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POLICY RESEARCH STUDY

THE CONGO:

A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

(Political Dynamics Study No. 3)

by

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DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

After three turbulent years, the Congo is entering a new period of political construction. The eventual departure of UN military forces will terminate on-the-spot responsibility for the maintenance of order. Authority over the entire Congo is now exercised by a government of unquestionable legality. But serious problems remain in the organization of the emerging polity.

To investigate the socio-political hurdles facing the Congo, an INR team, comprising M. Crawford Young, a consultant from Harvard University, and Edward J. Streator, Jr. of INR, visited 14 of the Congo's 21 provincial capitals in June-July 1963. Commenting on this initiative, Ambassador Gullion wrote recently that "...the idea of a Departmental officer working in tandem with an academic area specialist seems to me a good one. This kind of thing has been done by the French very effectively. I judge from the work of the Streator-Young team that it can be equally useful to us."

This Policy Research Study is the product of this collaboration between a Departmental officer and a member of the academic community. An abstract of the study accompanies this memorandum.

Thomas L. Hughes

ABSTRACT

THE CONGO: A STUDY IN POLITICAL DYNAMICS

1. A modern and virulent form of tribalism will continue to dominate Congolese politics. Tribalism lies squarely athwart every dimension of political behavior. But ethnicity in the Congo is not a phenomenon of the primeval forest. In the cities, tribal origin provided a focus for social organization. The elites of the cities extended this renewed sense of ethnic identity to their tribal homelands, where it served to rally support for emerging political movements. Ethnicity and politics fed upon each other and have been mutually reinforcing in the first years of independence. Ethnic arguments played the paramount role in provincial fragmentation. In 1960 only four political movements of any significance were not primarily ethnic. Since independence all political parties have been subject to serious ethnic tensions.

2. The new constitution now under discussion will perpetuate unwieldy institutions that hamper effective government. A parliamentary commission is considering a draft constitution prepared by UN experts, together with proposals submitted by Katanga and a conference of presidents of provincial assemblies. The UN draft preserves the essential features of the Loi Fondamentale, the Congo's present constitution which ranks with the most unsuitable organic laws in existence. Most other African states which followed classical forms of parliamentary government at independence have abandoned them in favor of presidentialism and single parties, which appear to permit more energetic development policies. The Congo, however, will probably adopt by mid-1964 the UN draft perpetuating a parliamentary framework. The draft makes some concessions to provincial demands for greater autonomy, but does not by any means realistically reflect the present and likely distribution of power between the center and the provinces. It preserves the principle of strong central government but establishes an institutional framework which will obstruct exercise of central power. The result will doubtless be to arouse sharp hostility among local leaders toward a central government which will have serious difficulty in supplying needed national leadership.

3. The new provinces are likely to persist as the basis of internal organization. The creation of 21 new provinces has transformed the character of the Congolese polity. Although ethnic factors are important, only seven of the new provinces are ethnically homogeneous, and four have one predominant group. In 15 of the 21 provinces there is a single dominant political party, and in many the party has a strong ethnic identity. Traditional tribal structures are significant in 11 provinces.

Secessionism, a spectre haunting many African presidential palaces, is endemic in several regions of the Congo. Although Katanga has been returned to the fold, latent secessionism persists there and in other areas on the country's periphery.

The phenomenon of fragmentation is more recent than the impulse to secessionism, although it derives from common roots. The emergence after independence of three de facto new provinces and the general breakdown of authority reinforced the movement to create new provinces. The paternity of the new provinces usually lay with elites in the urban centers whose aspirations for leadership in their areas of origin were frustrated within the framework of the six provinces inherited from the colonial period. They accordingly invoked ethnic-regionalist arguments to rally popular support for the formation of new provinces. After Parliament established criteria for new provinces in April 1962, a rash of new entities were approved.

4. The new provincial institutions are functioning with varying success. Four can be considered to function very well. Five have reasonably operative governments. Three function very poorly, and seven are unstable. The festering problem of territories disputed between two or more provinces remains to be solved, and several of the provinces show signs of further fragmentation.

The budgetary cost of creating the new provinces has been high. About 150 new ministers and their parasitic entourages are lined up at the pay window each month. And yet, there are reasons to welcome the new provinces. Before emergence of the new units, five of the six former provinces had ceased functioning. The new entities are more representative of local opinion. They frequently have governments of experienced technicians, regional pride to defend, more limited area, and imperfect, yet better, ethnic cohesion. Very real benefits in acquisition of political and administrative skills are accruing in the provinces. In many areas the institutions fun-

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tion quite well with virtually no European technical assistance.

5. The Congolese bureaucracy will continue to be handicapped by the lack of experienced and technically qualified personnel; but in the provinces it provides a strong backbone of local administrative continuity. In the colonial period, the bureaucracy, untrammeled in the exercise of power, penetrated and organized Congolese society. Though the present Congolese elite was shaped in the subaltern ranks of the administration, it was excluded from all top echelons of the civil service until 1959. In the context of terror in July 1960, all but a handful of European functionaries departed. Thus, Africa's most radical decolonization was compounded by the revolutionary Africanization of the civil service. The result was administrative chaos. The Lumumba government never really functioned. However, the Congolese clerks promoted to fill the shoes of departed Belgians gradually came to terms with their new responsibilities as administrators both in the central government and in the provinces.

The Congolese civil service today is much better than generally believed--not that its performance is outstanding in any absolute sense, but it probably is not sharply below the norm elsewhere in Africa. The civil servants as a group are far superior to the members of political parties and representative assemblies, though this is faint praise. Many have reasonable norms of rectitude and discipline. The performance of the territorial administrators, the middle echelon of the provincial hierarchy, is superior to that at the provincial and central government levels. Nearly everywhere the territorial administrators are career civil servants who have been the backbone of the Congo's internal administration since independence. In sharp contrast to the breakdown of government at the upper levels during the dark days of 1960-61, the basic administrative units below the territorial administrative level, the circonscriptions indigènes, also have largely remained intact. Their stability has been a significant buffer against widespread chaos in the countryside.

An explanation of the lack of revolutionary social credo accompanying the revolutionary power transfer may lie in the bureaucratic origins of most of the Congolese elite. The administrator is not by nature a radical.

Although the judicial system at the circonscription indègene and territorial levels functions fairly well, the superior courts were stripped of trained legal personnel by the Belgian exodus. The UN provided some judges, but far fewer than needed to assure minimal effectiveness. Some relief will be provided as Congolese law students complete their studies.

A better formula is needed for absorbing emergent university graduates into the system. Rapidly increasing in number, they are disaffected by their inability to obtain civil service positions commensurate with their competence.

6. The absence of national political parties and the new polarization of power between Leopoldville and the provinces will pose serious problems in elections under consideration for 1964. Political power in the Congo today is divided between Leopoldville and the provinces. Parliament and the central government, like Spanish moss, have their roots in the air, not in the hinterland. Power at the center derives from access to influence, position, and money. The weakening of links between Leopoldville and the provinces since 1960 means that, until elections are held, the exercise of power at the center remains unrelated to the provinces.

Leopoldville's alienation has left the provincial leaders relatively free to consolidate local authority, creating separate power structures collectively capable of challenging Leopoldville leaders in an election.

The new distribution of power has serious implications for the moderates around Prime Minister Adoula who seek to establish a national party. They must deal with provincial leaders who stand astride the lines of political communication with the electorate. Although the central government may apply certain pressures on the provinces to obtain support for a party under Adoula, the provinces retain most of the trump cards. Under these circumstances, an emerging national party would at the summit be, in effect, a loose coalition of Leopoldville and provincial leaders.

It is likely that a moderate national party of this sort would emerge with a narrow majority of seats in Parliament. However, an electoral campaign would run the risk of creating a serious security problem in many areas at a time when tranquility is returning to much of the country. Further, a moderate party of national scope might labor under the onus of identification with the American Embassy. Conceivably, a radical opposition movement might be built around an anti-American theme, offering opportunities for Soviet involvement.

These risks would be much diminished if elections were to be postponed until 1965, thus allowing time for provincial and central government institutions to shake down further, and for the hard political bargaining necessary to launch a moderate national party. If the tide of opinion continues to favor elections in 1964, even a mediocre moderate national party would at least enhance the electoral prospects of moderate candidates.

7. The Congolese National Army (ANC) has developed into a reasonably effective arm of central government authority in many areas of the country. Though the ANC committed bloody

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atrocities in the first two years of independence, the growing authority of ANC Commander Mobutu has increased control by the central government over the ANC. Recent incidents involving the ANC do not constitute evidence of generalized indiscipline. Rather, the ANC, except in ex-Kasai and southern Katanga, has proved to be a positive element in the political system. It has developed a nucleus of officers of real ability. It has retained the principle of ethnic scrambline, which operates to immunize it against local political influences and to give it a commitment to the nation as a whole. In many areas it is capable of acting as an adequate constabulary. The ANC retraining program now being launched under Western auspices may consolidate recent advances toward providing the central government with a reliable constabulary capable of maintaining domestic order and preserving the supremacy of central power.

    8. The Congo will continue to need substantial external technical and economic assistance. The United States, the UN, and other donors, including Belgium, have contributed massive technical and economic support to the Congo since independence. The shortage of Congolese technical personnel and capital resources will persist for the foreseeable future.

For a number of reasons the UN seeks to reduce its role. The United States to date has paid the lion's share, but wants to cut back its contribution. Belgium, the most likely candidate to increase aid to its former colony, is reluctant to shoulder more. Though an informal UN-US-Belgian consortium of assistance appears the most desirable formula for sharing responsibility, the Belgians to date have been relunctant to discuss forthrightly with us the extent of further aid they might provide. The result is a precarious outlook for aid to the Congo at a time when clear definition is needed to permit economic planning.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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INTRODUCTION

After three turbulent years, Congolese independence is slowly ceasing to be a world crisis. With the end of the Katanga secession in January 1963, the Congo was removed as a major cold war issue. The eventual departure of UN military forces will terminate international responsibility for the maintenance of order. Authority over the entire Congo is now exercised by a government of unquestionable legality.

There is no African state where the US commitment is greater, both in prestige and money, than in the Congo. The re-establishment of the unity of the young republic, albeit fragile, was accomplished only through a successful diplomatic effort of great magnitude.

Unity and legality are necessary, but not sufficient, requisites for the future political viability of the Congo. This study examines the emerging political system in the Congo, with a view toward clarifying possible alternatives in the pursuit of political stability. This would permit the harnessing of the Congo's substantial economic resources to the ends of development and, in the process, vindicate the massive US engagement in the 1960 rescue operation.

The essential elements in the post-independence political equilibrium have now emerged with sufficient clarity to bear analysis. We examine the sociological coordinates, institutional framework, bureaucracy, political parties, and coercive instruments. We have found it difficult to strike a balance between generalization useful to policy-making and a reasonable accurate rendering of the complexities of the situation. If we have erred on the side of simplification, we have done so deliberately in the interest of readability.

I. THE NATURE OF CONGOLESE POLITICAL SOCIETY

The Colonial Legacy

Congolese political society is the result of three-quarters of a century of acculturative contact between the Belgian colonizer and the plethora of traditional societies in the Congo Basin. Belgium constructed in Africa a colonial state distinguished by the thoroughness of its organization, articulated in an interlocking alliance of state, church, and capital. The colony's ambitious economic and social programs were pursued through an administrative organization heavily bureaucratic in norms and oriented toward increased economic productivity. The colonial state resolutely assisted the companies through extensive land concessions and aid in labor recruitment, and the religious missions through administrative support. In the words of former Governor-General Pierre Ryckmans, the aims of colonial rule were not to govern but to transform: "It is not only a matter of furnishing seeds or providing new techniques; it means the re-education of an entire people, modifying profoundly its mentality—giving it a new soul."[1]

The Congolese elite is very largely an "administrative bourgeoisie." In colonial society, access to high status for the African was almost exclusively through subaltern positions in the vast public and private bureaucracies. Of the 27 members of Lumumba's 1960 government, 25 were clerks before independence. Commercially successful Congolese were extremely rare, unlike their brethren in West Africa. It was virtually impossible for a Congolese to acquire land title in the colonial period. This placed the elite in a situation of peculiar dependence upon the state. The civil service post continues to represent the individual's precarious niche in the modern world, and the stakes in retaining it are high.

Traditional Authority

Traditional authority systems have not provided a major source of recruitment for modern political leadership, although in certain areas hereditary chiefs remain important. The traditional systems are roughly of two types:

1) Centralized systems: Well-structured traditional societies persist in Kwango (Bayaka tribe), Uélé (Azande tribe), Kivu lake region (Bashi tribe), a good part of Katanga (Baluba Shankadi, Lunda, and some smaller groups),

and east-central Kasai (Bakuba tribe). (See Map D in the appendix).

2) Non-centralized segmentary systems: These cover the vast equatorial forest zone of the central Congo Basin, where traditional systems never functioned beyond the village level, and social differentiation was frequently relatively slight.

The traditional element in leadership is of little importance in urban centers whose populations are recruited from areas of segmentary or decadent systems. In the urban centers of provincial areas where centralized systems persist, as in Katanga, it remains of considerable relevance.

Education

At least a feigned interest in the priesthood was for a long period the only path to post-primary education. Consequently the Roman Catholic Church in the Congo has developed about 500 African priests and 10 Congolese bishops, the most numerous indigenous clergy in any African country. The President of Uélé Province, Pierre Mambaya, is a former priest; the Vice-President of Sankuru, Abbé Athanase Djadi, has played an active political role since 1960 with the permission of the hierarchy. Many others, including President Joseph Kasavubu, received secondary educations in the seminaries.

Except for religious training, secondary and higher education became available only after World War II. The first non-theological university student, Thomas Kanza, was enrolled in 1952. The Catholic University of Lovanium opened its doors in 1954, the State University of Elisabethville in 1956; and the Ford Foundation sponsored the Ecole Nationale de Droit et d'Administration (ENDA) beginning in 1961. Belgian policy produced a broadly based but truncated educational pyramid. Enormous numbers have had some rudimentary primary instruction, and very few advanced training. By 1959 there were approximately 1,500,000 students in primary schools, and only 30,000 in secondary, technical, and higher institutions. Those with post-secondary training in 1960 included 30 university graduates, 500 priests, 130 medical assistants, 250 agricultural technicians, 30 administrative specialists, 20 social workers, and 15 veterinary assistants.

A significant portion of the modern elite was employed in the educational system. There were in 1960 about 44,000 primary school teachers. Although many of these had no more than a primary education, they enjoyed con-

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1. Étapes et jalons, 1946, pp. 137-138.

living standard of the mass of the population. By contrast, the "politicians" became conspicuously affluent, thereby producing a sharp sense of alienation by the mass from the political elite. Paradoxically, a popular nostalgia for colonialism developed--not, of course, for a return to the myriad vexations of European rule, but for the order and relative economic prosperity of "le temps des belges." Thus, the norms and values of both ruler and ruled in the Congo vary importantly from most post-colonial African political systems. The absence of an articulated nationalist ideology to supplant the values of the colonial system resulted in a retreat to the bureaucratic norms which characterized the Belgian administration, and in a lack of political structure.

II. ETHNICITY

No analysis of the emerging political system in the Congo can escape the elusive problem of "tribalism," or ethnicity, which lies squarely athwart every dimension of political behavior. A transcendent issue for the Congolese polity since the "steel grid of colonialism" was removed, ethnicity threatens the nation's continued existence. Symptomatic of its primordial importance are the many major political movements with ethnic names: Abako—Alliance des Bakongo; Unimo—Union des Mongo; Unerga—Union des Warega. No reader of any Congolese newspaper can fail to be impressed by the extent to which political discourse has adopted an ethnic lexicon, contrary to most experience elsewhere in Africa.

National integration tops the agenda of independence in nearly all tropical African states. Almost all contain the germs of conflict between the diverse ethnic entities incorporated within their artificial boundaries. However, all other new African states so far have contained the problem within tolerable limits. In many cases, independence was achieved under the tutelage of a single party. In others, such as Nigeria and Uganda, ingenious constitutional arrangements were devised to ensure a balance between major ethnic componets of the state. In most, a liberal dose of authoritarianism has been necessary. Only Kenya comes close to the Congo in the extent to which ethnic conflicts have dominated the political process. The Congo, however, lacks all three solutions: viable political organizations, a workable constitution, or a government strong enough to impose authoritarian measures.

The Modern Brand of Tribalism

It is initially tempting to approach the ethnic problem by establishing an analytical distinction between traditional and modern, equated respectively with anachronism and progress. The very term "tribalism" is tainted by an implication of retrogression. But ethnicity in the Congo is not a phenomenon of the primeval forest. The bloody conflict between Lulua and Baluba at Luluabourg was in no sense a throwback to the misty, pre-colonial past.

Even in the pre-colonial period, the notion of "tribe" was fluid and constantly transforming. Colonial rule not only imposed a new state, but also profoundly affected African society. Modernization wrought changes in individuals and ethnic groups. The increasing ferment of colonial acculturation accelerated the pace of change, and further altered but did not eliminate the contours of ethnic reference units.[2]

Perhaps because the Copperbelt towns of Rhodesia have so much in common with most Congo urban centers, especially the nearby southern Katanga cities, hypotheses related to them are particularly useful. Tribalism, in the view of scholars in this field, has two dimensions. In the countryside, based on economic and social needs, it involves participation in a working political system and sharing domestic life with kinfolk. In the towns, a new form of ethnicity develops. It does not involve a group bound in a patterned structure, but rather a solidarity network defined in ethnic terms. The towndwellers display their ethnic origin in the language they use and in their way of life. This enables others "immediately to fit their neighbors and acquaintances into categories which determine the mode of behavior towards them." According to Mitchell, "for Africans in the Copperbelt, 'tribe' is the primary category of social interaction, i.e., the first significant characteristic to which any African reacts in another [person]. Frequently relationships never penetrate beyond this, and tribes appear to one another to be undifferentiated wholes."

Despite the emergence in the urban environment of new, non-ethnic prestige and status strata, Mitchell argues, "there is a constant flow of newcomers into the towns from the various rural districts from which the Copperbelt draws its labor supplies. They are not immediately absorbed into the prestige system which could possibly supply an alternative principle of social interaction. Instead their own ethnic distinctiveness which they took for granted in the rural areas is immediately thrown into relief by the multiplicity of tribes with whom they are cast into association. Its importance to them is thus exaggerated, and it becomes the basis on which they interact with all strangers."[3]

There are other bases for group solidarity in the urban environment. The African may

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2. Among a number of American scholarly contributions on this subject, the most notable are Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, October, 1860; and A. R. Zolberg, "Effets de la structure d'un parti politique sur l'integration nationale," ibid. October, 1960. The most systematic study has been conducted by scholars of the Rodes-Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia, especially J. Clyde Mitchell, A. L. Esptein, and Max Gluckman (See especially Mitchell's The Kalela Dance, 1956; Epstein's Politics in an Urban African Community, 1958; and Gluckman's "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, January, 1960.

3. The Kalela Dance, ibid, pp. 28-32.

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see himself as an African vis-a-vis the European ruler or employer. He may react as a worker confronted with the company in certain situations. Nascent social stratification within the African community is yet another basis for social identification. In the Congo, the termination of the colonial regime removed the largest single progenitor of unity among the African population.

Urban Influences

As elsewhere in Africa, the focal points of the modern political process in the Congo are the urban centers, where two ethnic phenomena have been observed: 1) "super-tribalism," a reductive process fusing vaguely related groups into a single solidarity network; and 2) virulent ethnic "nationalism," spawned by the tensions of urban competition and subsequently transmitted to the countryside.

"Super-tribalism" has been widely remarked throughout Africa. In Nigerian coastal towns, all immigrants from the Northern Region are labelled "Hausa," whether or not the label is accurate. In the Copperbelt, those from the north and east are "Benba"; those from the west, "Lozi." In Brazzaville, all from up river are "M'bochi"; in Leopoldville, the same people are "Bangala." In Katanga, all from the north tend to be classed as "Baluba." The reductive process is completed when the individual himself accepts, at least in terms of his relations with other groups, the new label which others have assigned to him. The immigrant from Equateur eventually becomes, for purposes of his Leopoldville existence, a "Bangala." With other "Bangala" he shares a common vehicular language, Lingala, and a sense of resentment at the attempted domination of the rival Bakongo tribe.

In its extreme form, the "super-tribe" is an artificial entity like the Leopoldville "Bangala." There is no "Bangala" tribe anywhere in the Congo. Yet several decades of consolidation of the legend in Leopoldville have entrenched it to the point where Jean Bolikango could invoke the "grande ethnie bangala" as a basis for a political movement (the Puna party).

A more typical case is that of the "Baluba" of the Katanga cities. The Luba empires of traditional lore never gave political unity to the peoples now subsumed under the Baluba heading. Three of the world's four major descent systems are to be found among the Baluba, and the whole gamut of traditional political structures—from the segmentary, stateless systems of the Lualaba Valley Baluba, through the petty state systems of the Baluba Hemba (northeast Katanga), to the centralized chieftaincies of the Baluba Shankadi (northwest Katanga). The unifying thread lay not in coherence of traditional culture, but in common urban experiences, mainly in southern Katanga. Luba was many things in its rural cradles; it could become one only when confronted with more alien groups in the new towns.

Ethnic "Nationalism"

Related to the new ethnic solidarity systems which emerged in the urban environment was the birth in the cities of an aggressive ethnic nationalism, especially among large groups with a sense of their own history, such as the Bakongo. The Bakongo were endowed with a potent historic myth which embellished on the ancient Bakongo kingdom at San Salvador (in Angola). However, the kingdom was only a memory, and the Bakongo were rent by dissensions. Reassertion of Bakongo unity was initiated by intellectuals in Leopoldville in reaction to grievances suffered in the capital. Lingala was gaining ground and had become the official language of the schools, to the detriment of Kikongo, the Bakongo language. The two Belgian-appointed heads of the African quarters of Leopoldville since World War II had both been "Bangala," seemingly conclusive proof of colonial ill-will toward the Bakongo. From these grievances sprang the Abako party, which gradually succeeded in transmitting from the city to the country its militant appeal in defense of Bakongo prerogatives.

The Mongo tribe is a particularly significant example of highly developed ethnic consciousness. This vast group, including nearly 2,000,000 people and covering a large part of the central basin, was split among five of the six former provinces. A remarkable sense of cultural identity had been preserved over this huge area. All were conscious of having descended from the common ancestor Mongo, and spoke similar languages. However, the modern articulation of their latent sense of unity and "Mongohood" resulted from the frustrations of Mongo migrants to the cities. The leaders of the Leopoldville Mongo included Antoine-Roger Bolamba (MNC/L party, now Information Minister), Paul Bolya (Unimo party, former Minister of Civil Service), and Joseph Ileo (now central government Commissioner in Elisabethville). Bolamba wrote in a 1956 article indignantly rejecting the "Bangala" label by which the Mongo were popularly known in Leopoldville: "If we defend our name, it is not by egoism or mistrust, but because it suits us .... For the Mongo or Nkundo group occupies a vast stretch in the central basin of the Congo .... We are astonished to bear a name which is not ours and has no significance .... In the history of our ancestors, we are told that the neighboring group was our master, nearly all

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were inferior to the Mongo. Therefore we are discontented when people try to degrade us . . . ."

The Mongo movement then extended to Coquilhatville, a Mongo-dominated city believed to be situated on Mongo ancestral lands. During the urban elections of 1958 and 1959, Mongo disunity resulted in the election of Coquilhatville burgomasters from the Ngombe tribe. The essence of Mongo cultural "nationalism" is ably summed up by Father Boelaert, a Catholic missionary who was deeply attached to the Mongo. He wrote, "Objectively speaking, the Mongo present all the characteristics of a people . . . . It seems to me evident that, in an ethnic community which does not form an administrative entity or state, national consciousness is natural, but remains latent as long as it is not obliged to externalize itself before internal or external dangers." Thus, the seeds of renewed ethnic self-consciousness were first sown in the cities, but in many cases they fell on fertile terrain in the ethnic homelands.

Another fundamental aspect of awakening ethnic consciouness is the catalyzation of hostility toward other urban groups. A recurrent theme is an assertion of hegemony by one group and a violent reaction to this claim on the part of another. The claim to superiority may arise from the geographical situation of a city on what are considered to be tribal lands,[4] a numerical majority of the urban population,[5] or a clear advance in social prestige and economic status.[6] The last factor has proven the most combustible.

Examples of the Successful Assertion of Ethnic Solidarity

For the Congo as a whole, the three tribal groups most successful in collectively advancing their ambitions have been the Bakongo, the Baluba, and the complex of riverain peoples (Bobangi, Lokele, and others) who have been labelled "Bangala" in Leopoldville. These three groups, although they represent no more than 20 per cent of the population, almost definitely have furnished a majority of university students. Since World War II the advantages of entry into the modern sector have become abundantly clear to virtually all ethnic groups, and those which found themselves outstripped by others became intensely frustrated. Groups with an established elite provided the schoolmasters and company personnel directors. Tribes with less influence or less favored could find daily corrobora-

tion of their inferiority in many petty ways: e.g., the expulsion of a child from school, the promotion of a clerk.

Factors particular to the sequence of political developments in the Congo served to enhance the importance of the ethnic element in political behavior. Until 1959, political organization was not tolerated. A channel of communication between the mass and the elite operated only within the framework of the tribal associations in the cities. The Congo tribal association had little competition. Trade unions were very weak, and all other types of urban organizations suffered from the surveillance and controls of the paternal administration.[7] Thus the political process, without political parties, was first introduced in the large cities at the fulcrum of ethnic tensions.

The first elections in the Congo were held in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Jadotville in 1957, followed by others in Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Bukavu, and Coquilhatville in 1958. In most cases the electoral campaigns and/or the exercise of municipal offices by the victors served to heighten ethnic tensions.

