


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SUBJECT BOEHM, ANTON JOSEPH DR. DSN _____

DATE _____

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FORM 3768 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 9-87


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SUBJECT DR. BOHM, ANTON

DSN _____

DATE _____

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PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

_____/FRQ/____

1. Full name (Dr.) Anton Joseph BOEHM
First Middle Last
2. Name in native script _____
3. Name at birth (if different from 1) _____
4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (state briefly time, reason and place of use)
Gotthard MONTESI (present nom de plume)
5. a. Date of birth 3/6/1904 b. Place of birth Vienna
6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate Austrian, white
7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6) Austrian
8. Present residence (owner, tenant, sub-tenant) sub-tenant,
19 a Neutorstrasse, Salzburg
9. Permanent address (if different from 8) tenant,
9 Nachdemsee, Altmuenster on Traunsee
10. present occupation (full title, salary, etc.) employe with
Verlag Herder, 33 Wollzeile, Vienna I; mainly as cover
11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States (give date and name in which certificate was granted)
12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. Explain relationship _____
13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities Anton BOEHM, employe with Vereinigte Eisfabriken, Vienna,
born 2/28/1878 Vienna, Austrian; Vienna VIII, 17 Florianigasse
14. Mother - same information as 13 Rosa BOEHM, nee LOTHWURF,
employe with Vienna food trade firm Dominik Wild, born
8/25/1882 Vienna, Austrian; residing Vienna VIII, 17 Florianigasse

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPT 107 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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15. **Wife (or husband) - Full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages)**

Hildegard Anna Theresia BOEHM, née GLASER, born 8/10/1902 Vienna; marriage 11/24/1929 Vienna; Austrian; 9 Nachdemsee, Altmuenster on Traunsee

16. **Children - Full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.**

Hildegard Rosa Elisabeth BOEHM, female, born 5/9/1931 Vienna, Austrian, 9 Nachdemsee, Altmuenster on Traunsee

Gotthard Michael Anton BOEHM, male, born 8/14/36 Vienna, Austrian, 9 Nachdemsee, Altmuenster on Traunsee

17. **Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.**

Josef BOEHM, male, physician, born 1909 Vienna, Austrian 17 Dornacherstrasse, Amstetten

18. **Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.**

none

19. **List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue, and duration of validity.**

a- Austrian passport, Serie A no. 241823 III/PA-1473/49, issued by Bezirkshauptmannschaft Gmunden on 30/8/49; duration of validity: 29 August 1954

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20. Religion - Degree practiced, membership religious orders.

roman catholic

21. Present and past political affiliations.

presently no political affiliations;
1934 thru 1938 member of Vaterlaendische Front;
1938 thru 1945 member of NSDAP, no party rank

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates, purpose, people and firms visited.

between 1921 and 1938 travels to Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, France, Britain, Switzerland, Italy, North-Africa, Portugal, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina. No details concerning dates are remembered. 1940/1941 military service Slovakia, Bulgaria; 1942/1945 Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece as employe with German Foreign Office (see para.29); Germany 8/29/1950 (participation in Alt-Ötting Katholikentag); Germany 9/3 to 6/1951 (for holding a lecture at Köln-Bensberg during a session of Zentralkomitee der deutschen Katholiken).

23. Education - School, location, course, degree, dates

1915 thru 1923 high school Vienna;
1923 thru 1928 University Vienna;
12/18/1928 doctor's degree political science

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor)

Language	Latin	Speak	poor	Read	good	Understand	fair
Language	English	Speak	fair	Read	good	Understand	good
Language	French	Speak	fair	Read	good	Understand	poor
	Russian		poor		fair		poor
	Spanish		poor		fair		poor
	Italian		poor		good		poor

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23. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if over prisoner of war.

drafted on 12/2/1940; released on 12/11/1941 by request of German Foreign Office; units: 12/2/1940 thru 2/7/41 II-Lg Nachr.17 Vooslau (Lower Austria); 2/11/41 thru 3/25/41 Flieger Res.Komp. Malacky (Slovakia); 3/26/41 thru 6/6/41 LN:Flugm.Res.Komp. 8-17 Vienna; 6/7/41 thru 12/8/41 Lg. Stabsnachrichten Komp.2-17 Vienna, partly Bulgaria, rank: corporal, duty: radio communications; war decorations: Civil War Service Cross 1st and 2nd class.

24. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

no present membership in any organization;
1938/1945 member of Reichspressekammer;
1919/1945 member and later chairman of Catholic Youth Association 'Neuland';
1934/1938 member and leading functionary of Austrian Catholic Action;
1934/1938 member of Vaterländische Front

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

photography

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property.

no bank deposits, no property, no securities;
monthly earning as employe with Verlag Herder, 33 Wollzeile Vienna.

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

1929/1941 editor with 'Schönere Zukunft', publisher Dr. Josef BERLE, 14 Nusswaldgasse, Vienna XIX, reason for leaving: suppression of the weekly by Nazi Government;

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29. (Continued)

1927/1938 editor-in-chief of the monthly 'Neuland' suppressed after German Occupation; May thru September 1938: Government commissioner with Vienna 'Herold Verlag' and 'Albrecht Dürer Verlag', reason for leaving: differences with the superior authority; 1942/1945 employe with German Foreign Office, Berlin, first with Informationsabteilung, then with Kulturpolitische Abteilung, rank: Wissenschaftlicher Hilfsarbeiter, type of work: expert for South East Europe; November 1946 thru November 1947 employe with Otto Müller Verlag Salzburg, 11 Ernest Thunstrasse; November 1947 thru March 1948 free collaborator with Amandus Edition Vienna IX, 10 Weinburggasse, editor of 'Der Optimist'; since May 1948 employe with Herder Verlag, co-editor of 'Wort u. Wahrheit' (mainly as cover)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

- a- A very large number of articles in the above mentioned periodicals and others, for instance 'Neues Wiener Tagblatt', Vienna 'Presse', 'Freie Stimmen', the former 'Prager Tagblatt' and catholic periodicals; contents: cultural problems, foreign politics, religious matters, history, critical essays on literature;
- b- Co-editor of and contributor to the symposium 'Katholischer Glaube und deutsches Volkstum in Österreich' (Otto Müller Verlag) (approx. 1933), and of the symposium 'Bekenntnis zu Österreich' (Volk und Reich Verlag, Berlin, 1931).

31. List persons living at same address, close associates (individuals or groups), correspondents at home and abroad.

close associates: (Dr. Otto) SCHULMEISTER, editor-in-chief of 'Wort und Wahrheit', Vienna I, In der Burg, 54 Säulenstiege. Prof. Otto MAUER, Secretary General of Austrian Catholic Action, Vienna II, 10 Karmelitergasse; Dr. Karlheinz SCHMIDT'S, Oberwesel/Rhein, editor of 'Orbis Catholicus' (Herder Verlag, Freiburg i.Br.); Ing. Lambert BINDER, official with Vienna Bundesministerium für Verkehr und verstaatlichte Betriebe, residing at Vienna XVIII, 26 Theresiengasse

32. List five (5) character references.

Prof. Otto MAUER (see para. 31);
Prof. Dr. Michael FLEISLER, Vienna XIX, 42 Irlasegasse;
Otto MÜLLER, publisher, Salzburg, 11 Weinberggasse;
Albert BEUCHERT, publisher, Vienna I, 33 Wollzeile;
Barbara von HAEPTEN, widow of Legationsrat Hanns-Bernd von HAEPTEN, (nazi-killed leader of an underground resistance group with German Foreign Office), Heidelberg, 12 Gundolfstrasse;

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33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denasification, etc.

Automatic arrest at Camp Deggendorf, Camp Adenbrück (Feuerbach), and Camp Marcus W.Orr, Salzburg-Glasenbach, from May 28, 1945, thru October 3, 1946.

34. Description (use American standards of measurements, if possible)

Age 48
Apparent age
Height 5' 7"
Eyes blue-gray
Face-shape oval
Complexion white
Sex male
General appearance
prominent features

Feature straight
Weight approx. 160 pounds
Teeth healthy
Hair light brown
Scars none
Build normal
Other identifying features
short-sighted (glasses)

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

Immediately after my arrival at Berlin, I joined an underground resistance group within Auswaertiges Amt, headed by (Legationsrat) Hanns-Bernd von ~~MAERTON~~ and Legationsrat Adam Trott zu Solz, both belonging to the well-known 'Kreisauer Kreis'. I also had direct connections with leading members of said 'Kreis', mainly with Count Peter Yorck von Wartenburg, (Count Moltke and Bishop Gerstenmaier (now chief of 'Hilfswerk der Evangelischen Kirche' at Stuttgart). All these persons, except Gerstenmaier, were hanged by the Nazis after July 20, 1944. I escaped trial only accidentally because I was severely sick (nervous breakdown) and on leave with my family at Altmuenster, therefore not participating in the actions of July 20, 1944. Against subsequent investigations I was protected mainly by Ambassador Six (Foreign Office) and Mr. Wilhelm Höttil.

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PRQ Part II

36. CC-2
37. Grossbahn knew Subject since beginning of World War II. Grossbahn met him again in Salzburg in the fall of 1947 and recruited him to submit personality reports, sending him to Vienna for this purpose. On 1 June 1948, Subject went to work in Grossbahn's Salzburg office as an editor. (During this period Grossbahn was working for ZIPPER).
38. Subject could be turned over at any time to an American. The introduction could be made by GROSSBAHN's wife, in case GROSSBAHN himself were unavailable.
39. Originally Subject took up GROSSBAHN's offer of work because of financial need. He is definitely pro-Western and strongly Catholic. He is probably also motivated by a hope for security in case of war.
40. RI and division files.
41. Subject would not want it known that for a long period of time he worked in secret intelligence.
42. Subject has independently come to the conclusion as to the correct identity of the service he is working for. Although this has not been confirmed to him, he is convinced that his guess is correct.
43. Subject was a minor Nazi member in Vienna and possibly unknowingly was used as some type of informer. During the Anschluss he became a member of the German Foreign Office and in this capacity came in contact with both the SD and the Abwehr, although he was not a member of the latter organizations. From 1947 through 1949 Subject worked for GROSSBAHN who was then working for ZIPPER. No direct contacts with ZIPPER were noted at that time.
44. Subject started off with reports on personalities and developed a number of informant connections. Later he became German editor of reporting, mainly in the political field. On the basis of his strong church connections, his press work, and former diplomatic assignment, Subject is a thorough expert on personnel questions in South East Europe. His most promising possibilities lie in the gradual development of new sources, especially in the political field.
45. Not applicable
46. Has studied instruction material in GROSSBAHN's office, and otherwise has learned from experience.
47. Subject is closely connected with Austrian leaders of Catholic Action; he is cultural counsel to Landeshauptmann Klaus; he has contacts with Archbishop Rohrer; he was a leader with the "Neuland" students group. Holds strong press connections, especially with the European Catholic press. Personally acquainted with Willi HOETTL. Handles GROSSBAHN sub-source Anton FELLNER.

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48. Subject to be paid 4000 Austrian schillings monthly as salary, plus 200 schillings for expenses. He is also provided with some PX supplies which he pays for in Austrian schillings. He has an independent income, mainly from press and radio work.
49. A commitment was made during the time Subject worked under GROSSBAHN for Zipper that he and possibly members of his family would be rescued in case of war. This commitment is not considered binding by us.
50. Could pass as a native in either Austria or Germany.
51. Of middle class origin, but has developed into intellectual circle of upper middle class.
52. Seems to be open to approach by attractive young girls. Does not indulge heavily in alcohol, but under its influence in good company might lose some of his normally well guarded security. Can be approached by flattery, especially if given by a persons he considers superior. The female approach contains certain dangers because he would probably under all circumstances try to "save face".
53. Subject is ambitious, but has a definite inferiority complex which he tries to cover up, sometimes by harshness and sometimes by a show of superiority. Is a very hard worker when it pays or when he believes it is necessary. Under normal circumstances is reliable, loyal and willing. GROSSBAHN considers that Subject is at times timid because of concern for his personal security.
54. Subject feels closely linked to the Catholic Church. GROSSBAHN feels that Subject probably open to German approaches if not under a rather strong hand.
55. Subject is a clear thinker and writes extremely well. He is an expert photographer. He has slight skill as a radio operator. He is extremely learned and has a good memory for details. A good negotiator if provided with detailed instructions. Would make a good high government official or Nationalrat (member of Parliament).
- 56.
57. Furnished by Subject
58. If a younger assistant could be found for GROSSBAHN as a replacement for Subject, Subject might be sent into party politics. In such an assignment he could be a good investigator and informant, provided he respected the case officer running him.

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VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. MASA-172

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - CC-2 PRQ Pt II
Ref: MASA-1617, MAS-W-462

DATE: 10 October 1952

Attached is completed PRQ Pt II on CC-2, for whom operational clearance is requested. Please note that we do not consider ourselves necessarily bound, either legally or morally, by the earlier ZIPPER commitment to CC-2 on evacuation (para 14 of PRQ Pt II).

Distribution
2-Wash w/2 incl
2-Vien w/1 incl
2-Sals 101
1-Sals chrono

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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ABSTRACT INDEX
DATE

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(EXCL. / MTSU - 462)
6 6 8 29

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

1. (a) **Ansprechender:** CC 2
(b) **Arbeitgeber:** (Dr. Kurt KIRCHNER) Gotthard BARNERT

2. (a) Wann wurde die erste Verbindung mit dem Mitarbeiter
wie und durch wessen Vermittlung aufgenommen?
Was already known to me at the beginning of World War II.
Met him again in fall 1947 in Salzburg

(b) Wann, wo und wie wurde die eigentliche Zusammenarbeit
bestimmt (oder ihm vorgeschlagen)?
Agreed with him in fall 1947 to have him submit rep.
on personalities and their background, transferred him
to Vienna until spring 1948 and took him as editor of
the German reporting into my office on 1 June 1948.

3. Unter welchen Bedingungen und unter Berücksichtigung
welcher Reservierungen kann der Mitarbeiter einer anderen
Leitung übergeben werden:

(a) Wegen temporären oder permanenten Ausfall der Leitung:
To an American at any time. Respective introduction
should be made through: *CHRISTIAN's wife*

(b) Wegen erforderlicher Verwaltungsführung oder aus
operativen Gründen auf die Dauer:

see a

(c) Im Falle der plötzlichen Ausfall der Leitung der
Organisation:

see a

(d) Im Falle einer geplanten Abwesenheit aus verwal-
tungs-mässigen Gründen:

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(EXL 11/11/50-462)
7-8-39

Mr. Krugger 3 (a) was (b) - stream - Mr. Wenz

- (a) an American
- (b) an American
- (c) an American
- (d) an American

4. Motiv der Mitarbeit

Originally Subject was in a poor financial situation which induced him to take my offer. Subject is definitely Western and strongly Catholic. Reason why Subject carries on is probably best described by hate/love, combined with hope for security in case of war.

5. Wieweit wurde die Identität etc. des Mitarbeiters und die Angaben in FRQ I überprüft:

From personal knowledge and since Subject is well known

6. Welche Kontrollen haben wir über den Mitarbeiter. Wodurch können wir ihn swingen das zu tun, was wir wollen?

Subject would not risk disclosure that he for a longer period has worked with us in secret intelligence.

7. Für welche Organisation glaubt der Mitarbeiter zu arbeiten? Wohin glaubt er gehen seine Berichte? Wodurch kann der betreffende zu der Annahme; ZIPFER

Subject, when the out with _ occurred, came out with facts or suppositions which he had derived from a number of publications (such as Riess's in Swiss papers), although not confirmed, Subject is convinced of realities.

C = 285

Welche Verbindung hat der Mitarbeiter mit dem
Geheimen Nachrichtendienst in London?

Subject was a minor NSDAP member in Vienna and possibly unknowingly was used as some type of informer. He, during German time, soon became a member of the German Auswärtiges Amt and in this capacity came in contact with both SD and Abwehr, without - however - becoming a member. Subject then worked under me from 1947 through 1949 with , no direct contacts however were noticed.

9. Welche Art von Diensten, Beobachtungen oder Berichten hat der Mitarbeiter bisher geliefert und für welche Art der Arbeit erscheint er auf Grund von Erziehung und Erfahrung am besten geeignet; wie sind seine bisherigen Arbeiten zu bewerten?

Subject started off with reports on personalities and developed a number of informer connections, later became German editor of reporting, mainly in the political field. On basis of strong church connections, his press work, and former diplomatic assignment Subject is a thorough expert on personnel questions in the South East of Europe. His best possibilities are the gradual development of new sources especially in the political field.

10. Siche 9 - falls nicht im unmittelbaren Geheimen Nachrichtendienst verwendet:

not applicable

11. Welche Ausbildung hat der Mitarbeiter erhalten?

Studied carefully all pertaining instructions and learned from experience.

PKY

12. Ist es vorgesehen oder werden an den Mitarbeiter regelmäßige Zahlungen (monatlich, wöchentlich) geleistet oder erhält er andere Zuwendungen?

Subject is closely connected with the Austrian top of the Catholic Action, he is cultural counsel to Landeshauptmann Klaus, I had him introduced as liaison to Archbishop Rohrer, he was a leader with the "Neuland" students group, he holds strong press connections - especially within the Catholic European press - he is personally acquainted with ^{Wittke} HÖTTL and is in charge of the HH operation. Casual knowing informers are for instance Prof. Otto MAUER (secretary general of Catholic Action) Dr. Otto SCHULMEISTER probably unknowing and a number of others not specifically listed.

13. Ist es vorgesehen oder werden an den Mitarbeiter regelmäßige Zahlungen (monatlich, wöchentlich) geleistet oder erhält er andere Zuwendungen:

Receives regular salary and ^{provided some} makes use of PX facilities, ^{Supplier's train} but has independent income mainly from press and radio work
(S 4000 monthly plus S 200 unaccountable financial expenses
(see new proposal)

14. Sind Versprechungen oder Zusagen irgendwelcher Art gegenüber dem Mitarbeiter gemacht worden:

Commitment was made - during ^{ZIPPER} time - that he personally and possibly members of his family would be rescued in case of war.

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15. **Wäre es dem Mitarbeiter möglich, dass er als Ausländer einer anderen Nation in deren Lande arbeitet?**

Could move freely as an intellectual both in Austria and Germany

16. **Aus welcher Gesellschaftsschichte stammt der Mitarbeiter - Aristokratie, oberer Mittelstand, Mittelstand, Bauer etc. (zu Beurteilen sind sowohl Herkunft als persönliche Entwicklung):**

Comes from the middle class but has developed into the the upper middle class, and there in the intellectualist circle.

17. **Persönliche Schwächen (z.B. Alkohol, Rauschgifte, Spiel, Frauen, Homosexualität):**

Seems to be open to approach by attractive, especially young girls. Does not take to alcohol but under its influence in good company might lose some of his normally well guarded security. Can be approached by flattery especially if given by a "superior" person. The female approach contains certain dangers because he would probably under all circumstances try to "save his face"

18. **Beurteilung des Mitarbeiters nach Charaktereigenschaften, Verlässlichkeit, Gefühl für und Gewissenhaftigkeit in Sicherheitsfragen:**

Subject is ambitious but has a definite inferiority complex which he tries to cover sometimes by harshness sometimes by displayed superiority. Is a very hard worker when it pays or when he believes it necessary. Under normal circumstances reliable, loyal and willing, his personal security seems his major problem, which sometimes makes him timid especially in our work - needs then a strong hand that pushes him.

19. **Zu welcher anderen Macht würde Mitarbeiter am ehesten sonst inklinieren (aus Gründen der Ideologie, religiösen Gefühlen oder aus Opportunität). Welche Gefahrenpunkte bietet er beeinflusst oder unter Druck gesetzt zu werden (von fremder Seite):**

Basically first the Catholic Church but probably open to German approaches if not under stronger hand.

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... hat ... den ... der ... Mitarbeiter, die ...
... von Mitsun sein ...

Subject is an excellent propagandist in writing, has a clear head.
An expert photographer and a mediocre radio hand.
Outstandingly learned with a good memory also for details.
A good negotiator if provided with a strict march route.
Would make a good Nationalrat or high government official.

21. **Photo, Fingerabdrücke**

see card

22. **Hat der Mitarbeiter der Urtext des FRO, Teil I, selber ausgefüllt, oder wer hat dieses (warum) getan?**
filled it out himself

23. **Weitere Bemerkungen, Angaben etc.:**

If a younger replacement could be found, I would like to send him into party politics where he should make headways. It would be necessary to keep him on payroll. In such new assignment he could be a good Forscher and at the same time informer, provided that he respects the person leading him.

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(EXC. MITSU 462)
6-8-39

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

21 October 1952

SUBJECT: Dr. Anton BÖHM

1. Approximately one year ago I was notified by Mauritius that from a number of reports that had been intercepted between HÖTTL and Bonn the suspicion had arisen that BÖHM worked as a clandestine informant for HÖTTL. In consequence I made it a special task

- a. to keep BÖHM out of any operational knowledge even to a larger extent than before
- b. to check on his mail by clandestinely opening it
- c. to have him watched by CC 14 (which operation brought no derogative results)
- d. to have sample scripts from any typewriter whereto BÖHM was likely to have access (these samples proved that the reports were written on one of HÖTTL's typewriters - BÖHM himself is a very poor typer and definitely had not written the reports in question himself)

Careful cross-checking of these reports seemed to reveal that HÖTTL's informant could also have been another person in good contact with the development in Austria.

2. I had and still have the impression that BÖHM is not trying to cover a connection with HÖTTL from me. It was with my express permission that BÖHM edited HÖTTL's book "Die Geheime Front", and the work performed by him during that period was always loyally disclosed to me. On later occasions BÖHM edited a number of articles which HÖTTL has published - also here I have the impression that I was fully informed. When HÖTTL reopened his intelligence activity for Bonn, it was BÖHM who gave me the original tip, and it was him who kept me informed, as I believe, as far as he could find out details himself.

