

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 60

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SYRIA
AND
PALESTINE

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.


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






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AND

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HANDSOME PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE—No. 69

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SYRIA
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PALESTINE

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LONDON
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE

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Editorial Note.

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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| Acre | Akka | Jerusalem | El-Kuds |
| Aleppo | Haleb | Kishon river | Nahr el-Mukatta |
| Alexandretta | Iskanderun | Latakia | Laskie |
| Amanus | Giaur Dagh | Lebanon | Libnan |
| Anti-Lebanon | Jebel esh-Sharki | Litani river | Nahr el-Kasimie |
| Antioch | Antakia | Orontes river | Nahr el-Asi |
| Baalbek | El Buka'a | Palmyra | Tadmur |
| Beersheba | Bir es-Seba | Shechem | Nablus |
| Damascus | Esh-Sham | Sidon | Saida |
| Dead Sea | Bahr el-Lut | Tiberias | Tubariya |
| Gaza | Ghaza, Ghazze | Tripoli | Tarabolus |
| Hebron | El-Khulil | Tyre | Es-Sur |
| Hermon | Jebel esh-Sheikh | Yarmuk river | Nahr el-Menadire |
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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) POSITION AND FRONTIERS

SYRIA, broadly speaking, is the country that lies between the eastern shore of the Mediterranean and the deserts of Arabia; but, except in the west, the boundaries are vague. In Turkish official usage Syria consists of the vilayet of Damascus, extending from the Arabian borders on the extreme south to $35^{\circ} 25'$ north latitude.

Syria has no fixed boundary on the east; but in recent years the advance eastward of the sedentary population and the policy of the Turkish Government have considerably extended the limits of Syria in this direction. Starting south of Akaba, on the Red Sea, the boundary crosses the Hejaz railway, runs northward, and turns east so as to encircle the Jebel Druz; thence continuing by longitude 37° to the neighbourhood of Hama, and crossing diagonally to the eastward bend of the Euphrates, near Rakka. The Euphrates then forms the boundary to beyond Rum Kale (about $37^{\circ} 20'$ N.). The best physical boundary between northern Syria and Arabia, according to Blanckenhorn, would be the ranges of Jebel esh-Sharki (Jebel et-Tawil) and Jebel Bishri, which stretch from Damascus past Tadmur and reach the Euphrates at Halebie. The building of a railway from Homs to the Euphrates would probably tend to establish some such political frontier.

On the north the latest boundary of the vilayet of Aleppo supplies a provisional frontier. It starts from Jonah's Pillar, slightly north of Alexandretta, runs eastward to Giaur Dagh (the Amanus range), follows the crest of these hills northwards to a point nearly due west of Rum Kale, and then strikes on to the

Euphrates somewhat north of that place. There have been various temporary extensions of this line both to the east and to the north, but there is no satisfactory physical boundary corresponding either to the present administrative line or to former political lines, although various possibilities have been suggested. The further north the line is moved the greater is the wedge of Syrian territory between Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, and the larger is the Turkish-speaking territory included in Syria. It must also be remembered that Alexandretta is now the port of western Mesopotamia, and it will be to the interest of any power established there to have access to the Mediterranean secured.

In the south the boundary between Egypt and Syria, settled in 1906, follows an arbitrary line drawn from slightly west of Rafa on the Mediterranean to slightly east of Taba, south of Akaba, on the Red Sea. The boundary is completed by a line starting south of Akaba and running north-eastwards towards Ma'an and the depression of El-Jafar, separating the vilayet of Damascus from the vilayet of the Hejaz.

In modern usage the expression Palestine has no precise meaning, but it is best taken as being equivalent to southern Syria. When defined in accordance with geographical and political conditions, the drawing of the northern boundary alone presents any special difficulty. On the west side of Jordan the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie) is a definite physical limit from its western bend to its mouth, and the boundary may then be completed from the bend of the Litani eastward to the Jordan or may follow the northern limit of the kaza of the Merj Ayun.

The amount of country east of the Jordan that may be reckoned to Palestine depends chiefly on the political situation of Damascus. If Damascus itself be associated with southern Syria the difficulty disappears, as all that portion of the centre of Syria that lies to the east of Jebel esh-Sharki may easily be separated from northern Syria and associated with Pales-

tine. If, on the other hand, only a portion of the country along the Hejaz railway line, south of Damascus, is to be united to Palestine a satisfactory solution is not easily found. If the line be drawn at the Yarmuk (Nahr el-Menadire) full justice is done to the claims of Damascus. On the other hand, the Hauran now finds its principal commercial outlet into Palestine by the railway to Haifa, and so should be associated with Palestine rather than with Damascus. In that case the most distinctive line, physically, east of Jordan, skirts the southern and south-eastern base of Mount Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh), and then follows the Wadi Zabirani and the Nahr el-Awaj to the border village of El-Uijane, with its lake into which the Nahr el-Awaj flows.

The area of Syria, as defined above, has never been exactly measured, and estimates vary, according to the territories included, from 72,000 square miles (186,000 sq. km.) to 80,000 square miles (207,000 sq. km.) and 91,700 square miles (237,600 sq. km.) as a maximum. The area of southern Syria (Palestine) can be given more exactly. Western Palestine as far as Bir es-Seba has an area of 6,040 square miles (15,655 sq. km.); the country south of Bir es-Seba, as far as Akaba, 4,500 square miles (11,660 sq. km.); total for western Palestine, 10,540 square miles (27,315 sq. km.). The corresponding country east of Jordan and as far north as Hermon may be estimated to be of similar extent. The total area of southern Syria is accordingly about 21,000 square miles. This figure suggests that the 72,000 square miles suggested as the area for the whole of Syria is an over-estimate rather than an under-estimate.

The extreme length of Syria from about $37^{\circ} 20'$ to $29^{\circ} 50'$ north latitude is about 550 miles, and its width from the sea to the desert varies from 100 to 130 miles. From Rakka, on the Euphrates, to the sea is a distance of 180 miles.

Administrative Divisions.—Syria includes the three vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, and since

1887-8 the two sanjaks of Lebanon and Jerusalem. In 1908 the territory from Bir es-Seba to Akaba became a separate sanjak (though still associated with Jerusalem). The boundaries of the vilayet of Aleppo are noted above (p. 1). The sanjak of Jerusalem has been gradually extended since 1888, at the expense of the vilayet of Damascus, the eastern parts of which were distributed in 1894 and again in 1907. The vilayet of Beirut is split into two separate parts by the semi-autonomous district of Lebanon.

(2) SURFACE, COAST, RIVER SYSTEM AND LAKES

Surface

Syria is bordered by a coastal plain of varying width. In northern Syria the relative area of coastal plain is small except to the north of Alexandretta and around the Bay of Antioch. Between Latakia and Tripoli extensive plains spread in two inland sweeps of great depth, continuing in varying width as far as the base of Lebanon. The region immediately south of Latakia is well watered by perennial rivers, and the soil is rich and well cultivated, although the southern part is partially flooded in winter. Towards Saida the plain widens to a considerable breadth, and is very fertile.

South of the Litani, in Palestine, coastal plains become a more marked and constant feature, and there follow in succession the plain of Es-Sur (Tyre), some 12 miles in length and 1 mile broad at its widest part, and the plain of Akka (Acre), which stretches for some 20 miles as far as Carmel, and has an average depth of 4 miles, being continued inland along the basin of the Mukatta river in the plain of Esdraelon. South of the Carmel promontory the coastal plain runs continuously, and with gradually increasing breadth, to the confines of Egypt. The Nahr el-Auja divides this strip into two parts, the plain of Sharon in the north and that of Philistia in the south. Both sections have great agricultural possibilities.

Physically the rest of the territory of Syria lies in three parallel belts running roughly north and south: (1) the Maritime Range, with its broken coastal plain; (2) the Central Depression; (3) the Eastern Plateau, to the verge of the desert. On the north these three salient features are limited by the chain of the Anti-Taurus, and on the south they merge into the desert.

The *Maritime Range*, in north Syria, is divided into three sections, which are, from north to south: (1) the Amanus or Giaur Dagh, between the Jihan and the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi); (2) Jebel Ansarie, between the Orontes and the Nahr el-Kebir (near Tripoli); (3) the Lebanon, between the Nahr el-Kebir and the Litani (Nahr el-Kasimie). The construction of the range presents certain prevailing characteristics. The main ridge lies in general towards the east, but the western slopes are of greater importance, as on these practically all the perennial water is found and to them almost all occupation is confined. The general aspect is bare and rocky, but there are many fertile localities among the hills which are well watered. The range forms a formidable barrier to communication with the interior. Its average altitude is 3,000 ft., but numerous peaks rise to nearly 6,000 ft., and Duldul Dagh, in the north, attains a height of 8,500 ft.

Jebel Ansarie in its northern part has its main ridge close to the sea, skirting the Orontes gorge. It drains southward to the Nahr el-Kebir and eastward to the Orontes, through the cultivable tableland of Jebel Kuseir. Many of the Kebir spurs are clothed with forests. The main ridge lies to the east, at an average height of 3,000 ft., with several peaks. The general aspect of Jebel Ansarie is comparatively tame, and its slopes are easier, its gorges less wild, and its country more fertile and adaptable to cultivation than the Lebanon. Between Hama and Homs the mountains spread eastward in low and easy slopes, with little or no perennial water. This region is one of the least known and least developed in Syria.

The Lebanon is the highest and most rugged and developed region in Syria, and the main ridge for two-thirds of its length rises to sub-Alpine heights. There is a group of peaks in the north, the highest being Dahr el-Kadhib (10,018 ft.), and southwards Jebel Sunnin (8,650 ft.) marks the centre of the range. The eastern flank of the northern part is separated from the main chain by an elevated valley with an altitude of 5,000 ft. South of this the eastern slopes are unsuited to occupation; but the western slopes, although intersected by many gorges, have a perennial water supply, and are studded with villages. In general the northern part of Lebanon is less fertile than the southern.

South of the Litani the range continues southward through southern Syria to the Sinaitic plateau, its continuity only being interrupted by the plain of Esdraelon, which forms the easiest entrance to the interior of the country. The watershed in general is so situated that less than one-third of the country lies on its eastern side. The western slope is long and gradual, and merges into plains near the coast, but the eastern slope is steep and precipitous, especially towards its southern end.

South of the Esdraelon plain is the open hill system of Samaria, with the ridge of Carmel (altitude 1,810 ft.), and then the range, continuing parallel with the Jordan valley, passes imperceptibly into the compact tableland of Judaea.

In Judaea the highlands attain their greatest height (about 3,300 ft.) just north of Hebron, and then descend gradually towards the desert and the Egyptian frontier. The ridge as a whole varies in width from 14 to 17 miles, and its general character, especially in the south, is that of a stony upland with rough scrub and thorn vegetation, much broken up by deep valleys running both eastward and westward.

Central Depression.—With a few interruptions this feature is clearly defined from the base of the Anti-Taurus to the Gulf of Akaba. At the northern end it

is a wide plain, with an altitude of about 500 ft., narrowing as it rises southward to the heights of Amir Musa Dagh (altitude 1,800 ft.). Thence it falls southward to the broad Antioch plain, El-Amk, with its lakes and marshes. The whole of this northern part of the depression is extremely fertile.

From El-Amk the depression narrows and rises towards the south, carrying the Orontes, and widens out again into the marshy and almost level valley plain of El-Ghab, which is about 6 miles by 40 miles, and extremely fertile. From Hama it bends eastwards, and emerges upon the fertile Homs plain. Between the high ranges of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon the depression becomes the plain of Sahlet Baalbek, much of which is barren and stony, although with fertile belts. In the latitude of Baalbek is the highest point of the depression (3,600 ft.), on a low swell, where are the upper sources of the Orontes flowing north and the Litani flowing south. With a gentle fall to southwards the plain reaches Lake Hule basin, at about sea-level. This forms the head of the remarkable "rift," or deep, trough-like valley, known as the Ghor, down which the Jordan runs to the Dead Sea. The Ghor falls rapidly to a depth of about 680 ft. below sea-level at the Lake of Tiberias; the valley is here not more than 4 miles in breadth. At the Dead Sea, about 65 miles further south, the valley has reached a depth below the sea of 1,300 ft., the depression continuing downwards to twice that depth in the bed of the sea. South of the Dead Sea the depression is prolonged for another 100 miles to the Red Sea by the wide Wadi Araba.

The Eastern Plateau.—In Kurd Dagh, the northern part of this region, broken ridges rise to a height of over 4,000 ft., but at Aleppo the altitude is 1,205 ft. The plateau falls easily to the Euphrates in rolling downs intersected by valleys, which are generally fertile, though scantily watered. The Aleppo region falls southward in rolling hills to the lower plateau and to the desert, which commences at this point. Southward lies the plain of Homs, a level and fertile

but waterless tract stretching eastward to the desert and southward to the Anti-Lebanon range.

The mountain system of Anti-Lebanon consists of four distinct chains converging southward on Hermon. It has been compared to a hand, palm upward, Hermon (Jebel esh-Sheikh) representing the palm and the several chains the four fingers. Hermon is the most conspicuous mountain in this part of Syria, its snow-capped crest rising to a height of 9,700 ft. Its lower slopes are fertile and fairly well watered, and the well-wooded southern slopes fall to the Ghor and the highlands of Jaulan. The higher altitudes are bare and stony.

Along the eastern base of Anti-Lebanon the desert in parts approaches close to the mountains. The country is generally poor until the Damascus plain (2,260 ft.) is reached. This level tract, "the Garden of Syria," owes its great fertility to the Barada, which is here adapted to an extensive system of irrigation. The plain is limited on the south by the Nahr el-Awaj, which descends from Hermon. The Hauran Plain, treeless and level and dotted with villages, now stretches indefinitely southwards; in parts it is diversified by volcanic hills and boulders, in parts it consists of fine, red, stoneless soil. Everywhere the soil is fertile, although it is practically devoid of perennial water except in the western part and in the district of Jaulan, which marks the limit of the plateau towards the Jordan valley. On the eastern side of the plain is El-Leja, a black, desolate, and almost inaccessible region, with an area of about 350 square miles, containing patches of arable and pasture land which support the scanty population. Immediately east of El-Leja is Jebel Druz, whose main ridge rises to an average height of 4,000 ft. Numerous other peaks occur, the highest being Tell el-Jeno (5,910 ft.), many of whose ravines and spurs are clothed with oak. The soil is rich, and bears fine crops.

South of the river Yarmuk the mountains rise into a lofty fissured tableland, the western flank of which

extends as far as the southern extremity of the Dead Sea, while on the east it merges into the desert-steppe. This tableland is divided into three main sections: (1) From the Yarmuk to Wadi Hesbun, which empties into the Jordan near its mouth. This region comprises the hill masses of Jebel Ajlun and of the northern Belka. A considerable part of the latter is well wooded. (2) From the Hesbun to Wadi el-Hasa, the latter river falling into the Dead Sea at its southern end. This consists of the districts of southern Belka and El-Kerak, which form an open and high plateau sometimes known as the Mountains of Moab. The highest summit is Jebel Shiha (3,470 ft.). The region contains various perennial streams, and there are large tracts of the best wheat-growing land in Syria. (3) From the Hasa to the Gulf of Akaba. Here the mountains continue for the most part as a narrow and sterile plateau, terminating further south just east of the Gulf of Akaba.

Coast

The coast-line of Syria from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the Egyptian frontier runs in general from north to south. In northern Syria naturally good harbours are few, except in the Gulf of Alexandretta, where secure anchorage may be found at all seasons. Latakia and Tripoli are comparatively open and exposed, and Beirut depends largely on artificial protection. With the exception of the stretches of plain (see above, p. 4), the whole extent of coastline to a short distance beyond the Litani is in the main abrupt and in parts lofty.

In southern Syria, beyond Akka (Acre) the shore is conspicuously uniform and low, mainly consisting of long shallow curves of low, sandy beach. With the exception of the headland of Carmel there are no strongly marked prominences producing sheltered bays, and Athlit, Tantura, Abu Zabura, Jaffa (Yafa), and Askalon provide the only possibilities of natural harbourage. The small estuaries of the coastal streams

both in north and south Syria are usually closed by sand-bars.

River System and Lakes

The central depression forms the only drainage bed of great length in Syria, and in it flow the three great rivers, Orontes, Litani, and Jordan. In the north several considerable streams come down from the Kurd Dagh, flowing towards the Euphrates.

(a) *Northern Syria*.—The maritime slopes are mostly well watered, especially in Lebanon, which sends considerable streams to the sea, some of which, such as the Beirut, Kelb, Ibrahim, Kadisha, Barid, Akkar, Kebir (Tripoli), Alrash, and Kebir (Latakia) are perennial.

The Orontes and the Litani rise close together near Baalbek, and flow north and south respectively.

The *Orontes* (Nahr el-Asi) is the longest river in Syria. Some 20 miles from its source it receives copious affluents, and then, a large stream tapped by irrigation canals, it flows to the artificial reservoir of Lake Homs. Thence it flows to Homs, Hama, and Kalat es-Seijar, where it bends northward through the long marshy plain of El-Ghab, being then supplemented by the waters of several lakes and small perennial streams. The river is thickly fringed with papyrus and other reeds.

Beyond Jisr esh-Shoghu it flows in a deep gorge to Antioch plain, bending westwards to receive the navigable Kara Su, a larger stream than the Orontes itself, flowing from the Lake of Antioch. This lake catches the waters of the upper Kara Su and Afrin Su, which drain the country to the north and east. From Antioch the Orontes pursues its remaining course of 21 miles, and flows to the sea over a bar, being 200 yards wide and 12 ft. deep at its mouth. In winter it is navigable 3 miles from the sea for vessels of 100 tons.

The *Litani*, after receiving the Yafufe, the Barduni, and the Zair, flows close to the Lebanon base

to below Kalat esh-Shakif. Its bed lies in parts in a deep and narrow gorge. About $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the sea the river widens, and falls into the Mediterranean $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Tyre.

(b) *Southern Syria*.—The *Jordan* is the most important and in some respects the most peculiar river of this part of Syria. It flows southwards in the Ghor (see p. 7 above), and draws its head-waters from the slopes of Hermon. Its three main sources, the Nahr el-Leddán, the Nahr Baniyas, and the Nahr Hasbani, unite in the Plain of Hule (altitude 150 ft.), and flow to the marshy and papyrus-choked lake of Hule, a few feet above sea-level. Issuing from this lake the Jordan has a fall of 65 ft. to the mile and enters Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) at 682 ft. below sea-level. This lake measures 13 miles by $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and has a maximum depth of 160 ft. After leaving the lake the waters of the stream become very turbid. The fall gradually decreases, and the river enters the Dead Sea 1,300 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In this section the river actually flows in a trough, in some places 150 ft. deep and from a quarter of a mile to 2 miles wide, called the *zor*, which it has hollowed out for itself in the *ghor*. The *ghor* is intersected on both banks by the deep channels of small lateral streams and winter torrents.

The Jordan receives two main perennial affluents on the left bank, the Yarmuk and the Zerka, and on the right bank the Jalud and the Fara. The direct length of the Jordan from its most remote sources to the Dead Sea is about 104 miles, and of its actual course probably twice as much.

The *Dead Sea* has an extreme length of 50 miles, and its greatest width is about 10 miles. The greatest depth of the lake, 1,310 ft., is in the northern part, at which point the bottom is at least 2,600 ft. below the level of the Mediterranean. In its southern part the bed is shallow and shelving. In consequence of extraordinary evaporation the water is impregnated with 26 per cent. of mineral salts, and is extremely buoyant.

The minor water-courses all flow westwards into the Mediterranean, and of these the principal are (from north to south) the Nahr Namein, Nahr el-Mukatta (Kishon), Zerka, Iskanderun, Auja, and Rubin. They are the outlets of the wadi-basins of the western slope of the maritime range in Palestine, and, with the exception of the Mukatta, are usually perennial in their lower courses.

(3) CLIMATE

Syria has practically only two seasons—a dry, hot summer and a rainy but comparatively warm winter. Broadly speaking, three climatic zones may be distinguished: the humid, sub-tropical coastal region; the mountains, with a more temperate and drier climate; and the tropical depression of the Ghor.

Temperature.—The temperature varies from the intense heat of the Ghor to the Alpine temperature of the higher peaks of Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon. The mean annual temperature of the coastal zone averages about 70° F. (21° C.), and ranges from 57° F. (14° C.) in January to 84° F. (29° C.) in August; of the mountains 61° F. (16° C.), ranging from 43° F. (6° C.) to 73° F. (23° C.); of the Jordan depression 73° F. (23° C.) to as high as 130° F. (54° C.) in the shade. The mean annual temperature of Jerusalem (altitude 2,200 ft.) is 60° F. ($15\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ C.), with a yearly range of 29° F. (16° C.); Jaffa (altitude 66 ft.), 67° F. (19° C.); Beirut (altitude 115 ft.), 69° F. ($20\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ C.); Kereye, on the Lebanon (altitude 3,300 ft.), 56° F. (13° C.).

The climate of Syria is characterised not only by extremes of temperature but also by very great daily variations, amounting to 23° F. (13° C.) in summer and 15° F. (8° C.) in winter. On the tableland east of Jordan the daily variation is sometimes as great as 48° F. (27° C.). The heat at Damascus and other places in the depression and towards the desert is great, while on the sea coast the sun temperature often reaches 145° F. (63° C.), and in the deep Jordan

valley and the narrow gorges debouching into it the heat is blistering.

Frost seldom occurs on the coast, and never in the Jordan valley, but in the mountains it is not infrequent from December to February. Snow falls each winter to a considerable depth, but lies for any long period only in the higher altitudes; it sometimes lies for over a month in northern Jaulan, and for much longer periods at heights of over 4,000 ft. in Jebel Druz, Hermon, Lebanon, and Anti-Lebanon.

Rainfall.—The average yearly rainfall varies from 16 in. to 45 in., according to the district, and is least in the south, increasing northwards. In the coastal belt Gaza has an average rainfall of 16 in., Jaffa 20 in., Haifa 26 in., Beirut 35 in., Alexandretta 36 in.; in the highland belt, Hebron 25 in., Jerusalem 26 in., Nazareth 27 in., the higher altitudes of Lebanon 45 in. The central depression in general gets much less rain, and the Ghor least of all: Jericho 8 in., Tiberias 17 in., and Damascus $27\frac{1}{2}$ in. Kereye has an exceptional record of 63 in. The rainy season begins about the middle or end of November, but about five-ninths of the total fall occurs in January and February, and about one-third from mid-March to the end of April. The average number of rainy days is: Gaza 41, Jaffa 53, Beirut 82, Jerusalem 58, Kereye 80.

Winds.—On the yearly average the wind blows from the north and north-west for 114 days (May—October); from the west for 55 days, and from the south-west and south for 46 days (winter). The sirocco sets in in May and again in October, the thermometer then rapidly rising to 100° F. or more. A light sea-wind sets in almost every morning, and blows till sundown, when the cooler land-breeze begins.

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

Syria, generally speaking, may be regarded as a healthy country, and the prevalent diseases are mainly due to neglect, under the Turkish regime, of the most elementary sanitary precautions.

In winter the comparatively mild climate permits life in the open air, so the country is to a large extent free from the severe inflammatory affections so fatal in colder climates. The high mountains are, moreover, an excellent sanatorium for those enervated by the climatic conditions of the lower and damper parts of the country.

The most widely spread endemic diseases are malaria and trachoma. The former is naturally especially prevalent in all places where water stagnates, or where there are faulty or unclean cisterns. Trachoma is largely due to want of personal cleanliness, and is often accompanied by loss of sight. The so-called "Jericho" and "Aleppo boil" are confined mainly to the districts of Jericho, Homs, and Hama, and to the old town of Aleppo. Among epidemic diseases are meningitis, Malta fever, cholera, and at rare intervals dengue fever. Syphilis is exceedingly widespread, even in the villages.

The health conditions in the Jewish colonies generally are comparatively good.

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

Race

Syria has always been a land much exposed to invasion and conquest, and it therefore contains a large number of foreign elements, derived from both ancient and modern times. The Turks and Kurds are modern examples of these foreign elements. Distinct from this is the replenishment of the population from the tribes of the Arabian Desert, which maintains the specific racial character of the Syrian people. The transition between the nomad Beduin and the Syrian fellahin, or peasants, may be seen all along the eastern border, but the extremes are distinct. The Syrian people have a civilisation and history that marks them off sharply from the Arabs. Both peoples speak Arabic, and both profess Islam; but as some of the Syrians are Shias,

and therefore at variance with the Sunnite Arabs, they cannot be entirely identified.

Such elements of the population as the Ansarie and the Druses preserve more purely than most the blood and customs of an early period; but they are not, therefore, distinct races from the Syrians. The native Christians, also, are a part of the same Syrian people as their Moslem neighbours, and even the Arabic-speaking Jews (as distinct from recent Jewish immigrants) cannot be sharply distinguished from a racial point of view.

The most important foreign elements in the population of Syria are the Turks (and Turcomans), who are mainly officials, Circassians, Kurds, Armenians, Persians, immigrant Jews, and a certain number of Europeans. The Jews have recently increased rapidly, owing to immigration from Russia and Rumania, and are most numerous in Palestine (about 90,000).¹ The Europeans are settled chiefly in the coast towns, and in Jerusalem, Aleppo, and Damascus. There are several German "colonies" in Palestine, but the entire number of colonists does not exceed 2,500.

Language

The language of the country is Arabic (Syrian Arabic) spoken with considerable dialectal variation in different parts. Aramaic (Syriac) is now used only in a few villages to the north of Damascus and in the liturgies of some of the churches. Turkish is almost entirely the language of officials. The Jews speak a medley of languages, according to their origin, but most Jewish immigrants speak Yiddish. The missions have diffused a considerable knowledge of European languages, but English, and more especially French, are more generally understood than German. Many Russian schools have been established.

¹ Another recent estimate gives, for Palestine only, 475,000 Mohammedans, 150,000 Jews, 35,000 Greek Orthodox, 25,000 Catholics (including Uniats), and 15,000 other religions (including Protestants).

(6) POPULATION

Distribution

The latest official record (1914-15) makes the registered population of Syria 3,156,000. This does not include those who are not Ottoman subjects, nor the Beduin, and is believed to be otherwise under-estimated. The total population may be estimated at about 3½ millions.

The average density of the population is 43 per square mile. In the vilayet of Aleppo it is only 30 (population 857,000, including Beduin), in Lebanon 330 (population 407,700, excluding Beirut, which has 500,000), in western Palestine (as far as Bir es-Seba) 119 (population 718,000). For some years before the war the population of Lebanon was decreasing, and in 1914 it was probably less than 300,000.

The largest towns in Syria are Aleppo, Damascus (populations 200,000 or more), and Beirut (180,000). Jerusalem, Homs, Hama, and Aintab range between 60,000 and 80,000, and the following between 20,000 and 40,000: Jaffa, Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, Haifa, and Safed, in western Palestine; Tripoli, Latakia, and Antioch on or near the northern coast. In Lebanon (Beirut is not included in the province) Zahleh is the only town of any size (14,000). Elsewhere most of the Syrian people live in hamlets or small villages.

Movement

There are no statistics by which the birth- and death-rates, with the rate of increase of the population, may be determined, but the death-rate is known to be high. Emigration has seriously drained the country for many years, although, on the contrary, some of the towns of western Palestine have lately increased rapidly (*e.g.*, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth). Since 1880 the population of the coast towns generally has consistently increased (*e.g.*, Beirut, Tripoli, and Latakia); but

many districts are quite stationary, and others have largely decreased in population.

Recently the influence of emigration has been most marked in Lebanon, the Jebel Ansarie, and the neighbourhood of Homs and Hama.

The most numerous immigrants since 1880 have been Jews (between 60,000 and 70,000), who have settled in Palestine and are the chief cause of the modern growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa. Of these immigrants only 10,500 have settled in the Jewish agricultural colonies. Another substantial increase of population has been brought by the Circassians, who have settled at various points along the eastern borders.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1535 French rights in "Holy Places" (reasserted 1740, 1878).
- 1649 French assertion of protection of Maronites (confirmed 1727, 1792, 1901).
- 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji. Russian protection of Christians.
- 1788-1840 Beshir Omar el-Shehab in Lebanon.
- 1791 Jezzar (d. 1804) expels French residents.
- 1799 Napoleon invades Syria; defeated at Acre by Jezzar and British.
- 1821 American mission at Beirut.
- 1831 Egyptian invasion of Syria.
- 1831-40 Egyptian occupation.
- 1841 Egyptians expelled by British forces.
- 1840-45 Druse and Maronite troubles.
- 1847-54 Greek and Latin contention as to "Holy Places."
- 1856 Hatti Humayun. Equality of religions.
- 1859 French religious missions.
- 1860 Damascus massacre; French intervention.
- 1861 Organic Statute of the Lebanon.
- 1864 Law of the Vilayets. Direct administration of Syria.
- 1869 German Crown Prince's visit to Jerusalem.
- 1870 First Hebrew colony in Palestine (Alliance israélite universelle).
- 1876 Abdul Hamid Sultan.
- 1878 Treaty of Berlin; equal civil and political rights for all religions.
- 1878 British Jews settle in Palestine.
- 1879 Circassian colonies in Syria.
- 1886 Railway construction.
- 1887 Jerusalem Sanjak directly dependent on Porte.
- 1888 Further Hebrew colonies forbidden.
- 1895 Herzl and the Zionist movement.
- 1898 German Emperor's visit to Palestine.
- 1904 Hejaz Railway begun.
- 1908 Young Turk Revolution.
- 1908 German Jew colonies increase.

- 1909 Foundation of Arab "clubs."
1909-14 Repression by Young Turks of nationalist movements.
1915 Lebanon Organic Statute denounced.
1915 "Young Arab" party's application to the King of the Hejaz.
1917, Dec. British capture of Jerusalem.

Syria after Napoleon's Expedition.—The nineteenth century opened on the morrow of Napoleon's retreat from Palestine, his renunciation of designs on Syria, and his departure from Egypt. His expedition was barren of military advantage, and left the political state of Syria to continue as in the century past. But by attracting Sir Sydney Smith, with a British fleet, to the Lebanon coast, in March 1799, Napoleon brought into being the somewhat antagonistic views regarding Syria which still exist. For that reason the birth of the century marks an epoch in Syrian history. For that reason, however, only. The broad lines of political and economic life were to remain for another generation practically unchanged. What they had been during the eighteenth century has been sketched in the general survey of Asiatic Turkey.¹ If we look at Syria a decade after Napoleon's expedition we find it still in much the same state. During the years 1810 to 1812 the Swiss traveller, J. L. Burckhardt, lived in Aleppo, and wandered in Arab guise over most of Syria as far south as Petra and Sinai. He has left, in his *Travels*, a special description of the political situation as he found it, and general indications.

