

Doc. 2467 Evid.

Folder 9

(42)

Doc. 2467 Evid.

Folder 9

(42)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2467

19 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat of Testimony of Gen. KITA, Seiichi

Date: April 20-23, '46 Original ( ) Copy (x) Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes ( ) No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

KHABAROVSK Region, Dept of Home Ministry

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Russian Government

PERSONS IMPLICATED: KITA, Seiichi

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparations for War; Russo-Japanese Relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Twenty-two pages (photostated) of testimony of Jap General KITA, Seiichi, written April 20-23, 1946. Gen. KITA was commander of the 1st Section of the Kwantung Army. The testimony concerns; Japanese preparation to acquire Manchuria and Japanese plans to attack Soviet Russia.

Analyst: Lt. Wilds

Doc. No. 2467

## AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army  
of the Kwantung Army. General KITA, Seichi.  
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the first Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seichi shall state about the preparation for seizure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Bun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Bun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHIANG Tsuo-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TANAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHIANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the

object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HO Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HO Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHEN Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HUANG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSINGAN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.

I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Hanan line, and the Busan-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions—one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese advisers in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMARA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchow, and in the vicinity of TUNG PIEN TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chen-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. MUDO. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchow and Jehol the 8th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. FISHI).

3. The Province of HEILONGJIANG and the vicinity of CHIH HAERH the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MATSUKI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku.
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. SAKAMOTO)  
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Gen. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jehol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jehol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KANO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen. HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOMI TSUBARA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin, Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,

the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of HASHIN harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself.

1. The fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Rly Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INUKAI, KONOE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers, Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KANAYA, Prince KAN-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals KONJO, HISHIKARI, MITAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAN-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIRO-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed



by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attache at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Tsinan, and Canton, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

#### The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attache to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attache OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

#### The days when I was the Military Attache to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall cooperate economically.

3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Comintern activities.

It is noted that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan offered China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on maneuver were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHIANG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (KO-4-Id).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section

were to execute the work of Military administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied area in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Wang Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap--U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the

Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUNUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinkiang government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the detail and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunonuya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihaorh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.

When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaerh, as the division would be employed on the Hairaerh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaerh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaerh twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

13 divisions.....	195,000 men
2 tank divisions.....	30,000 men & 400 tanks
Air forces.....	24,000 men & 1,000 planes
Border guards (28 battalions).....	19,000 men
Railway guards (5 units).....	17,500 men
Rear forces.....	100,000 men
Total...(men).....	386,00
(horses).....	40,000

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights east of Hairaerh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to

say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Taku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General Limezu gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hairaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hairaerh for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hairaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hairaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaerh, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged, was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name "B" (Otsu), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army in Mutanchiang.

Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

#### Preparatory Measures

**Heihe District:-** In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsikar and Heike respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heike and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

**Maritime Province District:-** Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

**Offensive Plan:-** In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwu and Heike, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arshan.





As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogacha, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arhshan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arhshan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seiichi  
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army  
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shehebenkov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.,

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on April 20-23

was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the U.S.S.R.

on or about June 27, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26 , 1946.

自筆證言

俘虜前関東軍第一方面軍司令官大將

喜多誠一

自四月二十日

至四月二十三日 一九四六年

私前関東軍第一方面軍司令官喜多誠一大將ハ  
 日本ノ滿洲獲得準備及対蘇攻勢ニツキ陳述ス  
 昭和初頭一九二六年支那ニ於テ内乱擴大ス此内乱ハ  
 孫文及蔣介石軍ノ北伐ニヨリ起リタルモノニテ支那ニ  
 民ノ統一及支那ニ權田收ノ目的ヲ以テ行ハレタルモノナリ  
 此運動滿洲ニ波及スル時ハ是ハ日本ノ權利ニ撞着ス  
 ルヲ以テ日本政府ハ次ノ政治方針ヲ決定セリ

- 1. 滿洲ニ支那ノ内乱ヲ進入セシメス
- 2. 孫文勢力ノ滿洲滲透ヲ防止ス
- 3. 滿洲ニ於ケル張作霖ノ政權ヲ極力支持シ彼ハ  
 之ニ基キ支那ノ國民自由運動ヲ滿洲ニ進入セ  
 サル様努力シ又滿洲自体ニ於ケル排日気分  
 ヲ制圧スルヲ要セリ

此日本ノ政治方針ハ陸海大臣外務大臣ト共ニ策定シ田  
 中總理大臣之ヲ決裁セリ自今ハ一九二七年陸軍省ニ於  
 テ此決定ニ關スル書類ヲ見タリ當時陸軍大臣ハ宇  
 垣大將ナリ

FILE COPY  
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

No. 2.

Doc 2467

一九二八年五月北支ニ於ケル五民黨軍ハ張作霖ノ抵抗ヲ抑圧シ滿洲ニ驅逐セリ五民黨ノ運動ハ滿洲ニ進入セザリニモ滿洲ニ於ケル抗日ニ力ハ逐次激化セリ斯カル支那及滿洲ノ情況ノ下ニ私ハ一九二九年八月參謀總長金谷大將ノ命ニヨリ南京大使館附武官輔佐官ニ任セラレ上海ニ駐在セル大使館附武官佐藤少將ニ附屬スルコトトナレリ。私ハ支那ノ情況支那ノ五民性風俗及支那語ヲヨク研究シ又南京政府ニ於ケル軍政要人中ニ知人ヲ有セシヲ以テ此職ニ任セラレタルモノナリ例ハ軍政部長何應欽大將ハ一九二七年南京日本領事館ニ勤務セル彼ノ友人ニヨリ鎮江ニ於テ會見セリ當時日本陸軍省ハ支那ニ於ケル南京事件（日本居留民ハ南京領事館ニ避難シ國民黨軍ハ之ヲ襲撃セリ）ノ狀態ヲ調査ノ爲私ヲ派遣セリ其時私ハ五民黨軍ノ北伐ノ情況ヲ諜知スル目的ヲ以テ鎮江ニ赴ケリ茲ニ此方面ニ於ケル五民黨軍ノ最高指揮官タル何應欽ト知人トナレリ。何應欽ハ