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3. I consider BÖHM a fairly reliable supporter of the U.S. course from the time when he was in charge of I. & E. (beginning of 1946) up to his release from civil internment at Camp Marcus W. Orr. He was released ahead of his time upon intervention by the Austrian Bishop's Council and resumed his activity as a writer, ghost writer and free-lance writer for a number of Austrian publishing houses. In particular he became employed as a political reviewer and analyst with Herder Verlag, formerly in Vienna and later in Freiburg/Breisgau, a position which he still holds. I have considered this activity an excellent cover as well as a good checking position on his trend of mind. Apart from this permanent part-employment, he is a collaborator (non permanent) with "Rheinischer Merkur", ADENAUER's house paper. When he was offered the political editorship of this paper, he declined, because he did not want to move to Germany and also, as he stated, did not want to leave his employment with us. It should be mentioned in this connection that his financial status would have been by far more advantageous to him. I am also aware of the fact that he has written for Suedwestdeutsche Rundfunk, and it was he himself who voluntarily kept me informed.

4. BÖHM's family life is satisfactory, he is attached to his wife and two children, who are nearly grown up; obviously his married life is not based on sex. Ever since BÖHM has been working for me - since fall 1947 - he has had liaisons with girls and usually long lasting ones. In this respect he has acted clandestinely, a fact which can, as I believe, easily be understood. These liaisons have cost him money, and I believe that mainly for this reason he is after not exactly a quick Groschen, but an additional income. In general he seems somewhat attached to money, but I have so far not discovered that he endeavored to achieve money by dubious means.

5. His "necessity to have a large income" is the reason why I consider it possible that I may have to part from him as a close collaborator at a given time. This time definitely has not come yet.

6. For the time being I can hardly ^{spare} ~~use~~ him in my office, where he is a sound collaborator regarding personal background, biography and events of the past. His operational handling could be and should preferably be taken over by a younger man, but failing to have any prospect^s successor

(2)

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Casa - 225

at hand, I feel that I would severely harm my work if I would dispose of him by letting him go. I have to take into special consideration that he is a personal friend of the Salzburg Landeshauptmann, and that he is political adviser to the Austrian Catholic Action (an institution which I am planning to use extensively as soon as more detailed plans are laid down). I finally must consider that it is not out of the question that if I got rid of him, he would become employed by Bonn - the opening thereto would exist through "Rheinischer Merkur" and ADENAUER personally. My considerations in this respect are concerned with the fact that BÖHM could make an excellent liaison between Bonn and Austria, better than anything that exists so far. I believe that such development which undoubtedly would be partly clandestine and could become influenced by personal resentments would be against the interest of the Republic.

u. s.

Amendment:

BÖHM's present girl friend (and she has been for over two years) is Anny ERLINGER, dob 16 May 1928 at Maria Schroll District, Braunau, Upper Austria. ERLINGER lives at Bräuhausstrasse 10 c/o Buckmiller. She has been in Salzburg since 29 August 1945, coming from Mattighofen, and lived at the following addresses during such period: Wolf Districhstr. 39; Alpenstr. 16; Getreidegasse 27; Siebenburgerstr. 7; Bräuhausstr. 10; Roseggerstr. 32; Bräuhausstrasse 10 again. Nothing derogatory is known so far.

(2)

ppp
24100152
[]
~~6-16-48~~

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-225

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SE
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - Dr. Anton BSHM
Ref: EASA-205

DATE: 24 October 1952

MICROFILMED
JUN 27 1961
DOCUMENT MICROFILM SERVICE

Attached is a memorandum from GROSSBAHN further analyzing the implications of the BSHM relationship with Willi HOETTL. We second GROSSBAHN's plea in paragraph six of his memorandum; there is no question of GROSSBAHN's present urgent need for him, and we do not believe a serious security situation is involved. GROSSBAHN definitely has BSHM sealed off from information which might do GROSSBAHN's operations serious damage, and we are as yet still convinced that BSHM has no mischievous intentions in this regard. Please be sure, however, that we will continue the watch and the investigation.

Distribution
2-Wash w/2 incl
2-Vien w/1 incl
1-101
1-101 D-2c
1-Salz chrono

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

20B

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

RI COPY

24 Oct 52

2 December 1952

SUBJECT: CC-2

1. Late last spring CC 2 remarked to me that he had received and turned down an offer from "Rheinischer Merkur" - a weekly Cologne political newspaper, that allegedly is ADENAUER's house-paper - to become its political editor. Already previously he had informally told me that he had written a number of articles for the Merkur. From further side-remarks I learned from CC 2 that Herr Roegele, the chief editor of Merkur was in contact with him and had also visited him sometime during the summer in Altmünster.

2. On 27 November 1952 I had planned to go by train to Gmunden together with CC 2; I had however taken an earlier train to Attnang and there met CC 2 with whom I travelled together to Gmunden, where I left the train whereas CC 2 went on to Altmünster. During this trip CC 2 did not make the least remark that he was pressed for a conversation with me in privacy. On the morning of 29 November I received the letter from CC 2, dated 28 November, by ordinary mail. I was completely surprised by CC 2 giving me notice that he intended to leave on 31 January 1953. In accordance with the instructions that I had received, I had not mentioned or hinted anything regarding ~~the existing suspicion of~~ CC 2's connection with Hoettl.

3. I next saw CC 2 on Monday, 1 December 1952, when I briefly confirmed verbally the receipt of his letter and at the same time informed him that I was not ready to discuss this problem with him. CC 2, upon this occasion, tried to open a conversation on this topic but I declined by telling him that I would have to discuss the matter first with my friends. On 2 December he again tried to discuss the matter but I told him that I would prefer to delay a discussion. On this occasion I told him that I was not pleased at all since his leaving would create contact difficulties especially with HH 1. CC 2 replied that HH 1 could easily be handled by anybody else, and probably better than by him because he was aware that he was somehow to soft-pedalled.

4. CC 3 had informed me during last week that a phone call from Cologne had come for CC 2 after he had left for Altmünster the weekend before; the people in Cologne seemed nervous and annoyed that CC 2 was not in Salzburg. Some days before CC 3

RPS

2 Dec 52

had told me that CC 2 had made a remark to her that he was frequently going to Freilassing to send his mail off from there. In reasoning he had first said that he thereby could evade the censorship in Austria, immediately afterwards, as it occurred to CC 3 with the intention to make this statement unsaid, he went on and explained that mailing letters to inner-Germany speeded the delivery up considerably.

5. On the afternoon of 2 December I briefly asked CC2 whether he intended to move to Cologne with his family - he had briefly told me that " he was forced" to take up a position in Germany with the Merkur, not explaining why he acted under "force" - he replied that for the first half year he would leave his family in Austria and possibly then move them too. He further remarked that he intended to remain in Germany for possibly two years until grass had grown over the knowledge that he had been in intelligence, he then intended to return to Austria.

6. The motivation for CC 2's decision at this time is not known to me, I intentionally have not asked him now. From previous occurrences it does not seem impossible that he intends to break off his connections with his present girl friend - he has the habit of always having a permanent girlfriend apart from his family - and in desiring to do so needs a complete change. Undoubtedly he dislikes the work that I have presently assigned to him and especially the way how I make him do this work; he considers it too bureaucratic. Although he is a hard worker, he craves for "freedom" which I would rather style uncontrolled disorganization. I found it especially hard to enforce the writing of contact reports, and he only very reluctantly gave in. From that time on - to my belief - he commenced to be as evasive as possible. It seems to me to be true that he hoped for a revival of political reporting which suits his prolixity and unpreciseness far better. He certainly also felt, at least for all the time since we commenced reporting in English, that he could not fully succeed. Since he suffers from an inferiority complex which he in front of others usually overrides by some pompousness in an intellectual way, the final motivation may also be found here. He also had hoped for an improvement of his income with us - he is by no means materially disinterested - and was disillusioned that such increase never came up. Finally my way of handling him in "a-matter-of-fact-way" might have gotten on his nerves. I have often felt that he would have kicked if he had dared to, but here his inferiority complex and lack of personal courage stopped him; knowing this, I made the mistake of feeling too superior.

ref

7. I do not earnestly believe that CC 2 will become a major security risk, especially not after we are through with him. The following security questions must however be taken into consideration:

a- Connections that he personally held:

Permanent connection with HH 1, whereby he knows all details of this operation;
permanent contact with the leading committee of the Austrian Catholic Action, especially with MAUER and SCHULMEISTER, this contact is build up on his personal connection and may necessarily cease;
permanent contact with Landeshauptmann KLAUS, I hope that it will be possible to take this contact over personally;
permanent contact with Archbishop ROHRACHER through his secretary which was arranged upon my suggestion by EE 1 for CC 2, this contact can change hands at any time;
assisting me in permanent contact with PP 1 and PP 3 - here he only also knew of PP 5 but of no other sources, except that a liaison existed to the Ministry for Interior in Vienna; I believe that he would be scared to disturb this connection;
✓ former permanent contact with MAUTEY, a co-editor with "Presse" Vienna, which connection was dropped over two years ago.

b- Connections that he knew of:

He met AA 1 on four occasions at my house in 1949 and knows that this connection still exists. He is not aware of the other members identity;
he knows that XX 1 was working for me until recently;
he has seen SLAA contacting me on several occasions;
he knows of an existing contact with EE 1 but does not know of its extent or value;
he originally was in contact with van CUTSEM, but this connection stopped over two years ago, after he did not succeed in developing this source.

c- Access to office files:

He originally had access to a cover number list (three years ago) but did not know the respective identities. He had access to the raw reports as submitted by the AA group which he partly assembled and cross-checked for reporting. I once noticed that he went through a large number of P/reports - these reports are locked away by CC 3, and only CC 3 and myself have keys - but the matter turned out harmless because he assembled a long-breath political report. He had access to the raw reports, except any type of special investigation, by the PP group. He personally received the reports submitted by HH 1. Although the theoretical possibility exists, that he especially during weekends had the locks - these are Yale type locks - opened, I did not notice.

RP5

any change in the way how I had papers laid out - this is a habit of mine which enables me to check in connection with my photographic memory. He especially hardly could have had access to any personnel files which I keep completely separate in a steel box with a Yale lock and to which only I have access. I further saw to it that his connection with XX 1 did not grow to friendly, whereby XX 1 would have reported to me had he noticed anything suspicious going on in the former office where he and his family lived.

d- Possible intelligence connections:

His contact with Hoettl, which seems to date back to the time prior to the "Anschluss".

His contact with Franz STEINDL and through him with AUNER and MANDL.

A frequent personal contact with (professor) RASCHHOFER of Braunau, allegedly based on CC 2's work for HERDER Verlag. A reoccurring with (professor) Taras BORODAJKEWICZ.

8. When the problem of a leakage-possibility first came up in fall 1951 I ran a long term check on CC 2's mail and connections which then did not disclose anything derogative.

9. As a preventive measure I suggest to commence immediately with a reputation campaign against CC 2 starting off with church circles through EE 1, where his moral life would give a good explanation.

RAF

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-400

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attention:
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna

DATE: 3 December 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY
SPECIFIC— ~~BOEHM~~
BOEHM/HOETTL Contact

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

Ref: EASA-205, EASA-225, EASA-372, EASA-384, EASW-82

1. Attached hereto is photocopy of the Detachment 35 report which was the basis for our EASA-384. The source is Carlo ~~WASS~~.

2. Without revealing the source, the report was shown to GROSSBAHN. All agreed this was the final straw; there was no further point in attempting to explain away or rationalize the BOEHM/HOETTL relationship. What remained to be done was to determine the extent of possible damage to GROSSBAHN operations. Just how to go about this was something we were trying to study out carefully and had tentatively decided to us an alleged routine Carriage re-test as the opening wedge in breaking BOEHM on his relationship with HOETTL. This seemed desirable in order to protect our cross check on HOETTL through Detachment 35's HASS.

3. It was further planned to have GROSSBAHN conduct the interrogation of BOEHM, with the aid of and Carriage. The Case Officer was not to sit in on the actual interrogations, but would go over the results with GROSSBAHN and and help plan the course of the operation.

4. We have been in touch with by telephone and he has advised us that the earliest he could possibly come to Salzburg was about 20 January 1953. This seemed stretching out an imposing security problem a bit far and we were toying with the idea of substituting the local CID Carriage man for as the machine and operator are actually not necessary to the operation except for the purpose of giving us a plausible excuse for getting tough when BOEHM, as he inevitably must, goes even more sour on the HOETTL question than he did at the last run. We certainly would like to have with his well rounded interrogative experience, present at the session with BOEHM, but we cannot see waiting until 20 January before taking any action.

5. Now a new facet has cropped up. BOEHM himself dropped a bombshell in our midst by offering his resignation. A copy of his letter is attached, dated 28 November, which reached GROSSBAHN via mail

RI COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

RAF
3 Dec 52
(EASA-384)
11-9-52

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET

SECRET - 2 -

at his home on 29 November 1952. GROSSBAHN presented it to us on 1 December and swears by all that's Holy that he had nothing to do with inducing this action at this particular time. He claims he did not disclose to BOEHM by word or by his actions that anything was amiss. We must accept GROSSBAHN's plea of innocence, but continue to wonder if possibly something might not have leaked to BOEHM through the Detachment 35 end. We, of course, cannot say and are not in a position to make any inquiries.

6. The resignation, notwithstanding, does not alter the fact that we still feel BOEHM must be subjected to a complete debriefing on exactly what he has passed to HOETTL on GROSSBAHN operations. We now apparently have a solid reason for demanding that he agree to a re-test under the pretext of it being a routine procedure in the cases of resignations. We will try to work out the question of C 1's coming to Salzburg at an earlier date with MOB. If this cannot be done, we plan to go ahead with the idea of using local CID personnel and facilities.

7. When we are through with BOEHM, the parting can not be anything but unfriendly. This brings up the problems of control over him after he has been completely severed from GROSSBAHN. We are studying this problem, discussing it with GROSSBAHN and will submit our recommendation in our next dispatch on the matter. GROSSBAHN states that he has plenty of "dirt" (wine, women and song affairs) on BOEHM, which means we might be able to do one of two things; after the interrogation, we can offer BOEHM a few samples and tell him emphatically that more will be forthcoming in the proper quarters if he so much as takes a small step out of line; or we could begin to discredit him, without the direct threat, in his police, Church, and political circles, so that his chances of gaining sympathetic or believing ear will be sharply reduced. In any event, we are not too happy with either solution and hope that further discussions with GROSSBAHN will offer a better solution on the problem of after-control, which is inevitably a sticky one.

8. We wish to reiterate a point which we made, perhaps too indirectly, in EASA-205; that is, HASS is doing this monitoring of HOETTL strictly on his own. He is getting no direction from Detachment 35 and probably for the lack of something better to do (plus the fact that he is enough of a pro to recognize an intelligence tid-bit when he sees one) is making capital of his contact with HOETTL. We, of course, are not expressing any undue amount of interest to Detachment 35, merely expressing our gratitude when they call one of HASS' reports to our attention.

9. Your EASW-82 arrived here just as we were finishing up the rough draft of this dispatch. We offer our compliments for the excellent job represented in your memo. The thoughtfulness with which it was prepared is proven by the revelation of events as detailed herein.

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SECRET - INFORMATION

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

Some of the points you raise are answered in the foregoing; others can only be answered with the completion of BOEHM's interrogation, and still others we are a long way from answering. For example, you bring up the possibility of a GROSSBAHN/HOETTL tie. We can only say that we can not close our eyes to this thought in this or any future possibilities for checking this out that might crop up in the GROSSBAHN operations. BOEHM's connecting up with Bonn when dropped by GROSSBAHN seems to be a bridge we will have to cross if and when we come to it. We have already asked GROSSBAHN to do a complete study on the security implication surrounding BOEHM's infidelity, which means we must get a thorough run-down on his present duties as well as the type of material to which he has had access.

10. Any comments or suggestions Headquarters might have on the foregoing are requested by cable as we plan to try to bring off BOEHM's interrogation before the coming Holiday season.

11. Note for As you can see, this is a most serious security problem and could possibly mean that HOETTL has been reading much more of our GROSSBAHN operation than we suppose at the moment. Request that you advise us by phone what you might be able to work out on coming to Salzburg before the end of December 1952.

L @ M.
 GM

Distribution

2-Wash w/2 encl
2-Vien w/2 encl
1-MOB, Attn: w/2 encl (direct)
2-Sals #101 w/ 2 encl
1-Sals chrono
1-Fran

SECRET

REP
(EXC. ENCL 314)
1-4-52

10 December 1952

SUBJECT: CC 2

1. CC 2 informed me this morning that he had had a visit from (Professor) Otto MAUER, secretary general of the Austrian Catholic Action, last Sunday at his house in Altmünster. MAUER had informed CC 2 that Catholic Action was negotiating with OeVP to get a Nationalratsmandat for CC 2 during the coming elections as a representative of the Catholic Action within OeVP. MAUER had so far requested that the safe mandate should be given to CC 2 with the "Hausruckviertel" in Upper Austria.
2. CC2 informed me that if these negotiations would come off satisfactorily - a decision would have to be reached before Christmas - he would accept, immaterial whether at the Hausruckviertel or another election district. He personally did not like to act as candidate in the Hausruck because of its peasant and labor population to whom he would hardly appeal. Should he receive the nomination he would waive his plans for joining the "Rheinische Merkur" and remain in Austria. He declared his willingness to collaborate in this case, naturally under "changed circumstances".
3. On this occasion he also informed me that present Minister for Education KOLB would not become a minister again after the elections because he could not tackle the job; prospective successors were KLAUS and GSCHNITZER, but no decision had been reached so far.
4. I have to advise to carefully expect the "Nationalrat-question" on CC 2 before taking any open steps; once a Nationalrat he would be benefitting from parliamentary immunity.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

PRS
(ENCL. E75A-384)
CC-2-69

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA-468

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
 Attention:
 FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna
 SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/GROOVY
 SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - CC-2
 Ref: EASW-82, EASA-409, EASA-372

DATE: 12 December 1952

Deadline:		Check one
Hq Action Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para _____	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hq Comments Req.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para _____	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
For info and files		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

1. Attached are two GROSSBAHN reports on the ~~CC-2~~ matter. The first, dated 2 December 1952, is in answer to our request that he review the security situation vis-a-vis CC-2, and the second, dated 10 December 1952, covers an annoying angle on the possibility that CC-2 may wind up a Nationalrat before Christmas.

2. In regard to the earlier report, it is a bit difficult to sum up CC-2's exact duties in one single phrase. From what GROSSBAHN says, it appears that CC-2 has been doing some case work, some report work and some research work, all of which, we cannot deny, may possibly have given him more access to GROSSBAHN operations and files than all at this moment are inclined to suppose. We feel it is too premature to either condemn or condone GROSSBAHN (and ourselves) on this CC-2 affair; the interrogation of CC-2 will tell the story. On paragraph 9 of GROSSBAHN's report, we have instructed him that a campaign of character assassination should not yet be undertaken, if at all. We wish to study this point a bit more before deciding if such a move would net us an appreciable advantage.

3. The Nationalrat business leaves us a bit cold, and we have so expressed ourselves to GROSSBAHN. The question of immunity appears to have little bearing on the problem. Our interrogation will be along genteel lines, but firm, and we do not feel that CC-2 will make the matter a subject of Parliamentary debate once we make it quite clear where he stands with us and the possible consequences should he choose to air publicly the injustice he might feel has been done him.

4. We have talked with via telephone, and he now plans to be here no later than 5 January 1953 or possibly before Christmas, if he can work it into his rather heavy workload. With this improved time schedule, we ~~will~~ wait for him as we still feel he can help us do a real job on .

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RI COPY

SECRET
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CLASSIFICATION

CHARGED FROM [initials]

(Encl. EASA-384)
6-1-52 [initials]

FORM NO. 51-28A
 MAR. 1949

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2 -

5. As if we didn't already have enough to worry about, HASS' role in this CC-2 affair is becoming even more obscure than it has been up to now. Detachment 35 passed us a few more of his reports amongst which we found the two we are attaching hereto. HASS, as far as we can see, went far out of his way to make up a report on CC-2 as he specifically states that reports which CC-2 sent to HOETTL can no longer be forwarded to the "Amt Blank" as MAST has destroyed all his files. Wouldn't the same be true for all reports originating with all HOETTL's alleged sources? Why single out CC-2's stuff and say it specifically can no longer be sent? It could be that Detachment 35 has over-briefed HASS on the CC-2/HOETTL contact, certainly not at our prompting. However, they still stoutly contend they are giving HASS no operational direction. All this leads us to think possibly HASS or HOETTL, or a combination of the two, may be coloring up the CC-2 reports for a completely unclear reason. This would be strange, for if CC-2 is under HOETTL domination, it would be a poor time for HOETTL to cast him adrift, for our guess is that if HOETTL ever needed a friend (or a source) the time is now. If reports reaching us are correct, HOETTL's standing is at the lowest ebb it has been for the past several years.

6. We are not pouching a copy of this memo to POB and FRAN, in spite of the fact the attachment on the quarrel between the Munich and Austrian branches of "Amt Blank" would be of interest to them. We plan to pouch them this material separately as there appears no point in confusing them with the CC-2/HOETTL affair, which appears to have little direct bearing on the "Amt Blank" matter.

Recy.
[*all*] *SM*

Distribution

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2-Salz #101 "
1-Salz chrono

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 Dec 52
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OFFICIAL DISPATCH
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VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. RAS-W-139

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Base, Salzburg
FROM : Chief, ME
SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/PROCOVY
SPECIFIC - GROSSBARN - CO-2

DATE: FEB 2 1953

INFO: YIP
0 USAGE - Austria

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 2 1953	
FBI - SALZBURG	

References: RASA 372, 409, 468, SAIZ 921

1. With regard to the security problem brought to light by the HASS disclosures, we have withheld comment since RAS-W-32, pending receipt of the present carriage report on CO-2, since there seemed to be little additional advice to offer from here. However, the study of RASA 468 brings up a number of new points, and the receipt of SAIZ 921 suggests that a report on the interrogation of CO-2 will not reach here for some days, hence the present dispatch.

