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file Pearl Harbor

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The following statement by the President must be held in STRICT CONFIDENCE until the hour of release.

NOTE: Release is automatic at 1:00 P.M., E.W.T., today, Wednesday, August 29, 1945.

1947 JAN 23 AM 11 21

CHARLES G. ROSS
Secretary to the President

- -

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I have here reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster. One is from the Army and one is from the Navy. The Navy report gives a "Finding of Facts" by a Navy Court of Inquiry. Attached to this Finding of Facts are indorsements by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Admiral T. L. Gatch; Admiral E. J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy. You will find a summation of the findings in the final indorsement by the Secretary of the Navy at the end of the document.

From the Army we have the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and, bound separately, a statement by the Secretary of War. Certain criticisms of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, appear in the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You will notice in the Secretary's statement, beginning on page nineteen, that he takes sharp issue with this criticism of General Marshall, stating that the criticism "is entirely unjustified". The conclusion of the Secretary of War is that General Marshall acted throughout this matter with his usual "great skill, energy and efficiency." I associate myself wholeheartedly with this expression by the Secretary of War.

Indeed I have the fullest confidence in the skill, energy and efficiency of all our war leaders, both Army and Navy.

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Secretary to the President

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R E P O R T

of

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to Make such Recommendations as It May Deem Proper. Also, To Consider the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Directed by the Acting Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944.

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Legends.

RR - Roberts Record

R - APHB Record

D - Document

Ex - Exhibit

Underscoring ours unless otherwise stated.

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CHAPTER I

PREAMBLE: AUTHORITY FOR THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND ITS ACTION TAKEN

This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A.G.O. 8 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)) as amended by Letter Order A.G.O. 11 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)) and Letter Order A.G.O. 22 August 1944 (AGPO-A-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)), and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter Order A.G.O. 22 July 1944 (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (21 July 44)) which order made reference to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944--Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944 alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects, and which was signed by Robert P. Patterson, Acting Secretary of War. This supplemental order directed the Board to consider the phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster.(1)

Composition of the Board:

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, 01534, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 02871, USA
Col. Charles W. West, 012774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote)
Col. Harry A. Toulmin, 0205520, AC, Executive Officer (without vote)
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder (without vote)

Footnote:
(1) See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive.

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The Board interpreted these orders and the memorandum referred to as confining its investigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The Board convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from 24 July 1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washington, D. C.; twice in San Francisco, California; and in Hawaii. It has heard a total of 151 witnesses and has interviewed many additional potential witnesses whom it found did not have any pertinent information. There has been no available document, witness, suggestion or lead which promised any materiality that has not been carefully investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give, in addition to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evidence, or any other information that might possibly be pertinent. It has been our purpose, and we believe we have effected it, to explore every available piece of information on this subject. We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, documents, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been secured, although we have found a few files from which important and vital papers are missing. In many instances we found these documents elsewhere or were able to prove them through copies in other hands.

This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance has its invitation to appear and testify been ignored.

In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this

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Board, under Joint Resolution of Congress,[1] to examine the Army's part in the Pearl Harbor disaster because Congress desired, as appears from the legislative history of the Joint Resolution, a more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine the record of the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new documents; and to set forth wherein the Board's findings are in harmony with the Roberts Report; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported by fuller evidence.

The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and exhibits of the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially helped and enlightened by the Report and Record

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Footnote:

(1) Public Law 339--78th Congress, Chapter 247--2nd Session, S.J.Res. 133, Joint Resolution: To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

"Approved June 13, 1944."

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of the Roberts Commission. We append to this report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which probably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or, at least, were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or report of the Roberts Commission.

We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, pursuant to H. Res. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs to Study the Progress of the National War Effort, and the committee's records, counsel, and investigators, with particular reference to the activities of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it. We have been aided by the testimony of counsel from that committee and the complete record of the investigation of that committee on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard testimony and investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants, whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after the conclusion of the investigation of the Committee on Military Affairs, as indicated in its Interim Report. We have also been aided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Report of the Tenney Committee in California.

We transmit with this report the record of testimony of the witnesses consisting of 41 volumes and 70 exhibits. In the appendix to this report is a tabulation in detail of the

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witnesses who testified and a list of the exhibits.

In order to facilitate the examination of the Board's record by the War Department and by any others who may have occasion to review the record and exhibits, we append to this report and make a part of it extensive analysis of the testimony of every witness, indexing each statement by reference to the record, and with cross references of those statements to different parts of the record where similar or different statements on the same subject were made by other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same subject matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the exhibits presented before that commission. It is, therefore, possible for anyone reviewing this report to have a complete and, we believe, exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl Harbor matters, so that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly reviewed.

In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the deep spiritual and moral obligation, as well as its professional and patriotic duty, to present an impartial and judicial investigation and report. This we have earnestly endeavored to do, and have spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit animating our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state of mind and the background against which the events of the drama of Pearl Harbor could be adequately judged; and to sketch in retrospection the events and the knowledge of such events of each of the principal actors on the scene, so that their actions might be more fully understood and justly evaluated

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and judged. At no time, however, has the Board acted as a court.(1)

This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter several years after the event. We have endeavored to effect this reconstruction to some degree in the second chapter entitled, "Background". The same considerations have been evaluated in the succeeding chapters, as this background affected the events and actions of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing, we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by St. Paul of "forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before."

In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This is a running chronological story of the events that took place leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and through that fateful day and for a short period thereafter, so far as subsequent events reflected upon the conditions previously existing. We have discussed in this Chapter III the arguments for and against each principal proposition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of General Short and others involved in this matter. We have endeavored to state the surrounding facts and circumstances, the background, the considerations and factors which influenced each principal officer or official in the execution of his duties.

