

INTER KIDD - 26 Feb 46

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(31)

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 26 February 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Q We were talking about your June 17th entry in your diary when we quit yesterday. I wish you would tell me again, in your own words, just what happened at that particular liaison conference and what the proposal of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was.

A On that day, I heard from the Aide-de-Camp that the Foreign Minister said that the occupation or the sending of troops to French Indo-China would be internationally immoral or not right and for that reason he will not be able to tell the Emperor to that respect. Therefore, it was to be reconsidered by the liaison conference and the Foreign Minister instructed that negotiations would be conducted with the Vichy Government through Germany.

Q Was this liaison conference in Imperial General Headquarters?

A It is the liaison conference of the Imperial General Headquarters.

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- Q Several times in your diary you talk about cabinet liaison conferences. Is that a different type of liaison conference or is there just one type?
- A One.
- Q It is the one that brings various agencies together into this one liaison conference, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q At this particular liaison conference there were people present that advocated that Japan should land troops in French Indo-China and establish bases in order to operate out of that theatre. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q And it was the thoughts of those people that MATSUOKA was opposed to. Who were the people who advocated moving into French Indo-China without negotiations with the Vichy Government?
- A I believe it was the War Minister and the General Staff of the Army and the attitude of the Navy was not clear on that.
- Q In other words, your recollection is that War Minister TOJO and Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA were strong advocates at this conference that Japan needed these bases because of her national policy of penetration into the South in order to fight China from the South and that she should proceed to land troops. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, felt that would be a violation of international law and treaties and attempted to negotiate with Vichy in order to justify the landing of troops?
- A Yes.
- Q Was any effort made to negotiate with officials in French Indo-China or was Vichy the proper place with which to negotiate?

- A Thereafter, there were frequent negotiations conducted with the Governor-General of French Indo-China and the Governor-General of French Indo-China said he has been granted authority to conduct independently of the Vichy Government. That is what I recall.
- Q The War Minister and the Army Chief of Staff were willing to have these negotiations carried out but was it their attitude that if they were unsuccessful, they would land troops anyway?
- A Fortunately agreement has been reached with the Vichy Government and as far as the necessity of landing troops is concerned, it was absolutely necessary in order to gain the Army's objective.
- Q In other words, the Army felt that if an agreement could be reached to land troops, that would be fine and if it couldn't reach an agreement, they would land troops anyway because of the matter of necessity?
- A Yes.
- Q There were treaties between France and Japan which by their terms required Japan to recognize the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China, were there not?
- A Yes.
- Q And it was because of those treaties MATSUOKA wanted to negotiate?
- A Yes.
- Q The Army personnel, however, in those days weren't very much concerned whether they violated treaties or not, were they?
- A Rather than whether to violate the Treaty or not, they were looking more at the actions and the activities of the military and of military needs.
- Q In other words, I think you indicated that the Nine-Power Treaty was not popular with the military group and they were indifferent to its terms?
- A Yes.
- Q Were all treaties with reference to the sovereignty of territory in the East looked upon with indifference by the Army group, would you say?

- A No, the Japanese Government proclaimed that she would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China. Only the method may differ.
- Q I don't understand what you mean. Can you explain that a little more?
- A In occupying or sending troops into French Indo-China, Japan was respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France.
- Q You mean irrespective of how the agreement to obtain bases was brought about, she nevertheless did obtain such an agreement. I think you indicated yesterday it was your opinion a great deal of pressure was brought upon French Indo-China through Vichy to get the bases. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Is it not true that threat was made by Japan through her Foreign Office that if the bases were not granted, Japan would move in anyway?
- A I do not know to that extent because I never heard any words to that extent.
- Q On June 18, you mention talking to the Premier and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA with reference to these negotiations with Vichy. Did MATSUOKA on that occasion state what sort of pressure they were going to bring to cause this consent to be given?
- A I believe the situation was such that pressure was not needed.
- Q The true situation is that the Vichy Government was practically compelled to do anything that Germany told her to do. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q And all you had to do was to convince Germany that was a proper move and the consent from Vichy was forthcoming automatically. That is the true situation, isn't it?
- A Because French Indo-China became separated from France, she was powerless and therefore pressure was not needed.

- Q The true situation really was that Japan induced Germany to consent to Japan's having bases in French Indo-China, and Germany, through Vichy and down the line to French Indo-China brought about the consent?
- A Yes.
- Q I am just interested in this - it has no great significance other than my interest in your opinion. Do you think in your own mind that obtaining consent to land troops in French Indo-China by that procedure was something that was accomplished within the treaties and within international law or was it in violation of international law to take advantage of that situation where Vichy France was subject to German domination and forced, in effect, to consent to the landing of troops in French Indo-China. Would you say that was in violation of international law?
- A It may be a violation of the spirit of international law but because of the circumstances of the time and the influence of the great world in which that was occurring at that time, I do not believe that it is an absolute violation of a severe nature because those advantages are being taken by other countries just as well.
- Q Technically, you felt you were within the law because you had an agreement, although underneath, if you look deep enough, you have to agree it wasn't a matter of friendly dealing at arms length between nations?
- A Yes.
- Q Of course, the military group by that time were very much in favor of expansion toward the South, were they not?
- A Yes.
- Q As a matter of fact, the Japanese Government, as a whole, was pretty well committed to a program of expansion into the South by then, isn't that right?
- A I do not know any plan held by the directing body of the military in regard to incursion into the South but because France became weak, the militarists' desire and ambitions toward the South became more and more stronger.