2. Of great interest was the letter written by CO-2 to GROSSBARN (sent in an attachment to RASA 409), as it offered a good insight into CO-2's personality and the working of his mind. We are inclined to agree with the point of view implied in paragraph 2 of RASA 468 that a campaign of character assassination against CO-2 would not be of appreciable advantage to us, at least as things stand at the present time. Looking at the situation realistically, CO-2 has probably already done as much damage to the GROSSBARN operation as he is apt or able to do in the future, unless he harbors a very strong grudge against GROSSBARN and/or our organization. In tendering his resignation to GROSSBARN in such a way as to give him two months' notice, CO-2 seems to wish to bow out gracefully. In the forthcoming interrogation of CO-2, the important thing is to debrief him thoroughly as to the extent of his revelations to HOSTIL and possibly others, and also to make him realize that it would be very detrimental to him to make further revelations after departing from GROSSBARN. However, the foregoing is more easily said than done, especially as CO-2 is eager to leave his present intelligence work with GROSSBARN, and already feels a sense of hostility towards KURARI ("... 'oben' sin gewisses Misstrauen gegen mich besteht"). Moreover, CO-2 feels closer to HOSTIL than to GROSSBARN, so it will be extremely difficult to get him to reveal truthfully what he has told HOSTIL. If the parting is bitter, then CO-2 - especially if he goes off to Germany - will probably not hesitate to talk, even though GROSSBARN may threaten to reveal his serious indiscretions. The interrogation of CO-2, even though difficult, is very important, and we wish the undertaking the best of luck.

EE/FI/PO PS.
COORDINATING OFFICER

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FORM NO. 51-28
JUN 1949

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EASA- 770

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

JR

TO : Chief, EE
Attention:

FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE: 2 February 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational
SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - CC 2

Deadline:	by	Check one
Hq Action Rep.	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
See para	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>
	by cable	<input type="checkbox"/>
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	by pouch	<input type="checkbox"/>

MICROFILMED
 MAR 14 1953
 DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: SSALZ-956

GROOVI

1. The attached papers (Memoranda for the Record, 28, 30, and 30 January and GROSSBAHN Memorandum G-176) will, we hope, serve to allay fears of a major operational security situation in the Dr. Willi HOETTL - CC 2 relationship. Although final decision will be reserved pending the transcription in Vienna of the technically unsatisfactory interrogation recordings and a possible CARRIAGE testing of CC 2 in March, we feel safe in opining that no serious security damage was done GROSSBAHN by the HOETTL relationship. We also concur in conclusion on the basis of available evidence that CC 2 was not a viper at GROSSBAHN's breast, but, rather, an exceptionally naive person who, through Providence alone, avoided doing our interests serious harm. Although we do not as yet have the benefit of the transcribed interrogation and a final CARRIAGE test, we have discussed the interrogations exhaustively -- during their progress and following their completion -- with both and GROSSBAHN.

2. In view of what we are at the present inclined to view as slight damage done us by the HOETTL affair, we regard the lesson GROSSBAHN -- and we -- have learned from it as outweighing any harm done. This incident appears to have blown a draft of uncomfortably cold air though the last chink of GROSSBAHN's "I-know-my-people-thoroughly-and-am-an-infallible-master-of-psychology-in-these-matters" armor. GROSSBAHN, quite humanly, we believe, would have been less embarrassed had CC 2 turned out to be a cold-blooded penetration agent of HOETTL's than he was to discover that CC 2 was a reasonably honorable little guy who didn't tell GROSSBAHN much that he should have known simply because GROSSBAHN was aloof, chilly, and manifested no professional counter-intelligence interest. GROSSBAHN's awakening was so sudden and so complete finally that he apologized verbally to for his apology in the final paragraph of G-176 because it resembled Bolshevik self criticism. The salutary result of it all, GROSSBAHN has certified, will be more time spent by him in learning personally what makes his people tick, more emphasis on professional controls and less on Prussian discipline and the typical business executive's treatment, and a continuing written debriefing on all contacts.

3. Salzburg is deeply indebted to who, on a moment's notice;

4 att H/W

INDEX 5-28A

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

2 Feb. 1953
668-82

did as patient, sympathetic, and professional a job as we've seen for a long time. By his exceptionally competent briefing of himself, his establishment of immediate rapport with GROSSBAHN, and his astutely competent handling of the CC 2 interrogation, he appears to have transferred a sticky situation to the profit side of the ledger. We have learned something further about GROSSBAHN, GROSSBAHN has learned a great deal about control techniques, interrogation, and practical psychology, and CC 2 is apparently leaving Austria for a fairly important job in Germany with the feeling that if he ever had two friends they are GROSSBAHN and the United States Government.

Attachments:

3 Memoranda for the Record
G-176

Distribution:

3 - ~~EE~~ ✓
3 - Wien
1 - Sals 101 file
1 - Sals chrono

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-2-
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

2 Feb. 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION


JH

28 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ATTENTION: *call*

SUBJECT: Outline for CC-2 Interrogation



1. After reviewing the CC-2 file and discussing all the facets of this case with and Grossbahn, it was decided that the best approach to CC-2 would be made via the following plan:

will pretend that he had requested a meeting with CC-2 in order to close out the latter's relationship with the United States Government. To this end the termination form will be drawn up for CC-2's signature. It will be emphasized that the government is anxious to see that CC-2 has received full financial compensation and other considerations and that he holds no further claim, either expressed or implied, against the government. It will also be stressed that the government swears CC-2 to secrecy and that he agrees to hold secret all aspects of his training, operations, reports, etc., with the government from unauthorized individuals. Grossbahn mentioned that CC-2 is impressed by signed statements, and this gimmick was devised as a potential motivation device.

2. After the formality of official termination has been played out, will tell CC-2 that we want him to give us a complete history of his relations with Willi Hoettl because this subject has never been fully recorded and it will be necessary to do so in order to complete his file at Headquarters. Compliance with our request will clear the way for CC-2's consideration for re-employment by the government when and if he desires to make application again. Grossbahn related that CC-2 had indicated a desire to be re-employed by us at some future date, and it was felt that this felled offer of future assistance would also motivate CC-2 to cooperate at the cross-examination.

3. We will permit CC-2 to run the full gamut of his experiences with Hoettl going back to the Nazi era and requiring explicit details on their meetings during the past $4\frac{1}{2}$ years. He will be permitted to pick his brain for recollections and will be steered and prodded tactfully only on vital statistics.

4. If CC-2 balks, holds back, or is downright uncooperative, an attempt at duress will be made. This will rest on the premise that our government has omnipresent influence in Germany and can make things very tough for him there.

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5. The interrogation will be monitored at the CID meeting site by Grossbahn and it will also be recorded. At the close of the initial session, [] Grossbahn, and [] will hack over the results and arrange for a second meeting if it is necessary to do so. If it becomes evident that CC-2 has been engaged in duplicity or is trying to cover up, an effort will be made to carriage-test him on pertinent details.

6. This approach was decided upon because it was recognized that we had no significant hold on CC-2 and had very little that we could utilize as a control or motivation mechanism.

7. It was also recognized that the allegations against CC-2 stem from information supplied by Karl Haas, a dubious character from away back, who was reporting on conversations allegedly held with Hoettl, whose machinations in the intelligence game are legend, and that this foundation could spell out invention on the part of Haas or Hoettl or both of these men.

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30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ATTENTION: *EMM*
SUBJECT: CC-2 Interrogation Resume
First Sitting, 28 January

MICROFILMED
MMI 497953
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. In this statement only the salient aspects of our first session will be noted. The details of this meeting, which was held in the USFA CID lie-detector room and which lasted for 1 3/4 hours, can be obtained from a transcript of the wire recording.

2. CC-2 was visibly nervous when he was introduced to and tried to beg off conversing in English, but after being assured that his linguistic qualification was perfectly adequate, he was persuaded to do so. His command of the language is adequate but by no means fluent; notwithstanding this factor, it is felt that complete understanding was reached by both parties on all important issues. As had been planned at the outset, explained the provisions of our termination form to the source, and CC-2 readily signed the statement. It was then pointed out to him that we wished to put his Headquarters file in order before he severed his relationship with the United States Government and to this end had a number of questions to ask about his relations with Willi Hoettl. For the next hour and a half, CC-2 answered in what appeared to be a sincere and straightforward manner numerous queries put to him on this subject, and what is more important, he voluntarily disclosed many hitherto unknown aspects of his relationships with Hoettl. The most significant disclosures were:

- a. that since December 1951 he had been receiving 600 schillings a month from Hoettl for submitting a monthly Austrian political summary;
- b. that last year Hoettl had introduced him to Harry Mast;
- c. that Hoettl had frequently (five or six times) tried to get him to admit that he was employed by the American intelligence service;
- d. that Hoettl knew Grossbahn worked for the American intelligence service and had on four or five occasions tried to elicit information from him regarding Grossbahn's financial status and attitude toward his work.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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3. In regard to item c in the preceding paragraph, CC-2 stated that he never admitted to Hoettl that he was in touch with the American intelligence service but he felt that Hoettl had deduced this by his efforts to evade answering these questions. With respect to item d above, CC-2 mentioned that he was convinced in his own mind that Rudy Mandl or Karl Auner had revealed Grossbahn's affiliation with the American intelligence service to Hoettl and that he never acknowledged his association with Grossbahn to Hoettl. He allowed that Hoettl could have deduced that this relationship existed.

4. CC-2 confessed that he had elected to sever his relationship with the Americans because he: (a) found clandestine work distasteful, especially when it was necessary to lie to his friends about his actual occupation and his true means of support; (b) felt that the Americans had no further need for his specialty, political reporting; (c) considered himself to be unqualified to edit military reports in English; (d) had a burning desire to be engaged in overt journalism, where his ideas could be put across to the masses on a continuous basis.

5. At our second sitting on the afternoon of 29 January, CC-2 will be asked to elaborate on these points and undeveloped leads:

a. Details of his monthly political situation report for Hoettl, including origin of the relationship, content, source of raw material, ultimate recipient, maximum payment received, plus a detailed explanation on why he did not divulge this aspect of his relationship with Hoettl to Grossbahn.

b. Relationship with Harry Mast.

c. Acquaintance with Karl Haas.

d. Relations with Theodore Albert.

e. Disclosure of information on his carriage test to unauthorized individuals.

f. Why he did not report to Grossbahn on the intensity of Hoettl's interest in his contact with American intelligence and also on Hoettl's persistent interest in Grossbahn.

g. His relations with Taras Boredajkewycz.

h. A rundown on the degree of discretion he employed in dealing with his intelligence contacts and social acquaintances.

i. Determine if he has ever been threatened with blackmail for his illegal currency or other dealings.

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6. We will also get CC-2's forwarding address in Germany and will consider the possibility of getting him a "peak of tension" carriage test in Germany at some future date if an examination of this type is deemed necessary to clarify unsettled points.

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30 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

ATTENTION: [] []
SUBJECT: CC-2 Interrogation Resume
Second Sitting 29 January

MICROFILMED
MAY 19 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. At this session attention was focused on the circumstances surrounding CC-2's preparation of monthly political summaries for Willi Hoettl, and extensive querying in this regard brought the disclosure that early in 1952 Hoettl informed CC-2 that he had been designated the Austrian representative of the Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung. Since Hoettl felt unqualified to fulfill this assignment alone, he offered to share his salary with CC-2 if the latter agreed to prepare a monthly political situation summary on Austrian affairs. CC-2 readily accepted the offer, and a 600 schilling monthly emolument was agreed upon for this service. CC-2 insists that he completed his summaries after reviewing the Vienna and Salzburg press and adding some of his own ideas on political trends and sometimes making recommendations for improvements which were required on the local political scene. He didn't consider that any of these reports contained classified information and insisted that none of the data incorporated was wittingly extracted from reports which came to him in conjunction with his work for Grossbahn. He confessed that on only one occasion was he aware that information from a summary was published in the Soldaten Zeitung and admitted that almost from the beginning he had surmised that the summaries were designated for a recipient other than the paper's editorial staff. His guess was that they went to the Austrian desk of the Bonn Government and was pleased to think that his reports were helping to give the Germans a true picture of Austrian politics and he was thus helping to cement proper Austro-German relationships.

2. In July 1952 CC-2 learned that Eric Kerrmayer had intrigued against Hoettl and managed to pull the newspaper assignment away from the latter. Notwithstanding this knowledge, CC-2 continued to submit his reports to Hoettl and was compensated for them through August. Thereafter he continued to provide Hoettl with the summaries gratis, prompted by a feeling of obligation and because of his friendship for Hoettl, and because of the fact that he scrutinized the press daily and prepared political summaries as an avocation and in order to keep himself abreast of the local political scene. He saw no reason for not continuing to transmit his product to Hoettl even though he was no longer on the latter's payroll.

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3. CC-2 did not report this phase of his relations with Hoettl to Grossbahn because he was afraid that the latter would not approve of their collaboration. As a result, he said that his conscience bothered him on this score and he found himself in a quandry, torn between his professional loyalty to Grossbahn and his devotion as a friend to Hoettl. He said that he had reached an impasse in this respect and that this state of affairs was decisive in making him decide to pull up stakes here and move on to Germany.

4. CC-2 considered it incredible that what he regarded as routine overt political reporting should be appraised by the ultimate recipient in Germany as first-rate information. [] pointed out that Hoettl had duped CC-2 in this regard and that he had also lied to him about his influence with high-ranking officials of the American intelligence service; furthermore, that Hoettl is an intelligence flop who had sunk to the gutter of the game and might drag CC-2 down with him if the latter did not open his eyes. CC-2 was evidently impressed by these revelations and behaved like a repentant schoolboy, volunteering to break off his ties with Hoettl.

5. Repeated cross-examination failed to budge CC-2 from the premise that he did not divulge details of his work for Grossbahn to Hoettl or anyone else, although he did acknowledge discussing the subject in a generalised way with Hoettl on an occasion when Hoettl sounded off regarding his service for CIC at Lambach.

6. The importance and the proper perspective of these admissions can best be gained from reviewing the wire recording transcript.

7. CC-2 remembered that he was introduced to Harry Mast by Hoettl in a Bad Ischl cafe in 1952 and that he also happened to meet Mast by coincidence on two occasions thereafter, when the two were passengers on the same train. He avowed that he never discussed intelligence matters with Mast and left the impression that he considered the latter to be a relatively characterless individual.

8. CC-2 denied that he had ever met or heard of Karl Haas. He likewise denied that he had ever met Theodore Albert.

9. He insisted that he had never divulged information on his carriage test to anyone but confessed that he had discussed the lie detector as such in general terms with (Dr) Otto Schulmeister and Hoettl. In the latter instance he affirmed that Hoettl had introduced the subject on the basis of his knowledge of the machine that he had seen at the Lambach CIC office.

10. When queried on his reason for withholding information on Hoettl's interest in the American intelligence service and in Grossbahn from the

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latter, CC-2 asserted that he had always reported these conversations to Grossbahn.

11. CC-2's relations with Taras Borodajkewycz date back to their university days at Vienna in 1936 - 1937. It was Borodajkewycz who introduced CC-2 to Hoettl in 1938 and paved the way for the latter to arrange for CC-2's reinstatement as a journalist in the Nazi press association. In the post-W W II period he has seen Borodajkewycz frequently and recalled that he had prepared reports for Grossbahn on Borodajkewycz's affiliation with the Soviets and on his suspicion that Borodajkewycz was working for the Russian intelligence service.

12. A review of CC-2's friends and intelligence contacts disclosed that Dr. Otto Schulmeister probably surmised that CC-2 was engaged in clandestine work for the Americans, but CC-2 avowed that he never discussed this subject or acknowledged his affiliation to Schulmeister.

13. CC-2 could not recall any instance in which he had been the target of blackmail or had been pressured into admitting that he was employed by the Americans.

14. At this session CC-2 again impressed [] by his direct and lucid answers to all queries. He left the impression that he is an intellectually honest but professionally naive person who was having his eyes opened for the first time. At the end of the session he expressed his appreciation for this opportunity to get things off his chest and volunteered to sit again for questioning if it were thought necessary to do so.

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DOC. MICRO. SER.
MAY 29 1963
MICROFILMED

30 January 1953 G-176

SUBJECT: Final Conversation with CC 2

1. I came back to my office around 1500 hours on 29 January 1953, whereto CC 2 had already returned at approximately 1415 hours. My first impression when seeing CC 2 was that of a changed man in as far as he showed greatly relieved. For at least the last year I had perceived that CC 2 was nervous, avoided a free conversation with me, appeared to be under an influence of nervous strain, and performed his work properly, but reluctantly. It seems that the pressure under which he had lived had passed away after he had made a clean breast during the preceding official conversation.

2. CC 2 informed me that he would now leave for Altmünster and would go to Cologne on Saturday morning. There he would commence his work with the "Rheinischer Merkur" on 1 February 1953 as editor for internal politics. He personally would have preferred to have the foreign politics desk which was also vacant, but his superiors - possibly including ADENAUER - CONRAD had insisted on his taking over internal politics. He hoped that with the support of his catholic connections he would make a success, and he felt sure to find assistance from persons now serving with the Bundesrepublik Foreign Office whom he had known when serving with the Auswaertiges Amt at Berlin. Since he did not yet know his private address - his publisher had promised to find him suitable quarters - his address will be c/o "Rheinischer Merkur", Köln, Deichmannhaus. He will come to Austria for a visit at the middle of March. He will write me the exact date and on that occasion would gladly see the gentleman with whom he had talked or any other representative of the "Organization" that might want to speak to him. He asked me whether he could discuss his conversation with me, whereto I replied that he should not. He thereupon stated with enthusiasm that he had been greatly impressed by the personality, the tact, but also the sternness of his partner in conversation who had shown extraordinary knowledge regarding personalities and facts. His judgement of people - although CC 2 had not agreed with him in the beginning - was almost

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perfect. CC 2 went on that he honestly regretted not to have had this conversation long before, because it would have helped him considerably. He then asked me whether I would be agreeable to his writing to me approximately once a month, when he wanted to inform me on his general experience, on events that had occurred, on the political development in Germany as he saw it, and on all matters that might be of interest to us. I accepted expressing my appreciation and asked him for his authorization to pass such letters on to the "Organization", whereto he gladly agreed. CC 2 concluded the conversation by stating that he hoped that political reporting would become of interest to us again and that he at any time - possibly after a lapse of one year in Germany - could resume work for us directly or indirectly.

3. After mutual expressions of friendship CC 2 left shortly after 1600 hours. He had previously handed over to CC 3 his agenda in good order.

4. During the debriefing I noticed that CC 2 made minor misstatements:

- a. I do not recall that he ever asked for my consent to pass any information on to HÖTTL and especially not concerning KAUDER-KLATT.
- b. He did not report on his re-occurring meetings with Professor BORODAJKEWYCZ since 1949, concerning whom and his service for the Soviets I had spoken to CC 2.
- c. CC 2 had not mentioned to me for a longer period his meetings with RASCHHOFER, who is or was a member of GEHLEN's "Professorenklub" and is connected with Professor OBERLÄNDER and whom I considered a dangerous contact for a possible attempt to defect CC 2. I had commented on ~~RASCHHOFER~~ to CC 2 in an unfriendly way.
- d. CC 2 had probably during 1950/1951 informed me on two occasions that HÖTTL had sent him raw material for articles which I understood would be written under CC 2's name. I had then instructed him to remain in loose contact with HÖTTL and always report thereon so that we should know what HÖTTL was doing, but had warned him not to get involved beyond an occasional social contact or the editing of HÖTTL's second book.

APG

I had authorized him to cautiously take up the currency matter (D-Mark exchange) for checking purposes only.

- e. I had authorized CC 2 to write for different papers on historical topics, but had asked him to keep me informed. This together with his Herder employment was his cover. I have never authorized him to write for HÖTTL apart from re-writing HÖTTL's books.
- f. CC 2 has never mentioned meeting any of HÖTTL's collaborators, and especially not MAST. On this and other occasions he did not comply with my order to write contact reports on any meeting that directly or indirectly could have had intelligence or security importance.
- g. During 1952 CC 2 reported to have met HÖTTL on 27 February, at the middle of March, 5 August, 10 October, and 14 November (see contact and other reports).

During the debriefing I had the impression that CC 2 on all major issues did not try to cover up. In fact, his resignation now appears as the reaction of a man who became involved against his better intentions and is now striving for solid ground under his feet. It does not appear that CC 2 has defected any knowledge voluntarily, and if he did so despite his better intentions, this originated from a general weakness in character almost typical for Austrians in general and even more for members of his class. The experience collected from this case indicates the necessity of increased control, schooling, and contact apart from the routine work. This I seem to have insufficiently observed.

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Attachment D
EASA

Preface to Transcription

1. The interrogatory approach to the cross-examination was one of feigned friendliness and consideration for CC-2's welfare. It was recognized that tangible motivation instrumentalities were not available and that duress could at best be employed as a short-range bluff. Time was of the essence, since CC-2 was scheduled to leave for new employment in Germany in a few days. Fortunately, a few clues about CC-2's personality were at hand: he was an introvert, probably suffered from an inferiority, was impressed by written agreements, and probably had a latent desire to resume work for the Americans. This information came from GROSSBAHN.

2. All of these traits, plus others which were discovered as the interview proceeded, were exploited. First, CC-2 was induced by judicious flattery to converse in English, his weakest language. Concomitantly, he was made to feel that the Americans were sorry to lose the services of such a capable veteran operative and hoped that he would one day elect to work again for the Americans. To this end it was necessary to put his personal file in order and he would therefore be questioned on his relations with Willi HOETTL and others.

3. CC-2 gave evidence that he is a perfectionist. He hesitated to speak English since he could not do so fluently. Likewise, he disliked editing military reports because his military experience was limited. He has considerable pride in his reports as a journalist and like most writers has a penchant to be read by an admiring public. This could never be realized in covert work; hence, his distaste for sub rosa activity. Essentially a sincere person, he found it repugnant to lie to friends about his intelligence assignment. The switch in his assignment from political reporting to other coverage removed the last vestige of personal satisfaction which he derived from his daily chores for GROSSBAHN. From this point on he searched for an escape.

4. Complications which weighed on this complex were the impasse that he reached when he concealed his relations with HOETTL from GROSSBAHN, and when he hid an erotic affair with his mistress, ANNY EHRLINGER, from his wife. There was also a penetrating religious facet which could not be rooted out but nevertheless manifested itself. CC-2, professedly a devout Roman Catholic, had strayed from the path and was undoubtedly vexed by the deviation.