Various Local Rulers.—He represents Syria as a decentralised country, parcelled among divers local autonomies, under the rule of native chiefs or foreign pashas. The latter had generally been introduced by the Porte, but thereafter were quit of Ottoman control for the payment of tribute. Nominally the whole area was divided into five pashaliks, which, however, had come to be under three, or even only two, rulers, the Pasha of Damascus being also ruler

¹ See *Turkey in Asia*, No. 58 of this series.

of Tripoli, and the Pasha of Acre appropriating Gaza permanently and Damascus now and then. Really, three-quarters of Syria had very little to say to these rulers. All lying to the north, north-east, and north-west of the Aleppo oasis, including the towns of Killis, Aintab, and Marash, was in the hands of independent Aghas and Beys, mostly Kurds or Turcomans, the latter paying tribute and some sort of allegiance to the great Dere-Bey family of Chapanoghlu at Yuzgad, in Cappadocia. West to the Orontes, down the river almost to Antioch, and up it nearly to Hama, ruled three self-made princelings, seated in Edlib, Jisr Shogr, and Kala'at el-Mudik; while Antioch itself and Alexandretta were obeying only their own Aghas, and Kuchuk Ali, the Kurdish lord of Payas, held all the north-western angle. South of Antioch to within sight of Acre the whole length of the mountain country was autonomous, the Ansarie, under the Fakker house of Safita, and the Ismailiya admitting no Ottoman officer to the northern half, and the Shehab Emir of the Lebanon none, except as a guest, to the southern half. The Buka'a and most of Anti-Lebanon were at the discretion of the Emir of Baalbek, a Metawali. All the Trans-Jordan lands, except the Nukra Plain in the Hauran, kept outside Ottoman control, and so also did parts of western Palestine, for example the Nablus district, the Ghor, and the neighbourhood of Hebron. Needless to say, the Syrian deserts, east and south, remained untouched by Ottoman power. This list of exceptions leaves little to the direct rule of the pashas beyond the immediate neighbourhoods of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus; the littoral strip from Latakia to Gaza (with many interruptions); Galilee and parts of Samaria and Judaea. Nor even there was their rule always effective. Burckhardt's account of Aleppo in his time, torn between sherifs and janissaries, often without a pasha at all, besieged more than once by its pasha (when it had one) from a neighbouring hillock, and defied by Kurds and Turcomans at its very gates, illustrates better than

anything else the condition of Ottoman government in Syria a hundred years ago.

Imperfect Imperial Control.—Over even its imperial officers the Porte exercised very imperfect control, excepting over the weakest, the Pasha of Aleppo. One not infrequently made war on another. In 1803 the Pasha of Damascus marched on the Pasha of Baghdad, and in the following year was himself attacked by the Kiaya of the Pasha of Acre. The last-named pashalik had become almost private property. Ahmed Jezzar, who had foiled Napoleon, lived on to 1804; and, dying, bequeathed south Syria to one of his Mamelukes. The Porte could do no more than “confirm” the nominee of Jezzar. Actually, in 1810, Suleiman Pasha of Acre was holding not only Gaza, but also Damascus and Tripoli; that is to say, so far as the bulk of Syria was under any one rule, it was under a Prince of Acre. And so it was to remain for twenty years more. To avoid infringing this *imperium in imperio*, and revealing the unreality of Osmanli control, the Caliph’s Grand Vizier, who was commissioned in 1807 to turn the British out of Egypt, had to lead his army down the uncomfortable roads east of the Jordan; and it is not surprising that, three years later, no political effect of this manifestation of imperial power was visible in Syria.

Suzerainty of Caliph.—Nevertheless, if there was little substance of Ottoman Empire in Syria, there was everywhere something more than its shadow. Burckhardt somewhat minimises it. The pashas and almost all local princelings, Emirs, and Beys not only acknowledged the suzerainty of the Caliph by seeking (sometimes *ex post facto*) his approval of their successions or usurpations and paying a quit-rent for them, but also had a precarious and usually brief tenure, if disowned by the suzerain. Burckhardt does, in fact, admit that not to show marks of fealty was ill-esteemed by the Syrian population of whatever race and creed; and anyone who withheld them was regarded as illegitimate or a rebel. Ahmed Jezzar had an Ottoman

commissary at his side when he was resisting Napoleon at Acre, and the Shehab Emir never failed to pay to the Imperial Treasury at Constantinople a proportion (even excessive) of the *miri* (land-tax), which he extorted in triplicate, and sometimes quadruplicate, out of his feudatories.

Feudalism was, and continued to be, the dominant social feature throughout Syria. It was a feudalism of ancient prescription, centred not, as in Asia Minor, upon families sprung from Household officers of the Ottoman Sultan or commissaries of the Porte and enriched by the exercise of Imperial functions, but on chiefs who held power in virtue of descent from families originally preferred by popular selection or their own arms. We have ample evidence of its universal prevalence, whether the feudal unit was tribe, district, town, village, or clan; but we happen to know it best in the Lebanon, as it was in the time of Emir Beshir Omar el-Shehab, whose long reign covered intermittently all the period from 1788 to 1840. The paramount power of the Shehabs was based at the first on Druse tribal feudalism, to which the family, though originally Arabs of Hira, had obtained a claim by marriage with the greater family of Ma'an. It came to be supported and confirmed by a vassalage, not of birth so much as appointment—by a whole hierarchy of *mukatajis*, who contracted for taxes and had penal powers. As a result, the old feudalism of birth was subjected in the eighteenth century to a new feudalism, identical in character with that most often found in the Anatolian Dere-Beyliks, but sanctioned by a paramount Emir, not an Ottoman Sultan. In disgust at this change, a large section of the Druses emigrated to the Hauran; but a strong remnant remained in Lebanon under the chiefs of the Jumblatt and Yezbeki families. This kept Druse feudalism alive, and prepared a day of reckoning with the Christian elements in the mountain, who not only accepted the new feudalism, but secretly incorporated the Emir in their own religious circle. About 1820 the

Emir, who, at the time of Burckhardt's visit, had not got the measure of the Jumblatts, put the Druses firmly under his heel, and became free to lord it over Lebanon as independently and arbitrarily as his ally, Abdullah Pasha, son of a Mameluke of Jezzar, was lording it over Palestine from his palace at Acre.

Hereditary System.—In the course of a century the *mukatajis* became hereditary in most localities of the mountain by a process which operates inevitably in feudal countries, however drastically the substitution of appointment for birth may have been effected in an earlier generation. In the rest of Syria also the same process was repeated again and again, the deeply ingrained feudalism of the population disposing it, after a short lapse of time, to accord freely to birth the fealty which their fathers had been forced to give to appointment. Owing to this instinct, itself due largely to survival of nomadic tribalism among settled Arabs, more feudal features exist in Syria at this day than in any other settled region of Turkey.

When the Egyptian invasion of Syria began in 1831, the country was still under an eighteenth-century regime, still entirely feudal, and still given over to Abdullahs and Beshirs. Mahmud II had been at work on Asia Minor for over a decade, breaking up its feudalism and converting it from a dependency of the Ottoman Empire indirectly administered, into an extension of the Imperial centre itself. He had intended to make himself master in his own house of Syria also, and his writing was already on the wall. But the Russian war of 1828 delayed the execution of his will; and, with peace hardly restored, Mehemet Ali of Egypt sent an army across the Sinai Desert, which, by excluding the Sultan from Syria for the rest of his term of life, postponed Imperial centralisation there to successors less able, less single-minded, and more beset by international tutors.

International Rivalry of Foreign Powers.—Before, however, we pass to the Egyptian invasion, a word should be said about that international rivalry for

Syrian sympathies which had been inaugurated before the century began. During thirty years it developed obscurely, and gave little warning of the importance it was destined to assume. The earliest protagonists were France and Great Britain, traditionally the leading actors on that time-honoured stage. It was long before other competitors would enter the lists. Russia did not challenge in earnest till the 'fifties; and Prussia waited till there was a German Empire. A still longer period elapsed before Italy began to make herself felt in the Holy Land.

It cannot be doubted that France and Great Britain had very similar motives in endeavouring to obtain, each for herself, a preponderating influence in Syrian affairs: for each was anxious to establish herself in this neighbourhood on the road to the East, in order to secure the fullest advantage for her trade with India and China. With the progress of invention, it was felt that it would not be long before the difficulties of time and space would be overcome; it was obvious that the possession, or, at all events, the domination, of the countries round the eastern end of the Mediterranean would greatly facilitate the trade of whichever Power happened to be the strongest, at the time, in those regions. Hence the attraction both of Egypt and of Syria for the two great maritime Powers during the greater part of the nineteenth century, and hence the preponderating influence in the Near East which those Powers, now in happy alliance, enjoyed till near the end of that period.

French and British in Syria.—France had enjoyed a long start, but during two centuries made indifferent use of her Syrian monopoly. Nominal "protector" of the Latin Church in the Ottoman Empire since the Capitulations granted in 1535 by Sultan Suleiman to Francis I, she had allowed Latin rights to the Holy Places of Palestine to be limited by rights, equal or even superior, of the Orthodox Church; and she had made little use of her opportunities for acting politically in the Lebanon. Before the

last decades of the eighteenth century middle and southern Syria did not appear to France or any other European Power to have much political significance, the south-eastern angle of the Levant being considered a blind alley. Such politico-economic interest as the Western nations felt in Syria was directed to the north of the country, where Aleppo had been a half-way house to India and the East since the days of Queen Elizabeth. Moreover, towards the end of the eighteenth century the political effect of the platonic interest which Louis XIV and Louis XV had displayed in the Maronites was virtually obliterated by the anti-religious tendencies of the French Revolution. Jezzar turned the French residents out of his coast towns in 1791, and found none to object; and the French eclipse was completed by Napoleon's open avowal of anti-Christian policy in Egypt. Consequently, on invading Syria, Napoleon found, to his disappointment, Emir Beshir arrayed with Jezzar, and the Maronites helping, though somewhat half-heartedly, to beat him back from the walls of Acre; while the British admiral, Sir Sydney Smith, had no difficulty in instituting an accord with Beshir, which subsequent British hospitality and assistance, after the latter's exile from the mountain, in December 1799, went far to cement.

After 1808 Beshir's power grew in middle and south Syria, and became paramount when the Circassian Abdullah had succeeded to Acre in 1820 and put the Jumblatt chief out of the way. British influence had now every chance, France being discredited by the long absence of her flag from the Levant. But, like France before her, Great Britain found no conspicuous opportunity for using political influence. The Lebanese had yet to develop acute antagonism of creed; and, so long as but one European Power, whether France before 1800 or Great Britain afterwards, was concerning itself with them at one time, they lacked the external temptation to dissension which was to offer itself presently. British influence, therefore, was doing as yet no more harm in

middle and south Syria than French interest had done before it; but the fact that two European Powers, with growing and antagonistic interests in the Levant,¹ had gained a footing, where one alone used to be, foreshadowed danger.

The Egyptian Invasion.—This danger the Egyptian invasion and occupation of Syria was to bring to a head. Anxious to secure his Pashalik from sudden attack, to command a supply of ship timber, and to control the land to which 6,000 Sharkiyah fellahin had escaped from military service, Mehemet Ali had been giving a favourable ear for a while past to some (chiefly ex-officers of the Grand Army) who constantly reminded him of the example of Napoleon. He had tried, by cajolery and bribery, in 1822 and 1823, to persuade the youth and inexperience of Abdullah, the heir of Jezzar, to link his fate with Egypt's; and, failing, had asked the Porte outright for the Acre Pashalik no less than thrice. Put off with Crete only, he resolved to take what would not be given. It was the hope of France that he might succeed. Predominant in his councils, she looked to be carried back into Syria by his arms; and subsequently the Porte on more than one occasion reproached the French Government with interested connivance in a rebellion which, alone among the five Great Powers, France refused eventually to extinguish. Great Britain remained indifferent, trusting to her hold on both Mehemet Ali and the Emir of the Lebanon, and unwilling to thwart the controller of the overland route to India. Both Powers, therefore, kept their fleets out of harm's way; and late in October 1831 Ibrahim Pasha crossed the desert to go a greater distance than either he or his father had planned or desired, and effect more than they would ever know. For it is this Egyptian occupation which closed in Syria the ancient order of decentralised autonomy, and introduced the modern order of centralised dependence, vexed and limited by the rival interests of foreign Powers.

¹ See especially Driault. *Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1917.

Egyptian Occupation.—To end the nominal Empire of Turkey in Syria took less than a year of Egyptian conquest. To enable Turkey to have real Empire there was the work of nine years more of Egyptian occupation. Ibrahim did very much what Mahmud had done in Asia Minor and had intended to do in Syria, but probably would have been less able to do. He abolished once for all the decentralised pashaliks, and broke the power of local chieftains and recalcitrant or predatory townsmen and villagers, tribes and clans, to a greater or less degree, all over the area; while he enforced regular taxation and compelled the recognition of non-Moslem rights in local government. In the lower and the plain regions, *e.g.*, the Antioch and Aleppo districts, the middle and upper Orontes valley, the Damascus district, the western Trans-Jordan lands, and Palestine generally, his work was fairly complete by 1840, and Ainsworth has testified that in 1835 the Antiochene country was as safe as England. But pacification had not been effected without serious difficulties. The Moslems of Damascus and Safed, for example, had to be compelled by force of arms to admit Christians and Jews to any rights at all, and to forgo the gratification of seeing them walk the gutters or dismount at sight of the faithful. When the British Consul rode into Damascus in 1835 he had to be closely hemmed in by troops. In 1840 he could go where he pleased, unattended. The Nablus folk, who had defied Napoleon, tried the same course with Ibrahim, on being asked to accept military service, and actually besieged him in Jerusalem. Nazareth was as troublesome as Safed, and Hebron held out longer than Nablus. The Hauran Druses and the Arabs of the Ghor and Kerak needed several punitive expeditions and tedious experience of closed markets, occupied watering-places, and prohibited pastures. The Hauran and Kerak in particular gave Ibrahim some stiff fighting; and the villagers of the Judaeian highlands once exacted the release of their leader, Abu Ghosh, by blocking, with 17,000 armed men, Ibrahim's passage from Jerusalem to meet his father on

the coast. He had to thank the Emir Beshir that the Palestine revolt of 1834 came to nothing in the end.

In the mountains not so much was attempted. Lebanon kept its single prince; but he was constrained to help the unpopular disarmament of his Druses, and the Mountain had to grow accustomed to the passage of Egyptian troops. The Metawalis were coerced by a regular garrison at Baalbek. The Ansarie found their coast firmly held and their contributions rigorously exacted. The predatory Turcomans and Kurds of the north, who continued recalcitrant throughout the Egyptian occupation, had to keep to their higher mountains or the Antioch marshes; and Kuchuk Ali had no successor at Payas.

The process, like all interference with vested abuses, was cordially detested; and, when the moment came for Egyptian withdrawal—even at the prospect of it—Ibrahim found whole districts rise upon his rear and flanks. But his name has lived on in Syria, to be used still with awe and respect, although Egyptians are almost as unpopular there as, on account of another past occupation, they are in Hejaz. Superior apparatus and knowledge of its use may compensate for presumed physical and moral inferiority, but it will never make the user acceptable in his surroundings.

Encouragement of Europeans.—The work of the Egyptian occupation, however, had further results. In opening up Syria to Europe, even as Egypt had been opened during a quarter of a century past, it went far beyond Mahmud's work in Asia Minor. Mention has been made already of Ibrahim's consideration for the non-Moslem elements in the native population—a consideration for which he paid the price of present unpopularity, and they that of irreconcilable rancour. Attracted by such evidence of a liberal policy, Europeans came to Syria as they had never come before; and all, except those who were so ill-advised as to throw the Sultan at his head, were made welcome by Ibrahim. The earliest books on Syria that are still read—Chesney's,

Ainsworth's, Kinglake's, Thomson's, Lamartine's, Warburton's, &c.—narrate the authors' travels under his ægis, and some of the travellers were not mere globe-trotters. In 1839 Moses Montefiore discovered for Europe the Palestinian Jews and the possibilities of Jewish restoration. In 1835 a British Commission was studying a line for an overland route to the Euphrates; and the little opposition it encountered, in its extraordinary task of hauling steamers in sections overland from the Orontes to the Euphrates, is a testimony to Ibrahim's power, all the more significant because the British held their permission, not from him, but from the Sultan with whom he was at war. During those ten years Europe progressed from mediæval ignorance of Syria to almost as much knowledge of it as she has had up to the present war. When Lady Hester Stanhope settled in the Lebanon, in 1814, it was a wild, unknown region; and the British Government could only keep precarious touch with Pitt's niece through a Levantine consular agent in Cyprus. When she died, in 1839, a visit to her at Joun had become a common incident of the grand tour; and a British Consul rode up from Saida to collect and seal her effects.

Lebanon Question; Beshir.—Finally, for good or for ill, it was the Egyptian occupation that caused Syria to become a cockpit of Great Powers. If it did not make the Lebanon question, it brought it on. The fault was only in part Ibrahim's. During nine years of Egyptian occupation there was no more Lebanon question than there had been since the establishment of the Shehab dynasty and the emigration of the Yemenite Druses. Not that the Mountain had been an abode of peace during those hundred years; but its intermittent intestine warfare had been feudal, not religious—wars of one Druse sheikh or group of sheikhs against another—Jumblatts against Yezbekis, or one Shehab against others, with some Maronites or some Orthodox Greeks or some Metawalis enlisted for one or for both. Hitherto Druses had led in council and action, thanks to their superior feudal cohesion, their

social organization, which encouraged alert political spirit, and their small proportion of fellahin; also because, in Metn and Shuf, they held the best of the Mountain. If latterly the stars of their chiefs had paled before the single splendour of Beshir, the eclipse of the Jumblatts had gratified the Yezbekis. Beshir, who had begun life as more Moslem than Druse, was regarded as laxly complacent to all creeds rather than representative of any one (his reputed conversion to Maronite Christianity got abroad later). He held his power by grace neither of Maronite nor Druse, but of their common fealty to the Padishah of Stambul and the favour of the Pashas of Acre and Damascus. His overlordship did not impair Druse pride of place; his sympathy secured the position of the Christian clergy; and his strong hand protected the fields from all marauders but his own tax-collectors. All elements alike obeyed him, sharing his sentiment for Great Britain, if the Maronite clergy retained also some sentiment for France; but neither Maronite nor Druse yet entertained thought or hope of oppressing the other by the help of a foreign patron. Even in 1832, when certain Druses, instigated by sheikhs of the Jumblatt and Abu Nakid houses, fomented a scuffle with Christians in a Maronite centre (Der el-Kamar) and disowned Beshir's authority, further fighting was easily prevented by the prompt arrival of an Egyptian detachment from Baalbek; and no outside Power was concerned in the matter, except the Porte.

Druses and Maronites; Britain and France.—The economic state of the Mountain, however, grew worse during the Egyptian period. Ibrahim exacted regularly and inexorably the annual contribution for his father. Beshir had to provide both for this and for his personal greed and administration. His *mukatajis* also were determined to live well. The amount of *miri* (land-tax) which would be requisitioned by the Emir in any one year could not be foreseen. The Mountain became discontented, suspicious, and apprehensive. In

1838 Ibrahim took an unfortunate step. At his wits' end to deal with the Druses of the Hauran, who had cost him 15,000 casualties, he called in the Emir Beshir, armed 7,000 Maronites, and sent these against cousins of their fellow-mountaineers. They were successful, and disarmed the Hauran. Beshir, anxious about the effect in the Lebanon, asked that not only should these Maronites retain their arms, but other Maronites be armed, up to 24,000 in all; and Ibrahim, in the first flush of his gratitude, consented.

With the Druses already hostile, after their forcible disarmament, Ibrahim tried, two years later, to take back his gift from the Maronites, and enrol them, as well as the Druses, in his *nizam*. Beshir seconded this order, by telling each element that the other alone would be disarmed in permanence. Both were soon disillusioned, and each proceeded to sink for a moment its now profound suspicion of the other in a common hatred of the Egyptian. It was known that the Powers had come on the scene in earnest and arrested Ibrahim's advance the previous year, after his crowning victory at Nizib; but it was not yet known that there was division between Great Britain and France. Some Maronites and some Druses rose together, chose a Frenchman for leader, and appealed to the British and French Consuls in Beirut. It was a very partial rising. The mass of the Druses came out, only to return immediately to their obedience; the mass of the Maronites never came out at all. A small body of insurgents kept the field for a time against weak Egyptian forces on the coast; but Ibrahim would quickly have overwhelmed it from the inner country had it not been for events which had nothing at all to do, in their inception, with the Lebanon revolt—the Treaty of London restoring Syria to the Porte, and Mehemet Ali's refusal to yield except to force.

Egyptians driven out; Measures for Settlement.—Great Britain accepted a mandate to execute the London warrant, which France had declined to endorse. The easiest way was to shut Ibrahim from his vital ports.

These ports lie from Tripoli to Acre. Therefore, unfortunately, operations had to begin in the Lebanon. A British force landed in August 1840, called out the mountaineers, armed them without distinction of creed, and in three months swept both the Egyptians and Emir Beshir off mountain and littoral. Armed, blooded, and free, Druses and Maronites parted company to face one another, demand mutual satisfaction for accumulated griefs, and assert their respective equality or superiority in the future. Neither Great Britain nor France, it is clear, desired a civil war in Lebanon; but, while the former had armed both parties, the latter was favouring one and inspiring it to demand majority rights. British sympathy, therefore, inevitably went out to the minority, which, for its part, had been quick to recognise the discord of the two Powers and the superiority of British influence with the new Ottoman Powers that were. Tension lasted until October 1841, and then broke in rapine and massacre—Druses on the one side, Maronites, with Metawali, on the other, and the blame as much on one as the other. Not till January 1843 was there any truce. The Porte tried direct government in vain, and at the instance of the Powers consented at last to control a dual autonomy under a Maronite and a Druse.

Outbreaks of 1845.—This may have been the best that could be done while native passions were hot, and the new accord between Great Britain and France was weakened by the unpopularity of Louis Philippe's government and the avowed intention of Legitimists, Clericals, and Imperialists to force French interests in Syria to the front. But it was a bad measure. The hands to which the Powers had just entrusted Syria were fatally weakened. While the rest of the country could be brought under direct control of the Imperial centre, the Porte was compelled in Lebanon, to accept a survival of the old order of decentralisation, so constituted as to remain an open sore. For, in reality, there was no peace yet. Too lately had the Mountain

been drawing apart into fanatic camps. The Druses, with secular predominance to lose, continued restless, ashamed of such degradation of their chiefs as Churchill witnessed in the 'forties. The Maronites, who stood to gain, were irritatingly complacent under their Emir Haidar. The newly-established paramount authority was alien and derogatory. If both Druses and Maronites used frankly to acknowledge the suzerainty of a Sultan in distant Stambul, they murmured now at sovereignty exercised through a *mushir* in Saida. They had, both of them, learned by this time to appeal against his authority and one another to outside Powers of unknown strength but known rivalry. France and Great Britain had, indeed, returned to governmental harmony at home since 1842, but in the Lebanon their representatives were still at odds, and when trouble broke out again in 1845 were manifestly partisans. Their positions and aims differed as positive from negative. Poujade, inspired by the colonial element in the French Opposition, aspired to change the political and social state of the Lebanon, to promote a protectorate of his nation in Syria, and to invert the secular relation of Maronites to Druses. Rose, acting on his Government's fixed policy of preventing the introduction into Turkey of any foreign protectorate or sphere of exclusive influence, encouraged Lebanese society to resume, under Omar Pasha, the same mutual relations as had existed in the earlier days of Emir Beshir. France, for obvious reasons, hoped to compass her subversive aims through the Maronites; Great Britain, for reasons equally obvious, endeavoured to preserve the *status quo ante* by means of the Druses. Strong divergence of sentiment and sympathy was added to the political discord of the Consuls. The Maronites, as they then were, mariolatrous, priest-ridden, inconstant in warfare, and only in small part willing to fight at all, did not commend themselves to Rose as did the keen, warlike Druses. By the recent action of the

latter against Ibrahim Pasha in both the Lebanon and Hauran close ties had been riveted between Briton and Druse, while the Maronites had trimmed to the Egyptian, and to a Power which lately had stood out of the European Concert. Both Great Powers, working equally in their own interests, the one for peaceful change, the other for peaceful conservation, failed equally, and both were responsible for the outbreaks of 1845. The Maronites began them in the hope of driving the Druse remnant right out of the Mountain; but the Druses rendered worse than they had received. Both Great Powers showed themselves commendably impartial in encouraging the Porte to deal out even-handed justice and in blaming it for what had been largely their own work.

Reassertion of Turkish Authority.—When this account was settled, or, rather, deferred, the Mountain relapsed for fifteen years into such quiescence as interrupts the activities of a volcano, in which subterraneous forces continue at work. The Porte, anxious to complete the task of Ibrahim, found the Lebanon an impediment. It was successful enough with the Kurds and Turcomans of the north, against whom expeditions proceeded in 1845 and 1846, suppressing chieftains and deporting villagers from Amanus and Taurus into the lowlands, and *vice versâ*; and it pacified, if it could not break, the Hauran. But when, in 1846, it sent a strong force into the Lebanon to effect wholesale arrests among feudal sheikhs of both parties, the result was not satisfactory. The Maronites rather than the Druses were weakened, the latter being always better able to replace lost leaders: and the chances of future trouble were only strengthened, the more so since the interest and sentiment of the Turks inclined them inevitably to be tender with the Druses. Were they not a minority fighting by themselves against a majority suspected of reliance on the intervention of a European Power?

Latin and Greek Rivalry about the "Holy Places."—Turkish favour towards the Druses became

more pronounced after the Imperial Restoration in France, whose colonial designs grew more suspect. In 1847 a serious tumult between Latins and Greeks in the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem had resulted in favour of the Greeks, but led to the return of the Latin Patriarch *in partibus* to Jerusalem, and of a French Consul-General to support him. Four years later, when Louis Napoleon was in power as President, a Commission was demanded to report on the whole question of encroachments by the Orthodox Church upon ancient rights of French-protected Latins in the Holy Places of Palestine. The Russian Tsar had already revived his eighteenth-century claim to protect politically all Christians of the Eastern Rite in the Ottoman Empire. Was a similar claim to the Latins, based on French Capitulations, now in the mind of Louis Napoleon? The Porte desired one Protectorate as little as the other, and the Commission of 1851 was brought to nought. But two years later, a reiteration and definition of the Russian demand, with a stipulation for substantial guarantees, promising the greater danger, threw the Sultan into the French Emperor's arms, and brought on the Crimean War.

Effects of Crimean War; Confusion in Syria.—This war, far away though it was waged, had an evil influence on Syria. With heavy recruiting of the settled peasantry, and withdrawal of the better garrison troops, the newly-established Ottoman peace began everywhere to break down. Travellers who penetrated rural Syrian districts in the middle 'fifties bear witness to a general growth of insecurity and lively fear of nomads and mountaineers. The Metawalis were in open rebellion in the Buka'a and the northern Lebanon. In 1854 Ismail Bey, of the Metawara tribe of the Ansarie, succeeded in restoring his mountains to their pre-Egyptian independence for several years. Homs and Hama remained in a state of siege for months; and the neighbourhood of Damascus was as unsafe as that of Aleppo had been before Ibrahim's

conquest. It was not a return to the old order; for formerly feudal chiefs had had the power to stop all rapine but their own. Now there was no restraint but that of an immature Turkish administration, relying upon such tatterdemalion forces as Rey remarked sheltering in the ruins of Lebanese palaces in 1857.

Massacre of 1860.—Nor did the successful issue of the war bring any gain to Turkey. It only increased the French weight upon her back, and led to the reiteration of the *Hatti Humayun*, promising Christians and Jews the same rights as Moslems. The Druses saw the Maronites about to be exalted in their room; the fanatic faithful of Damascus believed that a worse than Egyptian regime impended over their heads. The result was the year 1860, infamous for all time in the annals of Syria. The reports of two Commissions working at cross-purposes, the rivalry of two Powers united in the primary object of securing atonement for atrocities and precluding their repetition, but divided, secretive, and suspicious in all other respects, finally, much mutual defamation ever since, have rendered hopelessly obscure the history of that and the following year. We can be sure only of the situation which was brought about.

Constitution of Autonomous Lebanon.—It would be useless, even were it in place, to ask now who was responsible, or in what measure, for those massacres of sixty years ago, or with what precise motives foreign intervention was planned, carried out, and crowned by the constitution of an autonomous Lebanon under a Christian *mushir*, who, in practice, would always be a Catholic. Certainly, if Lebanon alone had but added another to its series of internecine tumults, even at a cost of 5,000 lives, there would have been no mandate of Europe and no Organic Statute. It was not the Lebanon events, but the Damascus massacre, interpreted as a symptom of infectious fanaticism, that overcame the reluctance of Great Britain to commission Louis Napoleon. It is equally useless to enquire now whether it was wise, in the general interest of the Ottoman

Empire, or fair to the Ottoman Sultan, to guarantee for ever such an infringement of his sovereignty as the autonomous State of the Lebanon. But we may still ask usefully whether it had any effect on the general economy of Syria so bad as to offset the benefit it conferred on a part. The honest answer is negative. On the debit side we have to set no more than some periodic unrest of Buka'a villages seeking, for the sake of political or economic advantage of the moment, to be reckoned on one side or the other of a frontier which was never delimited; the development of Beirut into a focus of European diplomatic intrigue and native separatism; and, perhaps, the annual emigration of four to five thousand Lebanese, unable to live well within the narrow bounds assigned to an autonomous State which should have included the Buka'a, and the westward slopes of Anti-Lebanon and Hermon, as well as the coast-line from Tyre to Tripoli. This last disadvantage, at any rate, has been compensated by the knowledge and capital brought home again by the emigrants after a few years in Europe or America. To credit, on the other hand, stands the capital fact that, two years after the final ratification of the Organic Statute in 1864, warfare ceased in Lebanon for fifty years. Maronites and Druses relapsed into peace, if not amity; and public security and standards of social and political life advanced to a point not nearly reached by any other province of the Ottoman Empire.

Lebanon has been a spoiled child of fortune. Thanks to its misdeeds, it has received, at the hands of aliens, liberties which it has done very little in its history to vindicate for itself. Even if Burton's gibe, that the Lebanese hide their weapons at the call of patriotism, be too bitter, it may be owned that they have turned their arms ninety-nine times in a hundred on one another, and have allowed Arabs, Turks, and Egyptians to ride roughshod over them, unopposed by any local patriotism worthy to be mentioned in the same breath with that of the Armenians, the Greeks, and the Balkan races, or even that of their own Druse

cousins in the Hauran. The measure of their happiness is their lack of history down to the outbreak of the recent war. Indeed, their danger, as time went on, lay in the uncompromising attitude of the Powers towards the charter of the Lebanon. Suspicious of one another, and unwilling to give the Porte any opening, they tried to prevent any change, even the most plainly desirable, in the Constitution they had made; and such slight beneficial modifications as were, indeed, introduced, *e.g.*, in 1868 or 1892, were accepted only on protest as accomplished facts.

Organization of the Rest of Syria.—On the rest of Syria the settlement of the Lebanon had, on the whole, a good effect. It is no mere coincidence that the Ottoman Law of the Vilayets is dated 1864. The able Ministers of the half-crazy Abdul Aziz feared that more Lebanons would be constituted, unless their master's house were set in some sort of order. The attention of the world was being called to the south-eastern Levant by the construction of the Suez Canal. Napoleon III, who, in 1861, had commissioned Gifford Palgrave to go down from Damascus into the Arabian peninsula, was known to cherish far-reaching plans for the Arab lands. High-placed Europeans began to appear at the Holy Places. The future Kaiser, Frederick, came to Jerusalem in 1869; and the Empress Eugénie planned a pilgrimage in the same year, but did not make it. Russia, in spite of her Crimean defeat, was increasing her solicitude for the Holy City, having acquired a large tract of building land just outside it in 1856. The annual tale of Russian pilgrims, formerly a few hundreds, had become, by 1870, a matter of thousands, while since 1847 the growing influx of Russian Jews had been causing uneasiness to the Porte. For these and many other reasons the viziers saw it was high time to bring Syria under the same centralised system of direct administration, civil and military, as Asia Minor; and this they accomplished in the 'sixties. The system was substantially that still in force, only one important administrative change

having been made since. This took place in 1887, when an access of nerves about Jewish colonisation and the imminence of railway construction (the Jaffa—Jerusalem line, first mooted as long ago as 1864, was definitely sanctioned in 1888), caused Abdul Hamid to detach the Jerusalem *sanjak* from the vilayet of Syria and make it depend directly on the Porte. Even the irreconcilable Druses of the Hauran were forced by Midhat to accept a *kaimakam* depending directly on Damascus, and to send representatives to his *mejliss*. But this dose of law and order was sweetened by the choice of the officer from the native house of Atrash, and by the renunciation of taxes and military service for the time being.

