




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Vandyke Pinx.

Hilbert Sculp.

Gustavus Adolphus

KING of SWEDEN, &c.

Born Dec. 9 1594 Killed Nov. 6 1632.

www THE
H I S T O R Y

O F T H E
L I F E

32352 *ac* OF

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,
KING of SWEDEN,
Surnamed the GREAT. *1856*

His Ashes in a peaceful Urn shall rest;
His Name a great Example stands to show,
How strangely high Endeavours may be blest,
Where PIETY and VALOUR jointly go. DRYDEN.

V O L. I.

By the Rev. WALTER (HARTE,) M. A.
Canon of WINDSOR.

The SECOND EDITION Corrected;
With ALTERATIONS and ENLARGEMENTS.

L O N D O N : *www d 3*

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To the Right Honourable

Philip Dormer Stanhope,

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD,

Knight of the Most Noble Order of the
Garter, one of His Majesty's Most
Honourable Privy-Council, &c. &c.

MY LORD,

IT must be a peculiar happiness to every author, (and not the less so, for being uncommon) that choice and judgment should direct him to a Patron, as well as obligation and gratitude. It is, moreover an addition to my good fortune, that these imperfect labours have been perused, protected, and encouraged by One, whose single approbation is a sort of universal passport throughout all Europe.

With what pleasure could I indulge myself in painting a character that is *amiable*, and *illustrious* at the same time? But,

my LORD, the delicacy of your cast of mind deters me. It may suffice therefore to remark with brevity, that I have raised this little monument, as a testimony of my private esteem and affection; and if the duration of *it* proves short and transitory, it is not from want of zeal and spirit in the person who erecteth it: but from the inability of the artist, and the unsubstantiality of the materials he uses. I know my bounds; ---- and shall proceed no farther than to assure your LORDSHIP that I am, with the highest regard,

Your most Obliged,

and most Faithful Servant,

W. HARTE.

P. R E F A C E

T O T H E

FIRST EDITION, in 1759.

MOST persons of moderate learning and abilities, after finishing what is commonly called the tour of travelling into foreign countries, have been induced, either from self-love, or the partial solicitations of their friends, to make a present to the public of some performance, which took its rise from a closer and more intimate acquaintance with distant states and kingdoms than usually falls to the share of such people as are born in an island, and rarely leave it. As the Person who did me the honour to accept of my poor and imperfect services, exhorted me rather to be profuse than sparing in such expences as tended to the acquisition of knowledge, whether in history, politics, antiquities, laws of government, manners of courts, &c. I had once thoughts of reducing my observations of that kind into form; but upon mature reflection, it appeared to me, that the relative situations of kingdoms and states were disquisitions merely of a periodical nature; and as to antiquities, buildings, paintings, national characters,

and so forth, they had been described already, even to tediousness. The inaccuracies and errors of other travellers soon taught me to suspect my own; for many or most of them depend principally (not thro' indolence and inattention, but on the contrary from want of time and proper opportunity) upon the relations of natives, which are usually partial and insincere; or on such extracts as they are enabled to compile from books in vogue among the respective people thro' whose countries they pass. For these reasons I threw my materials aside; and after such a frankness of confession, it is natural to conclude that I shall procure my pardon from the public on easy terms. Yet the dye was cast, that I should disturb the tranquility of readers by some means or other, and enter their closets unsought-for with my literary present: That I do so is certain; but it is with respect and diffidence; and the part of history I here offer them carries this slight recommendation with it, that it is an original sketch, and not an imitation.

Now as part of the commission I was entrusted with induced me to renew my acquaintance with the modern history of other nations, I applied myself a second time to an undertaking that had been suggested to me in the earlier parts of life, by my first friend and protector the late EARL of PATERBROW, and which I then declined, merely thro' deficiency of materials, and from want of that intercourse with learned historians of other nations, which

- it hath since been my good fortune to acquire and cultivate. For these reasons I have *resum- ed* the history of Gustavus Adolphus more properly than *undertaken* it; and far from wanting materials, had rather more materials than I could make use of.

At first sight, without reflection, it may appear to some, that I have engaged myself in an undertaking which seems to be foreign from the studies of my own profession, and that the life of a warrior, interspersed with matters of civil history, bear no connection with the pen of an ecclesiastic: but the life of *that* warrior, which I am now drawing a sketch of, happens by a rare and unparalleled felicity to be the life of an hero, who, not contented to perform the greatest actions in the field and cabinet, super-added to his glory (in order to make the figure of it truly circular and perfect) the grand accomplishing perfection of an *honest*, a *moral*, and a *religious man*; in all which last-mentioned lights he appears to me as great and amiable as in the two former. For these reasons, I had ever a strong inclination to make this illustrious and extraordinary personage better known to posterity; and if in the execution of such an undertaking I shall happen to acquit myself without commendation, the fault must lie at my own door; for I writ with pleasure, upon an earnest desire of becoming useful.

Amongst other things, it has been my singular good fortune to provide and amass materials to such an abundance, that I found myself

plunged into an ocean of history, as full and redundant as that of the poet,

Omnia pontus erant, deerant quoque littora pontus;

so that my principal difficulty lay in the grand secret of selecting and rejecting; and what is equally extraordinary (but more to my disadvantage if I succeed ill) I have from a strange concurrence of accidents, but one competitor, properly speaking, as a biographer*.

Under this head there appears to me a farther circumstance which is worth mentioning: namely, that the life of Gustavus could never have made its entrance into the world at a period more interesting than the present, for the counter-part of the thirty years war, after a revolution of more than *one hundred years*, is now re-kindled in the self-same countries.

Yet what induced me principally to write the life of Gustavus, was the character he will be found to bear as a man of *honesty, magnanimity, morality, and religion*: as to your mere fighting heroes, I resign them to other hands. But after having long studied my inimitable example in the various situations of piety and honour, and indulged a close examination into all

* *Histoire de Gustave Adolphe*, A Par. 12°. 1653. pag. 167.
Professor Menke, whose collection in history was well known to all Europe, hath given us a picture of this book to the life: PEU DE CHOSES. *Catalogue des Principaux Historiens*, p. 413.

that hath been published partially or peevishly concerning him by the several writers of the *two* religions, I find no breach of trust, no habitual immorality, no infraction of religion, no inattention to public virtue or private devotion, which can strictly and with propriety be laid to his charge. I can discover but one habitual fault in the whole of his conduct (and that too may be alleviated, as it seems to be a constitutional frailty, interwoven with the warmth of his nature) which is, that he was subject on certain occasions to a momentary transport of passion; which, far from concealing, I have touched upon, and that boldly, in more places than one. But we never find him in the character of an encroaching or insolent king; we never discover him false or dishonourable in any one of the relative or social duties: he preferred no man, but for merit and probity; he broke his faith neither with potentate nor with subject; and as to military and state-favourites, they were a sort of regal trifles, which passed through his mind as transiently as they entered accidentally. He had no recourse to dissimulation; because as a brave man he *despised* it, and as an able man he did not *want* it: for though it may seem a paradox to the generality of readers, yet numberless people are dishonest merely for want of courage, or want of parts.

What hath been here slightly sketched out is not intended to pass upon the public by way of a character, but serves only as a plain enumeration of some few individuating circumstances,

x . . . P R E F A C E . .

stances, which induced me as an ecclesiastic to write Gustavus's life preferably to that of most other persons. For were I to delineate him in the other various appearances of the warrior, the politician, and private man of virtue (all which I chuse hereafter to leave the reader to combine from the several facts of history) it were impossible for me to confine myself within the common bounds of a slight Preface; since upon the whole he appears to me in every shape to be one of those great and fortunate human beings, whose reputation is neither to be advanced by encomiums, nor depreciated by obloquy. *Quem vituperare ne inimici quidem possunt, nisi ut simul laudent.*

My main view, therefore, in composing this work, is an attempt to enforce the ideas and practice of virtue and religion upon that large body of men called the *military*. The object and moral of my book being only *this*, *That the religious and good man* (all other circumstances being supposed equal) *stands the best chance to be the bravest too*. And if in putting together the warlike parts of this work I have employed no small degree of exactness and attention, it was merely from a sincere and earnest desire of conveying *the doctrine of my moral* more dextrously into the human mind. Moderation, humanity, decorum, order, and above all the grand efficacy of a good example, are the salutary ingredients prescribed to the warrior: the description of war itself being only the vehicle artfully contrived in order to convey down less perceptibly the dose of virtue, which men have

persuaded themselves to be more unpalatable than it really is, merely from the prevalence of custom and influences of prejudice. But my hope is, that I shall keep the reader's attention awake through the whole course of my history; and that the military youth of this kingdom may find the *useful* intermingled with the *amusing* ;

————— *Interea perpotet-amarum*
Abſynthi laticem, deceptaque non capiatur :
Sed tali potius tactu recreata valeſcat.

If, therefore, from the force of an example like that of Gustavus, I can display in new lights any fresh inducements (tending towards the promotion of virtue and religion) to that valuable part of the human species, the *brave* and *magnanimous*, I shall think my labours repaid to me with considerable interest: and with all the fervour which the mind of man is capable of expressing towards the Supreme Being, I sincerely pray, that my intentions may be answered in this important particular! On the king's piety I ground the whole of my undertaking: otherwise, *Totum hoc indictum volo.*

The two greatest heroes * in the course of the present history, were the most moral and religious persons in the two respective armies. And though it may be objected that many *wicked* and *fery men* have been *very brave*, (which point I no ways controvert) yet the

* Gustavus and Pappenheim.

former can never contemplate death seriously and composedly; and it may be doubted of the *latter*, whether they possess that *cool* bravery, which preserves itself the same without the help of the irascible or vain-glorious appetites to urge it on: for, if courage be prompted by passion in any degree, and not by principle, it must be hurried and agitated more or less, which is a misfortune: the fire will be fierce, but not clear; and the transport counterworks that presence of mind which performs such wonders in the moments of danger, and without which, bravery in war (with respect to superior commanders) is little more than animal ferocity. All the *great* and *magnificent* that is performed in the field, is effected by that intuitive glance of the judgment, which our neighbours denominate neither inelegantly nor improperly the *coup d'œil*, though that idea falls far beneath the Greek expression *Αγχινοια*; and I think it is plain to a demonstration, that the most tranquil and composed man stands always the best chance for snatching these critical and momentary opportunities. Nothing is so rapid as the flight of fortune; and if she is not seized by the wing, the very instant she passes by, the coy and capricious deity returns no more.

It grieves me likewise to say, that some military men vainly and heedlessly suppose, that a contempt of religion, and a virtuous life, argues a certain greatness and intrepidity of soul. Little, alas! in this respect do they know their own hearts, or those of their neighbours! For
 the

the presumption being, that a man of *service* is likewise a brave man, it is then manifest that this sort of conduct calls the owner's courage into question: for the coward, when danger is remote, is always most intrepid in his talk, most noisy, most insolent, and most prophane; nor is it an uncommon character to find the same man an hypocrite in valour, and an atheist in religion. Lord R. in the last age was an undeniable proof of this assertion, and daily observation confirms it oftener than one would wish to mention. The true hero has no recourse to such artifices.

There is another circumstance in the life of Gustavus which deserves the attention of men of *service*. It is natural to imagine that the king's high spirit and personal courage can scarcely be disputed, yet he thought it beneath *no* warrior to decline a *duel*, and make his applications to the court of honour. He denounced death against all decisions of quarrels sword in hand; and upon one occasion shewed great presence of mind and inflexibility towards a couple of officers whom he respected extremely*. These circumstances being premised, can any person be uneasy concerning a common challenge, when the great Gustavus despised the practice, and considered it more as matter of peevishness, and impotent passion, than any true mark of resolution and fortitude? Was not that prince jealous of the affairs of honour beyond all imagination? And if re-

* See this story in our account of the campaign 1628.
jecting

jecting a duel upon some occasions denoted cowardice, it is pretty certain that hardly any subsequent conduct could have restored that man to his master's favour; But to return from this digression.

It may seem to some men, that during the course of this work, I place the elector Palatin in too favourable a light: (not that I have omitted to spare him upon many occasions, and excuse him no where, but for contrary reasons that amount to greater probability;) but be that as it will, if in the course of my narration I appear to speak of this unfortunate person with more respect and greater compassion than the common historians are apt to do, I may assert truly and without vanity, it is because I know him better: nor can I allow a king to be branded with infamy, or hurried down the stream of history without notice, when he made such an *effort* in the cause of religion and liberty: (upon the *effects* of which effort the political laws of Europe have stood confirmed for more than a century) and from whose illustrious great-grandson, our present Sovereign *, I now enjoy the privilege of imparting my sentiments to the public with the spirit and impartiality of a protestant truly-born, and bred up in a free country.

Some people again may think that I have rather been too severe upon Charles I. and the ministers that served him: whereas, if they could but see how much I have expunged or

* This Preface was written in our late King's reign.

passed slightly by, they would readily accuse me of inclining to the compassionate side. To say truth, I love to disturb *no* man's *ashes*, especially *those* of a king: he had a *better* criterion to appeal to, than the censure or praises of a modern historian; and by *that* criterion I leave him to *stand* or *fall*. Upon this account I have related things simply, without descanting upon them: nor can I charge my memory with having played the rhetorician upon any fact, or indulged the least acrimony or petulance of style. Whereas, if I had reasoned only upon the several false steps (to say the least of them) then taken with respect to the continent, or explained at full the various circumstances relating thereto; I might have swelled that single article to half the size of the history before us. It may suffice to have cut a sample off by way of present to my readers, and to have kept the remainder of the piece in my own hands.

Enough however is set forth to convince the public, how little our historians know with regard to the affairs of the Palatinate; though in truth they were the secret springs that gave motion to all the politics of the latter part of James's reign, and the beginning of his son's.

It may appear also from the course of this work, that numberless important truths, facts, and anecdotes, may be collected from the archives of foreign courts, from the negotiations of ministers then concerned with England, and from the historians of various nations who write upon the memoirs of those very ministers, or had been allowed access to the respective *cancellarias*.

cellarias of their own country. A part of what lay within my power I embraced with thankfulness, and might have lived perhaps to have seen *more* done in this way, and *better* done likewise; but the person who undertook the task, and had made considerable extracts from papers in foreign courts (those of Rusdorf particularly) was cut off in the flower of his life*. The reader also may easily perceive, that every man is neither able to bear the expences of such an undertaking, or successful enough to procure the recommendations necessary.

Carte boasts of executing wonders in this respect: we have the rhodomontade, but not the performance. His design was to sacrifice Frederick and aggrandize the two English kings. He faggoted together just so much as made for his purpose, and left the rest in the state he had mangled it.

I have cautiously abstained from attempting to draw high-laboured characters, though perhaps no writer hath resisted greater temptations in that respect; since the very out-lines of Gustavus, Pappenheim, Walstein, or Oxenstiern carry with them their own magnificence and individuating originality. Besides, there was also another circumstance which withheld me. I had reasons to expect the character of Gustavus (and that single incident might have saved the reputation of my history) completely drawn by the first Hand in the kingdom; but

* Mr. George Grierson, who died at Manheim.



ill-health rendered it impossible to make good that generous and most friendly engagement. Of course I shall modestly decline to touch the Cestus which Entellus had thrown down to the public. Characters dawbed at random are only mere glare and false painting; they are the *copy* of a fantastic writer's thoughts, and *those* are but a *copy*. Nevertheless care has been taken to place the King's actions, *religious, moral, political* and *military*, in such ample and distinct lights in the *Index*, that the reader may be enabled with moderate judgment and little difficulty to combine a much better idea concerning him, than I can pretend to give. Every writer cannot do justice to the character of an Hero, who was so brave, so generous, and so modest.

—tenor idem animo; moresque modesti
FORTUNA CRESCENTE, manent.—

Therefore to proceed onwards in our Preface.

We flatter ourselves, that our *plans* of battles are more clear and exact than have hitherto appeared: The place not only of every column and regiment, but of each smaller group of forces being expressly denoted; the squares bearing always a proportion to the number of fighting men therein contained: and as no one can comprehend a battle (particularly those fought by Gustavus where the *foot* were intermingled amongst the *horse* upon a new principle) with-

out knowing precisely where the infantry and cavalry were placed, we have thought it proper (and the idea may not be unuseful in future plans) to distinguish a body of the *latter*

thus , and of the *former* thus . Nor

do we owe this idea to Maréchal de Saxe; since many of my friends remember to have seen this sort of *notation* in my drawings some years before the memoirs of that officer were made public.

As to the distances of places, and sums of money, we have calculated throughout the work by English measurement and computation; and have subjoined here and there an historical note, which contains some striking particulars relating to personages of more immediate importance; and this I was induced to do, partly to give the reader a clearer idea of the subject in question, and partly because some circumstances did not intermix well with the series of my narration, or happened to fall out before or after the period I have confined myself to. Some other notes are interspersed sparingly up and down, relating to laws and terms in *jus-publicism*: the change of property since the peace of Munster; or other matters not unworthy of observation. It is true, the death of Walstein did not happen till two years after the death of Gustavus: But as this personage was the second character in the drama, I thought myself obliged to step a moment out of my way in order to show more of him to the readers;

reader; and the rather, because the world had acknowledged itself to be quite unacquainted with so remarkable an event as his tragical exit, though it happened only about one hundred and thirty years ago *.

Nor may it turn to my disadvantage, that I have examined the ground-plots of the principal scenes of action (especially the three great battles of the Lech, Leipzig, and Lützen) with all possible attention and diligence. And though these assistances may be reckoned purely of a casual nature, yet thus much is certain, that no historian can describe a battle to his own satisfaction, except he has examined the ground-plot in person, or received his informations from people of veracity and skill.

Another circumstance has been fortunate; since few historians have had the advantages of a *chronological* diary whereby to regulate and adjust their narration; and yet except things follow one another in writing by the same order as they really took upon the stage of human life, it is impossible to behold them in their due proportions. But by the assistance of the journal

* These particular deficiencies in historical knowledge often happen, till time throws up some printed book or MSS. papers which treat expressly on the subject. Thus Carve's *Itinerary* lays open the death of Walstein; and Kevenhuller's *Annals* give a minute account of our own Prince Charles's journey to Spain, with the negotiation in respect to his marriage: A point wherein our historians have wanted some light. For Kevenhuller was at that time Imperial ambassador at Madrid, and the emperor and king of Spain went then hand in hand in political matters. Kevenhuller's *Annals* make 10 vols. in fol. two of which consist of portraits.

alluded to, it has been in my power to arrange every action in its right situation, which gives the whole a propriety of nature extremely beautiful, *Quodcunque rei proprium est, id pulchrum est*; a circumstance most historians may wish for earnestly, but without success. Nevertheless it becomes not me to boast much of an advantage which took its rise from mere accident, and from whence no reputation can redound to me, except that of being a laborious and diligent searcher. Yet thus much is certain, that amidst such a mass of combined incidents and events, as the present work evidently containeth, there will be nothing of that historical and chronological magic,

—*Quæ modo nos Thebis, modo ponit Athenis*;

By the help of such a *diary* to direct me, all things will succeed each other in their due periods, and at proper distances. What happened at one time will not be recounted as falling out at another: an embarrassment (in cases not so fortunately circumstanced as ours) which every historian who writes at a century's distance must *feel* much more than it is *his interest* to acknowledge: for he discovers in the cool revision of the closet that his incidents are more connected by proximity of page and paragraph than by the once-really existing order of nature: and of course, (at least to eyes of nicer discernment) where-ever the chronology of facts cannot be ascertained, there will always be some untoward awkwardness in the situations and connexions; something

—*Quod*

—*Quod nequeo monstrare, & sentio tantum.* .

If *truth* be the grand object of history, (which I think no man will care to deny, tho' in his choice of historians he may seem careless about the matter) then that writer is happiest who has the good fortune to be supplied with the *most* and *best* materials. A great Man whom I had the honour to be known to, used to say upon these occasions, "That *industry* to collect, "and *good-sense* to reject, made an historian—: "wit, elegance and fine writing (as it is called) "came in by the bye;" being *ornamental* (and highly so in certain cases) but not *essential*. From whence it seems to follow, that historical compositions, *when they are not supported by authorities*, may be compared to an human body that has neither muscles nor bones: The skin may be fair and the flesh well-coloured, but the misfortune is, that the poor *idol* can neither walk nor *stand*.

As this work is the result of carefully perusing near three hundred volumes, it can no ways be expected, that it agrees precisely in all circumstances with any single writer; yet (as it is hoped) more uniformly with the correct, than those that are less corrected. I have also had ~~abundance~~ of original memoirs as well as useful emendations *communicated* to me; and it is plain the intelligences conveyed to England at that period by lord Rea, Hepburn, Astley, and others, are more exact and scientific than the German historians can pretend to give;

for few or none of them were men of service, and knew little of the actions they attempt to describe. In a word, abundance of errors are to be rectified, if a man be commonly master of the subject he undertakes. For example, when the whole herd of historians assure us, that Gustavus Horn performed wonders at Lützen, we know by the *military table* published by us, that he then conducted an army in Alsatia, and had just concluded the siege of Benfelden. Galas is represented as uncommonly active in the above-named battle, when at the very time he had a separate command on or near the frontiers of Lusatia. He is numbered likewise among the slain, yet gained the battle of Nordlingen in 1634, and died not till two years before the peace of Munster. Pappenheim (for the sake of verifying an old woman's prophecy) is reported by many to have killed Gustavus hand to hand; whereas the king expired at eleven in the morning, and Pappenheim reached not the plains of Lützen till near four in the afternoon. It may suffice to repeat these few examples, relative to one single day's service, in order to shew, that if I depart from any man, it is for cogent and justifiable reasons; and yet in spite of all precaution, vigilance, and industry, some errors will for ever obtrude themselves upon us;

— *Quos aut incuria fudit,
Aut humana parum cavit natura.*

Upon the whole, if my work approacheth not to my own ideas, I am sensible it must arise from

P R E F A C E. xxiii

from wanting every day the kind assistance and sevifal of my two friends, Mascou and De Voltaire; the *one* would have opened the quarry for me, and the *other* would have taught me to have placed my materials like an architect. •

In a word, every day of the king's life, after he entered Germany, hath cost me more than a treble day in recording its performances: for Gustavus conquered the empire in thrice less time than I compos'd the history of his conquests. So difficult it is with a king of Sweden in the last age, or a king of Prussia in the present century, to make the pen keep pace with the sword.

P R E F A C E

T O T H I S

SECOND EDITION.

NHAVE at length bestowed upon the Life of Gustavus Adolphus all the re-touches it was in my power to give it, after it had lain by me five years; and I the rather examined it with some attention, because upon a cool revision of words, phrases, and military expressions, some part of the style did not satisfy my own judgment; and because likewise it was the opinion of my best friends, that the present work is the only thing I ever writ which deserves, in any degree, the consideration of the public.

Whoever takes the pains to peruse this history, will, I flatter myself, soon discover, that the author had many more materials at his command than could in all probability have been procured, if he had remained at home. For during the course of his travels assistances were

were given him by most foreigners who had turned their thoughts towards the same historical subject; access was allowed him to *public* papers; all *proper* books were put into his hands; and lastly, he had a Mascou and a Firman to recur to, whenever he found any thing that was perplexed, contradictory, or of dubious authority.

A *Life* of Gustavus Adolphus (supposing it to be written with common accuracy and fidelity) was certainly a *desideratum* in the learned world: and if somebody had not had courage to break the ice, too much time might have elapsed, and historical certainty would have diminished year by year. Besides, till something of this kind was done, there was a *chasm* in modern history: and what was more unfortunate, it was a chasm in one of the most *interesting, useful, and important* parts of it. The military and political actions of Gustavus laid the foundation for the *peace of Munster*; and a right understanding of that general pacification, and its final settlement, may be called the key that opens the door and leads us to the knowledge of the present relative situation of almost every nation in Europe. • •

As far as verbal criticism extends, I am conscious that in my first edition I admitted too many words of foreign growth, and others that were rather too elevated for plain prose: the use of which (to confess the truth) favoured a little of affectation. My friends likewise, to whose corrections I referred myself in this particular,

particular, amongst others, attended to *matter* rather than *words*; whereas in the present age, an author that aims at popularity should attend to the *perpetuo tenore fluere*, and leave the matter and authorities to, shift for themselves. However, I have taken care to draw my pen over all these exceptionable words and phrases.

The truth is, the first edition of this work was chiefly written in foreign countries: and my long and close acquaintance with books relating to the history of Gustavus, made many phrases and terms of war sound common to my ears, that may seem barbarous or affected to other men's ears. However, I thought it right in some respects to *keep the language of the Time*.— One may also venture to affirm, that if any man lives five or six continued years out of his native country, he will find himself at some loss to express his thoughts with grace and due ease even in his mother-tongue.—Nay, to give a more common and familiar instance, I dare appeal to our best authors now living, whether (if they were to discontinue writing for five or six years, even though they stayed at home and talked their native language every day) they would not feel a certain uncouthness and awkwardness when they took up the pen, and engaged in a new work; for *one* beauty at least (out of the *many* beauties that are to be found in a good writer) depends upon *constant practice*. A great poet says,

That those move easiest who have learn'd to dance;
and

and he might have continued to add with equal propriety, that those move easiest who never *discontinue* their dancing.

Upon the whole, I think it may safely be asserted, that the *verbal Critics* (in my first edition) carried me off here and there a *straggling soldier*, and now and then a *centry* from an *advanced post*, (which decides no great matter in war) yet they never had courage to attack *my lines*. It was my good fortune, or prudence, to keep the main body of my army (or, in other words, my matters of fact) safe, and entire. The late E of G. was pleased to declare himself of this opinion; especially when he found that I had made Chemnitius one of my principal guides: for his Lordship was apprehensive I might not have seen that valuable and authentic book, which is extremely scarce. I thought myself happy to have contented his Lordship, even in the lowest degree; for he understood the Swedish and German histories to the highest perfection.

It is also incumbent on me here to return my acknowledgments to her Royal Highness the *Princess Dowager of Wales*, who had the condescension to supply me with Cyprianus's Life of Duke Bernard of Saxon Weymar, which I had long sought for, but without success.

I have likewise many thanks to pay to that most excellent historian, the present earl of

Hardwick, who had the goodness to communicate to me, by the hands of my ingenious friend the late Reverend Dr. Birch, some of the most valuable materials in this history: namely, *all the extracts that relate to Roe's and Vane's negotiations.*

In the next place I shall only observe, that in this Edition I have suppressed the *Appendix*, but referred constantly to the *Authorities* in my *notes*: care being taken to name the title of every piece referred to; by which means, as well as by altering the size of my book, I have reduced the present work to near *one third* of its original price.

Appendixes in the *first edition* of a work are the author's justifications; and in that sense, and at that time, may be considered as indispensably necessary; but after they have been published in one edition, it appears to me sufficient (at least according to my own private judgment) to refer those few readers who are *very* curious to the above-named first edition. For these reasons, (having made an extract of what was thought necessary) I have omitted printing a curious MS. that I concluded to have been lost at sea, when the first impression of this work was made public;—but which afterwards came safe to my hands. It is entitled, REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO. — QUAM REX INVICTISSIMUS GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS ET MAGNUS REGNO

xxx P R E F A C E.

REGNO POPULISQUE SUIS STATIONE
HAC MORTALI FUNCTUS EXHIBEN-
DAM VOLUIT. This MS. which is most
beautifully written, contains sixty pages in 4^{to}:
and is deposited by me in the library of the
church of Windsor, where those that are curi-
ous may have recourse to it.

Lastly, in order to render this *Octavo Edition*
more uniform, I have added a New Head of
Gustavus in octavo, from a painting of Van-
dykè; and have caused the plans of the Bat-
tles to be engraven *in the same size*. With re-
gard to Maps, I refer my readers to *Homan's*
map of Gustavus's Campaigns, and The Seat
of Action in the Thirty Years War, inasmuch
as it was taken from actual surveys, and is far
superior to any thing I can pretend to in the
chorographical way.

A LIST of the BOOKS made use of in composing the LIFE of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

- Adelzreiteri* Annales Bavarici, fol. Lips. 1710.
 Ambassadeur de *Wiquefort*, 4to. 2 tom. 1681.
Angeli Histoire de la Ville de Magdeburg, 12mo. 1714.
Arlanibai Arma Suecica, 4to. 1631.
Arndii Vita Walthenii, 8vo. Rostochi. 1668. [This is a
 translation from Gualdo.]
Arcana Dominationis Hispanicæ, 12mo. sine anno.
Azioni Egregie da Generali e da Soldati Italiani dall' anno
 1600, sino al 1700. 4to. in Venet. 1742.
Barre; Allgemeine Geschichte von Deutschland, 4to. 7 tom.
 1752.
Bayle's Discourse of Gustavus Adolphus.
Bernard; Histoire de Louis XIII. fol. à Par. 1646.
Bertii Comment. Rerum Germanarum, 4to. Amst. 1632.
Blanc (Le) Histoire de Baviere, 12mo. 4 tom. à Par. 1680.
Bougéant; Histoire des Guerres & Negotiations qui précédé-
 rent le Traité de Westphalie, 6 tom. 12mo. & 3 in 4to.
Brachelii Historia nostr. Temp. 8vo. 6 tom. Col. Agrip. 1672.
Braunius de Tormentis Coriaceis G. Adolphi, 4to.
*Brief but Authentic Relation of the Siege of Magdeburg, in High
 Dutch*, 4to. 1633.
Burgi Mars Sueco-Germ. 12mo. Leod. 1633.
Caraffæ Comment. de Germania Sacra Restaurata, 12mo.
 Col. 1639
Carlton (Sir Dudley's) Letters, 4to. London.
Carve (Thom. Tripperariensis) Itinerarium, 12mo. 2 tom.
 Mogunt. 1639, 1641.
Character of Gustavus Adolphus, 4to. Lond. 1633.
Chemnitii Bellum Sueco-German. 2 tom. fol. 1 Alt Stetin.
 1648. 2 Stock. 1653.
Christii Spicilegium, 8vo. 2 tom. 1724.
Consideratio Causarum Belli Bohemici, 4to. in Libertate,
 1647.
Corps Diplomatique par *Dumont*. fol. 12 tom. 1725.
 — Histoire des Traitez de Paix, & autres Negotiations du
 XV^e Siècle qui peut servir d'Introduction au Corps Di-
 plomat. fol. 2 tom. 1725.
Cypriani Vita Bernardi Ducis Vinarensis, fol.

- Dankaertz*; *Historical but authentic Relation of the thirty years Wars, in Low Dutch.* With abundance of portraits, sieges, battles, plans, &c. by Mat. Merian, 3 vol. fol.
- Diet of Leipzig, 4to. Lond. 1633.
- Discours de l'Etat, & la Couronne de la Suede, 8vo. 1636.
- Discours sur les Moyens qui tiennent les Espagnols pour parvenir à la Monarchie de l'Europe & que l'on peut faire pour les empêcher, circa annum 1631.* MS. penes Autorem.
- Ephemeris Exposit. in Bohemiam, 4to. cum fig. Monach. 1621.
- Epitome Rerum Germanicarum, 12mo. Lipsiæ, 1750. [By Pappus, a canon of Constance.]
- Eremitæ* Epistolæ & Iter Germanicum, 4to. 1637.
- Folard.*
- Fowler* (secretary) his History of the Troubles of Sucthland and Poland, fol. Lond. 1656.
- Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato* Historia, 4to. In Venet. 1643.
- Historia della Vita d'Alberto Walstein. Lione, 1643; 4to.
- Vita di Mazarini, 4to.
- Genealogy of Gustavus Adolphus, MS. Sion College Library.
- Gaudenio* (Paganino) Singolarità delle Guerre di Germania, 4to. 1640.
- Helvici Historia*, fol. Francof. 1666.
- Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4to. Lips. 1703.
- Historia Persecutionis Boemicæ, 12mo. sine loco et anno.
- History of the Diet of Leipzig, 4to. Lond. 1632.
- Histoire Generale des Guerres & de Mouvements dans le Monde depuis l'an 1610, à l'an 1637, 8vo. 3 tom.
- Histoire de Pologne & Lithuanie, 12mo. 1698.
- Politique du Siecle, 4to. à Londr. 1757.
- Hübner*; Sa Geographie, Basle, 8vo. 6 tom.
- Ses Genealogies in German. fol. 2 tom. 1727.
- Imhoff*; Notitia Principum, &c. fol. Tubing. 1699.
- Invasions of Germany, with Portraits, 12mo. Lond. 1638.
- Kevenhuller's* Annales Ferdinandei. In German. 10 vol. fol. with fine cuts. Leipf. 1726.
- Kobierziski* Historia Vladislai, 4to. Dantz. 1655.
- Labreur*; (Jean de) Histoire du Maréchal Guebriant, fol. à Par. 1684.
- Lanspergii* Gustavi Magni Bellum German. 12mo 1650.
- Laurea Austriaca per N. Bellum. fol. Francof. 1638.
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- Letter to the German Church in Lond. 8vo. 1634.
- Lettre du Comte de Tilli à un sien ami, 1631.

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- Loccenii* Historia Suecana, 4to. Lips. 1676.
- Londorpii* Acta Publica, fol. 19 tom. Franc. 1668, 1721.
- Lotichius* de Rebus Germanicis ab anno 1617, ad annum 1648, 2 tom. fol. cum fig. 1646, 1650.
- Ludolfi* Schau Bühne der Welt, 4 vols. fol. Francf. 1699, 1701, 1713, & 1718. cum fig.
- Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg, 12mo.
- of the Dukes of Hamilton by Burnet, fol.
- of a Cavalier, 8vo. Printed at Leeds, in Yorkshire, about the year 1740.
- Memoires d'Electrice Palatine Louise Juliane, par Fr. Spanheim, 4to. à Leyde, 1645.
- De *Sirat*, 12mo. 2 tom.
- du *Maurier*, 12mo.
- du Maréchal le duc de *Grammont*, 2 tom. 12mo. 1717.
- Hist. & Polit. d' *Amelot la Houffaye*, 12mo. 2 tom. Amst. 1722.
- De *Beauveu*, 12mo. Col. [à la Haye] 1687.
- Memoriale al Duca di Savoya nel 1636, MS. penes Autorem.
- Menke* de dubio *Gustavi Adolphi* Mortis Genere, 8vo.
- Merian* (Mat.) Theatrum Europæ, with fine Portraits, Maps, and Plans. In German, fol.
- Mercure François*, 21 tom. 8vo. à Par. 1619, &c.
- *Suisse*, par François *Spanheim*, 8vo. 1634. fine loco.
- Monro's* Two Expeditions into Germany. Lond. fol. 1637.
- Monumenta *Paderbornensia*, fol.
- Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne, 12mo. à Col. 1664.
- Nani* Historia della Republica Veneta, 4to. Part 2. 1663, 1679.
- New Star of the North, 4to. Lond. 1633.
- Piasceii* Chronica Gestorum in Europa Singularium, Cracov. fol. 1646.
- Pietro Pomo*; Guerre di Germania; dell' Invasioni del Re di Suecia, 4to. in Ven. 1640.
- De *Præ* Histoire de *Gustave Adolphe*, 12mo. à Par. 1695.
- Proceedings in *Bavaria*, 4to. Lond. 1633.
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- Introduction du Mêm. e.
- Dissertat. sur les Alliances entre la France, & la Suede, 8vo. 1709.
- Recueil des Traitez & Confederation & d' Alliances entre la France, & Princes & Etats étrangers de l' an 1621, à l' an 1672, 12mo. fine loco.
- VOL. I. b Relation

- Relation de la Bataille de Leipzig à Halberst. 1631.
 Reveries du Marechal de Saxe, 4to.
 Riccio de Bellis German. 4to. in Venet. 1648.
 Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustrissimi, 4to. in Roma
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 Santa Cruz de Marzenado; Reflexions Militaires & Polit.
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 Sarrasin, Conspiration de Walfstein, 12mo. 1635.
 Schannat, Histoire Abregée de la Maison Palatine, 8vo. Francf.
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 Schefferi Memorabilia Suecicæ Gentis, 12mo. Amst. 1671.
 Serres (de) Inventaire Generale de l' Histoire de la France,
 fol. à Par. 1640.
 Siri; Memoire Recondite dall' anno 1601 fino all' anno
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 — Mercurio, ovvero Istoria de correnti Tempi, 4to.
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 Soldat Suedois par François Spanheim, 8vo. 1633, sine loco
 — Part II. [This is written by the Sieur de Grenaille]
 Spanish Relation of the Battle of Leipzig. Lisbon, 1633.
 Stella Nova. Uranop. 1610.
 Status Regiminis Ferdinandi, Part II. [A sort of Court-
 Calendar] 12mo. Viennæ, 1637.
 Swedish Discipline, 4to. 1632.
 Swedish Intelligencer, 4to. Lond. 1631, &c. 1638. Many
 parts, but not divided into vols.
 Suecicæ Respublica, 12mo. 1631.
 Supplement to *Foresti*. Italian.
 Terzeri Chronicon in Vitam Gustavi Adolphi, ad annum
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 Vita R. P. Josephi Capuchini, fol. MS. penes Autorum.
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 Wallin de Gladio Gustavi Adolphi. Lips. 1749.

A N
E S S A Y
O N T H E
M I L I T A R Y S T A T E o f E U R O P E,
I N T H E
F o r m e r P a r t o f t h e S e v e n t e e n t h C E N T U R Y.

C O N T A I N I N G

The M A N N E R S a n d C U S T O M S o f t h e A G E ; a n d
r e l a t i n g p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e H i s t o r y o f t h e
L i f e o f G U S T A V U S A D O L P H U S.

TH E state of war and customs of life were so different in the century I am treating of from what they are at present, that it appears necessary for me to give the reader some previous intelligences before I conduct him into an immense and perplexed labyrinth of history; great part of the scene whereof lies in a country which knows England much better than England is acquainted with Germany.

Some slight Essay of this kind may not be improper, inasmuch as I am describing a war

and negotiations as thoroughly interesting as any that are to be found either in ancient or modern history : And yet the more considerable portion thereof took its rise from an imperceptible, and, as some thought, a very contemptible beginning ; from an obscure potentate in the North ; a prince unheard of, or unnoticed in the European system ; *a king of snow*, as the language then ran at the court of Vienna, *whose dissolution was pronounced unavoidable long before the expiration of the summer-beats* *.

Yet this seemingly unexisting monarch, at the head of thirteen thousand virtuous and well-disciplined men, created and modelled to the very form they afterwards appeared in, ventured not only to cross the ocean, but to invade an immense hostile country, and oppose himself to a vast quantity of the best troops then in the world ; a set of warriors whom an habit of twelve years uninterrupted victory had rendered fierce and terrible ; sharpened by hardships, long-practised in all the arts of military discipline, and rendered cruel and insolent by accustomed exactions, depopulations, and military executions ; conducted by a general whose fires the frost of age could not extinguish, though grown grey in experience and the arts of stratagem ; one who in a word had shaded his aged temples with the laurels of thirty-six remarkable victories, and who had in his army a set of illustrious commanders, whose very names infused respect and caution even into Gustavus himself. Yet prudence, patience, order, mo-

* He landed in the month of June.

deration, humanity, benignity, morality, and religion (all supported by the clearest courage that can be imagined) soon penetrated and overturned this mighty mass of men and things: And though the emperor at first could have marched against Gustavus four or five considerable armies, for he and the Catholic Leaguers had then no less than *nine*, including the troops before Mantua; (not to mention more than one hundred garrisons placed in various cities and fortresses): Yet our monarch, in the space of twenty-nine months, possessed all that immense tract, which extends from the borders of Hungary and Silesia to the banks of the Rhyne, and from the lake of Constance to the Baltic ocean.

The *discipline* between the respective contending forces was widely different: For the Imperialists had been corrupted by long prosperity. In a word, making the single-exception of courage, *they* were just the reverse of the Swedes. One uniform undisturbed succession of conquests had rendered them audacious, avaricious, and cruel; and, (which was still worse) just before Gustavus's arrival, no inconsiderable part of the veteran infantry had been disbanded for reasons of state, and that was a loss which future industry could never possibly recover. Those who remained, affected terror in their looks, and cruelty in their actions; and though they had seen and performed great things, yet were obliged to submit to younger and less experienced men, merely because they were more moral, more virtuous, and better disciplined: For the camp of Gustavus was a school of or-

der, decency, and religion. The little sort of a court that was kept in it, knew nothing of servility, flattery, intrigues, or low meanness. The king lived well with all his soldiers, and knew them all. No cavalier came into his service, but he demanded of his officers a full and exact account of their opinions concerning him, and did the same again and again after they had tried him.

When he invaded Germany, he had his eyes fixed on all the soldiers in Europe who were then retired from service, and amongst others writ to the Baron de Sirot with his own hand. He was temperate in food, and rather abstemious than otherwise in respect to wine, often declaring, with a smile on his countenance, *That he came not to conquer the Germans by hard drinking.*

Luxury was a stranger in his camp, and so was *gaming*. The nobility and the rich made no expences but for the honour of the service, and the younger officers in point of dress never went beyond neatness and propriety. The common men had a full confidence either of overcoming the enemy by dint of valour and discipline in the field of battle, or wearying them out and reducing their numbers by virtue of judicious incampments and marches, and by being able to support themselves with greater moderation and frugality; for they could continue three months in those very quarters where the Imperialists could but barely subsist themselves one third part of the time. Their hardness of constitution was such, that they could extend the duration of a campaign almost

in the former part of the Seventeenth Century. 5

equal to that of the year, being alike patient of summer-heat and winter-cold. Their camp was their home, their inn, their farm, their city, and their country. In the course of the thirty years war, numbers came to bear arms, who had been born and educated in the field, and had seen no other profession than that of the sword and musquet. One would think an army no very excellent school either for learning to read, or apprehending one's duty to God: Yet Gustavus, and the Swedish generals after his decease, had a particular attention to these points: Public schools were opened every day with the same regularity and quiet as in a country town; and the moment the forces began to intrench themselves, the children went to a safe and peaceable quarter, marked out for their school. One day, contrary to the expectation of the general, who allotted them their ground, a cannon-ball happened to pierce thro' the school, and killed two or three young people at a single stroke; but the rest, far from quitting their places, neither changed colour nor dropped a pen or a book from their hands *. Thus they became habitually intrepid from the cradle, and had an education far superior to that of the Lacedemonian youth.

In the *exercice of the field*, neither serjeants nor corporals could be more vigilant or less sparing of their labour than Gustavus. One thing is remarkable, he was strict to his officers

* *Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne*, p. 176. 12^o. à Cologne, 1664.

and mild to the private men. It was a principle with him, that even a common soldier should rarely if ever receive corporal punishment; fully persuaded that such a disgrace cast a damp afterwards upon his vivacity, and agreed not well with the notions which an high spirit ought to entertain of honour. It was his idea, that a man of bravery would sooner forgive a sentence of death, inflicted upon him by a court-martial, than pass by the scandal of corporal chastisement. His general rule therefore was to degrade or banish.

In *field-reviews* or *private exercises* he chose always as much as possible to be present. There was scarce a private man of uncommon resolution in his whole army (which consisted of combined troops from various nations) whom he could not call readily by his name. The attention of his eye was so exact, (though his eye-sight was none of the best) that in a general muster of a regiment he hardly passed by a single individual without notice: and, if the meanest of the performers happened to be deficient in their exercises, he would dismount from his horse various times successively, and without peevishness or upbraiding, set them right in their business.

These *troops* were never apt to desert, the world being an immense wilderness unknown to them; and besides they could gain a subsistence in no profession but that of arms. The horse-boys of the cavalry (who were usually some years in their apprenticeship, and served in an inferior manner during the time of action) were generally chosen to replace their masters:

• • thus

in the former Part of the Seventeenth Century. 7

thus every man rose by degrees, and perfected himself by subordination and long experience. Hence it happened that the loss of the commanding officers in some sharp engagements rarely discomposed a Swedish regiment (a thing frequent enough in other armies) for half the corps was just as capable to take the command as those who had given them laws. There were but two means of advancement, *seniority* (which was sometimes superseded) and merit: Birth, quality, and court friends availed nothing; so that the world can hardly expect to see such another army but very seldom: an army formed by a monarch equally brave, moral, and religious, and nursed by him for twenty years with all the care that a parent educates a single child. The same plan was observed more or less by his generals till the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia; and this body of troops from the year 1612 to 1648 had hardly ever tasted a single month's repose. The regulations, order, and discipline of Julius Cæsar can bear no comparison with the correct emendations, harmonious adjustment, and religious decency of Gustavus.

Every regiment had *two chaplains*, who received then forty pounds a year apiece in our present money. They were governed by a consistory of their own order; and, being men judiciously chosen, were respected by the principal commanders and beloved by the soldiery; yet their authority was such, that they discountenanced and suppressed all profane swearing and drunkenness; nor was the camp filled with
vagrants,

vagrants, thieves, and prostitutes, as usually happened in the Imperial service.

Thus by a habit of discipline, morality, and piety, adjoining thereto a constant experience in matters of war, the Swedish army (at least in Gustavus's days) was rendered next to invincible, and became the most respectable body of troops then in Europe: for not long before Gustavus's death the Swedes possessed near three hundred strong towns and fortresses in the empire; and it was possible to dine in one of them and sleep in another, from the middle of Silesia to the western banks of the Rhyne, and from the lake of Constance to the Baltic ocean.

It no-where appears that the troops of Gustavus *wanted pay*, though that prince was extremely moderate and merciful in the affair of contributions; infomuch that the *Conquered* (if we set aside their prejudices to the Romish religion) usually preferred the Swedish government to their own hereditary constitution. Yet the astonishing point still remains: how, for example, and by what methods, Gustavus maintained and raised his numerous armies? Nor is it in my power to explain fully (and not superficially) from whence this monarch derived his resources; for most readers may conjecture what the riches of Sweden might be under his administration; nor can they be ignorant that the king had been engaged in an uninterrupted *invasive war* from the seventeenth year of his age to his dying moments; so that his ways and means of acquiring money will be ever inexplicable to posterity more or less; as will be likewise his œconomy and punctuality

in the former Part of the Seventeenth Century. 9
ality of payments: and so much the more as it
nowhere appears that his soldiers once mutinied
for want of pay.

It may be objected, that in the course of the
war he received great supplies from neighbour-
ing princes, and others who lay farther off;
but though this may be said, it is not so capable
of being demonstrated; the amount of their
subscriptions, being to a certain degree deter-
minable without much difficulty. Neverthe-
less, supposing that to be as it will, what shall
we say of his conduct the very Christmas after
he invaded Germany, having then received (so
far as we know) only sixty thousand pounds
from England; whilst France consented to
allow him a stipend of seventy-five thousand
three hundred pounds; but as De Charnacé had
retarded the signature of articles at least a year,
it was agreed by parole of honour (which whe-
ther verified, or otherwise, we cannot assert)
to throw in twenty thousand pounds by way
of supplement*.—Yet at the very time in
question, he had (besides a considerable marine,
in which were five thousand enrolled and regular
sailors) an excellent army in Germany only, con-
sisting of thirty-four thousand four hundred in-
fantry, and eleven thousand eight hundred
horse, with commissions to levy ten thousand
six hundred fresh men †.

In addition to the *œconomy* of supporting an
army it may be remarked further, that his ma-
jesty was also an exact and punctual observer
both of public and private devotions; and

* *Chemnitii Bellum Sueco-Germ.* Fol. p. 96. *Swedish In-
telligencer*, Part I. 4^o. p. 79.

† *Arma Suecica*, 72—3—4. 4^o. 1631.

ordered

ordered a set of military prayers to be drawn up and used constantly at the head of each regiment every day. I have seen about two and twenty of them, and many amongst them are of no inconsiderable length.

His *rules of discipline* were admirable both in a moral and military sense: they are a perfect code or system. He composed this work as early as in the twenty-eighth year of his age, when he made his expedition against Riga. These regulations he enlarged and rendered more complete when he invaded Germany, and added to them occasionally, according as the insolence and irregularity of his soldiers rendered fresh provisions necessary; as particularly happened when he took New Brandenburg by storm; for he then inserted twenty fresh articles relative to that tumultuous affair.

In the *perfective* parts of war Gustavus made a greater progress than any general before or since his time. The world had never seen a fine field-disposition till the day the battle of Leipzig was fought. His idea was, that every army should be considered like a fortified town; supplied in such manner with assistances and reinforcements as to be enabled to act offensively or defensively: that there should be supports behind supports, and passages of communication and relief, to be fed regularly with as much exactness as the circulation of the blood is distributed through the canals of the human body; his grand object being, that, though particular divisions might be thrown into disorder, yet that no confusion should prove *universal*. It was he who had the first notion of cloathing men well, and keeping them

in the former Part of the Seventeenth Century. 11

them clean and warm ; whereas Tilly's doctrine was, *A ragged soldier and a bright musquet*, following a false maxim of the ancients, *Horridum militem esse decet*. In military architecture and the duties of an engineer he exceeded all his contemporaries, and despised the Low-Country method of drawing up great incoherent bodies of troops in-square masses, commonly called *Tertias* ; forasmuch as originally they made up a third of the main body or center. He reduced the huge regiments, which consisted formerly of two or three thousand men, to twelve hundred, and afterwards to one thousand and eight, in order to distribute more officers among the soldiery, and multiply the posts of preferment for brave men. He allotted also four surgeons to every regiment ; but there is reason to think that the Imperialists had none ; since Tilly himself, after the battle of Leipzig, was obliged to have his wounds dressed by the town-surgeon of Halle*.

In the *creative* or *inventive* branches of war, we must attribute to Gustavus the discovery of the *brigade* or *column*, the doctrine of firing in *platoons*, and the use of *leathern portable artillery* ; (since discontinued, for reasons to us unknown.) To him we owe likewise a new *partizan* (long lost in oblivion, but thought by many to be more useful and less cumbersome than the bayonet) the *sea-bcom*, the institution of *dragoons*, and the use of *pouches* in the place of *bandileers*. The infinite variety of *evolutions* took its rise from him ; and to him we owe

* I have been informed the Austrians had no regular surgeons in their regiments till about the year 1718.

the demonstration that a *short cannon* will give the ball a larger range. It was he that first divided his men into little distinct *pelotons*, (now called *plottons*) and gave them officers accordingly. He considered space as the parent of order, and always allowed sufficient ground-plot for rectifying confusions. He was the first who *intermingled* infantry in the intervals betwixt the horse, which broke the formidable impression of the ponderous Austrian cuirassiers, a set of men then deemed irresistible: and, as brave regiments were often cut to pieces almost to a man, (and as *chosen* men were thought necessary for carrying on more particular designs) he devised the expedient of draughting soldiers from separate corps (who were then called *commanded men*) which first gave rise to the formation of brigades and battalions. It was his original idea probably, that a body of infantry could resist an equal number of cavalry upon most emergencies: and it was he first thinned the immoderate depth of ranks, and consequently brought more hands to engage in the hour of battle:—Yet one thing is very extraordinary: though each of his generals was properly speaking a favourite pupil, educated by him; and though his enemies were constant eye-witnesses to every branch of his military conduct; yet the art of war *declined* from his death, till the time that Montecuculi and Turenne revived it *in part*, conformably to the principles of the great inventor.—Nor must we neglect the extraordinary advantages he extracted from *winter-campaigns*; which may be considered partly as a new military practice:

• • and

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and it was from the same principle, that he gave little or no countenance to councils of war; for it was his reserved private ambition that every operation should pass upon the soldiery for his own invention.

Amidst the *perfective* branches of his warlike profession, may be mentioned his excellent methods of cloathing and subsisting armies, and the punctuality of his payments; his exact discipline, sobriety, industry, and perpetual reviewing his troops; the great improvement of his marine forces, and the manufacture of arms which he erected in Sweden; to which may be added, his new and uncommon skill in all sorts of military architecture, as likewise in constructing bridges, erecting batteries, and in all the arts of entrenchments, sieges, mining, incampments, debarkations, and battles. It was he that first improved the field-service of the horse, and transported infantry behind the cavalry. It was he that first reduced war to a system of tactics and religion; and, lastly, it was he that regulated the fire of the cavalry, and shortened their musquets into carabines. It was he that changed the incumbrance of armour into head and breast-pieces, reformed the matchlock, and abolished the long pike and pike rests.

And, if I may digress a moment, it may suffice to observe, that, as to the king's peculiar notions and practices in politics, his great abilities in treaties, manifestos, speeches, and letters, his personal bravery, presence of mind and firmness, his just spirit of resentment and sense of honour, his generosity and bounty,
polite-

politeness and courtesy, his humanity, moderation, compassion, and above all his religion and piety; if (I say) we were to give the reader a true delineation of him, in all these illustrious particulars, we could do little less than transcribe the numberless passages which he will peruse more at large in every part of the ensuing work: yet one thing is incontestable, and must never be forgotten; there is a certain *extemporaneous spirit and pointedness* in his speeches and replies, which always carries its own authenticity therewith, and can never belong to another man. Wit he had none, or affected to neglect it; nevertheless he had all the liveliness of a refined and forcible imagination, attempered with justness and solidity.

The *state of war* in those days differed in many respects from what it is at present. Most conflicts of consequence were decided by the sword, an implement in the present age almost intirely useless. The science of fortification was then in its infancy. Towns were besieged and defended with fewer cannons than are made use of now; being in general protected only from the insults of plunderers. The art of a campaign therefore consisted in giving decisive battles and possessing the *passes and navigable rivers*; by which means the fortified towns submitted of course; nevertheless all parties confided much in their artillery. Tilly and Gustavus battered some places with incredible fury, and made use of pieces of a very considerable size. The former erected many large batteries at the battle of Leipzig, and Walstein was not ill provided at that of Lützen.

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The generals *marched* their troops with greater spirit and expedition than hath been customary since. The common march of the infantry was sixteen and eighteen miles a day. In a journal of each day's marching, which a Scottish regiment made for six years successively, I find *that* quantity to establish the medium; and, to calculate more favourably, allow the German mile to be only four English miles and an half. In cases of emergency and importance, it was usual to stretch the journey to twenty-two miles: thus by the above-mentioned diary one corps of troops (which rested three months after Gustavus's death) marched in four years three thousand five hundred and fifteen miles; and by the way it must be observed, that the fire-arms at that time were much heavier than they are at present. Amongst some particulars in the age we are speaking of, it may here be noted, that the loss of the colours* in a respective regiment or company, absolved the military oath to the last master. Generals sent romantic challenges for themselves and armies by a trumpeter, with invitation to meet each other on equal ground; and war was denounced by an herald, conformably to the ancient laws of chivalry. Ecclesiastics cloathed themselves in steel without ceremony; excommunicated by the Pope when against him, and laden with benedictions when they served on his side. No Européan general from the time Charles V. besieged Metz till Wallstein lay incamped near Nuremberg, had seen himself at the head of fifty thousand fighting men. Armies were then of a more manageable size, and subdivided

into separate ones, which of course gave rise to a plentiful harvest of generals, and afforded men, from the highest to the lowest, an opportunity of seeing as much service in one campaign, as they now behold in all their lives. For the operations in these little transactions are more in detail, yet comprehended at the same time with greater facility.

It was a saying of Gustavus, that he never desired to place himself at the head of more than *forty thousand men*: [paying no regard to a military maxim equally profane and foolish, namely, *that the supreme Being always favours the greater squadrons**;] that a larger number of troops was only matter of parade and incumbrance, inasmuch as no general could compel him, in the aforementioned circumstances, to accept a battle except he chose it, whilst in the interim he could dispose of superfluous forces to better advantage elsewhere. Concurrently with what is here asserted, it was the opinion both of duke d'Alva and Turenne, that no army ought to consist of more than fifty thousand men; and the former used always to say, that veteran troops were the bones and muscles of the military body, and that new-raised recruits only filled up the interstices with shape and plumpness.

Whereas on the contrary it was the custom, in the last war which England was engaged in, and we may thank our neighbours the French for prescribing the fashion (who know their men to be less robust than ours, and perceive likewise, other circumstances being supposed

* A constant saying of Waistein's.

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equal, that the superior weight and pressure of troops will decide the day by squeezing the ranks into disorder) to bring two immense armies into the field, who gaze at each other for a whole summer; of which the event is, if each general be endued with parts, that it is next to impossible to bring on a decisive engagement, without incurring extreme hazard; and, what is still more, matters will be brought to a conclusion, not by the men, but by the bare machinery of the artillery. Thus only one general is formed in a country, and if he dies the loss is irreparable.

It may be objected, that if our opponents have an inclination to act this part, the party assailed must then be obliged to face them with an equal body of troops; but this, with submission, is a mistake of the state of the question. Great commanders are tied up to *no such* rules, and his Prussian majesty, not dissatisfied to imitate Gustavus in most things, has subdivided his armies in the same manner as *that* prince would do were he now living. If one general portions out his troops with proper precaution, the other will be compelled to follow the example. Wallstein, who first invented this method of waging war, played the artifice upon Gustavus; for he wanted, like our dextrous neighbours, to protract the time, and plunge his enemies into enormous expences, which is true policy with respect to opposing any army that carries on a war out of its own country; but Gustavus despised the futility of this stratagem, and though he had only eighteen thousand men, wherewith to confront above fifty

thousand, yet he allowed three separate bodies of his own troops to range freely throughout the empire, and intrenched himself under the beard of the Imperial general, who in the event was obliged to decamp, and take such cards as the Swedish monarch was pleased to deal him.

Nevertheless, such readers as examine the history of Gustavus with attention and correct observation, will soon perceive, that whenever any overgrown and enormous potentate on the continent aims at nothing less than absolute dominion over the whole European system, that it then becomes indispensably necessary, even for remote princes, separated from the affair in question by the intervention of the ocean, to support the balance of power in the greater world: for the evils and incroachments of universal monarchy resemble the undulations caused by a large stone thrown into a cistern of water, whose surface is of a certain diameter,—they will touch the extreme rim at last. And, had Gustavus allowed the Imperialists to make themselves masters of Pomerania, Mechlenberg, and such sides of the Baltic as lie opposite to Sweden, it is certain that Walstein would soon have rendered himself supreme arbiter of the northern ocean: so that if Sweden had not acted the *offensive* part in 1630, she might have felt a raging war kindled in her own vitals long before the year 1640.

For these reasons we are at a loss which to admire most, the bravery or the prudence of Gustavus in forcing the war to rekindle itself upon

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 the continent with a fresh degree of fury. His
 senators, almost to a man, approved after some
 little reflection this glorious effort, and the
 common people embarked in the expedition with
 as much zeal and promptness as if it had been
 another crusade. But, as this subject may ap-
 pear to many as a sort of disquisition *ad invidiam*,
 it may suffice for me to have transiently
 touched upon it (inasmuch as it gives a high finish-
 ing to the king's character) and leave the rest to
 work its way on the reader's better judgment.

Yet one thing shall not be passed by over un-
 noticed: nor had the knowlege thereof been
 unuseful to our *jus-publicists*, when the French
 exclaimed so outrageously against our com-
 mencing hostilities in Europe without some de-
 claration of war in form. Gustavus, in a case
 parallel, after long and sedate reflection, de-
 termined to enter Germany without sending
 any denunciation of war to the court of Vienna*:
 for he considered the Imperial actions as a very
 forcible sort of language; nor hath posterity
 ever decried the propriety or justice of his ma-
 jesty's conduct.

But I am obliged to a clear-sighted and ex-
 cellent author † for some other reasons (not
 taken notice of by historians) which induced
 Gustavus to enter Germany. “It must be re-
 “membered,” saith he, “that as the English
 “and Venetians in ancient times laid claims
 “immemorial to certain portions of ocean, so
 “likewise the Swedish nation formed uncon-

* *Laccenii Hist. Suec.* 4to. 567. Lipsiæ 1676.

† *Paganino Guadentio Singolarità delle Guerre di Germ.*
 4to. 1640, p. 174.

“troverted pretensions to a large part of the
 “Baltic sea:” and when the irresistible pro-
 gress of the Imperial forces (supported at all
 times by a Spanish navy more considerable in
 those days than ours) had possessed the whole
 tract of shore from Dantzic to Lubec; when
 mariners were inrolled, ships built, and Wal-
 stein himself had requested to be declared high
 admiral of the north:—surely it was due time
 and season for a spirited and magnanimous
 prince like Gustavus (removing for the present
 all other separate considerations and induce-
 ments) to restrain the audacious incroachments
 of the house of Austria, and vindicate the then-
 expiring rights and commerce of his faithful
 subjects.

But to return from a slight digression not
 unpardonable in an Englishman. The reader
 will be surpris'd when I tell him that the *pay*
 of those days was more considerable than one
 may be apt to imagine. Nor must we dissem-
 ble that here and there the commanders on the
 Swedish side (to the great regret of their royal
 master) contrived to levy some separate con-
 tributions for their own uses, and now and then
 filter'd away a little from what had been col-
 lected by them under the sanction of public au-
 thority. But these examples were rare, and
 resent'd with severity whenever discovered.

Whilst the king's officers lived decently and
 comfortably, the Imperial commanders led
 lives of magnificence. Those of prime dis-
 tinction (especially before Gustavus arriv'd)
 affected the expence and grandeur of princes,
 and had very often a company of cuirassiers, or
 infantry.

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infantry, by way of guards, of which some supplied the place of aids de camp: many colonels kept their coaches in the camp, eat on plate, had an ambition to possess abundance of servants and horses, and commonly maintained a secretary, partly for *state* and partly for *use*. And as to contributions, they raised them unmercifully and immeasurably.

In the *Swedish* camp it is true matters were conducted with greater frugality; yet I have seen an account of a funeral procession, performed for a Bohemian colonel in that service, which was expensive and pompous enough for a crowned head, and that in the very infancy of the war.

A colonel of a Swedish regiment of infantry, when Gustavus entered Germany, received about three hundred and eighty pounds per annum; the lieutenant-colonel was paid in the half-proportion, and a captain was allowed one hundred and twenty-eight pounds a year. To the officers military and civil were allotted one hundred and forty-two servants, who all did duty, but received seven-pence a week less than the common soldiers, whose pay amounted to a small matter under six-pence a day: and in cases of emergency, if the service required, it was Gustavus's custom to advance them a third of their monthly pay, one payment being made on the eleventh, another on the twenty-first, and the residue at the end of the month; and what is remarkable, there was an officer, or a sort of superior at least, allotted to every corps of five or six men throughout the infantry.

It is true the *Imperial pay*, at least amongst the generals and colonels, ran much higher than the Swedish; but then it was subjected to extraordinary defalcations, retardments, and stoppages; so that upon the whole the lesser annual stipend was most convenient and most profitable. And here I speak of the Imperial troops at the period when Gustavus by his excellent discipline had forced the emperor to take some new measures, in consequence of the opinions given by the electoral college at the dyet of Ratisbon; for before that time every general and soldier, without having regard to the salary of the service, extorted from the poor citizens and peasants all that could be amassed by rapine and cruelty. Upon the footing of the new regulation*, a colonel of cavalry (the regiments being extremely large) was allowed near eight hundred pounds a year, and the lieutenant-colonel two hundred pounds. The pay of the same officers amongst the infantry was near one fourth less: the stipend of a common cuirassier was about eleven pence per day, and the moiety of that sum was allowed to a foot-soldier.

Thus the *wages* of the common men in both services being pretty near the same, Gustavus, who knew how to seize every advantage, contented himself with giving his officers less stipend and easier duty, and creating just double the number that was to be found amongst his enemies. Hence it was that he appeared to be better served,

* Published at Ratisbon November 9, 1630. Vid. Ar-
Janibæi Arma Succica, 4to, p. 67.

and had more frequent opportunities of paying attention to merit. Nor must we forget here, that a common foot-soldier amongst the Swedes (besides some allowance for bread, and with no deductions from his pay, so far as we can learn) received three shillings and three farthings per week, or thereabouts. It was a custom in the Imperial service, and not a bad one, that when a young man of rank and family served his apprenticeship in the art of war, he was recommended to, or chosen by, some officer of great repute to be his *camerado*, or military companion; and in this respect he was to his friend and patron a sort of *aid de camp*. This serves to account how a young duke of Lerida was concerned in the death of Walsstein. He accompanied some one of the officers whose disciple he was; and probably was not participant of the secret.

The generals and colonels in those days made no great ceremony of passing *from one service to another*, which happened more frequently, as it was difficult to do themselves justice by way of duel. We do not find that kings or princes demanded that these officers should be sent back; nor were they put to death when the fortune of war threw them into the hands of their former masters, provided nothing could be laid to their charge except declining the service.

Prisoners were exchanged but very rarely, there being no established cartel of conditions; and as the ransom belonged to the party seizing, exchange in this case was considered as a robbery; which made the emperor pay Verdugo

dug out four thousand pounds in order to get the young prince of Anhalt into his own hands. Men of consequence were detained *ratione convenientiæ* : this happened particularly to Gustavus Horn and John de Wert, whom the Imperialists and French kept in their power many years, not chusing to discharge them till the peace of Münster appeared to be in some forwardness. Officers less renowned always paid their ransom : that of a colonel amounted sometimes to about one thousand pounds, and of the higher and lower commanders in proportion.

To repeat the *several depopulations* of fire and sword, the plunderings and extortions, the acts of cruelty and inhumanity, the massacres and violations, during the period of the thirty years wars, would be an endless as well as disgustful undertaking. It may suffice to observe in general, that the party who dealt most in those deeds of ferocity proved likewise the most unprosperous, and rendered themselves more odious to those of their own religious profession than their adversaries could be : whereas it was a maxim with Gustavus (to which his practice was always conformable) that the truly brave soldier had no need to commit any acts of cruelty *in terrorem*. He considered war as dreadful enough in its own nature and consequences ; and thought it became the man of service, and the Christian, to mollify its severities rather than heighten them. It was his turn of mind and earnest desire to mix as much religion and benignity with the course of a campaign, as the circumstances of
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the thing could admit of: he made humanity and generosity, the *two* criterions of bravery: and it was a doctrinal point with him, that something of the *liberal* man must complete the character of the *warrior*: for which reason he had the last-mentioned distinction always upon his lips (which he laboured incessantly to infuse into his troops from the highest to the lowest) and ever drew a *line of partition* between punishment and barbarity, contributions and extortions, legal restrictions and persecutions; and, in a word, between the soldier and the ruffian, the civilized being and the assassin.

The Swedish army had two regular *courts-martial*; one for each regiment, and one in general for the examination of superior commanders: yet the officers had acquired such an habitude of performing their duty, that in the course of twenty-eight years, namely, from the siege of Riga till the peace of Münster, one can hardly discover the traces of any trials on account of military misbehaviour, excepting those of the colonels Horneck and Mitzval, one of whom Gustavus spared, contrary to Oxenstiern's inclinations; though he thought fit to punish the other, notwithstanding the queen made great intercession in his behalf.

In *campaigns* that consisted merely or principally of incampments, marches, and counter-marches, the Swedes in the long-run always ruined the Imperialists, being more patient of fatigue and accustomed to greater frugality. Upon these principles Gustavus made the famous incampment against Wallstein near Nuren-

Nuremberg; and hence it arose that Galas saw three or four fine armies moulder away to nothing. From the superiority of the Swedes, Melander, one of the ablest generals in Europe, would have been undone, in the year 1646, if the elector of Bavaria (contrary to all faith of treaties) had not brought him off, by allowing John de Wert to desert at the head of four thousand cavalry.

There were *very few generals* then in an army.—The power and place of a commander in chief all men comprehend at the first found: under him served one *lieutenant-general*, being properly speaking his vicegerent, who received orders from him in the day of battle, and in his absence took the supreme command: (but this post of employment seems to have been considered as partly superfluous, about the time Gustavus entered the empire :) next ranked the *velt-maréchal*, whose business it was to receive the plans of engagement from the generalissimo, and select the ground. And here I must make a little remark on my neighbours the French, who copying servilely the German (or rather the German historians who writ in Latin) historians, suppose the *Velt-maréchal* (in the Thirty Years Wars) and commander in chief to be terms convertible: whereas *Velt-maréchal* (*Campi-Magister, vel Mareballus*) denoted *then* no other commander than what I have described. Next came the *general of artillery*, the *serjeant-major* (*di battaglia* *), the *general of horse*, the *general of in-*

* We are told that this officer had command over all the colonels; was invested with the power of raising recruits; and

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Jantry, the *commissary-general*, the *quarter-master-general*, and the *muster-master-general*.
 Now, few points in the present history have given me more vexation than this arrangement: for in short the customs of the two services were different, since it is certain that Pappenheim, after the king of Sweden's landing, acted in the character of *lieutenant-general* to Tilly; and Holk (not to disoblige the former officer) was appointed *deputy lieutenant-general* under him. Nor do I recollect to find any equivalent in terms for the *watch-master-general**, who occurs so frequently on the Imperial side; and of course the disposition here alluded to must be considered as Swedish; since (having no other lights) I was obliged to derive my rank of precedency from the prescribed form of sitting in one of Gustavus's grand-councils of war.—Next came the eldest colonels, with a reserve of giving place to those of the guards: and in the Imperial establishment it must be observed, that the Croats had always a general of their own chusing.

Yet it doth not appear that the *rank of honour* took place indispensably in the time of action: for every general (the two first excepted) was considered partly as a person mechanically adapted to the machinery of a battle: one was supposed to be the best cannoneer, another to understand best the marshalling of the infantry, a third the drawing up of the cavalry,

and helped to dispose and arrange the troops in day of battle.
Historia del Conte Galcazzo Gualdo Pricrato. Libr. II. p. 59.
 In Ven. 4to; 1643.

* We have since remembered an instance, Vol. I. p. 301.
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and so in other departments: but the fighting part was sometimes committed to the best hands; and many colonels in the hour of engagement took the command of honour before several generals; and this may be slightly remarked in the battles of Leipzig and Lützen*. Not that such practices were very frequent: nevertheless, an experienced colonel in those days was a very powerful and respectable personage. Nor did the command of a separate army necessarily constitute a general: Pechman had the sole management of seven thousand men against the Danish and Weymarian forces; Holk conducted eight thousand troops in the first irruption he made into Misnia; Arnheim commanded a body of ten thousand soldiers in the Polish war; and yet each at that time, though invested with the supreme authority, was only a colonel.

Turenne made Gustavus and Wallstein his models in this respect: he could not bear to see a general of horse at the head of a body of infantry, merely because he was the senior commander; and so *vice versa*, when an officer of foot was transferred for the same reasons to the conducting a wing of cavalry: and of course banished from his army all disputes concerning rank and priority of commission. If talents are not thus analysed, at least now and then; and their point of activity well-directed; the self-same man may succeed in matters of astonishing difficulty, and miscarry in others, which demand what may hardly merit to be called mere common capacity: "and thus,"

* See a note on the battle of Altoner, Vol. II. p. 857.
said

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said the chevalier de Folard on the occasion,
“ an inferior general, to whom every-thing
“ is made a department by the mere me-
“ chanism of age and rank, may be compelled
“ at length to imitate the lawyer, who per-
“ ceiving he lost every just and reasonable
“ cause, undertook for the future none but
“ what were notoriously defective both in title
“ and equity.”

I have not mentioned these facts by way of invidious comparison, but purely to render the knowlege of the history more intelligible. Some readers may be pleased with the remark, as most men have vanity enough in reserve to suppose themselves possessed of merit capable to counterbalance all pretensions of seniority. Nevertheless, my own private opinion is (if that can be of any weight) that seniority of command in general is the safest, quietest, and most prudent method of conferring honour, being less liable to exceptions and inconveniences than any other rule which human wit can devise upon the occasion.

But to pass from a subject which may be supposed (though very unjustly) to carry with it some tincture of malignity. *Quitting one service for another* was not considered then so much in the light of an action of baseness as it is at present; and the reason was, that as officers received frequent injuries, real and imaginary, from their superiors, and had not power to make their cause good at their respective courts, nor opportunity nor means to appeal to that false decision of justice called a duel, they retired from the service in high disgust (the enemy

my being always ready to receive them with open arms) and sometimes dispensed with themselves from the ceremony of taking a formal leave. The manners and circumstances of the age gave a sanction to this sort of practice, and few or none were ever called to an account for it, except some manifest treachery or treason could be laid to their charge, as was the case of colonel Farenbach, Velt-maréchal Cratz, and some others.

But to advance to a subject equally interesting; most of the great men in those days (for some from the very condition and nature of the service we find to be wholly illiterate) were alike equal in the field and in the cabinet. Gustavus never once gave Oxenstiern the lead in matters of politics. Nay, it was his private delight in hours of amusement to engage the politician with an host of arguments, and dispute the field with him inch by inch. And when the statesman, meeting, his master at Mentz, made him the invidious and venomously refined compliment of telling him, that he expected to have paid his court to him on the occasion at Vienna (sure, as he thought, in this one circumstance to have caught the king in a false step) Gustavus convinced him, in an instant, that he had ill-comprehended the point in question, and forced him to acknowledge his mistake in silence and blushes. The most difficult, delicate, abrupt, and important treaty, during Gustavus's appearance in Germany, was that which passed between him and the elector of Saxony, some days before the battle of Leipzig; yet it was concluded in
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the absence of the minister; and without his knowlege: and though Oxenstiern got great fame from his conduct at the convention of Nailbrun, 1633; yet he only executed a plan which Gustavus had sketched out a few weeks before his death. Not that I would be thought to depreciate the reputation of the great Riks-chancellor *: he did enough after his master's decease to merit the character of the first prime-minister in the world.

But to return to this age of politics and war. The politician I am speaking of commanded several armies with great prudence, and gave laws to Poland with an handful of foldiers. In the only good picture I ever saw of him, he is cloathed in armour from head to foot; and there is something in his eyes which, though the painter hath described, I cannot; and the very print of him from Mierfelt is superior to most things I ever observed in the engraving way. He had the *sciolto viso* to a degree that is inexpressible. Richelieu took upon him to be a soldier too on certain occasions: took Pignerol, and conquered all the province round it. The duke d'Angoulesme was general of horse. The ambassadors De Charnacé and De Brezé were both colonels of regiments: they attended Gustavus in the field all day, and conferred with him at night on matters of politics. Torstenson was concerned at Stockholm in civil

* *Riks-Chancell.* r, according to the Swedish way of writing, and *Reichs Chancellior* according to the German, signify the Chancellor of the Kingdom: who, in the times we are speaking of, was prime minister. In the reign of Charles IX. the title was suppressed, and the business executed by an *Offi.c.* consisting of more or fewer persons. *Memoir communicated.*

employs, and yet Banier bequeathed his army to him as the only person capable to conduct it. On the other hand, Mansfelt over-reached the Ditrichsteins, the Olivares, and the Gondamars, more than once. Walstein had served in both capacities; and Tilly in effect held the pen at the peace of Lubec. Gabriel Bethlem and Arnheim had more resources and artifices than two attorneys. Horn and Banier concluded the treaty at Bernwalt, and the former of the two was afterwards sent ambassador to Louis XIII.

