

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I
swear to tell the whole truth withholding
nothing ^{and} adding nothing

SUCIA I. Pshemaco (realizing)

On this 9th^{day} of January, 1947
At International Military
Tribunal For East

Deponent: SUGTA.I Tokeimaro (Seal)

I, MIYATA ~~Mamoru~~^{inoru}, hereby certify
that the above statement was sworn
by the Deponent, who affixed his
signature ^{and} real thereto in the presence
of this Witness.

On the same date
at the same place

- 1 My Name SUCTAI, Tokimasa
- 2 Present Address 2873, Kichijōji,
Musashino-Machi,
Kitatama-Gun, Tokyo
Metropolis
3. Date of Birth 27 July 1899
4. Outline of my Personal History
- Dec. 1921 Graduated from the
Military Academy
- Dec. 1931 Graduated from the Military
Staff College
- Dec. 1932 Attached to the General
Staff ~~the~~ Headquarters

+ ref loc # 1319

-1-

International Military Tribunal
for the Far East

United States of America + others
against

ARAKI Sadao + others

Sworn Deposition

Deponent SUOTA I, Toshimasa

Having ^{first} duly sworn an oath as on
attached sheet [^] in accordance with
the procedure followed in my country,
I hereby depose as follows:

- Dec. 1934 Appointed staff officer of the
4th Division.
- Aug. 1936 Appointed member of the
General Staff ~~Hqs~~ Headquarters.
- Aug. 1936 Promoted to major ^{the rank of}
- July 1938 Promoted to Lt. col. ^{the rank of}
- Aug. 1939 Appointed staff officer of the
Kwangtung Army.
- Aug. 1940 Appointed military staff
officer of the Imperial General
Staff ~~Hqs~~ Headquarters ✓
- Mar. 1941 Appointed section chief of
the General Staff ~~Hqs~~ Headquarters

Aug 1941

Appointed chief of ^{(Military Pre-}
~~parations)~~ ^{Equipment}
Section, ^{Service}
(Personnel) Military (Personnel)
Bureau of War Ministry

Aug. 1941

Promoted to ^{the rank of} Colonel.

Feb 1943

Appointed Adjutant of
War Ministry

Feb 1945

Appointed assistant chief
of staff of the 17th Area Army

~~also additionally appointed~~

and assistant chief of staff
of the Korea ~~Army~~ ^{Military} District

June 1945

Promoted to ^{the rank} Major-general

I ~~have had~~ ^{was ~~been~~} in charge of the business beginning ~~from~~ December, 1932, of mobilization for about ten years ~~since~~

the time of my appointment I was appointed to serve at ~~the~~ General Staff

Headquarters on ~~December~~ ^{Nov.} 1932.

I was chief of ^{the} Mobilization sub-section,

3rd section, ~~the~~ 1st Division, of ~~the~~ General Staff.

Headquarters when the CHANGKU FENG Incident broke out. According to our ~~It was our~~ military

mobilization plans, ~~systems~~ that when the mobilization of

the 19th Field Division, whose division

headquarters was in RANAN, Korea, was

carried out, the Depot Division was to be

organized at the same time. ~~And~~ Upon

the issuance of a mobilization order,

as well as ~~horses~~ Northeastern
reservists ~~horses~~ in the ~~F0110th~~ Area

to be ~~to be~~ called to military service

in their peacetime conscription district,

assembled in ~~the~~ barracks, provisionally

organized into a division, and transported

by train to the 19th Division. It took

them two or three ~~days~~ ^{weeks} were needed for them
to reach their

destination; After the issuance of the mobilization order ~~to~~

therefore, they could not be relied upon to
~~was impossible~~ to meet urgent needs

For this reason, a special emergency

mobilization was also ~~scheduled~~ ^{planned}. This ~~was~~
~~a~~ ^{was} plan to call up quickly reservists
and horses in Korea that ~~were available~~
located
within a three day trip of the barracks

and to arrange to ~~dispatch~~ ^{mobilize} them so as to
meet urgent needs before the completion

of the regular general mobilization of the
entire Army. In addition, ~~Besides~~, there was ~~yet~~ ^{still}

another plan called an emergency
dispatch of troops - a plan whereby
troops ^{and} horses could be dispatched
in ~~on~~ peacetime ~~factories~~ ^{bases} to a war front

This ^{planned} ~~was intended~~ as a ^{thoroughly} temporary

dispatch of troops ~~contemplating~~ to

carry on operations for only two or three days

It was an organization ~~under~~ which

~~it would have been impossible~~

~~which~~ would not have permitted the carrying out of any lengthy operations.