Relapse owing to Franco-German and Russo-Turkish Wars.—Further efforts to knit Syria to Constantinople and further steps in its internal development would, doubtless, have taken place but for two great wars and the intervening bankruptcy of Turkey. The catastrophe of France in 1870 relieved the Porte of its chief apprehension about the Arab-speaking part of its Empire; the financial crisis of 1874 cut short all reform; and the Russian war of 1877 produced on the outlying provinces much the same effect as had been coincident with the war in the Crimea. The Hauran Druses once more threw off the shadow of dependence. Eastern and central Syria became a happy hunting ground of nomads and other highwaymen. The Kurds again did as they liked in the north, and so did the Ansarie in their mountains. Only the Lebanon remained undisturbed. Then came the Treaty of Berlin, the consolidation of Abdul Hamid's position, after storms of constitutional revolution and war had subsided, and the inauguration of that Asiatic policy by which he looked to redress the balance of Europe.

Abdul Hamid's Policy.—In this policy Syria was the most vital province, as it has always been in the policy of Asiatic Empires which have tried to hold under one yoke Irak, Arabia, and Egypt. It is true

that Egypt, since the digging of the Suez Canal and the development of steam communication, stood no longer in the relation to Syria that it had held a generation before. But Abdul Hamid, it must be remembered, was very slow to abandon the hope that it would come again under his control; to the persistent vitality of this hope among Turks the Tabah affair of 1906, the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress, and very recent events have given conspicuous proof. He still held that a land-way to Egypt, as also to Arabia and Irak, must, at all cost, be better assured; and that by such assurance all those provinces, together with Syria, would be knit firmly into his Empire.

Circassian Colonies.—The harbingers of Abdul Hamid in Syria were Circassians. His idea of planting these truculent refugees on the desert fringes, as irregular garrisons, to hold back the nomad Arabs, was not quite new; for Richard Burton, when British Consul at Damascus in 1870, had found groups of them already established on the Alah plateau, east of Homs. But the immigration from the Caucasus, which followed the Treaty of Berlin, gave Abdul Hamid far more Cherkess material to dispose of than his predecessor had. A part of this he settled, from 1879 onwards, along the Haj Road towards the Belka. The colonists were to be pioneers in every sense; for they had to introduce not only their ploughs where nomad Arabs had been content to pasture, but also, in the 'eighties, their own government and police; for in neither the Jaulan nor the Belka would the Imperial Government organize permanently its administration or garrisons till 1895. The lands assigned were mostly Government property according to the letter of the Ottoman law, since, no doubt, they had neither paid tax nor been tilled within the prescribed term, nor, indeed, at any time. But Ottoman law did not run in Trans-Jordan, and the nomads and half-settled Arab villagers held that the lands so disposed of were, in fact, theirs. Accordingly, local enmity to the colonists was assured from the outset, and all the years since have been filled with

strife. The Government consistently supported its colonists, rounding up more than once on their behalf an irreconcilable tribe or clan, as, for example, the Abbad Arabs near Es-Salt, or a section of the Beni Hasan, near Jerash, and sending it to cool its passions west of Jordan or in the Eastern Desert; and the Cherkess have been able to hold on. But the Arabs have not forgotten what they believe to be their territorial rights, and the racial feud smoulders unquenched.

Administration and Communications.—In pursuance of his policy Abdul Hamid took in hand, in the early 'eighties, the public insecurity of northern Syria and southern Palestine, multiplying guards and increasing garrisons, and paying particular and unwelcome attention then and later to both the Kurds of Amanus and the robber Armenians of Zeitun. Improved communications, however, he knew, or soon learned, would provide the most effective means to his end. In the year 1885, when the Jaffa—Jerusalem track was improved into a metalled chaussée, began an era of road-building throughout Syria, and in 1886 it was followed by one of railway construction. This was destined, in the course of the next thirty years, to give Syria through-connection with Constantinople, a railway from Aleppo to Bir es-Seba linked to five ports, and trunk lines to Arabia on the one hand and Mesopotamia on the other. When it is remembered, further, that such harbour structures as exist in Syria, and the equipment of principal cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem with broad ways, modern buildings, electric lighting, tramways, and other convenient apparatus, are also of Abdul Hamid's time, one is bound to admit that a good deal of beneficent construction—almost all, in fact, that makes Syria as a whole the most civilised province of Turkey at this day—stands to the credit of a Sultan whose energies are popularly supposed to have been uniformly destructive and sinister.

Railway Schemes.—Two, in particular, among the

railway enterprises of his reign are of capital significance for the political future of Syria; but, being still incomplete, they have been able to exercise but a small part of their destined influence. These are the Hejaz railway, which promises to make Damascus again the chief gathering point of Moslem pilgrims, and the Baghdad railway, which should give back to Aleppo some of its lost importance in the commerce of East and West. Both cities, indeed, have resumed something of their cosmopolitan character; but the Hejaz railway must reach Mecca and the Baghdad railway the Gulf before either will relieve the Suez Canal of any great proportion of the men and merchandise that pass through it to-day.

Settlement of the Country.—The consolidating effect, whether designed or accidental, of these measures of Abdul Hamid's reign was supplemented by a deliberate governmental effort to diminish nomadism, to whose disturbing social influence, exercised from east and south, all Syrian history bears witness. The precedent of the Trans-Jordan agricultural colonies was followed in the north. Strong bodies of Cherkess were settled round the head of the Syrian Desert, on Imperial estates about Membij, and also at Rakka; and both in the Euphrates valley and in Trans-Jordan measures were taken to encourage or compel settlement along the arable fringes. These measures took the form of free or favourable grants of land, opening of local markets, establishment of administrative posts and police caravans, and, latterly, road construction and the institution of a posting service from Aleppo to Felluja and Baghdad. In the Trans-Jordan country, where settlement had been slowly spreading for a generation, amid a welter of tribal claims and feuds, the Government undertook at last, in the 'nineties, to assure and promote the process by establishing garrisoned posts from Kuneitra southwards, and by introducing administrative machinery of the same type as in the rest of Syria. A *mutessarif* appeared at Kerak, for example, in 1895, and *kaimakams* and *mudirs* fol-

lowed throughout the Belka region, and southward as far as Shobak and Ma'an. In 1896 considerable irregular forces were sent against the Hauran Druses; and with the exile of over 1,000 of their notables to Crete, Rhodes, and Asia Minor some peace was secured. On the southern desert frontier Bir es-Seba was selected to be a focus of settlement and a steady influence. Made an administrative centre in 1904, it was garrisoned and provided with solid government buildings; and an experiment was made, not unsuccessfully, with a Court of Tribal Appeal, to which representatives of the nomadic and half-settled Arabs of all the region east of the Egyptian frontier were called as assessors.

Christian Influx into Palestine.—Meanwhile, Palestine became an ever more irksome possession for Abdul Hamid. As he watched colonists, pilgrims, and tourists pour in an ever-swelling stream from Christendom and Jewry, he foresaw a second Lebanon to be constituted at the gates of Egypt and Arabia. Christian missions and educational institutions had been increasing steadily throughout Syria during all his reign, despite studied and obstinate obstruction. The American representatives, who dated back (at Beirut) to 1821, he regarded with least distrust, relying on the official aloofness of the United States from Old World politics. They had, however, extended their activities greatly since 1870, rebuilding the Beirut College in 1872, and opening schools all over Palestine; and, disinterested though they might be, the encouragement they offered to emigration from Lebanon and elsewhere, and the democratic and liberal ideas which their curriculum introduced to the minds of Armenians and Syrians, were disquieting to an Imperial Absolutist. Worse than these, however, were the French Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Sisters of St. Joseph of the Apparition, of St. Vincent de Paul, and others, who had been spreading all over Syria since 1859, and had established in Jerusalem a centre of educational and other charitable effort.

Thence their Sisters of the Rosary were penetrating even the doubtful districts east of the Jordan. The Italians, whose Franciscans were of such old establishment at Jerusalem (fourteenth century) as to be accepted as a matter of course, were not regarded as likely to increase either the numbers or the liberalism of their institutions; but the British Church missionary schools and hospitals throughout Palestine were another matter, and the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem had recently instituted a new centre for educating natives, whether Protestant or other.

Jewish Immigrants.—More, however, than any Christians, Abdul Hamid believed he had reason to fear the Jews. They were to be a wedge driven in by the hands of France, Russia, and Great Britain, whom, in this connection, he suspected in the order named. The *Alliance israélite universelle*, of Paris, had introduced a first Hebrew colony to Palestine in 1870. British Jews followed suit in 1878. Four years later there was a veritable rush, as a result of pogroms in Russia and Rumania. With ten colonies already in existence, occupying some of the best land of the maritime lowlands, while Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed had long sheltered Jewish communities, the Porte resolved to act. In 1888 it informed the Powers that it would not admit another Hebrew colony into Palestine, or, indeed, any Jew pilgrim, except on payment of heavy caution for his departure within a short term; and that the standing interdict against aliens holding real estate would be rigorously enforced. This effort, however, availed but little. The Powers (although Great Britain had pledged herself to cease protecting Russian Jews after 1890) refused to accept discriminatory legislation against their nationals, Hebrew or other; while a people so well supplied and so conversant with finance as the Jews found little difficulty in evading the prohibitions of a Turkish administration. The tide of Jewish colonisation slackened, but did not stop, and it flowed again with renewed volume after Herzl had enunciated his Zionist

gospel in 1895. Some, even then, dared to speak openly of coming Hebrew domination where Jews had hitherto crept to hide.

German Emperor's Visit.—Foiled by the Powers, and betrayed by men of his own household, Abdul Hamid turned to his one Christian friend, a sovereign who never browbeat him, but watched the French and Russians, and was not credited with any predilection for the Jews. Kaiser Wilhelm II appeared in Palestine in October 1898, made a royal progress through the country, was presented with lands at Jerusalem, and there inaugurated a German epoch of the city's history. German influence, which had begun obscurely about the time of the Prussian Crown Prince's visit in 1869, and had been sustained inconspicuously by small Templar colonies at Haifa and on Mount Carmel, was to challenge henceforward all others in Palestine. But when the spectre of a second Franco-Lebanon had thus been laid, Abdul Hamid was not minded to raise that of a German Palestine; and he was careful to keep his gratitude within bounds. Herzl retired baffled from Constantinople in 1902, and obstruction continued to be offered to the Jews. Only after the revolution of 1908 could the German-Jew institutions, which had come into existence to take control of the Hebrew movement in Palestine, begin to make headway, and the German era of Jew colonisation increased materially the numbers and holdings of alien settlers.

Progress under Abdul Hamid.—Taken as a whole, the Hamidian regime in Syria marked Imperial progress, and is open to less criticism than elsewhere in Turkey. There were, of course, bad features—the same repressive atmosphere as in other provinces; the same nervousness of foreign encroachment, issuing, for example, in fantastic prohibition of access to coastal districts; the same suspicious and jealous system of administration. But there was no general sense of oppression and terror. The population steadily increased. When the Porte took over from the Egyptians in 1841, Syria and Palestine were estimated to contain

less than a million and a quarter inhabitants. Sixty years later these had swelled to nearly four millions. In spite of the presence of a large Armenian population in the north, the Armenian troubles of the reign in the rest of the Empire awoke but a faint echo in Syria. No urban massacre took place there, even when such neighbouring centres as Urfa, Birejik, and Adana were convulsed; and a few isolated atrocities committed in convents and villages, like that at Yenije Kale in 1896, were so generally condemned by the public opinion of Aleppo, Alexandretta, Aintab, and other towns that their contagion never spread. Even Zeitun, provocative though it was, escaped any very severe treatment. Thanks to the influence of Syrians like Izzet Pasha el-Abid, in Abdul Hamid's secret councils, the province got something more than its share of Government help and opportunity of advancement, with the result that it was by no means ripe for revolt in 1908, and that Abdul Hamid's name is not held accursed there at this day. It would not have required more than some consideration, some breadth of sympathy, some relaxation of doctrinaire patriotism, to secure the co-operation of Young Arabs with Young Turks and the continued solidarity of Syria with the Ottoman Empire.

Young Turk Revolution and Arabs.—Such consideration, however, the Arab-speaking peoples were not to find at the hands of the Ottomanising doctrinaires of the Committee of Union and Progress. Like other provincials, the Arabs had been carried off their feet by the high-sounding phrases which rang out at the first from Salonika and Constantinople. Syria found these words easy to act upon, since she had no such notoriously subversive elements in her population as existed, for example, in European Turkey and in some parts of Asia Minor; and, even in Damascus, there was not much bitterness between races or creeds. But with ideas of nationality, home rule, and representative institutions in the air, no wonder the Arabs thought of managing

their own domestic affairs in their own language, of developing their own country, and of themselves enjoying the responsibilities and emoluments of its administration. Nothing more, even on the witness of Ahmed Jemal Pasha himself, was in the programme of the three or four Arab literary and political clubs which had come into being at Constantinople by the end of 1908, or in that of the larger "Reform Club," which was formed at Beirut in the following year.

Attempts at Ottoman Nationalisation.—The Committee of Union and Progress, however, lost no time in showing that it would have none of these ideals—not any nationalism but Ottoman Turk, not any official language but Turkish, not any home rule within the Empire, not any of the higher power in other hands than those that subscribed to its programme of one race, one language, one administration. One Constantinople club, the Akha el-Arab, founded by Shefik el-Muayad and Nadra Mutran, was snuffed out; Arab deputies heard plain words in the Chamber, and plainer if they attended meetings of the Committee of Union and Progress; the Adana massacre showed Arab-speaking Christians that they had not found a new earth; and the undisguised contempt testified by the Turks towards Arab Moslems warned these to expect no superior offices or emoluments. There was no mistaking the survival of the Old Turk in the Young one. All spirit of home rule was dealt with promptly and drastically, whether it was the Kurdish spirit of Ibrahim Pasha Milli in 1908; or the Arab spirit of the Mujaliah of Kerak, which threatened the Hejaz railway in 1910; or the Druse spirit, which provoked Sami Pasha in 1911; or the Armenian spirit of Zeitun, which never rested till broken in August 1914.

Anti-Turkish Committees.—By the time the Balkan War was going ill for the Turks the temper of Syrian Arabs had changed for the worse. Clubs like the Kahtaniya, which had been formed without a thought

of separatism, now contemplated a national *jihad* against Turkish "infidels," which Christians and Jews were called to join. Other clubs, the Jemiyat el-Islahiah, for example, were started to invite foreign intervention in Syria and even permanent foreign protection; and the attempt to suppress them in Beirut was met by a cessation of all trade and business for three days. In 1912 we find many of the Syrian Committeemen gathered into Egypt, where a "decentralisation society" ("el-La-Merkesiah") had been constituted with a non-separatist programme. It gradually became bitterly anti-Turk, and inclined to seek French or other European intervention. When the meagre concessions offered to the Arab Convention at Paris had proved a dead letter, the secret societies of Syria became definitely separatist; and the year 1914 was occupied with revolutionary intrigues in all the principal cities, the Turks knowing something of them and suspecting more, but being unable to lay their hands as yet on the leaders or on proofs of their guilt.

Incriminating correspondence was, however, found by the Turks soon after the outbreak of the recent war; and courts-martial, constituted in permanence at Aley, Damascus, and Aleppo, found excuse for instituting a reign of terror, which sent to execution or exile almost all possible leaders of Syrian revolt, and also for infringing the Constitution of the Lebanon. A Moslem Governor and Turkish garrisons were despatched to the Mountain in 1915, pending formal denunciation of the Organic Statute in the following year.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) RELIGIOUS

(i) *Mohammedans*

GENERALLY speaking, the indigenous population of Syria and Palestine is Sunni Moslem; and Jerusalem is regarded by orthodox Moslems as the holiest city after Mecca and Medina. The fellahin are more religious than the Beduins, though the latter were particularly influenced by the Wahabite movement.

There are in Syria a certain number of Shia sects, and of religious communities who came into existence during the first centuries of Mohammedan activity. To this latter class belong the Metawalis, who range from Lebanon as far as Homs; the Ismailites, or Assassins, who first appeared in Mesopotamia in the tenth century and are now to be met with in the Nusairiya mountains in the north of Syria; and the Druses.

The Druses number 55,000 in Hauran, 50,000 in the Lebanon (where they are to the Maronites as 2 is to 7), and about 45,000 in Hasbeya, Raheyra, and Homs. The Druses of Hauran are the most representative of their sect. They are secret Unitarians (Muwahhidin), believing in successive reincarnations of the One God; these reincarnations include Jesus, but not Mohammed. The last incarnation was Hakim, the sixth Fatimite Caliph, who founded the sect in A.D. 996. Hakim will reappear in the world to make his religion supreme. The Druses believe in metempsychosis; they consider prayer to be an impertinent interference with the Creator, but are not fatalists. Polygamy and the use of wine and tobacco are forbidden. Truth in words is enjoined as a commandment, but only between Druses.

Outwardly, the Druses conform to Orthodox Moham-
medanism; in their secret religion only 15 per cent. of
the adults of both sexes are fully initiated, and wear
a white turban as a distinguishing mark. It is doubt-
ful whether there is any foundation for the tales of
pagan practices connected with the secret religion.

(ii) *Christians*

Antioch and Jerusalem were the centres of
Christianity in Syria and Palestine under the Roman
Empire. The former was the seat of one of the three
Great Patriarchs; the latter was given patriarchal
dignity in the fifth century. Both sees were torn
asunder by the Nestorian and Monophysite heresies in
the fifth and sixth centuries, and through the epochs
of the Arab invasions, the Crusade, and the Turkish
rule, have never succeeded in re-establishing orthodoxy
in their respective spheres. A further schism has been
caused by the division between eastern and western
Christendom.

The present position is that there are three Uniat
Patriarchs and one Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch,¹
and a Latin and an Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem.
The Uniat Patriarchs of Antioch are: (i) the Melchite,
who resides at a monastery in the Lebanon, and has
jurisdiction over all Uniats of Greek nationality in
the Turkish Empire; (ii) the Maronite, who also
resides in the Lebanon, and has jurisdiction over about
500,000 people; (iii) the Syrian, who resides near
Diarbekr, and rules over 15,000-20,000 people who
have seceded from the Jacobite Church.

Of the communities represented by these three
Patriarchs, the Melchite represents the old Orthodox
and Imperialist Byzantine Church, which refused, in
the fifth and sixth centuries, to accept the Nestorian
and Monophysite heresies; the Maronite represents a
very old and extensive body of Christians in the
Lebanon and other mountainous districts in Syria,

¹ There is also a Jacobite Patriarch.

whose orthodoxy during the Middle Ages is more than questionable, but who accepted a constitution from Rome in 1736. The Maronite Church has retained local usages, but Romanising influences are gaining ground, especially since the higher native clergy have begun to be educated in seminaries at Rome and Paris. There are Maronite colonies in Cyprus, Alexandria, and the United States.

The Syrian community is a reflux of the wave of Monophysite heresy that resulted in the foundation of a heretical sect by Jacob Baradaeus in the sixth century. The Jacobite sect included 150 archbishoprics during the Middle Ages, but has now only a small following. About 1860 the Uniat seceders were able to gain possession of most of the Jacobite churches.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, who now resides at Damascus, retains little of his old authority. Nearly all the 250,000 Christians under his jurisdiction are Syrian Arabs who know no Greek; but from 1724 to 1899 all the Patriarchs were Greeks, and, as a rule, unable even to speak Arabic. In 1899, when the see fell vacant, the Arabs proposed a candidate of their own, who was backed by the Russians and Rumanians; the Sultan yielded to pressure from the Russian Ambassador and appointed the Arab candidate. The Constantinopolitan Greeks, supported by the French Ambassador, refused to recognise the Arab candidate, who was, however, installed. Throughout his patriarchate (1899-1906), he was not recognised by Constantinople or Jerusalem; and the schism was continued under the next Patriarch.

The Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem has about 15,000 Christians under his jurisdiction. The Patriarchs have, since the sixteenth century, been Greeks who, until last century, lived in Constantinople, whereas the Orthodox Christians are, again, Syrian Arabs. The history of the Patriarchate during the last fifty years has been one continual struggle against Russian interference.

The Latin Patriarchate was founded during the Crusades; after the tragic failure of the latter the Patriarchs *in partibus* resided in Rome. In 1847 Pius IX sent the Latin Patriarch back to reside at Jerusalem.

Both Catholic and Protestant missions have been active in Palestine; and, from the early nineteenth century, much educational and medical work has been done by missionaries, mainly of English, French, American, or German nationality (*cf.* pp. 53—56)

The custody of the Christian Holy Places has naturally been a matter of supreme interest to Christians, and has caused many disputes. Not the least unedifying feature of these disputes has been the way in which the religious claims of their own Churches have been used by Governments as pretexts for political interference on a large scale.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jewish religion in Palestine and Syria is in no way distinguished from orthodox Judaism elsewhere. Their ritual is Sephardic or Ashkenazic, according as they originate from Spain and Portugal or the rest of Europe. The newcomers, especially the colonists, are inclined to be somewhat lax in their observance of rites and ceremonies. Of special interest among the Jews of Jerusalem are the colonies of Yemenite and Bokhariot Jews who immigrated because of the oppression they suffered in Arabia and Central Asia. There is no great cathedral synagogue even in Jerusalem.

The Jewish Holy Places are the Temple Area, now occupied by the Mosque of Omar, and the cave of Macpelah, covered by the Hebron Mosque. The Tomb of Rachel near Bethlehem, and the Tombs of the Rabbis at Tiberias are objects of exclusively Jewish reverence.

(2) POLITICAL

Except in the semi-autonomous Lebanon, the Government of Syria and Palestine differs from that of the

Turkish provinces only in that the Sanjak of Jerusalem is directly under the Porte.¹

Lebanon has been, since European intervention of 1861, which followed the massacres of 1860, a separate sanjak under a Christian *mushir*, advised by a Central Council of Twelve, of whom only two are Moslems. The ordinance of 1861 was revised by the Porte in 1864, in concert with the six great protecting Powers.

The administrative divisions of Syria and Palestine have already been enumerated.²

(3) PUBLIC EDUCATION

General.—In Syria and Palestine elementary education is nominally compulsory for all. It may be given in other than State schools. For example, in Aleppo, a city of 250,000 inhabitants, there are stated to be 710 Moslem, 250 Christian, and 30 Jewish schools, with 19,000, 8,000, and 2,000 pupils respectively. This represents a school attendance of about 10 per cent. of the population. But, as the average number of pupils throughout the Turkish Empire is 4 per cent., that figure would probably be a fair estimate for Syria and Palestine also. The general level of efficiency in the State schools is low. Elementary education of a conventional kind is supplied gratis in the schools attached to the mosques.

Educational Work under British Control.—Ten British missionary societies report 19 educational institutions and boarding schools with close on 1,000 pupils; and about 120 elementary and village schools with about 9,000 pupils, of whom over two-thirds are girls. In Gaza alone 400 girls are in the mission schools.

The most important institutions are:—

In Syria: the Girls' Training College of the British-Syrian Mission at Beirut (staff, 6 Europeans and 15

¹ See above, p. 39.

² See above, p. 3.

native teachers; 114 boarders, of whom 42 are normal students; and 120 day pupils). There are also high-grade schools at Aleppo, Damascus, and Brumana in the Lebanon.

In Palestine: an English College (33 pupils) and the Bishop Gobat High School (84 pupils), both for men and boys, in Jerusalem; a Training School at Bethlehem (41 pupils); and an Orphanage School at Nazareth, both for girls. These four institutions belong to the Church Missionary Society. There are also high-grade schools at Jaffa, Safed, and Es-Salt, and several other places. A new college for well-to-do girls has recently been opened with great success in Jerusalem.

Educational Work under American Control.—This is all in Syria, except that the American Friends have schools at Ramallah, near Jerusalem. In Syria, 7 American Mission Boards have 19 institutions and boarding schools with about 1,400 pupils, and 118 day schools with 5,500 pupils, of whom over 3,000 are boys. The Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, governed by a Board of Trustees in New York, is a centre of light and learning in the country. It includes schools of medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, commerce, and arts and sciences. It has over 20 buildings and a staff of 69 foreigners. Even up to the middle of 1918 the College had over 700 students on its roll (not included in previous total), and its influence is felt in every country in the Levant. There are other American schools of high grade at Sidon (the Gerard Institution with industrial departments), Tripoli, Zahle, and other centres.

Roman Catholic Educational Agencies.—The following statistics are given by Comte Jean de Kergolay in the *Journal des Débats*. In Damascus and its neighbourhood between 4,000 and 5,000 children were being educated before the war by French religious communities. In Hauran there were nine schools, with 540 scholars. In Beirut the French Sisters of Charity had a girls' school with

2,000 scholars on the rolls; the Lazarists conducted a boys' school; there were also a boarding school and a day school for between 5,000 and 6,000 girls, and three other boys' schools. In Aleppo there was a Franciscan commercial college.

The Jesuit University in Beirut, founded as a school in 1875, almost immediately took the rank of a university, which has since 1891 had the power to confer degrees in philosophy and theology in accordance with the usage of the Gregorian University in Rome. The French Ministry of Public Instruction has also authorized it to grant the classical baccalaureate for Oriental lay scholars desirous of pursuing medical or legal studies in France. The Medical School, opened in 1883, was given, five years later, the power of conferring medical degrees after an examination passed before a Medical Committee sent out from France. These degrees were recognized in 1890 by Egypt, and in 1898 by Turkey; 390 doctors and 92 chemists have thus qualified. There were 275 students in 1911. There was also an Oriental Faculty, the lectures of which were open free; and smaller schools of law and engineering. A secondary and an elementary school, connected with this machinery for higher education, had, in 1913, 582 and 600 scholars respectively.

In Palestine there are 13 schools, several of them for girls, controlled by the Franciscans; these contain 1,700 children.

Jewish Educational Agencies.—European Jews have for the last half-century paid special regard to the educational needs of their co-religionists in Palestine. In Jerusalem there are the Rothschild Technical School and the Evelina Girls' School (Anglo-Jewish Association of London), and two boys' schools, one of which is administered by the Alliance Israélite of Paris (which also has founded an agricultural school at Jaffa); the other was formerly managed by the Hilfsverein of Berlin. These Jewish schools have restored Hebrew to its ancient rôle as the vernacular

of the Jews of Palestine. The foundation-stone of a Jewish University in Jerusalem was laid in 1918.

Other Educational Agencies.—German Protestant Missions have about 14 elementary schools in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem and in Haifa and Beirut, and an orphanage with a normal department attached in Jerusalem.

The Jaffa Gymnasium is chiefly Russian. The Greeks also have made provision for the education of their co-religionists and nationals in Palestine.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

POPULAR OPINION AND NATIONAL SENTIMENT

It is impossible to speak of any common national sentiment in Syria, since its population consists of so many diverse elements, often with conflicting interests and ideals. It may, however, be roughly divided for the present purpose into (i) Moslem, (ii) Christian (including Orthodox and Catholic), and (iii) Jewish. Each of these must be considered separately.

(i) *Moslems*

The majority of the population of Syria is Moslem; but it is by no means homogeneous in race, mentality, or organization, even in Palestine. Some West Syrians, who advocate the doctrine of "la Syrie intégrale," preach that Palestine is part of Syria, and that all the land from Alexandretta to Jaffa and from Aleppo to Ma'an is one country that can become a homogeneous state or nation. But such a policy could hardly be realised, even if there were no such things as the Arab and Zionist movements; and the existence of these movements makes it impossible. The people west of the Jordan are not Arabs, but only Arab-speaking. The bulk of the population are *fellahin*; that is to say, agricultural workers owning land as a village community or working land for the Syrian effendi. In the Gaza district they are mostly of Egyptian origin; elsewhere they are of the most mixed race. They have for

centuries been ground down, overtaxed, and bullied by the Turk, and still more by the Arab-speaking Turkish minor official and by the Syrian and Levantine landowner. They have little, if any, national sentiment, and would probably welcome any stable form of government which would guarantee to them reasonable security and enjoyment of the fruits of their labour.

A nebulous Syrian sentimentalism originated in Beirut, among a class of lawyers and traders, with no civilisation of their own, and demoralised by 500 years of Turkish misrule. They, like the Moslem effendi class in Palestine, and particularly the educated Moslem-Levantine population of Jaffa, evince a feeling somewhat akin to hostility towards the Arab movement, very similar to the feeling prevalent in Cairo and Alexandria. This class, while regretting the opportunities for illegitimate gain offered by Turkish rule, has no real political cohesion, and, above all, no power of organization. There is, however, a very widespread fear among the Moslem landowners that the progress of Zionism is inimical to their interests; and societies have been formed to organize resistance to the sale of land to the Jews.

A satisfactory solution of the West Syrian problem, which involves the territory north of the Litani river and west of the Rayak-Homs railway, is a matter for arrangement, now that Syria is definitely cleared of the Turks. As one goes eastward from the watershed which divides the Mediterranean from the Jordan valley, there is an increasing proportion of Arabs; and Trans-Jordania is an Arab country. The Arab movement is becoming increasingly national; its goal is Arab independence, free from British or French protection. It has as its aim the rehabilitation of the Arab nation, and the restoration of Damascus as a centre of Arab learning and culture (*cf.* p. 63) and an independent Arab capital.

(ii) Christians

The Christians in Palestine are for the most part settled in clearly defined local communities. There are about 12,000 in Jerusalem, 10,000 in Bethlehem, about 3,000 in Jaffa, and there are in addition a few Christian villages in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem. There is also a very considerable settlement of Christians who are partly Arab in race and speech beyond the Jordan, notably at Es-Salt. The overwhelming majority of the Christians in Judaea belong to Orthodox sects; in Jerusalem there are twice as many Orthodox as Catholics. The bulk of the Christians are interested, directly or indirectly, in the Holy Places and the pilgrims' traffic. However, in the villages round Jerusalem, and notably in Bethlehem, they engage in agricultural production, and must be regarded as an important element in the Palestinian local population.

The politics of Orthodoxy are in a transitional stage. Hitherto there has been a tendency to gravitate more and more into the orbit of Russia. Before the war large sums of money were received from Russia, and an annual flow of Russian pilgrims sustained the growing connection. The war and the Russian revolution have diverted this line of development. A certain number of the leading Orthodox clerics are now turning to the Kingdom of Greece; but, among many others, and the laity in particular, there are signs of the growth of the idea of a local Orthodox Church, autonomous and centred round the autonomous Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Catholics tend to fall into two very distinct groups. These two groups centre round the Italian Franciscans and the French clerics respectively. The head of the Franciscans is the Custode della Terra Santa, who lives in the Franciscan Convent attached to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The Franciscans are in possession of the more important rights in connection with the Holy Places so

far as the Catholics are concerned. On the whole, they have the largest numerical following among the Palestinian Catholics. The various French orders do a great deal of educational work among Moslems as well as Christians.

The Armenians (non-Catholic), of all Christian denominations, are the most friendly disposed to the Anglican communion on the one hand, and, politically speaking, to the Zionists on the other. The Anglican Cathedral, with St. George's School attached to it, has for some time played a certain part in the Christian life of Jerusalem.