A curious paradox placed in the vanguard of militant nationalism an ethnic movement, the Abako organization of the Bakongo tribe. The first overt nationalist act occurred in 1954, when the Abako publicly nominated a Mukongo for the post of Chief of Leopoldville's African quarter, based on an alleged authority to speak for "80 per cent of the Leopoldville population."[8] In 1956 the Abako issued the first demand for immediate independence, and in 1959 was the first to launch a civil disobedience appeal. Thus the Congolese nationalist movement bore ethnic birthmarks because of the exclusive tribal character of the Abako. Other groups could not join Abako and were forced to found other, opposing groups.

Belgian "Tribalism"

There is some relevance also in the fact that Belgium differs from other former major colonial powers in being culturally plural itself. Colonial contact between Belgium and the Congo was between two "countries," "neither of which was a nation."[9] Britain, France, and Portugal possess a highly integrated nationalism based upon centuries of history and common experience. Belgium as a separate country was born in 1830, only half a century before the Congo Free State. The Bel-

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4. Bakongo in Leopoldville, Mongo In Coquilhatville, Bashi in Bakavu, Basanga in Jadotville, Lulua in Luluabourg.

5. Bakongo in Leopoldville, Buluba in Luluabourg or the southern Katanga towns.

6. Baluba in Luluabourg and southern Katanga.

7. See also Chapter VI, "Politics and Parties."

8. A considerable exaggeration; the Bakongo element in the Leopoldville population, although by far the largest single component, could hardly have exceeded 50 per cent.

9. J. Gerard-Libois and B. Verhaegen, Congo 1960.

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gian national image is schizophrenic; tension between Walloon and Fleming is highly visible and was recognized in the Congo when an indigenous elite began to emerge that was equipped to remark that Europeans were not simply an undifferentiated and distant ruling class. Indeed, the movement for Flemish cultural autonomy, which Congolese studied under largely Flemish missionary teachers in the secondary schools, could not fail to win the sympathy of the Congolese students.

"Progress" through the Belgian prism stands in sharp contrast to the unitarian message of the French Revolution—"la republique, une et indivisible"—which had been transmitted as the meaning of history to the ex-French African elite. The Abako, in one of its appeals for a federal system, invoked the Belgian example:

"It suffices to observe the perpetual mistrust and misunderstandings between Flemings and Walloons to convince oneself of the danger there is to unite men of different origins. We don't want to meddle in the internal affairs of our Belgian friends, but we can't help saying that if the union between Flemings and Walloons were conceived on a federal basis, the almost interminable quarrels which have often broken forth between these two tribes would have been avoided."

Ethnicity as a Political Expedient

The dangers of the ethnic appeal were less well appreciated in the Congo than in other countries, where nationalist political goals and methods were more carefully elaborated. The abrupt collapse of Belgian resistance and the tumultuous contest for power by a headless and fragmented Congolese nationalist movement were an inevitable incitement to follow the shortest path to success, the ethnic appeal.

The atmosphere of crisis and insecurity in which the 1960 elections took place added impetus to ethnic self-awareness. Times of emergency and violence tend to shift frames of reference to ethnic and racial lines. There was in 1960 a crescendo of uncertainty in many areas. A number of groups, both African and European, began arming. The future for all posterity seemed to be resolving itself in a cataclysmic contest; elections were to settle whether Mongo or Ngombe ruled in Coquilhatville, whether Baluba or Lulua dominated Kasai.

The ethnic pattern had thus been established, and thereafter politics fitted the mold. Ethnicity and politics fed upon each other and have been mutually reinforcing in the first years of independence. By early 1961, the debate on the formation of new provinces was in full swing. Although by no means all of the 21 provinces are ethnically homogeneous, ethnic arguments, true or false, played a primordial it was rhetorical. Now that the new provinces

role in provincial fragmentation. In most cases, the demand for fragmentation arose from the political leadership rather than from the mass; however, once the ethnic question was asked, exist, the festering problems of the marginal, disputed territories keep the ethnic issue alive.

In 1960 only four political movements of any significance were not primarily ethnic: Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA), Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L), Centre de Regroupement Africain (Cerea), and the Parti National du Progrès (PNP). The PNP has disappeared, and the others have been subject to serious ethnic tensions. In the PSA, a split in Kwilu provincial leadership, between Kamitatu and Gizenga, was perceived at the base in ethnic terms. Gizenga's support was derived from his own Bapende tribe and from the Bambunda followers of his lieutenants, Pierre Mulele and Gabriel Yumbu. The Bambala, Bangongo, and most of the smaller groups rallied to Kamitatu.

In the MNC/L party, even in 1960, the voting support in the areas of Maniema, Sankuru, and Tshuapa was based on the ethnic solidarity of the Ankutshu-Anamongo group, of which Lumumba's Batetela tribe was a part. And in Stanleyville, where MNC/L support in the first instance had been genuinely panethnic, the sectarian policies of the local boss, Bernard Salumu, resulted in a sharp split between Salumu's Lokele tribe, the largest single group in the Stanleyville population, and the rest. Another example was the breakaway of the areas of Uélé and Kibali-Ituri from Stanleyville, and the formation in 1962 in Stanleyville of a "Cartel des Cultivateurs," whose purpose, we were told by one of its founders, was to "anéantir l'orgeuil des Lokele"; the significance of party name lay in the fact that the Lokele were a riverain fishing people, whereas the rest of the Stanleyville population comes from farming communities. In the case of Cerea, a party in Kivu, the political evolution resulted in a polarization which was perceived and described, not entirely accurately, as a tribal dispute between the Bashi (Kivu Central) and the Bakusu (Maniema); MNC/L became referred to there as MNC/Bakusu.

Thus the tensions born of competitive modernization in the urban centers created a new form of ethnic identification in the Congo. The insecurities and divisions of urban experience were catalyzed and deepened by the nature of the political process since 1957. Ethnicity as a central factor in Congolese political behavior is far more profound than being a simple anachronism or retreat to traditionalism; rather it is a dynamic element, begotten by the forces of modernization. Just how it will evolve in the coming years is difficult to forecast. The one safe prediction is that it will not simply disappear.

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III. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAME-WORK:

THE LOI FONDAMENTALE AND LIKELY SUCCESSORS

The Loi Fondamentale

A scissors-and paste digest of the Belgian constitution, the Loi Fondamentale ranks with the worst organic laws in existence. It was a by product of the extraordinary haste of power transfer in the Congo. The Brussels Round Table Conference of January-February 1960, which decided upon independence for June 30, started with an intellectual tabula rasa on the sort of government the Congo needed. The Round Table provided some general mandates, and turned over the task of drafting the Loi Fondamentale to a group of young Congolese and Belgians. After a cursory examination of other constitutions, the drafters found the Swiss, Nigerian, and Belgian the most suitable. They prepared a document in six weeks which parroted the Belgian model down to such maverick features as co-opted senators.[10] With apparently little serious thought by either Belgians or Congolese about the long-term problems of stable government for a complex and underdeveloped polity such as the Congo, they endowed the country with a bi-cameral legislature, a parliamentary regime, and a double executive comprising a chief of state and a prime minister.

It would be naive to suggest that an inadequate constitutional framework is at the heart of the Congo's difficulties. But given the problems this political community must overcome in governing itself, the added burden of a woefully inadequate legal framework is a heavy one.

The Belgian tradition is highly legalistic. "Legality" remains a hallowed political value in the Congo, no matter how frequently honored in the breach. An attachment to legality is surely an ideal to be fostered, yet it is difficult to sustain when careful observance leads down blind alleys.

Principal Defects in the
Loi Fondamentale

The present constitutional structure has several major defects:

1. Parliamentary power. A parliamentary regime would make sense in the Congo were there meaningful political groups represented in the legislature. But the utter disorgani-

zation of all parliamentary delegations, except those of the Abako party and both wings of the PSA party, renders the body incoherent and essentially negative. The disappearance of party roots in the interior after 1960 made Parliament irrelevant as a mechanism for legitimation of government decisions. The most potent single unifying factor within Parliament has been the special privileges of the body (e.g., salary and parliamentary immunity). Such a corporate guild provides few innovating impulses.

No matter how large the Council of Ministers, there seems no way a secure majority can be assured for a government. There is no doubt that the level of parliamentary decorum and efficiency has risen substantially since 1960, as shown by even a cursory examination of the debates. Yet placing the locus of power in Parliament, rather than in the executive branch under a presidential regime, really means that the government often is either paralyzed, or it acts in defiance of the letter of the constitution. Either is excessively high tribute to pay to literal application of classical liberal democratic theory to the Congo.

2. Dual executive authority. The very office of chief of state is an anomaly. It derived from the Belgian hope, later shown hollow, of reserving a constitutional niche for King Baudouin because of the Belgian dynasty's particular associations with the Congo. The chief of state-prime minister confusion come to an early head September 5, 1960, when President Kasavubu dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba. This action was based on Article 22 of the Loi Fondamentale ("The President names and dismisses the Prime Minister."). Kasavubu's act, although defensible politically, created a nearly insoluble constitutional impasse that lasted almost a year. Since the investiture of the Adoula government, Kasavubu has been content with a quasi-monarchical role of largely ceremonial dimensions. A more active president, however, could find himself in constant conflict with the prime minister. The duality of authority has grave latent dangers.

3. Legislative review. No clear way is suggested for obtaining a definitive interpretation of the law. Article 51 provides that "authoritative interpretation of laws belongs only to Parliament," but adds, "for the interpretation of the Loi Fondamentale, the Parliament can solicit the Belgian Parliament's interpre-

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10. A provision under which the Senate itself elects a number of additional members of the body.

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tation." This article arises from the Belgian constitutional notion that only the legislator can know his intent in the formulation of a law, and therefore he alone can resolve a disputed interpretation. However, the Congolese Parliament has taken advantage of the ambiguity in Article 51 to assert its right to give authoritative interpretation to the Loi Fondamentale and has used this clause to justify free-wheeling parliamentary actions. Though the Loi Fondamentale provided for the establishment of a Constitutional Court, this requires a special law, which has yet to be voted. Were the Constitutional Court in existence, its powers likely would be limited to judging whether new laws conform to the Loi Fondamentale, arbitrating central-provincial conflicts, and hearing charges of administrative torts. Nowhere is it suggested that the Court would be empowered to interpret the Loi Fondamentale as such.

4. "States of exception." Among other consequences of ambiguity has been a highly irregular procedure under which a chamber of Parliament adopts a resolution establishing a "state of exception" in a province, in effect seeking central government assistance to overthrow the existing provincial government. Should the executive branch fail to implement the resolution, the weapon of interpellation and censure could be invoked against the responsible minister. Although the "state of exception" procedure has at times been justified, in other instances it has been irresponsible and damaging.

5. Censure votes. Another example of ambiguity may be found in the Gizenga case. Although Parliament stripped Gizenga of his immunities by an overwhelming vote in January 1962 and he was later imprisoned, there have been several votes since December 1962 calling for his release. Finally, in June 1963, Parliament voted to restore his immunity. Justice Minister Justin Bomboko brilliantly defended the government's argument that this was interference in a case sub judice, which only awaited parliamentary creation of a tribunal competent to try him. But nothing could have stopped one chamber from enforcing its own interpretation by simply removing the minister in a censure vote.

6. Amendments. Another crucial defect is a loophole in the amendment process. Though a complicated procedure was specified for framing a new constitution, provision was made for amendment of the Loi Fondamentale itself by a two-thirds vote of both houses. There are therefore no entrenched provisions beyond the reach of amendment. A number of changes have already been voted, including a complete alteration of the ratification process for a new constitution. The requirement that elections be held in 1964 similarly could be removed by parliamentary vote.

The UN Draft Constitution

The Loi Fondamentale was intended to be only a provisional instrument. The Belgians and Congolese believed in 1960 that only the Congolese could define their basic law, and that its content should not be a subject of bargaining with the colonizer.

The UN assembled a group of experts in early 1961 to initiate preparatory work on a draft constitution. At the same time, the Congolese College of Commissioners charged Marcel Lihau, the first Congolese law graduate, with initial drafting efforts on behalf of the government. In early 1962, another UN group of three constitutional experts, led by T. O. Elias of Nigeria, was at work on the final form of a draft constitution. Another Congo government commission, again under Lihau, began in January 1962 to draft a document embodying the accords reached at Kitona between Adoula and Tshombe. In the course of the "dance of the cranes" which constituted the Adoula-Tshombe negotiations, there were extensive suggestions from both sides—as well as from the UN and other interested observers—especially on the provincial-central government relationship. Finally, in February 1963 the presidents of the provincial assemblies met in Coquilhatville and prepared an extensive series of proposed amendments to the UN draft.

Shortly thereafter a parliamentary commission began to discuss the UN draft, proceeding methodically article by article. By June 1963 they had completed consideration of about 40 of the 212 articles. The commission work is continuing during the parliamentary vacation of 1963, and Parliament is scheduled to reconvene as a constitutent assembly in September 1963. Parliamentary sources maintain that a draft will be complete by early 1964. It is likely to conform largely to the UN draft.

Proposed Organization of the Central Government

Much concern has been expressed over the central government-provincial relationships outlined in the UN draft constitution, but very little over the structure of the central government itself. Generally, the application of certain European procedural concepts of democracy to the organization of the central government seems excessive and insufficiently adapted to Congolese needs. Specifically, the parliamentary system provided in the UN draft appears to disperse the authority of the central government too greatly for effective direction of the country.

It is ironic that much of the pressure for retaining the parliamentary system in the Congo came via the UN from other African states

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which, in the name of progress, have suppressed opposition parties in their own countries. By the very nature of the UN's own code of public values, it had to endorse the parliamentary formula. The other major partner in preparation of the definitive constitution, the Congolese Parliament, also has an innate predilection for perpetuation of the parliamentary system.

The Congolese elite feels insecure and uncertain of its own values and the legitimacy of its rule. It therefore clings to the external trappings of legitimacy deriving from a functioning parliamentary regime. Present also are the paradoxical phenomena of widespread antipathy to parliamentarians yet indefectible popular attachment to the principle of parliamentarianism. These render almost inevitable the perpetuation of the existing institutional framework at the central level.

Proposed Central-Provincial Division of Powers

The most publicized facet of the Congo's constitutional quest lies in central-provincial relationships. "Federalism" was a polarizing political slogan in the purely polemic debate between the "federalists" (especially the Abako and Conakat parties) and the "centralists" (incarnated by the MNC/L party) during the final phases of decolonization. Much of the controversy, however, raged over such symbolic issues as who granted mining rights, rather than the real problems of dividing the fiscal domain, distribution of the security forces, and the nature of the hierarchical relationships between the provinces and the central government.

Before independence, "federalism" in its classical sense had two crucial limitations as a relevant organizing theory for Congolese society:

1) Federalism implies that the building blocks of the federation are internally coherent and constitute units which can reasonably share power with the center. As subsequent experience has shown, the six former provinces were all subject to uncontrollable fragmentary forces.

2) Federalism also implies that the federating units seek to join together in order to share benefits flowing from a larger political community. There is probably no other contemporary example of a working federation resulting from the dismantling of as tightly centralized a colonial regime as the Belgian Congo.

The events of the immediate post-independence crisis, however, were to transform the situation. The whole machinery of centralized government broke down, a result of the Katanga and South Kasai secessions and the Leopoldville-Stanleyville split, and of the loss of effective capacity to implement central government decisions. The old provinces dissolved into a series of new entities which, despite their administrative cost, are mainly more manageable and coherent entities. Moreover, they have been created through a willing act of community by elected representatives. Thus a federal form of organization became not only relevant but virtually inescapable.

The Loi Fondamentale itself provides for significant decentralization. The provinces for the first time became organic entities, with their own elected governments. The breakdown in the centralized budgeting and fiscal system of the Congo also forced an innovation of great importance. For the first time, in March 1962, provinces were required to maintain separate accounts, rather than debit the central government for their expenditures. The provinces also were given lump-sum subsidies and responsibility for covering expenditures in the areas of their own competence.

The UN draft moves somewhat further in a federal direction. The most important concessions to the provinces are:

1) Suppression of the office of Commissaire d'Etat. This Loi Fondamentale provision was in fact never applied in its original form, which called for a representative of the central government in each provincial capital to represent central authority and coordinate central services. However, the central government has named "special" or "extraordinary" commissioners to deal with real or fabricated crises in the provinces. With some exceptions, the remedy has been worse than the disease. The commissioners have become involved in local politics and created additional tensions. The argument for provincial coordinators of central services is not convincing. The central "services" in the provinces are the Congolese National Army (ANC), Sûreté, judiciary, Conseil Monétaire, postal services, and communications. The first four in any case would lie beyond the control of a commissioner posted in the provincial capital, and the latter two can be coordinated by other means.

2) Sharing of revenues. Certain explicit provisions are made for sharing the fiscal domain. In particular, the provinces obtain half the export duties, and the proceeds of individual (but not corporate) income taxes. Since this is far from an adequate tax base for the provinces, the presumption has been that there would continue to be a supplementary, direct federal subsidy.

3) Decentralization of judiciary. Under the proposed constitution, control of all but the highest level of the judiciary would be vested in the provinces. At present, with the exception of local courts delivering judgments based on customary law, justice is a central government function. This alteration is par-

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ticularly significant in view of the large number of corrupt provincial political figures whose bulging dossiers are in the hands of the central government magistrature. Presumably, the political decisions whether to prosecute will devolve on the provinces, removing a potentially important central government lever.

4) Consultation with provinces. The UN draft provides for regular consultative conferences of provincial presidents. This would supply an institutionalized mechanism for the provinces to vent their collective grievances against the central government.

Proposed Concurrent Powers

The UN draft maintains generally the broad allocation of functions established by the Loi Fondamentale. However, the listing of powers is more precise, and federal authority remains paramount in the exercise of concurrent powers. Table A, appended to this study, compares the enumerations of powers in the Loi Fondamentale and the UN draft.

Defense and Internal Security

A key power accorded the central government in the UN draft is the assignment to the Congolese National Army (ANC) of responsibility not only for external defense but also for the gendarmerie function. This is a continuation of the Belgian system, under which the Force Publique was stationed not only in a series of large military camps, but also in garrisons throughout the country, with a small detachment in each territory. The deployment of the ANC is a vital brake on provincial autonomy, which would be unrestrained were the constabulary function entirely assigned to police forces controlled by the provinces.

Central government authority would be further strengthened through the proposed creation of a federal police force. Its primary mission would be to maintain order in the Federal District of Leopoldville, but it could operate in a province on the orders of the central government or at the request of local authorities.

Recent Collective Provincial Initiatives to Amend the Draft Constitution

An important new dimension to the central-provincial debate has been added by the common front of provincial governments that emerged after the end of the Katanga secession. The resolutions of the 1963 Coquilhatville Conference of Provincial Assembly Presidents indicate a general, rising hostility to central authority. Detailed amend-

ments were proposed by the conference for 64 of the 212 articles of the UN draft constitution. If adopted, they would bolster provincial autonomy. The most important demands were for:

1) Provincial authority to fix jointly with the central government the levels of export duties.

2) Retention by the provinces of 75 rather than 50 per cent of export duties.

3) Elimination of the right of intervention by federal police in provincial crises.

4) Control over the local personnel of the postal, telecommunications, radio, and television services.

5) Provincial fixing of income tax levels for individuals and corporations.

6) Elimination of federal primacy in matters of concurrent jurisdiction.

7) Assignment to the provinces of all tax revenues except import duties and 25 per cent of export duties.

8) Establishment of a statutory joint federal-provincial commission of economic affairs ministers to allocate available foreign exchange.

9) A requirement that two-thirds of the provincial assemblies as well as two-thirds of Parliament ratify any constitutional amendment.

Parliament has taken the position that the Coquilhatville proposals are not the product of any legally constituted body and hence are not to be taken into consideration. Parliament also has amended the Loi Fondamentale to eliminate the requirement of ratification of the new constitution by provincial assemblies. Consequently, as noted above, it is likely that the constitution will hew closely to the UN model. This could well provoke a serious crisis in central-provincial relations and will place the new constitution under heavy and probably concerted attack by provincial authorities.

Table B, contained in the appendix, provides a summary comparison of central-provincial power distribution under the Loi Fondamentale and as proposed by the UN and Katanga draft constitutions and by the Conference of Presidents of Provincial Assemblies. The partition of the fiscal domain proposed in the UN draft is summarized in Table C, also in the appendix.

Conclusions

In sum, there can be no doubt that the prospective constitution will be a considerable advance over the Loi Fondamentale with two important reservations. The UN draft constitution entrenches a parliamentary system and hence weak government at the center. It is also unlikely to provide a federal solution

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acceptable to the provinces, especially in view of the unilateral adoption procedures involved. The latter objection is somewhat mitigated by the technical incapacity of the central government to exercise a number of its enumerated powers. But, by the same token, it is too weak to impose a form of government without the cooperation of pro-vincial authorities. There is certainly wisdom, based on federal experience elsewhere, in making provision for the gradual expansion of power exercised at the center as the capacity for its responsible exercise in the interests of the community as a whole increases. But the survival of a federation will be hazardous without the consent of the federated.

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IV. FRAGMENTATION AND SECESSIONISM: THE 21 NEW PROVINCES

The redrawing of the Congo's internal boundaries, and the criteria upon which it was based, have transformed the character of the Congolese polity. For this reason we examine briefly the twin phenomena of fragmentation and secessionism, and the nature of the 21 new provinces.

Secessionism

Secessionism is a spectre haunting many African presidential palaces. It derives from the artificial character of nearly all African boundaries, and the co-existence within them of disparate cultural groups. There are two frequent causes for secessionist movements: 1) among large ethnic groups, such as the Bakongo or Ewe (of Ghana-Togo), a particularly keen sense of cultural identity often persists despite the division of the ethnic group between two or three states; 2) uneven endowment in natural resources and economic development may enhance the economic interest of a region in getting the rest of the country off its back, particularly if it is so situated geopolitically that the rest of the country does not have the compensating advantage of political domination.

Secessionism is most likely in areas situated on the periphery of the state. In the Congo secession would be unthinkable, for example, in Sankuru or Lomami Province (see Map D in appendix), whereas it looms as a political alternative in the Bas-Congo, Katanga, or other fringe areas. For this reason, South Kasai, in the Congo heartland, only briefly referred to its recalcitrant attitude as "secession"; thereafter it was termed "autonomy."

Latent secessionist sentiments in the Congo appear endemic in two primary regions, the Bas-Congo and southern Katanga. As these are the two most important economic areas of the country, the problem assumes agonizing dimensions.

In the Bas-Congo the motivating factor is the remarkable solidarity of the Bakongo tribe vis-à-vis other tribes. Bakongo cherish the hope of reuniting the fragments from Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), and Angola in a single political kingdom. Secession would become a much more immediate threat were there a serious possibility of achieving Bakongo reunification, which at the moment is not politically feasible. The key geographical location of the Bakongo, at the doorstep of the capital, also mitigates the secessionist threat. The Bakongo are well represented in the Leopoldville population and hold many top civil service positions. In addition, the Chief of State, Joseph Kasavubu, is of their tribe, and they have established a solid claim to the central government Finance and Interior portfolios. Their ability to obtain satisfactory treatment under the existing national political structure is therefore substantial.

Secessionism in Katanga was first a European movement and hence was somewhat tainted in African eyes. However, in an intricate metamorphosis, the non-Baluba Africans fused this European incentive with their own revolt against Baluba hegemony in the southern Katanga urban centers. The Conakat party, a coalition of southern Katanga tribes, provided the vehicle for the movement. Though Katanga's 1960 experiment in self-determination was terminated by international intervention, temptations will almost certainly arise again, probably less compromised by transparent neo-colonial influences than the European-backed secession of 1960.

Katanga is simply too far from Leopoldville to obtain subjective satisfaction from participation in the central organs of government. Moreover, the Congo government at the moment is too weak and inexperienced to render to outlying areas functional services in proportion to the resources it reserves for its own use. This is not to argue that there will necessarily be a future secession, or that the central government cannot and should not act to prevent it. But Leopoldville-Elisabethville relationships will continue for the foreseeable future to be unsatisfactory, and a secessionist spirit will remain near the surface in Katanga.

Around the periphery of the Congo there are other, less pronounced secessionist possibilities. Three are discernible as possible future trouble spots:

1) Ubangi Province. The Sudanic population of this province has more in common culturally with the peoples of the Central African Republic (CAR) than with the Congo. A Ubangi delegation is said to have visited Bangui in mid-1961 to open negotiations for annexation of the region to its northern neighbor. The CAR authorities were not at that time interested and apparently gave no encouragement.

2) Kibali-Ituri Province. Several of the major Nilotic ethnic groups of this province, such as the Lugbare and Alur, straddle the Uganda frontier. Traditional economic circuits were entirely transformed during the period of the Stanleyville-Leopoldville rupture, and this region is now very closely linked with Uganda by (mostly illicit) trading relationships. Union with Uganda is not likely to be

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a serious issue while the present Kibali-Ituri provincial leader, John Foster Manzikala, stays in power.

3) The Lunda and Tshokwe tribal zones of southwest Katanga. There are large Lunda and Tshokwe populations in both Angola and Rhodesia. The Lunda are most numerous in Rhodesia, and the Tshokwe in Angola. In this area latent secessionism is complicated by the traditional hostility between these two ethnic groups. There is food for thought in the name of the Tshokwe party in the Congo, Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola, et de la Rhodésie (ATCAR). In 1960 ATCAR was actively seeking the incorporation of the Tshokwe-inhabited Dilolo Buckle into the Congo.[11] Negotiations were reported between the Conakat territorial administrator in Dilolo and his Portuguese counterpart in July-August 1960, with a view to repatriation of 50,000 Tshokwe to Angola. The potential for trouble, though now diffuse, could become concrete, depending on political developments in the three countries involved.