When an urgent emergency dispatch

of force was made, it was necessary

to have a ~~necessary~~ number of men

and horses in the barracks as a ^{skeleton} ~~base~~

organization in order to carry out the

mobilization business of in case ~~the~~ an

emergency mobilization order was issued.

When the CHANG KUFENG Incident broke out, the General Staff Headquarters did not positively reinforce the military strength ^{at} of the front line. However, from August on, the number of casualties ^{mounted} went on mounting day by day, ^{to} the extent ^{if not strengthened} ~~much~~ so that, ~~when left alone~~, this ^{force} ~~strength~~ would have been in danger of ^{annihilation} ~~being reduced to zero~~. It was therefore urgently necessary to send reinforcements to the front line, and

as there was no alternative plan,
a special ~~urgent~~ emergency mobili-
zation ~~came~~ ^{was} to be ordered. It was on

August 9, 9 ~~remember~~ ^{think feel sure.}

9 was chief of the Mobilization
sub-section then ~~I~~ ^{and} was afraid that
even if ~~the~~ ^{an} order for ~~the~~ special ~~urgent~~
emergency mobilization ~~should~~ ^{were} be
issued, it would be very difficult
to carry it out. ~~And~~ 9 thought 9
would rather go to the ~~front~~ front
~~I~~ ^{and} give instructions in person. So 9
hastily flew ^{from Tokyo} to the 19th Division ~~I~~ and

landed at KAINFI instead of at
RANAN, ^{since} ~~so~~ there was then no airfield

at the latter place. There was an

air unit in the airfield. The commander
at that time

was ~~then~~ Col. FUJITSUKA, Shikao.

When I saw him he
~~who~~ was seated before a tent, looking

up at the sky. As I was already

acquainted with him, I ^{greeted him} ~~cordially saluted~~

cordially.

~~to the colonel~~

The colonel was

gambling, "We have been ordered not to

fight with Soviet airplanes ^{unless} ~~except~~

when they cross ~~over~~ the border ~~line~~

and

* attack our airfield. But ^{since} ~~so~~ it

takes them no more than 12 minutes

to reach ~~our~~ our airfield from

the border-line, ^{have to} we ~~must~~ keep

our pilots on board the planes all

the time, ^{the event of an} in ~~preparation for~~ their attack

so that they might start their engines

at any moment. ~~But~~ Neither can our

pilots ~~keep up~~ patroling in the air,

nor ~~have~~ they ^{would have} time to fly up to the

altitude required for fighting ~~them~~ ^{attached us.}

if ~~where~~ the enemy's planes ~~made their~~

~~road~~ ~~If we take up an altitude of~~

standing by in the airfield, ^{like this} it actually

means our annihilation. We are indeed in a distressing situation."

Does ~~Does not~~ this fact ^{not} prove that the

Japanese army had no ~~positive~~ ^{intentions} will

of making ~~to assume~~ an offensive attack?

I went ^{by car} to ~~the~~ ^{the} RANAN Division Head-
quarters, from the airfield ~~by road~~ ^{at that time} ~~the~~

mobilization staff officer of the division

was Major SAITO, Tokio, ~~there~~. I

told him that a ^{not} special emergency

mobilization order had been issued

and ~~therefore~~ ^{must therefore} that we, ^{muster reservists}

in Korea, ~~to recruit the troops~~, ~~and~~

We studied how to ^{receive this} ~~accept these~~ personnel
and
to reinforce the front line.

As the CHANGKUFENGT Incident broke
out unexpectedly without any ^{provocation} ~~aggravation~~

from the Japanese side, the division had

not ^{that} expected the incident ^{would} ~~should~~ have

assumed such dimensions. Therefore,

even though we had dispatched forces

to the front line, ~~at the frontier~~, we had

never anticipated ^{that} a special emergency
mobilization order ^{would} ~~should~~ be issued,

to say nothing of general mobilization.