前二日本士官学校ニ留学シ日本人ニ対シ親切ナリキ  
 是レ以外ニ私ハ南京政府軍政部次長陳儀訓練總監  
 周亞衛中將軍測量局長黃慕松中將工兵司令楊  
 杰中將ト能ク友好關係ニ在リ私ハ上記ノ支那將軍ト  
 東京陸大ニ共ニ在学セリ当初ヨリ彼等ト友人ナリ私ヲ大  
 使館附武官輔佐官ニ任命セル時ハ上記ノ條件ノ外支那  
 ニ於ケル日本政策ニ対シ自今ノ意見ヲ考慮セリ私ハ勿論  
 此政策ニ対シ賛成者ナリキ南京出發前ニ私ハ參謀總長  
 金谷大將ヨリ次ノ訓令ヲ受ク

ハ南京

政府中央軍ノ武カヲ諒知スヘシ

2. 國民黨ニヨリ起

レル國民自由運動ニツキ資料ヲ蒐集

シ持テ滿洲ニ於ケル此運動ノ拡大ノ傾向ニ注意シ之ヲ

滿洲ニ波及セシメサル如ク努力スヘシ

3. 業務遂行ヲ容易ナラシムル爲南京政府ノ軍人界ト

連絡支廿關係ヲ結フヘシ是等ノ訓令ハ上海大使

附武官佐藤少將ヨリ同様ニ受ケ此外私ヲ南京ニ派

遣ノ時南京政府ノ軍事政治ノ狀態ニ注意スヘシト

指示セリ私ハ南京到着後上記ノ南京政府ノ軍事

局者ト連絡ヲ遂ケ又受ケタル訓令ニ基キ自己ノ業

務ヲ実行セリ是レ以外ニ又軍事政治ノ諜報ヲ担任

セリ此任務ハ南京政府ノ要人トハ連絡又諜報者ノ利

用ニヨリ遂行セリ當時ノ支那ノ情況ハ諜報勤務

ノ爲容易ナリト云フヲ得ヘシ即チ支那ニ於ケル社

會ハ内乱ニ依リテ分立ニ支那軍閥ノ対立又政府

ノ爲容易ナリト云フヲ得ヘシ即チ支那ニ於ケル社

反対分子等アリテ吾々如何ナル謀報上ノ要求ヲモ達成  
 スルヲ得タリ而シテ上記ノ條件ノ下ニ南京政府軍当局ノ  
 關係ハ若干良好トナルコトニ成功シタルモ當時滿洲ニ於ケル  
 情況ハ抗日運動逐次拡大シ總ニル事件ヲ惹起セリ  
 一九三三年滿洲事變ノ稍前興安嶺ノ或ル道路  
 索倫附近ニ於テ日本中村大尉ヲ殺害セラレタリ中村  
 大尉ハ參謀本部參謀ナリ參謀本部ハ彼ヲ興安  
 嶺附近謀報ノ任務ヲ以テ派遣セル中村大尉ハ興安  
 嶺ノ道路調査ノ目的ヲ以テ派遣セルコトニ付私ハ一九三三年  
 關東軍司令部ヲ課長トシテ着任後關東軍司令部  
 部ノ勤務者多數ヨリ聞知セリ又是ハ實際ナルコトヲ自  
 分モ確信ニアリ日本ノ滿洲ヲ獲得スルノ準備ニ関シテ  
 ハ私ハ次ノ如ク云フヲ得ヘシ日本ハ從來ヨリ滿洲ニ對シ  
 希望ヲ有セシハ滿洲事變前ノ狀態其他種々ノ事態  
 ニヨリ證明セズ日本ハ自己ノ對蘇攻勢計畫遂行爲  
 滿洲ニ於ケル軍事地盤ヲ保有スルヲ欲セリ朝鮮ニ於  
 ケル戰略鐵道建設例ハ京城—圖們線圖們—羅津  
 —羅南線又釜山—奉天線ノ建設ハ云フ迄モ其ノ一ツノ目  
 的ヲ追フモノナリ此問題ヲ解決スル爲ニ適當ナル歴史的  
 時間ヲ選ハサルヘカラス斯クシテ一九三一年ハ恰度適時デ  
 アツク即チ滿洲ニ對シ關係アル他五例ハ支那ハ内訌ニ惹  
 カレ蘇聯モ五年計畫ニヨツテ五内建設ニ惹カレアリシ時  
 ナリ是等ヲ考慮シ日本ハ一九三三年九月十八日滿洲出征  
 ヲ拡大シ全滿ヲ獲得スルノ結果トナレリ

満洲獲得ニ従ヒ日本ハ満洲ヲ組織ニ着手セリニツノ意  
 見アリカ一満洲ヲ支那ノ政權ノ下ニ置キ満洲政權ニ若  
 干日本顧問ヲハルル業然シ南東軍司令官ニ勤務スル  
 石原中佐板垣大佐ノ主張ヨリ荒木大将ハ之ヲ支持シ帝  
 政満洲独立ヲ樹立シ其實權ヲ日本ニ於テ把握スル様  
 組織セリエシカ爲各大臣ヲ滿人トシ次長ハ日人ヲ任命シ又  
 官衙内ニ日人官吏ヲ入ルルコトヲ決定セリ斯カル政策ハ又  
 一層ニ滿人中ニ抗日運動ノ氣分ヲ鋭クセリ是ハ満洲ニ於  
 ケル日本軍ニ対シ抗日ニ活動シアル反抗軍ノ拡大ノ原因ニ  
 爲セリ南東軍ハ是ニ對シ滿洲ニ於ケル抗日分子ヲ討  
 伐ニヨリ掃蕩シ他方ニ於テ宣傳ニヨリ彼等ニ帰順ヲ勸ム  
 ルコトヲカ一ノ任務トセリ是等ノ主ナル討伐ハ哈爾濱錦州  
 東辺道附近ニ行ハレ又馬占山及李杜軍ノ追撃熱河討伐  
 等ナリ是等ノ討伐ハ南東軍司令官本庄大将武藤大将  
 ノ時参謀長三宅中將小磯中將ニヨリ行ハレタリ是等ノ  
 討伐作戰ハ無辜ノ滿人住民ニ大ナル損害破産ヲ與ヘタリ  
 即チ討伐ハ住民ノ離散住家ノ焼却財産ノ喪失等ヲ伴フ  
 コトヲ明ラカニ認めサカラス私ハ長年月ヲ経過セル爲  
 討伐ニヨリ住民ニ與ヘタル犠牲ノ数量ト範圍ヲ記憶セサルモ  
 然レ七年内ノ騷擾ニヨリ大ナリ犠牲ヲ與ヘタルコトヲ認メテ  
 レハカラス私ノカニ課長トシテ南東軍司令官ニ在職  
 間是等討伐ノ安置及計画ハ南東軍司令官ニ於テ  
 者藤大佐及遠藤中佐ニ於テ策定セリ然シ討伐隊ヲ直  
 接指揮セルモノ次ノ如シ

