

which the Japanese wanted to raise against everything Western.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation, which was the cause of daily privation and heavy pressure imposed on the population. Distraction was sought in a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland as a good third, were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.

It was necessary for the Japanese to lay increasing stress on the national element in their propaganda, because their incitement of hatred was mainly based on race discrimination.

IV. FOURTH PHASE

Further promises.

September 1944 - August 1945.

1. Koiso's Promise.

The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile had considerably changed. The break-through at Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very foundations of the Japanese defence. The Tojo cabinet was succeeded by the Koiso cabinet, which had to face the isolation of the Southern Regions and the necessity for the Japanese troops there to stand by themselves.

The Japanese need for cooperation of the population consequently gained more and more importance.

When the way in which Tojo's promise was going to be realized became known in August 1943, disappointment was expressed rather clearly among those prominent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in Japan's promises. This served as a warning to the Japanese that they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspirations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain the full cooperation from this group.

Even this category began to see through the realization of Tojo's promise concerning participation in the administration of their local government, which was merely a camouflage with little reality. After the cooling down of the initial enthusiasm fanned by propaganda, here again the policy of empty promises began to be apparent.

In view of these circumstances it was logical that Premier Koiso on 7 September 1944 during the 85th Session of the Diet, after he had promised Korea and Formosa equality of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, also made a further promise in regard to the Southern Regions. The part of his address relating to these regions reads as

/ follows

follows (Prosecution Doc. No. 454, Court Ex. No. 277):

"As to the East Indies, Japan permitted the inhabitants
"to participate in politics according to their wish.
"The inhabitants throughout the East Indies have
"continuously endeavoured to carry out the Greater
"East Asia War, recognizing the real intention of
"Japan. They have also been cooperating remarkably
"with the military government there. In view of these
"facts we declare that we intend to recognize their
"independence in the future in order to ensure the
"eternal happiness of the East Indian race. In this
"way the Japanese government intends to continue with
"her former policy toward Greater East Asia and by
"developing strongly the spirit of the Greater East
"Asia Joint Declaration, she expects to live up to
"the trust of the nations of Greater East Asia. Thus,
"if Greater East Asia, with Japan as its center and
"under the firm belief of victory, further increases
"its solidarity, concentrates its forces both
"spiritually and materially, and prosecutes ardently
"the "Holy War", which aims at the reconstruction
"of Greater East Asia, we firmly believe that we can
"destroy the ambitions of America and England and can
"express our ideals concerning the world forever."

Here again is a vague promise: it was not made clear exactly what region would gain independence when granted; the promise of independence involved the condition to defend their own territory for the support of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence was only defined by the reference to membership of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as an application of the *Hakko Ichiu* ideal.

Previously, towards the end of August 1944, the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed confidentially of the contents of this statement. This Headquarters consequently had an opportunity to prepare itself and issued the following secret orders to various Japanese organizations. The text of these orders, which documents have been recovered in the building used by the Gunseikanbu, during the Japanese occupation of Batavia, reflects so accurately the position of the Japanese "Masters" and the way in which Japanese propaganda was handled, that quotation of the whole text seems justified.

The first document (Prosecution Doc. No. 2756) reads as follows:

"SECRET

COPY

"Osamu San Jo Ho No. 142.

"

" Notification regarding the measures ensuing from
" the proclamation of Admission of the Independence
" of the East Indies.

"

"From: Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps.

"To:

7 September 1944.

"

" We hereby notify you that, based on the Prime Minis-
" ter's proclamation regarding the Granting of the
" independence of the East Indies at the 85th Special
" Session of the Diet today, the 7th of September, it
" is decided that the army will meet the situation
" properly generally in accordance with the following
" stipulations:

"

"1. The purport of the granting of independence shall be
thoroughly

" thoroughly understood (based on the Prime Minister's
" Speech).

"

"2. It is not permitted to touch upon the time, (T.N. of
" the granting of independence) the sphere of the East
" Indies nor the form of government until these are
" finally decided.

"3. National consciousness must be raised to the highest
" degree; especially during the execution of the war
" this must be utilized to strengthen defence, cooper-
" ation with Military Government, and to make Japan and
" Java one and unseparable.

"

"4. There shall be no great alterations in the operations
" and the business structure of Military Government.
" However, participation in the Government shall be
" enlarged and strengthened, and political training shall
" be carried out.

"

"5. Nationalistic speeches and activities shall be actively
" allowed; for that purpose the following measures shall
" be taken:

" a. Permission to sing the national anthem and to use
" the national flag.

" b. The use of nationalistic terms such as "The Indonesian
" people" shall not be restricted.

" c. The appointment of nationalists.

" d. Those advocates of independence who are connected
" with the Communist Party shall not be allowed to exist.

"

"6. Investigation and study necessary for independence
" executed by the local inhabitants under the guidance
" of Military Government shall be recognized. /

"

"7. Thorough measures shall be taken for the spreading of
" the Japanese language, the adoption of Japanese
" institutions and the infusion of the Japanese culture.

"

"8. There shall be no distinction between the natives and
" other races, especially those who are to be treated as
" local inhabitants, but they must be made to understand
" the elemental point that they must participate in the
" construction of a new society, and must cooperate with
" all their might.

"

"9. All Japanese must realize and put into practice the
" mission of this new era in which the divine work of
" "Hakko-riu" (T.F. same as ichiu, i.e., the whole world
" one family) is to be carried out. Especially the idea
" of colonial subjugation has to be banned; and towards
" the natives we must be like parents and elder brothers
" and sisters, approaching them with affectionate feelings
" while instructing and guiding them sternly. Haughty and
" arrogant speech or behaviour shall not be allowed under
" any circumstances.

"

"10. In guiding the public opinion stress shall be laid on
" the raising of national consciousness, the intensification
" of war-mindedness, confidence in and reliance upon Japan
" and the desperate determination to win complete victory
" ensuing therefrom, and on the manifestation of leader-
" ship in carrying out these things.

"

"11. Looking at the other side of the joy on the granting of
" independence we naturally anticipate the confusion
" accompanying shifts and changes of powers, but it is
" absolutely forbidden to meddle in these; we must guide /

" them always standing aloof.

"
"12. Although the insatiability which springs from the
" Indonesian character may sometimes provoke our resent-
" ment, we must not be hostile, but guide them, sternly
" indicating the established policy; a so-called
" flattering attitude is not allowed.
"

"13. As for the instruction of the Volunteer Defence Corps,
" on this occasion particularly we must scrutinize the
" attitude of officers and men towards them, and the main
" points of the instruction in order to deepen the feeling
" of unity; and we must not let them get the feeling that
" they form an independent army. Special attention shall
" be paid to the training of instructors.
" This also applied to the Hoi-Ho (T.K. Auxiliary troops).
"

"14. In observing the real situation of the people we must
" not fall into the superficial view that the aim of
" securing their confidence in Japan and raising their
" war-mindedness has been attained, by judging from their
" enthusiasm and festive excitement; but we must observe
" them, guiding them firmly and continually according to
" our principle of guidance.
"

"15. Planning and execution in the field of general direction
" shall be the duty of Military Government, and others
" must cooperate with it.

" There must be no inconsistency whatsoever in carrying
" out the policy.
"

"16. In general the several functions will be as follows:
" a. The 7th day of September is designated as National
" Independence Commemoration Day, and the week from the
"

" 7th until the 13th shall be the National Festival
 " (temporary name) and thanksgiving functions will be
 " performed at that time.
 " b. On the 7th the Provincial Governors shall assemble
 " and the Commander-in-Chief will indicate the policy
 " to cope with the new situation.
 " c. On the 8th it is anticipated that a ceremony will be
 " held at which the representatives of the inhabitants
 " will express their gratitude.
 " d. On the 9th or the 10th a special session of the
 " Council shall be convened in every province and the
 " special municipality, and on the 11th, a special session
 " of the Central Council."

 The second document (Prosecution Doc. No. 2757) reads as follows:

"66

"CONFIDENTIAL (T.F. in circle)

"COPY (T.F. in circle)

"Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlightenment attendant on
 "the Proclamation re Recognition of the Independence of the
 "East Indies.

"

"GUNSLIHANBU (Inspectorate of Military Administration),

"

September 7, 1944.

"

(Showa 19)

"

Policy.

"

" Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-Chief,
 " to promote the racial consciousness of the Indonesians and
 " to incite this into a hostile feeling for the complete
 " prosecution of the war to exterminate the U.S.A. and
 " Britain.

"

"

" Outline.

- "
- "1. The promotion of the racial consciousness of the
" Indonesian Race by the establishment of racial ideals
" shall be planned.
"
- "2. The responsibility and efforts of the race shall be
" stressed, in addition to which they shall be made to
" realize their aggravated mission for the complete
" prosecution of the War, and the inspiration which may be
" aroused shall be incited into a hostile feeling for
" the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate the
" U.S.A. and Britain.
"
- "3. Measures necessary for the Independence shall be left
" entirely to the Army, and they (T.K. the people) shall
" be made to understand the necessity of offering them-
" selves entirely for defence and services to the
" Military Administration during the War.
"
- "4. They shall be made to look back upon the process of the
" glorious spreading of creed of "Hakko-riu" (T.K. same
" as ichiu, i.e. making the whole world as one family)
" and the realization of the national policy of the
" Empire (T.K. Japan) by means of the independence and
" participation in the government of Burma and the
" Philippines; in this way they shall be induced to
" increase their confidence in and reliance upon the
" Empire (T.K. Japan) and also to manifest their deep
" emotion for the August Virtue of His Majesty and the
" sincerity of their devotion to the Emperor.
"

- "5. Those who have blamed persons cooperating with the Army
" or those who have been negative in their cooperation
" with Japan, while maintaining a dubious attitude, shall
" be ostracized, and the fact that Cooperation with the
" Military Administration implies the Prosperity of
" Indonesia shall be clarified, thereby forcing out and
" checking all critical speech and actions.
"
- "6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the Great
" East Asia Conference and the Joint Declaration of Great
" East Asia, and by the process of realization (T.N. of
" the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to become
" conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding the
" Construction.
"
- "7. In order to check the enemies' counterpropaganda before-
" hand, they shall be reminded of the past when they groaned
" for ages in misery under Jewish Oppression under the
" external appearance of dazzling splendour, by tracing back
" the history of the atrocities of the U.S.A., Britain and
" Holland.
"
- "8. The cooperation of the Chinese Residents, Half-castes
" and Arabs is also worthy of attention. It shall be
" emphasized that these people too, while basking in the
" new glory similarly to the Indonesians, must, together
" with the latter, exert themselves towards the construction
" of a new society; and the policy of concord of all the
" peoples with the Indonesian Race as the nucleus shall be
" adhered to.
"
- "9. The new policy shall be glorified by utilizing the actual
" results and the present condition of the cooperation of the

" people, the policy of the organization of the Volunteer
" Defence Corps and the participation in the government as
" the background.

"

"

Measures.

"

"1. Every kind of information-organization and primitive
" method shall be utilized.

"

"2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins; there shall be
" no suspension of publication on Sundays; and on the first
" and second days four page newspapers shall be issued.

"

"3. As for movies, the functions during a week after the official
" announcement shall be filled and edited, by also taking
" into consideration the effects in foreign countries.

"

"4. In the broadcasting the text of the official announcement
" in Tokyo, the statement of the Commander-in-Chief and the
" talks of the Authorities of the Military Administration
" etc. shall be repeated, accompanied by clear and cheerful
" music. Moreover, the inspiration and the determination of
" the native inhabitants shall be put in the daily programmes.

"

"5. The national flag of Great Japan shall be hoisted for
" one week from the day of the Official Announcement.

"

"6. The details of this Outline shall be planned and executed
" by the Department of Propaganda in cooperation with the
" Bureau of Native Affairs.

"

"

" To be distributed for office-purposes to:

"
" Department of Propaganda (including news correspondents),
" Bureau of Native Affairs,
" Bureau of Japanese Affairs.

The promise made on 7 September 1944 by Premier Koiso was announced in Java by the Commander-in-Chief in, inter alia, the following words:

"As for the nation that will be set up in the future,
"it will be a just and true nation that will become a
"link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere
"and has the duty to contribute in the development of
"Greater East Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon.

"
"Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise the standard
"of the nation that will be set up so that it will become
"one of the Greater East Asiatic nations in the true
"sense, then it is very necessary that they train themselves
"ceaselessly to become a Greater East Asiatic people
"until the final victory is achieved, i.e., by thoroughly
"convincing themselves as a Greater East Asiatic people.

"
"Suppose the final victory will not be won, then the
"construction of Greater East Asia cannot be materialized,
"and as a matter of course, the East Indies will not get
"their independence.

"
"Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all their efforts
"to win the final victory in a sphere of perfect friend-
"ship between all nationalities.

"
"They must patiently endure all hardships and they also

" must remove all obstacles that might come up in the
" future.

"
" And therefore, while waiting for the arrival of the
" moment of that glorious independence, all the inhabitants
" must work hard for the continuance of this war. With
" such an attitude the duties for the future can be fulfilled.