Q In other words, it was a situation that the military could very well exploit and take advantage of; that is, the weakness of France?

A Yes.

Q You had mentioned in your diary about the policy of penetration into the South which existed in the military circles and by the thinking of MATSUOKA, the desire for Japan to expand into the South. Isn't that right?

A The Emperor was very much concerned about the tactics of the military taking advantage where their opponent was weak and the Emperor cautioned against taking advantage of anybody that happens to be weak.

Q Was it the opinion of the Emperor in your discussions with him that Japan had really taken advantage of French Indo-China and Vichy in obtaining these bases?

A The Emperor worried about measures taken being too severe and I was worried about it, too.

Q What did the Emperor say, as nearly as you remember? How did he express himself about the dealing with Vichy and the getting of these bases through that process?

A The Emperor said that one should not take advantage when a person is weak and is powerless to defend himself. There is a Japanese saying "Stealing while the place is on fire", and the Emperor said Japan should not "steal while the place is on fire".

Q On June 18, you indicated that you went to see the Emperor and reported to him the fact that MATSUOKA had caused negotiations to be entered into with Vichy through Germany. Do you remember what the Emperor said on that occasion? Is that when he mentioned the Japanese proverb and thought it was a mistake to so negotiate?

A Yes, the same sort of a concern has been held by the Emperor.

Q What did you write in your diary, in effect, on February 3?

A It says on February 3, "Last Saturday, both the Chief of Staff and the Prime Minister came and reported to the Emperor the measures to be taken up in regard to Thailand and French Indo-China and I felt that as a principle, to take advantage

- A (Cont.) of the opponent that is weak or powerless would be more or less committing robbery when the place is on fire which is a very undesirable thing to do. However, in the great changes which are occurring in the World, a mere principle and argument alone would not be sufficient. The proposal in respect ~~or~~ has been ignored but its execution must be taken very cautiously.
- Q In other words, that was a meeting between the Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and the Emperor shortly before he was going to make this trip to Germany and Russia. That is right, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And that is what we talked about yesterday when you indicated that MATSUOKA had expressed the feeling that the biggest problem that Japan had was not the China problem but really the Southern Problem and that he was talking in terms of the future and not of the moment, although you thought he meant immediate expansion into the South. But you came to the understanding he was talking in terms of long term-policy of Japan having to solve the problem sooner or later?
- A Yes.
- Q Even at that stage, before he went to Germany, the Emperor was concerned about taking advantage of a nation, such as France which was subjugated to Germany?
- A Yes.
- Q At that particular time, Marquis, was it being discussed by the Foreign Minister and the Emperor, as to the possible negotiation of a treaty with Vichy for the granting of bases in French Indo-China, as early as February 1941?
- A No, previous to that, there were no special talks.
- Q But as of February 3, 1941, MATSUOKA had already come up with the thought that when he made his trip to Germany, he should try to negotiate with Vichy for some bases in French Indo-China?
- A I do not know if it was taken to that extent because there is no evidence to that.

- Q What was the Emperor really warning MATSUOKA about when he gave his example of stealing from one when the house was on fire if MATSUOKA didn't have some plan in mind for obtaining special privileges for Japan in French Indo-China?
- A This is not a talk with MATSUOKA at all.
- Q Who was the talk between on February 3?
- A The Prime Minister and both Chiefs of Staff and they gave their impressions to me.
- Q I see. In other words, the Chiefs of Staff had implied or indicated to the Emperor they desired penetration into the South and it was in answer to that policy that the Emperor gave his example and said if we go into the South, we should not take advantage of weakened France?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you know whether or not MATSUOKA, when he made his trip into Germany in the Spring of 1941 discussed with German officials the negotiation of the right to bases in French Indo-China and the possibility of bringing about such a treaty?
- A I do not know because I didn't hear anything about it.
- Q The first time you recall hearing about the actual negotiations was during June?
- A Yes.
- Q I might say to you, Marquis, I have been reading all of your diary with a great deal of interest, particularly 1941, and I think that you are in a position to give some very intelligent and valuable information as to what actually took place and it would be my opinion that not only you but also the Emperor probably knows the facts and many of the views as well as anybody, and it would be to your own personal advantage and to the advantage of your country to tell us everything you do know about it.
- A Yes.
- Q I notice on June 19 that MATSUOKA telephoned to you what turned out to be a false report about the invasion of Russia by Germany and you passed the information on to the Emperor.