For this reason all the plans for war had been neglected on our side, so much so that, though an emergency ~~order~~ mobilization had actually been issued, it was very hard to carry it out ~~perfectly~~ ^{completely and} properly.

As I stated before, the 19th Division was actually in such condition then that it could not carry out an emergency mobilization smoothly, ~~and~~ This is a proof ^{that} the incident ~~had been~~ ^{was started} neither by the will of the central headquarters in Japan, nor by that of our Korean Army Headquarters, nor by that of the 19th Division

Commander.

If the Commander of the 19th Division had had a positive ^{intentions of} ~~will~~ to starting the incident, he ^{would} ~~must~~ have ^{had to} make plans beforehand for the replacement ^{and} replenishment of personnel, ammunition, ^{and} provisions.

~~beforehand~~ However, ~~But~~ as it was, neither preparations nor plans, ^{for attack} had been made ^{There} ~~It~~ was nothing further ~~for the purpose~~.

from our intention than to issue a mobilization order.

~~But~~ Nevertheless, a special emergency mobilization was finally carried out, as conceived, ^{and in spite of} ~~though it was under~~

great difficulties, the reservists in
Korea were mustered into the barracks
of the 19th Division by about the 11th.
They could have given some replacements
and ~~to~~ aid to the front line if they had reached
there promptly. ~~But~~ ^{However, they} hardly had they made
their ~~arrival~~ ^{appearance} there, ~~before~~ ^{when} an agreement
for suspension of hostilities was un-
concluded and
expectedly ~~arrived at~~ ^{at} fighting stopped
^{as I recall,}
The total number of troops mobilized on
the occasion was 3,000 in round figures
at RAVAN I visited a cavalry regiment.
The regiment ^{dispatched} ~~was not ordered to move.~~
~~stayed in the barracks~~ In
obedience to ~~the~~ orders ~~from~~ the division

The reason for this was that
~~But why this?~~ Because the division had

no intention ^{of} to making any cavalry operations
~~from~~ ^{on} another front,

against the enemy, nor ~~to~~ ~~of~~ ~~launching~~
sending reconnaissance troops
cavalry attacks against them from

another direction to ~~ascertain~~ ~~the~~ ~~enemy's~~ ~~condition.~~
ascertain the enemy's condition.

line ~~condition~~

The cavalry regiment commander,
was Lt-Colonel KUBOTA, Tokejio. ~~I saw~~

~~him~~ In the barracks, ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ my presence,

he said to Major SAITO in an emphatic
tone of voice, as if complaining, "Why

don't they use our cavalry regiment? We

^{are} feel so ashamed to be ~~keeping~~ idle in

the barracks, while troops at the ~~front~~

front are suffering ~~with~~ a great loss of
personnel ~~that they~~ ^{and} having great difficulties
in getting ammunition ^{and} provisions
transported ^{and} supplied. Please give us
something to do. ~~some work~~. We are quite willing to do
any thing, ^{even if} no matter whether it is ^{only} carrying
ammunition or some other ~~work~~ such task.

Staff officer SAITO looked ^{disturbed,} ~~annoyed,~~
The cavalry of the division is said ^{never} ~~not~~
to have been dispatched to the front line
till the end

As cavalry service is generally
limited to searching ^{and} reconnoitering,
the division commander ^{could not use} ~~had the idea~~
that their services ^{since they were} ~~were~~ not needed for

a ^{defensive} battle in such a locality, ~~for it~~

~~was a defensive battle~~

I ~~was~~ ^{became} chief of the Mobilization sub-

section, ~~the~~ 3rd section, ~~the~~ 1st Division, ~~of~~

~~the~~ General Staff Headquarters, ~~since~~ ⁱⁿ August,

1937. ^{Since} ~~As~~ ^{Towards} the end of April,

1939, ^{our} military operations in the South China area came to an end

I left Tokyo about the 10th of May for

the purpose of inspecting ~~the conditions~~

of our forces in Central, ^{and} Southern China

Passing through various ~~places~~ ^{places in}

Central China, TAIHOKU, ^{and} Canton, I

arrived at Hainan Island in the begin-
ning of June. I ~~learned~~^{learned} there for the
first time that hostilities had broken
in Nomonhan ~~at~~^{and its} vicinity

Major General IIDA, Shojiro was
then garrison commander at Hainan
Island, ~~and~~^{and} Colonel IMADA Shintaro, Chief
of Staff. They had not ^{yet} been informed
in detail of the Nomonhan Incident, ~~yet~~.
(They might not have been informed
~~by~~^{by} the central headquarters, it is
guessed.)