As mentioned in the orders quoted above, the so-called
"gratitude" of the Indonesians for Koiso's promise remained
the theme on which the Japanese propaganda continued to play
for months to come.

At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters were instructed
to advise the section concerned of the Ministry of War at
Tokyo as to what area should be declared "independent", the
date on which this was to take place, and the form of the new
government and state.

The Military Government of Java in reply submitted a
report entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence",
in which it was proposed to make Java independent first.
Measures suggested to strengthen the national consciousness
were as follows:

- a. Institution of the Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the
Building of the State).
- b. Increased "participation in the administration."

The attitude of the Japanese Navy as regards this problem
was ambiguous owing to lack of interest. This was true for
the Naval High Command at Tokyo as well as for local head-
quarters.

Thus, for the time being Koiso's promise had no
practical effect, with only two exceptions. On 8 September
1944 the population was allowed henceforward to fly the
Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag on certain specified
holidays, subject to strict regulations as to place and size.

/It

It remained forbidden to show that flag any other day and without giving the Japanese flag the place of honour. On Government buildings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was to be flown.

On that same date permission was given to sing the "Indonesia Raya"-song (Song of Great Indonesia) as the national anthem.

On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief convoked a special session of the Tyuuko Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the following question put by him:

"In which way can the intense gratitude of the Indonesian inhabitants for the promise of future independence for the East Indies be shown to the Imperial Japanese Government and the Japanese Army and how can the will of the population to fight to death in order to bring about the destruction of America and England still further be enhanced?"

An extraordinary session of the Tyuuko Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was held on 17 November 1944 in commemoration of the first anniversary of the "Charter of Greater East Asia", when a motion was adopted to lay down a so-called "Pancha Dharma" (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a "compass" for the Indonesian population.

This "Pancha Dharma" reads as follows:

"For the Indonesian people, to wit:

- "1. We, along with other nations in Greater East Asia,
" are in this war one in life and death with Dai
" Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all
" sincerity because this present war stands up for
" justice and righteousness.
 - "2. We found an Indonesian State that is independent,
" unified, sovereign, just and prosperous and that
" always will value the spiritual merits of Dai-Nippon,
- /

DOCUMENT 2750

" and that will live as a true member in the family-sphere
 " of Greater East Asia.

"3. We will sincerely endeavour to achieve a glorious great-
 " ness by way of keeping up and elevating our own civili-
 " zation and culture, by helping to develop the Asiatic
 " culture and by beautifying the world's culture.

"4. While maintaining strong and lasting friendly relations
 " with the nations of Greater East Asia, we serve our
 " country and people with all our heart and with an un-
 " wavering mind while we will always believe in God
 " Almighty.

"5. With a united and burning desire we strive for the
 " achievement of an ever-lasting Worldpeace based on
 " the family-conception of the whole mankind according
 " to the principle of Hakko Ichiu."

After having harped on Indonesian "gratitude" for several months a new impulse had to be given to propaganda. On 1 December 1944 the application of Tojo's promise (participation in the Administration) was extended to the appointment of Indonesian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vice Governors) in several Syuu. Several more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) were appointed to the various Departments of the Gunseikanbu, while a Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established, which would meet regularly to advise the Gunseikanbu in the periods when the Byuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was not in session.

2. Progressive Militarization of the Indonesian Population.

Meanwhile the propaganda service had introduced a new slogan, and activities for the "Benteng Perjuangan Jawa" (Java One Fortress) were in full swing. The object was to bring the population to the maximum war effort in view of the threat of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air Raid Defence and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine but besides, the

population was worked upon by the powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla fighting. They were instructed in the methods of destroying small enemy formations with primitive weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass action.

Fostering of hate reached new heights. During a propaganda meeting in Batavia effigies of Roosevelt, Churchill and Van der Plas (a prominent Dutch administrator) were burnt after having been paraded through the whole town. American, British and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration. Incitement of the population increased; religious propaganda exerted itself to cause the Mohammedans to declare Holy War on the Occidental Powers in order to bring religious fanaticism into play.

Three new semi-military organizations were established during this period, viz:

- a. To the Jawa Heekoo Kahi (Central Corporation for Communal Services) a Defence Corps was attached, called "Pelopor".
- b. A similar Corps was attached to the Mashumi (the Islamic Corporation) called "Hizbullah" (Army of Allah).
- c. In every Syuu (Residency), Jibakutai (Self-immolation or Suicide Squads) were established whose training, similarly to that of the "Pelopor" and the "Hizbullah", was aimed at guerilla warfare.

The Tonari Gumi (Neighbourhood Associations), finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboodan in the defence of the village.

On no occasion were these simple villagers ever told that such action on their part in war time would constitute a violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the opposing party to treat them as 'franc tireurs'.

3. Effects of Incitement.

Early in 1945 the Japanese awoke to the fact that the hate instilled by them might be turned against themselves and that it might not always be possible to keep this xenophobia, provoked by them, focussed on "foreigners".

One night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer Defence Corps at Blitar (East-Java) made a surprise attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured the arms as well as key-points in the town, e.g., Kempci HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, etc. Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued, the victims being all non-Indonesians. These included what few Eurasians were still free, but also, and even particularly, Japanese, Chinese, Arabs and Indians.

The xenophobia instilled by the Japanese propaganda was beginning to bear fruit. In the course of the next days the movement was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out by violence and bloodshed.

4. Results of the "Volunteers" rebellion.

It had become clear that the hate instilled by the Japanese threatened to rebound against themselves.

Another indication of internal difficulties could be observed in increasing resistance against Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially against the delivery of agricultural produce and the recruiting of ronusha (native labor).

In order to overcome this resistance, strong measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian officials who were held responsible for the poor results in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substituted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite politicians, in conformity with stipulation 5 (c) in the Gunseikanbu Notification dated

7 September 1944, which has already been cited. These politicians had come to the fore through the Java Pookoo Kai, (Central Corporation for Communal Services) or through the religious courses. The fact that these new arrivals in the Indonesian administrative corps were not fully competent, made little difference since they always had a Japanese adviser. In this way the Japanese succeeded in staffing roughly one third of this corps with nationalists favourably disposed towards themselves. Nevertheless, neither the required delivery of foodstuff nor the recruitment of coolies and volunteers were achieved by many Ken (Regencies).

It became uncomfortably clear to the Japanese that they were increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the population and that they had to bear the consequences of their own propaganda. For this reason, a Ken-Koku-Gakuin was instituted after approval from Tokyo. The installation of this "Academy for the Building of the State" took place on 29 April 1945. The object was to influence the minds of the future "leaders" of the "independent" state and to imbue them with ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this leadership.

Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945, a conference took place at Singapore and was attended by Soomubutyoo (Chiefs of General Affairs Departments) of all areas under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising Java and Sumatra and commanded by Itagaki. At this conference which was called for a discussion of measures necessary in regard to the population in various areas, the Soomubutyoo of Java explained to what extent the national
consciousness

consciousness of the Indonesians had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact that there was no other way to regain the confidence of the population but by carrying out the promise of independence.

As a result, Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Headquarters on "independence." Java promptly responded with a proposition to declare the whole of the Netherlands East Indies independent within a year. The reply given by Singapore was disappointing. The issue was dodged and it was said that the time was not yet to initiate independence.

Subsequently, on 20 May 1945 a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed to convene a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This committee was installed on 28 May 1945, and took a solemn oath of loyalty and of "sehidup senati sama Nippon" (to live and to die with Japan).

For the sake of clarity, it may be pointed out that the above conference was instigated by the General Officer Commanding the 7th Area Army (Itagaki) and consequently restricted itself to territories occupied by this Area Army, i.e., only Sumatra and Java in the Netherlands East Indies.

"Naval" territories (Borneo, the Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented at this conference. Measures discussed, therefore, only related to "Army" areas which, as a matter of fact, narrowed down to Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged behind that of Java; not until February 1945 was a Tyuuc Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) for Sumatra installed.

The Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence) consisted of approximately 60

members, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. A Japanese, the Syuutyoo (Resident) of Cheribon Syuu (Residency), was Deputy Chairman. Seven other Japanese were "special members". The Committee had an Administrative Bureau, again with a Japanese Deputy Chief.

The Ordinance founding this Committee laid down that its findings had to be reported to the Gunseikan. Later, a new "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" would be formed. It was clearly stipulated that the "Committee for Study" was to confine itself to study and was not empowered to make any decision.

The Committee met twice, from 29 May to 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings were not open to the public. Among other things, a constitution resembling that of the Philippine puppet-state was drafted.

When, after all the Japanese stimulation of national consciousness, it became known that the Committee had no powers to make decisions, again disappointment was caused among Indonesians. In addition, in reply to the question over what territories the preparations for independence were to extend, it was said that the Committee had been installed by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, who had no authority over other areas, and that, therefore, the Committee had to restrict itself to Java.

5. Tokyo Policy in regard to the Position of the Southern Regions within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Even before the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, high Japanese authorities, both military and civilian, devoted a great deal of study to the position of the Southern Regions within the Co-prosperity Sphere. Possibilities varied between administering these areas as a colony and granting them puppet-independence. As has been emphasized in

Prosecution Doc. No. 1987B, Court Exhibit No. _____, after occupation Japan was in a position to prescribe all matters concerning the type of sovereignty, policies, culture and economy of these regions. One objective remained of paramount importance, viz., the Japanese Empire desired complete political, economic and cultural control over these areas.

Various plans were drafted in course of time by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Command and the Total War Research Institute. (Prosecution Doc. No. 837A, Court Ex. No. 628; Prosecution Doc. No. 790A, Court Ex. No. 1169; Prosecution Doc. No. 1443, Court Ex. No. 1176; Prosecution Doc. No. 1112A, Court Ex. No. _____; Prosecution Doc. No. 1987A, Court Ex. No. _____; Prosecution Doc. No. 1621C, Court Ex. No. _____; Prosecution Doc. No. 2402B, Court Ex. No. _____; Prosecution Doc. No. 2754).

Opposing plans in regard to the status of the East Indies may be discerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Command agreed on the granting of so-called independence to Burma and the Philippines, but disagreed in relation to the East Indies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured the establishment of a puppet-state in the south with the exception of certain areas which would remain under Japan's direct control for military purposes.

Both Army-and Navy-High Commands, however, thought the granting of puppet-independence to the East Indies premature and wished to retain these regions under more or less direct administration.

Top-secret plans, drafted pre-war by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bear out the latter's policy, following in outline:

1. The Netherlands East Indies were to be included in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (with Japan, Manchukuo and China as centre), in which the various areas were /
to

- be coordinated politically, culturally and economically.
2. Some degree of independence was to be given the Netherlands East Indies either by threat of armed force or by stimulation of the nationalist movement. Japanese advisers were to occupy key positions in the new state. Certain less developed areas, like Borneo, New-Guinea and Timor were to belong to the new state, but their administration was to be entrusted to Japan.
 3. Economic agreements were to be concluded with the new puppet-state for the development and exploitation of its natural resources under a planned economy (both internally and externally with regard to the Co-prosperity Sphere) with an exchange agreement.
 4. A protective treaty under the name of military alliance was to be concluded aimed at coordinating the military and diplomatic policy of the new state with that of Japan.
 5. Military bases were to be ceded or leased to Japan. Singapore was to be an area under direct Japanese administration and islands surrounding it (Netherlands East Indies territory) were to be incorporated.

Plans drafted by the High Command and the Total War Research Institute envisaged a puppet form of self-government rather than puppet independence for the East Indies.

Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured recognition of a puppet form of independence soon after occupation, whereas the High Command was not prepared to even grant puppet self-government until some time after the conclusion of the war. The Total War Research Institute regarded the East Indies as a pawn for negotiation in case the war should not end in a decisive victory for Japan.

All authorities, however, agreed that Occidental influence had to be expelled from the East Indies to a degree which

which was in most cases made dependent on the measure of success gained by Japanese arms. It is clear from these plans what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in mind in regard to the so-called independence of the East Indies; for reasons of its own, this Ministry preferred a puppet variety of independence to direct colonial rule or to a puppet-variety of self-government. In essence, however, there was no difference between the policies of the Ministry and the High Command; both desired complete political, economic and cultural control over these areas.

The Total War Research Institute in particular made a close study of policies to be followed during a war, in, inter alia, the East Indies. The general congruity is striking between the plans drafted by this Institute on "Military Affairs" "Politics", "Economics", "Spiritual Civilization" (Thought and Culture) in regard to the Southern Regions, and actual development there. (Prosecution Doc. No. 1621C, Court Ex. No.)

According to these plans, the granting of independence to the Philippines (conditional upon positive cooperation in the war) was to be accelerated as much as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as this policy was calculated to stimulate aspirations to independence among other native peoples within the Co-prosperity Sphere. The Indonesians would be given reason to hope that independence would be granted them after a certain period subsequent to conclusion of the war.