- Q (Cont.) Was that the customary procedure for Ministers that had such information, to convey it to you and for you to take it to the Emperor as Lord Keeper, rather than them going direct and advising the Emperor.
- A Ordinarily, direct information is given to the Emperor. In this event, the information was not given to the Emperor through me by the Prime Minister but that the Prime Minister informed me about it and it just happened I was going to see the Emperor on that day, so on that occasion, I happened to inform him.
- Q It wasn't your official duty to convey information from the Minister to the Emperor but you were obligated, when you had an audience with the Emperor, to tell him about current affairs?
- A And because this was of great concern to the Emperor at that time.
- Q On June 20, you talked with Prince KONOYE and he complained about being unable to understand MATSUOKA's foreign policy. What did he have to say to you on that occasion and what difficulty was he having in comprehending MATSUOKA's foreign policy?
- A When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA returned from Germany, his attitude changed abruptly and he more or less had an attitude of disrespecting the Prime Minister and his opinion was always vacillating, and his opinion regarding the Japanese-American negotiations was not clear. Therefore, the Prime Minister was greatly worried about him.
- Q Well, can we say this? Before MATSUOKA went to Germany, he was inclined to follow the views and principles of Premier KONOYE but upon returning, he was much more independent and did not see things eye-to-eye with KONOYE.
- A He became swell-headed and began to disagree with him.
- Q What did he say or do that you recall that was indicative to you that MATSUOKA became big-headed when he returned from Germany? What conduct on his part indicated that?
- A There were many instances where MATSUOKA would not even have conferences with the Prime Minister but would go directly to the Emperor and give all sorts of talks about foreign policy.

- Q What would be the nature of these talks with the Emperor? What would he advocate in going direct to the Emperor that he would not discuss with the Premier?
- A MATSUOKA had the tendency of telling the Emperor those matters which normally should be decided in a Cabinet meeting.
- Q Can you think of anything or any occasion which happened as an example of that?
- A Especially, when Germany and Russia went to war.
- Q What happened on that occasion?
- A When the Russo-German war started on the 22nd of June, as written in my diary, I was suspicious that MATSUOKA probably would go directly to the Emperor on his own accord and give an arbitrary report or talks on the foreign policy of Japan. So, before he had the audience with the Emperor, I went and had an audience with the Emperor and I told the Emperor that this event has a great bearing on the fate of the Japanese nation and when MATSUOKA would come and give his opinions on diplomatic foreign policies, MATSUOKA should be referred to the Prime Minister and have everything straightened out with him. Just as I expected, MATSUOKA had an audience with the Emperor.
- Q Without first talking to the Premier?
- A Without talking to the Premier and he said that Japan should immediately dispatch troops into Siberia and for that purpose the Liaison Conference should be opened and he gave all sorts of radical proposals to the Emperor. The Emperor inquired of MATSUOKA "Did you confer with the Prime Minister on that matter?" But MATSUOKA did not, so the Emperor did not consent to MATSUOKA's proposals. The Emperor ordered him to confer with the Prime Minister.
- Q In other words, the Emperor followed your suggestion that you had made at an earlier date. One of the things that MATSUOKA came forth with immediately upon ^{the} attacking of Russia by Germany was that Japan should attack Russia from the Eastern end, is that right?
- A That is the tactics of MATSUOKA which is very indiscernible because he concluded the neutrality pact with Russia and on this occasion, he immediately advocated the attack on Siberia. That was the dangerous nature of MATSUOKA.

- Q Was it your feeling that MATSUOKA negotiated the Tripartite Pact and later went back to Germany and other such people that had conversed with him that in case of war between Germany and Russia, Japan should attack Russia simultaneously?
- A At that time, it may have been so.
- Q Did you ever have any information or were any statements made by MATSUOKA indicating that Germany had requested or suggested that Japan should attack Russia at the same time that Germany did?
- A I heard that it was said that Germany will not borrow Japan's power or help.
- Q Who was supposed to have conveyed that information to you? Do you recall?
- A I can't find that here (diary).
- Q Well, we may come to that later on. Let me ask you this. Was it true that MATSUOKA had always been an advocate of Japan attacking Russia when the appropriate time came?
- A MATSUOKA presumed that Russia would collapse in about two or three months and for that reason it was necessary for Japan to obtain a foothold in Siberia. He had that sort of an opinion.
- Q He got that opinion from Hitler, himself, who made the statement that Russia would collapse in two or three months?
- A I believe so.
- Q Why did he think Japan should obtain a foothold in Siberia?
- A I believe that on the occasion of the collapse of Russia, Japan wanted to settle the outstanding controversy she had with Russia, especially the boundaries between Manchukuo and Russia.
- Q Had MATSUOKA always been an advocate of having a war with Russia? Over a period of years, was that his philosophy?
- A MATSUOKA was of the opinion that war with Russia was inevitable.
- Q BARON HIRANUMA was another man who was an advocate of attacking Russia, was he not?