Fragmentation

The phenomenon of fragmentation is much more recent than the impulse to secessionism, although it derives from common roots. Fragmentation, a lesser variant of secession, has entailed withdrawal to establish a semi-autonomous entity, while not renouncing participation in the state. No movement for a new province goes back further than 1959 in the Congo, and these initiatives were really only given a decisive fillip by the tensions of the 1960 electoral campaign and the immediate pre-independence period.

Two factors made inescapable the formation of new provinces:

1) The emergence of three de facto new provinces in the immediate wake of independence: Kongo Central, South Kasai, and North Katanga. The first was a result of the strong desire of the Bakongo for their own political entity; the second ensued from the calvary of the Kasai Baluba and the forced regrouping of some 250,000 refugees in the narrow confines of the Baluba ethnic homeland; and the third was a riposte to the unilateral Conakat act of secession.

2) The general breakdown of authority, which gave autonomist movements the opportunity to establish their claims at a time when central authority was powerless to resist and incapable of exercising leadership.

With Pandora's box opened by the three initial de facto new provinces, further fragmentation occurred. For example, in former

Leopoldville Province, once the Bas-Congo withdrawal was a certainty, both Lac Leopold II and Kwango demanded separation from Kwilu. When Cuvette Centrale pulled out of Equateur Province, the Ngbwaka-Ngbangi tribes of Ubangi refused to remain linked with the Ngombe of Moyen Congo. By early 1961 the candidate provinces had been fairly well delineated. Their claims to legitimacy were consolidated by the principle, adopted at the Tananarive and Coquilhatville Conferences in March and April-May 1961, of admitting "de facto or de jure" leaders to sit at the conference table. Sixteen of the present 21 provinces were represented at the Coquilhatville Conference. By the time legitimate, constitutional government was restored in Leopoldville in August 1961, there was no turning back the clock.

With the exception of the first three new provinces, the fragmentation movement did not reflect any popular groundswell. The paternity of the provinces lay usually with "out" groups whose aspirations were frustrated within the framework of the old provinces. The elite from a given region had little difficulty in invoking ethnic-regionalist arguments to rally popular support to form a new province.

Legal Basis of the New Provinces

Parliament writhed in eight months of elephantine labors to give birth to a judicial monstrosity, the law of April 27, 1962, which established criteria for the new provinces. The Lumumbist bloc, then still a relatively coherent group, fought hard against the law.

The problem of defining criteria and procedures was complex. The ethnic factor was generally advanced as the guide to partition, but it was immediately subject to debate. The Bakongo group was clearly identifiable, and its will to constitute itself into a separate political entity was manifest. However, where the Mongo community, for example, begins and ends is a subject of endless dispute among anthropologists, with significant variations between the Mongophiles and Mongophobes. Further, in many areas, such as Kwilu and Kasai, precolonial migration patterns produced a population mosaic of infinite intricacy, which all the techniques of gerrymander could not unscramble.

Three prerequisites for provincial status were finally adopted:

1) A population minimum of 700,000;
2) Economic "viability";
3) A petition submitted by two-thirds of the provincial and national deputies from the putative provincial area.

There was, however, an escape clause which rendered the minimum population criterion meaningless; a population of less than

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11. This small piece of land was traded by the Belgians to the Portuguese in 1926 in return for land near Matadi to permit railroad construction.

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700,000 was acceptable "si les impératifs politiques et sociales l'exigent." Any group could concoct "imperative reasons" for ignoring the population minimum. Economic viability was indefinable and hence inapplicable. Thus the only real criterion was a petition from two-thirds of the deputies from the region.

Characteristics of the New Provinces

Table D in the appendix to this report provides summary profiles of the characteristics of the new provinces. Map D, also in the appendix, shows the provinces and ethnic groups.

Although ethnic factors were important in the establishment of the new provinces, it is not really adequate to describe them as "tribal provinces," as Table D clearly shows. Only seven can be considered really ethnically homogeneous, and four more have one group which tends to predominate. Again, the ambiguity of the concept of ethnic homogeneity must be stressed. For example, though one might argue that North Katanga was a Baluba province since most of the peoples inhabiting the zone belong at least peripherally to the Luba culture cluster, a subjective sense of "Lubahood" is shared by only a portion of them. The province, therefore, cannot engender loyalty by explicitly stressing a Baluba character.

Some provinces classifiable as ethnically homogeneous have experienced some of the most serious tribal disorders in recent months. For example, Kwango is essentially a Bayaka tribal province, but grave disturbances have been created by the dissidence of a Bayaka sub-group, the Bapelende. Even more costly has been the strife in Sankuru, where, viewed externally, only Batetela are visible. However, there are two kinds of Batetela: those who experienced acculturative contacts with the Zanzibar Arab traders at the end of the nineteenth century, and those who did not. The former, enlisted as marauding warrior bands by the Arabs, were shrewd enough to pick a winner and joined the Belgians in their war against the Arabs. As a reward, they were given land and posted in strong points throughout the Sankuru region, where they subjugated their brethren. Provincial President Diamasumbu reopened the issue recently by an appeal to the "downtrodden" to rise against their "arabisé" oppressors, led by Abbé Athanase Ndjadí. The result was tribal war, involving a large number of deaths and the destruction of a sizeable part of the capital city of Lodja.

Only seven of the new provinces seek to invoke ethnic loyalty as a fundamental ethos.[12] At the other extreme are Haut Congo, Kivu Central, and Katanga Oriental, which became provinces after being deserted by neighboring areas and will have a difficult time developing a sense of common purpose.

Another hypothesis occasionally advanced to explain the new provinces is that they are one-party provinces. It is true that in 15 of the 21 there is a single dominant party. A major qualification to this is that in four of the new provinces (Haut Congo, Uélé, Kibali-Ituri, and Sankuru) MNC/L is the single party. Here one could argue that, rather than the parties shaping the provinces, the provinces have consecrated the disintegration of a once potent and supra-ethnic party. In Uélé, for example, MNC/L is virtually excluded from the government.

In four of the other "one-party provinces," the parties were poorly organized and had only a fleeting existence (Kwango, Moyen Congo, Unité Kasaienne, and Lomami). In six, the parties were an expression of a strong sense of ethnic identity (Kongo Central, Sud-Kasai, Kasai Central, Kwango, Moyen Congo, and Lomami). Ethnic and political party criteria overlap, however, and it is difficult even in analytical terms to disentangle them.

Pre-existing administrative divisions helped to shape the new provinces. In only one case (Lomami) has a new province been established which straddles the old provincial boundaries. Although provincial boundaries underwent major revision in 1933, they had remained stable since that time, whereas districts and territories had been constantly in flux.[13] Intraprovincial migration was not encouraged; the provincial capital served as the primary pole of attraction for the young, the educated, and the ambitious. The former district boundaries in 17 cases have served as guideposts for establishing the new provinces, although in most cases with some adjustments. It may be suggested that the former administrative units serve as starting points for the fragmentation process. If there were strong ethnic or political reasons to redraw the lines, this was done. Otherwise, inertia favored retention of the familiar frame of reference.

Although in some instances colonial provincial boundaries coincided with ethnic frontiers, in many others they did not. To cite only the more important, the Mongo people were divided among five provinces

12. Kongo Central, Bakongo tribe; Kwango, Bayaka tribe; Cuvette Centrale, Mongo tribe; Moyen Congo, "Bangala"-Ngombe tribe; Lomami, Basongye tribe; Sud-Kasai, Baluba tribe; and Kasai Central, Lulua tribe.

13. The administrative hierarchy is structured as follows (in descending order): province, district, territory, sector (circonsription indigène), village.

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(all but Katanga). The closely related Batetela and Bakusu were split between Kivu and Kasai. The Bapende were divided between Kasai and Leopoldville. The Basongye were split between Kasai, Kivu, and Katanga; only they have suceeded in regrouping in a new province (Lomami).

Traditional structures are to some degree significant in 11 provinces. In Kwango, the Kiamfu, a local tribal leader, is clearly the dominant political force. His 40 sons provide him with ample manpower to infiltrate key administrative positions, and the weakness of modern development in the region leaves him little competition. In Uélé, 4 of the 11 ministers, beginning with President Mambaya, belong to the Azande ruling clan, the Avungara. The provincial government relies heavily on the strong authority of the Azande chiefs. One of them, the Minister of Agriculture, has no fewer than 16 relatives in the Uélé Assembly. In Kasai Central, 3 of 11 ministers are members of the family of the scheming and ambitious self-appointed Lulua paramount chief, Sylvestre Mangole Kalamba. Provincial President François Lwakabwanga was formerly Kalamba's personal secretary. And in Kivu Central, the key obstacle to the formation of a government was the complex set of hostilities deriving from the traditional hostility between the two ruling houses of the Bashi (the Kabare and Ngweshi clans), compounded by a dispute over the selection of the Kabare Mwami (King).

Provincial Administration

The new provinces have begun operation with varied success. The official installation of the new institutions started in September 1962. Four (Uélé, Kongo Central, Kwilu, and Cuvette Centrale) can be considered functioning very well. Ubangi, Kibali-Ituri, Nord-Katanga, Sud-Kasai, and Lomami have reasonably operative governments. The most unstable are Sud Congo (Lualaba), Lac Leopold II, Kivu Central, Kasai Central, Haut Congo, Katanga Oriental, and Sankuru. Maniema, Unité Kasaienne, and Kwango function very poorly.

Possibilities for Further Fragmentation

Two critical problems remain for the new provinces; the festering issue of territories disputed between two or more provinces is entirely unsolved, and several of the present units show signs of further fragmentation (see map). The problem of the territories was to be settled by referendum. However, no referendum has been organized to date, and none is scheduled in the near future. In one instance, Goma and Ruthshuru territories (disputed by Kivu Central and Nord-Kivu),

Parliament tried to settle the dispute by awarding the territories to Kivu Central. However, this procedure has caused more problems than it solved.

The disputed territories are administered directly by the central government. There have been numerous complaints about the perpetuation of this interregnum. On the other hand, since these are, by and large, marginal zones with diverse populations, the referenda are likely to be bitterly fought. Especially when the issue is attachment to an ethnic province, the fears of small groups that they would be accorded subordinate status are unfortunately justified. It may well be that the best solution for some of the more hopelessly divided transitional zones would be indefinite prolongation of the present central administration. Some way might be found to formalize the arrangement, so that the wounds of civil strife may heal.

In some instances, provinces have simply dispatched their police forces to conquer disputed areas. This has happened in Bolobo, now occupied by Maindombe police after a sharp engagement with Moyen Congo forces, and in the Kasongo area, now in the hands of Lomami, to the great indignation of Maniema. The dimensions of the problem can be seen by the length of the list of disputed areas:

Zones Legally Subject to Referendum

Former Province	Regions contested	Provinces claiming territory
Leopoldville	Kimvula sector (Popokabaka territory)	Kongo Central-Kwango
Equateur	Banzyville	Ubangi-Muyen Congo
Orientale	Watsa	Uélé--Kibali-Ituri
	Faradje	Uélé--Kibali-Ituri
Kivu	Goma	Kivu Central--Nord-Kivu
	Rutshuru	Kivu Central--Nord-Kivu
	Shabunda	Kivu Central-Mainema
		Kivu Central-Mainema--Nord Katanga
Katanga	Basongye regions of Kongolo, Kabalo, Kabongo	Lomami--Nord-Katanga
Kasai	Musumba group (Kasai District)	Unité Kasaienne-Sankuru
	Dibaya	Unité Kasaienne-Kasai Central
	Mwene-Ditu	Kasai Central--Sud-Kasai--Nord-Katanga
	Lusambo town	Lomami--Sankuru
	Tshishilu sector (Dibaya territory)	Kasai Central-Unité Kasaienne

Other areas subject to dispute:

Leopoldville	Leopoldville suburban zone	Kongo Central-Leopoldville Federal District
	parts of Kutu, Banningville territories Bolobo	Kwilu-Lac Leopold II
		Lac Leopold II-Moyen Congo
Equateur	parts of Bongandanga, Basankusu territories	Moyen Congo-Cuvette Centrale
Katanga	Baudoinville	Nord-Katanga--Katanga Oriental
	Lubudi, Mitwaba territories	Nord-Katanga--Katanga Oriental
Kasai	Dimbelenge parts of Mweka territories	Lomami-Kasai Central
		Unité Kasaienne-Kasai Central

The following provinces appear far from stable in their present form and may well break up, or perhaps regroup with another province:

1) <u>Maindombe</u>: Nearly half the provincial councilors, led by Jacques Massa, are in "exile" in Leopoldville. The split is primarily regional, with the opposition dominating Mushie, Kutu, and Inongo, while provincial President Victor Koumorico's bloc is strongest in the east and south, in Kiri and Oshwe territories.

2) <u>Moyen Congo</u>: The Budja-inhabited territory of Bumba is thoroughly hostile to the capital of Lisala. Bumba has demanded a new province. A more remote possibility might be a Budja union with Haut-Congo.

3) <u>Uélé</u>: The Babua tribe in Aketi and Buta territories are unrepresented in the provincial government. A secession plot might be mounted by such Babua leaders as Christophe Gbenye or Egide Bocheley-Davidson, who are certain to be frozen out if new elections are organized under the aegis of the present Uélé government.

4) <u>Kibali-Ituri</u>: There is some disposition to rally to Uélé. The incumbent president, Manzikala, is strongly opposed to this, and it is unlikely to happen as long as he retains leadership.

5) <u>Nord-Kivu</u>: This province is lacking any town which could serve as a capital, unless it obtains Goma. There is some hope in Bukavu that Nord-Kivu will eventually agree to reunification.

6) <u>Kivu Central</u>: The Warega areas in the south are still by no means committed to this province.

7) <u>Mainema</u>: The present government is a highly uneasy coalition of the two dominant ethnic groups, Bakusu and Warega. President Kisanga is a Murega, and Vice President Bulakimuri a Mukusu. A break-up of this province, with the Bakusu areas joining Sankuru, and the Warega portions uniting with the Warega of Kivu Central to form a new province, is a distinct possibility.

8) <u>Nord-Katanga</u>: In early 1963, immediately after the end of the Katanga secession, there was some sentiment for a reunification of the old Katanga province. Balubakat leaders in Leopoldville, especially Jason Sendwe, tended to support this. However, important elements in Nord-Katanga vigorously oppose the move, and the splitting of South Katanga into two provinces would seem to complicate future reunification efforts.

9) <u>Unité Kasaienne</u>: This province includes a diverse collection of ethnic groups united only by their common hostility to both Baluba and Lulua. The government is weak and corrupt, but does not appear to face any immediate challenges.

10) <u>Kwango</u>: Although there is ethnic homogeneity and a strong traditional system, this region is the poorest of the Congo. It is almost without economic resources. Some observers feel that the province may collapse eventually because of its poverty.

The pious hope is occasionally expressed that the new provinces experiment is already shown to be such a catastrophe that a movement toward reconstitution of the old entities will shortly emerge. It is also suggested that this might be encouraged by grouping certain common services in the old provincial capitals. This hope appears, on reflection, forlorn. There is absolutely no sentiment in any of the provinces for reunification, with the exceptions noted above. Such wishful thinking especially is encountered in the old provincial capitals, which have seen their horizons abruptly narrowed. Nostalgia for the good old days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was found in Vienna, not Budapest. The old provincial services have already been dismantled to the extent physically possible. In such fields as communications, where dependence on the old capitals continues, a major objective of the new provinces is to terminate the existing arrangements at the earliest possible moment.

A Mixed Blessing?

The cost of creating new provinces has been considerable. The procedures and records of the colonial administration have been rendered largely worthless. About 150 new ministers and their parasitic entourages of friends and relatives in the "ministerial cabinets" are lined up at the pay window each month. There is obviously no increased output to justify this outrageous charge upon the treasury.

Yet it appears that there are important reasons to welcome the change, which now seems irreversible. Before it transpired, five of the six old provinces had ceased functioning. The Bakongo refused to sit with the rest in Leopoldville. The Mongo were determined not to cooperate further with the Ngombe in Equateur. Kivu was at an impasse. Katanga and Kasai had split apart with hostilities costing thousands of lives and the relocation of several hundred thousand persons. Therefore, the alternative of retaining the old provinces was not really open.

We would endorse the conclusions of a Lovanium University delegation of economists and political scientists which toured most of the new provinces early in 1963. They cite as common advantages of the new provinces:

1) a provincial assembly more representative of public opinion;

2) frequently, a government of technicians which is better aware of the situation in the province;

3) a regional pride to defend;

4) a more limited area;

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5) imperfect, yet better, ethnic cohesion.

It is worth stressing that in many areas the new institutions function quite well indeed, with virtually no European technical assistance. Very real benefits in acquisition of political and administrative skills are accruing in these regions. A great contribution could be made to the Congo in providing technical assistance to those provinces which have clearly passed the "takeoff" point.

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V. THE BUREAUCRACY

The colonial state is the prototype of a bureaucratic system. And Belgian administration was perhaps the most thoroughly bureaucratic of all colonial systems. The bureaucracy was almost untrammeled in its exercise of power by any consultative or semi-representative bodies, either in the colony or in the metropole. In short, there were no politics other than administration.

With system and purpose, the colonial bureaucracy penetrated and organized Congolese society. It created an elite in its own image, whose access to the modern world was through the subaltern ranks of the administration. In a profound way, it established the values, the standards of judgment, and the style of the Congo's leadership.

In any political system, the technical capacity to transmit and execute a decision is a determinant of the efficacy of government. For these reasons, we examine the nature of the Congolese civil service.

African Exclusion from the Colonial Civil Service

The Belgian colonial service differed from its British and French counterparts in the absolute exclusion of Congolese from all the top echelons, until the adoption January 13, 1959, of a statut unique. Until then there were two official barriers to Congolese:

1) Entry into the civil service was limited to citizens of Belgium (and Luxemburg). Congolese were held by most judicial hairsplitters to be "subjects," but not "citizens."

2) After World War II a university degree was a prerequisite. Since the first Congolese to hold a degree was Thomas Kanza, who graduated from Louvain in 1956 (and still was not admitted to the civil service), the exclusion was complete. A special auxiliary civil service was organized to staff the clerical ranks; this was entirely African.

Friction with the Africans first developed at the bottom grade of the European service, which included non-university personnel. Beginning in 1953 a certain number of Congolese would have qualified for this rank, but the administration held that a complete reform of the civil service was "under study," and continued to deny access to Africans. Entry on equal terms to the civil service was of crucial importance to the Congolese elite. Through 1958 it was probably their greatest single grievance. Significantly, it was not until after the Leopoldville riots of 1959 that the statut unique made its appearance.

The Statut Unique

The provisions of the statut unique are the root cause of the present outrageous salary scales for the civil service. The familiar colonial conundrum was posed: to attract able European talent, relatively high pay scales were necessary. But African opinion vehemently rejected any salary differential between European and African performing the same work. An initial effort was made to write in an "expatriation bonus" for European civil servants, but this foundered on the problem of the few Europeans recruited in the Congo itself, who considered themselves permanent residents of the Congo and thus would not have qualified for the bonus. At this time, Belgian policy postulated a Eurafrican future for the Congo. It was assumed that for a long period—even after independence—Belgians would play an important role both in administrative and representative bodies at all echelons. Accordingly, even this limited number of Europeans were an important concern for the colonial policy-maker.

The final solution, embodied in the statut unique, involved simply pasting together the two civil service structures. There were seven ranks. The top three were to remain virtually exclusively European for the immediate future; the fourth category would be the point of fusion between the two systems; and the bottom three were the African grades. The high European pay scales were to be applied to the few Africans who entered at the top. The traditional low scale would continue to apply at the bottom, as illustrated by the following table:

COMPOSITION OF CIVIL SERVICE AND PAY SCALE, 1960

Rank	European	African	Pay scale (annual) (Belgian Congo francs)
1	106	0	Over 440,000
2	1,004	1	325,000-440,000
3	3,532	2	225,000-325,000
4	5,159	800	90,000-225,000
5			73,250-90,000
6	0	11,000	45,000-73,250
7			Less than 45,000

The Effects of Independence

The months immediately before independence saw grave tensions within the civil service. On the African side, there was radical discontent among the clerks over the

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decolonization formula agreed upon at the Brussels Round Table. This, in sum, provided for a completely Africanized political direction for the country, while the administration was to remain almost entirely European at the top levels. A "revolt of the clerks" was brewing, and had the ANC not first mutinied, a serious breakdown would have been likely within the administration.

Insecurity grew apace on the European side. There were demonstrations and strike threats, which Belgium tried to allay in March 1960 by a law guaranteeing integration into the metropolitan service for any agent unable to continue his career in Africa. In the panic days of July 1960 the Belgian Ambassador announced a blanket extension of these provisions to all Belgian civil servants except those in Katanga. This, in the context of terror, ensured the massive departure of nearly all the European functionaries. Africa's most radical decolonization plan was thus compounded by revolutionary Africanization of the civil service.

Initially the result was administrative chaos. In the territories the general tendency was for the senior clerk to fill the shoes of the departing Belgian, provided he was not ethnically or politically incompatible. But in the central and provincial ministries the disorganization was massive. The Lumumba government never really functioned. There was a large-scale influx of persons into the civil service on the basis of ethnic and political criteria.

It is difficult not to underestimate the enormous pressures placed upon the newly installed ministers. Each of them was confronted with a virtual army of political and ethnic clients camped on his doorstep, who expected a concrete reward for their support. The minister was unprotected by any established, operative administrative regulations to escape these claims. Neither law nor party existed at that time to provide a discipline permitting rational solutions. Violence and intimidation were in the air, and it took a rare, brave minister to avoid substantial concessions--even in those cases where he understood that these were wrong. It was not until the installation of the College of Commissioners in September 1960 that administrative disorder began to come under control.

In legal terms, the new promotions were initially on the basis of "encommissionment" rather than formal "nomination." This was to avoid giving an employee permanent rank above the civil service grade he previously held, pending a complete overhaul of the regulations. The spectacular promotions therefore did not immediately yield financial benefits. It was not until the enactment of Ordinance 33 of April 21, 1961, that concessions were made to confirm the material advantages expected by the civil servants. Under international pressures even this was not immediately applied. Moreover, the central government was sparing in the number of permanent nominations made to the top two grades.

Inflation of the Civil Service Pay Scale

A new civil service law was finally promulgated in July 1963. The distorted salary scale has been definitively corrected by aligning the bottom with the top. The upper levels received emoluments higher than those paid to Belgian functionaries before independence, and injustices within the public pay scale were reduced by giving enormous boosts at the lower ranks. In mid-1962 there were approximately 15,000 functionaries "sous statut" (not including Katanga). In addition there were: 2,000 "political personnel" (parlementarians, ministerial cabinets), approximately 45,000 teachers, about 35,000 soldiers, 10,000 police, and the mass of workers employed by the government in various menial capacities (100,000-300,000).

All government salaries in the last analysis have been scaled upon the excessively high civil service salaries. The result is a situation where public receipts cover perhaps one-third of expenditures, and salaries account for nearly 90 per cent of all government expenditures. Unfortunately this exorbitant privilege lies with those who have significant power within the political system--politicans, functionaries, teachers, soldiers, and policemen. An austerity program in this context is not a matter of imposing sacrifice upon the society as a whole; the ruling group must penalize itself.

Disaffection of the University Graduates

Another major area of difficulty in the structure of the civil service is the failure to provide adequate opportunities for absorbing the new generation of university graduates shortly to emerge in relatively large numbers. Under the new statute, access to the top category and the upper half of the second rank is open only to those who had received an efficiency rating of "very good" for three successive years prior to 1960. This was unmistakably directed against the university graduates, who were thus disqualified entirely.

An older group, which had no higher educational facilities in its youth and which cites long experience, albeit in subaltern posts, and the wisdom of age, conflicts with the younger generation emerging from the universities of Europe and Africa. This tension is found in most new African states, and the Congo's problem differs only in degree. The workings of history and Belgian policy have made the contrast between generations par-

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ticularly sharp. Only Minister of Justice Justin Bomboko and Foreign Minister Auguste Mabita-Kalanda, among the present top leadership, hold university degrees.

The flavor of the mutual antagonisms between the clerks and students is captured in the two statements briefly quoted below; the former from an Abako journal, and the latter from a Manifeste des universitaires congolaises (written by Mabita-Kalanda) published in 1961:

Even in the Abako, we have no knowledge of a single university student who has accepted to serve even as secretary for the movement. They belittle our work and consider us as primitive.... We have done everything ourselves, and therefore, we must not be forgotten.... We have won our independence with our little bit of French, we will govern the country with this same little bit of French.... We have learned by experience, which the university students are incapable of doing. Consequently, we intend to occupy all the positions and we will make good use of our experience.

* * *

It has often been said that the Congo lacks trained persons. Yet we see nonetheless that the Congolese university graduates are kept away from political responsibilities. If one or the other has been given some responsibility, it was in most cases by a politician from his tribe, in function of a short-sighted policy.

It has often been said: university graduates are theoreticians, they have no experience. One thing, however, is clear, and that is that in the matter of experience, at least concerning the problem of the modern world, no Congolese has very much in the political, administrative, or military field. The experience of the majority of the present leaders is limited to having been clerks, soldiers, or teachers. We don't know any Congolese who has had a long experience in the art of commanding, of conceiving or of supervising a task of great scope.

The university graduates obviously tend to overrate their own immediate value to the society. James Coleman has perceptively observed the "uncritical equating of education with special rights and legitimacy" by the African elite, which views Western education as a grace-giving process. "Politics," he adds, "have been permeated with the presumably incontestable assumption that the educated have a divine right to rule."[14]

But the present utilization of university graduates makes neither administrative nor political sense. The relatively modest post

14. Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, Politics of the Developing Areas, 1960, pp. 282-283.

of assistant bureau chief is not satisfactory to the graduate; only a handful have in fact entered the civil service. It is ironic that nearly all members of the Congo's oversized ambassadorial corps are university graduates, hardly a rational employment of an extremely scarce resource.[15] There is a sharp sense of grievance on the part of the growing group of university graduates, which can become dangerous for the existing order.

