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Country Profile

East Germany

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

SECRET

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COUNTRY PROFILE Integrated perspective of the subject country • Chronology • Area Brief • Summary Map

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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS Political evolution of the state • Governmental strength and stability • Structure and function • Political dynamics • National policies • Threats to stability • The police • Intelligence and security • Countersubversion and counterinsurgency capabilities


THE ECONOMY Appraisal of the economy • Its structure—agriculture, fisheries, forestry, fuels and power, metals and minerals, manufacturing and construction • Domestic trade • Economic policy and development • International economic relations

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Appraisal of systems • Strategic mobility • Railroads • Highways • Inland waterways • Pipelines • Ports • Merchant marine • Civil air • Airfields • The telecom system

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ARMED FORCES The defense establishment • Joint activities • Ground forces • Naval forces • Air forces • Paramilitary

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East GERMANY

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
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SECRET



A Place in the Sun (c)

With the conclusion in late 1972 of the General Relations Treaty between the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany gave its blessing to having its friends and allies proceed at their own pace to establish relations with the German Democratic Republic. The dam burst, and a literal wave of new diplomatic relationships engulfed the East Germans. This, coupled with its simultaneous entry into the world of international organizations, has brought the CDR the acceptance which it vainly sought since its founding. (U/OU)

The demise of Nazi Germany left the Third Reich dismembered. Some of its eastern area was transferred to Polish or Soviet rule. The old capital city of Berlin was separated into sectors under Four-Power administration. The remaining German territory was divided into zones of occupation—later merged, in the West, to create the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviets countered by declaring East Germany a separate state. To Bonn and its allies the move was a hypocritical attempt to provide a facade for continued manipulation of East Germany by Moscow. (U/OU)

At that time, in the wake of World War II, East German assertions of separate statehood and sovereign status clearly lacked credibility. The Germany of recent memory had been a large, independent, prosperous, and powerful nation. The new East Germany, by contrast, was a mere fragment of that territory, economically deprived and dependent on Moscow's mailed fist for its political muscle. After more than two decades, the expenditure of mountainous effort, and continued Soviet backing, East Germany still stands—and now stands much stronger. (U/OU)

The international acceptance East Germany has gained has not come easily. For 20 years West Germany, with the aid of the Western Allies and by weight of its own political dynamics and surging economic strength, kept its eastern neighbor isolated from the non-Communist world. East Germany tried with dogged determination to win favors where it could—by exchanging trade missions with emerging African states, for example—but its successes were few. Finally, in April 1969, East Berlin's persistence and

some fumbling by Bonn in the Middle East broke the ice. Iraq established formal ties with East Germany, and then a number of other Afro-Asian states followed suit. When West Germany's Government, led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, concluded the reconciliation treaty with East Germany in late 1972, broad international diplomatic acknowledgement of East Germany began to follow in due course. (U/OU)

In its campaign for international acceptance, East Germany has held one major trump card: it is an integral part of the German Problem, a major source of cold war tensions which stood as a massive stumbling block to the realization of an enduring peace in Europe. It would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to resolve the problem without Western acceptance of East Germany. Over the years East Germany and its Soviet sponsor have reinforced that point by various means, including the instigation of periodic crises over control of the movement of goods and persons across the autobahn between West Germany and West Berlin. The aura of East-West confrontation there was finally cleared away by the laboriously negotiated Berlin Agreement of 1971, which guaranteed access to isolated West Berlin. In subsequent accords West Germany formally conceded the existence of an East German state, albeit as a part of one German nation. East German political theorists make no such proviso; they claim a completely sovereign existence for their country, a claim which has been unwavering under the late Walter Ulbricht and his successor Erich Honecker. (U/OU)

Well before the East German regime gained non-Communist acceptance abroad it began to win the grudging respect, if not the support, of the native population. Along the way, the regime was favored by an assortment of traditions that allowed for a measure of popular approval. By and large, the populace found nothing strange in a prideful nationalism, a strong socialist movement, a highly developed social welfare system, a Prussianized view of state dominance and citizen conformity, and a certain scorn for those Germans living to the west or south. The authorities needed only to exploit this endowment. (C)

For years the Leipzig Industrial Fair has symbolized East Germany's striving for international stature.

The regime has also attempted to create its own tradition. The new rulers first argued their claim to govern on the basis of historical determinism. According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, a socialist worker's state was destined to replace the capitalist system on German soil. It was asserted that this progression had already been sanctified by Soviet success, which Walter Ulbricht, a one time "associate" of Lenin, was best able to interpret. (U/OU)

While this may have satisfied true believers in the Communist faith, it failed to generate mass loyalty. Therefore a more pragmatic line was introduced and emphasized: the contention that the East German system works, purportedly in ways even superior to those of rival West Germany. (U/OU)

The government in East Berlin boasts in particular of high standards in such fields as education, welfare, health care, and in the dramatic arts. It impresses on the young that East Germany is a "land of opportunity" where aptitude and drive—not to mention political conformity—are likely to bring rapid advancement. It asks the general public to take pride in an "economic miracle" that has made East Germany the ninth-ranked world industrial power and provided it with the highest standard of living in the Soviet camp. It sports the trappings of a full-fledged nation, including an army to patrol its borders and a civil airline and merchant fleet to show its flag abroad. The regime also has working in its favor, of course, the fact that it has endured—far longer, in fact, than did either the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich. (U/OU)


The overall extent to which the rulers of the new "worker-peasant state" have won popular support is difficult to estimate. The regime has its warm adherents (doubtless a minority) and its outright opponents (probably an even smaller minority). There remains the bulk of the citizenry, among whom an unemotional conformity seems to be the rule. Life evidently goes forward in a familiar pattern for most East Germans, who are concerned with things other than politics. Privately they may find the regime doctrinaire, niggling, and clumsy; publicly they may drop a critical remark. Yet, resistance appears futile. The regime's capacity for coercion and willingness to use it, the Soviets' determination to maintain a firm grip on Eastern Europe (as exemplified in East Germany itself in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968), and the West's caution about intervening directly in the East are factors that would stifle the hopes of any would-be resistance leader. (C)

Linking the Old with the New (c)

On the whole, the history of East Germany has been short and inglorious. Deriving from that sector of Germany assigned Soviet occupation forces by World War II agreements, East Germany grew up in the Russian image as a well-regimented state in which human beings conformed to the wishes of the Communist party. Incorporated formally in 1949 as the German Democratic Republic, East Germany under the much-hated Walter Ulbricht remained an international pariah for much of the cold war era. Unilateral grants of sovereignty by Moscow were effectively countered by Bonn's efforts to isolate the regime. Internally, there was a short-lived popular uprising in 1953, and in succeeding years many East Germans "voted with their feet"—as President John F. Kennedy put it—until the construction of the Berlin wall in August 1961 closed the last escape route.

In the decade following the erection of the infamous wall, East Germany inched forward in economic and political stature, winning a grudging respect from the populace and a modicum of international acceptance. In May 1971, Ulbricht—who had come to place his wisdom above that of the Soviet masters—"retired" as party leader and long-time party stalwart Erich Honecker was installed in his stead. During the early months of Honecker's efficient but colorless rule, he endorsed the Four-Power negotiations then in progress on the status of Berlin, thus paving the way for the inter-German General Relations Treaty establishing the GDR as a member of the international community. Despite humble beginnings and a deprived upbringing, East Germany had reached maturity.

East Germany's rulers, as if fearful that their hold is more tenuous than it appears to be, have been expert at invoking past spirits and building new illusions in their own behalf. A regime specialty is to push the East



Berlin's ancient Maiden's Bridge; SED Central Committee offices are at left and apartments on the right, with the State Council and Foreign Ministry buildings in the rear.

German story back in time so as to make current happenings seem the natural outcome of prior events. History is reinterpreted; in East German texts the "class struggle" is rampant, and "heroes of the people" are many. Ultimately the "triumph of the proletariat" is assured, and thus the legitimacy of the

GDR is validated.

In tangible ways East Germany also links itself with older times. It uses the black, red, and gold flag of Weimar, but with the hammer and compass state symbol affixed. Its rail system is still called the *Deutsche Reichsbahn*. Statues of the Prussian generals

Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bluecher, and Yorck are again in place on broad, tree-lined Unter den Linden, the Fifth Avenue of prewar Berlin. Goethe, despite his aristocratic tendencies, is made to seem a democratic progressive and thus a progenitor of the East German ethos. The greatest prize of all is Berlin, long promoted as "the capital of the German Democratic Republic." For years, East German authorities intimated that it was only a matter of time before they took over the entire city, but with the General Relations Treaty they finally admitted the right of West Germany to represent West Berlin. Nevertheless, they seek whatever advantage they can derive from the fact that their capital is the city—part of it, at least—that throughout Germany's history as a nation-state was its political and cultural heart and soul.

Germany, centrally located as it is, has served as the crossroads of Europe. Historically it has been a battleground and an arena of conflicting cultures. Primarily Western-oriented, it also has displayed a fascination with the East. It has preyed upon its neighbors and in turn has been a prey. That Germany should now exist in two parts is not extraordinary. More often than not it has existed in a state of disunity.