5. As a law-abiding citizen, CC-2 disclosed that he was preoccupied because of his illegal currency deals for HOETTL and evidently expected some pressure to be applied to him by the interrogator on this score. It is well to bear this factor in mind, since it constitutes a potential control factor if CC-2 fails to observe the terms of the secrecy oath which he signed.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3025
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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6. After CC-2 made a clean breast of his relations with HOETTL and still manifested a strong attachment to the latter, it was felt necessary to expose HOETTL as a fraud and an intelligence reprobate in order to jolt CC-2 into the realization that his admiration was ill-considered. Basically naive, CC-2 was convinced that he had narrowly missed damaging involvement with HOETTL. He volunteered to break off with the latter and avowed that he would remain aloof from intelligence entanglement after he arrived in Germany to commence work at his new job.

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First Sitting: 28 January 1953

C: CC-2

D: []

D: Good afternoon, Doctor. We are glad that you were able to find time to attend this interview. I understand that you speak English?

C: A little, but I would prefer to speak German.

D: Your English is undoubtedly much better than my German, so let's commence in English--if we encounter difficulties, then we can switch over to German, and I'm sure that in this way we'll reach complete understanding. We will understand each other completely by using both languages, but I think that you are quite fluent in English, aren't you?

C: (in German) May I answer in German?

D: I would prefer that you answer in English.

C: I'll try.

D: This is good practice for you.

C: I will make faults (sic).

D: Well, that's all right; everybody makes faults. If I were to try to speak to you in German, I would make more errors.

Doctor, the reason that I have asked to see you is because I understand you are going to leave our service now. We're sorry to hear that; you're one of the oldest employees that we have in Austria and we feel that you are a specialist in your own field of political reporting, but we also understand that if you have an offer of a better job it is quite necessary for a man to look out for his future, and we can understand that if you want to change it is your right to do so. The Americans do not hold anybody to work for them when the person doesn't want to do so of his own free will.

One of the things that we will do this afternoon is to get your signature on a document which we call a release form. It includes two provisions. One is a paragraph in which you acknowledge that you have received full payment from the government for the services that you have rendered and that you have no claim; that nothing was promised to you which you didn't receive from the U. S. Government--you understand that?--and that second one is that you will forever hold secret the nature of your work in our interest.

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- C: That is in my interest.
- D: Yes, but from the Government's standpoint--and I am representing the Government--I have to put it that way. That means everything that you have done in the way of writing reports and in the way of operations, so if you are in agreement with it I will bring out the document and let you read it over. If it is not clear, I can explain it to you.
- C: (Reads the document and understands its content without difficulty.)
You must understand my special knowledge is not usable to the Americans any more. I am a political analyst.
- D: The program is a long-range one. Just as your career is one which you look at for 20, 30, or 40 years, the program of the U. S. Government also does not go from 1950 to 1951 or from 1953 to 1955; it continues on.
- C: (Signing the document) Is that all?
- D: Could you put the date in, please? Thank you very much.
Do you smoke, Doctor?
- C: No.
- D: Not even a pipe or cigars?
- C: Nothing at all.
- D: You are very unusual in never smoking at all. We have something in common.
I understand that you are going on to Germany.
- C: To work for the Rheinische Merkur.
- D: and to work for the Rheinische Merkur.
- C: But I hope that it would be a temporary job. I shall return to Austria as early as possible, perhaps in two or three years.
- D: As long as that?
- C: Yes.
- D: And you will be doing political editing?
- C: Home policy.
- D: What do you mean by home policy, internal politics?

RPG

C: Yes, internal politics.

D: You will be reporting on the various political parties, and their practices and their aspirations?

C: Yes, but I hope that I can change to the foreign policy work.

D: Do you prefer that--the foreign?

C: Yes. I am more experienced in foreign policy. However, the editor-in-chief has discussed with ADENAUER my assignment, and ADENAUER allegedly said that he would prefer an Austrian who is not involved in the clicques.

D: That seems very unusual, doesn't it?

C: Yes.

D: That's a pretty old paper, the Rheinische Merkur; the history of the paper goes back some time, doesn't it?

C: There was a paper issued in the 19th century at Koblenz which had the same name. The present Rheinische Merkur was founded in 1946, also at Koblenz.

D: Was it in existence in the Nazi period?

C: No, the founder was an immigrant named KRAMER who lived in Paris and then moved to London during the war. He returned in 1945 and together with the present editor-in-chief started the paper. It is an independent political paper. It is difficult to run such a paper.

D: There are very few countries where you can be really independent in journalism.

C: Our so-called Austrian independent papers are not really independent but are dependent upon certain political or financial groups.

D: In Austria it is almost impossible...the Salzburger Nachrichten, for instance.

C: (in German) One doesn't know. (laughs)

D: I was interested in your statement that you might in the future sometime wish to join us again, and that was the second reason for my being here. We want to close out your record in our headquarters. We're on a friendly relationship and in the future, if you feel as though you desire to come back with our organization again, that will be taken

under consideration; but before we can close the record satisfactorily, we would like to get from you the whole history, in as much detail as possible, of your relationship with WILLI HOETTL. I would appreciate it, and the Government would appreciate it, if you would start from the very beginning--from Adam and Eve--and take your time and recall as much as you can about your meetings, conversations, and dealings with Mr. HOETTL going back into the 40's. If you don't mind, I'll take notes on this, asking questions once in a while if something is not clear.

- C: Now start from the beginning--the years, the dates?
- D: Approximately--as close as you can give them.
- C: I became acquainted with HOETTL in 1936 or 1937, through the intervention of DR. TARAS BORODAJKEWICZ.
- D: Was that in Austria?
- C: Yes, in Vienna.
- D: What was Mr. BORODAJKEWICZ by occupation; was he a journalist?
- C: No, he was an Austrian and was employed by the State Archives in Vienna, on Minoriten Platz.
- D: And how did that meeting occur? Was it just a social gathering?
- C: Yes, a social gathering. My wife and I were invited to BORODAJKEWICZ's home for a reception and there I met HOETTL for the first time. But my acquaintance with HOETTL was not important then; I met HOETTL in the next two years only occasionally, without having a more intimate acquaintance with him, but in 1938--I didn't know then that HOETTL already worked in the illegal Nazi Party intelligence. I realized it only a few years later. After the arrival of the Germans, in 1938, I was excluded from the journalists' association because of my previous connections. It was my Catholic connections, and because I had allegedly worked for the Catholic Action intelligence service.
- D: And you were brought to the police on that occasion, or did your boss just tell you that you were dismissed?
- C: (Did not understand the question and so it was rephrased.)
- D: Were you discharged from the association by one of the officials or were you called to the police first?

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- C: By one of the officials. It was an internal proceeding within the organization, but the exclusion was based upon a police report. I tried to get into the association again in order to be able to be gainfully employed, and BORODAJKEWYCZ was ready to help me do so, and he discussed my situation with HOETTL. I had appealed to BORODAJKEWYCZ, and BORODAJKEWYCZ took up the matter with HOETTL. HOETTL then worked in my interest. I had a meeting with HOETTL and asked him to help, and HOETTL did so. I was reaccepted for employment after about six weeks. Then for some time I had no further connection with HOETTL. I suppose HOETTL went to Berlin, and I remained in Vienna. In the first year of the war I was employed with the Viennese newspaper Pleasant Front, the same publication for which I worked since 1928.
- D: What kind of newspaper was that?
- C: A weekly publication directed by DR. JOZEF EBERLE.
- D: Is he from the EBERLE Press?
- C: No, he had nothing to do with the EBERLE printing house.
- November 1940 I was drafted into the air corps. I was discharged in December 1941 to go to the Foreign Office headquarters in Berlin.
- D: What was your specialty then?
- C: I was a member of the Information and Cultural Department. It was a kind of propaganda detachment, and besides, the detachment had to supply German artists and singers, professors and scholars, for lectures abroad. One can say it was principally a propaganda office.
- D: Who was the head of that office?
- C: The last head was Ambassador F. R. SIX (phon). SIX came from RSHA.
- D: And you were tied in with the German intelligence? This office was tied in with the German intelligence some way, was it not?
- C: No. German intelligence tied into the Foreign Office through a special detachment headed by (could not recall the name)--it was through the Deutschland Abt.
- D: The office in which you worked was primarily overt?
- C: It just collected overt publications and issued bulletins, posters, and so on, and did translation work. It directed expositions abroad. In Berlin I saw HOETTL occasionally. We never discussed service matters.

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- D: What was he doing at the time?
- C: Then I supposed he was in AMT VI, but now I know that he was. He was in charge of operations in Italy, Hungary, and Croatia and was abroad often.
- D: Was he pretty much of a big shot?
- C: Yes.
- D: Quite an important official at this time? Did you see him often?
- C: No, not often.
- D: Did you dine with him?
- C: Yes, at the Hotel Adlon, four or five times in the two years--or maybe it was ten times, I don't recall. In any case, it was only a personal contact; no service matters were discussed. Then I collaborated with the resistance group (German resistance) of ~~Haftin~~ and ~~York~~ ~~von~~ ~~Wartenberg~~. ~~Haftin~~ was the man who was responsible for having me transferred to the Foreign Office headquarters in Berlin. ~~Haftin~~ had previously been German Cultural Attache in Vienna and then was transferred back to Berlin and when there had me called to Berlin because he knew that I was a Balkan semi-expert.
- D: When was that?
- C: My cooperation with ~~Haftin~~ commenced in January 1942. When the 20th of July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life failed I was on leave at ~~Altamster~~ and probably therefore I was not arrested. I wondered for a long time why I had not been. I had resided in Berlin in ~~Haftin's~~ and ~~Wartenberg's~~ home for a long time, and the fellow who took my room in ~~Wartenberg's~~ home was ~~GEORGE~~ ~~WARTENBERG~~ ~~(phon)~~, one of the leading collaborators with ~~KREIS~~ ~~KREIS~~ ~~(phon)~~. If I recall correctly, I met ~~HOETTL~~ for the first time after the attempt on Hitler's life at the beginning of 1945 and then ~~HOETTL~~ told me that he while in Vienna had intercepted a message from the Gestapo, which had hindered the investigation against me and that as a result he was responsible for saving my life.
- D: How did he come to divulge that information to you? Do you remember the circumstances?
- C: (Did not understand the question and so it was rephrased.)
- D: How did he happen to tell you that?
- C: We were both in Berlin. He phoned me at my office and we met at the Adlon, and during the conversation he began to speak about the attempt on the 20th of July, ~~HAFTIN~~, and the others.

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- D: When was that, in 1945? Before the end of the war?
- C: Yes, but he didn't come out clearly and disclose this information at that time. The detailed explanation was made to me after the end of the war. In the early part of 1945 HOETTL's statements were merely allusions. I also felt that Ambassador SIX had done more to prevent my arrest than HOETTL because two other members of SIX's detachment had been arrested and were executed after the attempt failed, and SIX was not anxious to have others of his personnel apprehended on the same charge. HOETTL contacted me again in 1947 and told me about his plan to write a book about his experiences with German intelligence.
- D: Was that early in 1947?
- C: The dates are difficult to remember. He told me of his plan to write a book on his intelligence work and his experiences during the war and he asked me to edit it. I accepted, and then in 1948 or 1949 I completed the work and I received royalties from the sales.
- D: What type of financial arrangement did he have with you?
- C: I was to receive 2½% of the sales royalty.
- D: Did he give you any cash in addition to that? Was that your complete payment?
- C: Yes, that was my complete payment.
- D: Did he give you anything in addition?
- C: No, but occasionally he asked me to edit newspaper articles, for which HOETTL provided the raw material. He gave me these assignments while I was engaged in editing his book and also afterwards.
- D: How long did it take to finish his work?
- C: If I remember it correctly, the work was finished at the end of 1949.
- D: About how much money did you receive for this job?
- C: The payments are not yet completed, since the Italian, French, and Spanish editions have not yet been accounted for.
- D: What other work have you performed for Mr. HOETTL?
- C: I edited articles on the Communists' activity in the Salzkammergut, including the preparation of partisan groups, the Communist mountain redoubt in the Totes Gebirge, and so on.

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- D: Was that quite recently? Did it have to do with the activities of GEISWINKLER and his group? Did you believe that information?
- C: (Laughs) That was for the press.
- D: How much did you get for an article of that sort?
- C: The payments for articles varied from 500 to 800 to 1,000 schillings.
- D: And you did other articles for him? What kind?
- C: HOETTL was the correspondent and representative for the German Soldaten Zeitung, and he asked me to deliver to him monthly political situation reports on Austria.
- D: And you did that on a monthly basis?
- C: Yes, on a monthly basis.
- D: When did that start?
- C: 1952.
- D: And it continued up to the present time?
- C: Up to the present time.
- D: And what did you say you received for that work?
- C: I received different fees: 500 to 600 schillings.
- D: Why did HOETTL want you to do that? He's a pretty clever man; couldn't he do that work himself?
- C: HOETTL is not capable of writing good critical journalism and he didn't have the capability to expand on an idea in writing. HOETTL is not a writer.
- D: Not a journalist?
- C: No.
- D: On the basis of the work that you were doing for HOETTL in 1952, you saw him a few times a month?
- C: Every six weeks or two months. We had an exchange of letters.

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D: Did he send you your money in a letter, and you sent him the manuscripts by mail?

C: Yes.

D: Let's go back to the time you started to work on the book. In that period, 1949, you must have seen each other quite often as you prepared each chapter?

C: No, I didn't see him any more than once a month.

D: Even when you were working on the book?

C: Yes.

D: Did you handle most of your business by correspondence?

C: Yes.

D: Where was he living at the time?

C: He was living at Alt Aussee, where he is presently living...where he is living now? or where he lives now? My faults are horrible, isn't it? (sic)

D: No, not at all. I have understood everything you've said perfectly. After all, that is the function of a language: to transmit thoughts and ideas. It is very nice and a sign of culture if you can speak a language perfectly. I should try to do it in German and you should try to do it in English, but if two people can get together and understand each other as well as we do-- I can say that your English is adequate but I can't say that it is fluent, but you can understand me and I can understand you.

In these meetings that you had with Mr. HOETTL, he must have been interested in you and how you were making your living, was he not? How did you explain this to him?

C: I explained to him that I was a collaborator and a co-editor of the Welt und Wahrheit, published by the firm HERDER in Vienna. This is a job which I actually held, and I told him that I was a Salzburg representative of the HERDER firm, which of course was not actually true, but my statement on my affiliation with the HERDER publishing company in Vienna was true. I never had to tell him how I made my money or how much I earned.

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D: Did he ever indicate that he knew that you were engaged in some other activity?

C: No. But in 1952 he began to ask me if I was not working with American intelligence and gave me a hint that he knows that I did. I tried to evade answering his questions and broke off the discussion of this matter but he would return to it. I believe that he was informed either by RUPERT MANDEL, who knew that I worked with GROSSBAHN, or by AUNER. We never discussed this matter specifically. He queried me and I evaded answering the questions. I did not expressly deny because I believe that he actually knew.

D: He acted as though he knew it?

C: Yes.

D: Did he act as though he knew you were in touch with GROSSEBAHN, or did he just indicate that he thought you were working for the Americans?

O: Working for the Americans. We did not discuss GROSSEBAHN at the same time. On other occasions he inquired how GROSSEBAHN lives and if he were in good financial circumstances and if he had satisfactory work conditions and so on. He knew that GROSSEBAHN lived at Altmunster and that GROSSEBAHN worked for the Americans but he did not know that GROSSEBAHN and I were collaborating.

D: You are quite sure he didn't know that?

C: Yes.

D: Did he ask you from time to time about your work with the Americans?

C: Yes, but I never made any concrete explanation.

D: Did he ever ask what you were doing for the Americans?

C: No, no. He didn't ask so indiscreetly. He only wanted to know if I did work for the Americans.

D: He just wanted you to admit that?

C: Yes.

D: But you didn't admit it?

C: No, but I did not deny or admit it.

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- D: So he could have deduced it or might have thought it?
- C: Yes, he could have deduced it, I think.
- D: From a facial expression? Or from some other action?
- C: Yes, or from my evasion.
- D: He's a very clever man. But he never pushed you on the point and said, "I know that you work for the Americans," and so forth?
- C: He did not. He never tried (in German) to force me into a corner.
- D: How often did he infer that he knew that you were connected with the Americans?
- C: Not at every meeting, but about every second meeting.
- D: He would bring it up in a very subtle way?
- C: Yes, in a subtle way.
- D: And this started sometime in 1952? The early part or the middle of 1952?
- C: It's very difficult to say, but I think it was the beginning of 1952.
- D: Approximately how many times did he inquire about GROSSBAHN?
- C: Oh, four or five times.
- D: And always along the same line? What would he ask you?
- C: He used to ask me about my acquaintances and among these acquaintances he mentioned GROSSBAHN's name.
- D: The other acquaintances he mentioned on these occasions--were they mutual friends of yours?
- C: Mutual friends, yes, politicians.
- D: Whom you should know anyway?
- C: Yes.
- D: But in the case of GROSSBAHN's name, wasn't it out of context because he didn't know that you and GROSSBAHN were acquainted?

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- C: He didn't know that, but he connected it always with other persons and questions.
- D: Did he ever use that same technique in regard to other individuals in whom he seemed to have a special interest?
- C: I suppose that you are interested in men who are suspected or supposed to work for intelligence? He asked about DR. ~~REINHOLD LOEW~~ ^{HANSEN}, KARL VON WINKLER, who is a friend of HOETTL's.
- D: And what did he want to know about men like VON WINKLER?
- C: Whether he was living at Salzburg or had moved to Vienna. He also asked about OTTO BEGUB, KAUDER-KLATT, and AUNER.
- D: Did you ever ask him, "Why are you interested in these people, Willi?"
- C: No, I tried to evade discussing them because it was painful for me to be asked about these persons. I was in a very difficult situation.
- D: Did you ever meet any other people when you went to see HOETTL? Did he ever introduce you to anyone?
- C: Oh, once he introduced to me HARRY MAST.
- D: What did he say about HARRY MAST?
- C: He said that HARRY MAST is an old intelligence man, worked first for the GEHLEN organization, then was fired by them because of his connections with HOETTL, and then was employed by the HOETTL group and now is unemployed.
- D: Were there any other people like MAST to whom he introduced you?
- C: No, I can't remember any. He always said that he had good American connections but that he would not use them because the time for his return to service with the Americans wasn't right.
- D: Did you ever lend HOETTL money?
- C: No.
- D: Did he ever lend you money?
- C: When he gave me money it was always related to the book royalties or some other editing work.

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D: I don't mean did he pay you money, but from the standpoint of borrowing, did he ever lend you money and did you ever lend him money?

C: No. But on the subject of money, he repeatedly asked me to change sovereigns and gold napoleons and sometimes also dollars, francs.

D: And you did that for him?

C: I did.

D: On how many occasions, would you say?

how many occasions?
sell cash?
?

C: Two times sovereigns and napoleons, one time a golden ring, one time a golden watch, and three or four times dollars. The other currency that I changed--(in German) I imagine that we are coming to that yet-- (He showed a sign of concern in this regard.)

D: I'm not so interested in the criminal aspects; that isn't my job, that's the CID's job. We aren't sitting here for that reason, but I would like to learn from you why WILLI asked you to negotiate in these black market transactions. How did that whole thing start? They seem to have gone on for some time; they must have gone back to 1952.

C: Earlier; 1951.

D: How did the whole thing start? Do you remember?

C: It was Christmas 1951. I remember it because he gave me the reasons for selling the gold things; he said that he had to pay for Christmas presents.

D: Was there a relatively large sum of money involved?

C: No. The objects were worth about 3,000 schillings. I don't remember any time he gave me objects or money to exchange where the value was more than 3,000 schillings, except the German marks transaction--the German marks (which I exchanged) which he pretended came from a payment from a German publishing house.

D: WILLI is a man who knows a lot of people. I am trying to find out why he would have asked you to do him this favor rather than to ask someone else. After all, you weren't dealing in the black market in money at that time, were you? It must have been difficult for you to establish a contact in that circle.

C: No, it wasn't. Next to my house is the Riedenberg, and there are many Jews on the street. In those days everybody in that vicinity was engaged in this sort of transaction. HOETTL considered me as a reliable friend, and I am not convinced that he had many persons whom he trusted.

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D: Who do you think his other trusted friends were here in Salzburg?
Do you know any of them?

C: I know that THEODORE ALBERT is his Salzburg representative.

D: So you feel that he trusted this to you because he felt that you were
a reliable individual.

C: I think so.

D: Did you receive a commission for doing this?

C: No.

D: Wasn't there quite a risk involved in regard to the last transaction?

C: Perhaps, but I felt obliged to do so.

D: Why did you feel obliged?

C: I believed then and I still believe that he really did something to save
my life.

D: So you feel obligated to him for that?

C: Yes, and I did it out of gratitude.

D: In the case of the German marks, was it quite easy to find someone who
could handle such a large sum of money?

C: Oh, yes, quite easy. Would you like to know the names of the dealer?

D: No. Did you do it with one person or were there more?

C: With one person.

D: Well, maybe you had better tell me. Who is this person?

C: There was a so-called DANIEL; he is no longer here. There was a certain
WEICHSMANN. The third one is already in the U. S. or Canada, I can't
remember.

D: One was DANIEL, one was WEICHSMANN, and the third you can't remember--
so it was three men, then?

C: Well, no. The three worked together.

D: Is HOTTIL acquainted with your family?