The Organization and Effectiveness of the Civil Service

The civil service may be examined at two levels: 1) central and provincial ministries, and 2) the territorial service.

The central and provincial ministries. To begin with positive aspects, the Congolese civil service is much better than generally believed. Not that its performance is outstanding in any absolute sense. Most readers, however, are likely to presume chaotic incompetence. For this reason, it is important to emphasize that the general level of administrative ability in the Congo is not sharply below the African norm. This is faint but necessary praise.

Moreover, the caliber of members of the central administration in the Congo stands out in relation to other elements in the governmental process. They are far superior to members of political parties or representative assemblies. Although the top civil servants are exercising functions far beyond those for which they were trained, they generally have behind them long years of service in the Belgian administration. Many have reasonable norms of bureaucratic rectitude and discipline, and know what constitute reasonable criteria of satisfactory performance, if they do not always have the capacity to achieve it. A modern bureaucracy provides to a transitional society invaluable experience in the exercise of responsibility in a setting where rational (in a Western sense) standards of behavior exist. It is precisely these norms of conduct which are lacking in the Congo's political sector.

There are, of course, many shortcomings of the civil service. The most significant are examined below:

1) The exigencies of ministerial inflation have created serious duplication and jurisdictional conflict, especially at the central level. The workings of Parliament are such that apparently no government can win a vote of confidence without having a cabinet numbering, at a minimum, 20 ministers. Under the colonial administration there were

15. For example, Mario Cardoso in Washington, Theodore Idzumbuir at the UN, Thomas Kanza in London, Andre Mandi in Rome, Paul Mushiete in Paris, and Joseph Mbeka at the Common Market are all among the small group of university graduates.

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11 major departments. These have been broken into a maximum of 25 ministries. At the present time, there are 20. In the field of economic affairs a continuing jurisdictional dispute is waged among the overlapping Ministers of a) Finance, b) National Economy, and c) Planning and Industrial Development. There is, in addition, a Vice Premier for Economic Co-ordination, an important organ attached to the Prime Minister's office. In the field of social policy, a Vice Premier operates alongside Ministers of a) Labor and Social Welfare, b) Social Affairs, and c) Youth and Sport. Overlapping is less serious at the provincial level, where the Loi Fondamentale restricts the number of ministers to 10.

2) The Congo has imported the harmful continental practice of "political cabinets" for ministers. Provincial and central government ministers are entitled to a personal cabinet of 13 persons. These cabinets are supposed to offer "political" advice, as op-posed to the administrative recommendations emanating from the civil service. The auth-orized annual salary total for one ministerial cabinet (there are approximately 250 minis-ters in the Congo, each of whom could have his own cabinet) is 2,705,600 Congo francs (about US$43,000 at the official rate of ex-change). The Congo would no doubt profit if this hungry horde of camp followers simply drew salaries and never came to the office. As there are no legal minimum requirements for employment in this capacity, the quality of most is particularly low, and their nuisance value to the regular civil service high.

3) Related to (2) is the fact that relations between the ministers and the civil service are often poor. Venerable functionaries have inherited the "apolitical" mores of the colonial administration and tend to resent the "upstart" politician who was catapulted via the 1960 elections to a command position.

4) Even the most highly educated ministers tend to pad the civil service rosters of their ministries with ethnic followers. A striking example is the Foreign Ministry, which from the outset has been headed by a university graduate. Former Foreign Minister Bomboko, whatever his political merits, systematically created for himself a solidly Mongo tribal ambiance for his working environment. We were told by a young Muluba subaltern, freshly installed at the ministry under the new min-ister, Mabita-Kalanda, that fellow Baluba tribesmen have descended like locusts, while the unhappy Mongo are out on the streets. "C'est comme ça dans la démocratie," he observed with a philosophic chuckle.

5) Good will and long clerical experience are not enough in the more highly technical functions. Air traffic control is a case in point. Visitors travelling by air would do well to arrive via Brazzaville should the UN with-draw its personnel from the Leopoldville air-port control towers in the near future. The whole area of public finance is another example. Foreign technicians are indispensable in these departments. The whole judicial structure similarly cannot operate without a minimum number of trained magistrates.

6) Areas of administration involving large sums of private or public money are particu-larly prone to corrupting influences. The im-port licensing system, for example, is vulner-able. Anything which touches the diamond trade from near or far is likewise susceptible.

7) The inability of the Congolese Government to assure regular payment to its functionaries, especially at provincial and local levels, is an open invitation to corrupt behavior. In the Congo as elsewhere, those with adminis-trative power usually can find a way to assure themselves of what they feel to be their due--and corruption has a narcotic effect.

8) Finally, central and provincial adminis-trations often lack the technical means of effectively communicating instructions and information to subordinates in the field.

The territorial service. The territorial service differs importantly from the central administration. These local echelons are in much more intimate contact with the popula-tion, especially in the rural areas. Because he is face-to-face with the people, the ter-ritorial administrator, unlike most other civil servants, is under close scrutiny. Possibilities for corruption are accordingly fewer.

The territory, averaging roughly 7,000 square miles and 100,000 inhabitants, was the lowest echelon of European administration in the colonial period. Below approximately 125 territories lay approximately 1,000 circon-scriptions indigènes (native authorities) headed by traditional (or appointed) Congolese chiefs. Thus the territory was and remains a crucial administrative level. Many of the major deci-sions affecting the lives of the mass of the population are taken or, at least, implemented at this level.

In our view, based on observation of a large number of these local seats of gov-ernment, the administrative performance in the territories is superior to that at provincial and central levels. The territorial seat today is usually a small, dusty town of perhaps 5,000 inhabitants, lacking the amenities found in Leopoldville or Elisabethville. In a real sense, the local administrators share the life of the population at large, even if they do occupy the large, pleasant houses left behind by their European predecessors.

In the immediate wake of independence a tendency appeared in several parts of the country toward political appointments to ter-ritorial administrative posts. Well-organized parties such as MNC/L, PSA, and Abako recognized the critical importance of the

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territorial administrator in the local power structure. However, the bureaucrats progressively have had their revenge. Now, nearly everywhere, these positions are filled by career civil servants. Like their colleagues in the central administration, they are "anti-politician" and view their task, like the Belgians before them, as one of maintaining peace and order, and supporting the local economy. These values are to be cherished in the period immediately ahead, especially where "politics" in the countryside has meant civil disobedience, ethnic hostility, and non-payment of taxes.

The method of nominating territorial administrators has had important implications for the balance of power between the center and the provinces. The colonial practice was to assign a functionary from the central government to a province, which would post him in turn to a district, whence he would be assigned to a territory. The province, however, had the final authority in naming the territorial administrators. This procedure after independence took on entirely new meaning. The provinces assumed the right to name the African replacements for the departed European civil servants. Thus the key to exercise of power in the countryside, the territorial administrator, was beholden to the province, and not to the central government. Lumumba recognized the importance of this, and in some areas tried to intervene in the nomination process. But he was unable to impose his own choices.

One result was an ethnic unscrambling of the territorial service. The provinces had every incentive to install local persons in the top slots. Where there was some ethnic integration, it was always within the confines of a region. For example, MNC/L-dominated Orientale Province prided itself on its refusal to follow tribal criteria. But the nature of parties in that area meant that political criteria gave a similar result. Thus all the MNC/L-appointed administrators came from the MNC/L zone of Orientale, and the Batetela-Bakusu areas. The PSA also ruled that no territorial administrator could serve in his home territory in Kwilu. But the other side of the coin was that the candidate had to come from within the Kwilu District.

The Circonscriptions Indigènes

A profile of the structure of the Congolese polity would be incomplete without reference to the very local administrative structures, the circonscriptions indigenes (CI's, sometimes called "sectors"). The surprising solicity of these institutions stood in sharp contract to the breakdown of government at the top levels during the dark days of 1960-1961. Their stability provided a significant buffer against widespread chaos in the countryside.

"Build-from-the-ground-up" was a Belgian policy axiom. The commune is the hero of Belgian history. Medieval townsmen asserted the rights of the people against the foreign feudal overlords. Thus there is a veritable mystique about the innate virtue of local institutions. In the Congo this value was in complete harmony with colonial convenience: let there be local institutions; let our wards learn first to handle the humdrum problems of streets and sewers before they are permitted to taste the delights of policy-making on a grand scale. For this reason, the first meaningful institutional reforms with a view toward decolonization were decrees in 1957 providing for elected councils in both urban and rural areas.

In the cities the reform has been of less lasting value because of particular urban circumstances. Structurally, the town communes were established on a Eurafrican basis, with paritary European representation. Paritarism ceased to be relevant in July 1960, but the legal structure remains unchanged. More importantly, the initial municipal elections attracted a larger number of the African political elite. However, new opportunities subsequently arose at much higher levels, and able individuals deserted the municipal organs of government.

But such was not the case in the countryside. The indirectly elected councils were grafted on to the administrative circonscription structures which had been developed over a long period. The chiefs selected by the councils were rural in orientation. Very few were tempted by the electoral campaign of 1960. Thus there was a substantial continuity in personnel at this level. Further, the functions exercised were not new, and a considerable backlog of experience already had been acquired by most. The CI's have been the effective capillaries of modern government. The territorial centers are equipped with the external symbols of administration: a respectable office building, several permanent functionaries, typewriters, files, account books, and a treasury. They have auxiliary agricultural monitors, who work under the supervision of the more highly trained agricultural officer posted in the territories. Also present is a tribunal, and usually a marketplace. As any officer in the territorial service will tell a visitor, "If the territories and the CI's function, the whole country can function." Only in the Bas-Congo was there a systematic political purge at the CI level; elsewhere the continuity was remarkable. What Belgium really sought to do thoroughly in the way of political construction was done with competence. The local institutions remain a credit to the colonizer.

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Belgian Personnel

A handful of Belgian functionaries stayed throughout the crisis period of 1960. Beginning in the fall of 1960, a certain number responded to appeals by central and provincial authorities to return. At the moment of independence there were 10,000 Belgian civil servants, not counting Belgians with the vast parastatal organizations or the 8,000 lay teachers. In January 1961 the Congo employed only 2,268 Belgian civil servants (including 1,168 in Katanga). By early 1963 the total was 1,590. None of the Belgians occupies a position in the command hierarchy of the administration. They are attached as "technicians" or "advisers," mainly with the central government, former Equateur Province, and Katanga.

Their role has a thousand variations, depending upon the personalities of the Europeans and Congolese involved and their working relationships. In a number of ministries the Belgian technicians visibly perform a great deal of the important work; in others, they are assigned to tedious tasks. The feeling is widespread among them that they are not being used effectively.

The Judiciary

A non-political organ of government, the judiciary was extremely hard hit by the 1960 exodus. In large parts of the Congo the administration of justice simply stopped.

The judicial system has two branches, modern and traditional. The latter, which operates at the circonscription indigène level and judges by customary law, generally continued to operate. However, the maximum penalty which could be imposed by a traditional court was one month imprisonment, or a fine of 1,000 francs. Serious offenses and infractions of written law had to be judged by the modern courts.

The modern judiciary began at the territorial echelon. There the territorial administrator sits as judge (and prosecutor) in cases involving penalties not exceeding two months or 2,000 francs. The lowest echelon with professional magistrates was the District Court, which could sentence to five years and judge civil suits up to a value of 50,000 francs. The old provincial capitals had a Tribunal of First Instance, with general penal and civil competence. Finally, Appeals Courts operated at Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

In 1959 the modern jurisdictions had a total of 168 magistrates and were considered seriously understaffed. Following the continental model, the magistrates were in part assigned to the bench (magistrats assis) and partly to the office of the public prosecutor (magistrats débouts). These departed almost to a man

in July 1960 (except from Katanga).

Curiously, the judiciary was one field where there was no pressure for Africanization. The Belgian magistrature had a tradition of independence and integrity. Congolese nationalists expressed no desire to purge the judiciary as they did the civil service, nor did the Congolese court clerks demand immediate promotions. They knew all too well that a bench without an executive to protect its independence and carry out its sentences was an unrewarding hot seat. Gradually the Congolese employees of the judicial system were named auxiliary judges. In some cases they hear cases; in others, they maintain the records of the public prosecutor's office.

A few Belgian magistrates returned to reopen some tribunals. Beginning in 1962, UN-recruited magistrates from Greece, Haiti, the UAR, Syria, and Lebanon began arriving. The target of 50 qualified magistrates has never been reached, however, and the whole structure operates by fits and starts. There can be no long-term solution until at least 1964, when the Ford Foundation-sponsored École Nationale de Droit et d'Administration begins graduating 60 Congolese magistrates a year.

Conclusions

In sum, the heavily bureaucratic tradition of the Belgian colonial system has left an indelible mark on the Congolese state. For all its shortcomings, the bureaucracy is a crucial element in the political system. Especially in the countryside, the position of the territorial service is paramount. To be sure, the administrators are handicapped by communications problems and by their own limitations in training and policy-making experience. But there are no effective challengers to the power they hold. The limits of their authority are the limits of effective organization of the political society.

At the center, decision-making and initiation of policy are not really in the hands of the bureaucracy. But the limits of the capacity or desire of the civil service to carry out policy are the boundaries of the effectiveness of government. Political ideologies never took root in the Congo, and there is accordingly no alternative offered for the Belgian-instilled administrative criteria of good government: public order and increased production.

At the same time, the bureaucracy poses some vexing problems. It has won for itself a level of remuneration beyond the capacity of the country to pay. The Congo cannot be viable until some adjustment takes place in the pay scale, perhaps through a depreciation in the Congolese franc. As one observer has wryly commented, the once-militant civil serv-

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ice union, APIC, will no doubt undergo "pro-
found modifications" in outlook, as "for the
first time since its creation, its objectives
seem to be fully realized." Also a better
formula must be found for absorbing the
emergent university generation into the civil
service.

But this should not obscure the real merits
of the bureaucracy. The failure of the transfer
of power left the clerks with the sudden re-
sponsibility of managing a vast, complex coun-
try. What is remarkable is that so many
of the routine administrative functions were
continued in the central administration, and
that in many territories the new adminis-
trator maintained a reasonable degree of
public order.

Perhaps the explanation for the lack of
revolutionary social credo to accompany the
revolutionary power transfer lies in the bu-
reaucratic origins of the Congolese elite. The
administrator is not by nature a revolutionary.
His rationale is the governance, not the
transformation, of society. The political pro-
gram of the bureaucratic elite in the Congo
was the Africanization of the administration,
not a root-and-branch remaking of colonial
society.

VI. POLITICS AND PARTIES:
THE PROSPECTS AND RISKS OF ELECTIONS IN 1964

The Fragile Roots of Nationalism

The most fundamental characteristic of the nationalist movement in the Congo is the lateness of its emergence. Throughout British and French colonial Africa national political parties were beginning to function by the end of World War II. In the Congo overt political movements began only in 1957 and were not launched in earnest until 1959. Lack of experience is a trait common to all Congolese political parties.

This difference between the Congo and other parts of independent Africa is largely explained by the character of the Belgian administration, which was highly authoritarian compared with its British and French counterparts. For example, a vigorous and colorful African press dates back to 1858 in Ghana. In the Ivory Coast, L'Éclaireur de la Côte d'Ivoire was launched in 1935. On the other hand, the first independent Congolese papers, Quinze and Congo, began only in 1957 and were quickly suppressed. Although political action was not unrestricted in British and French colonies, it was recognized from the end of World War II as legitimate in a broadening area. In the Congo, African (or even European) political movements were prohibited, as indeed was any kind of political activity. The low level of political sophistication of the elite and absence of an awakening sense of nationalism among the mass made it possible for the Belgian authorities to forestall any African nationalist movement.

The complete isolation from external influences of the Congolese elite was another key factor. For decades the emerging elite in British and French Africa had been educated in the universities of France, Britain, and the United States. The leaders knew one another, at least within the confines of the English and French linguistic barriers. The latter group had years of working together in the French National Assembly, one of the world's toughest political schools. In the Congo the contrast was stark. Before the Brussels Exposition in 1958, literally only a handful of Congolese had travelled abroad. At that time there were only 15 Congolese students overseas, mostly at Louvain University. Rigid censorship was maintained on all material entering the Congo. External events did not begin really influencing the Congo until the independence of Ghana in 1957. The Bandung Conference, for example, had passed unnoticed.

The year 1958 was a turning point. In that year, Patrice Lumumba and Joseph Ngalula (now Sud-Kasai President) attended the All-African People's Conference in Ghana. General de Gaulle's speech in Brazzaville in August 1958, announcing that independence was available for the asking, had sharp repercussions across the river in Leopoldville. The Brussels Exposition provided an opportunity for large numbers of educated Congolese to visit Europe.

In the first decade following World War II, however, both the Belgians and the Congolese considered that the most important issue confronting the colony was the status satisfaction of the new elite. Colonial debate focused on the "immatriculation" card (a device to grant Africans limited access to certain privileges reserved to Europeans), equal status in the civil service, and discrimination. Mrs. Paul Robeson, after a session with Leopoldville's African elite during her 1947 African tour commented, "The évolués did not seem visibly interested in independence, nor emancipation. They were unaware of what was going on in the world." [16]

There was no explicitly nationalist statement of a comprehensive character until the Conscience Africaine Manifesto of August 1956, a document of Catholic antecedents. This provoked an almost immediate riposte by the Alliance des Bakongos (Abako) of the Bas-Congo, which for the first time used the slogan of "immediate independence." The next major statement was Joseph Kasavubu's inaugural speech as burgomaster of Dendale commune in Leopoldville in April 1958. The word "independence" was not publicly uttered beyond the confines of Leopoldville until after the riots there in January 1959.

The Messianic Sects

Symptomatic of the high degree of frustration with the colonial situation and the lack of a nationalist outlet for these feelings was the prevalence of radical messianic sects. These are a synthesis of pre-nationalist expressions of social discontent and traditional ritual symbols, both animistic and Christian. Although syncretistic sects are found throughout tropical Africa, their activity has been most intense in the southern third of the continent. There, conflict with the European settler colonial complex has been greatest, and a

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16. A.A.J. Van Bilsen, l'Indépendance du Congo, 1961, p. 47.

secular solution has seemed most remote. There have been dozens of these sects in the Congo, all having in common a radical rejection of European domination. But they responded through the escapism of the apocalyptic dream rather than the development of nationalist programs.

Associational Experience

Related to the late emergence of nationalism was the mediocre level of pre-nationalist associational experience. Group activity involving Africans prior to the emergence of parties took at least five different forms:

1) Unions. These suffered under legal restrictions on their operation and the efforts of the Belgian trade unions to organize and control their activity. The only really African union prior to 1959 was the Association de Personnel Indigène de la Colonie (APIC), the civil service union.

2) European political groups. After 1954 the metropolitan parties began establishing political clubs in the major centers and sought to attract satellite African clienteles. The Belgian Liberals and Socialists were particularly active; in contrast, the Parti Social Chrétien (PSC) tended to oppose the introduction of metropolitan parties into the Congo. The African role was always subordinate, and although a number of leaders went through a phase of association with one or another of these clubs, they did not consider them a very useful training ground in political organization. Attempts by these groups to circulate informal electoral lists for the 1957 urban elections were an abject failure and ended European illusions of being able to enlist the African elite as foot soldiers for their own battles.

3) Cercles des évolués. These were set up by the administration immediately after the war, often with attractive club houses, as social centers and controlled forums for airing the grievances of the elite. The cercles probably did fulfill the limited purposes for which they were established, but again were not very helpful for political training.

4) Alumni associations. These were more important than the preceding groups. Sponsored by the Catholic missions, they brought together in an African-led organization many of the future leaders. The federation of alumni associations, Union des Intérêts Sociaux Congolais (UNISCO), was the closest thing to a comprehensive African movement. It dates from immediately after World War II. Kasavubu got his start when he was elected president of UNISCO in 1946. Some political grievances were channeled through these bodies. They were, however, by definition elite groups and tended to articulate the specific complaints of the elite.

5) Tribal associations. These were by far the most important of the pre-political associations. They were the only effective, wholly African organizations, formed to help adjust to the colonial situation, both in the humble functions of mutual aid and in the assertion of comprehensive political programs. They can be traced back to about 1925 both in Leopoldville and Elisabethville. However, there was a fundamental change in their character after the war. In the early days, leadership was in the hands of traditional elders; after 1945, young, educated elements took over. Only in the tribal association did the mass and elite establish a working relationship.

Two ethnic associations, the Abako and Lulua Frères, stand far above all others in effectiveness. Both played a determining role in shaping the fragmented, ethnic nature of the eventual nationalist response. The Abako was the real founder of militant Congolese nationalism, but it never sought to become a comprehensive organization. Lulua Frères was a tightly disciplined, ethnically organized, and terrorist body whose cohesiveness was based on acute resentment of the Baluba, especially in the Luluabourg area.

Parties Prior to Independence

Thus the Congo lacked the exotic flowering of politically oriented associations which characterized so much of West Africa; valuable leadership training ground accordingly was not available. And the tribal associations, although found in every African city, had an unchallenged position in the Congo as the most important group activity.

This was particularly apparent when the first elections took place in the urban centers: Leopoldville, Jadotville, and Elisabethville in December 1957; and Coquilhatville, Stanleyville, Bukavu, Luluabourg, and Matete-Ndjili (Leopoldville) in December 1958. Political parties were not permitted to contest these elections, and accordingly the ethnic association was a logical organizational structure for candidates to utilize. Many of the present parties are in fact lineal descendents of the ethnic associations called into electoral duty during the urban elections.

Other influences inhibited the development of a unified political life: the regional character of Belgian colonial organization; restraints on population mobility; and lack of African social and political communications between the main urban centers. As a result, not one elite but six provincial elites emerged with virtually no contacts among them until 1958.

To enhance their claims to political leadership, the provincial elites traded on tribal themes, strengthening ethnic self-awareness on

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the part of the mass, and widening cleavages between ethnic groups. National politics were subsequently dominated by this development in each of the Congo's component parts.

Especially in the face of the rapid dis-solution of the colonial power structure in 1959-1960, removing any externally compelling reason for national unity, there was virtually no possibility of forming a coherent national party. Lumumba had many of the charismatic qualities of other single-party state leaders in Africa, but in seeking to extend his party, the Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L), outside its Stanleyville womb, he was faced in virtually every instance with the insurmountable task of working with po-litical leadership in the provinces that was sharply divided, mainly on ethnic grounds. In most cases, he had to choose one faction, and in the process earned the bitter enmity of the others.

Parties, when they finally did emerge, had agonizing problems in sorting out leader-ship in the short time available before elec-tions and independence. Most major parties experienced serious internal tensions. Abako leader Daniel Kanza formed a dissident wing of Abako. Relations between Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) groups in Leopoldville (under Gizenga) and Kikwit (under Kamitatu) were subject to periodic crises. The MNC split into Lumumba, Kalonji, and Nendaka wings, with the second becoming a Baluba party and the third having little following. The Centre de Regroupment Africain (Cerea) party in Kivu developed Kashamura, Weregemere, and Bisukiro wings. There is little real ideological divergence underlying these splits.

At the time of the December 1959 elections for territorial councils and municipal offices, only the Abako and PSA had organizations extending into the countryside, as demon-strated by their successful electoral boycott. These elections were suspected of being part of a Belgian maneuver to install, with the sanction of an electoral process, a govern-ment subservient to Brussels. Thus the par-ties did not enter wholeheartedly into the electoral campaign. It was really only in the period from February to May 1960, after the Brussels Round Table which had set the terms and timetable for independence, that political organization got underway through-out the country on a grand scale. The parties were thus working under enormous time pres-sure, and every available shortcut was taken. In some areas, there was intimidation and violence; in most, unbridled demagoguery, extravagant promises, and appeals for ethnic solidarity.

The parties and the political leadership were not placed in a position of bearing any responsibility for public order or the main-tenance of good government until literally the eve of independence. This contributed in large measure to the irresponsiblity of the electoral campaign. An effort was made to establish an "Executive College" to share decision-making responsibility with the Gov-ernor-General in March 1960, and subse-quently in the administrative hierarchy at provincial, district, and territorial levels. However, this idea came too late to prove effective. The situation was at complete vari-ance with all other African experiences of decolonization, with the exception of Algeria; and even there, a structured revolutionary movement existed which could supplant the colonial administration. Elsewhere in Africa, there was a transitional period when the prospective African leaders were forced to restrain their attacks on government because they shared in its operation.

In their brief life prior to the electoral campaign in the spring of 1960, the Congolese parties had performed only two concrete organizational functions: the sale of member-ship cards and the preparation of electoral lists. The second task did require a certain degree of sophistication. In a system of multi-member districts with proportional representation, a great deal was at stake in the ordering of an electoral list.

But in general, parties were built upon sand despite some impressive feats of high-speed organization, such as MNC/L's rapid growth from a party limited to Stanleyville in January 1960 to one sweeping all Orientale and several other districts in May of that year. Organization was a function of the immediate, short-term objectives of the elec-tions. Even without the 1960 breakdown of law and order, all parties would have experienced major crises after independence, when or-ganizers in the provinces attempted to collect debts of patronage.

The characteristics of the ten major par-ties emerging from the 1960 elections are summarized in the appendix in Table E ac-cording to five differentiating criteria: mass-elite; national-regional; pan-tribal-ethnic; unitary-federal; radical-moderate. A "mar-ginal" category is included where a party does not fall clearly into one or the other polar type. Where the classification might be considered debatable, a justification is in-cluded in the footnotes. Table F, also in the appendix, records the results, by party, of the May 1960 elections.[17]

Parties since Independence

The bewildering sequence of political events

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17. A glossary of the principal Congolese parties may be found in Table G in the appendix. Map C in the appendix shows the geo-graphical distribution of major party strength in 1960.