The territory which became East Germany is situated principally on the central North European Plain and is dominated by Berlin, a focus of land and inland waterway transportation routes. Generally scenic though not spectacularly so, the country ranges in north-south perspective from flat to gently rolling terrain. Only in the south and southwest is there high ground with elevations up to 3,300 feet. A rail network, so extensive as to be likened to a national trolley, constitutes the backbone of the transportation system. Good highways, lengthy canals, and modern oil and gas pipelines help speed traffic. The two great navigable rivers, the Elbe and the Oder, lead respectively to the ports of Hamburg, West Germany and Szczecin, Poland. Cool to cold winters, mild summers, prevalent cloudiness, and frequent precipitation constitute the weather pattern. Generally variable within fairly narrow limits, the weather at times turns sufficiently capricious to disrupt crop growing, an endeavor already beset by soils low in fertility. The subsurface endowment—primarily brown coal, potash, sulfur, fluorspar, natural gas, and uranium—is insufficient to maintain an advanced industrial society, and East Germany must look largely to Soviet suppliers to meet its energy and raw material re-


quirements.

Looking outward, East Germany finds its setting to be equally bleak. To the west stands a powerful German rival. To the south lies a potentially unstable Czechoslovakia, and to the east a proud, nationalistic Poland comes between East Germany and its patron, the U.S.S.R. As the westernmost of the European Communist states, East Germany has developed a "front line" mentality. Party functionaries have visualized themselves as members of an outpost holding back the tide of "Western imperialism." On a broader front, regime leaders have at times displayed suspicions of all their neighbors and performed as if East Germany were virtually beleaguered. In a sense it is. East Germany is smaller in area than any adjoining state and surpasses only Czechoslovakia in population. In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that East German authorities suffer some sense of insecurity.

Within a compact area of almost 42,000 square miles there exists a population of slightly over 17 million, a figure that has remained virtually static since the building of the Berlin wall. The people are a Nordic-Slavic blend, and thus exhibit the tall, blond, blue-eyed and short, brunet, brown-eyed characteristics of both groups. East German society is homogeneous, however, being some 99% Germanic in makeup and outlook. Only a tiny Slavic minority, the Sorbs, form an exception. Even they are highly integrated into the Germanic lifestyle, despite the government's attempts to portray them as a treasured minority.

The regime has largely destratified the old Germanic society, eliminating the former ruling class and bringing the middle class under control by economic strictures. The working class in theory dominates the system, but in practice Communist authorities—somewhat distrustful of worker loyalties—speak for it. Thus, a party-managerial elite constitutes the true dominant class.

The old Teutonic family portrait of the iron-willed father, domestic-servant mother, and submissive children has also been drastically altered. Women have been granted equal rights with men, and are no longer kitchen-bound. Nurseries, schools, and youth groups are heavily responsible for child-rearing by "approved methods." Originally unpopular, such policies have been increasingly accepted by a populace which with the passage of years has perceived that it had little choice but to come to terms with the regime.



Institution of the New Society (s)

The regime, during its two-plus decades of existence, has busied itself domestically with reshaping old German institutions into a new socialist establishment. It has been fortunate in that some of its reforms have proven popular and thereby established a rapport between ruler and ruled. It has also dispensed medicine bitter enough to antagonize its citizenry. Throughout, the guiding principle has continued to be the exaltation of the interest of the state. The populace has had to adjust accordingly.

The determination of the government to have its way was most strikingly demonstrated in the spring of 1960 when it unleashed a massive campaign to com-

plete the collectivization of agriculture, Many farmers resisted as best they could, only to be overwhelmed in a matter of weeks by party organizers fanatically devoted to the dictates of political doctrine and socialist agricultural science. Defeat bred apathy among the peasantry, which in turn contributed to a downturn in agricultural production. Typically, the regime persevered and through the application of threats and incentives inspired East German farmers to outproduce their counterparts in neighboring East European countries. In human terms, the happy, smiling peasantry portrayed by the regime is doubtless a great distortion, but still the original bitterness seems to have dissipated and the collectivized farmer apparently finds life tolerable.

By contrast with the equivocal result in the agricultural sector, educational reform has definitely bolstered the regime. By and large, the changes undertaken have proven acceptable, and the credit goes to the government. The old European class system, which permits the advancement of only a small elite, has largely been scrapped, and a mass schooling system has been substituted. The formerly submerged levels of society may now achieve according to their ability, and their political reliability. Principal emphasis is placed on vocational training and on socialist indoctrination, which is pervasive. Practical work programs in the factory or on the farm are emphasized as an educational adjunct even for those hoping to enter the professions. This factor of socialist learning is equaled in unpopularity by one other: as in other areas, also in education and science there persists the strotg odor of Soviet dominance and exploitation. Russian is given first priority in the study of foreign languages. Research projects are frequently oriented toward Soviet needs. Soviet dogma, as it extends into the physical and natural sciences, is stressed. In the classroom, life in the West is presented in an extremely restricted and highly colored format, thus reinforcing the mental isolation of the student. He may opt not to believe what the teacher imparts, but still he will be able to acquire precious little ground on which to build a counterbelief.

In the instance of at least one institution, the military, the regime has sought popular acceptance by retaining rather than abandoning "the best of the old tradition." The *Volksarmee* presents with its goose-stepping troopers, neat formations, rumbling tanks, and heavy Germanic marches a remarkable resemblance to the forces of former times. Aspects of

socialist modernity also creep in, however, including: the shaping of an officer corps representative of the party and the proletariat, the lowering of caste barriers between officers and men, and the reordering of German military history to highlight "revolutionary episodes."

East Germany nurtures its army as a prominent symbol of the integrity of the state. Totalling almost 120,000 men, the East German armed force exceeds in numbers only those of Hungary and Albania in Eastern Europe. However, relative to population it has almost as many men in uniform as West Germany. The army is clearly subordinate to the civilian officials of the state and is virtually incapable of exercising political influence. In addition, there is doubt about its combat reliability. Ultimately the question that has hung over the *Volksarmee* is the same as that which has haunted its West German counterpart: "Would German fight German?" The proposition may seem highly theoretical, but still it exists. And, in the East German case, any answer other than a strong affirmative bespeaks doubt about the endurance of the state.

Alert to this frailty, the regime continually seeks—with some success—to bolster the morale of the army. Plaudits are showered on it by the government, and extensive favorable coverage is given in the media. Military parades are held with considerable frequency in East Berlin even though they violate the terms of Four-Power Agreements on the status of the city. In addition the armed forces increasingly have been permitted to play a more prominent role in Warsaw Pact exercises, though hardly one that challenges the reality of Soviet dominance in Pact affairs. The *Volksarmee* itself is molded along the lines of the Soviet forces, is supplied chiefly with Soviet equipment, and, quite naturally, is subject to considerable Soviet influence in its day-to-day operations. The approximately 333,000-man Soviet component—euphemistically known as "the friends"—maintains a low public profile in East Germany, but by its presence helps insure the life of the regime.

From 1945 onward, the Protestant Evangelical Church has represented the longest lived holdout against the dominance of the state. The church initially sought to operate on the basis of one Germany, in principle a denial of East Germany's right to exist. The church was also identified with the old society, whereas to many pastors the new secular authorities were the representatives of "godless Marxism." In

former times the church had had a say in the running of the state. Now the state encroached on the church. In the name of "socialist morality" (i.e., whatever fosters socialism is moral), Walter Ulbricht proclaimed the "Ten Commandments of Socialism." The state pressed its own forms for baptism, confirmation, and marriage, and discouraged religious education. Recalcitrant clergymen were browbeaten, or even jailed.

Presently, after years of feuding, church and state have learned to coexist, although not always comfortably. The regime continues to grant small subsidies as in pre-1945 days, tolerates religious training, and permits pastors to speak out against state-sponsored atheism but not against the socialist state itself. For its part, the church has forsworn open political opposition and, under extreme pressure, broken ties with the church in West Germany. Viewing these developments, some observers have seen the regime trying for a genuine *modus vivendi*, but the situation appears to be more a case of the state, by cat-and-mouse tactics, turning the church into a cooperative subject.

Overall, the regime has been more watchful of its intellectuals than its churchmen. Religious expression may be dismissed as anachronistic and irrelevant; cultural expression is officially regarded as a modern-day tool for upholding and exemplifying the state. From time to time, as in the early Honecker days, the regime deems it wise to relax its hold, but normally intellectual dissent is rooted out far more quickly in insecure East Germany than in other, better established East European states.

The regime has failed rather woefully in enlisting the full cooperation of its most innovative people. It has permitted them to travel abroad, provided them with social clubs, showered them with honors, and made them financially secure. Yet, it has not seen fit to supply the degree of freedom that even avowed Marxists demand. Some of the most able of German Marxists—Bertolt Brecht and Arnold Zweig, for example—chose to reside in East Germany following World War II, and by their presence lent prestige to the regime. The situation soured, however, as many of the great talents rebelled or dried up, and few replacements were found in the younger generation. To some extent the collective excellence of orchestral and theatrical ensembles has filled the void, but individual genius remains a dear commodity in a land of group conformity.

Lifestyle: Political and Economic (c)

As a political entity, East Germany is the product of interlocking wills: that of German Communists to fulfill their destiny as set down by the patron saints Marx and Engels and that of the Soviet Union to build for itself the broadest possible buffer zone in central Europe. The event that historically was supposed to bring forth a German Communist state—a violent class revolution—never materialized. This omission constitutes a serious departure from orthodoxy for a highly doctrinaire regime. A successful revolution, however, was never an immediate prospect for struggling members of the radical left, who ultimately found in Russian expansionism their instrument for victory.

The Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the direct antecedent of the East German ruling party, was founded at the end of World War I following a split of the Socialist Party. True to Lenin's vision, it sought by all available means to promote an upheaval on German soil as the precondition for revolution everywhere. At the time of Hitler's accession to power in 1933, the KPD had 300,000 members, a total second only to the Soviet party in the Comintern. Over the next 12 years Nazi persecution and party factional strife thinned the ranks and hardened the survivors in their determination to build a new German state following World War II.

Communist rule in the Soviet Zone of Germany commenced on 30 April 1945 when the "Ulbricht group" arrived from Moscow. Operating under Soviet aegis, it offered the semblance of a democratic system. As the cold war came on and the time for mollifying the West passed, a new reality appeared: an authoritarian state patterned on the Soviet model and subservient to it. All power was lodged in the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the party formed by the forced merger in April 1946 of the Social Democratic Party

into the KPD.

From the beginning, the SED was largely the tool of Walter Ulbricht, and he endowed the party with his principles: rigid organization, strict discipline, doctrinal orthodoxy, and loyalty to Moscow. Any deviation from these norms was a privilege reserved for Ulbricht himself. Having faced many perils since his youthful days as a KPD functionary—including the menace of Stalin's displeasure during his Moscow years (1938-45)—he had become practiced at political survival. He set the public example as the well-informed, painstaking, and puritanical leader who worked almost ceaselessly for the new state. In private he manipulated the party machinery ruthlessly to his own advantage. Overall, he liked to be considered the father of his country, but his inability to rise above the image of a petty tyrant more often made him an object of ridicule.

Under Ulbricht, the party, by its own accounts, guided the state from one triumph to another in a quest for excellence. At its founding in 1949 the self-styled German Democratic Republic was declared to be a people's democracy at an intermediate stage, aiming to become a genuine socialist state. By 1952 the groundwork was being laid for a socialist order, and as of 1958 the groundwork had been completed. In 1968 a new constitution hailed the achievement of the socialist state and assumed its continuing perfection. Throughout, important anniversaries were—as they continue to be—celebrated by the party with overflowing self-praise for its achievements in building "the first German peace state."

Such outpourings over the years doubtless have constituted an attempt on the part of regime leaders to inspire confidence in the durability of the party and the system that it has wrought. The doctrinaire dullness of the exaggerated claims and constant sloganeering, however, has served more as a reminder of the nature of the leadership itself. It has been the burden of the party to have produced few top men of the type who inspire popular trust. What has been produced has been a coterie of grey-faced bureaucrats, solemn of mien, and joyless of mood, who operate in the old German paternalistic tradition of "papa knows best." As the chosen keepers and interpreters of Marxist truth, they exhibit an elitist mentality and a consequent distrust for popular feeling. On occasion they pose as true democrats and friends of the people, but conformity is what they demand and expect to receive from those below.

The success of political regimentation as practiced by the SED has rested to a considerable degree on a commonality of view and a uniformity of purpose among the top members of the party. Ulbricht was for years the personification of the unity of the Socialist Unity Party. Fealty to the master was the price of political success. There were those who plotted his demise as party leader, but so firm was his grip and so favorable the fates that even the workers' uprising of 17 June 1953 failed to dislodge him. Eventually he was eased out, but even then the changeover to Erich Honecker in 1971 was carried through smoothly. Like Ulbricht, Honecker is experienced and artful, the sort of man not likely to be taken by surprise by his foes.

As is usually the case with Communist governments, the East German regime has outfitted itself with Western-style democratic finery. One of its showier items is a multiparty system which allows four additional parties—representing Christian, Liberal, agrarian, and reformed Nazi elements—membership in parliament. These parties purport to be counterparts of similar groups in West Germany, but in reality they are largely paper organizations. Each, of course, is regime controlled and lacks any stature of its own. In similar fashion, so-called mass organizations such as the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB) and the Free German Youth (FDJ) operate under direct SED guidance and serve both as listening posts for popular opinion and as conduits for regime edicts. Finally, the regime groups together the political parties and the more important mass organizations into a semisacred body known as the National Front, which claims to represent the views of the population as a whole.

In East Germany the indispensable political element is solidarity. An election is a referendum for or against the system. Candidates are hand chosen, and their speeches are carefully tailored. Subsequent discussion is so arranged as virtually to be scripted. The campaign audience is well aware that only its approval is desired. Social and psychological pressure is applied to guarantee a massive turnout since a nonvoter is considered a dissenter. Regularly, 98% to 99% of the electorate do their duty and overwhelmingly "confirm" the regime.

The sham forms of democratic practice in East Germany are complemented by empty vessels of parliamentarism. The republican institutions stipulated in the Constitution serve largely as stage props around which the SED directs the human

The "People's Chamber" is the Communist party's rubber stamp parliament.



scenario. Unreal in the Western context, this scheme nevertheless represents "socialist reality."

A reading of the East German Constitution gives the impression that the government constitutes a functioning parliamentary system, replete with shared powers and responsibilities. Twin multimember executive bodies exist: the Council of State, with powers approximating those of a ceremonial president; and, the Council of Ministers, largely an administrative force. Both purportedly operate on the collegial principle. In fact, both carry out orders presented by the SED Politburo, the tightly knit body of select party authorities who decide policy "in the name of the working class." Parliament is endowed with multitudinous duties, most of which have been delegated to the executive, and in practice has been relegated to the role of a rubberstamp. In any case, the

task of the elected legislator is not to represent the people to the state but the state to the people, pushing the regime's message and soothing those troubled by it.

East Germany's economic planners have faced, and to a considerable degree met, a greater challenge than that posed to the state's political leaders. Weighted down by the ravages of war and the dictates of socialism, they have nonetheless built a new "nationalized" economy, fed Soviet appetites, and provided a flow of goods to the local consumer. These accomplishments—by and large superior to those of the other East European states—have evoked a measure of admiration in the West and as much as anything else have provided to those leaning toward the East German cause a rationale for acceptance.

In the immediate postwar years, East Germany was beset by severe handicaps: truncated transportation

systems, a paucity of raw materials, a lack of heavy industry, and an inadequate agricultural base. Heavy reparations, including the dismantling and shipping of entire industrial enterprises to the U.S.S.R., completed the gloomy picture. While the West German economy, given the impetus of the Marshall Plan, took off and soared, the East German economy for years remained grounded. The factors were many, and certainly not the least of them was the dire labor shortage caused by the flight of 2.3 million persons prior to the building of the Berlin wall. Whereas in the West the wall signified the division of Germany, for the GDR it meant the start of a new economic life. With escape no longer a possibility, the people had no choice but to serve East Germany. The result was what the East Germans choose to call their very own *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle). It clearly is a source of pride, even to those East Germans unsympathetic to the regime.

The manner in which the regime directed the

buildup of the economy was indicative of its ambition to give East Germany a claim to a sovereign existence. Prior to 1945 this sector of Germany had been somewhat sparsely industrialized—its chief production being in light industry: chemicals, optics, and precision instruments. The regime proceeded with a vengeance to build a broad industrial base in the interest of virtual self-sufficiency.

Unfortunately for the East Germans, their economic aspirations frequently remained just that, as Soviet needs took priority over their own. By Moscow's lights, East Germany's role was to be that of a servant of the Soviet economy. It would be a machinshop turning out high-quality products for the U.S.S.R. and would provide a ready market, at inflated prices, for Soviet raw materials. The East Germans over the years have swallowed hard and accepted Soviet demands, but not without acts of protest, the most spectacular of which was the suicide in December 1965 of Erich Apel, head



of the State Planning Commission.

Apel's death illustrated a basic fact of East German life, i.e., that politics dominates economics and that party chiefs are ascendant over technocrats. Those who would push the economy ahead in a rational fashion, even resorting to capitalistic devices, have won a modicum of freedom, particularly under Honecker, but the dead hand of party doctrine still lies heavily on their plans. It is as if the authorities would rather permit economic lag than commit political heresy. Thus East Germany, advanced though it is by East European standards, has proceeded under severe handicaps. Its industry for years was cut off from important scientific and technological advances, and its markets were restricted by reason of its isolation from the West. It continues to exist in the straitjacket of a centralized command economy. Finally, it seems frequently to be stretched to the limit of its resources and thus susceptible to grievous damage from the errors of man or the whims of nature. Acts of God are impermissible in socialist planning, but nonetheless wet summers have ruined crop harvests, and harsh winters have produced power shortages dire enough to disrupt industry and douse city lights.

Breakdowns are embarrassing, especially in that they serve as a reminder of grimmer days for the average man. The late 1940's and much of the 1950's were times of deprivation. In the 1960's the populace experienced a steadily increasing standard of living, and now, by Communist criteria, a consumer-oriented society has arrived. Television sets and to a lesser degree refrigerators and washers are generally available, though frequently not at a price the average family can easily afford. Private cars are still luxury, and housing remains in meager supply despite the best efforts of the regime. Food shortages are largely a thing of the past, with the quality and variety of the offerings both improved. Some advances also have been made in supplying high-quality clothing, shoes, and furniture.

As consumers, the East Germans are not unlike their cousins in the West. They yearn increasingly for luxury items—exotic food, stylish apparel, or even a car, and work long hours and stint themselves in various ways to gain their goals. They inwardly rage at authority if the product is not available, or, if obtained, it proves unsatisfactory. The regime is well aware that its reputation is on the line in the nationalized market place, and under Honecker in particular it has made adjustments to fill the wants of the people.