Old Thurn divided his life betwixt war and embassy: at the head of troops in the summer; in winter either at Venice or Constantinople. Pappenheim could never be spared from the field: but in dexterity of parts was thought equal to the very best of his cotemporaries; and the letter he writ to the duke of Bavaria after the defeat of Leipzig (which I have read by chance, but where or how hath escaped my memory) shews him to have been a person thoroughly able upon the greatest emergencies, and that he understood the relative strength of Gustavus and the empire far better than the *interior* council at Vienna could pretend to do. Aldringer was in effect political historiographer of the empire: the *manifesto's*, *deductions*, *justificatory pieces*, and *little flying satires and invectives*, chiefly flowed from his pen. Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weymar's project of securing Alsatia from the paws of France, effousing the landgraves of Hesse Cassel, and giving down to his posterity the glory of possessing a dominion that made the barrier between the French

French and Germans (which, from the very nature of its situation, must have forced his descendants to be men of parts) was an effort of politics, the inventive work of a soldier, which the great people of the cabinet must not despise; and the rather since the bare apprehension of it threw Richelieu into inexpressible disquiet. But, not to tire my reader with more examples, I shall only observe, that Piccolomini, after growing grey in the service of thirty campaigns in Germany only, worn out with hardships, weakened by wounds, and approaching, as may be imagined, to a decline of life and parts, was yet considered, by the ministry at Vienna, as the only person capable of putting the peace of Münster into execution; by adjusting all the difficulties that might arise upon disbanding an immense army to whom war had been a trade, and plunder a subsistence; and to effect the evacuation and repossession of countries, cities, districts, signories, church-possessions, &c. almost beyond the power of calculation to specify; and yet *all* this was effected without any one remarkable impediment, and, as far as I can remember, without bloodshed.

In a word, the fact is this: *Trying times* make great men, either in the field or in the closet; and though war takes the lead, negotiation is the child of it: for there must be trials of art as well as strength. And of this we have a clear proof, since greater generals were never beheld than in the course of the Thirty Years Wars. Such for example were Mansfelt, Tilly, Gustavus Adolphus, Wallstein, Horn, Banier, Pappenheim, Merci, Guébriant,

Bernard duke of Saxe-Weymar, Torstenson, Condé, and Turenne. The ministers of state were equally famous, as Klefel, Dietricstein, Olivares, Oxenstiern, Richelieu, Camerarius, Rusdorf, Salvius, and de Rache. For the general and the statesman are reciprocally formed to call forth each other; forasmuch as wherever there is war, there must be likewise negotiation.

The times we speak of had such a power to awaken what is called a genius, that the very ladies put in for their share of heroism and treaty-knowledge. The first and last ambassadress extraordinary and plenipotentiary was the wife of a general at this period.—The queen of Bohemia possessed her presence of mind the most of any person after the defeat at Prague: And when an offer was made her in the very ebb of her fortune (at a time when the unhappy exile subsisted upon charity, and had hardly a place to repose her head) that matters might then be composed, upon condition her eldest son was permitted to receive his education and religion at Vienna, with a promise of espousing one of the emperor's daughters: Her answer was, *That she would sooner cut his throat with her own hands.*—Eleonora, queen of Sweden, left the pleasures of Stockholm to attend her husband in Germany, and marched to him at the head of a little army which she conducted to his relief. The electress of Brandenburg made a personal treaty with Gustavus at a time when her consort and all his *Hofraths* could effect nothing.—And as to Amelia of Hanau, the landgraves of Hesse Cassel, no encomiums can

do her justice. I own myself lost in astonishment, when I consider that unparalleled princess, who acted only for a minor, and consequently was circumscribed in power: Always Great, and almost always Fortunate; in the most critical situations of distress on every side!—As her life (on this side the water at least) may be considered as almost an anecdote, the public will hardly believe me when I say, she was her own prime-minister, her own secretary, and her own general: And, what is still more, her courage, her ability, her honesty, went so hand in hand, that ill principles never tempted her to be unfaithful to her allies; and past ill conduct never called upon her to play a second game by way of self-preservation!—And though this account of her be only momentary and incidental, yet a few slight touches may serve to give the reader some idea of an heroine who is not to be met with in every page of a common history. In a word, she fulfilled that extraordinary character, worthy to be transcribed in letters of gold, which was drawn by a cotemporary poet in her own neighbourhood; for the incomparable Amelia was precisely, in a political and military sense;

MOLLIOR CERA MULIER FLUENTI,
DURIOR SAXIS EADEM MARINIS—
FLECTIT, AUT FRANGIT; VIOLENTA DURUM:
LUBRICA MOLLEM.

The *generosity* of kings and chief commanders in those days was very great. Gustavus, though far from being rich, never promoted a

common soldier for his merit, but always gave him bountifully at the same time. Walstein seldom presented an officer of consequence with less than five hundred pounds. The cardinal Infant, after the battle of Nordlingen, settled a pension upon Gamba-corta, made him knight of St. Jago, and procured him a second annual salary from Madrid: he gave Piccolomini a fine diamond on the same occasion, and a *commandery* worth more than one thousand pounds per annum. Nor did he forget any single officer that behaved well. The emperor paid Verdugo near four thousand pounds, by way of ransom for the young prince of Anhalt, and allowed him for a crest to his arms, a right-hand supporting the Austrian eagle. Several rich *signories* in Lower Saxony were conferred on Tilly. Walstein was first gratified with the duchy of Sagan in Silesia, and afterwards with that of Mecklenberg, whose annual revenue is well known to be very considerable. Tilly bequeathed ten thousand pounds to the veteran Walloons; and the great diamond the Infanta gave him (with money also) to found a chantry for the holy Virgin of Oetinghen. The duke de Weymar devised about the same sum to his several colonels, and ordered a month's pay to be advanced to every soldier, which might make a donation which amounted to above twelve thousand pounds more.

Something remained in that age which resembled the old *chivalry-taste* of *impresa* and devices. The little victory of Oyta informed the Imperialists that Mansfelt was a man of
evidence

elegance as well as courage; for his colours were all new, and of the richest materials; exquisitely blazoned, the emblems admirably chosen, and the mottos extremely pertinent. A regiment in those days valued itself as much upon its *deviza* or motto as its colonel; I once saw an illuminated collection of all the emblems and inscriptions that had been carried on standards during the Thirty Years Wars; but it was only transiently, and without the power of making a drawing from them. What surprised me was, that those belonging to the Croats were the best imagined of any, which made me conclude at the time, that having little fancy and less learning, they purchased their designs of some man of parts, who gladly exchanged his classical learning against their plunder.

The *romantic* taste alike prevailed in the very names of their horses; for I have seen a list of some of the principal ones that belonged to Walstein and other generals; which were surnamed, *Amaranto, Bellocchio, Focotesta, Inamorato, Bellpello, Stabene, Allegramente*; as likewise *Donna Biancha, Balarina, Donzella, Fanciulla, Vittoria, Fortuna, &c.*

In the times we are speaking of almost each city, and every town about the size of a good English market town, had its castle. Most princes and noblemens seats were also castles; the continuance of some with little injury, and the remains of others, give Germany to this day a solemn and romantic appearance. Nay, here and there, villages were walled in and fortified: especially if they commanded a pass in hilly and rocky roads that were narrow and full of precipices.

cipices. Of these villages (or *dorps** rather) I have seen three, which if defended by an hundred valiant soldiers might stop an army forty-eight hours. The first is Ilmenau, where the one-eyed Walloon captain stopped Gustavus †. The second lies in that mountainous part of the Lower Palatinate called the Bery-Sträfs, or Strada Montana, in the high road from Francfort to Heidelberg; and the third stands between Stiria and Corniola, commanding the great road from Venice to Vienna. This last, which is the strongest of the three, has the appearance of being placed where it is by art magic. For to clear the passage with a light post coach, you must have four horses and six yokes of oxen, and stop, to breathe the cattle, once a minute, or every two minutes at most, for a good hour, as the Germans express themselves.

It was found out likewise in the course of these wars, that there was no *hiring foreign troops* to any considerable purpose, except the power that contracted for them sent a *commissary-general* of its own to pay them: since to levy armies upon other principles was nothing more than profuse and useless squandering of public money; which after it had passed through the canal of a foreign prince, and the little aqueducts of a few court-favourites and general officers beneath him, underwent so many filtrations, that hardly a drop escaped for the

* *Dorp* is a German word, and signifies a little village or hamlet dependent on a greater village. *Thorp* is an old English word, and signifies the same. As *Bishopsthorp*, &c. &c. *Dorp* may be called a *classical* English word, for Dryden uses it *twice*.

† Vol. II. p. 58.

consolation and support of the poor fighting soldier: nay this measure was thought so salutary and self-evident, that (except my memory deceives me greatly) it was practised under the Ministry of James I.

As to *contributions* and *military exactions*, it was customary with a commanding officer to collect them according to his muster roll; of which the consequence was, that he put that portion into his pocket which was claimed by virtue of non-effective men. This abuse ran so high in the Imperial army, that Tilly, for fear of disobliging the powers that were his master's friends, published a strong manifesto against it in the year 1627, denouncing nothing less to all delinquents than the forfeiture of their lives and fortunes; concluding with assuring them, that the infliction of this punishment was, and should be, *indeprecable*, to use his own word.

An illustrious author* observes, that the contributions raised by generals, and the pillage extorted by soldiers, constituted at that time (namely just before the arrival of Gustavus) the principal military art among the Imperialists: that the two regiments of Pappenheim and St. Julian, quartered in the middle *Marche*, drained the country of sixty-two thousand pounds in sixteen months: and Wallstein is said to have pillaged the whole electorate of Brandenburg to the amount of two millions sterling; but that calculation can hardly be admitted. Two millions of dollars seem to me more probable.

It is remarkable, at least in the Imperial service, that the generals and colonels gained immense sums we know not how; and some amassed great fortunes on the other side of the question. [But not so much in the times of Gustavus as in former and latter parts of the Thirty Years War.] Of Wallstein we shall say nothing: for he was more magnificent than any king or emperor. A thousand pounds were a common present from him, and he rarely kept less than one hundred thousand pounds in the bank at Hamburg for sudden emergencies. Tilly died very rich; and Aldringer (of whose origin we shall speak in the next page) left large sums in the funds at Venice. Duke Bernard of Saxon Weymar, who was the eleventh son, and had a title with very little patrimony, bequeathed, as we have already observed, two and twenty thousand pounds to his officers and soldiers only. Ernest Count Mansfelt, who fed himself entirely from the point of his sword, maintained for many years (with little help from foreign or German potentates) an army of twenty thousand men and died rich; and lastly, John de Wert, who was of as poor an extract as man could be, bought a fine castle in Bohemia, and a vast estate in land.

The *nature of the times* was then such, that Aldringer and Merci (which latter I suppose to be one of the greatest generals since the days of Gustavus) with numbers more whom I could easily mention, all rose to high commands merely by superiority of genius: for in a course of thirty years long and serious struggle, the favourites of princes

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princes and ministers, and the children and relations of people of quality (such excepted as had truly great abilities) were all supplanted, cashiered, or destroyed by the fate of war; on the other hand, merit was its own patron, and forced the public to accept it: so that hardly can a general be found in these times who had not originally carried a musquet. Oxenstiern (though in that respect I think him blameable) had a mortal aversion to admit men of great rank and condition into high commands. Tilly and Walsstein were gentlemen born, with little more than a titular patrimony; as were Dampier and Bucquoy. Mansfelt and another illustrious commander had nothing to feed themselves with but the point of their swords: John de Wert was a peasant; General Beck a shepherd; Stalhaus a serving-man; Aldringer a valet de chambre, an amanuensis, a velt-maréchal.

Gustavus had some generals who were no great masters of *writing* or *reading*; and it was partly for this reason, as I have hinted elsewhere, that most commanders of consequence kept a secretary. I have heard a pleasant anecdote upon this head, which may be worth relating; not that I intend to become surety for its authenticity: One evening, at a council of war, some intercepted letters were brought to the king; his majesty (whose eye-sight was not the most perfect) ordered a venerable grey-headed general who stood by him to break them open and read them aloud. The officer shewed an inclination to obey, but complained he had lost his spectacles. *Read you,* said the king

king hastily to another; but that great commander complained grievously of an inflammation in his eyes: *Pish*, said Gustavus, being a little provoked, *my thoughts were absent upon other matters*: and then reducing his countenance to a smile; *General Banier*, said he, *pray read; you have been used to it* *.

The *military dress* of those times was curious enough; for the heroes were a sort of fine gentlemen in their way. Ruffs were worn in all varieties, and frilled and tortured into every kind of shape; nevertheless, the flat sort which fall down on the shoulders was preferred for convenience-sake upon most occasions; but then we must except the practices of the Spanish commanders and Tilly: which latter followed the mode of Bruxelles, where he first grew acquainted with courts. Wigs were then hardly known: most wore their own hair, managed carelessly enough, but cut short *à la soldatesque*: Pappenheim, Piccolomini, and even Oxenstiern, affected an high bold foretop, which had a martial air, for it seemed to stand half upright; the rest smoothed down the front-part with a milder appearance; and Christian duke of Brunswic, Bernard duke of Saxe-Weymar, Dewbatel, and John de Wert, spread the hair half down their foreheads, in the manner Vandyck's young men are painted, Whiskers were thought as necessary as swords;

* Banier was a nobleman of fashion, and had received an excellent education. His letters to the maréchal de Guébriant, may be considered as masterpieces in war and politics. They are preserved by *Jean le Labreur. Hist. du Maréchal Guébriant.* Fol. Par. 1684.

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I remember no picture without them, excepting duke Christian's of Brunswic; which prince was so very young that perhaps he arrived not to the happy hour of wearing the mustacho. But their distinguishing vanity made its appearance in a gold chain, which each officer of distinction wore round his neck, fastened behind with a loop and button. Some of these chains were decorated in such manner as to amount to a very great expence: yet it is thought by many that affectation was not the pure motive of wearing them, since they served to secure the owner from the fury of the enemy, in case of being taken prisoner, and proved a sort of retaining fee, engaged for the payment of a future ransom. The colour of their military scarf was arbitrary, and so were the materials; but nothing was spared in the magnificence and richness of the embroidery. Their swords were large and heavy, not extremely ornamented; their pistols very long; the temper of metal ~~in both~~ incomparably perfect. Their boots were large, thick, and wrinkled, with high tops cut slant-wise, and made strong enough to resist a common pistol-ball, except it came in a particular direction. But the oddness of their spurs is scarce to be accounted for: it is thought they were made to *jingle**, in order to animate the

* I have seen one of these *jingling* spurs, which was found in the *Star Park*; on the famous *White Mountain*, near Prague, where the battle was fought between the Imperialists and the *Protestants* of the Union; by the event of which the Elector Palatin lost the crown of Bohemia. The spur was large and strong: it was made of brass, and had a short curved neck. The box (from whose center the rowels came) was as broad

the horses and keep them up to their duty without goring their flanks unmercifully. Many generals armed themselves cap-a-pie: their breast-plates, helmets, and the junctures of their armour were often inlaid with gold and silver, richly diapered with the same materials; and some few (but this must be restrained to the Swedish service) wore only back and breast plates, with an upper-suit of perfumed leather, prepared and stiffened so as to be a covering of resistance.

His majesty himself wore nothing of the defensive nature, except an elf-skin waistcoat, which seems to me (notwithstanding the excuses alledged by him) to be matter of inclination and pure choice.

That we may judge better of the dress of warriors in the former part of the preceding century, history hath preserved us a curious portrait of the count de Tilly. He was a little man, and affected something of the Spaniard in his dress and manners, having received his first education at the court of the Infanta. Maréchal Grammont* found him at the head of his army on a march, mounted on a small white Croatian pad, in a green sattin doublet with slashed sleeves, and trowsers of the same stuff; a little cocked hat, with a red ostrich plume in

as an half-crown piece; hollow, and something more than a quarter of an inch thick. It was of bell-metal gilt, and contained three or four metal balls about the size of a small field-pea. The rowels, which were generally four or six, passed through the sides of the box, and measured near three inches from opposite point to point.

* *Memoires du Maréchal Grammont.* 2 Tom. 12^o. 1717. Tom. i. p. 12, 13, 14.

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it, which reached down to his reins; and a belt round his waist of two inches breadth, to which hung his fighting sword, with a single pistol only in one of his holsters. This general, when the Frenchman paid his compliments to him; said, "Sir, perhaps you may find my accoutrements somewhat extraordinary, and not wholly reconcilable to the mode of France; nevertheless, 'tis my humour, and that's sufficient. I am persuaded likewise, that my little hackney and single solitary pistol surprize you as much as my habit; but that you may not entertain an unfavorable opinion of the count de Tilly, to whom you have done the honour of paying a visit of curiosity, permit me to inform you, that I have gained seven decisive battles, without being obliged to discharge the pistol now under consideration; nor hath the little pad in question ever failed me, or hesitated in performing his duty." In a word, saith Grammont, he had the look of the old duke d'Alva, surnamed *Castigador de Flamencos*.

Duels were not extremely fashionable in those days; we hardly find half a dozen in the space of thirty years continued war; every hour affording better proofs for valour, than such irrational appeals to public opinion. Nor were superior commanders ill thought of by their adherents and followers in case they refused to refer themselves to such sort of decisions. Cratz, in the transports of resentment, challenged Walstein when he was generalissimo and absolute; yet nothing resulted from the provocation; it was passed by with neglect.

John

John de Wert killed Merodé, but the affair was purely a rencounter. Young Pappenheim, 'tis true, lost his life in a real duel, but that happened merely because he had eluded the vigilance of his general, who had locked the city-gates, and planted spies to watch the combatants. Aldringer never forgave Sirot for drawing his sword in his presence, though he himself set the example, and insisted upon making his life the forfeiture for the offence. Greater cautions were still taken in the Swedish service: count de Souches challenged general Stalhau, but first resigned his commission. Duels before this time had been severely prohibited in France, and the French king declared, with an oath, that he would reward such military persons as had spirit enough to refuse a challenge. By Gustavus's laws all private quarrels were decided by the officers of the regiment, and all challenges referred to a court-martial: and, if an inferior officer allowed the common soldiers to engage hand to hand, he was to be cashiered *ipso facto*, and serve as a private man, being answerable also for all the mischief that should be committed in such engagements. The best and most remarkable swordsman in the course of these wars was the count de Forgatz, yet we find nothing concerning him in the public field of action. As to the custom of seconds, I think it appeared as early as the year 1570.

Judicial astrology was the reigning passion of that age: nothing great was undertaken without consulting the stars. Tycho Brahe, Grebner, Braunborn, Herlicius, Baptista Seni, &c.

&c. were all revered, as far as men could reverence them, on this side of idolatry. Princes dreaded them, respected them, and see'd them. These *predicting sages* were of both religions; and each of them read the book of the heavens his own way. In the regions of the north Gustavus was the *Arctic Lion*, the *vis vivida* of the reformation, and the *new luminary* in Cassiopéa: again, in the dominions of the south, he was *another Alaric and Attila*; the *scourge of God*, and *the genuine Antichrist*.

Every prince was esteem'd who had the happiness to retain in his service one or more well-instructed *astrologers*: for the explanation of an horoscope half determin'd Frederic to accept the crown of Bohemia, and partly induc'd the emperor to depose Walstein; who, on the other hand, that he might keep pace with his master in point of intelligence, allow'd his philosopher an extraordinary equipage and pension magnificent enough to be call'd *royal*. When Herlicius died, the princes and generals in Germany became quite bewildered; but Gustavus saw through these weaknesses, and considered them as alike impious and childish. France in this respect was as little illuminated as the empire: the grave history of De Thou, and the sage memoirs of Sully, breathe much of these doctrines. Louis XIII. was surnam'd *The Just*, because born under *Libra*: and Ann of Austria had a mathematician conceal'd in her closet, in order to calculate the fortune of Louis XIV. with uncommon accuracy. William Lilly, in England, did Cromwell more service than a regiment of cuirassiers. Nay, it

was with great obstinacy and reluctance that the science expired even in our island; for, amongst many others, Dryden himself relied partly thereon, and understood horoscopes and astral culminations with no contemptible exactness. The taste for prodigies was likewise very strong in the times of Gustavus; even Chemnitius treats them with great deference, the best-instructed and most sensible historian of that period; for he was supposed to compose his works, or a part thereof at least, on the memoirs of Oxenstiern. Boys born with boots and spurs, showers and rivers of blood, black rainbows, pitched battles in the air, and a thousand such other prodigies* were supposed to happen every year. The king of Denmark concluded the peace of Lubec in consequence of a flash of lightning. Not that I take upon me to doubt but that the Supreme Being, in such extraordinary times, may give uncommon indications of his displeasure, and that many circumstances related, were or might be *preternatural*; yet, as they cannot be precisely distinguished at this distance, I have thought fit to pass them all by, except one or two that fell necessarily in my track, and bore some reference to the tenor of the history.

Predictions had their weight too. The arrival of Gustavus in the empire was no secret to the *Illuminati* many years before it happened. Tycho Brahe foretold, with reference to the new star that appeared in *Cassiopea* 1572, that a prince should rise in the north, from whom much

* Some of the Imperial troops, to this day, would cut a man to pieces who denied the existence of Vampyres.

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happiness should be expected by those who made profession of the evangelical religion; and this prediction was made public twenty years before Gustavus entered Germany.

Amongst other examples of this kind, Pappenheim boasted, (or others more probably in his behalf) that, conformably to a prophecy recorded in the archives of his family, a certain Pappenheim *Balafré**, mounted on a white steed, should kill a king of Sweden hand to hand. And historians have thought themselves so much obliged to give authenticity to the completion of this event, that one third of them introduce him some hours sooner than he really arrived at the battle of Lützen, merely for the sake of fulfilling the prediction.

Omens and dreams were studied, explained, and believed with great attention and respect. The fall of a triumphal column was one of the arguments the Austrian ministers used to persuade their master to depose Walstein. A visible damp spread itself through the Imperial army, because the council of war preceding the battle of Leipzig chanced to be held at a gravedigger's house; decorated then, and (if I mistake not till this moment,) with an Arabesque fresco of shank-bones crossed, skulls, and hour-glasses. The lesson for the Sunday † preceding the battle of Prague, Mat. vi. 22. *Render to Cesar the things that are Cesar's*, broke the spirit of the Palatin-party all at once, forasmuch as Cesar is the German and Bohemian word for Emperor.

* Hacked, gashed, cicatrized: for he carried the marks of one hundred wounds on his body.

† Twenty-third Sunday after Trinity.

On the other hand, the Swedes gained a part of their victory at Leipzig by the interposition of a ring-dove, and a part by virtue of a dream which Gustavus had the preceding night; of which the substance was, that in a struggle with Tilly he never quitted the hold he had in his hair, but received a bite from him in his left side: which Frederic Spanheim, one of the most sensible and exact writers of that period, interprets thus: That Gustavus should keep the field of battle, and obtain the advantage; but that the Saxons, in the left wing of the army, should retire with infamy.

Many military men believed that their armour and bodies might be rendered impene- trable by *enchantment*. When a person was sub- limated to this pitch of being invulnerable, he was pronounced, with great elegance of speech, to be *gefrorn**, and it is thought the Italian astrologers who attended the army, carried on this trade in order to eke out their other pro- fession. Tilly himself was supposed, by the common Swedes, to have tampered with these sorts of practices. An honest Englishman tells us, that the town-surgeon of Halle having dressed his wounds after the battle of Leipzig, and discovering nothing but horrible contusions (a thing not uncommon in wounds received un- der a well-tempered suit of armour) pronounced his body to be *gefrorn*. *But*, saith my coun- tryman, *very loth I am to leave so base an imputa- tion on such an honourable commander* †. Never- theless, Perugia was supposed by the multitude

* *i. e.* Frozen.

† *Swedish Discipline*, Part iii, p. 32. Lond. 4^o, 1632.

to have been rendered invulnerable beyond dispute, as was also the Austrian shoemaker*, [who succeeded one Fadinger an hatter, and conducted a rebellion, at the head of 60,000 rustics:] since the stroke of a cannon-ball, saith a grave and serious historian †, made him recoil seven

* This extraordinary phenomenon made his appearance in the European hemisphere, Anno 1626. His predecessor had sent an embassy to Ferdinand II. consisting of one nobleman's steward, two tradesmen, and three farmers. He himself, on assuming the reins of authority, (and this may shew how finely Shakespear painted human nature in the character of Cade on a like occasion) published something between an *edict* and *manifesto*, which ran precisely thus:

“ We Achaz Willenger, elected upon the death of
“ Stephen Fadinger, supreme commander of the three evangelical armies in Upper Austria, send greeting to all colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains, &c. acting under our authority: whereas several ships; filled with soldiers and military stores, have been conveyed by the duke of Bavaria to our capital enemy Adam, who calls himself count Herberdorff, and governor of Lintz, and that more supplies of the same kind (whereof We have certain knowlege) are daily expected, to the entire destruction of the Protestant religion, except some remedy be administered thereunto; determine, in our great wisdom, to assault the town of Lintz with redoubled violence, and reduce the pretended governor to reason by fire and sword.

“ Wherefore, in order to overcome a commander so artful and designing as this our adversary is, in a case where force and numbers may happen to miscarry, it seemeth highly expedient that you recommend to us men of distinguished capacity and experience, men who love their country, and have a sincere zeal for the liberties and salvation of their fellow-christians.

“ We also convey the same instructions in military matters to all the officers serving under us in our several armies, and request them to send us select and approved men: it being highly reasonable, that all should exert themselves in an emergency, where all (if unsuccessful) are equally liable to the same irreversible sentence of destruction.”
(*Laurea Austriaca*, p. 836, 837.)

† *Lotichius ad annum 1626. Laur. Austr. p. 840.*

paces without killing him, till at length a colonel of Pappenheim's put an end to his life by a pistol-shot. And here is it not amazing, that the same author should recite these two stories, and believe them both? Be that as it will, this doctrine in general was chiefly believed by the common sort of people; and so far it was a real object of public notice; for the first article of Gustavus's discipline is directed against enchanting the human body, so as to render it invulnerable; as also against enchanted armour and swords; all delinquents to be prohibited from conversing with their fellow-soldiers, and to be strictly punished according to the laws of the land, and those of scripture. Yet so strong then was the power of delusion that the Maréchal de Grammont tells us,* that being taken prisoner by a German officer at the siege of Mantua, and carried to that commander's tent in a fainting fit, occasioned by the loss of blood; the said officer being as much wounded as himself; an Imperial colonel requested his friend (there being no surgeons in the army) that he might pronounce a few words of mystical importance over him. Immediately the orifice of the wound closed, though it had poured out blood in a full stream. The enchanter then begged leave to perform the same kind office to Grammont; but, says the latter, my answer was, "That, as I trusted in God, I would hold no correspondence with the devil; and if I was to die, my exit should be such as truly became the man of honour."

* *Memoires*, tom. I. 27.

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From whence it is plain that Grammont believed the fact.

Nay, farther, with respect to incantations, whilst the life and actions of Gustavus have long lain forgotten, Dissertations* have been published on his *very sword*, which, from the extensive nature of his conquests, was supposed to be *magical*. Fresh debates have likewise arisen from the same subject; as whether, for example, the sword he used at the battle of Lützen be still preserved at Stockholm or Leipzig †: or, if 'tis not more probable to be found at Vienna; for an Imperial soldier seized it. Nevertheless,

Non nostrum est tantas componere lites.—

We may extend our remarks by observing, that as the soldiers, at least in the Imperial service, were generally *ill-clothed*, and not over careful in point of cleanliness, being obliged to content themselves sometimes with the worst of diet; pestilential and petechial fevers raged abundantly; and the latter are still very rife among those nations who supply the Austrian army with irregulars; as I observed myself in the year 1749, when I passed a summer on the confines of Croatia.

The *famine*, during the greater part of these wars, kept pace with the *pestilence*. Wheat

* Three Dissertations by Dr. Wallin, Professor at Upsal, published in the years 1722 and 1729.

† That it is preserved in the arsenal at Stockholm, is denied by Glassey in *Dissert. de Gladio quocum Gustavus Adolphus Rex Sueciæ in prælio Lutzenensi occubuit.* Lips. 1749.

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But by this time it may be highly proper to draw a veil over the more melancholy productions of a war which raged much and continued long; for though its subsequent effects may be considered as the re-establishment of peace, order, religion, and property, throughout all Europe, more or less; yet the sufferings of those poor wretches, to whom Providence then gave their period of existence, must be ever looked upon, by an humane and compassionate man, as a very sharp and severe trial: and of course, one may safely infer with Gustavus (for the remark is as just as if it had proceeded from a professorial chair) that be the advantages of war as great as it is possible to imagine, yet that *war* itself is an *evil*, permitted by Providence,

PROPTER DELICTA HUMANA*.

* See the Letter to Oxenstiern, vol. ii. p. 312.

PRINCES CONTEMPORARY *with* GUSTAVUS.
 ADOLPHUS; *and concerned with him, or*
against him.

EMPERORS.

MATTHIAS ———— 1612—1619
 FERDINAND II. ———— 1619—1637

POPE S.

PAUL V. ———— 1605—1621
 GREGORY XV. ———— 1621—1623
 URBAN VIII. ———— 1623—1644

KING of FRANCE.

LOUIS XIII. ———— 1610—1643

KINGS of SPAIN.

PHILIP III. ———— 1598—1621
 PHILIP IV. ———— 1621—1665

KINGS of ENGLAND.

JAMES I. ———— 1603—1625
 CHARLES I. ———— 1625—1648

KING of DENMARK.

CHRISTIAN IV. ———— 1588—1648

KING of POLAND.

* SIGISMOND III. ———— 1587—1632

ELECTORS of MENTZ.

JOHN SCHWEICKARD of Cronenberg ———— 1604—1626
 G. FREDERIC of Grieffenclau ———— 1626—1629
 ANSELM CASIMIR WAMBOLD, of Umstadt 1629—1647.

ELECTORS of TRYERS.

LOTHARIO of Metternich ———— 1599—1623
 PHILIP CHRISTOPHER Van So^tTERN ———— 1623—1652

ELECTOR of COLOGN.

FERDINAND Duke of Bavaria ———— 1612—1650

ELECTOR of BAVARIA.

MAXIMILIAN ———— 1623—1651

ELECTOR of SAXONY.

JOHN GEORGE ———— 1611—1656

ELECTORS of BRANDENBURG.

JOHN SIGISMOND ———— 1572—1619
 GEORGE WILLIAM ———— 1619—1640

ELECTOR PALATIN.

FREDERIC V. ———— 1617—1632
 Chosen King of Bohemia ———— 1619

PRINCES, &c. of TRANSYLVANIA.

GABRIEL BETHLEM ———— 1603—1629
 CATHARINA of Brandenburg, who resigned 1629—1631
 GEORGE RAGOTZKI ———— 1631—1648

T H E
H I S T O R Y
O F
T H E L I F E O F
G U S T A V U S A D O L P H U S.

IF a personal valour of the clearest and most distinguishing sort; if a firmness of mind rendered more active upon the approach of dangers and difficulties; if a capacity in politics equal, (to say the least of it,) to that of the greatest prime minister whom Europe hath ever seen; if an abhorrence of dissimulation and subterfuge; if a generous, open, and undissembled spirit of resenting national injuries; if a *perfective* and *inventive* genius in all the branches of military knowledge; if generosity and humanity, moderation and courtesy, public and domestic affection, and above all, a sincere and vital sense of religion and piety, are sufficient outlines to give force and character to the portrait of a true hero; (allowances being ever to be made for the frailties and errors incidental to meer human nature;) it seems to me highly probable, that the reader will not be dissatisfied with the delineation I propose to make of the life and actions of the Great Gustavus*; and if, more or less, in all, or various instances, it is my misfortune to write beneath the truth, and even below my own ideas, yet thence it can never follow with strict justice that the original object is void of lustre; but that it shines on a body, made up of broken and unequal surfaces, neither capable to receive the brightness itself, nor transmit it to others.

The hero of my present history, born December 9, 1594, was grandson of Gustavus Ericson, (whose family name was Vasa †) the great deliverer of Sweden. And here a writer more superstitious than myself, might be enclined to think, that there was something in the name of Gustavus con-natu-

* Oxenshiern named him first the GREAT GUSTAVUS in the speech he made at the opening of the diet of Heilbrun 1633.

† Vasa signifies a sheaf of corn.

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ral (if I may so say) to the prosperity of that kingdom, whenever he considers the reigns and illustrious actions of these two renowned princes; so that the northern wits are not to be looked upon as determined triflers by profession, when they anagrammatized the letters which form the word GUSTAVUS into the name of AUGUSTUS.

It is well known to the generality of readers, that the grandfather of Gustavus Adolphus, had been deputed by Sweden as one of the six hostages of state to Christian II. king of Denmark: a prince equally faithless and despotic; who, in contradiction to his own royal promise, removed them all into his own country, and confined them there as prisoners of war. Thence, Gustavus Ericson, having obtained permission to amuse himself with a morning's hunting, contrived means to escape in disguise, and after various dangers, (making his first retreat to Lubec) reached his native soil in the year 1520: at which the tyrant Christian conceived such extraordinary offence, that contrary to his express promise of an universal amnesty, (sworn by him four days after his Swedish coronation) he made the city of Stockholm an ocean of blood, sparing neither bishops, nor nobles, (amongst which the father of Gustavus Ericson was one) nor magistracy, nor gentry: and denying them likewise the common rights of religious sepulture. Upon which Ericson, transported with the warmth of a true patriot, collected some few companies of armed men during the winter season, and making fresh and fresh efforts of vigour as his party increased, arrived in the year 1523 to the honour of being elected king by the states of the country; but with a modesty and magnanimity almost peculiar to himself, he refused the form of coronation, and consented only to be called the governor of the kingdom. Vested with this authority, he convened the several orders of state, having chiefly in his eyes the great work of religious reformation; but untoward and unsurmountable obstacles presenting themselves, he resigned his title, and left the nation in the state he found it; nevertheless, the Orders of Sweden at length persuaded him to accept the kingship in good earnest, and in 1528 he passed through a coronation in form; being the first protestant prince that the world had ever seen adorned with the regal diadem.

This great deliverer of his country died in the year 1560, having reigned more than one half of his life; and it was his singular fortune to govern with prudence and virtue, what he had conquered by industry and magnanimity; he left behind him three sons*: Eric the eldest, who succeeded his fa-

* We shall say more of this succession when we settle the pretensions between Gustavus Adolphus and Sigismund,

ther in 1560, and having reigned eight years died without issue. John the second, who succeeded his brother in 1568, and enjoyed the throne four and twenty years; and Charles duke of Sudermania, the father of the great Gustavus Adolphus.

But here it must be remembered, that on the death of John, the second son of Gustavus Ericson, in the year 1592, Sigismund, John's elder son*, who had been elected king of Poland seven years before, was admitted on *certain* conditions to ascend the throne of Sweden, of which the principal were (being all confirmed by solemn oath) That no strangers should be introduced into the kingdom; and that the confession of Augsburg should be the sole model of religion;—but as this prince notoriously violated more or less all his engagements, and strove to make Sweden a province to Poland, he was rejected and deposed by the states in full assembly, anno 1599, and his son Vladisläus, then an infant, appointed to succeed him, with this strict proviso, That in six months he should be removed to Stockholm, and there educated in the religion of Luther. But the conditions mentioned being never observed, Charles duke of Sudermania, the father of Gustavus Adolphus, was considered by all the Orders of state as the man marked out by Providence for the preserver of their civil and christian liberties; and of course they disqualified young Vladisläus, and elected him their king in the year 1601: Gustavus being at this period but six years old.

We shall mention but few particulars with relation to Charles IX. (for so that prince was surnamed) excepting only such passages as bear a reference more or less to our youthful hero: concerning whom; in the year 1609 (a circumstance if we mistake not; omitted hitherto by the English historians) he dispatched two ambassadors to the court of London † with instructions; amongst other matters of negotiation, to propose a marriage between his son Gustavus, who had then attained his fifteenth year, and the princess Elizabeth; who, to her great misfortune, both in point of glory and happiness, was unluckily pre-engaged to the elector Palatin; a young heroine formed by nature to be a consort worthy of Gustavus Adolphus: for she was intrepid beyond her sex, and remained mistress of herself under all the pressures of poverty and miseries of exile: Yet Providence supplied her place with a second heroine, inasmuch as Mary Eleonora princess of Brandenburg appeared equal to Elizabeth in greatness of soul, and attained likewise a much happier and more fortunate situation.

* He had another son, John duke of Ostrogotia, who persevered sincerely and steadily in the Lutheran religion. He died in 1618. *Garleton's Letters*, p. 265.

† *Lecturæ Histor. Suecan.* 4º: 476.

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Gustavus from a child gave great marks of a military genius: and indeed he possessed so many shining good qualities from the indulgence of nature, that his father was tempted to bestow the finishing strokes on his education, in every possible respect. So that besides the tour he made thro' Germany incognito (of which we shall speak in the proper place) there is some reason to conclude he travelled when he was quite a youth * : but of this one can pronounce nothing with any tolerable degree of certainty. Sure, however, and certain it is, that he talked Latin as a mother-tongue, with uncommon energy and precision; and was made master of mathematics and tactics in the very early parts of life. As to the French, Italian, and German languages, it is well known he spoke them fluently; and with respect to English (the only remaining language of reputation, wherein we can discover him to be deficient) he had so many officers of Great Britain who bore commissions under him, that he never could be puzzled for want of interpreters in any negotiations with that kingdom.

As to his manner of living, he was taught to feed wholesomely, but not luxuriously; and enured to hardships from the first beginnings of his infancy. Heats and colds were rendered indifferent to him; and he learned the duties of a common musqueteer, before he had strength to carry a musquet. And thus was Bucquoy, Tilly, Piccolomini, Merci, Montecuculi, and all the greatest generals formed in that century: and perhaps Turenne was one of the last who passed through this school of gradual probation.

In a word, it may be fairly said of Gustavus Adolphus, and as properly here as in any other place, That he was the first prince who taught the public, that there was a region buried in the depths of northern snows and ice, named Sweden; and a race of men in the world called Swedes, who had some business with the grand continent of Europe: of which we shall hereafter give various proofs; not merely with reference to Poland and Muscovy, but countries and kingdoms far more important; since (without mentioning the terrour, admiration, and jealousy excited by him in the courts of Madrid and Versailles particularly) at, or near the death of that prince, and many years before the conclusion of the peace of Munster, the Swedes possessed 132 strong towns and fortresses in the Germanic empire; so that it was possible to sleep in one of them every night from the lake of Constance to the Baltic ocean. Yet they were obliged at last to sacrifice all these great acquisitions for half Pomerania; Wismar, the

* *Swedish Intelligence*, part iv. 183.

archbishopric of Bremen and Verden, and some other trifles*.

Prince Gustavus in the seventeenth year of his age made a campaign against the Danes, being made by his father a colonel of cavalry. His first expedition (and therein 1611. he had the command in chief) was to secure Blechingen, and storm the important town of Christianopol, which the young hero effected sword in hand, having burst open a gate by the application of a petard; nevertheless, in approaching the city with too much eagerness, for a letter of the governor's being intercepted, wherein he requested his party to send him a reinforcement of 500 cavalry, he was obliged to use all possible expedition in order to prevent discovery, having cloathed the same number of Swedish soldiers in the Danish uniform, and advancing under Danish ensigns; when lo! all in an instant it was his misfortune to sink into a morass covered with ice, but not sufficiently frozen, yet in that situation he still kept fighting against his enemies, whilst his horse lay beneath him almost suffocated, and struggling in mire and water; at length one of the Baniers brought him off at the head of his company of cavalry, and received for this generous assistance the order of senator. Yet the person here mentioned was not the Banier who made so great a figure afterwards in the thirty years war; that officer being junior to Gustavus. Towards the conclusion of the same campaign, the young prince at the head of 2000 musqueteers made a descent secretly at night into a little nameless island, and cut to pieces a considerable body of Danish troops who had there encamped themselves.

As to this war with Denmark, it is well known to all the world, that there had long subsisted a sort of hereditary jealousy and animosity between the Danes and the Swedes: for the latter began to grow formidable in more respects than one, ever since Gustavus Ericson had changed not only the religion, but the warlike and commercial notions of Sweden. Upon which his Danish majesty Christian IV. displeas'd and mortified to contemplate the figure which his neighbours began to make in the system of the North, and exasperated likewise to find his subjects prohibited from trading with Riga, Courland and Prussia, and their ships subjected to the capture of the Swedes, of course dispatched a herald to Stockholm, and declared pre-emptorily a fresh war in all the solemn ceremonies conformable to the practices of that age.

Charles IX. finding himself engaged against the Poles and the Muscovites, had certain prudential reasons for preferring a peace, and made various plausible advances towards an ac-

* *Motifs pour la guerre d'Allemagne*, p. 176.

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commodation, which was to be managed by the states of the respective kingdoms, or by the interposition and mediation of neighbours and allies; but Christian had a secret inclination to embroil matters right or wrong, and of course opened the campaign by laying siege to Calmar and Elfsburg. Charles, enraged at such an instance of irreconcilable obstinacy, and being tired heartily with Danish wars from time to time, conceived a whimsical thought; correspondent with the humour of the age; of sending a challenge to this troublesome and intermeddling adversary, proposing to decide the fate of the field in the compendious manner of single combat. Christian treated the proposal as it seems to have justly merited, and in a very polite manner told him, that such an enthusiastic scheme favoured more of the knight-errant, than of the monarch; and that it was an inconsiderable object of glory for a middle-aged man to put to death an old one, whom nature would take care to remove out of the way very soon. For Charles was then extremely infirm, having had a stroke of an hemiplegia about two years before; which put an end to his life some few weeks after he had sent this letter of defiance to his antagonist. At first sight the behaviour of his Danish majesty carries with it the appearance of greatness of mind, and perhaps the answer was truly heroic; yet the Swedish nation formed other conclusions with respect to Christian's magnanimity. Be that as it will, it is at this distance impossible to pronounce upon what grounds he declined the combat: whether from timidity or generosity of spirit; or whether he considered a decision by duel as a rash and unlawful action; or as matter of chivalry unbecoming the dignity of crowned heads. Yet thus much is certain and undeniable, that the gallantry of the proposal touched and hurt him at the very moment he made it the subject of ridicule and raillery; for he attacked the Swedish camp (where the king then lay) some few days afterwards, not without inconsiderable disadvantage to the party attacked. Upon the death of Charles he still conceived more sanguine expectations, for it was thought a long interregnum might prove very prejudicial to the affairs of Sweden; and the rather, as the kingdom at that juncture was involved in a disagreeable war, not only against Denmark, but with Poland and Muscovy likewise.

And here we may just observe in passing along, that it was the lot of Charles, Gustavus's father, to be more concerned with proposals of duels than had happened to any personage of his rank in that age. For about eleven years before an angry letter had been sent to him by Zamoski first general to Sigismund king of Poland (a spirited old man, who was then high chancellor of the republic) to which Charles returned this
short

Short note in Latin; *Non es mihi par; si par esses, non armis re, sed fuste depexum & unctum darem.* To which Zamoski replied in a stile more extraordinary, as it passed from a Polish nobleman to a person of Charles's rank and elevation; *Audiebam te hominem cerebrosum &c.— Si non sint in Polonia, per Dei gratiam proditores; in aula vestra querendi sunt. Quicquid in me contumeliosum scripseris aut dixeris, prorsus te MENTIRI dico, & dicam & scribam.— Jam desino.*

Nevertheless Charles, the father of the great Gustavus, was brave in war; faithful in alliances, and sincere to his friends; active to reward, and equally active to punish; for it was observed of him, even to a proverbial expression, that the thunderbolt always succeeded the flash of lightning. True it is, that his temper took fire upon some occasions to an eminent degree, (and a part of this infirmity Gustavus received from him) but the torrent soon subsided and grew calm, if nothing opposed it: and even in the transports of an impetuous passion, there always appeared an opening for better information and reconciliation. No king ever hated popery with more firmness, or upon better principles; and as to his plain good sense, solidity and sagacity, let those passages be a proof which he uniformly conceived from the young Gustavus; for whenever the chiefs of the ministry and himself were puzzled upon any foreign or domestic difficulties, it was his custom to call the child to him (who chose always to play in the father's apartment) and laying his hand tenderly on his head, *There gentlemen,* said he, *this is the person who must unravel the intricacy, or repel the danger; ILLE FACIET*.*

Charles likewise gave Gustavus an example of cultivating the arts of peace and war with equal application; for he took care to see justice speedily and impartially administered; he exhibited annual pensions to thirty students, and levied all taxes with caution and delicacy; he applied himself assiduously to agriculture, mines, and commerce: in which latter instance he shewed so peculiar a fondness, that it was his constant custom to go aboard all foreign ships on the summer-evenings, and if the captain imported corn, salt, and such like useful merchandizes, "Friend, said he, you shall lade back with good exchangeable commodities of iron and copper;" but if the master of the vessel brought matters of luxury and superfluity, he used to say aloud to his attendants, "Take care that this man be re freighted with Swedish turnips, and nothing else."

This

* *Loeuii Historia Suecana*, 4^o. pagg. 502, 503. From this book M. Bayle has chiefly taken that sketch he hath given us of the former part of the life of Gustavus, which he never finished: breaking off at the invasion of Germany.

† The bulb of this northern pine-apple (for the natives esteem it as a sort of

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This illustrious prince arrived to the age of sixty-one. It was told him on his death-bed * that general De la Gardie † had obtained great successes in the Russian war, and settled various preliminaries concerning the advancement of his younger son Charles Philip to the station of Czar; to which he replied with an air of composure, *That he resigned all worldly cares into better hands*, ‡ casting an affectionate and earnest look upon our Gustavus. He married two wives, Anna Maria daughter of Louis elector Palatin, who bore him two sons and four daughters, who all died before they arrived to years of maturity, except the princess Catharina, who espoused the count Palatin of the Rhine, and gave to the world Charles Louis, crowned afterwards king of Sweden under the title of Charles X. By his second wife Christina, daughter of Adolphus duke of Holstein and Sleswic, he had Gustavus Adolphus and Charles Philip lately mentioned, which latter prince was born in the year 1600, and died at Narva, January 25, 1622; as likewise Maria Elizabeth, who married John duke of Ostrogothia; and by an illicit amour Charles Carlsson count de Gildenheim, high admiral of the Swedish fleet when his half brother entered Germany.

Immediately on the death of Charles IX. all persons seemed inclined to favour Gustavus; and at the expiration of two months the queen dowager and John duke of Ostrogothia, who (with Oxenstiern and several senators) were the young prince's guardians, convened an assembly of the states at Nicoping, where the right of succession was first examined into, and ways and means afterwards considered whereby to propose a peace or truce with the Danes, Polanders, and Muscovites, or continue the war with success and vigour. Under the first head some few difficulties arose of no great moment, and at length it was resolved unanimously to remain by the hereditary *disposition* which had been agreed upon at Norcopen in 1594: and with regard to a future war, which most people foresaw and expected, it was determined to support the young prince with reputation and spirit, and infuse new activity into agriculture and commerce. Nor were the mines forgotten. Mean while it was thought expedient that duke John should resign all pretensions to the throne of Sweden, being half brother to Sigismund king of Poland, and first cousin to Gustavus; but more nearly related to the throne

delicacy) is something of the size and figure of a soup-plate, but thick at bottom. It is a vegetable I remember not to have seen in our English gardens.

* He died Oct. 30, 1611.

† Gustavus Adolphus always acknowledged to his dying day, that he learnt the art of war under this excellent preceptor. *Schefferi Memorabilia*,

‡ *Laccenii Hist. Suen. p. 501,*

by the laws of consanguinity, inasmuch as he was the son of Gustavus's father's elder brother; of course the kinsman generously added a part of Westergothia to his former appenage of Ostrogothia. On the other hand, the dowager queen Christina made a full resignation of her regency, partly as her son had attained the age prescribed by law*, and partly as they discovered talents and capacity in him which made him in effect a person of mature years and discretion †. And here it may be matter of some astonishment, why a youth of parts and courage, circumstanced like prince John, who had arrived to due and lawful age conformably to the regulations of the Swedish constitution, himself a soldier and not disliked by the army, should freely and voluntarily without a sigh or a murmur resign a throne, to which his pretensions were not only justifiable, but strictly legal! It is true the succession had been settled (when John was a minor) upon Gustavus, but that was no argument to a prince of spirit and magnanimity, inasmuch as the same people had once settled the like political entail upon him ‡; and with respect to age and experience according to the common course of things he had the advantage over his cousin by five years, being at this very period twenty-two. Yet John, to the amazement of us at present, and all Europe in those days, neither advanced his claims, nor retired from court, nor formed cabals and factions there, or in the country where he had great property, but on the contrary bore a command under his kinsman, and served him in war and peace faithfully, cordially and vigorously to his dying moments: and yet this prince was not void of ambition, as appears by the figure he chose to make at the head of an army.

Now whether it was, that Gustavus was so beloved by the people that nothing could give a man the chance of setting aside the decrees of senate; or whether John had the same prepossessions with the Swedish nation in his behalf, discovering abilities in him which made him alone worthy to conduct the affairs of Sweden at that juncture, are matters we cannot presume to explain distinctly at this distance from the fact itself. That he should act likewise in perpetual opposition to his brother Sigismund's measures (descended indeed from another mother) appears to be a sort of conduct that carries with it an air of partiality; nevertheless it may be resolved into his sincere and warm zeal for the Lutheran religion. Yet Sigismund was still more nearly related to him than Gustavus, nor

* It must here be observed that in Sweden and Denmark the kings come to age in their eighth year, not concluded but commencing.

† *Introduction de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 80, 81.

‡ *Secretary Fowler's History of the troubles of Suetland and Poland*, Lond. fol. 1656, p. III.

did he want for solicitations, promises and temptations, as his Polish brother bore a determined hatred to the young king of Sweden.

.. In a word, John was either a prince of heroic gallantry, who preferred *that* system (to his own prejudice) which appeared *best* for his country; or else dreaded to dispute a succession with one in whom he discovered abilities of all kinds far superior to his own. But sometimes great events are directed by private and scarce-perceptible motives; and perhaps the passion he bore for Gustavus's sister, whom he married the year ensuing, made him naturally esteem the brother of his beloved object, whom a war concerning the succession might have separated from him for ever. And it is probable from the great expediency of a good understanding in this point, that the queen dowager talked in so high a strain of authority and firmness to the Swedish clergy when they made attempts to propose difficulties concerning the marriage.

.. In a word, this act of John, considered in whatever light we please, carries with it a fine spirit of heroism; for the same senators that settled the succession upon Gustavus had fixed it upon him some few years before. Yet he made a voluntary and cheerful resignation of all pretensions; (except Gustavus died without male or female issue;) to his own immortal honour, and the perpetual advantage of Sweden. By all I can learn, he had no descendants.

.. Yet notwithstanding all these favourable concessions, Gustavus behaved himself with great moderation, and assured the senators in a public speech, that his youth and inexperience on the one hand, and the great difficulties of state-affairs on the other hand, made him wish to decline such a dangerous pre-eminence; *nevertheless*, continued he, *if the states persist to make me a king, I will endeavour to acquit myself with honour, magnanimity, and fidelity...* And then before his inauguration he delivered to the Orders of state what the Swedes call a paper of asscuration, whereby he declared to *preserve the reformed religion till the last moments of his life; to maintain the rights of senator and subject; and respect his mother and relations with all that tenderness which consanguinity is supposed to dictate.—Engaging and stipulating at the same time, to make no infraction on the laws of his ancestors, nor offer new proposals in respect to war, truces, treaties or general taxes, except with the full and free consent of the states assembled.—That he would preserve the received and established formulary of church-ordination; protect and encourage the university of Upsal, and the state of learning in general, (of which he gave strong proofs that very year) that he would reform all common abuses in the courts of judicature; and not only declare the names of state-informers, if properly requested, but pu-*
nish

nish them (whenever in the course of trial they appeared guilty) according to the crimes and injuries they had committed.

These great concessions conveyed in effect much more power to the Swedish nation than it could presume to ask; but a prince like Gustavus, who determined always to act honestly and magnificently, preferred rather to depend on the generosity and gratitude of the people, than on his own authority and political artifice: in consequence of this declaration, signed at Nicoping December 31, 1611, he received the sacred communion, and passed through the ceremony of inauguration.

At the opening of the year 1612 the new-designed king summoned a public convention of the states, where the methods of administering the government at that juncture 1612. were first considered, as likewise ways and means whereby to establish a truce or declare war against Poland; a resumption being next made of all crown grants, which was confirmed afterwards by regal sanction. He then published a memorial (this was towards the conclusion of the year) setting forth the uncertain returns of tythes* and feudal lands: and that an account of the annual income arising from them should be delivered every twelve months into the royal exchequer; and lastly, that all grants which his majesty proposed not to resume, should receive from his hand a new confirmation before the conclusion of half a year.

It is certain that the situation of Gustavus was truly critical. Is it not amazing that a youth who had but then turned the seventeenth year of his age, should be able to confront on the one hand an indefatigable pretender to his throne and dominions, like the king of Poland, and two professed avowed opponents, the Dane and the Muscovite; and have strength likewise on the other hand to settle the interior parts of a kingdom but just rendered hereditary, and where every person of a certain birth and rank had equal claim (at least according to the representations of human partiality) and similar pretensions with himself? But the character of Gustavus was an unshaken firmness †, and by his spirit he kept all his nobles in profound subjection, though at first, till they knew him better, they secretly repined to see a grandson of a subject raised to a throne, and that throne appropriated to the family of Vasa. Having thus made mankind acquainted with his steadiness, he gave the world a new opening into his character as a prince of uncommon judgment and sagacity by one of the first steps he took after his inauguration; for he filled all the

* The tythes in Sweden make a considerable part of the crown-revenue.

† *Memoirs communicated.*

public posts civil and military with persons of the most distinguished merit in their respective departments, and placed Oxenstiern at the head of domestic and foreign affairs; one of the ablest statesmen perhaps that ever appeared in the political world. This was one of those masterly strokes that determine the character of a man's life: and yet the idea was conceived by Gustavus about the eighteenth year of his age; so that Oxenstiern being then but twenty-eight or twenty-nine* the disproportion appears not so very extraordinary betwixt the sovereign and the minister.

Oxenstiern was a statesman whom posterity considers in the character of a man that hath never been rivalled! and yet it is more than probable that Gustavus was at least his equal in political science. Not that hereby I would manifest any inclination to depreciate the merit of the great and illustrious Rikschancellor, whom I regard as highly as man can do on this side of that partiality which borders upon implicit veneration. He had fame enough from his own fund, to stand in need of borrowing from no other man's. Nevertheless it is my duty to do all possible justice to Gustavus, since this single circumstance will deliver him down to posterity adorned with a double portion of ability and glory.

But omitting these considerations, the king had still great demands for the assistance of Oxenstiern: and in truth, he had so much business upon his hands, whether as a warrior or as a statesman, that it was necessary to admit a partner in the fatigues and honour both of government and war. And thus a king, of a cast peculiar to himself, supported by such a fellow-labourer in a life alike military and civil, produced such a rapid and uninterrupted series of great events, as neither ancient nor modern history can parallel, if all difficulties and obstructions come to be considered attentively and effectually, and not partially and superficially. And lastly it must be observed, that the person assumed into participation of employments with Gustavus was not only a politician of the first class, but no inconsiderable general besides. Nor must the reader blame me for bestowing my encomiums so profusely on Oxenstiern, when at the same time we assure him that Urban VIII. one of the most clear-sighted and sensible personages then in Europe, always considered the chancellor as a being of some superior order.

Soon after the interval between the death of Charles IX. and the accession of Gustavus, the pacificator-general of Europe dispatched Sir James Spence on an embassy into Sweden,

* By Miervelt's excellent print of him engraven from life, he was but fifty-three years old in 1636.

exhorting the young prince to make manifest the same inclinations towards peace which his father had always discovered*. Gustavus received the interposition of his Britannic majesty with an air of frankness and cheerfulness, as likewise the kind interference of the states-general: for by the way England and Holland wished much to see the navigation of the Baltic free and undisturbed. Of course a congress was appointed, where much disquisition passed between the chancellors of Sweden and Denmark, who sustained the two principal characters in the debate. But though it might be matter of conscience in a German historian to recite religiously every circumstance in the whole transaction, (of which the objections and solutions, the tergiversations and over-reachings, the suspicions of a king's good faith passed in days of minority, the punctilious ceremonies and chicaneries were alike endless and insignificant:) yet it may suffice for us to leave these ministers during a season in their political state of warfare, till the deputies of England in particular had time to administer their gentler anodynes. For the king their master had always a firm persuasion, (grounded on his supposed skill in logic and school-divinity) that he could compose the resentments of two contending nations as easily as Virgil does the battles of the bees;

*Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta
Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt.*

Nevertheless, we fancy his Britannic majesty paused a little upon the above-mentioned ceremonial difficulties, for a sensible foreigner assures us †, that he was very scrupulous in matters of form and precedence, refusing to stand godfather to madame Elizabeth of France, in conjunction with the infantia Clara Eugenia, daughter and sister to a king of Spain, and sovereign of the Low Countries. And yet Anne, mother of Louis XIV. condescended to appear at the font with cardinal Richelieu, who was her subject.

Gustavus, (which was very extraordinary,) if one considers the youthful fire and impetuosity of a temper like his, gave strong indications of acquiescing cheerfully under all safe and honourable proposals; but as the king of Denmark seemed to discover an unbecoming eagerness for crushing or over-reaching a young unexperienced monarch, he soon gave that artful prince to understand, that he feared him no more in a field of battle, than at a table of conference. Yet here from the very

* The letter, dated Whitehall, May 5, 1612, is to be seen in *Loocenius*, p. 516.

† *Mémoires Hist. & Pol. d'Amelot de la Housaye*, tome i. 378.

first beginning of war, he convinced the public, that great as his natural courage and vivacity were (and sure a larger share never became the portion of a human being) yet that his reason and good sense still maintained the ascendancy over them; and therefore though it was natural for all bystanders to conclude, that a young prince full of enthusiastical gallantry, despising the objections of friends, and the obstructions of enemies, would have began the campaign against Denmark by undertaking the siege of Calmar, (an important place surrendered barely the year preceding) yet on the contrary, revolving the enterprize long in his mind, and more particularly the strength of the new fortifications, his correct judgment soon got the better of his vivacity; soasmuch as he foresaw the hazard and disappointment that might attend such an undertaking: and for these reasons carried the seat of war into Schonen, (to which Christian had retired) and commanded his cousin John, who had raised an army in his own duchy, and wanted to co-operate against the Danes; to make a diversion in Oitrogothia, and succour Elfsburg. He then invaded the Danish territories a second time, though the senate requested him not to hazard his person too far, and made reprisals with great advantage, notwithstanding his enemy had received a reinforcement of some German troops under the command of George duke of Lunenburg*; but whether these forces were dispatched by the emperor's connivance or not, (that being a point of great consequence in the history of Gustavus with reference to his future invasion of the German empire) is more than I can take upon me to determine in a satisfactory manner. Leaving these things therefore in the doubtful state we find them, Gustavus laid siege to Elsenberg; wisely foreseeing, that in rendering himself master of this passage and harbour, he should prevent the arrival of fresh succours from Denmark, and obstruct the retreat of such Danes and Germans as had entered into Sweden, having placed garrisons to hinder their march, in all the fortified towns that lay between them and their native country. During this expedition the Danes surprized a part of the king's troops by

* *Histoires generales des guerres & mouvements arrivés en divers estats du monde sous le regne de Louis XIII. depuis l'an 1610 jusqu'à l'an 1637, in trois tomes 2^o. Laccnii Hist. Suec. p. 507.* This prince was afterwards general of the protestant troops in Lower Saxony, and elected protector of the circle: but being displaced by the artful insinuations of the king of Denmark, submitted to the emperor on the defeat of his Danish majesty at the battle of Lütta 1626; and joined the Imperial army with his own regiment. He had for a time in the next year the chief command of Wallstein's troops before Straßund, but on some disgust joined Gustavus, who replaced him in his old employment. He gained a signal victory over Merodé and Gronselt at the battle of Oldendorp, 1633; but quitted the Swedish service in 1637, and died in 1641.

night*, and a report was spread, (which took its rise from the enemy) that Gustavus was killed, which threw his mother into agonies of affliction; but an express from her careful and affectionate child soon restored her to her former tranquillity. He then marched the residue of his army into Norway, and made a furious irruption into those parts. But to relate every single event of this campaign against the Danes would only prove minute and tedious. It may suffice to observe, that the king had three little armies on foot; the first led by himself, the second in Halland conducted by his cousin John, and a third on the confines, under the command of general Cruse. Duke John received a slight repulse in a skirmish with Christian king of Denmark, and the duke of Lunenburg and Cruse took Nylosia (where 300 of the garrison enrolled themselves under the Swedish ensigns) but wanted strength to reduce Marstrand. Mean while Gustavus collected together several regiments of infantry in the Low Countries, with a small body of mariners; and gave public commissions to various Dutch privateers to interrupt the naval commerce of Denmark †.

Nevertheless our young monarch laboured under some difficulties highly disagreeable: for though his enemy on the other hand, Sigismond king of Poland, [whom of all his adversaries he most disliked personally, and that for reasons which may easily be conjectured ‡] had employed himself this year in opposing the Muscovites, yet he contrived to create some fresh business for Gustavus in the province of Livonia, where he was obliged to maintain a considerable body of veteran troops, having a district to defend of 180 miles long, and 90 broad, surnamed by the Swedes Carelia, as it had been conquered by Charles their late king. So that Gustavus having half finished his irruption into Norway, found himself obliged to make a personal appearance in Carelia. At that instant Christian reimbarcked his troops, and invaded Westergo-

* In the first edition, instead of a *surprize by night* it was called a CAMISADO. The critics found fault with *this word*, which has been used by the ancient classics of our country. Now in my opinion every word should be retained that was once classical, provided no equivalent word has been substituted in its place. Camisado is purely a term of war; it is never applied on any other occasion. *Surprize by night* is as applicable to the taking Jonathan Wild in his bed, as the taking of Prague. We may be too delicate and fantastical upon these occasions; like the man who translated the New Testament merely to make it more polite, and call the Virgin Mary *Madam*. What word would these men substitute in the place of Gustavus's *brigade*, or Wallstein's *tercias*? or what equivalent expression could they find for *watch-master*, *arquebuse à croc*, *commanded men*?

† *Intercurs. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 81.

‡ *Schifferi Memorab. Succ. Gentis*, 42.

thia a second time, where he rendered himself master of Elfsberg and Goltzberg; and having penetrated above sixty miles into the country, commenced at length the siege of Jencop, which gave him an entrance into the heart of Sweden. This new and unexpected invasion threw Gustavus into great perplexity; he had two games to play, both (not in themselves, but as circumstances then stood) equally interesting. At length not caring to sacrifice his army by a long and precipitate march, (the most troublesome difficulty that can befall a general who is to defend an invaded maritime territory) he ordered the governor of Jencop to ruin the town and adjacent district, and retire with his garrison into the castle. This grand stroke of superior judgment soon carried its advantages with it: yet in spite of all these arts of management and precaution, our young hero, though he considered Sigismund as an imperfect warrior to a certain degree, soon found Christian * to be a soldier that had acquired a correct judgment by a series of misfortunes and ill success: for Christian not only intrenched himself judiciously, and declined fighting, but took his measures upon such principles, that he created obstructions and delays; and made them arise from the very nature of his own plan. Thus by perpetual checks he blunted the impetuosity of our young assailant, mortified his hopes, and wearied out his patience; so that Gustavus finding he could not act in the way he chose, nor shine in that sort of military character he was ambitious of appearing in, equally great in every thing, great in repulses and disappointments, as well as in prosperity and victories, dropped his scheme, and made a peace, (by the mediation of England principally) to the astonishment of all Europe. Indeed it cannot but surprize posterity too, that a prince in the eighteenth year of his age, as personally brave perhaps as any soldier that served under him, (not to mention the rage and despair that disappointment produces in young impetuous minds) that such a prince, I say, in such circum-

* Christian IV. king of Denmark, succeeded his father in 1588, being then about twelve years old. He died turned of seventy-one, having reigned in effect near threescore years, though not crowned till 1596. He told d'Avaux the French ambassador, that he was not only at that time the eldest king in Christendom, but that he had seen three changes of sovereigns in almost all the kingdoms and principalities of Europe. The same remark might have been made afterwards by Louis XIV. He had three horses killed under him at the battle of Lütter. There is a good picture of him at Hampton-Court, painted by Vanfomer.

Nor may it be amiss to transcribe what a Spanish author saith concerning him. *Rey que en setenta annos de edad fatiga lo que otros a veynsé, y que estos últimos solre tantas preuvas de su valor, en disgracia tubo dicha de acreditarle con un ojo perdido de un cannonazo, paleando en sus navas.* Epitome of *Cæsar's Commentaries* by the Baron d'Ausby.

stances

stances should make a free sacrifice of what he then thought his only fame, and listen with the coolest attention to the strict doctrine of good sense and right reason. Other warriors are so fortunately circumstanced as to enter upon the theatre of action, surrounded and adorned with a blaze of glory; nor does their character in general encrease proportionably to the more important services they are afterwards engaged in. On the contrary Gustavus began the military life, if not unprosperously *, at least in a manner that was neither shining nor triumphant. Yet sedate and sensible people soon perceived the young man's merit, for they discovered in him equal mixtures (both in the highest degree) of judgment and bravery: and thence prefigured to themselves great events at their proper period; and from this moment the clear-sighted Spinola †, as far removed from Sweden as the Low Countries, assumed in right of his age and experience the gift of presaging, and foretold that Gustavus might become one day or other the first commander in Europe ‡. For he had three adversaries driving furiously § at his ruin in one strict confederacy, all his seniors in point of war, and more experienced, and each his equal, if we consider their riches, possessions, and quantity of troops:

* *Bayle's discourse on Gustavus Adolphus.*

† This great man was originally a Genoese merchant. His siege of Breda was an illustrious action: fearful of ruining his fair reputation, he was very unwilling to undertake it; but the king of Spain's remarkable letter determined him:

“ Marquis;

“ Take Breda.

“ I the king.”—

And this by the way is the original of those brief military letters which have been since so greatly admired.

He was appointed governor of Milan a little before his death; but notwithstanding all his services the Spaniards looked coldly upon him for concluding the truce with Mazarine, as also for want of success in the siege of Casal, and upon supposition he held a criminal correspondence with Richelieu. He died of a broken heart in great agitations at a sort of his own erecting called Scrivia, September 15, 1630, grasping the king his master's letters in his hand, and crying out day and night, *M'banno levato l'onore, m'banno levato l'onore!* And indeed Philip IV. and the Spanish ministry behaved towards him with unparalleled ingratitude, for they refused to defray the debts he had contracted for the support of the army: and on the contrary sequestered to that purpose the estates he had purchased; so that his son thought it best economy to decline all attempts of taking possession. *Hispanica Dominationis Arcana*, p. 115. Yet in favour to his memory as a soldier, and in confirmation of what occasioned this note, he had sagacity enough to declare again, (namely, immediately after the battle of Prague in 1620) *that Gustavus was the only protestant prince who ought not to be provoked.* *Heylmanno Leo Arctovii*, 4º. 1703. See more in the *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri*. 4º. in Rom: 1646, p. 64, &c.

‡ *Heylmanni Leo Arctovii* 4º.

§ *Memoriale al Duca di Savoia nel 1636. MS fene. authorem. pagg. 21. folio.*

so that negative glory in a case circumstanced like his was equal to positive glory in the general situation of others. What therefore the fire of passion could not effect, (and warmth of temper was the only constitutional infirmity interwoven with his nature) the cool reflexion of reason conducted soon to a fortunate conclusion. And then to make manifest to the world his generous sentiments concerning religion; he established a church at Stockholm for the comfort of such Germans as had left their country on account of religion.

An extraordinary event which happened in the course of this year, made it plain that Gustavus inherited a portion of his firmness from Christina his mother; for when John duke of Ostrogothia, who was then but twenty-three years old, conceived the idea of espousing Maria Elizabetha, the young king's whole sister, and his own first cousin, the principal ecclesiastics of Sweden opposed this marriage violently in the assembly of the states, as contradictory to the laws of Scripture*; but the queen told them with an air of decision, That she had held private conferences with various learned and pious churchmen on the subject in question, and finding nothing therein repugnant to God's word, had made her mind and conscience entirely easy; adding, moreover, that their opposition was alike unseasonable and improper, since they all knew that the young people had publicly exchanged their promises two years before. "You give me," said she, "advice, which I no ways ask; for when popish power, and popish subtleties are once abolished, it seems to me that the affairs of marriage appertain to the secular as well as clerical governors;" [I am here reciting the queen's own words agreeable to the memoirs that lie before me] and therefore, concluded she, "give me no farther trouble concerning the present difficulty; for your retardments proceed more from a spirit of perplexing matters than a love of peace."

And here perhaps the reader may doubt how a prince of John's age could be brother to Sigismund king of Poland, there being twenty-three years difference between their respective dates of birth? But their father, after having lived in marriage twenty-one years with Catharina of Poland, espoused at her death a Swedish young woman of quality, and John was the produce of these second nuptials †.

Whilst the congress lately mentioned were very busy about meer nothings, two other eminent personages (for Sir 1613. John Merrick had been dispatched some months before) presented themselves on the part of England, namely, Sir

* *Introduct. de Priffendorf, tom. iv. 88.*

† *Genealogia Ruteb. 4r, fol.*

John Merrick, and Anstruther*; the first was sent expressly to Gustavus, the other being only the Britannic ambassador at Copenhagen: the former a good Swede, the latter a well-wisher to the Danes, who of course created delays, and deferred his journey to the very last moment. On his arrival he sent his secretary to Spence (who by the way favoured the cause of Sweden) with intimations to him, that his majesty of Denmark would no ways allow him (namely Anstruther) to make the first visit, and of course requesting Spence to come to his tent without hesitation; which latter informed Oxenstiern immediately of this extraordinary message, who broke forth into a flame all at once, protesting loudly that it was amazing insolence on the part of Denmark to demand precedence over Sweden from pleas of dignity and superiority; and that the contrary practice had ever uniformly been well understood in all public communications between the two kingdoms. And thus at length it was agreed that the two Britons should meet at a place appointed, which was situated half way between their respective tents. Merrick and Spence acted both with great caution and impartiality towards the contending parties, so that Gustavus opportunely and dextrously lent a willing ear to all their proposals, and after a strange variety of delays, obstructions, and punctilios, the treaty was signed January 19, 1613 †. For particular reasons it had no preamble, nor was any guaranty admitted, for the king of Denmark could not bear to hear the Hollanders mentioned ‡.

But what privately disposed Gustavus to listen to an accommodation, was the deplorable and wretched state of the Swedish marine; at the time he contended with a prince not contemptible for naval forces. As he knew the extraordinary advantages of maritime strength, so he foresaw likewise that such a power could not be created but by perseverance and industry, and therefore chose to obtain a little intermission with respect to Denmark. And indeed he had strong reasons to support a project of that nature: nor did he ever swerve to the hour of his death from this first idea; for Christian the preceding summer had made a descent near Stockholm, and missed little of destroying the capital; which indeed may be considered as the finest military performance in that prince's life; but Gustavus took care to render the attempt abortive. His next business was to procure the best officers and mariners he could from the dominions of the States General and the Hanse towns.

* *Loccenii Hist. Suecan.* 521.

† The Treaty may be seen in *Loccenius. Hist. Suec.* p. 522.

‡ *Hist. ed. H. de Passanderf.* tom. iv.

But to return to the treaty, which was long and tedious; for half the debate turned upon matters of heraldry and titles. At length the conclusion (which alone carried with it the least glimmering of good politics and sound sense) was, that his Danish majesty should restore Calmar, &c. and keep possession of Elfsburg till Gustavus refunded some satisfactory equivalent. In a word, the Danes demanded one hundred and eighty thousand pounds by way of indemnification: allowing the Swedes to call the payment of that money either a reimbursement, or a gratification, as best pleased them; referring the full and ultimate decision to James I. who was to sign the treaty in the character of a person interested. But at length, by the unwearied interposition of the British ministers, it was concluded to make a very small part of the demand supply the place of the whole, and assign the delivery of certain fortresses by way of hypotheque or security. Terms of very hard and difficult digestion! But Gustavus was well disposed and tractable, and the senate without farther delay devised means and expedients for discharging the debt. In consequence of which, the principal result was, that both kings were allowed to bear the three crowns for their arms. Christian was to make no pretensions on Sweden by virtue of this concession, and Gustavus on the other hand was not to take the title of king of Lapland.

From all that hath been said, it will appear plainly to the reader, that reasons of prudence induced Gustavus to conclude this peace, though at that very time he had made a progress in war which surprized all Europe: for it may be worth observing here once for all, that he, Condé, and his own disciple Törstenson, were the only three generals who at twenty years of age shewed the public all the effects of a long experience. Nevertheless, the king concluded this peace *sub clypeo tantum*, (according to the advice of his senate upon another occasion) for he levied just before two good regiments in Scotland and the Low Countries, and hired likewise fifteen ships from the Scottish nation, which plundered the town and district of Drontheim, and sailed afterwards to the southernmost shores of Sweden*.

The demands of Denmark being thus satisfied, it was thought expedient in the next place, to enter into a 1614. fifteen years treaty of commerce and mutual guaranty with the States General; and to this purpose Gustavus dispatched Van Dyck, a favourite minister with his father, in an embassy to Holland, where the whole affair was concluded both effectually and speedily. As to the interior management

* *Introduct. de Puffendorf, tom. iv. p. 84.*

of Sweden, due and sufficient care was taken both of cities and countries, and better means were devised for exercising trade and commerce, both by natives and foreigners. The farmers and peasants were excused from supplying horses and carriages gratis to the king's armies. Nor must it here be forgotten, that though Gustavus from a principle of sincere religion, as well as solid policy, had an earnest desire to make his dominions the asylum of all virtuous and industrious emigrants, from other countries, whether papists or protestants, yet still one remarkable restriction was intermixed with the royal edict, namely, that no foreigner or banished person should presume to enter the kingdom without bringing with him letters testimonial concerning his religious and moral deportment from persons of character. After this a society of trade was established at Stockholm, where each party who enrolled himself voluntarily, undertook to advance the king certain sums (none less than twenty pounds) at 12 *per cent.* and to 1614. encourage this subscription, the persons contributing were exempted from taxes for three years.