There has been during the past ten or fifteen years striking growth in German religious and political penetration. The city of Jerusalem is to-day literally dominated by new German religious buildings. Within the city, near the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, is the great Lutheran Church of the Redeemer. Immediately outside the walls, near the Damascus Gate, is the big German Catholic Hospice, while on the other side of the city the Catholic Church of the Dormition has recently been rebuilt in the German Romanesque style by German effort. Above all, on the Mount of Olives, is the great German Convent. Large establishments at Bethlehem and the agricultural colonies of Savona and Wilhelma, founded by the German Templars near Jaffa, are evidence of the rapid growth of German penetration.

American Protestant and other missions have also done much work in Syria; the well-known American college at Beirut is the most prominent of these.

(iii) *Jews*

The Jews in Palestine may be divided into two main classes, by no means identical in their social conditions and their aspirations. On the one hand there are the older inhabitants, some of them craftsmen or agriculturists, refugees from other lands; but the great majority of them, particularly in Jerusalem, are fanatical in religion and opposed to modern Zionism.

On the other, there are the more recent immigrants, consisting mainly of agricultural colonists introduced into the country by Zionist influence or other philanthropic agencies. The attitude of the two classes to political questions generally and to the Zionist movement in particular, is widely divergent.¹

In Jerusalem the Jews form the majority of the population, outnumbering all the Christians and Moslems combined. In Hebron they are a small minority. The Jerusalem Jews include a minority of Zionists, composed of the artisan and shop-keeping classes; but the bulk of Jerusalem Jewry consists of the orthodox Jews, either devoted entirely to the religious life or dependent upon the religious devotees. This class of Jews (the Halukah) produces no wealth, and depends on charity, being supported by contributions from Jews all over the world. It does not participate in the political life of the country or in the common work of organization of the colonists. The religious devotees, who are emigrants or the children of emigrants from the ghettos of Russia, Hungary, Galicia, and Rumania, spend their whole lives in the study of religious books; and their lives are regulated by the closest observance of the Judaic ritual. Some of them are undoubtedly "religious," but many of them live on alms in a condition of dirt, poverty, and idleness, which is almost indescribable. They, however, regard themselves as a caste above the other Jews of Jerusalem. The children begin at an early age to study the Talmud in the Talmud Torah schools, after which they continue their study for the remainder of their lives in the Yeshivoth. There they read or intone aloud from Hebrew books daily from sunrise to sunset, or are cross-examined by the rabbis regarding the most abstruse points of scholastic interpretation of the Mishnah in German Yiddish. All this takes place in conditions so insanitary that periodical ravages of typhus and malaria carry off numbers of the popula-

¹ For the Zionist Movement, see *Zionism*, No. 162 of this series.

tion, whose physical development is almost atrophied and whose intellectual development is abnormally strained. They are intensely bigoted, and are ruled by the rabbis. Nevertheless, these students represent an idea which must not be allowed to die; they have kept alive some aspects of Judaism for the Jewish people. The Hebrew university would go a long way to inspire the Halukah with the idea that they did not exist merely for themselves. It is important that the Halukah should be guided in such a way as would assure the flame of Jewish learning being kept alive in Jerusalem under more tolerable conditions.

There are in addition other communities, attracted to Jerusalem as the Holy City from all parts of the world, who, while they do not carry matters to such extremes as those described above, live a life of comparative seclusion from the ordinary affairs of the world and as more or less self-contained colonies. The most interesting of these is the Bokhara-Samarkand colony from Trans-Caspia. This colony, which is situated some two miles outside the Holy City, speaks either Hebrew or Persian Yiddish; most of the people write in Persian character. They are well-to-do, somewhat attractive in mien, and, if their statements regarding their origin are true, they are the descendants of people who have lived in Bokhara and Samarkand since the time of Tamerlane the Great, and before his time in Persia, and before that in Babylon. Another element that deserves mention is the Yemenites, who have been coming back to Palestine in fair numbers during the last twelve or fifteen years under the influence of the Zionist movement. These Yemenite Jews, who speak a pure Hebrew and very pure Arabic, have been cut off from the rest of the world since the rise of Islam in the seventh century of our era. They are the remnant of those large Jewish communities, many autonomous, which existed in all the cities of Arabia in the time of Mohammed. They have maintained themselves absolutely distinct and orthodox in religion for many

centuries in Yemen, and have acted as metal-workers, craftsmen, and carpenters for their Arab rulers. Three or four thousand Yemenites are now living in Palestine either as agricultural labourers or still as craftsmen in Jerusalem.

The Jewish agricultural colonies, which have grown up during the past twenty-five years, show a level of agricultural and scientific development far ahead of anything else in Palestine. The Jews have in many cases flung themselves upon barren and uncultivated land and transformed it into rich intensively cultivated plantations. The colonies are inhabited by strong and healthy agriculturists living in clean, well-built houses, and possessing a high degree of commercial and political organization, as well as a distinctive social life. The schools are progressive and excellent in every way. The children think and talk in Hebrew, and all the colonists possess the newly acquired national consciousness. They have their own newspapers, their own cultural institutions, and their own national anthem. They are all pioneers, and look forward to the day when they can acquire more land and can be joined by emigrants from all parts of the world inspired by the same ideals. They have a representative system of organization on an adult suffrage basis. Each colony is self-contained and autonomous; and the common affairs of all the colonists are in the hands of a Federal Committee elected by the Vaads (Committees of the Colonists).

The most important event which has taken place, so far as the Jewish community in Palestine is concerned, since our occupation, has been the recruiting of Palestine Jews, whatever their national states, into the British army; and practically the whole available Jewish youth of the colonies and many of the townsmen of military age came forward for voluntary enlistment in the Jewish battalions, took the oath to King George V, and were clad in British uniforms. The initiative in favour of the recruiting movement

took place as the result of the demand of the Jewish population itself, rather than from any desire or even encouragement from the British authorities. The campaign in Palestine is regarded by the Jews as a campaign for the liberation of the country from the thralldom of Turkish misrule, and the return of even Turkish suzerainty would be regarded by them as a betrayal.

The essence of the Zionist ideal is the desire to found upon the soil of Palestine a revived Hebrew nation based upon an agricultural life and the use of the Hebrew language. Just before the war, a struggle took place between the Zionists in Palestine and a body called the "Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden," over an attempt by the German Jews to introduce the German language into certain Jewish schools in Palestine. The whole secret of British popularity in Palestine depends upon our willingness to give the people freedom to develop their own national consciousness in their own way.

The desires of the Zionists, as formulated in the document quoted in *Zionism* (No. 162 of this series, p. 39), are very moderate in themselves and by no means inconsistent with the interests and ideals of either the Arab movement or of the Moslem inhabitants of Palestine. Jewish national development, cultural, agricultural, and economic, is inevitable and natural in Palestine after the war. There is so much unoccupied and uncultivated land in Palestine that there is plenty of room for Zionist development without ousting the existing Moslem population. The Jews have already shown that land, hitherto regarded as barren, can be converted in a very short space of time into rich vineyards, or into fruit and almond plantations. With the Arab movement centred at Damascus, Zionism in Palestine would be a help rather than a hindrance to it; for that movement would only suffer from the attempt to absorb a district ethnologically and otherwise so different from countries in which the Arab element stands alone or is distinctly predominant.

Above all, from the Zionist point of view, Turkish and German influences must be kept as far as possible from the confines of Palestine; and this can only be done by the realisation of Arab hopes.

The Zionist development will be practical rather than political, and Zionists make no secret of the fact that they wish the political control of the country to remain in the hands of Great Britain. They seek to have in Palestine cultural and local autonomy together with commercial representation, such as has been granted to the Mohammedans in India. They want Hebrew recognized as an official language of the country equally with Arabic.

History, age-long associations, and present-day conditions point alike to the separability of Syria and Palestine; and such a separation violates none of the principles laid down by the Allied Powers at the commencement, or recognised by them in the course, of the recent war.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(a) *Roads, Caravan Routes, Tracks*

OF the more important Syrian roads, two, the Beirut—Damascus and Tripoli—Homs roads, are peculiar in having been built by private companies, both of which were afterwards bought out by the railway company whose lines between the same points have more or less superseded the roads. All other roads are due to the Government, and are divided into three classes: those of the first class, connecting capitals of vilayets with Constantinople or with the nearest seaport or railway station, are seven or eight metres in width, and metalled to a depth of 25 cm.; second class roads, which connect vilayet capital towns, are six metres in width, with lighter metalling; all other roads are included in the third class. Maintenance of roads is exacted from the population, either in labour or in a money equivalent, and in 1889 10 per cent. of the revenue of the Banque agricole was also assigned to this purpose. Bridge-tolls are collected in some instances. Nevertheless, before 1914 the roads generally were very defective, except in the Lebanon, where they were well kept up. During the war, however, great improvements have been effected both by repairs and by fresh construction, additions of about 500 km. in all being reported.

The existing system of main roads in June 1916 may be summarised as follows:—

- (i) Along the coast: Gaza—Jaffa—Haifa, about 180 km., and Es-Sur—Saida—Beirut—Tripoli, about 170 km. Between Haifa and Es-Sur a stretch of some 60 km. remains ill-provided, and a much longer one between Tripoli and Alexandretta, a region which is especially badly served. At Alexandretta the coast road begins again, skirting the gulf and then striking west to Missis and Adana.
- (ii) The main internal artery: El-Auja—Bir es-Seba (Beersheba)—Hebron (El-Khulil)—Jerusalem—Nablus (Shechem)—Nazareth—Tiberias (Tubariya)—Kuneitra—Damascus—Homs—Hama—Aleppo (Haleb)—Killis—Aintab, about 750 km.
- (iii) Roads from the principal towns on the coast joining or crossing the route last described: Gaza—Bir es-Seba, about 45 km.; Jaffa—Jerusalem—Jericho—Es-Salt—Amman, 182 km.; Jaffa—Nablus, 60 km.; Saida—Safed—Rosh-pina, 76 km.; Beirut—Damascus, 126 km.; Tripoli—Homs, 94 km.; Alexandretta—Aleppo—Meskene, 245 km.

A road from Akka to Safed, which should be very useful, has been begun. The road between Alexandretta and Aleppo, the most important trade route of the country, is partially out of repair. With proper maintenance and the extension of the roads, vehicular transport, both mechanical and animal-drawn, would no doubt soon increase. Hitherto, waggons have been little used except in the Lebanon and by the agricultural colonists near Haifa and Jaffa. Motor lorries have recently been extensively employed for military transport, the wear and tear occasioned to the roads being made good by labour battalions.

The main caravan routes from Syria take five directions, (i) northwards to Marash and beyond: (ii) north-east across the upper Euphrates towards

Urfa and Diarbekr; (iii) eastward across the Euphrates towards Mosul and, further south, Baghdad; (iv) south and south-east to Arabia; (v) south-west to Egypt.

(i) The most direct route from Alexandretta to Marash leaves the Aleppo road at the Beilan Pass, and follows the Kara Su valley along the eastern slope of the Amanus (Elma Dagh). This valley is unhealthy in summer, and there is an alternative route *via* Payas, Osmania, and the Bagche Pass. There is a considerable traffic, chiefly by means of camels, between Alexandretta and the inland towns to the north and north-east.

(ii) From Aleppo, routes leading in the direction of Urfa and Diarbekr cross the Euphrates at three points, Birijik, Jerablus, and Tel Ahmar (Kala'at en-Nejim). The northern crossing at Birijik is taken by caravans from Killis, Aintab, and Marash, the route from Marash passing slightly north of Aintab. From Aleppo there are two well-defined routes, by Akhterin to Jerablus, and by El-Bab and Membij to Tel Ahmar, the latter, which had gone out of favour owing to danger from Beduin, having since 1908 come into use again.

(iii) The two main easterly routes (for Mosul, Baghdad, &c.) are from Aleppo to Meskene (whence goods for Baghdad are commonly carried down the river on rafts to Faluja), and from Damascus to Deir ez-Zor (Ed-Deir) *via* Tadmur (Palmyra). Traffic between Damascus and Baghdad is fairly regular, caravans passing each way every 40 or 60 days; they are less frequent in the summer months. The usual route between Damascus and Tadmur is by Nebk and Karyatein. There is also a direct route between Tadmur and Homs.

(iv) The old pilgrim road from Damascus to Ma'an for Medina and Mecca is now largely super-

seded by the railway, and a more important caravan route in this direction is that leading from the Hauran down the Wadi Sirhan to Jauf and central Arabia. At Weisat, about 175 km. from Jauf by this way, another track strikes westward to Ma'an.

- (v) Traffic to and from Egypt is for the most part by sea, but the old coast road *via* Gaza and Rafa is still used, and many camels are sent that way in the summer.

Inferior roads and tracks are too numerous to describe in detail, though they have an importance in consequence of the large extent to which pack-animals are still used. It has been estimated that in Syria the tonnage transported by animals is at least equal to that sent by rail. Since 1914, however, pack-animals have been commandeered in large numbers for military purposes, and very many are reported to have died.

(b) *Rivers*

The Euphrates lying outside the scope of the present survey, Syria and Palestine may be said to have no navigable rivers. In winter, boats of 100 tons can ascend the Nahr el-Asi (Orontes) for about three miles; this river is 100 yds. wide at its mouth; its depth inside the bar is 9 ft., and on the bar 3-5 ft. There are no canals. During the war a service of motor boats and barges across the Dead Sea was established in order to transport grain from the Kerak district to the north-west shore for Jerusalem. A small steam launch owned by the Hejaz Railway plies on the Lake of Tiberias from Semakh to Tiberias in connection with trains.

(c) *Railways*

(i) *Railway System in General*

The railways fall into four groups:—

1. The Baghdad Railway, of which the Syrian portions are: Islahie — Muslimie — Aleppo,

142 km.; Muslimie—Jerablus, 93 km.; Alexandretta—Toprak Kale branch, 60 km.; total, 295 km., completed 1914.

2. The French Group, consisting of:

(a) The system of the company now called the Société Ottomane du Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements. This includes three lines of a total length of 682 km.:

i. Beirut—Rayak—Damascus—Mzerib, 249 km., completed 1895;

ii. Rayak—Homs—Hama—Aleppo, 331 km., completed 1906;

iii. Tripoli—Homs, 102 km., completed 1911.

(b) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem), 87 km., completed 1892.

(c) Tramways Libanais (administered by the management of the Beirut—Damascus line): Beirut Harbour—Mameltein, 19 km., completed 1908. In 1913 an extension was undertaken to Jebeil, 20 km. further.

3. The Hejaz Railway, of which the Syrian section of the main line, Damascus—Deraa—Ma'an, 459 km., was completed in 1904. Between 1904 and 1917 the following lines were added: Haifa—Deraa—Bosra, 200 km.; Akka—Beled esh-Sheikh (Haifa line), 17 km.; Afule (El-Fule, Haifa line)—Massudie—Ludd (Jaffa line), about 100 km.; Massudie—Nablus, 15 km.; Wadi Surar (Jaffa line)—Bir es-Seba—El-Auja, 155 km., with a branch Et-Tine—Julis—Deir Sineid—Beit Hanum, 39 km. to be carried on to Gaza, some 10 km. further, and a sub-branch of about 12 km. from Deir Sineid to Huj. These two branch lines have been dismantled since the British occupation. The total length is 997 km., exclusive of the Arabian section from Ma'an to Medina [843 km.], the present terminus to the south. This line is

linked up with the French Beirut—Mzerib line by short branches at Damascus and Mzerib.

Some portions of these railways have been more or less dismantled during the war, *viz.*, the line between Alexandretta and Erzin on the branch of the Baghdad Railway, the Damascus—Mzerib section, the Tripoli—Homs line, the Jaffa—Jerusalem line between Jaffa and Ramle, and the Deraa—Ma'an section, and the greater portion of the Deraa—Bosra eski Sham section on the Hejaz main line. This last has been partly destroyed by the British Army, while the Alexandretta—Toprak Kale line has also been bombarded by the Allies.

4. Strategic railways built by the British Army.

These consist of the following:—

- (a) The extension of the Kantara—Rafa line along the coast *via* Gaza and Sukereir to Ludd on the Jaffa—Jerusalem line: approximately 102 km.
- (b) A branch line from Rafa to Bir es-Seba: 60 km.
- (c) Ludd—Tulkeram, 44 km. This line was built practically along the old Turkish 3 ft. 5½ in. gauge line which has been dismantled.
- (d) Tulkeram—Haifa, 67 km. This runs along the old Turkish railway alignment as far as El-Mejdel.
- (e) The line from Ludd to Jerusalem has been altered from the Turkish 3 ft. 5½ in. gauge to the standard gauge.

All the railways are single track, and burn coal or patent fuel.

Local electric tramways have been installed at Beirut and Damascus, but have so far been unremunerative, apparently owing largely to the excessive cost of the concessions. Similar systems have been planned at Aleppo, Jerusalem, and Jaffa. A horse-tramway owned by a native company connects the town of Tripoli with its harbour of El-Mina, 2 km. distant.

(ii) *Particulars of Construction*

Gauges. On the Baghdad Railway, the Tripoli—Aleppo section of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama, and on the British lines, the gauge is the normal one of 1.435 m., or 4 ft. 8½ in. On all others it is the narrow gauge of 1.05 m., or 3 ft. 5.34 in. (the Jaffa line was 5 cm. narrower, but has been altered during the war).

The *mode of traction* on all lines is the usual adhesion system, except on the line of the Chemin de fer Damas—Hama from Beirut to Rayak, on which, between the stations of Hadeth and Jedita-Shtora, trains are run on a rack-rail (Swiss Abt) system for a distance of 31 km.

Bridges, gradients, &c.

1. Baghdad Railway.—The line from Islahie, which enters the Aleppo vilayet near Rajun, crosses several streams, the chief bridges being at 12.8 km. and 37 km.; there is also a 130 ft. bridge at Kurd Kulak. Beyond Aleppo the line crosses the Kuweik by a 60 ft. span girder bridge, the Sajur by a two-span girder and reinforced concrete bridge, each span of 30 ft., and leaves Syrian territory at Jerablus, where the bridge over the Euphrates is of 10 spans, with overhead lattice girder, and of a total length of 2,677 ft. Between Akbar and Katma the ruling gradient is 1 in 40, elsewhere it is 1 in 80.

2. (a) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. Apart from one curve of 80 metres radius between Damascus and Mzerib, the sharpest curve on the adhesion section has a radius of 100 metres, and on the rack section a radius of 120 metres. On the rack section the steepest gradient is about 1 in 12, between Muderij and Deir el-Beidar. On the ordinary line are some gradients of 1 in 33-40. There are a number of bridges, the most

notable being two of 50 ft. over the Litani, and two of 60 ft. over the Barada; these are girder bridges. There are five tunnels, but the length of the longest is not more than 400 yds.

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The ruling gradient is 1 in 80. After the 48th kilometre from Rayak there are several bridges, including two of three 20 ft. girders, and at the 98th km. there is a 50 ft. girder bridge. Further on there are two large bridges over the Orontes: one, near Telbise, has a central span of 80 ft. between two 30 ft. arches (while beyond it is a four-span girder bridge over a tributary stream); the other, at Hama, is 165 ft. long.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. The steepest gradient is 1 in 50, and the chief bridge that over the Orontes.

2. (b) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). There is a sharp curve at Ludd station, and others after Deir Aban. The steepest gradient is 1 in 62. Over the Wadi Surar there is a girder bridge of 50 ft. beyond Sayad, and two others of 100 ft., beyond Deir Aban.

3. Hejaz Railway.

(i) Damascus—Ma'an. There is insufficient ballast on several sections. Gradients of 1 in 45 occur, one coinciding with a sharp curve of 100 m. radius at the tunnel (154 yds. long) south of Amman, where derailments have taken place; there is also a sharp curved gradient after Khan Sebib (295 km.). The more important viaducts and bridges are: one of three 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Awaj, one of five 20 ft. arches after Deraa, two of six 20 ft. arches over Wadi Zerka (at 207 km. and 220 km.), the Amman viaduct of ten 25 ft. arches, one of six 20 ft. arches after Jise, four of six 25 ft. arches after Khan Sebib, and another similar one at 348 km.

(ii) Haifa—Deraa. There is a masonry bridge of six 20 ft. arches over Nahr el-Mukatta, one of three 25 ft. arches over the Nazareth road, and one of six 40 ft. arches over the Jordan. From this point a long

succession of bridges and tunnels occurs. There are thirteen bridges over the Yarmuk, the last, which has a central girder span of 165 ft. with three 40 ft. masonry arches on either side, being the longest. Of the seven tunnels, the longest is 300 yds. Between Haifa and Jasr Mejamie in the Jordan valley the ruling gradient is 1 in 70; east of that point the gradient varies between 1 in 40 and 1 in 55.

(iii) Afule—Ludd. The line follows an easy route in the plain, crossing a few water-courses and the Nahr el-Auja. Accurate details are not yet available.

(iv) Wadi Surar—El-Auja. There are a number of bridges, of which the largest are: one of ten arches at Wadi el-Abiad, one of 16 arches over Wadi Rak-hama (36 km.), one of 19 arches at Um Dabkal (93 km.), and one of 15 arches at Arak el-Menshiya (116 km.).

4. British Strategic Railways. Details of the construction of these lines are not yet available.

(iii) *Relations to Government: Foreign and Other Concessions*

The only State-owned railway is the Hejaz system, which owes its inception to the Sultan Abdul Hamid; it has been built with funds subscribed by Mohammedans in Turkey and elsewhere, supplemented by taxation, and much of the labour was supplied by soldiers. Other lines have been built, under concessions, by private companies:—

1. Baghdad Railway (German). The concession for the Syrian sections is for 99 years from 1908.

2. (a) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama et prolongements.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib. A concession for the Damascus—Mzerib section was originally given to a Belgian company, and another for a line from Beirut to Damascus to a French company; in 1892 these companies amalgamated, and the concession for the whole was fixed at 99 years from 1891.

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo. The concession is for 99 years from 1893.

(iii) Tripoli—Homs. This concession (granted in 1908) runs concurrently with the last, and includes a service of lighters in the port of El-Mina. The Government has the right to half the gross receipts above 15,000 frs. per km. from the 46th to the 50th year of the concession, and subsequently to half those above 18,600 frs.

2. (b) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The concession is for 71 years from 1888.

2. (c) Tramways Libanais. The concession is for 99 years from 1891, with provision for prolongation of the line northwards to Tripoli and southwards to Saïda.

(iv) *Finance*

1. Baghdad Railway.—The company has a capital of 15,000,000 frs. only, the building expenses having been met by the State, which issued 4 per cent. bonds to the company at the rate of 269,110 frs. per km.; and there is a kilometric guarantee of 4,500 frs. for working expenses. If the gross receipts exceed this latter sum, the difference up to 5,500 frs. goes to the Government, and 60 per cent. of any further excess. No separate statistics for the Syrian sections of the line have been issued. In 1915 the total gross receipts were 10,443,553 frs., and 5,900,912 frs. were paid to the Government on account of receipts above the guarantee, but no dividend was declared; from 1906-13 there was a dividend of 5 per cent. The Government has a right of purchase at any time.¹

2. (a) Chemin de fer Damas—Hama. The capital of this company, behind which is the Paris Régie Générale des Chemins de fer, consists of 107,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, issued since the reconstruction of 1901, on which interest has regularly been paid; 60,000,000 frs. in 3 per cent. old debentures, taken over by the Imperial

¹ See also *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, pp. 45-48.

Ottoman Bank, on which for the years 1907-1911 slightly under 3 per cent. *per annum* was paid; and 15,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which received in the same period only a little over 1 per cent. *per annum*. Only the Rayak-Aleppo line has a kilometric guarantee, finally fixed at 13,600 frs., which in 1911 cost the Government over 1,800,000 frs. In 1905 the company received £T150,000 in State bonds as compensation for loss entailed by the competition of the Hejaz Railway, whose line from Damascus to Deraa runs parallel with the French line to Mzerib.

The traffic returns show that while the Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line is the most lucrative, the Rayak—Aleppo line has progressed more steadily.

(i) Beirut—Damascus—Mzerib line.

| Year. | | Gross receipts in frs. | Receipts per km. in frs. |
|-------|-----|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1907 | ... | 4,171,991 | 16,891 |
| 1908 | ... | 4,704,744 | 19,048 |
| 1909 | ... | 4,619,333 | 18,701 |
| 1910 | ... | 4,578,055 | 18,585 |
| 1911 | ... | 4,350,436 | 17,458 |

(ii) Rayak—Aleppo line.

| Year. | | Gross receipts in frs. | Receipts per km. in frs. |
|-------|-----|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1907 | ... | 1,804,648 | 5,436 |
| 1908 | ... | 2,110,000 | 6,355 |
| 1909 | ... | 2,284,610 | 6,881 |
| 1910 | ... | 2,627,234 | 7,913 |
| 1911 | ... | 2,678,625 | 8,063 |

(iii) Tripoli—Homs line. For the seven months of 1911 during which the line was working the gross receipts were 627,757 frs.; at this rate the receipts for the whole year would be 10,550 frs. pr km.

2. (b) Chemin de fer de la Palestine (Jaffa—Jerusalem). The capital of the company consists of 286,000 frs. in old debentures redeemable without interest by 1949; 9,512,000 frs. in new 5 per cent.

debentures, to which 95 per cent. of the net revenue is assigned; and 4,000,000 frs. in ordinary shares (all in units of 500 frs.). Since the reconstruction in 1894 the gross receipts have risen steadily, and in 1908 the full dividend of 5 per cent. tax free on the new debentures was paid, but the return to shareholders was still under 1 per cent.

| Year. | Gross receipts in frs. | Receipts per km. in frs. |
|----------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1907 ... | 1,120,609 | 12,881 |
| 1908 ... | 1,120,690 | 12,882 |
| 1909 ... | 1,211,079 | 13,920 |
| 1910 ... | 1,368,423 (approx.) | 15,729 |
| 1911 ... | 1,388,755 | 15,963 |

Receipts are largely derived from passenger traffic, which is at its height in March and April. Of the goods traffic over 80 per cent. is in the direction of Jerusalem, whence there is little export. The competition of camel transport is assisted by the inconvenient position of the railway stations both at Jaffa and Jerusalem.

2. (c) Tramways Libanais. The capital is 2,400,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures, interest on which has been paid, and 3,600,000 frs. in ordinary shares, which have hitherto received no dividend. Statistics of the traffic of this line are not published.

3. Hejaz Railway.—Being Government property, this system is independent of interest-bearing capital.

| Year. | Gross receipts in £T. | Receipts per km. in £T. |
|-------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1911-12 ... | 282,868 | 193 |
| 1912-13 ... | 297,976 | 198 |

Working expenses for the year 1912-13 were £T 251,702. These figures include the extra-Syrian section from Ma'an to Medina. Receipts have depended on passengers rather than on goods. The most profitable portion of the line is that from Haifa to Deraa, but no separate statistics are available.

(v) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Expansion*

Syria is now comparatively well provided with railways, though the use of two gauges is unfortunate. A line traverses the interior of the country from north to south, forking at Deraa into two branches, one running east of the Jordan, while the other, with its feeders, serves the region west of that river. The chief ports, Beirut, Alexandretta, Haifa, Jaffa, Tripoli, are linked with the internal railway, and the main inland centres of commerce and industry have been given communication by rail with the sea. Some projected extensions would further improve the system.

On the Baghdad Railway branches are designed to Aintab and Birejik; a branch *viâ* Killis to Aintab, which is a flourishing industrial town, is especially desirable.

A proposal put forward in 1909 by the Ministry of Public Works included a line from Rayak to El-Arish *via* Afule. A line has now been built from Afule southwards, but the extension north to Rayak remains to be constructed; it would traverse a fertile region, and serve the considerable town of Safed.

In 1908 the administration of the Hejaz Railway was authorised to build a line from Afule to Jerusalem. There is continuous railway communication between these places, and though the route might be greatly shortened by building a line from Nablus to Jerusalem, it is doubtful whether such an undertaking is sufficiently needed to justify the labour and expense. Connected with this plan is one for a branch from Jerusalem to Ma'an by Jericho and Es-Salt, which would give access to a somewhat isolated district, and in particular facilitate the exploitation of the large phosphate area about Es-Salt (*cf.* p. 111). It has also been proposed to extend the Deraa—Bosra branch to Salchat and then carry it northwards through the Druse country to join the main line again at El-Mismije.

The line of the Tramways Libanais (Beirut—Mameltein—Jebeil) was planned to connect Tripoli and Saida.

In 1913 the extension to Jebeil was taken in hand; and the completion of the programme should be beneficial, and not unremunerative in this populous district.

The project of connecting the Palestinian and Egyptian railways has lately been realised by the construction of the military line from El-Kantara to Gaza. A proposed branch of the Hejaz Railway, connecting Ma'an and Akaba, might prove of some economic importance, provided that political and military considerations permitted its construction.

The question of the line advocated by Sir W. Willcocks across the Syrian desert to Mesopotamia becomes important in view of recent events. The best route seems to be Tripoli—Homs—Tadmur, whence the line might be carried along the regular caravan track to Deir ez-Zor (190 km.), or strike more directly east to Abu Kemal (245 km.), a route on which, however, water is scarcer. By the former, the total length (passing directly from Ana to Baghdad, and avoiding Hit) would be 916 km., of which 814 would be new; by the latter 830 km., 728 being new. The Tripoli—Homs line has comparatively easy gradients and good alignment, and is further commended by its standard gauge. The railways to Damascus from Beirut and Haifa are narrow-gauge; the Beirut line is, moreover, handicapped by its rack-rail section, and the port is already too small for the traffic, while against the Haifa—Damascus route there is the greater distance. A line from Alexandretta to Aleppo *via* Beilan would be very costly.

Apart from the projects described above, further development in suitable localities by minor branch lines, which would obviate expensive camel transport, is desirable (*cf.*, however, p. 85, note).

(d) *Posts, Telegraphs, Telephones*

The foreign post offices, which were maintained in several centres by each of the six Powers, were formally abolished by the Government in 1914. Turkish post offices are of three kinds: (1) international, from which

telegrams can be sent in a European language (not cypher); (2) native, at which only Turkish or Arabic telegrams are accepted; and (3) postal stations without telegraphic connection. Offices of the first two classes are fairly numerous, and postal facilities now extend to all the more important towns. The following places have international offices: Aintab, Akka, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Antakia, Baabda, Beirut, Beit ed-Din, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Hasbeya, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Kuneitra, Latakia, El-Merkez, El-Mina (Tripoli), Nazareth, Safed, Saida, Tiberias.

Syria has no public telephones; short lines have been installed in some towns for official use.

(2) EXTERNAL

(a) Ports

(i) Accommodation, &c.

In general, westerly winds predominate on the coast. From April to October land and sea breezes prevail, but in April and May hot south-east winds are liable to occur. Gales begin in November, and are frequent in January and February, generally starting from south or south-east and veering to south-west or to north-west, when they may become very violent. The current generally sets north; its rate, even when helped by wind, is rarely over one mile an hour. There is no variation of tide at ports north of Jaffa, though here spring tides rise $1\frac{1}{2}$ ft.