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since 1960 almost defies coherent summary.[18]

The circumstances of independence produced simultaneously a spectacular promotion in social and economic status for much of the elite and an abrupt drop in the standard of living of the mass. This inevitably ruptured the briefly established mass-elite relationship and resulted in what might be termed a "social demobilization." The mass, failing to comprehend what had happened and lacking an easily identifiable scapegoat to blame for the disappointments of independence, could only react by an apathetic withdrawal from the system, politically and economically. Politically this was expressed by resentment at the betrayal by "politicians"; economically, by a tendency to secede from the market economy. Symbolic of this was the general strike called in March 1962 by the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) to protest inflated salaries for politicians.

Party roots in the countryside shrivelled almost as fast as they had been implanted. By 1961 no party cards were being sold anywhere in the Congo. Local sections had ceased to function; political meetings were outlawed; deputies rarely returned to their constituencies. This was even true of MNC/L, PSA, and Abako, which had achieved high levels of organization.

The revolt of the army in July 1960 was followed by the collapse of the constitutional framework, the dismissal of Lumumba, and the subsequent establishment in Stanleyville of a competing "legal government" with some international recognition. The Loi Fondamentale provided no means by which the situation could be resolved. Thus force and negotiation between de facto leaders became the only means of re-establishing the legitimacy of the central government. Only the presence of the UN, the strong international commitment to preservation of a single Congo, and the vigor of US policy prevented the permanent disintegration of the country during 1960-1961. The UN provided a framework of minimal order while sporadic negotiations took place between the two competing "central" governments, and the two seceded fragments, Katanga and South Kasai. The armies rarely fought one another, but all became involved in bloody conflicts with civilian populations. At the nadir in January-February 1961, civilian-ANC clashes resulted in massacres of

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18. It is beyond the scope of this paper to record this history. Summary chronologies of major events since independence may be found in RAF Research Memoranda Nos. 16 of December 22, 1961; 20 of January 29, 1962; and 5 of February 5, 1963 (UNCLASSIFIED). For highly detailed materials, the reader is referred to the series of volumes published by CRISP in Brussels (Jules Gerard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1960, 2 vols.; Benoit Verhaegen, Congo 1961; Congo 1962 will appear in mid-1963); and the excellent monthly, Etudes Congolaises, published by the Institut National d'Études Politiques in Leopoldville.

civilians at Elisabethville, Bakwanga, and Stanleyville.

The Alienation of the Politicians from the People

With the attrition of the parties and the establishment under international tutelage of rudimentary authority, the primary source of power now lies in access to the organs of influence, force, and money at Leopoldville. What the outlying areas feel is no longer relevant--unless and until new elections are held. The political system at the center resembles Spanish moss; its roots are in the air, rather than in the ground.

A symptom of Leopoldville's isolation from the mass is the contrast in leadership style between Lumumba and Adoula. The former had remarkable talents in mass mobilization. At a time when political power depended upon this, Lumumba was a well-nigh irrestible force. His prestige derived from his eloquence in French, Swahili, Lingala, and Tshiluba. Almost anywhere in the Congo, he could project a compelling image of himself in the Nkrumah-Touré-Nyerere fashion. Adoula entirely lacks these characteristics. He was in eclipse in the heady days of 1960. But with the transformation of the nature of politics, his talents suddenly became relevant. He is a manipulator, an arbitrator, a broker. He has mastered the art of making himself indispensable, of balancing competing demands of a shifting constellation of caucus groups. And he has made able use of the diverse types of international support most useful in the present situation: US, UN, and Belgian.

The Failure of Lumumbism

Another symptom of alienation between the politicians and the mass has been the failure of efforts after Lumumba's death to construct a "Lumumbist bloc," a mass nationalist movement akin to the radical African nationalist model. Lumumba's strategy at the outset had been to weld a national coalition of parties-- MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, Balubakat, and at times Puna--alleged to share his three-point program of nationalism, anti-tribalism, and centralism. This was only briefly successful. The Lumumbist bloc did vote with discipline for the election of officers of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate in June 1960, but barely mustered enough votes to confirm their leader as Prime Minister. Again there was a brief moment of united action at the Lovanium Parliament in July-August 1961, but this failed to elect Gizenga as Premier. Despite periodic proposals in 1961 and 1962 for the establishment of some form of Lumumbist national

party, Lumumbism as a political force steadily eroded until by mid-1963 it had entirely fragmented. The following reasons may be adduced for the failure of the effort to build a mass movement around the martyr image of Lumumba:

1) The inefficacy of a corpse. The departed hero may be mourned, but he cannot lead.

2) The divisive aspect of the Lumumba memory. Although Lumumba was adulated in large areas of the Congo, he was despised in others. There was no possibility of achieving unity about this symbol.

3) The Gizenga obstacle. Gizenga, an inept individual lacking the essential prerequisite of audacity and personal magnetism, was able to pre-empt the top position. He could not be ousted without fatally dividing the movement, nor could he supply the necessary leadership himself.

4) The incompetence of other leaders. None of the major contenders for the mantle of Lumumba possessed the necessary leadership characteristics. Only an exceptionally gifted person could have had any chance, and politicians like Christophe Gbenye and Antoine Kiwewa are the incarnation of mediocrity.

5) The irrelevance of radical nationalism. The Lumumbist message of national unity against the Belgian colonists became irrelevant in the post-independence situation. The "enemy" symbol which might have served, as elsewhere in Africa, to rally a nationalist movement was dissipated with the Belgian exodus. To some extent the Congolese "politicians" serve as scapegoats today, but animosity toward them remains diffuse.

6) The lack of access to effective means of support. MNC/L was anathema to major domestic forces--the Catholic Church, the large corporations, and the Western governments represented in the Congo. The assistance of the Soviet bloc and Casablanca group of African states was insufficient to sustain the Lumumbist drive.

Political Power Clusters in Leopoldville

Politics in Leopoldville has become essentially a bargaining process between clusters of leaders; ideology plays only a small role.

The most important political cluster to emerge is the "Binza group." This group includes a cross-section of leadership which collectively forms an interlocking directorate of influential persons, who between them control or have access to a broad spectrum of influence and power. Although membership fluctuates somewhat, there have never been more than ten in the inner caucus. This coalition began to emerge in 1961 and did not really become a major importance until 1962. The key members are described below:

1) Victor Nendaka, head of the Sûreté since September 1960, is an intelligent man of will and courage. He took over this key agency at a moment of total disorganization from Christophe Muzungu, who was personnally loyal to Lumumba. The Sûreté's national organization, power of arrest, and files of compromising information on many political figures make it a potent instrument.

2) General Joseph Mobutu had by 1961 firm control of ANC units close enough to Leopoldville to be able to exert political pressures. His involvement guarantees the support of at least a good part of the ANC.

3) Justin Bomboko was Foreign Minister in all governments until the most recent Adoula cabinet shakeup in April 1963. Despite some character defects, he has become a skilled politician and able operator in the Leopoldville environment. In addition, he has constructed a solid popular base at Coquilhatville. He has excellent access to both Belgian and US sources.

4) Albert Ndele since 1960 has headed the Monetary Council, shortly to become a National Bank.

5) Damien Kandolo began as a member of Lumumba's personal cabinet charged with supervision of the Surete. He then defected from the Lumumbist bloc, was for a time Adoula's Chef de Cabinet, and was subsequently Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior.

Adoula himself is not a member of the "Binza group," but is very close to it. There is no ethnic element to the group; Nendaka is a Mubua, Mobutu an Ngbandi, Bomboko a Mongo, Ndele a Mukongo, and Kandolo an Otetela. The success of the group lies in the nature of the Congolese political process; there is no need for formal organization, or a structure capable of developing a web of political communication with the mass.

There are a number of other caucus groups, based in large part upon the activity of Parliament. The most effective and coherent is the Abako. Although there is no clear leader of the Abako group, its representatives in Parliament maintain remarkable discipline. There has never been an occasion when Abako members have taken opposing positions in debates or votes. This cohesion has been used in the systematic pursuit of the objectives of the Bakongo peoples, in the furtherance of which the Abako has been extremely successful.

PSA Kamitatu and PSA Gizenga are both relatively effective caucus groups. Part of the Cerea-Reko party delegation from Kivu, under the leadership of Joseph Midiburo and Edmond Rudahindwa, also has shown capability for group action.

Parliament has become a major focal point for political maneuvering, especially in the last year. It had very few meetings in the

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summer of 1960, then was put on vacation by Mobutu in September 1960. It did not reconvene until July 1961. From that time forward, Parliament has been in session most of the time. As the techniques of parliamentary action have become familiar, its strength as a branch of government has increased. The powers vested in Parliament by the Loi Fondamentale are vast; as the deputies have learned how to make use of them, Parliament increasingly has been an obstacle to effective executive action.

Provincial Political Consolidation

A development of major significance in recent months is the rapid consolidation of a series of local power clusters centered on the new provincial institutions. Where a homogeneous leadership has emerged, it is virtually unchallengeable from inside or outside. The provinces have three major trump cards:

1) Control of the police forces. These are frequently overt political instruments.

2) Control of the local administration. Territorial administrators are named by the provinces; the territorial administrator is the unchallenged authority in his zone.

3) Monopoly of direct contact with the population at large. This is not significant in the normal process of decision-making in Leopoldville. However, if and when national elections are held, it would be a critically important asset.

The ability of the central government to intervene in the provinces grows in situations where provincial leadership is split. It has proved to date virtually impossible to dislodge an incumbent provincial government. Dissident provincial political groups have developed the habit of carrying their grievances to Leopoldville, trying to secure a vote (by a procedure of dubious legality) of one house of Parliament to request central intervention and arbitration. But once substantial accord has been achieved within a province, there is very little the central government can do to influence the situation.

The Role of Labor Unions, Students, and Youth

Like most under-developed countries, the Congo does not possess many functional interest groups. Labor unions and student and youth groups, however, are worthy of brief mention.

The Congolese unions are not proletarian organizations; the most effective ones are white collar groups (i.e., civil servants and teachers). In a society such as the Congo, the bargaining power of the relatively scarce skilled, educated person is by nature vastly superior to that of the unskilled laborer, who lives in the shadow of a "reserve army of unemployed" willing and eager to take his job. The organized, white collar groups have through union structures been quite successful in registering their grievances. Unions have relatively little concrete to offer the unskilled laborer for his dues. Union leaders are accepted on consultative bodies of an official character, but do not participate in real collective bargaining, except in the government-level negotiations establishing the legal minimum wage (which is the salary in fact received by the majority of workers).

The major unions are:

1) Union des Travailleurs Congolais, (UTC). This union has the largest membership and probably must be rated the most important. It is of Catholic inspiration and was initially organized under the patronage of the Belgian Catholic union. Its leader, André Bo-Boliko, is a keenly intelligent and able person.

2) Confédération des Syndicats Libres Congolais (CSLC). This is a very close second to the UTC in importance. It is accused by its opponents of being remote-controlled by the American Embassy. Its leader, Alphonse Kithima, is Adoula's brother-in-law and has had the informal support of the Prime Minister. CSLC is an ICFTU member.

3) Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Kongolais (FGTK). Formerly head by Adoula, this is the stepchild of the largest Belgian union, the FGTB, associated with the Socialist Party. There have been periodic hopes that it would rally to the CSLC, but to date it remains separate. It suffers from the absence of a single national secretariat. At the top, there are merely two regional offices.

Though union leadership has been effective in articulating the widespread resentment of the privileges of the politician class, unions probably do not have the capability of mobilizing widespread positive support for a political movement.

On the student level, the Union Générale des Etudiants Congolais (UGEC), dominated by the Lovanium University section, unites loosely the farflung college student community. Thus far, it has not exhibited a great capacity for action. It participates both in the International Union of Students (IUS) and the International Student Conference-Coordinating Secretariat (ISC-COSEC). The university students are at present an alienated group. They feel that access to opportunities commensurate with their intellectual talents is blocked by the former clerks now holding government positions. UGEC is far from being an extremist, Marxist-Leninist body like the Union Générale des Étudiants de l'Afrique Occidentale (UGEAO) in Dakar or the Fédération des Étudiants de l'Afrique

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Noire en France (FEANF) in Paris. However, at the Second Congress of UGEC, held in August 1963, it was evident from the anti-American resolutions that the Soviets have made some headway in infiltrating the organization. There is also an ineffectual youth federation which is a member of the World Assembly of Youth (WAY), but it has little significance in the Congo.

Political youth groups attached to various parties were a volatile force in the 1960-1961 period. They were originally organized as paramilitary auxiliary groups to serve as weapons of intimidation and violence. Political leaders have become disillusioned with these organizations, however, as they have proved very difficult to control and a great public nuisance. They are less ideological groups than bands of disoriented, unemployed persons seeking a violent outlet for their frustrations.

Political Communication

Means of political communications are very limited. Thus, the Leopoldville government is handicapped in projecting a favorable image in the interior. As a result, Adoula is largely unknown to the mass of the population. His anonymity could prove a drawback in possible elections in 1964.

One can hardly speak of any "mass media." Press and radio now reach only a restricted audience. Only in Leopoldville and Elisabethville is there a widely circulated daily press. The largest newspaper in the country, Courrier d'Afrique (Couraf), has a circulation of no more than 15,000, mostly in Leopoldville. The Couraf staff is mostly Bakongo, and of a Catholic coloration. The Adoula organ, Le Progrès, circulates less than 10,000 copies. There are printed newspapers--in nearly all cases organs of the provincial governments-- in the following cities: Coquilhatville, Bukavu, Kindu, and Kikwit. Although circulation figures are not available for these, it is doubtful any prints more than 1,000 copies.

There are radio stations in each of the six former provincial capitals. The most powerful is that of Elisabethville. There is at present no political content to the programming; news broadcasts are controlled by the central government. The number of radio sets in the Congo is considerable. Estimates vary from 100,000 to 600,000, although the latter figure seems much too high. Many of the radios are battery-operated and are now not functioning because batteries are in short supply.

By far the most important means of communications is by word of mouth, through the marketplaces and along the transport axes. News spreads with amazing rapidity from city to country by the "bush telegraph"; however, the reverse is much less true.

In a number of cases, provincial officials travel widely within their provinces. However, this is rarely done by central leaders. Adoula has failed to use this means of making himself known to the country at large. Travel in the interior by deputies and persons in opposition to the provincial governments has been closely controlled. Political meetings are prohibited in most sections of the country.

Incentives to Elections

The Loi Fondamentale stipulates that elections must be held by June 30, 1964, to replace the present Parliament and the provincial assemblies. However, the deadline is not sacrosanct, since a two-thirds vote of both houses of Parliament suffices to amend this or any other clause of the Loi Fondamentale.

Moreover, Article 67 and 76 of the Loi Fondamentale and the debates at the Brussels Round Table in 1960 appear to indicate that completion of the new constitution is a prerequisite to the holding of new elections. Congolese sources predict adoption of the constitution by late 1963 or early 1964. While possible, we hold this unlikely. However, by mid-1964, work on the new constitution could well be completed. After it has been promulgated, pressures for new elections will be very strong, since the legal basis for the present representative assemblies will no longer exist.

The contentious issue of the disputed territories would also have to be settled prior to elections. There are at least 15 areas claimed by two or more of the new provinces. Though the central government had planned to hold referenda to determine the future of the territories, it has avoided to date opening any of these Pandora's boxes.

The leaders of the new provincial governments share a sense of isolation from the sources of power at Leopoldville. Although some provinces have surrogates in Leopoldville, including several with "native sons" in Adoula's Cabinet, most feel their representation in Parliament inadequate, largely as a result of the failure of the parliamentarians elected in 1960 to maintain contacts at the provincial level. Thus, the provincial governments anticipate elections as a means of replacing incumbent parliamentarians with representatives owing allegiance to the new provincial regimes. With this new blood, the provinces hope to increase their leverage in Leopoldville and their share of central government patronage. The impulse to elections at the provincial level is virtually unanimous.

There is as well surprising depth of attachment by the Congolese elite to precepts of Western democratic theory. The Congolese are well aware that their country has been the

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object of world ridicule. For this reason, elections become all the more important as a redemptive process.

Postponement of the elections will become increasingly difficult, and there seems no possibility of introducing a formula of indirect elections which would pose less of a security problem. Despite the excellent access which the United States enjoys to many top leaders, and their willingness to receive political advice on many issues, we doubt that the Congo government could be dissuaded from holding elections in the next two years, short of a total breakdown of law and order on a scale which made them physically impossible. To seek a different formula for legitimating the organs of government would be to confess inability to enter the civilized world on equal terms with other states.

The broad alternative of centralized authoritarianism appears to be unavailable, given the weakness of the central government and the limited administrative and security capability of the ANC. Also, the ANC leadership shows no disposition at present to assume the unwieldy burden of political responsibility in the Congo. Finally, the UN relationship with the Congo creates unusual requirements for democratic legitimacy, which can be expected to persist for some time despite any reductions in the UN presence.

Provincial Electoral Experience since 1960

There have been since independence local elections in the city of Kikwit (Kwilu) and the province of Cuvette Centrale. Two features of these elections are important:

1) In both cases, the elections were carried out peacefully. In Kikwit calm was maintained in the face of a heated political contest. This suggests that elections may not be a serious threat to public order in areas where provincial institutions are functioning reasonably well. Kwilu and Cuvette Centrale are two of the best-organized and most ably administered provinces in the Congo.

2) In both cases, the elections resulted in strengthening control of the provincial administrations. This suggests that, in provinces with functioning governments, elections will operate to consolidate the position of the incumbents.

Prospects for a Moderate National Party

In light of possible national elections in 1964, there has been considerable recent discussion on the desirability of forming a national party of moderate persuasion. The principle arguments advanced in favor of such a movement may be summarized as follows:

1) Stability in most African states has been

achieved through the mechanism of a single dominant national party, which performs the key functions of national integration and containment of disparate local and ethnic loyalities.

2) The Adoula government has the desirable characteristics of moderation and responsibility. However, it lacks any structure capable of engendering popular support for its policies; there is no linkage between the rulers and ruled, except through the administrative structures of the state. This could be supplied through the organization of a national party committed to the same principles of government as the Adoula regime.

3) The Adoula government is subject to continual harassment and is frequently paralyzed by a fragmented and irresponsible Parliament. It is argued that the creation of a solid national party could assure the government a firm and disciplined parliamentary majority, while permitting the kind of energetic leadership necessary to restore order to the public finances and to "get the country moving again."

Careful analysis of these arguments requires first an understanding of efforts now underway to establish a national party, a look at its possible organization, and a survey of the risks involved.

The idea of a national moderate party is not new. The Belgian administration sought to form a similar movement in 1959-1960, the Parti National du Progrès (PNP). Indeed, the decision to accede to the demands for independence was partly based on the calculation that universal suffrage would operate in favor of a moderate, administration-backed party, rolling up overwhelming majorities in rural areas to compensate for the loss of the cities to more militant groups. The circumstances now are vastly different, but a brief review of the major reasons for the humiliating failure of the PNP still provides material for reflection:

1) The movement was immediately identified with the colonial administration, and discredited as the "Parti des Nègres Payés."

2) The party lacked dynamic, determined leadership prepared to get to the hustings and to contend with the more radical movements on their own terms.

3) As the campaign proceeded, the PNP's prospects began to look so unpromising that major interest groups, such as the large companies, sought to reinsure themselves by making substantial contributions to the radical movements. Ironically, despite clear Belgian sympathy and support for the PNP, a party such as MNC/L enjoyed greatly superior resources by the end of the campaign.

4) "Moderation" does not constitute a dynamic political program in an electoral campaign.

5) The PNP was not a coherent national

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movement, but a weak coalition of numerous local movements. It was not capable of effective, united action.

Recent Efforts to Create a Moderate National Party

The need for a national party is felt by a large segment of the present Congolese leadership. Several efforts are underway:

1) Defense Minister Jerome Anany has been travelling extensively in recent weeks, establishing contacts with local leaders. Anany was born in Lisala (Moyen Congo), but his parents were from Kivu. He was elected as Senator from Kivu in 1960, on a non-party list. He considers Moyen Congo his bastion, but there is reason to doubt how much genuine support he has in that area, or whether he is accepted as a "native son." His choice of Kivu as an electoral constituency in 1960 would suggest the contrary. Anany's prospective party is the Parti Démocratique Congolais (PDC)--already dubbed by its enemies the "Parti des Députés Corrompus." His position as Defense Minister is a key one. It is not yet clear whether he considers the PDC "his" party, or whether his efforts are on behalf of the Prime Minister.

2) Adoula has not yet firmly committed himself to the national party project, but he clearly views the scheme as one he would lead. For all his fine qualities, Adoula does not seem to have the magnetism necessary to make his personality the central feature of the party's image. It seems unlikely that he would lend his active support to the effort to develop a national party unless he were the acknowledged leader.

3) Sûreté Chief Nendaka has also been travelling extensively and seeking to mold his security police force into an effective weapon for the political campaign. Nendaka wants to be elected as a deputy from his Aketi home district in Uélé Province, and then move to the Ministry of the Interior. It is not clear to what extent Nendaka's efforts are coordinated with those of Anany.

4) The "Binza group" feels that it, or its members, should be the organizing committee for a national party. The strength of this caucus derives, however, from its power linkages in Leopoldville, and not from its mass support. It is not clear whether Nendaka's efforts are on behalf of the "Binza group" or himself; Anany is not a member of the consortium.

5) Kamitatu, leader of the Parti Solidaire Africain/Kamitatu (PSA/K), and his top parliamentary lieutenant, Felicien Kimvay, are very interested in the national party project. Kamitatu is a highly ambitious and very able leader. He conditions his participation on a

satisfactory place near the center of the political constellation. He recognizes, however, that his source of political strength is regional (Kwilu), and he probably has no illusions that he himself could organize a national party. The recent PSA/K Congress in Kikwit (June 1963) was explicitly designed to renovate the party and to recreate its rural apparatus, looking toward the electoral campaign.

6) Alphonse Kithima, leader of one of the major labor unions, Confédération des Syndicats Libres Congolais (CSLC), has initiated the Mouvement pour la Defense des Intérêts du Peuple, based upon his union organization. This structure probably does not have enormous potential, but reflects the tendency of the diverse elements in Adoula's entourage to anticipate the formation of a national party by launching their own movements as quickly as possible. It appears that Kithima has Adoula's approval of the project, which is likely to become a link in any national party under Adoula.

Numerous other lesser organizations need not be catalogued. Individually, they are of very little significance; collectively, they are important symptoms of the strong potential for fragmentation inherent in the Congolese polity.

These scattered efforts to achieve a national party may indicate that Adoula has given his tacit assent to the simultaneous pursuit of several initiatives. If so, this may place him once again in the position of the indispensable broker between these groups, clearly indicating the nature of the leadership which the "party" is likely to have. It is not the manner in which dynamic and successful national parties have been created elsewhere in Africa.

The Bargaining Power of the Provinces

In organizing a national movement from Leopoldville, one comes hard against the incontrovertible fact that, in most areas, access to the electorate must pass through the groups and "bosses" entrenched at the provincial level. It would be unthinkable to seek to organize a party in competition with the Abako in Kongo Central; an organizer sent into Uélé without the authorization of President Mambaya would be summarily dealt with. Therefore, the only possible procedure is to undertake negotiations with provincial authorities and solicit their cooperation. Collaboration would come at a price. Provincial authorities will certainly demand substantial concessions to their list of provincial needs. Further, the cooperation probably would be in the form of an electoral alliance, rather than absorption into a national movement, which would then be able to communicate directly with the masses. The kind of national

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party likely to emerge bears many resemblances to an American political party. It would be a loose coalition at the summit level of a series of provincially based power centers.

Possible Coercive Instruments of the Central Government Leaders

The central government possesses certain potential instruments of coercion in the provinces which might be of some use to national party organizers. These include:

1) The ANC. The ANC has sufficient level of discipline and effectiveness as a constabulary in most areas for it to be a potentially decisive force. Mobutu's concept of the ANC's role in the elections is not clear. He has tried hard to preserve the "apolitical" tradition of the ANC, and this approach is shared by most of the senior officers. Accordingly, he will probably resist requests for overt commitment of the ANC to one side or the other. However, the army probably would prevent or limit the use of intimidation and violence by opposition groups in the campaign. In some areas, these techniques played an important role for parties like MNC/L. The ANC could be important in provinces where political fragmentation exists, depending upon how it chose to intervene to halt likely disorders.

2) Sûreté. In Nendaka's hands, this is an overtly political instrument. The Sûreté has the power of arrest and clandestine means of intervening in local situations. It is effectively under central control. The caliber of the Sûreté agents, however, varies substantially from very good to mediocre.

3) Subsidy. The major part of the provincial budget comes from the central government, although this will change somewhat under the new constitution. Theoretically, the threat of a subsidy reduction should be a potent weapon. However, an agreed, automatic formula for calculating the subsidy level exists, and there is not much room for central government manipulation. In general, experience to date shows that, rather than using its financial leverage upon the provinces, the central government permits those provinces which levy the most effective demands or make the most fearsome threats to extract the largest shares.

4) Import quotas. At the moment, these are centrally determined. There is more room for arbitrary decision and manipulation, but the above remarks apply as well to import quotas as to subsidies in general.

5) Patronage. The central government theoretically could reward well-behaved provinces with attractive public works projects. The budgetary situation limits the potential of this approach, unless large new infusions of foreign aid were received. As to employment possibilities, the central government can offer

jobs in Leopoldville to meritorious political workers, but in fact controls very few appointments in the provinces. The central Civil Service Ministry still controls the promotion and ranking of civil servants, on which basis pay scales are calculated. There is, however, no way of stopping the provinces from making their own promotions and paying the persons concerned from their own resources.