- 一、哈爾濱及吉林附近 才十師團(長廣瀨中將)
- 二、錦州附近及熱河 才八師團(長西中將)
- 三、黑龍江省齊齊哈爾附近 才十四師團(長松木中將後細俊中將)
- 四、熱河附近 才六師團(長坂本中將)

混成旅團(長服部少將)

上記師團ノ内ニ部ハ他方面ニ於テ同時ニ討伐ヲ行リ  
 熱河討伐ハ關東軍司令官武藤大將カ直接指揮セリ  
 私モ熱河討伐ニ参加ス 抗日軍ノ行動動靜及抗日氣  
 分ノ發生ニタル住民ノ区域等ニ因テ諜報資料ヲ私ハ才二  
 課長トシテ關東軍參謀長ニ提出シ是ニ基キ關東軍  
 司令部第一課ハ討伐ノ爲作戰計畫ヲ策定セリ一九三四  
 年春佳木斯南方土龍山附近ニ於テ大ナル討伐處置カ行  
 ルタリ是ハ日本ノ滿洲拓植會社カ滿人ノ土地ヲ買収シ  
 タルニ付此附近ノ滿洲部隊カ反乱暴動<sup>加</sup>進<sup>進</sup>日本ノ中隊ヲ  
 殲滅シ又聯隊長飯塚大佐ヲ殺シタルヲ以テ是ヲ討伐  
 ニタルモノナリ 土龍山附近ノ暴動ヲ鎮壓スル爲日本軍  
 八大ナル部隊ヲ派遣シ自己ノ聯隊長飯塚大佐戰死ニ  
 ヲリ復仇ノ意味モ加ハリ滿人住民ニ大ナル損害ヲ與ヘ  
 タリ此作戰ハ才十師團(長廣瀨中將)參謀長加納大  
 佐ヨリ實施セラレ一九三二年ヨリ一九三三年迄滿洲ニ於  
 テ關東軍ヨリ行ハレタル全般ノ討伐ノ責任ハ此期間  
 ニ於ケル關東軍司令官タル本庄大將武藤大將及才  
 大將植田大將ニ在リ

南大將



同時二一九三三年ヨリ日本ハ東支鐵道ノ經營ノミニアル蘇  
 聯ノ勢カヲ滿洲ヨリ驅逐スルノ爲メ置テ開始セリ此目  
 的ヲ以テ東支鐵道及其職員ニ對シテ各種ノ壓迫ヲ加ヘ  
 タリ是等ノ工作ハ主トシテ哈爾濱特務機關長少松原少  
 將又哈爾濱滿鐵代表宇佐美理事及其他ノ機關ニヨリ  
 行ハレタリ此工作ハ關東軍司令部才三課長原田大佐  
 ノ指導ノ下ニ行ヘリ 滿洲ニ於ケレハ蘇聯勢力ヲ驅逐  
 スル爲メ日本ハ東支鐵道ニ攪乱者ヲ使用シタルコト鐵  
 道ノ經營ニ對シ妨害並ニ鐵道職員ニ對シ壓迫ヲ行ヒ爲メ  
 ニ日本ハ匪賊ヲ利用シタルコト關ニ私ハ否認スルコト能ハス然  
 ニ當時ノ情況ハ東支鐵道ノニテラス全滿ノ鐵道ノ經營ハ匪  
 賊ニヨリ妨害セラレアリキ 一九三五年日本ハ凡ユル手段ヲ  
 盡シテ蘇聯ヲニテ東支鐵道ノ權益ヲ賣却スルニ至ラシメタリ  
 其後日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ對蘇作戰ノ爲メ軍事地盤ノ準備ヲ  
 逐次拡大セリ滿洲ノ地盤ヲ準備シツ日本ハ十地区ニ要  
 塞ヲ構築シ大小二百ノ飛行場ヲ設置シ九千四百米ノ鐵道ヲ  
 敷設シ四雄津港ヲ築港通信道路ノ構築軍需工場ノ設  
 置其他ヲ建設セリ是等ノ建設ノ大畧ハ日本政府參謀  
 本部陸軍省<sup>陸軍省</sup>務局ノ計畫ニ基キ實施セリ是等ノ計畫及  
 參謀本部ノ指示ニ基キ自己ノ要求セル處ヲ遂行スル  
 爲メ關東軍ハ次ノ如クセリ

1. 要塞構築ノ爲メ築城部
2. 飛行場構築ノ爲メ飛行部隊
3. 作戰道路建設ノ爲メ滿洲土木工程局

- 4. 通信施設、為滿洲電氣會社
- 5. 築港及鉄道、建設、滿鉄ニ委ス
- 6. 軍需工場、設置及終店、為滿洲重工業株式會社ヲ設置ス

日本當局ハ是等構築及日本移民、為強制的ニ低價ヲ以テ  
 滿人ノ土地ヲ買収シ又彼等ヲ別地ニ移住セシメ滿人ノ大ナル不満ヲ  
 招キタリ此外軍事構築作業、為労働カトシテ強制制度ニ作  
 リ滿人ヲ徵傭セリ此方労働者徵用ハ自由労働ニ比シ低率ナル  
 賃金ヲ受ケルヲ以テ滿人ノ福祉ニ苦痛ヲ與ヘタリ他方面ニ於テ若  
 住施設及衛生給養ノ状況及日本管理ノ不良等ニヨリ労働  
 者中ヨリ多數病死者ヲ出シタリ例ヘハ一九四四年ニ興安嶺  
 附近ノ要塞構築ニヨリ滿人労働者約三萬人ノ作業セルカ  
 死亡率ハ五百名ニ達セリ他方面ニ於テ死者アリシヲ前滿洲軍  
 總參謀長秦中將及後宮大將ハ自今ニ説明セリ且量ニ云ハサ  
 リキ一九四五年ニ於テハ滿洲軍強制徵用滿人労働者ハ二萬  
 一三萬迄達セリ