- A Because Baron HIRANUMA disliked communism so vehemently, he probably was of that mind. He wanted to settle the differences and the disputes with Russia.
- Q I want to ask you a little more about the change of attitude in MATSUOKA. Between the time he went to Germany in the spring and when he returned, insofar as his foreign policy was concerned, what was the main change? You say there was a change and he had a lot of radical ideas.
- A I believe that the basis of his opinion was that Russia would collapse soon after Germany has attacked her.
- Q Is it true that when MATSUOKA returned from Germany in April of 1941, he brought back with him information that before long Germany would attack Russia? Did he know that was being planned?
- A Perhaps he did come back with that information about the possibility of Germany attacking Russia.
- Q Of course, you learned about it shortly thereafter from you Minister in Germany, OSHIMA?
- A Yes.
- Q Was it on this trip in 1941 that MATSUOKA negotiated the neutrality pact with Russia?
- A It was on MATSUOKA's return trip from Germany that he negotiated with Russia and concluded the neutrality pact.
- Q In the spring of 1941?
- A Yes, and consequently, Russia also was aware of being caught in a pincer of Germany and Japan and for that reason, she probably concluded a neutrality pact with Japan.
- Q I can understand how Russia would be desirous of having a neutrality pact with Japan because of the activities of Germany and Japan, but why was it that Japan, and let us say, MATSUOKA, himself, desired a neutrality pact with Russia? What was the advantage to Japan in signing the neutrality pact with Russia?
- A Because at the signing of the Tripartite Pact, Japan desired the inclusion of Russia in that Axis Pact and for that reason, Japan probably concluded the neutrality pact. MATSUOKA, on his return from Germany, perhaps, was aware that Germany would attack Russia but he did not know when nor was he actually fully aware of it.

- Q But if MATSUOKA felt that sooner or later, Germany would attack Russia, why was it MATSUOKA wanted a neutrality pact with Russia?
- A Therefore, I think that MATSUOKA carried over his previous policy of being on good terms with Russia and including Russia in the Tripartite Pact. Another reason is that the Japanese Army was not prepared to strike Russia at the Russian-Manchurian border. Therefore, even though MATSUOKA demanded immediate expedition into Siberia, the Army opposed it and MATSUOKA's proposal consequently collapsed.
- Q Isn't it true that the majority of the Army group, in those days, were thinking in terms of penetration in the South rather than fighting a war against Russia in the North?
- A In operation against Russia, the front there is so long that it would require a tremendous amount of mechanized strength and it would be needed to be raised, and the occupation of Siberia would not obtain for Japan any oil and for that reason, operation against Siberia was impossible.
- Q In other words, the majority of the Army felt that penetration into the South would be more beneficial to Japan than fighting a war on the long front of Siberia?
- A And also the preparation was very meager.
- Q But MATSUOKA, the very day that Germany invaded Russia, immediately advocated that Japan should attack Russia.
- A And also, such a feeling existed in a section of the Army, too. At that time, those sections that advocated the expedition into Siberia were saying "Don't miss the bus" and they were worried that soon Moscow would fall and in that event the German influence and power would be great while Japan's words in Siberia would be weak.
- Q In other words, it was another example of certain elements desiring to take advantage of a country while she was in a weakened condition. Is that right?
- A Yes.

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- Q In other words, it was another example of certain elements desiring to take advantage of a country while she was in a weakened condition. Is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q The very principle, you say the Emperor was opposed to?
- A Yes.
- Q What was MATSUOKA's attitude with reference to this neutrality pact that he had just recently signed with Russia when he advocated this program of attacking Russia? Did he have any justification for violating that pact?
- A MATSUOKA explained that the Tripartite pact was much more weightier than the pact with Russia and that was the only explanation he gave. That explanation was not comprehensible to me.
- Q In other words, he stated to you that he felt that Japan was more obligated to live up to the Tripartite Pact and, in effect, support Germany and Italy than it was obligated to live up to its pact with Russia? That one was of a higher degree than the other?
- A I believe he had the intention of solving the problems with Siberia upon the collapse of Russia.
- Q But the Tripartite Pact had nothing in it that required Japan as a matter of law to attack Russia because of the fact that Germany had attacked Russia rather than Russia attacking Germany?
- A Therefore, Japan was not obligated.
- Q Japan was not under any obligation under any of these treaties to attack Russia, was she?
- A No.
- Q But MATSUOKA, in spite of the treaty and the relative degree of importance of the treaty was willing to violate the treaty and attack Russia because he felt it was the opportune moment?
- A Yes.
- Q Who were those in the military group that were the leading advocates of MATSUOKA's foreign policy of attacking Russia at that moment?
- A I do not know of any particular persons. There may have been a section of younger officers in the Army but the directing body of the Army and the operations section of the Army, because of its unpreparedness, were not advocating an attack on Russia at this time.