Deliberations had been held likewise, and royal constitutions made public, with respect to money, imposts, and certain immunities from taxes, distinct from those already mentioned. All possible precautions were taken to establish a peace with Muscovy and Poland; nor did this great and good king, amidst all his perplexities and difficulties, forget to regulate the lectures, discipline, and morality of the university of Upsal. It was then concluded that his majesty ought to propose a peace with Muscovy sword in hand; after which ensued a royal edict relating to the jesuits, whom the king disliked more than any set of men in the Christian world; and the business was closed with (what some historians miscall) the *famous edict against metaphysics*, upon supposition, as they falsely imagined, that he had conceived an aversion to these trifling studies. But the truth of the matter appears to me in another light. Gustavus had his political reasons for taking this step; Poland was the fountain-head of such sort of reveries; and a tribe of refining schoolmen had given philosophical laws to all Europe in that respect. The Swedes for these reasons flocked in great numbers to the universities of Warsaw and Cracow, and imbibed sentiments favourable to Sigismund, and consequently disobliging to Gustavus. Hence it was that the metaphysical science was made only the poor scape-goat upon which our monarch wrecked his just resentments, condemning it in the character of a politician, and not a philosopher. And in consequence of this, a subsequent law was made public, whereof the purport was that no young man of quality or condition should quit the kingdom without a passport first obtained from

the crown, with proviso not to solicit leave to prosecute his philosophical studies and military exercise in a suspected place*.

But to return to the affairs between Sweden and Denmark, Gustavus having embraced in the critical moments a flying and casual incident, which served to throw his Danish majesty into a state of inaction, (the person of his three assailants he disliked the most, for he was cool and reserved, and likewise understood best the profession of war,) found still more work than he chose, in being obliged to carry on a sort of barbarian campaigns against the great duke of Muscovy and the king of Poland. And to understand this situation more clearly with respect to the former, we must go back a little, and observe, that Gustavus's father had sent troops to assist the czar Basil against the enterprizes of Sigismund, by which assistance the Swedes privately hoped to procure prince Charles, Gustavus's brother, to be chosen great duke; the Poles on the other hand expected that Sigismund might happen to be elected, or Vladislaus his son. But the Muscovites overlooked the pretensions and expectancies of both parties, and following their own free choice, relied entirely upon a genuine descendant of the Demetrian race; upon which the new czar by way of gratitude declared war immediately against Sweden.

And indeed here it is thought by many (for dissimulation will not become a faithful or exact historian) that Charles Philip, Gustavus's brother, might have been elected great duke of the Russias; yet though the king loved him tenderly, he was at the same time too good a politician to wish to see that event made successful, being well apprized that certain elevations to power and dignity might remove a brother out of reach of brotherly friendship. Of course he retarded Charles's journey by so many unperceived delays, (having, it is imagined, some thoughts of being elected himself) till at length the Muscovites fixed their choice upon another object †.

But notwithstanding the last-mentioned opinion which hath been suggested to me, it appears highly probable from history, that Gustavus, who had then other affairs upon his hands still more important, never truly and really impeded the election of his brother or of himself. The fact was, that the people of Novogrod had entered into a negotiation with Charles's agents, and these persons were sincerely in earnest, for they made him an offer of their own duchy, without presuming to become answerable for the rest of the Muscovites; but the prince preferred a quiet and well-settled appennage at home (for he enjoyed four duchies and the Valensian territory, &c.) to a litigious and turbulent possession amidst a multitude of

* Anno 1620,

† *Memoirs communicated.*

barbarians: *Carolus se ab illis vana spe laetatum esse sentiens, & rem justæ vindictæ a rege fratre & se suo tempore in mobilem gentem exercendæ committens, inde abiit**.

The life of a prince like Gustavus, may be justly divided into two departments, the one civil, and the other military: since we can hardly discover a single moment assigned, 1615. for relaxation or amusement; and as to pleasure, there was neither room to receive it, nor time to indulge it. Nevertheless, if Gustavus had ever leisure to cast his eyes on books of politics and history, (for in fact we find him eminently conversant not only in these studies, but in classical learning, tactics, and mathematics) it must have been principally in the years 1615 and 1616; and yet notwithstanding this remark of mine, a period of time may be very busy, and not void of occupations and perplexities, though nothing appears sufficient to make a shining figure in future annals. Yet sure it is, that the king passed whole nights in reading the military history of the antients, and often used to say, that the invention of fire-arms, and the art of fortifying places, made a wide difference between us and them, yet that a man who possessed the courage of the heroes of antiquity might perform actions as illustrious as theirs. The continuator of Foresti produces the example of Gustavus upon this occasion to shew, that much may be learnt from the antients in point of war, though the manner of attack and defence at present be widely different from what was practised by the Greeks and Romans. There is reason for entertaining the reader with this remark, for the knowledge of plans of battles and fortifications makes but half the science which belongs to a general: it is military and civil policy that help to complete the other half, and these the antients knew as well as the moderns †.

It may suffice therefore to observe, that in the beginning of the year 1615 he convened the states and orders of the realm at Helsingford †, where, amongst many other important transactions, he introduced and finished one of the greatest acts that a king can perform in times of peace: for he published an edict to abridge the tediousness and expence of law-suits, especially in matters of regal judicature, and prescribed the form and manner how these proceedings were to be shortened. The glorious consequences of which have been enjoyed by Sweden more or less to this present hour: for no king, as the Swedes

* *Loccenii Hist. Suec.* lib. viii. 523.

† *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques traduites de l'Espagnol de M. le Marq. de Santa Cruz de Marzenado*, tom. i. 27. This valuable work consists of 12 tomes, 120.

‡ January 19.

acknowledge to this very day, ever devised more salutary, or more sensible laws than Gustavus Adolphus †.

His majesty then, to give every action of his life the fairest and most candid appearance, deputed Oxenstiern ambassador to Christian IV. king of Denmark, with instructions to explain to him, amongst other things, the sincere and honourable intentions that Sweden bore with respect to Muscovy and Poland, and particularly in regard to a permanent, substantial, and well-concerted peace: and as a proof thereof dispatched on the same errand, (though without success) Everard Horn, general de la Gardie, and a third deputy to the court of Russia. But the czar persisted inflexible, and of course a war could not be avoided. Which resolution did not greatly discompose Gustavus; and, in this one instance, the king of Poland thought fit to join him. Nor did he much dislike the military abilities of his new opponent, being a warrior far inferior to his late Danish adversary; and indeed his great object in the present expedition was not making conquests, but securing to his subjects a firm and lasting peace, and fixing the affairs of public good faith upon solid foundations. For the cause of this quarrel on the side of Sweden, was a refusal the Muscovites made of re-imbursing to the states of Sweden a very considerable sum of money, which they had generously advanced to supply their necessities.

Provoked at such an act of ingratitude, his Swedish majesty soon rendered himself master of the vast province of Ingria, and took by storm the strong fort of Kexholm, then looked upon to be impregnable. In the next place he formed the siege of Pleſko, of which the event appeared doubtful to all, but men of great and enterprizing genius; and so much the rather, as the wintry season began to approach †; but his majesty of Great Britain, at the request of the Muscovites, graciously interposed his pacific offices: and in consequence thereof Gustavus writ Sir John Merrick an extremely civil and generous letter ‡, remarking here and there casually, “ That he besieged Pleſko, not from the ambition of taking
“ a fortress supposed impregnable, but with a view to force
“ the enemy into conditions of peace, by an unexpected
“ stroke, which carried with it the appearance of performing

* Introduction de Puffendorf, tom. iv. 94. These regulations were published by authority.

† During this difficult and perilous siege, his majesty defeated an army of 24,000 Muscovites, near the confines of Livonia and Russia. *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri.* 4^o, in Roma, 1646.

‡ The whole letter, dated from Narva, November 30, 1615, is preserved by Loccenius, p. 525.

something in the art of war.—All the former part of which, says he to Merrick, you have known to be true, and have beheld likewise the obstinacy of the Russians and their infidelity.—Hearing no proposals with respect to an accommodation, I had reduced the place to the very point of capitulating: but notwithstanding all my fatigues, expences, and military losses, upon promise the Muscovites be duly and justly restrained for times to come, I lay my glory a sacrifice at the feet of England, with a view to convince mankind in general, that I waged this war not from motives of ambition, (for my territories are sufficiently large and powerful) but from the mere compulsion and necessity of things.—It ever hath been, and is still my inclination to cultivate peace and friendship with all my neighbours.—This upon just and honourable terms is most agreeable to my natural temper. But if a lawful war is not to be healed by conciliatory and reputable measures; *We can embrace it with resolution.*” And thus the king contented himself with reflecting coolly, even in the earlier parts of life, That the greatest generals are not indispensibly obliged to render themselves masters of every town they think fit to besiege*.

Nevertheless it must be observed in regard to the memory of James I. (*O si sic omnia fecisset!*) that the conditions of agreement were good and honourable; for the enemy refunded to the Swedes a considerable sum of money, under appearance of making amends for the expences of the war, and ceded to them a large part of the continent of Muscovy; so that those who love to foretell events even then said (so promising were the beginnings of our hero's life) that he had made good in one part that line of conquest on earth which corresponded with the draught first sketched out for him by Tycho Brahé in the celestial regions †. Nor ought we to forget here, that it was in this campaign he first formed and seasoned that invincible body of troops called the Finlanders, and at the conclusion thereof, having brought the national soldiers in general to a more steady and regular sort of discipline, disbanded a

* Bayle's Introduction to the Life of Gustavus Adolphus.

† This calculation was made in 1572. See *The new Star of the North*, Lond. 4^o. 1622. from pag. 1. to pag. 23. In addition to which the following paragraph may be subjoined from the *Patiniana*, p. 7. La Vie de Tycho Brahé a été composée par le bon M. Cassendi. Ce fut ce Tycho Brahé qui dans le traité qu'il fit de la comete l'an 1674 (qu. if not 1672) qui disparut à la mort de Charles XII. apres avoir duré depuis le massacre de la S. Barthélemi, a dit, qu'en vertu de cet étoile naitroit vers le nord dans la Finlande un prince qui ébranleroit l'Allemagne & qui disparaitroit'en fin de l'an 1632. Voilà précisément GUSTAVE ADOLPHE, roy de Suedes. See also *Pietro Poma*; Guerre di Germ. lib. v. p. 5.

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large corps of foreign veterans, partly to redress the silent murmurings of his subjects, and partly because he less and less wanted their assistance.

It was likewise during the military operations of this summer, if after all my enquiries I am not greatly mistaken, that Gustavus in the twenty-first year of his age gave an extraordinary proof of his enterprizing genius, declaring to all his officers that he would lay siege to Notteberg-castle, a place by each of his generals looked upon to be impregnable: being situated on a small island on the mouth of the Narva, more than cannon-shot from either shore; the conflux of waters on all sides being extremely rapid and violent. Representations on representations were offered unto him; but our young hero, like another Joshua, landed his forces and took the fortress by capitulation, in which were found provisions and ammunition abundantly sufficient to supply the garrison for a twelvemonth's siege.

Upon this Gustavus returned home: and enjoying for a short space a moderate repose, which may be called almost the only one he ever tasted, from the early parts of youth to the last moments of his life, applied himself with uncommon diligence to comprehend the true nature of commerce, and rendered himself master of that grand monarchical science, the art of easing (as much as in him lay) the taxes of his people. But no where appeared he greater than in the speech † he made his senators at the commencement of the year, when it was necessary to explain his private sentiments in the debate which concerned the Russian war. This he performed with attractive grace and dignity; with all that eloquence could inspire or reason could confirm; obviating and overturning that accusation of ambition which some of his subjects tacitly brought against him in their own breasts; and explaining and answering at the same time the insinuations of certain malevolent libels, which his cousin Sigismund had taken care to see dispersed through Sweden. And thus at once he charmed his subjects and convinced them likewise, that his ambition extended no farther than a brave and prudent prince ought to point it. Of course one uniform universal assent ensued, and the states and orders granted him all supplies that could be looked upon as necessary.

And indeed whoever peruses carefully the speech I have mentioned (though it is rather too long to be inserted,) will

* The author of the *Swedish Intelligencer* places this event in 1617, which appears to me improbable. *Character of Gustavus*, Part iii. p. 134.

† This master-piece of good sense and oratory consists of eight pages in quarto, and may be perused in *Loecenius*, page. 526—533. See also the APPENDIX, Art. I. First Edition, 4°.

And a difficult task to abstain from admiring the eloquence of Gustavus, which must have suffered greatly by being translated into Northern Latin. Yet meer oratory being little more than one of the *speciosa miracula* in the art of reasoning; we shall not fix our principal encomium upon that topic. It is the *clear judgment* of Gustavus which we most admire: the possessing an object in the single point of view which is *alone essential*. As to *wit*, it no where appears that he aimed at it: though he seems to have had a natural turn to *repartee* and *humour*; but there is a poignancy and propriety in all his speeches, replies and rejoinders; and such I may say, as serve to individuate him from every other man. Not but that upon particular occasions he could expatiate with all the charms of the most persuasive eloquence, of which no farther proofs need be alledged than the speech now before us, and those spoken at Erford and Nurenberg; but the closer the engagement was, the more the *vis vivida* of his genius shone forth; and therefore he always chose to discuss matters personally with foreign ministers, and dictate all important instructions to his own ambassadors. Conscious of his abilities in a private chamber he solicited an interview with Christian of Denmark, (one of the subtlest politicians of that age) and obtained the effect desired; he made the same proposal to Louis XIII, but that prince had just sense enough to dread the experiment, and of course declined it.

The year ensuing was entirely employed in treaty-litigations between the Swedes and the Muscovites, as 1616, likewise in contriving farther means to lessen the taxes, and administer ease and plenty to the subjects of Sweden.

At length Gustavus, in order to give the world fresh instances of his generosity and sincerity, allowed a peace to be concluded at Stolba, after the obstruction of ten thousand ceremonies of precedence and titles, which a proud and ignorant nation like, the Muscovites, is always ready to make. And indeed in most, if not all treaties, the grand object is sooner settled, (because better foreseen and understood) than the incidental and collateral ones.

And here it must be observed, that the great duke had required permission from the States General and James I. to raise recruits in their respective dominions, which his Britannic majesty made no difficulty of granting, upon condition the men were not to be employed against Gustavus. This damped the czar's ardour not a little; and Sir John Merrick, gentleman of the bed-chamber, was sent ambassador from England (who had discharged a commission to Gustavus at Narva some years before) to give all the assistances he could towards an accommodation; by which it was at length stipulated,

lated, " That a general amnesty should be settled between
 " the two nations, the pretensions of Charles Philip be set
 " aside, and free intercourse of commerce established; that
 " the Swedes should restore all their conquests, and the great
 " duke in return give back Livonia, renounce the title he
 " derived from it, surrender four towns in the *presecture* of
 " Novogrod, and refund the Swedes 9000 *l.* in good and ster-
 " ling money. The concluding article was, that neither
 " party should assist Poland in any attempts against the two
 " crowns*."

Holland as well as England interposed sincerely in this me-
 diation: yet the treaty was not effectually ratified till the year
 ensuing. All parties wished earnestly for this event, and all
 rejoiced in its completion. His majesty of Great Britain in
 particular shone now in the full meridian of peace-making;

— *Quod optanti Divum promittere nemo.
 Audeat, vokvenda dies en attulit ultro.* —

It was about this time that Gustavus borrowed a very consi-
 derable sum of the States General, in order to re-imburse the
 king of Denmark according to the articles of peace lately
 concluded between them: but as this money arrived not at
 Hamburg in due time, his majesty (who piqued himself on
 his exactness) spared neither application nor pains to procure
 it in good season from another quarter; nevertheless he re-
 ceived it afterwards on due security, and paid it back in cop-
 per-ore †. Nor did the friendship and humanity of the Hol-
 landers stop here; for they gave him permission at or near the
 same time to levy a body of 2000 men in the United Pro-
 vinces, and allowed him likewise the year ensuing ‡ to raise a
 complete regiment of infantry, and a certain definite number
 of seamen sufficient to equip five ships of force against the
 Polanders; and as a terror was then conceived over all the
 northern parts of Europe, that the court of Madrid, in or-
 der to facilitate the future conquests of Sigismund and the em-
 peror §, proposed to send a strong fleet into the Baltic ocean,

* This treaty (not to be found in the grand collections) was comprised
 in xviii articles, and may be perused in the *Laurca Austriaca*, lib. i. p. 30, &c.
This book, which affords the best accounts extant with reference to England
 and the courts of Vienna and Munich in regard to the Palatinate, (a cir-
 cumstance that directed the measures of the British ministry more or less
 during the reigns of James and Charles I.) containeth numberless things
 which are not to be found in our own historians, and hath been supposed by
 some to be composed upon the memoirs and state-papers of cardinal Dietrich-
 stein, successor to Klesfel, and prime minister to the emperors Matthias and
 Ferdinand II.

† *Carlton's Letters*, p. 95.

‡ Anno 1618,

§ *Laurca Austriaca*.

they generously supplied Gustavus with six men of war, which actually failed under the command of Obdam, vice-admiral of Holland*.

Nor must we omit here that Christian, in consequence of the late accommodation between Sweden and himself, made the king a very genteel and plausible offer of sending a body of Danes to augment his army; which proposal was accepted with thankfulness, but for certain private reasons politely declined. For Gustavus knew to perfection the address and artifice of his neighbour, and desired nothing from him but a bill of acquittance. He discharged therefore the debt with all imaginable diligence, and employed the moderate overplus that remained in puzzling the fidelity of the governor of Dunamond, which important place soon admitted a Swedish garrison †.

During this short pause from military transactions his majesty (having first convened the states) passed through the forms of a coronation at Upsal, and then proceeded to reduce his kingdom more and more to one uniform and well-connected system: settling the interior springs and movements of it upon such a principle of regulation, as that no great inconveniences or obstructions should arise during his absence in whatever wars he might chance afterwards to undertake. To effect this, he made some very sensible alterations in the manner of convening the states and in the dispatch of business, and established five public offices of great extent, namely, a court of justice, a chamber of exchequer, a *cancellaria* †, (as the Swedes and Germans call it) and two councils of war, one for land-affairs and one for naval; in each of which departments he appointed himself (absent or present) to be supreme judge and ultimate referée. This being settled, he in the next place augmented and confirmed the privileges of the states and orders; and to encourage what is usually called the fair and settled trader, published an edict against all vagabond and itinerant merchants, ordering likewise in express terms that matters of trade, husbandry, &c. should be transacted in well known and public markets.

And as a war by this time had commenced against him on the side of Poland, he next cast his eyes on his cousin Sigismund in good earnest: concerning whose quarrel and pretensions in order to see the ground-work of them, we must make a small retrospect into the Polish and Swedish histories: Nor can this digression be looked upon as improper, forasmuch as the war lasted (excepting only some few short intermissions) till within three years of our king's death.

* *Carlton's Letters*, 96. 101. 126. 186.

† *Ibid.* 180.

‡ A sort of secretary of state's office.

Gustavus Ericson, or Vasa, our hero's grandfather, having reigned two and thirty years with the character of another Titus, left behind him three sons. Eric (who had been proposed by his father to queen Elizabeth of England) married a young woman of mean parentage, merely from a romantic turn of love; but growing discontented, vicious and cruel, was deposed by his own subjects, and thrown into prison. Upon this John, who had been confined for reasons of state in his brother Eric's reign, (but fortunately contrived his escape) was declared successor to the throne. He died in 1592, after having governed four and twenty years; and then Charles, duke of Sudermania, the younger of the three sons, and father of Gustavus Adolphus, (the posterity of John being set aside by the states) was appointed to succeed him. John by Catharina his wife, daughter of Sigismund II. king of Poland, left two sons, Sigismund, (upon whom our history particularly turneth) and John duke of Ostrogothia, which latter prince, a minor of three years of age when Charles was made king, died without issue in 1618: And in imitation of his father kept firm to the *Evangelical* or *Augustan* confession; but Sigismund, converted by his mother's means, had privately admitted himself into the Romish communion. Charles was a bold and sincere Lutheran; of course his brother John by his last testament made him a sort of pledge to the people with regard to the protestant religion, and appointed him governor of Sweden till Sigismund should return from Poland. During the interregnum he acquitted himself with the clearest honour, exhorting Sigismund to hasten immediately to Stockholm and accept the regal title which lay open for him, exhorting and conjuring him at the same time to preserve the protestant religion inviolably to his subjects. Sigismund took no notice of this latter passage, nor gave the least satisfaction concerning it when his subjects presented a particular remonstrance to him. Charles pressed him a second time, and in the interim refused the crown which the senate had offered him. At length Sigismund was enthroned in the year 1594, and took the coronation-oaths, from the observation of which he scholastically absolved himself with all the dexterity of a Polish metaphysician. "This oath" (declareth the juror,) "I religiously promise and vow to keep to all my subjects, young and old, born, and to be born, beloved, or not beloved, absent or present, no way infringing, but rather improving the same by royal affection: so God be propitious to my soul and body." At the same time it was stipulated likewise, that Sigismund should profess the Lutheran religion, and introduce no foreigners into the kingdom;

dom *; and some time afterwards, upon his dismissal from Sweden into Poland, his once-electors shewed so much justice and generosity to him and his family, as to keep the succession open upon eventual provision that his son Vladislais, then a youth of twelve years old, should receive his education at Stockholm, and there admit himself into the Protestant religion †.

Nevertheless during this interim, after full proof given to the public of various breaches of trust, equivocations, tergiversations, persecutions, and violations of property on the part of Sigismond, duke Charles by the univereal voice of the people was invited to accept the crown October 22, 1595, which honour in hopes of some accommodation he declined heroically for several years; but in the year 1600 the states of the kingdom lost all patience; and an act was passed, not only to incapacitate Sigismond and his heirs, but to establish Charles as king, and appoint the young Gustavus, then six years old, for his successor. Nay such was the extraordinary zeal of the people in behalf of their civil and religious liberties, that a declaratory clause was added to this effect, that regal obedience and allegiance should be paid Charles, though he declined to assume the title of king, and though the coronation-ceremonies had not been performed. And therefore, let historians speak what they please, it is possible Charles had some doubts with relation to John, prince of Ostrogothia, a youth at that period eleven years old, and bred a Lutheran, who had an hereditary title antecedent to his own, (being his brother the late king's second son :) who by way of compensation had been created duke of Ostrogothia, &c. But however that affair might stand, Charles, one way or other, was reasoned and compelled, as it were, into the acceptance of what others not only passionately long for, but commit so many crimes in order to obtain! so at length he submitted to be crowned in form in 1607; upon which event popery was declared a religious and political incapacity in all future kings; no hereditary princes were allowed to marry a wife who professed an erroneous religion; and all seducers of princes from the doctrines of the established church, were to be punished as traitors and conspirators against their country. On the other hand, the Swedish reasons for depriving Sigismond and incapacitating his heirs were as follows, namely, that he, Sigismond, had departed from the received established Christian religion then professed in Sweden; contradicting the intent of his grandfather's last testament, and violating the oath taken

* MSs relating to the genealogy, &c. of Gustavus Adolphus ii. Sion-College library.

† *Ib. d.*

at his coronation, and neglecting the promise made by him to his late father never to infringe the rights of Sweden, nor subscribe (when removed to another country) to any decisions relative to that kingdom, without previously applying to the states, and requesting their advice and concurrence therein. He was accused further of leaving the realm at several junctures, without due and legal notice given; of removing sundry papers of great importance out of the national *cancellaria*; exciting war against his own country, and his best friend and adviser, duke Charles his uncle. It was objected moreover, that he had allowed Denmark to insert the *three Swedish crown* in the regal arms; that he had employed a naval force against his country, turned a deaf ear to the remonstrances of a free people, and refused to educate his son at Stockholm; in order to render him capable of inheritance.

Nevertheless, in spite of all these incapacities and disqualifications alledged, Sigismund, who was a prince of a restless, turbulent, caballing, and ambitious spirit; employed all the time he had to spare, in projecting and executing a number of attempts in order to repossess the crown aforesaid. To this purpose he posted a set of political missionaries throughout the kingdom of Sweden, and assigned them their separate incendiary departments with equal judgment and dexterity; and had caused remonstrances, defamatory libels and manifestos of war, to be dispersed every where in great abundance. And as they all took their rise first from the Polanders, and not from native Swedes, Gustavus determined, partly to mortify Sigismund, and partly to prevent considerable sums of money from being spent out of his country, (not to mention some other inconveniences) to publish an edict which prohibited his subjects from pursuing their studies in Polish universities; paying visits to the court, or holding any correspondence with the inhabitants of that kingdom. Now though Gustavus managed the pen with the same address as he did the sword, yet he no ways considered a paper-war as a desirable sort of contest; especially as it was conducted by a nation, formed by nature for school-distinctions and empty refinements: where the jesuits likewise presided in council, and mixed the politics of Loyola with the sophistry of Smiglecius, and the plausible elegance as well as specious method of Socinus. These circumstances determined him to cut the knot of controversy with *that magical sword* of his; concerning which the Swedish and German professors have produced more dissertations than one.

Yet still the unquiet and malicious Sigismund continued to publish fresh defamatory libels, and new-devised pretensions and claims upon the crown of Sweden. That he breathed
revenge

revenge and war appeared manifest to all men; and it is supposed by the more clear sighted and * judicious, that the hopes of this desperate and hazardous enterprize were founded upon Austrian promises of supplying the Polish army with a body of troops sufficient to re-conquer the dominions of Sweden. And from this hardly visible embryo, from this diminutive spark of latent fire, arose afterwards those amazing flames which burnt with inextinguishable fierceness for eighteen years, and reduced the empire to an heap of ruin. For Gustavus from a youth never truly relished any interposition which took its rise from Vienna, (as we suggested before in the supposed assistance under the duke of Lunenberg sent by the emperor to the king of Denmark) and as he knew the Imperial court to be of a phlegmatic temper in carrying her projects into execution (Sigismund at that time being counselled and governed by *Hispaniolized Germans*, (as the language then ran) and not native Polanders, which was a singular oversight) he seized the flying opportunity to a moment, having first summoned a slight convention at Orebro, and embarked for Livonia under the protection of eighteen ships: well foreseeing, that the surprizing this province would obstruct all attempts from Poland during the remaining parts of the campaign. He then took Dunamond (having paved the way to that incident as we hinted before) and Windau. The former place was the key to Riga.

No prince ever made a better choice as to the time and manner of invading Poland. Gabriel Bethlem, prince of Transylvania, exasperated to the highest degree against Sigismund, who had assisted the emperor in the Hungarian war, (for Bethlem had lately invaded Hungary) formed a design to conquer Moldavia, part of which then belonged to his Polish majesty, and drew the Turks and Tartars into the project, who assisted him with a great number of forces †: but as the king of Poland appeared to be quite embarrassed in the last instance, Gustavus seized only what he thought barely reasonable and convenient, tho' the whole province of Livonia lay exposed to his mercy. A moderation rarely to be found in a victorious prince. Thus he generously concluded a truce with Sigismund for two years, upon that monarch's humble request and supplication; under restriction however, that the intermediate space should be employed in projecting means to establish a permanent and solid peace. All which may be considered as a piece of

* *Loccenii Hist. Suecan. p. 534.*

† *Histoire de Pologne, 120 p. 323. Laurea Austriaca. fol. p. 64.*

conduct truly heroical, and not to be paralleled in common histories; for which Sigismond made him afterwards very unkind and ungenerous returns.

Gustavus allowed his adversary this parenthesis of repose, (if the expression may be permitted me) in order to enable him to chastise the barbarians who so furiously invaded him, and give him scope likewise, provided he was sincere, to settle amicably and by mutual consent all the differences that subsisted between the two kingdoms. This he did for his own honour, merely to divest Sigismond of all plausible pretensions of undertaking a second war at conjunctures and opportunities more convenient. Yet still Gustavus had some private misgivings (and time afterwards proved how very just his suspicions were) that an unfair and insidious adversary, like the person in question, having once freed himself from such troublesome enemies as Turks, Tartars and Transylvanians, might create fresh objections and delays, and set himself to renew hostilities against Sweden with double vigour. A few months soon realized this conjecture; and as Gustavus piqued himself upon acting openly and with spirit, he demanded the promise of a perpetual peace or a good truce; and receiving no categorical assurances on the part of Poland, renewed the war without any farther messages or declarations: having first obtained the full approbation of his senate, and solemnly confirmed the peace with Muscovy on the festival of St. Peter and St. Paul in the great church at Stockholm.

Princes of a lesser genius would have commenced this unexpected invasion, under the appearance of feeling the pulse of Poland by an accommodation: making protestations one way, and acting another way. Timorous and weak men always shelter themselves in dark and serpentine bye-paths; for it requires great parts to be at the same time prudent and brave; successful and explicite! There was the like difference between Gustavus and Sigismond, as betwixt Oxenstiern and Mazarin; the one executed what he determined, nobly, firmly, and instantaneously; the other brought to pass, what he had combined together after a million of reflexions, with a certain meanness, timidity, and hesitation. One performed the most momentous actions by that glance of judgment which precisely seizes the critical object and occasion, without allowing the mind to wander a moment under the influence of any by-considerations; the other making up by philosophy and inductions what he wanted in presence of mind and strength of parts, puzzled himself by a multiplicity of political knowledge, saw too little, by seeing too much; was often by caution betrayed into danger, and fell into

into real fears at the same moment he avoided supposable ones.

But to return to Gustavus, concerning whom we ought to remark as we go on, that this cautious, just, and sensible young man did not think it consistent with prudence and equity to make Poland the seat of hostilities, till he had first discharged the residue of arrears due to Christian king of Denmark. In the beginning of the autumn therefore (for the campaign this year commenced no sooner) he paid the remaining sum due for the redemption of Elfsburg, and by his readiness, as well as dexterity of conduct, kept the rear of his dominions free from a troublesome interfeerer and invader, who acquiesced with reluctancy; but was precluded from all possible means of devising a pretext for renewing of hostilities.

And it was about this time that Gustavus obtained several valuable territories and possessions by the death of his cousin John duke of Ostrogothia*: and in the same year one of his castles where he lodged took fire during the night, which spread itself with so much vehemence, that the doors and stair-cases were all in flames; so that he and his chancellor were obliged to throw themselves out at a window, in which extraordinary attempt he suffered inconsiderably, but Oxenstiern received some contusions. Nor did the danger cease here, for as the castle was surrounded with a moat, which almost touched the edifice, his Majesty was obliged (so great was the violence of the fire) to cross that moat by venturing up to the shoulders in ooze and filthiness †.

During the course of the ensuing year, the Polish war began to grow languid on either side: nor was more fewel administered to the fire than what just served 1619. to preserve it from going out. Mean while Gustavus returned to Stockholm, and having well reformed and improved his navy, rendered it respectable throughout the whole European ocean. He then examined into the duties and business of every particular land officer and private soldier, and reduced not only the art of fighting and sieges, but the whole military discipline to one regular system of his own invention ‡. The very instruments of war were considered and improved; the management of large artillery was rendered more dexterous and practicable; the encumbrance and other defects of the match-lock were rectified; the rest of the pike was abolished, and the pike was shortened; and

* *Genealogiæ Ritterhusii*, fol.

† *Carlson's Letters*, p. 265.

‡ *Loecen, Hist. Suec.* p. 535.

perceiving that Sweden (though it abounded in the very materials with which those instruments are made) sent large sums annually to Spain, Lombardy, and Venice, (for a man of service in those days could use only the pistols and carabines of Brescia, or a sword tempered in the Ebro) he be-
 thought himself prudently and sensibly to establish manufac-
 tures of arms in all convenient places throughout his whole dominions. In all which instances, not to add a great number of others, as the reformation of law, and abridgment of law-suits, &c. &c.; he has been wisely and faithfully copied by the king of Prussia.

And lastly, as it was a maxim with Gustavus to perform as much as he could in his own person, he requested an interview at a frontier town called Ulfsbeck (others say Halmstadt) with Christian king of Denmark, in order to leave his dominions unexposed to any invasions from that quarter; and all these difficulties being previously adjusted, he published the famous constitution, *De administratione & incrementis civitatum in regno Suecico*. But there still remained another reason for renewing a good understanding between Sweden and Denmark, for the kings of either country plainly apprehended, that the new commotions in Bohemia and the *Annexed Provinces*, (as they are called) deserved their attention. And therefore having exchanged all matters of compliment and civility on an open plain, with ensigns flying, drums beating, and a reciprocal discharge of musquetry from the little armies that escorted them, they retired to a neighbouring city, and passed the time from February 25th to March 11th in hospitality and friendship*.

Nor was Gustavus's attention to the troubles of Bohemia and the annexed territories ill directed; for Sigismund at that moment had ordered a body of Cossacks to march to the emperor's assistance, and had exhorted by letters the duke of Lignitz protestant general in Silesia, and the Bohemian nobles to make their timely submissions to the court of Vienna †.

In the year 1620, when Gustavus was meditating how to make an effectual invasion into Poland, (which project was carried into execution the ensuing year) Sigismund formed a design, say some, to entrap this enterprizing and magnanimous neighbour. With his connivance and privity therefore, colonel Farenbach had orders to make an offer of surrendering into Gustavus's hands seve-

* *Laurea Austriaca*, pag. 145, 146.

† *Ibid. Lotichius de Rebus Germ.*, fol. tom. 1. 224. Francofurt. 1646.

ral fortified towns in Livonia, with a view thereby to seize his Swedish majesty at some conference upon the occasion, and make him prisoner; but the stratagem by some chance or other took air, and the whole negotiation vanished in an instant. And thus Sigismund was obliged to repose his towns; nor did the loss of them discontent Gustavus, as he still continued master of his own person and liberty.

By Farenbach's appearing at this time in the Polish service, though a Lifelander by birth, he had borne command under the house of Austria) it is pretty certain, that a sort of clandestine assistance (though the point hath hitherto been over-looked in history) had been conveyed into Poland by the Austrian ministers nine years at least before the noted period of Walstein's dispatching colonel Arnheim upon that errand at the head of 10,000 men; which shews, that the pique and resentment which the king of Sweden had conceived against his Imperial majesty was a wound of long duration, and the memory thereof pre-disposed him for a number of years, (though reasons of prudence checked his inclination) to make some honourable reprisals by a German invasion in his own behalf, whenever a proper opportunity should present itself.

But to return from this slight digression: notwithstanding I have thus related the enterprize of Farenbach *ex fide codicum*, yet still it is my own private opinion, that his want of sincerity in this affair pointed towards Sigismund, and not Gustavus; for why otherwise should the prince last mentioned admit him afterwards into his service, and entrust him with large sums of money, in order to levy 3000 men in Holland and Denmark? Yet though Farenbach at this period of time appeared not to be a villain in the eyes of Gustavus, nor perhaps was he; nevertheless he soon convinced the public, how dangerous it was to repose any trust or confidence in him, for he ran away with the king's money, and enrolled himself a second time under the Imperial ensigns; and he it was who at the head of his German regiment first entered the town of Bamberg in 1632, when Tilly's army fell upon the troops commanded by Horn, and obliged that general to retreat; which vigorous attack ruffled the temper of Gustavus for a few moments, as it was the first and only small disgrace worth notice which the Swedish armies met with during two of the most extraordinary campaigns that perhaps ever were made.

This Farenbach was one of the strangest mixtures of inconstancy, perfidiousness, ability, and bravery, that is to be found in modern history. For at the time he beat the Swedes

at Bamberg, he corresponded with Gustavus at Mentz and Francfort: and at length (though this indeed happened near twelve months after the king's death) was condemned publicly at Katibon, upon presumption of having kept up an epistolary intercourse with the late Gustavus, in reference to betraying the town of Ingoldstadt*, which general Cratz intended to deliver up in the same manner the ensuing year. As officers of fashion in those times were beheaded, without being disgraced with bonds or fetters, he sprung from the scaffold, and wresting a partizan from the hands of one of the guards, killed four soldiers directly, and wounded several; but at length was oppressed by numbers, and cut to pieces. In that instant a courier arrived from Vienna, with a reprieve, or pardon, obtained by the intercession of his lady and friends, (for in him fell the best engineer in the Austrian service, having learnt his profession under no less person than Gustavus) upon which incident an Italian author †, with all the gravity of a Spanish casuist, gives this sober moralizing advice; "Courteous reader, if ever it is thy misfortune to be condemned to execution, walk slow, create excuses, and devise delays; who knows but a pardon may arrive the very last moment?"

And now Gustavus thought fit to embark in a different enterprize from all those already mentioned: for concluding that one day or other he might find himself embroiled with the house of Austria, which seemed (in case she could once thoroughly humble the princes of the evangelical union) to aspire at nothing less than universal monarchy, he judged it highly expedient to make a tour through the empire ‡, attended only by a friend and some domestics, under the disguised name of monsieur GARS ||; which four letters make the four initials of *Gustavus Adolphus Rex Sueciae*. When this precisely happened, I was long at a loss to form any solid and well-grounded conjecture. Some suppose it to be just before he invaded Germany, which appeareth improbable §; but an excellent book lately published **, (the preface to which may be considered as a master-piece of historical correctness) gives us assurance in so many words, "That Gustavus in the summer of the year 1620 passed in a disguised habit through the chief towns in Germany, and

* *Proceedings in Bavaria, &c.* 4°. Lond. 1633. p. 48.

† *Riccio de Bellis Germanicis.* L. x. 4°. Ven. 1648.

‡ *Supplement of Foresti.*

|| *Swedish Intelligencer,* part iv. 183.

§ *Riccio de Bellis German.* p. 191. &c.

** *Letters to and from Sir Dudley Carlton*

“ ended his journey at the court of Berlin, in order to see the young princeſs of Brandenburg, whom he intended to marry *.” Thus in *love*, as well as *war*, our Hero always choſe to reconnoitre the ground in perſon.

And here a ſecond particular circumſtance deſerve ſome notice. I have been aſſured by a perſon of excellent parts lately deceaſed, who had travelled many years in ſearch of hiſtorical knowledge, that the name of Guſtavus Adolphus is enſrolled among the ſtudents of Padua; but if ever that prince was there, it muſt have been in his younger days, as I hinted before, or by enlarging his tour a little in the preſent journey. Upon the like authority it was moreover aſſured me, that Oliver Cromwell appears to be regiſtered in the ſame book, and yet hiſtory is ſilent in both theſe reſpects; though each paſſage (except my memory deceives me) is confirmed by a modern Italian author, in his account of that feat of learning; but as I neither remember the writer’s name, nor have the performance by me, it becomes me to expreſs my ſentiments on the ſubject with reſerve and caution.

It is highly probable that both the tender and warlike paſſions engaged his Swediſh majeſty to make a journey into the empire. He had a view perhaps, (even ſo far back as the preſent period) of having ſomething to ſay to the Germanic ſyſtem: and as to Maria Eleonora, ſiſter to George William then elector of Brandenburg †, then in the twentieth year of her age; ſhe appeared to be a conſort worthy of him, both as a heroine and a Chriſtian. By a painting I have ſeen of her, ſhe was a beauty of the graceful and majeſtic kind: and moreover, a connection with her brother was not to be overlooked by one, who had conceived an idea of erecting ſome future edifice upon German ground. Nor may the perſon of Guſtavus be paſſed by here without remarking, that he was one of the tallſt and moſt graceful figures in all his army, large limbed, but not corpulent: yet ſomething inclined to plumpneſs towards his latter days, though his bulk never encumbered or incommoded him; his eyes, of light gray colour, had a piercing clearneſs mixed with ſoftneſs, except when anger diſcompoſed them; his

* Letter from Sir Dudley to Secr. Naunton, July 20, 1620.

† George William was a weak prince and not very prosperous, for Schwartzenberg his prime miniſter betrayed him perpetually to the houſe of Auſtria. His two uncles, the duke of Jagerndorf and the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, were both put under the ban of the empire. He married the princeſs Charlotte, ſiſter to the king of Bohemia. *Memoirs of the Houſe of Brand.* 40, 41.

hair fair coloured, his nose gently aquiline, his forehead large, and his complexion florid.

In more barbarous ages his look and stature might have advanced him to the regal dignity: for hardly a Swedish horse could carry him when completely clothed in armour; but in the paintings and prints I have ever seen of him, of which the number cannot be recollected, he appears, (even making allowances for the mode of dress) to be much older than he really was, which I attribute to the violent and constant fatigues of his mind and body. There is a thoughtfulness mixt with spirit in all his looks when well drawn, and a sort of recollection joined with fortitude. And indeed, as he united the statesman with the warrior, neither his limbs nor his mind were ever at ease; for he negotiated and made campaigns, without ever being dismayed or puzzled, from the seventeenth year of his age to the hour of his death. So that no warrior or minister ever better deserved the device and inscription on a medal which an ingenious foreigner, the chevalier Edlinger, once shewed me; the emblem was a cube, with this motto, *ÆQUALIS SEMPER ET ERECTUS*.

Gustavus introduced his queen into Stockholm with extraordinary pomp, and the nuptials being there solemnized, appointed the ceremony of her coronation in the month of November. This illustrious and amiable princess, after one or two disagreeable miscarriages, at length brought him a daughter called Christina in 1623; who died the ensuing year; and then a second Christina, who at a year old was declared by the states heiress to the throne in 1627. This decree of the senate is still to be seen*.

Mean while Gustavus made great preparations for war by sea and land, and introduced a *secular* solemnity in memory of the reformation established in Sweden. The edict against travelling was enforced likewise by additional clauses, (inasmuch as such practice thinned the kingdom of subjects, and promoted evil designs from enemies) yet leave was allowed the nobility, out of regard to their antient privileges, to pursue their studies, or cultivate the art of war in foreign countries, upon condition they first obtained a royal passport, and resided not in suspected places. Lastly, new care was taken of the army and navy, and a slight tax levied upon corn and cattle.

His Polish majesty at the same time, whilst Gustavus was employed in the pursuits of love and glory, escaped fortunately from a sudden danger in his own capital at Warsaw:

* *Sueciæ Respublica*, 12^o: 1631, p. 249.

for one Piecharschi *, a nobleman of distinction, had conceived a violent aversion against his sovereign, partly on account of his political and military conduct, (for the prince gave the better half of his time to music and chymistry, and twice lost the throne of Muscovy by his neglect) and partly because his majesty had assigned curators to take upon themselves the management of his estates, which were very considerable: representation being made that he was disordered in his intellects. Like Felton his successor in that desperate trade, who assassinated Buckingham, he was supposed to have no participant in the undertaking; but one morning as the king, attended by his courtiers and guards, entered the vestibule of the great church, Piecharschi started from behind a private door with a small battle-axe in his hand, and suddenly attacking his master, gave him two strokes, one on the cheek, and one on the shoulder. Sigismond dropt immediately, but neither wound proved mortal. Few people were in the church, and fewer still observed the blows. Mean while a poor Italian musician who belonged to the choir, but could not speak half a sentence of Polish, augmented the confusion (for he beheld the whole affair) with crying aloud, *Traditore, traditore!* which the bystanders concluding to signify *Tartari*, rushed out of the cathedral to save themselves, supposing that a party of those barbarians had broken into the city †. Vladislavus the king's son, assisted by a croud of courtiers, soon seized the assassin and disarmed him. He made no confession nor submission; lamenting only that his right arm had deceived him. His breasts were torn off at two different gates of the city with red-hot pincers, which operation he submitted to without a word or a groan †. His limbs were then torn to pieces by wild horses, they were then burnt, and their ashes thrown into the Vistula.

By this time Gustavus was determined to reduce Poland to reason by some methods or other: of course he made the Poles repeated offers of prolonging the truce, or concluding a peace; but Sigismond, notwithstanding the Turks, Tar-

* *Piasceci Chronica Gestorum in Europa singularium.* Cracov. 1646. p. 404. This otherwise excellent book must be considered as very partial to the Polish cause, as will appear by confronting it with Loccenius, M. Bayle, and others. I thought it proper to give the reader this precaution once for all. See also, *Bracbelii Hist. nostr. Temp.* p. 37. Which is one of the completest abridgments ever published in any language: being equally excellent as to method, truth, and a right choice of incidents.

† *Tacite d'Amelot de la Houssaye*, L. 6. p. 516, 518.

‡ *Kobierziski Histor. Vladislav in loco.*

|| *Laura Austriaca*, p. 341, &c.

rars, and Muscovites attacked him on every side, continued immovable, in opposition to all advances that could be made towards him on the part of Sweden. Upon this Gustavus declined the ceremony of previously dispatching an herald to declare his intentions; as he understood the war, in the language of the juspublicists of that age, to be *protractum duntaxat, non sublatum*. Therefore for prudent reasons, conformable to his natural spirit and turn of mind, he began the campaign, at the head of four and twenty thousand men, with a very critical and difficult undertaking, the siege of Riga, the capital city of Livonia; wisely foreseeing, that the reduction of the province would depend entirely upon the fate of the metropolis. Riga was a large city, the emporium of all the countries that lay round it, well fortified, according to the custom of those days, and carrying on a considerable commerce. It stands on the river Dwina, which divides it into two unequal parts, not to mention its being protected by a safe and commodious harbour, removed about two leagues from the ocean. This town belonged originally to the knights of the Teutonic order: it then formed itself into a republic, and submitted to Poland on the same footing with Dantzic.

Had Gustavus been of a timorous or superstitious temper, he suffered enough at the beginning of this enterprize to have deterred him from the attempt. A violent storm in the mouth of the Dwina dispersed and shattered a good part of his fleet, in spite of all the care of Gildenheim and Fleming, the two admirals; but his maxim was always to gain ground upon disappointments, and redouble his activity, instead of wasting time in useless reproaches upon himself or others. Keeping his eye therefore firm on his object, he landed his four and twenty thousand men, and invested the city. The principal officers that served under him were De la Gardie, Wrangel, Horn, Banier, Oxenstiern, and Ruthven a Scottish colonel: names well known in the succeeding parts of our history. Mean while his fleet being once more collected together, protected the mouth of the harbour, and conveyed to him all proper supplies, preventing not only the enemy, but all neutral powers from throwing any relief into the town, whether of men, ammunition, or provisions. What was still more fortunate for him, the Grand Signior had raised the siege of Babylon, in order to pour the whole torrent of his forces into Poland*; so that 60,000 troops, under the conduct of an old experienced

* *Erachel. Hist. nostr. temp. 52.*

officer, namely, Chodkiewi, prefect of Lithuania, (who died soon afterwards of a broken heart) were looked upon as nothing more than barely sufficient to check the incursions and depredations of 300,000 infidels.

Now though Gustavus landed his troops at Mughab with great dexterity (a circumstance of war then little known and to which he gave uncommon attention) yet it was not in his power to perform any service very remarkable, till *veld-maréchal* De la Gardie arrived with the Finland regiments. His majesty then opened his intentions to the soldiers in a set speech, and having run a line round Riga, invested it according to form: encamping chiefly on the sandbanks to the east of the Dwina. In his own quarter, which consisted of 6000 foot and 800 horse, served prince Charles his brother, Oxenstiern, Horn, Banier, and count Mansfelt. De la Gardie extended his troops on the king's right hand, having under his command the *pretorian* foot-guards, and three regiments of infantry, (making 4500 men) and 300 horse. Wrangel directed the third station at the head of his own and Ruthven's foot-regiments, with 700 cavalry; being ordered to encamp on the king's left hand, at or near a place called Heintz's farm: and Seaton, a Scots gentleman, commanded the fourth division, which lay encamped round a wind-mill, and was nearest the town. Mean while colonel Henry Fleming (for the admiral was named Claudius) having turned his soldiers into pioneers, guarded the islands in the Dwina, and also the western shore of that river next to Dunamond-fortress, whilst the ships lay stationed in the mouth of the harbour. I am the more minute in describing the dispositions of this siege, as it was the first Gustavus made in full form, and as it was a master-piece in the inventive parts of war, (wherein his great talent lay) notwithstanding all the tedious and expensive performances of Spinola in the Low Countries some few years before.

The town of Riga was well prepared for defence in every respect. It was guarded with good bastions and *well-fraised* half-moons; the citadel was garrisoned with a considerable body of regular infantry, and two troops of horse; and the citizens undertook to join to them 400 experienced soldiers, and their own militia. How well they performed their duty, the duration of the siege will soon shew; for their attachment to Sigismund's interest appeared to be quite enthusiastical.

Gustavus spared his attention upon no occasions; and on every casual occurrence hazarded his person without difficulty. As it was the first siege of consequence he ever engaged in,

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in, he appeared, if I may be allowed the expression, a very Proteus in command; sustaining in the same day the characters of general, engineer, common assailant, and pioneer; for at Riga in particular he often stripped to his shirt, and wrought in the trenches with pick-axe and shovel, exhorting another Charles Philip, and the several officers who stood round, to follow the example.

This unparalleled vigilance and application to every object, greater or lesser, soon threw him into the way of danger: for in some preparatory measures he took on the sand-hills in his own quarter, he missed little of disproving an observation made by Charles V. *That no king had ever been killed by a cannon-ball**, since a shot of considerable size passed directly on the very line where he stood a few moments before. Some time afterwards he conceived his presence to be necessary where Seaton commanded; and there a second shot killed some soldiers that stood near him, and dashed the blood of lieutenant-colonel Stakelberg upon his cloaths; and on another occasion, during the continuance of this siege, a third cannon-ball pierced his tent, and made towards him in a direction, as if it was predestined to destroy him †. Upon these accidents he changed the position of his batteries, and made himself master of higher ground, commanding the town and raking the streets through and through where-ever the least opening presented itself. But as he chose not to begin an invasion with too much bloodshed, foreseeing well that it was almost impossible to enter the town by storm, he sent his trumpeter to the commander and magistrates three several times with proposals of an honourable nature, conceived in courteous terms; but they on the last message, in order to preclude all hopes of accommodation, received and dismissed the king's messenger blindfolded, returning him to his master quite overcome with spirituous liquors, and without an answer. Upon this the Swedes redoubled their efforts, and threw more bombs into the town than ever had been known in so short a space with the same quantity of artillery. What kept alive the spirits of the defendants, was a reliance on Sigismund's promise of raising the siege; but that prince was so embarrassed by the Turkish invasion, that it was not in his power to make good his intentions to any notable purpose. Wherefore, to remedy this defect, Radzivil, prefect of Lesser Lithuania, and one of the first men of quality in Poland, marched such troops as could be spared, namely, 10,000

* Bayle's discourse on Gustavus Adolphus.

† *Lectenii Hist. Suec.* p. 537.

foot and 4000 cavalry, to the assistance of Riga; nevertheless, astonished at the precautions Gustavus had taken, he contented himself with gazing at a distance from the banks of the Dwina. He had only such troops with him, as could be collected in an hurry, proposing to throw some supplies into the town, in case he had not the power to raise the siege. The besieged, conducted by one Burk an Irish officer, made two attempts to cross the Dwina in ships, and secure an entrance to some of Radzivil's troops: but Gustavus thundered upon them in such a manner from his batteries, erected on the shore for *that* purpose, that it was thought proper to discontinue all future attempts of the like nature. Mean while the king, by way of gallantry, entertained Radzivil with a general cannonade; and as one ball happened to pierce the tent of that commander, he for honour's sake, began a skirmish the next day, and then departed. Upon this the king redoubled his efforts, and filled the town-ditch with fascines and rubbish, having first cut off the communication with the rivers, and rendered himself master of Dunamond-fortress, a strong place to the north of Riga. He then sent the magistrates a fresh summons, admonishing them of their danger, and the impossibility of their relief; to which they returned an abrupt and rude answer; enraged at which, he took an half-moon by storm, and the garrison in return sprung a mine that lay beneath it, and blew up an hundred Swedish soldiers into the air; nevertheless, their companions re-possessed the ruins, and made a fresh lodgment among them. The art of mining was carried to great perfection in this siege, for both parties made various extraordinary efforts, which almost deserve to be repeated; and his majesty himself still continued to work with his Dalecarnian miners below ground, with the same spirit as he had laboured with the hardy Finlanders above ground in first opening the trenches. At length a breach was made, and Gustavus, in order to pass the town-ditch, formed the first idea of a project which he executed afterwards more gloriously on the banks of the Elbe and Lech. In a word, he contrived a flying bridge of wood, and to prevent it being slippery, made the surface rough with strong nails and pitched sackcloth, seizing the opportunity under favour of the night to throw it cross the fosse, which, though filled with fascines and rubbish, retained still too much water to admit the passage of a large body of men. The colonels Seaton and Horneck * conducted the attack,

* This colonel was condemned afterwards in Germany for cowardice, but the queen begged his life.

but the ardour of the troops, which crowded forwards in greater numbers than was ordered for the first detachment, unfortunately broke down the machinery; for they were so eager that nothing could restrain them. In this accident the gallant Seaton * broke his thigh, which was afterwards cut off, and the garrison at night reduced the king's building to an heap of ashes.

Gustavus, not in the least dismayed by this disappointment, applied himself once more to mining, being resolved, if he could not pass over the ditch, to enter the town beneath it. He laboured therefore in a fresh mine that very night; whilst the besieged still expected (contrary to all probability) a second relief from Sigismund. During this interval, the king ordered his young military favourites Horn and Banier, attended by Chapelle, a French officer, and Mufter, a Scottish man, to storm the sand half-moon at the head of 3000 chosen soldiers. These brave soldiers soon crossed the ditch, and dislodged a part of the enemy; but when they approached towards the top of the fortification, the besieged made such

* Since publishing the first edition of this work, the following curious anecdote relating to Seaton has been communicated to me, by a learned friend, a gentleman of Scotland, who does an honour to his function:

“Many years before Gustavus entered into Germany, and even before the Polish war began, he happened at a public review to have some dispute with Seaton, and gave him a blow. When the field-business was over, Seaton went immediately to the king's apartment, and demanded his dismissal; which his majesty signed; they both being so angry, that not a word more was said on that subject. But as Seaton could not manage his other business so as to get away till next morning, Gustavus had time to consider matters more coolly; and having learnt from undoubted intelligence, that Seaton proposed taking the great road to Denmark, he took a trusty officer and some grooms with him, and contrived to sleep every night where Seaton had dined the same day. When his majesty came to the Danish territories, he ordered the officer to stay behind, and taking only one groom with him, over-took Seaton on a large plain. Riding up to him, he cried, *Dismount, Sir; that you have been injured, is acknowledged; I am now come to give you the satisfaction of a gentleman: and take this farther with you, namely, that I am at present out of my own dominions. Gustavus and you are both equals. We have both, I see, pistols and swords.—Alight immediately, and the affair shall be dispatched.*

“Seaton, recovering a little from his surprize, dismounted, as the king had done before, and falling down on his knees, said, “Sire, you have more than given me satisfaction, in condescending to make me your equal; “God forbid, that my sword should do any mischief to so brave, so great, and so gracious a prince. Forgive the transports of my false pride. Permit me to return to Stockholm, and allow me the honour to live and die in your service.” [Which words he afterwards made good.] *

“His majesty raised him from the ground, and embraced him; and thus they returned in the most amicable manner to Stockholm. Which created great astonishment to all the army, till every circumstance of the story was known.”

an incredible resistance, that they were repulsed by main force. Beams of wood were thrown upon them in order to crush them, and huge stones and grenades dispersed among them in every part. Chapelle's son died bravely, for he continued fighting to the very last; Horn and Banier were both grievously wounded, but his majesty to comfort them, and the rather as they were unsuccessful) sent them both the order of knight-hood that very evening. Upon this slight superiority the garrison proposed a sally, but the prudent magistrates imposed a negative on so rash an undertaking.

And now, towards the middle of September, matters approached to the very last extremity, for the Swedes had formed their mines under the town-ditch, and beneath the fortifications that lay round it, whilst the king (in order to prevent supplies from entering the city) having thrown a strong boom cross the Dwina, (which some have thought to be his *own invention*) and prepared two new bridges capable of admitting five soldiers in front, his determination was to fire the mines at once, pass his troops over the bridges in two places, and give the town a general assault with all his army. It was then the inhabitants, after an obstinate defence for the space of six weeks, began first to be terrified: for on the one hand the king had undermined the walls in every part, and on the other hand their garrison was enfeebled, their ammunition consumed, and all hopes of relief appeared chimerical. Now though Gustavus knew their distresses, he affected not to discern them, in order to give the Livonians a right notion of his generosity. Morally certain of possessing Riga in a day and a night, he allowed the besieged a deliberation of six hours, at the conclusion of which hostages were exchanged, and a capitulation ratified. Mean while, from a true sense of military merit, he granted the inhabitants very honourable conditions, though they had spoken of him during the siege in disrespectful and injurious terms*; and permitted them to incorporate themselves into one system with his own subjects. These acts of mildness and generosity arose partly from the dictates of his own heart, and partly from a good maxim of policy, always to behave humanely and generously in a conquered country; of course he never once upbraided the natives for the fatigues and mischief their obstinate resistance had created to himself and his troops. And as all great and good men, however modest they may be, feel some complacency upon having rightly performed any noble and illustrious action, his majesty in the famous speech he made nine years afterwards to the generals of his

* *Memorabilia Suecica Gentis*, p. 81.

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army near Nurenberg, on the subject of their avarice, cruelty, and expropriations, in a decent transitory manner just suggests to their recollection his own very different conduct at the surrender of Riga.

But to return to my subject; the instant Gustavus entered the town-gate, he directed his steps to the great church of St. Peter, where he kneeled down, and returned his thanks to God in a short prayer. As to allegiance; he told the inhabitants, *he never desired or expected better from them, than they had shewn their former master: upon which account he should not only preserve their privileges, but enlarge them.* The magistrates then apologized for their conduct with respect to Poland, obliquely upbraiding Sigismond, after the representations they had made him of their imminent danger, for returning this cold and evasive answer, namely, that the palatin of Wilno (who at that time was employed in Podolia) ought to have taken due care of the Livonian territory.

They then told his majesty likewise*, that Gustavus made a swifter passage from Stockholm to Riga, than Radzivil had done from Poland to Riga, and that though the latter commanded troops enough to have answered the purpose, yet that he (Gustavus) prevented him in every thing, by possessing the country before hand; as also, by making himself master of every strong pass, and stopping the navigation of the Dwina: (in which circumstance at that time consisted one great part of the military science.) They then expatiated much on the clemency and affability of their new conqueror, who far from reproaching them for having made a resistance so detrimental to him, told them from his own pure generosity in so many words, that if a solid peace could be concluded between him and Sigismond in three years, he would allow them to return to their Polish allegiance, with reservation of all their antient rights and liberties: concluding with this remark, *That whoever had occasioned the loss of their city (and whom he meant is easy to be discovered) must render account for it at the last day to the Supreme Being †:* and thus the affair ended.

To this remonstrance Sigismond had not the condescension to return an answer: but prince Radzivil held the pen in his place, and writ a letter full of acrimony and recriminations; a sort of return which the brave inhabitants had no ways merited.

* In a memorial, dated at Riga, Sept. 20, 1622.

† *Loecenii Hist. Suec. p. 537.*

There is one circumstance in his letter extraordinary enough. The people of Riga had represented Gustavus as a prince of unparalleled clemency and generosity, to which Radzivil replied coldly, "That he was not displeas'd to hear that the king of Sweden was a Christian."

Gustavus then, at the head of a detachment of 14000 men, having first banished the jesuits from Riga, invested Dunamond and took it; in consequence whereof he next made himself master of Mittau*, the capital of Semigallia, and place of residence of the dukes of Courland. This city then subsisted under the title of a *beneficiary possession* from the republic of Poland, with whose interests the reigning duke naturally sided on account of his situation: and from compassion to these circumstances, Gustavus generously promised to restore the town to him upon the observance of some certain conditions set forth in the body of the truce then to be concluded between himself and Sigismund; which engagement was made good by the king of Sweden.

Farther than Mittau he advanced not; for by this time some Polish parties had committed great depredations near Riga. He therefore flew to the assistance of his new subjects, and left general Wrangel in Mittau with a garrison of 2000 men. Upon this a truce ensued between Sweden and Poland, which was to remain in force till the expiration of the ensuing year.

The entrance of 1622 was rendered highly disagreeable to Gustavus by the death of his brother †, whom he loved extremely: a young prince of clear courage, 1622. and remarkable for an uncommon sweetness of temper. But the same year was rendered illustrious in another respect, inasmuch as it gave birth to Charles Gustavus, afterwards Charles X. king of Sweden.

And now Gustavus began to be perfectly well apprized, that to *subsist* an army was far more difficult than to conduct the *fighting part*: For these reasons, returning to Stockholm in the winter, (a slight truce being concluded with Poland, as we observed before, and oaths of allegiance administered to the deputies of Riga) he took care to procure a clear notion of his revenues, adjusted some difficulties then subsisting betwixt Sweden and Denmark; and formed so good an understanding with Christian, that he promised neither to allow the Poles to make levies in his dominions, nor permit

* Puffendorf says Brittau, but a nobleman of Courland (the baron de Klopman) assures me there is no such place.

† He died at Narva Jan. 25, 1622, aged twenty years and nine months.

their ships to carry provisions through the Sound, nor military stores; and as the duties of the year 1620, upon corn and cattle, did not appear sufficient to carry on the war, Gustavus introduced what was then called an EXCISE, an expression till that time unknown in Sweden: which was defined to be a royal tax levied upon such things chiefly as were eatable and drinkable. The states made some objection to this impost at first, but at length it passed with universal consent. His majesty it is true proposed it only as a temporary expedient, but (however sincere his intention might be) it was never afterwards in his power to take it off: being involved every day in more and more interesting exploits. In a poor country like Sweden, as this was the most advantageous, so it was the most trying contribution that could be devised. Yet the nation had such a confidence in the integrity and bravery of their sovereign, that after a few slight murmurs, they submitted cheerfully: and upon this agreeable compliance Gustavus determined to move the seat of war into Prussia, partly as lying nearer home, and partly to secure the Baltic, and preserve it free from depredations and insults.

Yet nothing could compose the uneasiness which Gustavus received from the death of his brother, and his mortification upon that occasion was rendered still more sensible, as he had no children by queen Eleonora. These two events contributed to raise Sigismund's hopes to the highest degree: for that prince, by the way, was the greatest pretender then in Europe. He had a right to all he could take, and in proportion to his prospects his pretensions always improved, not only in tone of style, but in force of title. His men of law kept pace with the sword, and upon every event brought new demands and new proofs.

Hence it was that Sigismund the ensuing year, having formed a design of invading Sweden, made a political progress through Poland, and being entertained with great magnificence at Dantzic, took care to consider occasionally the state of his marine, and the means and possibility of transporting an army to the gates of Stockholm. But Gustavus being, as my historian observeth*, *prince's cautious, ad omnes occasiones invigilans ad avertendum si quod ingruerat periculum*, thinking it always the best policy to commence an invasion, instead of repelling one, arrived by a sort of magical transportation with a fleet of sixty-six ships (of which twenty were large ones) at the mouth of the port

* *Kobierziski, Historia Vladislaii, 4^o. 857—859.*

of Dantzic. Sigismund mounted a watch-tower, in order to behold his kinsman in the character of a sea-commander: upon which the land-fortresses paid him the compliment of a general discharge of artillery; and to these Gustavus replied with all his naval cannon, which by some was interpreted as a kind of warlike declaration. But his Polish majesty did not chuse to explain the incident according to this fashion, contenting himself to dispatch a person in the name of the magistracy of Dantzic, with orders to represent and complain that such practices infringed the liberties of the port in time of truce. Gustavus received this deputy with great courtesy, protesting that he was inclined to cultivate a peace more and more, and that he meditated no fresh warlike transactions, except under the justification of a *prior lesit*. He then asked abundance of familiar questions concerning the king and queen, and charging the representative employed to deliver his compliments to prince Vladislaus, (whom he desired greatly to see) returned contentedly home without causing the least molestation.

Yet time soon convinced the public that Gustavus's prefaces and precautions were extremely well grounded: for the truth was, Sigismund received his opinions at that juncture concerning Sweden from discontented exiled Swedes, suborned Germans, and Spanish jesuits*, stationed near him by the court of Vienna, (rarely admitting a single Poland into deliberations of this nature) and of course meditated an expedition at the very moment we are now mentioning; and this broke out more distinctly the year ensuing, when he demanded large assistances in money at the assembly of the senators, and requested that the marine might be placed on a new footing, and the land army re-inforced; but the states of the kingdom declined to advance money towards these purposes, and on the contrary prolonged the truce in a manner no ways conformable to their master's inclinations; which gave Gustavus opportunity and leisure to plan his future enterprises upon Livonia and Prussia †.

State-intrigues produced another mismanagement on the part of Sigismund. Most men cast their eyes on Conospoliski as the ablest commander in the crown-service: but as that officer was then employed on the side of Russia, it was thought necessary to give the present command against Gusta-

* Polonia rex nunquam excidisset regno Sueciæ nisi credulam autem jesuitis Hispanicis, quibus accessus per conjugium Austriacum liberè patebat in regnum & ad reginam præbuisset. *Arcana Dominat. Hispan.* 124.

† *Kibicki'ski*, Hist. Vladislaui. 4^o. 857—859.

vus to one Zamofki palatin of Kiow: but Denhoff prefect of Lasci, who had then great interest in the cabinet, did not care to admit a representative in Conospoliski's department, lest the kingdom, in case of any notable success, should request to see him continued. And thus the campaign of a second summer was ruined, for Conospoliski arrived not till the month of October*.

Mean while the Spaniards wanted greatly to keep Sigismund in a state of war against Gustavus, and to this purpose his Catholic Majesty dispatched count de Solre to him with a magnificent retinue. This nobleman, originally a Fleming, wore the order of the golden fleece, and arrived afterwards to high authority in the court at Madrid. In his instructions Gustavus was styled more than once the supporter of an erroneous religion; and usurper of Sweden. The main purpose of his embassy was to obstruct the truce, and prolong the war. To which Sigismund replied very sensibly, That the constitution of Poland was no ways calculated for a state of warfare, and that Spain could assist him only by commanding a powerful fleet to range the Baltic †. Of course he asked for a fresh cessation of arms that was to hold till June 1625, which favour Gustavus readily granted him; for he formed this opposition merely upon a principle of self-defence, since Sigismund had placed himself at the head of a fleet of transports with a view to make a descent on the Swedish territories. Thus the designs of Spain and Poland were rendered abortive, and the town of Dantzic was obliged to make a profession of neutrality. The Spaniards thought better of the matter five years afterwards, and sent a fleet to the Baltic.

* *Kobierziski, Hist. Vladislavii, 4^o. 921--923.*

† This answer may be worth preserving; it is the extract of a letter from Sigismund III. to Philip IV.

“Conditio imperii regiae majestatis qualis sit; & quibus adscripta legibus, non ignorat catholica majestas: omnia pene in hoc regno statuum arbitrio geri, ita ut de bello bellicae nervo, nihil inconsultis ordinibus statui nec unquam possit: quae res saepe necessaries & opportunos regis pro publica salute conatus retardat, nonnumquam etiam irritos reddit.” Hic ipse regni Sueciae invasor, jam pridem in ordinem redactus fuisset, nisi toties ab ordinibus regni impetratis induciis, falsa honestae pacis & transactionis ostentatione, nobis illuisset. *Ultimo addit de paciscendis cum hostem induciis etiam si ille ab iis abhorretere non videatur in praesenti rerum statu non cogitat regiae majestas, magis eas circumpicit rationes, ut, hoste hic impedito, arma in Sueciam transferat, quod si à classe paratior esset, jam pridem nefarii hostis ausus coerciti fuissent. Qua in re si catholica majestas classis suae hitoribus Sueciae admota regiae majestati suppetias ferret, rem dignam et catholico nomine & fraterno amore praestaret: & haud dubie una eademque ratione Danica regem, nunc visceribus Germaniae inhaerentem, adjuvandum regnum suum & praesentis & domesticum belli ostentatione retraheret.* *Kobierziski, ut supra.*

During

During this short cessation from hostilities, his majesty found opportunities to take a second view of the state of learning in his kingdom; bestowing on the university of Upsal * all the patrimonial estate belonging to his own house of Vasa †, excepting Lindholm, his family-mansion, and the manour round it, which he thought fit to reserve; the one and the other remaining now in the possession of the Cederhielms ‡. He founded a second university at Abo, and erected schools in Lapland; and performed an act of like nature some few months before his death, establishing and endowing the university of Dorpat in Livonia, with a view to cut off all the inconveniences and expences of travelling into Sweden for the sake of an education. And Christina his mother conveyed afterwards by her last testament 5000*l.* towards the perpetual support of thirty students at Upsal. Nör was high-admiral Gildenheim, Gustavus's natural-brother, behind the family in point of generosity to learning, for he bequeathed six little farms for the maintenance of two scholars of more distinguished genius than the rest of their companions; and what was still a further subject for wonder, his executors for forty years bestowed the benefaction unexceptionably on the most deserving §. Influenced by these examples, the preceptor of Gustavus, who was an excellent classical scholar, and well knew the advantages of style and eloquence, endowed a professorship of oratory, and the pupil confirmed it by royal charter. And indeed Gustavus always shewed the highest gratitude to this excellent man: for he made him a senator and chancellor of Upsal, supreme judge in the kingdom of Gothland, and (though his birth was no ways extraordinary) created him baron Duderhoff, and employed him afterwards in several important embassies.

In a word, the university of Upsal had been quite neglected, and became a sort of desert during the reign of John, Gustavus's uncle, but the donations allowed by the king sufficed to maintain 150 students.

How uncommon is the pleasure to behold the studies of theology, philosophy and humanity, protected and encour-

* In the whole grant he ceded to the university for ever thirty-six manours, and thirty farms, eight established granaries of tythes, and four mills, in order to support poor students, as well as augment the salaries of professors; so that it is probable (notwithstanding I want authorities whereby to support this conjecture) that some crown possessions were added to the paternal estates of Vasa.

† *Memoirs communicated.* The present owner's grandfather was a senator.

‡ *Ibid.*

§ *Memorab. Succ. Gent.* 157.

aged by men of the sword? And by the way, it is probable that one of the most remarkable instances of the affection which military men have shewn to learning is to be found in the history of Ireland, where the troops in 1622, (if I can read the date right in my papers) at the conclusion of a very fortunate campaign, made a present of 1800*l.* out of their pay to the college of Dublin to purchase books; and Usher and Chaloner saw the sum faithfully applied. And indeed Gustavus, as far as the hurry and confusion of a martial life would allow him, testified upon all occasions an high regard for learning and men of letters; giving the public a proof of his excellent taste, by making Grotius's incomparable book *de Jure Belli et Pacis* (which though mentioned here was not published till the year afterwards) his delight and his study; nay, he carried his idea of the author so far, that he determined to employ him (whenever business flowed in faster upon him) as a public minister: with which measure Oxenstiern heartily concurred. This project was resumed, when negotiations began to thicken extremely in Germany. But the king's premature death rendered the scheme abortive for that period.

Returning therefore from this digression, I shall continue to inform the reader, that the conditions of the aforesaid treaty turned purely upon one circumstance, which was, that neither party at its expiration should be allowed to declare war without two months notice previous to the 1st of June 1625: and this very stipulation, by the mere perversity of accidents, created some misunderstandings in the ensuing year. Many other punctilious difficulties were started and refused*, inasmuch as all that *jus-publicists* could devise, and all that a scholastic nation could refine upon, was advanced by Poland: but it may suffice to remark, that the solid strong sense of Oxenstiern soon pierced through these delicate, but thin-spread cobwebs of ingenious subtilty.

Matters stood upon the same footing between the two kings: for the rival of Gustavus was little more or less than a schoolman on the throne. Distinctions without difference made up the half of his policy; he thought all things lawful that he had the dexterity to obtain, and valued himself more upon artifice, (if he could reach his object) than upon sincerity and plainness; falsely supposing, that all circumvention and over-reaching implied superior abilities. On the other hand, Gustavus was unreserved and open, generously honest and void of dissimulation; and it was his choice (though

* *Loccanii Historia Suecana, 548, 549.*

nature had given him talents to act otherwise, had it so pleased him) to oppose a sort of compendious pointed common sense to theory, eloquence, and, sophisticated distinctions; convinced (as hath been observed on a like occasion) that in this and all similar cases, *The very gleanings of the grapes of Ephraim are better than the vintage of Abiezer.* And indeed, if we examine history ever so carefully, we shall find but few families that have produced at the same time two contenders of such opposite characters as Gustavus and Sigismund, both descended from the house of Vasa, and both first cousins to each other. Of the two, Sigismund alone must be considered as the person irreconcilable: yet, unfortunately for him he found perpetual obstacles (partly occasioned by his own misconduct and dissingenuousness) from that *honest* but *capricious* form of government, a *Polish diet.*

In truth, the good people of Poland had sense enough* (being not a whit inferior to the Italian nation in quickness of parts) to dislike the great abilities of Gustavus in the character of a soldier, since it appeared plainly, during the uniform course of all preceding campaigns, that he overcame them merely by the arts of fortification and the regular conduct of sieges, by a new manner of using artillery and uncommon precautions in the article of encampments †, possessing in an high degree that great military virtue which Tacitus recommends; *non alium ducem OPPORTUNITATES locorum sapientius legisse.* On these accounts they privately wished for peace; nor were reasons wanting to close the wheels of war, in order to facilitate that event; for the king had conferred the bishopric of Warmia on prince John Albert his third son then living, who was under the age prescribed by the ecclesiastical laws, being in truth only twelve years old. It was likewise contrary to the constitutions of the realm, to raise a prince of the blood royal to such a station as must place him *ex natura officii* in public prefectures, and give him session; deliberation and suffrage in a national capacity: such provision had been made to check the influence of the royal family! The queen likewise, who was an Austrian by birth ‡, had given great umbrage to a nation jealous of its liberties, inasmuch as she had purchased from a certain nobleman the county of Zyweck for the sum of

* *Brachet* Hist. nostr. temp. lib. ii. 85.

† *Kobierziski*, Hist. Vladislavi, p. 924.