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- C: Yes, he knows my wife.
- D: How did he meet your wife? Did you introduce him to her?
- C: My wife was invited to visit BORODAJKEWICZ's home with me at the time that I first met HOETTL.
- D: You are sure that you never told WILLI anything about your connection with the Americans?
- C: Oh, quite sure--regarding the details--quite sure. He never asked me for details.
- D: He never asked you for details; he indicated that he knew that you were in touch with the Americans?
- C: He did. I did not deny this connection.
- D: Did you ever engage in conversation with him on the subject?
- C: No.
- D: Did he ever try to use pressure on you?
- C: No.
- D: He isn't that kind of a man?
- C: Well, no.
- D: You know, WILLI is an interesting individual from the American point of view. As you know, he has worked for the Americans, he was dropped and then he was picked up again and then he was dropped--I don't know how many times myself. You probably know him better than any American has. What is your opinion of the man from the standpoint of loyalty to the West, for example?
- C: I am happy that you give me the opportunity to say something about this. I am deeply convinced that HOETTL is for the West and that he is for the closest cooperation between Germany and the United States. I am quite sure that that is the case. But I have detected that he has some remnants of pan-German feeling. He is not trying to foster a union between Germany and Austria, but he is convinced that Germany is the leading power in Europe and that Germany has to control the Balkans. This is my opinion, but he never expressed his opinion to me; I concluded it from my conversations with him. I say that HOETTL would never collaborate with an intelligence system which is not sponsored by the United States or in a friendly connection with the United States. I concluded that he has also tried to get in touch with the French intelligence because he often traveled to the Vorarlberg and he had a French officer as a liaison or a friend.

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Now I will give you my criticisms of HOETTL. HOETTL has no political aspirations but he is ambitious politically in the sense that he would like to direct political activity from the background.

D: He is ambitious then in that sense.

C: Yes, and he will always try to use his intelligence knowledge to create a political effect. He does this because he feels that intelligence must be integrated with political action.

The second weak point is that he is a romanticist.

D: Why do you say this is his weak point? Is it because he is not practical or realistic?

C: He seems to be realistic but he does not seem to have the ability to distinguish the true from the untrue.

D: You mean that he can't distinguish the truth from fantasy. Is that an intentional or unintentional characteristic?

C: Unintentional.

D: You think that it is unintentional. Now let's take a concrete example before we go to the third point. In the case of the GEISWINKLER article, do you think that he didn't know that was a fake?

C: (Laughs spontaneously at this.) That was a special case. He just used the material to make a good press article. Maybe he knew that the GEISWINKLER articles were not true but to make the headlines and to create a desired effect he used them.

D: In that case you would say it was intentional?

C: Yes, it was intentional.

D: But there are other cases you feel where he has received false information and he actually believed it was true?

C: He has a bias for the mysterious, the unusual.

D: The sensational? Of course, I understand. What was the third point?

C: The third point is he is too optimistic. He believes that what he is contemplating is already true.

D: And you don't think that this is a controllable factor; it is just his desire to have a thing come true which makes him believe that it is actually true?

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C: Yes. A fourth weak point: he has a poor understanding of human nature. He trusts men who don't deserve to be trusted.

And now some more strong points: he is an active individual, and has good ideas, imagination, good personal relations and is acquainted with a large number of people and he has had a large experience in intelligence work.

D: But how about his character? That is the thing with which I am particularly concerned. As far as your case goes, he evidently saved your life. He was very courageous at this time. Were you a good friend of his when he saved your life or just an acquaintance?

C: He was just a good acquaintance but not a friend.

D: Is he an honest man? If he gives you his word can you depend upon it? For instance, in your business dealings when you first worked on this book, he said "I will give you 2 1/2%." Has he given you this? Have you ever had to ask him for it?

C: No.

D: Never?

C: No. His publishing enterprise was often in poor financial circumstances and then payments to me were suspended, but I eventually always received my money. He is vain. I cannot imagine that HOETTL would harm or intrigue against a friend.

D: Is he loyal to his friends? If one of his friends were put in jail for three or four years, he would stick by the friend, help him out?

C: He would do that. One can say he is too good. For instance, in the case of ERICH KERNMEYER: KERNMEYER first collaborated with him, and HOETTL entrusted to him the full direction of his intelligence group. Subsequently, KERNMEYER separated himself from HOETTL and commenced to intrigue against him. He made reports against HOETTL and gave these to the state police and the Ministry of the Interior and maybe also to CID, I don't know. HOETTL knew about this for a long time but he never tried to stop KERNMEYER. He only laughed about KERNMEYER's activity against him. Maybe he overrated his influence over KERNMEYER.

D: About his religious feeling-- Is he a religious man, or does he not go to church?

C: He is without religion.

D: But he is not an atheist?

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- C: No. He never participated in the Nazi persecution of Catholics.
- D: And Jews?
- C: I don't know, but I think Catholics he never did.
- D: Is he a dependable man?
- C: Yes.
- D: Do you think he has any chance of ever becoming important politically in Austria?
- C: No.
- D: Who are his enemies as far as the government is concerned?
- C: He is on friendly terms with State Secretary GRAF, and...
- D: Does he know GRAF personally?
- C: Yes.
- D: Does he ever see GRAF in Vienna?
- C: No, not in Vienna.
- D: He probably does not go to Vienna very often.
- C: Probably not.
- D: I mean, he probably does not travel over the demarcation line, so if he meets GRAF, it must be down here.
- C: He could have met GRAF at Salzburg, but I don't think he met him in Vienna.
- D: GRAF, you say, is a friend or acquaintance of his. Who else does he have who might protect him or help him politically?
- C: GRAF, and KLAUS, and maybe FIGL. His connection with GRAF I know from my intelligence work was KARL VON WINKLER.
- D: Who are his enemies? Who are the people who work against him? He seems to be very friendly with the OeVP group, so that the Socialists could be expected to work against him.
- C: The VdU has not been friendly to him.

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- D: Is he acquainted with KRAUS?
- C: I don't know, but the VdU is against HOETTL since HOETTL was the sponsor or the co-sponsor of the OBERWEISS talks, and the OBERWEISS talks were intended to unite the Nazis with the OeVP.
- D: Did WILLI HOETTL actually organize the OBERWEISS meeting or did he just get credit for it?
- C: One cannot say organize, but he participated in the preparatory sessions.
- D: He wasn't actually at the meeting, was he?
- C: He was at Gmunden while the meeting took place at Oberweiss. That is only five or six kilometers from Gmunden. In relation to my connections with HOETTL, I forgot to tell you that when the OBERWEISS meeting was being planned, I worked very closely with HOETTL, and I thought then that he was working to bring the Nazis into the OeVP because I was opposing the establishment of an independent VdU party because I was afraid that it would become another Nazi party.
- D: Well, it did; you were right. Was he very cooperative at that time?
- C: Yes.
- D: Did he ever ask "Why are you so interested in this?"
- C: HOETTL knew that I was interested in it because of my Catholic orientation and that I was for the OeVP and he took it for granted that I would try to bring about a settlement favorable to the OeVP.
- D: Have you told HOETTL that you are going to leave here and that you are going to Germany?
- C: Yes.
- D: Has he indicated any interest in that?
- C: No, he asked only that I should edit his second book on his intelligence work regarding the fifth column and the operation ZEPPELIN and that I from time to time would edit his articles.
- D: He wants you to continue on doing the same thing that you have been doing here? You are willing to do that?
- C: Oh, the payment is good for me and the work is not too difficult and I don't spend much time at it.

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- D: Are you looking forward now to your move to Germany? Do you think it will be a very interesting experience?
- C: Oh, I hope so, but I have to become oriented to the new position.
- D: Do you have any friends there who can help you in that regard?
- C: Editor-in-chief DR. ~~ROSE~~^{ROEGELE} (phon) is a friend of mine, and I have good connections with the German Catholics, especially the members of the editors' association and publishing houses.
- D: There is no chance that you will reconsider your intention of moving on to Germany and stay here in Salzburg, is there?
- C: To tell the truth, I would like to return to my previous profession, at least for a couple of years, but I feel that I could do more for our common purpose, to fight Communism, by returning to that profession. Here I only have the possibility to edit reports which originate with other persons. I cannot be active; I cannot be responsible; I cannot be independent.
- D: You miss the satisfaction which you formerly received when you created these reports yourself, is that it?
- C: But if in the future the political intelligence is of importance to the Americans again, then I would consider reemployment if the U. S. intelligence wished it, and I would rejoin our group. I am on the closest and friendliest terms with GROSSBAHN. I have appreciated my opportunity to collaborate very highly and this was a very good time for me. I have the wish to do more.
- D: To do more in what regard?
- C: More active journalistic work. My work for the Vienna publication wasn't gratifying enough since it only appears monthly and is then aimed at an intellectual and sophisticated level and I would like to write for a wider public.
- D: That is your own ambition then, in other words.
- C: Yes.
- D: Would that be probably the chief reason why you have been unhappy?
- C: You can say that is the chief reason.
- D: And if you could get a job in Austria doing the same thing, would you consider staying here?

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- C: Yes, but at present the outlook for that type of job in Austria is not too good.
- D: You mean that if such a thing could be arranged, you would consider staying on here, working for some publication where you could write an article every day, for instance?
- C: Sometime later, but for now, for the coming year, it's impossible.
- D: Have you already signed a contract?
- C: I have signed a contract.
- D: For how long?
- C: For a half year.
- D: And you wouldn't want to break that contract?
- C: No, it would be an unfriendly act.
- D: How about after a half a year? Would you consider that?
- C: Yes, after a half a year I would reconsider.
- D: But only on the terms that you would be given a chance to work more out in the open on straight political reporting?
- C: Yes.
- D: Your desire is, then, to work in the journalistic field where you have an overt office and you write your daily article and the people have a chance to read it. You wouldn't object, with a set-up of this sort, to some clandestine work in addition, would you?
- C: No.
- D: Is clandestine work disagreeable to you?
- C: Oh, a little. I have so many acquaintances and some have been asking me "What are you doing," and in order to answer I must evade or make up an untrue answer. I feel uncomfortable about this. But if it would be possible to connect clandestine work with overt activity in a way that makes the clandestine inconspicuous, I would be willing to do it.
- D: Has your wife ever raised a question as to what you're doing with your time, and so forth?

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C: My wife is an intelligent woman. I have never told her what I am doing in Salzburg, but she probably guesses that I am engaged in some type of clandestine work....clandestine work, or something unusual.

D: In comparison to what you were doing before the war?

C: Yes. Before the war I was a journalist.

D: You had your name in the paper and now you don't have your name in the paper.

C: Yes. But my wife has not influenced me. For a long time I have considered the problem of my future, but I repeat that I would return to intelligence work if my working conditions were changed to a political-type activity.

D: Yes--if it could be arranged that you would be working as a political journalist in the open?

C: Yes, in the open, and besides I could collaborate, because I am convinced that such work is very important and will grow increasingly more important if a state treaty is signed. But I am not familiar with military matters.

D: Oh, I see.

C: I was a recruit in the German air force for one year and I served in a commission unit, so I am unacquainted with military matters.

D: Well, I think that we understand each other, and we'll let the thing go at that. If I have a few additional questions that I may think of I'll let GROSSBAHN know that I want to see you again, and we can make arrangements to hold another discussion tomorrow. I want the information that you have conveyed to me to go into your file; it will be the last chapter in your book for the time being. Then in the future if you change your mind about intelligence work or we have the kind that you are looking for, we can call upon you or send a representative to you. It seems to me your future lies here in Austria. Your friends are here, your contacts are here, and your interests are here. You're an Austrian after all, not a German.

C: I intend to return to Austria after two years at the utmost.

D: It will be difficult now for you to see your family at all, won't it?

C: Oh, my family will move to Germany with me.

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D: Isn't that rather expensive?

C: The publishers will pay the expenses.

D: How about your children? They're in school now, aren't they?

C: Yes. That was a difficult problem because the German schools run on a different schedule, but it must be done. It will be very good for my son to experience learning under another school system.

D: Is he a pretty smart boy?

C: Yes. He is sixteen years old.

D: Where is he studying now?

C: In high school, and my daughter is at Vienna University. She intends to go to the United States for one year on a scholarship.

D: Is that the Fulbright Scholarship?

C: Yes.

D: She must speak English.

C: Yes, she speaks English.

D: Has she been interviewed here by the committee and passed already?

C: Yes, from the eight thousand applicants only thirty were accepted, and she is among the thirty.

D: That's a great honor and a wonderful opportunity. So she will leave next year?

C: Yes, next year. She will leave before Christmas or in the fall.

D: Well, Doctor, I appreciate the time that you have spent. If I think of any more questions I will let you know.

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Second Sitting: 29 January 1953

D: As I told you yesterday, I looked over my notes and reviewed in my mind what we had been talking about, and a few questions that were not clear in my own mind came up. I figured if they weren't clear to me, they would not be clear to someone in Headquarters who would read your file, so I would like to go over that ground again.

You made a statement that since 1952 you had been preparing political summaries for Mr. HOETTL. What type of information went into those summaries?

C: They were press reviews. I took the papers of the past month and I made an extraction from them in order to form a view on the essential proceedings in internal politics in Austria. These included no special information except what I knew from friends, but the essentials were taken from the press.

D: Do you have any examples or copies of these reports?

C: No, I wrote it by hand.

D: Do you write all of your things by hand?

C: Most of them. I am not accustomed to writing with a machine.

D: So you wrote these political summaries based upon statements of press items which you had read?

C: Yes.

D: What papers did you review in order to prepare them?

C: The Vienna Press, Salzburger Nachrichten, and Arbeiter Zeitung.

D: What was Mr. HOETTL's particular interest in these summaries? Did he give you any direction along the line?

C: No direction. He merely said, "You are acquainted with Austrian politics and you will know what is essential and what is not."

D: And what was Mr. HOETTL going to do with these summaries?

C: He said that he would send them to the editor of the Soldaten Zeitung.

D: You have mentioned that HOETTL was the representative of a German newspaper. What paper was that?

C: The Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung; their offices are located at Munich.

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- D: That is the paper for which he worked here? And he was taking your statements and he was sending them to the editor of the Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung?
- C: Oh, I guess, but I don't know.
- D: Did you ever read the Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung?
- C: Occasionally; it is not a paper of my choice.
- D: Did you ever see anything which you wrote in that paper?
- C: No, except one time. Once I had written an article for HOETTL, a review of politics during the past year, and that was published.
- D: On one occasion? Did he call that to your attention, or did you discover that by yourself?
- C: No, I discovered it by chance at a news vendor's stand. Oh, I can probably guess why you are asking me these questions and I have ideas of my own. I suspected that he made other use of these reports.
- D: What did you suspect?
- C: I suspected that he submitted these reports to a Bonn office.
- D: An intelligence office?
- C: No; I think rather a foreign office.
- D: The Bonn Foreign Office?
- C: Yes, this I did suspect.
- D: To whom there? Anyone in particular? Anyone with whom you know he was in contact?
- C: He never mentioned any names but I guess it was the official in charge of Austrian matters, and I appreciated the possibility to bring my views to the attention of that official in Germany, which probably were not known to him. I felt that the reports submitted to that officer by others were not as objective and as complete as mine.
- D: Did you consider your report as restricted information?
- C: No. It could have been published at any time.
- D: Could it have been published in Austria?

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- C: (Did not understand question.)
- D: Would you have been willing to publish them here under your own name?
- C: Probably not, because I wrote frankly--too frankly for political tactics.
- D: You criticized what was going on, from the standpoint of pointing out what should be done to correct undesirable trends?
- C: Partly.
- D: And would that have been embarrassing to you if it had come out here?
- C: No, it wouldn't have been embarrassing--except for one fact. I didn't deal in a friendly manner with DR. KARL GRUBER, whom I do not like.
- D: You had the feeling that Mr. HOETTL might have been using this information for some other reason than that which he expressed. Did you ever ask him about that?
- C: No, I didn't.
- D: Did you ever tell him that it was unusual that your articles did not appear regularly in the Soldaten Zeitung?
- C: No. HOETTL said that even if the articles were not published in the paper, they would still be valuable as background information for the editors and that my articles could be used as a brief for the preparation of other news stories.
- D: By HOETTL?
- C: No, by the editors of the Soldaten Zeitung. But I will tell you at what time I first suspected that my articles were not going to the Soldaten Zeitung. It was after KERNMEYER had taken the job of Salzburg representative of the Soldaten Zeitung away from HOETTL and HOETTL failed to inform me that he no longer needed my reports for the Soldaten Zeitung. I did not ask him about this matter but I concluded that this was the case.
- D: How was HOETTL outmaneuvered by KERNMEYER? How did KERNMEYER take HOETTL's job away?
- C: KERNMEYER is now the editor of the Soldaten Zeitung, in Munich, and KERNMEYER intrigued against HOETTL by claiming that HOETTL had used his influence to get the Germans to agree upon reparations for the Jews

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because HOETTL had at one time made a report on the number of persons who had been murdered by the Nazis.

D: When did HOETTL lose his job with the Soldaten Zeitung?

C: July 1952.

D: You started to contribute these to HOETTL early in 1952. Now, after HOETTL lost his job with the Soldaten Zeitung, you continued to contribute reports to him. What explanation did HOETTL give you as to the ultimate destination of your summaries?

C: He made no explanation because I didn't ask him for one.

D: But you were satisfied in your own mind that if your reports were not going to the Soldaten Zeitung that they were going to Bonn or to some other recipient whom you say HOETTL did not identify to you; is that correct?

C: Yes.

D: What were your thoughts in the matter?

C: I felt a little uncomfortable, but I decided to continue submitting the reports.

D: Why? Did you need the money?

C: The money was one of the reasons, but not the main reason. The main reason was that I hoped that my reports would be of use for Austria.

D: Did HOETTL ever tell you how your information was regarded? Did he ever say that it was considered to be very good or exceptional?

C: Oh, very good.

D: Did he say that he considered it to be very good or that the person or persons who ultimately received it considered it to be very good?

C: He said it. But he only paid me for these reports until October 1952.

D: You started to give him these reports in December 1951. That was a review of the political situation in Austria, and that article was published in the Soldaten Zeitung.

C: Yes.

D: He gave you 600 schillings for that?

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C: Yes.

D: How did he come to make an offer to you in this regard? Do you remember?

C: He said that he could not prepare this correspondence for the Soldaten Zeitung and he would pass over to me part of the salary if I would ghost write the monthly reports for him.

D: That was the beginning of your relationship? In December 1951 you prepared the first report? And then thereafter every month you submitted a report until July 1952?

C: The reports were paid until July of 1952 and from then on I sent him the reports without receiving pay.

D: Could you afford to do that? Through August of 1952 they were paid?

C: Yes.

D: Why did you continue to do so?

C: Out of friendship.

D: Did you feel obligated to him?

C: Yes.

D: In what way were you obligated?

C: The work which I did in the last few months was something which I did for myself anyway, not necessarily to be published or to be sold, but just for my own knowledge and for my own use, in order to keep myself au courant with the local political situation. It wasn't much trouble and very little work.

D: Then in July 1952 KERMEYER took the Soldaten Zeitung job away from HOETTL?

C: I don't recall exactly, but I think it was July or August.

D: Of last year?

C: Yes.

D: And from that point on you continued to give him these reports, which you presumed were going to somebody in Germany.

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C: Yes.

D: But you're sure that HOETTL never told you whom they were going to?

C: Yes, I am sure.

D: He never told you anything about that?

C: No.

D: And you never asked him?

C: No.

D: As far as you're concerned, then, HOETTL could have been giving these reports to the Kommandatura in Vienna and you wouldn't have known anything about it. Is that right?

C: No. I couldn't suppose that HOETTL would deliver any material to the Russians.

D: It could have gone from HOETTL to somebody in Germany and then to the Russians.

(Due to technical difficulties the next two minutes did not record, but it is recalled that CC-2 appeared shocked by the idea that his reports could have reached the Russians, as [] had suggested.)

(CC-2 was then queried on the source of the raw information used in his political summaries. After stating that he did not use any information which reached his hand as a result of his work for GROSSBAHN in these statements, he was quizzed again on this point.)

D: You are sure that none of the information which went into these reports came from GROSSBAHN's statements?

C: I am sure that I intentionally did not include any information of that sort but unintentionally one or the other detail which coincided with my own ideas was placed in a political summary.

D: You never intentionally extracted information from reports which came to you from information received from GROSSBAHN's apparatus? You never did that? You are quite sure?

C: Except once. Once I gave HOETTL details on KAUFER-KLATT. This information came to me from police contacts and I informed GROSSBAHN about this matter.

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D: You informed him before you gave HOETTL the statement?

C: Yes, before.

D: Is there any other similar information which you might have extracted from GROSSBAHN's apparatus?

C: No.

D: Are you quite sure?

C: Yes.

D: Why didn't you tell GROSSBAHN that you were getting 600 schillings a month from HOETTL for preparing a monthly political summary?

C: I considered the affair pertaining to my regular collaborations in journalistic matters. It was a private thing.

D: You informed GROSSBAHN you received money for editing newspaper articles and editing WILLI's book, and that is certainly a private enterprise.

C: Maybe it was an error of mine that I didn't inform GROSSBAHN.

D: Is there any reason why you hesitated to tell GROSSBAHN? Did you think he might not have approved of that?

C: Maybe.

D: Do you think that GROSSBAHN might not have wanted you to prepare monthly summaries?

C: I don't think so, but possibly he might have felt that way.

D: You must have had some reason for not telling him because, after all, you're a good friend of GROSSBAHN and you've told him about a lot of things.

C: Yes, but I didn't tell him about each article that I wrote for HOETTL. He knew that I collaborated with HOETTL in journalistic matters but I didn't inform him on the details of my collaboration.

D: This is something which had been going on for almost two years--

C: Not two years; one year.

D: December 1951 to 1952--yes. You're sure there was no intentional reason for withholding that information?

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C: No.

D: Was there anyone else for whom you were preparing summaries on a regular basis?

C: No. HOETTL was the only man who was giving me money for doing editing work. Sometimes I wrote articles for the Vienna press and I edited a book for a Stuttgart publisher.

D: But there was no one who gave you a steady salary for preparing political reports or any other kind of reports?

C: No.

D: Did you tell anyone about the lie detector test to which you were submitted?

C: No.

D: Are you sure?

C: Yes.

D: Are you sure that you didn't tell HOETTL about that?

C: Yes.

D: How could HOETTL have found out that you had taken a lie detector test?

C: He found it out?

D: Yes, he did. How could he have found it out?
(CC-2 thought about this for some seconds but made no response.)

D: Did you tell THEODORE ALBERT about it?

C: I don't know THEODORE ALBERT personally.