- Q The real leaders in the Army were sponsoring a program of penetration in the South rather than war with Russia?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice on June 22 in your diary that the Emperor, after he had talked with MATSUOKA and while he was talking with you at a later period in the day, asked some very pertinent questions along the lines we were discussing. One of the questions he asked you was whether or not MATSUOKA's policy of attacking Russia wouldn't involve Japan in a war in the North as well as in the South. Did he ask you that question - the Emperor - on that occasion?
- A The Emperor said that the expedition of Japanese forces into the North would mean war in the North and also the fact that there are troops in the South more or less present a problem of the division of command. Also, it is questionable that the Government and the Supreme Command may not agree and that it would be impossible from a standpoint of national power, and so, the Emperor was greatly concerned.
- Q The Emperor, in rejecting MATSUOKA's theory of attacking Russia at that particular time, had in mind that there was a good likelihood that the Army was going to force Japan to expand in the South and he didn't want Japan to get in the situation of having to fight both in the North and the South. Can we say that as of June 22, the plans-for penetration into the South were sufficiently formulated that the Emperor felt there was a good likelihood that that activity would soon take place?
- A No, it wasn't to that extent because even in the Imperial Conference in July, only the matter of an expedition to the South was taken up.
- Q Why was the Emperor concerned there might be a war both in the North and South if there wasn't present in the picture some good possibility there might be war in the South?
- A It means aggressive expansion into the South. It does not entirely mean the dispatch of troops.
- Q In other words, the Emperor knew that the country, through its foreign policy, had become pretty much committed to a program of expansion into the South, whether by force of arms or not and he thought it was an inopportune time to start fighting war in the North when you were trying to obtain materials in the South?

A Yes.

Q You indicated on June 22 when war with Russia started that MATSUOKA came up with the idea of immediately attacking Russia, so Japan wouldn't miss the boat, etc., and that he had other radical ideas. Do you recall any other radical ideas he had at that time? You mentioned a while ago that he had a lot of radical ideas.

A That was the radical idea he had.

Q MATSUOKA still favored Japanese penetration into the South, didn't he? This thought of attacking Russia was in addition to that program?

A Upon returning from Germany, MATSUOKA said that the northern front now is quiet so we must plan toward the South. But because Germany attacked Russia, he felt that Russian collapse is imminent and he thought it would be necessary to settle the problems with Russia in the North and he thought that everything would be over in a short time.

Q In other words, immediately upon his return from Germany, he favored the southern expansion program but the minute the war broke out with Russia, he thought now was the opportune time to attack Russia. Is that right?

A He makes decisions very quickly but he is rather dangerous.

Q Well, irrespective of who MATSUOKA advocated Japan attack, whether in the South or in the North, he certainly advocated that Japan attack somebody, either in the North or the South after his return from Germany, did he not? MATSUOKA, when he came back from Germany was committed to a foreign policy on the part of Japan that she expand whether it was in the South or the North. Although he varied in his philosophy from time to time, he was for expansion of Japan by active measures. Is that right?

A Yes

Q Would you say that he was more of an advocate of aggression after his return from his trip to Germany than he had been before he went?

A He had that sort of tendency even before he went to Germany.

- Q Would you say he was more aggressive in his foreign policy for Japan after his return from Germany than he was before he went?
- A Upon being the Foreign Minister, he endeavored to take away all diplomatic activities from the hands of the military and upon the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and the success of the mediation between Thailand and French Indo-China, he became very swell-headed and upon his return from Germany, he became more and more arbitrary and willful and exercised his powers at will in the Cabinet.
- Q Don't you think it is likely true that when he made his trip to Germany and he saw this great power that Nazi Germany was exercising over the continent of Europe and rewriting the map of Europe, he became imbued with some of the Nazi philosophy and thought it was about time Japan rewrote the map of the Far East?
- A I cannot be as conclusive as that.
- Q It has some elements of that, don't you think?
- A Yes, he had the same tendency.
- Q I would be interested in your explaining, without too great detail, your entry of June 21 with reference to the possibility of the KONOYE Cabinet upon war being declared upon Russia by Germany.
- A In the HIRANUMA Cabinet, the Japanese-German Pact was being studied and it was aimed at against Russia in combatting communistic influences. While that Germany-Japanese anti-Comintern Pact was being studied, Germany and Soviet Russia concluded a non-aggression pact without any warning, so Premier HIRANUMA said that he had no words to say to the Emperor regarding that and for that reason, HIRANUMA resigned from the Premiership.
- Q In other words, the HIRANUMA Cabinet was trying to negotiate a Tripartite Pact against Russia and right in the middle of it, Russia and Germany entered into a friendly pact and that caused his Cabinet to fall?
- A Yes, but in this event when Japan had a neutrality pact with Russia and Germany attacked Russia, the situation is entirely different so in Japan, it is not necessary for the KONOYE Cabinet to resign.

- Q I understand. Back in the days of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, was there an active plan in those days by the military to attack Russia? You mention in your diary about June 21 that Baron HIRANUMA had long emphasized the necessity of attacking Russia and in another place you mention that the HIRANUMA Cabinet was not yet in complete agreement as to starting a war against Russia. Was there a movement on foot to attack Russia in those days?
- A No intention of attacking Russia in those days was contemplated by the HIRANUMA Cabinet because it had no power whatsoever of doing it and because the China incident was taking the full effort of Japan.
- Q Was it true, as you wrote in your diary, that Baron HIRANUMA had emphasized and indicated the necessity of attacking Russia?
- A It does not mean that Japan is going to attack Russia. It means that Russia is the hypothetical enemy in reference to the Pact.
- Q On June 23, I notice that the Chief of Staff had an audience with the Emperor and that the Aide-de-Camp reported to you about it. Do you recall what was said in that report and what the attitude of the Chief of Staff was with reference to this breaking out of war in Europe?
- A The Aide-de-Camp gave a report on the situation of Germany attacking Russia.
- Q What was the nature of the report? What did he say with reference to the Chief of Staff?
- A The Field Military Attache usually gives a report as to where and when the German troops are in their attack on Russia and things like that and he gave me a report on those matters.
- Q It was a report on what was actually taking place on the Russian front? Is that right?
- A Yes, and then he commented on whether the war was progressing smoothly or not.
- Q What was War Minister TOJO's attitude with reference to Japan attacking Russia at that time?