I thought: "The nature ~~of~~^{and} magnitude in detail,
of the incident are not yet ~~exactly~~ known."

but this is, ^{indeed,} a very serious matter,

~~indeed~~. If the incident should ~~make~~

develop further,
~~further development~~, it will be urgently
necessary to ~~make further dispatch~~ ^{prepare a greater} #

^{and make}
~~proper~~ ^{and} other arrangements

As I am chief of the Mobilization sub-section,

my services ~~as such~~ will be required

in ^{my} ~~the~~ office. I hope the trouble will

be terminated peacefully. Anyway, I

am bound ~~to~~ ^{by} duty to return to Tokyo

~~as~~ ^{as} quickly, since ^{true} the ~~actual~~ situation

is not known at all".

Perhaps It was ^{then} the rainy season
or was nearing it. As ~~the~~ foul weather
was prevalent ~~prevailing~~ at Hainan Island, Canton,
and Formosa, our airplane could not

make a ~~satisfactory~~ ^{the} flight as we desired
It was around the 15th of June ^{before} ~~when~~ I
could reach Tokyo.

In the General Staff Headquarters
the 2nd section had ~~no~~ charge of military
operations, so I had nothing to do with
operations. plans for However,
But when the 2nd section
came out ^{a plan of} operation, ~~plan~~, they had
to make arrangements for ^{calling up} ~~bringing~~ the

number of Troops required for their
purpose. ^{Therefore,} ~~And so~~ from the regiment
numbers, branches of service, ^{and} ~~the~~ equipment
of these troops, I could guess what
kinds of operations were being under
consideration ^{and} where they were going
to be made. Before I ^{had} left Tokyo, I

had ^{had} neither ^{indication} ~~signs~~ nor ^{even} ~~any~~ presentiment
of the incident

The purpose of my trip was
chiefly to inspect the conditions of
each ^{unit} ~~force~~ at the ^{front,} ~~front~~ ^{and to} ~~examine~~
whether its organization ^{and} ~~the~~ equipment

were good enough, and ^{to} study whether

some of the troops ^{who had been there for a time} stationed long in

~~case~~ ^{stead} of maintaining their position of

defence ^{against} ~~facing~~ the enemy still

further, ~~should~~ ^{must} ~~not~~ be sent back to

Japan, ^{whether} and their number could

~~not~~ be reduced. ~~For~~ For the purpose

of inquiry I got in touch with ~~the~~

General Headquarters of the China

Expeditionary Army in Nanking ^{and} the

Headquarters in Hankow, Shanghai,

TAIHOKU ^{and} Canton, but I ~~could~~

~~learned~~ ^{nothing} in detail about the

Nomonhan Incident ~~anywhere~~ ^{at any of these places} they

It is possible that ~~did not know~~ ^{heard} of it, ~~might not have been reported~~

~~detail of the incident~~

As

I had ~~the~~ charge of the mobili-

zation of the whole Japanese army,

I ~~had~~ ^{was} greatly ~~concerned~~ ^{anxious} about the

future replacement ^{and} replenishment

of personnel ^{and} horses, ^{against our wishes,} since the sino-

Japanese Incident had made such

development ~~against our wishes~~ ^{that} to the

~~contrary~~ that our military forces had

come to be stationed even in Hainan

Island of South China. ~~Nothing had~~ He never

dreamed that we would
be ~~farther from our intention than~~

to get into trouble with Soviet Russia

over this matter.

~~into the bargain~~

It was indeed ~~an~~

irony of ~~circumstances~~ that I ~~should~~

~~have~~ learned on Hainan Island about

an ~~the~~ incident which broke out at the

north western end of Manchuria.