The only adequately constructed port is that of *Beirut*, built at a cost of 12,500,000 frs. by a French company, which has a concession for 99 years from 1887. Its management since 1903 has been in the hands of the Régie Générale des Chemins de fer (*cf.* p. 74). In 1909 the revenue was 1,038,695 frs. gross, 210,835 frs. net. The capital consists of 6,000,000 frs. in shares and 7,500,000 frs. in 4 per cent. debentures: the former received a first dividend of 1 per cent. in 1904, and this rose gradually to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1913. The

harbour, which is about fifty acres in extent, lies between two moles, the width at the entrance being about 160 yds. and the depth seven fathoms, decreasing to one fathom by the quays. The railway runs on to the main quay. Four electric cranes of five tons capacity have lately been set up, and Beirut alone of Syrian ports possesses proper warehouse accommodation. There are two coaling wharves, the outer one about 150 yds. in length, with a depth of 17-25 ft. of water alongside, the inner about 100 yds., with 6 ft. of water. Nearly all steam vessels enter the harbour when they can find room, but the port is too small, as well as too shallow, for modern requirements. The anchorage outside is open from west to north, and strong westerly gales are frequent from November to March; but ships are comparatively safe above the mouth of the Nahr Beirut, just east of the town, where there is a tough mud bottom.

The six other ports which are regularly visited by steamers—Alexandretta, El-Mina (Tripoli), Haifa, Jaffa, Latakia, Saida—are at present open roadsteads without artificial protection. *Alexandretta* (Iskanderun), at the south-east corner of the gulf which bears its name, has the safest anchorage on the whole Syrian coast. Winds, indeed, are extremely variable here, but there is shelter from all except those from the north, which in January and February sometimes delay landing for a few hours. The bottom is generally mud. There are some fairly good storehouses and several small piers for loading and discharging cargo, which has to be done by means of lighters; the Custom House pier, 120 yds. long and 9 yds. broad, with a steam crane of $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons, has only 5 ft. of water at the end. The projected harbour works were begun in 1912 by the Baghdad Railway Company, but so far have made little progress. The town is handicapped by the prevalence of malaria in summer, and seems unlikely to grow greatly in importance except as a port of transit.

El-Mina, the port of Tripoli (Tarabolus), is protected to some extent on the west by a chain of low rocks and

little islands which runs north-west for some distance from the promontory. Between two of the islands a channel nearly half a mile broad and at least six fathoms deep gives access to the bay from the west. The roadstead, however, lies open to the north, though when gales blow from that quarter an anchorage south-west of the promontory may be utilised. Boats of 5 ft. draught can discharge at one of the moles, except in a strong north wind. There is a coal wharf 120 ft. in length, with 6 ft. of water alongside. Warehouse accommodation, as usual, is defective. Surveys for projected harbour works have been made.

Haifa lies on the south-west shore of the sandy bay at Akka, which is well protected on that side by Mount Carmel, and affords a safe anchorage in summer. The railway pier extends about 380 yds., and has a width of about 50 yds., with a depth of 12 ft. of water at the end; it is supplied with two cranes, the larger lifting two tons. There was no coal wharf in 1914, though large stocks of coal were imported for the Hejaz Railway.

At *Jaffa* the harbour lies between a sea wall on the north side of the town and a fringe of low rocks, the width ranging from 50 to 100 yds., and the depth from 3 to 7 ft. It is provided with a short wharf and jetty. The best anchorage is in seven to nine fathoms, sand, about half a mile off the rocks, but ships lying there are much incommoded by westerly winds, which are accompanied by a heavy swell and a northerly current of 1-1½ miles an hour. They have sometimes to proceed to Haifa in order to land passengers. Jaffa is subject to malaria, especially in autumn.

The ancient port of *Latakia* is choked with sand, and useless except for coasting vessels; others anchor outside in the open about a mile off shore on a sandy bottom.

At *Saida* (Sidon) the anchorage, on a sandy bottom, has some natural protection from west and south-west winds, a narrow island a quarter of a mile in length lying off the ancient port, which is sanded up and can shelter only a few small coasting vessels.

Besides the places mentioned there are several minor stations, of which two, *Akka* (Acre) and *Gaza*, receive a few calls from steamers in the harvest season. From *Akka* the coast trends for three miles south-east from the peninsula on which the town stands. Large vessels anchor about a mile out in 9-10 fathoms, smaller vessels in 5-6 fathoms, sandy bottom. *Gaza* is separated from the coast by two miles of drifting sand. Vessels anchor about a mile out to receive cargoes, but owing to the exposed position and a persistent heavy swell from the west loading is often a tedious process. *Suedia*, *Banias*, *Tartus*, *Jebel Yunie*, *Nebi Yunus*, *Es-Sur* (Tyre), and *Kaisarie* (Caesarea) are small places with a certain amount of coastal traffic, conducted for the most part by sailing vessels. Late in 1913 official sanction was obtained for opening *Yunie* and *Nebi Yunus*, on the Lebanon coast, to steamers.

(ii) *Volume and Distribution of Trade.*

Tables showing the tonnage of steamships engaging in foreign trade at various Syrian ports from 1910 to 1913 are printed in the Appendix (Table I). In estimating the total volume of foreign shipping engaged in the Syrian trade, it must, of course, be remembered that many vessels call at several Syrian ports on the same voyage, and are consequently included in the returns of each of these ports.

Beirut, which since the loss of *Salonika* has been the third port of the Turkish Empire, has a rich hinterland in the Lebanon, the *Buka'a*, and *Damascus*, with which it is connected by railway, and is the principal distributing centre of foreign manufactured goods, especially the large textile imports from England. It is also the chief coaling station on this coast, and plays a leading part in the silk export to France. This prominent and well-established position may be impaired when the harbour works designed for *Alexandretta* and *Haifa*, both of which have now obtained railway communications with the interior, have been provided. A certain amount of the traffic with the *Aleppo* district

has already been diverted to Tripoli by the railway thence to Homs, which reduced the distance by rail to the sea by over 100 miles, besides obviating the reloading necessitated by the change of gauge at Rayak. The new branch from Alexandretta to Toprak Kale will make Alexandretta a still more attractive alternative for trade with Aleppo. The competition of Haifa with Beirut for the Damascus market is already felt.

Alexandretta is clearly marked out by nature as the harbour *par excellence* of northern Syria. It has long been the principal port of Aleppo, with which it is connected by a much-frequented road, and also of a wide district to the north and east, and an increasing trade with this region seems now assured by the branch of the Baghdad Railway connecting Alexandretta with the main line. Copper from Arghana, in Kurdistan, was already exported through Alexandretta to Belgium, and among the other exports were large numbers of sheep and cattle, principally for Egypt, from the Euphrates district and beyond, liquorice for the United States, silk from the Antioch district for France, native fabrics for Egypt and Turkey, Aintab leather for Egypt and Tunis, and pistachio nuts from Aleppo and Aintab for England, Turkey, and Egypt.

From *Tripoli* an easy route skirts the Lebanon in a north-easterly direction, and is now followed by the railway to Homs. Though, as already remarked, the advantage temporarily secured by this railway in regard to Aleppo has passed to Alexandretta, Tripoli remains the gate of the rich Homs-Hama district. Silk and eggs for France, native fabrics and soap for Egypt and Turkey, oranges for Turkey and Russia, and wool for the United States, England, and Italy are the principal exports.

Haifa, which in 1906 became the Mediterranean port of the Hejaz Railway, is likely to rise rapidly in importance when once supplied with an adequate harbour. It has a fertile hinterland in the plain of Esdraelon, the upper Jordan valley, and the Hauran, which the railway has now opened up, and considerable

quantities of grain and sesame go this way, especially to Marseilles. Haifa has begun to attract imports for Damascus as well as for Arabia, and may well play the part in southern Syria that seems destined for Alexandretta in the north. It is now connected by rail with Jerusalem, from which, however, it is twice as far as Jaffa.

Jaffa, in spite of the disadvantages of its harbour, has a large export and import trade, being not only the centre of a fertile district, which produces especially oranges, wine, and oil, but also the port of Jerusalem and the nearest regular port to Egypt, whither goes an appreciable part of the local produce. The bulk of the orange export, with some durra, goes to England.

Latakia and *Saida* are on much the same level, and serve only local needs. The former is best known for the black tobacco which it exports to England and Egypt. *Saida*, besides oranges, eggs, figs, &c., exports a little bitumen from Hasbaya, on the slopes of Hermon.

Of the minor ports, *Akka* and *Gaza* are visited by steamers after the harvest for the export of grain. *Akka* has no natural advantages compared with the adjacent Haifa, with which it is now connected by rail, and which is likely in future to handle the Hauran cereals, of which there has been some export *via Akka* in the past. Barley from *Gaza* is taken by England.

(iii) *Adequacy to Economic Needs; Possibilities of Development.*

The inadequacy of the Syrian ports in their present condition has long been recognised, even Beirut being inconveniently small. Works at Alexandretta are, however, included in the concession of the Baghdad Railway Company, which began some operations there in 1912, while a French concession for harbours at Haifa, Tripoli, and Jaffa was agreed on in 1913, and arrangements for their construction at Haifa and Jaffa, at an estimated cost in each case of fifteen to twenty million francs, were in progress at the outbreak of war. Jaffa stands in especial need of some artificial protection for

shipping. With these additions, and the provision of suitable warehouses, the country would be sufficiently well supplied, though minor improvements at the smaller places of call are no doubt desirable. The people of the Lebanon in particular are anxious for the development of the harbours on their littoral, and the French concession of 1913, already mentioned, provided that any new works at Yunie or Nebi Yunus should be granted to the Beirut Harbour Company.¹

(b) *Shipping Lines*

Before the war Syrian ports would have enjoyed good sea communications if their harbours had been more adequate and quarantine on vessels from Egypt less frequent. The following lines have regular services and carry mails:—

Messageries Maritimes: from Marseilles (1) weekly to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut (on the return journey Jaffa only is visited once a fortnight); (2) fortnightly to Constantinople, Smyrna, Rhodes, Beirut, north as far as Mersina, thence to Larnaka (Cyprus), Jaffa, and Haifa, returning to Marseilles by Beirut, Smyrna, and Constantinople. The second of these services provided the most rapid service between Constantinople and Syria. The company has a subvention from the French Government.

Austrian Lloyd: weekly from Trieste to Alexandria, Port Said, Jaffa, Haifa, Saida, Beirut, Tripoli, Latakia, Alexandretta, Mersina, and back the same way. Subsidised by the Austrian Government.

Khedivial Mail Steamship Company: weekly from Alexandria to Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut and back, with fortnightly extension to Mersina, Smyrna, and Constantinople.

¹ The above remarks must be taken as referring to pre-war conditions. A good deal of uncertainty prevails regarding the present state of the country, but, in view of the reported depopulation of certain districts (see p. 87), existing facilities of communication might be expected to prove more than adequate for some time to come.

The Società Marittima Italiana and the Società Italiana di Servizi Marittimi both maintain fortnightly services from Genoa or Venice to Alexandria, Jaffa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, Alexandretta, Mersina, and from Venice to Beirut by Rhodes or the Piraeus.

Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company : weekly from Odessa to Constantinople, Smyrna, Mersina, Alexandretta, Latakia, Tripoli, Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa, and Egypt. Many pilgrims from Russia come this way.

The recurrence of Alexandria in these services is noticeable. That port, moreover, receives the bulk of the British exports to Syria, which are sent from Liverpool or Manchester, and reshipped from Alexandria to their destination.

Besides these mail steamers, numerous merchant vessels call more or less frequently, those of the Rumanian Service Maritime, the Deutsche Levante Linie, and the Bulgarian Varna Company sometimes taking passengers as well as cargo. Among British lines are the Prince, Moss, Ellerman, Asia Minor Steamship Company, and Westcott and Laurance; the Orient is Belgian, with British boats. A "conference" or syndicate, including the Prince Line, Westcott and Laurance, the Deutsche Levante Linie, the German Atlas Linie, the Belgian Armement Adolf Deppe, and the Royal Netherlands Line, with sailings from London, Antwerp, and the chief German and Dutch ports, was established for the unification of freights and the exclusion of competition. A curious feature of this combine was that goods for Syria of German origin enjoyed cheaper rates than those of other countries. Ottoman shipping, apart from the small sailing vessels engaged in the coasting trade, has much decreased since 1911.

(c) *Telegraphic Communication Abroad*

There is no direct cable between Syria and Europe. Foreign telegrams may go either by Constantinople or by Egypt through the Eastern Telegraph Company. A

submarine cable connected Latakia with Agios Theodoros, in Cyprus. All the chief ports (including Akka and Gaza) have "international" telegraph stations (*cf.* p. 79).

Except at the German sanatorium on the Mount of Olives, there were no wireless installations before the war, but other stations have since been established, at any rate at Hebron, Ramle, and Damascus, and no doubt at Aleppo.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) LABOUR

(a) *Supply of Labour*

Syria as a whole is thinly populated (*cf.* p. 16), and the supply of labour is not generally abundant, though certain districts are, no doubt, better off than others. The Lebanon especially, in spite of a large emigration (*cf.* p. 17), was comparatively well peopled before the war, and the bulk of the population being Christian, male labour could be supplemented by that of women, which was an important factor in the silk industry; it is, however, not usual for women to continue work of this kind after marriage. Again, in some parts of Palestine the labour supply has been appreciably increased by Jewish immigration. A United States consular report of 1909-10 goes so far as to assert that in the south the abundance and cheapness of labour formed an obstacle to the introduction of agricultural machinery. This, however, can certainly not be said of the country at large, where scarcity of labour is a common complaint, and machinery is usually regarded as the remedy. During the war the situation has undergone a change. The countryside has been drained of men of military age, some of whom will, of course, not return; and the population has been further thinned by famine and disease. The Lebanon especially has suffered severely, being reported to have lost from half

to three-quarters of its inhabitants. On the other hand, there has been some accession in northern Syria of Armenian refugees, of whom some 40,000 are stated to have been drafted into the Aleppo vilayet. These may relieve the scarcity of labour which has hampered the textile industry of Aleppo. It is possible, too, that war conditions may to some extent break down the Mussulman prejudice against female labour. The mortality among beasts of draught and burden—a serious matter for both agriculture and trade—has been noted above, p. 68.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

According to a law of 1916, all labourers in factories having a capital of £T 100 or over, and workers enough to make 750 working days a year, must be Turkish subjects. Another recent enactment enables the State to demand labour at will. Four days' work annually (or a money payment in lieu of work) for road-making was previously incumbent on male subjects between the ages of 18 and 60.

As noted below (p. 99), peasant proprietorship has declined, and no small proportion of the fellahin are now insecure metayer tenants of large landholders. A certain number also work for a daily wage. In Palestine, for instance, on the land of the Jewish colonists, both Jews and Arabs find employment, commonly earning from one to two francs a day. This may be regarded as an average wage for agricultural labour. In the Lebanon, to take another example, during the olive-gathering season, 6 or 7 piastres are paid for men, and about half that amount for women and children; but lower rates are found elsewhere, and payment is sometimes made in kind at the rate of about $1/13$ (7-8 per cent.) of the quantity gathered. In other industries also wages are low judged by European standards, grown men, unless specially skilled, seldom earning more than about two francs a

day, and often less (*cf.* p. 113), while the scale for female and child labour is considerably lower. In the factories little attention has hitherto been paid to hygiene; in particular the unhealthy conditions prevailing in some of the Lebanese silk-spinning establishments, where young girls work for long hours in steamy and ill-ventilated rooms, have been the subject of criticism. Attempts at improvement have lately been made in some instances.

(2) AGRICULTURE

Syria is essentially an agricultural country. Its wealth is derived almost wholly from the cultivation of the soil, and the bulk of the population is engaged in raising produce of various kinds or in keeping and breeding domestic animals. The extent of the cultivated area is not accurately known. Official figures for the year 1915 give to cultivation in the vilayet of Damascus, exclusive of natural pastures and forests, 15,710,481 *donum* (14,438 sq. km.),¹ and in the Lebanon 435,200 *donum* (400 sq. km.), *i.e.*, about 16 per cent. and 12 per cent. respectively of the total areas. In the vilayet of Aleppo and the mutessarifik of Jerusalem the proportion is probably somewhat smaller, in the vilayet of Beirut somewhat higher, and the total area normally under crops may be put roughly at from 20,000 to 24,000 sq. km., or from 10 per cent. to 12 per cent. of the whole. This is no doubt capable of appreciable extension, even if the ancient limits cannot be reached. The theory of a considerable alteration of climate in the historical period is, indeed, now commonly discredited, but, on the other hand, the facts are not easily explained without supposing some decrease of moisture in these regions. Drought is the chief danger to the harvest. Much depends on equable distribution

¹ Reckoning the *donum* as 919 sq. metres, or 1,088 to 1 sq. km. The exact value of the *donum* in Syria is said to be 919:3024 sq. metres, or about 227 acres.

of rainfall during the winter season, and a failure of the late rain in March and April makes a great difference to the wheat crop. Damage from frost or hail is rare (*cf.*, however, p. 93, note), but locusts may be very injurious. The Italian locust has been persistent of late in the Aleppo vilayet, and Sudanese locusts have occasionally appeared in great numbers, causing serious loss, for instance, in 1915.

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products. Owing to its geological complexity, and the great diversity of its climate, which ranges from tropical heat in the Jordan valley to a temperature on the upper slopes of the mountains compatible with perennial snow, Syria has a rich variety of vegetable products. Cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees are produced in profusion; tobacco, cotton, and hemp are successfully cultivated; and there are some wild-growing plants of value.

Cereals. Of these the chief is wheat, to which is devoted nearly half the area under grain, the total crop in the average year being estimated at upwards of a million tons. It is sown in December-January, and harvested between the end of May and the beginning of July. The principal wheat districts are the upland plains east of the Jordan, especially the Hauran, and the Buka'a (Coele-Syria), and, in the west, the plain of Esdraelon. Several varieties are grown, that of the Hauran being the most esteemed.

Barley is cultivated on about 30 per cent. of the cereal area, and the normal crop is some 500,000 tons, much of which is grown in the Homs-Hama district, and about Gaza and Bir es-Seba. Gaza barley ripens as early as the end of April, and is much appreciated by English brewers, but the crop is uncertain, and the amount available for export varies greatly. Barley is largely used locally for feeding animals.

Durra (Indian millet), which is sown in March-April, and harvested five months later, yields about

200,000 tons. The bulk is used for bread by the poorer classes, small quantities only being exported.

Maize is grown in the plains of Damascus, the Hauran, &c., but is of minor importance, as are oats and rye, which are only raised in small quantities by the foreign colonists.

Sesame, from which oil is produced, is one of the most valuable crops, fetching as much as £16 a ton, but it needs much labour and is very uncertain; consequently it is not much in favour except as a preparatory for wheat. It is grown chiefly on the coastal plain and in the Homs-Hama district, the annual yield being about 30,000 tons, of which a third or so is exported.

Rice, which requires a swampy soil, is grown in small quantities in the north of the Aleppo vilayet and in the upper Jordan valley (Jaulan district). Its cultivation is subject to Government restriction.

Leguminous plants, including chickpeas, lentils, beans, vetches, and lupins, are largely cultivated. Chickpeas are sown in February, the others earlier, and harvest time extends from April to July. The total crop may be estimated at about 500,000 tons, and chickpeas and lupins are exported in appreciable quantities. The latter are sometimes grown merely as a manure. Lucern and clover are grown for fodder, especially in the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo.

Vegetables, which are for the most part consumed locally, include potatoes, turnips, onions, melons, marrows, aubergines (egg plants), tomatoes, carrots, garlic, cabbages, cauliflowers, artichokes, and asparagus. Potatoes, which fetch £4 5s. the ton, are not much grown except in the Damascus and Aleppo districts: an obstacle to their wider cultivation is the fact that they ripen early and do not keep through the hot weather till the next sowing time, so that seed-potatoes must be imported afresh every year. The combined yield of potatoes and turnips amounts to about 200,000 tons. Melons grow best on the coastal plain

between Jaffa and Haifa, whence they are sent in large numbers to Constantinople and Egypt in the autumn. There is also some export of onions from Tripoli and Latakia. Experiments recently made with sugar-beet by Jewish colonists are said to have given satisfactory results.

Other crops. Tobacco. The Beirut vilayet and the Lebanon are the chief tobacco-growing districts, smaller amounts being produced also in the vilayets of Aleppo (at Aintab and Killis) and Damascus. According to official statistics the area under tobacco in the departmental districts of Latakia, Aleppo, and Beirut with Damascus, in the year 1911-12 was 20,203 *donum* (about 18.5 sq. km., 4,652 acres), and the produce 1,310,000 kg.; in the following year the production was larger, the export from Latakia alone amounting to 1,323,944 kg. The Latakia smoke-dried tobacco is practically all exported, about 90 per cent. going to England. There is also an export to Egypt both of the ordinary tobacco and of *tombac*, a variety used in the *nargileh* or hookah, and grown mainly about Latakia. The total value of the tobacco crop, which is subject to official restriction, is put at about five million francs.

Cotton was extensively cultivated during the American Civil War, but subsequently died out along the coast, and in central and southern Syria it has reappeared only in the last ten years. The neighbourhoods of Latakia, Akka, Tiberias, and Nablus, and the valleys of Esdraelon and the Buka'a now produce some 1,000 tons, and approximately twice that amount is grown in the Aleppo vilayet (chiefly about Edlib, Dana, Killis, and Aintab), where heavy dews make artificial irrigation unnecessary.

Hemp, the annual crop of which was estimated in 1911 at about 1,300 tons, is grown chiefly in the Barada valley (Damascus), and to a less extent in the Euphrates district of the Aleppo vilayet. The best fibres are exported, and the rest used in the factories of Damascus.

Sugar-cane can be grown on the coast and in the Jordan valley, but needs profuse irrigation, and is only cultivated in small quantities for chewing.

Other minor crops are carraway seed, fennel, and aniseed, the first of which is grown about Tripoli, the other two in the neighbourhood of Damascus. Aniseed, of which about 500 tons are raised, is used locally for flavouring arrack, and there is some export, as of carraway seed and fennel, to Egypt.

Fruit trees. Four of these, the olive, vine, mulberry, and orange, are of special importance.

Olive trees may be seen all over the country, but the largest groves are in the Lebanon, and about Beirut, Tripoli, Akka, Nablus, Safed, Ludd, Antioch, Edlib, Killis,¹ Aintab. The tree, which is comparatively hardy, growing on the poorest soil and requiring little attention, comes into bearing between its eighth and twelfth years, but usually yields a good crop (10-20 *okes*²) only in alternate years. It attains a great age. Olives are gathered green in September for eating, but hang till about the end of October when intended for oil-making. The total number of trees in the country before the war may be estimated, from official and semi-official statistics, at upwards of 10 million, producing 125,000,000 *okes* (about 158,000 tons) to the value of about 30,000,000 frs. During the last three years, however, the number has been much reduced, many trees having been cut down for fuel for the railways, &c.; as many as a third are stated to have been sacrificed in this way.

Vines are also very widely cultivated. Official and semi-official figures of 1910 and 1913 give the grape-producing area as 887,227 *donum* (nearly 815.5 sq. km.), with an output of 250,268,150 *okes*, exclusive of the Lebanon, for which another 30,000 *donum* (over

¹ Many trees in this neighbourhood were destroyed by frost some years ago.

² The *oke* (*okka*) is reckoned at 1.282 kg. or 792.5 to the English ton.

27.5 sq. km.) and 20,000,000 *okes* may be added, raising the total production to some 345,000 tons. Of this a certain proportion is dried or converted into wine or spirits, but the bulk is consumed fresh on the spot. The vintage begins in July at Gaza and Jericho, the period varying elsewhere with the climate and the kind of grapes. Phylloxera, which has made its appearance during the last twenty years, has been successfully met by the introduction of American vines.

The white mulberry is largely cultivated in northern Syria on the coastal plain between Saida and Antioch (Antakia), the lower mountain slopes, and in the Buka'a, for feeding silkworms; the black mulberry is also grown to some extent for its fruit. The tree thrives in both heavy and sandy soil (the latter being said to produce the most suitable leaves), arriving at maturity in 15-25 years, and living for 80-100. In regular plantations other crops—vegetables, grain, or tobacco—are often placed between the rows. The young silkworms are hatched in April and May, and their feeding, which is largely carried on by women and children, lasts for about five weeks. Subsequently the leaves are used for fodder. The area devoted to mulberry trees in 1914 may be put at about 310,000 *donum* (285.5 sq. km.), with a production of fresh cocoons of about 6,600,000 kg. Owing to decreasing profits due to the competition of Chinese and Japanese silk, there has been a tendency in recent years to replace mulberries by oranges or tobacco; and during the war, which has closed the French market, there has been a great decline. In the Lebanon, which is the centre of the silk industry, the production in 1915 is stated to have been not above half the normal, in 1916 not above a third; and many mulberry-trees are said to have been felled.

The cultivation of oranges and lemons, especially the former, has made great strides in the last two decades, though, owing to the need of summer irrigation, it is limited to districts where water is readily accessible, *e.g.*, the neighbourhood of rivers and the plains

between Gaza and Haifa. The bulk of the orange plantations are in the vilayet of Beirut and the mutessarifik of Jerusalem, the Jaffa district being especially important; the chief lemon groves are about Saida. Official statistics make the area under oranges and lemons in Beirut 26,430 *donum* (about 24.3 sq. km.), and the weight of fruit 21,078,000 *okes* (about 26,680 tons). There are no corresponding figures for the Jerusalem province, but the area under cultivation must be at least as large, and the weight produced is probably considerably greater. The Aleppo vilayet is comparatively unimportant in this respect. Large quantities, to the value of about 8,000,000 frs., representing perhaps half the total crop, are exported, especially oranges from Jaffa. During the war the plantations have suffered severely, particularly in the Jaffa neighbourhood, partly from locusts, but still more from the failure of irrigation. Fortunately, orange-trees mature quickly, and the groves could be restored within a few years.

Of other cultivated fruit trees, statistics are available only for the Aleppo vilayet, where in 1914 there were reckoned to be 1,314,520 fig trees, yielding 34,038,780 *okes* (43,080 tons); 289,021 apple trees, yielding 911,250 *okes* (1,153 tons); 105,350 pistachio trees, yielding 811,125 *okes* (1,026 tons); and smaller numbers of pear, peach, apricot, pomegranate, black mulberry, almond, and walnut trees. Other trees which occur are quince, plum, cherry, hazelnut (especially about Hama and Damascus), and carob, while in the Jordan valley grow date palms, bananas, and cactus figs. The carob-fruit (known as locusts) is partly exported for spirit manufacture, partly converted into syrup for home consumption. The chief fruit crops are apricots, especially about Damascus, where quantities are dried or made into paste, figs, of which a few are dried and exported, pomegranates, pistachios, almonds, and walnuts. Pistachios, which are cultivated in the vilayet of Aleppo, were exported in 1912

to the value of 1,500,000 frs., representing, perhaps, about half the crop; the crop of walnuts, grown chiefly in the Damascus district, averages about 4,000 tons, with a value of about 1,000,000 frs.; while the almond crop, a considerable part of which comes from the Jewish colonies, is worth approximately the same amount. Some dates are also exported. The total value of the average yield of the fruit trees must reach 10,000,000 frs.

The preservation of the fruit is for the most part done by the actual growers. Olives, green and black, are preserved in salt water, especially at Damascus, where a species, large in size but of low oil-producing capacity, is grown. From three to four million *okes* are prepared annually.

Apricot preserving is another speciality of Damascus and the neighbourhood, where this fruit is largely cultivated. It is both dried whole and made into a paste, the kernels being also an article of export. In 1909, the annual production of dried apricots was put at 500-700 tons, and of the paste at 3,000-4,000 tons, and it has tended to increase. Some of the paste is exported to Rumania, and both the paste and the dried fruit go to Egypt and all parts of Turkey. Apricots and other fruits are also preserved with sugar at Damascus, and "Turkish Delight" is made there in considerable quantities. The annual value of these various products, including apricot kernels, is estimated at four to five million francs.

Dried figs are produced at Antioch and about Saida, but the industry is not large. They are not usually prepared like Smyrna figs, but are compressed into a solid mass.

Sultanas are produced chiefly in the vilayet of Aleppo, and about Damascus, Es-Salt (from which the word sultana is sometimes derived), Zahle in the Lebanon, and Hebron. The small grapes are moistened with olive oil, and then dried over hot ashes and afterwards in the sun. In 1914, the production of the vilayets of Damascus and Aleppo was about 11,000,000

okes. Large quantities of grapes are also converted into a kind of honey. In the vilayet of Damascus over 33,000,000 *okes*, in that of Aleppo over 14,000,000 *okes* were so used in 1914.

Of the *wild produce*, much the most valuable is the liquorice root, which grows abundantly in the Aleppo vilayet, particularly in the upper Euphrates region and about Antioch. The greater part of the root collected goes to the United States; in 1908 the amount was over 20,000 tons, to the value of £158,510, these being the highest figures in recent years. In the north-eastern districts there is also a considerable production of gall-nuts, valonia, yellow berries (buckthorn), gum-tragacanth, and scammony, though much of what passes through Aleppo and Alexandretta in these kinds comes from beyond Syrian borders. Colocynth grows in the sandy region of Gaza and Bir es-Seba, and about 1,500 tons are exported annually, chiefly to Germany. The papyrus of Lake Hule (Merom) is made into mats by the Arabs of the district. Gum-arabic is obtained from the acacias to the east of the Dead Sea.

Animals and Animal Products.—The quadrupeds kept are horses, donkeys, mules, camels, buffaloes, kine, sheep, goats, and pigs. The horses in ordinary use are of very fair quality, but pedigree animals are not often seen now, even among the Beduin. Donkeys and camels are the usual beasts of burden, and are found everywhere; they are sometimes used by the fellahin in place of oxen for ploughing. Donkeys are of two kinds, the common sort and the large white Arabian variety, which commands a higher price. Camels are usually bought from the Beduin of the desert, and not home-bred. The best cows are those of Damascus and the Lebanon, the Damascus (Egyptian) variety being the richer in milk; there is also a useful cross between the two. Those found elsewhere are as a rule small and ill-favoured, and give little milk except in the spring. Buffaloes are confined to swampy districts. Sheep, which are mostly fat-tailed, are especially important; besides those bred in the country many come in from

the north and east, the great centre of distribution being Aleppo. Goats also are kept in large numbers, and the Angora goat occurs occasionally in northern Syria. A few pigs are found in Christian villages. Trustworthy statistics of the numbers of these various animals in the whole country are not to be had. Figures for 1914-15 gave, for the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus, 190,130 horses, mules, and donkeys; 299,325 cattle, including buffaloes; 3,614,976 sheep and goats; and 150,402 camels. On the basis of these returns and of incomplete semi-official statistics for 1909-10, the total number in 1914 of horses, mules, and donkeys may be put roughly at 270,000; of cattle at 500,000; of sheep and goats at 4,800,000; of camels at 200,000; with a combined value of about 265,000,000 frs. These numbers, however, have certainly been much reduced during the war, which has made especially heavy demands on transport animals.

In the vilayet of Damascus and the Lebanon, where fodder is plentiful, milk and its products are obtained chiefly from cows, elsewhere from sheep and goats, which are the source of the large quantities of native butter (*ghi* or *semn*) brought by the nomadic tribes of the desert to Aleppo, Hama, and Homs. An extension of cow-keeping is hindered by the lack of fodder, the poverty of the fellahin, and their inability to co-operate or arrange for the disposal of their milk. Of sheep's wool there is a large production and a considerable export, to which the desert tribes make important contributions. Shearing takes place usually in May or June, the yield per sheep being about 3 kg. Lambskins are also exported, but other skins and hides are mostly absorbed by the home market. According to official statistics for 1914-15, the production in the vilayets of Aleppo and Damascus of milk, butter, and cheese was 62,536,493 *okes* (79,160 tons); of wool and goats'-hair, 1,826,994 *okes* (2,312 tons); with 447,274 hides and skins. Altogether, including the increment in young, the annual value of the produce of the animals mentioned may be reckoned at about 80,000,000 frs.