- A The military did not favor Japan attacking Russia because she was unprepared for it.
- Q But TOJO still was favorable to expansion toward the South to get materials and supplies?
- A I believe so.
- Q What was it that General SUZUKI advocated with reference to Imperial Headquarters?
- A General SUZUKI talked on the fact that the Army section and the Navy section were divided in Imperial General Headquarters and he advocated that they be unified; that they be brought under one; that they be combined. As a result, the Imperial General Headquarters place of meeting was established in the Palace.
- Q What was the advantage of moving the place of meeting of Imperial General Headquarters from outside of the Palace Grounds to inside the Palace grounds? What did that accomplish?
- A As a consequence, they were to meet in one single room in the Palace - in one place, because, hitherto, they were meeting separately and as a consequence, the operation was not progressing smoothly.
- Q Wasn't most of the work of Imperial General Headquarters done in these liaison conferences - the policy questions were decided there?
- A On a matter of policy, it is determined at the liaison conference but the matter of operations is determined separately at Imperial General Headquarters.
- Q So he advocated that operational matters be agreed and discussed in one room?
- A Yes.
- Q What did you have in mind when you referred to the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals of the Fleet?
- A General SUZUKI said that the proposal of making the Imperial General Headquarters become unified be referred to the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals and in taking this matter to the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals, he said they would have to be very careful.

- Q But as a matter of fact, the Imperial Headquarters would become unified and operational questions were determined at one place by the joint participation of the Army and Navy?
- A Yes.
- Q And then they continued to hold liaison conferences in this particular room from time to time and that was in the Palace Grounds after this change?
- A Yes.
- Q On June 24, you indicated that the Emperor expressed his opinion regarding the policy Japan should follow in view of the new turn of events. What did he say on that occasion?
- A I do not know the details but gave his impression of the matter of Germany attacking Russia and he said that the flame of war is gradually enveloping the world and so Japan should have a firm policy in mind and not be enveloped by it nor take advantage of the situation and "commit robbery while the house is on fire". That is what I believe the Emperor said.
- Q Was the Emperor, in your opinion, fearful that the strong position of the military in Japanese affairs in those days would break loose and try to take advantage of the weakened condition of its neighbors and acquire territory, etc. around Japan, which is what eventually actually happened?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you recall whether he cautioned the military group in that respect? Did he warn them or advise them not to take aggressive action under the circumstances?
- A There were such a story in talks with the War Minister and the Chief of Staff.
- Q What did he say to them, approximately the same as what you just stated his policy was?
- A I do not know what was exactly said because I wasn't there but I believe the Emperor was always cautioning them.
- Q On June 25, when you refer to there being certain "echoes", according to my translation, in Japan as a result of the European war, what did you have in mind?

- A I do not know exactly what was said. The Chief of the Police Bureau gave a report on the situation and that was all.
- Q Who was this WAN CHIN WEI?
- A He was the Administrator of the Nanking Government.
- Q That was the puppet Government that had been set up in China?
- A He is the head of the Puppet Chinese Government.
- Q What was he advocating in those days in connection with the settlement of the China affair?
- A He was cooperating fully with Japan as head of the Puppet Government.
- Q Well, he, in his conversation with Prince KONNYE indicated that the war ought to be brought to an end by negotiation, didn't he?
- A He talked about the plan of making an open peace treaty with China.
- Q You refer to it being difficult to carry out Japan's policy in China because of bad relations between the forces in China and the Army at home. What was the difficulty. What trouble were you having with controlling the Army in China?
- A WAN CHIN WEI said that the Supreme Headquarters of the Army in China and the Nanking Government were going along harmoniously but that there were many inconsistencies and disagreements between the lower echelons. It was because the staff officers in the lower echelons and the Ronins in China were obstructing everything by their activities.
- Q And when you write in your diary that "it was difficult to carry out our policy on the continent", is that what WAN CHIN WEI said?
- A Yes
- Q When he refers to "our policy" what did he have in mind? Do you know what "our policy" means?
- A No mention is made here (diary) of policy.