‡ Sigismund married two daughters of Charles duke of Stiria, father of Ferdinand II. namely, Anne in 1592, and Constantia in the year 1605: the first in her nineteenth year, and the second in her seventeenth. *Genealogie Ritterbusis*, vol.

300,000 *l.* this being a direct infraction of the *pacta conventa*, wherein it is solemnly stipulated, that the king and the king's family should always continue under an inability of purchasing, or, in other words, of employing the nobles and enriching themselves; and so anxiously was this restriction kept alive, that confiscations for treason devolved not into the regal treasury, but on the contrary were bestowed on some other person who was of the same rank and order with him that was proscribed; with this single advantage of prerogative reserved to the crown, that his majesty had power to nominate the party who was to enjoy the forfeiture, under the conditions above-mentioned.

But the purchase here spoken of was attended with other circumstances, capable of alarming a nation so thoroughly tinged with political jealousy. The district of Zyweck lay near enough to Cracau to prescribe laws to it, and at the same time bordered on Silesia, Moravia, and Hungary, whose inhabitants were of a turbulent and warlike nature, and in proportion more intermeddling with respect to Poland, as the major part of them consisted of protestants very sincere and extremely jealous. What administered farther cause for suspicion was, it lay very convenient for enlisting soldiers to the detriment of the republic: and contained several fortresses, castles, and strong passes, where the crown had no concern*. It was objected in the next place, that the current coin of the kingdom was debased by counterfeiting, and diminished by clipping; upon which point one of the senators observed, that this was a grievance that proved burdensome to every individual, and assigned the following state-reason for a speedy redress, *Privata citius urunt, publicorum sensus facilius transmittitur* †.

But the Lithuanian representatives, as if it were by a concerted design, refined upon the abuses of the national coin, by observing, that it was not only clipped and adulterated, but reduced to such a scarcity in point of quantity, that hardly enough remained to answer the common circulating demands; which scarcity was alledged to result from an ill-conceived and unprosperous war against Gustavus, who to their own knowledge had generosity enough to allow Poland no dishonourable peace, whenever the kingdom thought fit to ask it properly; and indeed it was Gustavus's character never to urge an enemy to the last extremity of distress; since if such a person chanced to prove ungrateful afterwards,

* *Piaſceius* in annum 1624.

† *Brachelii* Hist. post. temp. lib. ii. p. 86. §va.

or unfaithful, he was always conscious from a superiority of parts and valour that he had the power in his hands to reduce him to right reason, or brand him with some mark of condign punishment.

The obstructions and difficulties already assigned, served to cool that rancour of heart which Sigismund always cherished in opposition to his kinsman, and paved the way to a series of truces, which he signed grudgingly, and observed unfaithfully.

Some other national allegations were likewise produced. It was remarked, that Sigismund had dispatched a large body of Cossacks into Bohemia, and plunged himself abruptly amidst the confusions of the empire, without requesting the concurrence of the states; which precipitate step had given birth to an irruption of the Turks, instigated by the persuasions of Gabriel Bethlem, and made Poland liable to incursions and depredations.

At length the Lithuanian senators had the boldness to assert; that without assuming to themselves the right of prophecy, they would venture to foretel what sort of terms Gustavus would condescend to grant them; (which serves to shew that a great prince performs as much by dint of correspondence as by the point of the sword.) It was observed therefore, that upon supposition all Livonia was restored to him, assignment should be made of the territories of Finland and Esthonia to some one of Sigismund's children; in case Gustavus died without male-issue: mean while Sigismund was to preserve the title of king of Sweden, under strict proviso that he gave no disturbance to the actual possession of his rival and neighbour.

A discussion of all these matters being thus premised, there remained still some fresh latent causes of mistrust and disapprobation. A clandestine and criminal correspondence had been discovered, from the import of certain letters intercepted in the Low Countries, whereby hopes had been given (it was supposed from prince Radzivil prefect of Lesser Lithuania) to Gaston duke of Orleans, brother to Louis XIII. of succeeding Sigismund in the throne of Poland; upon which the king took the alarm, and denied Radzivil the prefecture of Greater Lithuania, then vacant, to which he had a right both from merit and station: substituting in his room the prince Sapieha, an old man of great authority, approaching to the eightieth year of his age: rich enough from his own funds to contribute immensely towards the support of a war, but enfeebled as to his capacity, and conversant in civil life more than the military: from whence the consequence was, that

Radzivil

Radzivil ever afterwards maintained a good intelligence with Gustavus, and made him an offer of the crown of Poland in 1632.

Upon the whole, the event of this diet proved not unprosperous to the affairs of Sweden; for the friends of Gustavus had interest enough to check the advance of money necessary for the maintenance of a northern war: which compelled Sigismund, with infinite reluctance, to conclude the truce above-mentioned; during which interval the Swedish monarch extracted money enough from the province of Livonia to put himself into a capacity of resuming the war with success and vigour. The affair of Zyweck was referred to a future diet: and as to the bishopric of Warmia*, the king was obliged to make provision by diploma, that his son Albert should neither exercise the episcopal function, nor take possession, till he had arrived to due ecclesiastical age; submitting likewise to take the oaths of fidelity to the republic, previously to all rights of session and suffrage in the diet: and lastly, all officers and soldiers employed in foreign services, the Imperial service especially, were solemnly recalled, under penalty of being considered and punished as fugitives and rebels; which last point was carried against the crown at the very close of the diet, though Sigismund sat himself in the senate-house, and listened to the debate till break of day. At this period Gustavus finished the dispute, which still subsisted in a latent manner betwixt him and Denmark from the year 1622, with reference to the duties of the *Sound*; and effected it meerly by the dint of an high and unsurmountable spirit.

Mean while the death of James I. king of England, made no considerable variation in the affairs of Gustavus; and here I will spare myself the vanity of drawing a laboured character of his Britannic Majesty, such a task being the exercise of a rhetorician and not the work of an historian: since it is in an author's power, if he hath any skill in historical painting, to place the picture in this or that particular light, and overcharge or diminish the features, in proportion as fancy shall direct, or prejudice and partiality misguide him. True characters are best collected from a fair narrative of facts. The more unprejudiced foreigners (if people are inclined to know *their* opinions) seem to have had a thorough insight into James's cast of mind and politics; Nani informs us, "That he governed the English and Scots by the machinery of their natural aversions to

* *Piaſcecbii Chronica Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium, in Annus 1624. ſel. Cracov. 1646.*

each other, upon the principles of a private political maxim, that ease and idleness, in the very nature of things, soften and predispose mens hearts to admit slavery: his first proposals at Vienna might have been listened to, but they were so impracticable and absurd, that the subtil Spaniards soon saw what sort of person they had to deal with, and availed themselves accordingly of his improbable schemes and delays. They knew likewise that he trembled at war, and abominated a rebellion *." And Le Barre tells us in words so elegant, that I shall leave them to work their way in his own language, "*Il étoit d'un naturel doux, mais d'un esprit qui ne portoit guères ni ses soins, ni ses vues au delà de lui-même. Borné. au present, abandonnant au tems le sort de sa posterité, droit par caractère, & facile à être trompé; comme il le fut par les fausses négociations de la maison d'Autriche. Il s'en aperçut vers la fin de sa vie, lorsqu'il n'étoit plus tems de se courir le Palatin son gendre †.*"

Charles succeeded his father in the crown; He was a good man, but wanted resolution. It is true he formed a league offensive and defensive with the states of the United Provinces, and equipped a large fleet, to which the latter joined a Squadron of two and twenty ships. Nevertheless, without expatiating upon these circumstances, it must ever be candidly acknowledged, that James felt some remorse and compunction with respect to the Palatinate in his last days and hours; and according to the accounts of a veracious and sensible author † (who writ upon authentic memoirs delivered to him by the injured family in question, which had no great reason to be partial) charged his son, only eight and forty hours before his decease, *as he hoped for a parent's benediction, and that of heaven, to exert all his powers in order to re-instate his sister and her children into their hereditary dominions: for, continued he, it was my mistake to seek the Palatinate in Spain §.* It is a satisfaction to me to insert this little anecdote, whereby James's character is so far cleared, as he appears to have died a political penitent.

The year 1625 opened with new transactions in 1625. the Swedish senate. A vote passed for raising a sort of standing army (*De perpetuo milite subsidario*) with this reason assigned, that a warlike strength of such a nature might be always ready to prevent the difficulties which arise from unforeseen or sudden events, both in times of war and times of peace; and in order to levy a new fund for this purpose, by way of succedaneum to the other taxes then subsisting, a

* *Historia de Nani*, pag. 138. fol.

† *Le Barre*, Hist. Générale d'Allemagne, Tom. ix. 4^o. pag. 557.

‡ *Fredric Spanheim*.

§ *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine, Louise Juliane*, 4^o. Leyde, 1645.

duty was laid upon all corn that passed the mill, and the impost was intended to favour the poor, who bruised at home by hand the little pittance of grain which was barely necessary for the support of life. But before this edict received its full sanction, the senate and nation agreed to supply the land and naval expences by a voluntary contribution, and voted a large body of recruits, in order to fill up the necessary deficiencies occasioned by the accidents of war.

The truce being now expired between Sweden and Poland, Gustavus, who sincerely adhered to the good faith of an honest warrior, sent a trumpeter at the time appointed to declare his intentions, but the severity of the weather rendered it impossible for the messenger to acquit himself of his commission in due season. The Polish ambassadors complained loudly of this neglect, to whom the Swedish ministers replied, That the king their master had been amused beyond all human sufferance, and that he alone could grant with propriety, what they on their own parts could not presume to ask. It was observed further, that the deputies of Poland were not furnished with sufficient powers, and that Sigismund in his instructions of 1624 had implied Gustavus to be an usurper; whereas the latter, on the contrary, had not dropped a single expression that could be looked upon ill-natured or equivocal; nor were they, (the Swedish ambassadors,) charged with any one secret article, it being their sovereign's custom to explain fully and publicly every circumstance he proposed to follow. But the Polish representatives still insisted, that a war and a treaty were things incompatible at the same time, and that Gustavus must first disarm, and then negotiate. Upon this Oxenstiern *, who was at the head of the legation, assumed the argument, being exasperated not a little; and told them firmly, there should be no cessation of arms till the preliminaries of the treaty were adjusted; and upon that ground-work he had his master's orders to prolong the truce till August next ensuing, and not a moment further; since otherwise the season of the campaign would be elapsed, and who would indemnify the Swedes for their expences and fatigues? observing at the same time, that Livonia was intended to be included in the armistice aforesaid; insisting likewise, that during this cessation it should be allowed the Swedes to draw provisions from Lithuania and Courland, and that Radzivil should approach their camp no nearer than at a distance of ten miles. He then concluded with remarking, that he had the honour to serve a prince

* Loccenii Hist. Suec. p. 548, &c.

who knew how to shoot opportunity on the wing;—That their proposals were only a stale pretext, calculated to protract the time;—That the king his master had the sword drawn;—That he saw his conveniencies, and understood how to use them.—And thus the affair terminated without decision.

Mean while, assisted with such helps as the good-natured Swedes had generously contributed, his majesty sailed for Livonia, having a fleet of seventy-six ships under his command; and by the beginning of April made himself master of the castle of Kokenhausen, an important fortress situated near the banks of the Dwina, rendered strong by art, at the expence of the knights of the Teutonic order, and advantageously protected by nature. He then conquered Selburg, Duneberg, and Nidorp, (not to mention Potnavia which he had taken before) which places were all well supplied with Polish garrisons. Afterwards he mastered Dorpat, which made an imperfect resistance, and surrendered through meer despair of not receiving relief. Thus he reduced all Livonia in a short space, excepting Dunamond, having marched his army backwards and forwards near 700 miles: and as one of the enemy's colonels had formed a design of possessing Riga, either by treachery or surprize, our vigilant monarch intercepted him in the very march, and cut his detachment to pieces. After that, by the dint of good intelligence, he overreached young Sapieha (who had then some second designs upon Riga) at the head of the Polish army, who lost most of his baggage, and a considerable quantity of artillery: for the youth, from his natural impetuosity, sought to give battle at the very moment he ought to have declined fighting; and rushing into a general action over rashly, soon fell a sacrifice to a vigilant, composed, and determined opponent. This the very Polish historians acknowledge. The king then throwing a bridge over the Dwina, which parts Semigallia and Lithuania, and opening a way to himself into the latter province, took Posvelia (which harboured a garrison of Cossacks, who greatly harrassed his march) and then Birzen, a fortification of note in those days, where he found sixty or seventy pieces of artillery, one of which was remarkably fine, being embossed and indented on the outside in a manner to resemble cracks and flaws, and bound round with an ornamental foliage of iron-work, as if it was intended to render the piece fit for service. In the next place he cast his eyes upon Courland and Semigallia, and made himself master of Mittau, Brasche, and several other important places, partly by force, and partly by stratagem: yet all these successes in

war were not sufficient to render him averſe to an accomodation; ſo that it appears at firſt ſight as if it was matter of choice with him, rather to receive laws than impoſe them; though perhaps there may be another reaſon aſſigned, which ſhall be glanced at hereafter. Therefore to this effect he diſpatched Oxenſtiern to propoſe once more a treaty of peace; and Salvius, *ſubdelegate* to the chancellor in ſuch conferences, and Horn, (not Guſtavus Horn the general) were ſent before or after him as co-adjutors: but the two latter † fell into the hands of the Cofſacks, and were interrupted in their political voyage: Oxenſtiern, violently exaſperated at this infraction of the law of nature and nations, demanded his aſſiſtants with a tone of authority by way of preliminary; to which Radzivil the Polish General at length conſented. Thus they rejoined the chief of their embaſſy, but he and they effected nothing. Upon which a battle enſued on the vaſt plains of Semigallia ‡, near a village called Walhoff, about twelve miles from the banks of the Dwina, where it was pretended the Polish cavalry would perform wonders, having full ſcope and room to act; but Guſtavus ſoon convinced Sapieha the father §, (a prince not deficient in fine parts but too old to become a great commander) that he could conduct a pitched battle with the ſame conduct as he entrenched his camp, or beſieged a town. And here it may be worth remarking, as we obſerved before under the ſiege of Riga, that nothing could be more curious in the military ſcience, than an exact deſcription of this firſt capital battle which Guſtavus engaged in, ſince it was upon the preſent occaſion

† Bayle in his hiſtory of Guſtavus mentions Arvitz, Horn, and Salvius, as three ſubdelegates; but here he miſtakes, for the hiſtorian ſays ARVIDUM HORNIVM, & IOHANNEM SALVIUM: which laſt perſon, whoſe ſurname was Adler, born of mean parentage, was firſt a phyſician, and next a juſt-publiciſt. He then rambled over all the more enlightened nations of Europe, much in the manner of the ingenious baron Holberg in our days, who after having ſtayed long in England, undertook a journey on foot from Calais to Italy on the ſlight foundation of fifty ſhillings, and there ſtudied many years. But Salvius on his return could not eſcape the penetration of Oxenſtiern, who having ſtrongly recommended him to the King, employed him in all caſes of importance, and moſt particularly at the peace of Munſter, being created a ſenator and baron Orneholm.

‡ The duchy of Courland (which we ought to have obſerved in the preceding page) is divided into two provinces, Courland properly ſo called, and Semigallia. Courland in the old *Curish* language, which is a dialect of the Sclavonian, ſignifies a *flat land*, and Sem-galle (Semigallia) imports a *land on the other ſide*: for the word *ſem* is alſo ſynonymous to land. *Memoir communicated.*

§ This prince Sapieha was called Leo; and the ſon (who had been lately deſerted) was named Stanilaus.

that

that he discovered all at once his inventive talents in the dispositions of the field: but historians like commentators, usually leave us in those *parts* that are most *curious*, which will appear more plainly when we come to examine how the king lost his life in the battle of Lutzen. All we learn with reference to the present engagement is, that Sapieha conducted no inconsiderable army, for he carried with him the flower of the Lithuanian troops, then thought the best in Poland; 400 Cossacks, and 200 cuirassiers; about 900 German infantry, 2000 huslars, and 400 Heyducs. Nor know we more on the other hand, except that Gustavus placed himself in the centre, and gave great proofs of military genius. Count Thurn the father (and not the son, according to the relation of some historians) commanded the right wing, and Gustavus Horn the left, supported by the colonels Plato and Teuffel. The action was sharp, but soon brought to conclusion in favour of the Swedes. Upon which Gustavus, in the very height of this new prosperity, forgot not to make Sigismund a tender of a second peace; for he well knew the tediousness and uncertainty of waging war against a sort of vagabond army, whom it was hard to find, and harder still to fix to a decisive battle.

Be that as it will, the Poles lost their artillery, their baggage, a good number of standards, relinquishing to the enemy many prisoners, and leaving 1600 dead men on the field of battle. It is asserted by some, that the king of Sweden, previously to this engagement, sent a trumpeter to Sapieha with this short message; *That as there were two such things in the world as peace and war, he made him the compliment of chusing that which he preferred most.* To which Sapieha replied, "That having only one ambition, his desire was, to make a fair trial with his majesty upon equal ground." Not that Gustavus complied with his request, (which was then the high military mode) upon a principle of gallantry; but foreseeing that as his troops were better than the Polish ones, and his discipline superior, *plain ground* to him was a sort of *advantage*. Moreover, it was highly expedient in his circumstances to bring on a battle of the decisive kind; and it may easily be guessed what induced Sapieha to come to action. The Polish armies, it is well known, abound in cavalry, and it was firmly believed in those days, that infantry on flat ground could make no resistance against horse; but the king of Sweden (who *first* supported the *contrary opinion*) conjectured otherwise, and realized his ideas upon that subject more than half a century before the invention of the bayonet, which, when compared with the *reform'd* pike

of Gustavus, appears to be not so useful. Mansfelt's troops, it is true, had performed something of this kind a few years before, but that was effected purely by chance, and the mere dint of necessity: nor (though the fact was indisputable) did he, or any military man, draw conclusions from it.

Yet Sigismund still continued inflexible, notwithstanding he perceived his competitor to be great in all things; and felt in the space of a few months the several effects of his extraordinary abilities, not only in a pitched decisive battle, (the event of which had thrown into the hands of the Swedes all the vast duchy of Lithuania, excepting only the town of Dunamond) but in the art of investing fortified towns, and in the very direction and management of a Polish diet. Add to this, that the dispositions of Providence, and the wise arrangement of human events, by the artful adjustment of Gustavus, had rendered the military transactions of this year highly unprosperous to Poland. Two national misfortunes helped to co-operate to the same end: the one was a fire which broke out at Jaroslau, one of the most renowned fairs in Europe, next to those which are held at Franckfort and Léipsic; and as the houses in Poland are all built of wooden materials, the flames soon consumed the city; and all the rich merchandizes therein contained*. The other unfortunate circumstance was, that the Cossacks thought fit to invade the Chersonese of Tartary, in order to revenge a brother of the Cham, who had been lately dismissed from the Ottoman service: this irruption forced the Grand Seigneur to request that Sigismund would recal his barbarians; which obliged his Polish majesty to send Conospoliski, his best general, to reduce these invaders to reason. Thus Gustavus, during the spring and summer, obtained a breathing-time of very considerable advantage to him.

And here, having mentioned the Cossacks, it may be matter of curiosity to make a few remarks incidentally upon a race of beings as extraordinary in the military history of those days, as the Pandours and Talpaches are in the present century.

The Cossacks are not properly speaking an original nation †, but a set of irregular soldiers, formed upon their own principles into a community. His Polish majesty appointed them a general, (which was not the case at that time betwixt the emperor and the Croatsians) but the inferior officers were elected according to their own regulations. They derive

* *Piascehii Chron.* in annum 1625, fol. p. 455.

† *Brachelii Hist. nostr.* temp. 8^o. p. 110, &c. *Piascehii Chron.* p. 52, &c.

their name from the word *coza*, which in the language of Poland signifies a *goat*, alluding to the celerity of their moving from place to place, and the depredations they make in the countries round them. It was their custom to winter in the islands of the Nieper, or Borysthenes, called *Saporois*, in order to be prepared against the irruptions of the Tartars and Turks. In summer they roamed from place to place, supporting themselves partly by hunting, and partly by dried fish, with which the aforesaid river abundantly supplied them; and towards the approach of the new year, (except the roads had been rendered impassable,) returned regularly to their cottages, and revisited their wives and children; in all places of their peregrinations and wanderings ever acknowledging themselves subjects to the crown of Poland. In former times they carried a bow, a quiver, and a short sword; but in the wars we speak of, they supplied themselves with carabines, head-pieces, and breast-plates. Such were the Cossacks properly so called; nevertheless it must be observed in the course of history, that the Polish light horsemen in general usually pass under that denomination.

Mean while Sigismund their sovereign, astonished with such rapidity of conquest on the part of Gustavus, in order to recover the immense tract of ground that had been lately lost, issued out his *monitorials* to convene a fresh diet at Warsaw, immediately upon the opening of the ensuing year; but Gustavus was expeditious enough to prevent his rival, and while Sigismund was racking his imagination with devising ways and means how to drive him from the duchy of Lithuania; behold! the Swedish monarch (though the enterprize at that period remained a secret) was forming a scheme of kindling up a fresh war in the heart of *that* Prussia which belonged to Poland. About the same time his Britannic majesty made some faint attempts of entering into measures with Gustavus and the king of Denmark, with regard to the restitution of the Palatinate; but received very cold and unsatisfactory answers from them: at length they roundly told him, they had nothing to send him but matter of unintelligible amusement, except he gave them an example by dispatching an English army into Germany.

Buckingham afterwards (in the congress of ambassadors held at the Hague) resumed the point, purely with relation to Sweden, in which some advances were made on either side: but the Swedish Majesty, who wanted impatiently to interpose in the empire, and clip the wings of the Austrian eagle, demanded some conditions incompatible with the interests of the king of Denmark, who was Charles's uncle,

and thus the negotiation came to nothing. Nevertheless, fresh instructions came, tending to compose all differences between the two northern kings, with a view it is thought of giving Gustavus room to interfere in Germany, which was then supposed to be his predominant passion.

Having mentioned Buckingham in this place, it hath been suggested to me by some people, that he and Gustavus formed a better intelligence betwixt each other a few years afterwards; and that when the Duke made his famous expedition against the island of Rhé, doubting much of success in such an undertaking, he conceived a scheme, in case of disappointment, (being then absolute master of all men's services that acted under him) of sailing directly and fixing a settlement by virtue of a commission from Gustavus in some part of the Spanish West-Indies, of which the idea is romantic, but not absolutely improbable. Nevertheless I have been shewn the sketch of a treaty between Gustavus and Buckingham to this effect, which latter was a visionary man and of an imagination unbounded. The foreigners give us a better idea of him than our own historians; he had the presumption in France to talk to queen Anne in the style of a lover: and the marchioness of Sennecy, dame of honour, who placed herself between him and her mistress in order to keep him at a greater distance, said to him in an angry tone, "Sir, *people do not talk thus here to a queen of the realm* *."

♦ Bassompierre, in the journal of his own life, gives us another instance of the duke's petulant vivacity; "I had, said he, a long disputative audience with his Britannic majesty, who permitted himself in the course of the debate to be hurried away by the violence of passion, to whom I answered respectfully but firmly; when on a sudden Buckingham moved from that part of the room where he was standing, and planting himself between the king and me, said pertly enough, *Je viens faire le bolà entre vous deux*." I must observe likewise, that Richelieu and he hated each other mortally; the cardinal writ him a letter, where he joined the body of his epistle to the word Monsieur at the beginning, making no space nor distance: and the duke returned him an answer upon the same principle: for which indeed one cannot blame him; for he seems to have remembered something of the same nature which passed between two grandees in Spain; the one writ a letter to the other and subscribed himself at the bottom simply, *The Marquis*. (31-

* Memoires Histor. & Polit. d'Amelot la Houffaye, Tom. i. 545. which anecdote is confirmed by Nani.

plying that this title belonged to him by way of pre-eminence) but the other returned him a signature at the bottom of his letter equally extraordinary, for he signed himself, *The other Marquis*.

Nevertheless in spite of all successes with reference to Poland, Gustavus still showed himself inclinable to peace: He did not relish a long unprofitable war, which noways satisfied his great designs; and as he pitied his subjects with the tenderness of an affectionate parent, chose not to emburthen them with extraordinary expences, except profit and glory could make them ample amends for the generosity of their contributions: and as he perceived Sigismund, on the footing things then stood, determined to omit no occasions of distressing him; in case he embarked in another war, and found therein the slightest check; he therefore ardently desired to introduce a solid peace; or an inviolable truce: both which he had a right and power to prescribe to his adversary; but perceiving Sigismund to be a man whom he could neither restrain, amuse, or satisfy, he at length resolved to put one favourite scheme into execution with a very high hand, (the *FELICITER AUDET* being his military and political motto) and this was nothing more nor less than to produce a war nearer home, or a new theatre of action: When therefore it was concluded naturally by the Poles, he (being now at Stockholm) would make a second irruption into Lithuania, all on a sudden, to the surprize of Europe in general (before the common season of opening a campaign) it being only the month of February, having already contented himself with the conquest of Livonia* or Lifeland, embarked an army of 26000 men in 150 ships †, and steered his course into the harbour of Pillau, which was then garrisoned by the troops of the elector of Brandenburg, as duke of Prussia; but the governor (whom some suppose to have been retained by a proper application of money ‡) had more probably private instructions to relinquish the place without reluctance to the possession of the Swedes, firing only a few pieces of artillery unladen with balls: for Sigismund, some days before, had predicted the invasion of Gustavus to the states of Ducal Prussia and the elector of Brandenburg: (requesting the latter to consider himself as a possessor only by *beneficiary* right from the crown of Poland) and had sent inspectors to examine thoroughly the harbour in question, who all returned him solemn asseverations,

* *Latitudo de rebus Germanicis*, fol. Tom. i. 179.

† *Kobierzki*, Histor. Vladislavi, 4^o. p. 920.

‡ *Idem*, *Ibid*.

that every thing appeared to be in a state of absolute safety, which created afterwards no small suspicions in the king's royal mind *. Nor must we, on the other hand, forget that Gustavus had previously offered a neutrality to the elector, his Brother-in-law, which he accepted with thankfulness, and by way of return made him an offer of the town and harbour, both as a security in case of retreat, and as the means whereby to collect either contributions or purchasable supplies from the city of Dantzic, the first of all the Hanse-towns, and usually styled the granary of the North: where great things were dreaded from this astonishing invasion of Prussia; since a grave and pious historian † assures us, that the inhabitants had beheld two armies fighting in the air with thunder and lightning instead of artillery.

Pillau, (especially if the castle be included, which surrendered likewise) was a strong place of great importance, situated near the island of Nerunga, on the coast of the Baltic, and distant from Koningsberg (a town then celebrated for its wealth and traffic) about twenty miles. A little frith conducts you from Pillau into the lake of Frischa, which extends itself from Koningsberg westward to the mouth of the Vistula; a breadth which measures little less than threescore miles. In this quiet water Gustavus refreshed his troops some days, and then disembarked them at the very point, where the river Passenge, or as some call it Passeria, disembogues itself into the aforesaid lake. And here it may be worth while just to inform the reader, that Prussia (which belonged originally to the knights of the Teutonic order, who in process of time fell a sacrifice to their insolence, luxury, and corruption of manners) was divided into two parts, one belonging to the king of Poland, and one to the elector of Brandenburg: The former of these princes possessed Dantzic and all that lies eastward on the banks of the Vistula to a certain breadth: in which tract may be reckoned many towns of great consequence, as Thurn, Marienberg, and Culm, (formerly the metropolis of the district) as also Elbingen, the most flourishing and beautiful of them all; and the latter of these princes enjoyed a territory which borders to the north on the Baltic ocean, the Churish lake, and the edge of Courland; confined eastwards by Samogitia and part of Lithuania; having the palatinate of Massovia to the southwards, and Royal Prussia on the western side.

* *Kobierziski*, Histor. Vladislavii, 4^o. p. 92 r.

† *Schefferi* Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 11, &c.

‡ *Piascobii* Chronica, in annum 1626.

Gustavus, who had but one principle of action whenever he entered a conquered or neutral country, acquitted himself in the elector's dominions with all imaginable moderation, equity, and humanity, and so much the rather, as the terms agreed upon between them were perfectly well comprehended on either side: passing therefore all electoral towns without having any thing to say to them, and pointing the course of his army to the south-west, his first step, in order to dismay the enemy, was laying a tax of 30 *per cent.* on the navigation of Dantzic. After that he took Braunsberg and Frawnberg, (which Pillau in effect commanded) transferring the collegiate and town-libraries of the former place to the university of Upsal, which in truth was more matter of show than real advantage, being intended as a *secret reproof* to the friends of the house of Austria, inasmuch as Tilly had some years before, by the connivance of that court, transported very nearly the whole Palatine-collection from Heidelberg into the Vatican: concerning which unfortunate siege, the Heidelbergers to this moment talk of the incredible resistance made by the English, for it was more a carnage than a military engagement on both sides. Every thing was plundered indiscriminately from the palace to the artificer's shed: nor did those learned treasures escape, which till that time were esteemed the glory of the protestant parts of Europe. This library stood in the church of the Holy Ghost: most of which books (especially the MSS. ones) Tilly, by the emperor's orders, conveyed to Italy, and a small dividend was sent to Munich. The Croatsians, whether they could read or not, secured some few books, which were sold to the learned and curious bit by bit; so that one may see morsels of this illustrious collection, not only in various libraries, (besides the Vatican and at Munich) but dispersedly amongst private hands all over Europe. Amongst other valuable MSS. there were some pieces that the Romanists were extremely glad to secure from public view: such, for example, was St. Chrysostom's epistle to Cæsarius, which opposeth the doctrine of *transubstantiation*; and many more of a like stamp. Nor can a protestant till this hour, though ever so well received by the Cardinals at Rome, (who to do them justice are remarkable courteous to men of letters) procure any free and undisturbed access to several MSS. that once belonged to the Heidelberg collection.

The elector of Bayaria, who was a prince of great acquired as well as natural parts, had a violent desire to transport this inestimable treasure to his own palace; and if he had, Gustavus might have restored this learned treasure to the Elector Palatine in 1632, but the pope had a fancy to make him-

self master of so extraordinary an acquisition : and his request did not well admit of being opposed ; for by the way he was the first mover of transferring the Palatinate to the house of Bavaria, and the court of Munich besides had a new game to play at Rome, for Gregory XV. (formerly cardinal Ludovico) died soon after this period, and Urban VIII. succeeded him, who well deserved to be courted on account of his great spirit, as well as excellent understanding. He had been deputed nuntio by Clement VIII. into France, and had held Louis XIII. in his arms, when he was christened. Nor was he over-much prepossessed in behalf of the interests of the Spanish faction, with which Bavaria then co-operated. For a thesis had been published immediately on his election, with this title, *Num Papa esset Catholicus ?* To which Pasquin by the direction of the party replied, *Tace, tace — Est Christianissimus* *. Matters therefore being thus situated, the books were divided ; and as a Greek named Leon, librarian of the Vatican, crossed the Alps on the occasion, he made no unfavourable division, as to quantity and quality, in behalf of his master, when a partition-treaty of manuscript-learning came to be settled between him and one of Tilly's commissary-generals.

But to return from this short digression : the king banished the whole race of jesuits from Frawenberg, as he had done formerly at Riga, not merely as Roman catholics, but as public incendiaries both in war and politics : and it will appear hereafter how sincerely earnest they were to be revenged of him, and how capable they demonstrated themselves of returning him an equivalent at no inconsiderable distance of time. He then took Ravensberg by composition, with the smallest loss that can be well conceived ; for a sudden panic had possessed the garrison.

Some days afterwards he invested Elbingen †, where the defendants were almost equal in number to those that besieged them. And here the king gave a fresh proof, both of his good nature and contempt of danger ; for whilst the commander and burgomaster were signing a capitulation in his tent, he walked up to the town-gates, and desired to be admitted within the walls upon courteous terms. He then asked pardon of the inhabitants for not making his appearance in a better suit of cloaths, and conveying himself from the crowd, in the midst of their admiration, stepped into a bookseller's shop, and desired the honest man to supply him

* *Arcana Dominat. Hispan. p. 15, 12°.*

† *Piasceebii Chronica in hunc annum.*

with an edition of Buchanan's poems *. And here perhaps, for the remark is proper to be made under any article of this or a similar nature, the public in general may be apt to blame me, for mentioning such little incidents in respect to the life of a person truly great: But I appeal to every man's heart, whenever he respects the character on any one, whether he is not more pleased with the recital of little circumstances unknown, than with a pompous repetition of shining actions which have already been told, over and over. Illustrious persons are partly known from minute, common, and unguarded transactions; and if the public can ever bear the recital of particularities, it will receive them kindly in the account of a *man*, the very copying of whose picture afforded daily bread to half the portrait painters who then flourished in Europe.

By making himself master of Elbingen, (to whose governor Gustavus gave as good terms as the Romans granted Antiochus king of Syria on a like occasion,) he fulfilled what the continuator of Foresti observeth sensibly concerning him, namely, that though he had rarely more than an army of 12000 men in Poland, yet he engaged successfully several Polish generals at the head of great bodies of forces in the same campaign, took the strong and important city of Elbingen, and ruined afterwards two imperial detachments, which amounted at least to 16000 soldiers: obtaining, by the possession of the last named town, all that a warrior in such circumstances could desire; for he procured money, refreshments, and a vast quantity of military stores. At the same time an infinite number of recruits (many of them soldiers of fortune, and Scotsmen) flocked to him from Ducal Prussia; so that he completed all his regiments †, and was enabled in three days to march to Marienberg, being the seat of the knights of the Teutonic order, into which city one Penclay, a commander in the Polish service, had conveyed with great dexterity a re-inforcement of 200 men, whom he was marching casually into Lithuania. But as the garrison was still deficient and incomplete, he undertook only the defence of the castle, and changed even that resolution upon a night's reflection. Not that it is certain whether he feared an assault from the Swedish army, or whether he dreaded a court martial, at home; inasmuch as he had undertaken to defend a fortress without orders: for the Polish service in those days was full as punctilious as

* *Character of Gustavus Adolphus*. Lond. 4^o. 1633.

† *Blackwell's Hist. No. 11. temp. lib. iii. 128.*

that of the Spaniards. 'Be the cause whatever, we may suppose, having the honour to be invited by Gustavus to supper, he frankly surrendered both town and castle during the course of the repast, leaving in the hands of the Swedes a Polish receiver-general, with his provincial chest, by way of security. Fortunately at the same time count Thurn joined his master with a considerable body of cavalry, having left Livonia, and made a very prudent march through Ducal Prussia.

Thus reinforced the king took Stum, Christburg, Vormitz, and Brodnick, and formed a lodgment in the two islands of Verder, which are surrounded by the Vistula and the river Nagoth: to which the natural remissness of the Poles, and the dissentions that subsisted between their generals, not a little contributed. But in truth the great matter was, that Gustavus was infinitely their superior, not only in pitched battles, and the art of investing towns, but in the method of intrenching his army, and erecting fortifications almost in an instant; so that it was next to impossible to force him into an engagement, except he chose to embrace the opportunity. He then, to open a free passage between Sweden and his army, blocked up the mouth of the Vistula in the narrowest part, and with great presence of mind prevented an attempt of the Polanders to burn his ships; by reasoning rightly from the accidental discharge of a single musquet. (This stratagem, if we substitute fascines in the room of turfs, was precisely the same with that which had been practised against Breda.) He then rendered himself master both of Mew and Dirschau, two strong towns situated on the banks of the Vistula, having thrown a bridge over that rapid and wide-extended river. And here the greatness of his parts appeared very conspicuous, for by pre-occupying these places, it was his purpose to preclude Sigismond from interrupting the important siege which he proposed afterwards to lay to Dantzic: but matters were not then ripe for so important an event. Marching therefore with one Brahé*, an officer of twenty-four years of age, at the head of some cornecies of Smalindian horse, he drove the Poles from Gluckstadt, and seized all their baggage; contenting himself, at the present juncture, to send to the Dantzickers (as he approached their city) certain terms of hard digestion, of which the principal were to this purpose:

* The king chose him afterwards for his companion, when he crossed the Rhine in a wherry to attack the Spaniards. He commanded the first centre of infantry at the battle of Lutzen, being then count Welfenburg.

That

That all ships should pay him a certain impost: that the town should enter into a strict and unreserved neutrality: that his commissaries should be allowed to purchase corn for ready money; and that the Polish vessels then lying in the harbour should be dismissed; to all which propositions, the last only excepted, the inhabitants consented with outward complacency it is true, but with an inward duplicity. Nevertheless, in a short time he made himself master of the whole Polish Prussia; for upon this occasion some successful circumstances happened to assist him. On the one hand, Sigismond was absent, and violent personal animosities subsisted betwixt his generals. On the other hand, Gustavus was not only a first-rate general, but proveditor of the army, *mestre de camp*, engineer, explorer of passages, and common soldier. He had vigilance to foresee, activity to examine, and courage to execute whatever appeared to come within the reach of man. Which seems to correspond with what Sir Thomas Roe the English ambassador pronounced concerning him about three years afterwards; "That he was a prince who had well considered *si violandum est jus*: a most temperate and courageous commander, that doeth all offices both of a soldier and counsellor: *Vir ad magnas res, & revolutiones natus* †." It may be observed further, that his troops were well clothed, well paid, and well fed. He allowed of no licentiousness, plunder, cruelty, debauchery, or immorality; and by his example, joined to an exact distribution of favour and censure, rewards and punishments, made his officers and soldiers as like himself as circumstances could admit.

Nor may it be amiss to observe afresh in this place, that what passed between Gustavus and the Dantzickers, appears to be only on their side meer matter of cajolement and trial of skill: for they sent deputies to him just to rebate the edge of his keenness, and protract the time till Sigismond should approach, whom they favoured privately. In effect, that monarch arrived soon at the head of 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Graudentz; and then the Dantzickers took off the mask, and committed some hostilities on the Swedes, who afterwards treated them as they justly merited.

Sigismond after some fruitless attempts, in one of which he lost 4000 men near Marienberg, laid siege to Mew, a small town in Pomorelia, near the entrance of the river Vistula, and entrenched the main part of his army on a steep eminence, by which the Swedes must neces-

MS. letter to the earl of Carlisle, October 27, 1629.

fairly pass; for as he foresaw they would attempt to raise the siege, he wanted to bring them to a sort of general engagement, which in his judgment, conformably to the nature of the ground, had all human appearances of proving favourable to himself. Gustavus drew near, and examined the approaches with uncommon attention, but foresaw great inconveniencies from the furious sweep of two batteries, which the enemy took care to erect in good time.

It was indispensably necessary for the service of the campaign, either to raise the siege, or throw relief into the town; (for on Mcw and Dirschau depended the hopes of possessing Dantzic;) but nothing less than a compleat victory could effect the first, and a certain superiority, like that of a battle something more than half-decisive, was alone capable of producing the second. That sharp service was to be performed, every soldier well comprehended; how to effect it like men of honour was the remaining difficulty. And here it was the rare felicity of Gustavus to be puzzled, but not dismayed; to lose his conjectures, but not his reason; for his mind, on these occasions, exerted itself in proportion to the danger. Having marched therefore from his camp at Dirschau, at the head of 3000 chosen infantry, and 500 horse, without drums, and without trumpets, in hopes of beating up one of the enemy's quarters, (so far at least as to throw relief into the town) he determined instantaneously, in one of these military irradiations, to ascend the hill, pursuing the track of a small winding by-path; nevertheless, at the same time, he found the enterprize so dangerous, that he thought himself obliged, conformably to the custom of the age upon peculiar occasions, to animate his soldiers by a short speech. The brave young Thurn, seconded by colonel Hepburn, a Scots officer of great abilities, and of approved courage, conducted the attack.

If the reader can represent to himself the behaviour of a body of English sailors, commanded to climb a very desperate hill, he may then form some idea of that alacrity which animated the Swedish soldiers; and as the slopes of the ascent were well furnished with trees, these trees served the assailants for masts and cordage whereby to mount.

When Thurn and Hepburn had reached the summit, which lay near the banks of the Vistula, they found the Polish soldiers entrenching themselves, like good pioneers, and fell on them with incredible fury. But as the Poles poured in fresh troops every moment, the fight was maintained for two hours with incredible obstinacy. Upon which Thurn, finding the service to be extremely dangerous, re-
 . tired

fired a few paces to a post which had appeared to him more defensible. The Polanders attacked him in making this retreat with redoubled fury, being re-inforced by a large body of Heyducks and Cossacks, crying aloud, "That the Swedish curs could not bear the bite of the Polish wolves;" but the gallant Bohemian soon convinced them, that a short retreat was something very different from an actual flight. During this interval, Gustavus threw a supply of men and ammunition into the town. And here once more it appeared, that infantry were able to resist an equal or superior body of cavalry: for the fire of Thurn's soldiers was irresistible, and the pikemen stood immovable, like a wall of brass. Upon this footing the action ended; of which the success was whimsical and capricious; for though the Polanders kept the field of battle, they abandoned the siege. Thus the turn of the scale inclined rather to Gustavus's side: for he carried his point, and his opponents lost theirs. Sigismund was not present in this engagement, but prince Vladislaus his son behaved extremely well; the action lasted two days*. There were some other circumstances uncommonly remarkable in the present engagement: for at a just average, every Swede killed a man, losing only one seventh of their own number. The English colonel Mostyn, and a count Brahe (not the young man we mentioned before) performed particular services that day. The former stood firm at the head of 200 German arquebusiers, and resisted every impression the enemy could make. And the latter, by the king's command, had ventured up the hill by another track, attended only with a small party of infantry, and supported there the fire of the Polanders till he had made himself master of the ground, and conveyed the intelligence to his royal master.

The Poles were so terrified with this desperate resolution of the Swedes, that without further delay they raised the siege, though attacked only by an handful of men. This conduct of theirs, as it is commonly delivered down to us in history, seems to me remarkably mysterious; but in truth the matter was, the Polish generals disagreed among themselves; they knew likewise that Gustavus would immediately cause the larger part of his army to join him (being then at a small distance from him): and in the third place, the Polish camp was ill supplied with powder.

Gustavus entered the town that evening, extolling the fidelity of the inhabitants, and bravery of the garrison, to the highest degree, and allowing no man's good services to

* *Loric. de Rebus German. fol. tom. i. 481.*

pass by unrewarded. At night, when all the officers assembled to prayers in his lodgings, (as was not uncommon) with a view particularly to return thanks for their master's delivery that day, (for his great escapes were manifest) Botvid, his majesty's first chaplain, who had retired to his devotions apart from the army during the whole of the action, made him his congratulations after the service was concluded: to whom Gustavus gave this pious and elegant answer; *That he little doubted the prosperity of the battle, when Moses assisted him with his prayers on the mount* *.

In the hurry and confusion of this action, Gustavus fell twice into the enemy's hands. How he escaped the first time cannot well be ascertained; nevertheless, he was preserved a second time by the admirable presence of mind of a Swedish horseman, who (to conceal his majesty's quality) cried aloud to the Polanders, "Have a care of yourselves, for we will rescue my brother;" since, by the way, it must be noted, that he had three or four companions at his elbow. This task he performed in an instant: when, not long afterwards, Gustavus perceived his deliverer to be made a prisoner in his turn: and putting himself at the head of five or six cavaliers, brought him off triumphantly. *Now, says he, brother soldier, we are upon equal terms: for the obligation is become reciprocal* †.

Mean while Sigismund made some slight indications of listening to a treaty. Place and time being named, the ambassadors met, and it was the most unmeaning and solemn interview that ever was known; for every man affected the gravity, wisdom, ceremony, and taciturnity of a Spaniard. At length a Polish nobleman of spirit, provoked beyond patience with these serious grimaces, broke silence, and proposed terms, which Oxenstiern and the others positively rejected. And indeed this expedient of Zamoski's ‡, (for such was the proposer's name) if one may judge of the piece from the sample, carries with it a very extraordinary appearance, and may serve to demonstrate (at least collaterally) what an high idea he, and his brother-deputies, had conceived of our king's generosity and greatness of spirit: For the tenor of it ran to the following effect, "That the Swedes should cede Livonia to Poland, and Sigismund on his side should resign to Gustavus Esthonia and Finland:" (to which latter principality he had a more immediate claim, inasmuch as it was a part of his father's appennage;) "and in

* *Loccenii Hist. Suecan. p. 554.*

† *New Star of the North. Lond. 4^o. 1633.*

‡ *Lottich, de Rebus, Germ. tom. i. 482, &c.*

“case Gustavus died without issue-male,” (his only brother being dead about four years before) “that then one of Sigismond’s sons should be declared successor to the crown of Sweden, and Sigismond himself assume the title as an external form; the next relation of Gustavus being to be invested with the duchy of Sudermania *in perpetuum*.”

Now it is Puffendorf’s opinion, that this proposal came from the Swedes*, which appears to me highly unlikely, and so much the rather, as a better instructed author informs us, that the conditions, alike unjust and unworthy†, were first devised by the Polanders; nor can the *baron’s* exactness (any more than his impartiality) be always relied on: for he tells us in the same paragraph, that prince Charles the king’s brother, died the preceding year (1625): whereas his decease happened four years before, in 1622.

As this proposed accommodation had the air of extravagance, of course the war commenced afresh; and Conospoliski, the ablest general amongst the Poles, formed an enterprize against Dirschau, but retired with loss and disappointment; for Gustavus had prudently thrown troops into the town before he could possibly approach it. Sigismond made like attempts upon Mew and Marienberg, with the same ill success. Thus the campaign concluded neither unprosperously nor ingloriously for the Swedish cause. For the king, whose troops began to be extremely harrassed through the extensiveness of his conquests from April to October, encamped himself with great judgment on the approach of winter; having all Prussia at his devotion behind him, and the navigation of the Vistula open betwixt himself and Sweden; and thus he bade defiance to the united efforts of Sigismond, Conospoliski, and Sapieha.

Towards the end ‡ of this year, Gustavus was rendered happy by the birth of a second daughter, called Christina; the former named likewise Christina (or as some say Christiana) being dead for some time. Upon this new event, Sigismond (which is not uncommon to persevering, and obstinate minds) grew more and more encroaching, proud, and intermeddling every day: upon which the Swedish senate, fully determined to mortify his vanity and check his ambition and turbulence all at once, thought proper to settle the succession on Christina, and declared her heiress to the throne.

* *Introd.* du Baron Puffendorf, tom. iv. p. 202.

† *Ihiquis storus, & indignis conditionibus à Polcnis oblati.* *Lecten.* lib. viii. 554.

‡ December the 8th.

It hath been the misfortune of this unaccountable woman to have been more spoken of in history and memoirs, than one half of her female coteremporaries. Reading much (for the great Oxenstiern was her tutor) yet not extremely learned; a collector and critic in the fine arts, but collecting without judgment, and forming conclusions without taste; affecting pomp, and rendering herself a beggar; fond to receive servile dependance, yet capable of abdicating a crown; delighting in cruelty, yet divesting herself of the means; paying court to the most serious Christians; and making profession of little less than deism. It is afflicting above measure to consider such a daughter in the light of being descended from such a man. She has claim at least to a certain degree of oblivion; and one must say of her with the great Oxenstiern on a like occasion (who when he pronounced the words could hardly refrain from tears), *Alas, alas, be things as they will, nevertheless she is the daughter of the GREAT GUSTAVUS!*

Matters continuing still upon a disagreeable footing in respect to Poland, Gustavus took care, like a prudent and condescending prince, to lay before the senate all the efforts, advances, and concessions he had made, in order to procure a lasting peace. These papers being thoroughly perused, the states took flame in an instant, and being charmed on the one hand with their master's sincerity and communicative temper, and exasperated beyond all imagination on the other hand at the rejection of such reasonable conditions as he had vouchsafed to propose, determined once for all to mortify the pride of Sigismund, and cut off his pretensions even from the very root. In a word, they reposed a confidence so unlimited in their sovereign, that they made him a tender of new supplies of money, and determined to serve under him in their proper persons, if there should be occasion. And indeed great national actions can

† Amongst various anecdotes that might be produced on this head, I shall specify only one with regard to pictures. She collected at Rome many fine pieces, painted by the greatest masters, and ordered their extremities to be clipped with shears, till she reduced them to the size of the sides of rooms, or the compartments of stucco-work and wainscoting, where she intended to place them: little considering, that when the superficial extent of a picture is diminished by cutting, that the proportions which remain are greatly injured, if not totally ruined. I have seen a roll of Titian's painting, half yard wide, at a broker's shop, which had been separated from its original by this unmerciful Procrustes. From an anecdote delivered down to us by Dryden, she is delineated in the Grand Cyrus under the character of queen of Corinth; from whence that poet drew her in his dramatic performance, called, *The Maiden Queen*.

never be effected, except the king and his people preserve a mutual confidence and esteem for each other: for it was in the power of the latter to have checked the operations of the war at any time, either through peevishness or capriciousness. After such evidences of unreserved frankness and sincerity, his majesty began to feel he had fixed his footing on firm ground; and therefore with an eye to popularity, and in hopes of conciliating the affections of his subjects to him more and more, he besought the states to examine carefully a plan that had been laid before him for establishing a commerce to the West-Indies†. From which undertaking he proposed to give his nation a new turn for maritime affairs, and draw no small advantage from an intercourse which had proved not unprofitable to his European neighbours, alledging likewise (which in him was certainly matter of sincerity) the singular advantages of spreading the sacred truths of the Gospel over those uncultivated and unlightened regions. On the same religious principles he ventured on a bolder and more noble step nearer home, and at this important juncture re-published and enforced an edict in *favour of distressed and oppressed protestants in all countries*, offering these emigrants a safe retreat in Sweden, together with an immunity from all taxes* for some years; and what is still more noble and disinterested, full permission to return whenever the troubles of Europe should be composed. And here, besides preserving a sincere and generous sense of piety at bottom, his majesty had certainly an eye to the extravagant power and cruelty of the house of Austria, and opened a sanctuary to a million of people, who, after the loss of all their worldly goods and possessions, were deprived of their civil and religious liberties; so that we may denominate this measure one of those fortunate actions in a prince which at the same time is wise and good: and as Gustavus had something of the singular and inventive cast in all he did, he may be considered (except we suppose him to copy the conduct of queen Elizabeth on the like occasion) to be the father of the *refugees*, and the protector of exiles. In this circumstance likewise he has been imitated by One, who by copying the actions of Gustavus, pays a silent tribute of honour to the memory of the deceased.

It is not to be described how much all these new schemes at Stockholm delighted the senators; and that particularly

† See the APPENDIX, Art. III. *first edition*, 4°. It consists of six pages, and was preserved by Bisaccioni in his Commentaries, 4°. in Venet. 1634.

* This heretical and christian declaration is preserved by Leticibus, tom. i. p. 546.

which

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which related to establishing a settlement in the West-Indies; to which all people subscribed generously and readily, in conformity to the example the king had set them. One Ussing; a Fleming, two years before, first made this proposal to Gustavus, who readily complied with it both from religious and political reasons; inasmuch as in the latter case he proposed, by introducing commerce, to lessen the taxes that affected agriculture, casting likewise a small side-glance at the king of Spain, who extracted, as he thought, rather too much money from the American regions, which tended chiefly to aggrandize himself and the Imperialists likewise. But his majesty, greatly interrupted by affairs nearer home, had not power to give laws to two worlds at once: and the Spaniards, with a view to support the Polish or Imperial interests; (for no reason was assigned) contrived, dexterously enough, to make themselves masters of the little Swedish squadron that sailed for America. Nevertheless the disappointment was far greater than the real loss; for this first equipment was only a sort of feeling the pulse, in order to judge how far such a kind of expedition might answer hereafter: so that the subscribing subjects, and the nation in general, bore their losses patiently enough, and the sums of money that remained were appropriated to the uses of the war, and other services of state.

Whilst Gustavus employed himself with great attention at Stockholm, (where by consent of senate, making a draught of one man out of ten throughout his dominions; he formed a body of 40,000 fine recruits in case of emergency*) Conspoliski, notwithstanding the extreme severity of the season, changed the siege of Dantzic into a blockade, taking care at the same time that the little Swedish army, which Gustavus left behind him, should make no incursions into the parts of Poland not hitherto conquered, having rendered himself master of the port of Buca, from whence, and from the harbour of Pillau, the Swedes in effect, invested Dantzic. Mean while Gustavus suffered no small uneasiness, as the tempests of the ocean and the inclemency of the season would not allow him to transport a large re-inforcement to his army. But what contributed most to agitate and chagrin him was, that the Poles had re-possessed the city of Putzka, which gives laws to a small territory of the same name; and that the colonels Strief and Teuffel † (both men of service, the former having commanded the right wing of cavalry at

* *Loitch. de Rebus Germ. tom. i. p. 845.*

† *Ibid. p. 545.*

the battle of Prague †, and the latter being an officer whom Gustavus particularly esteemed) had the misfortune to be surprized by the vigilance of Conospoliski, at a time they supposed him at least sixty miles removed from them. They had 8000 new-raised troops under their command; all levied during the preceding winter, in and near the territories of Brandenburg. As the men were unpractised, and unexperienced, it was not easy for their commanders to infuse spirit into them; for when Sigismund's general had surrounded them on every side, and the Polish horse begun the attack, these military novices advanced their hats upon their pikes, without deliberation; and asked for quarter. Of course Strief and Teuffel were taken prisoners, and the common men were dismissed to Germany, under promise not to serve against the kingdom of Poland for one year then next ensuing. Behold here the only real disgrace that ever befel a large body of troops under the pay of Gustavus; and still it must be considered in the second place, that the men were all infants in the practice of war, and their master likewise was absent. His majesty, when the event had happened, made no remonstrances nor complaints, (it being his custom to be angry only whilst matters continued undecided) yet never meeting with the name of Strief in the future course of our history, it seems probable to me that the king dismissed him. Teuffel he knew to be brave and able, (and allowances being made that the best officers may be defeated once or twice) he continued his favours to him; and rather increased them.

Conospoliski thought it now high time to refresh his men; but Gustavus arrived with the first fair wind in the month of May, and forced him to return to the duties of the field with great reluctance. Indeed it was our hero's custom to anticipate the approach of spring in opening a campaign, but the tempestuousness of the season prevented his embarkation till the time mentioned, and then he made his appearance in Prussia at the head of a brave and well-disciplined army, opening the campaign with uncommon lustre; and gaining two very notable advantages in one day; for he took the fort of Kesmark by assault, and defeated a large detachment of Polish troops which marched to its relief. He then applied himself to the siege of Marienberg, a strong fortress built by the Dantzickers in order to free them from the insults of the Swedish fleet, and soon reduced it, though

† This officer was an Hollander, and sent by the states-general with a regiment of horse to assist the king of Bohemia.

it was well supplied with provisions and military stores, and doubly garrisoned. The Poles however pursued the war with surprizing perseverance, and had briskness enough to attack Gustavus's camp, which occasioned a second action at Dirschau; where the enemy's infantry had been intirely broken and ruined by the Swedish cavalry, if a large body of Polish horse had not made a motion instantly to their support. The assailants however, notwithstanding their superiority of numbers, were at length repulsed, and happy for them they escaped on so good terms; for whilst Gustavus was surveying, from an eminence, the nature of the ground, both with respect to himself and the enemy, upon some notable alteration in the turn of the battle, he had the misfortune to be struck by a falcon-shot near his elbow, which disconcerted his generals and his soldiers not a little. On this occasion all the chief officers of the army, with Oxenstiern at their head, besought him, in the tenderest manner, to manage his life with more care, as he passionately loved his subjects, and was beloved by them with reciprocal affection. Convinced of their attachment to him, he told them with emotion, modesty, and at the same time a certain degree of firmness: "That the Divine Power would continue just the same, when he was gone; nor did he suppose himself so indispensably necessary to the conservation of his kingdom as they, from a kind prepossession in his favour, were inclined to imagine: Since, said he, if the Supreme Being should be pleased to dispose of me in the day of battle, he will questionless raise up some abler support to the crown of Sweden. But, continued he, if that self-same Being hath committed this important charge to me, it is my business to perform it without any views of favouring myself; and if death be my portion in war, how can a king die more gloriously than in the defence of his people?"—It appeared afterwards from Gustavus's future practice and turn of mind, that the remonstrance had less effect than the reply*.

But when his majesty's physician approached him, who thought a man of his importance must say something to strengthen the request of the prime-minister Oxenstiern and the generals, the king, with a smile, replied to him: *Doctor, pray make your conversation short, and call to mind the good old Latin proverb, Ne futor ultra crepidam*†. From whence it is manifest that he bore all his pains with composure of mind and gaiety; since, on another occasion, when the surgeon was puzzling himself to extract a musket-ball, Gustavus remembering doubtless a saying of Alexander the Great on a

* *Loccenii Hist. Suec. p. 556.*

† *Ibid.*

like occasion) *besought the artist to allow the ball to continue in his body, as an illustrious monument that he had not passed his youth in idleness and inactivity* *.

But what afflicted Gustavus more than the wound, was the news he received that Adolphus, duke of Holstein, had marched a body of Imperial troops in order to join himself with Sigismund. This general, ever distinguished for giving marks of the clearest courage, laboured under two misfortunes; his powers to act were circumscribed; nor had his troops over-much opinion of his parts, or military conduct, if we except only the fighting part. Yet, in spite of the arrival of these veteran bands, the king was obliged to go to Stockholm, in hopes to recover his health, much impaired by the wound he had lately received; and in the interval left the command of his army to count Thurn, who chose to give the men rest rather than action; nevertheless, upon relinquishing a castle which the Polanders immediately seized, he contrived, having left a concealed mine beneath it, to blow up a considerable number of enemies, together with the whole fortification.

Thus concluded the campaign of 1627, and Gustavus by this time had obtained so great a character as a prince of consequence, that even his Britannic majesty humbly entreated his friendship, and sent him the order of the garter by way of compliment for the heroic actions he had performed.

And here we naturally conclude the transactions of the year 1627, where we may just transiently observe, having made mention of Charles I. that England, France, and Spain, were governed at this period by three youths, who had Buckingham, Richelieu, and Olivarez, for their prime ministers.

Nor was Gustavus unactive during his residence at Stockholm, admonishing by edict †, under pain of confiscation of ships and cargo, all commercial persons, 1628. in the Hanse-towns to abstain from conveying provisions and military supplies of any sort to the inhabitants of Dantzic, whom he considered in the light of declared enemies, inasmuch as they publicly infested the ocean, and did great harm both to his subjects and allies. Nevertheless, that he might not preclude all hopes of an accommodation, he artfully allowed them at the same time a free intercourse of commerce with foreign countries, excepting in such in-

* *Loccenii Hist. Suec. p. 556.*

† It was rather a sort of manifesto very politely and yet acrimoniously worded: *Lotichius* hath preserved it, tom. i. 608, 609, 610.

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stances as fell within the article of warlike stores and assistances; upon this condition, that they paid a certain impost to the royal fleet of Sweden, which then blockaded the harbour. Nor were these measures hard conceived with respect to Dantzic, as that town was a thorn of uneasiness which his majesty could not eradicate, except with dexterity.

Matters being placed upon this footing, (the spring of the year as yet but just commencing) Gustavus re-embarked from Stockholm in a fleet of three and thirty sail, and lighting upon seven Dantzic ships between that town and the fort of Weiffelmond, took three, sunk a fourth, and gave chase to the remainder. One refused itself in the port of Colbergen, but the Swedes demanded it from the inhabitants, who being subjects to the elector of Brandenburg resigned it, as is supposed not unwillingly, though a certain face of appearances was kept up: His majesty's Squadron was not so fortunate a few days after, for lighting by chance on five Polish ships (one of which was laden with stores) the commander of them behaved so well, that they forced their way through the Swedish fleet. About the same time a detachment from the main army attempted to storm some of the outworks of Dantzic, but were repulsed with loss, several captains being taken prisoners, and count Thurn wounded; during which operations the Polanders with very inconsiderable loss made themselves masters of Pautzken and Mew. Stung to the quick with these slight disgraces, his majesty broke up from his camp of Dirschau, at the head of a detachment of 7000 men, and having made a concealed march over morasses thought impassable, possessed himself by dint of industry, dexterity, and stratagem, of the lesser island near Dantzic; for he passed the river over three flying bridges, conveying in light carts and on horses his boats and leather-artillery; for which latter invention he had an uncommon fondness*: so that almost in an instant he crossed the stream and erected his batteries; a task the Polanders in their own minds allowed him a week to effect, and that with difficulty; having killed 200 of his opponents, and seized twelve (some say twenty-two) pieces of artillery; upon which it was commonly said by the Swedish soldiers, that the Polish general had found the spoil of a village in Mew, but that their king had found the plunder of a city in a half-inhabited island. Mean while Achatius Todt, who proved afterwards a renowned general

* *Loiseb. de Reb. Germ. tom. i. 617.*

in the German wars, (accompanied, as some say, with Lesley and Sperreüter, whose names will be better known in the course of our history) was dispatched with two troops of cavalry and a small body of dragoons to observe the motions of Conospoliski's army; but as the Poles, like the Croatians, &c. have little resource but in the arts of surprise and stratagem, he found himself suddenly involved in an ambuscade in the forest of Grebin, and as there remained no possibility of a retreat, placed himself at the head of his men, and cut his way twice through the enemy, four times his superior in numbers, more with the air of a conqueror than like an officer who was compelled to act the best part he could; for he conducted his troops safe to the camp, and brought four standards with him. Upon which the king rewarded the more distinguished officers and common soldiers, and conferred the honour of knighthood on their commander in as public and solemn a manner as he could devise*.

Upon this Conospoliski began to take flame in earnest, and marched up to the king's lines, who feared him not, as his army had been augmented by 9000 Scots and English soldiers, which joined with his other troops, made a body of 24000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 3000 archers. How indeed a first-rate genius, enlightened in the arts of war like Gustavus, could condescend to employ this latter species of soldiers, will appear to most persons as something that exceedeth all common belief; but my own private conjecture is, that they were a combined mass of irregular barbarians who had deserted to the Swedes, and had been accustomed to use no other sort of military weapons. From whence it is natural to imagine that the king received them, merely because he could not decently reject them; for to his dying moments he hated that class of soldiers (if the name may be given them) called *irregulars*; partly on account of their depredations and cruelty, and partly because they had a talent for military mischief without ever producing any one positive military good. In proof whereof it has been assured me, that prince Eugene always honoured Gustavus for this great and just idea, and in consequence of it disposed the rabble of his Hungarians and Croatians (though some of them since the days of Gustavus have been rendered regular) in such posts and situations only, where no particular onset could be expected, allowing them barely the power of working harm, without being connected with more honourable forces. But, setting these barbarian combatants out of the question, the king had strength

enough not to suppose Conospoliski so formidable an enemy, as that he ought to shun him; therefore to give his adversary a fair pretext of entering into an engagement, he gallantly confronted him upon equal ground; for a speedy decision was highly to be wished for by one who commanded an army in an hostile country, where provisions were procured with difficulty. The conflict was very obstinate on either side, but Gustavus finding himself able to bear the efforts of the Polanders without breaking his ranks, or causing the men to retreat, detached the best of his cavalry and infantry to make an onset on the rear of the Polish army. Measures were so well taken, that this march was made unperceived, and in the first and last attack the Poles lost 3000 men, four field-pieces, and fourteen colours; not to mention that Conospoliski himself was grievously wounded.

This event gave the citizens of Dantzic more serious thoughts; they saw themselves marked out as an object of chastisement, and began to perceive, that they were more and more confined and limited every day; for the king by this time had blockaded their city with his land-forces, and stationed eight vessels at the mouth of their harbour to hinder all ingress and egress: this was giving the inhabitants a wound in the vital part; for a town of commerce soon lends an ear to accommodations when you can once divert the stream that feeds and supplies it: yet the remark failed in the present instance, (partly as Walslein had conveyed an Imperial fleet to their assistance) for the Dantzickers had the good fortune with eleven vessels in a sharp engagement (which lasted at least three hours) to defeat the Swedish ships; four of which (one being admiral Sternskiold's) they took; and had probably treated the vice-admiral in the same manner, if he had not, more vainly gloriously than prudently, blown up his vessel and all the mariners into the air*. The Swedes lost a considerable number of people, besides their commander in chief, who died sword in hand; for in truth the Dantzickers, though less brave, were the better seamen: yet Appelman their admiral was killed, as were likewise several officers and 400 mariners: and as to the Swedish fleet, the remainder thereof was driven in a forlorn and shattered condition into the port of Pillau. Mean while Gustavus did not greatly relish this disgrace, though the affair was performed on an element where in truth he had acquired no great experience: of course in the first transports of his ill-humour he could not help repining, *That a pacific commercial rabble* (to use his

* *Memorab. Suec. Gotis*, 91, 92.

own words) *should beat a set of brave fellows, who made fighting their profession.* But notwithstanding this momentary disappointment and chagrin, he soon looked upon the event with less prejudiced eyes, and, (as was always his custom) after the over-boiling of the first momentary heat, set himself to repair the loss with double diligence, attention, and patience; nor was it his temper ever to be angry or complain after he had passed his first sentiments upon any unprosperous affair. Immediately therefore he replaced his former fleet with a second fleet of twelve ships, and having obstructed all commerce between Dantzic and other places, transferred that very maritime intercourse to the city of Königsberg; a place for commerce not injudiciously chosen, as an acute and sensible prince hath since demonstrated.

It was, if I mistake not, in this campaign, but upon what occasion one cannot say, that Oxenstiern attempted to dissuade his master from some undertaking of a very spirited and hazardous nature; *My good chancellor,* said the king, *you are too cold for my temper.* *Yes, Sire,* replied the minister, *yet if my ice did not infuse a damp into your fire, it is possible your majesty might have been scorched some years ago*.* How far Oxenstiern had reason for insinuating this incidental reproach as to military enterprizes, is by no means here a matter of question. The king heard him with good humour, and dropped the conversation: nevertheless, it may suffice to observe, that no man more than Gustavus trusted in foresight, precaution; and the probable judgment of second causes; so that many days before the breaking out of any important design, it was his custom to decline company, affect retirement; and stray abroad in the fields like a person immersed in thought. It was in one of these reveries that Gassion afterwards found him, alone, and wandering far distant from his camp and soldiers, at which very time his majesty was meditating to make his first trial of skill on the renowned Tilly.

A peace had now been talked of some months: it was to have been effected by the interposition of the Dutch ambassadors; but as in their journey they had made a private visit to the army of Gustavus, and conferred with him on the footing of openness and freedom, his Polish majesty paid little regard to their mediation, though in truth the terms proposed carried with them a better prospect than had appeared formerly. Upon this a new scene broke forth to view: for Gabriel Le Roy †, the Spanish minister, perplexed the cause

* Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 32.

† Piaschbii Chronica, in annum 1628.

on the Swedish side of the question, and baron D'Auchi, who afterwards assisted him, overturned all: the truth was, the houses of Austria and Spain began to perceive too manifestly from the generous, the prudent, the magnanimous turn of our northern hero, that he had it always in his power to disturb, if not destroy the immense conquests they had made in Germany, the rich acquisition of ten the most prosperous campaigns that Europe had then beheld. It was therefore resolved to traverse the schemes of Gustavus. Prodigal therefore of promises, they assured Sigismund of securing to him the possession of all Sweden, and agreed to send him twenty-four men of war, 14000 veteran soldiers, and about 33000*l.* sterling*. The first and last articles were never thought of afterwards, (excepting that D'Auchi deposited about 16000*l.* by way of beginning) which breach of promise was an irreparable defect in point of politics, since a body of 20,000 men, a moderate naval force, and one tenth part of a million of money, had questionless secured them in the possession of Germany for the century then to come, if not much longer. It is thought this parsimony or remissness proceeded purely from the Imperial court. For though the wary Spaniards, better politicians than the Austrians, feared Gustavus even at the greatest distance, and the rather, as the sagacious Spino-la had always declared, that Gustavus was the only prince in Europe whom the two crowns ought either to find employment for, or cajole and amuse; yet the latter supposed him an impetuous enterprizer in war, and looked upon his men as novices and probationers in the school of fighting. Walfstein's extraordinary speech to Arnheim, when he sent him afterwards into Poland, seems partly to confirm this opinion, as will appear hereafter: and when Gustavus landed in Germany, the rodomontade at Vienna was, "That he was a king of snow, and would soon melt to pieces as he advanced southward." The emperor, in conjunction with his allies, and inclusive of garrisons, had likewise 170,000 seasoned men, most of whom had been engaged in ten years sharp service; and as for one part of them, the old corps of Burgundians and Walloons, who had been formed in the Low Country wars, they were looked upon as invincible: yet genius and courage, plac'd at the head of an handful of men, soon counterbalanced all these seeming advantages: for Gustavus, by an extraordinary reach of parts, created a new system of fighting; and saw, moreover, that cruelty,

* The papers relating to this transaction fell afterwards into the king's hands when he entered Germany,

rapine, lewdness, drunkenness, and immorality, were capable of bringing the best soldiers down to the common level. Yet as Sigismund had not the gift of foreseeing these disadvantages or advantages, it was his misfortune to listen to the proposals made by Spain and Austria. And great on the other hand was D'Auchi's surprise, when upon his arrival at Lubec and Rostock he saw plainly, that no use had been made of the money he had engaged to give with intention to put the marine in order. But this proceeded from no remissness in Sigismund. The truth was, the society of Hanse-towns withheld their assistance, having no desire to see an Austrian admiral in the Baltic; nor did they chuse to give umbrage to the kings of Sweden and Denmark, who had just added a temporary article to their late alliance with reference to all intrusions upon the free sovereignty of the Northern ocean*, under condition that neither party should accede to new terms with any other prince or state without including his first ally. The naval enterprize being thus rendered abortive, Sigismund humbly requested, that the sum deposited might be made over to the uses of a land-war. But to that petition the Spanish minister pleaded want of instructions. This chicanery rather sharpened the king of Poland than dejected him; for though the senate, convened this autumn at Warfau, had complained of the prolongation of an ineffectual war against the Swedes, and had withholden as much as lay in their power the annual supplies, yet, in spite of all obstructions and retardments, he purchased and equipped ships with his own money, and placed them under the conduct of an excellent seaman, who on the approach of winter had attacked a Swedish squadron, which blockaded the harbour of Dantzic, agreeably to what we have before-mentioned.

By this time the cold season began to approach; but Sigismund and Conospoliski being now joined (for the latter had been dispatched for a short season to oppose an irruption made by the Tartars) formed a scheme of entertaining Gustavus with a winter campaign. But the king of Sweden had a great desire to refresh his men, and therefore applied himself to the grand secret of entrenchment, which was, properly speaking, a military invention, almost all his own. In this situation he allowed the enemy to gaze during pleasure: upon which, struck with astonishment at the judiciousness of his encampment, Conospoliski undertook the siege of Dirschau, and Sigismund paid a visit to the inhabitants of

* *Loccen, Hist. Suec. 559.*

Dantzig, whose fidelity to him justly merited that attention. In the month of November he held a national diet at Thurn, and supplies were voted for the war with greater unanimity than is usually to be found in Poland. Encouraged by a disposition of the nation so benevolent, it was proposed by the king's party to appoint a successor to the throne; upon which the nobility took fire, and demanded that the traitorous adviser of such a project should be given up to the mercy of the laws: so jealous were they of not appointing one king during the life of another.

And here I must ask the reader's permission to make a digression for a moment, in order to introduce a story which I know not where to place according to the strict rules of chronology.

It was in one of these Prussian campaigns that the irrational practice of duelling arose to a considerable height in the Swedish army, not only amongst persons of rank and fashion, but between common soldier and common soldier: upon which Gustavus published a severe *edict*, and denounced death against every delinquent. Soon after a quarrel arose between two officers of high command and as they knew the king's steadfastness in keeping his word inviolable, they agreed to request an audience, and besought his permission to decide the affair *like men of honour*. His majesty took fire in a moment, but repressed his passion with such art that they easily mistook him: of course with some reluctance, but under the appearance of pitying brave men who thought their reputation injured, he told them, that he blamed them much for their mistaken notions concerning fame and glory; yet as this determination appeared to be the result of deliberate reflection to the best of their deluded capacity, he would allow them to decide the affair at time and place specified: *And, gentlemen, said he, I will be an eye-witness myself of your great valour and high spirit.*

At the hour appointed Gustavus arrived, accompanied by a small body of infantry, whom he formed into a circle round the combatants, *Now, says he, fight, till one man dies;* and calling the executioner of the army to him, (or the *provost-martial*, as the language then ran) *Friend,* added he, *the instant one is killed, behead the other before my eyes.*

Astonished with such firmness, the two generals, after pausing a moment, fell down on their knees and asked the king's forgiveness, who made them embrace each other, and give their promise to continue faithful friends to their last moments, as they both did with sincerity and thankfulness*. So that

* *Memorab, Suec. Gentis*, p. 61—63.

from this period we find no duel between men of note in Gustavus's service; and though the edict above referred to is not to be found in the Swedish or German historians, yet in the king's military code (which admirable system of laws now lies before me) there are the same severe decrees against *duelling* (all injuries of honour being to be redressed by the *army-consistory* upon due complaint and representation); nor is it unknown by the curious that this work was originally composed in Livonia, 1621, at or during the siege of Riga †. It was revised and corrected during the Prussian campaigns, particularly in the years 1626 and 1627, and lastly, nineteen fresh articles ‡ (and many more perhaps occasionally) and some new prayers were added * after his majesty arrived in Germany, being made public in 1631.

Nothing disturbed Gustavus so much as the resistance made by the city of Dantzic; for commercial towns have infinite resources, and are always hard to be conquered. Nevertheless, as he had the affair so much at heart, it is probable he would have taken it the preceding year; but a musquet-ball happened to wound him in the belly, insomuch that his life was despaired of; and then the generals, losing all their hopes, proceeded coolly in the enterprize. As it was a maxim with Gustavus always to carry war into an enemy's country, he made this town the principal object of his attention, and the rather, as the enemy drew from it his greatest supplies. Having therefore new-modelled his fleet, which consisted of twelve large ships; the Swedes, by way of retaliation, soon overcame the combined Dantzic and Polish fleets, after an obstinate engagement, which lasted a whole day; forced the admiral's ship on a bank of sand, and there battered it to pieces. † A second ship of almost equal size and value, called Holland-house, had certainly been taken, but after an incredible resistance of twelve hours, it happened to blow up into the air by chance.