The Regime and the People (c)

In an era of increasing detente, the regime continues to prefer that its people live in semi-isolation behind heavily barricaded borders. With few exceptions, only those certified as politically reliable or economically expendable are allowed to travel to the West. Those rash enough to attempt flight across a boundary or over the Berlin wall are still deemed guilty of a crime against the state and may be shot by border guards. Within its political compound, the state constantly extracts pledges of loyalty from the populace and dispenses a rigorous brand of justice. To a large extent, Western influences are still shut out. Intellectuals are exhorted to be good servants of the state, mirroring East German society in their works and combating alien ideologies. The People's Army, the state security forces, and the considerable encampment of Soviet troops are frequently lauded as a bulwark against the enemy to the west. Trends towards liberalization elsewhere in Eastern Europe frequently have elicited public condemnation from a regime intent on warding off any infection in its body politic. Even the Soviet Union has been open to criticism, at least during the latter years of Ulbricht, though seldom under the generally loyal Honecker, who has also seen fit to relax domestic strictures ever so slightly.

As compared with earlier years, East German society in the 1970's is caught in something less than an iron vise. On occasion, the authorities even relent sufficiently to allow a modicum of free expression. Such leniency serves to alleviate a buildup of tensions. However, the situation is rarely permitted to get out of hand, and, if signs of dissent appear, the clamps are likely to be reapplied. Since most potential troublemakers apparently either have had their spirits crushed or have long since fled the country, public officials—encouraged by the lead of Honecker—have



assumed more of an air of trust of the populace.

Most inhabitants of East Germany on a day-to-day basis have faced the reality of their existence and have learned to give the cooperation required of them. Many slip into rationalizations to the effect that life in East Germany is more secure, less hectic, and therefore "nicer" than in West Germany. Those who are a part of the regime or who owe their success to it doubtless constitute a growing band of state loyalists.

There remains, however, an air of negativism among East Germans, which frequently is more pronounced than that found elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Even allowing for the traditional German tendency to face life grimly, many observers have commented on the absence of enthusiasm and spontaneity. There appears to be a "we versus them" mental set among the populace vis-a-vis the authorities. At times individuals are surprisingly outspoken on such matters as the inability

to visit West Germany or the unavailability of certain items at the neighborhood store. Sallies against "the system" at this level are generally tolerated, but outright attacks on the political leadership are taboo and invite stern retribution.

Other evidences that "a correct socialist attitude" has not been fully implanted are readily available. Rock music and long hair, for example, frequently have been portrayed as tools of capitalistic subversion, although as of 1973 these "youthful aberrations" were tolerated. High party officials continue to inveigh against juvenile delinquency, or "hooliganism" as they call it. In addition, the regime has acknowledged alcoholism as a considerable problem. The high incidence of divorce and extramarital relations also suggests that a systematized existence does not necessarily bring the high standards of morality preached by the regime.

By and large, however, antiregime and antisocial behavior is a relatively minor concern in a state in which regimentation has become a way of life. Personal documentation is constantly required, and police checks are common. Job mobility is severely restricted, and variant behavior is viewed with suspicion. What regular authorities fail to detect, police informers may ferret out. Political offenses, though considerably less frequent than in earlier days, usually result in harsher punishment than standard crimes, and, once accused, the individual's chances for acquittal are slim. Then too, a personal existence as such is sharply diminished by reason of the fact that an individual is merged into a series of collectives—for work, play, and political and social activity. Within that context, he is expected to conform in realization of the socialist dictum that cooperation with one's "comrades" and obedience to the rules of the team are the highest goals.

Centralized direction by the regime of the nation's intellectual and cultural life provides another means for the perpetuation of mass subservience to the state. Radio, television, and the press bear witness to the greatness of the nation and the wisdom of the party with a constancy, volume, and uniformity seemingly guaranteed to promote boredom. Motion pictures and theatrical productions frequently supply only a slightly less rigorous political indoctrination. Unhappily for the regime, Western influences such as radio and TV broadcasts are available in sufficient quantity to provide a standard of comparison for those East Germans who care to take advantage of them. On balance, however, the regime's domestic propaganda

is the major factor. Pervasive and thus largely unavoidable, it must eventually seep into the individual's being.

Doubtless the most powerful instrument of control is the ruling Socialist Unity Party itself. About 1.9 million East Germans are Communist party members, but some only nominally so. In addition, the party directs a 350,000-man Workers Militia, a paramilitary force, admittedly of unknown effectiveness, charged with putting down civil unrest. Basic party organizations are established in factories, collective farms, production cooperatives, police units, state and economic administrations, scientific and educational institutions, residential areas, and any other place a small group may congregate. At this level, trained functionaries propagate the regime's message to the extent that their sometimes limited skill and their auditors' frequently limited interest allow.

When propaganda and political agitation fail, the government may still enforce its will on the populace by resort to the police, the courts, and the prisons. De-Stalinization and liberalization as practiced elsewhere in Eastern Europe, however, have also taken root in East Germany, albeit somewhat tentatively, and in the process the government's use of terror tactics has abated. Memories of state oppression persist, however, and they serve to discourage overt dissidence. Even then it is important to note that bloodlust was more a Soviet than an East German aberration and that Ulbricht disposed of opponents in less brutal fashion than Stalin. Generally, the regime in recent years has preferred to cow rather than crush its opponents. A domesticated critic is living proof of the regime's ability to triumph. Purges would only invite comparisons to events of the Hitler era.

The maintenance of public order on a day-to-day basis falls to the People's Police and the State Security Service (SSD), both responsible to national and not local authority. The SSD, operating covertly, has been the feared instrument of political control, although today to a considerably lesser extent than formerly. Summary punishment is no longer a feature of the East German system. Arrests, indictments, and trials are conducted according to established procedures. Acquittals, reversals of sentences, and pardons are now conceivable. By constitutional writ the East German is entitled to many of the same rights and privileges as the citizen of a Western democracy. In practice the individual is judged according to the degree that his behavior detracts from the well-being of the state.

Big Brother and Others (c)

In the successful quest for status, East Germany has had the decisive backing of the Soviet Union. For Moscow, East Germany represents the Soviets' forward-most military-political position in Europe. It is an important industrial partner, and above all else its continued existence obviates "the German threat." Soviet troops stationed in East Germany provide a guarantee of the endurance of the regime. The U.S.S.R. takes about 40% of East German exports and is the chief supplier of essential raw materials. By its accomplishments, e.g., space flights, it radiates an aura of socialist success in which East Germany may bask. For its part, East Germany has a record of compliance that compares favorably with that of any other East European state.

The evident harmony of the Moscow-East Berlin relationship has been punctuated by some discordant notes over the years. In the postwar era, the Soviets plundered their sector of Germany, hesitated before approving the creation of the GDR, domineered over it for years, failed to deliver Berlin to it or to sign a separate peace treaty with it despite frequent promises. In the early days, the proud Nordics had little choice but to accept humiliation by their Slavic mentors.

As East Germany became stronger and hence less dependent, the leadership undertook a new course. It frequently finessed Moscow's demands, openly pledging loyalty to the Soviets and then quietly proceeding the German way. In the post-Khrushchev era, the Ulbricht regime, perhaps exaggerating its importance to the bloc, went a step further. It ceased giving the Soviet full credit for all socialist advances and with evident delight pronounced some of its own accomplishments superior. As the elder statesman of bloc leaders, Ulbricht increasingly advised Moscow on proper courses of action, particularly on Berlin where

East German interests were involved. Finally a more pliable leader was found in the person of Erich Honecker. From this episode it became clear that on crucial issues Moscow's desires still prevailed over Pankow's, to the detriment of the image of full East German sovereignty. In domestic affairs the regime clearly enjoys the dominant role, but overall it remains only a junior partner in Soviet-sponsored ventures.

"Friendship among peoples" is one of East Germany's most heavily stressed precepts. Yet even in Eastern Europe East Germans often are resented, since they are viewed more as Germans than as socialist brethren. Alluding to past Teutonic depredations, many East Europeans are inclined to believe that Germans, East or West, simply "cannot overcome their national character." As inheritors of a Western cast of mind and a Protestant morality, East Germans are also considered to be "different." For their part, many in East Germany would agree that they themselves are "different," and also "better."

The regime has lived in mortal fear that incipient liberalism in the established East European nations may spread into East Germany and produce infections, perhaps even convulsions among the populace. Broadly, it was for this reason that East Germany was a prime mover in the bloc's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Once again the world was treated to the spectacle of Germans marching into Czechoslovakia.

Despite underlying tensions and occasional flash-points, the East Germans remain generally cooperative allies in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Within this context, Pankow looked to the other allied capitals to back its claims to sovereignty and boost its campaign for recognition. Their frequent failure to do so vigorously increased the regime's sense of insecurity, and at times induced among East German leaders concern that their Eastern neighbors would succumb to the wiles of West Germany, strike a deal with Bonn, and thus leave East Germany in an isolated and weakened condition.

A new confidence born of acceptance has partially displaced such concerns, and has imbued the regime with a sense of belonging. Still, old fears die hard among the East German faithful, and they remain vigilant against any infidelity on the part of East Europeans.

On the basis of experience, the East Germans have never been quite able to trust the Soviets. In 1952 Stalin proposed a draft treaty offering reunification of



Germany conditional on its neutralization and disarmament, and Khrushchev shortly before his downfall in 1964 was dropping hints to Bonn of a possible deal. For the time being, however, the Soviet commitment to East Germany appears firm. A reversion by Moscow to a strategy of a united, neutralized Germany would

at this stage seem only a remote possibility. Equally remote is the chance that the Soviets would soon allow East Germany, should it wish, to make its own deal. In the final view, the lot of East Germany depends on how well it, with Soviet backing, can meet the challenge of West Germany.