- Q I won't pursue that any further. A little later on that day, you refer to the Chiefs of Staff in the Army and the Navy making a report to the Emperor with reference to French Indo-China. Do you remember the nature of that report? Did you hear what it was or what was said on that occasion?
- A I don't know the details but I believe that at the liaison conference it was decided that the Japanese forces be stationed in French Indo-China.
- Q Do you know whether they took the position that they should be stationed there irrespective of treaty agreements to that effect?
- A I believe it was after agreement had been reached with the Vichy Government.
- Q Was the Emperor in any way opposed to the stationing of troops in French Indo-China even though the treaty, such as it was, was entered into?
- A As indicated before, the Emperor did not favor it, but, however, in this case, it was presented by the Prime Minister and both Chiefs of Staff so as a rule the Emperor had to consent to it.
- Q Even though the Emperor consents in situations where there is unanimity of opinion, does he sometimes express his feelings that they are wrong in taking that position?
- A The Emperor cautioned before that it was alright to go ahead but to do it cautiously and well, he was always making cautions that way.
- Q It is a condition precedent to the dispatching of troops to a place like French Indo-China that consent of the Emperor must first be obtained?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, the Supreme Command would not have dispatched troops to French Indo-China without first appearing before the Emperor and obtaining his consent?
- A No.
- Q Although there was unanimity of opinion, there would be little likelihood that the Emperor would not consent?
- A Yes.

- Q Is that because the Emperor, in effect, is the Commander in Chief of both the Army and the Navy?
- A Yes.
- Q On June 26, you mention OKURA, Minister of State. What is the Minister of State in the Japanese Government. Is that a separate ministry or is that a part of the Foreign Office of some other ministry?
- A This is an independent ministry. It is a Minister without portfolio.
- Q Is there always a Minister of State in Japanese politics or just occasionally in various Cabinets?
- A It is occasionally established by the Cabinet. On this occasion, three ministers of portfolio has been placed.
- Q But you do not always have Ministers of State in every Cabinet?
- A Occasionally there isn't any.
- Q Do you remember what you talked to him about or what his opinions were on that occasion?
- A I do not know much about him but he is a business man so he acted as an advisor on economic matters.
- Q Do you have any recollection what MATSUOKA had to say to the Emperor on that date, June 26?
- A I believe that MATSUOKA was explaining to the Emperor the circumstances of the Russo-German war.
- Q You think he was still advocating that Japan should attack Russia on this particular occasion?
- A I believe this was the time when the liaison conference was being put into session frequently in order to oppose the proposal of MATSUOKA.
- Q Tell me about that. Were there several liaison conferences in those days at which MATSUOKA's proposals to attack Russia were discussed pro and con?

A I believe frequent sessions of it were conducted. That is made clear in the memoirs of KONOYE. Before the opening of the Imperial Conference in July, I believe the Liaison Conferences were held four or five times.

Q In other words, as you told me on other occasions, before an Imperial Conference was held, it was customary to have one or more liaison conferences, at which time the various matters were threshed out and agreed upon before they were presented to the Emperor at the Imperial Conference?

A Yes.

Q And because of the strong position that MATSUOKA was taking on attacking Russia, there were several liaison conferences in those days in order to thresh out what the foreign policy with reference to Russia should be?

A Yes.

Q You never attended the conferences, did you?

A No.

Q Did you ever hear the nature of the discussion at those conferences and what various people said and advocated. Do you have any recollection on that?

A No.

Q Could we say that the big issue was whether or not Russia should be attacked or did the discussion involve more than just the attack of Russia?

A I don't believe the sentiment for attacking Russia was strong.

Q You don't think that was discussed very much at the liaison conferences because no one agreed to it except MATSUOKA?

A No, because very few persons agreed with MATSUOKA.

Q Then, what was the necessity for several liaison conferences in those days? What was the subject of discussion?

A I believe it was because MATSUOKA would not give in and also the matters of worldwide change as a result of the Russo-German war has been discussed.

- Q In other words, the world situation because of the war in Europe was such that it was felt necessary to have these liaison conferences to discuss just what the foreign policy of Japan was going to be?
- A Yes
- Q Among other things, the question of whether Russia should be attacked was discussed?
- A Yes
- Q Also the question of whether Japan should adopt the policy of penetration into the South?
- A Yes
- Q Also the question of what to do in its negotiations with the United States and what to do with China, and things of that kind?
- A Yes.
- Q Will you tell me in your own words what War Minister TOJO had to say when you had the lengthy talk with him on June 28?
- A The first thing is that the attitude of the Kwantung Army in regard to the German-Soviet War was very calm and that served as a good indication that the Kwantung Army did not have any plan of going into Siberia.
- Q Was the ability of the military to control the Kwantung Army so weak that there was some danger that the Kwantung Army might move into Russia even though Staff Headquarters didn't want them to do so?
- A I don't believe it would do such a violent thing.
- Q Then what difference did it make whether the Kwantung Army was calm or wasn't calm if they followed orders from Tokyo? What problem would they have created if they were not calm but very excited?