Fowls, turkeys, pigeons, and more rarely geese and ducks, are kept, especially in the vicinity of large towns, but nowhere on an extensive scale. The fowls and ducks, as usual in the East, are small and poor layers, and the industry generally, which might be highly profitable, especially as there is no tax on birds, is in a backward condition. Eggs are, however, exported to a considerable extent, chiefly by Beirut merchants, who buy them up through local agents. Prices *per* 100 range from 2-3 frs. in spring to 5-8 frs. in autumn.

Bee-keeping is carried on in a primitive fashion by the natives, especially in the mountain valleys, where flowers are plentiful. Much better results are obtained by colonists who use European hives.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

Although large proprietorship predominates (*cf.* p. 88), farming on a large scale is the exception. As a rule estates are let and sublet to peasant cultivators, the normal size of individual holdings being roughly reckoned as the extent that can be tilled by means of a pair of oxen, *i.e.*, 100-250 *donum* (about 23-57 acres), though smaller farms are common.

The cultivation of these modest holdings proceeds on methods which have changed little with the lapse of centuries. Crops on arable land fall into two classes, winter (wheat, barley, &c.) and summer (sesame, durra, &c.), but the same soil will not produce a double crop except where artificial irrigation is possible. Rotation of crops follows the two-field system, in which the main crop of wheat or barley is sown in alternate years only, the land, in the intermediate years, being either left fallow or put under a crop of different type, such as sesame, durra, leguminous plants or roots. Such rotation, though not providing for winter fodder, is adapted to the natural requirements of the soil, but needs to be supplemented by adequate manuring, the absence of which is the chief defect in native cultivation. Animal manure is unavailable in any large

quantity, partly because the animals are mostly on pasture, partly owing to its use as fuel. Artificial manures, which have been proved by experiment to be beneficial and remunerative, are beyond the reach of the fellah, whose tenure, moreover, is not commonly such as to encourage him to sink any savings in the improvement of his land. The result is progressive impoverishment of the soil. No great importance is attached to the removal of stones, which do not hamper the native plough and sickle. On the hill-slopes, especially in the Lebanon and in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, terraces are often built to prevent the erosion of the thin layer of soil in the rainy season. This terrace-building descends from remote antiquity, and was much more highly elaborated in the past than now. Planting of trees is generally neglected, except in the immediate neighbourhood of towns and villages, and the more extensive plantations are generally owned by large proprietors or town capitalists. Here again development is hindered by poverty and the prevailing conditions of tenure. In the Lebanon, however, and about Damascus, tree culture is successfully carried on by small farmers, as also in the Jewish colonies.

The agricultural implements in common use are extremely primitive, though better adapted to local conditions than is often supposed. Ploughing must be completed as soon as possible after the first rains, and the light iron-tipped wooden plough does its work quickly, and is readily drawn by a pair of oxen, which are cheaper to keep than horses or mules; it penetrates only a few inches, but if the ground is to retain its moisture and to produce summer crops, this loosening of the upper layer is better than deep ploughing. Reaping with the sickle suits the stony soil, which in Syria is only too common. There is less to be said for the ox-drawn threshing sledge, which is wasteful. But it has the merit of cheapness, and is said to break up the hard straw well, while the time and labour involved in its use are of no great consequence to the native after his crops have been reaped. European machines and

implements, which have been introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, can be employed advantageously in certain conditions, which, however, are by no means always present.

Owing largely to the exhaustion of the soil, productivity is comparatively low except in especially favoured districts. On the unmanured lands of the fellahin the yield of wheat may be reckoned at eight to tenfold; of barley, beans, lentils, and peas at ten to fifteenfold; of sesame at forty to fiftyfold; of durra at sixty to eightyfold. Under native cultivation a hectare ($2\frac{1}{2}$ acres) of land of best quality in the neighbourhood of Jaffa produces only about 1,540 kg. of wheat or 1,760 kg. of barley, though yields of 2,000 and 2,880 kg. respectively are obtained by the better methods of the Jewish colonists. A typical holding of 100 *donum* (23 acres) of medium quality cultivated with grain by a fellah and his wife gives in an average year a net income of about 750 frs., and this is not more than doubled on the best land; with the usual rent, the profit would be reduced by about 40 per cent. In the Jewish colonies of Galilee, where working expenses are heavier, the net income per hectare for grain cultivation is even lower than on the fellahin holdings, but much better results are obtained by German colonists near Jaffa, who supplement grain by production of milk, vegetables, and fruit. The relatively poor returns obtained from pure agriculture have led the colonists and others who can command the capital to turn to plantations of oranges, vines, and other fruit trees. On land of medium quality in the Jaffa district the net annual return per hectare of oranges is 557 frs., of almonds 267 frs., of apricots and peaches 196 frs., of olives 170 frs., and of vines 214 frs.; the profit on these forms of cultivation works out at 10-11 per cent. on the capital outlay, and this may probably be reckoned as the average return on fruit-tree culture elsewhere in Syria.

Irrigation and drainage. In the hot dry months of summer irrigation is necessary for oranges, lemons,

apples, pears, bananas, sugar-cane, hemp, cotton (in Palestine), and many vegetables (not, however, for water-melons, pumpkins, tomatoes, marrows, aubergines, or onions). It may be performed in three ways: (1) by leading water from rivers, as in the Damascus plains from the Barada and other streams, in the Buka'a from the Litani, and at Homs, Hama, and Antioch from the Orontes; (2) by raising water from wells by means of the ancient waterwheel worked by animals; (3) by mechanical pumping, either from rivers of which the bed is too deep for the first method, or from wells. Suction pumps driven by petrol or gas engines were introduced by the Jewish and German colonists, and have been spreading to the native cultivators; wind-motors are used at a number of stations on the Hejaz Railway, and by some German colonists. Irrigation from wells is practised chiefly in the coastal plain between Gaza and Haifa, where water is commonly found at about sea level, and wells rarely attain a depth of 50 metres. Recently much deeper excavation has been tried in higher localities; water is obtained from wells of over 90 metres on the spur of Mount Carmel, and has been reached by mechanical boring at twice that depth in Judaea. An elaborate riverside pumping station has been set up by a German company on the banks of the Auja, whence water is supplied to about 1,500 *donum* (340 acres) of land at the Jewish colony of Petach Tikwa. A more extended use of this river has been projected, and would not be difficult, while other irrigation schemes, more or less practicable, have also been mooted. The Jordan, however, like some other Palestine rivers, has too deep a bed to lend itself very readily to such projects. Much remains to be done in the way of economising the country's winter surplus by means of reservoirs or dams, a method far more developed in early times than at present.

Drainage on a small scale by laying pipes or planting eucalyptus trees has been carried out by colonists in Palestine; the extensive marshes on the coastal plains

and about Lake Hule (Merom) could only be reclaimed by more elaborate and costly works.

(c) *Forestry*

It has been estimated that 88 per cent. of the forests of Turkey are State-owned, and except in the Lebanon there is certainly little private property in the forests of Syria. According to statistics of the year 1907-8 the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut contained only 2,000 hectares (about 4,950 acres) of privately-owned forest; on the other hand, in the Lebanon, which those statistics do not include, the forests are entirely owned either by private persons or by village communities. With regard to the present extent of forests, official statistics for 1915 assign to the vilayet of Aleppo 135,000 hectares, to Damascus 61,000, to Beirut 55,000, to the Lebanon 60,000, a total of 311,000 hectares (1,200 sq. miles). Some reduction has no doubt taken place in consequence of the heavy demand for timber and fuel occasioned by the war. The 1907-8 statistics, which do not seem very trustworthy, represent the forests of the Aleppo vilayet as consisting of 53 per cent. of pine or fir, and 34 per cent. of oak; those of the Beirut vilayet of 75 per cent. of pine or fir, and 21 per cent. of oak; and those of Damascus entirely of oak. In the Lebanon also pine and oak predominate. Oaks, of which there are several varieties, tend to be rather stunted. Other trees found are carob, pistachio, sumach, cypress, plane, poplar, and lastly eucalyptus, which has been planted in large groves by Jewish settlers, especially about Kaisarie. The cedars of Lebanon are reduced to a few small groups.

The forests have been subject to Government control since 1870, and two schools, an upper and a lower, from which the local inspectors, keepers, and other officials are drawn, have been maintained at Constantinople. These officials, however, were more interested in increasing revenues than in arresting the advance of

deforestation, which has been most rapid along the coast, in the neighbourhood of towns, and wherever railways or roads facilitate transport. Profits were obtained by putting up the forestry rights to auction or allowing villagers to cut trees on payment of certain dues; and tithe is paid on wood sold by private or corporate owners. Much damage has been done by fire as well as by indiscriminate felling. A great hindrance to the growth of trees are the flocks of goats which keep down all young wood within reach, and saplings are often felled merely for the sake of fodder. Sheepfarmers too are hostile to trees, on which wool is lost by rubbing. Quite recently steps have been taken to place the forestry of the Empire on a better footing. An Austrian expert has been called in to advise, a better inspection service instituted, and exploitation regulated by new enactments. One of these (1917) provides that foreign companies receiving concessions must offer half their shares for a period of three months to Ottoman subjects.

Timber from the forests is used mainly for fuel, either raw or in the form of charcoal; rough planks, posts, &c., are also made, but the better qualities of wood for building and cabinet-making are imported. In 1907-8 the output of timber in the vilayets of Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut was worth 6,573,168 piastres (1,645,000 frs.); with the addition of the production of the Lebanon, of wood used privately by villagers, and various by-products (gall-nuts, pine seeds, sumach leaves, &c.), the annual value of the forests may be put at three or four million francs.

(d) *Land-Tenure*

Agricultural methods and conditions have depended in no small degree on the complicated system of land-tenure in Turkey, which is described at length in *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 92 *seq.*; the following account summarises the main points.

Land held by private persons may be of three kinds:—

Miri, the property of the State. The crown domains, though retaining their old name, were declared State property on the re-establishment of the constitution in 1908.

Mulk, private freehold.

Vakuf, land vested in religious or charitable institutions.

Of these *mulk* is of comparatively small extent, private property being found chiefly in the areas of towns and villages, where individual freeholds are limited to half a *donum* (1/9 acre) in addition to the site built upon. Practically the whole of the cultivated area consists of either *miri* or *vakuf*. *Miri* is held by individuals, but the State ownership involves certain restrictions upon its disposal, which, however, were lightened in 1913. It may now be freely sold, leased, or mortgaged, except to foreign companies, but cannot be disposed of by will, lapsing in case of failure of legal heirs to the State, to which it also reverts if left uncultivated for three successive years. Until 1913 the tenant was not even permitted free agricultural use of his land, permission being necessary for planting trees or vines, as well as for the erection of buildings; but these disabilities are now substantially removed. Of *vakuf* land, which is under the supervision of a special Ministry, there are different varieties, depending partly on the terms of the original dedication. Both *mulk* and, with the consent of the State, *miri* can be converted into *vakuf*, and the previous owner or tenant may retain the usufruct with its free disposal, or both ownership and usufruct may become vested in the institution concerned. In the latter case the land is usually let for periods not exceeding three years.

Apart from these legal distinctions, agriculture has been greatly affected by certain other fundamental facts, to which brief reference must be made.

The existing land-register, which was drawn up fifty years ago, is very inexact with regard both to measurements and boundaries, and enjoys no public confidence. A proper survey and valuation was decreed in 1913, but has not yet been begun in Syria.

In the next place, a primitive system of collective tenure still prevails at many villages, though individual indebtedness has of late not infrequently led to partition. Under this system the land is re-apportioned among the families of the village every two years, a practice resulting in stereotyped cultivation, and leading the temporary holders to minimise their outlay of both capital and labour.

Apart from communal land, much is concentrated in a few hands. Vakuf accounts for a good deal. Another large section, including the greater part of the Jordan valley, consists of domains belonging to the late Sultan, which have lapsed to the State and are commonly leased in small plots in return for one-fifth of the produce paid in kind. Moreover, the old miri land has to an increasing extent passed into the hands of large proprietors, who, as a rule, do not farm it themselves, but let it on similar terms to small cultivators. The plain of Esdraelon, for instance, is now entirely owned by a few town landlords. These large proprietors are apt to regard their estates merely as an investment, and the fellahin, or peasant cultivators, are always liable to be evicted when a favourable opportunity for realisation offers. It is also customary, in order to obviate any prescriptive rights, to change tenants at intervals. A frequent cause of land passing into capitalist hands is the oppression of the tax collector, from which the fellah seeks relief, either by disposing of his holding to a local effendi, or by turning it into vakuf. In Turkey the burden of direct taxation falls mainly upon the land (*cf.* p. 138), and is aggravated by the tax-farming system, which involves much extortion and oppression.

A large proportion of the fellahin, therefore, are in no sense proprietors, but merely cultivators with a

limited, and often highly precarious, tenure. In 1907 it was estimated that in Judaea 50 per cent., in north Syria 20-30 per cent., in Galilee 20 per cent., and in the Hauran 15 per cent. only of the land was the property of the actual occupiers. A recent official report of the vilayet of Damascus puts the small holdings there at 25 per cent. Fruit plantations often belong to large owners; the orange-groves of Jaffa, for example, are mostly owned by town effendis. On the other hand, many of the silk cultivators of the Lebanon are small independent proprietors.

The price of agricultural land varies greatly with its quality, position, facilities for irrigation, and the kind of culture to which it is suited. It is highest in the Lebanon, where returning emigrants increase the demand: unplanted land of average quality will there fetch from 600 frs. to 1,000 frs. per *donum*, while for the same area planted with mulberries, 1,000-1,200 frs., or with oranges, 1,500-3,000 frs. may be paid. Irrigated fruit gardens at Homs are worth 1,000-1,500 frs. the *donum*. Land suitable for orange-plantation, but depending on pumped water, fetches in the Jewish and German colonies 300 frs. Grain land of the best quality costs in Palestine 30-50 frs. per *donum*, in north Syria 10-30 frs. Value is reduced by distance from a town, and especially by proximity to the desert, where there is danger of Beduin incursions; land may be had, for instance, on the eastern borders of the Aleppo vilayet for $\frac{1}{2}$ -5 frs. the *donum*. In Palestine prices have risen in consequence of the spread of the colonies, which have taken up more than a tenth of the cultivable area. Land which has lapsed to the State is often bought up by capitalists very cheaply.

(3) FISHERIES

The coasts are not well adapted for the development of an important fishing industry. There is neither great abundance nor great variety of fish; owing to shallow water the fishing boats which, as

usual in the Mediterranean, are small sailing vessels, have to go a long way out; in winter there are frequent storms, while the summer heat interferes with transport and limits consumption to the vicinity of the coast.

No fish exist in the Dead Sea; in the other inland lakes, especially Tiberias, Hule, and the Amuk lake near Antioch, they are plentiful, as likewise in the rivers. They are taken by net, line, and dynamite, but for the most part are only consumed locally. In the lake of Amuk, however, fish are killed by dynamite in January and February for the Aleppo and Damascus markets; in 1912 the catch there was 200,000 kg. There is practically no curing industry.

Fishing is a State monopoly. Ten piastres are paid for a permit, and there is a tax of one-fifth the value of the catch in the sea, large lakes, and rivers flowing into the sea, and one-tenth in the smaller lakes and other rivers. These taxes are assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt, and are farmed out.

The sponge fishery on the northern part of the coast has declined greatly of late, apparently owing to emigration of the divers. Where thirty years ago 400 boats were producing sponges to the annual value of 800,000 frs., there are now no more than about 30 boats and a production of 50,000 frs. The fishing season is from the middle of May to the end of October. No diving dress is worn by the fishermen, who jump into the sea with a stone to take them to the bottom. Besides a tax of £T 3 on each boat, one-fifth of the sponges are taken by the Government.

Though the murex is still found in Syrian waters, the once famous purple industry has died out.

(4) MINERALS

(a) *Mining Laws*

For a full account of these see *Turkey in Europe* (No. 16 of this series), pp. 98 *seq.* The regulations now in force date from 1913, when the enactments of

1887 and 1906 were revised. They apply to all mineral obtained below ground, as well as to substances dug up in the open, and under minerals are included mineral springs, water containing salt, salt beds, &c. A permit is required for preliminary prospecting, even on land already in the possession of the prospector. Applications for prospecting rights are made to provincial governors, and if approved are granted on designation of a surety and after a payment of £T5-15, according to the extent of the concession. The permit, however, is still subject to the approval of the Ministry of Forests and Mines, against whose decision there is a further appeal. Prospecting rights, when finally obtained, last for one year, with a possible extension to a second, and may be transferred. An export of 100 tons of the mineral is allowed, or more in special circumstances. The next step is the definitive application for the concession proper; it follows a prescribed form, and if made on behalf of a company, this must be certified to be composed of Ottoman subjects. On the authorities being satisfied that all is in order, the firman is issued to the concessionnaire on a payment, in proportion to the importance of the undertaking, of £T50-200 (for open digging, £T4). Concessions for underground mining usually run for 99 years, and can be inherited or otherwise disposed of. After the firman has been granted, the concessionnaire becomes liable to two taxes, a fixed annual sum of 10 piastres per hectare payable to the landlord, who is commonly the State, and a percentage of the gross output, varying from 10 per cent. to 20 per cent. for closed mines, and from 1 per cent. to 5 per cent. on products obtained in the open. Work must be begun within two years, subject to an extension of six months for special reasons, the concession then lapsing if the mine is still unworked. A responsible agent must be appointed; and except engineers and superintendents, the workmen must be Turkish subjects. Plant and work are subject to official inspection.

Quarries are regulated by a special ordinance. They may be worked under permits granted in the same way and on similar terms as prospecting permits for mines, a firman being unnecessary.

(b) *Resources and Output*

Syria is commonly supposed to be rich in minerals, but, though there have been many mining projects, the actual output is worth perhaps barely 2,000,000 frs. a year, quarries included. In 1907 the gross revenue to the Government from mines and quarries (salt workings excluded) was 24,135 frs.; in 1908 (without Jerusalem) 37,091 frs. The following notes refer chiefly to minerals which are being or have recently been exploited.

Asphalt. The principal mine is that of Hasbeya, on the slopes of Mount Hermon, which has been worked intermittently for a number of years. About 100 tons, of the value of 50,000 frs., is the average output, which is exported to Hamburg. Asphalt is also obtained in smaller quantities from the Dead Sea (where it is found floating on the surface, and is collected by the Arabs, who pay for a permit) and from the vicinity of Latakia, but a concession held by a Greek for mines at Kefrie and other villages in this district was revoked in 1917 on the ground that no mining was being done. An asphalt and lignite mine near Jezzin, for which a concession was granted some forty years ago, is not being worked.

Lignite has been obtained during the war in the Lebanon district to the amount of about 100 tons a day. It is found in various places, but occurs in thin seams, is of poor quality, and in normal times would hardly repay working, except perhaps at Haitura, near Jezzin. According to a recent report (1918), coal has begun to arrive in Beirut from a mine at Bhamdun, twelve miles to the south-east.¹

¹ It is reported that there is an important coal deposit 50 miles south-east of Aleppo.

Petroleum and lubricating oil are said to be obtained in small quantities from bituminous rock at El-Makarín, near Mzerib (the yield from twelve retorts being 180 kg. daily), and at Nebi Musa, south of Jericho, where there appears to be a spring. Borings at El-Makarín had been carried to a depth of 166 metres in 1912-3 by the Syrian Exploration Co. Concessions in the kaza of Ajlun (south-east of Lake Tiberias) have been the subject of negotiations between the British and Turkish Governments; other concessions for petroleum, &c., about Kurnub, south-west of the Dead Sea, were recently purchased by the Standard Oil Co., whose operations were, however, suspended during the war. Between twenty and thirty prospecting licences for petroleum, bitumen, or asphalt were issued between 1910 and 1913.

Salt. The salt produced in Syria comes principally from the lakes of Jebbul, east of Aleppo, which are under the management of the Ottoman Public Debt. Crystallization takes place during the summer, and is promoted by the diversion of the two streams by which the lake is fed. In 1911-12 the output was 12,080,217 kg.; in 1912-13, 9,303,392 kg.; the ordinary sale price at the place of production being 0.4 piastres (9 centimes) the kilogramme.

Chrome Ore. Three mines near Latakia were worked in 1904-7 under a prospecting licence, and 1,089 tons extracted. A concession was applied for, but the mines are no longer exploited.

Phosphates. A concession in the neighbourhood of Es-Salt was obtained in 1911 by a Turkish-Italian company, the terms including a loan of 12,500,000 frs. from the company to the Government for a branch railway from Es-Salt to Amman, and for harbour-works at Haifa. The project, however, came to nothing. The phosphates are said to lie close to the surface, and it has been estimated that with 100 workmen a daily production of 100 tons might be possible.

Iron mines in Syria are said to have been under the control of the German Eisenindustriengesellschaft.

Deposits of iron are known in several localities, but do not appear to merit extensive working. At Kesruan in the Buka'a the natives were extracting ore in a primitive fashion in 1909.

Stone and marble of different kinds are quarried at many places. Mill-stones of basalt from the Hauran are used in water-mills throughout the country. Potter's clay is obtained about Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramle, &c., but is not of very high quality.

(5) MANUFACTURES

Metallurgy. The metallurgical industry depends upon imported material, and is not of much significance. Its chief centre is Damascus, where the annual production of articles of copper and brass, plain hammered or inlaid with silver, is worth one to one-and-a-half million francs, about one-half being exported; metals are also inlaid on wood. There is a small output of a similar kind at Jerusalem. Machinery works with metal foundries are established in Jaffa, Beirut, and Haifa; repairing workshops, where smithy work is done, are found in most of the larger towns, and primitive smithies in the villages.

Chemical industry. There is a small factory at Beirut, but a chemical industry can hardly be said to exist in Syria; chemicals are imported.

Textiles are one of the few industries that can claim any real importance.

Silk spinning. Spinning machinery was first set up in 1840, and until the end of last century the industry, supported by French capital, enjoyed a progressive development, but decreasing profits owing to foreign competition have since led to a decline (*cf.* p. 94). The old hand-spindle has not yet quite disappeared. Silk spinning is centred in the Lebanon, where in 1912 there were 155 factories, as against 39 elsewhere. More than half the silk produced in the country comes from the Lebanon, and both there and in the adjoining districts of the Beirut vilayet the

bulk of it is spun on the spot between July and November. Further north, about Antioch and Latakia, the cocoons are merely dried, either by the old method of steaming and exposure to the air, or in hot air chambers, and so exported. The spinning establishments are mostly small, employing from 30 to 100 persons, who sit at basins and guide the threads from the cocoons to the spindles; only a few factories belonging to Lyons firms are fitted up with modern plant. Possessing little capital, the native manufacturers are largely dependent upon advances made to them by French importers. The number of persons who were engaged in spinning before the war is estimated at 10,000-12,000, mostly Christian women or girls. Wages are low, the equivalent of about 30-90 centimes for a twelve-hour day, and half as much for children. The future of the silk industry is doubtful, especially if the Lebanon remains deprived of its former privilege of immunity from tithe and trades-tax.

Weaving. All silk of better quality is normally exported either as raw silk or as dried cocoons. What is rejected goes to the native looms, supplemented by Chinese silk. Cotton, and, to a less degree, wool, are also woven, the yarns being imported. Weaving is a home industry in a double sense, as it supplies primarily local needs and is carried on by workers who have two or three wooden hand-loom in their houses, or a dozen or so in small buildings called *kaiserliks*. The output is limited and labour poorly paid, grown silkweavers earning 1-2 frs. a day, cottonweavers half that sum, boys 15-50 centimes; women are hardly employed, except in Aleppo and the Lebanon. Cloths of pure silk, cotton, and wool are produced, and also mixtures of these, the kind and quality varying at the different centres, of which the chief are Aleppo, Homs, Damascus, Aintab, the Lebanon, Hama, and Gaza. At Aleppo in 1909 there were 5,500 looms for cotton, and 4,500 for silk, or silk and cotton, but a more recent report gives the numbers

as 3,000 and 1,200 respectively; the only carpet factory was closed some years ago. At Homs before the war about 10,000 weavers were engaged, some employers having as many as 200, and profits of from 15 to 20 per cent. were obtained. Homs cloths are finer and dearer than those of Aleppo, and have a good sale in Egypt as well as in Turkey. The Egyptian market is further supplied by Damascus, where mixtures of silk and cotton are a speciality, and some 5,000 weavers are normally employed, including 1,000 wool weavers. Aintab, where there are about 4,500 weavers, chiefly produces cheap cotton cloths which have a large sale, but also manufactures low-grade rugs and the goat-hair cloths of which Beduin tents are made. Cottons are the staple product of the 2,000 Lebanese looms, which, however, in consequence of the claims of the silk industry, are not fully engaged throughout the year. At Gaza with Mejel there are about 550 hand-loom, producing cotton cloth. The annual value of the total output is estimated at thirty to forty million francs. Further development of the industry has been impeded by the absence of co-operation and organisation, the predominance of the primitive hand-loom, with its restricted output, and the competition of foreign cotton cloth. Some Jacquard machines are in use at Aleppo and Damascus, but power-loom have not so far been introduced with success. The new customs tariff (p. 135) is designed to meet foreign competition.

Knitting. Cotton socks and stockings are made in a number of towns, especially at Aleppo and Damascus; 5,000-6,000 machines were in use at Aleppo and 1,500 or more at Damascus. Like weaving, this is essentially a home industry, and the women and children engaged turn out from one dozen to three dozen pairs, and earn 40-60 centimes, daily. The annual output is valued at 10,000,000 frs.

Lace-making and embroidery are in the main Christian or Jewish industries, practised chiefly at Aintab (where they were started by American mission-

aries, and before the war employed three or four thousand women and girls), but also in the Lebanon, at Jerusalem, Nazareth, Jaffa, Aleppo, and other places.

There are also a number of miscellaneous industries, of which the following deserve mention:—

Oil and soap production. Olive oil. Most of the presses in use are still of the primitive wooden kind, and slow and wasteful in working, though during the last 20 years many have been replaced by iron screw-presses or hydraulic machines; in 1911 there were already about 80 of the last in the Lebanon. The number of oil presses in the country is not ascertained, but may well be 600-800, employing on an average 10 workmen each. There is also a large native factory at Tripoli engaged in the chemical extraction of oil from the refuse olive cake, which when not so utilised is burnt as fuel. A second factory of this kind was installed shortly before the war at Beirut by an English firm. The extraction of edible oil must take place very soon after the olives are gathered, the tendency to ferment being accelerated by the native method of knocking the berries from the trees with sticks. Less than half of the 22,000 tons produced annually, representing a value of some 25,000,000 frs., is fit for food or export, the remainder being used for soap. The oil is at present hardly equal in quality to the best European.

Sesame oil is produced as an article of food at Aleppo and Damascus, but chiefly in the mutessarifik of Jerusalem, where there are some forty small factories at Jaffa, Ludd, Jerusalem, Ramle, &c., each capable of treating 150-200 kg. of sesame daily, from which about 45 per cent. of oil is extracted by primitive methods. Better results are obtained by two Jewish factories at Jaffa, working with hydraulic presses. Unpressed sesame is made into a popular sweetmeat. The pressed cake is used as fodder, and also by the poor for food.

Volatile oils are produced on a small scale in different localities from mimosa, thyme, geranium, orange-blossom, and aniseed; they are used in a perfume factory at Tripoli, and in another at Jaffa, and are also exported. Oil from the bay berry is extracted in considerable quantities about Antioch and in the south of the Aleppo vilayet for use as an ingredient of soap.

Inferior olive oil is used for making soap, and the centres of this large industry are naturally in the chief olive districts, the Lebanon, and in or about Aleppo, Antioch, Damascus, Tripoli, Nablus, and Jaffa. The factories are mostly quite small, many having a single boiler, and only a few in the Lebanon and Tripoli districts have iron pans, the others using receptacles of stone or brick with an iron plate at the bottom. Owners often work not on their own account, but for regular customers who provide the oil. Modern methods are followed in two factories (Russo-Jewish and German) at Haifa. The total number of factories is about 150, with an annual output of some 20,000 tons, which is partly exported to other parts of the Turkish Empire, and also to Egypt and Cyprus. Besides olive oil, the ingredients used are caustic soda, carbonate of soda (for which the ash of a plant called *killi*, found about Tadmur and Es-Salt, is often substituted), bay oil, lime, and talc, the mixtures varying slightly in different localities. The soap is cooled on an earthen floor, where it is cut into squares, and turns out very hard, a quality which recommends it to native taste. In some years the supply of oil is not equal to the demand, and is supplemented from outside. Experiments with imported vegetable oils (cotton seed, coco-nut, and groundnut) have also been made, but the results are not greatly liked.

Milling, &c. Mills driven by motor, steam, or water-power are met with all over the country; the windmills introduced in the middle of last century have been given up. The old water-mills, which sometimes work as many as fifteen sets of mill-

stones, still preponderate. Steam and motor mills are usually small, working with one or two pairs of stones, which grind 200-500 kg. an hour; large up-to-date installations are quite exceptional. The two most important are at Beirut, where the milling industry is of recent growth, and has been encouraged by the railway, which has facilitated the transport of wheat from the Hauran. At Damascus, on the other hand, which once supplied the Lebanon, there has been a corresponding decline, as is also the case at Jerusalem, which, owing to the Haifa railway, no longer receives the same quantity of grain from across the Jordan. Milling in the coastal district is, however, especially open to the competition of European flour. Village mills commonly work for hire, grinding the corn brought for a small money fee or a percentage of the flour.

Of wheat products other than flour, starch, which is used for native foods and sweetmeats, is made in a number of small factories at Aleppo and Damascus, which turn out 2,000,000-3,000,000 kg. a year; there is some export to other parts of Turkey and to Egypt. Macaroni, for which the hard Syrian wheat is particularly well suited, is made in a German factory at Jaffa, and at Jerusalem and Beirut, but is not in demand except among Europeans.

Wine and spirit industry. The fabrication of alcoholic liquor is subject to a duty of 15 per cent. of the value of the product, one-half being repayable on exportation. Both the native *raki* and ordinary wine are made; the former, most of which is consumed locally, chiefly in the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets; the latter, which is mostly exported, in the Lebanon, the vilayet of Beirut, and the mutessarifik of Jerusalem. The largest producers of wine are the Society of Jewish Vine-growers at Rischon le Zion near Jaffa, who own capacious cellars at that village and at Sichron Jacob, near Haifa, and annually make 30,000-40,000 hectolitres of wine and spirits from the grapes

of the neighbouring Jewish vineyards. Smaller quantities are produced at Shtora on the east slopes of the Lebanon, by the German colonists of Sarona and the Haifa district, at Latrun, and elsewhere. In 1914-15 the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets produced respectively 56,000 and 21,000 hectolitres of grape liquor, mainly *raki*. The total annual production of wine, *raki*, &c., is about 130,000 hectolitres, worth upwards of five million francs.

Tobacco-making and cigarettes. Except in the Lebanon, the preparation of these has been monopolised by the Régie des tabacs, which has a large factory at Damascus, and another at Aleppo. That at Damascus employs 200 workpeople, and turns out about 430,000 kg. of cigarettes and cigarette tobacco a year. In the Lebanon there are some 20 factories, with an annual output worth about 10,000,000 frs.