D: Did you tell MAST about it?

C: No.

D: Did you tell VON WINKLER about it?

C: No. I never see VON WINKLER.

D: Did you tell KARL HAAS about it?

(This name had to be repeated and finally spelled for CC-2. He drew a complete blank on the name and from all appearances was sincere in stating that he had never heard this name or known an individual bearing this name. The question on HAAS was buried in a series of names in an effort to entrap CC-2 into admitting that he had discussed the lie detector subject with HAAS.)

D: Did you tell your wife about it?

C: No, but my wife could have guessed that I had a difficult week when I took the lie detector test. My wife asked me what I had been doing in that week and I merely told her that I had been engaged in a difficult conference. I made no reference to the test.

D: Did you ever talk about the machine?

C: No.

D: Did you tell anyone in ROHRACHER's office about it? Or anyone in KLAUS's office?

(CC-2 thought about both of these questions before replying in the negative.)

D: Or HERBERT KRAUS?

C: No, I am not acquainted with KRAUS.

D: Are you quite sure that you never mentioned anything to anyone about the machine?

C: I never mentioned anything to anyone about the machine.

(CC-2 reflected upon the question a moment and added "It was quite impossible.")

D: You don't talk in your sleep?

C: (Laughs) I don't know.

D: And you say that you haven't seen HARRY MAST in a half a year?

C: Yes.

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- D: Would you please review the history of your relationship with MAST?
- C: There really isn't any history. I became acquainted with MAST through HOETTL, and I believe it was at Bad Ischl or Bad Aussee in a cafe. Then I met MAST once or twice in a train when we traveled to Aussee in a train.
- D: By accident?
- C: Yes, by accident. My connections with MAST were merely superficial.
- D: Is that the entire extent of your relations with MAST?
- C: Yes. I only saw him three or four times, but I had the impression he was a man who boasted that he knew more than he actually did, and I don't care for such people.
- D: Why did HOETTL introduce you to MAST?
- C: I had an appointment to meet HOETTL to discuss an article that was to be published, and when I arrived at the cafe MAST was seated at a table reserved for HOETTL.
- D: So it was an intentional meeting arranged by HOETTL?
- C: I don't know. I don't believe it was because MAST left the table after a short time.
- D: Yes, but don't you see? You had arranged a meeting with HOETTL at a cafe. You come to the cafe and HOETTL has a table reserved. Mr. MAST is sitting at the table. Mr. MAST is a friend of HOETTL's. Didn't it appear to you that that was a staged meeting, that HOETTL wanted you to meet MAST?
- C: It might have been possible.
- D: What did you talk about on that occasion?
- C: (Thinks about this one for a while.) Oh, the political situation and HOETTL's friends, regarding HOETTL's publishing house, and the receipts from royalties. They were not intelligence matters.
- D: And on the other occasions you merely chanced to meet MAST on the train?

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Q: Yes.

D: And he was going to see HOETTL at the same time that you were?

Q: I don't know. I was going to visit my family and I don't know where MAST was going.

D: Did he mention anything about his destination to you?

Q: No. I walked through the train, I was looking for a seat, and I noticed MAST sitting in one of the trains and I sat down beside him to talk for a few minutes.

D: But you never discussed any intelligence matters on these occasions?

Q: No. MAST was then concerned over HOETTL's welfare because he thought that HOETTL might find himself in difficulty with the Austrian police because of his intelligence activity. I told MAST that there was nothing to worry about since this activity wasn't against the Austrian or American interests, and MAST dropped the subject.

D: That is the essence of one of the conversations?

Q: Yes.

D: Can you recall what the essence of the other conversation was?

Q: No. (Thinks about this for a while.)

D: Did you say that you knew THEODORE ALBERT or that you didn't know him?

Q: I have never seen him. I received a telephone call once from him which I reported to GROSSBAHN.

D: Was that in relationship to a money matter?

Q: Yes.

D: The last money exchange matter?

Q: Yes, in DM's.

D: And did he give you the money?

Q: No. I sent a messenger to him and in this way I received the German marks. I had no interest to become acquainted with him.

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- D: Did you ever tell GROSSBAHN that WILLI was trying to find out about your connection with the Americans?
- C: Yes. I repeatedly told him. From the beginning I discussed these matters with him, and twice HOETTL asked me to greet GROSSBAHN.
- D: Twice he asked you to greet GROSSBAHN?
- C: Yes, and once he asked me if I believed that he and GROSSBAHN could enter into an agreement of neutrality (sic).
- D: Did he feel that GROSSBAHN was an enemy of his or was angry with him?
- C: No. GROSSBAHN did not approve of him and he wouldn't take up contact with him.
- D: Did you tell HOETTL that? Did you tell him that GROSSBAHN had no interest in seeing him?
- C: No. HOETTL realized this from the fact that I never brought up the subject.
- D: Yesterday you mentioned that HOETTL did not suspect that you and GROSSBAHN were collaborating.
- C: Yes.
- D: Now, doesn't it seem strange that you could believe that and yet still not realize after HOETTL had asked you four or five times about GROSSBAHN--what GROSSBAHN was doing and so forth--that HOETTL might have suspected you worked together?
- C: HOETTL knew that GROSSBAHN and I were acquainted and he knew that GROSSBAHN lived in the same town, at Altmunster, and therefore he supposed that I met GROSSBAHN from time to time, but he never said anything directly about my collaboration in intelligence matters with GROSSBAHN.
- D: But yet he suspected that you worked for the Americans?
- C: Yes.
- D: And you believe that he was pretty sure in his own mind about that?
- C: Yes.

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D: You mentioned yesterday that HOETTL asked you several times, or indicated to you, that he knew that you were working for the Americans, and you didn't answer him directly, which could have given WILLI reason to believe that what he suspected was true.

C: Yes.

D: On the other hand, WILLI indicated to you that he knew that GROSSBAHN was in touch with the Americans?

C: Yes.

D: He knew that you two were acquainted. Don't you think that he is a clever enough man to have deduced that you worked together?

C: It's possible--probably he did.

D: What is your opinion?

C: My opinion is that he probably knew it--not merely assumed it--but I believe that he didn't learn this from me, and I believe it not from what HOETTL said but from the fact that HOETTL no doubt had been informed of our relationship by MANDEL about the organization and about my collaboration with GROSSBAHN for this group.

D: You feel that WILLI knew that you and GROSSBAHN had worked together at one time in intelligence matters and had learned this not from anything which you had said but something which came from MANDEL or AUNER.

C: More probably from MANDEL, because HOETTL and MANDEL are still on friendly terms and they had collaborated during the Nazi era.

D: Did HOETTL ever ask you how much money you were making?

C: No. I never told him that my financial condition was rather good. On the contrary, he believed that my financial condition was poor.

D: You think he really believed that?

C: Yes. I don't think that WILLI was informed on the extent of my collaboration with the Americans and with GROSSBAHN. He believed, I assume, that I was only an unimportant collaborator.

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D: Do you think that he could have believed that these summaries which you were handing over to him were based on work which you were doing for the Americans?

C: No. I am sure that these reports were harmless.

D: And yet WILLI considered them very good?

C: That could be so, because they were based on information which I gathered from my own political friends and from my special knowledge of Austrian political matters, but the summaries could be published in any paper.

D: When you talk about political friends, whom do you mean?

C: PROFESSOR MAUER, KLAUS, SCHULMEISTER, PEYENDORFER (phon)

D: ANTON FELLNER?

C: FELLNER wasn't a political friend of mine; FELLNER was my collaborator.

D: You never used any of FELLNER's material in reports to HOETTL?

C: No.

D: How about GLATZER?

C: I never met GLATZER.

D: How about the information received from him? Could that have been incorporated in the monthly political summaries?

C: No.

D: What other friends do you remember who were the sources for information which went into your political summaries?

C: (thinking) MAUER, SCHULMEISTER, KLAUS, PEYENDORFER.....

D: Did you introduce HOETTL to KLAUS?

C: Yes, I tried to support HOETTL's request for amnesty.

D: And was that successful?

C: Yes. KLAUS and GRAF were the political sponsors of the act. WUEHRER (phon) was the organizer of the petition.

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D: What does WUEHRER do for a living?

C: He works in Vienna.

D: I just thought of another interesting name. You had spoken about this TARAS BORODAJKEWYCZ. In looking through a file I came across an interesting reference. Did you know that BORODAJKEWYCZ had been in touch with a PROFESSOR LEO STERN?

C: Yes, I reported this information to GROSSEBAHN.

D: Do you know who PROFESSOR STERN is?

C: Yes, I reported it.

D: That he had been a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Army?

C: Yes, I know it.

D: Didn't that make BORODAJKEWYCZ suspect in your eyes?

C: Oh yes, it made him suspect in my eyes.

D: What is your opinion of BORODAJKEWYCZ now?

C: I believe that he has lost his connection to the Russians because he is no longer holding a scholarship which had been granted by the Russians to him and under which he conducted research in the state archives files about Austro-Soviet diplomatic correspondence prior to World War II.

D: Didn't it seem strange to you that the Soviets would give a scholarship to a man like BORODAJKEWYCZ, who is a refugee from the Soviet Union?

C: He is not a refugee from the Soviet Union. His father had been a native of the Ukraine and had been an Austrian official and later served with the German civilian affairs administration of the Carpatho-Ukraine when this territory had been conquered by the Germans.

D: And what is BORODAJKEWYCZ's history during the war?

C: He was a professor of modern history at Prague.

D: Where does he live now?

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C: In Vienna.

D: And he is supposed to have had a scholarship. Was that scholarship from the Russians? Did he receive it through PROFESSOR STERN?

C: No, by way of PROFESSOR EDWARD WINTER. WINTER is an old friend of his. WINTER is a professor of church and Eastern Slovene history. WINTER was befriended by STERN and so he arranged the connection between BORODAJKEWYCZ and STERN. WINTER was the intermediary. BORODAJKEWYCZ never made any secret of this connection to the Russians. There are other professors who also received Russian scholarships--for instance, BRUNNER (phon).

D: What department is he in? The history department?

C: Yes. He is a former Nazi. He was fired from the university in 1945 and then was rehired, and while he was unemployed he probably accepted the scholarship from the Russians.

D: Are there any others that you can remember?

C: No. I remember only the two names BORODAJKEWYCZ and BRUNNER.

D: You reported those to GROSSBAHN?

C: Oh yes, I believe in 1950. I think that for the past two years BORODAJKEWYCZ no longer has a connection to the Russians.

D: You think that you can do business with the Russians and then, while you're living in Vienna, just say that you're finished with them? Do you think that is possible?

C: (looks doubtful)

D: You know what a Russian scholarship amounts to, don't you?

C: (no response)

D: When you receive a scholarship from the Russians you sign up to do some intelligence work for them.

C: That was my suspicion.

D: You suspected then that BORODAJKEWYCZ was engaged in intelligence work for the Russians?

C: Yes.

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- D: And you think that he has stopped that? Do you really believe that?
- C: Yes.
- D: You're a smart man, you know.
- C: It's difficult to say. I have seen him a number of times in the past few years.
- D: Where did you see him, in Vienna?
- C: No no, mostly in Salzburg, when he was traveling from Salzburg to Germany, where his main interest was to gain membership in the new East European Institute in Munich.
- D: He was interested in that?
- C: Yes--headed by JOZEF HANS KOCH--and he intended to become a member of this institute, but he failed to be accepted.
- D: Why did he fail? Could it have been political background?
- C: Yes, but I was never informed on it.
- D: How often have you seen him in the last four years? Let's say in the last two years, approximately.
- C: Approximately eight or ten times.
- D: And where did you usually meet?
- C: In a Salzburg restaurant or cafe.
- D: And what did you talk about?
- C: The political situation, mutual friends.
- D: Did he ever ask you about GROSSBAHN?
- C: No.
- D: Did he ever ask you about HOETTL?
- C: No, because he and HOETTL maintain a correspondence relationship. He doesn't know anything about GROSSBAHN. I doubt whether he has ever heard his name.

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- D: Did you ever prepare any statements for BORODAJKEWYCZ?
- C: No.
- D: Did he ever make any remarks indicating that he knew you were earning money for doing work other than your overt journalistic activity?
- C: No. He believed that I was the Salzburg representative for HERDER.
- D: Can you remember how you happened to meet BORODAJKEWYCZ back in 1936 or 1937? Who introduced you?
- C: BORODAJKEWYCZ was formerly a journalist student leader at the University of Vienna, and he and I were interested in the same student organization. We occasionally participated in meetings together, so I knew him from my university days. For a while BORODAJKEWYCZ was a member of my university lodge. He then changed over to the history faculty.
- D: When did you resume contact with him after the end of World War II?
- C: I saw him for the first time in 1947 when I worked in Vienna as editor of a weekly publication.
- D: What did you talk about?
- C: He asked me about my job in Vienna and other personal matters. At that time I did not know that BORODAJKEWYCZ was in contact with the Russians. I learned this later on.
- D: Who informed you of that?
- C: DR. SCHULMEISTER, co-editor of Wort und Wahrheit, told me that a suspicion existed. He is very well acquainted with a large number of people in Vienna and had heard of BORODAJKEWYCZ's scholarship and his connections to PROFESSOR EDWARD WINTER and maybe to STERN and from then on I tried to collect information on BORODAJKEWYCZ's operations without having much success.
- D: You tried on his operations? You have mentioned that he was working at the state archives. What other operations were there?
- C: BORODAJKEWYCZ is a very active individual. From morning to evening

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he has callers at his home, and I was interested to know who these people were, but I was unable to find out much about them.

D: Did SCHULMEISTER ask you to inform him on BORODAJKEWYCZ's friends and acquaintances?

C: I don't understand.

D: Why did you become interested in BORODAJKEWYCZ's contacts and friends?

C: Because I was then already working for GROSSBAHN. I learned much about BORODAJKEWYCZ' and his activity from the reports which came from the ~~REFUGEE~~ (phon) group. ~~GROSSBAHN~~'s reports on BORODAJKEWYCZ came to GROSSBAHN and they were collected in a file.

D: Doesn't it strike you as odd that a man like BORODAJKEWYCZ, who was in touch with the Soviets, wasn't trying to find out what you were doing for the Americans?

C: He never endeavored to find out. He asked me what my job was and I gave him the usual cover story. He did not insist on any explanation. Maybe because we were good friends I suppose that he did not tell the Russians about me.

D: And he knew that you were a friend of HOETTL's?

C: Yes.

D: Did HOETTL ever say anything about BORODAJKEWYCZ?

C: He has mentioned that he has received letters from BORODAJKEWYCZ and BORODAJKEWYCZ mentioned that he has received letters from HOETTL.

D: To your knowledge do they visit each other?

C: Oh yes, I'm sure that BORODAJKEWYCZ visits HOETTL once or twice a year. I have reported information on BORODAJKEWYCZ's contact with HOETTL to GROSSBAHN.

D: I know that. I am just trying to get the picture clear in my own mind.

Do you remember the names of any other of the articles you wrote for HOETTL. You mentioned the GEISWINKLER article.

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Q: Oh yes, I can remember--not all, but the principal ones: the Communist partisan organization in the Totes Gebirge, there were several articles on that; an article on what the former Nazi leading figures are doing now; an article on a former employee of SCHAUB (phon); on the discovery of HITLER's secret archives (SCHAUB had given this information to HOETTL); an article on the last photograph of HITLER taken on the occasion of his last birthday; an article on MUSSOLINI's diary.

D: And what did you receive for those articles?

C: HOETTL paid me different sums. I said yesterday about 600 schillings; I think it was between 300 and 800 schillings. If an article on which I worked wasn't published, he nevertheless paid me for my work.

D: You said yesterday it might have been even a thousand schillings.

C: Yes, it could have been even a thousand.

D: Not more than that? Not two thousand?

C: No. HOETTL's payments to me were combined ones and usually included money for my share of the royalties, for newspaper articles which I wrote, and my salary for the monthly political summaries.

D: So that sometimes it could have been as much as two thousand schillings for the month on the basis of the fact that you were getting paid for the three types of work?

C: Yes.

D: Were those schillings sent to you in cash, or did you have to go to the bank and draw the money?

C: They were sent to me in cash.

D: I hope you don't mind that I review my notes; otherwise, I'll have questions after you have gone. We want to help you in this regard and clear up these questions. Incidentally, when are you going to Koln?

C: I should leave on Sunday to confer with the editor in chief and therefore I must leave on Saturday.

D: Saturday morning?

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C: Yes.

D: When do you think you will be coming back here?

C: The middle of March.

D: March?

C: Yes, so if you want I can visit you then.

D: I would appreciate that if there are some other questions which come up. You'll be in touch with GROSSEBAHN? Do you know your address?

C: DEIKMANN HAUS, KOLN.

D: It is a hotel?

C: No, it is the office building.

D: If you would be so kind and write to GROSSEBAHN, we could meet for maybe two hours if there is any reason to. I hope we can cover everything this time. Is your wife going with you now?

C: My wife will join me in May.

D: As late as that?

C: It won't be possible to find a home before then.

D: Did HOETTL ever ask you about other people who might work for the Americans?

C: No. He asked me about people who did intelligence work for his own organization and for other organizations but he never asked me about people who work for the Americans.

D: What do you mean, for his own organization?

C: CANAVAL, and other agents who worked for HOETTL's own purposes.

D: Did he ask you about CANAVAL?

C: Yes.

D: Who else was he interested in? Other intelligence personalities?

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- C: He asked me if I could give him information on CANAVAL, WINKLER, BEGUS, KAUDER-KLATT, PASENDORFER. I think that HOETTL was well informed on the persons who are working for the Americans in Austria.
- D: How about people who work for the British? or for the French?
- C: He never asked me about them.
- D: Or the Soviets?
- C: No no, except BEGUS.
- D: Did he ever mention to you that BORODAJKEWICZ was connected with the Soviets?
- C: HOETTL mentioned once or twice that BORODAJKEWICZ was suspected of working for the Soviets and that BORODAJKEWICZ had been in touch with WINTER and STERN. He did not like this relationship but on the other hand he was willing to overlook it because BORODAJKEWICZ was an old friend.
- D: He never tried to find out from you who was working for CIC?
- C: He never seemed to be interested in those things, and, moreover, he himself had worked for CIC and he probably knew quite a lot about CIC employees.
- D: Can you remember approximately when you met HARRY MAST?
- C: In the middle of 1952.
- D: And then you met him twice on the train after that, and have not seen him now for how long?
- C: Oh, four months.
- D: You never wrote to him at all?
- C: No.
- D: You act as though you don't like the type of man that MAST is.
- C: MAST is a cockolora.
- D: I don't know that word. What does it mean?

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- C: A man who talks too much and has too much imagination; not the reliable individual; a fake. He's an old intelligence man. Maybe a good technician, but I would never collaborate with him.
- D: Did HOETTL ever introduce you or arrange for you to meet any other people whom you knew or suspected to be intelligence personalities like MAST?
- C: No. Once I had an appointment to meet HOETTL in a Salzburg cafe and MAST was seated at the table with HOETTL and two unidentified men. I didn't speak to any of the others and HOETTL left his table to come to where I was and speak with me.
- D: And he never told you who they were? Did he ever indicate that he would like you to meet someone here in Salzburg?
- C: No. On two or three occasions he phoned me when he was in Salzburg and asked me to meet with him.
- D: No, I mean did he ever want you to meet anyone?
- C: Yes, he wanted me to meet ALBERT for the money transaction but I didn't do so.
- D: That is the only case?
- C: I didn't want to meet ALBERT because I don't feel comfortable in such company.
- D: Did you ever arrange for HOETTL to meet anyone except in the KLAUS incident?
- C: No, I can't recall anyone. Oh, I would like to say in regard to the previous question that once he introduced me to a certain DR. ROBERT KATCHINKA (phon) at ~~St. Paul's~~ ~~St. Paul's~~. I didn't know that I already was acquainted with KATCHINKA from the days when I worked in the Foreign Office. KATCHINKA had then been subordinate to me. He subsequently received the post of Cultural Attache at Zagreb. KATCHINKA is an expert in searching for oil. I thought that KATCHINKA could now be exploited to supply information on Zisterdorf oil fields. I reported this to GROSSBAHN and I met KATCHINKA sometime later and sounded him out to find out if he were prepared to give us information. GROSSBAHN wasn't willing to have me develop this contact with KATCHINKA because of his assumption that KATCHINKA was already working for HOETTL.

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D: And it looked as if HOETTL was trying to feed you one of his men?

C: Yes.

D: You reported that to GROSSBAHN?

C: Oh yes. Immediately and verbally.

D: Are there any other instances of that sort?

C: No.

D: Was this a voluntary proposition on HOETTL's part? How did the subject come up?

C: HOETTL did not offer me the man but on my own initiative I thought that we could use him because we needed information on Zisterdorf and I thought that KATCHINKA could deliver us the information we wanted but when GROSSBAHN and I reconsidered the use of KATCHINKA we decided that because of KATCHINKA's connections with HOETTL KATCHINKA wasn't the right man for us and we dropped the matter.

D: But HOETTL didn't offer the man to you?

C: No.

D: What was the reason for introducing you to KATCHINKA?

C: I think it was just a coincidence. KATCHINKA was waiting at the station at ~~Stass~~-Puchheim where HOETTL and I were also waiting to take a train and therefore the meeting could have been fully accidental.

D: On the other hand, did you ever introduce anyone to HOETTL?

C: No, except in the KLAUS case.

D: That is the only one?

C: Yes.

D: As a result of your dealings in currency for HOETTL, has anyone ever tried to blackmail you in that regard?

C: No.

D: Has anyone ever tried to blackmail you because they suspected or knew that you worked for the Americans?