Prior to the date of publication of this plan, Prime Minister Tojo, speaking officially on behalf of the Japanese Government, publicly announced Japanese intentions for the first time at the Diet Session of 22 January 1942 (Prosecution Doc. No. 1038B, Court Ex. No.). Independence was promised the Philippines and Burma, if these nations understood the true intention of Japan and cooperated as members of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. If the Netherlands

Netherlands East Indies were to continue their resistance against Japan they would be crushed without hesitation. If, on the other hand, the inhabitants were to understand Japan's true intention and were to cooperate, support would be given to their development and welfare with full understanding on the part of Japan.

This declaration involved no promise of "independence" to the East Indies. The future status of these areas within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was left uncertain.

At the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government of Japan held on 20 November 1941 (Prosecution Doc. No. 1448, Court Ex. No.), general policy as well as details of military government to be organized in occupied territories were decided upon. In regard to the future, the only decision taken was that the military administration would be gradually taken over by the new organization which the Government would establish, dependent upon the progress of the Imperial policies toward the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the fundamental policy was to be aimed at restoration of public peace and order, at immediate acquisition of resources vital for Japan's war effort, and at maintaining self-sufficiency for her operational forces. The ultimate reversion of territories overrun by Japan and their disposal was to be decided later. Recalcitrant American, British and Netherlands nationals unwilling to cooperate with the Japanese military government were to be taken against them. A sense of dependence on the Imperial Forces was to be instilled into the native population. A premature growth of a movement for national independence was to be avoided. All important matters concerning Japan's local military administration were to be decided at Liaison Conferences between Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Government. Forces on the spot would be notified of decisions of the Central Executive by the Army and the Navy respectively.

The policy favoured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not adopted; the future status of the East Indies remained undecided.

Immediately

Immediately before the landing operations in the Netherlands East Indies, Southern Army Headquarters broadcast propaganda for self-determination on the part of the Indonesian race over Saigon-and Bangkok-Radio, in order to facilitate military operations and post-occupation administration. (Prosecution Doc. No. 2754).

After Japan's occupation of the Netherlands East Indies the local Japanese military authorities pushed the administration along the line of strengthening nationalist tendencies. This was also the case in Burma and the Philippines, where so-called independence was proclaimed later.

General Headquarters, Southern Army, on the other hand, adhered to the principle of suppressing such movements.

In Japan, Army and Navy High Command were strongly opposed even to so-called independence of the East Indies, since it was necessary for the control of raw materials essential to the prosecution of the war to retain the Netherlands East Indies under direct administration, in order to enable Japan to carry through all necessary measures, whereas a policy of racial emancipation, such as the granting of independence would impede Japan's plans.

At the end of September 1942 Count Hideo Kodama, referred to before as one of the civilian advisers to the Commander-in-Chief of Java, visited Tokyo and attempted to arouse interest for the views of the local authorities concerning the East Indies. He discussed the problem of East Indian "Independence" and explained why it was considered inexpedient to divide these territories. The matter, however, remained undecided.

In November 1942, the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry followed. The deliberations in the Privy Council concerning this draft law supply important clues for the understanding of Japanese intentions under the guise of the Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (Prosecution Doc. No. 1086). The question
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was closely studied as to whether the institution of this Ministry would not arouse the suspicion that Japan considered the various countries of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as colonial possessions, which might unfavourably influence the attitude of the local inhabitants. In addition, the position of the new Ministry was discussed in relation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The world was to be divided into two groups; all dealings with the one group (the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) would be handled by the Greater East Asia Ministry and not by the Foreign Ministry.

The Military Administration exercised by virtue of the prerogatives of the High Command fell outside the direct control of the Greater East Asia Ministry; this Ministry would only provide personnel and take part in discussions concerning general policies for territories under military administration. The Greater East Asia Ministry would make preparations for the ultimate reversion of these territories to its own control. Tojo declared that the military administration would be replaced as soon as feasible by a civil administration and that the local inhabitants would be admitted to Japanese administrative services.

The Privy Council finally rejected this proposal, on the ground that it was incompatible with a proper administration and that it was destined for a military dictatorship. Tojo however, carried through his views.

On 4 January 1943, at last, policy in regard to the Southern Regions was subjected to discussion at a Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Government, when a plan for reversion of sovereign rights in occupied territories was decided upon.

The granting of puppet-independence to Burma and the Philippines was definitely laid down. A decision on the statu-
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of the Southern Regions, however, met with opposing views from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Command and was, therefore, deferred.

Finally, at the Liaison Conference on 31 May 1943, attended by the Emperor, the incorporation of the East Indies in Japanese territory was decided upon. However, Indonesian participation in the administration was to be introduced. The decision on the incorporation of the East Indies in Japanese territory was not to be published lest it should give the Allies material for propaganda.

At that time Prime Minister Tojo appeared to favour setting up a puppet-state, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to advocate this policy. The High Command, however, insisted on its strong opposition. Moreover, a number of authorities were of the opinion that, if the Japanese Empire once granted independence, she would be obliged to respect this independence as a point of honour which would involve her in difficulties, in case a negotiated peace had to be considered; they opined that the maintenance of the status quo would be more suitable. Finally, incorporation in Japanese territory was decided upon.

The military authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision. Sukarno was sent to Japan, immediately after the Greater East Asia Conference held in November 1943. Sukarno pressed Premier Tojo to grant independence, but obtained no definite answer.

In August and October 1943, the Philippines and Burma respectively, had gained their so-called independence. These two nations participated in the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943; the East Indies, however, were not represented, even by an observer.

This Conference revealed the typical picture of the camouflage set-up of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. A "Joint Declaration" was adopted (Prosecution Doc. No. 2339C), which reads as follows:

/"The

"The Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations.

"

" Joint Declaration adopted on November 6, 1943

"

" It is the basic principle for the establishment of world

"peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place,

"and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance

" The United States of America and the British Empire have in

"seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples.

"Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression

"and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate

"ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came

"to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies

"the cause of the present war.

" The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contribut-

"ing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward

"prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful con-

"clusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-

"American domination, and assuring their self-existence and

"self-defense, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in

"accordance with the following principles:

" 1. The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual
"cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and
"construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based
"upon justice.

" 2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the
"fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one
"another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual
"assistance and amity.

" 3. The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one
"another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of
"each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater
"East Asia.

" 4. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavour to
"accelerate their economic development through close cooperation

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"upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general
"prosperity of their region.

" 5. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly
"relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the
"abolition of racial discriminations, the promotion of cultural
"intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world,
"and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind."

During this Conference, the so-called common destiny of
Greater East Asiatic nations as well as the "necessity" for a joint
struggle against the Allies were emphasized.

The same propaganda as described before was conducted in the
East Indies. Cooperation from the local population in the war
effort became more vital to the local Japanese as time went on.
Local authorities, therefore, made a last attempt to persuade the
Tokyo Government.

Hayashi, at that time the highest civil adviser to the Java
Military Government, was sent to Tokyo with the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Java to try and
persuade the Japanese authorities concerned to support puppet-
independence of the East Indies.

With the formation of the Koiso Cabinet, opinion favouring
a puppet-state in the East Indies began gradually to gain ground.

At the first session of the Supreme War Direction Council
during the Koiso Cabinet, the announcement regarding East Indies
independence, to be made at the next Session of the Diet, was
drafted as an item in "Measures for War Direction to be adopted
hereafter".

The considerations leading to this policy were as follows:
At that time Japan's defence line on the Pacific front had
collapsed at the Marianas and the American offensive was fast
gaining force. The new Cabinet considered it had to make some
political move to unify Greater East Asia. Needless to say
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu argued for his Ministry's conception

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of a puppet-state. The Army High Command finally agreed to the granting of such independence in the future. This fell in line with the views of Army authorities on the spot, for whom it became more and more difficult to secure the collaboration of the native population with Japan if the problem of independence were left unsettled. But the Navy still stuck to its stiff opposition and reserved its agreement to pushing independence measures in regard to areas under Navy control.

At the session of the Supreme War Direction Council of 5 September 1944, it was, consequently, decided to announce that in the future "independence" would be granted the East Indies, in order to "win over the natives, as well as to clarify the Greater East Asia Policy to all the world."

Policies laid down (Prosecution Doc. No. 2755), stipulated, *inter alia*, that the areas to be granted independence were expected to be the "former Netherlands East Indies" (with the exception of New-Guinea). This point, however, did not obtain agreement from the Navy, so that the area remained undecided.

The variety of independence and the relations with the Japanese Empire were to be determined separately. Measures were to be taken, however, to ensure that all requirements of the Empire should be fulfilled. The date was also to be fixed later, taking into consideration the development of the natives' political ability; premature granting was to be avoided. Whether or not the whole area was to be granted "independence" simultaneously, or one area after another, was to be determined in consideration of circumstances prevailing at the time of determination.

In Java, the following measures were to be taken and made to appear to be in consequence of native initiative. The tenor of the promise was to be thoroughly understood by the natives. The Military Government was not to be changed overnight, but

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participation

participation by the natives in the administration was to be further increased. They were to be given administrative training. Natives were to be allowed as soon as expedient to investigate matters necessary for their so-called independence. The Indonesian national anthem and national flag, hitherto prohibited were to be permitted.

In other areas similar measures were to be taken as and when circumstances permitted. On this point again the Navy reserved its agreement.

The Navy persisted in its opposition.

Consequently, Prime Minister Koiso merely announced in the Diet that the Japanese Government would grant the East Indies independence in the future. No concrete measures were taken in the matter.

Later, however, the strategic situation became increasingly grave and lines of overseas communication were practically severed. The material requirements of the Japanese Army in Java became more and more pressing and consequently it became increasingly difficult to keep the population in Java and Sumatra favourably disposed with nothing but abstract declarations of "future independence." It had become urgent to adopt concrete measures for its preparation.

On the other hand, the Navy was losing its argument after the loss of the Southern Regions had become inevitable since the fall of the Philippines. From the beginning of 1945 onward the Army and Navy approached agreement.

On 17 July 1945 a meeting was held of the Supreme War Direction Council for the discussion of this problem among others. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo Shigenori, had had prepared a memorandum (Prosecution Doc. No. 2758), in which this Ministry - as before a protagonist of puppet-status for the East Indies - proposed to come to the definite decision to grant

/ so-called

so-called independence to the whole of the East Indies. This proposal was argued by pointing out that the enemy offensive had reached a corner of the East Indies already and that the "natives" might possibly question the sincerity of the Japanese Empire if independence were further deferred. In the opinion of the Ministry it was high time to implement promises made and to announce before the world the date of independence, thus clarifying Japan's sincere intentions to achieve Greater East Asia autonomy. It was argued that, although Java was better fitted for independence, nationalist leaders would be disappointed if only Java was to be declared independent, and the effectiveness of the measure would be reduced by half.

This Ministry, therefore, strongly favoured granting so-called independence to the entire Netherlands East Indies area. Malaya and British North-Borneo had always existed separately with different traditions, so that it was considered unsuitable and unnecessary to grant those areas independence together with the Netherlands East Indies.

The Ministry also declared itself against the successive granting of independence to various areas as preparations had been completed locally. This would again disappoint Indonesian leaders and might entail formal complications. It would be preferable to declare the entire area "independent" simultaneously as soon as preparations in the main area were completed. The other areas would be theoretically incorporated in the new state but would remain under Japanese military government until preparations for reversion had been completed.

A Committee for Preparation for Independence in Java was to be constituted. If it proved no longer possible - on account of communications - to send delegates from the other areas to Java, then prominent personalities, natives belonging to those other areas, but living in Java, might be selected to represent them.

As for the date of independence, this Ministry urged, in view of the turn of war and the international situation, not to extend this date beyond the autumn of 1945. In order to meet the international political situation, which was in speedy transition, it was considered necessary to determine that date approximately and to announce same along with the decision of the areas to be declared "independent."

"Independence" was to be proclaimed not by Japan, but by the Committee for the Preparation for Independence, so that it would appear as if puppet-state was not brought about by Japanese guidance or encouragement, but on the contrary, by the free initiative of the East-Indian race.

National policy, the form of Government, the name of the new State, etc., were to be decided by the will of the people. This, at any rate, would be announced in order to emphasize the fact that independence was based on the free initiative of the East-Indian race.

At the meeting of 17 July 1945 of the Supreme War Direction Council (Prosecution Doc. No. 2759), this policy was adopted. The Japanese Empire was to grant the East Indies "independence" as soon as possible, while preparations for that purpose were to be accelerated and intensified immediately. It was laid down that the chief Japanese aim was to raise the natives' racial consciousness further by taking various measures concerning independence, thereby making them contribute to the war effort. Measures would be adopted to prevent or to overcome hindrances to military operations and preparations. Execution thereof was entrusted to local Japanese forces.

6. Preparations for the Foundation of a Puppet State in the Southern Regions.

This decision reached Java on 21 July 1945; according to directives from Tokyo, the territory of the new state was to comprise the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a "Committee for the Preparation for Independence" was to be set up in the near future.

However,

However, emphasis was laid upon the necessity for safeguarding the requirements for military operations. The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon, which had submitted in June 1945 that the establishment of the puppet state should not take place before the middle of 1946, and that the abovenamed Committee should at the earliest be set up towards the end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Soomabutyo (Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned.