一九三一年滿洲事變以來全期間ニ亘リ滿洲ヲ對蘇軍事  
 基地強化、為行ハタル處置ノ責任者ハ日本内閣大臣  
 近衛東條大將、日本陸軍大臣荒木大將、杉山大將、東條大  
 將、參謀總長、金谷大將、閑院宮、杉山大將、東條大將、閑  
 院軍司令官、本庄大將、菱川大將、南大將、植田大將、梅津大  
 將、其他本証言ニ記述セル間、東軍司令官、勤務者ナリ  
 私ハ一九三四年八月參謀本部、及那參謀長トシテ轉任ス當時  
 總長、閑院宮、次長、杉山中將、後大將、第一部長、鈴木大  
 將、(後中將)、第二部長、磯谷大將、(後中將)、第三部長、後

宮少將(後大將)支那謀業務、支那情報整理判断及  
 兵要地誌調査在リテ支那班(班長楠本中佐)及地誌班(班  
 長和知中佐)二班ヨリナリ両班ノモ四五名ノ部員將校ヲ有ス  
 而シテ業務、實地、朝鮮、遼東、天津、奉天、台湾、各  
 國、支那、大使館、計、武官、北京、濟南、廣東、駐在、武官ヨリ  
 情報書類、其、海軍、外務、ヨリ、通報、綜合、調査、シテ、廣  
 シ、私、在、職、間、支、那、全般、情況、滿洲、事變、原因、之、抗日  
 ノ、氣、分、逐、次、盛、ト、ナリ、松、大、モ、大、ナル、事件、發、生、ス、テ、終、過  
 セリ、又、當時、滿洲、兵、備、ヲ、増、強、ス、ヘ、計、画、ヲ、促、進、セ、ラ、レ、一、九、三、六  
 年、遼、東、軍、一、兵、カ、ヲ、四、師、團、ト、五、鉄、道、守、備、隊、(各、五、大、隊)  
 及、國、境、守、備、隊、四、増、加、ス、ヘ、キ、案、ホ、ラ、履、現、セ、リ

一九三四年ニハ、今、謀、本、部、ノ、案、慮、構、築、ニ、同、ノ、遼、東、軍、一、  
 指、示、セ、リ、此、問、題、ニ、キ、一、九、三、三、年、頃、ヨリ、既、ニ、研、究、ニ、着、手、セ、リ

日、獨、伊、防、共、協、定、  
 一九三六年日、獨、伊、間、ニ、防、共、協、定

ヲ、締、結、セ、リ、此、協、定、ハ、駐、獨、大、使、館、附、武、官、大、島、中、將、ト  
 獨、逸、官、局、者、ト、間、ニ、一、九、三、三、年、秋、交、渉、ヲ、開、始、シ、兩  
 後、大、島、武、官、ノ、活、躍、ヨリ、締、結、ニ、至、ラ、レ、メ、タル、モノ、ニ、テ、東、京

ニ、於、テ、ル、政、府、首、腦、者、中、ニ、何、人、ノ、此、處、置、ヲ、支、持、シ、タル、カ  
 明、カ、ナ、ラ、ス、然、レ、此、協、定、ハ、出、現、シ、テ、蘇、聯、ニ、對、シ、テ、挑、戰、的、態  
 度、ヲ、現、シ、兩、方、ノ、交、ニ、惡、影、響、セ、レ、コ、ト、ハ、私、及、他、人、ニ、モ、明、ラ

カ、ニ、認、テ、ラ、レ、リ、而、シ、テ、此、協、定、ハ、日、本、ニ、於、テ、防、共、ハ、對、蘇、思、想  
 ヲ、綜、合、ス、ル、為、利、用、セ、ラ、レ、蘇、聯、ノ、共、産、主、義、政、治、ニ、對、シ、凡

テ、一、切、力、ヲ、盡、シ、テ、反、抗、セ、サ、ル、カ、ラ、ス、ト、聲、ヲ、大、ニ、セ、リ、又、支  
 那、ニ、於、テ、ル、八、路、軍、ノ、解、消、ノ、必、要、其、他、ノ、聲、ヲ、盛、テ、ラ、シ、タ、リ、此  
 協、定、ハ、日、本、ニ、於、テ、對、蘇、作、戦、ノ、民、的、思、想、準、備、ヲ、強、化、シ

又支那内政ニ于涉スルニ至ラシメタリ

支那大使館附武官時代、私一九三六年四月支那大使館附武官ニ任命セシ上海ニ着任セリ是ヨリ先東京<sup>支</sup>於テ一日支關係悪化シアルニ鑑ミ外務省ハ新タニ川越大使ヲ支那ニ任命セリ川越大使ノ解決スヘキ問題ノ内容ハ次ノ如シ

1. 支那ハ滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ權利ヲ默認スヘシ即チ支那人

日本ノ滿洲ヲ獲得シタルコトヲ見ヌ振リヲナス

2. 支那ハ抗日侮日ヲ禁制スヘシ日支兩國ノ經濟

提携合作ニ進ム

3. 支那ハ日本ニ防共ニ協カス

以上ノ三條件ハ代償トシテ日本ハ支那ニ經濟的技術的援助ヲナスニアリト記憶ス而シテ一九三六年六月

川越大使ハ此問題ニウキ南京政府ト交渉ヲ開始

シタルモ南京政府ハ同意セサリシヲ以テ交渉停止

トナレリ、南京政府ハ日本ノ提出條件ニ對シ次如ク答合タリ

ハ支那ハ公然ト滿洲國ヲ認メザルモ滿洲ニ於ケル現狀ニウキ默認ス

又支那自体ハ共產思想ニ對シ反抗ス具體的ニ

云ハバ第八路軍ニ對シ反抗シアルモ他方面ニ

於テ對蘇外交上關係惡化スル恐アルヲ以テ日本ト

防共協力ヲ約束スルコトハ出来ス

3. 支那政府ハ支那ニ於ケル抗日運動ヲ自己ノ

力ヲ以テ抑制スル能ハス是レ個人ノ氣分ニアラス

シテ支那國民全般ノ感情ナルヲ以テナリ

南京政府ハ此意見ヲ最後迄持シタルヲ以テ一九三七  
年日本對支戰開始ノタメ根源ヲナセリ私ハ上海大  
使館附武官トシテ去発前共謀次長西尾中將ヨリ  
訓令ヲ受ケタリ其内容ノ重要ハ次ノ如シ南京政  
府ニ對シ政治動向持ニ軍事狀况ニ関スル情報ヲ  
蒐集スルト共ニ川越大使ノ西國國交調整ニ関レ  
協カスヘシ

