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*Approved
10 December 1946*

SECRET

COPY NO. 6

4th Meeting

SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 159 1/2
The State Department Building
on Tuesday, 3 December 1946, at 1430

MEMBERS PRESENT

- Mr. Francis H. Russell, State Department
Chairman
- Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, State Department
- Major General W. H. Arnold, War Department
- Captain Robert L. Dennison, Navy Department

OTHERS PRESENT

- Lt. Colonel T. E. Dupuy, War Department
- Captain Tichenor, Navy Department

SECRETARIAT

Mr. George Morgan (State)

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

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1. MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

The minutes of the 2nd meeting were approved as corrected.

The minutes of the 3rd meeting were approved without discussion.

2. INFORMATION PROGRAMS ON GERMANY AND KOREA

a. Two papers based on the minutes of the last meeting, outlining information programs on Germany and Korea, respectively, were distributed and discussed. Also a memorandum on Korea from Mr. Penfield to Messrs. Russell and Thompson was read and discussed.

b. THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

(1) Agreed that its policy papers should be classified SECRET, although members might make extracts from them with lower classification.

(2) Instructed the Secretariat

(a) To devise a system of numbering papers for convenient reference.

(b) To re-draft the papers on Germany and Korea in accordance with comments made during the meeting, making the contents more detailed and explicit, and using the following forms:

i. Situation giving rise to problem

ii. Problem

iii. Information Themes

iv. Information Operations

c. With respect to follow-up on the re-drafted papers it was agreed that:

(1) Mr. Thompson would undertake to secure

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necessary State Department policy clearance, in both Washington and New York, and would notify the Secretariat when forthcoming Korean policy developments reach a point favoring the beginning of the Korean information program.

- (2) General Arnold would undertake to secure necessary policy clearance in the War Department and, at the appropriate time, from General Clay; to suggest names of persons stationed in Germany who are suitable speakers and might be available; and to investigate the possibility of securing the services of a War Department writer to revise the background summary on Germany.
- (3) The Secretariat would consult the Division of Public Liaison about suitable occasions for speeches and about setting up the proposed Christmas broadcast; would discuss with Messrs. Weidman and White the press-relations aspects of the proposed program; and would ask the SWNCC Secretariat whether the Subcommittee is required to clear its decisions with SWNCC.

3. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF U.S. NATIONALS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

A memorandum with inclosures from the SWNCC Secretariat, raising the question whether the public should be informed concerning the restrictions imposed by other

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foreign Governments on the travels of U.S. nationals in and through those countries, was tabled until the Subcommittee should have related matters under the general heading of U.S.-Soviet relations on its agenda.

SWNCC

Approved 3 December 1946

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3rd Meeting

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SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 159 1/2
The State Department Building
on Tuesday, 26 November 1946, at 1430

MEMBERS PRESENT

- Mr. Francis H. Russell, State Department
Chairman
- Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, State Department
- Lt. Colonel T. N. Dupuy (Acting for the War Member)
- Captain Robert L. Dennison, Navy Department

OTHERS PRESENT

- Captain Tichenor (Navy Department)
- Mr. Allan Lightner (State Department)
- Mr. James Penfield (State Department)
- Mr. John Z. Williams (State Department)

SECRETARIAT

Mr. George Morgan (State)

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
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- File

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S E C R E T1. MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE SUBCOMMITTEE instructed the Secretariat to clarify the phrasing of paragraphs a and b, page 3.

2. INFORMATION ASPECTS OF GERMAN OCCUPATION POLICY

A memorandum was distributed describing the State Department's current information program on the occupation of Germany. In the subsequent discussion the following views were expressed:

a. Informational Objectives

An information program should begin with a formulation of specific points or objectives at which publicity is to be directed, rather than use a "shotgun method" of covering the whole field with miscellaneous information. The U.S. public supports the occupation of Germany in much the same vague way as it is "in favor" of virtue "in general." It needs to have hammered home the why and the how of our occupation policies, pointing up the necessity for adequate appropriations to implement them. It needs to have the clash of interests, the cardinal issues, explained well in advance, such as those involved in the persistent blocking of our constructive efforts by the Russians, the problem of the Ruhr, the formulation of a peace treaty, and the proposed investigation by the Kilgore Committee.

Information on Russian obstructionist and propaganda tactics could be used to appeal to the American competitive spirit, as a challenge to make

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a pre-eminent success of our side of the occupation. Care should be taken lest the manner of presentation tend to have the opposite of the desired effect, namely to discourage the public and cause it to favor withdrawal.