Two Germanies or One? (c)

It has not been easy for East Germany to live next door to the dramatic prosperity which burst forth in West Germany's capitalistic-pluralistic society. Pankow on the one hand belittles Bonn's economic success and on the other promises to outstrip it by way of Marxian socialism. Extending its effort to the breaking point has brought some results, but has not dispelled the sense of frustration and inferiority of coming off second best in almost any observable comparison with West Germany, which to begin with has two and a half times the territory and nearly four times the population of East Germany.

In marching to its own drummer, the GDR has written off the idea of German reunification—a notion it had occasionally extolled for propaganda purposes and which is still held up in West Germany as an article of faith. In one of his more accurate descriptions of the German situation, Walter Ulbricht told his Communist Party Congress in April 1967: "Two separate German states have been created, and they have pursued completely different paths of development. To unify them would be tantamount to combining fire and water. It is unrealistic to talk about unification now." On balance, it appears that the former East German ruler has a point. Time and circumstance have loosened familiar and fraternal ties. Regionalism has taken hold, and each state has been welded into military and economic pacts inimical one to the other. Each is prideful in its accomplishments and separate identity. Each sees itself as the true fatherland, reserving for itself the best of the Germanic past, and places the onus of unrighteousness on the other. Neither appears disposed in the near future to modify its style sufficiently to accommodate the other.

Present-day relations between the two Germanies are heavily influenced by a residue of distrust. For

years West Germany treated East Germany as a political and social outcast, an "untouchable" on the international scene. Bonn claimed the right to sole representation for Germany as a whole. Bonn spokesmen dismissed East Germany as "the Soviet occupied zone," "Middle Germany," and "the so-called German Democratic Republic." Only in the fall of 1969 did newly inaugurated Chancellor Brandt acknowledge the existence of "two German states," albeit in "one German nation"—a formula unacceptable to a Pankow regime intent on winning acceptance of a sovereign East Germany. By contrast with Bonn's attitude of disdain, East German spokesmen over the years verbally assaulted the Federal Republic with very special rage, some of it bordering on the obscene. More recently, the Brandt policy of reconciliation with the East has undercut Pankow's propaganda effort and the war of words abated in the early 1970's.

A sign of the mood of insecurity that still grips East Germany is the uncertainty with which relations with West Germany are conducted. On the one hand, the GDR in recent years has pressed a policy of separateness (*Abgrenzung*) in order to show in every small way the existence of two entirely different Germanies. It continues to regard West Germany as a menace to its existence, the governing SPD as a betrayer of socialism, and popular Chancellor Willy Brandt as a seducer of its people. On the other hand, East German leaders realize they must deal with West Germany in good faith, in order to solidify their political gains and to open new avenues to Western markets and technology. Seeking a solution to its dilemma, the GDR has agreed, somewhat grudgingly and with specific limitations, to permit those East-West German personal contacts spelled out in the General Relations Treaty. Simultaneously, the GDR has continued to bargain toughly on the official level with Bonn in behalf of East German interests. In small ways, such as the release of political prisoners, East Germany has made concessions to domestic and West German public opinion, but it remains doubtful that Pankow is ready to risk a full normalization of relations with the powerful magnet that is West Germany.

Looking ahead, observers of East Germany have mused for years as to what comes next. Many predicted that Ulbricht's passing from power would be a major turning point. As it turned out, observable changes have thus far been minimal. Erich Honecker has slightly relaxed domestic controls and allowed his



people a slightly larger measure of "the good life," both in terms of consumer goods and social welfare benefits. At the same time, he has opted for a somewhat greater degree of centralized control of the economy. In external affairs, he differs again by degree: conforming more fully to Soviet wishes, acting friendlier toward other Warsaw Pact states, and generally avoiding throwing his weight around in East European affairs. In party matters, he proceeds cautiously, in the process slowly replacing incumbents with his own men. As a lifelong bureaucrat and longtime heir apparent, he seems to have learned his lessons well.

Unlike Honecker and the bureaucrats now in office, there is no certainty that the younger generation, which will inherit the system, will conform to established practice. Self-confident and pragmatic, the new men seem willing to accept the concept of

socialism nominally, but then operate according to the dictates of reason. An infusion of more youthful, less rigid personnel into positions of power conceivably could eventually tip the balance in favor of a society sufficiently liberalized and an economy sufficiently Westernized to permit an accommodation with West Germany. Such a result is hardly foreordained, however. The probability remains that the liberals of today will be the conservatives of tomorrow; and, by the time they assume power, they will be prepared to march in lock step along the Ulbricht-Honecker course.

On balance, the East German regime has reason to believe that developments in the near term may be favorable to its interests. In effect, it has built its own house. To a considerable degree, it has gained acceptance at home and abroad. Overall, it feels that time is on its side, particularly as expectations of a return to

German national unity diminish further among East and West Germans and separation becomes more a reality.

Nonetheless, East Germany still has problems. At home, the regime must deal with the spiral of rising expectations, and it is problematical whether it can fulfill the demands of the populace both for a better life and increased contact with the outside world. Abroad, East Germany must be careful in several respects—to maintain the proper attitude of loyalty to the Soviet Union; to avoid the weighty embrace of West Germany; to exploit Western economies without falling prey to their ideologies; to keep the friendship of third world countries without paying an exorbitant price in terms of aid; and above all, to do these various things with slender diplomatic resources and little accrued experience in the international arena.

In the long run, Pankow also will not be able to rest worryfree. Hopes for reunification, as opposed to expectations, are unlikely to die out completely. Building on hope, Chancellor Brandt and his successors may be expected to pursue practical inter-German ties as the basis for some form of political union. In an era of detente, circumstances conceivably may arise which would break down the carefully erected barriers and make union the more possible. On a larger scale, West and East Europe may over time interact in a movement toward one Europe in which logic decrees that there will be one Germany. Thus, there is no guarantee in perpetuity that there will be an East Germany. At present, Pankow can only insist that such must be the case.

No matter what path the regime itself would take, it must in plotting its course accept two conditions as facts of life. The GDR will continue to be subordinate to the Soviet Union whose own national interests will define the broader aspects of East Germany's relationships abroad. Also, the West German Government has not abandoned the concept of reunification. Rather, it has switched to playing a long-term game on this paramount issue. Bonn has challenged East Germany to a competitive coexistence in the confident belief that ultimately its Western lifestyle and the spirit of German nationhood will win out. At present, it has acceded to East Germany's international recognition in an effort to lure the Communist regime into the arena. East Germany has accepted the challenge and now is fated to emerge from isolation into a world of change, with consequences as yet unknown.

18

Chronology (u/ou)

1945

April

First group of German Communist emigres, headed by Walter Ulbricht, returns from Moscow to take charge of civil affairs under Soviet auspices.

May

German High Command signs unconditional surrender.

June

Allied Control Council composed of United Kingdom, France, United States, and U.S.S.R. takes over government of Germany.

July-August

Tripartite (United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.) Potsdam Conference confirms division of Germany into four zones of occupation, while Berlin is divided into sectors occupied by four Allied powers. Germany not to be partitioned but to be treated as single economic unit with certain central administrative departments following a common policy to be determined by Allied Control Council.

1946

April

Socialist Unity Party (SED) founded in Soviet Zone through forced merger of German Communist Party and Social Democratic Party.

October

Elections held for parliaments in five *Laender* created in Soviet Zone, and coalition governments (SED, CDU, LDPD) formed. Number of central administrative departments created, directly responsible to Soviet occupation authorities.

1947

January

U.S. and British zones fused into the Bizone to cope with economic problems worsened by Soviet lack of cooperation. (French zone joined in October 1948.)

December

SED convenes People's Congress in East Berlin; by apportionment of seats SED and front parties dominate.

1948**January**

Power and composition of Economic Council of Bizone changed to create nucleus of a future German government.

March

Soviet representative walks out of Allied Control Council, thus ending last vestige of joint control.

April

Soviet authorities gradually extend restrictions on road and rail traffic to Berlin.

June

Soviet representative leaves Allied *Kommandatura*, executive body for Berlin. Total blockade imposed on 2.5 million inhabitants of West Berlin by Soviet and East German authorities, requiring airlift by U.S. and British to supply city.

Summer

U.S.S.R. begins to build up militarized police force in East Germany, in violation of Potsdam Agreement.

1949**May**

Blockade of West Berlin ends. People's Congress adopts East German Constitution. Federal Republic comes into existence in West Germany with publication of its constitution.

September

East German regime joins Soviet-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

October

German Democratic Republic proclaimed and its government recognized by Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated governments; Soviet Military Administration dissolved and administrative functions transferred to East German regime; East German representation at quadripartite functions retained by Soviet Control Commission.

1950**July**

East Germany and Poland sign treaty at Goerlitz recognizing Oder-Neisse line as their frontier.

October

General elections held in East Germany establishes primacy of SED. To enhance illusion of East German autonomy, Soviet Control Commission replaced by a Soviet High Commissioner with rank of ambassador.

1952**May**

Police-guarded no man's land 3 miles wide created along entire western frontier excluding only Berlin.

July

East Germany administrative divisions reorganized; traditional *Laender* abolished; 14 districts (*Bezirke*), similar to Soviet *oblast*, established. Collectivization of agriculture begins.

October

Judicial system revised in accordance with Soviet system.

1953**June**

Uprising in East Berlin over harsh labor policies spreads throughout East Germany; repressed by Soviet forces.

1954**January**

Reparations to Soviet Union cease; ownership of joint East German-Soviet companies, except for uranium complex in the Erzgebirge, returned to East Germans.