私ハ時々南京ニ赴キ川越大使ニ會見セリ  
然レ乍ラ支那關係ノ情勢ハ逐次險惡トナリ一九  
三七年七月北京郊外ニ於ケル日本駐屯部隊ハ夜間  
演習ヲ行ヒタル際支那人ハ之ヲ突砲セルタメ事  
變發生セリ

日本ハ現地ニ於テ解決スルタメ努力カシタルモ成功  
スルニ云エラス後日本ハ蔣介石政權ヲ否認シ支那  
軍ヲ肅清スルタメ進攻スルコトヲ新聞又外交代  
表者ニ発表セリ一九三七年八月上海附近ニ於テ  
日本陸戰隊(海軍)ト支那軍ト衝突ス是ハ日支  
戰逐次擴大セル次ノ段階ナリ

特務部長及興亞院連絡部長官職代、一九三七  
年八月日支戰事擴大ノ際北支方面軍ヲ北  
京ニ設置セラル、ニ伴ヒ私ハ方面軍ノ特務部長  
ニ任命セラレ北京ニ著任ス私ハ陸軍大臣杉山大將ヨリ  
任命セラレタリ特務部ハ軍政業務ヲ實施シ直  
接任務ハ支那占領地ヲ日本代スルニ在リ即チ政治

經濟文化及政治ノ指導機關タル政權ヲ樹立ス  
私ハ特務部ノ組織ニ次ノ局ヲ設ケタリ

- 1. 總務局 政治問題ニ關係ス
- 2. 第一經濟局 金融經濟ニ關係ス
- 3. 第二經濟局 交通産業ニ關係ス
- 4. 文化局 教育文化ニ關係ス

當時支那ノ占領地区ニ於ケル政治經濟ノ運営計畫ノ策定ノ為、日本政府各省ヨリ特務部ニ専門家を派遣セリ、私ハ特務部長ノ時北支ニ於ケル重要ナル處置ハ北支ニ親日家王克敏ヲ首班トスル政權ヲ樹立シタルコトナリ、彼ハ従来財政大臣ノ經歷ヲ有セルモノ、一政權時代ナリシヤ私ハ記憶セズ、王克敏政權ニ於ケル顧問トシテ日本代表ヲ入レタリ、此顧問ハ政治問題ニキキ

自今カ直接担当セリ、經濟顧問平生鈺三郎、行政顧問湯澤三斗男、法政顧問大憲茂雄ニシテ後者三名ハ軍人ニマラス、顧問原則ハ王克敏政府ノ活動及行動ニ於ケル日本政府政策ヲ実行シ、又全カヲ盡シテ對支戰ニ於ケル日本軍ニ協力ス、一九三三年特務部ハ解散シ、特務部ノ職務ハ新タニ組織シタル興亞院ニ移レリ、又興亞院ノ北支連絡部長官ニ私ヲ任命セリ、私ハ此任命ヲ内閣ヨリ受ケタリ、當時ノ總理ハ平沼ナリ、興亞

院ノ樹立ニ非ラザルニヨリ、私ハ文官ニ移リタルモ現役ニ列スルコトトナレリ、又興亞院委員ナリキ興亞院中央部ハ東京ニ在リ、平沼總理ハ院ノ頭首ニシテ、興亞院總裁ナリ、副總裁ハ陸軍大臣板垣中將、海軍大臣外務大臣大藏大臣ニ興亞院委員ハ約六十名ナリ、實際ハ任事ハ總裁之ヲ行ハズシテ、興亞院ノ事務長官柳川平助之ヲ實施ス、此興亞院ハ社會樹立ニ

非ラス純國家様肉タルニヨリ文官及軍人ニ於テモ委員トナルヲ  
 得、上述ノ如ク興亞院ノ計画的任務ハ自今カ一九四〇年迄連  
 絡部長官タリシ間ハ支那ヲ日本化スルニ在リ私ハ大東亞ノ  
 組織ニ入ルタル他國ニ此計畧ハ及バザルコトヲヨク承知ス。

然レ後ニ日米戰爭開始ノ時日本ハ東亞ニ於テ他國ヲ占領シタル  
 時例ヘハビルマ、泰、佛印、比島其他南太平洋ノ島ヲ占領シタル  
 時興亞院ノ如キ活動ノ範圍ハ大ニ拡大セルヲ以テ支那ノミテラス  
 大東亞ニ於テ占領地区ニ興亞院ノ計画的任務ヲ遂行スル爲ニ  
 興亞院ニ基キ最モ大ニ強化セル組織ヲ要求スルニ至レリ、斯  
 クシテ一九四二年当初興亞院ハ新設大東亞省ニ編入セリ又興亞  
 院ノ連絡部長官ノ勤務ハ各占領地ニ於テ設置セラレタル大  
 使館ニ移管セリ例ハ滿洲ニ於テ爾特命全權大使岡東軍  
 司令官山田大將支那ニ於テ汪精衛政權ニ對シテ同様ナリ  
 大使官又ビルマ、泰、佛印及日本ノ占領シタル他國ニ於テ斯  
 カ大使館アリキ、是等大使館ハ元ノ興亞院ノ計画的任  
 務ヲ遂行セラレタリ即チ日本ニ於テ占領シタル領土ヲ日本  
 化セリ、私ハ北支ニ於テ特務部長及連絡部長官時代ニ  
 在リテハ北支軍ノ作戰行動ノ適當ナル狀態ヲ確保セシムル爲  
 並ニ滿洲軍事地盤強化援助ノ爲大ナル仕事ヲ行ヘリ  
 一九三七年夏北支方面軍ノ行動ニ伴ヒ張家口ニ於テ内蒙  
 駐屯軍ヲ設置セラル一九三七年八月関東軍ハ參謀長東  
 條中將(後大將)指揮ノ下ニ内蒙ヲ占領シ茲ニ於テ特務  
 機關ヲ設置シ松井少將ヲ任命シタリ後駐蒙軍設置  
 (司令官蓮沼中將)ノ際ハ特務機關ハ特務部ニ更生シ  
 松井少將ハ其儘長トナレリ、一九三七年十一月頃松井少