6) Judiciary. Pending adoption of the new constitution, the judicial system is still controlled by the central government. In many provinces, highly incriminating dossiers on a number of political figures are in the hands of the judiciary. The Minister of Justice (Bomboko) could decide to pursue some of these cases. The judiciary values its neutrality, however, and would resist becoming a conscious political instrument. Further, there are a good many moonlight entrepreneurs within the Leopoldville establishment. The corruption issue is a two-edged sword.

7) State of emergency. The central government can declare a state of emergency in a province and install a provincial government more to its tastes. A prerequisite for this procedure is access to a faction in the provincial assembly. Where there is near unity behind provincial leadership, this ploy is excluded. Unusual opportunities for intervention existed at the time of the creation of new provinces. The central government appointed commissioners to serve as midwives for the new institutions. In Stanleyville and Bukavu, for example, this power has been used effectively. However, all but a few provinces now have governments, and central government leverage will probably correspondingly shrink.

8) Disputed territories. It may be possible to play one province against another in reaching a decision concerning the fate of the numerous territories disputed between two or three provinces. This, however, is a dangerous game. In rewarding one province and gaining support from its leaders, one incurs corresponding losses in the other.

The Electoral Law

The 1960 elections were organized under the electoral law of March 23, 1960. The law established the administrative districts as electoral units for the Chamber of Representatives, with the number of seats in a district ranging from 4 to 12. For the provincial assemblies, the territory served as the electoral district, with an average of 3 or 4 deputies elected per territory. The choice of a proportional representation system of voting for several seats for each electoral unit was dictated in part by the experience of the 1957 urban elections. They had

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been based on single-member districts. In Leopoldville and Elisabethville, a cohesive and disciplined group of the population provoked great discontent by winning representation far exceeding its numerical strength.

Parties or individuals were permitted to enter lists. The party had the responsibility of listing its candidates in order, perhaps the most difficult task performed by the parties. However, an unusual provision of the law permitted the voter to cast his ballot either for a list or merely for one candidate on the list. There was extensive solicitaton of these "preferential votes" by individual candidates on the party lists, a factor which undermined the effectiveness of party leadership. Another feature of the law permitted the combination of two or more districts in a province into a single electoral constituency. If retained in a new electoral law, this clause theoretically would permit a winner-take-all election, from which a single dominant party could emerge in control of a province.

The 1960 elections were organized under the supervision of the Congolese Executive Colleges, which had been designated at the Brussels Round Table. Control of electoral operations was exercised by special commissions, named by the King and headed by magistrates from Belgium. One commission was created for each administrative district.

Under no circumstances could new elections be organized on the basis of the 1960 law; its wording presumed the pre-independence situation. The Loi Fondamentale stipulates that a new electoral law is necessary for the organization of national elections to replace the initial Parliament, unless it is dissolved before the expiration of its term—which will almost certainly not be the case.

A number of serious difficulties will be encountered in the preparation of a new law. The creation of new provinces and the changes some have made in their administrative subdivisions invalidate the 1960 electoral districts. There have been substantial population movements, especially in Kasai and Katanga. Thus, the pre-1960 census figures can no longer be utilized for establishing the number of seats to which each province will be entitled. The census machinery rests upon the local authorities. Accordingly, the provinces will control the collection of information. The temptation to pad census results will be almost irresistible; one need only cite the inflated population figures claimed by the new provinces in their petitions for recognition in 1962. All urban centers also have experienced a tremendous influx of population. There voting status will pose vexing dilemmas. In addition, with the removal of administrative controls on population movements, cities like Leopoldville will experience

agonizing problems if contending parties bring in battalions of voters from the countryside. In the final analysis, control of the elections probably will lie with provincial and local authorities. The stake which the political elite of the country has in the elections cannot be over-emphasized. Because of its impact on the outcome of elections, the electoral law certainly will be a major concern for all political leaders.

Conclusions

A new electoral campaign would run the risk of creating a serious security problem in many areas of the country at a time when tranquility is at last returning to almost the whole nation. Disorder is not likely where effective provincial administrations are operating. However, there is sufficient political confusion or latent local hostility to create a real threat to security in the following provinces: Lac Leopold II, Moyen Congo, Hant Congo, Maniema, Kivu Central, Katanga Oriental, Nord-Katanga, Sud-Congo (Lualaba), Sankuru, Sud-Kasai, Luluabourg (Kasai Central), and Unité Kasaienne. In addition, nearly all the disputed territories would be powder kegs during an electoral campaign.

It is not likely that there would be eruptions at all these points. However, disorders in even a few of them would severely strain the ANC. Especially dangerous, in our view, is the threat to the key productive area of southern Katanga. The threat there is a latent problem stemming from the complete political vacuum in both Katanga Oriental (East Katanga) and Sud-Congo (Lualaba). It is not at all certain that this danger will have been removed by 1964.

The organizers of a national party will be wheedlers, not commanders, of the support of provincial leaders. The advantages which the latter enjoy sitting athwart the lines of communication to the electorate would not be compensated for in an electoral campaign by any corresponding weapon of intimidation in the hands of the present leaders of the central government. Thus, if it comes into existence, the national party will be a loose coalition between Leopoldville leaders and leaders of provincial governments.

A moderate national party would probably labor under the onus of identification with the American Embassy—even if there were no active US encouragement and support for such a party. Conceivably a united opposition group might be built around an anti-American theme, offering the Soviets opportunities for electoral involvement.

If, however, a loosely organized, radical, national opposition party emerged in reaction to the national moderate movement, it would be hampered by a) pressures which

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provincial leaders aligned with the national moderate party could apply, and b) the likely use of the ANC in many areas to suppress disorderly radical political activity. Sections of a radically oriented party are most likely to emerge in provinces where effective government does not yet exist. In those areas such a party could pose a serious threat to candidates of the moderate national party who are likely to be exposed to physical dangers.

Because it would be, in fact, a loose coalition between central and provincial government leaders, a moderate national party would likely dissolve into its component units shortly after the elections and would thus lack the power to promote national integration or the capacity to link the central government and the population at large. Management of Parliament would continue to be an exasperating process; the new party would not give Adoula (or a successor) the disciplined majority in Parliament necessary for dynamic executive leadership under a parliamentary regime.

However, a moderate national party under present Leopoldville leaders and with the backing of a core group of provincial leaders from stable areas who enjoy relatively firm control over their local electorate probably would emerge with a narrow majority of seats in Parliament, obviating the danger, at least for the time being, of a more extreme replacement for Adoula. In the accompanying table, we propose a very rough approximation of the votes a moderate national party might obtain in 1964 elections on the basis of present trends. There are a number of areas, like Kongo Central, where the results are preordained. There are others, like South Katanga, where prediction is virtually impossible. The disputed territories and the failure of the new provinces to coincide with the old districts make it impossible to know exactly how many representatives each province will have. Thus, no mathematical precision is claimed for this table; we are adrift on a sea of approximation:

Rough Estimate of Possible Popular Vote Favoring Moderate National Political Party in 1964 Elections a (as of June 1963)

Former District	New Province	Population of Former District	Number of Deputies b
Kwilu	Kwilu	1,148	9c
Kwango	Kwango	466	4 (✓)
Bas Congo } Cataractes }	Kongo Central	{ 412 { 439	4 4 (✓)
Ubangi	Ubangi	517	5
Mongala } Equater } } Tshuapa }	Moyen Congo Cuvette Centrale	{ 520 { 312 { 397	5 3 4
Ituri	Kibali-Ituri	652	6 (✓)
Bas-Uélés } Haut-Uélés }		{ 468 { 582	4 (✓) 6
Tanganika	North Katanga	397	4
Kabinda	Lomami and Sud-Kasai	480	8d

66 (✓ 4)=70e

a. Based on population figures for former districts of the ex-Belgian Congo, tables 1 and 2, pp. 133, 134, Tableau Général de la Démographie Congolaise, Ministry of Plan and Economic Coordination, Statistical Services, Leopoldville, July 1961.

b. The number of deputies is computed on the basis of one deputy per 100,000 population, as provided under the Loi Fondamentale. The UN draft constitution now under consideration by Parliament, however, provides one seat for each 50,000 population, which would double the size of the lower house.

c. Because PSA/Gizenga continues to have popular support among a segment of the Kwilu Province population, the estimated number of deputies has been reduced by 2.

d. Migration since 1960 of Baluba populations from Katanga, Unité Kasaienne and Kasai Central (Luluabourg) to Sud-Kasai has resulted in an important increase in the population of that area. The estimated number of deputies accordingly has been increased by 3.

e. There are nominally 137 seats in the lower house; hence 70 seats would provide a narrow majority for the national party.

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VII. THE POLITICS OF FORCE:
CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY (ANC), POLICE, AND SÛRETÉ

The role of force necessarily looms large in a political community like the Congo, which lacks a consensus, a sense of national identity, and adequate legitimation for its political structures. Indeed, the military throughout the underdeveloped world until recently had been greatly underestimated. As Lucien Pye observes:

> Only a few years ago it was generally assumed that the future of the newly emerged states would be determined largely by the activities of their Westernized intellectuals, their socialistically inclined bureaucrats, their nationalist ruling parties, and possibly their menacing Communist parties. It occurred to few students of the underdeveloped regions that the military might become the critical group in the course of national-building.[19]

In the stages of political development, there are certain characteristics of the military which are of positive value. Edward Shils indicates that the army is ubiquitous, recruits from all parts of the country, and, most important of all, is national in its symbolism.[20] Pye adds that armies as rationalized structures are capable of relating means to ends.[21]

The experience of military service provides a mechanism for an intensive acculturative experience for the recruit, and a shift from traditional to rational behavior. The good soldier, in short, becomes a modernized man. The structure of discipline in the army provides a relatively high degree of psychological security. Acculturation in the army proceeds in a very different environment from that of the urban center with its anxieties and tensions.

The ANC and Its Antecedent

The nature of the Force Publique, the predecessor of the ANC, was sharply different from that of other armies in tropical Africa. Unlike Britain, France, and Portugal, Belgium sent no metropolitan troops for the colonial con-

19. "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in John Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, 1962.

20. "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," ibid, p. 32.

21. Ibid, p. 74.

quest. Nor could the Congo Free State long bear the cost of recruiting "auxiliaries" along the West Coast of Africa or in Zanzibar. The Congo had to be quickly organized "to conquer itself." Although the Force Publique was formally founded in 1888, by 1897 it numbered 14,000 men of whom 12,000 were Congolese. Throughout most of its existence, its strength was somewhat over 20,000. The European complement of officers and non-commissioned officers was small. During the most difficult part of the conquest, the Arab Wars of 1892-1894, there were only 120 Europeans with the army in all of the Congo. In 1960, about 1,100 European officers and non-coms were in charge of 24,000 African non-coms and soldiers.

Ethnic scrambling. The Belgians endured a searing experience when in 1895 the "Batetela" tribesmen of the Luluabourg garrison mutinied and killed their commanding officer. The "Batetela" in the Dhanis column marching toward the Nile revolted in 1897. A third mutiny near Boma in 1900 was again attributed to "Batetela". The lesson drawn from these experiences was that the army had to be ethnically integrated very carefully to prevent domination by any single ethnic group at any unit level, even the squad. The army with its very small corps of expatriate officers could be a secure instrument only if it were so scrambled that no group resistance could emerge. Discipline could then operate on the individual, who by himself posed little threat. The Belgians could bank upon the postulate that being Congolese or even African would be an insufficient factor of solidarity for the Negro troop to unite against the white officer.

The impetus for ethnic integration received renewed life when the Luluabourg garrison again mutinied in 1944. The inquiries on this disaster showed there had been dereliction in the application of the scrambling principle. Instructions were reiterated that at least four tribes had to be represented in each platoon.

In the early days, the Free State tended to concentrate its recruiting of soldiers among the so-called "martial races," the "Bangala," Batetela-Bakusu, and Azande tribes. The great mutinies showed the dangers of this policy to the colonial system, and later levies were distributed throughout the Congo. Thus in 1960, the composition of the army, probably more than any other institution, including the civil service, reflected the ethnic composi-

tion of the population as a whole.

Loyalty to the nation. There was considerable effort to instill in the Force Publique loyalty to itself and to the symbols of the colony, such as the Belgian crown. "Congo uni, pays fort" was the slogan of the army in 1959-1960. The indoctrination was carried out through an active troop information program, newspapers, and veterans' associations. Much of this esprit was assimilated by the troops, and it is very visible in the attitudes of the officer corps today. The army is not partial to the pan-African brand of nationalism, but it has a loyalty to the whole Congolese political community exceeding that of most other sectors of Congolese society.

The French had an entirely different approach in the military field. Africa was regarded as a vast manpower reservoir for the French Army. In War War I France mobilized 181,000 tropical African troops. Even during peacetime, 100,000 black Africans served in the military. However, the military organization was not related to the territorial units which later became separately independent. The bulk of the soldiers came from the interior, rather than the coastal regions.

In areas formerly under British rule, only Sudan had an army of its own. However, recruitment in West and East Africa provided at least the embryos of national armies. In West Africa, enlisted ranks were recruited mainly in the northern regions, especially of Ghana and Nigeria. The small African element in the officer corps came mostly from the coastal regions, where education was more accessible.

Thus the Congo army was much more a national army than other tropical African military forces. The careful ethnic integration and sense of national mission enhanced its potential role in the nation-building process. The failure of political parties or representative institutions to develop in the Congo set the stage for a de facto abdication to the civil service and the army. In the rest of independent tropical Africa, the scales have thus far tipped in the other direction. The political sector has been substantially better organized, and the armies much less so.

The Shock of Independence

The events of independence shook the Congolese National Army (ANC) to its very foundations. Overnight the Belgian exodus removed the whole of its officer corps. Soon thereafter, the emergence of four separate armies reflected the political fragmentation of the Congo. In 1960-1961 leaderless bands of mutineers committed atrocities without number. The new Congolese officers had a daily battle to

restore discipline. Nothing is more destructive to an army than a successful mutiny; the mutiny of the entire Congolese army against its officer corps is a virtually unique phenomenon.

The immediate cause for the breakdown in the army was the obstinacy of its last European commander, General Janssens, who refused any real acceleration in the Africanization program he had devised. At the end of 1958, when Belgian policy-makers were counting on independence in five years, a scheme was announced that would have produced 14 second lieutenants in ten years. Preparation was literally from the cradle up. The candidates, in the initial plan, were to be chosen in primary school. Some meager additional concessions were made in the months before independence, in the face of a growing malaise in the army. However, these were hopelessly out of touch with the psychological requirements of power transfer. The new officers were to be newly recruited, not selected from the non-coms. Under this plan there would have been no Congolese officers before 1962.

Against this background the troops grimly observed the spectacular promotions which were available in civilian sectors and which the army did not share. The disintegration of the colonial order had kept the troops in almost constant action for 18 months. The army also had been the object of intensive solicitation by political leaders, who feared that in the hands of European officers it would be a neo-colonial instrument.

On July 5 the ANC mutiny began. On July 8 General Janssens was relieved of his command. Two days later the Congo government decided to Africanize the entire command structure. Victor Lundula was named Commander-in-Chief, with the rank of general, and Joseph-Désiré Mobutu was named a colonel and Chief-of-Staff. This formula reversed the Belgian plan through a massive promotion of the non-commissioned grades. Apparently the central authorities hoped only to exercise some control over the nomination of field grade officers. Company grade officers were chosen by the garrisons themselves, apparently by elections where there was more than one non-com who was a logical candidate. On July 9 government delegations were sent to different parts of the Congo to superintend the installation of the new officers.

During the following months the ANC was for the most part a "disorderly rabble." The new officers had little authority over their troops. Political figures tried to make use of bands of soldiers from their regional or ethnic groups. A result of this disintegration was Mobutu's coup d'état of September, which was made possible by his firm control over a very small number of men. The bulk of the

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army was capable of united action only in support of regular pay and in resistance to UN moves to disarm the ANC. In the chaos reigning in Leopoldville at that time, Mobutu's ability to position a few hundred disciplined, armed men proved sufficient to seize power. Lundula was dismissed by Kasavubu at the same time as Lumumba. Lundula did not immediately resist the move, enabling Mobutu to move into the top spot and ten days later to proclaim his coup.

Mobutu's Emergence

Mobutu energetically set to work providing himself with an officer corps on which he could depend and which had some rudimentary training. Only a minimum of Belgian assistance was available. After the mutiny, only seven Belgian officers, three of whom were chaplains, remained with the troops.

Mobutu had been able to exercise some influence over the designation of officers in the Leopoldville, Equateur, and Luluabourg garrisons, which gave him relatively secure control over a portion of the army. In Stanleyville, the struggle for the 3rd groupement was crucial to the power contest between Lumumbist elements, seeking to regroup at Stanleyville, and those elements disposed to accept the authority of the College of Commissioners at Leopoldville. The contest lasted from September to November 1960, with the Lumumbists finally winning. On November 26, 1960, General Lundula arrived in Stanleyville and took command. Shortly thereafter, the Gizenga government announced its claim to be the sole legal authority, with Lundula and the 3rd groupement under its orders. Thus, by the end of 1960, the ANC had broken into two groups, one at Stanleyville under Lundula, and one at Leopoldville under Mobutu. Meanwhile, South Kasai and Katanga had created new armies from scratch. No less than four armies roamed the land.

Between the two fragments of the ANC proper, the Leopoldville group by 1961 was clearly somewhat better led and disciplined. The heart of Mobutu's army was the 800-man paracommando battalion stationed at Leopoldville. The other detachments at Leopoldville and Thysville were also under reasonable control. By 1961 the troops in Equateur had ceased to be a serious menace.

Lundula's army. Lundula himself is an officer of considerable wisdom and integrity. His allegiance to Stanleyville undoubtedly grew from a sincere conviction that legality lay with the Stanleyville government. In Stanleyville he faced several handicaps:

1) Although Leopoldville continued paying this insurrectionary group, wages often did not reach outlying units, especially in Kivu, North Katanga, and northeast Kasai.

2) Lundula's control over much of his army was tenuous. He never was able to check the units in Kivu, Kasai, and North Katanga. Even among those in Orientale, he faced the problem of "political officers," who were susceptible to direct influence by Gizenga and other MNC/L leaders. He opposed politicization of the 3rd groupement, but could not prevent it.

3) Lundula lacked access to external material support. Beginning in 1961 the benefits of the overseas training of the new ANC officers loyal to Leopoldville began to be felt. Further, the Leopoldville group received some foreign assistance in the form of military equipment.

The Katanga gendarmerie. In Katanga, the first act of the Tshombe government was to call in Belgian troops to disarm and expel ANC detachments. Under Belgian Major Crèvecoeur, a Katanga gendarmerie was created at top speed, starting from a nucleus of only 300 former Force Publique troops ethnically compatible with the Conakat regime. There was substantial Belgian technical assistance. All of the 25 small aircraft of the Force Publique were flown to Katanga and placed at Tshombe's disposal. By early September 1960 the Katanga gendarmerie had received 100 tons of arms and munitions, 89 officers from the Force Publique, 326 junior officers and non-coms from the Belgian army who volunteered for detached service in Katanga, and 70 agents of the Belgian gendarmerie. Beginning in late 1960 European mercenaries were recruited for a special "international company"; by mid-1961 there was said to be nearly 500 of these. The exact total strength of the Katanga gendarmerie is not known. Estimates range from 11,000 to 19,000.

The South Kasai army. The kingdom of South Kasai also organized its own gendarmerie. In 1961 it had some 3,000 men and was assisted by nine European officers. Its commanding "general" was a 22 year-old youth, Floribert Dinanga.

Reunification of the ANC

One of the most difficult problems in reunifying the Congo has been knitting together the military fragments. In the case of the two wings of the ANC, a major obstacle was the question of who was the "legal" Commander, Lundula or Mobutu. The government of reconcilation emerging from the Lovanium parliament did not immediately resolve the problem. It was not until November 1961 that Lundula agreed to come to Leopoldville to accept Mobutu's authority as Commander. When he did, however, the end was in sight for Gizenga's campaign to re-establish a dissident power center at Stanleyville. In De-

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cember 1961 Lundula cooperated with the central government in dismantling the cabal of Gizengist officers in Bukavu that was a constant threat to public order. It was Lundula who finally arrested Gizenga in January 1962. Thus the last major center of ANC dissidence was eliminated. Slowly, during the course of 1962, "political officers" in the 3rd groupement were transferred. The process was accelerated in late 1962 when Lundula was replaced by the able and energetic Col. Leonard Mulamba.

Absorption of the South Kasai gendarmes has not posed insuperable problems. By mid-1963 the majority were integrated into ANC units. The remainder apparently may join the ANC if they so desire.

Mobutu has opposed complete integration of the Katanga gendarmes. They are so numerous that the ethnic regional balance of the ANC would be upset. Approximately 1,300 have been brought into the ANC. The rest are presumably now "technologically unemployed."

ANC Gendarmerie Function

Of great political importance is the fact that, in contrast to the general practice in former French Africa, the ANC is responsible not only for external security, but also serves as a national gendarmerie. This means that in addition to being stationed in approximately 12 major military camps, ANC detachments are posted on gendarme duty in each of about 125 territories. Ironically, during the 1954-1959 period there was a prolonged debate within the colonial administration on whether the gendarmerie role should be reassigned to the territorial police, under provincial jurisdiction. The army finally won this debate. Had the decision been otherwise, there would be little real power left today to the central government. Since to date the external security mission is largely theoretical, the key function of the army remains its constabulary role.

The Security Problem

Evaluating the role of the ANC in the political system entails examination of the Congo's security problem. The Congo alone of African states has experienced bloodshed on a massive scale since independence. There is no way to estimate the violent deaths since 1960. No one will ever know, for example, how many died in North Katanga. A reasonable guess would be about 100,000 for the Congo as a whole, including perhaps 100 Europeans. We examine the categories of violence and proceed to an analysis of the present dimensions of the disorder threat.

Post-independence violence can be usefully divided into several categories:

1) Anti-European Acts

a) Violence associated with the July 1960 ANC mutiny. For the most part, the civilian population did not participate in these atrocities, except in the Bas-Congo and the Tshuapa District of Equateur. Actual deaths were few; less than two dozen Europeans lost their lives. Men were forced to walk barefoot and were spat upon. Women were violated in the presence of their husbands and children. Priests and nuns were paraded nude. These acts were infused with the sadism and wanton cruelty of mob behavior, but their symbolic humiliation of European colonial society is also striking.

b) Abuses and intimidation of various sorts associated with the Kashamura regime in Kivu, January-March 1961. There were few casualties, but the entire European population crossed the border into Ruanda.

c) A narrowly averted St. Bartholomew's Day massacre in Stanleyville when the news of Lumumba's assassination became known. Lundula alone saved the European population of Stanleyville (about 1,500) on that February night.

d) Acts of savagery in Luluabourg, Kindu, and Kongolo, November 1961-January 1962. These are all directly linked with the abortive ANC invasion of Katanga. In Luluabourg a search for a radio set which had been transmitting to Katanga information on ANC troop movements degenerated into a drunken orgy of rape and looting. In Kindu 13 Italian aviators, suspected of being Belgian parachutists, were slaughtered, cut into small pieces, and eaten (the present Minister of Finance in the Maniema provincial government reportedly partook of the feast). In Kongolo 16 Catholic missionaries were massacred, purportedly for their Conakat sympathies. These incidents demonstrated the danger constituted by ANC units when under the tensions of combat. They had a pervasive fear of "Belgian paratroopers" and European mercenaries.

e) Southern Katanga. Since the arrival in the area of the ANC following the defeat of Katanga in January 1963, there has been a series of incidents, and several Europeans have been killed. Individual acts, the killings have not involved collective rampages as did earlier ANC incidents. The ANC retains a deep-seated fear and hostility toward Katanga's European population. ANC troops recall that European troops earlier threw the ANC out of Katanga. European officers and mercenaries were the backbone of the Katanga gendarmerie, which inflicted a series of humiliating defeats on the ANC, notably at Kongolo.

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2) Anti-civilian Acts

a) The ANC invasion of Sud Kasai in August 1960 degenerated into a massacre of several thousand Baluba.

b) Katanga gendarmes went into action against Baluba irregulars in North Katanga in September 1960. After a brief, UN-imposed lull in December-March, the offensive resumed until it was again halted by the UN in late April 1961. Apparently a minimum of 20,000 civilians were slaughtered.

c) Serious hostilities broke out between the ANC and irregulars of the Ngweshi (Bashi tribe) dynasty (Kivu) in March and May 1961. The number of deaths was reported as 800.

d) The South Kasai gendarmerie caused numerous casualties during incursions in the Dimbelegne-Lake Mukamba area of Kasai in early 1961.

e) ANC patrols acted similarly in the same area shortly thereafter.

f) In April 1962 approximately 70 casualties ensued from ANC operations in suppressing a local insurrection by a religious sect, mpeve, near Mangai, Kwilu.