Footnote:

(1) Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof that had not been previously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known once and for all.

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Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him all of the considerations for and against any proposition, all facts, any defense or any claim put forward by those interested, and answers to such questions of import to the services and to the public, in order to have the foundation for an impartial judgment.

In Chapter IV we continue the story in so far as it pertains to Washington. In Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl Harbor construction activities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions.

The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, background, and atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and brought them to their fateful decisions. This we believe we secured successfully from military and naval personnel of widely varying ranks; from civilians of varied stations in life; and from official and other contemporaneous publications. The range of witnesses ran from men in the ranks to Generals and Admirals, and from the humblest in civil life to United States Senators and the President's Cabinet.(1) Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely his views and opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to the discoveries of facts which might be helpful to this Board.

We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our approach has been, we hope, diligently and completely factual; and also equally impartial. Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear weight of the evidence from the facts set forth in the record.

Footnote:

(1) Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved it in favor of running down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality.

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CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

1.	INTRODUCTION:	Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of Opinions and Diversity of Views; Nation Not Geared to War.
2.	PUBLIC OPINION:	Psychological Conditions and Their Effect; Army Dependent on Public Opinion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness for War; American Public Reluctant to Consider A War; Japan Ready for War.
3.	U. S. POLICY: (1922-1939)	Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan Important; the Mandated Islands and Exclusion of the United States and Fortification of the Islands by Japan; the Navy's Efforts to Get Into the Islands and Its Relationship to the State Department; Diplomatic Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their Spying Activities; Strong National Policy for the Protection of American Rights Lacking and Effect Upon the Army and Navy; the Effect of This Policy on the Japanese Oriental Trading Mind.
4.	U. S. POLICY: (1939-1941)	Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1939-1941 by Avoiding Open Breach; Necessity for Delay to Prepare for War; Negotiations Based Upon Lack of Incidents.
5.	MORAL EMBARGOES VERSUS JAPANESE EXPANSION:	Moral Embargoes; Economic Sanctions by Direct Embargoes; Coincident Forming of Public Opinion Against Japan; Japanese Making No Concessions and Proceeding with Aggressions; Threatening Hostile Action; Lack of Public Understanding of Importance of Hawaii; War and Navy Departments Making

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Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deficiencies; Diversion of Resources to Assist England and France Retarding Our Own Rearming; Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War Council, Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and Miscalculation of Time of Attack; Japanese Full Understanding of Our Dilemma.

6. PUBLIC DEMANDS ACTION AGAINST JAPANESE: National Policy Against War; Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanctions Put Government in Difficult Contrary Positions; Conflicting Elements of Policy Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare for War and Not Precipitate an Incident Causing War; Public Opinion in 1941 More Belligerent Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating Government Position.

7. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN: The Economic Effect on Japan of Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail; the Rising Tempo of Economic Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of Negotiations; Inevitable Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation and Military Action Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941; the State Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy Departments.

8. THE HAWAIIAN POPULATION PROBLEM: Sabotage Complex; the Japanese Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii; the Rising Dominance Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group; Sabotage of War Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group; the Difficulty of Alerts Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt Act; Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii; the Local Opposition of Commercial Interests to

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Putting Japanese Under Control; Official Reluctance to Put Local Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance; Free Japanese Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii.

9. HAWAIIAN PRESS: Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing Difficulties with Japan and Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind of Local Commanders as to Difficulties with Local Population.

10. SUMMARY: Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of Public Officials and Commanders; Our Complacency Our Weakness; Our National Pride and Vanity Our Weakness; the Result was Lack of Action, Coordination, Cooperation, Teamwork, and War Spirit; United States Was Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or as an Organization for War.

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1. Introduction: The purpose of this explanation of the background of public and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this. There existed during this critical period much confusion of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists and nationalists were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were negotiating for peace with Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only to war; we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy Departments in their policies, plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there by the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotiations and newspaper attacks.

The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a peacetime basis; neither its management nor its general staff had perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enterprise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were struggling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organization in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been

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the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference method; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command; that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy.

Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into war.

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2. Public Opinion. The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected therewith can better be understood when the background of public opinion and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psychological conditions had a material effect upon the events that took place. A brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public; and the facts known to the public and to the government; and our national policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper perspective.

Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the background of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war, which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field.

For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even to consider a war.(1) There was a distinct

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Footnote:

(1) The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and on a proposal to abandon Land-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in 1941.

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lack of a war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and propaganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership. So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its influence.(1) The events hereinafter recited must be measured against this important psychological factor.

At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation. It had been at war for several years in China; both its people and government were psychologically and physically geared to war and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life is cheap; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane nationalism

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Footnote:

(1) Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight: "a fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred, *** our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers." (R. 2878)

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and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation united for the single purpose of world conquest based on more than a thousand years of conflict.

As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic policy, because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932:

> "The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it wants war."

And he continued:

> "At that time I said it would be criminally 'short-sighted', I think not to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end." (R. 4201)

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3. U. S. Policy, (1922-1939). The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as administered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its fortifications of the mandated islands.

The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator under date of December 17, 1920, the Convention for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates between the United States and Japan regarding the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly the island of Yap under date of February 11, 1922, have the following in common:

a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory, including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In short, it was a 'government in trust.'"

b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory."

c. "The Mandatory...allow all missionaries, nationals of any state member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the

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territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling."

d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates, whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one direct with the United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of 'The Permanent Court of International Justice.'"

e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and in no way impaired."

f. "The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the Mandated Islands."

g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island of Yap."

h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of action with respect

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to Yap.(1)

Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been made impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from the mandated territories, and during this time built up army, navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value.

Footnote:

(1) The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board: "Japan was given under a League of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.

"Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands provided that: 'Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated islands.' Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1911, contained the following provisions: 'The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to which they thus come.'

"By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the United States that 'the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands.'. The term 'usual comity' in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries."

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As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart of the Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.

Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temperamental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the United States.

We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first, to avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy of economic sanctions.

Efforts to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean information, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101-107; Pye, 1064-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527 -1529; DeLaney 1702-1703; Kimmel, 1807-1808; Layton, 3054-3055) The State Department explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net result was, however, that we did not get into these Islands; the Japanese fortified the Islands and in

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consequence the United States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his Department's views as follows:

"The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and American private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940-1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the information made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the office of the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance.

* * *

"The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the ports of other countries.

"No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readiness

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to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936 and in 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.

"In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the western Aleutian Islands."

The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movements of our fleet and the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii.(1) Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the F.B.I. had

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Footnote:

(1) Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: "I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area." (R. 2882)

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authority to tap these lines and find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the Communications Act of 1934.(1)

No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He used the commercial telephone and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested with his agents on December 7th, a large number of his messages were found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together, Colonel Fielder, G-2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radiophone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house

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Footnote:

(1) Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission: "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph, cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to December 7, 1941."

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in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and Colonel Fielder, G-2; but its exact meaning could not be made out. This message is referred to as the Mori message. (R. 2961) The next morning the Japanese struck. The evident trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses.

This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important information gathered, which would probably have prevented in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted, with the F.B.I., to tap these lines and find out what was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial business no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting their activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it and to take action accordingly, either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what they were doing.

Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense for a nation such as ours: the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line--held by the State Department--ofttimes handicaps and influences the preparation for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the policy of compromise between economic

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sanctions and negotiations(1) in turn influenced War Department action, in that Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the State Department's warnings, to take defensive measures but in doing so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent.(2) There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means to enforce same.

The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive relationship between the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the War and Navy Departments, in using all of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United States.(3)

Footnotes:

(1) The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to the lines along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of Peace and War (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941."

(2) The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to your request for an expression of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States."

(3) The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November, which Japan considered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy Marshall-Stark memorandum could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy. (R. Stimson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079)

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The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind, which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's front causes him to lose face and bargaining power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempting to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put our interests backward instead of forward. (R. 3062)

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4. U. S. Policy, (1939-1941). We had been following the policy immediately before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and France, of veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the European War in August 1939, it became apparent that it would be necessary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were available to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific.(1)

Footnote:

(1) Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome:

"Captain Layton. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.

"General Russell. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?

"Captain Layton. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane." (R. 3047)

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As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity of sending England and France what equipment and supplies were available.

It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it expedient to lean over backwards to avoid any appearance in Hawaii of a war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and towards the large Japanese population of the islands.(1)

Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department policy, very naturally conveyed itself to the commanders in residence in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they were not more fully advised of the progress towards a critical international situation in the Pacific must be taken into account.

This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commercial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, the abrogation

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Footnote:

(1) 160,000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one-third of the population. (R.2947)

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of Japanese commercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy.

The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected itself in the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the messages from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until December 7, 1941.

The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials in their attitude towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was made to maintain the status quo until we were ready. Time was our most precious commodity in 1941.

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5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion. No competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, the cutting off of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made to maintain the status quo leading up to the final visit of Japanese special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placating and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep the negotiations going.

During all of this period the government was not supported by a public that was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935 against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of considering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with them, it had no intention of doing so whatsoever.

During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite apparent that she would continue her course until the patience of the United States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into a position of an open breach--the time of that breach was stipulated clearly to the President

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November 27 by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counter proposals to Japan on November 26 anticipated that time--war came before we were fully prepared.

It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been characterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be expected that an unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified:

> "General Russell. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th of December?
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> "Mr. Stimson. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated islands--I know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an order; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama." (R. 4072)

Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941 sent the State Department the following message:

> TOKYO, January 27, 1941--6 p.m.
> (Received January 27--6:38 a.m.)
>
> "A member of the Embassy was told by my... colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of <u>all</u> the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic."
>
> GREW

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Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It was, therefore, obvious that the United States would have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese nationals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation of an international incident with Japan.

The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became increasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance towards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense.(1)

The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced by the transfer of a considerable part of Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the War

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Footnote:

(1) Fortune magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii; 25%, not to defend; and the balance did not know what they wanted.

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Department was directed towards avoiding any incident that might precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted with a grave lack of planes, anti-aircraft guns, and other implements of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechanism. The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us, two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations. The strong anti-war group in the United States made it unwise for the United States to take stronger action against Japan.

These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the War Council.(1) Its policies were reflected

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Footnote:

(1) There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the two bodies to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson, who said:

"The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Councils'. By the 'War Councils' we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.

* * *

"The name 'War Council' is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it.

* * *

"The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times that we are talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings--they can hardly be dignified by the 'organization'--but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of

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Footnote (1) - Continued from preceding page.

meetings went on until Mr. Knox died; they lasted right through.

"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.

"The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually called with great regularity--the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff--that was, of course, General Marshall--the Chief of Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well, that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname we called it the 'War Cabinet,' or the 'War Council,' or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you say, used that expression in his White Paper.

"There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of the President, at his office; and during this time about which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also; and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly, and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be important; in regard to the crisis that was coming along; and including these meetings; so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully." (R. 4041-4043) (General Marshall, R. 5-6)

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in the actions of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, as to measures taken for defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public. As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they account in part for the attitude of mind of Short and others in the Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.

Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen to the Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was a surprise to him. (R. 9)

All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to become the first

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involved. The Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority on equipment and maintenance. (R. 14,184)

Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1941, to Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe arrival. (R.168) This too led to a state of mind, both officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to those thought to become the first involved. (R. 2872)

Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state of mind. It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of January 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan understand our national psychology that it selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well that venture was

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prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter proposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum; because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Tankan Bay on the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.(1)

Footnote:

(1) The best attainable evidence supports this statement. (R. 3033)

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6. Public Demands Action Against Japanese. Our national policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy appears to have been its conflicting nature, in that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in business with Japan, and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotiation and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan. As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the administration, particularly the State Department, without the full support of the public so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy Departments without sufficient means to implement a more aggressive policy towards Japan.

The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for the State Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which well knew our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with Japan.

This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large proportion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality of

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Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities.

This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action by the Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggressions in 1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment because of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest army and navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be made.

This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully support the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions.

But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indicated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated the situation in that it made negotiations difficult of either progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should be made to

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behave herself and that our government should do something about it.

7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan. In 1938 and 1939 a series of "moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the United States. During those two years there had been brought about a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of September 1940.

The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result of embargoes. He said:

> "During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan--and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults--I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abysinnian campaign.

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"But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and, shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

"Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been two years earlier."

It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with live ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212)

In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort.

Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression, that the United States would continue its conversation with the

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Japanese government and offer her a reasonable and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.(1)

As was stated in the White Papers(2) as to economic sanctions, he (Grew) said that "considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course.. Finally he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States."

As Ambassador Grew testified in summary:

> "However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during the period you mention; that is, the years 1940 and 1941; was almost steadily down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call a 'tidal wave' of military extremism in Japan; and I think the results as culminating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact."

The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicate that he too was acting under what

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Footnotes:

(1) "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941," Department of State, Washington, p. 129.

(2) "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. I and Vol. II; and Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941, Department of State, Washington, D. C."

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apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.

On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported, even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the outlook was never darker for peace; on July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he reported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising the public,

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whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.

On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself.

Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a later clipper for "technical reasons", the significance of which was apparent.

On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet "that relations between Japan and the United States were 'extremely critical' and that there was 'imminent possibility' that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force." (White Papers, p. 136)

This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941.

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The White Papers continue:

"On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a 'sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then involved;'".

Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high officials of this government

"stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the purpose thereof." (White Papers, p. 144)

It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces.

On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a modus vivendi. The following day, at the request of the Japanese Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull, at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points", stating the three primary considerations upon which the "Ten Points" were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a joint memorandum to the President requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agreement reached with the British and the

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Dutch for reciprocal action in the case either one of them was attacked.

The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November. Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 4222) They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events, thus:

> "The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese--whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'
>
> "General Russell. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of--
>
> "Mr. Stimson. This was the 27th.
>
> "General Russell. 27th.
>
> "Mr. Stimson. The day after the 26th.
>
> "General Russell. Yes, sir.
>
> "Mr. Stimson. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it.
>
> "General Russell. Yes.
>
> "Mr. Stimson. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.
>
> "I then called up the President and talked with him about it." (R. 4052-4053)

On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, "The matter will now go to the officials of the

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Army and Navy." He warned that the Japanese action would probably be "a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk". His predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144-145) On November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted,(1) and on December 1 Grew reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President's Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend apparently high in that government, Grew saying "everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan."

On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred.

Footnote:
(1) "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew.

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8. The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complex. The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War Department communications, this was a fact; and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the Army also gave great weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation on the civil side.

It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United States to exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we permitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, to the extent of 30% of the total population or 160,000.(1)

Footnote:

(1) There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens known as Issei, about 37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for education known as Kibei, about 2,599; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children attend the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty. (R. 3919-3920) See also Chapter I, "Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.; "Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, Readers Digest, June 1943, pp. 19-23; and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, Saturday Evening Post, September 9, 1944.

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Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands; and it was the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations.

This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the islands of the Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941)

Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department of Hawaii or by G-2 or the F.B.I. in Hawaii.

Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order to General Herron, by which his troops moved

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into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940, had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on, including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii carried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday. (Exhibits 19-19a)

The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be considered in connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian population and the alien population of Hawaii.

The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; and certainly, in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack. The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move by Japan.

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The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army commander and the actions taken by his associates.

The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home territory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was considered an asset and not, in reality, a liability.

Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939-2940) as to the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing nothing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have been imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese population,

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about which he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as aliens. (R. 3255-3256)

It was well known in Honolulu to both the F.B.I. and G-2 of the Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto temples, three things: patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life.

The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society. The Japanese are well known as great organizers and they had countless organizations, many of which were of potential subversive character. The Japanese ran their own Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national spirit. They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular education in the American schools. Here again our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education, permitted these people to jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control the

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Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were closed.

9. Hawaiian Press. The state of mind and the state of information in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. A mere recitation of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical international situation.

The newspaper headlines in question read as follows: "U. S. Waits Japan Reply" (29 Nov 41--Honolulu Star-Bulletin); "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend"; "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle" (30 Nov 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today" (1 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in Philippines" (1 Dec 41--Honolulu Star-Bulletin); "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S."; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations" (2 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "Huge Pincer Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted" (3 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "Japan Spurns U. S. Program" (4 Dec 41--Honolulu Star-Bulletin); "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today" (4 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "Singapore on War Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave Manila" (6 Dec 41--Honolulu Star-Bulletin); "America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China"; "Japanese Navy Moving South"; "Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser); "F.D.R. Will Send Message

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to Emperor on War Crisis" (7 Dec 41--Honolulu Advertiser).(1)(2)

10. Summary. We have learned a great deal about psychological warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is possible to see that the psychological phases of the preparatory period for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders; and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The deception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combination with our own failures to take precautions against the attack played no small part in the disaster of December 7th.

Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would presume to attack it.

This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii.

With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter.