At this Conference a scheme was drawn up for guiding preparations for so-called independence, wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

V. THE FIFTH PHASE.

Japan's final effort.

The puppet-state within sight.

August-September 1945.

In the beginning of August 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to create this state in September 1945.

In pursuance of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for the Preparation for Independence).

This was effected by proclamation of the same date, reading as follows:

"Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese Southern Army).

"

" Concerning the "Committee for the Preparation for

"

Independence of Indonesia".

" Based on the proclamation of the Japanese Government of "7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun has consistently been

"taking measures to guide the Indonesians. Owing to the "spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they

"have all succeeded in achieving much and fast progress in "their training for government and for the defence of the

"country with burning enthusiasm.

" In response to the activity and the wholehearted efforts "of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the

"installation towards the middle of August of a Committee for

"the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee

"shall accelerate all measures concerning the final prepar-

"ations for the installation of the Government of an independent

"Indonesia.

"

12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal Terauchi was published in Java, the Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-

in-Chief) of Java also issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stated:

"The desire to become an independent nation has now
"reached a high point and is flaring up all over Indonesia.
"It was in response to the expression of this desire that
"the Dai Nippon Teikoku solemnly promised to grant her
"independence, in accordance with the basic principle of
"the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the ideals
"of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole population
"has exerted itself to its utmost to honour the national
"obligations and the stronger became their determination
"to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that the
"foundations for their independence could be built up fully
"and speedily. And now, as an independent nation, con-
"stituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphere
"of Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place in
"the battle-line for the common defence of Greater East
"Asia."

The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government) on this occasion stated the following:

"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosper-
"ity Sphere of Greater East Asia, is based upon humani-
"tarian principles so as to contribute in the formation
"of a new world order. Therefore, the lofty ideals of the
"Indonesians and their intense enthusiasm conform with the
"basic ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit
"of Hakko Ichiu.

"A new nation will have to meet some essential requirements:
"it must have sufficient strength, while its administrative
"machinery should be organized in a smooth and simple way.
"Therefore, the first duty is to bring the war now being
"faced by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To
"this end the Indonesian nation must develop its war-
"potential to its full extent, and together with Dai Nippon

fight

"fight unceasingly to achieve final victory in this Greater East Asia War."

A few days of silence on the subject of independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between Japan and Indonesia:

"To live or die with Japan".

Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, was flown to Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11 August. They were told by the latter that it was originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese Government. On account of difficulties and dangers of communications and pressure of time, the Field Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The main points were:

- a. The Japanese Government had been pleased to institute a Committee for the Preparation for Independence.
- b. The territory of the new State would include the entire Netherlands East Indies.
- c. The date when independence would be proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon as preparations were completed.
- d. The independent Government would be installed first in the island where preparations had been first completed. Subsequently this Government would be gradually extended to include areas where preparations had been completed.
- e. All Japanese demands in connection with the military situation were to be complied with.
- f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the Committee, which further consisted of thirteen representatives from Java, / three,

three from Sumatra and five from territories under naval occupation. These members were appointed on nomination by local Japanese military commanders.

On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java reported the news of Sukarno's return, who was welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the Commander-in-Chief and many of the military and Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile, the Committee members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali, whose names were now published, were flown to Java, after having received their instructions from the military or naval authorities of those areas.

Originally the first meeting of the Committee was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August, however, members of the Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation, Great consternation ensued.

During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945, the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth leaders, prominent during that period, met at the residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Maeda. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred with the Soemabutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department) and Maeda. It was decided to proclaim independence the next morning.

The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for the Study of Preparations for Independence) was hastily altered, and on the following morning the Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda service on the verandah of his house.

The population of Java was still uninformed, except through rumour, about the capitulation of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been unfitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from Tokyo; on instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the
Japanese

Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat secret.

The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese propaganda service, and the local broadcasting stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no mention of anything but the announcement of independence and the proclamation of the constitution.

On 21 August 1945, the papers published, next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia, the following words:

"Dai Nippon is and will always be a friend to
"Indonesia, immutably and forever. We never
"will forget our oath; united, in life and
"in death."

Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese authorities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has been referred to as the "stolen week". The Japanese used it to advantage to attempt to create a pro-Japanese state even if this were Japan's final effort.

Document 2750

PREPARED STATEMENT

of

K.A. de WEERD, Attorney-at-Law,
Major R.M.I.A.

Subject: The Japanese Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.

International Prosecution Section
Netherlands Division
November 1946.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

INTRODUCTION

The Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies for convenience has been chronologically divided into five phases,

- I. The period from March to August 1942, which can be designated the transition period.
- II. The second phase, which is characterized by the consolidation of Japanese rule, lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
- III. The period from July 1943 to September 1944, which is governed by an attempt at winning over the population by promises.
- IV. The period from September 1944 to the beginning of August 1945, involving further development of the policy of promises.
- V. The period from the beginning of August 1945 to the end of September 1945, involving at the last moment an attempt to create a state, friendly to Japan, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been more and less arbitrarily divided into periods and consequently these limits must be treated as being approximate. Occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases, even if the events in question extended beyond a particular phase.

Japan's policy in regard to the Southern Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions alike, so that only insignificant local modifications were made, and then solely in the application and not in the principle itself. Therefore, what happened in Java is treated as basic and mention will only be made of modifications in other regions of the Netherlands Indies which reveal important deviations from events in Java.

I. THE TRANSITION PHASE

Beginning of 1942 to approximately August 1942.

Throughout the East Indies, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration and in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

In addition a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of ^{their past support of} the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few local exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born in the Netherlands Indies who still showed ^{apparent} affinity with the Occidental world were interned, and those Asiatics, too, who were "suspected" of having Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According to official Japanese returns as of 1 September 1945, 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java. Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave labour elsewhere.

Of the former Western community, only three groups were still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their "freedom" in many other ways.

This non-interned Occidental community was subjected to very heavy pressure. Besides being spied upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial were such that the victims were deprived of all rights, and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

Occidentals were, whenever possible, dismissed from their official and private positions and appointments, thus depriving the greater part of this section of the community of its means of livelihood. All bank balances were immediately frozen, Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from Occidentals. The few non-interned Occidentals were faced with practically no alternative than gradually to sell all their possessions. They were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these communities.

Along with this, the use of Western languages was soon forbidden in public and business communications, and in certain places the speaking of Western languages was prohibited even within the home. Those who spoke a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and subjected to methods employed by that organization.

At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools. During the second period Occidental schools and education remained definitely banned.

In April 1942 a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies was promulgated. This prohibition was enforced by compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts from abroad. In July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial, that persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei, tortured and sometimes tried.

The possession of certain numerous specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

Old monuments, - reminders of former Occidental influence - were carried away, partly destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

In most places, the names of streets and towns were changed into Japanese, or sometimes Malay.

Names of shops, commercial concerns, trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese or Malay.

Since the Kempei-methods were practised not only on the Occidental community, but also upon members of the other communities, all expression of democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies was silenced.

All existing Councils wherein, hitherto, the opinion of various communities could be freely expressed on problems of administration were abolished.

The first to be dissolved was the Peoples' Council, established in 1918, which exercised legislative and budgetary functions.

Next, in Java, the Provincial, Municipal and Regency Councils, which similarly had legislative and budgetary powers, were abolished.

In regions outside Java, too, the various councils which had been established on a democratic basis to give the people an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, were liquidated.

By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 29 April 1942, all existing law courts were abolished, and in their stead Japanese "Law Courts of the Military Government" (Gunsei Hooin) were established. This new judiciary was provisional and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

There was no provision for appeals. The decisions in all pending cases of the lower courts were declared to be deemed to have been affirmed by the Appellate Court.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associations.

The only associations excepted were those concerned with sports and recreation, and scientific, cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activities; they were subjected to police supervision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining permission from the police, and registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the police.

In practice, activities were permitted only those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport League).

From the outset, the Japanese authorities built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

Along with the first troops to land on Java, came the vanguard.

These Japanese propagandists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immediate contact with Indonesian and Chinese politicians, known to be disaffected. With the assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April 1942 the so-called "Tiga A" movement was established. Local committees of Indonesians were set up to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no function other than to carry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

These propagandists immediately seized control of all means of public expression. All public and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic activities as well as the entire Press were immediately placed under their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers were still permitted to be transmitted and to appear in Dutch. As soon as the propaganda machine had been sufficiently organized, all newspapers were forbidden, and in their stead new papers were introduced in the Malay language under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propaganda service. On the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay language daily paper in Java, the "Asia Raya" (Greater Asia) was established, and continued to appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda. At first it was under Japanese direction;

but after the Indonesian staff had proved themselves "matured" the direction was officially handed over to them; but in reality, the direction remained in Japanese hands.

Other places in Java soon followed suit, so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers in Malay were issued in five places in Java.

In addition a Japanese language paper, the Java Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

In her propaganda Japan referred to herself as the "liberator", come to establish a "New Order". It stated, that "New-Java" was to be educated to become a worthy member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

The Japanese instituted a rigid censorship, which not only affected all postal-, telegraphic- and telephonic-communication, but also extended to all photographs given to professional photographers for development.

Furthermore, all public utterances were subject to censorship. This did not alone extend to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to the theater, sermons, etc. Gradually theatrical companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda service.

The publication of books was also subject to censorship, and only works emanating from the propaganda service appeared during the period of occupation. By these methods the Japanese had control of all expressions of public opinion.

During the period now being treated Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun. For instance, the use of Japanese words was immediately introduced for designating official services, offices, etc. and this usage gradually became prevalent during the occupation, so that ultimately the reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely possible without knowledge of the offices, services, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japanese words.

The Japanese authorities introduced the Japanese system of dating years, the Japanese time system and the Japanese budgetary year.

The police wore the Japanese flag for cap badges. Emperor worship - offensive to Mohammedans - was introduced. All public gatherings and meetings began with the obligatory bow in the direction of the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the words: "Tenno Heika - banzai". All Japanese days of celebration were introduced. The display of any flag other than the Japanese was forbidden. On the Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private buildings under strictly prescribed rules.

Portraits of members of the Dutch and Allied Governments were forbidden. These had to be handed over and were burned.

The possession of portraits and other pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no "lese-majesty".

Postage- and revenue- stamps were marked "Dai Nippon", and later new stamps were issued with texts in Malay and Japanese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japanese at once began to establish schools which taught only the Japanese language. When later schools for Indonesians were reopened the curriculum was revised to meet Japanese requirements and important subjects in the new schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs and dances, etc.

In the fields of finance and economics the programs applied in the East Indies were similar despite the fact that some areas were administered by the Army, and some by the Navy.

Java and Sumatra were occupied by different Japanese armies and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Japanese Navy, with practically no contact with each other. Nevertheless the basic principles upon which these regions were administered were entirely similar in reality.

The first Ordinance of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1, introduced Japanese military paper currency with the text in Dutch, reading: "The Japanese Government. One half guilder". Paper money was issued similarly in other denominations. The East Indies guilder was reduced to the value of the yen. At first, the paper money already in circulation was retained; but later, when this old currency had considerably greater value in the open market than the Japanese occupation money, it was withdrawn and its possession constituted a punishable offence. The Japanese paper money revealed differences in the various occupied areas. In Sumatra, which was originally under the same military administration as Malaya, the same text appeared on the same background as in the case of the paper money issued in Java, but in English, whereas in the other regions of the East Indies, and in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

In 1944, new paper money was designed and printed in Batavia, with the text in Japanese and Malay.

This paper money was issued in unlimited quantities without backing, which soon led to inflation, which began early in 1943 and continued to increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth of its original purchasing value.

All banks, both official and non-official, were closed down at once. During the course of 1942 and 1943 the Java Bank (the circulation bank) and private banks were liquidated. The Post Office Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened under Japanese names and under Japanese direction, but the balances due at the time of the closing remained frozen. Later, the cash deposits of Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen while the deposits of Occidentals and internees and prisoners remained frozen, and were transferred to the Japanese established Enemy Property Administration Bureau (Tekisan Kamibu), which

was charged with the "custody" of enemy property. This institution liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and credited in its books the owners thereof, when known, with the proceeds in Japanese paper money.

Later, after May 1945, this liquidation was hastened. In Batavia the Kenpei and its members were frequently the purchasers at so-called public auctions, and the proceeds in Japanese occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the real price for the same article in the same paper money in the open market.

All stocks of Occidental importers, as well as private possessions in the form of movables and claims for payment (when capable of realisation) owned by Occidentals were translated into claims in Japanese paper money on the above-named Tekisan Kanribu. Possession of "enemy property" constituted a punishable offence and the holder was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese. Unsold property was delivered upon request to Japanese officials and individuals, and their proteges.

Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies, big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals, had been invested in agricultural enterprises and industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting sugar-factories, which were organized in the "Java Togyo Rengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This organization had charge of the administration of "enemy" agricultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the control over all other agricultural enterprises including those operated with Indonesian or Chinese capital. Little attention was paid to the interests of owners. This body executed a policy directed towards carrying out a rigorous war effort and to the maintenance of production required by the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enterprises and industries which were of no importance

to the immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched over to other production, or when that was not feasible, were retained if such retention were deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. Tea- and rubber-plantations suffered seriously, because the Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation, gave precedence to foodcrops. Tea-plants and rubbertrees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates being parcelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foodcrops.