Gustavus now began to make his approaches in form round Dantzic on the land-side, having blocked up the mouth of the harbour with his fleet (which removed the trade to other places, and Königsberg particularly.) He then passed a morass fifteen English miles long, at the head of 10000 soldiers in high confidence; being assisted in swampy and difficult gullies by particular bridges of his own in-

† A copy whereof was transmitted to England by lord Res.

‡ *Arlanibæ, Arma Suec.* 4^o p. 96, &c.

* *Arlanibæ, Arma Suec.* 4^o p. 77—87.

† It only carried 40 guns, and was valued at 50000 l. sterling,

vention, carrying likewise with him a large quantity of that artillery * which he himself had invented, (than which nothing could be more useful in heavy countries, in case of a sudden attack) he conducted his army, contrary to all men's expectations, into a forest which incircled the town on one side; taking in Schonec and Marnevec as he passed along.

Alarmed at so unexpected a march, the magistrates of Dantzic began to fear an insurrection, as provisions, by the measures taken at land and sea, were thereby rendered extremely scarce. To augment these misfortunes, the Spaniards had so far deceived them with respect to twenty-four men of war, which they had promised to send to their support, that Walftein on the contrary, supreme commander in the northern parts of Germany, (who ridiculously enough stiled himself admiral of the Baltic, doing that by way of boasting which the court of Vienna affected in earnest) insisted on their sending nine ships to him, to facilitate the siege of Stralsund, and give laws to the sea-coasts. This doubly incommoded

* Whoever considers, extraordinary as such a consideration may be, that most of Gustavus's inventions expired with him, notwithstanding so many excellent officers had been formed under his eye, (the arts of war verging to a sort of decline from the death of our king till the times of Montecuculi and Turenne) will not be surpris'd if we hear no more of this invention of a new and more portable sort of artillery. Perhaps it was not so useful as was at first expected, yet this may partly be conjectural, since it is manifest, on the other hand, that the king used it from the year 1628 to the hour of his death.

These pieces were certainly of extraordinary service upon all sudden attacks in deep or mountainous countries, for one strong horse could convey a couple of them as fast as any troops could march; and what was more, they could be shifted in an instant, according as necessity required.

Authors well instructed on this subject inform us, (*Schefferi Memorab. Succ. Gentis*; *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania*, lib. i. p. 33.) that they were composed of the most hardened leather, girt round with iron or brass hoops, and could be brought to discharge ten times successively. Now if this account be true, they served to answer the purposes not only of sudden attacks, but of more decisive as well as more general engagements. About ten years ago I happened to mention this sort of artillery to a person who had a passion for new projects: he seem'd convinced that something might be struck out in this kind; and my learned and ingenious friend Mr. Johnson informs me, that he was just ready to ask the honour of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland to be present at an experiment, but in that interim the poor man died. See more in a note relating to leather artillery at the battle of Lippe.

Some give our hero the honour of first introducing *dragons* into the military service, though Mansfelt (as we have observed elsewhere) puts in a sort of claim to this invention. Yet Scheffer's words (*Memorab. Succ. Gent. p. 42, 43.*) are very peremptory in Gustavus's favour: *Primus sane fuit ipse qui pedites cum bombardis majoribus imposuit equis, illudque genus edoxit in aciem quod deinde dragonarios vocant, ut sic celeritatem equitum & vim peditum ingeniosa hæc mixtura in iisdem consequeretur,*

the

the Dantzickers, by depriving them of their own natural force, and by disobliging the king of Denmark, who ordered his navy to make reprisals on the people of Dantzic, whose ships they seized, and publicly confiscated. Yet the city itself escaped from Gustavus by a sort of miracle, for the rains fell to such a prodigious degree, (the Vistula overflowing its banks in all places, and washing away the temporary bridges) that the Swedes were obliged to break up their camp, having no alternative, but starving with hunger, or perishing by water. But 5000 men were surrounded so suddenly by the inundation, that the king was obliged to feed them with uncommon difficulty, and more especially as he found himself in a country where provisions are rendered extremely scarce; but the food (such as it was) was religiously divided between this corps and the main army. When the floods began to sink, his majesty drew off all his forces, having received a body of recruits from Sweden in 54 transports; and 2000 cuirassiers, enlisted by the Rhingrave*: Taking Neuburg on the Vistula by surrender as he marched along, as also Strasberg and Dribentz; in all which places, particularly the former, the soldiers gained an immense booty, belonging to the Polish queen and nobles, and amounting, as the language of the age then ran, to six tons of gold, which make about 54000 pounds of money sterling. It was the king's idea to advance to Thorn, but this acquisition of wealth occasioned a series of inconveniencies soon after; for the soldiers grew dissolute, and dispersed themselves over the country to find opportunities of spending their money; of course, some were put to the sword by the enemy here and there, and others surrendered on conditions which the Poles ill-observed; for they were all murdered in cold blood. Nothing hurt Gustavus like such violations of the law of nature, humanity, and common good faith; inso-much that in the transports of his resentment he made incursions, like the hero of a romance, even to the gates of Massovia and Warsaw: and in one of these expeditions took five pieces of artillery, which Wallstein had sent to Sigismund's army.

He then took the town of Switz by storm, and cut to pieces a body of Polanders who attempted to destroy a convoy that was marching to Strasberg. Amongst the prisoners at Massovia (which town was taken sword in hand) many Polish matrons and young women of fashion fell into the hands of his soldiers, who being heated and enraged with the

* *Letich. Tom. i. p. 611.*

resistance made by the garrison, and rendered vicious by their late ill-acquired riches, might have proceeded to some outrages against the fair-sex; but the king crushed all attempts in a single moment; telling the troops, *That people who served under his command were to wage war and commit hostilities upon their own sex only; and that the ideas of a soldier and a ravisher ought to carry no connexion between each other.* He then dismissed the ladies courteously, upon the promise of their respective ransoms, inasmuch that no one woman received even the slightest insult.

Yet these digressions allowed no one thing to escape the attention of Gustavus. He therefore kept his eye constantly fixed on the depredations committed in the Baltic by the combined fleet of Spain and Austria, which he soon dispersed and ruined by stationing a good quantity of ships near Wismar: and then, in order to preclude the interposition of Sigismund, (of which previous notice had been given him) allowed the elector of Brandenburg six months space to deliberate whether he would espouse the Swedish or the Polish cause. It is well known the said prince secretly favoured the Swedes; yet had strong reasons, which must be obvious to all readers, to wish for a lasting accommodation between the two contending crowns, which he helped to effect the ensuing year; nevertheless, in order to preserve appearances, he sent 600 infantry to Sigismund, whom Gustavus contrived to intercept in their march. Nor was it difficult perhaps to be apprized of the route they intended to take; upon which Sigismund broke off all intercourses of friendship with the said elector.

During these transactions, Conospoliski contrived to retake Brodnitz, which La Mortagne, a French officer of repute, had surrendered some time before to the Swedes; for which precipitate step the Polish general caused his head to be struck off publicly: and then, by way of retaliation, (being very dextrous in matters of surprise) defeated the rear-guard of the Swedish army, and took Banditzen prisoner, who was an officer of reputation.

In revenge for this check, Wrangel, governor of Elbingen, which town the Poles had in a certain manner blockaded, crossed the Dwina at a ford that was ill-defended, defeated a large body of troops, and seized their cannon and baggage: and again, as he was traversing the country with 8000 men, in order to collect provisions for the army, which was then in no small distress, he surprised near Strasberg, at a small village called Rudovic, a large body of Croats and Cossacks; and as he discovered them to be irresolute, or at
variance

variance in their opinions, he charged them so suddenly that he soon dispersed them, and carried off a convoy of 2000 carts and waggons, which greatly assisted the Swedish army during the remainder of the campaign, which was closed with a gallant performance of old count Thurn*; though the professed historians of that period have been silent upon the subject. It hath been observed before, that Gustavus had taken Neuburg. This town Conospoliski besieged, and whilst he invested it (Thurn and Teuffel being both commanders in it) young Thurn died of a fever. The old man writ to the Polish general to desire leave, as he only served Gustavus in the capacity of a volunteer, to remove the young man's body, that it might enjoy the rights of sepulture in a friendly country; but the request was

† Mathias Henry, count de Thurn, was one of the principal personages in Bohemia. He began the religious and civil commotions in that kingdom; nor did he ever submit to the house of Austria; but after the battle of Prague discharged several embassies in the name of Frederic (a sovereign of his own choosing) and Mansfelt to Gabriel Bethlem, the Grand Signior, and the Venetians; took a commission under the latter in 1624, and being honourably dismissed when the elector Palatin disbanded his army, passed into the service of Denmark in 1627: Accepted of a general's commission under Gustavus, and being taken prisoner was freed by Gallas, with orders, as was supposed, from Walstein; who out of a capricious gallantry peculiar to himself, had a mind to rob the court of Vienna of so delicious a sacrifice. Some time afterwards, namely in 1634, he made a brave defence at Ratibon, and had the courage and address to procure his own exception in the capitulation.

This great patriot was supposed by some to be justly piqued, because Martinitz (one of the three judges that was thrown down from the window, in the first insurrection) had supplanted him in obtaining the government of Carlstein-castle, where the crown of Bohemia and all records of consequence were preserved. His speech to the chiefs of his country on the breaking out of the rebellion, as it is delivered down to us by Nani, may keep pace with most of the pompous harangues of the ancient historians, and appears to me to have a better chance to be authentic; he concludes it in these words: "Liberty, " from this example of ours, will insinuate itself throughout the empire, " and though there be *some appearance of violence* in our conduct, yet *necessity* " and *piety* will excuse the fact. There remains now no room for repentance, " and no plea for forgiveness. The die is thrown—Freedom or the " scaffold—Men of principle, if conquerors, men of conscience and in- " dependent:—But if overcome, poor perfidious beings perjured and " rebellious."

Thurn, in the German language, signifies a *tower*; and therefore the French writers, conformably to their usual freedom and carelessness, soften the name into count *La Tour*; and Carte and the other English historians, when treating of the affairs of the Palatinate and Bohemia, talk of him very familiarly under that appellation: thus too, by the same rule I might undertake, as an Englishman, to discourse of Mrs. *Steel* and her Homer, intending at the same time to be understood as speaking of madam *Dacier*.

There is a large exquisite print of count Thurn from a painting of Miervelt: the fire of his eyes is inexpressible.

denied.

denied. Enraged beyond measure at this refusal, he cut his way through the enemy's lines, by an admirable stratagem; with only fifty followers, and carried his son's corpse to the place where the Swedish *cancellaria* was then held, never dismounting (but for the refreshment of a few moments) in a journey of eighty miles.

At the diet of Warsaw, held in the month of July this year; a considerable number of the senators declared, that it was in vain to wage war against Gustavus, except hostilities were commenced against the elector of Brandenburg; upon which king Sigismund sent a slight message to him, admonishing him, in gentle terms, of the allegiance he owed the kingdom of Poland, by Denhoff his secretray; being privately determined, in case of an evasion or downright refusal, to levy money at all events, and pursue his object of destroying Gustavus. It was likewise suggested to the elector of Brandenburg, that his right to Prussia was a sort of feudatory tenure, dependent on the republic of Poland, which said *fiduciary* possession he might forfeit, or not, according to his future conduct. Nevertheless the nuncios of the provinces, and the major part of the senators, afforded Sigismund as little assistance as possible; upon presumption or private intelligence, that it was not difficult to obtain a tolerable peace. And thus the war proceeded languishingly on the Polish side.

Two disagreeable occurrences happened this year in Germany; each sufficient to embarrass any mind but that of Gustavus: for the one was the siege of Stralsund; and the other the congress at Lubec. But the king carried his point in the first instance; and played his cards so dextrously in the second, as to give himself an advantageous opening soon after; for these two events were a part of the preparatory incidents which helped to bring Gustavus into Germany.

Wallstein's great intention in possessing Stralsund, was to give laws at one stroke to the kings of Sweden and Denmark, and invade the dominions of the latter without delay. In order to effect the transporting of his troops, Schwartzenberg was dispatched to the Hanse-towns, Lubec particularly, to demand such shipping as might be needful on the occasion; and grant them in the Emperor's name some privileges, upon condition they would confine their commerce for the future to the coasts of Spain, and the countries that depended on the house of Austria; but the answer returned to him was, that the said towns had confederations and alliances with neighbouring princes, (indeed Gustavus was the principal object alluded to) and that it would be highly imprudent

dent in them to add fuel to particular wars, who subsisted by a general commerce with all mankind. Upon this Walftein (who affected to be extravagant in all things) procured a patent to be *admiral of the Baltic*; and having conquered Rostoch, Wismar, and several other maritime towns, turned his thoughts to sea-affairs and building ships. Stralsfund alone obstructed his imaginary possession of the Northern ocean; for that city once conquered gave him just the inlet he desired: and as it was well-furnished with wealth, shipping, ammunition, and provisions, it was in a state of enabling him (at least as he conjectured) to land in Denmark, and make a conquest of the whole kingdom. The immense ambition of this project astonished Christian, and determined him to support the Stralsfunders at any rate: and as he liked no corps in his service better than lord Rea's Scottish regiment, he transported it thither without delay. This was the first siege of consequence that Germany had hitherto seen. Walftein for his own sake, on account of Stralsfund's lying so near his new dominions*, was resolved to obtain it, whatever sacrifice he made. And it is thought by many he had formed a design to involve the duke of Pomerania in some embroilment with the emperor, whose territories (supposing them to be seized under any pretext) lay very commodious for facilitating and extending his vast project on the Baltic; and for these reasons he poured regiments into Pomerania, like swarms of locusts, with this difference, that they not only devoured the product of the earth, but squeezed the very last dollar from the inhabitants, and made the duke himself little less than a state-prisoner in his own castle. But to return to the siege: he first proceeded by artful means, and sent Arnheim, camp-master-general of his army, to the magistrates, to demand winter-quarters for a certain number of men; but this request was not granted. He then dispatched colonel Goëtz to ask passage only for a body of troops through the town; but that petition was rejected. Walftein then, in order to make the emperor a party concerned in his system, demanded of the inhabitants a contribution of about 25000*l.* concluding naturally enough, that the magistrates would still continue in an humour of denial; but they, contrary to his expectations, advanced part of the sum immediately, and pledged their honour for the rest; upon condition he erected no fortification

† He had lately received the investiture of the duchy of Mecklenberg; but was never duke of Walftein, as the author of the *Annals of the Empire* inaccurately styles him.

near their town, as he had lately done. This prompt advancement of good rix-dollars pleased Walstein's avarice, (for that general was equally rapacious to collect, and profuse to bestow) but did not satisfy his ambition: he therefore without further ceremony ordered Arnheim to invest the town. Upon this the inhabitants implored the assistance of their neighbours the Dantzickers; and Gustavus, to all appearances unasked, (though this circumstance shall not be confidently asserted) supplied them generously, as the seas were open, with a good quantity of military stores, of which the inhabitants at that time stood in great need. Oxenstiern indeed had partly opened the king's intentions in a conference held with the duke of Pomerania, wherein it was suggested casually, (at least to all outward appearances) that Gustavus was determined not to see the poor Stralsunders deprived of commerce and liberty at one stroke, and that by such an interposition he manifested himself to consult the emperor's true glory and interests better than Walstein and the whole Imperial ministry could pretend to do. Mean while the duke of Pomerania (having in vain requested Oxenstiern to abstain from all interpolation with respect to Germany *) attempted to mediate a sort of convention between his Imperial majesty and the town; of which the conditions were: that all foreign troops should be dismissed from the garrison, and the city place itself under the protection of the said duke, passing its word of honour to be faithful to the emperor, and give no obstruction to the imperial troops then cantoned in the isle of Rugen (which was separated from the continent of Stralsund by a small frith of sea) and erect no new fortifications; with a proviso of admitting Pomeranian soldiers to guard the town. Upon this a treaty † was renewed, for former ones had subsisted between Sweden and Stralsund. Sadler undertook the task, and expressed his master's sentiments very dexterously; for allegiance to the emperor was inculcated strongly upon the inhabitants, and it was recommended to them to pay all due obedience to the duke of Pomerania; forasmuch as his majesty of Sweden had no object in view but to preserve the freedom of the Baltic, and maintain the immemorial rights and liberties of a town in those senses independent. During the attempt finally to adjust these articles, Walstein marched with the eagerness of a new monarch to Gustrow, in order to receive the homage and

* *Historical or Authentic Relat.* Tom. i. p. 58.

† It is preserved by *Lotichius*, Tom. i. 608, and was to hold in force twenty years. *Laccenii Historia Suecana*, p. 560.

baths of allegiance from his subjects, inasmuch as the two dukes of Mecklenberg, Albert and Adolphus, had fought under the Danish ensigns, and laboured even then beneath that bitter sort of proscription, commonly called the *ban of the empire*, having paid no regard to a previous admonition from the court of Vienna. Colonel Holk had hitherto, at the head of the Danish forces, taken upon him the command of the town. The men were obliged to perform forty-eight hours service turn by turn for six weeks, and yet Holk, in the midst of this severe service, took it into his head to espouse a young wife, and celebrate his nuptials in a public manner; which all the German historians consider as a very unbecoming act of levity.

During Wallstein's absence, Gustavus took the advantage to convey some forces into Stralsund, which gave the inhabitants spirit to change their language; so that the fine airy project of the duke of Pomerania vanished into nothing. That prince then persuaded the emperor to discontinue the siege, which provoked Wallstein to such a degree, that he sent a threatening letter to the elector of Saxony, whom he suspected to be at the bottom of this project; and what was still more, declined to obey his master's orders: and on the contrary, enraged with Arnheim's ill-success or remissness, made a journey to the camp in person, and renewed the attacks with incredible fury, swearing (according to his common custom of boasting) "that he would take Stralsund, though it hung in the air from heaven by a chain of adamant." But this was not an easy task; for no place is better situated by nature. It fronteth the sea in a sort of elliptical figure, and at the two extremities joins itself to the main land by a narrow isthmus. Behind it lies the lake of Frankén, which can be passed only in one place, by means of an high causeway: and what increased the difficulty more on the part of the besiegers was this, that it was not in their power to obstruct the entrance of supplies into the harbour. I shall not give a full detail of this siege; it may suffice to say, that as Wallstein pushed on his assaults with all the fury and industry that resentment could suggest, the Danes found the defence of the place beyond their strength: but a cessation of arms being agreed upon for fortnight, a second regiment of Scots in the Danish service was thrown into the town during this interval, and then Christian, making a private treaty with Gustavus, cast the burden off his own shoulders, and transferred the danger and glory to his Swedish neighbour: who immediately sent Sir Alexander Leslie with a body of chosen troops to defend the town, and Holk for some time acted

under him. This Supporting of the poor Stralsunders confirmed Gustavus in the idea of interposing with the affairs of the continent, and giving laws thereto. At length Walfstein, after a siege of three months, having half-ruined a numerous army, thought fit to dislodge; for he found by dear-bought experience, that it is next to impossible to take a city that can at all times receive fresh supplies from sea, especially if the garrison behaveth with fidelity and courage.

The congress, which was held at Lubec this year, created fresh troubles to Gustavus. The meeting of the plenipotentiaries was more ceremonious than useful. On the part of the emperor came the baron Aldringer and count Gronselt, both colonels; Rupa commissary-general, and Walmerode: and in behalf of his Danish majesty appeared Frieze and Uhlfelt, the one counsellor of the kingdom, and the other counsellor to the king; admiral Skeel, the two Rantzäus, (who were both privy-counsellors) Levin, maréchal of the court, and secretary Gunter. These politicians, who were all extremely able in their way, eat, drank, affirmed, denied, intrigued and wrangled for six months: so

1629. that the year 1629 overtook them in their debates; yet nothing of moment appears to have been decided. Much depended afterwards upon an event I am going to relate: Gustavus had parts enough not to allow a peace to be signed under his eye, without concerning himself more or less in an affair so critical: he therefore dispatched Spar and Oxenstiern (which latter was a relation of the prime-minister) to this assembly, with orders to see all things restored to their antient tranquillity, and solicit in particular for the town of Stralsund, and the re-instatement of the dukes of Mechlenberg, whom as relations and neighbours he had admitted under his more immediate protection. Some weeks before, secretary Salvius (who gave such proofs afterwards of his abilities at the peace of Munster) was sent into Denmark, to beseech his majesty to give introduction to the Swedish plenipotentiaries at Lubec: but that prince replied coldly by letter, after having taken an undue time to return an answer, "That as he had received no commands from the court of Vienna with reference to his Swedish majesty, he could not presume to venture on a step of so delicate and dangerous a nature, without being furnished previously with proper authorities: so that if these northern plenipotentiaries had any thing to offer which tended to the public utility, his advice was, that they should submit their proposals to the Austrian ministry at Vienna." The truth was, he loved not Gustavus, and dreaded the emperor: and most people at that time attributed this evasion

to the influence of Walftein. But without entering minutely into these secrets, the king of Sweden resented the indignity in a manner natural to his high spirit, (for if that prince had any one fault, it was being liable to sudden transports of passion) and this affront stuck so nearly to his heart, that he alledged it afterwards as one of the principal reasons that induced him to land his army in Germany, and interfere with the state of affairs upon the continent: since it is reported by a writer * well versed in the history of treaties, that the Swedish deputies were forbidden to enter Germany and approach the congress, under pain of death. The result of the treaty at Lubec was, that his Danish majesty should content himself with the title of Duke of Holstein, without presuming to name either his wishes or disinclinations to the emperor, with respect to the system of the Germanic body: that he should relinquish his pretensions to certain bishoprics on the continent, and restore to the Imperialists the islands of Femor and Neustrand, and such other places as he then possessed by right of arms: this premised, by virtue of the same treaty he was to re-enjoy his antient possessions, upon condition the emperor should still retain his old title to Holstein, Stormar, and Ditmar; that the expences of the war should be re-imbursed, and the prisoners exchanged on either side. Nevertheless the king of Denmark (at least in order to preserve appearances) had courage enough to refuse a request that Walftein made him, of adding a small squadron to the Imperial fleet, under pretext of securing the free navigation and tranquility of the Baltic †.

By this time Ferdinand had overcome all his enemies in the empire, and round it, and erected the house of Austria into an universal monarchy. Which one of Walftein's deputies in effect acknowledged to the king of Denmark: for being asked if the Imperial party did not fear some check from the united efforts of France, England, Sweden, and Holland, replied unconcernedly, that the person who was once master of Germany, might despise the combinations of such remote and inconsiderable enemies. But God (to make ambition its own curse) has given it certain ideas of acquirable greatness that are unlimited, unreasonable, and (what is still worse) never to be satisfied. Ferdinand therefore, arrived now at the utmost height of human vanity, (for all things relating to finite beings have certain restrictions and limitations) found still a void in his own breast. He wanted something: and this

* *Ambassadur de Wicquesfort*, Part i. 219.

† *Historical and Authentic Relat.* Tom. i. p. 58.

was neither more nor less, than the total extirpation of the protestant religion in Germany. The undertaking was great and hazardous, and therefore he began it gently: and as he was to walk in unfathomable waters, felt his ground step by step before he obliged himself to take the desperate plunge.

He made his first essay warily and cautiously enough, upon his own hereditary dominions; and published an edict to this import, that all persons of the evangelical persuasion must leave their possessions and depart, or conform to the popish religion within a time prescribed. Even one sixth of Austria itself was then peopled with protestants, and Bohemia, Hungary, Moravia, Stiria, Carinthia, and Carniola, boasted still greater numbers; many likewise wavered in their faith, and a good number concealed their sentiments till some general decision should put their declarations out of danger. Yet the publication of this edict produced more trouble than was first apprehended. The peasants of Bohemia (where the spirit of religious liberty could never be extinguished) formed themselves into a body, in spite of all former decimations and proscriptions, and concerted a design of seizing the emperor and his attendants on a hunting-day, when probably they would have given his ambition its decisive stroke. The conspirators drew lots who should perform this desperate deed; but chance or infidelity made a discovery of the whole plot, and the author escaped into Hungary, and then sheltered himself in the Ottoman dominions.

The prelude of religious tyranny being thus began, the emperor boldly displayed his whole game at once, performing what his predecessors had long fruitlessly desired to effect: and published the famous *edict of restitution**, which at length brought Gustavus into the empire, and overturned the labours of twelve of the most prosperous campaigns that the house of Austria or any European power had ever seen. For that little cloud which arose in the North, *no larger than the palm of a man's hand*, to make use of the words of Holy Scripture, collected its force so suddenly, and spread that force so violently, that it blotted out the radiant glorie of the house of Austria from the hemisphere, almost before a man could say *there, there!*

Ferdinand therefore, solicited hourly by the Princes of his own persuasion, and mighty-well inclined to bigotry on his own part, under pretence of making the *formulary* of the religious peace concluded at Augsburge by the common

* There is an excellent abridgment of this edict in *Brachelius*, 185—188.

consent of all the Germanic princes his rule and guide; gave orders to his men of politics and jurisprudence to compose and digest this mighty work, of which the publication (that it might be rendered more complete) was deferred till the ensuing year; during which interval application was made to the principal catholic princes to deliver in their opinions on so delicate and dangerous a subject.

Amongst a considerable number of ecclesiastical benefices marked out in a catalogue delivered to the emperor, these few following ones were to be made the first sacrifice, namely, the archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the bishoprics of Minden, Osnabrug, Halberstadt, Verden, Lubec; Ratzburg, Schwein, Camin, and the abbacy of Hirschfeld; and what was somewhat extraordinary, they all afterwards shared the fate of secularization by the consent of both religions at the peace of Munster, excepting Osnabrug (in which the catholic party reserved an alternative) and Lubec: which latter had taken its share in the common wreck, if the chapter had not engaged itself, one year before the peace was concluded, to chuse six bishops successively from the house of Holstein-Gottorp, to which family the plenipotentiaries allotted the administration of the bishopric.

Thus the papists artfully enough paid the protestants out of *their own church*, and the latter swallowed the bait without hesitation, though they had been fighting (as they pretended) thirty years for the support and dignity of *that very church*. Magdeburg, Minden, and Halberstadt, were all erected into principalities, and given to the house of Brandenburg. Bremen and Verden were made duchies, and assigned to Sweden; Ratzburg and Camin were dignified with the title of principalities, and bestowed on the duke of Mechlenberg; and Hirschfeld was stiled a principality too, and conferred on the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

At length, to the infinite disquiet of the protestant party, the *edict of restitution* was published, and commissaries dispatched into all the provinces, to effect the restoration of the several acquisitions which the evangelical party had been supposed to procure for themselves since the treaty of Passau. There was one clause in it very embarrassing: for in case a papist had turned protestant since that period, yet the possession was not to follow its natural and original master. Thus *confusion was rendered more confused*; and what was equally disagreeable, no prince was out of the reach of the decree; for it affected the friends of Cæsar (as the Germans affect to speak) as well as the enemies. The first and principal personages in the empire felt an unwillingness to relinquish

rich ecclesiastical benefices, which served to make ample provision for their children and relations; and some princes there were, whose possessions of the kind exceeded their patrimonial ones. It was objected therefore, that long and undisturbed possession ought to be considered in good politics as a thing sacred and a sort of title: and it was decreed likewise, that the protestants assented in the *peace of religion* to the insertion of the article in reference to the restoration of the *bona ecclesiastica*; and as a proof of this, appeal was made to the journals of the whole transaction: it being plain beyond contradiction, that the said clause had been forced into the *instrument of peace* by the obstinate perseverance of the papists and the mere arbitrary violence of the emperor. Here the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg joined issue, and requested that the difficulty might be referred to a new general diet, inasmuch as what related to all, ought to be examined and decided by all. To this the Imperial party replied, that the determination of the affair belonged solely to the emperor, as appeared from several *recesses* * of the empire, and the last resolutions agreed upon by the electoral convention held at Mulhausen.

Upon this the commissaries proceeded to visit their respective districts, with orders particularly to summon before them (at different times and places of hearing) all those who kept certain church possessions, and all those who sued for their restitution; and in case unjust occupation and detention were once proved, the party delinquent was to be commanded in the emperor's name to make restoration; nor was the matter to admit of any delay, though it was alledged that the cause was then depending in the chamber of Spires, or that it was determined to lodge an appeal in the next general diet, since the last edict had provisionally precluded all such obstructions and interferences. Cathedral and collegiate bodies were referred to the pope's declaration, which was expected to appear daily; and by way of encouragement to those who submitted frankly, and without any resistance, all past profits were to be allowed them: whereas at the same time a retrospection in this point was threatened to the refractory, and a speedy interposition of the military power. But in this rapid career of arbitrary persecution, the popish party made a false step in the

* To understand this expression the reader must observe, that what the states establish in a diet by plurality of voices, is called *placitum Imperii*, a decree of the Empire. When the Emperor approves this decree, it then becomes an Imperial decree in form, and is named *conclusum Imperii*, a conclusion of the Empire. And when the aforesaid acts are signed and published in the forensic style of the word, they are then styled *recessus Imperii*, or *recesses of the Empire*.

very first act of partition, for many old occupants expected (which was natural enough) to re-enter into their possessions, whereas new claimants started up, who had no title to show but a free grant from the emperor and the pope.

The first difficulty began at Augsburg, which appeared really to be something ominous, as the famous confession had been presented there. The then bishop demanded his intire jurisdiction; but a military force supported the authority of the Imperial commissary. In vain the elector of Saxony presented remonstrance after remonstrance: the protestant ministers were rejected from their parochial cures, and the inhabitants of the same persuasion prohibited from attending divine service, not only in the city, but in the neighbouring villages and fields. The circumstance of this transaction piqued the elector of Saxony almost as much as the transaction itself; for he considered Augsburg, with respect to the evangelical religion, as the place of its second birth, and was mortified also to observe, that matters stood now on as bad a footing as they did some time before. ~~The~~ *peace of religion* was agreed upon; and what alarmed him more was, that the writers of the opposite party asserted in numberless pamphlets, that the evangelical religion was not the same system of belief and practice which had been set forth formerly in the Augsburg-confession. This, as he well foresaw, was laying the axe to the roots of the reformation, since if that allegation was once allowed to be true, no person of the *evangelical persuasion*, as then professed, had any certain rights or interests in the *peace of religion*. He therefore summoned all the eminent civilians and divines of his party to a meeting at Leipsic, and united their arguments together in one apology against the Romanists, setting forth, that the elector of Saxony, and other protestant princes and states, had presented a clear and well-reasoned confession of faith to Charles V. (which act, reciprocally authenticated by both parties, had been enrolled in the registers of the empire) and as they had persevered inviolably in the same system, without any addition to it, or diminution from it, it was therefore absolutely equitable and reasonable to expect, that they should not be precluded from the protection and advantages which the *peace of religion* granted them, as it was composed and regulated by the principles of the aforesaid confession.

During these transactions a new persecution had arisen in Bohemia of a very extraordinary nature, upon which many of the unhappy natives fled to Sweden; for an edict was published,

lished, that all women of the evangelical persuasion, that were married to catholics, (whereof there were numberless examples) should be exposed *ipso facto*, to banishment, except they retracted their religious opinions. The severity of this decree gave uneasiness to the papists themselves, whom it affected: for the first officers of state, and nobles of the kingdoms, had intermarried freely amongst the protestants before the breaking out of the civil wars; (for the ladies in Bohemia became heiresses almost in the same manner as they do in England;) upon this account the husbands, fearing a confiscation of their wives possessions, expressed an aukward sort of dislike, and the rather, as no divorce was proposed by way of giving them opportunity to try their fortunes in a second marriage: but the ladies took a nobler part; they exclaimed loudly against this matrimonial persecution, and not a single woman left her house and family. Thunder-struck with such perseverance, the Imperial chamber issued out, May 1, 1629, a second edict of the explanatory kind, allowing the fair sex a sort of toleration till the husband's death; after which they were deprived from the right of possession, and ordered to remove themselves into some other country, under prohibition, during the interval, to be present at any nuptials or other public entertainments, except upon condition of giving precedency to every woman of the catholic persuasion. How arbitrary must a sovereign be who can enact laws of such a nature against poor women!

Whilst the commissaries executed their office with great severity in the judicial way, and both parties (to change the nature of their former dispute) engaged with great acrimony upon paper, a new complaint took its rise, which affected both sides deeply, though perhaps not equally; and that was the licentiousness, rapine, and cruelty, of the Imperial army, which Wallstein had increased beyond measure: even though 10,000 men had been sent into Poland against Gustavus, and a considerable supply detached for the service of the arch-duke in the Low Countries; not to mention an army of near 30,000 soldiers employed in Italy on the reduction of Mantua.

Wallstein gave room for farther complaints, for all Germany trembled at the thoughts of war, and the general was indefatigable in seeking opportunities to create a new one. As he was a punctual man in matters of severity, he sent colonel Pecker to Magdeburg with a regiment of Croats, in order to receive the contribution he had imposed on the town; which was an errand disagreeable enough to a city not over wealthy, and which valued herself upon being by

no means the most ignoble of the Hanse-towns. Upon which the populace (whether with or without the connivance of the magistracy cannot be asserted) seized some ships of corn that were making their way down the Elbe to Walfstein's army, and committed some slight acts of hostility on the regiment then quartered near the town. The magistrates made shew of great external disapprobation upon this occasion, but Walfstein, naturally vindictive and of a temper uncontrollable, (bearing them likewise an antient hatred, as they expressed no joy when he became their neighbour, and was created duke of Mechlenberg) sent them word immediately, that by way of making their peace with the emperor, they must levy a regiment of soldiers for his service, and maintain them at their own expence. A memorial was presented to him with a view to mollify this severity, but Walfstein rejected their applications with scorn, and ordered a part of his army not only to blockade, but besiege the town. Upon this the Hanseatic cities took the alarm, particularly Brunswic, Lubec, and Hamburg, and sent deputies to him, in hopes to break the force of his anger, and induce him to withdraw his troops. His answer was, (and if they knew the man they had reason to expect something of that nature) that the corn must be restored him in the first place, and the several delinquents delivered into his custody; (sufficient caution being also given him for all future good behaviour on the part of the citizens) and that then the contribution levied upon them must be discharged, and an Imperial garrison admitted into the town, in order to give laws to the populace. From that moment the magistrates of Magdeburg perceived that their destruction was determined, since a garrison would always have the power to exact contributions at will, and introduce the *edict of restitution* whenever they pleased. Be that as it will, they chose to wait the event, and refused to admit the garrison; promising at the same time to give implicit obedience to the emperor in every other respect. They then besought leave to send their deputies to Vienna, but Walfstein denied them that favour, (being advanced by this time as far as Gustrow) and gave the inhabitants to understand that if they did not receive his garrison in five days, all future accommodation should be set aside. Nevertheless that general, from some motive undiscoverable to us at present, (for the inhabitants had made all possible preparations for a desperate defence) contented himself with bare threatnings, and lowering his tone all in a moment, excused them even from the payment of the contribution he had before demanded, and requested nothing further of them, but to persevere in affection

affection and loyalty to the emperor. Some suppose that he dreaded to assault a set of men made desperate by oppression; but Walstein was not subject to terrors of that kind: others conjecture that he had received a positive countermand from his master; but such he had often disobeyed upon other occasions: therefore my private opinion is, (and that seems to me most agreeable to his character) that he feared to irritate Gustavus, who then wanted an occasion to invade Germany, (for Gustavus was an object of fear even to Walstein;) or that he thought it imprudent to kindle up a war just in the neighbourhood of his new acquired dominions.

Gustavus was greatly enraged with Walstein's insolence at the late convention, for great part of the outrage committed against his majesty's dignity was ascribed to him; therefore it was determined to push the war with such vigour, as to force the Poles into a compliance. In these campaigns he relied chiefly on the connivance and private favour of the elector of Brandenburg, whose sister he had married; for that prince secretly wished him well as far as he durst, and permitted him tacitly, in case of its success, to retreat and shelter his troops in his dominions. It was in this affair that Gustavus placed his confidence, upon supposition any considerable misfortune should befall his army. Nevertheless, a part of the elector's affection could not be concealed from the suspicious and watchful Austrians, and that was the easy possession he granted Gustavus of the port of Pillau, by which means the Swedish army was chiefly supported, not only as to provisions and implements of war, but also with respect to re-inforcements.

As Walstein had pressed the town of Stralsund extremely hard, and Gustavus had sent the inhabitants a succour of 500 men, and a good supply of ammunition, the court of Vienna grew enraged to such a degree, that in consequence thereof it was determined to dispatch Arnheim to the assistance of Sigismund*. Him Walstein dismissed with this extraordinary injunction: "Arnheim, take 10,000 men, and drive Gustavus out of Poland; and in case you cannot perform that task, tell him Walstein will come and effect it himself †." Which vain-glorious threatening puts me in mind of a speech that an Irishman made to one of our Henrys. He was sent by a certain Mac-Gilpatrick, chief of

* *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. three Tomes, adorned with maps, plans, portraits, &c. engraven by the celebrated Matthew Merian, and published by Cornelius Danckwartz. Tom. i. p. 51, 52.

† *Swedish Intelligence*.

Upper-Ossory, to the king, to complain against the deputy of that province; and meeting his majesty going to chapel, delivered his embassy in these words: "*Sta pedibus tuis, domine rex; dominus meus Gilla-Patricius me misit ad te, & jussit dicere, quod si non vis castigare Petrum Rufum, IPSE FACIET BELLUM CONTRA TE.*"

Nevertheless the Poles admitted these troops into Prussia with a sort of distrust †; notwithstanding Sigismund declared that he had personally requested such assistances from the emperor, in order to extirpate the Swedes from Prussia, and recover his own hereditary dominion of Sweden. Yet the senators entered coldly into his allegations; for Arnheim (as being the slave of Walstein's inclinations) was looked upon as a person of suspected faith: and upon this the orders of the kingdom replied, that Gustavus, on supposition he was not provoked, was too far removed from their concern: and if his majesty had carried his zeal for popery, (by the advice of the pontifical party) to the very brink of extremity, it was now his own business to recover the crown of Sweden in the best manner he could.

The Polish senators dealt much in plain-dealing and free-speaking, so the states of Sweden distinguished themselves in another respect, and that was in affection and loyalty: "Representing to their master in the strongest and tenderest manner, that as Sigismund had refused the reasonable offers which had been made to him by the deputies of Brandenburg and Holland, and insisted that Sweden should restore to him all the conquests that had been made in Livonia and Prussia; as he had requested an auxiliary army from his imperial majesty, and as the emperor had denied admittance to the Swedish plenipotentiaries at Lubec, they implored Gustavus, in case a deaf ear was turned to his future generous proposals, to commence the war with re-doubled vigour, and fix the seat of it in some foreign country, that being in their opinion the most advantageous method of carrying on hostilities: it appearing to them infinitely more dangerous and fatiguing to protect their own coasts, and less reputable and distinguishing likewise in the eye of the public." It was then voted, that money should be raised according to the taxes at that time subsisting; that the recruits to be levied should be continued for two years certain, and that the marine should be placed on the best footing that human prudence could devise: and to strengthen the fleet particularly, each nobleman, who

furnished an horse to the military service, engaged to subscribe about eight pounds. Large sums were likewise promised from the India company, and the clergy and people in trade agreed to furnish out fifteen armed ships. At the conclusion of the meeting the king paid a very gallant compliment to three of his officers; for he made Horn, Banier, and Todt, all senators.

Some time afterwards arrived an embassy from Muscovy, with full powers to make his majesty an offer of dispatching an army into Poland against Sigismund*; but the proposal was declined with thankfulness and courtesy: either because the king had some expectancies of an accommodation, or because he never relished the assistances of irregular forces; for he always considered war as over-eruel and bloody in itself, without the assistance of barbarians.

Arnheim by this time had made Higher Pomerania the rendezvous of his troops †. He then marched to Graudentz, a city of Poland, lying on the east-side of the Vistula, in order to join Conospoliski, whom the Imperialists considered as a general of reputation. In twelve days time, the Polish chief encamped his troops on the eastern side of the Vistula, opposite to Arnheim, who, as yet, could not reach Graudentz. A bridge of boats was then thrown over the river near Marienverder, in order to facilitate the junction of the two armies, whose respective generals, after that was effected, took care to regulate their marches in such a manner, and with such dispositions, as to be prepared for battle in case they were forced to engage. The emperor's army always made the right wing, as the post of honour. Amidst their various decampments from place to place, advice was at length brought them that Gustavus drew near. Arnheim and Conospoliski held themselves in readiness to receive him, and (to prevent surprise) marched in battle-array to a little town called Marienverder, about six miles from Thorn, where Gustavus then was at the head of a part of his army, which had made an advanced journey, in order to contemplate the countenance of the enemy. The Imperialists being apprised of Gustavus's intentions, decamped before break of day, with a view to render themselves masters of a difficult passage, situated in the midst of a wood, and

* *Historical or Authentick Relation, in Low Dutch, tom. i. p. 56.*

† As the operations of this last and most important campaign in Poland may be treated partially, both by Loccenius and Piafecchi, the one a Swede, and the other a Polish bishop, I shall conduct myself chiefly by the plain and soldier-like narrative of Sirot, notwithstanding he then bore arms on the Imperial side. *Memoires de Sirot, 2 tom. 120.*

capable to afford them opportunities of making great resistance. Here, in a sort of amphitheatre, stood a mill, situated on the banks of a considerable river, near which was a large morass, that on one side rendered the approach very difficult: the other side was likewise protected to a certain degree, inasmuch as the Swedes had a wood to pass through, and the roads were narrow. It is certain, if Gustavus had seized this post first, according to his own intentions, the Poles and Imperialists had been greatly perplexed: but fortune favoured the united armies; some of whose troops arrived there long before the Swedes, and made a lodgment by the dint of industry; for Conospoliski, who well knew the importance of the post, marched all night at the head of nine regiments, besides two regiments of dragoons and Cossacks, and began to entrench himself by break of day. He then placed a grand guard at the front of the wood, on that approach next the Swedes, for fear of being surpris'd in his concealment. A part of his advanced troops, favoured by the darkness of the night, dispersed themselves here and there through the fields that extended beyond the wood, and brought intelligence at break of day, that a regiment of dragoons, and another of horse, were in full march to secure the post in question.

These troops were conducted by the Rhingrave*, a hot young man, who had like to have ruined his master's scheme by his impetuosity; for Gustavus had ordered him to push on and secure the passage, upon supposition only that he met with no remarkable opposition †: but the Rhingrave (who afterwards, to do him justice, became a more composed and regular general) pushed his men on with that extremity of resolution, that the enemy soon found it expedient to relinquish to him this first post, though their number more than counterbalanced that of the Swedes; for he attacked them with that fury and intrepidity, that he allowed not his dragoons an opportunity to dismount, which was an order the king had given him for particular reasons.

Had this brave young man stopped here till Gustavus came up, all had been safe; and it is probable a signal victory might have ensued; yet it no-where appears that his master was angry with him; for it was his notion there should be

* His name was Otho Lewis. He performed before a very gallant action in the Danish service, at the retreat of Oldenberg in 1626, after the fatal loss of the battle of Lutter; but made a second mistake in Germany, which might have proved fatal to him.

† *Loxentius*, p. 561.

rather too much fire in youth, in order to supply proper remains for maturer years.

The Rhingrave advancing briskly to pursue his point, prepared himself to force a second entrance. Arnheim and Conspoliski being informed of this rencounter, and of the design of the enemy, imagined themselves to be outdone both in dexterity and bravery. Upon this instructions were given, that a large division of the army should march on, in order to sustain those who defended the passage and the mill. The troops marched with such diligence that they supported their comrades, who otherwise must have sunk under the superiority of the Swedes, who attacked like men possessed, and whom neither the difficulty of the ground, nor the perpetual discharge of musquetry, could compel to retreat. Nevertheless, the Imperial cavalry, after galloping a good hour, was so fortunate as to prevent the Swedes from making any farther progress, and arrived just at the point of time when the engagement began to grow desperate: for Gustavus in that instant had just joined his men with a reinforcement of some regiments, and some chosen troops; but soon found that matters were not so circumstanced as to favour his undertaking: but being a man of honour, he was resolved to bring his suffering soldiers off with credit; for the Rhingrave had lost five colours, and 200 men were killed: not to mention many prisoners whom the enemy had taken. At this very instant Gustavus learnt, that besides part of the Polish army, the whole Imperial force was advancing to attack him, (a set of hardened and experienced troops, far more respectable than the Polanders) which made him think of founding a retreat; and not engaging himself imprudently in a place, and in an attack where he could not succeed but by a combination of fortunate circumstances hardly to be expected: for his majesty had no intention to draw on a battle that day, but only secure a pass; having left the better part of his army at a good distance behind, under Wrangel's care, and having no more with him than 8 or 10,000 select men, with whom he was to oppose an enemy who outnumbered him by two thirds. But at the moment he was meditating to file off and retire, two fresh regiments of Imperialists arrived, and dismounting immediately, fell on with such fury, that they oppressed the Swedish troops by weight and number, and drove them back to the edge of the wood where the Polish grand guard had first lodged themselves. At the same time Sirot joined the Imperialists with the regiment of Arnheim, seven select companies of foot, and two regiments of Cossacks; so that Gustavus was obliged to re-

tire behind an hill of sand, about 3000 paces from the entrance of the wood, and range his troops afresh in a situation where one could not readily see them, or form a notion of the dispositions then made. After various skirmishes and attacks on loose uneven ground, Gustavus contrived to mount the eminence of an hill, on which there was a large area, protected on one side by a marsh and wide lake, and on the other side by a deep ditch, which came out of the wood and environed the space, round which was a very large meadow; and there Gustavus lodged his troops. After several skirmishes and rencounters, which took different turns; the Imperial army at length came up, but was greatly embarrassed for want of sufficient room to act in. Amidst this confusion, the Polish troops that were first on the post determined to make themselves masters of the summit of the hill. To this effect, they all advanced in one line, excepting the Cossacks, who marched a few paces after them at right and left. On this new movement the Swedes redoubled their efforts; but the numbers that acted against them were so disadvantageous, and the fire of the musquetry so greatly superior in frequency and quantity, that they quitted the top of the hill to their adversaries, who entrenched themselves there. Gustavus had strong reasons for making this sacrifice, though highly contrary to his natural temper; for he chose not to lie so near the veteran troops of Germany, (a set of men much cried up in those days) when there was nothing to divide the two armies, but the rubbish of some old ruins.

In this third retreat the Cossacks incommoded extremely the regiment of the Rhingrave in flank, which obliged him to attack them in self-defence. But unfortunately, in making this movement, he of course laid himself open to Sirot, who, though inferior in point of numbers, seized one of those critical moments in war, (which never present themselves a second time) and made so judicious and seasonable an attack, that the Swedish army was obliged to face about. And now regiment opposed regiment, in like manner as one man engages another; the irregulars upon the whole did much mischief, especially upon the right wing of the Swedes. A series of mistakes and misconduct in inferior officers had drawn Gustavus into such a dilemma, that he resolved for a short space to try what an incredible effort might effect: he fought therefore at the head of the first regiment like a common soldier, with an intrepidity not to be described. Sirot missed killing him very nearly; nor was the king backward in making his returns. To comprehend this matter more exactly, it must be known, that this gallant Frenchman had

shot the cornet of the *pretorian* regiment of guards, and wanted to carry off the colours. Gustavus, who was engaged just by, seeing the officer on the ground, and judging rightly of the French baron's designs, instead of taking a little path, which would have conducted him more safely round the edge of the lake, advanced towards Sirot by a shorter passage, and lodged a carabine-ball in his right arm, intending to have shot him through a vital part. Sirot advancing, made a return with his pistol, and fired so near the king's head, that he burnt his hair, and either the ball, or the motion the king made on the occasion, caused his hat to fall to the ground. Sirot had by chance a domestic with him, who being insensibly drawn into the engagement, and having a desire, as his horse was killed under him, to seize the horse of the cornet whom Sirot had shot, took up (as he was then on foot) the king's hat, and gave it his master. Sirot had not escaped so cheaply, had it not been for a coat of mail which he wore under his *hongreliné*. He neither knew the king, nor the king him.

It is said by an author*, (not that I relate that writer's account for matter of fact, having no collateral authorities) that this very impious and heretical *hat* was sent by the house of Austria to adorn the shrine of the lady at Loretto; which, saith the same person, is less to be wondered at, inasmuch as the father of critics had the presumption to bequeath his night-gown to the said holy virgin. Whereupon a wit of that age wrote the following distich:

*Criticus virilem virgini togam legans
In morte fecit Lipsius solæcismum.*

But to return to the action last mentioned. Upon the whole, certain it is, that the king always disliked this loss of his beaver, and comforted himself as well as he could with the following application to the enemy:

——— *Victor ovât spolio, gaudetque positus.
Turno tempus erit magno cum optaverit em tum
Intactum Pallanta & cum spolia ista, diemque
Oderit*———

We have no account of the numbers slain on either side; yet the regiment of Bindhauf, esteemed the very finest in the Imperial service, was intirely ruined: and fourteen ensigns of foot and five of horse were taken by the Swedes. Who were made prisoners, and who were killed, appears not, ex-

† *New Star of the North*, p. 44. 4^o. Lond. 1632.

cepting a Swedish velt-maréchal (whom I suppose to be Wrangel*) and count John, the Rhingrave's brother. Sirot's men took him, but the Polanders attempted to rob them of their capture, in expectation of a large ransom. In this tumultuous contest the poor young nobleman was unfortunately killed. The king received five musquet-balls that day on his armour: Conospoliski engaged hand to hand with a Swedish cornet, so violent was his inclination to seize a pair of colours; but his horse sunk under him, being pierced through with several balls; and, like Gustavus, he was taken prisoner, and then rescued. In one part of this battle, he exhibited a practice in war, which will hardly be credited in a Polish officer; and very probably it was his own invention; and that was a MASQUED BATTERY, secured by a redoubt †, which occasioned an unexpected and very great slaughter.

One Soop, a captain of horse, rescued the king when he was taken prisoner. The king was fighting amidst a body of Polanders that knew him not. A Polish horse-foldier had clapped a pistol to his ear, when Soop shot him in the very act of attempting to give fire; for Gustavus was fullen, and refused to ask quarter, or follow the enemy. Soop then, at the head of his own troop of cavalry, soon dispersed the crowd round his master, and seizing his bridle by force, compelled him to retire; for which the king created him a chevalier in the public assembly at Stockholm ‡.

The two generals determined to give Gustavus a second attack the next day; but the king's capacity foresaw the inconveniencies, and a maréchal of his camp reinforcing him by order with 3000 fresh men, gave him an opportunity to retreat triumphantly without the least retardment from the enemy.

His majesty's conduct on this occasion (allowances being made for the Rhingrave's impetuosity, and for his not possessing the post in dispute some hours sooner than perhaps it was possible for him to have done) had all things to boast which a great general can lay claim to. His personal bravery was perhaps justly blameable; except we consider, that he was training and forming himself in the apprenticeship of

* This officer (whose christian name was Herman) must not be confounded with Charles Gustavus Wrangel, who made so great a figure after the death of Gustavus Adolphus.

† *Hist. des Guerres & des Mouvements, &c. sous le regne de Louis XIII.* tom. iii. 185.

‡ Soop, Henry, commanded eight troops of horse at the battle of Leipzig.

war; and all commanders at first must give the troops an high idea of their personal valour. His presence of mind was extraordinary; he never lost his coolest thoughts for a moment; but made the immediate and only proper use of every man that came to his assistance; his dispositions, his changes, his efforts, his attacks were such, that the cuirassiers of the Imperial army (who were armed cap-a-pè, and looked upon as invincible) could never break his lines or force him to fight beyond his choice; and the retreat he made was carried to the utmost pitch of credit that the circumstances could admit of. Sirot took nine pieces of leather-cannon, and two of cast metal, from four to six pounders.

The king afterwards earnestly desired to have an interview with that officer, and gave him many encomiums with great politeness. He pressed him much to serve under him, and, as Sirot only commanded some select companies in the Imperial army, offered to place him at the head of as many regiments in the Swedish service. Sirot at that time made his excuses, upon the footing of a man of honour, who had engaged his word elsewhere: *Trust me*, replied Gustavus, *and quit the party you have espoused; assuredly else you will be obliged to do so in a few years: for if ever a peace be concluded between Sweden and Poland, I that moment will declare war against the emperor, in conjunction with the king your master: and if you chuse not to comply with my request at present, promise me at least, when you have delivered back your companies, to give me a meeting* *. When the king afterwards had made some progress in Germany, he writ to Sirot with his own hand: Sirot hastened to him: but in that interval Gustavus was killed, and the Frenchman served under the duke de Weymar.

At night Gustavus retired to his old camp at Marienberg, and the enemy's two generals retreated to the post they had defended; since in truth they could not possibly find a more secure and advantageous situation. Their army passed the whole night under arms; but no enemy molested them.

The next day two prisoners taken from the Swedish army, (one of which was named Hume) were greatly surprised to see Sirot wearing the king their master's hat; Sirot himself being entirely ignorant unto whom it belonged. They wept: they exclaimed: they acknowledged it to be Gustavus's. They besought in the most earnest manner to be informed if the king was dead. Sirot recounted the transaction to them; upon which they recovered a little from their anxiety and surprize.

Soon after the united armies retired to Marienverder, in order to observe Gustavus's motions. At this time his Polish majesty arrived in the camp; changed the dispositions the generals had made, and the designs they had formed: for having summoned a grand council of war, he proposed to seek Gustavus in his entrenchments at Marienberg, and make an attempt to force them; concluding, they were not yet put in a posture of defence: but in that circumstance he little knew the military skill, the caution and diligence of his antagonist: who in eight days (nature having done much) had made his camp difficult to be approached; being protected on one side by a morass, and on the other side by a little river; and having only a small opening, which Gustavus had made defensible with excellent entrenchments and fortifications. Nevertheless, the king of Poland had still an inclination to force his enemy's lines; and having made several unsuccessful attempts, was at length repulsed with very considerable loss. In consequence of these mortifications, Sigismund determined to encamp himself not far from his old entrenchments. Arnheim quitted the Poles, and taking with him his four regiments of horse, and four of foot, lodged himself at Neuburg, near the Vistula, where the enemy had erected a fort in a small island. Forming a design therefore to make himself master of this fort, he attacked it with a body of soldiers, whom he conveyed over in boats; but the enterprise miscarried: so that after various unsuccessful attempts, he united himself a second time with the Polish army, and encamping near Gustavus, gazed upon him during the remaining part of the campaign without doing any thing. It is true, the united generals spared no pains to tempt Gustavus to a decisive battle: but that prince understood his profession too well, and had too distinct a notion of the superiority of his adversary's numbers, to enter into any hazard out of pure gallantry; he therefore kept firm to his post; nor were they able either to force his lines, or compel him to retire. By this time Arnheim grew indisposed (or made pretences rather of an indisposition, for he was the best dissembler in the world); and thus the command of the Imperial troops devolved on duke Julius of Sax-Lauenberg; and then on a count Mansfelt.

Arnheim had displeased Sigismund, by refusing to attack the town of Marienberg, having no authority, as he alleged, from his court, to invade the territories of the elector of Brandenburg, who owned that part of Prussia. What his instructions were, cannot well be ascertained, but this is manifest, that his estate lay in the dominions of that elector;

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and there are reasons to suspect, that he betrayed the Poles, and advertised the elector privately of all their designs, so far as they bore any reference to his estate.

In this interval, Sirot made an attempt to force Gustavus's lines, which the king allowed to be a spirited attack, and undertaken like a man of service. The young Frenchman in the first place made himself master of an approach called Pozolar, where he defeated four troops of horse and two of dragoons, commanded by a brother of maréchal Wrangel, whom he killed. He next seized the dike of Elbin, and had stormed fort Osbron, where was only a garrison of fourscore men; but the water being high, and the fosse wide and deep, and having no portable bridge, nor scaling ladders, he sent to the new Imperial general for advice and assistance, who abruptly refused them both, and gave him positive orders to withdraw. In that interim two Swedish regiments, with some field artillery, arrived to sustain the fort. They handled the French baron rudely enough, (to make use of his own words) nevertheless he retired in good order, and with no considerable loss. The king then disposed his troops so judiciously, securing all passes, and bringing such plentiful supplies of provisions to his army, that Sigismund and the Polish generals had not power, after various efforts, to make themselves masters of an inconsiderable city called Stum*.

But the arrival of M. de Charnacé, the French ambassador, a minister more esteemed at home than abroad, soon put an end to this Polish war. He was a military man as well as a politician †. Nevertheless Richelieu, who did not absolutely confide in his abilities, dispatched artfully to Gustavus, (but without any public character) the capuchin father Joseph, whom he called, not improperly, *His political right-arm*. De Charnacé made his proper applications to the two contending kings, and prevailed on them to send their respective deputies to a conference. To this purpose tents were

* *Historical or Subvent. Relat.* tom. i. 53.

† Hercules, baron de Charnacé, was a colonel of infantry, and a captain of horse. He was the first public minister who gave the prince of Orange the title of *Highness* instead of *Excellence*, in the year 1639. He had always a certain abruptness in his manner; for when prince Henry-Frederic of Nassau modestly made him his excuses for omitting a certain enterprize, on account of the opposition that arose from wind and tide, he cut him short by replying; *Sir, be pleased to remember, that there is no wind nor tide in France*. At the siege of Breda, the same prince, by way of return, said to him, as he stood near him in the trenches: *If you feel any uneasiness, let me beseech you to withdraw*. Upon which De Charnacé kept his ground out of obstinacy, and was killed by a musquet-ball.

erected about 500 paces distant from each camp: but his Swedish majesty protested the conference should not go on except he saw Sirot; so great a regard did he always pay to persons of distinguished valour.

De Charnacé having brought the treaty to some forwardness, played his cards with a sort of shyness mixed with indifference, which put Gustavus partly out of temper, and partly upon his guard. Nevertheless, he made Gustavus an offer of a supply of money, assuring him at the same time, that the duke of Bavaria (and his confederates) earnestly besought the king his master to undertake the protection of Germany, and give a check to the progress of the house of Austria, whose power began to be equally terrifying both to papists and protestants. How far this assertion was literally true, in each of its branches, cannot distinctly be ascertained: yet thus much is certain, that De Charnacé had been dispatched to the elector of Bavaria some months before, with a view to reconcile him to the protestant princes, and detach him from the emperor; dexterously insinuating at the same time, that they, in conjunction with his master, would raise him to the dignity of the Imperial throne after the death of Ferdinand. But Maximilian did not chuse to make so desperate a plunge in politics all at once: nevertheless, dropped some expressions, which tended to shew some indistinct disapprobation of the emperor's conduct, and a strong disgust to the king of Spain, who *traversed* him, to use his own expression, in all things*. He then harangued more at large on the ambition and insolence of Walstein, and passed his word not to assist the emperor to the disadvantage of the duke of Mantua, from whence it appears, that though the elector had not courage enough to separate himself at once from the house of Austria, yet it is plain he had certain inclinations to procure and cultivate a good correspondence with France, as will appear more distinctly in the sequel of our history. Gustavus had no dislike to this negotiation, but still suspected that the French minister did not act sincerely and seriously with him. He had likewise a doubt if De Charnacé had any other views than to divine, if possible, what might be his future intentions. For these reasons he gave him some slight glimmerings of hope, and then returned him an answer, conceived in vague and general terms.

But to return from this short digression. The elector of Brandenburg had his reasons likewise to dispatch a public

* Dissert. de M. Puffendorf sur les alliances entre la France & la Suede, 3°. A la Haye 1709.

minister, in order to bring the aforementioned treaty to an happy conclusion; and his Britannic majesty (successful by happening once in his politics to agree with the inclinations of the contending parties) made use of Sir Thomas Roe in the like undertaking, who acquitted himself with good temper and distinguishing capacity. In truth, Gustavus had a great desire to settle a good correspondence with England, having conceived favourable opinions to the advantage of Charles I. who had honoured him with the investiture of the garter, and rendered him signal services before this period, in composing the disagreeable commotions that had subsisted between him and Sigismund, which in one word opposed the darling project of his life, namely, an invasion into Germany. Nevertheless, it was Charles's misfortune not to keep pace with Gustavus's expectancies; for inheriting a part of his father's pacific disposition, he at the same time spirited up Gustavus, and lent a kind ear to proposals of accommodation from the court of Vienna: and with a view to facilitate this project, dispatched Anstruther afterwards (who had been long the Britannic resident at Copenhagen) with instructions of a conciliating nature to the diet of Ratisbon.

In a few days the treaty took effect, it being now the month of August*. It was to hold its force for six complete years: [at the expiration of which in 1636, D'Avaux protracted it for one and twenty years more] and indeed it was high time, on the part of Sigismund, to conclude something, notwithstanding he showed great unwillingness on the occasion †; for the kingdom of Poland was weakened and perplexed to such a degree, that the king found it impossible to carry on the war with any tolerable success and reputation. These reasons induced him to connive at the mediating assistances of France and England: and it was agreed that the Swedes, during this period of reconciliation, should possess Elbingen, Memel, and Braunsberg, the fort of Pillau, and all the acquisitions Gustavus had made in Livonia. Two years and more before the expiration of which truce, his Polish majesty died, (six months and a few days before Gustavus) in the sixty-sixth year of his age, worn out with iniquities and fatigues, after a reign of forty-five years, checkered with good and adverse fortune. His parts were rather acute than strong: he was enterprising, artful, having resources at will; and had the talent of struggling through misfortunes without being dismayed by them. Self-conceit and obstinacy were his greatest faults, and served to

* *Hist. or Authent. Relat.* tom. i, 56.

† *Lacten, Hist. Suec.* p. 562.

account for the most considerable part of his misapprehensions and miscarriages. His family hath been long since extinct.

After the adjustment of the last mentioned truce, nothing ensued of importance, except that a treaty was concluded betwixt Gustavus and the town of Dantzic*. And the first consequence of the truce between Sweden and Poland, was the return of Arnheim and the Imperial army into Germany. It may be asked, why this general, with a body of 10,000 † veteran troops, did not perform his duty better, and with greater success? He was a man of artifice and stratagem, beloved by the soldiery at that period, and endued with great political abilities. But by the way, Arnheim (very justly suspected through the whole campaign) possessed no inconsiderable estate in the territories of Brandenburg, which made him unwilling to promote the war with vigour (for then the aforesaid electorate might have become naturally the seat of action;) and upon these occasions prince Vladislaus suggested his suspicions concerning him to his father Sigismund ‡. He was a creature also subjected to the *ferula* of Wallstein, who, like many other generals, had the self-denial to sacrifice his glory (great as that glory was) to his private passions and interests, his caprice and ambition. Wallstein (for reasons which must occur to every sensible reader) had no desire to bring this war to a conclusion by any decisive strokes; yet I must acquit him of having any personal views to a considerable degree, with respect to the private orders he gave Arnheim as to the campaigns of Poland; since the true interest of the house of Austria then was (coincidentally with Wallstein's interest too) to carve out just employment enough for Gustavus, without reducing either him or Sigismund to any certain and definite conclusions: for then they knew but too well (even though Gustavus had been forced to make a peace) that he would turn his arms against Germany, and in that respect France counterworked them, and over-reached them.

Mean while new circumstances in the Germanic system paved the way for an invasion more and more on the part of Gustavus; for it was now thought high time at Vienna to take off the mask a little with regard to the elector of Saxony, who had implicitly, without serious reflection, been its obsequious servant for many years, with a view to make some inconsiderable acquisitions in Lusatia and Bohemia, which

* *Hist. or Authent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 57. † *Loccenius* says 7000, p. 563.

‡ *Kobierziski, Histor. Vladislaui*, p. 925.

the house of Austria, meerly by dint of its superior greatness, had the power of resuming whenever she pleased. The event I am going to relate soon convinced him (though a weak man, who had been sold by his general and ministers many times before this period, and many times after) that the emperor had a mind to check him in his career, and give him a thorough mortification once for all, in spite of all meritorious past services, and the alliance that then subsisted between them. To explain this point, it must here be known, that the chapter of Magdeburg, out of obedience to an Imperial proscription, in the beginning of this year had dispossessed Christian William, marquis of Brandenburg, administrator of the archbishopric, and placed in his room Augustus, third son living of the elector of Saxony; which young man was then aged about fifteen. But the court of Vienna, instead of ratifying this election in behalf of a family that had served its interests assiduously, (assigning no incapacity on account of youth) chose to make it devolve on the archduke Leopold, the emperor's second son*, who was born the same year with his brother-candidate. Mean while the see of Rome was applied to, and secured upon this occasion; and when a denial was returned to the elector of Saxony, he perceived forthwith that the court of Vienna could write two styles with equal energy; and that the title of prince *ab utili* (as the politicians then expressed themselves) had an interest in her infinitely stronger than all past assistance and good services. This repulse comforted the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel not a little; for he (who was half an enemy at least to the Imperial family) had lost the abbacy of Hirschfeld, which was made an appennage to the archduke aforesaid; and the elector of Saxony, an inviolable ally and friend of the emperor, met with a treatment just as harsh; conducted from the beginning to the end, with as little ceremony and as much indelicacy.

* This prince was not ill-provided with church-preferments, both in protestant and popish countries; for the archbishopric of Magdeburg and the bishopric of Halberstadt were supposed to amount each to 50,000 l. per ann. and the income of the abbacy and territory of Hirschfeld was imagined to be half that value. But these were only a sort of commendams, to be preserved with his other ecclesiastical possessions. For previously to the present period he had been created bishop of Strasburg and Passau, by the resignation of his uncle, the arch-duke of Inspruch, who had married the widow of duke d'Urbino. It was moreover intended to have procured for him, in course of time, the archbishopric of Bremen. He was also administrator of Murbach and Luders.

His Danish majesty too began to suspect, as he possessed only one town, namely, Gluckstadt, in the duchy of Holstein, that to support an equal balance of power in Germany, was a task beyond his strength and abilities. It was therefore he inclined a favourable ear to the treaty of accommodation which the emperor had declared should be held at Lubec, for a tedious and unsuccessful war had chastised his ambition thoroughly; and as omens and prodigies in those days determined most men's resolutions and practices, it happened, (whether fortunately or otherwise I cannot say,) that a flash of lightning pierced the royal chapel of Copenhagen, and destroyed the funeral trophies of all the kings. Christian was struck motionless in his military capacity from that moment, and never afterwards recovered the use of his warlike faculties.

Mean while Gustavus, who above all things passionately desired the concurrence of his subjects, could not allow himself to venture on invading Germany till he had first collected the sentiments of the good people of Sweden. But not caring to receive any public check in the senate-house, he conceived it most proper to assemble in his own tent the ablest men, civil and military, he then had round his person. It was there suggested modestly by one or two, who alledged they were not able to comprehend the effects of a war on the continent (whether through design, or from narrow and contracted notions I cannot say:) "That the revenues of the kingdom had been exhausted in foreign expeditions: that it favoured too much of romance to support the interests of any power, or espouse the cause of any religion on the other side of the water: that a good king ought to stay at home, and not cross the ocean in pursuit of feats of arms: that the dukes of Mechlenberg might be reinstated better by good counsel than by the dint of the sword: that the German electors were the best judges of the affairs of the empire, and best able to vindicate them: that the maintenance of the protestant religion depended on God, and not on man: and lastly, that as the sea was a natural barrier, sufficient to protect Sweden from all invasions; so it likewise rendered every interposition upon the continent unseasonable, expensive, and unavailing.

It was observed farther, "That the emperor had given the Swedes no lawful occasion for declaring war, though many insults had been offered them, and various injuries committed against them: that the troops sent to Sigismund were supposed to be hired by the republic of Poland, and that this supposition might be admissible, if a nation chose

“ to close its eyes a little in order to obtain tranquility and
 “ peace : that a sea-invasion against Sweden was a thing
 “ remote and of a romantic nature ; and an irruption by land
 “ was equally improbable, since the kingdom of Denmark
 “ must be first subdued and reduced * ; and as to Livonia
 “ and Prussia, no attempts could be made there, but such as
 “ were incompatible with the Polish truce. The expences
 “ of a war upon the continent were next expatiated upon ;
 “ nor was the immense power of the emperor passed by
 “ without notice taken of it ; nor the dispeopling of Sweden,
 “ nor the making conquests for other persons advantages ;
 “ the whole being concluded with a pathetic peroration,
 “ relative to the state of the kingdom, during the minority
 “ of an infant princess, in case it should please God to dis-
 “ pose of his majesty’s life.”

To these allegations and suggestions the king, and the major part of the assembly, replied to the following effect † :

“ That universal monarchy, even upon the continent,
 “ must be repressed by neighbouring nations at great hazard
 “ and inconceivable expence, provided such nations, are only
 “ protected by a small interposition of ocean ; since a power of
 “ that encroaching and arbitrary kind must, in its own
 “ nature, make new and wider undulations every moment,
 “ except it be properly checked, and prudently restrained :
 “ so that the fate of a country, removed at a moderate degree
 “ of distance from it is only *res protrahata, sed non, sublata.*”

This preliminary being gotten over, it was observed next :

“ That the Imperial troops were dispatched avowedly into
 “ Poland, and that if such insults and aggressions were
 “ timorously connived at, the character of Gustavus would
 “ be given down to posterity in an ambiguous light ; for
 “ hostile actions carried more signification with them, than
 “ the disavowal of courts and ministers : *That invasions were*
 “ *more to be feared than people imagine ; having (according to all*
 “ *histories) been generally crowned with success : Great things being*
 “ *always to be done in war, merely because they were supposed to*
 “ *be impossible.* That Wallstein, by the assistance of a Spanish
 “ fleet, then stationed at Dunkirk, had formed immense
 “ designs (to say the least of them) against the marine of
 “ Sweden ; and that the king himself, considered in the
 “ light of a man of courage and an intelligent being, had no
 “ choice of an alternative with respect to peace or war.”

Yet still it was graciously observed by his majesty, “ That
 “ he should commit his own glory and private sentiments to
 “ the breasts of his senators, who, in a short space, should

* *Laccenii Hist. Succ.* p. 563.

† *Ibid.* p. 563, 564.

“ have full permission to debate publicly the expediency or
 “ inconveniency of *invading the empire.*” *I know,* cried the
 king with some emotion, *as well as any one person amongst my
 subjects the difficulty, the perils, the fatigues; and duration of such
 an undertaking; yet neither the wealth of the house of Austria
 dismays me, nor her veteran forces. There are powers, even in the
 empire itself, who may not dislike the favour of a visit; and I may
 venture to assert, that a certain edict has cast a damp upon the
 burning zeal of Saxony. It is moreover understood, that the Im-
 perial army subsists by rapine and military exactions; whereas on
 the other hand, though the Swedish revenues are not considerable, yet
 the money is paid with punctuality; and my soldiers are accustomed
 to temperance, frugality, and virtue. In the worst of cases my
 retreat is secure; and my brave troops shall never want their daily
 subsistence, though it is transported to them from Sweden: and if
 it is the will of the Supreme Being, that Gustavus must die in the
 defence of his country, he pays the tribute with thankful acquies-
 cence: it is a king's duty and religion both, to obey the great
 Sovereign of kings without a murmur. I shall leave the world
 with a firm persuasion that Providence will support my subjects,
 because they are faithful and virtuous; and that my ministers,
 generals, and senators, will punctually discharge their duties to my
 child and people, inasmuch as they respected me, and loved their
 country.**

I own myself at a loss which to admire most in this debate,
 his majesty's abilities or his honesty; for as he had not
 actually settled any distinct agreement between himself,
 France, and England, though morally sure of effecting some-
 thing on that head, he generously disdained to have recourse to
 persuasive and plausible arguments: and indeed it was always
 his way to preserve some resources by way of surprise, and per-
 form more than he gave people reasons to expect. It was
 only for a man like Gustavus to quit this common high road,
 of a politician: and if Charles I. had thoroughly understood
 this exception in human nature, he would not have ruined,
 as far as lay in his power, the elector Palatin's cause, by
 insisting upon promises from Gustavus relative to the restitu-
 tion of that prince, before he had power to make them
 good. The true policy had been to have trusted the king of
 Sweden, and suspected the rest of mankind; which incidental
 remark the reader will see verified hereafter, by the king's
 affection and regard for that unfortunate prince, at a time
 when his Britannic majesty gave over all concerns for his
 interest.

* *Laccenii Hist. Suecan. p. 563—565.*

It must be remembered, that this assembly was held in Prussia; and from thence Gustavus set sail for Stockholm, in which voyage De Charnacé attended him; and there he renewed his application to form an alliance between Sweden and France; but in such high terms, and with so great an air of indifference, that men of sense suspected Richelieu (who had been made secretary of state and prime-minister long before) to want more to penetrate into Gustavus's designs, than to form any real agreement between the two crowns: for De Charnacé threw out his proposals in a manner so extremely general and unlimited, that in every instance he seemed to reserve for his master a safe retreat: nor was he over-modest in the requisitions he made; for it was expressly requested by him, that Gustavus, upon entering Germany, should maintain an army of 36000 men, and oblige himself to continue the war six intire years, without exception; for which services France should pay him annually 75000*l.* sterling. Gustavus, conformably not only to right reason, but to the natural cast of his temper, treated every article of these conditions with an air of penetration and disdain: he chose not to inlist himself as a mercenary general upon so contemptible a stipend; nor was it pleasing to him to be excluded from the means of treating with the emperor; upon condition proposals were offered him satisfactory to his own honour and the protestant cause. He feared also lest the other princes and states, who courted his alliance, or might reciprocally be requested by him to enter into engagements, should neglect, contemn, or think ill of his friendship, when they knew him to be engaged by France to carry on the war in the empire, at all events, for a limited number of years: A further difficulty yet remained; De Charnacé had forgotten to speak ambiguously: and Gustavus saw plainly that France, whilst she fettered him for a certain number of years in the empire, had a private view to make an advantageous peace with the emperor in Italy. For these reasons the present negotiation was suspended; nevertheless, not to crush it absolutely, the secretary Nicholai was sent to Paris, to insinuate dexterously, that Gustavus had no disinclination to an engagement, where the conclusions were reasonable, and not inconsistent with his welfare and dignity.

During this interval, De Charnacé set out with a view to return home, but received orders at Copenhagen to embark again for Stockholm, with fresh instructions (as it was generally thought) relative to a new confederacy in respect to

the invasion of Germany * ; and th~~at~~ matters were conducted to a more successful conclusion.