將ハ徳王ヲ首班トスル日本の蒙疆政府ヲ樹立セリ此政府  
 ニ滿洲ヨリ来タル日人顧問ヲハレタリ 内蒙ノ占領及日本  
 的政府ノ樹立ノ目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得セル時ト同様ノ目的ヲ追  
 ヒ即チ内蒙ヲ日本ニ掌握シ此領土ニ於テ對外蒙軍事基地  
 ヲ作ラムトスルニ在リ是ノ處置ハ當時閣東軍參謀長東  
 條中將ノ主張ヨリ行ハレタリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣  
 トナレルモ此方針ヲ継続セリ 内蒙ヲ獲得スル為ニ行ハレタ  
 ル處置ニ於テ自分ノ援助ハ北支ニ於テ北支方面軍支那軍ヲ支那  
 及内蒙ヨリ驅逐スル為メノ條件ヲ作り以テ東條中將ノ蒙古占領  
 ヲ容易ナラシムルニ現レタリ 日本ハ内蒙ニ於ケル資産ハ不足為  
 滿洲ニ於ケルカ如ク要塞構築ヲ處置セサリシモ一九四一年迄内  
 蒙ニ五万ノ兵カヲ有セリ 一九三八年張鼓峯一九三九年ノモン  
 ハンニ五境紛争問題ニ関シテハ日本軍ノ不法行動ニヨリ日蘇兩  
 軍衝突トナレルモノニシテ其事件ノ經過及責任者ニツキ詳細  
 承知セラレアルヲ以テ私ハ茲ニ何等ノ新クニ答辯ヲ有セス  
 一九四〇年三月私ハ興亜院ノ連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ  
 宇都宮(日本)ニアル才十四師團長ニ任セラレタリ 私ハ  
 一九四〇年九月參謀總長閑院宮ヨリ訂画ニ基キ關東軍  
 ハ十五師團迄増加スヘキヲ以テ才十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用  
 セラルヘキ旨内示ヲ受ケタリ  
 私ハ一九四〇年十月師團ト共ニ齊々哈爾ニ到着ス  
 關東軍ノ此増加ハ滿内秩序ヲ防衛スル爲斯カル數量  
 ノ兵カヲ要セサルヲ以テ日本ノ對蘇作戰準備ナリ



2467

私ハ一九四〇年師團ト共ニ齊各略爾ニ居タル時自分ノ判断

以外ニ才六軍司令官ヨリ才十四師團ハ開戦ノ場合

「ハイラル」平地ニ使用スヘキヲ以テ師團ノ将校ハ海拉爾附近

ノ地形ニ精通スルヲ要ス又教育ハ裝備優良ナル蘇軍ニ

對スル持久防禦ニ重点ヲ置キ訓練スヘキ旨ノ秘密訓令ヲ

受ケタリ。尚「ハイラル」才六軍司令部ニ於テハ一九四〇年二回

ニ亘リ「ハイラル」附近ノ圖上戰術演習ヲ実施シ對蘇作戰ヲ研究

セリ。私及師團ノ參謀ハ是ニ參加セリ。私ハ對蘇戰鬥ニ

重点ヲ置キ部下ヲ訓練セリ。

一九四一年「独蘇開戦後參謀本部ハ對蘇作戰準備強化

ノ為日本ヨリ人馬及砲ヲ送り關東軍ニ大ナル増強ヲ行ヒタリ

此増加ハ開特演ノ稱呼アル計畫ニ基キ実施セリ。

一九四一年夏此計畫ニ基キ關東軍ノ兵數及兵器ハ最高迄

達セリ。才一從來十三師團ナリシヲ日本ヨリ新タニ二師團ヲ送り

此外各師團ハ人員五〇〇〇馬三五〇〇ヲ増加セルヲ以テ關東軍ハ

開特演前ニ

十三師團 人 一九五〇〇〇

戰車二師團 人 三〇、〇〇〇 戰車 四〇〇

2467

飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇〇

国境守備隊(三八大隊) 人 一九、六〇〇

鉄道守備隊(五 隊) 人 一七、五〇〇

後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇

計 人 三八六、〇〇〇

馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシカ爾特演ノ計畫ヨリ行ハレタル増加後陸東軍ハ  
人六〇〇、〇〇〇 馬八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至レリ

砲ニ関シテハ私ノ指揮シアリシ才十四師團ニ於テ爾特演計畫  
ニ基キ行ハレタル増加前三十六門増加後四十八門ナリ

他ノ師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ

陸東軍増加ノ際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ

命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス陸東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナルヲ

以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハ才十四師團ノ屋スル才六軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ケアラス

然シ才六軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在ル才二十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地ニ戰築城<sup>野</sup>

16

2467

ヲ構築セリ。一九四一年夏ノ凡テノ状態ハ関東軍ニ於テハ對蘇  
開戦準備促進ノ性質ヲ有セリ。

然シ此時日本軍ハ佛印ヲ侵領セルニヨリ日米關係ハ急激ニ  
尖銳シ情況ハ緊迫シ日本ヲシテ二途ノ岐路ニ立タシメタリ  
日本政府ハ所謂對蘇及對米開戦ヲ何レヲ先キニ行フ  
ヘキカヲ知ラサリキ