Leather industry. The most important tanning centre is Aintab, where large numbers of goatskins are turned into the red or yellow leather used in Turkey and Egypt for native slippers; some of the yellow goes to Tunis. In 1909 about 150 tanneries were engaged, their output being worth about 3,000,000 frs. Both goatskins and sheepskins are tanned at Homs, Hama, and Damascus; cow-hides chiefly at Beirut and Zahle. At the last place, where in 1910 there were about 30 small tanneries, a good box-calf is made, to the annual value of about 1,500,000 frs. Saddlery and shoe-making flourish at Damascus; in other towns shoe-making has much declined, owing to the growing taste for the European article.

Dyeing is carried on extensively in northern Syria, especially at Aleppo and Damascus, and in a minor degree at Aintab, Homs, Hama, and Beirut; small dyers, too, are found in many villages. Both woven cloth and yarns are dyed, the dyes employed being Indian and synthetic indigo, alizarin (madder) red, and aniline, all of which, except the natural indigo,

come from Germany. Indian and synthetic indigo, which are largely used, are now commonly mixed. The work is carried on by hand in small buildings, the dyers earning 50 centimes to $1\frac{1}{2}$ francs a day.

Building is in a backward condition. There are no large contractors, and skilled workmen are found only in the towns, the villager being commonly his own architect and builder. Masons and bricklayers are efficient, but plasterers, carpenters, and other subsidiary workers, are generally inferior. The industry is at a standstill during the wet winter months. Of materials, iron girders, wood, cement, and tiles are imported, burnt bricks are made at Beirut and in the Lebanon, and the production of concrete has lately been developed by Jews or Germans at Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias, and Aleppo. Lime-burning is carried on in European kilns in the larger towns, and by a primitive method elsewhere.

Carpentry, woodwork, &c. Large workshops for building accessories exist in some of the towns, such as Beirut, Jaffa, and Tripoli, and wooden furniture on western models is also made at Beirut and Jaffa. At Damascus there is still a considerable production of oriental carved or inlaid woodwork, and some export to Europe and Egypt, but this industry has been declining owing to a fall in the demand and to emigration.

Devotional objects. Rosaries, crosses, and other small articles are made in large quantities at Jerusalem and Bethlehem, both for sale to tourists and for export. Some 1,000 workers produce goods to the value of about 2,000,000 frs., the materials used being chiefly olive-wood, mother-of-pearl, silver, and a black stone from the Dead Sea.

Rope and string are made at Damascus and Aleppo, at the former out of the interior fibres of the hemp grown in the locality, the latter deriving the raw material from the Euphrates district to the north-east, and to some extent also from abroad. The methods

are primitive, and the product, which has a wide local distribution, is extremely cheap.

Matting and baskets. The papyrus of Lake Hule is made into matting by the local Beduin women, and some rough mats and baskets are produced in other parts of the country.

Pottery. The best known is that of Gaza, which has a wide sale. A quantity is also made at Ramle, Jerusalem, Nablus, in the Lebanon, in the Beirut district, and at Damascus.

(6) POWER

The use of electricity, which has not long been permitted, has so far made little progress. A power station outside Damascus supplies that city with light, drives street trams and irrigation pumps, and serves the workshops of the Hejaz railway at Kadem Sherif. Beirut, where also there are electric tramways, is partly lit by electricity, and some hotels in Jerusalem and Aleppo have private installations. Electric light is in use at Bir es-Seba, and electric works are reported to be under construction in the Lebanon. A small power station has been set up at the Jewish colony at Mesha.

Water-power is not much utilised, except for mills (p. 116). It supplies electricity at Damascus, and in 1913 a concession was granted for trams and light at Aleppo, for which the power was to be derived from waterfalls near Antioch. According to German reports, falls at Tell esh-Shehab, in the Yarmuk valley, are to supply power for the railway and for lighting Deraa, Tiberias, Haifa, Jerusalem, &c. Several other rivers are well adapted for the production of power, especially the upper Jordan, the Orontes (Nahr el-Asi), on which are Homs, Hama, and Antioch, the Litani, and the Nahr el-Auja, near Jaffa; the Jihan might well be drawn upon for the Killis-Aintab district.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) DOMESTIC

(a) *Principal Branches of Trade*

Internal commerce is comparatively restricted, since the agricultural population, which forms the greater part of the community, has few wants that are not supplied by its own production. One small miscellaneous store, selling articles of clothing, sugar, coffee, rice, tobacco, salt, and so forth, suffices for the needs of a village. Trade on a large scale is thus seated in the towns, and here also many commodities are supplied direct to the consumer by the producer, who brings in vegetables, milk, fowls, eggs, &c., especially on market days, from the surrounding country. This practice is facilitated by the Oriental mode of grouping sellers of particular products in a distinct part of the bazaar or market.

As regards home produce, internal trade is most actively occupied in supplying the demand of cities and localities which are not self-supporting, and in concentrating any surplus, as well as articles which have a better market abroad, in the hands of exporters. For example, cereals go in large quantities from Homs and Hama to Aleppo, Tripoli, Beirut and the Lebanon, from the Hauran to Damascus and Haifa, from Gaza and Bir es-Seba to Jerusalem and Jaffa. Among native manufactures, oil, soap, textiles, and leather are the most important articles of distribution; tobacco and salt are Government monopolies (*see* p. 128). The chief centres of local supply are commonly also engaged in serving the foreign export houses. It is noticeable that, although, of course, there are large and small dealers, and often intermediaries between them, a strict differentiation between wholesale and retail trade is not observed.

An important and more remunerative department of domestic trade is concerned with the distribution of imports. The two great importing centres are Beirut

and Aleppo, from which supplies are drawn by the secondary markets in their respective areas, thence descending by further steps to the minor towns and villages. Trade connections of more or less stability are thus established; the interdependence of the chief towns and their special commercial functions are discussed in the following section. The considerable traffic in animals and animal produce handled by the dealers of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Damascus originates to a large extent outside Syrian borders, and must accordingly be included under distribution of imports.

(b) *Towns and Markets*

Commercially two cities have a primary position, Beirut and Aleppo, the former for the middle and south, the latter for the north.

Beirut and area.—Besides supplying the Lebanon interior and inland centres like Damascus and Jerusalem, the importing houses of Beirut serve also the smaller ports Tripoli, Saida, Haifa, and Jaffa, with which there is easy communication, and their respective dependencies. With the development of trade there is a tendency to advance from indirect to direct relationship; Damascus, Jaffa, and Haifa, for instance, have to some extent established independent European connections. Beirut, however, remains the chief emporium for foreign manufactures, especially the valuable textile imports from England. It also has an active export business; its merchants and the local agents of Lyons firms control the silk industry, and wool, barley, eggs, and other produce are collected there for shipment.

Damascus, which is the greatest centre of internal commerce, is the chief of the dependencies of Beirut, though 40 per cent. of its European imports may represent direct trade. Besides its more immediate neighbourhood, Damascus supplies the Hauran and the places further south now served by the Hejaz railway, but goods for these districts will go in increasing quan-

tity through Haifa. With the growth of means of communication Damascus has declined to some extent as a collecting centre for native produce, but is still an important market for camels, sheep, wool, and butter from the nomadic tribes along the border. There is some traffic with Baghdad, whence Persian rugs and cloaks are brought in exchange for rope, string, silks, and cottons.

Tripoli traders for the most part make purchases at Beirut, or transmit orders through Beirut firms. Goods so ordered are, however, often shipped to Tripoli direct, and the railway to Homs has brought the port into greater prominence, both for exports and imports.

Homs, though now connected by rail with Tripoli, and obtaining foreign supplies through that medium, similarly remains to a large extent dependent upon Beirut importing houses. It is a prominent market for the nomadic tribes of the Euphrates district, who send in sheep, wool, and butter, Mosul sheep especially coming in large numbers for subsequent distribution to Damascus, Beirut, and the Lebanon.

Haifa, having become the sea terminus of the Hejaz railway, is rising in importance. It has already emancipated itself in some degree from Beirut, and this process may easily be carried further as the volume of imports for the Hauran and Arabia increases. Haifa also supplies Akka, to which it is now joined by railway, and the inland towns Nazareth, Tiberias, and Safed.

Jaffa, like Haifa, is tending to become less dependent on Beirut, but direct importation is as yet on a comparatively small scale. Jaffa is the great centre of the cultivation and export of oranges. Of its dependents the chief are Gaza, Ramle, and Nablus, the last of which, however, is promoting relations of its own with Beirut, a process likely to be encouraged by the recently established railway connection with Haifa. Gaza is noted both for its exports of barley and as a market for camels.

Jerusalem, though, of course, obtaining its imports through Jaffa, has independent business relations with

Beirut. Hebron looks to Jerusalem for supplies, and Bir es-Seba has hitherto done so, though this connection is open to disturbance from the new railway giving access to Jaffa. Hebron traders maintain large stores at Tafele, south-east of the Dead Sea, for traffic with the neighbouring Bedouin. The Hejaz railway, which now serves the district east of the Jordan, has helped to reduce the commercial importance of Jerusalem, which previously was not great.

Aleppo and area.—The district dominated commercially by Aleppo extends southwards to Hama, and north and east far beyond the limits of Syria, including Deir ez-Zor, Mosul, Mardin, Diarbekr, and places still more remote. How far the old relations will be changed by the Baghdad railway, to which *Alexandretta* is now linked, remains to be seen. *Alexandretta* has hitherto been little more than a port and depot for Aleppo, and merchandise passing to or from inland towns is mainly for Aleppo account. At Aleppo itself an active trade subsists both in foreign imports and native products, especially textiles and soap. It is also the chief centre of the large traffic in sheep, cattle, wool, and butter, which are brought from the Euphrates district and beyond, and are distributed in Syria or exported.

Antioch is a considerable seat of industry (silk-weaving and soap-making), but is not otherwise prominent. *Aintab* has several flourishing industries, especially tanning and the manufacture of textiles (for which cotton yarns are largely imported); and it is a small trade centre for the districts to the north and east. Its imports through Aleppo have been on the increase, and the place is rising in commercial significance. *Killis* is of less account, but has a large market for animals.

Hama, which is the chief town of a thriving agricultural district and has a well-established textile industry, is now more dependent on Aleppo for imports than on *Beirut*. A large trade is done with the Beduin tribes to the east, Hama being one of the principal recipients of their produce, especially wool and butter.

(c) *Organisations to promote Trade and Commerce*

Chambers of Commerce modelled on the one set up in 1880 at Constantinople exist at Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem,¹ but have very few members, and are destitute alike of activity and influence. The Jerusalem Chamber, which dates from 1909, has issued some monthly reports, but shows no other signs of life. Syria is not a congenial soil for such institutions. Diversities of race, of religion, and to some extent of language, militate against co-operation among the mercantile class; moreover, the native is, as a rule, strongly individualistic in character, and partnership seldom extends beyond members of the same family. Local associations for trade purposes are found chiefly among the Jewish and German colonists, *e.g.*, the Jewish societies of wine-producers and of growers of oranges and almonds, and the similar German associations at Wilhelma and Saron. A successful association established in 1908 by the shoemakers of Damascus for the purchase of leather and other articles is primarily concerned with the promotion of industry rather than of trade.

An institution which, in the past, has been of limited utility, but may, in virtue of newly acquired powers, do much to assist the agricultural class, is the Banque agricole. By a law of 1916 this bank was authorised to undertake the purchase and sale of land, draught animals, seed, and implements, which may be paid for by instalments (*cf.* p. 141). Co-operative credit societies have recently been started at several towns in Palestine with the assistance of the Anglo-Palestine Bank (*cf.* p. 140).

(d) *Foreign Interests*

Foreign enterprise is very prominent in public works, shipping, banking, and insurance, besides en-

¹ According to another recent authority, also at Alexandretta, Tripoli, and Jaffa, and in the Hauran. A measure for the promotion of local Chambers of Commerce has quite lately been introduced by the Government.

gaging in the business of export and import and various minor departments of trade. French companies are responsible for a large part of the railway system (*cf.* p. 69), the harbour and docks of Beirut, and the lighting by gas and electricity of that city; the water company there too is largely a French concern. A Belgian company, in which the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft, of Berlin, has a considerable interest, has installed the electric tramway and light at Damascus, and the electric trams at Beirut also were financed by Belgian capitalists. (For the shipping lines, whose agents are established at the principal ports, see p. 85, and for the foreign banks, p. 139.) In the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which has branches in Syria, French influence predominates. Agencies of a number of insurance companies (life, fire, transport) are found in Beirut, Aleppo, Damascus, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, Tripoli, &c., the principal being British, French, German, Austrian, and American. In miscellaneous trade and commerce the foreign firms are, for the most part, concentrated in the seaports of Beirut, Jaffa, and Haifa, and the three large inland towns, Aleppo, Damascus, and Jerusalem; French, German, Austrian, Italian, and Greek houses predominate. English firms usually employ native representatives, and English names such as that of White & Son, engineers and dealers in machinery (Beirut and Aleppo), are rare among local traders. Of American companies, the Singer Sewing Machine Company, who have agents in many towns, the Vacuum Oil Company (Beirut and Aleppo), and the McAndrews & Forbes Company, dealers in liquorice root (Alexandretta and Antioch), are the most important. Like the Vacuum Oil Company, the Russian petroleum company, Nobel Frères, is widely represented. French interests are paramount at Beirut, but are concerned more especially with export trade, above all in silk. A large general business is conducted by what is, perhaps, the most important firm, the Établissements Orosdi Back, which has

branches at Beirut and Aleppo, besides other places in the East. Elsewhere than at Beirut, German and Austrian firms are prominent, including, besides some large commercial houses, a number of minor traders such as hotel-keepers, tailors, clockmakers, jewellers, chemists, stationers, &c. These are especially numerous at Jaffa, near which are the German colonies Wilhelma and Saron, at Haifa, and Jerusalem. Italian and Greek traders also, especially the latter, are sometimes engaged in comparatively petty business.

(e) *Methods of Economic Penetration*

Of these the most obvious, perhaps, is the agency of Consular representatives, who are maintained in the more important trading centres, and may be of great assistance not only to their nationals on the spot, but also in keeping home manufacturers and exporters in touch with local conditions. Their influence is increased when, as in the German system, the Consular service forms part of the Diplomatic Corps. Secondly, commerce is naturally promoted by easy means of transit, and in Syria especially by shipping facilities. It is noteworthy that several of the foreign mail services are supported by subsidies from their respective Governments. Again, in a country where business depends so largely on credit (*cf.* p. 142), banking establishments can play an important part in the promotion of trade. Syrian importers not only need credit themselves, but as a rule have to grant it to their large customers, who issue negotiable promissory notes. The Deutsche Palästina Bank has of late been extremely active in extending its sphere in Palestine and pushing German interests. Commercial travellers and local commission agents are particularly important. The scarcity and ineffectiveness of British travellers, and the advantages secured by those of other nations, are emphasised in many Consular reports. Excursions of actual exporters and importers have been promoted by the German Government. A great deal of trade is

done through commission agents, and the number of foreign agents, especially Germans, residing in the chief centres is highly significant. Representatives of British firms are hardly ever themselves British born. Adaptation of business to native requirements is another point which foreign manufacturers are accustomed to study to better advantage than our own. Favourable terms of credit are of primary importance. Much, too, may be gained by a readiness to consult popular taste and by intelligibility in correspondence, catalogues, and quotation of prices. French is the language generally understood; the metric system is used in commercial transactions; and c.i.f. quotations are commonly expected. In Palestine German interests have a strong support in the colonies at Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, and are also served to some extent by the Jewish colonies, whose members are commonly German-speaking and not seldom tinged with German *Kultur*. The Zionist movement is openly advocated in Germany as a means of spreading Teutonic influence—an aspect of the question which in this country is not sufficiently appreciated. The various educational, religious, and charitable institutions—British, American, French, German, &c.—have no direct concern with trade, though they may do something by means of creating an “atmosphere.” Papers and periodicals, which are read a good deal in the more Europeanised towns, are by no means negligible. The *Deutsche Levante Zeitung*, for instance, has quickly found a public among the merchants of the Levant, and is said to have done good service to German trade.

(f) *Monopolies*

The salt monopoly is assigned to and managed by the Ottoman Public Debt, which has two administrative centres, Aleppo for the vilayet of Aleppo, and Beirut for the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus and the mutesarifik of Jerusalem, with depôts in numerous places. In 1913-14 the amount sold in the administrative area

of Beirut was 13,455,000 kg., fetching, at pre-war prices, about 1,500,000 frs., so that the sale in the whole country may well approximate to 2,500,000 frs. To the Lebanon the monopoly has not applied, salt being sold by the Public Debt to dealers and others in amounts of not less than 50 kg.

The conditions of the tobacco monopoly, which has been in the hands of the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman since 1883, were revised in 1914. Except in the Lebanon, which has hitherto been excluded from its operations, the Régie has the sole right to control and purchase all tobacco grown, to collect duty on imported and exported tobaccos, and to manufacture and sell tobacco in its various forms. Cigarettes, tobacco, &c., are sold at fixed prices and only on licensed premises, whose holders receive a commission. Tombac, or water-pipe tobacco, which is both imported from Persia and grown in the country (p. 92), is also controlled, but is subject to special regulations. Imported tombac pays a duty of 4 piastres per kg.; that grown at home, so far as not bought by the Régie, may be sold or exported, paying duty at the same rate. The annual value of the tobacco and tombac normally sold is perhaps fourteen to fifteen million francs.

(2) FOREIGN TRADE

No very clear statistics of foreign commerce are available. The official statistics include Adalia and Mersina with the Syrian ports, and the trade of these two places does not concern Syria, though it is true that it is not large. Secondly, these statistics confine themselves to trade with foreign countries, excluding the considerable traffic with other parts of the Ottoman Empire, and so do not do full justice to the country as an entity. They can, however, be supplemented to some extent from British Consular reports where the figures are collected for the several ports, though unfortunately not on a consistent system, those for Beirut, Tripoli, Haifa, Latakia, and Saida giving quantities only and

not values. Moreover, imported goods are often transhipped at the larger for the smaller ports (especially at Beirut), and not only are these goods reckoned in the returns for both ports but they are treated at the minor port as of Turkish origin. It is also to be remembered that the Consular statistics refer to sea trade only, and that in them, as well as in the official returns, a certain amount of the traffic to and from Alexandretta is not really Syrian.

(a) *Exports*

Statistics.—Of the tables given below in the Appendix, Table II summarises the official statistics for 1910-11, a fairly typical year, in which there was an average harvest and an absence of foreign trouble. Table III shows the values of the exports, classified according to destination, from the three principal ports, Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa, during the years 1910-12. Similar figures for the minor ports are not available, but those given may be taken as fairly representative. Table IV contains classified totals with percentages, for the same three ports in the typical year 1910.

The sum of the values in Table II is 398,374,279 piastres, or approximately £3,622,000. Exports from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa to other parts of the Turkish Empire, which, as already explained, are not included in Table II, amounted in 1910 to £626,249, and for the whole of Syria may be put roughly at £700,000. But against this must be set the values of those exports included in Table II which are really of non-Syrian origin, so that the total value for 1910 may be reckoned at approximately $3\frac{3}{4}$ millions sterling.

Syrian exports consist in the main of the vegetable and animal products of the country, and tend to fluctuate with them. Of the expanding branches the most conspicuous is the export of oranges from Jaffa, which advanced steadily from 744,463 cases in 1909 to 1,608,570 cases in 1913. Exports of oranges and lemons

from Tripoli, Saida, and Beirut have not shown a corresponding growth, there being a difference of only about 50,000 cases between 1909 and 1913, but a further development of the exports from that region appears likely with the extension of this form of culture, which is tending to replace that of mulberry trees. Tobacco-planting is similarly increasing, with a corresponding effect on export, which from the Beirut-Tripoli-Latakia district amounted to 986 tons in 1913, as against 671 tons in 1912 and 689 in 1911. Silk production, on the other hand, in spite of the excellence of the silk, is generally regarded as on the wane, although in the year before the war a good crop and a large French demand led to an increased export. The export figures for cocoons and raw silk in 1910-13 were :—

| — | | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Beirut and Tripoli .. | bales | 5,075 | 3,997 | 2,760 | 10,900 |
| Alexandretta .. | tons | 328 | 353 | 258 | 328 |

Beirut exports of native silk or part-silk fabrics, however, had a marked decline in 1913, reaching only 3,198 bales, or less than half the average for the three preceding years. Exports of wool, which now go mostly from Tripoli, have advanced materially during the same period, as shown by the following figures :—

| — | | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|-----------------------|-------|-------|--------|--------|--------|
| Beirut and Tripoli .. | bales | 4,411 | 10,023 | 10,750 | 19,300 |
| Alexandretta .. | tons | 555 | 349 | 165 | 42 |

If a ton is taken as roughly equivalent to three bales, the combined figures in bales will be 6,076, 11,070, 11,245, 19,426. Soap production is only partly depen-

dent on the home olive crop, and does not vary much; the export figures show an upward tendency:—

| — | | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|------------------------|-------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Beirut and Tripoli .. | cases | 15,550 | 16,830 | 12,010 | 17,750 |
| Jaffa and Alexandretta | tons | 4,890 | 5,116 | 8,325 | 6,657 |

Exports of wine from Jaffa have also risen, the amounts in 1909-12 being 2,289, 3,807, 5,180, and 4,477 tons respectively. Shipments of liquorice from Alexandretta are much influenced by freightage rates, the actual production being fairly constant. There is still a small export of egg-yolk and albumen from the same port, but it has almost ceased further south, where eggs are now sent out whole. The export of lace to America, previously valued at about 1,000,000 frs. annually, was stated in 1915 to have ceased, owing to deterioration in the quality.

Countries of destination.—As shown in Table IV (p. 153), France, Egypt, and other parts of the Turkish Empire are Syria's best customers. Besides the bulk of the silk, which goes to Lyons, France takes chiefly cereals, sesame, wool, skins, and eggs. Egypt imports a large variety of Syrian products—barley, durra, leguminous produce, cattle, sheep, dried apricots, wine, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, tobacco, soap, leather, silk and cotton textiles—and much miscellaneous produce goes also to parts of Turkey, especially barley, pistachio nuts, dried apricots, eggs, butter, oranges and lemons, melons, wool, soap, skins and leather, silk and cotton fabrics. England takes large quantities of oranges, which are shipped mostly to Liverpool, barley, durra, leguminous produce, pistachio nuts, Latakia tobacco, and wool; the United States liquorice, pistachio, and devotional objects. To Austria go sesame, figs, cotton, and hides; to Germany sesame and skins; to Italy wheat, cotton, and wool; and to Russia oranges and lemons.

(b) *Imports*

Statistics.—On the defects of the published statistics see above, p. 129. The Appendix contains tables corresponding to those given for exports, Table V containing the official figures for 1910-11; Table VI, which is based on Consular reports, showing the value of goods received at the three ports in 1910-12, classified according to the country of their origin; Table VII giving similarly classified totals and percentages for the year 1910.

The chief imports are :—

1. Flour and certain articles of food which are not produced in the country, *e.g.*, rice, sugar, coffee. Flour ground by the native mills is not suited for fancy baking, and in some years is insufficient for ordinary needs. Imports of flour, sugar, rice, and coffee (non-Arabian) in the years 1910-12 were as under :—

| — | | | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. |
|--------------|----|-----|------------|------------|------------|
| Flour | .. | kg. | 24,508,000 | 21,392,000 | 11,713,000 |
| Sugar | .. | „ | 21,777,000 | 24,240,000 | 13,801,700 |
| Rice | .. | „ | 23,849,000 | 19,667,000 | 11,963,000 |
| Coffee | .. | „ | 1,465,800 | 1,328,160 | 1,345,920 |

The decreases noticeable in 1912 may be largely put down to the general depression caused by the Balkan War, following on the war with Italy. In the case of flour there had been some overstocking at Jaffa in previous years.

2. Coal and petroleum. The figures for 1910-12 were :—

| — | | | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. |
|--------------|----|------|--------|--------|--------|
| Coal | .. | tons | 79,045 | 66,476 | 82,980 |
| Petroleum .. | .. | „ | 28,872 | 28,525 | 17,335 |

Beirut and Haifa import about 70 per cent. of the coal, and Beirut about 30 per cent. of the petroleum.

3. Wood, cement, tiles, and other building materials. Wood is largely used for box-making, as well as for building and on the railways, and its import at Jaffa rose, with the growth of orange exports, from 13,400 cubic metres in 1910 to 26,210 in 1913. Some 25,000 tons are received at the other ports. Imports of tiles declined between 1910 and 1912, but their value in any case is not very considerable.

4. Iron and other metals, metal implements, machinery, &c.—an important class. Metal (chiefly iron) imports for the years 1910 to 1912 were 18,226, 17,292, and 17,089 tons respectively, apart from large quantities of manufactured ware. The machinery received in 1910, including locomotives, motors, agricultural machines, pumps, sewing machines, &c., amounted, according to the official statistics, to 3,340 tons, with a value of 3,850,000 frs.

5. Textiles. These are by far the largest item, accounting, according to the official figures for 1910-11, for over 40 per cent. of the entire value of the imports. Cotton fabrics and yarn form the principal division in this class; the figures for these, with woollens, in 1910-12 were as follows:—

| — | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|
| Alexandretta .. tons | 3,289 | 2,543 | 3,484 |
| Beirut and Jaffa.. bales and cases | 29,356 | 31,701 | 23,799 |

The red fezes everywhere worn all come from abroad, and ready-made clothing is also imported in considerable quantity. Other commodities for which the country is entirely dependent on foreign supplies are paper, chemicals, dyes, hardware, glass, and matches.

Countries of origin.—Proportional values are shown in Table VII. The United Kingdom is the chief contributor, largely in virtue of cotton yarns and fabrics, about 60 per cent. of the quantity received coming from England. Besides these, British imports consist mainly of woollens, stockings, sacking, coal, machinery, and chemicals. Cotton yarns and sacking also come from India, together with rice and indigo; rice is also sent by Egypt. The chief contributions of other countries are:—

Turkey: Tobacco, coal, wood, and coffee (Arabia).

France: Flour, silken and woollen fabrics, tiles, cement.

Austria: Sugar, iron, metalware, woollens and other textiles, fezes, ready-made clothing, wood, cement, paper, glass, matches.

Italy: Cottons, matches.

Germany: Iron and metalware, machinery, coal, dyes, drugs.

Russia: Flour, sugar, alcohol, petroleum, wood.

Belgium: Iron, metal-ware, cement, glass, chemicals.

Rumania: Flour, petroleum.

United States: Petroleum, machinery.

China: Silk.

Brazil: Coffee.

(c) *Customs and Tariffs*

The 8 per cent. *ad valorem* duty established for all parts of Turkey in 1861-2 was raised by agreement with the Powers to 11 per cent. in 1907 (except for Egyptian goods, for which the old rate was maintained), and by the independent action of the Ottoman Government to 15 per cent. in 1914, and 30 per cent. in 1915. In 1916 the old system was superseded by an elaborately graduated tariff, to be revised at the end of three years, which aims at the protection of home products and industries, actual or potential, and their

encouragement by the admission, free or under low duties, of necessary machinery and raw materials. Textiles, leather products, furniture, woodwork, and paper are among the highly taxed articles. The duties assigned are throughout maxima, which are subject to modification by special agreement.

(d) *Commercial Treaties*

The commercial and other privileges known as Capitulations, which in relation to Great Britain had existed since 1675, were abolished by the Turkish Government in 1914. Treaties of commerce arranged with the Capitulatory Powers in 1861-2 were subsequently denounced by Turkey, but without being formally renewed they continued to be followed tacitly. Negotiations entered into for new treaties were without result, except in the case of Germany, with whom an agreement was signed in 1890; a stipulation was, however, added that the provisions and tariff should not come into force without the consent of Germany unless they were applied to other countries also, and the treaty consequently remained in abeyance. A new treaty with Germany has now been made, together with further conventions, regulating the functions of Consuls and other international matters, formerly governed by the Capitulations. With certain non-capitulatory Powers—Greece, Persia, Montenegro, Rumania, Serbia—agreements were reached some years ago conceding most-favoured-nation treatment; and a treaty was made in 1896 with Japan under which Consuls were reciprocally established and the right given to free exchange of commerce. With Bulgaria relations of free trade have subsisted, except for certain goods defined by a convention of 1906, but previous arrangements have, for the most part, been nullified by the events of the past few years, and Turkey's relations with other countries will require a comprehensive readjustment after the war.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Public Finance*

Budget.—For the public finance of Turkey, which includes that of Syria, see *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 115. Individually considered, Syria's financial situation contrasts very favourably with that of the Empire as a whole, local revenues being considerably in excess of the expenditure, as is seen in the following figures, taken from *La Syrie de demain*, by M. Moutran (1916), and based upon the previous Budget:—

| — | Revenue. | Expenditure. |
|------------------|------------|--------------|
| | Frs. | Frs. |
| Aleppo | 20,275,673 | 7,954,573 |
| Beirut | 31,919,329 | 8,804,400 |
| Damascus.. .. . | 15,568,401 | 16,902,682 |
| Jerusalem.. .. . | 4,630,015 | 2,373,991 |
| Lebanon | 1,100,458 | 1,062,761 |
| Total | 73,493,876 | 37,098,407 |

Here expenses exceed receipts in one province only, Damascus, and this small deficit is handsomely repaired by the favourable balances elsewhere, especially in the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut.

Of the total revenue, the bulk is accounted for by the following principal items¹:—

| | |
|--|------------|
| Taxes on land, animals, trades, and in lieu of military and other ser- vices | 18,657,600 |
| Tithe | 21,019,401 |

¹ These figures do not include the Lebanon, which had a different system, but, on the other hand, include Deir ez-Zor, the total revenue of which was only 450,000 frs. more than that of the Lebanon.

| | Frs. |
|--|------------|
| Import, export, transit, and other dues | 11,297,002 |
| Sale of salt and tobacco | 5,487,317 |
| Hejaz Railway | 4,459,125 |
| Stamps | 3,296,268 |
| Posts and telegraphs | 2,060,754 |
| State domains, State and private forests, mines, quarries, fishing, and hunting | 2,185,980 |

M. Moutran estimates the expense of an efficient internal administration at 64,290,758 frs., including in this sum 15,000,000 frs. as Syria's share of the interest on the Public Debt, 5,000,000 frs. for interest on a preliminary loan of 100,000,000 frs., and 1,760,000 frs. for a foreign resident with a staff of commandants, inspectors, &c., leaving a balance of over 9,000,000 frs.

Taxes.—See *Anatolia*, No. 59 of this series, p. 129. It will suffice here to note the heavy pressure on land, which has to pay not only the tithe,¹ now amounting to 12·63 per cent. of the crop, but also a direct tax of 4 per cent. of the value of the land (an increase of 6 per cent. is made where no tithe is payable). Taxes on wine production, in conjunction with the tithe, reach 29·63 per cent. of the gross produce. The agricultural class is further burdened with the cattle tax, from which only animals under two years and two draught animals *per* cultivator are exempt. (For the tobacco and salt monopolies *cf.* p. 128.)

(2) *Currency*

The currency of Syria is, of course, that of the Ottoman Empire, being based on the Turkish pound (£T) or lira, which has the nominal value of 100 gold

¹ The Lebanon and the less settled districts to the east of the Jordan and the south of Judaea have not paid tithe, but a fixed tax instead.

piastres—a sub-unit which does not exist as a coin. There are gold coins of 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500 piastres; silver of $\frac{1}{2}$, 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 piastres (1 mejidieh); nickel of $\frac{1}{8}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, and 1 piastre (5, 10, 20, and 40 paras). In practice, Turkish gold is seldom seen, the commonest gold coin being the French 20-franc piece, which = $87\frac{1}{2}$ gold piastres (£1 = 110 piastres, £T1 = 18s. $0\frac{3}{4}d.$). Besides the silver and nickel coins, the old Turkish beshlik and $\frac{1}{2}$ beshlik, of an alloy of silver and copper, equivalent to $2\frac{1}{2}$ and $1\frac{1}{4}$ piastres, and the metallik (also alloy) of $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre or 10 paras, and multiples and sub-divisions of the latter, circulate widely. In foreign commerce prices are quoted in francs, and franc-pieces are also in use. There is a good deal of false coin about the country.