- A If the Kwantung Army had a strong opinion, it would be difficult to control such cases.
- Q In other words, it might have moved without orders from higher-up?
- A Differing from the Manchurian Incident, I don't believe that it would act independently without orders because it would be dealing with strong powers like Russia. I believe that is absolutely impossible. If the Kwantung Army had a strong opinion, the tendency is that the central body in Tokyo may be dragged along by it.
- Q In other words, what he indicated was that there wasn't a strong movement in the Kwantung Army to try to bring pressure to bear for an attack on Russia?
- A Yes.
- Q What else did he have to say?
- A He also gave the report of the information sent by the Foreign Ambassadors in Japan to their respective countries concerning the Russo-German War.
- Q Do you recall what the nature of those reports were?
- A I have no accurate recollection.
- Q Have you any recollection on the matter at all, either accurate or inaccurate?
- A No, I don't have any recollection concerning it.
- Q When you say you don't have any accurate recollection, it implies you may have an inaccurate one. It means you don't remember?
- A I don't have any whatsoever. He also reported on the information concerning the attempt to win over the Chinese generals in the Shanshi Province and in the Fukien Province. He said that this attempt was progressing very smoothly and he said that the Imperial General Headquarters should be strengthened and that it should assemble at the Palace.
- Q Did he indicate that the Imperial Headquarters should meet daily?
- A Yes.

- Q He thought that the situation was sufficiently tense to warrant daily meetings at Imperial Headquarters?
- A I believe this wasn't carried into effect immediately.
- Q From your conversation with the War Minister on that day, did you get the impression that he was opposed to any attack on Russia at that time?
- A My impression is that TOJO was not very eager to attack Russia.
- Q Did he express any feelings with reference to the Southern expansion on that occasion?
- A At this time, TOJO was not saying anything about dispatching troops into the South.
- Q Did you ever have a talk with the War Minister with reference to the dispatching of troops into French Indo-China that you recall?
- A I have heard him talk about occupying French Indo-China peaceably and of respecting the treaties there.
- Q What was his attitude as of this time with reference to the United States and negotiations with the United States?
- A He was saying that if the Japanese-American negotiations can be conducted, it would be a very good thing.
- Q Did he indicate what Japan should do if the difficulties with the United States could not be settled peacefully and negotiated?
- A He was desiring talks to be conducted peacefully.
- Q My question is did he advocate an attack on the United States if the China Incident couldn't be settled by negotiation - as of this time? I mean was he in favor of attacking the United States if she interfered with the settlement of the China incident?
- A At this time, he didn't even think of attacking America.
- Q Did you know that in those days, at the suggestion of Admiral Yamamoto, very detailed plans had already been prepared incidental to a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

A I didn't hear anything about it.

Q You heard later that planning started early in 1941, did you not?

A I heard about it later but at that time, I didn't know anything about it.

Q Do you know whether the War Minister knew about it at that time; that is, the operational potential plans for use?

A He may have known but I don't know if he did know it.

Q You never heard him mention plans for operations against the United States?

A At this time, we didn't even think of ever going to war against America.

Q It was customary for these various ministers, after they had audiences with the Emperor to stop and talk to you, generally of the conversations had with the Emperor and this is how you get so much of this information?

A Many of the ministers came up to me for conversation but none of the General Staff members ever do come up.

Q Did various ministers go to see the Emperor jointly sometimes or did they always go alone to make their reports?

A In most of the cases they do it individually.

Q And were you not ever present when the ministers made their reports to the Emperor?

A No.

Q The custom was for the report to be made privately with the Emperor?

A Yes.

Q Were there any occasions when you were ever present when a minister made a report to the Emperor?

A Only once or twice just before this war ended but ordinarily there never has been a case where I was present. In the event I was present, they had to get the consent of the Emperor

- Q But generally speaking, after a Minister made his report to the Emperor, would you normally in the course of events learn from the Emperor or the minister what had taken place during the audience?
- A Generally so.
- Q Were there things that were disclosed to the Emperor that would be kept secret and away from you or would normally everything be disclosed to you?
- A Generally the Emperor tells me everything but on matters of operation, the Emperor is very reserved and would not tell me everything.
- Q In other words, when the War or Navy Chiefs of Staff would discuss operational questions with the Emperor, they were of such a high degree of secrecy, he normally would not tell anyone about them?
- A And perhaps the Emperor thought that if he disclosed those matters to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Keeper may be incumbered or may be made to regret for it.
- Q Didn't the Emperor ever discuss operational questions with you that he had learned from either the Army or Navy?
- QA No, because it is the individual matter of the Emperor and the matter of operations also isn't given to the Emperor from me also.
- QA However, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy would disclose major operational questions to the Emperor even though you didn't know about them, did they not?
- A There are occasions that he does talk about great problems.
- Q The Emperor, no doubt, knew from the Army and Navy in their private conferences about this plan to attack Pearl Harbor before it took place, did he not?
- A I believe he did know about the attack on Pearl Harbor.
- Q But later on, after the attack, did he ever disclose to you that he knew the attack was going to take place but he was more or less bound to secrecy?

A I never heard any stories concerning places to be attacked.

Q Did the Emperor ever disclose to you that he knew before the attack that it was going to take place? After it was all over, did he tell you about his knowing of the attack?

A I never heard him say that he knew about the attack previously.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 29 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~was~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 26th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan. *[Signature]*
Place

26 February 1946
Date