A large part of the Western-owned agricultural enterprises was liquidated. The entire sugar industry was allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japanese sugar companies, and was exploited by them under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

Sugar production was reduced considerably and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar-factories was partly scrapped or carried off, when the factories were not switched over to produce other commodities more important for the war effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The possession of immovable property belonging to Occidentals or governmental institutions, was transferred by the Japanese to the "Hudoosan Kanrikoodan" established by them, which handed over the property as required to the Japanese military or civil authorities for business and for personal purposes.

Ownership of immovable property was drastically changed by the Japanese.

The so-called "private estates" were appropriated by the Military Government without the payment of any compensation to the owners, under Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expropriations took place, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtue of an Ordinance No. 11 of the Minseifu (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March

1943.

Public utilities, including those privately owned, were seized by the Military Administration and were operated without compensation, and in some cases were allotted to private Japanese companies.

Private railway, tramway and bus companies were amalgamated with the State Railways. The equipment of private railway companies was for a large part shipped to the Burma Siam railway. Direction of railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sookyoku (Railway Head Office), and all trace of former independent operation by private companies was obliterated. The personnel of these companies was pooled and Japanese rank designations and terminology were introduced.

Private or semi-governmental gas- and power- companies as well as privately owned mining concerns were taken over and operated by either the Military Government or Japanese companies.

The policy of exploitation of natural resources of the East Indies^{was} carried on partly by the Military Administration itself, partly through monopolies granted to certain big Japanese business concerns and partly by Japanese "national policy companies".

The Southern Development Bank (Nanpoo Kaihatu Ginko), an entirely government owned and operated bank had as its chief function the financing of the development and exploitation of natural resources in the Southern Regions and the control of circulation and finance in those areas. This bank was directed by the Ministry for Greater East Asia and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to the Japanese Army.

The Japanese Government also divided up natural resources in the Southern Regions between the various Japanese applicants and allotted each of them part of those areas, usually according to their monopolies.

Domei was granted a news service monopoly although a local agency had started first.

Press monopolies in the Southern Regions were divided among various big Japanese newspaper concerns.

In the field of banking, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to operate in Java, and took over the functions of private Occidental banks.

The liquidation of these banks and the introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts were declared to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apply to the Japanese banks for new credits backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks.

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II. THE SECOND PHASE

August 1942 to July 1943

During the period just discussed the Japanese administrative machinery was relatively simple. The Chief of Staff to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java was concurrently Chief of the Military Government (Gunseikan) and was assisted by a simple "central organ" and by three Army officers each administering his respective area in East, West and Central Java. Administration was carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occupational detachments.

Original plans drawn up in Tokyo, envisaged sending out parties consisting of Japanese experts in colonial administration, technical sciences, and economy, immediately following the occupational troops. It was not, however, until the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

The Military Government, which at first was part and parcel of the Army, was next developed into a separate body.

The gist of its functions was laid down in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he assumed all powers which hitherto had been exercised by the Governor-General. The military administration (Gunsei) was divided into nine Departments under the supervision of the Gunseikan. The Departments were Soomubu (General Affairs), the guiding and policy making body; Naibunbu (Internal Affairs); Zaimubu (Finance); Shooibu (Justice), Keimubu (Police); Kootubu (Public Works); Sangyobu (Economic Affairs); Kaikai Kantokubu (Audition); and Sendenbu (Propaganda).

In addition from time to time a number of Bureaus, and other governmental bodies, without the standing of the Departments but under the Gunseikan and equally independent, were created to handle various matters, such as the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Bureau), the Zoosen Kyoku (Ship-building Bureau), the Tokisen Kanribu (Enemy Property Bureau); the Toogyoo Rengoo Kei (Sugar Producers' Corporation) etc. From time to time some changes were made, which did not affect the system.

The structure of the pre-war Central Administration was changed thoroughly and in its entirety. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a Propaganda Department had formerly existed. Police were under the Internal Affairs Department, while Public Health, Education and Labour (now under Meimubu) were handled by separate Departments or Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious Affairs had been handled by the Education and Religion Department.

The Government Secretariate, the Council of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Departments of general administration, corresponding in name with the new Japanese Departments (e. g. Justice Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

All leading positions in the Departments were occupied by Japanese. According to official Japanese information, on 1 September 1945 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military Government in Java, amounting to half the number of service personnel proper stationed there.

Legislative powers were exercised by the Imperial Government at Tokyo, the Supreme Commander in the Southern Area, the Commander-in-Chief of Java, and the Chief of Military Administration (Gunseiken). The laws and ordinances of the first two bodies were not published locally, although thousands were arrested, tortured and sentenced under them, while those of the two last mentioned organs were published in Java, in the Osemu Ken Po, the official bi-monthly Gazette, printed in Japanese and Malay. Some secret ordinances appeared only in the Japanese edition.

The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not affect the legislative position in any way.

Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942 laid down an entirely new system of local administration. Under this Java was divided into 17 "Syuu", comparable geographically to the former "Residencies" and one "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City Area") comprising Batavia. The four Sultanates in Central-Java were administered by two "Kooti Zimu Kyoku" (Sultanates' Bureaus).

The former "Provinces" of West-, Central- and East-Java were eliminated. In early 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three "Gunseisibu", coinciding geographically with the former Provinces but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

All these local bodies supplanted the former decentralized and autonomous local administration, and were placed directly under the Gunseikanbu in a rigidly centralized system. Local councils were not mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular participation in local administration came to an end.

The Syuu were subdivided into smaller units in accordance with the Japanese pattern. These were given Japanese names such as Ken, Gun, Son, Ku, Si and Siku. During this second period the organic laws governing the functions of administrative bodies under the old system were abolished, and replaced by Japanese regulations, on which the centralized new administration was based.

The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable to the former "Resident") and of other local officials was, on one hand, considerably strengthened, and on the other made far more dependent on the Central Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced. These officials, responsible only to their superiors, had a large measure of liberty in the execution of their duties; they had powers of dismissal and appointment, and almost unrestricted disciplinary powers over their staffs.

They were empowered to issue regulations to implement ordinances promulgated by higher authority and also regulations concerning matters not yet covered by such ordinances. However, they were subject to the authority of their superiors and were responsible to them in all cases. According to statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authorities, the object the Japanese had in mind was to build up an administration which in its final form should be on the same lines as those followed in their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

The four ruling Sultans were maintained, not, as having hereditary title to their positions, but as newly invested Rulers called "Ko" owing allegiance

to the Japanese Army in the same way as all civilian officials did.

All key-positions in the new establishment were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The Kontyoo, however, was, from 1944 onward, assisted by Japanese advisers.

The composition of the Administrative Corps was modified later pursuant to Prime Minister Tojo's promises. However, leading positions remained in the hands of Japanese and if an Indonesian held an important post there was always a Japanese who was the real executive.

It was not until the end of August 1945 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority to their Indonesian colleagues.

According to the biographies of the Japanese officials, published by the propaganda service, this corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and Korea, and some had been engaged in administrative functions in Japan proper.

The establishment of a new administrative system in islands other than Java developed along the same lines.

In the initial stage, Sumatra along with Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army Commander at Singapore, but later Sumatra was placed under a separate Gunseikanbu.

The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Headquarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages by Itagaki, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under the Southern Theater ~~Area~~ commanded by Field Marshal Terauchi.

The Military Administration operated pursuant to both orders issued through the ordinary channels of command and issued directly from the Ministry of War.

In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. While the terminology varied, the system was not substantially different. The same principles of centralized administration were applied and relations between Japanese and Indonesian officials were the same.

Administration in territory under Naval Occupation (Minsei) was executed by the Minseihu (Headquarters) at Macassar (Celebes).

The Minseihu at Macassar was under the command of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th Southern Squadron at Singapore.

Parallel with reorganization of the Administration, the Judicial System was entirely revised. In addition to the Gunsei Kooin (Courts of the Military Administration), set up in the first period to replace the former Courts, there were the Gun Kaigi, a Court Martial proper, to try Japanese service personnel and others subject to Court Martial, and the Gunritu Kaigi, a Court Martial to try violations of the Army Ordinances.

The Gunsei Kooin itself had jurisdiction to try violations of Military Government Ordinances and Regulations, and former Ordinances declared in force by the Military Government. This jurisdiction was shared with the Gunritu Kaigi.

Ordinance No. 14, of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 26 September, 1942, gave the Gunsei Kooin their final form.

Eight types of courts were set up, all bearing Japanese names, and including the Saikoo Kooin (Final Court of Appeal) and the Kootoo Kooin (Intermediary Courts of Appeal), the personnel of both of which at first was entirely Japanese. The lower courts comprised the Police Court, the District Court and other local courts corresponding to the local administrative subdivisions, and two special religious courts, all manned by Indonesians and directly controlled by the Intermediary Courts of Appeal.

To each court a Kensatu-kyoku (prosecution Section) was attached. This system was strongly centralized under the Justice Department. At a later stage it was detached from the Justice Department, and combined with the police force under the Police Department which was renamed Public Security Department (Tianbu).

In criminal courts with Indonesian members a representative of the Kempei attended the sessions, seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku.

In the initial stages the former Penal Code was maintained. Having determined that this criminal law was based on excessively democratic foundations the Japanese introduced a new Penal Code in 1944, in which criminal acts were defined in vague terms, leaving wide scope for interpretation. High minima of punishment were introduced for special offenses.

During the Japanese occupation interference by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in trials by Indonesian courts. In practice it was the Kempei representative, attending criminal sessions, who determined the sentence in criminal cases.

During the session only Japanese and Malay languages were allowed.

Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in Japanese and proper interpretation was seldom available.

In the other islands of the East Indies judicial powers were administered in the same manner. Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts established.

At the outset of the occupation the Japanese authorities took over the Police School at Sukabumi, Java. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, permanent courses for the training of police personnel, led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda courses for personnel already in the service were conducted regularly, in which the ideals of Greater East Asia and Japan's right were taught. A system of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for the settlement of minor infractions was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant offences was seen daily in the streets. A certain section of the Indonesian Police Force adopted the tactics of the Kempei.

A separate Police Department, later the Public Security Department, was established along centralized lines and all executive functions were taken over by the Japanese.

The existing Force was felt to be insufficient by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy this situation were attempted.

The Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of the Kempei, trained by Kempei personnel in Kempei methods, was organized. It was both feared and hated by the people.

In April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Village Guards) was organized as an auxiliary police force in all villages and municipalities. This reinforced the regular police by approximately 1,300,000.

The Keiboodan had a variety of duties. It had to go into action in case of fire or other calamities, it had to assist the regular police in apprehensions of crashed allied air crews, paratroopers and others, did 24-hour guard duties in its area, turned out in force during public propaganda meetings etc. Its main duty consisted of spying, chiefly in a general campaign against enemy spies.

In 1945, these Keiboodan were used to train the population in guerilla action, such as cutting lines of communication, destruction of small enemy detachments, etc., with wholly inadequate weapons such as bamboospears. This training taught the simple farmer fear of foreigners and hate for Occidentals and led to barbarous display of cruelty to those foreigners.

A third force auxiliary to the police, was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai, which operated only in towns and served the same purposes as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruited chiefly from among the Chinese.

The Kempei-Hoo was part of the Kempei, while both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai although Japanese-led, and trained, formed no part of the official Army organization. The members of the two latter were "volunteers", if the required numbers were not filled, the remainder were drafted.

The prison system was similarly reorganized under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for the training of newly recruited personnel as well as for the "improvement" of personnel with previous service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings were introduced. The treatment of prisoners was inhumane.

The Military Government proceeded to lay down a revised educational program with a view to reopening schools for Indonesians.

Elementary education in the People's Schools was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language, songs and dances, and the Japanese type of physical training was introduced. Instruction in reading and mathematics, was substantially reduced and the remainder of the curriculum abolished.

The several types of intermediate schools, with their varied curricula, were abolished to make place for one standard type of intermediate school with a uniform curriculum. This school was divided into a First and a Higher School. The curriculum was very much simplified with foreign languages and general history dropped to make place for Japanese language and history. Textbooks on the history of the islands were burned and a new textbook was introduced, which emphasized racial affinities and ties of common destiny with Japan.

An entirely new subject was the "Seisin" (Spirit), which taught Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere ideals to the younger generation, such as the Spirit should be able to overcome all material obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo spears if necessary.

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

Batavia Medical College was reopened on 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", under the name of Ika Daicaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, brought from Japan, who lectured in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

The students pledged themselves to enter the Japanese Military Government service after graduation. Students were billeted and were subject to a strict and semi-military regimentation under specially appointed Japanese, who instructed them in the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperty Sphere.

The curriculum of the Medical College was reduced from six to four years.

The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a limited program covering three years was opened. Students were subjected to the same routine.

