferdinand the Seventh, returned from his French prison to Madrid, and was once again a king;—and, surrounding himself with the adherents of absolutism, he immediately proceeded to establish a despotic government, and did so. This lasted about three years, the times varied by insurrections and anarchy. The glorious patriot Riego then raised the standard of revolt successfully, overthrew the government, proclaimed the constitution of 1812, under which the Cortes was convened, and liberal principles again declared.

During the next three years, varied as before by revolts and confusion, the King played falsely alike with friends and foes until a French army interfered and restored the Bourbon monarchy. Then followed military commissions and trials, held all over Spain, many of the noblest men of the country were executed, and Ferdinand crowned his perfidies and sunk his memory to eternal degradation by authorizing the execution of Riego.

The monarchy however had no peace; insurrections, guerrilla parties, the commencement of the Carlist war and the corruptions of the Court, reduced the country to beggary and bankruptcy, which continued down to the death of Ferdinand in 1833, when, by his abolition of the Salic law and the elevation of Isabel to the throne, another intestine war of seven years followed. The adherents of Don Carlos, under the title of Charles the Fifth, and those of the *good and virtuous queen mother Christina*, took the field, and hostile camps covered the country.

In 1834 a new constitution was proclaimed, inaugurated by pronunciamientos and revolts at Madrid, Malaga and Saragossa.

The Carlist war continued down to 1840, when the Duke of Victoria made his way to the head of public affairs.

In 1843 he in turn was driven from power, Narvaes took his post, and in 1845 a new constitution was proclaimed.

In 1854 Concha and O'Donnell raised the standard of revolt, the battle of Vivalcaro was fought, the streets of Madrid were barricaded, the houses of members were sacked, Christina was banished, anarchy reigned throughout the capital, and in fact over the whole country.

Espartero then took control of the Government and a new constitution was proclaimed in 1855. Espartero and O'Donnell divided

power, the former giving way in 1856, leaving O'Donnell at the head of affairs, when another constitution was established.

Such have been the last forty-two years of Spain's career; and further to exhibit the improbability of her retaining Cuba much longer, let us glance at the dominion she has parted with, as furnished by one of her own writers:

"In 1565 we gave up the Isle of Malta to the order of St. John. In 1620 the Lower Navarre and Bearne was yielded to France; and in 1649 the Rousselon. In 1640 we lost Portugal and her colonies. In 1648 we recognized the sovereignty of the Netherlands. In 1626 the English wrested the Barbadoes from us; in 1655 Jamaica; in 1704 Gibraltar; in 1718 the Luccas; in 1759 Dominica; and in 1797 Trinidad. In the 17th century France took possession of Martinico, New Grenada, Gandaloupe, and the half of the Isle of San Domingo; and in 1800 Louisiana. In the 18th century we yielded up Sardinia to the Duke of Savoy, and to Morocco our rights of Mazalquivir and Oran. We ceded Parma, Placencia, and Lucca, with other dominions in the north of Italy, to Princes of the House of Bourbon, and in 1759 Naples and Sicily were emancipated from Spanish Government. In 1819 we sold Florida to the United States; in 1821 we lost our half of the Isle of San Domingo; and before 1825 all the vast continent which our glorious ancestors had acquired was lost to us forever. Of all this immense power we have, as a remembrance of the past, the isles of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the distant Philippines, and our African possessions alone."

Sir, when I reflect upon the geographical position of Cuba, upon its command of our commerce, upon its iron despotism, upon the claims of her people upon us, upon its fertility and resources, but, above all, upon the repeated provocations which Spain has given us, I am reminded of the reply of Lord Clife, when called before the Parliamentary committee to answer for his alleged spoliation of the Indian Princes: "By heaven, gentlemen, when I reflect upon the temptation, I am astounded at my own moderation."

But our opponents say, what want we of more territory? Have we not enough? And they quote, amongst other opinions, those of Mr. Webster upon this point:

"I have always wished," said Mr. Webster in his speech on the admission of Texas, in 1845, "that this country should exhibit to the nations of the earth the example of a great, rich, and powerful republic, which is not possessed by a spirit of aggrandizement." "My opinion has been," said he, again, in his great speech of 7th March, 1850, "that we have territory enough, and that we should follow the Spartan maxim, 'Improve and adorn what you have. Seek no further.'"

Something like this fell from my friend from Vermont. "Improve and adorn what you have. Seek no further." Sir, it has been the cry from the formation of the Government. It was the cry when we acquired Louisiana, Florida, California, and New Mexico; but it has ever been the cry of minorities unsupported by power, minorities battling against majorities on party issues;—and I much doubt if Mr. Webster would have ever held such language as President of the United States.