The conclusion of the agreement with the U.K. on the economic unification of the U.K. and U.S. zones will provide a basis for presenting the increased monetary costs of occupation in a favorable light: the arrangement makes it possible to say that after three years the two zones will be self-supporting, thus placing a definite time-limit to the demands on American taxpayers' money.

b. Implementation (in addition to the information program already being carried on)

(1) General Clay might be informed of the Subcommittee's plans and invited to furnish information that might be used, particularly with regard to Russian tactics. The fact that the proceedings of the Allied Control Council are secret, except for rare occasions when the members agree that public statements may be made, is an obstacle to this proposal.

(2) More direct contacts might be arranged between prominent persons and representatives of press and radio, including commentators.

(3) Prepared press conferences might be arranged for the Secretary or the Under Secretary of State, assisted by several specialists, in which a desirable topic could be presented in systematic fashion, thus

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giving a much more connected view of the subject than the scattering of questions at regular press conferences permits. Transcripts of such conferences might then be worked into background summaries and given wider distribution to editors, writers and commentators.

(4) Specific points can be brought out by introducing appropriate questions at regular press conferences.

(5) Speeches might be arranged for top policy officers, such as General Eisenhower, Mr. Acheson, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Harriman.

(6) General Clay is broadcasting to Germany soon on the Voice of America program. Some or all of this might also be broadcast in English to the U.S. public.

(7) A pamphlet of the "fact and fiction" type might be used to combat current misconceptions of the occupation. Care would have to be taken lest it propagate the errors instead of correcting them.

(8) The question was raised whether the War Department might have a documentary film on Germany prepared. The chief outlet for such a film would have to be educational institutions rather than commercial theaters.

(9) Walter Lippmann was said to be summing up his criticisms of Secretary Byrnes' policies in an early issue of the Atlantic Monthly. Though it would

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be undesirable to try to answer or attack Lippmann or any other person, it might be well to prepare to meet certain arguments impersonally. MR. LIGHTNER requested that an effort be made to secure an advance copy of the Lippmann article.

At the close of the discussion, THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- (a) Agreed to take action regarding information on German occupation policy at the next meeting.

3. INFORMATION ASPECTS OF KOREAN OCCUPATION POLICY

A memorandum on this subject by the War Member had been distributed prior to the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting a memorandum on the State Department's current information program on Korea was also distributed.

In the subsequent discussion, the following views were expressed:

a. Situation

Contrary to the impression given by the press at the time, no arrangement implementing the Moscow agreement was even temporarily adopted by the American and Russian Commanders when they conferred. The present attitude of each side is that the next move is up to the other. The U.S. policy is to sit the Russians out, in the meantime adopting a constructive program in South Korea. The new directive for Korea is now with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but General Hodge is already doing what he can, with limited resources, to bring Koreans more actively into

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the administration, unite rightist and leftist political groups, and improve economic conditions. If the Russians see that life is becoming more attractive for Koreans in the U.S. zone, they will be more willing to agree to unified administration. In the Northern Zone they are already using the methods of domination they use in other satellite states.

b. Informational objectives

The Soviet angle, rather than Korea by itself, is the approach most likely to interest Americans. Korean occupation should be presented as a unique instance in which the respective totalitarian and democratic systems face each other directly as rivals, thus appealing to the American sense of competition. This would justify the request for appropriations necessary to implement the constructive program in the U.S. Zone. It is possible that publicizing Russian tactics would make the Russians less willing to adhere to the Moscow agreement, but this is unlikely if done while no negotiations are taking place. The Russians are conducting a terrific anti-American press campaign in Moscow and probably think it silly of the U.S. not to hit back.

In treating the Russian theme, it is all right to hammer at violation of the Moscow agreement without reserve, but no charges should be made against the Russians unless based on solid information.

The U.S. position on retention of collaborators

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in the administration is vulnerable, but that is not very important in this country. The information program should plug Western democracy, liberation of Korea after 40 years, constructive economic and political developments.

The American press has concentrated too exclusively on the problem of what to do with Korea. Americans should hear more about the nature and handicaps of Koreans, their political irresponsibility and inexperience, the economic potentialities of their country, as a basis for understanding U.S. policy. Such themes must be handled cautiously to prevent unfavorable effects overseas.

Korea should not be associated with Japan in an information program. U.S. policy is to stress the liberation of Korea.

c. Implementation

(1) A cable might be sent informing General Hodge of the proposed educational program and inviting his assistance with materials.

(2) The Russian aspect of the problem might best be handled by well-placed off-the-record talks by persons like General Arnold. Background information on Korea and its potentialities could be presented publicly.