一九四一年六月東京御前會議ニ於テ次ノ三條ヲ決定セラル

一、獨蘇戰ニハ独自ノ意見及政策ヲ以テ進ム。

二、對南方作戰準備ヲ進ム

三、蘇聯ニ對シ國境靜謐ヲ守ル。

然シ此時ニ於テモ關特演計更ニ基キ日本ヨリ関東軍ニ兵力  
増加ヲ繼續セラレタルヲ以テ日本ハ蘇聯ヲ急激ニ刺戟セリ

一九四一年十月私ハ才六軍司令官ニ任命セラレタリ固モ無ク  
他、兵團長ト共ニ関東軍司令部ニ呼ハレタリ其際関東

17 軍司令官梅津大將ハ各軍司令官ニ戰時軍ノ任務ニ關シ  
別々ニ訓示ヲ與ヘタリ。私ハ才六軍ノ為次ノ如ク訓令ヲ受  
ケタリ「才六軍ハ開戦ノ場合海拉爾陣地及附近ノ要地ヲ  
確保シテ持久ヲ策ス。一箇月後才六軍三師團ヲ増加ス」

2467

然シ持久防禦ノ時間及開戦ノ時期ニ関シテ梅津大将ハ  
私ニ指示セサリキ、只海拉爾陣地ヲ長期間保持スルニ在リ  
私ハ與ヘラレタル任務ニ基キ「ハイラル」東方高地ニ從來第三三  
師團力構築シタル陣地ヲ補強シ作戰準備ヲ強化セリト今時  
ニ彈藥糧秣等半年ヲ目途トシテ海拉爾附近ニ貯藏セリ  
而シテ一九四三年六月齊々哈爾ニ於テ才六軍ノ隷屬スル才ニ方面  
軍設置ノ際軍司令官阿南惟幾中將ヨリ才ニ方面軍設置  
ノ目的及最近ノ任務又自分ノ指揮スル才六軍ノ最近及將來  
ノ任務ニツキ説明ヲ受ケタリ此説明ヨリ私ハ關東軍力參謀  
本部ニ於テ決定シタル作戰計畫乙号秘密名稱ニ基キ行ヒアル  
對蘇攻勢ノ準備ニ関シ承知セリ關特演ノ計畫ヨリ日本及  
支那ヨリ關東軍ノ為人馬及砲彈藥ヲ増加セラル此關特  
演ハ乙号ノ名稱アル一般作戰計畫ノ一部ノ準備ナリ茲ニ又  
阿南中將ハ私ニ作戰才ニ段階ニ於テ才六軍ハ攻勢作戰ヲ取  
ルヲ以テ是カ研究及準備ヲナスヘキ旨指示セリ、又才ニ段階  
ニ於テ才ニ方面軍主力ノ作戰計畫ニツキ説明セリ其詳細ハ後  
ニ説明ス、  
才ニ段階ニ於テ乙号作戰計畫ニ基キ沿海州地ニ攻勢カハ

2467

才一方面軍ニ於テ行フ才一方面軍ノ攻勢作戰計畫ハ私ハ  
一九四四年十月東京ニ於テ前才一方面軍司令官山下大將ヨリ  
業務引継ノ際承知セリ又其他此作戰ニキキ才一方面軍司令官  
トシテ牡丹江ニ着任ノ際軍參謀長四手井中將ハ細密ニ説明  
セリ、之ヲ以テ私ハ乙号ノ計畫ニヨル南東軍ノ才一才二方面  
軍ノ準備及攻勢作戰ノ經過ニ通曉セリ。此ノ計畫ヲ以テ  
次ノ処置ヲ取ラレタリ

### 準備處置

黒河方面 此方面ニ於テ平時才四軍ニ師團及一國境守備  
隊アリ軍司令部ハ孫吳ニ位置ス 對蘇開戦前齊々哈爾ニ  
才二方面軍 黒河ニN軍(後ニ才八軍トナルカ如シ)ヲ設置ス  
是等ノ編合ハ支那及日本ヨリ四師團ヲ轉用シテ行フ從ツテ  
開戦前ニ才二方面軍ノ兵力ハ六師團ニ達ス其中孫吳ノ  
才四軍三師團 黒河ノ才八軍ニ師團方面軍直轄一師團ナリ  
其他才二方面軍ニ属スル才六軍ハ才三師團及阿爾山部隊  
19 (約一師團)開戦後一師團ヲ増加スヘク將來又ニ師團ヲ増加ス  
沿海州方面 平時ニ此方面ニ駐在シタルハ才五軍三師團  
才三軍三師團 琿春才七十一師團、佳木斯南東軍直轄

一師團計八師團ト戰車二師團ナリ

2467

一九四二年鶴崗一才二十軍司令部ヲ設置シ才三軍一ハ  
才三才五軍ヨリ各二師團ヲ抽出シテ喫ヘタリ、南戰前  
ニ乙号計畫ニヨリ牡丹江ニ才一方面軍司令部、周島ニ才二軍  
司令部ヲ設置ス又日本及支那ヨリ此方面ニ新タニ八師團ヲ  
轉用ス是ニヨリ才一方面軍八十五師團及戰車二師團トナル、  
内才五軍三師團、戰車一師團、才三軍五師團ト戰車一師團  
才三軍三師團、才二軍二師團、才一方面軍直轄ニ師團ナリ、  
此外關東軍司令官直轄飛行一軍飛行機一千機アリ

關東軍ハ乙号計畫ニヨリ南戰直前ニ東正面、北正面、西正面

共ニ斯カル状態トナル

攻勢計畫、乙号攻勢ノ計畫ヨリ全極東トバイカルニ至ル迄  
ヲ獲得ヲ豫期ス、此攻勢計畫ハ四段階ニ別ツ

才一段階ニ於テ才二方面軍ノ才四軍、及N軍ハ孫吳及黑河  
附近蘇聯國境ニ於テ示威的行動ヲ行ヒ時々蘇領ヲ射  
撃シ以テ攻勢ヲ準備ラ粧フ、然レトモ攻勢ヲ取ラス斯クシテ  
專ラ此方面ニ赤軍ヲ拘束シ若シ赤軍進攻シ来ラハ抑制ス才六  
軍ハ海拉爾及阿爾山ノ陣地ヲ確保ス若シ赤軍ニシテ知多方面