My anxiety was, in fact, the greater,

since
~~as~~ no details were available

Step 1/2

極東國際軍事裁判所

亞米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫 他

宣誓伊述書

菅井斌磨

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式

タル上次ノ如ク供述致シマス

先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓ヲ爲シ

一、私ノ姓名 スガ菅井 トシ試磨 マロ

二、現住所 東京都北多摩郡武藏野町
吉祥寺二八七三番地

三、生年月日 明治三十二年七月二十七日

四、私ノ經歷ノ概要

大正十年十二月 陸軍士官學校卒業

昭和六年十二月 陸軍大學校 卒業

昭和七年十二月 參謀本部附勤務

昭和九年十二月 第四師團參謀

昭和十二年八月 參謀本部部長

昭和十一年八月 陸軍少佐

昭和十三年七月 陸軍中佐

昭和十四年八月 關東軍參謀

昭和十五年八月 大本營陸軍參謀

昭和十六年三月 參謀本部課長

昭和十六年八月 陸軍省兵務局兵備課長

昭和十六年八月 陸軍大佐

昭和十八年二月 陸軍省副官

昭和二十年二月 第十七方面軍參謀副長

兼朝鮮軍管區參謀副長

昭和二十年六月 陸軍少將

陸軍省

一、私ハ昭和七年十二月參謀本部ニ勤務シテ勤員ノ
仕事ヲ擔任シテ以來約十年間殆ト勤員ノ仕
事ニ終始シタ

一、張鼓峯事件ノ起ツタ昭和十三年私ハ參謀
本部ノ第一部隊第三課勤員班長ヲシテ居タ
當時、勤員計畫テハ第十九師團（師團司令部ハ
朝鮮羅南ニ在リ）ハ野戰師團ヲ勤員スレハ同時ニ

留守師團を編成スル様ニナツテ居タソシテ動員下
令セラルト平時ニ於ケル壯丁、徵募區ノ關係上第
二師團管内即チ東北地方、在郷人馬ガ召集セラレ
テ東北地方、屯營ニ集ツテ假ニ編成ヲシ汽車輸
送テ第十九師團ニ到着スルコトニナツテ居タ。動員
下令後到着迄ニ二週間乃至三週間ヲ必要トシ

夕

從ツテ緊急ノ間ニ合ハナイ之カ為應急動員
ヲ計畫シテ居タ 應急動員ト言フノハ在鮮
人馬而モ三日以内ニ到着シ得ルモノヲ屯營ニ駐
ケ付ケサセテ本動員完結前ニ應急的ニ出動シ
得ル態勢ヲ整ヘサセル様ノ計畫デアリマス
其他ニ別ニ應急派兵ト云フノガアリマスコレハ平
時ノ人馬ノミチ出動スル計畫デアリマス

應急派兵ハ全クノ一時的出勤ヲ目的トスルモノデ
二三日間ノ行動ニ堪ヘ得ル位デ之デ作戰行動ヲ
長クスルコトハ出来ナイ編成デアル而モ原則的ニハ
應急派兵スルトキニハ應急勤負ガ下令セラレテモ
差支無ク勤負業務ガ出来ル様ニ所要ノ
基幹人馬ヲ此營ニ殘シテ行クコトカ必要デ
アツタ

一、張鼓峯事件カ起ツテカラ中央部トシテハ積極的ニ兵力増派モ
セラレスニ居タガ八月ニナツテカラモ毎日死傷者ヲ生シ此ノ儘デハ
兵力が零ニナツテシマウノデ兵員ノ補充ヲ必要トシタガ他ニ補充ノ
方法が無イノデ應急動員ヲ下令セラレルニ至ツタ。確カ八月九
日デアツタト思フ

私ハ當時動員班長ダツタガ應急動員ガ下令セラレテモ其ノ
実施ハ相當困難デアラウト想像シタノデ現地ニ行ツテ親シク之

ヲ指導スル爲ニ東京カラ飛行機ヲ第十九師団ニ急行シタ

當時羅南ニ飛行場が無クテ私ハ會寧ニ着陸シタ

飛行場ニハ飛行隊カ居タ隊長ハ當時藤塚止シカオ大佐大ヲアツ

タピストノ前ニ腰掛ケテ空ヲ仰イデ居タ

私ハ既ニ面識ガアツタノデ同大佐ニ親シク挨拶シタガ大佐ハ

ソ聯機カ越境シテ飛行場攻撃ヲ爲ス場合ニノミ反撃シテヨ

ロシイトノ命令ヲ受ケテ居ル、然レシソ聯機カ國境ヲ通過シテ

僅二十分テ飛行場上空ニ達スルノテソ聯機ノ未襲ニ備ヘテ操
縦者ヲ乗セテ居ルソシテ直クニ何時デモ發動機ヲ始動シ得ル様
ニシテ居ルケレトモ上空ノ哨戒モ出来ズ、ソ機カ未襲シテモ戦斗
ニ必要ナ高度ヲ取ル時間モ無イ。コンナ風ニ飛行場ニ待機シ
テ居タノデハ皆マラレルニキマソテ居ル。誠ニ辛イ状態ニアル
トコボシテ居タ。