Law College was supplanted by one year courses for the training of civilian officials and lawyers. Much time was spent on instruction in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ideals and the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of students was in force. Instruction in the Japanese Language played an important part.

Private education remained taboo for a long time. In 1943 and 1944, certain former private schools for Indonesians and for Chinese were allowed to reorganize but the curriculum had to conform to the official program.

Western teaching and education to Occidentals were prohibited throughout the occupation. This prohibition was strictly enforced, and the mere suspicion of having taught Occidentals was sufficient to involve the suspect with the *Kempai*.

Considerable numbers of Indonesian College students as well as graduates and prominent personalities from the Indonesian community were sent to Japan. A party of journalists from all the islands were taken to Japan to attend the Greater East Asia Journalists' Conference.

All sections of society were organized into corporations along fascist lines.

The organization and political coordination of society was carried out among all racial and political groups as well as among practically all professions and trades, practically all economic sections of society, all cultural groups, all religious groups, the younger generation, sports organizations, and women's movements. The Japanese authorities kept a close grip on a particular social group through these organizations and used them to command aid and support from its members for the Army or the Military Government. The corporations were required regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings. They were utilized for disseminating propaganda among the members. The Japanese used these corporations to keep abreast of public opinion and to conduct espionage.

The Propaganda Department maintained close relations with these organizations. Addresses by Indonesian officials in these organizations were not only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by the Propaganda

Department. These corporations were under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu. The various corporations, all serving uniform purposes and all modeled on the same lines, were instituted by Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same for practically all corporations, and stated that the corporate objective was support to the Japanese Military Government.

The executives in these corporations were appointed by the Japanese authorities; Branch executives were responsible to the central executive; Both were assisted by advisory councils appointed by, or with approval of the Japanese authorities.

The executive body within a corporation was authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its members and membership was obligatory for all within a given group.

A typical example is provided by the organization of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the Java Izi Hookokai (Corporation for the Public Service by Medical men in Java), established by Ordinance No. 28, of the Commander in Chief in Java, dated 3 August 1943, which provided inter alia:

"Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookokai is established with the purpose of coordinating those engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise their capability in curing, and the care for sanitation, so that in this way they can give their contribution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical affairs.

"Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medical experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals, must become a member of the Izi Hookokai, except enemy nationals.

"Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned in Article 7, the Izi Hookokai carries out special work necessary for conducting the Military Government at the order of the Gunseikan.

"Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookokai can issue orders and instructions necessary for carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 to the members after obtaining

approval from the Gunsoikan.

"Article 21.: The Izi Hookookai is supervised by the Gunsoikan.
The work of the branch officers is supervised by
the Syuutyookan (Japanese Local Governor)."

The lawyers, newspapermen, and most, if not all, other professions were similarly organized into single corporations.

In all fields of economic activity there was the same picture of obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and Japanese executives.

All artists and scholars were organized in the Keimin Bunka Sidosya.

The importance of a truly Oriental artistic expression was emphasized and Occidental influences were considered inimical. Paintings and other artistic expressions were to be and were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This organization, established in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as the other corporations: Japanese executives, obligatory support to the Army and the Military Government, etc.

The Japanese attached much importance to the spiritual moulding of youth and they took the matter into their own hands completely. The Indonesian Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized, was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training of the younger generation to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer was not considered good enough. The matter of guidance and training of youth was kept an exclusively Japanese concern. The organ of control was established by the creation in April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims were laid down as follows:

"In order to convince the youth of Java so that they will energetically cooperate with the Military Government and render assistance in the building up of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia, it is necessary that they be given guidance and training."

In every Syuu a Japanese Training Centre for local instructors was established, and a Central Training Camp was opened near Batavia, all under the direction of Japanese.

Later, a Seinendan was organized in every Ken and Si, each approximately at battalion strength. Some factories had their own Seinendan. These were organized into the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and commanded by Japanese officers of the Army and the Military Government.

Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and those were tested as to their enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The official training comprised instruction in the Japanese language oral and written, spiritual and military training, Japanese physical training, air raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc.

The manpower for the Boeki Giyu Gun (Defence Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September 1943, largely came from the youth corps. Soon after its establishment all other youth organizations were prohibited.

Sports were also brought in line. On 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized. The Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other corporations. In the official explanation of the applicable Ordinance it said: "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java, from office-employees to school-children, and also that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering how important sports is for our spiritual and corporal training, for learning and developing discipline, and for strengthening the spirit and the determination to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to the War of Greater East Asia."

In every Ken and Si a branch was established; these branches were organized in their respective Syuu and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa Iku Kai.

The Indonesian women of Java were organized in the Kuzin Kai, founded in August 1943.

Its objects and duties were laid down as follows:

"The purpose of this organization is to help the Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position of the women of the original inhabitants and also to raise the women's virtue.

In order to assist in the conduct of the Military Government, the Zigyotu (Working Section), is created within the Hujin Kai; this body has to carry out work necessary for the improvement of conditions behind the front-line and in the field of savings, education, public safety and public health.

In order to deepen the conviction of women in their duties towards the efforts of the defence of the country in wartime, in the first place to give instruction in first aid the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish a close contact with the Seinondan and Heiboodan in conducting exercises so that in future when there is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as possible."

Developments in the other islands, were roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with a lower standard of efficiency among their own Japanese personnel, and at the same time less dependent on the cooperation of the local population than they were in Java, their chief granary and supply base, they tackled the process of political coordination more sketchily.

III. THE THIRD PHASE

From July 1943 until September 1944.

As early as in the first period, there was some activity by Japanese authorities in the political field, but the policy adopted locally was characterized by the Naval Liaison Officer at Batavia as a policy of "wait and see."

Immediately after the occupation a prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March 1942, which read as follows:

"Until further notice it shall be strictly prohibited to commit the following acts:

"a. participation in any organization; attending any meetings; conducting propaganda in favour of the enemy; the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss, engage in activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning the organization and structure of the Government."

By virtue of these prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by the Kempei in April 1942, some of whom were only released much later.

In December 1942 to January 1943 a large scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activities of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not released until September 1945. Even after January 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very large number of victims.

In 1942 the Japanese initiated the "AAA" Movement. This name was announced on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Protector of Asia)

Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of Asia)

Nippon Chahaya Asia (Japan the Light of Asia)

The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more striking colour than the other letters. The themes which this movement elaborated were "Asia for

the Asiatics" and hate against "foreigners belonging to the white race" and against the "Western exploiters". The Japanese, on the contrary, were stated to be of the same race and stock as the Indonesians. The language "the Indonesian people who have the same ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese," appeared in Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7 March 1942. Western influence was represented as being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples, and the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under the "paternal" leadership of Japan was represented as liberating the Asiatic peoples. Apart from the slogan "New Java" or "a New Order in Java", the meaning to Java of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was not defined. Use of the word "Indonesia" in a political sense was not permitted. In most official publications the Indonesians were referred to as "the original inhabitants."

While the AAM Movement was in full swing, further contact was sought with the Indonesian world, and especially with those who were dissatisfied with the former rule and the rate at which that rule prepared for independence.

Chief among these was Sukarno, who was brought to Java by the Kempei in July 1942, and who formed the so-called "Empat Serangkai" (four-leaved clover) with three other nationalists. These became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of those nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with Japan. The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese promises a means of attaining the early independence for which they were striving. They believed in these promises and advocated complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Government.

The Japanese also sought to approach the group of Indonesian intellectuals who were not discontented with the former rule and had held high office thereunder. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukan Seido Tyoosa Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems): "in order to survey and study the customs and the former governmental systems of the country, and to contribute towards the Administration of Java." Nine Japanese including the chairman

and ten Indonesians, including the "Four-leaved Clover" and certain former Chiefs of Departments, former professors and members of the former People's Council, sat on this Committee. It never played an important role and was abolished by the Japanese in November 1943.

The first request to the Japanese authorities made by the "Four Serangkai" was to be allowed to form a party. This request was considered until 8 December 1942, when at the commemoration of Pearl Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia, and the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that a single party for Indonesians only would be permitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to wait for a decision from Tokyo.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Movement was created, deriving its name from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rakyat" denoting "Center of the People's Spiritual Power," while "Putera" means "knight's son."

Its aims and policy were approximately similar to those of the previously discussed corporations, except that the name of this people's movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera was not a party, but only a "movement" with leaders and advisory councils.

The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and were assisted by the advisory council in which there were approximately equal numbers of Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan. Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with Japanese approval.

The organization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-Chief, and its aims were officially described by the Japanese as follows:

"The object in arousing the strength and efforts of the people is
"no other than to support all measures for winning final victory in
"the Greater East Asia War. Since the work of this Movement is very
"closely linked with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Govern-
"ment, all leaders must bear in mind that they should have a
"profound knowledge of, and faith in, the aims and objectives
"of the Dai Nippon Army."

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In this address the Putera leaders were further urged:

"Do your utmost always to be fully aware of the existing limitations
"in the present situation, and never lead the common people astray.
"I hope you will do your best to fulfill the aims and objectives
"of this Movement, and that you will cooperate in the establish-
"ment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia and build
"a New Java to be a member in the family of nations within the
"Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia."

The functions of the Putera were officially set out in the following ten points:

1. To impress upon the Indonesian population their duties and responsibilities in regard to the establishment of a "New Java."
2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
3. To participate in the defence of Greater East Asia.
4. To foster self-discipline in bearing all mental and physical privations necessary for winning ultimate victory.
5. To deepen mutual understanding between the Japanese and Indonesians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japanese language.
7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

The Putera was only for Indonesians. The new social hierarchy introduced by the Japanese comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the "original inhabitants", were treated as a privileged category, while groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, with the Europeans and Eurasians receiving the worst treatment.

About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on travel by so-called "foreigners" were strengthened. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. "Forbidden zones" were introduced, covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern and Western extremities of Java, where no "foreigners" were allowed to enter and for which even Indonesians needed a pass.

The first great enthusiasm for the Putera dwindled when it became apparent that the activities of this body, to which the population had looked forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda service. There was great disappointment when the originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead their own youth movement.

Meanwhile, outside the East Indies great changes had taken place. Japan had been forced from an offensive into a defensive position and lines of communication were seriously threatened.

Against this background, on 16 June 1943, Prime Minister Tojo made a speech in the Diet wherein, inter alia, he stated that in view of the fact that the people of Java had shown their readiness to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration, they should be given participation in the ^{government,} / On this occasion Tojo also promised so-called independence to Burma and to the Philippines.

In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person.

Enroute to Java, Tojo called at Manila and Singapore, repeating the promise of "independence" for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no "independence" was promised, but only participation in the government. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

Following this promise, in August 1943, an Indonesian was appointed Chief of the Syuumubu (Department of Religious Affairs), but actual control remained in the hands of Japanese section heads; and two others were appointed Syutyoo (Chief of a Residency) in the two smallest Residencies of

Java, with actual power in the hands of the Japanese Vice-Chief. Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially appointed to lower positions, which they had held before, and were incorporated into the Japanese Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding Japanese rank.

The "San-yo Seido" (Adviser System) was introduced, and Indonesians were nominated to be adviser to seven Departments. The San-yo only acted when questions were referred to him for advice.

In all Residencies and also in the Special Municipality of Batavia an advisory body, the Sangi Kai, was established to advise the Resident in matters of local government, by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the numbers of members of each Sangi Kai to be appointed and elected, respectively. The "elections" were indirect with nomination of the candidates not public and the ballot not secret. The function of the Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local government put to it by the Syuutyoo with the right to make suggestions on the referred subject. It could only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and sittings were opened and closed on his orders. Officials of the Syuutyoo office could attend and participate.

The sessions were only public for the opening address, which was drafted and censored beforehand, and for the closing session. The sessions proper were held behind closed doors. At the final session motions, discussed and settled during the closed meetings, were put to a mock vote and always passed unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo. Every Sangi Kai sent representatives to the Tyuuo Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

This was established on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the Military Government." Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief. Of the remainder, eighteen were "elected" by the various Sangi Kai, and two were nominated by the Sultanates. The procedure was the same as that of the local Sangi Kai. They were only empowered to offer advice in respect to questions put by the Commander-in-Chief

or the Resident, and to make suggestions relating thereto.

The actual direction of affairs rested with the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuuo Sangi-In Zimu Kyoku Tyoo, who was a Japanese, as were also the other officials of his office. The function of this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing correspondence as well as to exercise internal supervision over the activities of the Tyuuo Sangi-In. The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and the first Head was the then private secretary of Prime Minister Tojo.

Similarly, the Secretary of the local Advisory Council was always a Japanese from the Syuutyoo's office. From the very beginning these organizations were used as an instrument of Japanese propaganda to recruit labour and "Volunteers" for the military organizations and to encourage the population to increase agricultural output and to deliver the crops to the Military Government.

As a further local participation measure wider administrative powers were given to the Sultans of Central-Java in elementary education, local government at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

Almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Central Advisory Council, as was later officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese Military Administration took the view that the Indonesian population of Java ought to give concrete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister Tojo's promise now that it had been translated into fact, and that it was their duty to demonstrate their preparedness to support the Japanese Military Administration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

The Propaganda service ensured that it should appear to the outside world that the inhabitants themselves were desirous of having their own army.