1955**January**

Soviet Union ends state of war with Germany.

May

East Germany joins Warsaw Pact as provisional member; receives full membership following year.

September

Soviet Union declares East German regime sovereign; East Germany given control over border security and communications between West Berlin and West Germany, with U.S.S.R. reserving jurisdiction only over movement of Allied personnel and freight.

December

West Germany formally implements policy of isolating East Germany diplomatically by proclaiming Hallstein Doctrine, i.e., West Germany will end diplomatic relations with any country except the U.S.S.R. establishing diplomatic ties with East Germany.

1956**January**

East Germany formally establishes armed forces.

1957**March**

U.S.S.R. and East Germany sign agreement on stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany.

October

Yugoslavia recognizes East Germany; first nonbloc state to do so.

1958**February**

Purge begins of leading Communist functionaries who oppose pace of Ulbricht's economic policies; party and government reorganized.

November

East and West Germany formalize commercial relations by signing Interzonal Trade Agreement, which for years serves as principal official link between them.

1959**May-August**

Big Four foreign ministers meet at Geneva in futile attempt to work out formula for German unification; East and West represented as "advisers."

1960**April**

Government undertakes drive to complete agricultural collectivization.

September

Upon death of Wilhelm Pieck, office of president abolished; Council of State created as replacement with SED chief Ulbricht elected chairman.

1961**July-August**

East German refugees to West Berlin and West Germany reach highest number since 1953: 33,415 in July and 47,433 in August.

August

Escapes virtually stopped by erection of Berlin wall and by strengthening of defenses on East-West German demarcation line.

1962**January**

Universal military training law passed.

August

Would-be defector Peter Fechter shot and allowed to bleed to death at the Berlin wall in highly publicized instance of East German brutality.

1963**June**

Ulbricht proposes and later (February 1964) spells out New Economic System which places emphasis on such factors as profitability, realistic price-cost relationships, greater outlays for research, material incentives for workers, and increased managerial responsibility.

August

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by East Germany.

December

West Berlin and East German authorities conclude first Berlin Pass Agreement whereby West Berlin citizens visit relatives in East Berlin.

1964**June**

Soviet-East German Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance signed.

September

Premier Otto Grotewohl dies and is succeeded by Willi Stoph.

1965**April**

Soviet and East German military forces harass West German civilian and Allied military traffic to West Berlin in retaliation for West German *Bundestag* meeting in West Berlin.

September

Ulbricht leads high-level delegation to Moscow to receive support for GDR claims to international recognition of its sovereign status; marks beginning of more intensive Soviet-GDR bilateral relations.

October

Youth riots occur in Leipzig and other East German cities.

December

SED leaders criticize youth and cultural policies at 11th plenum of the SED Central Committee; subsequent return to hardline cultural policy produces many incidents between regime and intellectuals during 1966.

Erich Apel, head of the State Planning Commission, commits suicide in spectacular act of protest against Soviet economic demands on East Germany.

1966**March**

In bid for international recognition, East Germany applies for U.N. membership through Polish offices.

1967**February**

Nationality Law enacted by People's Chamber establishes for first time concept of "citizens of GDR" as distinct from "German nationality."

Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers discuss bilateral relations with West Germany; East Germans, Poles against; Czechs, Bulgarians, Hungarians favor.

March-September

GDR seeks to shore up opposition to Bonn; signs 20-year bilateral treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia (March), Hungary (May), and Bulgaria (September).

June

East Germany publicly sides with Arabs in Arab-Israeli war.

September

West German efforts to broaden and improve contact founders on East German precondition of recognition for GDR.

1968**April**

New constitution replacing outmoded 1949 document adopted in East Germany's first popular referendum.

March-June

East Germany bans travel to and from West Berlin by members of NPD, West Germany's ultrarightist party. In April, ban broadened to include senior officials of West German Government. In June, People's Chamber announces passport and visa requirements for all West Germans and West Berliners.

August

Occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, including East German troops, followed by crackdown at home on liberals sympathetic to Dubcek government.

1969**March**

West German presidential election held in West Berlin; arouses ire of East German and Soviet Governments but no incidents result.

April

Recognition of East Germany by Iraq, first non-Communist country to do so, opens door to recognition by number of other Afro-Asian states.

September

Advent of West German Government led by Social Democratic Party's Willy Brandt renews efforts to normalize relations with Soviet Union, GDR, and other Communist neighbors.

Soviets reply positively to notes from Allied partners seeking cooperation in reducing Berlin tensions.

October

Delegations from 84 countries attend 20th anniversary celebrations in East Germany; divergences between East Germany and its allies over policy toward West Germany dominate speeches by most Eastern European leaders.

December

U.S.S.R. begins talks with West Germany on renunciation of threat or use of force in any conflict.

1970**March and May**

Prime Minister Stoph and West German Chancellor Brandt

meet in Erfurt and Kassel but fail to agree on basis for improving relations.

March

First Four-Power talks in 11 years discuss Berlin problems.

August

Soviet Union and West Germany sign treaty renouncing use of force and accepting all postwar European boundaries. Four-Power rights in Berlin and Germany not affected. (West Germany signs same agreement with Poland in December.)

December

Ulbricht criticized for economic planning failures at 14th Central Committee plenum.

1971**May**

Erich Honecker replaces Ulbricht as SED First Secretary.

June

Honecker's opening speech at Eighth Party Congress ratifying his accession indicates he would settle for less than full diplomatic recognition by West Germany; wishes success to Four-Power negotiations on Berlin.

September

Four-Power Agreement on Berlin initialed (signed in June 1972). Berlin remains under quadripartite authority with reduced political ties to West Germany; Soviet Union guarantees unimpeded access to West Berlin through East Germany. East-West German negotiations begin on supplementary agreements.

October

Major ideological speech to social scientists explicitly rejects Ulbricht's favorite themes.

1972**April**

General Traffic Agreement reached with Bonn in April (signed in May); covers transport of goods, travel of West Germans to East Germany virtually unrestricted, only emergency travel allowed to East Germans.

Fifth Central Committee plenum adopts package of social legislation, granting additional benefits in pensions, rent and family assistance allotments.

June

Four-Power Agreement on Berlin is signed; discussions begin with Federal Republic on general treaty.

October

Government reorganization places greater power in hands of ministers at expense of advisory commissions, according to Honecker's dictates.

November

Agreement reached on general German treaty designed to end 25 years of cold war hostility; states pledge to refrain from use of force, respect common border, recognize sovereignty of each state in internal and external affairs; left open question of reunification.

East Germany becomes member of UNESCO and is granted observer status at U.N.

Regime hails reelection of Brandt coalition in West German

parliamentary election, implicitly taking some credit for victory.

1973**January**

East and West Germany accorded equal representation at Helsinki preparatory talks for Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

By end of January, 67 states had established diplomatic relations with East Germany, 34 since 7 December 1972.

Area Brief**LAND (U/OU)**

Size: 41,800 sq. mi.

Use: 43% arable, 15% meadows and pasture, 27% forests, 15% other

Land boundaries: 1,433 mi.

PEOPLE (U/OU)

Population: 17,050,000 (including East Berlin), average annual growth rate 0% (current)

Ethnic divisions: 99.7% German, 0.3% Slavic and other

Religion: 59% Protestant, 8% Roman Catholic, 33% unaffiliated or other; less than 5% of Protestants and about 25% of Roman Catholics actively participate

Language: German, small Sorb (West Slavic) minority

Literacy: 99%

Labor force: 8.2 million; 36.9% industry; 5.2% handicrafts; 8% construction; 12.5% agriculture; 7.2% transport and communications; 10.9% commerce; 19.3% services and others

Organized labor: 88% of total labor force

GOVERNMENT (U/OU)

Legal name: German Democratic Republic

Type: Communist state

Capital: East Berlin (not officially recognized by U.S., U.K., and France, which together with the U.S.S.R. have special rights and responsibilities in Berlin)

Political subdivisions: (Excluding East Berlin) 14 districts (Bezirke), 218 counties (Kreise), 8,845 communities (Gemeinden)

Legal system: Civil law system modified by Communist legal theory; new constitution adopted 1968 by approx. 95% of the voters in national "referendum"; court system parallels administrative divisions; no judicial review of legislative acts; legal education at Universities of Berlin, Leipzig, Halle and Jena; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction; more stringent penal code adopted 1968

Branches: Legislative—Volkammer (elected directly); executive—Chairman of Council of State, Chairman of Council of Ministers, Cabinet (elected by Volkammer); judiciary—Supreme Court; entire structure dominated by Socialist Unity (Communist) Party

Government leaders: Chairman, Council of State, Walter Ulbricht (Head of State); Chairman, Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph (Head of Government)

SECRET

Suffrage: All citizens age 18 and over

Elections: National and local alternating every 2 years; prepared by an electoral commission of the National Front; ballot supposed to be secret and voters permitted to strike names off ballot; more candidates than offices available; parliamentary elections held 14 November 1971; local elections, 22 March 1970

Political parties and leaders: Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED), headed by First Secretary Erich Honecker, dominates the regime; 4 token parties (Christian Democratic Union, National Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Democratic Peasants Party) and an amalgam of special interest organizations participate with the SED in National Front

Voting strength: 1971 parliamentary elections: 98.33% voted the regime slate; 1970 local elections: 99.85% voted the regime slate

Communists: 1.9 million party members

Other special interest groups: Free German Youth, Free German Trade Union Federation, Democratic Women's Federation of Germany, German Cultural Federation (all Communist dominated)