It hath been asserted by Wassenberg †, an author of so great repute, that the famous count de Furstenberg published a commentary upon his history, that Gustavus, upon the proposal made him to enter Germany, placed so little confidence in French promises and subsidy-payments, that he insisted on his Christian majesty's sending seven hostages to reside at Amsterdam by way of security: and it was made a point likewise, that the republic of Venice should send two hostages on the same purposes to Stockholm; and the English and Muscovites should dispatch a certain number to make their abode in such places as the king should specify. ‡ But the states general were trusted upon their bare parole of honour: a mark of confidence which at that time they justly merited, on account of their sincere good-will to the unfortunate elector Palatin, and the protestant religion, upon all occasions.

This matter being thus dismissed for a season, Gustavus at length proposed the final discussion of peace and war to the states of the kingdom assembled in senate. Various arguments were then alledged on either side, in substance much the same with those already related; but at length it was unanimously determined in favour of a safe and glorious peace, or a brisk and persevering war, without admitting any intermediate state of things by way of succedaneum. The senate then concluded with an earnest request to his majesty not to consent to a peace, *except he had his helmet on* §; requesting him at the same time to relinquish no present or future acquisitions, without maintaining in the highest degree the honour and glory of Sweden, the sovereignty of the Baltic, and the free exemption of the town of Stralsund; not forgetting the restoration of the dukes of Mechlenberg, and the re-establishment of antient tranquillity in the two circles of Lower and Upper Saxony; keeping a strict and watchful eye to all alliances then contracted, or thereafter to be contracted, with foreign princes, and the true preservation of the rights and dignity of the protestant religion ||.

* MS. letter from Sir Thomas Roe to lord viscount Dorchester, secretary of state, Feb. 14, 1629-30.

† *Florus German.* p. 260.

‡ *Continuat. Laur. Austr.* Fol. p. 24.

§ *Sed tantum sub clypeo*: but the original words could not be translated literally, according to the usage of war then in being.

|| *Hist. Ausbent, Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. Tom. i. p. 51.

Upon this the states of the kingdom dispatched a deputy to Wallstein and Tilly, to whom his majesty sent also a couple of letters *. But when the person employed, whose name was Nicholas Bielké, (lord justiciary of the country of Smaland) arrived at Stralsund, he thought proper, for certain reasons, to send his letters and a copy of his instructions to the respective generals, and complained with great acrimony against the haughtiness of Wallstein. It does not appear, that this arrogant commander had the politeness to return the king an answer: but Tilly made a reply with great respect, and modestly vindicated both himself and his party. The result therefore was, that the affair of Stralsund gave Gustavus pretensions upon the empire; and paved a foundation for him to proceed upon; for it rendered him master of a sea-port equally convenient for advancing or retreating.

And now openeth a great prospect, that is to say, the invasion of Germany; and since this point may be justly considered as the most important event in European history, it appears here highly necessary, once for all, to form a short but distinct notion of the state of the empire, for a century preceding, and something more, with respect to its religious, civil, or military commotions.

“ Previously † to the Bohemia troubles in 1618, about an
 “ hundred years, (almost to a month;) Martin Luther,
 “ professor of theology in the university of Wittemberg,
 “ began to dispute publicly against the abuses of indulgencies;
 “ and Ulric Zuinglius at the same time declaimed from the
 “ pulpit against the aforesaid abuses. The doctrines of
 “ Luther in general were extremely relished by the majority
 “ of mankind; and he found moreover an excellent patron
 “ and protector in Frederic the Sage, elector of Saxony, and
 “ John the Constant, his brother. This was that very
 “ Saxon elector who, in conjunction with some other states,
 “ *protested* against the Imperial decree in the diet held at
 “ Spire, in the year 1529, from which action the name of
 “ *Protestant* first took its rise. After that a confession of
 “ their faith was presented to the emperor Charles V. ‡ at the
 “ diet

* *Historical or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. Tom. i. p. 51, 52.

† *Memoirs communicated*, by the famous jus-publicist M. de Mascou, Dean of Zeitz, a counsellor to the late king of Poland; who furnished me with abundance of hints and materials for writing this history. He was upon the whole the greatest master of historical and treaty-learning I ever knew. He had also taste and penetration.

‡ It has been thought by some, that the house of Austria, in succeeding ages, formed its plan of universal monarchy upon the practices of this prince, and some traditional schemes and sayings of his, that had been delivered down

" diet of Augsburg the ensuing year, and from thence the
 " Lutherans surname themselves to this very hour *Fidei*
 " *Augustanæ addictos*; and as there was great reason to fear
 " that the emperor would attempt to reduce them to con-
 " formity by force of arms, they thought it both safe and con-
 " venient to place themselves in a state of defence, and of
 " course formed immediately the famous league of Smalcalden;
 " a small city in the territories of Hesse.

" The elector of Saxony, and Philip landgrave of Hesse,
 " were the chief personages in this confederation. But
 " Francis I. king of France, Henry VIII. king of England,
 " (who had published a treatise against Luther, upon the
 " subject of the seven sacraments, which procured him the
 " title of Defender of the faith) and the king of Denmark,
 " all aspired to obtain the good graces and amity of the
 " confederators at Smalcalden. M. de Bellay concluded a
 " treaty with them at Esslinguën in 1532; and it was then
 " supposed in France, that a political step of this nature
 " would create the means of giving an oblique check to the
 " immense power of the emperor. Yet the new religion
 " unhappily performed that, which the enemies thereof
 " could not effect; for the two communions of Lutherans
 " and Zuinglians (or, as some affected to call themselves,
 " *Helvetians*) had the misfortune to disagree in the very
 " infancy of reformation. At first the difference was
 " slight, relating to little more than some slight disagreements

down to posterity by uninterrupted succession. The potentate in question,
 the most powerful and illustrious of all the successors of Charlemagne, trained
 up to great enterprizes; first by Perronet, and then by cardinal Granville,
 conceived the high idea of becoming sole monarch of Europe; a title the
 Austrians and Spaniards at that juncture greatly wished to see realized!
 They well foresaw the difficulties which the princes and states of the empire
 might throw in their way, and of course made the grand attempt to divide
 them, under pretext of extirpating the doctrines of a Saxon professor. This
 expression of *pretext* I purposely make use of, inasmuch as it was in their
 power, many years before, to have given the death-stroke to the Lutheran
 cause. For some writers have thought that Charles V. granted more favours
 to the protestants by the *pax religiosa*, than an absolute religionist could
 be thought to have done; and have suspected, (though perhaps without
 foundation) that the conference at Worms had made some impression on his
 mind, and wrought therein no inconsiderable change: for when the Spaniards
 in the Smalcaldic war, on the surrender of Wittemberg, after the defeat of
 John Frederic, elector of Saxony, desired permission from him to dig up the
 bones of Luther, and burn them, he replied with great emotion: " Leave the
 " man in peace, I have no inclination to behold him again, having seen
 " enough of him in the disputation at Worms." And what confirms the
 matter still farther is, that his last words were reputed to be these: *In suis*
meritis Christi confido. [*Hispanicæ Dominationis Arcana*, p. 20 & 26. *Motifs pour*
la guerre d'Allemagne, p. 95.]

“ in the article of the Holy Supper; but after the *Helvetians*
 “ had adopted the doctrines of Calvin, the separation pro-
 “ ceeded to greater lengths. It was the custom of the age
 “ to surname this latter party *Calvinists*, but for their own
 “ parts they chose rather to be dignified with the title of the
 “ *Reformed*.

“ At length the reformation made surprizing advances in
 “ neighbouring countries; Gustavus Vasa established it in
 “ Sweden, and Albert of Brandenburg, first duke of Prussia,
 “ embraced it likewise. Christian III. king of Denmark,
 “ caused Doctor Pomeranus to come from Wittenberg, in
 “ order to establish the new religion in the North. This
 “ ecclesiastic performed the ceremony of his coronation, and
 “ composed a liturgy at that time, which is made use of to
 “ this hour in the coronation of the kings of Denmark.

“ About the same time, and with a motion almost as
 “ rapid as lightning, the reformation spread itself over all
 “ Prussia and Livonia, as also over Poland, Lithuania, and
 “ even Bohemia, Hungary, Transylvania, Austria, and
 “ Carniola.

“ On the other hand it made its progress with the same
 “ rapidity through the Low Countries, but was attended
 “ there with great commotions and disturbances (which
 “ took their rise from the anabaptists); and then forced its
 “ way into the dominions of France, where Calvin threw it
 “ into a new mold.

“ The court of Rome discountenanced all discussions
 “ upon this subject; and the popes persisted in one uniform
 “ tone with Charles V. which was, to crush the protestants
 “ in Germany by meer force of power. But the emperor
 “ was not of so turbulent and sanguinary a temper, and had
 “ reasons besides for dealing more mildly with the protestants,
 “ and more circumspectly. He had a long and disagreeable
 “ war to carry on against Francis I. and the Grand Signior
 “ had no less scheme in view than to take Hungary from the
 “ emperor's brother, Ferdinand I; in prosecution of which,
 “ he threw all Germany into an alarm, by investing the city
 “ of Vienna in 1529.

“ Mean while the emperor, and many other catholic
 “ sovereigns, requested a free council of the pope, but un-
 “ successfully. Perhaps his Imperial majesty might have
 “ done better to have convened a national council by way of
 “ *succedaneum*: but that not being the case, at length pope
 “ Paul III. exhibited (what may justly be termed) a *farce*
 “ or *interlude* to all Europe, namely, the convening the
 “ assembly

“ assembly of Trent, which was supposed to represent an
 “ œcumenical council : but the protestants kept themselves
 “ upon their guard, and were not over-reached.

“ Such being the case, the emperor, after the conclusion
 “ of the peace at Crespy in 1544, found himself in a capacity
 “ to turn his arms against the confederates of the Smalcaldic
 “ league, and two years afterwards published an Imperial
 “ proscription against the two principal personages concerned
 “ therein, namely, the elector of Saxony and the landgrave
 “ of Hesse. He then defeated the elector at the famous battle
 “ of Muhlberg, April 24, 1547, and took him prisoner :
 “ commanding that day in person, though extremely afflicted
 “ with the gout. Yet so great was this prince’s passion for
 “ glory, when placed in the balance against other sentiments,
 “ that he transferred the electorate of Saxony to prince
 “ Maurice. And hence it is that the electoral dignity is
 “ passed into that branch of the family which is called
 “ *Albertin*. Mean while the landgrave, in order to obtain
 “ his pardon, was obliged to come to Halle and perform the
 “ ceremony of genuflexion at the emperor’s feet, who still
 “ detained him prisoner, though Granville his great chan-
 “ cellor had given strong hopes to the contrary. Hence
 “ arose a new war ; and this may be called the most shining
 “ epocha in the reign of Charles V. Inasmuch that a
 “ suspicion hath arisen in many minds, as if he intended,
 “ after the reduction of the protestants, to have given a new
 “ cast to the form of the empire.

“ Be that as it will, it grieved him particularly to have
 “ made his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans ; since
 “ thereby he precluded himself from having the power of
 “ associating to the empire his son Philip ; a young man
 “ whom history might have pronounced fortunatè, had he
 “ chanced to inherit his father’s genius ! But soon afterwards
 “ he acted an unbecoming part in England upon espousing
 “ Mary, who had just then succeeded her brother Edward,
 “ and in the transports of enthusiasm overturned that re-
 “ formation, which his brother-in-law had taken care to
 “ introduce.

“ But at that very time, when the emperor Charles V.
 “ concluded himself sovereign disposer of the fortunes of all
 “ the protestants in Germany, Maurice, the new elector of
 “ Saxony, formed a fresh league, in order to secure the
 “ liberty of religion ; and Henry II. king of France, who
 “ had lately succeeded his father Francis I. availed himself
 “ of this critical conjuncture with a view to make a powerful
 “ revulsion ; and of course concluded with the confederate

“princes the famous treaty of Chamdoor. The elector of Saxony marched an army suddenly against the emperor in 1552, who at that time was without troops in the country of Tyrol, and suspected nothing. His escape was fortunate; for the confederates missed little of surprizing him in the city of Inspruck. Mean while Henry II. declared war against him, and surnamed himself the protector of the Germanic liberty; a title the French kings have ever affected to assume since that period! As if there was an opiate in the sound, which might serve to lull the empire to such a degree, till it dreamt itself into a state of slavery.

“At the same time the princes of Farnese took the alarm in Italy, and cloathed themselves in armour: infomuch that the emperor, perceiving himself embarrassed on all hands by a series of revolutions quite unexpected, concluded immediately a truce at Passau with the protestants, in order to employ all his forces against the king of France. This truce was at length succeeded by the *peace of religion**, agreed upon at Augsburg, anno 1555, in a general diet of the empire, wherein Ferdinand king of the Romans presided in the absence of the emperor his brother, who employed himself at that time in the Low Countries, having already planned out to himself the scheme of relinquishing the throne, and passing the remainder of his days in retirement and tranquility.

“And here it must be observed, that the *peace of religion* did not then extend itself to doctrinal points; it established only a full and fair equality between papists and protestants *in rebus civilibus*: and of course the *latter* were left in quiet possession of all the bishoprics and other ecclesiastical benefices, with which they had invested themselves till this period. Nevertheless, king Ferdinand inserted one clause at the solicitations of the catholics, which was, “*That whenever a prelate of the Romish persuasion should think fit to embrace the protestant communion, he should then be obliged to relinquish his benefices.*”

* The most essential article of this pacification was, “That no person thenceforwards should be prosecuted in the Roman empire for the sake of religion.” The treaty itself, commonly called the *pax religiosa*, was concluded in the year 1552, between the emperor Charles V. and the elector of Saxony; to which the elector of Brandenburg and the landgrave of Hesse, &c. were admitted parties. It received a revision three years afterwards at the diet of Augsburg, and consists of thirteen general articles; of which the reader may peruse a clear distinct abridgment in *Bracbelius*, Hist. nostr. temp. 129 186, &c.

“ This.

“ This short clause is called the *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum*, and hath been considered by the Romanists as the bulwark of their church. The protestants exclaimed loudly against this perplexing limitation, and with greater reason, as it happened to be inserted contrary to their knowledge, and without their permission *. Thus a few strokes of the pen gave birth to innumerable discords, altercations, and intestine commotions, which were never truly composed till the peace of Westphalia.

“ When the prelates arrived at the council of Trent, they had no inclination to enter into debates in the neighbourhood of a respectable army; and making these appearances a pretext for withdrawing, retired to their respective homes April 22, 1552.

“ France extracted no small advantage from the wars and confusions then subsisting; for she procured the possession of Metz, Toule, and Verdun; and the delicious taste of these three little morsels quickened her appetite to such a degree, that she at length swallowed down the three respective bishoprics that belonged to them.

The council of Trent assembled a third time in the year 1562, and published its decree the year ensuing. But, in spite of all the anathemas then thundered out, the emperor Ferdinand † confirmed the *peace of religion* throughout the empire, and the number of protestants augmented under his reign, and those of his successors Maximilian ‡ and Rodolphus II §, in the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia,

“ and

* As the protestants had never interest to procure this clause to be expunged, a fresh one was inserted by way of counter-balance at the treaty of Munster, whereby it was stipulated, “ That a protestant prelate, upon professing himself a Roman catholic, should be deprived of his dignity and his revenues.”

† This prince, brother to Charles V. in all but what related to the *Reservatum Ecclesiasticum*, discovered no outrageous spirit against the protestant religion, and was pleased to say, a short time before he died, that he had laboured to compose the animosities between Christians, and had attempted to compel no man to believe contrary to his private sentiments. What confirms this is, that he and the elector of Saxony agreed very well in their general opinions, and his ambassador at the council of Trent gave attention to the marriage of priests, and the communion under both kinds: so that the council in general appeared to be much better satisfied than his holiness the pope. *Motifs pour la guerre d'Allemagne*, 96.

‡ Maximilian, successor to Ferdinand, decently observed all the forms of popery; but there are reasons to think his heart had no insuperable aversion to the opposite religion: for the protestants owe to this prince the favourable constitution granted them 1577, in which he disposed of all their *Bona Ecclesiastica*, in a manner contrary to the sentiments of his own party.

§ Rodolphus, brother to Maximilian, behaved well to the protestants, even in the hereditary dominions. He allowed a Lutheran doctor to come from

“ and in all the hereditary dominions of the house of Austria
 “ in Germany: and the latter prince in particular granted
 “ some notable privileges to the protestants of Bohemia, and
 “ the annexed provinces, under the title of *Literæ majestatis*;

“ Queen Elizabeth not only re-established the reformation
 “ in England, but supported it likewise in France and the
 “ Low Countries, where the indiscreet zeal of Philip II.
 “ paved the way for those future revolutions, which ad-
 “ ministered a series of opportunities, all tending to the
 “ dismembering and enfeebling of the house of Austria;
 “ whilst, on the other hand, the love of liberty took root
 “ imperceptibly in the United Provinces, and derived its chief
 “ support and nourishment from the treaty of Utrecht con-
 “ cluded in 1579.

“ But in France the reformed religion made more rapid
 “ advances, and missed little of ascending to the throne in
 “ the person of the king of Navarre. But the particular
 “ league so much talked of, compelled this prince at length
 “ to pay his attendance at mass.

“ Soon after the tempest began to thicken all over
 “ Germany, in a very formidable manner: for the protestants
 “ being alarmed at the persecuting spirit of Ferdinand II. to

Brunswic, and instruct such of his subjects as were of his persuasion. This anecdote was acknowledged by the Imperial minister, count Lamberg, and others, in his own house, at the congress of Osnabrug, 1648. From which series of remarks, by way of notes, it appears plainly, that the house of Austria was never so sincerely bent upon becoming absolute, as at the time Gustavus thought fit to enter the empire.

Under these above-named emperors, the court of Spain had no great ascendant in Germany. The two first were its concealed enemies more or less; and Rodolphus, piqued at the infant's being given in marriage to archduke Albert his brother, always maintained a secret hatred to Spain, notwithstanding he had been educated in the court of Philip II. These resentments continued so strongly upon him, that some years afterwards he gave the Spanish ambassador a box on the ear, and banished him from his court, for making a very petulant and lively remonstrance to him: and this Volmar, the Imperial plenipotentiary, confessed at Nuremberg to the French minister.

During all this period the crown of Spain received no considerable assistances from the emperor or the empire. But matters took another turn in 1612, when Matthias ascended the Imperial throne. Good correspondence and intelligence was immediately formed between the two courts; and the ambassador of the latter soon found means to create and foment divisions in the empire, upon the plan of Charles Vth's memoirs, and wakened the sleeping fires in Bohemia to their full activity, by discovering the uneasiness of the protestants, and then exhorting the court of Vienna to pursue the most arbitrary and persecuting methods of reducing them to obedience. Thus, by administering breath to a few latent sparks, a furious flame was raised, and the conflagration did not cease in less than thirty years. [*Motifs pour la guerre d'Allemagne, 96, &c.*]

“ which

“ which the Spaniards took care to administer fewel,
 “ and dreading extremely, what a person of so furious a
 “ temper might undertake, whenever he mounted the Im-
 “ perial throne, had the precaution to unite themselves under
 “ the denomination of *Unionists*; and on their parts, in order
 “ to counter-balance the schemes of the papists, formed an
 “ immense project, which had the appearance of exterminat-
 “ ing the Austrian princes from the empire, or depriving
 “ them at least of the better part of their dominions. This
 “ astonishing revolution broke forth at Prague in 1618.

“ But their expectances from England, France, Holland,
 “ and Denmark, all deceived them. James I. hated king-
 “ making, and had an aversion, as foreigners tell us, to a
 “ drawn sword. The protestants in France were soon
 “ humbled, and had the power of contributing nothing,
 “ except their good wishes and their prayers. And the
 “ catholic party there overturned the union by their intrigues;
 “ for that kingdom, at the period I am now speaking of,
 “ under the ministry of the constable Des Luynes, by a
 “ contrast of politics remarkably singular, cultivated the
 “ friendship of the Spaniards, and advanced their interests.
 “ Thus (the Austrian affairs being raised to the highest
 “ pitch,) out came, almost at one stroke, the fulminatory
 “ *edict of restitution*, which sounded the alarm afresh, and
 “ continued the war for a period of THIRTY YEARS. In
 “ the various edicts published by the court of Vienna on this
 “ occasion, it was expected by the emperor, that the Re-
 “ formed had no title to be comprehended in the *Pax religiosa*,
 “ and that the protestants in general ought to restore all the
 “ ecclesiastical possessions which they had appropriated to
 “ themselves ever since the conclusion of that treaty; and
 “ this single step brought the great Gustavus into the
 “ empire.” Thus far M. de MASCOU.

I shall now attempt to describe in a few words the farther situation of things at this important period. It appears from what hath been observed, that the house of Austria had continued in the highest splendor ever since the time of Charles V. At this important juncture, she was mistress of Spain, Portugal, the treasures of America, the Low Countries, the Milanese, the kingdom of Naples, Bohemia, the incorporated provinces, Hungary, its own hereditary dominions, and, to a certain degree, of all Germany; so that if so many states had united under one chief of that family, there is reason to think that the protestant religion must have been extinguished and all Europe enslaved. And the house of Spain, at that time, considered itself to be all powerful; since in a Latin

MANUSCRIPT memorial, or letters, which, I have in my possession, addressed to Louis XIII. it is there said, that his Catholic majesty, Philip IV. had the presumption, and one may add the impiety likewise, to place this MOTTO under his ARMS — SINE IP SO FACTUM EST NIHIL; — which expression, if it doth not border on blasphemy, the reader must judge; for it is applied to our BLESSED SAVIOUR by St. John. The emperor too, by means of his own proper forces, and those of the catholic league, had by this time crushed every prince and state that presumed to oppose his ambitious designs. He had reduced Bohemia and the *annexed provinces* after their revolt, and had compelled their unfortunate prince not only to relinquish his new kingdom, but his patrimonial territories: for, after a mock-reign of eighteen months, the decisive battle of Prague un-kinged him, and sent him to seek his bread and his fortunes in other countries, since his English father (as it is observed in the memoirs of Louisa electress Palatin) only supplied him with peaceable advice and scholastic quotations, instead of money and legions.

Upon this the emperor doled out in parcels the dominions of Frederic to several potentates that were in his interests. But the greater share was transferred to Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, as the person among them the most respectable in rank, and the most considerable in point of services. To him therefore was consigned the whole Upper Palatinate (excepting only a trifling part) and the electoral dignity. Alarmed and astonished at these transactions, his majesty of Denmark formed an alliance with some German princes his neighbours, and commenced a fresh war against the house of Austria, which proved upon the whole so unsuccessful, that he was obliged to accept such conditions of peace as the Imperial party thought fit to prescribe: Ferdinand on the other hand, elevated with such a series of successes, [which gave him pretext to raise a very considerable army, and pretences to continue the same army on foot, with appearance of extirpating his enemies, and maintaining a general peace throughout the empire] determined to unfold to the public, the mysterious object of all his wishes, which, though many suspected, yet few positively believed. And in order therefore to place such princes as were supposed to entertain unfavour-

* This treatise is written in very elegant Latin, with uncommon spirit and freedom of sentiment, and contains eleven pages in folio. It concludes with these remarkable words to Louis XIII. *Agnosce teipsum & victor eris.* The author hath another curious MS. on the same subject, entituled *Discours sur les moyens que tiennent les Espagnols pour parvenir a la monarchie de l'Europe; & que l'on peut faire pour les empêcher.* Fol, pag. 20.

able ideas of him, beyond the bare possibility of obstructing his future designs, published the *ever-memorable edict*; which, joined to the insolence, outrages, and depredations, of Walstein's army, that lived every where at discretion, and made but small difference between friends and foes, alarmed even the catholic powers, as well as the evangelical: for the former began to perceive that the plan formed by the house of Austria was too exorbitant, and likewise too tyrannical: for Walstein is said to have drawn 300,000*l.* sterling from the electorate of Brandenburg only*. Nor did George William himself (the then reigning prince) greatly relish the *edict of restitution*, inasmuch as it portended no less than an annihilation of the bishoprics of Brandenburg, Havelburg, and Lebus †.

In support of this remark, it may be worth observing, that the elector of Bavaria himself was not void of suspicions and jealousies; (who indeed principally on his own account) had thought fit, by one and the same stroke, to preserve the emperor, and secure to himself that delicious morsel the Higher Palatinate. Here he wished secretly to stop; but as such a check appeared to be rather too bold and abrupt, he contented himself with clogging the wheels of the Austrian machine, by projecting, at a distance, the disgrace and ruin of Walstein, and paving the way remotely to an under-hand intercourse between the courts of Munich and Versailles. And as he was the most refined and mysterious politician of any prince in those days, he made one attempt which appeared not to be much, and yet proved a great deal; for, under the shew of prudence, œconomy, and not giving any undue umbrage to the protestants, he induced the court of Vienna to engage itself in an enterprize, much more prejudicial to her project of absolute power, than the removal of Walstein could be; and that was, to march 30,000 men into Italy, in order to take possession of Mantua and Casal in the Imperial name, as also to *disband a veteran corps of protestants*, who fought under the Austrian banners (for this prince, with all his policy, was a determined bigot:) and lastly, to pare away something from the immense number of the catholic forces; since a smaller quantity of soldiers was sufficient in all probability to give laws to the empire at that conjuncture; which we will acknowledge to be true, if such a prince as Gustavus had not happened to live at the same time; but whether Maximilian privately wished for *his* interference, or whether he over-looked him or despised him (as a

* *Memoirs of the house of Brandenburg.*

† *Ibid.*

person so very remote from the Germanic system) is more than I can take upon me at this distance to determine. Either way it is certain that the Imperial forces and those of the league, (which made up 125,000 men in all) were reduced (garrisons excepted) to about 70,000 soldiers: a quantity of troops sufficient to have enslaved the empire at that time, if unforeseen accidents had not happened to interpose.

On the other hand, the neighbouring princes and states took umbrage at the immense and ambitious projects of the house of Austria; and after various reflections, in consequence of the ill success that had attended his Danish majesty's irruption into Germany, found no person upon whom they could fix their hopes but Gustavus: and him they were obliged to extricate from that disagreeable war which engaged him in Poland; for the fate of Europe seemed to depend upon this one political negotiation: and as all parties, without consulting each other, were convinced his Swedish majesty alone could perform the task, England, Holland, and France, alike interested themselves in proposing an accommodation. The last more particularly, as she was nearest in situation to the emperor, and most a rival to him in power: and the rather as Richelieu, who then sat at the helm, and directed the whole political machine, had adopted the system which *Henry IV.* formerly favoured, namely the depressing and humbling the house of Austria. A system France, since that period, hath contrived to execute successfully more times than one!

The Swedish and Austrian parties at this critical conjuncture both sought the assistance of the king of Denmark: but that politic and wary prince, long exercised in misfortunes and disappointments, expressed a desire to continue neutral; for in truth the emperor had terrified him on the one hand, and he had conceived a jealousy of so powerful and enterprising a neighbour as Gustavus on the other hand.

And here it may be asked by some persons, how far, and in what respects, the *thirty years war* may be considered as a war of religion? As Gustavus was a prince who had a vital and sincere affection for the preservation of the evangelical doctrine, it is not to be doubted but that these ideas made some impression on his mind; but upon the whole I think it is certain, that he would have opposed the insolence and arbitrary views of the house of Austria, even if she had made profession of the protestant belief: so that I have been prompted sometimes to think, that religion had less to do upon the present occasion than is commonly imagined, and

• that

that it was only a sort of half-pretext: as the electress Palatin, Louisa Juliana (no considerable states-woman), used always to assert.

Nor must I here omit, that the people of the cabinet constantly kept pace with the men of the sword: for previously to the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles, the protestants had violent suspicions that the Imperial court, then supposed to be under the influence of the jesuits, had a mind to violate the grand *pacifitorium* of Passau, and erect itself by degrees into an universal monarchy. With a view to recriminate upon this head, the elector of Bavaria, after the battle of Prague, ordered his *jus-publicists* to set forth an impression of the *Anhaltine Cancellaria*: (a collection of state-papers found amongst the plunder of the prince of Anhalt's baggage, which were alledged to contain no less designs, than to extend protestantism from the Baltic to the Mediterranean*:) to which a counsellor of the elector Palatin made a reply; and one Keller, a jesuit, under the name of Fabius Hercymannus, printed a sort of rejoinder in behalf of the catholic side. Various controversies ensued afterwards: at length Camerarius, prime-minister to the said elector (or next at least in consequence to the chancellor Grun), thought it high-time to enter the lists, and give the public, by way of counterpoise, a *Cancellaria Hispanica*. Ruzdorf afterwards bestowed the high finishing touches to what his master and preceptor in politics had left unfinished; and that not only in his *Vindiciæ Causæ Palatinæ*, but in his *Cancellaria Bavarica*; a work I have spoken of elsewhere with much approbation. And whilst I have the former part of that performance in my eye, I cannot help observing, that the translation of electorates hath been three times unprosperous to the Imperial house of Austria. Once in the person of Charles V. who found no enemy more inveterate against him than the duke of Sax-Maurice, whom he had invested with the honour of the electoral bonnet. Once again in Ferdinand II. who having disoblged Walstein by transferring the Palatin dignity, and displaced him from his supreme command as general, in order to pay court to Maxmilian of Bavaria, opened thereby an entrance to the sword of Gustavus;—and a third time in a later instance, which bears no connexion to my present history.

* Amongst these papers was found the prince's military journal in his own hand-writing, concerning which we shall speak more fully in another place.

These preliminary foundations of the state being thus adjusted, it may suffice to observe, that the protestant princes of Germany, in a manner indistinct and concealed, and with a sort of air, something betwixt distress and reserve (for their terrors of the house of Austria were inexpressible), had besought Gustavus to make some advances in their behalf; insinuating that Ferdinand in general aimed at an absolute sovereignty over the empire, and intended to render the whole Germanic body hereditary in his own family. It was suggested likewise, that his troops occupied every territory, and committed depredations and outrages unheard of; an Imperial garrison being lodged in almost every town of common importance: that religious and military persecution advanced by equal steps; and that princes, free cities, bishoprics, and ecclesiastical communities of all sorts among the protestants, were obliged, by the edict of restitution, to surrender all church-possessions; which said edict then subsisted, and was executed with the utmost severity. It was added farther, that his Imperial majesty had divested the dukes of Mecklenberg of their dominions (who by the way were nearly related to Gustavus) merely for presuming to take part with Christian king of Denmark; and conferred their territories on Walsstein by his own authority: and lastly, that he (the emperor), to encrease the number of the catholic votes, had annihilated *that* of Frederic elector Palatin, and created it anew in the person of Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, which made an alteration of two electoral voices in favour of the Romish religion. — It was then thrown out obliquely and at random, that both Saxony and Brandenburg had interceded with the emperor in behalf of Frederic their colleague, and declined long to acknowledge Maximilian in his new electoral capacity, inasmuch as he was chosen contrary to the orders of the golden bull (for no elector can be proscribed or deposed without the unanimous consent of the diet in body assembled;) but that the court of Vienna had paid no regard to these legal impediments.

Any person would naturally imagine, that a series of representations like these, voluntarily produced almost a twelvemonth before Gustavus entered Germany, would have prevailed on a prince, more diffident than Gustavus, to have undertaken the enterprize, in hopes of a free and generous assistance from the protestant part of the empire: but great was his majesty's uneasiness, and still greater his disappointment, when he received no encouraging answers from the electors and other German princes for many months after he had

had written to them †. The substance of what he writ contained, as follows. A clear induction of the injuries and motives which had incited him to make an invasion into the empire : after which he besought each elector to use all his interest, and exert the whole of his address, to prevail on the emperor to restore things to their antient situation ; adding, that any peace, except a *weak* and *inglorious* one, was preferable to a war supposed to be just in many respects. But if his Imperial majesty persisted to refuse him and his friends reasonable concessions and honourable conditions, he considered himself as absolved from all transgression before God and man, and was determined, for the sake of Europe in general, to support his own reputation and the cause of liberty and religion to the last moments of his life.”

It likewise raised his indignation, to discover that the terrors of the house of Austria had so far possessed his protestant well-wishers, that they durst not make use even of explicit terms, and had been so meanly timorous as to omit the regal titles in their addresses to him : for the emperor had taught them to understand, that Sigismund alone was king of Sweden. Nor was he much less chagrined at his Danish majesty's conduct, who had not interfered one half so much as was expected, contenting himself, after many remonstrances made, to have procured a mock congress at Dantzic, where the Imperial ministers rejected all accommodations in very peremptory language*.

Yet Gustavus was not to be dismayed ; and, never once losing sight of his object, pushed on according to his first plan ; being well-convinced in his own private judgment, that these princes must join him, when he once came to make a distinguished figure in Germany ; and that the king of Denmark would be obliged at least to keep a neutrality. Nay he was more exasperated when he reflected, that the house of Austria was determined to fix her footing on the other side of the Alps ; and was vexed to observe how ill the generals of the kings of Denmark and Bohemia had acted, and how languidly their Britannic majesties had exerted themselves in support of the unfortunate prince last mentioned.

The king took some time (notwithstanding he was thoroughly provoked) to return his answer to the German princes ; “ and reproved them with an air of dignity for

* See also the electors and Gustavus's letters in the APPENDIX, Art. X. XI. first edit. 4^o.

† *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. i, p 100.

“ the omission of his royal titles : titles, said he, which I
 “ have received from God and my ancestors, and having main-
 “ tained them with reputation for twenty years, will never re-
 “ linquish, even in the last moments of my life. He continued
 “ then to inform them, that he had once an intention to
 “ have sealed their letters, and returned them back, but
 “ that he perused them at length, and preserved them in his
 “ possession, in hopes he might confront them with others
 “ written in a quite different stile. He then commended
 “ them for approving his earnest desires to bring about a
 “ peace, and gently reprimanded them for not discovering
 “ their good wishes on that head ; insinuating, at the same
 “ time, that they must not be uneasy, if he sought elsewhere
 “ for such remedies as tended to preserve his own reputation,
 “ and maintain his allies and friends in a state of security.—
 “ But that he had no disinclination to form friendships with
 “ his Germanic neighbours, provided satisfaction was made
 “ him for the extraordinary freedom lately taken : and lastly,
 “ that the affairs of Germany and the evangelical religion
 “ concerned them much more than they referred to him-
 “ self.”

Nevertheless, it will appear a matter of astonishment to
 posterity, that Gustavus should invade the empire ; no ways
 certain of the assistance of the protestant princes, and not
 certain that France would co-operate with him. To the first
 point I have spoken already, that he expected *their* aid from
 a principle of convenience ; and from the latter difficulty I
 hope likewise to extricate myself. For people who have a
 moderate knowledge of the subject of the history they under-
 take, and the characters of the persons concerned in it, may
 arrive at truth sometimes by probability of circumstances and
 characters. It may be remembered, therefore, that the nego-
 tiation between Gustavus and the French ambassador broke
 off abruptly ; and if we follow the general track of histo-
 rians, we shall find no reconciliation of opinions till the
 conclusion of the treaty at Berewalt, in the month of
 January the year ensuing : yet still one cannot help thinking,
 that a prudent and politic prince, like Gustavus, would never
 have entered the empire till he had brought France to some
 terms, and for this reason, we observed casually in the proper
 place, that the Sieur Nicholäi was dispatched to Paris to ne-
 gotiate something more reasonable and more practicable than
 what De Charnacé had proposed ; and though nothing might
 be signed in the due form of treaty, yet it is manifest the
 substance and specification of articles were agreed upon un-
 der

der parole of honour. And though Puffendorf*, who writes professedly of the alliance between France and Sweden at this period, maintains a profound silence on the occasion, yet a Swedish historian † luckily steps in to our assistance, and says, that an agreement was made between the kings of the two respective nations; (it might probably be verbal only, upon the common principles of political good faith) whereby it was stipulated, that the former power, for six years, should allow the latter annually, either 66,000 l. or 82,500 l.; for the author pretends not to mark out distinctly the precise sum. France's intention however was to maintain and carry on a sufficient war in the German empire. And about this period Sir Thomas Roe, in a letter to lord viscount Dorchester, regrets that a contribution of money was not given to the king of Sweden, with a view to facilitate an invasion of Germany, “ inasmuch as De Charnacé, “ the French ambassador, had made some offers to that purpose ‡. And in another || to Sir Dudley Carlton, nephew “ to lord Dorchester, and resident in Holland, observes “ more minutely, that De Charnacé had offered Gustavus “ 50,000 l. annual contribution, attended with a com- “ mission to add 17,400 l. more; and that Mr. Meldrum, a “ Scots gentleman, was gone express to the king of Eng- “ land, to carry the propositions of a treaty.”

What confirms me in my opinion, that the king of Sweden would never have ventured on a German invasion without establishing a good correspondence with France, is this, that before he entered on this great work, he omitted not to communicate his motives and reasons to most of the protestant princes and states in Europe, hoping thereby to obtain their assistance, or at least found their inclinations. For these reasons he dispatched Sadler (some time after the writing of certain letters above-mentioned) to several German princes, and then to the Swiss cantons; commissioning him in this latter respect to open the whole scheme, frankly and without reserve; and paint in proper colours, “ The justice “ of the undertaking on the one hand, and the necessity of “ counterbalancing the immeasurable greatness of a certain “ power on the other. That the Helvetic leaguers in particular ought to have for their object the restoration of “ German liberty, since the house of Austria had dormant “ claims to produce against them, which she would be ready

* *Traité des Alliances, &c.* 120 & 80, 1709. † *Laccenius*, p. 565, 79.

‡ *MS. letter of Sir Thomas Roe*, dated Feb. 26, 1629-30.

|| *Second letter*, May 17, 1630.

“ to justify at the point of her sword, when other countries
 “ had been sufficiently chastised.—That attempts against
 “ mankind in general were to be repulsed by the united
 “ efforts of all.—And that his majesty hoped to behold with
 “ extreme satisfaction the revival of the antient Helvetic
 “ spirit †.”

But Sadler not being able to discover any thing to his advantage (for a dread of the house of Austria had possessed all men), judged it proper, like a prudent minister, to make his private attempt here and there, and suppressed his very ample commission directed to the general assembly of the states. Nevertheless Gustavus, indefatigable and undismayed in all his solicitations, resolved to make a second attack upon the Swiss before he entered Germany; and dispatched the chevalier Rache, privy-counsellor and counsellor of state, with orders to apply once more to the body of the league in general, and to some protestant cantons in particular. But this minister had so many political digressions to make in the course of his journey, that he arrived not at Baden (where the thirteen cantons and their several allies were assembled) till towards the end of the year 1631, of which we shall speak more at large in its proper place.

Notwithstanding these discouragements, Gustavus determined to maintain his point, having obtained the full consent of all the states of the kingdom, convened at a final assembly at Stockholm. He there declared his wife regent of the kingdom, and his daughter Christina lawful heiress of the crown; conformably to a preceding act of state made soon after her birth, with a view to mortify the king of Poland, and cut off his pretensions. It is true some few senators obliquely suggested, that a prince so passionately beloved and honoured by his subjects, would do best to continue in his own kingdom, and commit the war to able and experienced generals; in which they shewed themselves no very profound politicians, by judging so ill of their master's disposition and temper; who confuted them without hesitation, in a speech equally animated and well-reasoned, exhorting them to bear in mind the bravery and constancy of their ancestors, and returning them his best thanks for their services, concluded with a tender and affectionate farewell. He then stepped aside a moment, and bringing in his daughter by the

† *Mercurie Suisse*, p. 9. This excellent book was published anonymously in 1634. Its author was *Frederic Spanheim*, who writ *Le Soldat Suedois*, and the *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*.

hand, presented her to the house in dumb shew, which drew many tears even from northern eyes.

After that he delivered a manuscript treatise, of his own and the chancellor's composing, to the states of the kingdom, containing directions in all supposable matters of difficulty, in case the throne should become vacant; and joined to them by way of president (particularly in regard to the finances and the administration of justice) his kinsman prince John Casimir, count palatin of the Rhine, father to Charles Gustavus, who afterwards ascended the Swedish throne.

This body of laws, sixty-five in number*, was sealed up and repositèd afterwards in the public chancery. I have a beautiful MS. of it in my possession, which appears to have been copied immediately after the ratification of the senate, June 29, 1634. This great work of Gustavus and Oxenstiern may be considered as the reduction of contingencies to one uniform system. Nor is it possible to place their political characters in a more advantageous light. The packet, as I apprehend, received the following inscription on the outside, from the hand of the chancellor: REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO—QUAM REX INVICTISSIMUS GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS ET MAGNUS ULTIMAE VOLUNTATIS INSTAR REGNO POPULISQUE SUIIS STATIONE HAC MORTALI FUNCTUS EXHIBENDAM VOLUIT.

As Gustavus had received so many insults and injuries from the emperor, he dispensed with himself from declaring war in form; for he considered Arnheim's march into Poland as an express declaration on the Imperial side †. Nevertheless the invasion of Germany must not be considered as an action so very hasty and abrupt; for Gustavus had given more than glimmerings of an hostile disposition against the house of Austria, by sending Sir Alexander Lesly to Stralsund the preceding year, and in the month of April of this present year, had ordered him, being then governor of Stralsund, accompanied by colonel Dewbatel ‡ and some other officers

* See PREF. to this 2d edition.

† This precedent may serve to shelter the English nation from the resentments of my good friend M. de Voltaire, who expresses great displeasure against our kingdom for commencing the late war, without publishing a formal declaration of hostilities: whereas the operations of the French in America, and the transactions of the Imperialists in Poland, are circumstances nearly if not strictly parallel: and the words of *Loccenius*, with respect to Gustavus, on this occasion, deserve well to be transcribed: *Casus vero indicere bellum, rex non necessarium esse potavit: quum vim sibi ab eo prius haud denuntiatis armis, illat in acerè, natura ipsa permitteret; & hoc ipso satis denunciatum bellum esse crederet.* Lib. viii. p. 367.

‡ No one trifling circumstance in the present history has puzzled me so much as finding out the real name of this warrior; for we read promiscu-

officers of less note, to embark from Stralsund, and make a lodgment in the isle of Rugen*, where they soon drove Goëtz, the Imperial commander, to the last extremity; who, after various unsuccessful skirmishes, was obliged to save himself by water to Stetin, and leave the whole island to the discretion of the Swedes.

Gustavus had a much finer army at this time than the world could well imagine. He had trained up a set of young generals (for few, except Oxenstiern, were elder than himself) who were all selected and chosen geniuses: each eminent for one or more distinguishing qualities: nor were his common soldiers novices, as some people surmized, since the very Swedish forces had been seasoned by a succession of severe campaigns. But the major part of his troops were men of great experience, for he had gleaned up, at various times, all that was good in the dispersed armies of Mansfelt, duke Christian, the kings of Denmark and Poland, and the troops that belonged to the town of Dantzic. He had likewise 10,000 English and Scottish soldiers, who had most of them served in the German wars; a set of men he principally confided in, conferring on them the reputation of being always useful to him in time of need †. He had like-

ously in all historians of *Deubattle, Tupadel, Tubal, Dubalt, Du-wall, &c.* [As to Haubald, he was certainly another person.] Yet after all this, his true name was not *Deubatel*, (though I call him so, in order to correspond with other authors) but *Mac-Doughall*; being descended from a Scottish father in the Swedish service and a woman of Lifeland. The king loved him extremely from the time he knew him in the capacity of a common soldier, making him colonel of his own guards on the death of Teuffel and governor of Ruffelheim. Being taken prisoner near Nuremberg, the Imperial general Walstein dismissed him without ransom, and entrusted him to negotiate an accommodation with Gustavus. Acquitting himself well in various commands of importance, he was at length betrayed by Arnheim in Bohemia, but Walstein released him generously, and defrayed his ransom a second time. He then rose to be serjeant major general under the duke de Weymar; but, forgetting the obligations he had to his deceased master, deserted the cause of Sweden at a period his assistances were chiefly wanted; becoming a fatal, but we hope an uncommon proof, that the brave man, and the man of honour, are not always united in the same person.

* This island belonged to the duke of Pomerania. It is twenty miles square, and lies about two miles from Stralsund. It was *infefted*, saith an historian, rather than *guarded* by the Imperial troops; for Gustavus afterwards told the emperor by letter, who had accused him sharply of invading Germany, that he did not *conquer* the isle of Rugen, but only *took possession* of it. This island was confirmed to the Swedes at the peace of Westphalia as a distinct principality. The allies conquered it with great difficulty in the year 1715. But by the peace of the North 1720, it was restored to Sweden, very much shattered, and in extreme ill-plight.

† In the grand campaign of 1632, Gustavus had six British generals, thirty colonels, and fifty-one lieutenant-colonels. See *Monro's List*.

• wise,

wife, to a certain degree, the power of picking and collecting from the armies of Wallstein and Tilly; for many of the Augustan confession chose to serve under them rather than starve, and a good number had left their party upon having received some injuries, either real or imaginary.

No troops were ever better calculated for service than the Swedish part of his army, being naturally brave and hardy, patient of fatigues, frugal, industrious, obedient, sober, and verifying the remark made by Vegetius, *Septentrionales populi largo sanguine redundantes, sunt ad bella promptissimi*; and another by Lucan,

*Omnis in Arctois populus quicumque pruinis
Nascitur, indomitus bellis & Martis amator.* Lib. vii:

And Tacitus applies this high idea of the strength and bravery of northern nations to the country of Sweden particularly, as a territory *quod valebat viris & armis*.

The whole dominions of this kingdom, at the time Gustavus possessed the throne, measured, according to some writers, about 1500 miles in length by 1000 miles in width: an immense tract of country, but not so well-inhabited, as there are reasons to conjecture it had been in the times of the antient Goths, of whose populousness many manifest traces yet remain, even in the woods and forests, and of which more convincing proofs may still be produced by the four incredible emigrations made from thence into other countries. But an author who published an account in the year 1633, relative to the king's invasion of Germany †, tells us, that this kingdom, excepting only some remoter provinces, was comprized under the old denomination of *Scandinavia*, which vast peninsula, if one may be allowed to call it so, was supposed by Pliny to be a tract of land *incompartæ magnitudinis*; is at present imagined to measure lengthways about 1200 miles, and 540 miles in breadth. And here it must be noted, that under the name of *Scandinavia*, are comprehended the kingdom of Sweden, properly so called, and those of Gothland and Norway, excluding the part that belongs to Denmark. To which may be added Bearmia, Scirfinia, Lapland, Bothnia, Finland, Carelia, great part of Livonia, the town of Stralsund, and the island of Rugen. Thus stood the possessions of the crown, when the king of Sweden made his first appearance in Pomerania; and yet perhaps all these vast tracts of territory did not contain

† *Discours de l'Etat & Couronne de Suede, 80, 1633.*

many more inhabitants than the kingdom of England singly*.

Nature seems to have formed the Swedes expressly for war; for they are brave, sober, patient, compliable, well-principled, and industrious; every common soldier being at the same time a peasant, a pioneer, and a mechanic. Gustavus had likewise more resources than could well be imagined, having a fleet, which contained above seventy ships of notable force, and being capable at a fortnight's notice to produce 40,000 chosen infantry, and a good body of cavalry, wherever he pleased; and, what was more, he taught them all to follow their leader implicitly. It is true, the horses of the country in general were small, but active and vigorous. Nevertheless, his majesty, who was one of the tallest and most graceful personages in the whole army, could hardly be carried by one of them, when he was completely clothed in armour.

Matters being now advanced to a crisis, Gustavus determined to make good his intentions; and so far the rather, as the situation of his dominions removed him at such a distance from the house of Austria, that he had no reasons to fear many military reprisals from that quarter: for the Baltic ocean was spread between him and the emperor's generals,

* The kingdom of Gothland, saith the author last cited, which occupies the southermost part of the peninsula of Scandinavia, is about 450 miles long, and 300 broad. It is divided into three parts, Estergothia, Westergothia, and Gothia *meridionalis* or Smaland: the first contains the provinces of Teuschia, Bravichia, and Kindia: the second, Dalecarnia, Vermonia, Marchia, Falonia, V. bogia, Ridvegia, Frochinia, Gudhumia, Cachinnia and Warthopia; and the third, Verendia, Motingia, and the diocese of Nexo. As for the island of Gothland, it belonged to Denmark.

The kingdom of Sweden, stretching itself from South to North, extends 900 miles from the river Motala to the confines of Bearmia, and contains eleven duchies, namely, Sudermania, Roden, Gestritia, Halsingia, Midelpadia, Angermania, Coperdalia, Westermania, Upland, Fiermgia, and Neritia.

Swedish Norway is the westernmost part of Scandinavia, divided from Sweden and Gothland by one continued chain of mountains, in most places inaccessible.

The province of Bearmia is the very northernmost part of Sweden.

Scyfnia lies betwixt Bearmia and Finomarchia, but advances something more to the southward.

Of *Lapland* we shall say nothing, as Scheffer's history hath rendered it known to most readers: and *Bothnia* is a large province, which occupies the northern part of that large body of water, which the Baltic ocean disembogues into the center of Scandinavia, commonly called the gulph of Bothnia.

Finland is a very considerable province plentifully peopled; Carelia is large, but not so populous; Livonia, Stralsund and the isles of Rugen are better known. *Discours de l'Etat et Couronne de Suede*, p. 5—59. anno 1633.

• and

and as to naval strength he was greatly superior to his adversary.

He therefore published his grand manifesto once for all * ; and caused it to be printed in Latin and German, in order to disperse it more advantageously throughout the empire : but though it was a very sensible and well reasoned performance, I shall not trouble the reader with a long declaration of all the causes, which induced our hero to carry this invasion into Germany ; as many of the material ones have been already treated on in the course of our history. Nevertheless, there is something very solid, and at the same time not unartful in the beginning of it, where he insinuates, “ That whoever lives near a powerful and ambitious monarch, can enjoy peace no longer, and in no greater quantity, than that monarch thinks proper to allow him.”

The substance of it was to this effect : “ That his Swedish majesty had sincere intentions for the preservation of the evangelical doctrine :—that in the year 1625, his letters from Poland to Gabriel Bethlem † had been interceded
“ by

* The original performance being long and circumstantial, we have thought fit to abridge it carefully in the present and ensuing pages.

† Such was that prince's true name, and not *Bethlem Gabor*, as the English historians affect to call him. For the Transylvanians place the surname after the Christian ; and *Gabor* signifies Gabriel. If ever an unaccountable man deserved a note, it may be bestowed on this potentate, and the rather as he had many transactions with Great Britain. From a simple gentleman he mounted to the government of Transylvania, and from an insignificant portion of ground in the European system, negotiated at once with all the protestant princes and states, half the popish ones, and the Grand Signior into the bargain ; ambitious, artful, reserved, and treacherous, who served all, sold all, and betrayed all reciprocally. Formed in the court of Gabriel Bardiſori, he passed his life in arms from the seventeenth year of his age, and lived for some time at Constantinople. He had been present in forty-two battles ; and often declared, that his circumstances were so mean, even when he was thirty years old, that a merchant of Cassovia refused to lend him eighteen pounds for want of security. He was affable, polite, intriguing, but capricious and mutable beyond imagination : talked Latin with tolerable fluency, and loved the society of men of letters. His memory was astonishing, and nothing delighted him more than to reason about the reformed religion, which he professed. He took great delight in fine cloaths and jewels, copying the Hungarian fashion in the flowing length of his robes, and the short cut of his hair ; but modelling his beard according to the French mode. His first wife, Carola, though well descended, proved the best economist then in Europe, for she was his head-cook, and kept the key of his Tokay ; inasmuch as he had negotiated himself with the house of Austria into the possession of that vintage. On Carola's decease, he married in his advanced age a young beautiful princess, sister to the wife of Gustavus.

“ by the emperor’s means; that the matter of them had
 “ been shamefully misinterpreted, the contents falsely pub-
 “ lished, and the courier treated like a common criminal:—
 “ that the emperor had privately fomented the differences be-
 “ tween him and Sigismond, and besides supplied his adver-
 “ saries with great quantities of corn, and dispatched tw
 “ armies with orders to act publicly against him in Poland;
 “ one conducted by Adolphus duke of Holstein, in the year
 “ 1627, and the other commanded by Arnheim in 1629,
 “ denying him at the same time the common favour of en-
 “ listing men in the empire:— that he had dispossessed his
 “ kinsmen, Adolphus Frederic, and John Albert, dukes or
 “ Mechlenberg, of their territories, without citation or
 “ trial, and bestowed them on Walftein through meer
 “ caprice; and without being supported by any concurrence
 “ of the Imperial diet:— that he possessed several havens on
 “ the Baltic coasts, and assumed a sovereignty over that sea,
 “ to which Sweden had a just claim from time immemorial,
 “ interrupting all commerce betwixt the subjects of that
 “ kingdom, and the inhabitants of Colberg, Gripswald,
 “ Rostock, Wismar, and several other Hanseatic and Van-
 “ dalic towns, now enslaved by the Imperialists:— that he
 “ had confiscated the merchandizes of Swedish traders; at-

to whom he assigned three signiories on his decease (in one of which grew the vineyard we have mentioned) as likewise 100,000 ducats, as many rix-dollars, and as many florins; which made in all about 77000 pounds sterling. He died in the fifty-ninth year of his age, having passed the whole time of his existence in one continued storm of his own creating. Nature, to make his distempers correspondent with his life, united a sort of contradiction in them; for he died of a dropfy and St. Anthony’s fire. [*Continuat. Laurea Aust.* p. 17.] And to maintain his inconstancy and capriciousness to the last, he bequeathed a fine horse, and 20,000 pounds in specie to his old enemy the emperor; the same sum to Ferdinand king of Hungary, and the Grand Signior; recommending however his young wife and country to his Imperial majesty. *Ibid.*

He was ceremonious and jealous of his honour to the highest degree; for having dispatched an ambassador to the court of London, he gave him orders to make his appearance before the king without uncovering his head during the course of the audience; which punctilio created some confusion in the British palace.

In a word, his restless and turbulent spirit never allowed him to be idle a single year: for he was one of those princely tormentors of mankind, who love to poach in disturbed waters; no power of treaty-language could bind him; nor could even money secure him; since he either changed for the sake of changing, or flattered himself that he could always make a better bargain. I have seen letters from him to the cham of Tartary, where the rodomon-yade is a sort of comedy. The reader may find one of an extraordinary cast in the *Laurea Austriaca*, fol. p. 336. See also, *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri*, 4^o. cum fig. Roma, 1646. p. 360, &c.

“ tempted

“ tempted to throw all commerce into the hands of the Spaniards; and, when that attempt failed, had hired Polish and Dantzic ships, and made the Baltic a seat of piracy:—that the island of Rugen, which the Austrian troops had lately invaded, had voluntarily taken refuge under his protection, as had also Stralsund: in succouring which he had done no more than his Danish majesty had shewn him an example:— that he (the emperor) had rejected Salvius the Swedish ambassador at the treaty of Lubec, when a peace was negotiating between him and Christian king of Denmark:— and to conclude, had cast several neglects and affronts upon him at the general assemblies of the empire, and declared him, in so many words, a professed enemy to the Germanic system.”

As kings, whenever they have the condescension to oblige the public by their writings, are the fittest critics to review the conduct of kings, it may be worth while just to remark here, that a supposed r—— historian treats this manifesto as a complete piece of monarchical sophistry. For my own part, I acknowledge myself at a loss to penetrate into the reasons, which induced so clear-sighted a writer, to make this remark: nevertheless, it may not misbecome a person like me to imitate the humility of an antient rhetorician, who did not chuse to engage in a dispute against the *master of twenty legions*.

At the time Gustavus prepared to embark, all men's eyes were turned upon prodigies. Chemnitius*, an historian of the very best credit, mentions some. Armies were beheld in the air in various parts, and the very clashing of armour was supposed to be heard at Nuremberg. Three suns were seen at Ratisbon, and a soldier of Tilly's sweated blood very profusely, having no actual distemper, but complaining of a certain weight upon his spirits. And at Magdeburg (as some tell us) the seat afterwards of the most tragical scene in the whole thirty years war, a child was reputed to be born

* *De Bello Sueco-Germ. Lib. i. in fine.* The first volume of this work, originally set forth in German, was translated into Latin, as is supposed by the author, and published in folio the same year, 1548, containing 386 pages.

The second volume, which takes place after our period, was composed not only upon Oxenstiern's memoirs, but hath been imagined by some to have been committed to writing in the present form it stands by the minister himself, who gave Chemnitius [Bogislaus von Chemnitz] the honour of being its father. As far as I know, it hath not been translated, and was published at Stockholm 1653, making 1046 folio pages. The rest of the work is in the archives of Stockholm.

with boots and spurs of flesh, in dragoon fashion, and an helmet of the same materials, with two balls in a pouch of skin on the left-thigh. And all these circumstances, with numbers more, are related by historians, who, I believe, in other respects, would not have published a known untruth upon any considerations: but different ages have their periodical distempers of believing *too much*, or believing *too little*.

And here one cannot but regret, that some few days after his majesty set sail for the empire, the intrepid and sensible politician Sir Thomas Roe, found himself obliged to return for London*; the absence of which statesman is greatly to be lamented by all admirers of national glory; for England behaved afterwards with no great reputation in respect to Germany.

His majesty left Stockholm at the head of 130 ships of different sizes, and, if some accounts which I have seen be true, divided the care of conducting the five several squadrons (for of so many his fleet consisted) between the land-commanders and sea officers, reserving to himself the honour of being admiral supreme, and appointing lieutenant-general Banier (the person next to him in authority) to take the command of the third division. This enterprize of crossing the ocean carried with it from beginning to the end a very disagreeable and unpromising aspect; for it was five weeks before Gustavus reached the shore of the isle of Usedom, being confined to one port for a whole month.

On the king's right-hand (for the fleet was drawn up in a sort of battle-array) sailed high-admiral Gildenheim, who was natural son to Gustavus's father; and on Banier's left sailed the watchmaster-general of the navy; a small body of ships by way of reserve being conducted at some distance behind them by the vice-admiral.

His majesty had the foresight or good-fortune to reach Pennemond harbour in the isle of Usedom; just at the approach of evening, and was a little surprized to see the whole country all in a flame at one instant. Nevertheless, he ordered his infantry to debark in large flat-bottomed boats prepared for the purpose, assigning 200 men to each vessel, and two small field-pieces. It is to be remarked, that he piqued himself upon being the first person to set his foot on German ground, and taking a pick-ax in his hands immediately began to open a trench, ordering half the men to labour, and half to stand to their arms by turns. In this

* By his own papers it was June 1, or 2, 1650.

debarcation he made choice of the properest place in the whole island, it being a spot where the Danish troops in the late war had thrown up an imperfect redoubt in the year 1628; and as this first step was of a very hazardous and critical nature, his majesty exerted so much industry and dexterity on the occasion, that he conveyed eleven regiments to shore, and took care to see them entrenched before break of day, near a small village, from whence the harbour took its name.

A second, but smaller division of troops he conveyed to Stralsund, and dismissing the fleet, commanded all the sea-officers to return to Stockholm for new supplies of provision and forage, being determined to oppress the inhabitants of the empire as little as possible.

There was *one* thing very particular in regard to the times, when Gustavus first set his foot in Germany, for it happened precisely that very day, upon which, just a century before, the confession of Augsberg had been presented to the emperor Charles V. Immediately on landing, after having given some short necessary orders to the generals that served under him, he retired a few paces from them and his men, and falling down on his knees offered up a prayer to the Supreme Being*; and then turning round to his officers, some of whom seemed surprized at so uncommon an example of piety, told them with an alert and chearful air, *That a good Christian would not make a bad soldier. The man, continued he, that hath finished his prayers, hath completed one half of his daily work* †. It was not indeed the king's first intention to land his army in the island of Usedom: he knew Rugen to be a larger and more fruitful district, and purposed to make it his magazine of provisions, and his sure asylum in case of a defeat. But Lesly made himself master of it beyond expectation, and joined his master with a part of the Stralsund cavalry, with his own and half Hall's regiment of infantry, and four troops of Dewbatel's horse ‡.

* It is preserved in the *Historical or Authentic Relat.* tom. i. p. 166.

† *Arlanibæi Arma Sueci* 2, p. 19. Swed. Military discipline, 31.

At a country-seat in the middle of Sweden, which belonged formerly to the noble family of De la Gardie, but is now conferred on count de Tessin for life, is a hall adorned with historical paintings, portraits, and emblems, all relating to the actions of Gustavus Adolphus. In one little compartment the present story is set forth, and the heads of the generals, who stand round, are all supposed to be painted from nature. In larger compartments are to be seen Gustavus on horseback, and the principal actions of his campaigns, comprehending likewise the scene of his death. The generals heads are in lesser squares, and at bottom are emblematical designs relative to the character of each officer. *Memoirs communicated.*

‡ *Ckennitii Bellum Sacco-German.* tom. i. p. 44.

As this voyage had been protracted at least a month beyond the king's expectations, he frankly told his men, *That as they were veteran soldiers, and had experienced hunger with him as well as plenty, he besought them to continue their patience for a short space, and he would soon feed them well at the expence of their enemies.* After which generous proof of affection and sympathy, not a single murmur was heard throughout the army; nor did the meanest soldier conceive a notion of plundering the inhabitants even for subsistence; well knowing, that he served a master, who, though he compassionated the hardships his troops might suffer, yet never could be induced to dispense with any violations of natural justice and military discipline. It was upon this very occasion that Gustavus likewise told his men, *That they must not be alarmed at the Imperialists, and consider them in the light of new antagonists, since they had fought with soldiers of the same stamp in Poland and Prussia; and that the sample and the piece were of one colour and one contexture* *.

And here it may be worth while for a moment to take a short survey of Gustavus's marine; and the rather, as historians, like commentators, usually pass by these more curious researches and enquiries. This prince in general neglected nothing; and amongst other things kept an attentive eye to the sea as well as the land: for at the very period we are now considering, he was master of fifty fighting ships, from 20 guns to 40, and 6000 regular sailors, chiefly Finlanders, Angermans, Dalecarlians and Hollanders; which made his power with reference to the house of Austria as indisputable in the Baltic, as it proved afterwards in the empire. The quantity of royal artillery was at that time amazing, except we consider the vast resources of metal in the Swedish mines. It is supposed by many, that Gustavus was owner of 8000 pieces of ordnance †. And under this same article it may not be improper to observe, that Sweden at that time supplied the king with a certain number of land-forces; for each province maintained a considerable body of regular troops, to which the modern reader may give the name of militia, or what other denomination he thinks fit. For example, Sweden, properly so called, and Gothland, supported at the least 16000 infantry, and 5500 cavalry, who, though fed by their respective provinces, were clothed by the king; received a monthly stipend from him, and paid no duties. It is true, this military constitution or establish-

* *Cbemnitii Bellum Succo-Germ.* tom. i. p. 44.

† *Bertii Commentaria*, 4°.

ment in times of peace was extremely frugal: for though each company of infantry contained at least 500 men, yet only one captain was assigned it, and one lieutenant, who received their cloaths and food from the royal bounty. The captain had a salary of five pounds fifteen shillings a year; and the foot soldier had three shillings and sixpence per month. About one third more was allowed the cavalry: and every soldier made prisoner in war was to be exchanged, or redeemed at the king's expence. And here likewise it must be observed, that Finland, Livonia, and all the other provinces, contributed towards the general system of a perpetual army, according to their wealth and tract of country in the same proportions. Thus Sweden under Gustavus may be considered as a true military government, like that of the Romans in their better days*.

Such an original basis of national forces having been thus established by the laws of Sweden, his majesty increased his number of troops, when he pleased, *but at his own charges*; and thus much is certain, that he hired and employed more foreign troops, than the contingents of his own dominions could possibly amount to: so that we may reckon his own army, at least during the three grand campaigns in Germany, to amount to 60, or 70,000 fighting men. And yet, though the revenues of Sweden could not be great, this *wonderful man* neither borrowed money nor distressed his subjects, nor left behind him any one *considerable national debt, notwithstanding all the treasure was spent abroad*: nor does it ever appear that his army wanted pay a single month; nay, on the contrary, it was generally his custom to advance one third of pay on the first, eleventh, and twenty-first days of every month †.

There is a certain illustrious prince now in being, who copies Gustavus in one part of the circumstances above-mentioned, and that is punctuality of payment; and indeed, Gustavus was one of those genius's which shine proportionably both in the *great* and the *lesser* degrees of excellency. Alike considerable, if circumstances could be supposed equal, as common soldier, financier and provéditeur; or as an engineer, politician, and generalissimo: nor do I throw out these encomiums rhetorically and at random (the common method of adorning characters) but intersperse them occasionally as they rise from facts.

* *Bertii Commentaria*, p. 355—358, &c.
4^o. Lond. 1632.

† *Swedish Military discipline*,

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Indeed it is impossible to ascertain what the revenues of Gustavus might be at this period; nor have my Swedish friends been able to tell me. All we can learn from cotemporary writers is, that he had some royal demesnes, as well as a patrimonial possession*; that he had a sole right in particular mines, and a tenth from all; he had likewise some peculiar taxes appropriated to his own coffers, and the tythes of the kingdom, great and small, (as the ecclesiastics term them) including those of fish, cattle, and furs; which latter, from Lapland especially, made no inconsiderable object; and in times of war new demands were made from the provinces †.

As to his men, the Swedes from the days of Tacitus were remarkable from their *obsequium erga regem*. Neither Roman nor Grecian invasions could ever reach them; whereas they, on the contrary, at various times over-ran all Europe with the rapidity of an unexpected torrent. The soldiers of Gustavus were patient of cold beyond expression; nor was it uncommon for a centinel in extremity of winter to remain eight successive hours on his post without being relieved: but the king took constant care to cloath them accordingly, and allowed each man, besides his regimentals, a long warm cloak of Swedish manufacture, lined with Lapland fur. There was another unspeakable advantage in Gustavus's army; for every person was his own tradesman, his own artizan, and his own mechanic. And hence it happened, (to name only one particular instance), that when the king wanted to erect his extemporaneous bridge across the Lech, he had 2000 very tolerable carpenters amongst his soldiers. It was the same likewise when pioneers were wanted, or in matters of masonry and fortification.

As to the cavalry, the Swedish horses were small but well figured, making up in velocity and vigour what they wanted in height and bulk; it being possible for them, relieved only by a slight refreshment, to keep in action forty continued hours. Nevertheless, as the size, weight and pressure of horses are of no small consequence in the day of battle, Gustavus generally chose to mount his troops upon such as were the produce of Germany and Denmark †. But what was equal to most other advantages, his officers both respected and feared him; for he saw their faults with a single glance, and drew conclusions

* This he had bestowed on the university of Upsal. † *Bertii Commentaria*, p. 355, &c.

† *Ibid.* *Discours de l'Etat & Couronne de la Suede*, 4^o. 1632.

from them with the greatest exactness; and on the contrary, whenever they acquitted themselves well, he bestowed his honours, pecuniary rewards, and encomiums liberally. Nor have I hitherto discovered (though the case be common even in the ablest commanders) that he ever considered any one general, that acted under him, in the light of a rival; nor destroyed a single man of consequence either through jealousy, or resentment, or the just ideas he had formed of military discipline, if we except only colonel Mitzval. But though his heart was equally humane to all persons upon every occasion, yet it was very certain his *private* maxim was, to be revered by his generals * and beloved by his common soldiers: and indeed they devoted their hearts passionately to him, for no man balanced between certain death and the inclination of his master, who never made the meanest servant a sacrifice to his pride, his obstinacy, or his vanity. And perhaps one may judge of the temper of the soldiery from the slight circumstance I am now going to relate. The Livonian regiment of Denhoff had a standard of black silk damask, whereon Abraham's offering of Isaac was embroidered with this inscription:

“ *Ut Abrahamus vult immolare filium,*
“ *Pro Rege sic nos parati sumus mori.*” †

But to return to the present embarkation, his majesty contrived to bring with him ninety-two companies of foot, and sixteen cornetries of horse, (one half of which consisted of English, Scottish and German forces) which troops in those times, supposing them to be full, made about 13,800 men, whom the king in a month's time increased to 20,000, if not more: not to mention 6 or 7000 soldiers which had been conveyed to Germany some time before, in order to re-inforce the garrison of Stralsund, and take possession of the isle of Rügen. And indeed it may be considered as an uncommon instance of prudence and precaution in his majesty to dislodge the Imperialists from this island; for as it lies contiguous to

* This is corroborated from the idea which De la Gardie, his general in chief and military preceptor, had formed of him: for when that commander was invited to a conference with the Czar, the Muscovite courtiers told him, he must leave his sword in the anti chamber. “Gentlemen,” said he, “you may give countenance to such forms as you please; but the prince your master has had some obligations to his sword or mine during the campaign wherein I assisted him, by my sovereign's orders, against the Polanders: and be the disappointment of the interview ever so great, no monarch upon earth shall make De la Gardie resign his sword, except Gustavus.” *Memorab. Suec. Gent.*

† *Vide Astrucæ Anna 3. c. p. 39.*

Usedom [between Usedom and Sweden] of course his retreat, if fortune had favoured the enemy, could never have been made secure, whilst Rugen remained in any person's possession except his own. But Lesly, the Swedish commander there, took care to assure his master, about the time he drew near the German coast, that all things were brought about to his majesty's satisfaction, which determined Gustavus to advance to Usedom.

And here, in order to animate his army a little at first, the king gave his soldiers all the lawful plunder belonging to the Imperialists, and allotted a body of troops and two men of war to protect the island, being determined not only to make it his sea-port and magazine of war, but his sure retreat in case of misfortune or disappointment: and concluding it likewise highly convenient to refresh his troops, who were not a little fatigued with a tedious and disagreeable voyage, he had the goodness to allow them two days rest, and in that interim contrived to land his horses and his artillery, as also ammunition, provisions and military utensils. It was his next business to take care of the poor inhabitants; and having published a proclamation to assure them of the most perfect peace and protection, he distributed food and raiment to the hungry and naked: and thus by turns exercised the three glorious characters of an able general, a wise politician, and a good Christian; so that in the whole course of the war he injured the Imperialists as much by his clemency and generosity, as by his prudence and magnanimity.

Having taken these military and civil precautions, his majesty on the third morning made an excursion over the better half of the island, at the head of 1000 horse and 3000 *commanded** musqueteers, in which expedition he drove the Imperialists before him without difficulty; for in truth they had no inclination to engage with him.

And here it may be asked not improperly, where Walstein was at this conjuncture, the command in these parts being his proper and respective department? To which question one may readily reply, That he employed himself at the present conjuncture in other matters of more immediate importance to his own well-being, first in Bohemia, and then at Memmingen, in order to avert the disgrace that threatened

* *Commanded men*, in the language of those times, were the better half of a regiment selected from their companions, and conducted by the respective colonel; so that in this particular the troops, upon enterprizes of importance, were doubly colonelled. We shall speak more of this invention of Gustavus elsewhere.

him at the diet of Ratisbon. Tilly too, carefully declined to enter that military walk which belonged properly to Walstein, whom he feared on account of his ambition, and loved not by reason of his insolence and uncommunicative temper: for these reasons he chose to occupy himself in Franconia, and about the borders of Lower-Saxony, in giving the finishing stroke of reduction to the princes and states which had assisted the king of Denmark in the late war.

Or perhaps I may explain this passage more distinctly, by transcribing another paragraph from my original materials; where it is observed, that nothing could be better judged than the time which Gustavus seized for invading Germany. For though the house of Austria and the leaguers just before this period had a great number of veteran troops on foot, yet one part had been disbanded out of pure respect to the complaints preferred at Ratisbon; another army had been dispatched to form the siege of Mantua; Walstein lay inactive in the circle of Suabia (we mean in a foldier-like capacity) in order to watch the motions of the diet, where his ruin was intended; and Tilly bent his thoughts on reducing the only rebel to the majesty of the empire, the Landgrave of Hesse, and bringing some parts of Westphalia and Lower-Saxony into obedience; where he had grants given him of great possessions as a reward for his services: and particularly the lands belonging to that gallant youth Christian duke of Brunswic and bishop of Halberstadt.

Yet, after all this, it is still surprizing, how many *armies* his Imperial majesty and his associates had then on foot, all well seasoned troops, accustomed to victory. The forces of the league, consisting of *thirty thousand men*, acted in Westphalia and Lower-Saxony, under the command of Tilly, Pappenheim, and other generals in separate divisions. — A second body of troops *nearly equal in number* attended Aldringer, Colalto, and Gallas, in the Italian expedition, and all returned in a *few months*. — Montecuculi and Ossa, in conjunction with the archduke Leopold's forces (making in the whole a body of *ten thousand men*), gave laws to Suabia and Alsatia, extending their dominion more or less from the Valteline to the town of Strasburg. — Then their good allies the Spaniards took the lead, and dispersed *ten thousand* Walloons over the whole Lower-Palatinate and the countries adjoining. — The three ecclesiastical electors had an army of about *eight thousand men* in their own territories: and thus a boom of conquest was stretched out from the source of the Rhine to the circles of Westphalia and Lower-Saxony, or,
in

in other words, from the feet of the Alps to the shores of the Baltic, where Tilly and Pappenheim were supposed by all men to be next to invincible.

At the same time the interior parts of Germany secured themselves: for as the house of Palatin was by this time driven from its hereditary possessions, the other few protestant princes had submitted by agreement, or been dispossessed by force.

Nor was the eastern side of the empire without protection, though the elector of Saxony appeared not then disaffected to the Austrian interests, nor indeed was he; for Baltazar di Murradas commanded *eight thousand men* in Bohemia, where Wallstein likewise was all-powerful, like a sovereign ruler; and Tieffenbach and Goetz conducted another army *of the same size* in Silesia and Lusatia. — So that if any part was *weak* (and *that* we may attribute to the extraordinary sagacity and courage of the person that attacked it) it was the long extended duchy of Pomerania, and the shore of the Baltic thereto belonging: yet the duke of Pomerania was a mere shadow of power, being in effect a state-prisoner, and at best master of a few broken regiments; and as to the elector of Brandenburg, it is well known he had no more than four or six thousand soldiers, not over well paid, and but poorly disciplined; whilst Torquato di Conti, at the head of *sixteen thousand* insolent and unmerciful veterans, had reduced either country to such a state of servitude, that the inhabitants durst not trust the idea of Gustavus even to enter into their private thoughts. Yet that *great man*, expecting, but not sure of one German alliance, and relying on the consciousness of his own lenity, prudence, dexterity, and fortitude, had the astonishing resolution to cross the ocean, and fix his footsteps in a hostile empire, reposing his hopes on the narrow basis of *thirteen thousand eight hundred* soldiers (for the garrison of Stralsund must not be computed as any real assistance, except under its own walls) wherewith to confront *nine several armies*, which (supposing those troops to be divided into eight equal portions) were each equal (if we except only a few men) to the whole force of his majesty at his first landing. And to the Imperial field-troops, &c. may be added likewise the Imperial garrisons; for in those days every town in Germany being more or less fortified, required a protection. So that in truth, the king had more than one hundred strong cities and fortresses to besiege; and though the moderns may say that the strength of a fortification was in those days nothing, yet at the same time we ought to put them in mind that strength is a term relative to the arts of investing and attacking towns which then subsisted;

subsisted; nor could Gustavus have conquered the empire in twice the number of years, if he had not (by the force of his genius) managed his artillery as ably as if he had lived in the next century. And this justice Tilly allowed him at the taking of Magdeburg, for he had but one excellent engineer in all his army, and that was Farenbach, who had learnt his profession under Gustavus, and then deserted.