At the end of August 1943, an old friend of Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed "with his own blood," to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permission to set up a Volunteers' Corps as the first of a large series of such requests. The Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that he considered, moreover, that the population of Java was very rightly desirous

of offering some return for Tojo's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943, he instituted the Kyodo Booei Giyu Gun (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland). The aim of the Corps was "to call upon the original inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence of Greater East Asia."

Art. 4 laid down:

"The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of defending the homeland, and it is its duty to partake in the defence of the home country in the respective Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the Dai Nippon Army."

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form part of the Japanese Army and would have its own officers, but it would be trained by Japanese instructors. It would not be used outside Java and would consist of volunteers.

Recruiting for the first levy started immediately, but with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many "volunteers" were required in order to bring formations up to strength. One of the chief activities of Japanese propaganda was to encourage enlistment in this corps. In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started and lasted three months,

The object was to form one or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu. At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. Weapons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills, and training mostly took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a special section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army, an intelligence organization, was charged with training, and at the same time made use of it both for spying upon the new volunteers as well as using them as spies.

Prior to this, the Japanese had made use of Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the occupation many Indonesian soldiers were partly recruited and partly compelled to serve as a "Heiho" (auxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the Japanese Army and were issued a Japanese uniform. They were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and to guard camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho were sent off the island.

The Japanese Navy similarly made use of Indonesian Heiho.

Both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho were taught to speak Japanese. Commands were issued in Japanese, and the regulations were written in Japanese. They wore Japanese insignia. An important part of the training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit).

One of the important aims of Japanese propaganda was the increase of farming crops and their delivery to the Japanese Military Administration. The island of Java had to provide large quantities of food for the Japanese occupation troops and troops fighting in the East. Besides the Japanese army of occupation was laying up large stocks of supplies. Java, which before the war had barely been able to meet the essential food requirements of its own population, was expected to produce more. This increase in production was obstructed by the lack of proper supervision over irrigation works, due to the replacement of interned Dutch experts by insufficiently trained Japanese, and by haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the pursuance of their ends in forcing the production of desired agricultural commodities unsuitable to the climate and geographic conditions. All this further reduced the area available for food crops.

It became less and less advantageous for the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Japanese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Government to stabilize the price of rice at a proper level. As the Japanese military guilder decreased in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fell far below its former value relative to other commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with the proceeds of his rice became virtually unobtainable.

The Japanese authorities ordered that 60% of the harvest of food produce had to be delivered to them. They took far-reaching measures to combat the black market in rice and other food products, such as the imposing of closed regional economic areas, enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing of rice - except for individual consumption - in other than "coordinated" mills was prohibited.

The propaganda service exerted all its powers to persuade the farmers to cultivate wider areas in order to obtain more produce. It also tried to persuade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the Japanese Military Administration.

Not only in Java, but throughout the Southern Regions, Japan used labour everywhere, for the building of military fortifications, airfields, strategic railways, etc. Java was a source for such labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propaganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlistment of these coolies. In this at first the Japanese were successful. When the inhabitants learned how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their desire to work for them practically disappeared. This became worse when the coolies sent out of Java did not return, and no news whatever was received from them.

The Japanese thereafter adopted conscription, whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself, and for labour outside that island.

In 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had to be greatly appreciated. The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these was that the houses of relatives left behind were provided with a sign "Prajurit Pekerja", and it was pointed out to the public that one should honour such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee special protection. Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed certain privileges in the distribution of scarce commodities, such

as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all government officials had received their share.

These labourers received less care than the prisoners of war and internees, and their condition was aggravated by their ignorance of hygienic precautions and medical care. While the correct figures of those who were transported outside Java as Romushas are not known, the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation indicate a figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since the war's end. Most of the returnees suffered inhumane maltreatment. Accommodation, food, medical care were not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent altogether. During certain periods, "romushas" who had died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

In religious matters the propaganda service made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from the population.

These activities were especially directed at influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large majority of the population, while propaganda among other religions was of far less importance. Priests and preachers of an "enemy race" were forbidden to conduct services except for people of an "enemy race". If an "enemy" priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among the congregation he was to see to it that the latter left on penalty of very severe punishment.

From the very outset the Japanese made an effort to establish one organization for the Islamites to convey the Japanese aims to the people and to induce a maximum war effort through voluntary cooperation. Several attempts in that direction by the Japanese failed at first because of discord in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles. In November 1943 the Japanese succeeded in uniting the Moslem unions into one mother organization, the "Mashumi" (abbreviation for "Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia" - Consultative Council of Indonesian Islamites).

This coordinated the Mohammedan intellectuals. In addition there was a large number of Oelamas (expounders of the Koran) and Kiais (teachers on religious matters), not closely connected with Islamic intellectuals, but who exercised a considerable influence in the villages.

From the very beginning the Syuumubu tried to obtain influence amongst the population through these kiais and oelamas. As far back as July 1942 the then Japanese Head of the Syuumubu began to travel about Java and held meetings in each Syuu (Residency) for about 500 or 600 kiais and oelamas who had been ordered to attend by the local administration in each place. He spoke on Japanese views and aims in the usual vein and then tried to sound the opinion of his audience. He was assisted by five Japanese in Arabian dress bearing the title of Hadji in combination with Arabian and their own Japanese names. Following this tour there was a great meeting of representatives of all scholars and teachers on religion from all residencies at Batavia on 7 December 1942. The Gunseikan made a speech in which the Japanese policy in regard to the Islamites in Java was explained.

This policy embodied three principles. First, the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be respected.

For the second point the Gunseikan declared that religious associations would soon be authorized to carry on their activities and that they had the noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East Asia and the support of the Military Administration.

For the third point, the Gunseikan declared that the cooperation of the Islamic community in respect to education was acceptable in so far as it was directed at full support to the Japanese Army and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious education would be permitted and officially supported with books and other facilities.

The Syuumubu established a permanent training centre in Batavia where courses lasting three weeks in Japanese ideology were given to groups of sixty kiais and oelamas each.

These courses were also used to test whether Japanese propaganda had any effect, and afforded a means of selecting suitable collaborators. These accomplices carried the propaganda to the simple rural population, and were responsible for the production and delivery of sufficient rice for a sufficient supply of labourers and for enlistments as "volunteer" or heiho.

The Japanese adopted the old device of working on the fanaticism of Islamites, and they tried to persuade the kiais and oelamas to declare the Greater East Asia War as a "sabil" (holy) war against the kafir (unbeliever). When the point that the Japanese were themselves unbelievers was raised, the "common ancestry," the "common race" and the "destiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians" were pointed out.

In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) responsible, and he was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular kiais of Java. He accepted this post and spent one day in Batavia, but immediately returned to his religious institution, leaving the direction of the Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

From November 1943 the Mashumi became the organization through which the Japanese authorities ruled the Islamic intellectual world, and through it carried on propaganda for Japanese ideals, sounded public opinion and executed espionage.

The relationship between the Mashumi and the Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last the Mashumi was for all purposes directed by the Syuumubu.

Besides this the Japanese established Syuumuka (Religious Affairs Sections) in every Syuu under locally prominent kiais. They had the duty of making Military Administration policy understood in the villages. These agencies were gradually extended even to the smallest local subdivisions under a local kiai.

The Syuumubu issued a publication called "Asshu'lah," edited in Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, but printed in Arab script, the only script the orthodox kiais could read. This periodical was distributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

The Japanese also made several efforts to coordinate the Chinese who although comparatively few in number, were the mainstay of the middle class. The Japanese first tried to induce leading officials of the many Chinese associations (which had all been dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization, but the effort completely failed.

The Japanese decided in August 1943 to establish the Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few prominent pro-Nanking Chinese.

The Kakyoo Sookai was organized along the customary lines, with its leaders appointed by the Japanese authorities, and close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration as the prime object. No action was taken on their own initiative and the organization was used to disseminate Japanese propaganda and as an espionage organization.

At the same time the Japanese made certain concessions, such as permission for limited Chinese private school education, and for sending small remittances to their families in Japanese-occupied parts of China. This latter permission was not kept.

The Eurasians, who occupied mainly the middle strata of technical and administrative occupations, were at first ostracized. Japanese replaced them in the higher ranks, but not nearly enough were available for the more numerous intermediate ranks, and trained Indonesians were insufficient in numbers.

The first effort to secure the cooperation of the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. The Eurasians who had been regarded as "aliens," gradually began to be treated as belonging to the indigenous population next to the Indonesian group. The Japanese stipulated, however, that the Eurasians had to realize that from then on they were to feel and act as members of the Greater East Asia community under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce their Western ancestry.

The Japanese promised the Eurasians to admit a number of their children to village schools which had so far been reserved for Indonesian children. Separate schools for Eurasian children remained forbidden.

In the beginning of 1944 the Japanese decided to dissolve the Futera and to replace it by an organization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

According to the Japanese it had failed to reach the simple villager, who comprised about 80% of the total population of Java and supplied the manpower for army and labor services and the production of food crops for the Japanese. The movement became too strongly nationalistic.

The new organization followed a pattern used in Japan and combined the propaganda machinery with the organization for the distribution of essential supplies. Starting in January 1944, the whole of Java was divided into small communities of about 20 houses each, called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Associations). These Tonari Gumi were organized on centralized lines. They were headed by a kamityoo, who was appointed from above and who was responsible for the execution of the orders given to him. All existing associations, social, fire precautionary, agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

The duties of this institution were very extensive. Not only distribution, but also regular training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the community had to lecture at least once a week to his people on Japanese ideology and the practical application thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims in regard to the population were extolled according to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service. This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene.

Other meetings were held for larger units (called *aza*; a village was divided into two or more *aza*) once a month. One member of each family had to attend these meetings.

All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi, including non-interned Eurasians, had to be members of the organization. Only membership gave distribution facilities.

On March 9, 1944, when the Tonari Gumi were working satisfactorily, the Putera was officially dissolved and the "Jawa Hookoo Kai" (Corporation for Communal Services in Java), comprising all Asiatic groups was officially installed. This corporation remained as the instrument of Japanese control until August 31, 1945, when it was dissolved.

According to the official explanation accompanying the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding it, the Jawa Hookoo Kai was set up as an organ of the Military Administration to carry out its instructions in an atmosphere of "friendly cooperation" with all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to see that these instructions reached all the people and it was to work in close relationship with the Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for

seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive support of the Military Administration. According to this explanation the Jawa Hookoo Kai was in fact an executive body, based on the principle of complete coordination of all inhabitants and was, therefore, an organization of the entire populace.

The central direction of the Jawa Hookoo Kai was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and consisted of Japanese exclusively. The Executive Bureau under the supervision of the central direction had several Indonesians. Branches were established in all localities. The Ku Hookoo Kai, the smallest union, supervised one or more *aza* which in turn supervised a number of Tonari Gumi.

The leader of these local Hookoo Kai was the head of the local administration, assisted by a council (*Kaigi*), appointed by him. A session of the *Kaigi* had to be held at least every six months, when ways and means of promoting assistance to the Military Government had to be discussed.

The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the Jawa Hookoo Kai. Their task was:

- a. active support to police and *Keibodan* (village guards) in the defence of their country and during air raids, against enemy parachutists, enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.
- b. to make the inhabitants understand the aims of laws, regulations, etc., of the Military Administration.
- c. stimulation of increased food production; encouragement of delivery of these products to the authorities; the distribution of daily necessities.
- d. general support to the Military Administration, e.g., by protecting members of families of *Heiho* (auxiliary troops), volunteers and *romushas* (coolies) who had left their villages.
- e. mutual help and assistance.

The Jawa Hookoo Kai absorbed all organizations pursuing similar aims, regardless of nationality, including the Japanese. The *Huzin Kai* (Women's Corporation), the *Mashumi* (the Islamic Corporation), the *Kakyoo Sookai* (Corporation of Chinese), the *Tai Tku Kai* (Sports Corporation), the *Keimin Bunka Sidosya* (Cultural Corporation), etc., mentioned before, were all incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

The activities by the Eurasians for their mutual support brought on systematic prosecution by the Kempei-tai. Dozens of their leaders died in prison during the occupation as a result of ill-treatment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or sentences by courts martial.

Anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured in such a way that false confessions were a daily occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh victims within the clutches of the Kempei-tai. A typical example of this happened in 1944 in Pontianak on the west coast of Borneo, where more than 1200 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the local nobility, were executed on an entirely unfounded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kempei. Greatest care had to be taken in speaking since spies were around everywhere. There are hundreds of cases where people of all races were most cruelly tortured on the strength of reports of a usually entirely innocent conversation, by means of the "water-cure", electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa constrictors, etc.

Outside Java the same policy was adhered to in regard to political and religious activities. Here again, following Tojo's promise, a number of prominent cooperative Indonesians were appointed to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to the Sangi kai (local Advisory Councils) were established but this process was considerably slower than in Java. Territories administered by the Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes, Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuko Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuko Sangi-In for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in February 1945. No organization similar to the Putera was permitted in spite of requests from Indonesian intellectuals.