Apart from the official values, for trading purposes various local rates were commonly used in expressing prices. Thus, while in Constantinople £T1 was reckoned at 108 market piastres, at Tripoli it was 123, at Aleppo 127, at Jaffa 141; and so firmly rooted were these current local rates that they came to be recognised even in the accounts of the banks. In 1916, however, order was introduced by a measure fixing the lira for all purposes at 100 piastres. For further information about this reform and the Turkish currency generally, see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 129. Another innovation made during the war is less fortunate. Until 1914 the only notes in circulation were those of the Ottoman Bank. Since then the country has been flooded with paper of denominations down to 1 piastre, which, in spite of pains and penalties, the population persist in discounting heavily. In Syria, Government paper has been passing at about $\frac{1}{4}$ to $\frac{1}{5}$ of its face value.

(3) Banking

Banks.—Seven banking companies are represented in the country:—

- (i) Imperial Ottoman Bank. Branches at Aintab, Aleppo, Alexandretta, Beirut, Damascus, Haifa,

Hama, Homs, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Saida, Tripoli. The existing concession of this institution, which originated in a private British concern, but is now largely under French control, terminates in 1925. It acts for the Government in financial matters, and before 1914 it alone had the right to issue notes, which, however, were payable only at Constantinople and were never popular in the provinces; in 1913 the amount issued (against which metal in the ratio of 1 to 3 must be held) was only about £T1,100,000. But the Bank remains free to conduct business of all kinds on its own account, and hardly occupies the position of a national bank in the ordinary sense, though taking the lead in fixing rates of exchange and discount. It has been active in promoting trade by advances upon goods (see below). A new national bank, called the Crédit National Ottoman, has lately been founded at Constantinople.

(ii) Banque de Salonique. Branches at Beirut and Tripoli; nominally a Turkish company, but really a Jewish concern under Austrian influence.

(iii) Banque Commerciale de Palestine. A small Ottoman company formed in 1911, and carrying on business in Jerusalem only.

(iv) Anglo-Palestine Company. A Jewish bank, with headquarters in London, which started operations in Palestine in 1903; it has been suspended by the Turkish Government since the outbreak of the war. The company has branches at Beirut, Gaza, Haifa, Hebron, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias, and small agencies in the principal Jewish colonies. To facilitate advances to persons of small means it has adopted the principle of co-operative credit, and a number of societies have been started, especially among the Jewish agricultural population, to take advantage of this.

(v) Crédit Lyonnais. Branches at Jaffa and Jerusalem, with agencies at Beirut and elsewhere. The business of the bank has been reduced to a minimum during the war.

(vi) Deutsche Orient Bank. Branch at Aleppo; the bank was established at Constantinople in 1906 (see *Turkey in Europe*, No. 16 of this series, p. 134).

(vii) Deutsche Palästina Bank. Branches at Beirut, Damascus, Gaza, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Nablus, Nazareth, Tripoli. This company, which dates from 1899, and has shown much activity, has important branches at Berlin and Hamburg. A fusion with the Deutsche Orient Bank is to take place after the war.

Besides these companies, there are numerous private banks in the large towns, especially Beirut and Aleppo, which do a considerable amount of minor discounting, besides undertaking deposits and current accounts. In Aleppo, for example, eight or nine firms of good standing are to be found, with a score or more of less solid establishments.

The State-supported Banque agricole, which has a number of branches, exists for the special end of making advances to cultivators for agricultural purposes. Credits are given at the rate of 6 per cent. on suitable security. Facilities for credit were appreciably extended by a law of 1916, which removed previous restrictions as to the amount and term of loans, and legitimised advances on grain, besides including in the bank's sphere of operations the purchase and sale of land, agricultural implements, animals, and seed.

Extent and methods of business.—The volume of banking business, notwithstanding the number and diffusion of the establishments engaged, is not very great; for the public companies it has been estimated that the amount involved, including deposits and current accounts, ranged before the war from £T3,000,000 to £T4,500,000. The united working capital of banks of all kinds at Aleppo was put in 1913 at 22,000,000 frs., and their annual profit at about 2,000,000 frs. Such figures indicate a comparatively low stage of development. The banks take little part in financing companies or taking up concessions,

Their business may, for the most part, be summed up under the following heads:—

(a) Collection of values of imported goods.

(b) Discounting bills of exchange and promissory notes. The rate of discount is limited by law to 9 per cent. In 1910 the banks of Beirut agreed on the rates of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for first-class banks, $6\frac{3}{4}$ for those of second-class, 7 per cent. for first-class merchants, 7-8 per cent. for others.

(c) Advances on real property and on goods. The former have lately been made easier by a law sanctioning mortgages in the names of the specially licensed banks, but except those granted by the Banque agricole they are as yet exceptional. Advances on goods, on the other hand, are very frequent, and may be divided into three classes: (1) Advances on staple products, grain, wool, &c., or on merchandise. Some depôts for deposits of this kind are kept by the banks, but there are no storage companies, and accommodation is limited. 75 per cent. of the value is the recognised allowance, and interest at $5\frac{1}{2}$ - $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. is charged, besides fees for insurance, storage, &c. (2) Advances upon imports which have been ordered, but have not yet arrived. These are paid for wholly or in part on receipt of the bills of lading by the bank, which then takes over the goods on arrival, and releases them as the advances and the bank's own charges are paid off. This system is in use chiefly at Beirut and Aleppo. (3) Advances upon exported goods, the bank receiving the documents after shipment.

(d) Current accounts and deposits. This class of business is increasing, at any rate in the larger towns and for private account. As there are no public savings banks, the ordinary banking establishments are the only available medium.

(4) *Influence of Foreign Capital*

The notorious dependence of Turkey on foreign capital has been fully shared by Syria, which, as already indicated (p. 125), is both commercially and

industrially under no small obligations to assistance from without. Until recently the only railways were French. Oversea communications are still practically monopolised by foreign shipping. The one modern port is a foreign enterprise, and the country looks to similar support for further improvements to its harbours. Other important public works due to extraneous money are the electric tramways, the lighting and water supply of Beirut, and the electric trams and light at Damascus. Large undertakings of this character have, as a rule, been left hitherto to the foreigner, though since the beginning of the war there has been a tendency in Turkey generally to greater enterprise on the part of native capitalists. In finance, all the larger banking concerns are foreign, even that which has played the part of the official national bank being only thinly disguised; on the importance of the banks in the commercial system see p. 127 and p. 139 above. The insurance business has been entirely in the hands of alien companies.

A stagnating agriculture, affecting the prosperity of the whole country, has received some stimulus in Palestine from the Jewish and German colonies, and such advances as have been witnessed in the last decade or two are in no small degree the effect of their example. The spread of the colonies has also led to a substantial advance in the market value of agricultural land in their neighbourhood. Another of the few native industries of significance, the culture and spinning of silk, has rested largely upon French support, the enforced withdrawal of which during the war has been followed by a marked decline in production. Materially, the beneficial influence of external resources has thus been strongly felt, and they have been a not less potent factor in the promotion of the health and education of the people through the hospitals, schools, and other institutions which have been established and maintained by foreign benevolence.

(5) *Principal Fields of Investment*

Communications.—On the possibilities of the development of railways and ports, *cf.* pp. 77 and 84. Though essential needs are fairly well satisfied by the existing railway system, there is room for improvement, especially by the extension of local branch lines. With regard to ports, the construction of suitable works at Jaffa, Haifa, and Alexandretta is urgently demanded. For the last of these the Baghdad Railway Company holds the concession; for Jaffa and Haifa (with Tripoli) a concession was granted in 1913 to France, and some preliminary financial arrangements were made which have now lapsed in consequence of the war.

Mining.—The prospects here are very uncertain, and further scientific investigation is required. Explorers have noted the occurrence of metals, &c., at various points, but the possibility of their being profitably exploited is not established. Fuel is a vital want, but so far neither coal nor petroleum has been obtained in any quantity. That a profitable oilfield exists within the borders of Syria has yet to be proved; recent expert examinations of concessions in the neighbourhood of Latakia and to the east of the Jordan and the Dead Sea were not of a very hopeful character. The potentialities of the phosphate deposits of the latter region (*cf.* p. 111) are also not yet fully ascertained.

Electricity.—In the absence of combustibles, the utilisation of water-power, for which sufficient opportunities exist (*cf.* p. 120), should be especially fruitful. Of the larger towns only Beirut and Damascus are at present supplied with electricity.

Agricultural development.—Both in drainage and irrigation much remains to be done. On the coast about Alexandretta and between Jaffa and Gaza, as well as inland north of Antioch and about the Lakes of Hule and Tiberias, large tracts of land might be reclaimed. Cultivation is also capable of appreciable extension and improvement by irrigation, either by pumping, in

which the use of water-power would play a prominent part, or by means of the ancient system of reservoirs. Acquisition of land by private companies is restricted by the existing law, and anything tending to the expropriation of the peasantry is to be deprecated.

Building, &c.—As has been already remarked (p. 119), there are at present no large local contracting establishments, although there appears to be an opening for such. The possibilities of the country as a health resort, which it is well fitted to become by virtue both of its climate and the presence of a number of hot springs, are as yet undeveloped. More adequate storage accommodation in the commercial centres, perhaps also provision for cold storage in connection with one or more of the shipping lines, are other needs.

Miscellaneous industries.—Various branches of industry, for which the raw material is or can be produced in the country, appear capable of introduction or development and improvement. Milling and oil-pressing, for example, need to be further modernised. With an extension of the cultivation of sugar-cane or beet, sugar manufacture might become profitable, and there is an abundance of material for the production of alcohol, which at present is largely imported. If cotton were more widely grown, it is possible that cotton-spinning might be successful; for wool-spinning there is already in the country an ample supply of raw material. The weaving industry, however, is hardly likely to expand very much except under the protection of a tariff. There is no obvious reason why the demand for such things as cement, tiles, and glass should not now be satisfied on the spot. Tiles and similar products have lately been manufactured to some extent locally, but a glass factory started at Damascus in 1909-10 was a failure. The utilisation of the papyrus beds of northern Galilee for paper manufacture has been suggested. Further attention might well be directed to the preservation of fruit, vegetables, and fish, and the production of perfumery.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

Syrian industry, as appears from the foregoing review, is at present very one-sided. Apart from agriculture, only silk-spinning in the Lebanon, the textile industry in the same district and at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and the production of olive oil and soap at Antioch, Tripoli, Jaffa, &c., can be said to have attained any real significance. Mining is negligible, and the absence of a home supply of both coal and petroleum has been a serious hindrance to the development of manufactures. The country therefore depends greatly upon foreign imports, and its purchasing power is much affected by the quality of the harvest and similar natural factors. Agriculture, upon which everything else hangs, has been handicapped by lack of security, adverse conditions of land tenure, and a vicious system of taxation, and has remained, except in certain favoured districts, in a backward condition. The removal of these blighting influences is the prime need. Among more special means of agricultural improvement, drainage and irrigation have already been referred to (p. 101). The various forms of arboriculture successfully practised in the Jewish settlements might be extended with advantage; in the uplands of Judaea, in particular, an adequate yield is hardly to be obtained from cereals. An assured market is, however, a necessary preliminary; the dangers of neglecting this precaution have been well seen in the experiences of the Jewish colonists in wine production. Within certain limits (*cf.* p. 100) something may be hoped from a more extended use of machinery.

Trade and commerce have naturally been profoundly affected by the war. In some directions, indeed, the country has profited; for instance, in the improvement of roads, more especially in the south. But there is a longer tale of loss. Apart from such obvious results as the withdrawal of labour, the losses both of men and animals and in parts the serious depopulation due to

famine and disease, or the felling of olives and mulberry-trees for fuel, grave dislocations have been caused by the interruption of overseas communications. On the one hand, the supply of many commodities, some of vital importance, has been cut off; on the other, several of the most flourishing industries have temporarily lost their market; for example, the Lebanese silk and the oranges of Jaffa. The orange plantations have, moreover, been much damaged by the failure of irrigation consequent on the deficiency of petrol.

Some possibilities of commercial development have been briefly discussed in the section on openings for investments (p. 144 above). In general, the industrial and commercial future of Syria is closely bound up with political conditions. In Palestine the situation would be transformed by Jewish immigration on a large scale, while dependence in any way upon the British Empire would no doubt greatly strengthen the ties with Egypt, which are already close.

| (B) ALEXANDRIA | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1912 | 1913 | 1914 | 1915 |
| Wool | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Wheat | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Barley | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Other | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Total | 400,000 | 400,000 | 400,000 | 400,000 |

APPENDIX

TABLE I.—Tonnage of Steamships cleared at Principal Ports

(A) BEIRUT

| Nationality. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Austrian.. .. | 219,508 | 214,368 | 180,130 | 273,859 |
| British | 317,661 | 359,649 | 323,677 | 305,820 |
| French | 394,601 | 399,555 | 354,052 | 476,505 |
| German | 66,549 | 61,474 | 67,965 | 93,962 |
| Italian | 287,193 | 161,010 | 36,164 | 250,167 |
| Ottoman | 47,145 | 39,756 | 2,099 | 20,986 |
| Russian | 235,614 | 198,629 | 188,005 | 245,415 |
| United States .. | 62,158 | 53,764 | 38,206 | 37,430 |
| Others | 70,858 | 47,286 | 42,996 | 43,447 |
| Total | 1,701,287 | 1,535,491 | 1,233,294 | 1,747,591 |

(B) ALEXANDRETTA

| Nationality. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|---------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Austrian.. .. | 113,443 | 106,331 | 103,840 | 120,180 |
| British | 156,206 | 166,918 | 175,776 | 172,246 |
| French | 55,564 | 62,391 | 41,459 | 54,667 |
| German | 14,109 | 24,454 | 41,631 | 51,847 |
| Italian | 78,725 | 29,505 | — | 41,889 |
| Russian | 160,202 | 138,043 | 158,521 | 201,032 |
| Others | 53,253 | 45,077 | 34,417 | 33,833 |
| Total | 631,502 | 572,719 | 555,644 | 675,694 |

(C) EL-MINA (Tripoli)

| Nationality. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| Austrian .. | 206,124 | 198,155 | 216,806 | 229,033 |
| British .. | 183,419 | 209,335 | 204,591 | 213,459 |
| French .. | 143,592 | 124,905 | 133,716 | 191,830 |
| German .. | 12,186 | 37,485 | 70,618 | 88,079 |
| Italian .. | 105,497 | 68,322 | 17,502 | 158,617 |
| Russian .. | 179,496 | 139,625 | 168,383 | 197,016 |
| Others .. | 65,840 | 45,689 | 47,567 | 13,803 |
| Total .. | 896,154 | 823,516 | 859,183 | 1,091,837 |

(D) HAIFA

| Nationality. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Austrian .. | 98,254 | 209,146 | 207,149 | 236,536 |
| British .. | 167,701 | 233,378 | 201,197 | 189,961 |
| French .. | 69,038 | 76,080 | 43,725 | 49,310 |
| German .. | 17,817 | 21,389 | 29,848 | 49,418 |
| Italian .. | 82,633 | 33,169 | 12,032 | 65,462 |
| Russian .. | 278,246 | 144,408 | 166,441 | 193,518 |
| Others .. | 57,755 | 32,690 | 24,953 | 9,175 |
| Total .. | 771,444 | 750,260 | 685,345 | 793,380 |

(E) JAFFA

| Nationality. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Austrian .. | 178,674 | 211,729 | 213,679 | 228,456 |
| British .. | 250,926 | 292,785 | 315,876 | 270,361 |
| French .. | 191,899 | 192,560 | 161,560 | 213,202 |
| German .. | 84,128 | 60,167 | 85,673 | 78,656 |
| Italian .. | 140,669 | 56,171 | 6,964 | 104,265 |
| Russian .. | 184,713 | 156,699 | 174,526 | 212,469 |
| Others . | 84,382 | 55,350 | 55,806 | 52,906 |
| Total .. | 1,115,391 | 1,025,461 | 1,014,084 | 1,160,315 |

(F) GAZA, LATAKIA, AND SAIDA

| Port. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1913. |
|------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Gaza .. | .. | 9,434 | 6,730 | 8,007 |
| Latakia .. | 169,816 | 120,341 | 128,147 | 180,808 |
| Saida .. | 61,166 | 22,945 | 25,925 | 49,762 |

TABLE II.---Summary of Exports for the Year 1910-11.

| Commodity. | Alexandretta (including Adalia and Mersina). | | Beirut. | | Other Ports. | | Total. | |
|--|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. |
| Live animals ... (head) | Kg. (178,754) | Piastres. 29,917,302 | Kg. (1,901) | Piastres. 850,100 | Kg. (2,123) | Piastres. 227,835 | Kg. (182,778) | Piastres. 30,995,237 |
| Animal provisions ... | 500,179 | 4,519,924 | 735,503 | 6,703,812 | 1,195,891 | 3,286,584 | 2,431,573 | 14,510,320 |
| Cereals ... | 10,988,619 | 16,322,760 | 4,367,240 | 4,347,624 | 18,723,396 | 21,072,157 | 34,079,255 | 41,742,541 |
| Fruit, vegetables (fresh or preserved) | 5,900,972 | 6,083,057 | 3,405,111 | 9,458,995 | 33,102,941 | 29,760,307 | 42,409,024 | 45,302,359 |
| Trees, kernels, seeds, plants | 5,960,961 | 3,532,927 | 125,743 | 406,052 | 162,319 | 164,030 | 6,249,023 | 4,103,019 |
| Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c. | 30,190 | 48,458 | 397,462 | 1,006,145 | 153,786 | 348,014 | 581,438 | 1,402,617 |
| Sugar and sugar products | 184,797 | 811,226 | 102,487 | 341,779 | 10,745 | 30,292 | 298,029 | 1,183,297 |
| Tobacco, tobac... | 41,932 | 524,150 | 123,735 | 1,546,700 | 1,323,944 | 16,550,000 | 1,489,611 | 18,620,850 |
| Alcoholic liquor and mineral water | 19,100 | 40,941 | 610,595 | 775,361 | 4,036,951 | 3,976,267 | 4,666,646 | 4,792,569 |
| Oil and oil products | 162,293 | 1,335,483 | 227,612 | 1,309,386 | 5,994,943 | 24,225,173 | 6,384,848 | 26,870,042 |
| Ivory, offal, bones, and other animal products, burning material | 2,818,121 | 1,501,737 | 206,699 | 2,383,328 | 1,518,441 | 721,412 | 4,543,261 | 4,606,477 |
| Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter | 1,406,638 | 3,049,380 | 34,789 | 65,064 | 1,424 | 11,190 | 1,442,851 | 3,125,634 |
| Drugs, perfumes, &c. | 12,694,763 | 8,591,089 | 829,442 | 2,161,032 | 74,281 | 197,839 | 13,598,486 | 10,949,960 |
| Gun, glue, asphalt, &c. | 236,335 | 1,392,731 | 101,670 | 660,875 | 5,175 | 11,878 | 343,180 | 2,065,484 |
| Ore, metal, metal work | 6,366,513 | 1,683,156 | 257,722 | 1,219,566 | 63,196 | 202,197 | 6,687,431 | 3,104,919 |
| Wood and woodwork | 4,898,636 | 1,701,638 | 278,067 | 771,820 | 256,884 | 330,517 | 5,433,587 | 2,803,975 |
| Skins, leather, &c. | 437,722 | 3,776,609 | 673,709 | 4,342,442 | 143,994 | 843,325 | 1,255,425 | 8,962,376 |
| Textiles, raw and manufactured | 9,051,883 | 77,600,714 | 3,201,065 | 79,056,070 | 298,638 | 14,889,622 | 12,551,586 | 171,546,406 |
| Miscellaneous | 7,611 | 29,167 | 135,795 | 763,135 | 50,898 | 893,895 | 194,274 | 1,686,197 |
| Total | 61,707,265 (61,707 metric tons.) | 162,462,449 (£1,476,931) | 15,814,446 (15,814 tons) | 118,169,296 (£1,074,266) | 67,117,817 (67,117 tons) | 117,742,534 (£1,070,386) | 144,639,528 (144,639 tons) | 398,374,279 (£3,621,584) |

TABLE III.—Comparative Table of Exports (in £) from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910-12.

| Destination. | Alexandretta. | | | Beirut. | | | Jaffa. | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. |
| | United Kingdom .. | 24,722 | 14,228 | 19,543 | 70,500 | 41,000 | 31,500 | 173,085 | 185,000 |
| British Colonies (India) .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 698 | 9,000 | 10,500 |
| Turkey .. | 525,234 | 397,218 | 308,282 | 18,000 | 19,000 | 10,000 | 83,015 | 78,000 | 95,000 |
| Austria .. | 22,142 | 11,643 | 13,395 | 2,300 | 1,500 | 1,300 | 12,103 | 21,000 | 24,500 |
| Russia .. | 15,385 | 20,781 | 22,574 | 3,100 | 4,200 | 3,500 | 29,589 | 33,000 | 45,000 |
| Germany .. | 18,761 | 25,539 | 30,170 | 1,900 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 8,384 | 17,000 | 21,000 |
| France .. | 189,086 | 178,414 | 133,491 | 672,000 | 431,500 | 423,800 | 22,255 | 46,000 | 50,000 |
| Egypt .. | 322,730 | 209,005 | 258,767 | 17,000 | 22,000 | 23,000 | 277,328 | 270,000 | 290,000 |
| Belgium .. | 3,022 | 50,868 | 41,404 | 2,500 | 1,100 | 1,000 | 1,101 | 15,000 | 12,000 |
| Italy .. | 38,645 | 50,453 | 860 | 3,000 | 2,200 | .. | 15,332 | 12,000 | 6,000 |
| United States .. | 137,454 | 84,022 | 190,960 | 21,000 | 17,000 | 21,000 | 4,272 | 10,000 | 11,000 |
| Other countries .. | 3,844 | 2,153 | 1,001 | 11,200 | 10,000 | 9,500 | 8,983 | 14,660 | 19,162 |
| Total .. | £ 1,301,025 | 1,044,324 | 1,020,447 | 822,500 | 550,500 | 525,600 | 636,145 | 710,660 | 774,162 |

TABLE IV.—Totals of Comparative Export Values from Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

| Destination. | Value. | Percentage. |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| United Kingdom | £ 268,307 | } 9·7 |
| British Colonies (India) | 698 | |
| Turkey | 626,249 | 22·7 |
| Austria | 36,545 | 1·3 |
| Russia | 48,074 | 1·8 |
| Germany | 29,045 | 1·1 |
| France | 883,341 | 32 |
| Egypt | 617,058 | 22·4 |
| Belgium | 6,623 | 0·2 |
| Italy | 56,977 | 2 |
| United States | 162,726 | 5·9 |
| Other countries | 24,032 | 0·9 |
| Total | £2,759,675 | |

TABLE V.—Summary of Imports for the Year 1910-11.

| Commodity. | Alexandretta. | | Beirut. | | Other Ports. | | Total. | |
|--|----------------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. | Quantity. | Value. |
| | Kg. | Piastres. | Kg. | Piastres. | Kg. | Piastres. | Kg. | Piastres. |
| Live animals ... (head) | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Animal provisions ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... |
| Cereals ... | 293,867 | 1,699,419 | 390,969 | 1,981,996 | 466,532 | 1,777,209 | 1,151,368 | 5,458,624 |
| Fruit, vegetables (fresh and preserved) | 4,179,276 | 4,720,975 | 18,122,533 | 19,474,282 | 37,690,591 | 38,992,344 | 59,992,400 | 63,187,601 |
| Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, &c. | 739,996 | 908,044 | 1,088,584 | 1,165,846 | 2,505,110 | 1,470,629 | 4,333,690 | 3,544,519 |
| Sugar and sugar products | 485,665 | 2,720,581 | 1,528,766 | 8,877,877 | 790,068 | 4,546,565 | 2,804,499 | 16,145,023 |
| Tobacco ... | 8,522,204 | 14,241,458 | 11,037,227 | 20,089,135 | 11,365,100 | 19,865,340 | 30,924,531 | 54,195,933 |
| Alcoholic liquor, mineral water | ... | ... | 724,247 | 7,157,881 | ... | ... | 724,247 | 7,157,881 |
| Oil and oil products | 833,186 | 1,660,107 | 1,475,059 | 2,896,843 | 1,093,079 | 2,357,919 | 3,401,324 | 6,914,869 |
| Dung, offal, bones, and other animal produce; burning material | 7,888,123 | 6,045,480 | 15,144,252 | 12,962,064 | 19,219,189 | 12,365,236 | 42,251,564 | 31,372,780 |
| Chemicals, dyes, dyeing matter | 14,325,664 | 2,536,511 | 43,447,087 | 8,122,356 | 9,150,551 | 2,385,482 | 66,923,302 | 13,044,349 |
| Drugs, perfumes, &c. | 1,463,210 | 6,037,546 | 1,810,933 | 4,810,835 | 2,913,734 | 4,777,528 | 6,187,877 | 15,625,909 |
| Explosives, arms ... | 104,670 | 1,208,959 | 506,514 | 3,221,443 | 87,683 | 833,468 | 698,867 | 5,263,870 |
| Earth, stone, and products | 574,988 | 2,981,612 | 280,787 | 3,546,193 | 335,005 | 1,845,227 | 1,190,780 | 8,373,032 |
| Metals and metal work | 8,666,459 | 3,066,493 | 25,136,398 | 13,283,247 | 17,687,092 | 5,432,681 | 51,489,949 | 21,782,421 |
| Wood and woodwork | 24,300,701 | 24,795,879 | 12,202,550 | 26,367,332 | 14,256,356 | 19,007,181 | 50,759,607 | 70,170,392 |
| Rags, paper, and products | 2,483,251 | 1,282,499 | 18,131,847 | 7,987,210 | 20,442,119 | 8,987,878 | 41,057,217 | 18,257,587 |
| Skins, leather, &c. | 70,902 | 2,136,869 | 1,714,388 | 4,530,153 | 929,754 | 2,600,023 | 2,715,044 | 9,267,045 |
| Textiles, raw and manufactured | 346,910 | 3,728,431 | 1,631,071 | 19,902,675 | 508,075 | 4,072,380 | 2,486,056 | 27,703,486 |
| Rubber and products | 5,639,217 | 62,479,644 | 5,352,331 | 234,548,426 | 2,267,665 | 21,294,099 | 13,259,213 | 318,322,169 |
| Machinery, carriages | 40,770 | 319,785 | 116,139 | 2,055,528 | 22,995 | 386,599 | 179,904 | 2,761,912 |
| Clocks, musical instruments, &c. | 4,465,237 | 14,323,157 | 1,131,164 | 7,046,155 | 1,149,533 | 5,378,672 | 6,745,934 | 26,747,984 |
| Fezes, hats, feathers, &c. | 2,943 | 151,831 | 79,617 | 1,888,052 | 19,810 | 423,878 | 102,370 | 2,463,741 |
| Objects of art, scientific instruments | 44,354 | 1,873,052 | 45,314 | 2,551,144 | 9,643 | 320,144 | 99,311 | 4,744,340 |
| Jewellery, hardware, &c. | 103,305 | 632,983 | 318,827 | 2,725,361 | 42,690 | 759,295 | 464,822 | 4,117,639 |
| Miscellaneous ... | 34,725 | 3,194,550 | 181,699 | 4,709,170 | 46,458 | 1,382,255 | 262,882 | 9,285,975 |
| | 53,023 | 283,457 | 504,068 | 3,503,237 | 185,737 | 1,129,938 | 742,828 | 4,916,632 |
| Total ... | 85,662,646 | 163,290,347 | 162,102,371 | 425,706,514 | 143,184,569 | 163,174,182 | 390,949,586 | 752,171,043 |
| | (85,662 metric tons) | (1,484,457L.) | (162,102 tons) | (3,870,059L.) | (143,184 tons) | (1,483,401L.) | (390,949 tons) | (6,837,918L.) |

TABLE VI.—Comparative Table of Imports (in £) at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa in 1910-12.

| Country of Origin. | Alexandretta. | | | Beirut. | | | Jaffa. | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. | 1910. | 1911. | 1912. |
| | United Kingdom .. | 547,853 | 445,405 | 572,788 | 933,500 | 902,000 | 748,500 | 128,730 | 146,000 |
| British Colonies (India) .. | .. | .. | .. | 45,000 | 31,000 | 23,000 | 3,105 | 49,000 | 54,000 |
| Turkey* .. | 284,565 | 286,338 | 266,042 | 110,000 | 78,000 | 47,500 | 328,965 | 340,000 | 305,000 |
| Austria .. | 159,527 | 100,438 | 86,738 | 165,000 | 172,500 | 134,500 | 83,840 | 114,000 | 126,000 |
| Russia .. | 25,376 | 32,012 | 28,168 | 94,000 | 76,000 | 62,000 | 97,000 | 108,000 | 110,000 |
| Germany .. | 48,940 | 38,571 | 71,035 | 178,000 | 145,000 | 129,000 | 68,615 | 74,000 | 80,000 |
| France .. | 170,599 | 120,627 | 87,637 | 150,000 | 130,000 | 121,000 | 103,000 | 112,000 | 84,000 |
| Egypt .. | 33,018 | 29,980 | 50,925 | 27,000 | 23,000 | 29,500 | 58,095 | 70,000 | 61,000 |
| Belgium .. | 46,094 | 41,413 | 33,676 | 67,500 | 55,000 | 71,000 | 49,185 | 60,000 | 54,000 |
| Italy .. | 75,400 | 37,623 | 440 | 257,000 | 190,000 | 47,000 | 24,940 | 16,000 | 5,000 |
| United States .. | 5,911 | 8,351 | 7,387 | 23,200 | 15,750 | 11,000 | 10,400 | 25,000 | 12,000 |
| Roumania .. | .. | .. | .. | 61,000 | 72,000 | 48,000 | .. | 22,000 | 17,000 |
| Other countries .. | 1,601 | 4,377 | 4,810 | 42,000 | 30,200 | 25,500 | 46,575 | 33,910 | 27,019 |
| Total | £ 1,398,884 | 1,145,135 | 1,209,646 | 2,153,200 | 1,920,450 | 1,497,500 | 1,002,450 | 1,169,910 | 1,090,019 |

* See note in Table VII.

TABLE VII.—Totals of Comparative Import Values at Alexandretta, Beirut, and Jaffa for 1910.

| | Value. | Percentage. |
|----------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| | £ | |
| United Kingdom | 1,610,083 | 35·3 |
| British Colonies (India) | 48,105 | 1 |
| Egypt | 118,113 | 2·6 |
| Turkey* | 723,530 | 15·9 |
| Austria | 408,367 | 9 |
| Russia | 216,376 | 4·8 |
| Germany | 295,555 | 6·5 |
| France | 423,599 | 9·3 |
| Belgium | 162,799 | 3·6 |
| Italy | 357,340 | 7·8 |
| United States | 39,511 | 0·9 |
| Roumania | 61,000 | 1·3 |
| Other countries | 90,176 | 2 |
| Total | £4,554,554 | |

* The imports from Turkey are exaggerated, consisting partly of foreign goods re-shipped at Beirut. Approximately one-half of the Turkish imports at Jaffa are of foreign, and mainly British, origin.


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
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