Footnotes:

(1) Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits 19 and 19A.

(2) The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in international relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them. (R.3107-3108,3169-3170)

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III. THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

A. GENERAL

1. INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER AND ITS PURPOSE: Chronological story of the events, documents, and actions culminating in the Pearl Harbor disaster; statement of the facts and circumstances; two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December.

2. GEOGRAPHICAL: Hawaii and outposts; reason for location of naval and military establishments in the Islands.

3. MISSION OF ARMY IN HAWAII: Joint tasks, Army tasks; Navy tasks.

4. CONDITION OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AT THE TIME OF SHORT'S ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND AND JUST PRIOR THERETO: Report of the Navy on weaknesses of Army Pearl Harbor defenses concurred in by the Army; action of the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War.

5. ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY AT PEARL HARBOR: Organization of the Navy complex, duties of Admiral Kimmel; duties of Admiral Bloch; duties of Admiral Bellinger; problem of Short in dealing with this complex organization.

B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941

1. SELECTION OF GENERAL SHORT: Selection by General Marshall; instructions and basis of his action; correspondence between the Chief of Staff and Commanding General Hawaiian Department as to plans, policies, and status of defense in Hawaii.

2. SHORT'S STAFF: Selection of Colonel Phillips and his training for Chief of Staff, qualifications of Phillips; Short's relationship with his senior officers.

3. SHORT'S ACTIONS IN BUILDING DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND ADDING EQUIPMENT: Short diligent in his demands for equipment, defense construction, and personnel; status of defenses summarized as of December 7, 1941.

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4. SHORT'S REORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS: Reorganization of the Hawaiian Division into triangular divisions, unusually heavy fire power in the divisions.

5. SHORT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NAVY: Efforts to carry out Chief of Staff's direction as to cooperation; resulting agreements with the Navy generally considered and their effect.

6. ABANDONMENT OF HERRON'S FIELD ORDER #1; ADOPTION OF TRIPLE ALERT SYSTEM; SABOTAGE ISSUE: Standard Operating Procedure of July 14 and November 5, 1941; the three alert system; the distribution of Standard Operating Procedure; the effect of the three alerts; the composition of the Japanese population in Hawaii and the sabotage issue; views on sabotage by the Japanese in the Islands from local leaders in Hawaii.

7. NAVY LONG DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE: Short's assumptions as to the Navy's conducting long distance reconnaissance by air and water; Navy's acceptance of the responsibility for long distance reconnaissance; the long distance reconnaissance essence of defense of Oahu; failure to take steps to implement the agreement by the Navy to do long distance reconnaissance; effect of the failure to have long distance reconnaissance; relationship of Army's close-in reconnaissance; place of the Aircraft Warning Service in the reconnaissance system; the radio interceptor system; the failure of the reconnaissance arrangements.

8. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY: War plans, Joint Action of the Army-Navy 1935; Rainbow War Plan; Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; category of defense D; Joint Air Agreement; Short's problem in dealing with Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger to fix responsibility of the Navy under the agreements; failure to implement the agreements; failure to put the agreements into operation; uncertainty as to when the agreements would go into operation; unity of command issue; agreements go into effect upon actual emergency too late without previous practice and organization of staff; training explanation as reason

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for not putting agreements into effect; complete absence of ability to implement the agreement between the Navy and the Army.

9. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Estimate pursuant to the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941; operating plans by Bellinger and Martin April 9, 1941; joint estimate of the situation; Short's responsibilities under the estimate of the situation; concurrence by the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of War, Admiral Richardson, Admiral Kimmel, General Herron, and General Short in air attack the primary danger; Chief of Staff's repeated warnings that air superiority against air attack matter of first priority; responsibility of Short to provide defense to the primary threat of air attack.

C. CRITICAL PERIOD OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. VITAL MESSAGES: Short's action in taking Air Force personnel and putting them on military police duty; Chief of Staff's objections supporting the Air Force; Navy message October 16, warning Japanese relations deteriorating; War Department radio of October 18, 1941 Japanese deteriorating relationships, November 24, 1941 radio Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet doubtful outcome of negotiations with Japan and warning surprise attack possibility; November 26, 1941 War Department radio instructing Short special photo mission Jaluits; November 27, 1941 Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet "war warning"; November 27, 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, negotiations with Japan terminated practical purposes; instructing action to be taken; November 27, 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department possible hostilities may begin; Short's selection of Alert Number 1 and reply to War Department advising such selection November 27, 1941; knowledge of the War Department of his decision; significant Navy messages of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941.

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2.	ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION FROM NOVEMBER 24 TO NOVEMBER 27:	War Council action on the 25 November 1941; War Council and Secretary of State action with the Japanese on November 26, 1941; absence of the Chief of Staff from Washington from evening of the 26th to the 28th; draft of message of 27th by Chief of Staff on 26th; counter proposals handed by the Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassadors 26 November 1941; construction of the counter proposals by the Japanese and their action; the Marshall-Stark memorandum.
3.	THE DRAFTING OF THE MESSAGE #472 OF THE 27TH:	Meeting with the Secretary of War to modify the message to be sent General Short; authorship of various parts of the message identified; Short's position as to the position with reference to long distance reconnaissance; Short's claim of ambiguity in the message considered; Gerow's recollection of the conferences of the 27th; communication of the contents of the message by Short to his principal commanders; the question of secrecy and method of transmission considered.
4.	ANALYSIS OF THE NOVEMBER 27, 1941 MESSAGE:	Parts of the message considered in light of Short's responsibilities and knowledge; message considered in connection with estimate of the situation; message considered in connection with the alert to be adopted; message considered in connection with the communication of its contents in view of restrictions on Short.
5.	MESSAGES 28TH NOVEMBER TO 6TH DECEMBER, INCLUSIVE:	G-2 message November 28, 1941 #484; War Department message November 28, 1941 #482; Short's reply to #482 on 28 November, 1941; December 3, 1941 Navy message on destruction of codes; Navy message of December 4, 1941 on codes; Navy message December 6, 1941 on codes; Short's position as to reception of this information.