The condition of nations is the condition of the individuals composing them. Tell any of these distinguished men who surround me here, "pause in your career, make no further advance up the steep hill of fame, improve and adorn what you have!" Tell the ambitious student, with all his university honors clustering around his head, "rest from your labors, cease your pursuit of knowledge, stay the ambitious beatings of your heart, improve and adorn what you have!" Tell the seaman fresh from the deck of victory to sheathe his sword and lie upon his oars—and even while they listen, they turn off each to pursue his own particular career.

Alexander, at the height of his military glory, sighed for new worlds to conquer; and Sir Isaac Newton, when complimented upon his sublime labors, replied that he felt that like a little child he had but wandered on the shore, occasionally finding a shell or a pebble more lovely than the rest, while the great ocean of truth lay unexplored before him.

No, Mr. President, it is no more possible for this country to pause in its career than it is for the free and untrammelled eagle to cease to soar. The blood in our veins and the institutions we have adopted equally impel us onward. Every homestead and hamlet of New England refutes this stand-still policy; for each and every one retains the cherished memory of a son, a brother, or a father, who, surmounting every obstacle, has wandered into distant lands to carve out a home, there to transplant a loved mother, wife or sister; there to win name and fame, and come back at some distant day, perhaps to old Connecticut, a proud and honored son,—perhaps to Congress, to tell of the hopes of his constituents.

At our present rate of progress this vast continent, every inch of it, must soon be ours. Since we turned England adrift from us we have added a new sovereignty and three hundred thousand people to the confederacy nearly every four years. It was but as yesterday, sir, that a handful of hardy pioneers, with the axe and the rifle, crossed the mountains and settled in Oregon; and last week, while our Chairman of Finance was upon the floor, lucidly explaining the monetary condition of the country, the President's messenger was announced, and said, "The President of the United States has signed a bill admitting Oregon into the Union." Not another word was said,—the Chairman proceeded with his remarks, and Oregon, with her ninety-seven thousand people, her seventy thousand square miles, her two hundred miles of seaboard, and the agricultural and mineral resources of a great empire—took her place, the thirty-third in our magic circle of stars, whose union and harmony are never broken by additions.

I am sensible that I have detained the Senate longer than I should have done, and I will close in a very few minutes. I desire to advert to what has been said in relation to the manner in which this offer may be received by Spain. I believe that from 1825, if we had had an agent in Spain ready to make a commercial treaty securing to her the carrying trade between Spain and Cuba to a certain extent, or its equal enjoyment with ourselves; and the admission of her oils and wines into Cuba upon their present terms, and at the same time paying a sum of money down to a ministry, we could have had Cuba on several occasions. —


But, sir, I am asked what I would do if Spain should reject all reasonable terms? I can hardly suppose such a contingency, sir, but I would be prepared to meet it.

I would in such case act openly and fairly with her, and look directly at the contingency of taking Cuba and talking about it afterwards, as Frederick did with Silesia.

I would remind her that for her hold upon Cuba to-day she is not only indebted to our neutrality laws, rigidly enforced—to our forbearance, but to our active assistance;—forbearance and assistance which we can no longer, in justice to ourselves, extend. I would remonstrate with her upon the tendency, so perilous to us, of her Cuban policy. I


would tell her that she has established a government there which is an ulcer upon the civilization of the nineteenth century—an ulcer doubly offensive because of its proximity to our shores; a government whose daily precept and practise are at war with every principle of civil and religious freedom;—you have fired upon our vessels on the high seas in the lawful pursuit of their trade, upon paltry pretences; you have taken American seamen from our decks under the protection of the stars and stripes, upon pretences false and frivolous, incarcerated them in filthy dungeons, and you have liberated them only at your own pleasure; you have arrested our people, unjustly confiscated their property, and you have murdered them without the shadow of a trial;—nay, you have so systematized fraud, so established corruption in your own public offices, from the Captain General down, that our citizens who go there under your treaty have to administer to your rapacity to conduct their affairs. We will tell them this, and further, that throughout the whole of these outrages we have sought redress from the Captain General there, and have been put off on the paltry pretence that he had all power to do wrong but none to do right; and, sir, having proclaimed our purpose, I hope there is stamina, and strength, and power enough in this Government, when we have exhausted these peaceful remedies, to let Spain feel that Cuba shall continue her aggressions no longer, but that hereafter we will right the wrong where it is committed. And, sir, I would let Spain know that an American citizen, wherever he may go, whether standing within these halls, or beneath the dark portals of Cuba's prisons, cannot wander so far but that his country's interest will be felt and her power exerted to right his wrongs, even though it might lead to the end of Spain's dominion over Cuba.

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