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- C: No.
- D: To use pressure on you?
- C: No.
- D: Have you ever discussed with DR. SCHULMEISTER anything about your relationships with the Americans?
- C: Yes, but to say "discussed" is an overstatement. I once discussed employment with him and he wanted to know if I had another position in addition to my job with the Herder publishing company. I said that I had something to do with the Americans but I did not say that it was intelligence.
- D: You told him that you had something to do with the Americans? Did he ask you what it was?
- C: No, he didn't ask.
- D: Do you think he could have suspected what you were doing?
- C: Yes.
- D: He could have suspected that you were engaged in that type of work?
- C: I never admitted it and he never forced the matter.
- D: Did he just ask you that one time or several times?
- C: Twice--at the beginning of 1951 or 1950. It's a long time ago.
- D: How about the journalist MOUTHE? Do you know a journalist named MOUTHE?
- C: Yes. Prior to the GROSSBAHN reorganization we received regular press resumes from MOUTHE.
- D: And he knew about your relationship to GROSSBAHN?
- C: Yes. MOUTHE had been introduced to me by SCHULMEISTER. I was looking for a qualified man and I asked SCHULMEISTER to recommend someone to me.
- D: How about DR. OTTO MAUER?

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- C: He is a close friend of mine and the secretary-general of Catholic Action.
- D: Did he know about your work?
- C: I don't know, but if he did learn of my contact it must have been through SCHULMEISTER.
- D: He could possibly know?
- C: He could, possibly.
- D: And how about DR. PHILIP METZLER?
- C: Oh, the friend of DR. FELLNER. I never saw METZLER personally, but he worked for us for a few months and gave us reports on Communist activity, but GROSSBAHN had the impression that his reports were not always true.
- D: How about PROF. RASCHHOFER?
- C: He is a former law professor in Prague. In Prague he was a confidant of KARL HERMANN FRANK, the German administrator, and at the end of the war RASCHHOFER was arrested and interned here in Salzburg. Then when he was released he engaged in local politics and participated in the OBERWEISS meeting. Now GROSSBAHN has told me he has taken up connections with OBERLANDER (fnu) and is in his organization. I know about this connection to OBERLANDER because he once invited me to meet that man who at that time had declined an opportunity to emigrate to the Argentine, but I refused his offer. RASCHHOFER had a contact in Bonn last year and he is also interested in the East European Institute which I mentioned to you in regard to BOBODAJKEWYCZ.
- D: Is he a member of that institute?
- C: Yes; I presume that he is the one who hindered BOBODAJKEWYCZ's admission.
- D: Where did you see RASCHHOFER last?
- C: About three weeks ago here in Salzburg.
- D: What was he doing here?
- C: He came here allegedly only to speak to me. If it is true I don't know.
- D: Is he an inquisitive individual?

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- C: No. I am sure that he has no idea that I am working for the American intelligence.
- D: You are quite positive of that?
- C: Yes.
- D: Do you have any idea at all who could have reported to HOETTL on your activity with GROSSBAHN? That is why I'm bringing up all your friends and acquaintances--to see which one it might have been.
- C: Only MANDEL.
- D: But this report is a recent happening. It didn't happen two or three years ago. It took place within the last half year.
- Who is there that you know and that WILLI knows who could have told WILLI some factual details of your work for the Americans?
- C: Factual details?
- D: Yes. We know that for a fact.
- C: (He mulls this over in his mind for some seconds.)
- D: You understand what I mean?
- C: Yes yes.
- D: It's correct information; it was checked out. That's what I'm trying to get at, you see. You say you didn't tell WILLI...
- C: Yes.
- D: Who could there have been who knew some of the things that you were doing and could have told him?
- C: (Makes no reply.)
- D: It must have been from someone who knew that you were working for the Americans and also who knew approximately how much money you were getting from HOETTL for this political information.
- (There is a long pause while CC-2 thinks this over for a couple of minutes.)

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D: It couldn't be AUNER or MANDEL—they knew of your relationship to the Americans as it existed some time ago. I am referring to recent information.

(Another long pause.)

D: Can you think of anybody at all who could have revealed some of these details to WILLI? You see, we know that GROSSBAHN and WILLI have no contact whatsoever. The third person in the complex is yourself. We know that WILLI knows some of the details—not too many—but enough, so that he knew of your recent relations with the Americans. He couldn't have concocted this information in his head; he couldn't have invented it. The person who is reporting made several statements. Each one was checked out and found to be true.

(CC-2 appeared to pick his brain in an effort to discover some acquaintance who could have acted as an informant for HOETTL.)

D: Do you have any good personal friends whom you take into your confidence?

C: No. I have only had discussions with FELLNER, but FELLNER has no direct connection with HOETTL.

D: Is FELLNER the only one whom you talked to about your official contact?

C: And my policeman contacts.

D: What contacts?

C: ^{OSSI}
OSIRY (phon), MOLNAR (phon). I contacted them a couple of months ago but I did not talk to them about this matter.

(Another long pause while CC-2 deliberates.)

D: You can't think of anyone? Well did you tell FELLNER about this lie detector test?

C: I didn't have to tell him about it because he took the test himself.

D: Well, now, you didn't mention that to me before. Is there anyone else? To whom else could you have mentioned it? You say you didn't tell your wife what had taken place but you told her that

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you had a difficult conference.

- C: My wife probably has no idea that a lie detector exists.
- D: Who else is there in the same category with whom you might have discussed the matter?
- C: I discussed the matter that a lie detector existed in general terms but not in reference to myself with SCHULMEISTER, but without going into any details and no reference to my own experience.
- D: I am just as interested in instances like that, if you ever discussed the subject in a general way. In the past six months with whom did you discuss the subject?
- C: With SCHULMEISTER, with FELLNER...
- D: Are you sure you didn't discuss it in general terms with HOETTL?
- C: In general terms, maybe.
- D: After all, you met HOETTL quite often and you must have discussed a few things besides the political summaries.
- C: Oh, political summaries, they were nothing secret. I discussed this matter in general terms with HOETTL, who said that he had experience with the lie detector at the Lambach CIC.
- D: Was HOETTL a participant himself in a lie detector test?
- C: Yes, at the headquarters of this group in Lambach the CIC used such a machine.
- D: So he knew about the machine? Could he describe it?
- C: (Shrugs his shoulders, indicating that HOETTL could do so.)
- D: You could describe this machine (pointing to one that was in a corner of the room) just from looking at it.
- C: I don't think so. I am so untechnical minded that I couldn't describe the machine in half a year.
- D: But you could describe the procedure involved in using the machine --how the several pieces of equipment are attached to your body?

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- C: Yes, I could do that.
- D: And HOETTL could do that, couldn't he?
- C: No--it's impossible.
- D: What's impossible?
- C: That I have told about the machine and the questions that were asked me.
- D: I'm not talking about the questions; I just want to know because that will be a big help in clearing up the matter, you see. I just want to know if you can recall discussing the subject of the lie detector without going into any details on your own experience. You have remembered that you have discussed it with SCHULMEISTER once and with FELLNER one time.
- C: And I think with HOETTL, I don't recall when.
- D: You must have discussed it with him at some time because you know that HOETTL saw a lie detector at Lambach. How long ago was that?
- C: July or August of last year.
- D: You don't remember the circumstances?
- C: I'm quite sure that I did not mention at the time that I was subjected to a test.
- D: One could have concluded that. Do you think that WILLI knows you well enough so that he can read from your facial expressions the answers to some of his questions? For instance, in the case of his queries to you about your work for the Americans, you never expressly admitted that you did so, but on the other hand you acknowledged that he could have deduced this from your reactions to his questions.
- C: I cannot exclude this possibility.
- D: No, I don't say that; I'm not holding you responsible for that. What I'm trying to get at is the truth in this whole thing, you see. I want to find out the facts and the truth, that's all.
- C: The human spirit is not designed to tell the untrue.

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D: You think so?

C: It is very difficult to say.

D: It is difficult to say. I hope what you say is true.

C: I think that it is difficult for human beings to lie over a period of time.

D: Do you think so?

C: Oh yes.

D: You give human beings credit for a lot more than I do. In any event, it is conceivable or very probable that you did discuss the subject in general terms with HOETTL. Now let's carry that one point further. Did you ever in general terms discuss American intelligence with HOETTL?

C: In general terms, yes.

D: What lines did your conversation follow?

C: For instance, HOETTL told me about his CIC operations in Lambach in 1949.

D: Did he identify to you sources and reports and did he give you details on what he was doing?

C: No, because I already knew all of that information from our reports which were then being collected by FELLNER. FELLNER was a member of the Lambach CIC headquarters and I translated his reports into English, and so the story of HOETTL's experience with CIC wasn't new to me. One time HOETTL complained that he was out of favor with the local CIC authorities and unfortunately found it impossible to contact his old American friends who he had allegedly known before, Gen. Donovan and Allan Dulles. He claimed that he knew Allan Dulles in Switzerland. It appeared to me that these claims were a little optimistic or fantastic, but I had no way of disclaiming them, so I believed them. I was not informed on this aspect.

D: Was this in 1949?

C: 1950, and it was after his break with CIC. He said that he hoped later on he would be accepted by the Republican administration and Dulles and others. For instance, I spoke with him on intelligence matters and I came to the conclusion that he would

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only work for Americans or a German organization that was under American sponsorship. HOETTL had once stated that Germany alone couldn't make a success of it because the Germans did not have enough funds at their disposal and secondly, because Germany could not exist politically without American support. As a result, German intelligence is forced to collaborate with the Americans. HOETTL's one preoccupation was that he was unable to find the right American contact.

- D: Who couldn't find the right contact?
- C: HOETTL couldn't find the right contact with the Americans, and I told you already that he had tried to talk to GROSSBAHN about intelligence matters and he thought that via GROSSBAHN he would be able to come in contact with more influential American authorities. You probably know from my reports of his connections with the BLANK organization and that he was fired by BLANK but he did not claim that the Americans intervened to bring about this act.
- D: What made him think that it could have been American intervention?
- C: Because he feels that the high-ranking Americans are not his enemies but he believes that only the lower stratas, the CIC, and possibly some individual personal enemies had intrigued against him but that the Americans in general are his potential friends.
- D: So you had discussed things along that line with HOETTL?
- C: Yes, along this line.
- D: And what was your contribution to those discussions?
- C: My contribution? I did not contradict HOETTL because his general views were in many cases similar to my own, and to tell you the truth I believed that HOETTL could be amalgamated in the American intelligence system, but I don't know the background of HOETTL. Maybe there are some things that I should know and I don't know about him.
- D: But you feel that he could be a definite asset to the Americans?
- C: Yes, under proper control, if he were assisted by a staff officer who has the ability to differentiate between the true and the untrue.
- D: He is not capable of doing that himself?

- C: No, but he certainly is a good organizer and he can find new contacts and find new sources and can be a dynamic worker.
- D: And you think that you could work successfully with a man like HOETTL?
- C: No, I never could. I can work with a man like GROSSBAHN or another man who is well disciplined and exact and reliable and quiet.
- D: I can understand that, but what makes you think that WILLI has something to offer to the Americans that is of special value? The fact that he can make new contacts?
- C: He can offer in any case a large circle of former collaborators who would be willing to work with him again but would not work for anyone else.
- D: But you yourself have brought up the fact that HARRY MAST is a very poor personality.
- C: The case of HARRY MAST is a special one. MAST was fired by the GEHLEN group because of his connections with HOETTL, and HOETTL felt obligated to him.
- D: Who does HOETTL have in his great circle of competent people who would permit him to build up a fine team of intelligence workers? Who does he have? I don't know his circle intimately. Do you think THEODORE ALBERT is such a good man?
- C: I have no opinion on THEODORE ALBERT because I don't know him personally but from what I have heard I would judge that he is an expert, but not as an intelligence officer in the field but rather as a man at the desk who can work on political information which comes in from Slovakia, Hungary, and the Balkans.
- D: Who else does he have? You speak as though the man were now idle and could be of some great help in our struggle against the Soviets and I am interested in that, certainly, and my government is interested in that, but on the surface I can't see where HOETTL has these loyal co-workers. VON WINKLER? Is he such a good man?
- C: No. He is not a bad man. He is certainly anti-Communist and reliable. I don't know many of his collaborators.
- D: Is this just an impression on your part?

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- C: No, it is a conclusion.
- D: But it must be based upon fact, because you're an intelligent man and you wouldn't believe that this were true unless you had some reason. Did he ever say that to you? Did he ever tell you that he had people who would work with him again if they had the chance?
- C: No. He could never have performed the operations that he did for the Nazis if he didn't have a circle of loyal and capable collaborators.
- D: But you must remember that was back ten years ago and a lot has taken place since then. Some of the men may be dead; some of them may be in Soviet custody; some may be in South America. Do you see that?
- C: Yes, I see.
- D: You understand what I mean?
- C: Yes.
- D: Now I say that for this reason. You yourself mentioned yesterday that one of his great weaknesses is the fact that he is a poor judge of human beings. Now, no man can be a leader and a good field captain--and that is what a man in his position has to be--unless he can judge individuals.
- C: Yes. What he needs is an assistant who could do that.
- D: If that were the case, then you would give the job to the aide, you wouldn't give it to HOETTL. In the business world you don't put a manager into a factory and then give him a crutch--a man who will hold him up. You hire the crutch and put him in the job and do away with the manager. Do you follow me?
- C: Yes, but HOETTL is a dynamic force. He has many ideas.
- D: He is a dynamic personality?
- C: Yes.
- D: The great problem then is channeling that energy to go in the right direction. You take a motor on a motorboat, for instance. If you've got a rudder on the boat, you stop the boat and adjust the rudder north and the boat will go north, but if you put a motor on a motorboat and you don't have a rudder, what happens? The boat keeps going around in circles, isn't that true?

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C: It is the difference between the capitalist and the workers. HOETTL has the capital and the workers should do the work.

D: But does he? That is what I question. Does he really hold the capital?

C: It would really be interesting to investigate that matter.

D: That won't be necessary. Do you realize that the information that you gave to HOETTL in your political reports was some of the best information which he had? Do you realize that?

C: (Laughs out loud.) No.

D: It's true; I'm serious. Now you have your own question answered. That information which you say was something that anybody could have gotten out of the newspapers and with some knowledge of the Austrian scene could have written was some of the very best information that HOETTL was turning out, and you can believe that. That's the truth. Why do you think he was giving you the 600 schillings?

C: I don't know.

D: I told you yesterday that you were a specialist in your field and that you were good in your job. We realize it and HOETTL realized it. Why do you think that he is interested in maintaining a contact with you in Germany?

C: He wanted me to edit his newspaper reports.

D: Why do you think that he is interested in your doing this editing work even though you will be in Germany? Because he probably hopes, I think, that you will eventually get so well acquainted with the German political scene that you will be able to give him the same kind of political summaries from Germany that you formerly prepared here in Austria and that he would be able to sell here to someone who is interested in the German political picture.

C: I don't think so.

D: Well, you might say that, but I'll tell you how the pattern has worked out. The information that you gave him, these political summaries, was some of the very best information he had, and that is the way it is regarded by the people who ultimately received it. If sometime he does want you to start writing the same kind of thing in Germany for him so that he can put it in the hands of people, possibly in the Austrian government, who

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don't know the German scene and who would be impressed by your work...

C: What do you advise?

D: My advice to you is to stay away from HOETTL. You will be well off and I'll explain to you why. This is something I'm telling you in friendship; this isn't my professional advice.

C: Thank you.

D: Here's the thing. You are very fond of HOETTL and I admire you for it. You're a good, loyal and a very true friend to HOETTL. You appreciate the fact that he saved your life and you are indebted to him for that. That's a wonderful characteristic in a man, and you should never forget that HOETTL saved your life. But on the other hand, do not be blinded by this obligation because if you review HOETTL's history in the eight years you will see that HOETTL has gone downhill, downhill, downhill. And here are the facts. He was several times employed by the Americans. They were dissatisfied with him. He was employed by the Germans. They eventually became dissatisfied with him. Now you can accept his explanation of why they were dissatisfied if you wish, but one thing you can't deny is that the West is fighting a desperate battle with the East--with the Soviets--and we will pick up any man we can who will help us defeat the Soviets--any man, no matter what his Nazi record was. Possibly not the worst ones--the war criminals--but a man in HOETTL's category certainly would be acceptable to the West. He was acceptable at one time when he worked for CIC, but he failed. He failed to measure up to the standards of CIC and he failed to measure up to the standards of his German contacts. Now I say that the man is washed up. He is what we call a "has-been." You have the type in the journalistic field; you have a man who writes a perfectly good book or two or three novels and then begins to slip. It happens in every profession: engineering, medicine, any profession you can name. What happens to this individual? He begins living in the past. He begins living in fantasy. He can't face the fact that he is finished, that he is no longer a big-shot, that he no longer has troops to command, that he doesn't have subordinates who are there to be directed by him, and so fantasy enters the picture. You see the result of this in the Geiswinkler articles, in the Totas Gebirge article; there is the evidence right there. What has happened to this man who was once according to your word a very fine intelligence officer? What has happened to him? He has gone down to the gutter of the game; he has slipped right down to

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the bottom of the ladder so that now he is writing articles based upon fantasy and selling them to the newspapers. It doesn't matter whether he gets a thousand or two thousand schillings. Where is his own feeling about himself, about his reputation? When a man begins to lose consideration for his own reputation, then he is a dangerous individual with whom to associate. You wouldn't do that. Would you write an article with your byline, a fake article which you had taken from somebody else, and plagiarize it?

- C: No.
- D: All right, you wouldn't. You have too much respect for your name, don't you, and for your professional standards, and that is a credit to you. So what has happened to this friend of yours?
- C: I don't know. Your description is very impressive and I accept your advice.
- D: I don't want you to accept it; just think about it. It's your business; he's your friend.
- C: No no, I accept your advise as an official and a person.
- D: It is personal advice based upon an objective examination.
- C: But what to do about the editing of his new book?
- D: Well, I'm not talking about that. You've entered into this agreement with him; it's up to you to settle the matter. I see no reason why you can't edit his book and even if you want to, to continue preparing his articles for the paper, but I tell you this: that unless my guess is wrong, WILLI HOETTL is going to want you to do some intelligence work for him in Germany, and that is where you'll be getting into the danger zone.
- C: No. I assure you that I never intended to do any work for HOETTL in Germany and I will not do so.
- D: What are you going to do if he says to you, "You have been working for me for a year and a half. I've paid you 600 schillings a month for these political reports. What do you think that I did with the reports?" What will you say if he puts it up to you in that way? Are you going to say like a schoolboy, "Well, I didn't know that was political intelligence; that was just something that I picked up from the newspaper and then I put my own ideas in and I gave it to you." Do you think he will be satisfied with that?

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- C: I never estimated my work in that way.
- D: He certainly estimated it that way. One thing that I can't understand: you're a good friend of HOETTL's and you did this work for him even without pay; you're a good friend of GROSSBAHN and he helped you to make nice money and you had a good relationship with him. I can't understand why you didn't tell GROSSBAHN about your work for WILLI.
- C: I admitted it was probably a fault of mine.
- D: But you must have had some reason for holding back that information. Were you ashamed of your work for HOETTL? Were you afraid that GROSSBAHN wouldn't approve?
- C: No. Maybe I was afraid that GROSSBAHN would want me to discontinue this activity.
- D: Why? Because GROSSBAHN might not think you were getting this information from the newspapers?
- C: No. Because GROSSBAHN would not appreciate such close collaboration with HOETTL.
- D: I see. Well, that sounds plausible; I can understand that. But you now think it was a mistake that you didn't tell GROSSBAHN?
- C: Yes. You must see my situation between GROSSBAHN and HOETTL. It was very difficult. It was difficult to be loyal to GROSSBAHN on the one side and on the other side to be loyal to HOETTL.
- D: Where was your greatest loyalty?
- C: The only way out was to cut off the connection with HOETTL.
- D: Were you disturbed by this situation? Did you lie awake at night because of the fact that you were giving this information and GROSSBAHN wasn't told about it, and on the other side you felt indebted to WILLI and felt that GROSSBAHN might have objected to the close collaboration? Were you bothered by that at all? Do you understand me? (In German) Did it bother your conscience?
- C: Yes, naturally. It was difficult for me to spy on HOETTL and on the other hand I felt it was my duty to report on my contacts with HOETTL to GROSSBAHN. I considered that as a disloyal act to HOETTL.

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- D: That bothered you?
- C: Also it bothered me when I didn't report all that I was doing for HOETTL to GROSSBAHN.
- D: This is the time to clear it up. Are you sure that you didn't tell HOETTL anything else about your work for GROSSBAHN?
- C: I did not.
- D: Did you feel that your loyalty was stronger or greater to HOETTL than to GROSSBAHN?
- C: No. My loyalty to my Americans obligations was by far the stronger.
- D: But on the personal side, since you have known WILLI much longer than GROSSBAHN and WILLI has saved your life and so forth, the personal feeling must have been stronger to WILLI.
- C: Yes, possibly.
- D: I'm trying to differentiate between the personal and the professional here.
- C: I have never considered this matter in detail. My personal relations with GROSSBAHN are thoroughly agreeable and I never had troubles with him. I would have accepted the opportunity to go to Germany even though I had not found myself in this situation between WILLI and GROSSBAHN, but the opportunity which the new job presented for me to get out of this impasse was an additional motive which convinced me to sever my relations with GROSSBAHN.
- D: I'm glad that you have mentioned it because I suspected that that could have been the case.
- C: Yes, I see no reason for not clearing up these matters.
- D: That's what we want to do, you see, and I think that it is very good of you to be so honest and help us to understand this relationship which has been very cloudy to us.
- C: Yes, very cloudy, and even a separation of two years or three years might enable us to work together again, starting with a new foundation.
- D: You said it would have to be as long as that?