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6. DECEMBER 7, 1941 MESSAGE: Its method of sending, status of communication; what happened in transmission; other means of communication available.

7. FAILURE OF NAVY TO ADVISE SHORT OF ENEMY SUBMARINE IN PEARL HARBOR ON MORNING DECEMBER 7, 1941: Submarine reported sunk by the Navy about 7:15 a. m.; no report made to Short.

8. FAILURE OF AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE TO ADVISE OF APPROACHING PLANES, DECEMBER 7, 1941: Status of aircraft warning system, detection of the approaching planes; efforts of the mobile station to communicate the information to higher authority; Lt. Tyler's disposal of the matter.

9. NAVY FAILURE TO ADVISE SHORT OF SUSPECTED NAVAL CONCENTRATION IN THE JALUITS: Loss of radio contact 25th of November to December 1.

10. NAVY ACCOUNT OF THE JAPANESE TASK FORCE THAT ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR: SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO JAPANESE: Origin of information of the attacking forces; history of the attacking forces and the dates of its movement; intelligence sources to the Japanese as to the disposition; activities of the Japanese consulate; maps of the Japanese based upon intelligence information; Japanese information of the disposition from Alert Number 1.

11. INFORMATION NOT GIVEN SHORT: Jaluit task force; information on negotiations with Japanese; no disapproval of his selection of sabotage alert number 1; additional information available in Washington.

D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF READINESS ON DECEMBER 6, 1941 OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS

1. AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE AND INTERCEPTOR COMMAND: Service operative prior to December 7, 1941; operations of the service on December 7, 1941; nature of technical difficulties; state of training of the personnel; probable effectiveness of interception.

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Necessity for immediate use not appreciated in Hawaii by senior commanders; doubtless whether would have been used by Department commander even if in perfect condition.

2. STATUS OF THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE ON DECEMBER 7TH: System operative for month prior to December 7; Department commander would not turn operations over to Air Force and take it away from the Signal Corps; mobile radio stations and information center in a reasonably operative condition prior to December 7; lacked full manpower to operate this service; Department commander holding on to it using it as training stations instead of operating station; cooperation of the Navy, permanent construction did not hold up putting the aircraft warning service into operation; Short's action in putting the aircraft warning service on a partial operating basis insufficient; relationship with the interceptor command and the information center.

3. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND COAST DEFENSES: Composition of the force; relationship to the interceptor command; status of the mobile antiaircraft and its ammunition; mobile batteries seldom placed in combat position prior to December 7.

4. AMMUNITION ISSUE: SHORT'S AND THE ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY: Short refused to permit the timely issuance of antiaircraft or artillery ammunition; small arms ammunition issued to divisions; insufficient small arms ammunition issued to Air Force to meet the attack.

5. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT DEFENSES: Deficiency in aircraft spare parts, etc.; efforts of General Martin to secure equipment; relative status of Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska in equipment; priorities on airfield construction; use of Hawaii as a training ground by the Air Corps.

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E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7TH, 1941

1. ARMY AIRCRAFT: Under Alert Number 1 aircraft was substantially grounded and assembled wing to wing; Navy had no PBY's in the air that morning.

2. NAVAL LONG DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE: Navy had insufficient means of conducting adequate long distance reconnaissance by air; Navy reconnaissance by air was confined to observation of maneuver areas for the fleet with particular reference to submarines; Navy's fleet maneuvers were for the purpose of training and such aircraft reconnaissance was primarily antisubmarine.

3. AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE: Service working from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. on December 7, 1941; one station continued in operation beyond 7 o'clock for the training of Elliott; interceptor command was operating daily but no formal orders had gone out from Short.

4. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES: Mobile guns had seldom gone into battle position; ammunition was not issued to mobile guns; it took up to six hours to draw and distribute the ammunition.

5. SUMMARY:

F. THE ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

1. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE: Japanese submarines in the harbor prior to Pearl Harbor attack; completeness of Japanese maps; completeness of Japanese information as shown by the maps.

2. NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE ATTACKING FORCE: Strength of the attacking force; planning done by the attacking force; the submarine phase of the attack; the planning phase of the attack.

G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK, THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST

1. ATTACK A SURPRISE: Chief of Staff, Navy and Army witnesses all admit the attack was a surprise; accuracy of Japanese estimate of the situation; the Japanese gamble.

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2. TIME ELEMENT-THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ALL ESTIMATES: Estimate of the attack by Air Force; error in the estimate was in the time it would occur which led to unexpected results.

3. EXPECTED TIME TO CONTINUE TRAINING: Error in estimate of the time of the attack brought decision to continue training; Hawaiian forces disposed for training at the time of attack; personnel organized for training rather than combat at time of attack.

4. SHORT'S TRUST IN NAVY TO GIVE HIM TIMELY NOTICE: TIME ELEMENT AGAIN: Short's relationship with the Navy; Short's belief that naval forces were doing long-distance reconnaissance; Short's belief that the Navy planes were doing long-distance reconnaissance; Short's belief that the Navy was not withholding any evidence from him; Short's policy of not pressing for information from the Navy.

H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK?

1. REASON FOR ANALYSIS OF ACTION TAKEN AFTER 7 December 1941: To determine how effectively General Short was able to use the materiel, personnel and facilities after the attack which he had before the attack; and to determine what Washington supplied Hawaii after the attack which it could have supplied before.