Mean while his majesty, no ways dismayed by numbers; and taking the advantages of Walsstein's avocations, and Tilly's jealousies, crossed the small frith which divides Usedom from the continent; it being little more than the mouth of the river Pene; and leaving serjeant-major-general Kniphausen to guard Pennemond-fort and the rest of the island; marched directly to the town of Wolgast; and cutting to pieces two hundred Croatians out of a larger number that opposed him, made himself master of a strong fort at the water's edge, sword in hand, and left Banier to maintain it: Nevertheless, during this slight attempt on the town of Wolgast (which was only to feel the enemies pulse) Torquato de Conti *, chief commander in those parts, an elder officer than Walsstein, but not so dexterous nor successful, and beneath him too in rank and authority, marching at the head of three German regiments †, made a fruitless attempt to raise the siege.

For upon all occasions this general shewed himself to be no great commander. By meer dint of extortion, it is true, he wrested from the duke of Pomerania the strong towns of Gartz and Griffenhagen, but miscarried in his attempt on Stetin, though he dispatched colonel Walsstein thither; who carried a letter of summons from his kinsman and namesake ‡:

* *Rouge* at call him Torquato Conti; honest Thom. Carve, who was not very exact in names, calls him *Tuccatöcht*. *Vices generalis inter Imperatoris tunc forte gerebat Excell.* *Brus.* Tuccatöcont. *Itin.* Tom. i. p. 11. but to speak properly he should be called Torquato de Conti: *Torquatus de Comitibus*, according to the tenour of the Imperial patent. He was originally destined to the church, but chose rather to carry arms; and served first in Lombardy among the Spanish troops as captain of horse, and then under Bucquoy in the Hungarian wars. He was little beloved, and less confided in, by the soldiers: and on account of his exactions and severities, the common people always surnamed him *The Devil*. Nevertheless, before he passed into the Imperial service, he was the first man who discovered Mazarine's genius, and recommended him, when he was about twenty three years old, to his holiness the pope. Upon quitting the Imperial service, he obtained a fresh employment at Rome, which suited better with his age and infirmities; for he was made *captain-general of the ecclesiastical forces*.

† It must be observed that the German regiments were much larger than the Swedish.

‡ *Cbemnitius de Bello Sueco Germ.* Tom. i. p. 37.

Indeed it has been matter of difficulty to some, why Torquato did not attempt to oppose Gustavus at his first landing, or give him battle at least a few days after his arrival? Nevertheless of this difficulty one may safely venture to give a solution. The whole country had been depopulated by the Imperialists; nor could their general with certainty transport provisions to his army from the parts of the empire which lay to the southward; whilst Gustavus, for the first two months, having the ocean open at his pleasure, derived supplies (though not abundant ones) from his own country. It was upon this account that Torquato fell back and formed two camps at Gartz and Stolp, almost at the two extremities of Outer-Pomerania; making Landberg, which forms the southern point of the triangle, a sort of middle place of residence, by the emperor's express orders.

And on this point I may digress for a moment, in order to observe, that it was one great error in this general (not the less absurd for being common) to destroy, in the manner he did, all cattle, provisions, barns, hay-stacks, and mills, merely with a view to deprive the Swedes of subsistence at their first arrival. If the house of Austria had previously *paid* for these things, and then *destroyed* them, the conduct had been admirable; but in the other view of the question, she lost the hearts of the common people entirely: for we must take human nature from the highest to the lowest as it really is; and though a peasant may greatly esteem his prince and country, he loves his family, and his little dearly-earned acquisitions, still more. The event soon justified the observation, for Gustavus from that moment wanted nothing at the market price.

And here I may still give the reader a better idea of Torquato de Conti's inabilities; for about this time, (namely, at or near the landing of Gustavus) Sigismund king of Poland informed him by letter what sort of warrior he must expect to find in the person of his Swedish majesty; and how much it behoved him to keep a strict eye to the preservation of Pomerania. But Torquato, who, though a native of Italy, had more Spanish pride in his temper than Roman cautiousness, returned him a short slighting answer, (according to the language then used at Vienna) which he never afterwards took care to make good; namely, that Gustavus should find enough and enough employment against men of service, and learn by dear-bought experience, that he had left his laurels in the groves of Prussia*.

* *Kobierziski*, Hist. Vladislaus, p. 931.

From Wolgast his majesty returned to Usedom, and gave some little attention to matters of politics, employing his troops at the same time in the total réduction of that island, and a small one contiguous to it, called Wollin.

His first business was to give audience to the ministers of his cousins the dukes of Mechlenberg*, and the deputies from Stralsund; and some private messages passed between him and the duke of Pomerania †; for the latter, terrified by the menaces, and dismayed by the severities of the house of Austria, had made some overtures to his Swedish majesty on the subject of returning home and leaving the empire to be the sole arbiter of its own peace and quiet.

For this prince, well foreseeing which way the storm of the north pointed, had sent to Gustavus just before he embarked; to beseech him to make some other country than Pomerania the seat of invasion: many memorials and replies passed between the Swedish and Pomeranian ministers; at length the king told the latter, just as he was going on ship-board, *That he would carry his answer in person to the duke their master.*

Rightly therefore concluding, that these difficulties proceeded more from fear than any real disapprobation of his expedition, he advanced directly to the strong fort of Schwein, situated on the eastern side of the island, and took it without resistance, for the Imperial garrison thought fit to dislodge at first sight, and crossed the river into the island of Wollin: which little district (for it is somewhat smaller than Usedom, being about twenty miles long by ten or twelve broad) is formed into an island by the sea, the Frischoff-lake, the mouth of the Oder, and a small frith, that is half a rivulet and half a morass. Gustavus having found some boats, soon pursued the Imperialists across the water, who in their flight set fire to a fine castle belonging to the elector of Saxony's sister, and soon evacuated the island, leaving behind them their cannon, baggage, and a part of their horses; fulfilling to a tittle the remark of Tacitus, *Triumphati magis quam victi.* Here were found two beautiful leopards confined in a cage, being intended by Walstein as a present to the emperor: for as he had the vanity to consider himself as admiral of the Baltic, he thought it necessary to give some proofs at Vienna of his commercial correspondence.

In these two islands the king had rested near a fortnight, not from any love he bore to inactivity, but merely to procure

* Adolphus Frederic of Schwerin and John Albert of Gustrow; the former born in 1589, and the latter in 1590.

† Bogisläus duke of Pomerania died, aged seventy-seven, in 1637, the last of a family which had enjoyed that duchy 700 years.

means for transporting his artillery, troops, and baggage over the lake of Frithoff, a passage of about twelve miles in length, which gave him entrance into the large mouth of the Oder, and thence to Stetin: of which enterprize we shall speak more distinctly hereafter.

Whilst matters were thus preparing, we will cast our eyes for a few minutes on the last-mentioned diet of Ratibon, which continued sitting, and had been convened before Gustavus arrived in Germany; or, to speak more properly, just before his landing: for on his quitting Sweden, the states of the empire, at the earnest sollicitation of the protestants, had assembled themselves at the place aforesaid, in order to deliberate about the means of restoring their country to its ancient tranquillity. But upon the grand event of his Swedish majesty's arrival in the isle of Usedom, *Cesar*, as the Germans affect to call him, gave indications of his supreme will to the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, commanding them to supply his numerous army with provisions and military stores; and upon these conditions generously promising them to make some mitigations in their favour (by way of acknowledgment) in the *edict of restitution*. Gustavus likewise notified his appearance in Germany to the latter of these two electors, and explained to him the reasons that induced him to make an attempt upon Pomerania (that country being contiguous to the electorate of Brandenburg) preferably to any other part of the empire, making him at the same time an offer of security and protection, provided he did not oppose him in an hostile manner.

It is much to be doubted whether it was in the emperor's power, consistently with common prudence, to have put by this general convention of the Germanic body. The protestant princes had been almost ruined, and complained so loudly, that it was necessary to make them some plausible concessions: for military executions on the one hand, and the forensic executions on the other hand, had given the edict into full activity, and many princes, the duke of Wirtemberg in particular, had allowed the monks, nuns, and clergy to repossess their ancient establishments. The elector of Saxony likewise was particularly anxious to maintain his son Augustus in the archbishopric of Magdeburg, which the emperor had designed for his second son Leopold. Upon this account the elector promoted privately the assembly at Heidelberg in 1629, from whence a petition for the revocation of the edict was addressed to his Imperial majesty, and a slight sort of *confederation* projected between the protestant powers; nor were certain innuendos omitted with reference to Gustavus.

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But what was still worse, many princes of the catholic persuasion wished for peace, inasmuch as their countries had been terribly harassed even by the armies of their victorious friends. Of this class was the duke of Neuburg, descended from a younger branch of the Palatine family. The archbishop of Saltzburg too had withdrawn his contributions for no better reason, but because no desirable spot of protestant ground bordered upon the edges of his territories, at a time when his neighbours were all making new acquisitions. The elector of Triers * likewise grew sick of the depredations of the Spanish troops, and the elector of Cologne, brother to the duke of Bavaria, joined with him in remonstrances on the same subject; yet not one of these princes would consent to suppress the edict of restitution.

Nevertheless, certain suspicions, or glimmerings of suspicion, were supposed to prevail amongst these princes; for though the real object of the house of Austria was the subversion and destruction of the protestant party, that being considered as a work of no extraordinary difficulty; yet a traverse scene was to be drawn behind this outside one, and the deep design at bottom was to humble the catholics in their turn, and establish an *universal monarchy* in the empire. Count d'Ognata, the Spanish ambassador, unfortunately opened himself once upon this subject, and said, "That the episcopal gowns in Germany were something of the longest, and wanted paring."

Upon the occasion of this diet the emperor made a magnificent entry, attended by his wife and son, the king of Hungary and Bohemia. All the catholic electors appeared. The electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, though personally written to by the emperor, implored him to listen to the representations of Sweden and France, and conclude an universal peace. Of which the real reason was (though the elector of Brandenburg complained that fourteen regiments complete had been quartered on him alone, and the Austrian regiments were then extremely large) that both these electors declined to see the emperor in person, as they did not chuse to elect his son king of the Romans: nor was the duke of Saxony by any means so poor as he pretended; and what was still more, they had maintained an indistinct but timorous correspondence with Gustavus, and had a consciousness that something of that nature might take air during the transactions of the diet.

Each of these princes pleaded poverty in order to be excused attendance, and mentioned the seemingly incredible

* Philip Christopher Van Soëtern.

sums which the Imperial officers had extorted from their subjects*. Such public expilations had never been known or read of; and besides all this, a lively picture was drawn, not only of the avarice, but of the cruelty and insolence of the commanders †; and, by way of conclusion, it was strongly recommended, upon supposition a laudable peace could not be procured, that new laws should be made with regard to conquests, contributions, and plunder; and that a fresh system of discipline and regularity should be enforced by the strongest penal sanctions that could be devised. It was requested also that some more effectual method of paying the army might be proposed to the public; and that a better application be made of the Germanic money collected and set apart for this purpose: in which latter clause the catholic electors all agreed; for the Imperial armies made little difference between friends and foes.

Great part of the military licentiousness and severity of courts of judicature above complained of was attributed to Walstein, whom the world in general agreed to style the *German Dictator*. The confederate princes and electors hated him as a *new-raised man*, who from a Bohemian gentleman, by the emperor's indulgence, rose to be first a count and then duke of Fridland, Sagan, and Mechlenberg. His manner of living disgusted them too, for he maintained finer retinues, and kept a more magnificent table, than most of them could afford to imitate. But in generosity, and a more than princely affectation of rewarding valour and merit, he exceeded them all; for it was a maxim with him, "*that a prince who desired to be served cheap, had always cheap services done him.*" There were other circumstances peculiar to this unaccountable person, which produced fresh uneasinesses; for being uncommunicative by nature, and reserved through choice, he made himself free with none of his associates, either imparting his own designs, or collecting the sentiments of others, except at such distance as was unobservable: so that upon the whole, at least to external appearances, he overlooked all men's opinions, and neglected all men's advice, if we except only his Imperial majesty. For these reasons he levied contributions, granted protections, disposed of troops in garrisons and into winter quarters, without ever consulting the princes in whose territories these disorders were made; and upon any complaint or remonstrance from them, his answer was, *That*

* *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg.*

† Published by the duke of Pomerania in High Dutch and in Latin,

he had offended formerly by an improper condescension; but perceiving mankind to be void of gratitude on that head, he for the future should change his mildness into asperity.

It may next be observed, that besides the electors and their deputies, many persons of great consequence paid their attendance at this diet, as Sir Robert Anstruther from England, Brulart and Father Joseph on the part of France, and Rufford in the behalf of the elector Palatin. Indeed the diet in general was the most pompous and magnificent that had ever been known, (a circumstance that ill became the deplorable misery and poverty of those times); and it is thought the expenses of the duke of Bavaria alone, though that may not sound high to the ears of an Englishman, amounted to near 25,000 pounds a month*.

Tilly likewise and Anholt†, the two generals of the catholic league, made each of them an extremely handsome appearance. The former spoke of Gustavus in the highest terms of respect, and, unfortunately for himself, compared the grand event of a war to a cast upon the dice: but Walstein, who then did not think his revocation so certain, rivalled even his master in point of show, being attended by 600 horsemen finely mounted and richly habited, which created envy in the electors, and paved the way to his future disgrace.

It may justly be imagined, that all parties here assembled had their respective games to manage. The house of Austria aimed at universal monarchy over papists as well as protestants; and wanted likewise to give a check to the interposition of all foreign powers in the affairs of the empire: and a third grand object still remained behind the scene, which was to cause Ferdinand, the emperor's son, to be then appointed king of

* *Mercuré François*, Annuaire 1630. This diet began to dispatch business about June 19, and ended November 13.

† *Le Barre*, (*Historie d'Allemagne*, Tom. ix. p. 589.) in other respects a most exact historian, says, Tilly, and the Prince of Anhalt; but the prince of Anhalt entered into no service, after he received his pardon and reprimand on account of the Bohemian wars. The person here meant is John James count of Anholt, next in command to Tilly, and watch-master general of the Bavarian army, who died the November ensuing. Having here mentioned a small inaccuracy in *La Barre's* history of Germany, I think it incumbent on me to declare, that this gentleman may be considered as a true historian. Instead of giving us a pleasing narration of his own, unsupported by authorities, he carefully perused most that had been written on the subject, and then sent eight or nine copies of his work, *interleaved*, to all the eminent historians in the empire, requesting them to write their remarks and additions on the blank leaves; which was accordingly done. But the work, excellent as it is, was of little use to me, for it is only a compendium of the whole German history.

the Romans. The elector of Bavaria had his reasons for traversing indirectly this last attempt, and desired likewise that Tilly should be substituted in the room of Walstein. The protestant electors joined with him in this respect. Their deputies harangued largely on the insolence and avarice of Walstein duke of Fridland (for few people cared to give him the title he derived from Mechlenburg) and remarked in the course of their invectives, that he had waged war upon countries against which no war had been ever declared. In this combination against the general, the Spanish ministers and the *Hispaniolized* Austrians, (as the phrase then was) most heartily concurred. France interfered too upon its old principle of first disturbing the waters, and then purloining a good part of the fish. The elector Palatin acted purely out of form, without any hopes of success; and the British ambassador appeared in the character of a preacher more than a negociator. As to the ecclesiastical electors, they aimed at nothing but at Walstein's dismissal, and the full continuance of the edict of restitution.

The emperor promoted and carried on the intrigues of this assembly very artfully; for though he determined to grant the protestants no one advantage, yet at the same time he well foresaw, that the appearance of making some concessions bore an air of good temper and mildness. Moreover, he had resolved within himself to insinuate, that as France, Holland, and Sweden, all caballed against the empire, and sent both men and money into it, it behoved the protestants, as well as catholics, to unite in one common system, and frustrate such public attacks on the Germanic body in general. It was argued specifically, that the elector Palatin had given no signs of repentance, and therefore it was necessary to pronounce an irreversible sentence upon him: that the Dutch had long taken off all filial duty to the Imperial throne, and had rendered themselves masters of several towns which belonged to the empire, not without intentions of restoring the elector Palatin to the Lower-Palatinâte: that the French king had interfered both in Italy and Germany, without solicitation on one part, and without giving notice on the other part: and, lastly, that Gustavus was worthy of blame above measure, since he had never received the least provocation from the house of Austria; there subsisting in truth no one dispute between him and the emperor but the affair of Stralsund, in the accommodation of which matter he had neglected to listen to Dhona, the Imperial ambassador, as also to a public minister on the part of Denmark, who had undertaken the office of a mediator. One cannot presume absolutely to
contradict

contradict this last assertion; yet it is plain enough to the clear-sighted and intelligent, that the king of Denmark's friendship to Gustavus carried with it an insincere aspect, which naturally created mistrust and suspicions. That prince justly triumphed, as he thought, in prefiguring to himself, that the house of Austria might happen to be humbled to a certain degree; yet it did not please him to behold the Swedes in possession of Stralsund; nor did he like the lodgements Gustavus had made in the island of Rugen, which gave him power on either side of the Baltic ocean. He had a secret joy however in predicting to his nation, that Sweden and Austria would at length weary and torment themselves to nothing. These ideas, joined with caution and timidity, kept him in a sort of suspense, which he thought fit to name a neutrality; yet at bottom he dreaded Gustavus, and hated him more, and in spite of all obligations which the protestant religion might be supposed to have on his mind, preferred the interests of the house of Austria in his secret wishes.

On the other hand, it appeared plainly, that the Imperial ministers made peace only a plausible pretext in the first article of the several proposals produced by them; for the five subsequent ones breathed nothing but menaces, chastisements, and hostilities; of which we have a clear proof: for when all the protestant deputies besought the emperor to put a stop to such unmerciful proceedings, cardinal Klefel*, who had relinquished politics except with a view to humble Wallstein, replied coldly and unconcernedly: *It was the decree of heaven, that people should bear patiently what they had deserved* †.

To

* Archbishop of Vienna, prime minister and favourite of the emperor Rodolphus and Mathias.

† We cannot but suspect that historians have made this speech proceed from a wrong mouth: since this prelate, who was first personage in the Austrian cabinet was generously inclined to the Bohemian protestants, and no great friend to the Spanish faction. For when, in the year 1618, he persuaded Mathias to use mild and gentle methods towards the revolvers in Bohemia and the annex provinces, and displayed in the strongest lights the miserable effects of persecution and intestine wars, Ognata the Spanish ambassador made no ceremony to consider him as a traitor; and the archduke Ferdinand (next year elected emperor) roundly told him, *He would rather see the kingdom starved than damned.* *Hist. Eccl. Bohem.* 12^o. p. 152.

From these hints Klefel the cardinal archbishop soon concluded his downfall to be inevitable, and as he went to court conjured his domestics to stand upon their guard. The apostolic nuncio attended him. When he entered the antichamber, a chamberlain of the archduke's made his master's excuses for not receiving him. The emperor likewise compelled him to wait some time (the council door being bolted, and he and Ognata in close conference) and then baron de Preüner came out and told him, (whilst Dampier and Colalto waited below with an armed force) that he had committed great mismanagements

To recapitulate all the several offences of the protestant princes will be difficult; but the duke of Pomerania's great crime was, *that he had wished the emperor ill-success in a bumper of white ale.*

As to the ambassadors from foreign countries, it may safely be said, that Anstruther at least did nothing, having in truth nothing to do: for though he had certain authorities to treat with the Imperial commissaries and the electoral princes, yet it is evident, that no good could be produced from such attempts, as the house of Austria aimed only at cajoling his master, and laying a-sleep those faint good wishes which he bore to the Palatinate and the protestant cause. Nevertheless, by the artful interposition of Spain, who pretended to stand in the character of a third person between their Britannic and Imperial majesties, he was received politely and courteously by the emperor, who perhaps at that time had some fears of an alliance then transacting between Charles and Gustavus.

Anstruther's second instructions, bearing date July 22, 1630, carried the same conciliating pacific air, which those of James I. had formerly borne, and are filled with remonstrances and petitions instead of menaces and resentment. They have all one tone; *Armis semotis, nostro exemplo:* and his Britannic majesty declares in them, that the elector Palatin had resigned to him the management of all his affairs. (an assertion which may perhaps be liable to some queries,) and that notwithstanding his father and himself had ever proved unsuccessful in their interpositions on Frederic's be-

mismanagements in the government, and must retire with him: to which step the then pope Paul V. had given his consent. The cardinal himself was thrown into great emotion at so abrupt an attack, and talked very loudly in justification; upon which Preüner presented him with a riding coat and black hat, compelling him much against his will, to quit his red hat and pallium: and having conducted him privately down a back stair-case, Dampier received him in a close post-chariot, and conveyed him to Inspruck; the court obliging him to sign a resignation of all his preferments. And thus room was made for cardinal Ditrichstein.

In vain Mathias lamented his disgrace, for he loved him intirely, and confided in him above all men; nor was he made privy to the stratagem. All the answer he could receive from Ferdinand and his adherents, was, that the measures taken *had a view purely to his glory.* He then requested a promise from them in writing, that they would not injure the cardinal's life or fortune: but they only gave him their engagements of honour. When Urban VIII. examined this great minister's cause, he was found to have neither money nor possessions. A disculpation was then passed in his favour: nevertheless, he declined all concern with state affairs, except with regard to the dismissal of Walstein; and died in 1630, aged seventy-seven. *Laurea Austriaca*, p. 98, 99, 635.

half,

half, yet that he should still continue to pursue the same pious work and salutary measures: and the rather, as his catholic majesty exhorted him to persevere in this plan, giving him reasons to expect the most equitable allowances from the emperor: and for fear these advances might not prove considerable enough, Anstruther had powers likewise to become responsible for the Palatin's submissions*. Nevertheless it no where appears that these powers were derived from the proper source of authority, that is to say, from the elector Palatin himself.

Some few weeks after the date of this second commission, I believe towards the conclusion of the month of August, if the present conjecture be exact in point of chronology, the emperor must have retired from Ratisbon to his metropolis, for a few days, upon some business of consequence. The said ambassador from England was admitted to an Imperial audience at Vienna, (not being able to procure such admission at the diet) where he made a long, submissive, and plaintive speech, which carried with it more the air of an elegy, than the spirited representation of a powerful kingdom: Its purport was, (for I care not how little time we employ on it) "That the king his master acknowledged with grief and shame, that his brother-in-law the elector Palatin, without any regard to *his* opinion and concurrence, had acted formerly (in reference to the crown of Bohemia) not only rashly, but unadvisedly; which imprudent measures ought chiefly to be attributed to the ambition and intemperance of youth; and that it would highly become the emperor, consistently with his accustomed clemency, to receive his submissions, and re-instate him into his dominions: inasmuch as such an act of free and gratuitous favour would oblige the kings of England to all posterity."

It then proceeded to remark, "That his majesty of England (notwithstanding the reasons of war appeared self-evident) always chose to prefer the amicable adjustments of treaty, so often essayed, and negligently regarded by all his friends! reposing himself in every emergency upon the known candour and *mansuetude* (that being the very word) of the house of Austria." — In the next place the folly of this speech is equal to its meanness: since war is there considered as the most unchristian act in human nature, and the most uncertain. "Mention is then made of the kind interpositions from the courts of Madrid and Bruxelles: (than which nothing could be more insincere;)

* *Fœdera*, Tom. xix. p. 172.

“ and

“ and the *merites non petits* of James I. towards the house of
 “ Austria are strongly inculcated. — No pretensions of
 “ right are so much as glanced at: on the contrary, all is
 “ referred (as if one was addressing the supreme being)
 “ to the free, gratuitous, unconditional mercy and clemency of
 “ the Imperial throne. Lastly the distresses, the poverty,
 “ the exile of the numerous Palatin family are represented as
 “ in a tragedy*; and then a petition is preferred for an
 “ allowance, just sufficient to keep them from starving,
 “ which, saith Anstruther, by prescription of right as well
 “ as the laws of piety, cannot be denied to any person
 “ consistently with common justice.”

Thus, as an Austrian historian observeth †, with respect to
 another English ambassador dispatched on the same errand,
 he flattered and trembled like a criminal pleading his cause
 before Pluto. Walslein's associates joined with Anstruther
 upon these representations, partly to prevent England from
 joining with Sweden, and partly to play the elector Palatin's
 re-establishment against the immeasurable ambition of the
 duke of Bavaria. But all these attempts were eluded with
 politely giving them a patient hearing; and the unhappy
 Anstruther fate himself down contented; for the Austrians
 knew the extent of Charles's hereditary patience to an hair's
 breadth, and had received likewise indirect but tolerably
 certain assurances, that he had been tampering for some time
 with Gustavus, whom he had invested with the order of the
 garter several years before at the siege of Dirschau.

It may be worth observing here, that Frederic was more
 political and heroical than his brother Charles; and Rusdorf ‡,
 his

* Que votre majesté, &c. daigne aussi jeter les yeux benignement sur une tendre, numereuse, & innocente famille Palatine, & sur une multitude d'autres leur parents & alliez, qui embrassent en supplication les autels de vostre clemence & bonté Imperiale!

† *Laurea Austriaca*, ad annum 1621.

‡ One of the ablest prime ministers of the elector Palatin, who resided many years in a public capacity at London, where he collected all the negotiations and state-transactions relating to Great-Britain and the continent: which MS. work, consisting of several volumes in folio, is still preserved in the archives at Hesse-Cassel: and, from a list of the contents transmitted to me, deserves highly to be made public; since it is certain the affairs of the Palatinate influenced all our measures more or less during the reigns of James I. and Charles his son. As to the style of Rusdorf (for the collection I am speaking of is composed in Latin) the reader may easily form an idea from the other performances he has thought fit to publish, the *Vindictæ Palatinæ* being one of the completest works the world ever saw, and in the single articles of method, brevity, and perspicuity may dispute the palm even with Thomas Aquinas's *Summa*, so justly celebrated for these perfections. It is here we may admire him in the character of a politician, jus-publicist,

and

his first agent at the diet, gave proofs of ability and firmness far superior to what Antruther could pretend to. His master, the elector Palatin, had taken the precaution to convey letters to each elector, all written with his own hand, in which he besought them to interpose their good offices with the emperor in his behalf. To these representations his Imperial majesty replied artfully enough, That he had private dispositions in that unhappy prince's favour, whereof he should soon behold the benign effects, if he would personally ask his pardon, renounce the crown of Bohemia, and his own electorate for himself and his heirs, and enter into no future alliances or intrigues either with German princes or foreigners; and then only, and upon these conditions, promised, from the mere inherent motives of bounty and clemency residing in his breast, to restore to him the part of a province, and a pension suitable to the dignity of a prince.

These proposals served to amuse the king of England very well; but Frederic rejected them like a man of honour and spirit, laughed at them, despised them, and detested them: for though this prince was no great hero in the field, he had a just sense of his parentage and station: and declared peremptorily, that he would have *all* the Palatinate or *none*: nor should any worldly motive induce him to cut off his children's birth-right and leave them pensioners to the house of Austria, if they were of a tame disposition; or vagabonds and mercenary soldiers, if they were of an heroic one.

In return to this, it is remarked by some, that the emperor alledged, by way of clearing himself, that the better part of Frederic's dominions were deposited in the hands of the infant Isabella*. But the elector Palatin gave no ear to such ridiculous complements and excuses.

But

and civilian; and as to his classical abilities; witness his beautiful elegy, entitled, *Querela Frederici missa Unioni*, written with all the elegance and spirit of the ancients. It consists of 304 lines: and it is preserved by Lotichius. And if one may form any conjectures, from similitude of thought and language, it was he that composed the epistle from the city of Heidelberg (in the character of a virgin,) to general Tilly in 1621, when the English garrison behaved so gloriously. It begins, *Siccine virginum*, &c. and containing forty-four verses. The curious may peruse it in the *Laurea Austriaca*, p. 493, &c. — The prose work bears this title; Jo. Joachim: a *Rusdorf Vindiciae causae Palatinae & cancellariae Bavaricae*. Fol. 1640 — Another folio, which I suppose to be his, was published in 1725, entitled, *Rusdorf Consilia & Negot. politica*: and many of his letters are to be found in *Christiani Spicilegium*, 8^o, 2 Tom. 1724. *Memoirs communicated*.

* Isabella Clara Eugenia, wife of arch-duke Albert. This great and political princess was born at Segovia in 1566. She fixed herself in the Low-Countries

But to return to Anstruther's oration: it is surprizing that our historians know nothing of this *speech*, nor the *four extraordinary conditions* required by the emperor, though the reigns of James and Charles I. can never be understood with any common exactness, except we comprehend far better than we do at present the whole transaction relating to the Palatinâte, with respect to ourselves as well as the courts of Vienna, Madrid, and Bruxelles. The reader therefore may have some slight obligation to me for producing this *political threnody* after the expiration of a century, and one fifth of another; yet still it will be hard to ascertain *what these four indigestible propositions truly consisted of*. I once mentioned the affair transiently to a German nobleman, who at present is the brightest luminary of the court he serves, and than whom no one is more intimately conversant in the depths of history; and upon the whole it appeared highly probable to me, that the proposals from the Austrian ministry were to this effect: (1) *That Frederic should resign the Upper Palatinâte forever to the family of Bavaria*: (2) *And accept a pension for his own life*. (3) *That his elder son should be bred a catholic at Vienna, and having espoused an arch-duchess of Austria, be re-instated at the father's death into the Lower Palatinâte*. (4) *And, lastly, that the elector Palatin, in asking pardon, should submit to the odious circumstance of DOING IT ON HIS KNEES*.

As this prince, whose affairs explain the secret history of Great-Britain for fourteen years, appears to be known chiefly by hearsay to the English historians, I shall venture to observe concerning him, that the unhappy Frederic seems to have been born to nothing but vexations, distresses and disappointments*. The dukes of Neuburg and Deux Ponts disputed strongly, during his minority, the administration of the Palatinâte; the one by virtue of the late elector's will, and the other as being the nearest relation to him. At length the emperor Rodolphus decided in favour of the duke de Deux Ponts, who exercised the office of guardian, as guardians usually do, that is, severely and insolently enough.

Countries at the beginning of the last century, and governed singly for twelve years. She lived to the age of sixty-seven. There are many fine pictures of her: his grace of Devonshire hath a good one. It is suspected by many that she was rendered *barren* before she was created arch-duchess; for when Philip II. conveyed the seventeen provinces to her by way of dowry (which give his son no small disquiet,) he answered like a politician formed in his own Coimbrian college, "Promississe se quidem eas provincias, sed multas rationis & causas posse inveniri, quæ eum hoc promisso absolvant." *Arcana. Dominat. Hispan. 124.*

* *Schannat, Hist. Abrégée de la Maison Palat. 8º. à Francf. 1740. p. 55. &c.*

Our young prince was son of Frederic IV. and the celebrated Louisa Juliana, whom Spanheim's pen hath rendered immortal in one of the most curious pieces of history we have extant*. Formed at Sedan under the duke de Bouillon, and most virtuously educated, he understood Latin extremely well, and talked all the modern languages; he was likewise uncommonly versed in history, and consulted with earnestness the peace of the empire. For he had three excellent ministers, Camerarius, Grun, and Rusdorf.

The moment he was disengaged by age from the incumbrance of a guardian, he hastened into England, and espoused Elizabeth, daughter of James I. The English, who are seldom indifferent upon any occasion, took it into their heads to be extremely transported with this protestant match; and to do them justice they had reason. Universal joy possessed the whole nation: the balls, carousals, and feastings were innumerable. The very poets were called in from every quarter: such magnificence of the scene hath rarely been beheld in the most expensive and extravagant times. Johnson and Davenant held the pen; Lawes composed the music; Ignio Jones contrived the theatrical architecture, and the best painters on this side the Alps adorned the scenes with their pencils †.

These honours, to which the order of the garter was added, lulled Frederic into a sort of dream, and rendered him a visionary in ambition, to which the spirited and magnanimous temper of his wife did not a little contribute ‡. He forgot his own dominions, (in themselves the most beautiful, and at that time the most flourishing in the empire) and caught incautiously though honestly, and with some diffidence, at what he imagined to be a great acquisition, the crown of

* *Memoires de Louise Juliane Electrice Palatine*, 4^o. a Leyde, 1645. [By Fred. Spanheim]

† So that by a calculation which hath fallen in my way, it appears that his Britannic majesty (including Elizabeth's dowry of 40,000 l) expended on these nuptials from the beginning to the conclusion 146,572 l.

‡ Job. Nadanyi *Florus Hungaricus*, 12^o. Amst. 1663. p. 361.

¶ Amongst various justifications of resistance, &c. alledged by the Bohemians, concerning which an express treatise hath been published, entituled *Consideratio causam Belli Boemici* 4^o. in *libertate* 1647, it is remarked principally, that the LITERAS MAJESTATIS of the emperor Rodolphus, anno 1609, which granted free exercise of the protestant religion and communion *sub utraque*, had been notoriously as well as frequently violated, contrary to all good faith, stipulation, and promise. With which assertion each impartial reader will concur readily, when he peruseth the *original Imperial letter*, preserved in the last mentioned performance. Par. ii. pag. 68, 84.

Had this prince been blest with a caution and penetration that rarely fall to a young man's share, had he well known his own comparative weakness, or the strength and fury of his enemies, had he seen ever so little into the mutability, insincerity, and timidity of his father-in-law, who never held but one tone, namely *abstineto ab armis fatuis*, he might then without hesitation, have rejected the offers made him by the protestants in Bohemia, who sought him not as a sure protector and safeguard, but as the *only one* that could then be found.

Amongst other things, this unhappy young man, according to the custom of that age, allowed himself to be influenced by judicial astrology; and as the book of fate was a volume which every star-gazer could read his own way, backward, forward, sideways, or downward, it happened that one of these genius's had too much influence over the resolute mind of Frederic, who was hardly warm in the regal throne, when the battle of Prague put an end not only to his *power*, but even to his *expectations*. Thus vacating a throne which he never enjoyed, he retired into Holland for an asylum, and lived twelve years an exile upon public charity. His friend and relation the king of Denmark was too unfortunate in war, to be able to render him any assistance: and his father-in-law paid him only with school distinctions and old sayings, instead of well conducted troops, and letters of exchange.

As a soldier, it must be acknowledged he made no great figure, for he committed a great error in creating Anspach generalissimo, and secretly favoured Hohenlo, whom all men suspected, and who afterwards deserted him. He wanted neither courage nor firmness; but they were more of the reflective than military cast: for just before the battle of Prague he conveyed his eldest son and declared successor out of the kingdom of Bohemia, which cast a damp upon all men's spirits; he left the field of action like a defeated colonel of Croats, and not with the dignity of a retreating prince, losing his order of the garter in retiring; and upon this account the Imperial beaux-esprits affixed a programme on the gates of Prague to the following effect: namely, "That great rewards should be bestowed on the person who could give any tidings or intelligence of a certain run-away monarch, in the flower of his youth, of a complexion inclining to the florid, diminutive in stature, with a beard entirely juvenile, and eyes squinting a little: of himself a well-conditioned and worthy young man, but seduced by
"evil-

“evil minded and seditious advisers*.” This is the first hue and cry after a fugitive king that I remember to have met with either in ancient or modern history.

Yet this prince, in all other respects relating to civil and political life, appears to be stedfast and unshaken: for he demonstrated, in the election of the king of the Romans, that if the Austrian succession was not interrupted *then*, when the right line failed, there remained no hope hereafter, when that honour was conferred on Ferdinand, who, having issue, would make it an appendix for ever to the Imperial throne; and instead of sinking under the oppressions of the house of Austria, he rather seems to rise upon them, preserving a clearness of judgment as well as an uniformity of temper under the severest trials †. Yet part of this may be attributed to the conduct of Elizabeth of England, his consort, who was intrepid and heroical beyond all the rest of her family; for when young Thurn undertook to defend Prague a single day, in order to facilitate her escape, she generously refused to force the brave son of her best friend to fall into the hands of an unforgiving enemy. And though it is certain that her Bohemian majesty never gave countenance to any intrigue, yet she had a violent inclination to be adored at a distance. She was not to be called a consummate beauty, though then in the height of her bloom, being aged about twenty-three years; but her figure was both of the majestic and attractive kind ‡, and she certainly possessed what the French call *the manners and the graces*. Her courage and presence of mind provided her admirers; half the army being in love with her. The fierce Christian duke of Brunswic was her tractable slave §; and so were young Thurn and lord Craven. They all fought for her, as much as the cause, and the *latter* when he lost the wars (all hopes of recovering the Palatinate being cut off by the death of Gustavus) carried his enthusiasm so far, that he built the fine house of Hampsted Marshall, on the banks of the river Kennet, in Berkshire (a tract of country not unlike the Palatinate, nor superior to many

* *Riccio de Bellis German. B. i. p. 46. Venet. 4^o. 1648.*

† See his *letter* to James I. preserved in the Cabala, which may be considered as a master-piece in politics.

‡ There are two pictures of Elizabeth at Hampton-Court, one when princess of England, and one when electress and queen of Bohemia; the latter by Vansomer.

§ Elizabethæ conjugii Frederici ereptam de manibus Chirothecam pileo suo accommodans, juraverit; non demissurum se symbolum illud in capite, priusquam regem Fredericum solio Pragensi redditum vidisset. *Brachel. Hist. bohr. temp. p. 52.*

parts thereof in beauty) as a sort of asylum for his injured princeſs *.

It is certain that poſterity, which uſually draws concluſions from the ſucceſſful or unfortunate nature of events, may blame Frederic for accepting the throne of Bohemia too raſhly. Yet that prince had excellent miniſters, who judged rightly according to the probability of ſecond cauſes: but his patriotic father-in-law deceived every expectation of the young prince: and the Bohemians, as much as they ſighed for liberty, declined to advance all pecuniary aſſiſtances. Nevertheless, it muſt not be diſſembled, that a pamphlet was published at that period, namely, in the year 1620, ſome few months before the battle of Prague, which for ſpirit, elegance, and political argument ſurpaſſeth any thing relative to the times in queſtion, which I have peruſed †; and contained true ſuggeſtions no way diſadvantageous to the proſperity of Frederic.

“ *The drift of this work was to prove, that his Bohemian*
 “ *majeſty had paſſed the Rubicon; that the die of his fortune was*
 “ *caſt, it being in his power to fall, but not deſcend: that he*
 “ *might periſh by his friends more probably than by his enemies,*
 “ *as the whole race of Alexander was extinguished by the generals*
 “ *of Alexander: that not four monarchs had proſpered in new*
 “ *acquired dominions from the times of Julius Ceſar to Ferdinand*
 “ *II. but had been deſtroyed through envy or hatred; nor had any*
 “ *king ſate on the throne of Bohemia, who hath not experienced*
 “ *ingratitude and rebellion.* “ *Believe me, Sire, continueth the*
 “ *author to Frederic “ every man that deſpiſeth life is maſter of*
 “ *yours; conſider well your declared enemies, your true friends,*
 “ *and your concealed ones. Amongſt the firſt are the houſe of*
 “ *Auſtria, the pope, and their allies; to overcome ſuch power, you*
 “ *muſt have brave officers, large reſources, and perseverance in*
 “ *abundance. Hannibal gained three illuſtrious victories, and ten*
 “ *ſmaller ones, and yet at length becoming both tributary and exile,*
 “ *tarniſhed his whole character of bravery, by deſtroying himſelf*
 “ *with a draught of poiſon. You want his army and his ſupplies;*
 “ *and have therefore thrown yourſelf under the proteſtion of men*
 “ *who believe themſelves at preſent your true friends: But reflect*

* It was a piece of architecture in the true taſte of the reign of Charles I. and coſt Lord Craven (though he never lived to finiſh the inſide) about ſixty thouſand pounds. The author, when a child, was a melancholy ſpectator of its deſtruction by fire, in the year 1718 or thereabouts. It was not built by Inigo Jones, but by Gerbier a German architect then in vogue.

† It was entitled a *Free Diſcourſe*, or ſecret inſtructions with reference to the affairs of Germany, Bohemia and Hungary, addreſſed in a letter to the elector Palatin.

a moment; may they not be obliged to contribute more than they like? may they not despair of a proper remuneration? may not competitions arise among them? may not something hinder them from supplying their contingent? may not unforeseen wars arise and demand their assistance at home? and, lastly, may not your ~~own~~, merely considered in itself, become odious unto them and matter of jealousy? Nay in length of time, they may propose counsels contradictory to yours, and desert you at last. This happened in the reign of Charles V. when the princes gave up the cause of the cities. The house of Austria hath cards of exchange to play in her very last distress. She can cede the annexed provinces* to the king of Poland, upon his promise to repulse you, and guarantee her rights in other dominions: she can make a peace with the Venetians, and grant them Friuli, Carniola, and Carinthia, upon supposition the republic will re-instate her in Bohemia and the above named incorporated provinces: she can resign something remote to France and Spain; and make a just demand upon their assistances. Thus, Sire, you may be ruined in the high career of your prosperity: parts and industry contribute to destroy those, who are predestined to be unfortunate.

“ If you have any friends; they are your father-in-law, your wife, and the marechal de Bouillon. As to your concealed or nominal friends, the Bohemians are the first; they declared you king by mere necessity, having made a previous tender of the crown to the electors of Saxony and Bavaria, and even to the prince of Transylvania. It was their original intention to have created you a stadtholder of Holland or an advoyer of Berne; but the unforeseen election of an emperor forced them to change the consul into the king. You have taken oaths like an inconsiderable dependant; the states are your accusers, your witnesses, and your judges. They can wage war when they please, but you cannot: they can levy an army against you; whilst at the same time you are not master of an arsenal, a magazine, or a single regiment. In a word, Sire, you are a tree that is propped, but not rooted. One may add also, that the Lutheran party dislike you in private, and the Hussites likewise.

“ Venture not to imitate the example of your uncle Maurice. No prince ever waged war with more difficulties and greater success; no son ever afforded more sincere pleasure or reputation to the ghost of a father; those whom he conquered adored him; and made him a promise of eternal affection. Yet at this moment, if he had not prevented the malice of certain ill-wishers;

* Silesia, Lusatia, Moravia.

“ nothing had remained of him but a name in history, and Barneveldt had reigned: for the war between liberty and monarchy is inextinguishable. It is just thus in Bohemia. You desire to be a king in substance and not in shadow. You want subjects, and they want a servant.

“ Nor have you better reasons to rely upon the friendship or fidelity of Gabriel Bethlem. He is piqued at miscarrying in the Bohemian election: contented now to fix his foot in Hungary, by your means to put in for a half share of the general wreck of the incorporated provinces, or, upon any good occasion, join with the emperor, and make the same division with him, as he now wishes to effect with you. The inconstancy and duplicities of this prince are well known: I here inclose two original letters that passed from him to the grand vizir, the latter of which is dated since his alliance with the Bohemians*, and there you may see he makes no ceremony of betraying you to the Turks upon a proper occasion. As to the Venetians, your Bohemian subjects will acquire no good sentiments in your behalf, by entering into an alliance with determined republicans. The free towns of Germany will dislike you, when their present apprehensions are composed. Worms, Spire, Francfort, Ulm, and Nuremberg, thought you too powerful before. Remember to practise what Cicero advised the noyos homines: farewell.”

The age we are speaking of, hardly ever gave us a more spirited, or more sensible, remonstrance than the present; and it is a pleasure to me to snatch from oblivion a fragment of history of so uncommon a cast. It is all truth, more or less; and it is likewise a very compendious sort of truth, powerfully and forcibly worded; and happy had it been for the unfortunate elector Palatin, if he had paid regard to a system of politics, which perhaps came from an enemy: but the influence of his evil stars gained the ascendancy, to which ambition contributed not a little.

Had Gustavus lived, the Elector might in all probability been reinstated at last: but on the death of that prince he soon followed his generous deliverer, labouring under no other distemper than a broken heart; he died at Mentz in the thirty-seventh year of his age, leaving behind him an afflicted wife and ten children under age.

It is true, the Bohemians alledged in their defence, that this prince was too economical to preserve a kingdom that had been generously offered him: but this is only taking the advantage of being the first accusers, and transferring the

* Presburg, November 24, 1619.

fault to him, which was more peculiarly their own †. For as to generosity, he performed vast works with respect to the palace of Heidelberg, which any one will soon acknowledge when he knows the rock upon which it stands; and completed with immense expence the fortifications of Manheim, begun by his father Frederic IV. And in regard to his management of government, it is certain, that the common people loved him extremely: and amongst other reasons, that which a poor peasant gave, was not a contemptible one; “*Friend,*” said a Spanish general to an inhabitant of the Palatinate, “*what makes you adhere so stedfastly to an exiled and nominal sovereign?*” “*Why, Sir,*” replied the fellow, “*that prince, when he governed us, raised fewer taxes in a year, than you extort from us in the space of a month*.*”

Yet notwithstanding all that may be said, it was the fate of this unfortunate prince to be unhappy, and yet amused at intervals with glimmerings of hope to the very last. Before the battle of Prague, he appeared to have every thing at his devotion. Two years afterwards, the great Mansfelt, who was a warrior cast in a particular mold, retrieved his affairs a second time: whilst the journey he made through France incognito, and the quarters of arch-duke Leopold’s soldiers, highly merits to be well represented: but the loss of three decisive battles, and three several armies, in the space of two months and eight days, reduced him at length to sign the following extraordinary dismissal of his troops, which discovers more greatness of mind than dependency. Nor can I

† In proof of this suggestion, it is clear from history that they submitted with too much visible readiness and complacency after the battle of Prague: [*Ephemeris expedit. in Bohem. 103, 104.*] signed a retraction and swore new allegiance to Ferdinand II. of which the form may be perused in the last mention’d valuable performance, p. 107, 108; where it is subjoined, that eight days after the aforesaid battle, “*Duo ex Britannia legati apud suam serenitatem (Maximilian. elect. Bav.) de pace componenda egerunt, quærendam aliquam viam, qua inter Cæsarem, reges, & principes pax conveniret. Sed eum, sigillatim nihil adferrent, quo modo res tractanda fuerit, sua serenitas generatim, quæ res postulabat, respondit.*” Ibid. 109.—And to this may be annex a subsequent remark: “*Angli fratrum expectationi non responderunt; spem miserorum sefellerunt, causam evangelicorum nunquam satis cognoscere voluerunt, papistis in Antonia de dominis impostori, fidem habuerunt; aliquid aliquando, legatis & verbis pro Palatinis egerunt, sed ita frigide, ut nihil effecerint. Nec huic causæ & bello communi sese immiscere ipsis placuit, donec animadversione dei tacti, ipsimet intestino bello puniantur, atque in viscera sua sevientes immutuas cædes ruant.*” *Consideratio causarum belli Boemici. 40. in libertate, 1647. pag. 137—part. 11.* See more in a tract very scarce, call’d a 111, *Part of the Swedish discipline, p. 4.*

* *Areana Dominat. Hispan. p. 136.*

abstain from attempting to recover a fragment of history so extremely curious.

“ BE IT KNOWN TO ALL :

“ That the illustrious princes, the captain-general of my
 “ forces, and the general-lieutenant under him, namely,
 “ the count of Mansfeld, prince Christian duke of Brun-
 “ AND all the colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains, and
 “ other officers of every denomination, at present serving
 “ under them, HAVE each singly and conjointly to the ut-
 “ most of their power rendered the elector Palatin faithful
 “ service in war: BUT now being destitute of all human
 “ assistances, HE perceives it impracticable to make further
 “ use of them, except to their own great inconvenience and
 “ detriment. HE therefore, with all due resignation of mind,
 “ alloweth them to solicit their dismissal in the dutiful and
 “ respectful manner they have done: and, like a friend, with
 “ all imaginable tenderness and humanity not only *absolves*
 “ them *from the oath*, they have taken to him, but permits
 “ them according to their prudence, to consult their safety
 “ and interest, as far as may be possible, elsewhere *.”

This *document* he subscribed with his own hand, and affixed his seal to it, July 13, 1622.

But to return from this digression, which we hope carries novelty enough with it to procure its pardon, we will resume the negotiations at the diet of Ratibon, where Brulart † the French minister, discharged his duty with parts and industry: for (not to mention his private transactions and intrigues) he set himself in public only to prove this one proposition, That France had not only an inherent affection for the empire, but power likewise to render it important services; and that her interference formerly, now, and upon all future occasions, had, did, and ever would proceed from the glorious and disinterested principle of doing good to her neighbours. An ostensible doctrine she hath followed faithfully and invariably ever since!

* *Laurea Austriaca*, fol. p. 551.

† Charles Brulart, surnamed de Leon, passed from an ecclesiastic into a negotiator, and gained, during his residence at Venice, 25,000*l.* by means of carrying on a secret commerce with the merchants of the Levant. After having discharged this duty, he was appointed ambassador into Switzerland, and from thence removed to Ratibon. Richelieu did not love him; and when Brulart's natural son carried to Paris the result of his father's negotiations at the diet there, the cardinal dispatched him back with this studied and malignant introduction to his verbal orders: *I beg you, Sir, on my part to inform your father—I mean, Sir, pray tell the ambassador.—Brulart bequeathed by will five gold crowns to every person of his name, who appeared at the anniversary celebration of his birth day. Memoires Hist. & Polit. d'Amelot à Mousseye, tom. i. 540.*

Father Joseph, cardinal Richelieu's better half in matters of politics, made his appearance at this diet, intrusted with a separate commission, whereby he was commanded to exhibit a long deduction of the reasons that had induced France to afford protection and assistance to the duke of Mantua. He was charged likewise with one private instruction, and that was to traverse the designs of Wulstein's faction, whom the cardinal considered as a person too haughty and too intractable. To make the bait more alluring, he promised the emperor, on the part of his master, to facilitate the election of his son as king of the Romans*.

In virtue of these three commissions (for his business was only to interfere gently, and penetrate dextrously into other men's designs) he contributed in part, as some people thought, to the removal of Wulstein; though in truth all parties wished it, and the event might have happened without his assistance. He concluded a treaty with the emperor in relation to Italy, which all parties concerned thought fit to disapprove, and the French king declared he would never ratify, except some articles were expunged relating to his allies and friends, amongst whom Gustavus was supposed to be principally intended. And as to the election of a king of the Romans, he executed precisely just that very thing he proposed to himself; making abundance of promises, and keeping his actions in reserve. Thus much is certain, he performed his business so perplexedly on the one hand, and so distinctly on the other hand, that Richelieu ever afterwards made him the partaker of his secrets, and the counsellor of his bosom †: and how greatly Louis XIII. relished his negotiations

* *Siri, Memor. Resond.* tom. vii. 229.

† This extraordinary man, according to a *Latin manuscript life* I have of him, written by father Leon, a Carmelite, was descended from the noble and illustrious family of the Le Clercs, and born in the year 1577. He had the complete education of a gentleman and a scholar, and passed his youth interchangeably between the Belles Lettres and Sciences, and the manly exercise and practice of arms. His Latin and Greek verses were much admired in France, and he perfected himself at Padua in jurisprudence and mathematics. At Rome he studied mankind and politics, and was much esteemed by Clement VIII. His mother, without hurting her fortunes, supplied him with money to make the tour of Germany and England; the constitutions of both which countries he knew to the bottom, and kept company with none but the great and best instructed. In this latter voyage he considered England well in a religious sense, and paved the foundation for that introduction of popish emissaries, which gave afterwards such an untoward turn to the affairs of Charles I.

Conscious of his usefulness to the king and minister, he thought it redounded much more to his honour to perform the great things he did in the character of a private man, than to attract the formal observance of the people by the splendour of a mitre and a cardinal's bonnet, both which he

gotiations at this diet, appears by the following passage in his epitaph (of which I have a transcript by me) *Valtelinæ motus composuit, Ratisbonæ QUÆ rex optabat in solenni conventu à Germanis EXPRESSIT; & multo ante Julio-dunensem pacem & Andegavensem procurabat*—

It was during the session of this diet that news came of Gustavus's actual arrival in Germany: nor knew the assembly which to admire most, the strength and power of the emperor, or the heroic ambition of Gustavus, whose peculiar turn it was to consider few things to be removed beyond his reach. It was remarked likewise by all parties, that he knew how to fight, and how to be obeyed; and as to discipline, he maintained it in equal subordination and proportion from the general to the meanest horse-boy in the service. It was a maxim with him to allow no one person of his army to remain inactive*: for when the operations of the field stood still, he constantly turned his men into pioneers and military architects; and when nothing of that nature presented itself, every common soldier was his own mechanic, his own taylor, and his own sempstress. It may seem ridiculous, but is incontestably true, that a Swedish officer might often be seen at hours of amusement, knitting his own stockings, and weaving his own point-lace. And with regard to the difficulties that attended an invasion,

refused with firmness; affecting, from a peculiar greatness of mind, to be considerable in his own particular way; and best pleased to receive visits from Richelieu in a *private lodging*.

He made himself a Capuchin in the twenty-third year of his age, though not only his relations, but Louis XIII. himself attempted to dissuade him; and so much the rather, as he had passed through a campaign, in quality of a volunteer, with no small applause. He procured great benefactions and endowments to the religious orders, and took upon himself the difficult article of sending missionaries to the East-Indies. The duke d'Alençon, who was of the blood royal, and the wife of the constable Montmôiençi, were his sponsors at the font; and it is remarked, that in his youth he produced fruits and blossoms at the same time. He talked most of the modern languages with great correctness, and was remarkably acute in his theological disputations. He had the humility to perform many journies on foot, but entertained such high ideas of the glory of his country, that he entered into politics upon that single consideration. He directed the constable De Luynes before he undertook the management of Richelieu; and died in 1639, being constantly visited in his sickness by the cardinals Richelieu and Bichi, the king's brother, the chancellor Seguier, the president Bouthillier, and the three secretaries of state. In a word, his individuating character was, that he seized the point in view at the first glance, even in cases of the most trying and perilous nature, and never departed with any notable variation from his original ideas.

Vita [MSta] R. P. JOSEPHI, Capuchini: incipit, *vir origine*—Explicit, *veri amantiſſimus scripsit*.

* *Le Parre; Hist. d'Allemagne*, tom. ix. 598.

Gustavus

Gustavus contrived to render them very easy; for his providers and soldiers paid for every thing at the full market-price; and when they found themselves straitened either for necessaries or conveniencies, submitted patiently, and took nothing by force. Thus the *invader* grew more acceptable to the country than the *person invaded*; nor do I find the peasants ever did the least mischief to the sick, the straggling, or wounded soldiers.

As Gustavus by this time appeared to have entered the empire in *earnest*, it was now thought necessary by the Imperial party to venture upon some preliminary measures, in order to check his progress; and as the *command of rivers* greatly influenced the success of war in those days, the Austrian ministry dispatched a message to the duke of Pomerania (since the invasion of the Swedes seemed to point his way) commanding him to deliver into the hands of Torquato de Conti, the Imperial general in those parts, the strong towns of Gartz and Griffenhagen, which two places made him master of the river Oder. But whilst the duke hesitated concerning his answer (for his private wishes, so far as he durst indulge them, attended Gustavus) Torquato's troops entered the towns by force, but gave the prince all the tolls by way of contenting him.

It was next proposed by the Imperial party, that the whole empire should oppose Gustavus as a common enemy. In order to obviate which attempt, the protestant *confederators* wisely suggested a second time, that the *edict of restitution* should be reversed: but the Austrians and representatives of the catholic league continued immovable on that subject. Yet the tempest at length collected itself with united force, and all agreed (the emperor excepted) to permit it to discharge its fury on Wallstein's head: And the better to pave the way to this important event (the arrival of Gustavus being notified to the emperor in due form by the elector of Saxony) it was thought expedient to lend an attentive ear to the representations of friends, and make some new laws with regard to military discipline. These laws in themselves were good enough, had it been as easy to enforce the practice of them, as it was to compile them: but the troops were already abandoned to avarice, extortion, rapine, and cruelty, so that it was next to impossible to produce a reformation among them. Nevertheless it was decreed by the diet, that the power of appointing and collecting the prescribed quota, or contingent of men and money, from every province should be exercised by civil officers, and not military ones; and that the emperor having made a reduction of some superfluous

fluous regiments, should signify to each circle the sum he proposed to levy from it: from whence it was expected, that the troops would all be paid punctually, and not in an irregular manner. Be this as it will, one misfortune attended these fine schemes, which was, they were never carried into execution.

Yet all parties contributed towards the degradation of Walstein; and Ferdinand at length found himself obliged to pave the way gently for that general's dismissal. The elector of Bavaria * hated him mortally, as a new raised man, as a general, and as a rival; and considered himself (Tilly being naturally modest, and his own creature and dependant) as the person, that ought to be supreme general of the Austrian forces and the catholic league. The Spaniards favoured him inasmuch as his marriage had rendered him subservient to their interests; and the court of Madrid had the insolence to style herself *Signora di orecchi di Cesare* †. Wherefore, upon the whole, it may suffice to say, that the major party seemed inclined to declare the elector of Bavaria generalissimo: nevertheless, that prince was too sagacious to accept an employment of so hazardous a nature; sufficiently contented, that he had a general at his absolute devotion, namely Tilly; whom he could mortify by his displeasure, or persuade with his plausible and artful eloquence: for though war was not his talent, he was the ablest and most designing politician amongst the Germans; insincere likewise, dissembling, artful, and self-interested beyond measure.

In order to reconcile Walstein's mind to such a shock, his Imperial majesty sent privately to him the barons Verdenberg ‡ and Questenberg §, both favourites with the general,

* Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, a prince self-interested, it is true, and bigotted beyond imagination, but considerable likewise as being esteemed the shrewdest and most artful politician at that time in the empire. He had parts sufficient to have embroiled Germany more, if possible, than it then was; but his temperament was of such a cast, that he had always one perpetual difficulty upon his hands, and that was to harmonize religion and interest. His education had been somewhat above the princely level, for he understood all the dexterities of history and treaty-learning; he talked most of the modern languages [English alone excepted] extremely well, even the Hungarian and the Slavonian; and was remarkable for a correct Latin style. He had the singular happiness to out-live the very completion of the thirty years wars, which himself began: and died the third autumn after the conclusion of the peace of Munster, in the seventy-eighth year of his age.

† *Pietro Poma; Guerre di Germ. tom. i. 23.*

‡ John Baptista Verdenberg, privy-counsellor and Aulic Austrian chancellor.

§ Gerard Questenberg, privy-counsellor,

These two ministers were employed afterwards to beseech him to resume the command.

and

and very particular friends to him, (for, in one word, they had all been reciprocally friends and patrons to each other) and ordered them to insinuate the strong reasons of state, which compelled their common master to assent to a proceeding so harsh and so sudden. Walfstein, comforted a little by Sepler, who then served him in *quality of astrologer*, received the message with profound submission and resignation; at the same time inveighing bitterly against the enemies of himself, and his master, who, to ruin him, destroyed the whole Imperial power. He had retreated at that time like a private nobleman to Memmingen, in order to watch the resolutions of the diet, and convey directions to his friends who made their appearance there; hoping to avert, if possible, the fatal blow that threatened him.

After some conference with the ministers of state, Walfstein retired to a private room, and wrote to his master, " beseeching him to shew so much justice and fortitude at least, as not to listen to those reports, which courts and factions create against a man of any consequence, whenever disgrace threatens him. That for his own part he concluded his employment to be *perpetual*; nevertheless, he now resigned it cheerfully, and without retrospect:" affecting not to feel those certain pangs, which ambition usually gives men in its last struggles. " I beseech your Imperial majesty," continued he, " to dispose a part of your army in the neighbourhood of Ratibon, and distribute the rest on the confines of Bavaria, and near the territories of those princes, who seem to have an inclination to counterwork your designs. One single motion of this nature will impose silence on them all. The watch-word of the faction is to alarm your *Cesaréan* majesty with the name of *Gustavus*: let him advance farther into the empire, and I will scourge him back with a rod."

Having sealed and directed this letter, he returned to his friends without delay; and, after entertaining them with extreme politeness, dismissed them with an unperplexed and open countenance, which was the more extraordinary, as his natural aspect was not of *that* cast in his most unguarded and undisturbed moments. In consequence of all that had preceded, the emperor was obliged to command him to resign the investiture of the duchy of Mechlenberg, under pretence of not giving umbrage to his Swedish majesty, or the electoral college. He then removed him from the command of the army, (a part of which was ordered to be disbanded) and declared for the future, that contributions should depend on the regulations made by the circles, and not on the will of a general;

general; protesting likewise, that he would wage no war, without apprising the electors.

We shall observe elsewhere, that this dismissal of a considerable part of the Imperial forces gave the first fatal stroke to the emperor's affairs, being one of those unprosperous measures, where all that was not weakness in one part of the proposers, proceeded from insincerity in the other part; no uncommon case in deliberations of state. Nevertheless, the emperor still retained an immense number of veteran troops, besides garrisons, and not including the army that belonged to the league; which at that time were esteemed doubly or trebly sufficient to have chased Gustavus out of the empire. Yet the error was soon discovered by dear-bought experience; and the combined catholic armies the campaigns ensuing were advanced to the number of 160,000 fighting men.

One may attempt to account for Wallstein's profound submission several ways. In the first place, he found it impossible to stem the fury of the torrent; and in the second place, it is probable the emperor had given him private assurances of restoring him to power, as soon as the present tempest should begin to disperse itself: and lastly, it appears from some accounts, that his own astrologer predicted a sudden *emersion* from this eclipse; a circumstance sufficient to rest his hopes on, if the cast and turn of the age be duly considered!

At length, by the artful intrigues of Maximilian elector of Bavaria, (whom the emperor all along suspected of having an eye to the kingship of the Romans, and of tampering with France in a sinister manner) Tilly, who had been created a count at Vienna with the title of *Illustriſſimo**, was advanced to the supreme command of the Imperial armies in conjunction with that of the catholic league. He soon collected together a large body of forces, which lay dispersed through Bavaria and the Palatinate, and advanced directly into Misnia, in order to keep the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg in submission. Thus ended the diet of Ratisbon, which met about June 19, 1630, and concluded November 13th next ensuing; giving birth to the assembly at Leipzig, convened February 8, 1630-1, and ending April 3d in the same year.

The protestants retired from Ratisbon, not greatly satisfied in *four* particulars; for war was declared against Gustavus at a time they hoped to propose some accommodation: The emperor likewise requested money, provisions, ammunition,

* *Status Regiminis Ferdinandi II.* 120. 1637.

and foldiers from the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg; which these princes considered as a new bill of very disagreeable nature. The enforcement of the edict of restitution was still supported with vigour; and various reformati-
 • proposed in reference to protestant churches, schools, and colleges; which last especially were intended to be confirmed in a future diet, which was to be held at Francfort on the Mayne, the month of August ensuing.

We left his Swedish majesty in full preparation to embark for Stetin, the antient residence of the dukes of Pomerania, and the capital city of the inner-duchy; into which place Torquato de Conti had attempted without success, to throw a large body of troops two days before; but the vigilance of his unwearied enemy prevented him.

On the very day the king proposed to set sail, the wind, which had been tempestuous for a long continuance, then happened to blow directly against him, which afflicted him to such a degree, that he retired privately to his closet-devotions*. Towards evening the gale changed point blank, and the whole fleet ran twenty miles in two hours, arriving before Stetin under full sail in the most beautiful order. His majesty next morning invested the town with all his army, upon which colonel Damitz the governor (who had the command likewise of the district round) dispatched a trumpeter to him, with request not to approach within the reach of cannon-shot. The king with a tone of eagerness, demanded immediately, who sent him? (for the duke of Pomerania was in the city) and being informed of the governor's rank and condition, and that the message came from him and no other person, returned the trumpeter back with these instructions: *Tell Damitz, it is not my custom to treat with men of his stamp by the intervention of an interpreter* †.

Puzzled with this answer, and the innuendo that lay concealed beneath it, the governor waited on the king without delay, who, pointing to his troops, said, *Behold, Sir, there is the key of my admission*: nevertheless, he generously took him by the hand at the same time.

Gustavus pressed Damitz to procure an interview betwixt himself and his master, for, Sir, said he, *I treat only with principals*; and agreed either to visit the duke in Stetin (for he had no fear of being taken prisoner) or give him a meet-

* *Arlanibai, Arma Suec.* p. 21. This prayer is preserved in the *Hist. or Account. Relat.* tom. i. p. 167.

† *Soldat Suedois,* p. 25. 8°. 1633. sine loco,

ing in the open fields. During this discourse, the magistrates and citizens all flocked out to see the king, and were charmed with his affability and good manners; for he spoke courteously to the meanest inhabitant of the town; and being informed the *burgo-master* was mixed amongst the crowd, soon made it his business to discover him, gave him the compliment of his hat, and shook him heartily by the hand, with assurances, *that he came to visit him and the good people of Germany in the character of a friend, and not in that of a king †.*

During this interval, the duke of Pomerania * arrived in a sedan-chair. But the king had the politeness to meet him half way, and told him before all his subjects, *That he came to restore peace to the empire, and that his soldiers were neither ruffians nor banditti, as those were who belonged to some other princes.* Upon this the duke begged to retire for a single hour, in order to confer with his counsellors of state upon so important an occasion; in which request he was indulged with great good humour. On his return, he told the king he durst not presume to take a step so hazardous; To which Gustavus replied, *that though he should possess his country, he would restore it to him upon his royal word:* desiring nothing but a slight reward for his soldiers, and the prayers and thanks of the German nations; telling him likewise, that it was impossible for him to make resistance, and pointing out by name to him every weak part in the fortifications †. The duke then petitioned in the strongest terms to obtain the favour of continuing *neutral.* To which the king gave this short answer, *He that is not with us, is against us:* and though this application of Holy Scripture may seem too light and ludicrous for a religious prince to make; yet I must caution my readers to observe, that it is a sort of *proverbial expression* in the High-Dutch language.

† *Arlanibai Arma Suecica*, p. 20. 4°.

* The duchy of Pomerania is about 200 miles long, and 50 or 60 miles broad. Conformably to an ancient treaty of *confraternity*. It was allowed to devolve upon the house of Brandenburg, in case the dukes of Pomerania became extinct: which event happened during the confusion of the *thirty years* war. Nevertheless, the Swedes declined giving up the possession of this commodious territory, partly as it was their first conquest in the empire, and partly as being the only sure country into which they could retreat. At length, by the peace of Munster, all *Outer-Pomerania* was granted to the Swedes, and the *Inner* only was conferred on the elector of Brandenburg. Nevertheless, by way of equivalent, the three bishoprics, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, and Minden, were secularized and bestowed upon him. As the Swedes in these latter days have been almost squeezed inch by inch out of Germany; so the Prussians have no ways kept their eyes closed against such favourable events.

† *Cbennitius*, tom. i. p. 50.

To relieve the seriousness of this conversation, the king, who observed the palace-windows to be crowded with ladies (for the conference was held just under the city-walls), touched the duke gently on the shoulder, and said with a smile, pointing towards the castle, *Cousin, yonder fair defendants will not hold out three minutes against one company of my Dalecarnian infantry.* But the duke was not to be drawn off from his purpose with a stroke of gallantry, still urging the dilemma he was thrown into, and dwelling long upon his oath of allegiance, as well as the power and implacable resentment of the house of Austria. To whom the king, resuming a gravity of features, replied abruptly, *That he had 30,000 brave and good men under his command, who were ready, singly or conjointly, to sacrifice their lives at one glance of his eye*. That the Supreme Power had made him a present of the isle of Rugen before he entered Germany* (for Lesly and the Stralfund-troops had made themselves masters of it) *and that it would hardly become him at such a juncture to leave his throat exposed to the enemy's knife.* Well then, replied the duke, it is necessary to submit to superior power, and the will of Providence.

Being thus upon the point of taking leave, *Well, cousin,* said the king with great composure, *keep your mind at ease, and give yourself no disturbance; my trust is, that God's providence will assist me, and prosper my designs.* And, Sir, added he, with an air of pleasantry, *behave yourself with greater magnanimity in the married state* (for the duke was old and expected no issue), *or else permit me to address you to adopt me for your son and successor †.* A speech, to all appearance without meaning, and full of pleasantry! and yet it is probable, that Gustavus was never more sincere than at the very moment he spoke it. And here it must be remembered, that the emperor had once made the same request, but with less success.

In the evening, when the duke returned, lord Rea ‡, privately instructed by the king, under pretence of escorting him with due military honour, entered the town attending his sedan, at the head of 200 chosen men, all Scottish musqueteers. Thus, securing the outward gate for the rest of the army, the garrison immediately took the alarm, and submitted, enrolling themselves, to the number of 1200 men,

* Schefferi *Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, p. 181.

† *Mercure François*, tom. xvi. 285.

‡ Donald Mackey, lord Rea, colonel of the Scottish brigade, that was created afterwards in 1637. He was succeeded in that post by Sir John Hepburn. We have great obligations to the memoirs and intelligence, which this officer communicated to his friends in London.

amongst his majesty's troops, and taking the oaths to the crown of Sweden: and this regiment of infantry, from the colour of its ensigns, took afterwards the surname of the *White brigade*. His majesty then ordered his officers and soldiers to pitch their tents along the ramparts, because he did not chuse to incommode and molest the citizens, and for his own part slept aboard a ship in the mouth of the Oder, saying with great good humour, *That a furred cloak for a general, and clean straw for a soldier, made excellent beds for the subjects of a king, who lay in an hammock*. Nor was another saying of his less remarkable; for though he entered Stetin on the Saturday night, he went thrice to church upon the Sunday, assigning this reason to his officers and soldiers, *That though war might be their amusement, yet religion was their business*. And as Torquato with his light troops surrounded the town on every side, he on that very account, by way of gallantry, ordered the city gates to be set open.

His majesty upon examining carefully this capital of Inner-Pomerania, a place from its own nature and situation of great importance, soon perceived, that it was not fortified to his own liking, and in the manner it truly wanted. Discovering likewise, that the citizens and peasants were unexperienced in these matters, and of course not over-industrious or zealous on the occasion, he gave them to understand, that the town and district ought to raise money to defray the expences of the new fortifications, and that his own soldiers should be the architects and pioneers*. So calling for paper, he sketched out a plan extempore, and gave it his generals to reduce into practice without delay: and as carriages and horses were not to be procured, the removal and raising of earth was all performed by hand. His majesty passed the whole day with his soldiers, and ordered each man, after twenty turns of carrying the earth-basket, a comfortable draught of Bremen or Dantzic ale. Thus this immense piece of work was advanced more with the air of a festival, than like a task of drudgery, being made superior to the insults of the enemy in a few days: and as Gustavus was known to be the best engineer of that age, it received such final additions and completions from his hands, that it was considered not only in the light of a town defensible beyond a state of danger, but as the model of just fortification during the succeeding part of the war.

Yet time was found, in the midst of all this hurry, to publish a second manifesto on the part of Sweden, and conclude

* *Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, p. 11.

a public act of treaty * with the duke, of which the substance was, “ A renovation of all antient agreements then subsisting between the kings of Sweden and dukes of Pomerania: a perpetual alliance for themselves and successors, defensive and offensive, so long as the emperor and empire should exist in their present relative situation and connections: a restitution to the duke under certain assurances of all the places, that should be obtained in Pomerania; and, in case the said duke should die without heirs-male,” (he being at that time without children, as we said before, and advanced to the 50th year of his age) that his territory should then remain in the king’s hands by way of *hypothèque*, or mortgage, till reparation might be made by the elector of Brandenburg (the inaugural successor at all events) for all the expences incurred by Sweden in rescuing the aforesaid territory from the cruel persecution of the house of Austria †.” The addition of this latter article may be considered as a master-piece in affairs of politics, for it prepared at due distance the incident of tying up the elector of Brandenburg’s hands, and naturally paved the way to some future accommodation with him.

Upon this event, Bogislaus duke of Pomerania dispatched a letter ‡ to the emperor, which letter contained a long and full detail of the rapine and cruelty of the Imperial troops, representing the sudden approach of the Swedish army on the one hand, and the negligence and inattention of the Austrian commander on the other hand; the impossibility of resisting a power so formidable as that of Gustavus; not to mention fine promises of inviolable affection and allegiance; with a gentle insinuation at last, which carried the air of a petition, obliquely hinting the restitution of all the estates, which the Imperial house had usurped from him ||.

But the emperor had more regard to hostilities and treaty-subscriptions, than to representations and remonstrances, and ordered Torquato (whom Wallstein had made his substitute in those parts) to treat the duke as a declared enemy, to the utmost of his power: which in the event placed the Swedes in an amiable light, and made the Imperialists more odious. He had orders also to ruin the whole duchy of Pomerania; which command he obeyed with great exactness. Neverthe-

* We have preserved the original in the APPENDIX, Art. IX. *first edit.* 4°.

† The whole treaty consists of thirteen or (as some have it) fourteen articles. It may be perused in the *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. p. 606. *Lusdorpiæ Act. publicæ*, fol. tom. iv. p. 79. and is preserved likewise by *Arlianibæi in Armis Suecicis*, p. 23, &c. and in the *Mercure François*, tom. xvi. 286—290.

‡ It may be seen in the APPENDIX, Art. X. *first edit.* 4°.

|| *Historical or Luthent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 172.

less, the rendering the country desolate, and destroying all forage and provisions, did Gustavus but little harm; for as he was master of the sea, he received plentiful supplies from his own dominions. Nor did Torquato chuse by any means to give him battle; for being equally timorous and covetous, he dreaded to lose the vast treasure, which he and his officers had amassed by rapine and plunder: a fatal effect of licentiousness, which his majesty of Sweden well foresaw. And here some historians pretend not to conceive why Walstein did not defend his own duchy, and take the command upon him against Gustavus; but to this difficulty we have given a solution in its proper place. For he lay all this time at Memmingen near Ratisbon, to watch the motions of the storm, that was gathering against him there: nor did he think it worth his while to act in the capacity of a general, when he expected to receive the news of his removal and disgrace every day.