Compared with Java, propaganda in the other islands was more concentrated on the younger generation.

"Volunteers Corps" similar to the Giyu Gun were established.

The four basic aims of Japanese propaganda were given full play during the course of 1944. Using the slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" and teaching

religious hatred, the Japanese worked upon all sections of society by holding courses of instruction. The first group to be dealt with was that of school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads of villages, minor officials of the civil service, higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and personnel of all government offices. Even the smallest group was given attention in turn.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation. There was a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.

DOC. NO. 2750

IV. FOURTH PHASE

September 1944 - August 1945.

The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile had considerably changed. The break-through at Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very foundations of the Japanese defense. The TOJO cabinet was succeeded by the KOISO cabinet, which recognized that it had to face the isolation of the Southern Regions, and the necessity for the Japanese troops there to stand by themselves, and that it was more and more important to gain popular cooperation.

When the way in which TOJO's promise was going to be realized became known in August 1943, disappointment was expressed rather clearly among those prominent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in Japan's promises. The Japanese were warned that they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspirations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain the full cooperation from this group.

On 7 September 1944, in the Diet, Prime Minister KOISO, after having promised Korea and Formosa equality of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, made a promise of independence for the East Indies. (Exhibit No. 277).

In this speech it was not made clear exactly what region would gain independence when granted.

The promise of independence was conditioned on the people defending their own territory for the support of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence was only defined by reference to membership in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.

Previously, towards the end of August 1944, the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed confidentially of the contents of this statement, and issued certain secret orders to various Japanese organizations. Those orders, Prosecution documents Nos. 2756 and 2757, were recovered in the building, used by the Gunsōikanbu during the Japanese occupation of Batavi

Doc. No. 2750

The promise made on 7 September 1944 by Premier Koiso was announced in Java by the Commander-in-Chief in the following words:

"As for the nation that will be set up in the future, it will be a just and true nation that will become a link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere and has the duty to contribute in the development of Greater East Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon.

"Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise the standard of the nation that will be set up so that it will become one of the Greater East Asiatic nations in the true sense, then it is very necessary that they train themselves ceaselessly to become a Greater East Asiatic people until the final victory is achieved, i.e., by thoroughly convincing themselves as a Greater East Asiatic people.

"Suppose the final victory will not be won, then the construction of Greater East Asia can not be materialized, and as a matter of course, the East Indies will not get their independence.

"Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all their efforts to win the final victory in a sphere of perfect friendship between all nationalities.

"They must patiently endure all hardships and they also must remove all obstacles that might come up in the future.

"And therefore, while waiting for the arrival of the moment of that glorious independence, all the inhabitants must work hard for the continuance of this war. With such an attitude the duties for the future can be fulfilled."

The "gratitude" of the Indonesians for Koiso's promise remained the theme on which the Japanese propaganda continued to play for months to come.

Doc. No. 2750

At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters were instructed to advise the Ministry of War as to what area should be declared "independent" the date on which it was to take place, and the form of the new government and state.

The Military Government of Java in reply submitted a report entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence", in which it was proposed to make Java independent first. Measures suggested to strengthen the national consciousness were the creation of the Ken Kok'u Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State), and increased participation in the administration.

Only two practical steps were taken at first to carry out Koiso's promise. On 8 September 1944 the population was allowed henceforward to fly the Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag but only on certain specified holidays, subject to strict regulations as to place and size. On Government buildings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was to be flown. On that same date permission was given to sing the "Indonesia Raya"-song (Song of Great Indonesia) as the national anthem.

On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief convoked a special session of the Tyuwoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the question of how the Indonesians could show to Japan and her army their intense gratitude for the promise of future independence, and how the will of the people "to fight to bring about the destruction of America and England could still further be enhanced."

Another extraordinary session of the Tyuwoo Sangi-In was held on 17 November 1944, and a motion was adopted to lay down a so-called "Pancha Dharma" (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a "compass" for the Indonesian population.

This "Pancha Dharma" reads as follows:

"For the Indonesian people, to wit:

- "1. We, along with other nations in Greater East Asia, are in this war one in life and death with Dai Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all sincerity because this present war stands up for justice and righteousness.

2. We found an Indonesian State that is independent, unified, sovereign, just, and prosperous and that always will value the spiritual merits of Dai-Nippon, and that will live as a true member in the family-sphere of Greater East Asia.
3. We will sincerely endeavour to achieve a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's culture.
4. While maintaining strong and lasting friendly relations with the nations of Greater East Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart and with an unwavering mind while we will always believe in God Almighty.
5. With a united and burning desire we strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting World Peace based on the family-conception of the whole mankind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu."

On 1 December 1944 participation in the Administration was extended to the appointment of Indonesian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vice Governors) in several Syuu, and of more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisers) to the various Departments of the Gunseikanbu. A Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established to meet regularly to advise the Gunseikanbu in the periods when the Tyuuso Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was not in session.

Meanwhile the propoganda service had introduced a new slogan for the "Benteng Forjuangan Jawa" (Java One Fortress). The object was to bring the population to the maximum war effort in view of the threat of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air Raid Defence and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine but besides, the population was worked upon by the powerful propoganda machinery and trained in guerilla fighting. They were instructed in the methods of destroying small enemy formations with primitive weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass action:

During a propaganda meeting in Batavia offices of Roosevelt, Churchill and Van der Plas (a prominent Dutch administrator) were burned after having been paraded through the whole town. American, British, and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration. Religious propaganda urged the Mohammedans to declare Holy War on the Occidental Powers.

Three new semi-military organizations were established during this period, and the Tonari Gumi, finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboodanin the defence of the village. On no occasion were these simple villagers ever told that such action on their part in war time would constitute a violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the opposing party to treat them as 'franc-tireurs'.

This training had an unintended result. One night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer Defence Corps at Blitar (East-Java) made a surprise attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured the arms as well as key-points in the town, e.g., Kompei HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, etc. Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued, the victims being all non-Indonesians and included Japanese. In the course of the next days the movement was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out by violence and bloodshed.

There was also increasing resistance against Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially against the delivery of agricultural produce and the recruiting of native labor.

In order to overcome this resistance, strong measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian officials who were held responsible for the poor results in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substituted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamite politicians. These new officials had come to the fore through the Java Hookoo Kai, or through the religious courses. The new arrivals in the Indonesian administrative corps were not fully competent, and they always had Japanese advisers. Approximately one-third of the corps was staffed with nationalists favourably disposed towards the Japanese. Required delivery of foodstuff and recruitment of coolies and volunteers were not achieved by many Ken.

The Japanese realized that they were increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the people and that they would have to bear the consequences of their own propaganda.

In September 1942 already, Count Hideo Kodama, then adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of Java visited Tokyo to try to arouse interest in local views concerning the East Indies. In November 1943 Sukarno was sent to Japan and pressed Premier Tojo to grant independence, but obtained no definite answer. At the end of 1944, Hayashi, the then highest civil adviser to the Java Military Government went to Tokyo with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief in Java to try and persuade Japan to support puppet-independence for the East Indies.

A Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the Building of the State) was instituted on 29 April 1945 with the object of influencing the minds of the future "leaders" of the "independent" state and of imbuing them with ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this leadership.

Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945, a conference took place at Singapore, attended by Chiefs of General Affairs Departments of all areas under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising Java and Sumatra and commanded by Itagaki. At this conference the Soemabutyoo of Java explained to what extent the national consciousness of the Indonesians had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact that there was no other way to regain the confidence of the population but by carrying out the promise of independence.

Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Headquarters on "independence." Java promptly responded with a proposition to declare the whole of the Netherlands East Indies independent within a year. Singapore dodged the issue and said that it was not yet time to initiate independence.

Subsequently, on 20 May 1945, at the instigation of Itagaki, a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed to convene a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This committee was installed on 28 May 1945,

and took a solemn oath of loyalty to live and to die with Japan.

"Naval" territories (Borneo, the Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented at this conference, and measures discussed only related to "Army" areas which narrowed down to Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged behind that of Java, and it was not until February 1945 that a Central Advisory Council for Sumatra was installed.

The Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence consisted of approximately 60 members, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. A Japanese was Deputy Chairman, and seven others were "special members". The Committee had an Administrative Bureau with a Japanese Deputy Chief.

The Ordinance founding this Committee required that its findings had to be reported to the Gunseikan. Later, a new "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" would be formed. It was clearly stipulated that the "Committee for Study" was to confine itself to study and was not empowered to make any decision.

The Committee met twice, from 29 May to 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings were not open to the public. Among other things, a constitution resembling that of the Philippine puppet-state was drafted.

There was disappointment when it was learned that the Committee had no power to make decisions and had to restrict itself to Java.

On 17 July 1945, the Supreme War Direction Council decided to adopt the policy of granting "independence" to the East Indies as soon as possible. (Pres. Doc. No. 2759, Court Exhibit No. ____).

This decision reached Java on 21 July 1945. According to directives from Tokyo, the territory of the new state was to comprise the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a "Committee for the Preparation for Independence" was to be set up in the near future.

Emphasis was laid upon the necessity for safeguarding the requirements for military operations. The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon, which had submitted in June 1945 that the establishment of the puppet state should not take place before the middle of 1946, and that the abovenamed Committee should at the earliest be set up towards the

end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned. At this Conference a scheme was drawn up for guiding preparations for so-called independence, wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

V. THE FIFTH PHASE

August-September 1945.

In the beginning of August 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to create this state in September 1945. In pursuance of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi Iin (Committee for the Preparation for Independence).

This was effected by proclamation of the same date, reading as follows:

"Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese Southern Army).

"Concerning the 'Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia',

"Based on the proclamation of the Japanese Government of 7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun has consistently been taking measures to guide the Indonesians. Owing to the spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they have all succeeded in achieving much and fast progress in their training for government and for the defence of the country with burning enthusiasm.

"In response to the activity and the wholehearted efforts of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the installation towards the middle of August of a Committee for the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee shall accelerate all measures concerning the final preparations for the installation of the Government of an independent Indonesia.

12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal Terauchi was published in Java, the Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-in-Chief) of Java also

issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stated:

"The desire to become an independent nation has now reached a high point and is flaring up all over Indonesia. It was in response to the expression of this desire that the Dai Nippon Teikoku solemnly promised to grant her independence, in accordance with the basic principle of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the ideals of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole population has exerted itself to its utmost to honour the national obligations and the stronger became their determination to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that the foundations for their independence could be built up fully and speedily. And now, as an independent nation, constituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place in the battle-line for the common defence of Greater East Asia."

The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government) on this occasion stated the following:

"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, is based upon humanitarian principles so as to contribute in the formation of a new world order. Therefore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesians and their intense enthusiasm conform with the basic ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit of Hakko Ichiu.

"A new nation will have to meet some essential requirements: it must have sufficient strength, while its administrative machinery should be organized in a smooth and simple way. Therefore, the first duty is to bring the war now being faced by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To this end the Indonesian nation must develop its war-potential to its full extent, and together with Dai Nippon fight unceasingly to achieve final victory in this Greater East Asia War."

A few days of silence on the subject of independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued to elaborate upon the common ties of destiny between Japan and Indonesia: "To live or die with Japan".

Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, was flown to Terachi's Headquarters at Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11 August. They were told by the latter that it was originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese Government. On account of difficulties and dangers of communications and pressure of time, the Field Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The main points were:

- a. The Japanese Government had been pleased to institute a Committee for the Preparation for Independence.
- b. The territory of the New State would include the entire Netherlands East Indies.
- c. The date when independence would be proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon as preparations were completed.
- d. The independent Government would be installed first in the island where preparations had been first completed. Subsequently this Government would be gradually extended to include areas where preparations had been completed.
- e. All Japanese demands in connection with the military situation were to be complied with.
- f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the Committee, which further consisted of thirteen representatives from Java, three from Sumatra and five from territories under naval occupation. These members were appointed on nomination by local Japanese military commanders.

On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java reported the news of Sukarno's return, and he was welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the Commander-

in-Chief and many of the military and Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile, the Committee members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali, whose names were now published, were flown to Java, after having received their instructions from the military or naval authorities of those areas.

Originally the first meeting of the Committee was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August, however, members of the Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation.

During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945, the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth leaders, prominent during that period, met at the residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Maeda. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred with the Soembutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department) and Maeda. It was decided to proclaim independence the next morning.

The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for the Study of Preparations for Independence) was hastily altered, and on the following morning the Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda service on the verandah of his house.

The population of Java was still uninformed, except through rumour, about the capitulation of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been unfitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from Tokyo. On instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat secret.

The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese propaganda service, and the local broadcasting stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no mention of anything but the announcement of independence and the proclamation of the constitution.

On 21 August 1945, the papers published, next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia, the following words:

"Dai Nippon is and will always be a friend to Indonesia, immutably and forever. We never will forget our oath; united, in life and in death."

Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese authorities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has been called the "stolen week".