20

2467

ヨリ滿州里ヲ經テ攻斃シ来ル場合ニハ此等障地ヲ固守シテ之ヲ阻止ス此際沿海州方面才一方面軍ハ次ノ計更ニヨリ断乎トシテ攻勢ヲ取ル

a. 才五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シ「イマン」ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ対シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進「オロシロ」附近才一方面軍主力ノ會戰ニ参加ス

b. 才二軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ瑋春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ南島地区ヲ北進「オロシロ」ニ向テ其行動ハ方面軍主力ト策應ス。

c. 才三軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ向テ興凱湖西南側ヲ經テ「オロシロ」ニ向テ前進ス。

d. 才三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧ヨリ「コロデ」ニ向テ前進ス茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ参加ス

21  
是等ノ總テノ兵力ハ「オロシロ」ニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ「オロシロ」ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シテ浦塩ヲ攻圍占領ス。是ヲ以テ才一段階ヲ終了ス主ナル目的ハ蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲産業地区ヲ沿海州方面ヨリスル赤軍ノ航空襲撃ヲニ対シ安全トラシムルニ在リ。

2467

才ニ段階、才一段階ノ攻勢成功シタル場合ハ占領地区ヲ確保ス  
 為一部ヲ以テ沿海州ニ残置シ才一方面軍ノ主力ハ北方ニ向ヒ  
 鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハバロスク」ニ前進ス。佐木斯ニアリシ師團ハ「レニスク」  
 ニ対スル陣地ヲ占領シ此附近ニ於テ才一才ニ方面軍ノ翼側ヲ  
 掩護ス。此時才ニ方面軍ノ才四軍及「」軍ハ才一方面軍ノ  
 行動ニ策應シテ黒河及其附近ヨリ攻勢ヲ取り「アムール」ヲ渡  
 河シ「ブラゴエ」「クヒブシフカ」「スホルネ」ヲ確保シ西伯利鉄道ヲ  
 遮断シ一部ヲ以テ掩護ノ為西方ニ對セシメ主力ハ東方ニ向ヒ  
 鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハバロスク」ニ前進ス。茲ニ於テ才一才ニ方面軍ハ  
 策應シテ赤軍ヲ兩方ヨリ挾撃ノ決戦シ以テ哈府ヲ占領ス  
 是ヲ以テ才ニ段階ヲ終ル

22

才ニ段階、哈府占領後才ニ方面軍ハ急速ニ西方ニ轉進シ  
 將來後貝加爾攻勢作戰ノ為兵力増加準備ヲ行フ  
 此時海拉爾ニ在ル才六軍ハ三師團ヲ増加セラレ兵力四師  
 團ニ達シ攻勢ヲ前進ノ為準備ヲ行フ  
 才一方面軍ハ沿海州ニ於テ重要ナル地区及才ニ方面軍ノ後方  
 ヲ確保ス。



2467

西伯利鐵道ニ沿ヒ知多ニ前進ヲ開始ス 才ニ方面軍ノ主力  
モガチヤニ達スレハ才六軍ハ直ニ三河附近及滿洲里附近  
國境ヲ突破シ攻勢ヲ開始ス自己ノ行動ハ才ニ方面軍ノ主力  
ニ策應シ知多及其南方地ニ前進ス

知多及其附近ヲ占領後才ニ方面軍ハ西方ノ重要地ニ確  
保シテ才三段階ノ作戰ヲ終ル

才四段階ノ攻勢ニ於テハ後貝加爾及貝加爾ニ至ル迄獲得ス  
然シ攻勢計更ノ才四段階ニ就テハ私ハ承知セズ

對蒙作戰 才三段階ニ於テ才六軍ノ前進開始ト共ニ阿爾

山部隊(約一師團)ハ才ニ方面軍ノ直轄トナリ滿洲蒙古

部隊(約一師團)ヲ併セ指揮シ阿爾山ヨリ「タムサンボラン」ニ

次テ「バイントメン」ウヤンオラサモンヲ經テ知多ニ向ヒ前進ス

此部隊ハ東部外蒙ヲ前進シツツ才ニ方面軍ノ右翼ヲ

掩護ス

23

大本營ハ總テノ武力行動ニ策應シ北支ヨリ機械化一兵團

ヲ轉用シ張家口ヨリ庫倫ニ向ヒ作戰行動ヲ開始セシム

然シ將來ノ攻勢力行動展開ノ計更ハ私ハ承知セサルヲ以テ

説明スルコト能ハス

對蘇攻勢計畫ノ概要以上ノ如シ此一九四二年度ノ對蘇  
 攻勢作戰計畫ハ參謀本部陸東軍共ニ立案作製シ  
 爾後年々更新セリ此日本ノ軍ヲ処置ノ計畫ハ一九四四年  
 中頃迄存在セリ

日本ハ大東亞戰爭ノ戰場ノ困難ナル状態ニ陥リタルニ依リ  
 此計畫ヲ実行スルコトハ出来得サリキ  
 此自筆ノ證言ハ署名ヲ以テ確認ス

前陸東軍才一才面軍司令官大将 喜多 誠一  
 署名  
 記同者 フェエヒエランキン中佐 署名  
 通訳者 シチエベンユーフ 署名

Doc 2467

證明書

余中佐 G. I. タラネニコ / ТАРАНЕНКО Г. И. / 社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦陸軍ノ部員ニシテ、茲ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス

記

日本人俘虜陸軍大將喜多誠一ニ依リテ四月二十日ヨリ今二十三日迄ノ間ニ日本語ニテ記サレタル二十二頁ヨリ成ル書證ノ直接複寫寫真ノ寫ハ、

一九四六年六月二十七日又ハ其前後ニ於テ

社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦ハバロフスク地方ノ檢察官ニヨリ余ニ引渡サレタル事、並ニ該文書ノ原本ハハバロフスク地方ノ檢察局ノ保管書類ノ中ニ所在スルト着ラルコトヲ

余ハ更ニ左ノ事ヲ證明ス

(署名及階級) 中佐 タラネニコ / 署名

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年九月二十六日

CHARGE OUT SLIP

SEP 25 1946

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2467

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

*Exhibit # 835*

SIGNATURE *L. A. Yarrano* *PC*

ROOM NO. *314*