2. HAWAII AND WASHINGTON ACTION: Troop dispositions and troop increases; increased activation of all engineering; increased equipment in the air sent from the mainland; activation of the interceptor command; dispositions of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery; condition of readiness of the interceptor command and aircraft warning service; reorganization of the District Engineer's Office and delegation of authority by the Corps of Engineers; treatment of the civilian Japanese population; lack of check on the Hawaiian situation by Washington.

I. SUMMARY

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CHAPTER III

THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR

A. GENERAL

1. Introduction: Scope Of The Chapter And Its Purpose: This is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discussion of the pro's and con's of each situation in order that all arguments for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth.

After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December. As will be noted elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of understanding, appreciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be observed because it is an important factor in what was done or not done in Hawaii.

2. Geographical: The Territory of Hawaii comprises an island group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during 1941 of the Commander-in-Chief of the

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Pacific Fleet and Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the national defense system of the United States while other national defense elements are located on the adjacent islands.

It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an outpost in the American Defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the commander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on a par with the Panama Canal.

The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; and the fleet sea and air base at all times. Aside from the necessity of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations as a springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on the alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might rest securely

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and be protected. There is no other fundamental reason for the great concentration of naval and military power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very location of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground forces for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum protection of the mainland of the United States.

3. Mission Of Army In Hawaii: The Army in Hawaii had a mission and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this was:

> "a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
>
> "b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, to support the Naval forces.
>
> "c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein, to support the Army Forces."

The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, because it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for these purposes, was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. It should be observed that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the responsibilities of the Army, because of the dual facts

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that the fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its being at sea in waters adjacent to the islands, and when in the harbor itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immobilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack.

4. Condition Of The Hawaiian Department At The Time Of Short's Assumption Of Command And Just Prior Thereto:

With the above mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the senior naval officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the status of the Army's deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802) The Secretary of the Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention to the serious conditions existing.(1)

Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony: He was "astounded at the then existing weaknesses" of the Pearl Harbor defenses,(2) and collaborated with his

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Footnotes:

(1) See p. 99 in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence.

(2) Underscoring by the Board.

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predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:

> "(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of Ship's A.A.guns while in port.
>
> "(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.
>
> "(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, etc.
>
> "(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore." (Roberts Rec. 544)

He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768)

It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, that the lack of adequate defense equipment and what was needed to bring it up to a satisfactory status, were clearly known to both the Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy Departments. Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February, 1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command.

General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, 1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215) After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

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General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

> "General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement." (R. 226-227)

In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

> "General Grunert. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment?
>
> "General Herron. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island." (R. 228)

5. <u>Organization Of The Navy At Pearl Harbor</u>: Before proceeding to a consideration of the Army's problems and the action taken by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short was to deal extensively and with which he was to

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enter into various agreements and understandings, which have a material bearing upon which was done or was not done.

To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Bloch was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the following:

a. Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized Navy Department for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters such as plans, buildings, work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like.

b. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel; his duties related to the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to purely military matters.

c. Administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of the Base Defense Air Force.

d. Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installations at the outlying island bases, such as Midway, Wake, Guam, etc.

It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly with the Navy Department on certain phases of

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his work. He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the naval installations on shore. He was also a Task Commander under Admiral Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore-based naval air forces, which were charged with the mission of naval long-distance reconnaissance.

Additionally, Bloch, in his capacity a s a Defense Commander, had administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was under Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows:

a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.

b. Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for conduct of Pacific operations.

c. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore.

d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

e. Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the following senior officers:

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(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego.

(2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

(3) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his capacity as Commander, Task Force 9.

(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 of patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.

To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six positions in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, namely,

(1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing

(2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2

(3) Commander, Task Force 9

(4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor

(5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District

(6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In these various capacities he was responsible to the

(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force

(2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2

(3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in connection with Task Force 9

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(4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force

(5) Commander-in-Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3.

In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another capacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander.

As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two governing heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short's staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made somewhat difficult.

By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and presented a single air commander with whom the Navy had to deal; and Martin was under the direct command of Short. When the agreements and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will become important in understanding what was done and what was not done and some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.

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B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941

1. Selection Of General Short: General Short was selected for his high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to confer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions as to the responsibilities of his new command.

Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February 7, 1941. Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted.

At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and Martin.

Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on February 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems confronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, and said in part:

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"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns ...

"What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. ...

"You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. ...

"... However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

"Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of National defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. ..." (R. 14-17)

Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound advice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what particulars he complied with

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them or varied from them and the reasons for his actions. In conformity with the instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and cooperative relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. By the 19th of February he "had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey" (R. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were:

> "As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:
>
> (1) Cooperation with the Navy.
> (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
> (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
> (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
> (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
> (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
> (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers.
> (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops."

The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his being turned down by the War Department, particularly because of lack of money in connection with permanent installations.

Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th, "Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army", and the fundamental question to be considered is: What did Short do with what he had to meet the attack?

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As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the construction of many types of installations, including the important aircraft warning system. (See the discussion of supply of equipment and construction, and also the delays in construction.) (p. 256)

Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language:

> "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." (R. 19)

On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construction, and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays:

> "One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.
>
> "The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. ... I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.
>
> "Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the

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early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion."

On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:

"The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying. ...

"The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared."

On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters pertaining to its National Park Service:

"The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.

"I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time."

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On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection of aircraft. Among other things he said:

> "On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius." (R. 21-22)

In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti-aircraft defense.

On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows:

> "Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes will be included in estimates."

On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and amongst other things reported progress, as follows:

> "Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:
>
> "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
>
> "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.
>
> "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
>
> "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral

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Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

"We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command." (R. 26-27)

On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of money needed for the construction of airports and other defense projects totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram forwarding supporting data.