Member of: CEMA, IPU, Warsaw Pact, UNESCO

ECONOMY (UJOU)

GNP: \$45.1 billion (1972, at 1971 prices); per capita \$2,650

Agriculture: Food deficit area; main crops—potatoes, rye, wheat, barley, oats, and industrial crops

Major industries: Metal fabrication, chemicals, light industry, brown coal, uranium, and shipbuilding

Electric power: Installed capacity 14.3 million kw.; production 72.8 billion kw.-hr. (1972), 4,270 kw.-hr. per capita

Exports: \$7,635 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial and agricultural products

Imports: \$7,248 million (1972) at 1972 monetary conversion rate; metal products, basic materials, light industrial, agricultural and forestry products

Major trading partners: 75% of export trade and 70% of import trade with Communist areas (1971), U.S.S.R. 38% of total trade, West Germany 10.2%

Fiscal year: Same as calendar year

Monetary conversion rate: DME2.8 = US\$1 (early 1973); DME3.15 = US\$1 (1972)

COMMUNICATIONS (S)

Railroads: 9,109 route miles; 8,762 miles standard gage, 347 miles meter and narrow gages; 7,379 miles single track, 1,730 miles double- and multiple-track; 843 miles electrified; government owned

Highways: 28,500 miles classified routes, mostly paved; 7,750 miles classified state or national highways including 950 miles of limited-access autobahns, 20,750 miles classified district roads. Additionally, 25,600 miles unclassified, natural-surface minor roads

Inland waterways: 1,040 miles navigable, 1,040 miles of which are principal

Pipelines: About 650 miles, mostly for crude products; estimated 116 miles of new lines under construction

Ports: 5 major (Rostock, Wismar, Stralsund, Sassnitz, Peenemuende), 12 minor

Merchant marine: 138 ships (1,000 g.r.t. and over) totaling 1,043,247 g.r.t. and 1,392,260 d.w.t.; major part of fleet consists of 91 dry cargo, 12 bulk cargo, and 10 tankers

Civil air: 28-30 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 146 total; 54 with permanent-surface runways; 49 with runways 8,000-11,999 ft.; 42 with runways 4,000-7,999 ft.

Telecommunications: Domestic and international facilities modern and adequate; good coverage provided by radio-broadcast stations (AM and FM), 6 million receivers; 12 regional and 7 local TV stations, 4.5 million TV receivers; 2,165,000 telephones (fully automatic)

DEFENSE FORCES (S)

Military manpower: Males 15-49, 3,876,000; 3,140,000 fit for military service; about 132,000 reach military age (18) annually

Personnel: (Estimated) ground forces 90,000, naval forces 17,500, air force 12,000, frontier groups 49,500, alert police 11,000, security guard 3,500

Personnel in reserve (not on active duty): (Estimated) ground forces 700,000, naval forces 22,800, air force 4,400

Major ground units: 6 divisions (4 motorized rifle, 2 tank), 1 SCUD (SS-1) tactical missile brigade, 4 regiments (2 artillery, 2 antiaircraft artillery), 1 airborne battalion, 2 antitank battalions

Ships: 2 destroyer escorts, 141 coastal patrol types, 69 river/roadstead patrol types, 57 minesweepers, 28 amphibious types, 54 auxiliaries, 91 service craft

Aircraft (operational): 399 including 329 jet (320 jet fighters and 9 turboprop transports), 3 turboprop transports, 13 prop transports, 14 turbine helicopters, 35 piston helicopters

Missiles: 20 SA-2 SAM sites (120 launchers)*

Supply: Dependent on Communist countries mainly the U.S.S.R. except for light infantry weapons, small arms ammunition, explosives, chemical warfare, defensive materiel, signal equipment, transport vehicles, some CW/BV warfare agents, and most naval ships

Military budget: For fiscal year ending 31 December 1973, 8.3 billion DME; about 9.2% of total budget

*National SA-2 force capability is increased by presence of 27 operational SA-2 sites and 23 operational SA-3 sites which are subordinate to Soviet Group of Forces (stationed in) East Germany; deployment of SA-4 (23 SA-4 battalions) continues in defense of Soviet forces. Deployment of SA-6 has commenced, and elements of at least 2 regiments are believed to be present.


SECRET


23

Places and features referred to in this General Survey (u/ou)

	COORDINATES			COORDINATES	
	'N.	'E.		'N.	'E.
Adlershof (sec. of East Berlin)	52 27	13 32	Naumburg	51 09	11 49
Altenburg	50 59	12 27	Neisse (stream)	52 04	14 46
Aue	50 35	12 42	Neubrandenburg	53 34	13 16
Babelsberg	52 24	13 06	Neustrelitz	53 22	13 05
Bad Elster	50 17	12 14	Niederfinow	52 50	13 56
Bad Hersfeld, West Germany	50 52	9 42	Niemegk	52 05	12 42
Bad Schandau	50 55	14 09	Oberhof	50 43	10 44
Bansin	53 58	14 08	Oder (stream)	53 32	14 38
Barhöft	54 26	13 02	Oder-Havel-Kanal (canal)	52 52	14 02
Barth	54 22	12 44	Oder-Spree-Kanal (canal)	52 23	13 41
Bautzen	51 11	14 23	Oranienburg	52 45	13 14
Bergen	54 25	13 26	Osnabrück, West Germany	52 16	8 03
Berlin	52 31	13 24	Osthafen (port)	52 27	13 27
Biesenthal	52 46	13 38	Ostseebad Wustrow	54 21	12 24
Bitterfeld	51 37	12 19	Paderborn, West Germany	51 43	8 46
Blankenheim	51 31	11 25	Pankow (sec. of East Berlin)	52 34	13 24
Böhlen	51 12	12 23	Parow	54 21	13 05
Boizenburg	53 23	10 43	Patz	52 14	13 39
Bonn, West Germany	50 44	7 06	Peenemünde	54 08	13 47
Boxberg	51 24	14 34	Petkus	51 59	13 21
Brandenburg	52 25	12 33	Piesteritz	51 52	12 36
Brandenburg (region)	53 00	14 00	Plauen	50 30	12 08
Braunschweig, West Germany	52 16	10 32	Pomerania (region)	53 40	15 00
Breege	54 37	13 21	Potadam	52 24	13 04
Briesen	52 03	13 43	Prague, Czechoslovakia	50 05	14 28
Brocken (peak)	51 48	10 37	Radeberg	51 07	13 53
Buch (sec. of East Berlin)	52 39	13 30	Rheinsberg	53 06	12 53
Bug	54 37	13 13	Riems (island)	54 11	13 22
Calvörde	52 24	11 18	Riesa	51 18	13 18
Cöpin	53 31	13 26	Rosendorf	51 03	13 56
Cottbus	51 46	14 20	Rosslau	51 53	12 15
Crossen	50 46	12 29	Rostock	54 05	12 08
Dänholm (island)	54 19	13 07	Rothensee	52 11	11 40
Danube (stream)	45 20	29 40	Ruderitz	50 25	12 01
Darsser Ort (cape)	54 29	12 31	Rügen (island)	54 25	13 24
Dequede	52 50	11 41	Rummelsburg	52 30	13 31
Dessau	51 50	12 15	Saale (stream)	51 57	11 55
Dresden	51 03	13 45	Saalfeld	50 39	11 22
East Berlin	52 30	13 32	Saalow	52 12	13 23
Eberswalde	52 50	13 50	Saar, West Germany (region)	49 15	7 00
Eggersdorf	52 32	13 49	Sangerhausen	51 28	11 18
Eilenburg	51 28	12 37	Sassnitz	54 31	13 39
Eisenach	50 59	10 19	Kühlungsborn	54 09	11 43
Eisenhüttenstadt	52 09	14 39	Saxony (region)	51 00	12 00
Eisleben	51 32	11 33	Schkopau	51 24	11 59
Elbe (stream)	53 50	9 00	Schönebeck	52 01	11 45
Elbe-Havel-Kanal (canal)	52 24	12 23	Schwarzenpfort	54 11	12 18
Erfurt	50 59	11 02	Schwarze Pumpe	51 32	14 21
Erzgebirge (mts)	50 30	13 10	Schwedenschanze (site)	54 33	13 09
Espenhain	51 11	12 28	Schwedt	53 04	14 18
Fichtel-Berg (mt)	50 26	12 57	Schwerin	52 12	13 53
Forst	51 44	14 38	Seefeld	52 37	13 41
Frankfurt	52 21	14 33	Seelingstadt	50 47	12 15
Freiberg	50 55	13 22	Seiffen	50 39	13 27
Fulda, West Germany	50 33	9 40	Senftenberg	51 31	14 01
Gedser, Denmark	54 35	11 57	Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia (region)	51 00	18 00
Gehlsdorf	54 06	12 06	Sonneberg	50 21	11 10
Gera	50 52	12 05	Stendal	52 36	11 51
Gerstungen	50 58	10 04	Stralsund	54 18	13 06
Glowe	54 34	13 29	Strausberg	52 35	13 53
Görlitz	51 10	15 00	Stubbenkammer	54 35	13 40
Greifswald	54 06	13 23	Südhafen (port)	52 31	13 12
Gross Inselsberg (mt)	50 52	10 28	Suhl	50 36	10 42
Güldendorf	52 19	14 32	Szczecin (Stettin), Poland	53 25	14 35
Halle	51 30	12 00	Tarnowitz	53 58	11 14
Halle-Neustadt (sec. of Halle)	51 29	11 56	Tautenburg	51 00	11 43
Hamburg, West Germany	53 33	10 00	Teplice, Czechoslovakia	50 38	13 50
Harz (mts)	51 45	10 30	Thüringer Wald (mts)	50 40	10 50
Havel (stream)	52 53	11 58	Thuringia (region)	51 00	11 00
Havel-Kanal (canal)	52 36	13 12	Torgau	51 34	13 00
Heinersdorf	53 06	14 12	Trattendorf	51 32	14 23
Helbra	51 33	11 30	Trelleborg, Sweden	55 22	13 10