(3) Names of important persons returning from Korea should be secured immediately on their arrival and a series of exclusive interviews arranged with influential columnists to present different

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aspects of the problem.

(4) Feature writers might be sent to Korea to collect off-the-record material. It would be important to get specially qualified writers with a big popular following. Schisgall of the Saturday Evening Post and Davenport of Collier's were mentioned.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

(a) Agreed to take action on the Korean information program at the next meeting.

4. INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN ARMS FOR IRAN

MR. THOMPSON reported that the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs had agreed that the facts concerning Russia's supplying arms to Iran should be made public, and would handle the matter.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 9/12/46

TO : A-H Mr. Gardiner

FROM : PA F. H. Russell

SUBJECT :

Attached are the Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information. They were approved by the Subcommittee on December 3, 1946.

PA:FHR:mjp

*Approved as Corrected
3 December 1946*

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COPY NO. 6

2nd Meeting

*334
Foreign Policy
JAP*

SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

Minutes of meeting held in room 1591/2
The State Department Building
on Tuesday, 19 November 1946, at 1430

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Francis H. Russell, State Department
Chairman
Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, State Department
Major General W. H. Arnold, War Department
Captain Tichenor (Acting for the Navy Member)

OTHERS PRESENT

Colonel Dupui, War Department

SECRETARIAT

Mr. George Morgan (State)

SECRET1. MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

The minutes of the 1st Meeting were approved without discussion.

2. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

The draft of the memorandum explaining the policies and objectives of the Subcommittee was approved for distribution by the members to appropriate offices in the three Departments.

3. AGENDA FOR NEXT MEETING

The Subcommittee discussed a memorandum presented by the War Member on information concerning U.S. occupation policies and on the special problem of Korea. It was pointed out that the expected economy drive in Congress might severely handicap the implementation of present occupation policies, thereby having far-reaching effects on general U.S. foreign policy. Since the American public does not generally understand that funds appropriated for the War Department are used to feed the peoples of occupied countries and to operate the military government, it might be advisable to secure the separation of appropriations for occupation and appropriations for military purposes. It is also desirable that the public have a more adequate understanding of occupation policies and of the constructive achievements of military government and the occupation forces.

With regard to Korea it was pointed out that the United States must be prepared to continue occupation for a long period if its objective of an independent Korea is to

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be attained, and that Communist propaganda and other difficulties threaten to undermine the public's understanding of this necessity, unless the public is more adequately informed of the issues involved. It was suggested that the theme of friendly competition between two rival economic and social systems here in an area where they exist side by side without other complicating factors would give this country an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of the American system. Conversely, a failure by the United States to stimulate a successful democratic economy in its section of Korea would have an adverse effect upon our prestige not only in the Far East but elsewhere.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- ~~a. Placed information problems relating to the financial support of occupation policies and the Korean occupation on the agenda for the next meeting.~~
- ~~b. Instructed the Secretariat to invite the appropriate policy officers to attend, to prepare a brief paper on information about the occupation of Germany stating how the problem has been viewed, what has been done and what might be done, and to draw up a list of suggestions for an information program on Korea. *see attached corrigendum*~~

4. OTHER POSSIBLE AGENDA

It was suggested that the following problems may become urgent in the near future:

- a. U.S. loan to Iran. Representatives from Iran are at present negotiating for arms and equipment from the War Department. It is not generally known in this

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country that the Russian government has been supplying Iran with arms. It was suggested that this information be released before the U.S. loan to Iran becomes public. Mr. Thompson agreed to discuss this problem with the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.

b. U.S. credit and restitution policies in eastern Europe. The United States has refused applications for loans from the countries of eastern Europe. It has also delayed returning gold taken from these countries during the war, in an effort to induce them to compensate American business for property expropriated by their governments. These facts may become public, and the U.S. position might be made to appear vulnerable from using its economic position for purely political ends.

SECRETCOPY NO. 6

6 December 1946

*J. M.*SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATIONCORRIGENDUMTOMINUTES OF THE 2ND MEETINGNote by the Secretary

Holders of the Minutes of the 2nd Meeting are requested to make the following changes therein:

Page 3, paragraphs a and b:

Delete paragraphs a and b and substitute the attached paragraphs a, b, and c.

George A. Morgan
Secretary

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THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

- a. Adopted the following agenda for the next meeting:
- (1) Information problems relating to the financial support of German occupation policies.
 - (2) Information problems relating to the financial support of Korean occupation policies.
- b. Instructed the Secretariat to invite appropriate policy officers concerned with each item of the agenda to attend the next meeting.
- c. Instructed the Secretariat to prepare brief papers on the State Department information programs on Germany and Korea, indicating what has been done to date and listing suggestions as to what might be done.