On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:

"The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

* * *

"It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time." (R. 28)

On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a complete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of the ground and the construction of field fortifications, and the plans for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense of Hawaii, saying:

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"My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following:

"1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.

"2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.

"3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary.

"4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans.

"5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counter-attack."

On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following wire:

"For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality Pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end."

This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941.

On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield on the Island of Oahu.

On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General

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Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and exchange of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particularly saying:

> "Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities."

On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communications between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941.

2. Short's Staff: Short brought one, Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that most responsible and important assignment--the "alter ego" of the Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and candid advice of high professional character and with a competent vision and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place.

His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak

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and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.

Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance.(1) Short's selection of Phillips appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips' testimony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144) In justice to Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never was present at important Navy conferences, (R. 393-394, 534), and that information of important and vital events came to him second-handed.

Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely dealt directly with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship with his G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then existing tense situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521) Although he frequently visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no periodic conferences, and his second

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Footnote:
(1) R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626.

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in command, General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing conditions nor was his advice sought. (R.2625)

3. Short's Actions In Building Defense Installations And Adding Equipment:

There is no question that Short made many demands for equipment, defense construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and anti-aircraft, his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and making funds available therefor, and some of the recommended defense construction was disapproved by the War Department.

4. Short's Reorganization of Divisions: Short converted the square division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divisions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time of war.

General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified:

> "General Grunert. And in your division you had what artillery?
>
> "General Murray. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too." (R. 3076-77)

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5. Short's Relationship With The Navy: Turning from Short's efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square division into two triangular divisions on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon General Marshall's instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941, which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger.

As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooperation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to properly implement them.

The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effective would have taken skilled professional officers of both services, guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in operational tests.

The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate this defect.

Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contract" for a conduct of "war by command".

Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically into effect, had the equipment and materiel available been utilized, had there been in existence a

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detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exercised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor undoubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly avoided.

(For a full discussion of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97 .)

6. Abandonment of Herron's Field Order #1; Adoption of Triple-Alert System: Sabotage Issue:

A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on November 5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are defined by Short as follows:

> "Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threats from the outside.
>
> "Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.
>
> "Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight." (R. 283)

Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400) He says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431) Alert No. 1 was purely antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did this because of

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his deficiency of personnel in protecting his planes against sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed positions about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack.

Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action and maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.

As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses - R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This is significant, in view

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of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533)

It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers oftimes contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility.

At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F.B.I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.

We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the

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increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F.B.I., General Wells, executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress.

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7. Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance: He assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his assumption that the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were conducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training operations. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527, 1600, 1725, 1773, 1802)

It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the Army any such assistance, even though under the agreements the Army on call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor available for this purpose only six planes capable of this work.

The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance is set forth in paragraph 18(i) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provides:

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"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

* * *

"i. Distant reconnaissance." (R. 1745)

The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy assumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack. The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-distance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was substantially for the same purpose.

The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack was to be made. (R. 106) Under the protection of darkness 300 additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could be launched within

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approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently substantially what actually did happen. (Roberts Record 556-F)

The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance reconnaissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY's and the Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a 360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766) It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier and for the employment of the Army-Navy Air Forces, to place the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leaving to the Army reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore. This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distant reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was O.K.'d by Kimmel and approved by the War Department.

The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose and employed them otherwise. (R. 1763)

Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were conversant with these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439) It was obvious,

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therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental and its chances of discovery remote.

An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have been greatly lessened.

The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.(1) The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis, which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was in operating condition, even with the state of training of the personnel that then existed in late November and early December 1941 was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted men operating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to "forget it". This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941.

If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that purpose, the Army anti-aircraft

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Footnote (1) See p. 147 for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system, signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered.

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system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could have gotten off the ground.

The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that being operated by the Navy.

It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was constantly supplying information of the greatest value to important naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated to General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772)

The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were reported as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and possibly other vessels. (R. 361) About the first of December radio contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654-1655, 1662) The loss of such contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion for a directive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with live ammunition and remained there for six weeks.

So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as the Army had failed to transmit its radar information on the morning of December 7th to the Navy. Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from whence

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the main attack was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107)

After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force had assembled at Tankan Bay in northern Japan and had moved from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situation. The Navy failed to give to the Army a very vital and important piece of information.

In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the failure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army the presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval action (the destroyer "U.S.S. Ward" and a naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments should have been correspondingly alerted. The "Ward" reported this action to the naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536-537; Roberts Record 1725)

The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts in testimony from senior commanders. The

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long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBYs and it was "nothing to amount to much." (R. 1820) General Martin said: "I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done. 'Well', he said, 'this is all that I have. This is all I can put up'". (R. 1822)

> "General Frank. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?
>
> "Admiral Bloch. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion." (R. 1527)

As to Army reconnaissance, General Mollison testified that such reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate on Sundays, saying, "I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if it did." (R. 812) So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air Forces did so little that it would amount to "a token payment only". (R. 824)

> "General Rudolph. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out—an airplane, seaplane." (R. 1232)
>
> "General Frank. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?
>
> "General Rudolph. So I was informed." (R. 1233)
>
> "General Grunert. Then, according to the instructions under which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?
>
> "Admiral Bloch. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.

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"General Grunert. But actually was there some distant air reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously?

"Admiral Bloch. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. That would not be under me." (R. 1484)

With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it under the joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified:

"So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval District force." (R. 1484)

"General Grunert. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?

"Admiral Bloch. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air." (R. 1494)

So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such reliance for protection by Naval long-distant reconnaissance and joint air action with the Navy.

8. Agreements Between Army and Navy. The basic document governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled "War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935". This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the over-all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsibilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers That May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this