コノ事實ハ日本軍ニ積極的攻勢ノ意思ノ無カソタコトヲ証明

スル事實デハアルマイカ。

一、私ハ飛行場カラ自動車デ羅南師団司令部ニ行ツタ。

當時師団ノ動員主任參謀ハ齊藤敏雄少佐デアツタ。

應急動員ノ下令セラレタコト、即チ之ニ依ツテ在野在郷軍

人カ召集セラレテ人員ノ補充ガ出来ルコトヲ傳ヘ、如何ニシテ

之ヲ受入レテ第一線ニ補充スヘキヤヲ検討シタ。

一、師團ハ張鼓峯事件ガ全ク突発的ニ起リ且ツ日本側カラ

陸軍

シカケタモノデナイ爲ニコンナニ大マクナルモノトハ豫想シナカ
ツタ、從ツテ国境第一線方面ニ兵力ヲ出シタモノノ後日本動
員ハ勿論應急動員モ下令セラルルカ如クコトヲ豫期シテ居
ナカツタ爲總テノ計畫が無視セラレテ居ル、應急動員力
下令セラレタモノノ整々タル実行極ムテ困難ナル状態ニ
在ツタ。

陸軍

半居カツタ爲總テノ計畫カ無視セヨト半居九

應急動員ガト令セカトキモノノ整理カタル事実行極トテ
困難ナル状態ニ在リタ。

一 以上述ヘタ如ク第十九師団テハ應急動員サハ整理カト出
来ナリ状態ニ在リタト云フ事、安兵カラ見テ此ノ事件ハ日本ノ
中央部ノ意思田心ニ依ラス又朝鮮軍司令官ノ意思田心ニモ
依ラス、更ニ又第十九師団ノ意思田心ニモ非スレテ起リタ

コトヲ証明シ得ラレマス

第十九師團長ニ於テ積極的ニ此ノ事件ヲ起ストスレハ

余後ノ人員補苴、彈藥、糧秣等ノ補云ルニ就テモ計畫

スル所が無ケレバナラヌカ事實則全ク此ノ準備モ計畫モ

出来テ居ナカワタ、況ンヤ勤員カ鈴セラシル等トハ思ヒ

モ依ラサカワタノデアワタ。

此ニ角ニ應急勤員ノ計畫通り在解在御軍人が

陸軍

第十九師団ノ部隊ニ集ホツテ來メタカ
非常ニ困難ナル

状態ヲ許シ十日頃迄ニ之ヲ收容セシメ
此ノ人員ガ

第一線ニ到着補ハムセラシメタラ
第一線モ多少樂ホニナルカ

ラウト共々ノデアツタカ
過々停戦協定成立シタノデ

此ノ人員ガ第一線ニ着クカ
至カナイデ戦闘行動ヲ

中止シタノデアル

此ノ應急心動員ヲ集ホメタ
人員ハ師団全部ヲ

約三千名位ゴアワタト記憶スル

陸軍

一、四維南デハ騎兵聯隊ニ支寄リツタ、騎兵聯隊ハ

師団命令ニ依リ出、高シテ居ナカッタ。

之ハ師団トシテ別ナ正面ニ戦闘ヲシカケルトカ別ノ

方面カラソ聯内部ノ状況ヲ搜索スルトカ、言フ

意^官思^官心^官ガ無イ為ニ騎兵聯隊ハ少シモ使ハナカッタ

トノコトデアワタ

騎兵聯隊長ハ六港田武ニ即中佐デアワタガ

也營ニ居テ私ノ前テ「何故騎兵聯隊ヲ使用シ
ナイカ、第一線ハ人員ガ損耗シテ彈藥糧秣ノ
補給トカ運搬ニモ困ツテ居ルニ五ヶルガ也營ニボシヤリ
シテ居ルコトハ申一証ガ無イ