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Policy Info -*SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

Minutes of meeting held in room 159 1/2
The State Department Building
on Tuesday, 5 November 1946 at 1430

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(288)*MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Francis H. Russell, State Department
Chairman

Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, State Department

Major General W. H. Arnold, War Department

Captain Robert L. Dennison, Navy Department

OTHERS PRESENT

Colonel Dupui, War Department

Captain Tichenor, Navy Department

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There was general discussion and general agreement to the effect that:

The Subcommittee should deal with long-term informational objectives and that only in the case of specially important and urgent situations should it concern itself with informational problems relating to special events.

The Subcommittee should attempt to ascertain from each of the three Departments represented what present policies are not receiving adequate public understanding and what future policies are being contemplated concerning which there should be planned information programs.

The government should not be in the position of continually "answering somebody". It should take the initiative in making sure that as far as possible the American people have the facts which will enable them to understand the government's policies. In many instances it should be possible to provide the facts before the policies are announced so that there will be general understanding of them when they are announced. It was recognized that there are some problems with respect to which it is impossible to know the policies that will be adopted until the time of their adoption. In other cases it will be possible to see the emerging problems and policies and to provide information at an early stage. An effort should be made to counteract the tendency for policy developments to be too closely held until the situation breaks when it is too late to do anything in the way of providing background information.

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It was agreed that the Subcommittee at its next meeting would consider policy areas which should receive attention.

The following policy areas were mentioned:

1. US-USSR relations and subsidiary problems relating to Poland, Greece, Iran, Turkey, et cetera
2. Spain
3. Disarmament policies
4. Trusteeship
5. Europe as a whole
6. China
7. Credit policies toward countries in eastern Europe, including Export-Import Bank policies and U.S. policy in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
8. Assistance to other countries in arms and materials
9. Argentina and proposed Rio Conference
10. U.S. interests in the Near East
11. Proposed trip of naval force through the Near East
12. German and Japanese occupation

It was agreed that the Subcommittee representatives should seek advice from other offices within their Departments concerning subjects that should be placed on this list for consideration and concerning the priority which should be attached to the various subjects.

It was agreed that after a list of policy areas has been agreed upon for attention by the Subcommittee, the Subcommittee would operate in the following way:

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1. The Subcommittee will obtain as much authoritative information as possible concerning the government's policies, both present and prospective, in these areas. This will be done by:

a. enlisting the assistance of the Division of Historical Policy Research (State).

b. requesting the SWNCC Secretariat and the State Department Central Secretariat to furnish the Subcommittee with papers, reports, and background information of the sort which should be considered by the Subcommittee.

c. having the Special Assistant for Program Planning of the Office of Public Affairs (State) utilize the procedures of his office for raising questions and obtaining information for the Subcommittee.

d. sending a memorandum to the offices in the three Departments which would have policy questions or background information that should be considered by the Subcommittee. This memorandum should state briefly the objectives of the Subcommittee, indicate the nature of the questions which it proposes to consider, and give assurance with respect to the security of the information given to the Subcommittee (it should be made clear that one of the purposes of the Subcommittee is to provide a mechanism for handling top secret informational problems with assurance that all information given to the Subcommittee will be

*Index &
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safeguarded, and information programs designed to assist the policy officers with their policy problems will be undertaken only after full clearance at a high level). The offices should be requested to give their estimates with respect to future needs for public support of present and prospective policies.

e. arranging to have policy and informational documents in the Subcommittee's field of interest that should be considered for release and concerning which clearance by SWNCC is necessary referred to the Subcommittee for consideration with respect to possible clearance.

f. having the secretariat services available to the Subcommittee screen the following sources of politico-military developments and policy problems for possible submission to the Subcommittee:

- (1) daily reports of the Central Intelligence Group of the National Intelligence Authority
- (2) map presentation by the War Department
- (3) reports prepared by various offices in the three Departments
- (4) reports of various committees in the three Departments
- (5) country and policy statements

2. The Subcommittee should obtain from the Division of Public Studies (State) analyses of current public opinion and opinion trends with respect to the various policy

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areas which it proposes to consider.

3. The Subcommittee will then formulate recommendations with respect to desirable informational objectives for the assistance of offices in the three Departments engaged in informational activities and may make recommendations concerning possible special high level informational steps in connection with the various policy areas such as top level speeches.