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- C: Maybe one year would be enough. The case of HOETTL nevertheless is depressing.
- D: It depresses you because you would like to help him as a friend.
- C: Yes, even though I admit you are right in your description of him.
- D: Look at the man now and the man as he was ten years ago when he was dining with you at the Hotel Adlon. He was a big shot. He was a ranking officer in the German intelligence, a man who was respected and who did a good job. Then look at the man today, writing Geiswinkler articles for the Salzburger Nachrichten.
- C: It is a poor turn of events.
- D: There's no question about it. And further than that, tying up with men like KERNMAYER, tying up with men like MAST. You have got to draw the line between loyalty and blind devotion, you know. You can't be eternally obligated even with a man like HOETTL just because he saved your life, or you're going to find yourself in a difficult situation. See what I mean?
- C: What do you advise me to do when I'm in Germany?
- D: My advice to you is to stay clear of any of that stuff and as soon as you smell it, keep your hands away. Say, "I'm not interested in it; I never participated in for anybody; I never worked for the Americans," etc. Because they could never have access to our file and the facts. They can suspect all they want, and if they say, "Yes, we know from MANDEL that you did this," or "We know from this man that you did this," you can say, "Are you taking my word against his? Where is the proof?" The matter would never be brought out in the open, so that you can always deny your past affiliation, but you've got to be strong in that regard when you're in Germany. As soon as someone comes along who wants you to write a political summary for Mr. X, who is sitting up on the top of a mountain and whom you will never meet, you know enough about the business now, you're a smart man to say, "Thanks very much, but unless I know what this whole proposition is, unless I see my articles in the paper on a monthly basis, it's nothing for me."
- C: Oh, I will continue to write my political summaries on Germany and I will send them to GROSSEBAHN free of charge.

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D: That's good. I'll appreciate it, and in that way you'll get rid of the drive to do creative work, which is a very fine thing. It's like an author who has an idea and wants to put it on paper. If you want to send it to someone afterwards, send it to GROSSBAHN.

Well, I think we've both learned a lot through these meetings. Don't you feel that we have learned?

C: Oh yes.

D: You've been honest with me, and I've been honest with you.

C: I have appreciated very much the opportunity to talk with you, and I'm sorry that I didn't have a chance to do so a long time ago. One can see this same matter from more than two sides. I always looked at my relations with HOETTL from just one side.

D: You said that you were getting 600 schillings a month from WILLI just because WILLI thought you were a good fellow.

C: But he is a good fellow, especially in money matters.

D: But you aren't pressed for the money; you were getting a fairly nice salary. Wasn't that enough to support your wife and two children?

C: No, the money wasn't so important. I could have done the work without it.

D: Well, you did it without it. Since August of last year you performed your work without pay. How is your salary going to be in Germany? Is it quite satisfactory?

C: I have two salaries: 1200 marks from the Rheinische Merkur, and Herder will pay me 300 marks.

D: That will be 1500 marks. You should be able to live quite nicely.

C: Oh yes. In Austria no newspaper could pay this much, except the Neues Oesterreich.

D: Does the Neues Oesterreich seem to have a lot of money?

C: Their circulation is estimated to be about 250,000.

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- D: Is their circulation bigger than the Kurier?
- C: No, about the same. The Kurier is also a well-to-do enterprise.
- D: They have good backing.
- Let's see if there is anything else. I think we've gone over most if not all of the unclear areas and I think that it is all cleared up now. I will look over the file again about BORODAJKEWICZ and I will examine your reports again.
- C: My reports on BORODAJKEWICZ are all in GROSSBAHN's file, and he could give them to you.
- D: It would be appreciated if you would let us know when you are coming back to Austria because there may be a few questions, and if we could talk to you for a couple of hours--we would pay you for your time--
- C: That won't be necessary.
- D: It could be arranged maybe while you're on the way back from your vacation, or you might come in while you are on vacation and we'll pay the train or bus fare.
- C: I will keep in touch with GROSSBAHN and, via GROSSBAHN, with you.
- D: That's fine. I've appreciated the opportunity to talk over these things. I hope that you have real success in your new job.

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RPT

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AM
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. 2000-100

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: FEB 24 1953

TO : Chief of Base, Salzburg

DATE:

FROM : Chief, RI

INFO: YIP

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational/INDOVI
SPECIFIC - GROSBACH - CS-2 etc.

USAGE - Austria

Reference: RASA 770, RAS-45-50, RASA 105

1. RASA 770 and its attachments were read here with interest and satisfaction. It is felt that [] handled the final interview and termination of CS-2 in a thoroughly professional and common-sense manner, and he should be commended for it. It is further felt that you have done all that could be done at this point to bring the various figures in this case and the relationships between them into focus. Congratulations to all of you on a job well done.

2. Headquarters is thus disposed to accept your conclusion that the CS-2/HOTEL relationship did not seriously damage the security of the GROSBACH operation, but it cannot overlook certain reservations about the security of the operation as a whole.

3. Paragraph 2 d. of []'s report of 30 January states that the interview with CS-2 made the "significant disclosure" that "HOTEL knew GROSBACH worked for the American intelligence service and had on four or five occasions tried to elicit information from him regarding GROSBACH's financial status and attitude toward his work". Whatever may be said about GROSBACH's initiative and usefulness as a facility in Salzburg, do you not agree that "disclosures" such as this make it difficult for Headquarters to defend the project as a secure and strictly clandestine intelligence operation? By this we do not mean to intimate that we do not consider the GROSBACH operation a highly valuable one, nor that we are loath to go to bat for it - quite the contrary. However what we do need is a realistic and frank survey of the case from a CI angle so that we can put the facts forward, then justify the operation on the grounds that despite certain security implications, the production from the project is so valuable that the strengths far outweigh the weaknesses.

RELEASE

EE/FE/PO
COORDINATING OFFICER

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DVLE 8 MAR 1953
VBA/ [] ER
EE/FIA/ []

INT. X REF LOW LITED 24 FEB 53

FORM NO. 51-20
JUN 1949

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHOD EXEMPTION 3026
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

4. As to CO-2's actual statements while under interrogation, we note that he denies he ever met Theodore ALBERT. According to paragraph III c of S-111, attached to EASA 304, CO-2 was asked by HORTL to contact ALBERT in order to obtain D-Marks which CO-2 was to exchange and then return the counter-value to ALBERT. Several explanations are possible for the discrepancy - perhaps this plan did not come off, or CO-2 may have forgotten about the contact when interrogated.

5. Of interest is CO-2's statement that he received 600 Reichmarks per month from HORTL, especially as in EASA 205 GROSSMANN SGR reported that HORTL claimed CO-2 received AS 2000 from HORTL. Again there are a number of possible explanations, among them that a certain exaggeration crept into the report as it went from HORTL to GROSSMANN SGR to GROSSMANN, another that HORTL claimed to give AS 2000 to CO-2, but actually kept it all for himself except AS 600.

6. May we have a copy of the wire recording transcript when it becomes available?

7. The point about GROSSMANN's being made to realize that the relationship between intelligence operators and their sub-operators can never be exclusively a contact-and-pay proposition, is well taken. We are glad that he has become aware of the need to deal with his people on a more human and understanding basis.

8. Regarding EAS-2-13, we regret that the time it took to clear headquarters and in transit made it rather outdated on arrival.

9. With regard to EAS-2-54, we wonder if the Compass Vending material has been shipped, as the Library of Congress has been inquiring about the approximate date of arrival.

10. Regarding EASA 126, we note that no other opportunity of running a car has since been mentioned. However, we are hoping for approval in the near future of a car of 200 AS per month, so that if another chance presents itself, GROSSMANN can be put on wheels right away.

Date of Origin
18 February 1953

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(ENCL. EASA-770)

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3. We are still inclined toward the view, as expressed in EASA-770, that the damage to Grossbahn operations does not appear serious, though we are still at considerable loss, despite the LCFLUTTER test, to accurately estimate the damage, if any. Providence, plus the ineptness of friend Hoettl, seems to have spared us from a greater blow. CC-2's mind appears quite remarkable to the extent he appears to have the dubious faculty of not letting himself remember that which he finds unpleasant to recall, and, as [] correctly points out, the one real solution left open to us for getting at the bottom of the matter appears to be the interrogation of Hoettl himself. We are indeed happy to report that a warrant for Hoettl's arrest was issued by G-2, USFA, on 21 March 1953 on the basis of his complicity in the Tophole case. [] of VOB will handle our end of the interrogation. He has spent the 24th and most of the 25th preparing his brief in conjunction with members of this base, plus [] of POB, who has many questions regarding Zipper operations he wishes to clear up with the good Dr. Posing questions which will lead up to a revelation of how badly CC-2 compromised Grossbahn's operations with Hoettl is of necessity a fairly delicate matter, for we wish to avoid disclosing undue interest in either CC-2 or Grossbahn, if possible. We hope to be able to get him to open up on this matter by dealing with various personalities in which the names of CC-2 and Grossbahn will be inserted. It may well be that we will finally have to resort to direct questioning, but even though we do, are not inclined to feel this will be especially damaging as the entire interrogation will be under G-2 auspices and [] is fairly well identified in the Salzburg area as a G-2 person. Direct KUBARK interest in CC-2 and Grossbahn should be adequately camouflaged. The results of the Hoettl interrogation should be most enlightening and we will pouch the results in the near future.

4. The wire recording transcript of []'s interrogation of CC-2 is completed and a copy is attached hereto as Attachment D. The matter of Theodor von ALBERT, which you raise in para 4 of reference a, is apparently cleared up on pages 31 and 34. Note that CC-2 did handle the money transaction for von Albert, but through an intermediary and thus never came into direct contact with von Albert.

5. The point which you raise regarding payments from Hoettl to CC-2 in para 5 of reference a appears to have a fairly simple explanation. The actual sum of cash which changed hands between the two each month did vary considerably and probably did, at times, reach the amount of 2,000 schillings. However, as you will note from the transcript, CC-2 points out that a larger part of this sum was for his share in the royalty commissions on Hoettl's book for his translation work. The sum which Hoettl was paying for the political reports was never set exactly, but varied from 500 to 1,000 schillings per month, so that CC-2 claims it was difficult, if not impossible, to now recall what amounts were for royalties and what amounts were for the reports. We find it difficult to believe that anyone could be so naive about money matters as CC-2 pretends to be. One fact worth noting in this regard is that Hoettl still owes CC-2 money for the Italian, French and Spanish editions, which means they will probably be coming together again in the future to straighten out their financial affairs.

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6. Other points raised in EASW-188 will be made the subjects of separate dispatches.

LCM.

Attachments:

- A. LCFLUTTERING of GROSSBAHN Agent, CC-2
- B. G-180
- C. G-185
- D. Interrogation of CC-2

Distribution:

- 2 - ~~EC~~ (1 w/atts.)
- 3 - Wien (1 w/atts.)
- 1 - Salz chrono
- 1 - Salz #101 (w/atts.)
- ~~1 - Salz chrono~~
- 1 - Salz RCM Notebook (w/atts.)

copy sent to Germany attache J. per EASA-1190

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RCF
(ENCL. EASA-710)
~~6/8/52~~

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA ROUTE)

DISPATCH NO. EASA- 1149

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
Attention: [] []
FROM : Chief of Base, Salzburg []
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Op/GROOVI

DATE: 30 March 1953

SPECIFIC— GROSSBAHN - CC-2
- General Security

Reference: EASW-188

1. The points you raise in paragraph 3 of reference are valid and require thorough consideration. We have never stoutly contended that the Grossbahn operation was completely clandestine and have often wondered out loud, in memo form, how he retains his cloak of anonymity so well in the hotbed of Salzburg intrigue. Grossbahn is entering his sixth year of service with KUBARK and it is inevitable that anyone who stays in place that long is going to commence to wear a bit thin at the cover seams. In spite of his shortcomings in this security regard (a few soft spots showing up as exemplified in the CC-2 affair), we do feel that what Grossbahn has to offer us does outweigh a certain lack of clandestinity. He is our long arm, sweeping the local landscape; an arm which is extremely flexible and can be adjusted to give most desired results. At the same time, he does serve as an effective block between field operations and the front door of SOB. If we tried to run the same operations with staff personnel as we are now running through Grossbahn, we might be faced with the possibility of having the roll-up come through the SOB door. We feel an excellent example in point was the Slovakian operation, which stopped one link short of Grossbahn in the persons of SIAA and XI-1.

2. Naturally, we agree the one weakness of such theorizing lies in a possible penetration as we have had forced home to us in the CC-2 case. To this can be said that CC-2 could tell Hoettl little even had he been so inclined. He could identify no U. S. personnel, he could give no financial run-down and could make no guesses as to Grossbahn's degree of cooperation with and attitude towards his employers. This would seem to speak well for the care with which Grossbahn handles his staff. In this vein, we have made it a fetish to get all Grossbahn's people on LC-FLUTTER and have been successful in doing so, with a few minor exceptions. Given time, we will have the slate complete. Grossbahn personally is due for a re-check, which we hope to schedule within the next few months. Not that we have any misgivings about Grossbahn's basic loyalties; we merely wish to make sure and also have a few minor points, such as the OFFCZAREK affair, to clean up.

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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30 Mar 53
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3. Thus we come down to the following facts we wish to establish; penetration at a low level in the Grossbahn operation would be comparatively unrewarding vis-a-vis a penetration of KUBARK due to the effective screening operation Grossbahn performs for us and the care with which he handles his personnel. Secondly, we have checked out all main personalities utilized by Grossbahn on LCFLUTTER and will maintain a schedule of periodic re-check. The great danger for us lies in a penetration through Grossbahn himself, a thought we find hard to reconcile with fact. Be that as it may, in spite of our feelings that Grossbahn is essentially our man, we do intend to apply the same procedures to him as to the rest of his operation; he will be re-checked periodically on LCFLUTTER and we will apply the traditional testing techniques, continue gathering detailed personalia on all his contacts and continue checking his details against facts coming in from other sources.

4. Rounding out the picture in regards to the personal security of Grossbahn, needless to say, we are over-cautious in this respect, are constantly lecturing him on the need to keep his guard high and usually escort him on any trips where we feel there is an unreasonable degree of danger, e.g., trips to Vienna are made with his case officer via [] means.

5. We appreciate your thoughts in regard to the need for a thorough CE analysis, but looking back on the Grossbahn operation for the period since SOB took it over, we gain the impression that we have done a fairly thorough job of polishing off the roughest corners, and except for possibly a few minor chinks close to Grossbahn personally, the operation has been overhauled and streamlined. The Slovakian and Hungarian operations are by the board, and possibly with a good deal of luck, the Grace of God, and sound compartmentation by Grossbahn, we came out of those without any terrifying compromises. XI-1, who was the one closest to Grossbahn to become compromised, is slated for REE employment as soon as we can work out the final details. SLAA, who was also badly burned, has long since been dropped. CC-2, another soft spot, is gone. Our recent memo (EASA-1096), which fairly well winds up the CC-2 affair, expresses our previous thoughts that the damage CC-2 was able to do through HOETTL appears to be insignificant. We are in the throes of an operation involving AA-2 (ref. EASA-1097) which should throw considerable cold CE light on the entire AA operation.

6. The only important assets left untouched upon in the preceding paragraph are: HH-1, ZZ-1, PP group in Salzburg and the CC administrative staff close to Grossbahn. We did deal at some length regarding Grossbahn's takeover of the HH-1 contact from CC-2 in EASA-819. The contact with ZZ-1 has been reported on a continuous basis and appears fairly sound and secure. The PP group in Salzburg is one spot where we might spend some time looking into operations from a general CE standpoint. We will take this matter up with Grossbahn, time and conditions permitting. The remaining CC staff close to Grossbahn are his most trusted employees and, naturally, the most sensitive spot in his operations. We feel his

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handling of his staff has been exceptionally sound (e.g. the case of CC-2 who could tell little even had he so wished), but we will continue to do all possible to insure that his standards of compartmentation are maintained at the highest possible level. Another factor is that the personal relationship between Grossbahn and his staff is of such a nature, in spite of the unfortunate CC-2 experience, that we do feel that they would be loyal enough to report any attempts to wring information from them. To this can be added the eye-opening experience Grossbahn has recently gone through with CC-2, which we feel will tend to make him extremely CE sensitive toward his remaining staff.

7. The problem of EE-1, which is a peripheral one as Grossbahn sees him very seldom -- the relationship is more personal than business in nature -- is being treated with separately on the basis of EASW-119 and Grossbahn's report will be forwarded shortly.

8. We do not wish to convey the impression that we feel all is rosy-hued vis-a-vis the CE aspects of the Grossbahn operation. One thing that bothers us considerably along this line is the predilection of Grossbahn's people for casually throwing out a name a few years after they first establish contact. All his people, past and present, have carried sources, sub-sources, operational contacts, political and/or social contacts without ever quite clarifying their status. Grossbahn has been equally guilty in this regard as witness your recent questions in EASW-119 concerning his exact relationship with EE-1. We have cracked down -- probably not as hard as we should -- on Grossbahn and have stated that he must furnish a listing of all operational contacts since the inception of his operations. We realize this is a tremendous task, but we see no other way around the problem. Some added examples we can cite -- and items we are working on -- are PP-1's "contacts in the Ministry of Interior" and "contacts in Vienna city Police", AA-1 and AA-2's relationships with ~~WOLFF~~ WOHL, GEMUTH in Vienna, and the status of Grossbahn's "liaison" relationship with SLAA and SLAG. These are some of the things that really bother us about the Grossbahn operation and we consider them an extremely serious CE weakness. As we have said, our first step will be the operational contact list we are pressuring Grossbahn for and we hope from there to establish a degree of progress in determining exactly how far the periphery of Grossbahn's operations extend.

9. We have thus lead ourselves around to the point we wished to establish originally in paragraph 5, that circumstances, coupled with our own efforts, have forced us to conduct CE analysis of the Grossbahn operation on a continuing basis. There are a few spots left untouched, as we have pointed out, and we will strive to do a bit of poking around in these corners.

Distribution: 2 EE
3 Vien
1 - Salz chrono
1 - Salz #101
1 - Salz RCM notebook

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R.C.M.
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6-8-52 30 Mar 53

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
HOETTL, WILHELM		2. RI FILE NO.	C	J
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
		DAR -03711	07 APR 53	
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.	
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PERTINENT INFORMATION				
14.				
<p>BOEHM, ANTON / C J</p> <p>WHEN ASKED ABOUT SUBJECT'S ACQUAINTANCE, LIPPMAN STATED THAT WHOM HE WAS ATTENDING SCHOOL IN SALZBURG, HE TOLD SUBJ THAT HE NEEDED A CERTAIN BOOK OF PHILOSOPHY FOR HIS STUDIES, AND SUBJ RECOMMENDED THAT LIPPMAN SHOULD CONTACT DR. ANTON BOEHM, A LAWYER IN SALZBURG, ONE OF SUBJECT'S FRIENDS. SOMETIME IN 1952 LIPPMAN WAS NOTIFIED BY SUBJECT THAT A MAN WOULD MEET LIPPMAN IN HANUSCHPLATZ, SALZBURG, AND GIVE HIM SOMETHING TO MAIL. LIPPMAN MET THIS PERSON, WHO INTRODUCED HIMSELF AS BARON HARRY MAST, AND INTRODUCED HIS COMPANION AS ALBERT, FIRST NAME UNKNOWN TO LIPPMAN. ALBERT ASKED LIPPMAN TO MAIL LETTERS FOR HIM TO HIS SISTER IN GERMANY, TO WHICH LIPPMAN CONSENTED. SINCE THAT TIME, LIPPMAN HAS FREQUENTLY TAKEN LETTERS OVER THE BORDER FOR ALBERT AND MAILED THE LETTERS IN GERMANY. LIPPMAN STATED THAT MOST OF THE LETTERS WERE ADDRESSED TO DUSA KAZIMIR, ADDRESS UNKNOWN, KARLSRUHE, GERMANY.</p> <p>AGENT'S NOTES: ON 3 APRIL 1953, THE FILES OF 430th CIC SUB-DETACHMENT A WERE EXAMINED BY THIS AGENT CONCERNING THE PERSONALITIES AND FIRMS MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT, AND WERE FOUND TO CONTAIN THE FOLLOWING INFO.</p> <p>DRASCO VIDIC, BORN 12 MAY 1921, IS LISTED AS A FORMER INFORMANT OF 430TH CIC SUB-DETACHMENT A, WHO WAS DROPPED WITHOUT PREJUDICE ON 20 FEB 1950.</p> <p>ANTON BOEHM, RESIDING AT NEUTORSTRASSE 192, SALZBURG, IS LISTED AS A TIB EMPLOYEE AS OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1949.</p>				
15.				
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.		➔	=	∩
				X

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(7-46)

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO. C-12977	SOURCE STC/SPB	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST []	
SUBJECT BOEHM, Anton (Dr.)			DATE 21 Jan 54	
PERTINENT INFORMATION LIST # 231 THERE IS A RESTRICTED STC/SPB FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD IN RI/AR FILE, WASH-CIA-Pers-4.				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	
SECRET			[]	[]
			[]	X

FORM NO. 59-34
DEC 1952

(35)

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RE-PUNCH

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST				NOTE: Consult the 201 Control System Reference Manual before completing this form. Form must be typed or printed in block letters.			
TO: RID/201 Section				DATE: 27 AUG 59		ACTION: <input type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AMEND <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSE	
FROM: EE/G/L []				ROOM NO. 2211 K		TELEPHONE 528	
SECTION I							
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SENSITIVE		1. 2- []		SOURCE DOCUMENT			
<input type="checkbox"/> NON-SENSITIVE				UJVENTURE SHEET (ATTACHED)			
NAME (Last)		NAME (First)		NAME (Middle)		NAME (Title)	
BOEHM		ANTON		JOSEF		DR.	
NAME VARIANT							
2. TYPE NAME (Last)		NAME (First)		NAME (Middle)		NAME (Title)	
TYPE A		MONTESI		GOTTHARD			
4. PHOTO		5. BIRTH DATE		6. COUNTRY OF BIRTH		7. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		D 06 M 03 Y 04		AUSTRIA		VIENNA	
OTHER IDENTIFICATION						8. OTHER IDEN CODE	
Mbr. BND						1. UA 2. 3.	
OCCUPATION/POSITION						9. OCC/POS CODE	
SECTION II							
CRYPTONYM				PSEUDONYM			
SECTION III							
10. COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE		11. PRIMARY DESK INTEREST		12. 2ND COUNTRY INTEREST		12A. 3RD COUNTRY INTEREST	
		EE/G/L					
COMMENTS							
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006</p> <p style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">PUNCHED</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">VERIFIED</p>							
PERMANENT CHARGE		RESTRICTED FILE		SIGNATURE			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		ESD []			
FORM 12-58 831 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.		SECRET (38)		RID/AN COPY		✓ X	

SECRET

~~PEN NAME:~~ MONTESI, Gotthard

BOMM, Anton Joseph (U)

SECRET

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