彈藥運ビテモナシテモヤルカラ使ツテヨト

亦同藤少謀ニ強イ語ニホテ話サレタ

亦同藤少謀モ困ツタ様ナ顔シテ居タガ、此ノ部隊ハ

遂ニ第一線ニ出サレナカツタ。

積極的ニ思田心ガアレハ捜索ホトカ偵察ノ為ニ騎兵

聯隊ヲ使フベキデアルガ高地ノ東字防禦ノ為ニハ

騎兵聯隊ハ西野トシテ師団長が使ハレナカツタノ

デアル。

附記ニ紛争ノ起キタトノ旨イタ。

三、書付 海部島守傳、菊倉、飯田祥二郎

少将、美濃長、今田新太郎、大津、アワタガ

ノモシバン事件、詳細ニ知ツテ居ナカワタ。

(詳シイ事ト、中野部カラ知ラニテナカワタノテアラウ)

四、私ニ次ノ採ニ考ヘタ

是ニ大要トユトニナワタ、万ニ之ガ採大サレシ採ナエト
事件ノ性質ヲ大ニ判ラナイカ、兎ニ角

陸軍

ニテルト 兵力上ノ準備ヤ其他ノ處置ヲ必要トス

ル、從ツテ 勤負班友ニアシ 私ヲ必要トスルテアラス

トウカ平穩無事ニオサマツテ是レハ良イ、

然シ様子が サツパッ 判ラナイカラ 兎ニ角早ク

東京へ歸ラナケレハナルマイ也

五、當時兩期ニ入ツテ居タカ或ハ兩期ニ近カワタリ、

海軍島 弘 東、基隆方面ニ於テ不良ノ為

思ハテハ此ノ様カ飛ハナイテ 漸ク東ヨリニ
歸リテ着イタニ 六月ノ十五日次テアワセ。

古 考 漢 東 部 部 々 作 戦 二 課 加 担 任 シ テ 任 夕
私ニ作戦計急ニ聞知ニナイ、然シ作戦課カ

作戦行動ヲ計急スレハ夫ニ必要トシ兵カ準備

ヲスルカラ、其ノ兵力、部隊ノ種類、裝備等ニ

依テ、何カ作戦カ甚起サレトス及ヒ凡ソ何方ニ

ノ作威ナリヤ位ノ所ハ判断カ付クモノナリ。

私カ東京出立前ニ何等ノ微儀モ豫感モ

無カシク

七、私ノ旅行目的ハ主トシテ第一各部隊ノ状況ヲ視

察シ其ノ編成壯表等ハ果シテ之ヲヨイカ、又

既ニ長期対峙ノ守備ノ總要ニ後ニシテハ長

期ノ服飾者ニ歸國サセテシラウ又又兵カモ

縮少に得るノテリイカヲ検討スルニアツタ、

南東ノ支那派遣軍總司令部、漢口、上

海軍世に東等夫々司令部に連絡シタ

ケレトモ何事デモノモンハン毒件ノ事ヲ

南カチカワタ

恐ラク各軍司令部モ知ラチカワタノデアンマ

イカ、

陸軍

八、日軍全軍、勅令計を以て担任するに私に任ずる支那

事變が吾々の希望に及ばず拡大せられ、今中東支

海軍島嶼に遠征力ヲ駐屯スルに至り、夕下、予、將來

人馬ノ補充、交代等ニ就テ亦、常ニ心懸テ

アツタ。

況シテ此ノ上、ソ研ト事ヲ構へ、等トシ、夢ニ

思ヒヨラス、海軍島嶼ニ來テ、滿海ノ西北端

事件ノ起ツタニク簡イタニ一書ニ皮肉ニア
、事情ガ判ラヌ丈ニ心配モ大ナカシク
弟ヲアム。

昭和二十二年(一九四七年)一月

九日於極東軍事裁判所構内

供述者

菅井 斌 磨

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ證

明シマス

同日

於 此所

立會人

宮 田

實



宣誓書

良心ニ従ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ黙祕セズ又何事ヲモ附加セザ
ルコトヲ誓フ

(捺
印名)

菅井斌磨