Dresden	51 08	13 48	Saalfeld	51 07	11 50
East Berlin	52 30	13 33	Saalew.	50 39	11 22
Eberswalde	52 50	13 60	Saar, West (Germany) (region)	52 12	13 23
Eggersdorf	52 32	13 49	Sangerhausen	49 15	7 00
Eilenburg	51 28	12 37	Sassenitz	51 28	11 18
Eisenach	50 59	10 19	Kühlungsborn	54 31	13 39
Eisenhüttenstadt	52 09	14 39	Saxony (region)	54 09	11 43
Eisleben	51 32	11 33	Schkopau	51 00	13 00
Elbe (stream)	53 50	9 00	Schönebeck	51 24	11 59
Elbe-Havel-Kanal (canal)	52 24	12 23	Schwarzenpost	52 01	11 45
Erfurt	50 59	11 02	Schwarze Pumpe	54 11	12 18
Erzgebirge (mts)	50 30	13 10	Schwedenschanze (isle)	51 32	14 21
Espenhain	51 11	12 28	Schwedt	54 33	13 09
Fichtel-Berg (mt)	50 26	12 57	Schwerin	53 04	14 18
Forst	51 44	14 38	Schwerin	52 12	13 53
Frankfurt	52 21	14 33	Seefeld	52 37	13 41
Freiberg	50 55	13 22	Seelingstädt	50 47	12 15
Fulda, West Germany	50 33	9 40	Seiffen	50 39	13 27
Gedser, Denmark	54 35	11 57	Senftenberg	51 31	14 01
Gehlsdorf	54 06	12 06	Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia (region)	51 00	18 00
Gera	50 52	12 05	Sonneberg	50 21	11 10
Gerstungen	50 58	10 04	Stendal	52 36	11 51
Glowe	54 34	13 29	Stralsund	54 18	13 06
Görlitz	51 10	15 00	Strausberg	52 35	13 53
Greifswald	54 06	13 23	Stubbenkammer	54 35	13 40
Gross Inselsberg (mt)	50 52	10 28	Südhafen (port)	52 31	13 12
Güldendorf	52 19	14 32	Suhl	50 36	10 42
Halle	51 30	12 00	Szczecin (Stettin), Poland	53 25	14 35
Halle-Neustadt (sec. of Halle)	51 29	11 56	Tarnowitz	53 58	11 14
Hamburg, West Germany	53 33	10 00	Tautenburg	51 00	11 43
Harz (mts)	51 45	10 30	Teplice, Czechoslovakia	50 38	13 50
Havel (stream)	52 53	11 58	Thüringer Wald (mts)	50 40	10 50
Havel-Kanal (canal)	52 36	13 12	Thuringia (region)	51 00	11 00
Heinersdorf	53 06	1. 12	Torgau	51 34	13 00
Helbra	51 33	11 30	Trattendorf	51 32	14 23
Helmstedt, West Germany	52 14	11 06	Trelleborg, Sweden	55 22	13 10
Hennigsdorf	52 38	13 12	Tremdorf	52 16	13 07
Hettstedt	51 39	11 30	Unstrut (stream)	51 10	11 48
Hildesheim, West Germany	52 09	9 58	Unterwellenborn	50 39	11 26
Hof, West Germany	50 19	11 55	Vetachau	51 47	14 04
Hohenwarte	50 36	11 29	Vitte	54 34	13 06
Hoyerswerda	51 26	14 15	Vockerode	51 51	12 21
Ilmenau	50 41	10 54	Wahnsdorf	51 07	13 10
Jena	50 56	11 35	Waldheim	52 35	13 03
Juliusruh	54 37	13 22	Warnemünde	54 10	12 05
Kamenz	51 16	14 06	Weimar	50 59	11 19
Karl-Marx-Stadt	50 50	12 55	Werra (stream)	51 26	9 39
Kassel, West Germany	51 19	9 30	West Berlin	52 30	13 20
Kolkwitz	51 45	14 15	Westhafen (port)	52 32	13 20
Königstein	50 55	14 04	Westtaaken	52 30	13 08
Königs Wusterhausen	52 17	13 37	Wieck	54 06	13 27
Köpenick (sec. of East Berlin)	52 27	13 34	Wilhelm-Pieck-Stadt Guben	51 57	14 43
Kostrzyn, Poland	52 35	14 39	Wismar	53 54	11 28
Kühlungsborn	54 09	11 43	Wittenberg	51 52	12 39
Lauta	51 28	14 04	Wittenberge	53 00	11 45
Leipzig	51 18	12 20	Wolgaat	54 03	13 46
Leuna	51 19	12 01	Wroclaw (Breslau), Poland	51 06	17 02
Lichtenberg (sec. of Gera)	50 50	12 09	Wunsdorf	52 10	13 28
Lindenberg	52 12	14 08	Wurzburg, West Germany	49 48	9 56
Linow	53 23	13 57	Zehlendorf	52 47	13 23
Lippendorf	51 11	12 23	Zehrendorf	52 10	13 30
Lohme	54 35	13 37	Zeitz	51 03	12 09
Lübbenau	51 52	13 58	Zella-Mehlis	50 36	10 39
Lubmin	54 07	13 36	Zeuthen	52 22	13 37
Ludwigslust	53 19	11 30	Zielitz	52 17	11 41
Lützkendorf	51 18	11 51	Zossen	52 13	13 27
Magdeburg	52 10	11 40	Zachornowitz	51 43	12 24
Marienborn	52 12	11 07	Zwickau	50 44	12 30
Marienehe (sec. of Rostock)	54 07	12 05			
Markersbach	50 32	12 52	Selected airfields		
Markgrafenheide	54 11	12 10	Alt Lönnewitz	51 33	13 13
Marlow	51 09	12 35	Briesen	52 02	13 45
Marquardt	52 27	12 58	Dresden	51 08	13 46
Mecklenburg (region)	53 30	12 00	Drewitz	51 53	14 32
Meiningen	50 33	10 25	Gross Dolln	53 02	13 32
Meissen	51 09	13 29	Kothen	51 43	11 58
Merseburg	51 22	12 00	Oranienburg	52 44	13 13
Mittelland Kanal (canal)	52 16	11 41	Prenemünde	54 10	13 47
Moxa	50 39	11 38	Prechen	51 40	14 38
Muldenstein	51 40	12 20	Schönefeld	52 23	13 31
Nauen	52 36	12 53	Welzow	51 35	14 08
			Werneuchen	52 38	13 46






East Berlin Land Use and Industry

- LAND USE**
- Urban
 - Forest or park
 - Open area (primarily field or meadow)
- INDUSTRY**
- Circles and segments indicate relative importance:
- Basic materials
Metallurgy, power, chemicals and fertilizers, rubber, building materials
 - Metal working
Heavy machinery, transportation equipment, shipbuilding, electrical equipment, precision and optical equipment
 - Light industry
Textiles, clothing, wood, paper, glass
 - Food industry
- Stadtbezirk boundary




Basic Resources and Processing

- RESOURCES**
- Natural gas
 - Brown coal
 - Bituminous coal
 - Potash
 - Copper
- MAJOR PIPELINE**
- Oil
 - Natural gas
- PROCESSING**
- Iron and steel
 - Copper
 - Oil, gas, coal




Berlin and Industry

Berlin
 Park
 (primarily meadow)
 NY
 indicate
 chemicals and fertilizing materials
 transportation equipment, electrical equipment, optical equipment
 wood, paper, glass
 boundary



Land Use

- Most intensive agriculture (primarily wheat, sugarbeets, and corn)
- Mixed intensive and extensive agriculture (including rye and potatoes)
- Mixed extensive agriculture, pasture, and forest
- Permanent pasture
- Forest




Resources Processing


SOURCES
 Rural gas
 brown coal
 luminous coal
 ash
 copper
 PIPELINE
 Rural gas
 PROCESSING
 iron and steel
 copper
 gas, coal



Industrial Centers

- Circles and segments indicate relative importance
- Basic materials
Mining, metallurgy, power, chemicals and fertilizers, rubber, building materials
 - Metal working
Heavy machinery, transportation equipment, shipbuilding, electrical equipment, precision and optical equipment
 - Light industry
Textiles, clothing, wood, paper, glass, ceramics
 - Food industry





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


Central Intelligence Agency For Official Use Only



Basic Resources and Processing

- RESOURCES**
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 - Copper
- MAJOR PIPELINE**
- Oil
 - Natural gas
- PROCESSING**
- Iron and steel
 - Copper
 - Oil gas coal




Population

Persons per square mile
 0 100 250 510 777

0 50 100 200 300

Persons per square kilometer




Resources Processing






Industrial Centers

- Circles and segments indicate relative importance
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 - Metal working
Heavy machinery, transportation equipment, shipbuilding, electrical equipment, precision and optical equipment
 - Light industry
Textiles, clothing, wood, paper, glass, ceramics
 - Food industry



Population

100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000



Summary Map