3) Recent ANC Incidents

In 1963 there have been three major incidents involving the ANC: at Kakenge (near Mweka) in Unité Kasaienne, in the area west of the Bushimaya River in Sud-Kasai, and in Boma, Kongo Central.

a) Kakenge. There were a reported 400 death, including those of the two Europeans, in these incidents. The blame for this violence appears to lie not with the ANC but with Lulua Chief Kalamba and the present Luluabourg government. Kalamba, in a radio speech September 17, called for the Lulua to press outward in several directions to expand the Luluabourg provincial boundaries. Two Europeans were murdered by Kalamba's thugs. The UN magistrate in Luluabourg has in his possession a letter from Luluabourg President Lwakabwanga, an ocolyte of Kalamba, ordering the assassination. When armed bands of Lulua youth pressed toward the Mweka area, which had been awarded to Unité Kasaienne province, the ANC intervened. A patrol was ambushed, and several soldiers were killed. At this point, the ANC intervention became brutal. But the brutality was provoked, and the action was clearly in preservation of law and order and to put down an insurrectionary act.

b) Sud-Kasai. In January 1963 ANC patrols were dispatched to deal with armed bands of youthful supporters of former South Kasai ruler Albert Kalonji that were roaming the countryside. (Their arms reportedly had been provided by Luluabourg Minister Mukenge, a close relative of Chief Kalamba of Luluabourg.) The ANC was attacked and went on a rampage. Casualty estimates range from 30 to 12,000. It is indisputable that villages over a large area were burned and that the entire population fled into the bush. In this instance the ANC was acting on behalf of the legally constituted government of Sud-Kasai, but its brutality seemed out of proportion to the seriousness of the provocation.

c) Boma. In March 1963 a riot occurred between ANC troops and the civilian population of Boma. There were a number of injuries, but no deaths. Triggered by a banal incident involving a parrot and some women in a bar, the clash was based on latent hostility that had been developing for some time. The intensely self-conscious Bakongo tribesmen at Boma regarded the ANC as a "foreign" force camped in their midst. "Bangala go home" slogans were scrawled on walls. Local hotels, the ANC alleged, refused lodging to officers. Soldiers could not find the sort of recreational activity to which they were accustomed. At the same time, the administrative demotion of Boma from a district to a territory, which followed the creation of the new provinces, resulted in a claim by the ANC commander that he out-ranked the territoral administrator. Mutual smoldering grievances ignited. The transfer of the local ANC commander and the institution of joint local police-ANC patrols seem to have considerably reduced the tension.

These recent incidents do not constitute evidence of generalized indiscipline in the army. There is a sharp contrast between the incidents in Kasai, where the ANC was guilty of an excess of brutality in defense of legally constituted government, and the anarchic acts of 1960-1961, where the ANC was a threat to legal government.

4) Political Assassination

There was a wave of murders in Elisabeth-ville, Bakwanga, and Stanleyville in February 1961. Although there had been a number of crimes of this nature in late 1960, the virtually simultaneous execution of 26 leading figures in early 1961 represented the real low point of the Congo crisis. Since then, this technique has generally ceased to be used, except for two members of Tshombe's cabinet who died under mysterious circumstances. A symptom of the total impasse of the political system at that time, the situation has now clearly changed.

5) Ethnic Clashes

Tribal disorders on a massive and serious scale have been restricted mainly to ex-Kasai

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Province. There, conflict was triggered by Lulua-Baluba animosity, with peripheral groups drawn into the maelstrom. The bulk of the disorders have been on the fringes of the homelands of these two large, aggressive groups.

The most recent example of disorder in this category occurred in Sankuru Province in May 1963. The hostilities there involved two subgroups of the Batetela ethnic cluster, whose principal differentiating element (see chapter II) seems to be whether or not they were subjected to acculturative contact with the Zanzibar Arabs in the late 19th century. Trouble of this sort may reoccur in many areas if an effort is not made to settle the question of the disputed territories.

6) Present Security Threats

Southern Katanga is the only area of the Congo where security remains a matter of immediate concern. Hostility between the ANC and the Katanga Europeans remains sharp, and there is a threat of serious incidents, possibly leading to a European exodus when the UN troop buffer is removed.

The whole of ex-Kasai province remains an area for concern, but disorder there is less of a threat to the fundamental stability of the country. Security of the main rail line will become more important when Katanga copper again is exported on this route. However, the UN forces have never been able to contain the sort of disorder which occurred in Kasai. Accordingly, UN troop withdrawal from Kasai may not make an important difference.

The ANC as a Force Promoting Stability

Although the exact figures are unknown at the present time, the ANC has about 35,000 men. On the whole, and excluding troops in southern Katanga, the ANC has been a positive element in the political system. It has developed a nucleus of officers of real ability. It retains the vital principle of ethnic integration at all levels, which operates to immunize it against local and political influences and gives it a commitment to the nation that is shared by few elements of Congolese society. In most areas, sufficient discipline has been restored so that it is not a real threat to the expatriate population or to the government. It is capable in many areas of acting as an adequate constabulary in the interests of the central government. It would be of little use in protecting the Congo from external threats -- but there is no pressing immediate need for it to be more than a constabulary force.

ANC Retraining

Plans for retraining the ANC are finally crystallizing. A retraining program was drawn up by a US Special Military Advisory Team headed by Col. Michael Greene.[22] Although the program has gone through several subsequent metamorphoses, many of its salient features remain. The report concluded that key emphasis should be placed upon the training of the officer corps:

In the final analysis, the ANC can accomplish its own basic individual and unit training provided that it receives assistance in training of its officers, an increased number of foreign military advisors placed in specific positions, increased school quotas in foreign officer and specialist schools, observer/orientation visits in foreign countries, and some material and equipment support to fill known gaps and to effect modernization.

Following abortive efforts to obtain from the UN a commitment to coordinate ANC retraining, an ad hoc consortium was devised to carry out the program. Belgium agreed to provide over 100 officers to train the ANC; Israel undertook to provide paratroop instruction in Israel; and the United States will furnish equipment and other material support. Several other countries, including Italy, interested in aiding in ANC and other military training, subsequently may make firm commitments.

Because under current plans the bulk of the training personnel will be supplied by Belgium, the program presumably will bear a strong Belgian stamp. As a result of prolonged uncertainty as to the extent of international cooperation in the scheme, the precise details have remained vague. However, there apparently has been considerable divergence of views among interested parties as to how the retraining would operate. On one hand, a simple reinforcement of technical, consultative personnel in headquarters positions was recommended. On the other, the placement of Belgian officers in the regular command structure of the ANC, even down to the small unit level, has been proposed. Until very recently, the Belgian military group seems to have desired the latter, while the ANC leaders preferred to use Belgian personnel as advisers.

If real value is to be derived from the retraining program, the foreign role must go beyond a mere presence behind headquarters

22. Report of Special Military Advisory Team, Republic of the Congo, July 23, 1962. (CONFIDENTIAL)

desks. However, there is no possibility that Belgian officers can resume command functions without engendering very serious tensions among both the officers and the troops. The Congolese officers are insecure in their new status and are keenly opposed to any infringement of their prerogatives. Therefore, a careful delineation of the Belgian officers' relationships with the ANC officer corps is crucial. A model of effective operation is provided by Col. Dekoster in Stanleyville. He never left in 1960, and he has worked unobtrusively with Col. Mulamba, the Stanleyville commander. It is generally recognized that he made a major contribution to the re-establishment of discipline in the 3rd groupement, without ever seeking to intervene directly.

The notion of retraining, we believe, should be viewed in perspective. At times "retraining" seems to have ben discussed as a redemptive process to produce a profound metamorphosis in the ANC. It is probably a mistake, however, to regard the program in terms of a "before" and "after" caricature. Without the program the army has already made considerable progress toward restoring its discipline and developing a command structure. The more intensive dose of technical assistance, which the retraining program essentially entails, will probably make a real contribution to the acceleration of this regenerative process. However, the ANC will not become in six months an effective army. The ANC will continue to be brutal—as it was under the Belgian administration. Its interventions will result in unnecessarily high casualties among the civilian population. Retraining's chief accomplishment is likely to be consolidation of the gains already made in placing in the hands of the central government a reliable constabulary force capable of maintaining domestic order and preserving the supremacy of central power.

The ANC Officer Corps

The ANC officer corps is a relatively unknown elite group of considerable potential political importance. The officers constitute a very special sociological group. Both before and after independence they have been very far removed from the administrative bourgeoisie which rules in the political spheres.

In the Force Publique, the career noncoms lived with their families in military camps. They were seldom posted to their home areas and generally were transferred too frequently to develop any network of relationships in their garrision areas. Soldiers frequently took wives from outside their own tribes. With the exceptions of Generals Mobutu and Lundula, virtually the only top officers who were brought back from civilian life, the officers of the ANC have not been involved in the social-po-

litical circuits of Leopoldville or the provincial capitals. Lundula was in the Force Publique for only 30 months during World War II, and Mobutu left in 1956, after seven years' service.

As a whole, the officer corps is apolitical. The political elements present in the 3rd groupement during the Gizenga regime at Stanleyville have been removed or neutralized. There is little evidence of the militant, radical nationalism advocated by the officer corps in the Middle East and in some other areas, although this may emerge among the new generation of officers, and it was present in elementary form among those purged from the 3rd groupement. However, the army mentality today is that of the technocrat, not the political organizer.

For analytical purposes, the officer corps may be divided into four categories:

1) A small group of former sergeants personally loyal to Mobutu, and with long service in the Force Publique. These number no more than ten. They are typified by Col. Louis Bobozo, who was designated ANC commander in reintegrated Katanga. Bobozo has more than 30 years of military service and entered the army at a time when little education was available. He has an imposing military presence. However, he lacks the education and imagination to exercise effectively a top-level command responsibility.

2) A larger group of younger, better-educated field grade officers, most of whom had considerable Force Publique service. These are exemplified by such dynamic and capable officers as Maj. Joseph ("The Terrible") Tshatshi, who organized the famous paracommando battalion; Col. Leonard Mulamba, commander of the 3rd groupement in Stanleyville; and Maj. Jacques Puati, the 23 year-old Chief-of-Staff. This group seems to be eclipsing the old sergeants, who played their crucial role in the 1960-1962 period. This group has had very little experience outside the Congo, since Mobutu has never been able to spare its members for prolonged periods. Yet they clearly have sufficient education to benefit greatly from advanced officer courses abroad.

3) There are more than 300 very young officers, with little military service but with substantially more formal education, who, since 1960, have received several months of training in Belgium or elsewhere. Seventeen have completed the Belgian military academy program.

Clear signs are visible of a coming conflict between these men and the older, former non-coms. The elders point to the lack of practical field experience of the new officers and insist that they can achieve responsible positions only after a prolonged apprenticeship. The new officers are equally convinced

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of their superior endowments in education and training and are frustrated to find access to high rank blocked by former non-coms.

4) A substantial group of mediocre officers fits into none of the above categories. They are most nearly comparable to those in category 2 above, but lack leadership abilities.

The Sûreté

Another coercive instrument available to the central government is the Sûreté. In colonial days this omnipresent, clandestine force had the mission of preserving internal security and overseeing immigration and the movements of persons. It had 81 European agents and an enormous network of occasional "informers." The official definition of the Sûreté mission is today unchanged, but its actual role has altered vastly.

The potential of the Sûreté was early recognized by Lumumba, who put one of his trusted lieutenants in charge. The Sûreté was ordered to report directly to the Prime Minister's office, rather than to the Ministry of the Interior. Since no Congolese had access to the inner circle of Sûreté operations before 1960, the independent government had to organize the service from scratch. Lumumba was not in power long enough to advance very far in this task, although in the disorderly days of 1960 various private persons operated under the guise of Sûreté agents.

In September 1960 the College of Commissioners entrusted the direction of the Sûreté to Victor Nendaka. From the outset, Nendaka, a resolute and able man who has put to good use the Belgian and US support he has received, established the special branch as an autonomous agency. He first consolidated the structure in Leopoldville. By late 1961 the Sûreté began to operate effectively in the provinces.

A major crisis arose when MNC/L leader Christophe Gbenye became Minister of the Interior in the first Adoula government. He made a determined effort to bring the Sûreté under his control. In December 1961 he announced that Nendaka had been relieved. However, Nendaka responded by surrounding the Interior Ministry with his agents, and Gbenye had to concede defeat. Since then, there has been no real challenge to the autonomous position of the Sûreté and its direct relationship to the Prime Minister.

At present, the Sûreté has an estimated 168 persons in its inner network. Sûreté detachments are present in every provincial capital. In all cases but one, the chief provincial Sûreté agent is not a native of the province in which he serves. Although the calibre

of personnel varies from excellent to very poor, the Sûreté has emerged as a potent instrument under effective central government control. It possesses its own communications network and has come to work increasingly closely with the ANC. The Sûreté has the power of arrest and the capability for involvement in a broad range of sub rosa activities. Its excellent files on the dubious financial transactions of many political figures provide another element of leverage. A main arbiter in Leopoldville, the Sûreté is also a crucila instrument of the central government in limiting the extent of provincial autonomy.

The Police

The other important instrument of coercion available in the Congo is the provincial police. The one element of force in the hands of provincial authorities, the police are a major factor in the evolving relationship between the provinces and the central government.

The present provincial police force is an outgrowth of the pre-independence Territorial Police. Organized in 1926 as a corps distinct from the Force Publique, and specially trained for the responsibilities normally vested in a police force, it reflected the growing complexity of colonial society after the pacification phase. With the emergence of provincial urban centers, the necessity arose for a force trained in the enforcement of criminal law and in policing the rapidly expanding African quarters surrounding the European outposts. Two important procedures were adopted that have decisively affected the role of the police in the independent Congo:

1) The police forces were placed under the direct authority of the provincial governors rather than the Governor-General, thus establishing the tradition of a provincial, rather than a national, role.

2) Recruitment has been local rather than national. Unlike the ANC, the police forces are directly related to the populations which they serve.

During the colonial period, a detachment of police, commanded by a European police commissioner and under the authority of the Territorial Administrator, was posted at each territorial seat. Unarmed local police also were recruited and commanded by the chiefs of the Circonscriptions Indigènes (CI). These detachments were in addition to the Force Publique platoons, and the exact delineation of the respective jurisdictions of the territorial and CI police was always somewhat blurred.

In the post-World War II years police strength usually remained near a figure of 6,000. In the year before independence there was a sharp increase. By early 1960 the force

included 8,927 Congolese police and 272 Belgian commissioners. There were no Congolese police commissioners before independence, and no serious plan was elaborated for accelerated training.

Although in 1960 there was no mutiny of the police comparable to that of the ANC, the disorders of independence hit the police harder than it did the army. Nearly all the police commissioners—except those in Katanga—left. Thus the force was as leaderless as the ANC, although not as a result of its own insubordination. Belgian sources who have worked with the police estimate that half the 1960 force was absorbed into the ANC during the large-scale army recruitment in 1960-1962. The army offered better and more regular pay. African police commissioners were designated by the provincial Ministers of the Interior, frequently on a political basis. In this respect the police stand in sharp contrast to the ANC, where political criteria played very little role in the massive promotions of 1960.

The present status and possible reorganization of the police form the subject of a recent extensive survey by an AID team which spent April-June 1963 in the Congo. Although reliable figures on present strength are unavailable, the AID team estimates there are about 22,000 police. Most of the police, unlike the army, have been recruited since 1960 and have never known the training or discipline of the old Territorial Police. Dressed in shabby uniforms and frequently under incompetent or venal leadership, the police are a sorry force.

In many areas provincial authorities have used police forces as an avowedly political instrument. One example is the recent invasion and occupation of disputed territories by Lac Leopold II and Lomami provincial police. Another is Stanleyville, where the ANC has been forced to supplant the police because of the political orientation and ineptness of the latter. In Leopoldville the PSA Minister of the Interior of former Leopoldville Province had inflated the police forces with recruits from Kwilu in a transparent effort to solidify PSA predominance at the provincial level. An unstated objective of central government Interior Minister Maboti (a Mukongo) in dismissing the entire Leopoldville city force following a brief mutiny in

May 1963 was to rid the capital of the Kwilu policemen. In Luluabourg the police force is a potent instrument of the vicious Kalamba-Lwakabwanga clique. Its commissioner is notorious for the magnitude of his illicit gains from the diamond traffic.

There is growing recognition of the threat which the police constitute to Congolese recovery. For some time the UN has worked with the police, using mainly Nigerian personnel. A few Belgian police specialists are assisting as well. The AID report urges a vigorous program of retraining and assistance by Belgium and the United States in an effort to strengthen the police force. However, any reorganization plan will encounter the acute difficulty of provincial supremacy in the police field. The central government apparently would be willing and eager to have help with the police. However, agreement centrally negotiated cannot always be carried out at the provincial level.

Two other solutions to the police problem recently have been proposed: 1) dissolution of the police and delegation of all law enforcement to the ANC; and 2) federalization of the police force. Both these solutions appear unrealistic in the present political context. The provinces have no intention of abandoning their control over the police, and the central government would need to be far stronger than it is at present to enjoin the provinces to surrender their police forces. The ANC is not capable at present of handling routine police work, such as the collection of evidence and accident reporting. Further, effective police work requires a more intimate contact with the local population than ANC detachments are likely to achieve. The AID report, which concludes that no basic structural alteration is now possible, strongly recommends that a central inspectorate be established to place limits on police venality and political activity. Just how an inspectorate general would enforce its will is not clear.

The police are likely to continue to pose a serious problem. Probably in the more efficiently governed provinces, technical assistance could enhance police effectiveness. In the unstable provinces, the police will continue to be key weapons of factions contending for power.

VIII. EXTERNAL FACTORS

Since its accession to independence the Congo—as a result of its colonial inheritance and of the disorders which have plagued its three years of self-government—has been reliant upon and subject to greater external influences than any other newly independent African state. Invoked to thwart an East-West confrontation in Central Africa, the UN has played an unprecedented civilian and military role in the Congo. By virtue of its commercial and financial stake Belgium retains major economic ties with the Congo. Because of the massive assistance rendered by the United States to the Congo and to the UN Congo operations, the United States probably has greater political leverage there than has any other foreign state. Finally, the Soviet Bloc, although discredited in the Congo, remains a potential source of external influence.

The historical roots of the present confluence of foreign interests are of significance, but their relevance to the present discussion is limited. We therefore intend to discuss the most important elements of non-Congolese influence only as they relate to the current situation. Excluded from this discussion is the impact on the Congo of developments in Angola and other neighboring states. The implications of the Congo's relations with its neighbors are of such potential importance as to warrant separate consideration.

The United Nations

The dual military and civil character of UN Congo operations has been obscured by the news value of UN military successes. However, the civil operations program has furnished important technical assistance to sagging central government and provincial institutions. The specialized agencies of the UN have financed almost 700 experts in fields ranging from medicine to meteorology, under the supervision of the UN Civil Operations representative in the Congo.[23]

The UN civil presence. At the level of the central government, UN technicians have served in many instances as replacements for Belgians who left the Congo in 1960. Although about 1,590 Belgians are employed in the Congo Government and parastatal enterprises, UN civil operations personnel continue to fill many advisory and functional positions requiring advanced technical skills. The lack

of Congolese university graduates will require the maintenance of UN or other foreign personnel in many of these jobs for the foreseeable future. It is likely that bilateral assistance programs could provide qualified French-speaking personnel to replace UN technicians, but at the cost of some dislocation to administrative relationships already existing between UN personnel and the Congo Government.

UN technicians provide assistance, on a much more limited scale, to the infant provincial governments. Most striking, however, are the UN civilian representatives who fill the ad hoc role of "district commissioner" in several unstable provinces. At Kindu, capital of Maniema Province, a single UN representative of UAR nationality, assisted by only a handful of Nigerian police, has gained the confidence of the provincial government, the local ANC commander, the representative of the Sûreté, and the judiciary. In his role of counselor and mediator, he has prevented latent hostilities from erupting into serious disturbances. Similarly, in the confused and uncertain political climate of Luluabourg, the UN civilian representative has marshalled the representatives of central government authority—the ANC Commander, Sûreté Chief, and District Attorney—into a peace-keeping team which has had to contend mainly with the Luluabourg government, probably the most corrupt provincial administration in the Congo.

Although the effectiveness of the UN civilian presence varies, it appears generally good. Insofar as the UN civil representatives serve as buffers between competing elements of the population, their presence aids greatly in the maintenance of order. If possible, their services should be retained, particularly in Luluabourg, Kindu, Albertville, and Elisabethville. Consideration might also be given to placing resident UN representatives in troubled Sankuru and Unité Kasaienne Provinces.

The UN military presence. Since the end of Katanga's secession, UN troop strength has been reduced to 7,475, including 1,983 administrative support troops (June 24, 1963). All but a few are positioned in southern Katanga. Apart from Kasai, where about 700 Ghanaian UN troops act as a damper on possible disorders, the only area appearing to warrant a continued major UN troop presence is southern Katanga. The absence of local political leadership in southern Katanga, and the hostility between the ANC, on the one hand, and the Belgian and African populations and former Katanga gendarmes, on the other, present a latent threat of blood-

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23. There are, in addition, about 550 teachers provided by the UN.

shed. If possible, UN or other international forces should be retained in Katanga well into 1964. By that time, it is possible that political leadership will have emerged, the ANC will have improved its effectiveness, and all elements of the population will be acclimated to the new situation. Also enhancing the need for a foreign military presence in southern Katanga until well into 1964 is the prospect of national elections, which could be accompanied by serious disorders.

Belgium

Since the Congo's independence, the Belgian Government has restricted its aid contribution to servicing the Congo's external debt and to technical assistance involving about 1,200 teachers for the Congo and scholarships for Congolese in Belgium. Total Belgian Government expenditures for Congo aid were about $53,000,000 in 1962 and may reach $72,000,000 in 1963. Belgian assistance beyond this amount apparently is under consideration in the wake of the recent settlement of the contentieux, outstanding financial issues between the Congo and Belgian Governments that date from independence.

The Belgian Government also has agreed to furnish military personnel for retraining the ANC. The importance of ANC retraining is crucial, particularly in view of the eventual withdrawal of UN forces, and should have the highest priority among foreign assistance efforts.

With respect to increased Belgian public responsibility in the Congo, the Belgian Government apparently has an ambivalent attitude, compounded by the failure to plan ahead in terms of contingencies. Although the Belgian private stake in the Congo is vast, the Belgian Government is reluctant to take steps to increase its technical and financial assistance as long as the United States or other nations are willing to bear the principal burden. In the absence of any other effective lever to obtain an increase in the Belgian aid contribution, a reduction in the US contribution might serve to heighten Belgian private and official interest in covering the shortfall. A risk in this essentially negative approach is that the Belgians may react too late to meet Congolese needs. If the United States then failed to recover the situation, the way might be opened to renewed Soviet involvement. It is clear that the Belgians, at least for the moment, are being less than frank with the United States about their intentions in the Congo, and the possibility of a really close Belgian-US aid consortium may consequently be somewhat limited.

The role of Union Minière in the Katanga secession diverted attention from the substantial constructive contributions of Bel-

gian private individuals and concerns to emerging stability in other areas of the Congo. All but a few of the major Belgian-financed agricultural, industrial, and mining enterprises are in operation, some at levels of production approaching or above the pre-independence period. Although handicapped by shortages of spare parts, vehicles, and imported consumer items for sale to workers, the Belgian enterprises and their managements have provided surprising economic continuity. In most areas, plantation and plant managers and local governments are cooperating closely to increase productivity. Relations between the indigenous population and Belgian managements are cordial; outside of southern Katanga there are few reports of significant Belgo-Congolese animosities. Particularly in the provinces enjoying relatively stable governments, leaders have stated their desire for additional Belgian investment. Where Belgian farmers and small businessmen have failed to resume their enterprises since 1960, provincial leaders especially have said they would welcome renewed Belgian activity. Unemployment stemming from the closing down of some Belgian operations has created serious problems for Congolese political leaders.

Nearly 50,000 Belgians are estimated to be in the Congo. Some observers have expressed the belief that this number would not increase significantly in the future, since most who left in 1960 had either returned or found satisfactory employment in Belgium or elsewhere. Were conditions more settled, and were special inducements offered, it might be possible to attract more Belgian nationals to the Congo for employment in both the private and public sectors.

The United States

The pivotal role played in the Congo by the United States has paid off handsomely in terms of American prestige, not only in the Congo, but also in the rest of Africa. As long as Congolese attention centered on the Katanga secession, the US image was positive. However, in the wake of the Katanga victory, the American presence in the Congo is receiving new scrutiny, through an optic untinted by the rosy aura of the Katanga success.

At Leopoldville the US presence is linked very closely with the Adoula government. Radical Congolese sniping at Adoula has developed with considerable effect the theme that Adoula is an American "stooge." Belgian far-left circles recently issued a particularly venomous pamphlet attacking the United States for alleged neo-colonialism in the Congo. Irresponsible Belgian nationals and interests in the Congo also appear to be actively undercutting the United States by spreading anti-

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American rumors. These attacks find an audience among the Congolese elites of the principal urban centers. Thus American "prestige" is on the firing line for the first time since the demise of Lumumba.

At the same time, provincial leaders often equate the American presence with the failure of the Adoula government. Where there have been inadequate central government responses to real or imagined provincial problems, the central government is heaped with blame that often includes an indictment of the United States. In particular, the impressive and useful AID truck import program has backfired on the United States. Provincial leaders are aware that over 1,000 trucks were imported under US Government auspices. But they also believe that, with the connivance of the US Embassy, the trucks were deliberately denied to the provincial governments. The provincial leaders' misunderstanding of the import program is complete; but more serious is their belief that the United States has conspired with "politicians" at Leopoldville to deny the provinces their due.

In the context of possible national elections in 1964, developing anti-American sentiment is ominous. Since the Belgians no longer are scapegoats in any area, except possibly southern Katanga, a radical national party—if it emerged in reaction to a moderate national coalition under Adoula—could be expected to build into its platform a plank of demagogic anti-Americanism. Such a backlash could harm an emerging moderate national coalition.

The Soviet Bloc

Badly burned by its past experience in the Congo, the USSR has hesitated to make a major new bid for influence either in Leopoldville or the provincial capitals. The absence of cohesive political groupings in the Leopoldville parliament—other than the loose coalition of moderate leaders backing the Adoula government, and the generally conservative Abako and PSA/K parties—has reduced the field for potential Soviet activity at the center to a lunatic fringe of disaffected deputies. At the same time, the weakness of the central government, reflected in the polarization of effective political power between Leopoldville and the provincial capitals, has raised the ante for the Soviets should they wish to develop influence at the provincial level. That the Soviets have concentrated their activity since 1962 in Leopoldville and in the Stanleyville area of ex-Orientale Province, despite the emergence of other strong provincial power centers, is indicative of their current reticence.

gian reluctance to provide higher education for Congolese, few were offered an opportunity to imbibe Marxist doctrine at European university centers. Unlike Africans from former British and French territories, there is no significantly large group of Congolese even aware of the Marxist vocabulary. Consequently, such ideological discourse as there is on the East-West confrontation is at a very low level. Even the so-called radical nationalist Congolese leaders who accepted Soviet military assistance in 1960 were ideologically motivated only to the extent that they sought to crush Katanga or to salvage personal power.

Most vulnerable at present to Soviet blandishments are disaffected national parliamentarians and some labor leaders and students. The Soviets at times have bought with the traditional bribes of women, money, and the promise of power a fringe group of deputies such as Anicet Kashamura. However, the profits from this commerce in venality have yet to be reaped. Most of the extremist fringe is discredited at Leopoldville and in the constituencies.

Among students at Leopoldville, the Roman Catholic auspices of Lovanium University have inhibited much pro-communist activity. Even the radical Congolese students do not generally conceptualize their opposition to the status quo in Marxist terms.

Among labor unions, only the Conféderation Générale des Travailleurs Congolais (CGTC) and the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais (UNTC) have a pro-communist tinge. Their range of activities appears limited.

The Congo's massive budgetary deficit and foreign exchange shortage offer new opportunities for Soviet bloc involvement. Even the pro-Western Adoula regime might look with interest on Soviet offers of assistance if the financial and monetary crisis worsens. For example, a recent alleged Soviet offer of 5,000 trucks, if true, would be hard for Adoula to refuse, particularly if the offer were made known to provincial leaders, whose transport needs verge on the desperate. The Soviets may be expected to seek to exploit these and other rifts in the Congo's economic fabric.

Additional significant opportunities are likely to open for the Soviets in the political pot now beginning to boil in preparation for national elections in 1964. A moderate national party is envisaged by those around Adoula, whose opponents may be expected to seek to form, in reaction, a national party of a radical stamp. The Soviets might reap a rich harvest from investment in such a radical opposition.

APPENDIX

TABLES:

A. Enumeration of Powers Under Draft Constitution Compared to Loi Fondamentale

B. Comparison of Proposed Central-Provincial Power Distribution on Three Key Issues:
   UN, Katanga, Coquilhatville Provincial Assembly Presidents' Conference, and Loi Fondamentale Positions.

C. Proposed Partition of Fiscal Domain, UN Draft Constitution

D. Profile of New Provinces

E. Typology of Congolese Parties

F. Seats Won, by Party, May 1960 Elections

G. Glossary of Principal Congolese Political Parties

H. Congolese Provincial Governments since 1960

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MAPS:

A. Republic of the Congo - Provinces

B. Republic of the Congo - Political Stability

C. Republic of the Congo - Major Political Parties, May 1960 Elections

D. Republic of the Congo - Provinces and Ethnic Groups

TABLE A

ENUMERATION OF POWERS UNDER UN DRAFT CONSTITUTION
COMPARED TO LOI FONDAMENTALE

Central Powers		Concurrent Powers		Provincial Powers	
UN Draft	Loi Fondamentale	UN Draft	Loi Fondamentale	UN Draft	Loi Fondamentale
Foreign affairs, including foreign aid and trade	Foreign relations and treaties	Civil liberties		Provincial political and administrative institutions	Organization of provincial political structures in framework of general principles of Loi Fondamentale
Nationality and control of aliens	Armed forces	Civil and customary law		Provincial civil service	Provincial police
Extradition, immigration, emigration, passports and visas	Gendarmerie with special provisions to regulate assistance given by this to provincial powers	Labor legislation, social security, unemployment compensation		Provincial electoral law	Investigators attached to the prosecutors' offices attached to provinces
External security	State security	Economic legislation, including mines, minerals, industry, energy, conservation		Provincial debt	Proposals for nomination of magistrates for lower echelons of judiciary
National defense	Nationality	Statistics and census		Provincial finance	Proposals relative to the designation of administrative entities corresponding to present territories, with exception of cities, whose tribunals will be presided by a career judge
Federal police	Immigration and emigration	Internal security		Internal loans	Primary, secondary, technical, and normal schools
Federal civil service	Penal law	Pensions		Grant of land and mining concessions	Designation of school inspectors for these, subject to central approval
Federal courts	Regulations on judicial organization and procedure	Public health		Local public works	Grant and supervision of agricultural and forest concessions on the provincial domain
Federal finances	Nomination and statute of magistrates	Agriculture, hunting, fishing, veterinary services		Provincial police	Grant of mining concessions, within framework of general rules established centrally
Fixing of income tax	Finance, subject to special law to divide fiscal domain between center and provinces	National monuments		Provincial courts	Development of sources of hydroelectric energy, for provincial needs
Public debt	Money	Meteorology, geodesy, cartography, hydrography		Prisons	Railroads of provincial or local character
Foreign loans	Exchange policy	Scientific and industrial research		Education except that reserved to center	Provincial and local roads
Internal federal loans	Weight and measures	Cultural affairs		Municipal institutions	Provincial public works
Money	Customs	Excise, consumption, and other taxes not assigned to central government		Penal sanctions on provincial laws	Supervision of local institutions, without prejudice to central rights
Weights and measures	University and higher education			Internal communications	Fixing of penalties sanctioning the execution of edicts
Customs	Rules on equivalence of diplomas for primary, secondary, technical, and normal schools			Local taxes	
Commercial code, including insurance	Rules to guarantee the quality of teaching personnel				
Regulation of banking	Approval of provincial educational inspectors for primary, secondary, technical, and normal schools				
Exchange control	Legislation on healing arts				
Patents and copyright	Scientific policy				
Bankruptcy	General economic policy				
PTT, radio, television	Commercial code				
Navigation, airways, railways, other communication routes between provinces	General rules on land tenure				
Universities and other institutions of higher education supported by federal government	General rules on agriculture and forest concessions from the public domain				
Educational standards	General rules on mining prospection and exploitation				
Penal code and prison regime	General rules on mine concessions decided by the provinces				
Incorporation	Coordination of sources of energy of national interest, including hydroelectric				
Eminent domain	Geologic, geodetic, cartographic, and hydrographic service				
Medical and legal professions	Rivers and ports				
	National railways				
	National roads				
	General organization of postal service, including stamps				
	Telecommunications and radio				
	Public works of national interest				
	Supervision of local institutions to extent they are charged with the execution of tasks of general interest conferred directly upon them by central power, such as population registers				

TABLE B
COMPARISON OF PROPOSED CENTRAL-PROVINCIAL POWER DISTRIBUTION ON THREE KEY ISSUES: UN, KATANGA, COQUILHATVILLE PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENTS' CONFERENCE, AND <u>LOI FONDAMENTALE</u> POSITIONS

Issues	UN	Katanga	Coquilhatville	Loi Fondamentale
Security Forces	ANC under central command, posted in all provinces, has gendarmere mission. Federal police force for capital, possible intervention in provinces. Sûreté exclusively central function. Central limit placed on numbers, equipment of police.	ANC units under command of province where garrisoned. Province to retain own gendarmes. Province has own Sûreté.	ANC under central command. Provinces can fix own level of police forces. No federal police.	ANC same as UN draft. Provinces control police, no provision foreseen for setting limit on numbers or equipment. Sûreté is central function.
Finance	Import duties to central government. Export duties 50-50 between center and province of orgin. Income tax on corporations to central government, on individuals to provinces. Concurrent tax rights in excise, consumption.	Provinces fix and levy all taxes. Provinces agree to a % contribution of their total receipts equal for all states. Guarantee of sufficient foreign exchange for all needs of Katanga; derivation principle for allocating exchange.	Central government fixes and collects all import duties. Concurrent fixing of export duties, provinces retain 75%. Provinces fix royalities on mine concessions, give 25% to center. All other taxes set and retained by provinces. Special central-provincial commission to allocate foreign exchange.	No provision made for statutory allocation of tax receipts. Centralized budget, treasury to be retained; all taxes collected by central government, provincial budgets covered by central subsidy.
Administration and judiciary	Federal services manned by federal civil service; provincial services by provincial civil service. Only top two echelons of judiciary under federal control. No state commissioner in provincial capital; provincial government represents authority of state in province.	All administration in provinces, whether performing federal or provincial services, under authority of provincial president. Provinces control judiciary, except supreme court. No state commissioner.	With minor variations, same as UN draft. Larger provincial role in naming supreme court.	Civil service statute, nominations, and salary centrally controlled.

TABLE C

PROPOSED PARTITION OF FISCAL DOMAIN, UN DRAFT CONSTITUTION

(millions of francs)

Tax category	1960 budget 1/	1961 receipts	Allocation	
			Federal	Provincial
Export duty	2,188	344	50%	50%
Import duty	1,982	529	x	
Excise and consumption	1,532	875	x	
Administrative and judicial receipts 2/	2,006	N.A.		x
Income	5,033	940 3/	corporate	individual
Portfolio	1,180	0	x	

1. These figures are the estimated receipts, prepared before independence. The 1961 figures exclude Katanga and South Kasai.
2. The breakdown on the respective corporate-individual contribution is not available, but in normal circumstances the former is considerably more important. Most corporations have not paid income taxes to Leopoldville since 1960.
3. The state portfolio of shares held in colonial corporations is being retained by Belgium, pending an overall settlement of conflicting Congolese and Belgian claims arising from the 1960 disaster.

TABLE D

PROFILE OF NEW PROVINCES
(June 1963)

Key: 1 indicates that the stated characteristic is strongly or clearly present.
2 indicates that the stated characteristic is present in diluted form.
3 indicates that the stated characteristic is absent, or exists in very weak form.

Province	I Ethnic homogeneity	II Party homogeneity	III Administrative continuity	IV Strong traditional structures	V Pre-independence autonomy demands	VI Urban conflict in origin	VII Economic viability	VIII Incipient fragmentation	IX Operating institutions, June 1963
Leopoldville									
Kongo Central	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	3	1
Kwango	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	3	2
Kwilu	3	1	1	3	3	3	1	3	1
Lac Leopold II	3	3	1	3	3	3	3	1	2
Equateur									
Cuvette Centrale	1	2	1	3	1	1	3	3	1
Ubangi	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	1
Moyen Congo	2	1	3	3	3	1	3	3	2
Orientale									
Uele	2	3	1	1	3	2	1	2	1
Kibali-Ituri	3	1	1	2	3	3	2	3	1
Haut-Congo	3	1	1	3	3	1	2	3	3
Kivu									
Maniema	3	3	1	3	2	1	2	1	2
Kivu Central	2	3	1	1	3	1	3	1	3
Nord-Kivu	3	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	2
Katanga									
Nord-Katanga	2	2	2	2	3	1	3	3	1
Katanga-Orientale	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	3
Sud-Congo (Lualaba)	3	3	1	1	3	3	1	3	3
Kasai									
Sud-Kasai	1	2	3	2	1	1	2	2	1
Kasai Central	1	1	3	2	3	1	3	3	2
(Luluabourg)	3	1	3	2	2	1	3	3	2
Unite Kasaienne	3	1	1	3	3	2	3	2	2
Sankuru	1	1	3	2	3	1	3	3	2
Lomami	1	1	3	2	2	1	3	3	1

TABLE E

TYPOLOGY OF CONGOLESE PARTIES

Mass	Marginal	Elite
MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, Abako, MNC/K	Balubakat, Puna, Unimo	PNP, Conakat

National		Regional
MNC/L, PNP		PSA, Cerea, Balubakat, Abako, Puna, Unimo, MNC/K, Conakat

Pan-tribal	3/	Ethnic
MNC/L, 1/ PSA, Cerea, PNP, Conakat 2/	Puna	Balubakat 4/, Abako, Unimo, MNC/K 5/

Unitary 6/		Federalist
MNC/L, PSA , Cerea Balubakat 7/ Puna, PNP	Unimo	Abako, MNC/K, Conakat

Radical		Moderate
MNC/L, PSA, Cerea, Abako	Balubakat, Unimo, MNC/K 8/	Puna, PNP, Conakat

1. Pan-tribal in its official ideology, although in fact ethnic in its campaign in the Batetela-Bakusu-Bankutshu zone in Maniema, Kivu, Sankuru, and Kasai; starting from this base, it began to penetrate rapidly into the related Mongo areas in Equateur.

2. Some might argue that the Conakat belong in the marginal column. It is classified as pan-tribal because its official ideology, if not its actual performance, is a claim to represent all the peoples of Katanga; it is in any case not ethnic in the sense of representing any single tribe, although there is an important difference between the Conakat, which is a federation linked at the level of the tribal association, and the PSA, where membership is individual.

3. Puna claims to cover all of northern Equateur (now Moyen Congo). In the terms of its leader, Bolikango, this is a reunification of the "grande ethnie bangala," but in fact it covers a number of different ethnic groups, especially the Ngombe.

4. This overlooks the alliance with a smaller ethnic party, Association des Tshokwe du Congo, de l'Angola, et de la Rhodésie (ATCAR).

5. The MNC/K was not at first ethnic when the original MNC split into Lumumba and Kalonji wings in July 1959. However, it became increasingly a Kasai Baluba party, although some of its original intellectual members, such as Iléo and Adoula, are not Baluba.

6. Listed as unitary despite its flirtation with federalism at the Kisantu Congress in December 1959.

7. Despite its initial link with the Conakat and early sympathy with some of the latter's views on the need to ensure Katanga a larger share in the use of its own wealth.

8. MNC/K until early 1960 would have fallen into the radical category; as independence neared, the Kasai Baluba became increasingly preoccupied with the threat to their security in Luluabourg.

TABLE F

SEATS WON, BY PARTY, MAY 1960 ELECTIONS

Party	National Chamber of Deputies [1]	Senate	Leopoldville	Equateur	Orientale	Kivu	Katanga	Kasai
MNC/L	41	19	2	10	58 [2]	17	1	25
PSA	13	4	35					
Cerea	10	6				30 [3]		
Balubakat	7	3					23 [4]	
Abako	12	4	33					
Puna	7	7		11 [5]				
Unimo	1	2		8				
MNC/K	8	3					1	21
PNP	15	3		5	6	5		4
Conakat	8	6					25	
Other	15	27	20	26	6	18	10	20
Total	137	84	90	60	70	70	60	70

1. Including direct alliances.
2. Indirectly elected by provincial assemblies.
3. Including all three wings.
4. Including five from alliances--two Atcar and three MNC/L.
5. Including two from alliance.

TABLE G

GLOSSARY OF PRINCIPAL CONGOLESE POLITICAL PARTIES

Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba (MNC/L

Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA)

Centre de Regroupement Africain (Cerea)e)

Association des Baluba du Katanga (Balubakat)

Alliance des Bakongos (Abako)

Parti de l'Unité Nationale (PUNA)

Union Mongo (Unimo)

Parti National du Progrès (PNP)

Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (Conakat)

Mouvement National Congolais/Kalonji

TABLE H
CONGOLESE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1960
(Party affiliations shown in parentheses are as of 1960)

Time scale columns: 1960 July | October | 1961 January | April | July | October | 1962 January | April | July | October | 1963 January | April | July

Leopoldville
Kamitatu (PSA)
Kongo Central
Moanda (Abako) — Diomi (Abako)
Kwilu
Leta (PSA)
Kwango
Delvaux (Luka) | Mayamba (Luka)
Lac Leopold II
Koumorico (PNP)

Equateur
Eketebi (PUNA)
Central Gov't Intervention
Omari — Eketebi (PUNA)
Cuvette Centrale
Engulu (UNIMO) — Bolya Incidents
Moyen Congo
Interregnum — Eketebi (PUNA)
Ubangi
Nzondonyo 1/ (PNP)

Orientale
Finant (MNC/L)
Badjoko (MNC/L)
Manzikala (MNC/L)
Losala (MNC/L) — Manzikala/Losala disputed
Uélé
Mambaya (no party)
Kibali-Ituri
Manzikala (MNC/L)
Haut Congo
No Government
Grenfell | Isombuma(?)

Kivu
Miruho (Cerea)
Kashamura (Cerea) | Omari (MNC/L) | Miruho (Cerea)
ILLEGAL
Central Gov't Intervention (Mayamba, Anany, Weregemere)
Kivu Central
No Government
Nord-Kivu
Moley (Cerea)
Maniema
Kisanga (MNC/L)
Malago (Reko)

Nord-Katanga
Mwamba-Ilunga (Balubakat)
Mwamba-Ilunga resigned

Katanga
Tshombe (Conakat)
Tshombe Jailed (Ministerial Triumvirate) | Tshombe
Ileo (Central Gov't)
Katanga Orientale
Bulundwe
Lualaba
No Government

South Kasai
Kalonji (MNC/K)
Kazadi (MNC/K) — Ngalula (MNC/K)
(Kalonji coup fails)

Kasai
Mukenge (UNC)
Lubaya (UNC)
Central Gov't intervention (Mukenge)
Lomami
Manono (MUB)
Luluabourg (Kasai Central)
Lwakabwanga (MNC/L)
Unité Kasaienne
Kamanga (UNIKAS)
Sankuru
Diamaumbu (MNC/L) | Ndjadi (MNC/L)
Rival Gov't at Lusambo
Lubaya disputes
Diamasumbu arrested and released

1/ Sometimes spelled Zondomia.

TABLE I
CONGOLESE CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1960 (AND SECESSIONS)

Independence — Lumumba

Katanga secession

South Kasai autonomy

Ileo — Kasavubu dismissal of Lumumba
— Mobutu coup

Kalonji

Tshombe Government

Tshombe

Commissioners

College of

2nd Ileo

Tananarive — Tananarive Conference

Participation at Coquilhatville

Tshombe under arrest

Gizenga Government Stanleyville

Government

Participation at Lovanium

Lovanium Parliament

1st Round UN

Kalonji arrest

Dissidence

Gizenga

2nd Round UN

Kitona Accords

Gizenga arrest

Kamitatu replaces Gbenye

1st Adoula Government

Adoula-Tshombe talks

1st Reshuffle

Ngalula Government

2nd Adoula Government

Kalonji escape and rearrest

3rd Round UN

Secession liquidated

2nd Reshuffle

3rd Adoula Government

July
1960
Oct.
Jan.
April
July
1961
Oct.
Jan.
April
1962
July
Oct.
Jan.
1963
April

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO-PROVINCES

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

CAMEROON

UBANGI
★ Gemena

U E L E

Paulis
★

MOYEN-CONGO
Lisala

HAUT-CONGO

KABALI-ITURI
Bunia ★

CONGO

Coquilhatville
★Stanleyville

UGANDA

GABON

CUVETTE CENTRALE

NORD-KIVU

Kirotshe
(tentative)

RWANDA

★Inongo

LAC LEOPOLD II

SANKURU

Kindu
★

Bukavu
KIVU CENTRAL

BURUNDI

MANIEMA
★Lodja

Léopoldville

KWILU

KONGO CENTRAL
Djelo-Binza
Kenge ★
★Kikwit

Luluabourg
KASAI CENTRAL ★

LOMAMI

Bakwanga
★Kabinda

Albertville ★

TANGANYIKA

Tshikapa
UNITÉ KASAIENNE

SUD-KASAI

KWANGO

NORD-KATANGA

ANGOLA

LUALABA
(Capital not yet selected)

KATANGA ORIENTAL

ATLANTIC OCEAN

Elisabethville
★(de facto)

————— Province boundary
★ Province capital
■ Area in dispute (arrows indicate claimants)

1 August 1963

0   100   200
MILES

FED. OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

36177 7-63

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

MOZAMBIQUE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

CAMEROON

UGANDA

CONGO

GABON

RWANDA

BURUNDI

Léopoldville

TANGANYIKA

Atlantic
Ocean

ANGOLA

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
POLITICAL STABILITY*

Provincial area with functioning institutions
under fairly strong emergent leadership
likely to support a moderate national coalition
(as of June 15, 1963)

Provincial area under leadership likely to support a
moderate national coalition (as of June 15, 1963)

*With respect to possible 1964 national elections

0   100   200
MILES

CONFIDENTIAL

38176 7-63

FED. OF RHODESIA
AND
NYASALAND

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

MOZAMBIQUE

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

SUDAN

CAMEROON

CONGO

GABON

UNIMO

PUNA

PNP

CEREA

UGANDA

MNC/L

RWANDA

MNC/L

PNP

BURUNDI

CEREA

MNC/L

TANGANYIKA

Léopoldville

ABAKO

PNP/LUKA

PSA

PNP

MNC/K

MNC/K

CONAKAT

MNC/L

BALUBAKAT

CONAKAT

ANGOLA

CONAKAT

Atlantic
Ocean

MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES
MAY 1960 ELECTIONS

Local lists, individuals

Areas of political parties
are approximate.

0   100   200
MILES

38175 7-63

FED. OF RHODESIA
AND
NYASALAND

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

MOZAMBIQUE

CAMEROON 16

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
PROVINCES
AND ETHNIC GROUPS

—— Ethnic group boundary   —— Province boundary
Area in dispute   ★ Province capital
(arrows indicate claimants)

AREAS IN DISPUTE
(Submitted to referendum)

1. Kimvula region
2. Banzyville territory
3. Faradje territory
4. Walsa territory
5. Rutshuru and Goma territories
6. Shabunda territory
7. Fizi territory
8. Basonge sector
9. Munga-Kisuka group
10. Musule-Lumba group
11. Mwene-Ditu territory
12. Tshishilu sector and Kamiji region
13. Lusambo (that area ethnically different from the native center)
14. Misumba group

0   50   100   150   200 MILES

0   50   100   150   200 KILOMETERS

BANGUI
TOGBO
GOBU
BANZIRI
BARUKA
SANGO
BONGO
NGBANDI
NZAKARA

UBANGI
BWAKA
Gemena ★
BANZA
GOMBE
MABALE
BUDJA

GOMBE
DOKO
BANGALA
MOYEN-CONGO
Lisala ★
BAPOTO
DOKO

LOBALA
BOMBE
GOMBE
BALOI

GOMBE
MONGO
BALOLO

GABON

CUVETTE CENTRAL
Coquilhatville
WANGATA
LALIA
ELINGA
BOSAKA
GOMBE

TUMBA
KUNDU
MBOLE

BAYANZI
BOLIA
Lac Léopold II
TUMBA
Inongo
BAKUTI
BASENGELE

LAC LÉOPOLD II
BABOMA BADIA
BABAIE

AKEL

Kwa
Fimi
BASAKATA
BALESA
IPANGA
BATITU
DENGESE
SANK

CONGO
BAMFUMUNGU
BAYANZI
Kasai
BANGOLI
BALURI
BOKALA YAELIMA
BOOLI
BASONGO-MENO
Sankuru
14
BABINDJI

BRAZZAVILLE
Djelo-Binza ★
LÉOPOLDVILLE
BASUNDI
BAKONGO
BAWUMBU
Kenge ★
BADINGA
BAHUANA
Kikwit ★
BASHILELE
BATSHIOKO
BABUNDA
BAKUBA
BAKETE
LULUA

CABINDA
(Angola)
BAYOMBE
KONGO CENTRAL
KAKONGO
MUSERONGO
BAMBATA
BAYAKA
BASUKU
BAKUA
BAKWESE
BAPENDE
BALUA
BAWONGO
KWILU
KASAI CENTRAL
ZAPO ★
Luluabourg
BASHILANGE
Tshikapa ★

KWANGO
BASONDE
BAPENDE
BAHOLO
TSHOKWE
(BATSHIOKO)
UNITÉ KASAIENNE
BABINDJI
BAKE
12

SUDAN

AKARE

Bomu
ABANDJA

AZANDE

AZANDE

ABAKA

MUNDU

AMADI
Uele
MANGBETE

MOBENGE
BAKANGO
AZANDE
ABARAMBO
MANOB
MANGBETU
AZANDE
3
LOGO
KAKWA

MOBATI

4

MABINZA
ABABUA
MAKERE
AZANDE
AZANDE
ABANGBA
4
MOMVU
LUGWARE

MAYDGO
MANGBELE
Paulis
BADJO

MOBATI
NIAPU
MEDJE
MABUDU
WALESE
Bunia
BANIARI
BALENDU

MOBANGO
POPOIE
MALELE
BALIKA
Ituri
BANDAKA
KABALI-
ITURI
BABIRA
ALUR
Lake
Albert

HAUT-CONGO
BANGELIMA
BAMANGA
Semliki

TURUMBU
BABALI
BARUMBI
BABIRA

CONGO
Stanleyville
BAHAMBA
BAMBUBU
UGANDA

TOPOKE
TOPOKE
BAPERE

LOKELE
WAGENIA
BABUGOMBE
WANANDE
Lake
Edward
0

BAMBOLE
WALENGOLA
BAKUMU
NORD-
KIVU

5

WANIANGA
BAHUNDE
BANIARUANDA

BAKOSU
Kirotshe
(tentative)

BOYELA
MITUKU
WASONGOLA
BAHAVU
Lac
Kivu
KIGALI

Bukavu
RWANDA

URU
WAREGA
6
BANIA-
BUNGO
KIVU
CENTRAL

Kindu
MANIEMA
BAKUSU
WAFULE
USUMBURA

Lodja
WABEMBE
BURUNDI

ANKUTSHU
WAZIMBA
7

BATETELA
WABWARI

TANGANYIKA

LOMAMI
BANGO-BANGO
BASONGE
8

Kabinda
Albertville

kwanga
9
Lukuga
Lake
Tanganyika
KASA
10

WARUWA

11
BATABWA

KANIOKA
NORD-KATANGA

BALUBA

BASHILA
BABEMBA

BALUN

LU

(Capital st.

TSHOKWE (BATSHIOK)

FE

Rio Cassai

A N G O L A

(Portugal)

Rio Cuanza

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

20

16

12

12

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