I shall now dismiss this subject with observing, that the states readily confirmed the agreement betwixt their master and the king of Sweden. The town of Stetin advanced his majesty 8316 pounds, and the district furnished him with an equal sum; one half in present payment, and the other half to be paid at the feast of St. Michael next ensuing. They allowed him also a portion of the sea-duty on goods.

About this time the Pomeranian ministers made many efforts to get Stralsund into their master's power, but Gustavus for certain reasons continued inflexible on that head; and as to the government of Stetin, it was made a sort of mixed government between the Swedish commander, the duke, and the magistracy. To the latter was committed the civil government of the city, the care of erecting barracks for a garrison of 4000 men (whom the king was to pay, and the inhabitants to feed) and the providing guards and watches for the inner-parts of the town. The nominal supreme military command was allotted to the duke, as also the privilege of issuing out the watch-word. He and the magistrates had the keeping of the arsenal and city-keys, with provision never to open the gates, except by the consent of the Swedish governor. Thus the duke was generalissimo in title, but without power; for the soldiers were all to be tried at the commandant's court-martial; who likewise had the prerogative (it being set forth, that he was a person of most consummate experience) of disposing the artillery and watches in such places as best pleased him, with this further authority, that nothing, which was matter of military
use,

use, should be moved out of the town without his privity and consent*.

His majesty, whilst he continued at Stetin, began to grow impatient for action, and dispatched Banier and lord Rea cross the Oder at the head of 1200 infantry, to make themselves masters of Dam, a small fortification within sight of Stetin, and about six miles distant from it on the south-east side. A peasant offered to conduct this detachment over a morass, which having one narrow cause-way was thought impassable in all other places: but as this proposal happened to take air, the inhabitants like good politicians sent Banier word (well-knowing that a town taken by storm became subject to military plunder) that if he would postpone his visit till evening, they would open a postern-gate for him. Mean while the Imperial garrison perceiving how matters were like to proceed, dislodged very prudently before sun-set, and threw themselves into Stargard, a stronger place, and more capable of resistance: for some days before the Italian colonel Piccolomini, had conveyed by surprize a considerable garrison into it, and having seized the city-keys, which were in the magistrates possession, exacted a contribution from the inhabitants amounting to 1000 pounds. In consequence of these severities, a private express was dispatched to the king, requesting him to turn his arms against Stargard: but as Gustavus had some suspicion of the townsmen's good faith, he thought fit to employ the governor and garrison of Stetin (accompanied by a body of his own troops) in this expedition, partly as better acquainted with the town and its avenues (being less liable also from their knowledge of the people to be amused or misled) and partly because he was willing to engage the Pomeranian forces in some open act of hostility against the emperor, in order to secure them more faithfully to his interests. This little body of troops having made a midnight march of about ten miles, scaled the walls at break of day, and put to the sword a considerable part of the garrison. Piccolomini, with two or three companies of infantry, retired to the castle, and at length capitulated. Some days likewise before the episcopal town of Camin, which lies on a promontory over-against the island of Wolin (being the capital of a small principality) underwent the same fate. But the loss of Stargard, being one of the principal towns of Outer-Pomerania, was a more sensible inconvenience to the Imperial general; for it was the magazine of corn and provisions, and lay in the road between his two camps.

By this time his Imperial majesty plainly discovered he had been grossly abused with respect to Gustavus, whom he found to be formidable in every shape. Perplexed in his mind what measures to pursue, he at length dispatched a letter * to him, by the hands of one of his courtiers, requesting a fuller explanation of all the king's reasons for invading the empire in so hostile a manner; alledging, that his Swedish majesty had no more to do with the affairs of Stralsund, and the intestine quarrels of the princes and states of the empire, than the emperor had to do with the internal government of Sweden; admonishing him at the same time to withdraw his troops and conclude a peace, or else threatening to drive him and his army out of the empire, by sending the whole weight of his mighty legions against him; inasmuch as the affairs of Germany regarded only the Germanic body. Gustavus received the letter with extreme politeness, and told the gentleman it required too many serious considerations and reflections to be answered immediately: *Besides, Sir, said he, I am at this present juncture unable; but will not fail to send a proper reply to his Casarean majesty the very first moment I am recovered of a wound, which an EAGLE † hath given me in the hand, wherewith I hold my pen.* Upon which the courier, without saying a word more, made his obeysances, and retired, perceiving plainly, that this allegorical excuse proceeded from the resentments the king had entertained on account of the detachment, which had been sent into Poland under Arnheim's conduct; and so much the rather, as the court of Vienna had denied the Swedes to raise recruits in the empire during the Polish war ‡. And here it may not be improper to relate a few passages with regard to Ferdinand II. emperor of Germany, whom more from a sense of his power, than from an idea of any extraordinary abilities in him, Gustavus considered as his great antagonist. He succeeded Mathias in 1619. That monarch had two brothers, Maximilian, who died one year before him, and Albert; but neither of them had any children. Ferdinand was their cousin-german, first prince of their blood, son of the late arch-duke Charles, prince of Stiria, who was brother to the emperor Maximilian, father of Mathias, Maximilian, and Albert. The said emperor Maximilian and Charles prince of Stiria were brothers sons of the

* See the original in the *Mercure François* en l'an 1630, tom. xvi. p. 334. It bears date from Ratisbon, August 1². Vide APPENDIX, Art. XI V. first edit. 4°.

† Alluding to the Austrian arms. See *Le Baron*, tom. ix. p. 601. *Riccius de Bellis Germ.* 199. ‡ *Heymanni Leo Arctotus*, p. 9.

emperor Ferdinand, and Anne heiress to the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary; which made out Ferdinand's title to those dominions.

This person had great concerns in history, and yet history reports little with respect to him. That he was a bigot is certain, as appears by a remark we have made elsewhere in a paragraph relating to cardinal Klesel *. To which another anecdote of the same nature may be added. When the decisions of the Bohemian judicature were transmitted to Vienna, with reference to the intended state-massacre, which was decreed to complete the battle of Prague, he sent for his confessor (whose name was Lamormain) and adjured him by his conscience to inform him; whether he could safely sign the dead warrants, or as safely grant an universal pardon. To which that worthy and generous ecclesiastic replied, *Utrumque in potestate tua est, Cæsar* †. Yet the unmerciful alternative took place. One hundred and eighty-five noble protestant families were sent to beg their bread in foreign countries; and the principal personages of the kingdom signed the evangelical profession with their best blood on a public scaffold, not merely like Greeks and Romans, but with a serenity and vivacity no ways unbecoming the primitive Christians: of which I cannot refrain from inserting some few particulars, being such as it is highly probable have occurred to few people in the course of their reading.

When the inquisitors of justice examined count de Schlick with great rigour, he tore open his cloaths, and laying bare his breast, made the following speech in so many words; *Tear this body of mine into ten thousand pieces; probe every vein and corner of my heart; you shall not find a single sentiment there, but what my right hand hath subscribed at the bottom of the apology. The love of liberty, and of God's religion, and of my country; prompted that very hand to wield the sword: and since it hath pleased the Supreme Being to transfer success to the emperor, and deliver us into your hands, I can only say with submission, resignation, and reverence, the will of God be done* ‡!

Many other unfortunate prisoners spoke much to the same effect; and all protested, *That the justice of a national revolt could not derive its morality from the event of second causes; and, what is still more remarkable, no one person acknowledged the crime of rebellion.*

When that part of Schlick's sentence was read, which pronounced his body to be torn to pieces with wild horses,

* See p. 169, 170.

† *Hist. Persecutionum Eccles. Bobem.* 120. p. 211. 1632. Sine loco.

‡ *Ib.* &c. &c. *Lanæa Austriaca*, fol. 460, &c.

and his limbs hung up in various places, he addressed to his judges with an air of serenity a beautiful application from the classics,

FACILIS JACTURA SEPULCHRI :

and when father Sedatius, chief of the Jesuits, who had much laboured to bring about his conversion, cried out hastily, at the time the executioner's hand was lifted up, *Domine comes, recordare adhuc*; he replied to him and his associates with an air of severity, *Jam me facite missum*.

When supper was served up to these state-criminals the evening before the execution, they all declared, that they had no need of a *material* repast: nevertheless, lest the public might conclude their abstinence to proceed from fear, they were determined to take the refreshment of the table, and then endeavour to obtain a good night of repose. On the morning of execution they all dressed themselves in their richest apparel, and those, who were military men, wore such part of their armour and habit as might not create any hindrance to the executioner.

The chevalier Kapler had an offer made him of receiving his life upon condition he could content himself with perpetual imprisonment; but the answer he sent the vice-roy, the prince of Lichtenstein, was, “*That being an extremely old man, unable either to taste wine or relish meat, walking with pain, and sleeping with difficulty, he had but one favour to ask, which was to be BEHEADED.*” The venerable Michaelovitzki, whom the king of Bohemia particularly loved, when the officers came to conduct a young nobleman to the scaffold, stepped before him with an air of vivacity, and said, *seniores, priores: I demand the precedency of age.* He had been one of the principal actors in all the public commotions next to Thurn, and had been joined with him as deputy-burgrave of Carlstein-castle (a post of singular honour and profit, as the regalia of the crown are there preserved), and was one of the three embassadors, that had been sent to Francfort at the election of Ferdinand.

Kutnar, a senator of old Prague, for some particular reasons, was condemned to be hanged. When he mounted the scaffold, *My good friends and countrymen, said he to the spectators, a strange death is allotted me; for whether I am to be suspended by the heels, the neck, or the ribs, is more than I know, and more than I care for, except it be that I cannot have the reputation to leave the world as a gentleman ought to do.* And another criminal of superior rank, when that part of the sentence was pronounced against him, which mentioned tearing of his body to pieces with wild horses, made a very lively

answer without much disturbance; *Gentlemen*, said he, *send one limb to the pope, a second to the emperor, a third to the king of Spain, and a fourth to the great Turk; yet the Supreme Being will know how to re-unite them at the last day.*

But to conclude these tragical scenes: the case of Dr. Jessen was more extraordinary. This gentleman (who was an Hungarian of noble extract) had been rector of the university of Prague, celebrated for his learning and knowledge throughout all Europe; and being a physician had amused himself with judicial astrology, according to the vogue and practices of that age. In the year 1618 he had been sent ambassador to the Hungarians, and in his conferences with them had executed his commission with great success and dexterity: but it was his misfortune in his return homewards to be seized by some imperial soldiers; and thus he became a state-prisoner at Vienna. The house of Austria thought fit to exchange him against an Italian of consequence, who served the emperor, and upon quitting the prison he wrote thus on the chamber-walls, I. M. M. M.

The arch-duke Ferdinand, amongst others, went to the prison, in order to decypher and explain these initial letters, and at length declared their meaning to be, IMPERATOR. MATHIAS. MENSE. MARTIO. * MORIETUR. He then with eagerness drew a pencil from his pocket, and added a second reading and explanation; JESSENI. MENTIRIS. MALA. MORTE. MORIERIS. † which shews at least, that the future emperor had some readiness and vivacity of parts.

These circumstances were recalled back to men's minds, and much talked of, whilst the doctor lay under condemnation. Nevertheless his custom was to give one general answer to all enquirers; *As my prophecy held good with relation to the death of Matthias, his Imperial majesty, Ferdinand, will certainly take care to see his prediction verified in relation to poor Jessen.*

In a word, the persecutions of the house of Austria had hardened the Bohemians into a state of heroism; and of course I shall relate but one striking example more in regard to cruelty. Two officers held a naked infant by the legs, and one of them splitting it through with a stroke of his sabre, made use of this horrid expression, *Jam habes sub utraque*; alluding to the communion under both species, which the unhappy protestants had requested with earnestness †.

* He died the March ensuing 1619. † He was executed in 1621.

† *Hispanica Dominatio: Arcana*, p. 85.

These short instances may serve to give some idea of the temper and government of Ferdinand II. Mean while Gustavus received a joint-letter *, subscribed by the several electors, dispatched from the same place with that of the emperor, and bearing date August 3: in which, by the way, they had recovered their memories so far, as to give him the titles of king; an honour they had withheld from him in the preceding part of their application to him. It was pretended, that the omission of the regal title did not proceed from any disregard or evil-intention of the heart, but from a certain form and parade of dignity, which the electoral body had assumed from time immemorial in their correspondence even with crowned heads. But it is visible to every reader, that the house of Austria held the pen even in *this* letter, for the electors blamed him on account of his interference in regard to Stralsund, for interrupting the deliberations at Ratisbon with an armed force, and for a needless interposition in respect to the restitution of his kinsmen, the dukes of Mechlenberg; and then advised him to evacuate the empire and rely on the humanity and equity of his Imperial majesty.

By this time Gustavus, (it being near the middle of August,) thought proper to form one general camp under the walls of Stetin (which he committed to the conduct of Gustavus Horn); having received a reinforcement from that commander of 8000 fresh troops out of Livonia; himself making excursions here and there, in order to reduce the neighbouring fortified towns into subjection. He had an earnest desire to make himself master of Gartz and Griffenhagen, two important cities, which commanded the river Oder; but did not think it expedient to hazard his troops on so hard a service in the very infancy of an invasion. He therefore left a part of his army encamped, as we observed before, to carry on the conquest of Pomerania: and applied himself with the rest of his forces, (having first ordained a general fast,) to reduce the duchy of Mechlenberg, which lies contiguous to it, partly from a point of honour to recover the dominions of his kinsmen the deposed dukes, and partly with a view to attack Walftein's new acquisitions (an enterprize highly popular in the empire) and render himself master of the whole shore of the Baltic. Shaping his course therefore towards Stralsund, he attacked Wolgast, the capital of a duchy bearing the same name (whose fort he had taken before, and

* It had been preceded by one dated July 10. This letter is preserved in the *Mercure François* and in *Arnaldæus*, p. 37.

which

which town Bahier had blockaded) and having made himself master of the city, at length took the castle by surrender, after discharging 8000 cannon-shot against its walls. Colonel Schleücter evacuated the place, marching out at the head of five companies of infantry, which were reduced to 600 men; one half of whom immediately enlisted themselves in his majesty's service. Upon this the castle was repaired and furnished for the reception of the Queen of Sweden, who was soon expected to make a visit to her husband, and become the partaker of his good or bad fortunes.

By this time Torquato had withdrawn from his camp at Anclam, and entrenched himself under the cannon of Gartz; and as he dreaded Gustavus in open field, determined (according to the practice of his country, for he was an Italian) to over-reach his enemy by fraud and stratagem, and either kill him, or make him his prisoner. To this purpose one of his officers named Quinti Aligheri (some call him Quinti del Ponte) deserted by permission, under pretence of some disgust, and was admitted, lieutenant-colonel in Falkenberg's regiment of cavalry. He there found a countryman, who was a captain of horse, one John Baptista, whom, according to the custom of the wars, he chose for his comrade, and imparted to him the whole plot which Conti and he had contrived. Some time afterwards Gustavus had a desire to take a view in person of Torquato's lines, in order to form the siege of Damin, where all Quinti's ill acquired wealth was deposited*; upon which this officer, who was a favourite with the king, being one of the party, contrived to leave his master; and riding full speed to the Imperial general gave him a brief information of the expedition intended. As his majesty had only seventy soldiers with him, Torquato dispatched immediately 500 chosen Neapolitan cuirassiers, whom the traitor Aligheri commanded †. The subtle Italian having disposed an ambuscade with great dexterity (for therein consisted good part of the military genius, before the arrival of Gustavus) inclosed the king on his return in a narrow defilé, where he could neither advance nor retreat. No private soldier ever made a braver defence than his majesty did; and in spite of a superiority more than six to one, the Swedes kept firm to their leaders, nor did a single man behave ill. Their resistance was so heroical and so obstinate, that Quinti was obliged to change his original plan (of taking his majesty alive) and try, if possible, to cut him to pieces. He twice or thrice determined to shoot him; but his presence of mind failed

* *Memorabilia Suec. Gentis*, p. 85.

† *Riccio de Bellis Germ.* 201, &c.

him;

him* ; for he dreaded the look of a man like Gustavus, whom he had basely betrayed ; and greatly feared that the cries of the combatants, and brisk discharge of the fire-arms, might collect some straggling partizans to the king's defence. Gustavus, after his horse was killed by two musquet-balls, fought for a considerable space of time on foot, nor had his soldiers opportunity or power to remount him. He for some moments was taken prisoner, though unknown, (and it is remarkable he never moved so sullenly, as when the enemy wanted to carry him off :) but his companions threw themselves round him, like men in despair, and instantly recovered him ; for every man, without consulting his friends, had determined to die or conquer.

At length a Livonian colonel, (posted at the head of a detachment by the king's orders, to secure a retreat,) grew uneasy at discovering no signs of his master's return. He commanded his men to advance with all convenient speed, and dispatched a troop of horse before in full gallop to procure intelligence. Hearing the noise of the fire arms, they followed it, and soon found his majesty with a surviving handful of men crowding round him, just upon the point of being overcome. The colonel appeared, and soon routed the Neapolitans, without attempting to pursue them, concluding it honour enough to have preserved his sovereign.

This action in point of bravery was considered by the army as a very extraordinary one ; namely, that seventy men, taken at a disadvantage and by surprize, should maintain a fight half an hour against 500 chosen troops, animated with the hopes of taking no less person prisoner than the king of Sweden. As to Aligheri, or Quinti, he returned back to the Imperial service, and there continued ; but his comerade John Baptista, according to the then military law, had the honour to be beheaded in the Swedish camp. Two Imperial banners were gained in this rencounter, and presented to his majesty, who, though charmed with the fidelity and bravery of his followers, received the compliment with an air of affliction ; for other thoughts then possessed his mind, and obstructed his joy. *I am sorry, said he, to have brought a set of brave men (for such my companions truly were) so far from their respective homes, and see them cut to pieces by unequal numbers. What might they not have lived to perform, if the warmth of my temper had not delivered them inconsiderately to slaughter †?*

* Schefferi Memorab. 209, 210.

† Hist. or Autbent. Relat. in Low Dutch, Tom. 174: Nevertheless the author Danckaertz has placed his speech under a wrong paragraph.

But a misfortune more inglorious still threatned his majesty; for a German monk born at Amberg, originally nothing better than a taylor, had formed a design to deprive him of his life*.

This man, in order to attract Gustavus's observation, wandered about the camp under the appearance of an exile, having a book in his hand, and always affecting to pore therein. Some say his purpose was to give the king a packet of poisoned papers to peruse; a practice at that time much in vogue † amongst the Italian troops that served the emperor; others assert, that his intention was to have recourse to the Stilleto. Be that as it may, the attempt was suspected and believed.

Whilst Gustavus employed himself in considering the situation and the fortifications of the town of Gartz (which town as well as Griffenhagen the duke of Pomerania had besought him to free from the Imperial garrisons) a Swedish colonel had formed a design to take an outwork, which belonged to the former place, by surprize; and in order to obtain what he thought the securest advice, imparted his project to several officers, that served with him; but by some accident, either of treachery or heedlessness, the secret took vent, and the garrison being prepared for his coming, gave him a very unexpected reception. Nevertheless he made his retreat like a man, who understood the fighting part; and presented two standards to the king, who received them with a certain air of dissatisfaction, observing to the generals, that stood round him, *That no retreat or defence could justify a commander, who had no power to lock up a military secret in his own breast ‡.*

His Imperial majesty thought it now high time to cement his friendship more and more with the court of Madrid; and of course a contract of marriage was signed between Ferdinand his son, king of Hungary; and Anna Maria, sister to Philip IV. king of Spain. This princess embarked at Barcelona with a very numerous and magnificent fleet; but not being able to land at Genoa, (on account of the plague, which then reigned there,) pointed her course to Naples, and asked permission of the Venetians to cross the

* *Loecenii Hist. Suecana*, p. 571.

† I have been informed, that prince Eugene was once stunn'd with perusing a poisoned letter purposedly written in a hand so difficult, that it required a very close examination: and to this moment some great persons in Italy break open suspicious acquets with their hands behind them, and leave them unfolded to the air for some time.

‡ *Historical or Authentic Relat.* Tom. i. p. 174.

Adriatic*. But that republic, whose maxim it was to talk highly at a time when other nations act with timidity, ordered Pisani, general of the islands, to give battle to the fair lady's squadron, without any ceremony: nevertheless an offer was made to convey her to Trieste, in the gallees belonging to the state. Upon this, couriers were dispatched immediately to the courts of Vienna and Madrid: and as the politicians there did not chuse to convert a wedding into a sea-fight, the escort of the republic (which the state paid for) was accepted. But, by these delays, the princess did not arrive at Vienna till the third week of the year ensuing, and then the nuptials were celebrated in full form.

Led by some evil destiny of war, a small party of 300 Swedes entered the little town of Passewalk, and began to fortify themselves therein: but a body of 3000 Imperialists detached from Torquato's army surrounded them unexpectedly; and either their resistance was so extraordinary, or the cruelty of the Imperialists so great, *that not a single person out of the garrison escaped.*

From this moment the war began to grow quite in earnest, and extremely bloody. At length it was agreed, in consequence of the representations of the king of Sweden, to allow free and fair quarter on either side. Nevertheless the Imperialists were cruel enough to except the soldiers of the duke of Pomerania, and Gustavus by way of retaliation excluded the Croatsians: *For if, said he, the former are to be considered as a band of rebels, I shall look upon the latter as an herd of savages* †.

About this time a singular adventure happened to 700 Scots, who, in coasting the Baltic from Pillau in order to join the main body of the Swedish army, had the misfortune to be shipwrecked near Rugenwall ‡; which town was defended by an Imperial garrison.

These poor wretches lost their ammunition and baggage, and excepting a few wet musquets had only pikes and swords, wherewith to defend themselves. Add to this, the enemies troops were quartered all round the country, and the king and his army removed from them at a distance of eighty

* *Le Barre, Hist. d'Allemagne, Tom. ix. 602.*

† *Pietro Pomo; Guerre di Germania, lib. i. p. 9.*

‡ Rugenwall is a large town, with a good harbour and castle, situated on a tract of land which projects into the Baltic, lying just half way between Stetin and Dantzic. It was then one of the duke's places of residence, and was greatly embellished with parks, waters, &c. Rich XIV. king of Sweden held his court there twenty years, having left his country in 1439.

• miles.

miles. In this dilemma Robert Monro * their commander sent a message to the late Pomeranian governor, who was still in Rugenwalt with some soldiers, (acting seemingly under the Imperial directions) with orders to inform him, that if he would open a postern gate for him at night, and convey to him fifty firelocks and ammunition, he would engage to clear the town of its new visitants, and restore it in such manner as their two respective masters should afterwards agree.

Thus Monro by a singular fortitude and presence of mind took Rugenwalt by a midnight assault, and having dispatched a messenger to advertise his majesty of what had happened, obstructed all the passes that approached the town, and maintained himself bravely and prudently there for the space of nine weeks, till his countryman colonel Hepburn, who commanded under Oxenstiern in Livonia and the adjacent parts of Prussia, relieved him with his own regiment, and having drawn together a small army of 6000 men, acted in concert with Kniphausen, and blockaded Colbergen. Indeed, by peculiar good fortune, 400 German soldiers belonging to the Swedish army were driven by stress of weather into the harbour near the town, which increased the garrison to 1100 men. And here one may just observe incidentally, that during the shipwreck of the Scottish troops, a serjeant's wife without the assistance of any other woman, was delivered of a fine male-child, which she anxiously held in her arms, and conveyed safely to shore, and marched with it in the like manner four long miles the next day. So that when lord Rea gave the king an exact account of the extraordinary manner whereby the town of Rugenwalt was thrown into the possession of the Swedes; his majesty replied, with visible marks of joy in his countenance, *That he now began to hope, that the Supreme Being gave marks of approbation in the support of his cause.*

About this time Gustavus marched an army, consisting of 13,000 men, up to the very front of Torquato's lines, (which stretched themselves round the fortifications of Gartz) and used all sorts of provocation and allurements to draw the cautious Italian to a pitched battle. Gustavus performed this feat of chivalry merely to keep the troops in spirits; nor was it an unsuccessful artifice, according to the practice of war in that age; for he well foresaw, that Torquato would not depart from the strength of his intrenchments. However, in his return from this piece of military gallantry, he met by

† *Author of the two expeditions, Lond, fol. 1637. part 2. p. 3.*

chance a kinsman of Wallstein in a coach and six, escorted by part of a regiment. Orders were given to charge him instantly, and 150 persons were taken prisoners; but the young man quitted his coach, and owed his escape to the fleetness of his horse.

The greater part of Pomerania being now secured, his majesty turned his thoughts towards an irruption into the duchy of Mechlenberg, and having rendered himself master of the strong fortrefs of Stolpe, which commanded the narrow frith, through which he was to sail from Stetin, embarked 12,000 chosen men aboard his fleet, and passing by Wolgast and Stralfund, surprized Bart, and then took by storm the important towns of Damgarten and Ribnitz. These two places, (joined together by a bridge cross a small river bearing the same name with the last town, and removed from each other at a distance of about three miles,) were in those days considered as the lock and key that gave admission into the duchy of Mechlenberg on the Pomeranian side; the securing a passage over rivers being esteemed in those days the first part of military prudence. Gustavus attacked Ribnitz at midnight, and carried it after a very sharp struggle; for the Imperial colonel Merodé made an obstinate resistance, and was taken prisoner sword in hand. Nor must it be forgotten, that in the confusions of a night-attack some retaliations were made for the cruelties lately exercised at Passewalk. Nevertheless the king soon repressed the fury of his troops: so that only a few Imperialists were put to the sword.

And here it must be observed, that the navigation from Stetin to Damgarten was a very difficult and dangerous undertaking, being all to be performed in a narrow channel, full of islands, sand-banks and promontories, not to mention that in some places the whole Baltic ocean set in upon them in case the wind blew from the north, or any points tending towards the north. But Gustavus was by this time a sort of admiral; affecting independency alike both by sea and land; and having thus obtained a tolerably secure footing in the duchy of Mechlenberg, invited all the country by proclamations to disown Wallstein, and acknowledge their antient possessors.

It is true the duke and states of Pomerania had besought his majesty to give Torquato battle (of which he made a proffer, without expecting it should be accepted) and drive him from the neighbourhood of Gartz, and Griffenhagen,

* See the original in *Arlanibai's Armis Suecicis*, P. 4. 43.

both

both for the general quiet of the country, and the security of Stetin in particular: but the king had not phlegm enough to waste his time and sacrifice his men in watching the motions of an intrenched wary Italian. Besides, he knew from good authority (for no prince ever procured better intelligence) that the inhabitants of Mechlenberg wished to see him. Their natural prince had been dispossessed, and whole country long groaned under the tyranny of Walstein. He foresaw too, as he governed all his campaigns by political good sense, that a vigorous attack upon *that general's* territories would be highly agreeable to some of the enemies, and all the friends of Sweden. He had a by-view likewise in approaching nearer and nearer to the territories of William landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, whose father Maurice was then alive, but had resigned the government to him in 1628. Herman Wolf, the landgrave's minister, besought the king's protection and assistance, and made overtures of assisting him with an army of 8000 men. A treaty was instantly committed to paper without hesitation on either side, but was not signed and confirmed till the ensuing year.

Amelia Elizabeth of Hanau, the widow of this prince (for he died in 1637) proved the best ally that Sweden ever had in the course of twenty German campaigns. Her designs were great and generous, and executed with such precision, firmness and fidelity, that she became the ornament and glory of the protestant cause. Her husband William left the minority of his son to her regency, and, if I mistake not, the kings of England and France were requested to give their assistance. She waged war boldly against the emperor and the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt concerning the district of Marpurg, and obtained at the peace of Westphalia the abbacy of Hirschfeld, and four signiors to be annexed forever to her dominions. She gained likewise by way of indemnification upwards of 90,000 l. to be raised in nine months from the dioceses of Mentz, Cologne, Paderborn, Munster and Fulda: resigning the power of government to her son in 1650, and surviving duke Bernard de Weymar (who had an ambition to marry her) about twelve years*.

Mean while Torquato attacked Horn in his entrenchments at Stetin, but was repulsed with considerable loss; and having dispatched the duke of Savelli into the duchy of Mechlenberg (which was properly speaking, the duke's district of command) in order to counteract the king's motions, wasted the rest of the campaign in a sort of desponding

* *L. Hoff Notit. Principum, fol. 244.*

inactivity, and took here and there a defenceless town merely for the sake of extorting money; dealing in nothing except little incursions, surprisings, and matters of plunder and contribution.

The king next turned his eyes upon Rostock (by the natives supposed to signify the town of roses) a considerable city, and an univerfity; distant from the Baltic about four miles, and from Ribnitz something more than twenty. But Savelli put a stop to this siege; for asking permission of the magistrates to march a detachment through their town, in order to secure Doberan, the thousand horse, who entered first, seized the grand gate by violence, and let in the infantry. His majesty wrote to the magistrates on the occasion, who seemed willing to admit him, but knew not how: upon this he changed the siege into a blockade; ordered part of his fleet to possess the harbour, and erected redoubts and strong fortifications upon all the principal roads that approached the town. By these methods the garrison began to be extremely straitened, and Savelli, with a view to merit the good graces of Walstein, dispatched 4000 men to cut a passage for themselves, and throw some relief both of provisions and soldiers into the town. This detachment the Swedes handled very roughly (his majesty being returned to his camp at Stetin) and Banier received orders to continue the blockade.

I should have observed before, that Gustavus, highly pleased with these prosperous beginnings, and confirmed in his good opinion of the loyalty of the Mechlenbergers, published a second manifesto relative to his entrance into their territories, which contained little more than a bitter invective against the usurpation and tyranny of Walstein, whose pretensions to the dukedom he treated with contempt, and called his soldiers land-buccaneers, ruffians, and murderers*.

In the way to Stetin, the king rested for a short space at Stralsund, and after a consideration of three and thirty days from the time of date, dispatched his reply †, to the joint letter of the several electors. He here tells them, (as fresh letters had arrived during his majesty's silence, full of excuses

* See the original in *Arlanibzi, Arma Suec.* 44. 45. *Hist. or Authent. Relat.* Tom. i. p. 178.

† This reply is preserved in the *Mercure François.* Tom. xvi. p. 338; but as more letters had passed from the electors to the king, I chuse to take my account from Loccenius, being an author of better repute, and who had nearer access to the truth: (*Hist. Suec.* p. 574.) nevertheless, I have preserved the letter of the *Mercure* in the *Appendix*, Article XII. *First Edition* 40.

for omission of terms of ceremony, and requesting him at the same time to depart from Germany) *That he was not displeas'd to find they had at length discovered him to be a king, (for his name in these second letters was placed before their own) and had not denied him the title, which the Supreme Being had bestow'd on him.*

In addition to what hath been already mention'd, the substance of his answer was, "That the suppression of the regal title was treating him slightly, which (said he) was a want of respect and good manners, but neither demerited him, nor exalted them. He then enumerated the various causes and motives that induced him to enter the empire, and added with great frankness, that in case such conditions could be procured for himself and his allies, he would discontinue the war as cheerfully as he had undertaken it.

Two days afterwards he wrote to Louis XIII *, cardinal Richelieu †, and Charles I. As to the latter I can say nothing, it being only in my power to relate the fact. In his letter to the French king, "He desired leave to raise recruits in France; and told him roundly, he was surpris'd De Charnacé his ambassador had made a difficulty in a point of meer form only."

To understand this matter, which is only hinted at in the letter, with an equal degree of delicacy and politeness, I must have recourse for the satisfaction of my readers to other authorities †, and observe that de Charnacé, in the rough-draught of the treaty, had insert'd the word *protection* on the part of France; and insist'd likewise, that the name of his master should *precede* that of Gustavus, even in the ratification, which the latter was to sign. To this his Swedish majesty answer'd livelily and with some emotion, *That he knew no protection but that of the Supreme Being; and as the two contracting parties were both kings, so they were both equal in dignity; and that precedence in this case was a thing not to be understood.* To which De Charnacé replied, conformably to the petulance of his nation, *That all scarlet was not of the same value.* Gustavus nettled to the quick with such an impertinence, and at the same time being the prince in the world the most jealous of his dignity, told him with a stern air, *That he chose rather to dispense with the assistance of France, than tarnish the glory of the antient crown of Sweden; it appearing matter of astonishment to*

* These two letters are preserved in the Appendix, Articles XVI. XVII. First Edit. 4^o.

† Puffendorff, *Sur les Aliances entre la France & la Suede*, p. 5. The latter part of this book, by answering Chanut in many places, renders that period of history more complete.

him, that his Christian majesty should desire him to resign a title, which he held only from heaven: These difficulties being smoothed, (or rather acceded to by the French,) the treaty was concluded in the beginning of the next year.

In his letter to Richelieu *, he renews the same complaints concerning the wrong-headed obstinacy of M. de Charnacé, and beseeches the cardinal to put an end to such ridiculous obstructions, which tend in their own nature to create delays and misunderstandings.

As Tilly had orders from Vienna and Munich to approach Torquato de Conti as expeditiously as possible, Gustavus was determined to hinder that junction, which he had reason to be alarmed at; since two powerful armies in the neighbourhood of Saxony and Brandenburg might have hindered the electors from coming to an accommodation with him, which he earnestly wished for; and which he was almost morally sure of effecting, upon supposition he could either obstruct or traverse the motions of Tilly. In order therefore to form a diversion of this nature, he set himself to contrive that general some business in the duchy of Magdeburg, and to that purpose persuaded the administrator Christian William of Brandenburg to make himself master of the capital, and prevail on the inhabitants and their neighbours to take up arms. A Swedish envoy attended him in this expedition. The magistrates and people soon complied, and raised a body of 2000 foot, and 2500 horse.

The city of Magdeburg had been the subject of great contests some years before; for the house of Brandenburg (as we have observed) had fixed a kinsman there in the administration, who was uncle to the then elector, and had found his interest long declining at the court of Vienna, having made himself an associate of the league at Lawenberg, and formed an alliance with Christian king of Denmark. Upon this account Ferdinand recommended his son, the archduke Leopold, to be co-adjutor; but the chapter renounced against the proposal, and petitioned for Augustus, second son then living of the elector of Saxony, because he was a protestant.

The old administrator had made a visit to Gustavus at Stockholm, just before the expedition into Germany, and had asked assistances of men and money. He received great encouragement in both particulars: but the king charged him to check his resentment for some time; and make pretences of submission †.

* See the Appendix.

† Chemnitzus. lib. ii.

His majesty at that time either could not, or, (to speak more properly) chose not to answer the demands of the administrator, who required money to raise an army of 10,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry: nevertheless he gave him letters of credit on several bankers and merchants, to raise a part of the sum; for the payment of which he made himself responsible*.

This exiled prince was kindly received by all the inhabitants of the duchy; and the troops he had collected in the king's name and in his own, made several excursions, and drove the enemy out of many important posts. But their commander, though no young man, was a new warrior; undertaking more than he could conquer, and more than he could have maintained in case he had proved successful in his first enterprizes: for the elector of Bavaria had long foreseen the effects of this insurrection, and had sent Pappenheim † at the head of 6000 men to give a check to it, and co-operate with Torquato and Savelli in such a manner, as to give their troops free room to act in. Pappenheim, the ablest and most active general in those days, next to Gustavus, soon compelled a novice in the art of war to contract his conquests, and at length reduced him to shelter his troops under the walls of Magdeburg, round which he formed a fort of blockade.

His majesty perceiving the prince to be thus straitened, and well foreseeing, that the preservation of the duchy of Magdeburg might have great influence on the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, dispatched colonel Falkenberg, grand maréchal of the household, an officer of approved bravery, to direct the administrator with his counsels, support the spirit of the inhabitants, and promise them speedy relief; which soon afterwards, from a strange concurrence of circumstances, it was not in his power to bring about. I speak not here of the grand relief, which he destined to send to the inhabitants in the month of May ensuing, when Tilly besieged the town in form; but purely with a view to the present blockade. Nevertheless, it was impossible for his majesty to leave the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to chuse their party, being both of them at that time in a state of uncertainty: and, what was still worse, it was not in his power just then

* *Bracelii Hist. Nost. Temp. ad Ann. 1630.*

† Godfrey Henry, count de Pappenheim, one of the most renowned warriors in that century. He was originally a baron, and got nothing of the emperor but the title of count, with the appendix of *Illustriſſimo*. He married Ludomilla of the house of Colorath; but we shall recite more particulars concerning him in another place.

to convey to the inhabitants of the town a considerable sum of money, which put the burghers out of humour, who expected prompt payment.

To make this diversion in behalf of the Swedish cause still stronger, Francis Charles, duke of Sax-Lawenberg*, was employed to insist a body of soldiers in the districts round Hamburg and Lubec. The prince had the good fortune to take Ratzburg (a place of residence belonging to his family) by a surprize at midnight; a city of some consequence and natural strength, being situated like Mantua in a large lake. Him colonel Reinach was sent to oppose and harass with his own regiment newly raised in Frizeland, and a thousand other soldiers. To support him Pappenheim advanced, and as he exceeded most generals in secrecy and speedy marches, soon trode on the duke's heels, at a time when he expected nothing less than a visit from him. The first step that vigilant commander took was to surprize a convoy, that came to Lawenberg's assistance; and then making a forced march, secured the foot of Ratzburg bridge, and the port-cullis which defended it, before the garrison perceived him. The possession of this bridge, (which was 300 paces long, and the only way of entrance into the town,) soon gave him a power to prescribe laws to it. Upon this, duke Augustus,

* In these wars were several dukes of Sax-Lawenberg; as the reigning duke, named *Augustus*: and he, after many attempts towards a neutrality, at length espoused the Swedish cause; as did also *Francis Charles*, the person here mentioned, who married the widow of Gabriel Bethlehem, (with whom he received a fine dowry) and then the relict of colonel Teuffel, who was born counts of Megau. He made himself a convert to the church of Rome. *Francis Henry* was a Swedish colonel, to whom Gustavus gave the estates belonging to the convent of Marienflays in Pomerania. On the other hand, *Rodolphus Maximilian* served under Tilly, as did also *Francis Julius*, who was killed by the peasants near Lintz. Next came the youngest son *Francis Albert*, whom we shall speak of more minutely hereafter. In the year 1625, this prince commanded a regiment of light horse under Wallstein. He was an officer of good esteem at the siege of Mantua, and acted next to Arnheim in the Polish campaign of 1629. As to the duchy of Lawenberg, it belongs now to his Britannic majesty; the family of Lawenberg becoming extinct at the decease of duke Francis Julius in 1689; which is the more extraordinary, as his grandfather Francis II. had twelve sons and seven daughters, many of whom married, and were blessed with a numerous offspring. Yet the whole family became extinct in fifty years. On this event, only eight competitors preferred their claims to this territory, of whom the chief were George William duke of Zell, and Augustus king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, who being occupied in other matters, sold his pretensions to the duke of Zell for something more than 150,000 l. And as about this time a new electorate was erected in favour of the house of Brunswic-Lunenberg, the dukes of Zell and Lawenberg, in the year 1715, on the death of George William, fell, with all rights of succession, to the electoral branch of Hanover,

who

who not long before had refused to give his brother entrance into the castle, found himself obliged to admit Pappenheim, for he did not care to exasperate the emperor. Francis Charles made an appearance of defending the town (though in truth it was not defensible): nevertheless, when all things were prepared by the Imperialists for a general assault, he sent to ask a truce, which Pappenheim granted him for the space of one single quarter of an hour. In that interim the duke attempted to escape to Lubec in a small pleasure-boat; but the steersman being killed by a falcon-shot, he thought it most prudent to drive to shore, and surrender himself to Pappenheim, who promised him, (with that generosity peculiar to brave men,) that neither the emperor, nor elector of Bavaria, should hurt him; engaging likewise for the security of his life, and an exemption from perpetual imprisonment.

The king, in order to be something nearer to these operations, made a second visit to Stralsund, from whence (it being now the last day of October) he thought fit to answer * the emperor's letter, which bore date August the 8th, having delayed returning a reply to him eight and forty days from the time he had dispatched his justification to the several electors: An affected indifference, partly with a view to mortify the Austrian pride (as the emperor had only bestowed upon him the title of *Our Prince*) and partly because he saw no ground-work whereon to establish a solid accommodation.

It may suffice to say, with reference to this extraordinary letter, that he upbraided the emperor with great spirit and acrimony at first setting out, and gave him to understand, " That it became not the Cesarean majesty to suppress the
 " title of king in writing to him, since that implied a sort of
 " dependency on the Germanic empire; whereas at the
 " time the letter was written, he was not master of a single
 " inch of land in the empire: nor was it a reason, if
 " the case had been otherwise, that an affront should have
 " been offered to his regal character. Alledging afterwards
 " in the strongest terms, that the emperor had waged war
 " against him in Poland and Prussia, without any formal
 " declaration of hostilities. That for these reasons he could
 " not be accused of transgressing the laws of nature and
 " nations, inasmuch as he paid back a war, but did not
 " commence one. He then recapitulated briefly the several

* See the original in *Arm. Suecicis*, p. 54, &c. Nevertheless, I have rather carried the abstract of Lappenius in my eye. See a copy likewise in the Appendix, Art. XIV. First Edition 4^o.

“ arguments of his manifesto, but in a manner more pointed,
 “ more spirited, and more *ad hominem*; and finished his
 “ letter with observing, that he had no dislike to a general
 “ accommodation, if his allies, kinsmen, and friends, could
 “ be effectually redressed and himself convinced of the
 “ Imperial friendship, which at present appeared to him to
 “ be equivocal; since the house of Austria raised armies,
 “ and pretended to wish for peace, at the same moment:
 “ That for his own part he would deal in realities, and not
 “ uncertainties, and consent on no account to the proposals
 “ of a truce, or the dismissal of a single soldier.”

None but the truly brave and great can be thus firm and explicit in cases of emergency! But the short and honest way is always the true one, if men have *parts to reach their object*.

Highly satisfied therefore with affording the emperor so distinct an explanation, Gustavus gave audience next to a public minister from Brandenburg, who congratulated him in the elector's name, and besought him to consider his master as a neutral power. His majesty granted the request with great frankness; but, Sir, said he, *be pleased to tell the elector at the same time, that henceforward no connivances, no indulgencies must be shown to my enemies, and no advantages must result to them. — Tell him, moreover, effectually, (and not superficially) That he must dismiss the Imperialists from every part of his dominions, and allow them, under no pretext, either provisions, or quarters, or money. If he cedes one town to the emperor's convenience, let him resign another of equivalent importance to me; and if he furnishes the Imperialists on one hand, let him supply my Swedes on the other. Tell him, Sir, these are Gustavus's notions of a NEUTRALITY: and upon these terms, though he does not offer him FRIENDSHIP, he promises him SAFETY.*

It may readily be foreseen, that the proposals to the emperor on the part of Sweden were rejected with disdain; in consequence whereof Camerarius was sent ambassador to the Hague, with a view to solicit some powerful assistances from that quarter.

In his harangue *, dictated to him by the king and pronounced in full assembly of the states general, he told them with an air of candour and firmness, “ That his majesty at
 “ that period was attempting only to realize a scheme of
 “ supporting the distressed and afflicted, conformably to the
 “ request and exhortation of their high mightinesses some

* We have preserved it at full length in the Appendix, Article XVIII. *First Edition* 4°. It was pronounced in October 1630.

“ years

“ years before. — That the said prince his master had
 “ besought them in the month of May preceding, to dispatch
 “ their representatives to the conferences his Danish majesty
 “ had procured to be held at Dantzic; whither (as it is
 “ supposed) no deputies ever arrived on the part of the
 “ United Provinces. — He then acknowledges, that the
 “ letter of his master made its appearance at the Hague some
 “ days too late; but attributing that delay merely to acci-
 “ dents, insists strenuously, that no inconveniency had thence
 “ arisen to the states general: at the same time obliquely but
 “ politely expostulating with them on the subject of not
 “ returning an answer to his Swedish majesty.”

Recovering himself from that digression, which, though
 fully intended, had the appearance of being casual, “ he
 “ exhorts them to give some important diversions to the
 “ enterprizes of Spain and Austria;” since if the arms of
 Sweden should prove unsuccessful, the whole torrent of war
 might pour itself on the Low Countries; — and then observed
 with great modesty, “ that the king his master, far from
 “ flattering himself with presumptuous hopes, considered the
 “ success of the field as a periodical sort of prosperity;
 “ nevertheless, that he had cast the die, and passed not only a
 “ Rubicon, but the Baltic ocean.”

And as there are reasons to think, that Gustavus was
 somewhat piqued at the inattention of the Dutch, both with
 regard to forms of respect, as well as due vigilance to the
 public welfare of Europe in general, Camerarius concludes
 with telling them, “ That being then on the wing of
 “ departure, it might not be improper to appoint deputies to
 “ hold a conference with him the first moment that appeared
 “ convenient.” And thus the affair ended, in no degree to
 the disadvantage of Gustavus.

Whilst his majesty remained at Stralsund, a public fast for
 three days was observed in Sweden, and on his return to
 Stetin he appointed a second general humiliation, and ordered
 divine service to be solemnly celebrated at the head of every
 regiment. He then gave directions to a part of his army to
 push on vigorously the blockade of Colbergen*, which Tor-
 quato de Conti, and all the troops, that served under
 him, had made their magazine of wealth and plunder.
 The garrison consisted only of 1700 infantry, and a few
 horse.

* Colbergen is the third principal town in Ulterior Pomerania. It hath a
 rapid port near the Baltic, and carries on a considerable trade. Most people think
 the fortress strong, and the cathedral is esteemed a good piece of Gothic
 architecture.

The Imperial general, for the reason above assigned, was very desirous to raise the blockade, or throw 7 or 800 dragoons into the town: but that attempt was difficult, as Kniphausen and Bauditzen had closed up all the avenues with an army of about 12,000 men. It not being easy therefore to render this enterprize practicable, Ernest, count de Montecuculi *, was dispatched at the head of a detachment, consisting of 10,000 men (being the regiments of Colorado, Isolani, Goëtz, Spar, and Charles Walstein) who marched in full hopes of cutting the Swedes to pieces by way of surprize, and rendering ineffectual a very long and tedious blockade. But Horn, who lay at Stetin, soon procured intelligence of this enterprize, and having summoned a council of war, sent the generals advice to march out of their lines, and give the enemy battle. Upon this a draught was made of the moiety of soldiers in each regiment (for such was the king's practice;) every colonel being to conduct his own division; and as they were commanded *men*, (to use the language of the times) it was their custom to march *without colours*. By these means a general, upon any emergency, had the choice of the better half of his army, and the more experienced officers of rank and seniority; who by their presence not only kept the common men in spirits, but did them honour; and if the service proved sharp, no regiment was destroyed, but in part only †.

The army being thus draughted, the remaining moiety, with Lesley at their head, and under the direction of their respective lieutenant-colonels, defended the lines of the camp; so that the Swedish detachment being re-inforced from Horn's army, and by several handfuls of soldiers selected from the neighbouring garrisons, made in the whole about 11,000 effective men. Serjeant-major-general Kniphausen, who commanded it in chief, considered well the nature of the road, by which the enemy intended to approach him, and having requested Sir John Hepburn to examine well the pass and fortrefs of Scheffelbein, orders were given to lieutenant-colonel Monro, to throw some companies of infantry into

* This officer, a person extremely accomplished, was descended from one of the best families in Modena, and passed regularly from the musquet to the partizan and baton; being at length general of the artillery and chief commander in Alsatia. His valour led him into an indiscreet rencounter near Colmar, where after having received two wounds from a sword and three musquet-shots, he had the misfortune to be taken prisoner, and died partly with grief, in the year 1633. He must not be confounded with his nephew Raymond, count de Montecuculi, of whom we shall speak hereafter in the storming of Brandenburg, &c.

† *Pietro Pomo; Guerre di Ferd. II. & Gustavo Adolfo. 4^o. Venet. 1638. p. 2.*
the

the town and castle, to whom Kniphausen gave a short billet in writing to this effect: *Maintain the town as long as you can, but give not up the castle whilst a single man continues with you**.

Upon the whole, this place was not defensible for a longer time than twenty-four hours; yet Monro having taken possession of it three days before Montecuculi's arrival, made a good appearance of resistance; and when the Imperial general had ranged his army round the walls, in order to give one united assault, and sent a trumpeter to propose a treaty, the brave Scot replied with great plainness, *That the word treaty by some chance had happened to be omitted in his instructions, and that he had only powder and ball at the count de Montecuculi's service*. Upon this orders were given to commence a general storm, but the Scottish troops behaved to admiration, and having laid the town in ashes, retired with great regularity into the castle. The Imperialists perceiving the governor to be a man of resolution, broke up their encampment, and quitted the siege.

This behaviour of Monro gave the Swedes a great advantage, for in that interim Kniphausen received Horn's assistances, and obtained a short space for deliberation; it being no small error in Montecuculi to have lost time in tampering with Monro, who had resolved to give a respite to his comrades, or perish in the ruins of Scheifelbein-castle.

Both armies were now in full march with different designs. As to the Swedes, the chief command was vested in Kniphausen; the baron Teüffel led the German infantry, lord Rea the English and Scots, and Bauditzen conducted the horse. About midnight they received intelligence from a peasant, that the Imperialists had taken up their lodgings in some little dorps hard by them; a piece of intelligence which was not unacceptable; since if these two bodies of troops had missed one another, the Imperialists probably might have forced the camp that remained round Colbergen, and thrown relief into the town. A council of war being summoned immediately, Kniphausen gave it for his opinion (for he was an officer of equal calmness and valour) that a midnight battle might prove a tumultuous and indecisive affair; since, supposing the worst to happen, that could be imagined, it would still be sufficient glory to maintain the siege, and render the enemy's design abortive: observing further, that they knew neither the strength nor the situation, nor the

* *Monro's Expeditions, part ii. p. 3.*

precautions taken by their adversaries ; and if by any misapprehension or error they should chance to be defeated, that then Colbergen, and even Stetin, would be irrecoverably lost. This opinion with some difficulty prevailed. Mean while the self-same peasant, as it is imagined, deserted to the Imperialists ; who took the alarm, and at three in the morning left their camp in flames. All were ready to blame Kniphausen, though perhaps unjustly : for appearances in war amount to demonstrations in weak minds. Nevertheless it was resolved at last, to march in pursuit of the flying enemies : and the Swedes the next morning, by eight o'clock, overtook them on a large heath, continuing their retreat with prudence and diligence, and skirmishing in good order ; but coming to a defile, and some carriages breaking and choaking up the road, the Imperialists found themselves obliged to confront their pursuers in good earnest. The Croatians, unaccustomed to serious fighting, soon took to flight : but the foot-soldiers ranging themselves in a morassy plain, determined to obtain honourable conditions, or sell their lives as dearly as they could. In this interim one of the darkest mists sprung up, that ever was known. The Imperial infantry asked quarter, and offered to serve his Swedish majesty in the same rank, and under the same conditions they had served the emperor ; protesting at the same time, that if these proposals were not accepted, they would maintain the fight to the last man. Whilst these matters were in agitation, Bauditzen, intirely ignorant of what had happened, returned from pursuing the Croatian horse, and seeing the gross of the enemies army drawn up in fair battalia and unbroken, attacked them immediately with great resolution. The Imperialists suspecting treachery, and finding themselves surrounded on every side, altered their first disposition, and forming immediately into Burgundian squares, returned a furious uninterrupted fire ; nevertheless Bauditzen entered them with his body of cavalry ; and upon these frequent charges, the other half of Bauditzen's horsemen, which composed the opposite wing of the Swedish army, supposing the enemy to have halted, and put themselves in a posture of disputing the victory (which opinion was confirmed by the flight and fear of dispersed soldiers, as is usual) fell immediately on the troops of their own army, who hemmed in the Imperialists on the point directly over-against Bauditzen. And thus a dreadful conflict ensued amongst mutual friends, and servants to the same master, which cost many a brave man his life. What caused the mistake was, that the Swedish army, as we hinted before, carried no colours on that day ; such being the custom in Gustavus's

Gustavus's service, when armies of expedition were composed of battalions draughted from several regiments. In this confusion and panic all the Swedish troops behaved by turns well and ill, excepting the van of the infantry commanded by Teüffel, and Bauditzen's large brigade of horse, conducted by lord Rea, and Sir John Devereux an Englishman. The Imperialists, under favour of this mist and mistake, retired with as little loss as may be imagined.

Thus the Swedes lost a compleat victory, partly by the springing up of the mist, and partly by not carrying the respective colours that belonged to each regiment: but whether the king ever altered this oversight, (in case it be thought one) is more than we can take upon us at this distance to determine.

And thus concluded a re-encounter of a very uncommon and disagreeable nature, where comrade killed his comrade, and friend his friend: nor can I agree with a brave Scottish officer, who in his relation of this engagement, where he happened to be present, calls it *a mighty pretty and comical sort of a battle*. Rut be that as it will, public thanksgivings were made throughout the several Swedish armies, with great seriousness and solemnity*.

And here it must be observed, that during the interval, which Monro's vigorous resistance procured, the king flew to Horn's camp, and placed himself, in conjunction with that general, at the head of a body of cavalry, in order to bear a share in so important a business; but an express from Kniphausen advertised them on the road, that he had obliged the enemy to retire.

Upon this Kniphausen returned to his antient camp, where he received a considerable re-inforcement from his master, and was succeeded by Horn, who having changed the blockade into a regular siege, and intercepted a convoy of 180 waggons laden with provisions, took Colbergen (which had been three years in fortifying) by capitulation, agreed upon in the month of March the year ensuing, after an obstinate resistance of five months. The garrison, consisting of 1500 good soldiers, was escorted to Landsberg; but, to encrease the governor's chagrin, four Imperial ships arrived the next day after signing the articles, well provided with a re-inforcement of soldiers and military stores. The Swedish vessels, which guarded the coast, gave them full opportunity to steal into the harbour, which is formed by the mouth of the river

* *Heylmanni Leo Artibus*, p. 17.

Perfant ; and thus they were entrapped between a naval and land fire, without possibility of escaping. And some time after that, the garrison was arrested at Friedberg in the New Marche, on account of the slaughter committed by Tilly in the storming of New Brandenburg.

But to return back to the month of November 1630 ; his majesty having cast his eyes a second time on the duchy of Mecklenberg and the countries adjacent, returned once more to Stralsund, and thence directing his march to Stetin, made a fresh review of its fortifications. A person who had a discerning genius like Gustavus, soon saw room for some additions and improvements, and in spite of a very rough approaching winter, turned his whole army into pioneers and military architects. During the main stress of this work it was told the king, that a captain had been imprisoned for giving his company a bad example, by complaining of the severity of the season, and the hardship and servility of the employment. *My good friend*, said the king, *the earth is always frozen to those that want industry. It is ridiculous to postpone till to-morrow what ought to be executed the present moment : on the contrary, it is impossible to pursue one's point with too much earnestness. It is persevering alacrity alone, which performs all that is great and shining. Most things might be effected by men, upon supposition that indolence did not retard them nor fear dismay them* *.

It was about this time, according to the relation of an † historian well versed in the affairs of the present period, that his majesty received from England the sum of 60,000 l. with advice likewise concerning the body of recruits then to be raised by the marquis of Hamilton. He was favoured likewise with a good supply of 48,000 l. from another quarter ; but whether it came from Sweden I cannot say, or elsewhere. Nevertheless it induced him to make a general review of all his troops, and having distributed a part of these sums among them with uncommon frankness and generosity, the disbanded and disbanded Imperialists soon flocked to his ensigns from every quarter ; insomuch that sixty cavaliers in a body, each completely armed and mounted, made him a tender of their services in one morning.

Astonished with such vigorous proceedings, old Torquato de Conti, weakened with infirmities, or, in truth, grown sick of a war, where he made no figure, besought the emperor to excuse him from the command of the army. From thence

* *Loccenii Historia Suecana*, p. 577.

† *Soldat Suedois*, p. 38. *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, 4^o. p. 60.

he retired to Rome, took an employment under the pope, where the service was more pacific, and died there the last of his family: Hannibal count de Schomberg succeeded him in command, and having removed his camp from Anclam, entrenched himself near Gartz; ill-provided (according to the usual management of the house of Austria) with provisions, money, ammunition, baggage-waggons, and draught-horses*.

About this period the king showed an example of lenity and Christian moderation towards the inhabitants of Lubec, who, though all protestants, had refused his officers the power of enlisting soldiers. It was easy at a single stroke to have crushed them for this unkindness, which Gustavus calls *inhumanity*; but on the contrary he graciously tells them, that though the proofs on his side were incontestable, yet still something privately assured him, that such behaviour proceeded only from secret ill-wishers to the glory of his cause, and not from the body of senators and patricians in general. *Wherefore, concludeth he, I shall make no difficulty of re-instating you all into my antient favour and good-will, upon condition, that what hath been practised hitherto, may hereafter be omitted* †. And at the same time he took care to cultivate a spirit of religion in his own army, and gave orders to the confistory of clergy, which attended his camp, to draw up a fresh body of prayers, three and twenty in number, by way of supplement to those already published; most or all of them relating to war ‡.

It was now the 23d of December, but his majesty paid little or no regard to the severity of an uncommon German winter; for it was a customary saying with him, that he *could perform greater actions in a winter campaign than a summer one* §. Of course he crossed the Oder, at a time the Imperialists concluded he would refresh his troops in warm quarters, according to the common custom of making war: and reviewing his strength a second time, which consisted of 12,000 infantry, 85 cornets of horse, and 70 pieces of cannon, ordered public prayers to be offered up at the head of every regiment; and after resting some hours; made a midnight march, and invested Griffenhagen by break of day; notwithstanding Schomberg lay encamped at Gartz in

* See his letter to Tilly preserved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 93—96, which concludes with these remarkable words: *An ego solus omnibus sufficere possim, tua Excellentia judicet.*

† See the original letter in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 87.

‡ *Ibid.* 77—87. *Hist. or Authent. Relat. in Low Dutch*, Tom. ii. p. 34.

§ *Arlanibai Arma Suecica*, p. 76, and 61.

such a manner, that the two armies were only separated by the river Oder.

The town of Griffenhagen, whose situation is naturally strong, stands on the north-east side of the river, about twelve miles distant from Stetin. By means of its bridge it is also a pass of great importance, as it communicates with the Marche on one side, and with Pomerania and Brandenburg on the other*.

What apparently rendered the siege more difficult, was the neighbourhood of Schomberg's forces; yet his majesty had received private assurances, that the Imperial general, merely through the distress and poverty of his troops (for they durst not plunder and commit outrages in the manner they had done before the Swedes arrived†) had dispersed a part of them into better quarters at some distance from the main army. It was true he had the power of throwing as many men into the town before it was invested, as he thought fit: but Gustavus was not to be deterred by an effort of this sort, concluding thereby only to obtain a greater number of prisoners; since he took his measures so prudently, after having once invested the town, that Schomberg should not pass its bridges without permission, it being in his own power to blow them up whenever he pleased. Nevertheless, he mixed consideration and humanity with the ideas of precaution and safety, and looked upon destroying the bridges as ruining the intercourse between two very considerable places, losing the affections of the natives, and cramping his own marches to the east and to the west, in case he became successful. For these reasons he moored his ships at proper distances along the sides of the two bridges, with directions to fire from fixed batteries upon any extraordinary occasion.

His majesty soon examined the situation of the ground round the town, and having made choice of a convenient hill, thundered upon the city-walls day and night from the mouths of sixty pieces of large battering cannon with such inexpressible fury, that he made an opening, which had the appearance of being sufficiently wide. Nevertheless, to be more secure, and not sacrifice the lives of his men out of pure gallantry, he sent for Wildestein, a Swiss lieutenant-colonel

* It must be observed there were two bridges over the Oder, neither of them tending directly to the opposite town: for that from Griffenhagen abutted two miles above Gartz, and that from Gartz did just the same in regard to Griffenhagen. It sufficed Gustavus to entrench a body of troops on the eastern-foot of Gartz-bridge.

† *Brachelii Histor. Nostr. Temp.* p. 231.

in his own regiment of guards, giving him orders to put on his armour, and take an exact survey of the breach: but as that officer brought back an unfavourable account, the fire was renewed a few hours more, and then two entrances were made by a couple of batteries, which mounted 20 pieces of cannon on each side of a tower. These entrances were capable of admitting three men abreast. Wildeſcin led on the first musqueteers, and his colonel, the gallant baron Teuffel, seconded him with a body of pike-men. Struck with such astonishing resolution, the Imperialists began by little and little to give ground, and fly out of the town by way of the Oder bridge. On that side Sir Alexander Lesly lay encamped, who attempted to clear the passage by such ordnance, as had been planted in the king's ships for that purpose: but before this could be effected to any considerable purpose, great part of the garrison, (which consisted of 2,500 men,) had got over, and drew up in battle array on the other side of the river, where the king's troops could not approach them. Lesly then made himself master of an outwork, and getting between that and the town-wall, near the place where the assailants had entered, an unlucky mistake happened between his party and theirs, from consequences natural enough in such great confusion; for they fired reciprocally on each other with incredible fury. The brave Wildeſcin and Sir Thomas Conway *, an Englishman, were both wounded; nor might the mischief have stopped there, had not a Swede, who received a mortal stroke from a musquet-ball, made some ejaculations to heaven in his own language, and thus the misapprehension was discovered. Both parties then joined and soon cleared the town: for the governor Ferdinando di Capua, a Neapolitan, and knight of the order of St. James de Compostella, could keep only 5 or 600 soldiers about him: nevertheless, he fought it out to the last man, and died soon afterwards of the wound he received in his thigh; being conveyed at his own request to Stetin, which place, some weeks before, he had vainly boasted to make himself master of with little or no difficulty. This brave man was much dismayed at one circumstance; he had been overpersuaded, during the siege, to send his colours for safety's sake to Schomberg's camp, and from that moment, began to despair of the success of his resistance. This slight circumstance also, for *that* age was very superstitious, terrified and

* Sir Thomas commanded a regiment of English infantry. Some time afterwards he had the misfortune to lose his life in a ship-wreck on the coast of Denmark; and Sir John Castell succeeded him, who was also an Englishman.

puzzled the common men to such a degree, that they soon left their commander and betook themselves to flight. Signior Antonio, serjeant-major to the governor, was taken prisoner, and some few of the better sort; whom the king, on account of their ransoms, made a present of to baron Teuffel. Amongst the few that made a good resistance, was a count La Torre, a youth of a most liberal countenance, in the fiftenth year of his age. His majesty had an eye immediately to this young warrior, and after giving orders to protect him from the fury of the soldiers, commanded him to be new clothed according to his quality and merit, with permission to wear his sword, scarf, and plumage.

The Imperialists had deputed an handful of men to set the town on fire in various places, but the flames were soon extinguished by the vigilance of the Swedes. As the town was taken by assault, the soldiers were allowed free plunder for the space of four hours; but no outrages were committed.

Immediately after Christmas-day, his majesty marched his whole army in high spirits towards Gartz, crossing the river Oder at both bridges in hopes to tempt Schomberg, (who had more troops than himself,) to a decisive engagement; but that general retired immediately, and dispatched a messenger to Tilly with an account of the ill state of his troops. In the king's way stood a very important fort in a morass, called Capua's sconce; but the real name of it was fort Morvitz. It was new and fortified upon the best principles then known; but the garrison hardly made any resistance. A lesser fort was taken by the king immediately afterwards. But at supper time it was reported in his majesty's tent, that the town of Gartz was all in flames; and on this the king starting up from table, beheld the lights, and heard great explosions in the air. Schomberg was employing himself at that moment in decamping; and blew up some old turrets where the powder was lodged; in which he was considered by many as behaving in an unfoldier-like manner, as also in not defending fort Capua, and giving up a pass so important as Gartz was looked upon to be without a blow. But the king's intrepidity, good discipline, and perseverance, had created a sort of alarm in Schomberg's mind: he pretended too, that his troops were ill paid; that they were too libertine and dissolute, and too much accustomed to cruelty and plunder. Of course having first drawn off his garrison, he sunk his cannon in the river, destroyed all the ammunition he could not remove, burnt the bridge after him, (an act highly unpopular to the country) and made a long retreat, which

which appeared rather too precipitate for a good commander, inasmuch as it threw his soldiers into some distrust. What this general proposed to himself was, to lodge his troops in Francfort upon the Oder, and take upon him the defence of that city, not under the appearance of a garrison, but in the light of an army that was to defend it. Supposing the idea to be right or wrong, Schomberg was not happy in the execution thereof; for four of his regiments in their march were overtaken and handled severely enough; 300 baggage waggons were lost, and colonel Spar escaped with difficulty; and if during the latter part of Schomberg's retreat the town of Custrin* had not opened its gates to him (Spar being detached on that occasion) he had missed securing that important passage, and lost, in all probability, the greatest part of his army †; on the other hand, Francfort and Landsberg had fallen of course into the possession of the Swedes; and the fatal storming of Magdeburg, which happened the May ensuing, had been prevented. But for the present, the unhappy timidity of the elector of Brandenburg counter-worked, as much as possible, that great and astonishing plan of conquest, which Gustavus had formed.

For it must be observed, that when his troops arrived at Custrin in pursuit of the flying Imperialists, the garrison closed the city-gates against him, which deprived him of the means of ruining Schomberg's army, and marching directly to Tilly with a view to give him battle. Nevertheless, a disappointment of this kind only sharpened the king's industry; instead of dismaying him.

Here ended the military operations of the year 1630; in which year died John count of Anholt, second in authority to Tilly, and Rambold count Colalto, who had been commander in chief in the Mantuan war; as also Melchior, cardinal Klefel, in the seventy-seventh year of his age, who had been prime minister and favourite to the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias, but was imprisoned by Ferdinand, and banished,

* This town, situated about fourteen miles from Francfort, was then, and is since, considered as one of the most important passes in the empire; being placed in the middle of a great morass, at the confluence of the Warta and Oder. The fortress is accessible only by one cause-way, which is five miles long; and in approaching it you cross no less than thirty-two bridges. Most of its proprietors, the electors of Brandenburg, have made improvements to its fortifications, so that it is deemed upon the whole impregnable; and thus much is incontestably certain, it hath never yet been taken by open force.

† This part of the history, with much afterwards ensuing, is taken from the accounts of a British officer, who was serjeant-major in the royal regiment of guards, under the command of baron Teuffel.

before that prince ascended the throne; of which transaction we have spoken largely in another place, as likewise of his poverty, and how he disculpated himself before the see of Rome. He was recalled some years before his death, but never chose (if we make only one exception) to immerse himself again in politics. What we mean is, that he gave his assistance to overthrow Walstein.

By way of a finishing paragraph for the year 1630, I shall only observe, that Charles I. by the interposition and persuasion of the court of Spain, sent Sir Henry Vane to the electress Palatina, with orders to lay before her, in the most persuasive manner, the expediency of allowing her eldest son to be educated a papist at the court of Vienna, with a view to make a match between him and one of the princesses of the house of Austria; to which representation she replied heroically, "*That rather than comply with so irreligious and mean a proposal, she would be her son's executioner with her own hands.*"

The year 1631 opened with the common severity of a German winter; but Gustavus kept the war alive very briskly. The night Griffenhagen was taken, he, for some reasons, slept with his army in the open field, and next morning cast his eyes upon Landsberg, a strong town situated on the river Warra. It was an object worth possessing, both as a place of importance, and as it was full of provisions, ammunition, and artillery. But the attempt, upon a closer view, appeared discouraging; for the garrison had been increased by many fugitives from Gartz: so Horn, who had been sent to besiege it, was commanded back, and orders were given to blockade it with several regiments of foot and horse.

The court of Vienna began now to consider Gustavus as something more than a king of snow, (such being the denomination, which the Austrian ministry at first gave him;) for he continued to gain ground every hour, and had amassed together an army, which appeared to be formidable even in respect of numbers, having improved it in the space of six months, from a slight beginning of 13,000 men, to 34,400 infantry, and 11,800 cavalry, without including the British and German troops, that acted under Oxenstiern in Prussia; the forces that Banier commanded in the reduction of Mechlenberg and about Magdeburg; and the eight regiments, that were employed in the blockade of Colbergen. He had likewise in Sweden a body of reserve, amounting to 25,000 effective soldiers; so that upon the whole, he was thought capable at this time, in case of emergency, to bring into the

field a well instructed and well appointed army, amounting to 71,200 men; having at the same time issued out commissions to raise 10,600 fresh troops*.

Astonished to behold a prince creating to himself such inconceivable resources, and approaching more and more to the southward every hour; the house of Austria, which saw no visible marks of Gustavus's dissolution, began now sincerely to repent, that she had ever inclined an ear to the representations of the catholic princes at Ratisbon, which at that time were looked upon as meer memoir-work and matter of form. It is true, she struggled long and hard against swallowing this bitter prescription, that was recommended to her: but as the cry, either at, or just before the arrival of Gustavus, was so very loud, with regard to the enormous expences of maintaining a number of superfluous and dissolute soldiers, it was resolved to disband *a certain part of the army*; and, what was yet more unfortunate, the young and vigorous troops were retained, and many of the old weather-beaten Walloons were dismissed, upon supposition they had passed the flower of their age and service; though perhaps one fourth part of these men were fit to be officers. *By this single error* (which no historian hath taken notice of, as to its consequences) *the house of Austria ruined herself*. For these experienced veterans, who had been born in camps, and nursed in war, knew nothing either of manufactures or of agriculture; and having ambition to live by the sword, conveyed themselves, by little and little, into the service of Gustavus and his allies. I mention this circumstance a *second time*, because much depends upon it. The step had been taken some months before.

When Gustavus first engaged himself in the German invasion, it was the fashionable tone of raillery in the court-circle at Vienna to consider him as a sort of enthusiastical adventurer, who with an handful of new-raised troops, that had fought only against Muscovites, Poles, and Cossacks, had formed a chimerical hope of defeating and destroying an inconceivable number of regular troops; who, to say the least of them, had been flushed with success, and improved by the experience of twelve successive campaigns, all crowned with uninterrupted victories.

The fatality of this disbanding scheme was soon found out, but the men were vanished. However, by way of *succedaneum*, the Imperial regulations in matters military were

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecicæ*, p. 74.

made public*: the doctrine of levying contributions was proposed to be made more reasonable and equitable, and assurances of pay set forth to the soldiers upon better probability; and as peace by this time was concluded in Italy, Aldringer and Galas had orders to march that army into Germany, which had performed such great service at the siege of Mantua. The emperor then exhorted the electors and catholic princes to exert themselves to the utmost at this crisis, "which in truth, said he, ought to annihilate all personal interests, as well as private animosities." But what went most against his inclination was, to rebate the edge and rigour of the edict of restitution; and yet the supposed convention of protestant princes, then talked of to be assembled at Leipsic, made something necessary either to be done or promised on that head. Some moderate catholics sincerely wished to make a few concessions in good earnest; for they saw a tempest gathering, which they had reasons to be afraid of. But the majority of the Austrian and Spanish faction was dazzled with the glittering hopes of universal monarchy, and the unbounded prospect of confiscation and plunder. Some were delighted with the total subversion of heresy; numbers confided in the fortune and experience of the Imperial troops, and feared their enemies the less, as their army was a confused collection of twenty different nations.

If we except the difficulties which Gustavus found at this time in the hope of besieging Landsberg, it may be worth observing, that in the short space of eight days, during the very depth of winter, he had cleared all Pomerania and the Marche from the Warta to the Oder, and opened to himself a communication with Brandenburg, Silesia, and Lusatia. By these means he gave the inhabitants of Pomerania a breathing-time to renew their commerce and agriculture, and drew from them very considerable supplies for the support of his army.

Leaving Horn therefore with the gross of his army about Landsberg, he shaped his course towards Stetin, and made himself master of New-Brandenburg, where colonel Marazini commanded with 1600 men, part of whom was his own regiment, which proved so fatal afterwards to the king at the battle of Lutzen. Pleased with this latter enterprize, he next took Clempno, Trepto, and Loitch, the town itself

* This edict, bearing date November 9, 1630, is to be seen in *Arlanibæi Arm. Succic.* 4^o. p. 67.

being of no consequence, but the fortrefs extremely strong. At this last place a ridiculous accident happened which first surprized the king, and then made him smile. One Pietro Perazzi, an Italian*, commanded the castle. A trumpeter was sent to him with an exhortation to surrender; upon which Perazzi fell into a violent passion, called for his servants to help him on with his armour, sent for the ladies to behold him in his military dress, ordered the trumpets to sound a charge, and returned word back to the king; *That he was a man of honour, and would maintain the depositum committed to his charge at his enemy's peril, and for his master's glory, to the last moments of his life; since his purpose was to make a quite different figure from what the commandants had done at Clempno and Trepto.* During the time the trumpeter delivered his message he changed his mind, and sent word he was ready to capitulate. Gustavus was astonished at a man of so unaccountable a character, and admitted the surrender upon one proviso, that Perazzi might be present at the signing of the articles; for he privately longed to see him. But greater was his astonishment, when Perazzi produced himself as gay, and as well dressed as any Frenchman, and without the least appearance of concern. A gentleman of fashion belonging to Gustavus's life-guard had no patience to see such a hero, and gently, but without ceremony, took off his rich scarf from his shoulders. His majesty gave some secret mark of approbation, and Perazzi, not in the least disconcerted, made a low bow with a smile, and talked of something else. And thus this interview ended; for the king was so divided betwixt the ridiculous and the incomprehensible, that he knew not what to do, or say; insomuch that it was a matter of question amongst his officers, whether the bravest person in Europe would have puzzled him so much. Nevertheless, this famous Perazzi had passed among the Imperial troops for a true Italian *Spetza-ferro*. Which recalls to my mind the behaviour of an half-countryman of his, one Pietro Ferrari, a Corsican †, who being asked, why he threw a commander of great distinction, whom he had taken prisoner, into a dark dungeon, which he did in order to get a ransom the sooner, feeding him only with bread and water, and appointing two wretched followers of the camp to attend him, one loathsome with his wounds, and one infected by the plague; made this answer to his friends: *Gentlemen,*

* *Clemmitz* calls him Peralta, and supposes him to be a Spaniard: but other very valuable historians pronounce him an Italian; and indeed the character is more consistent with that nation.

† *Mémoires du duc de Gramont*, tom. i. p. 31, 32.

what shall I alledge? My father is dead, and I have consoled myself—My mother is dead, and I have consoled myself—And if this rascal, this becco cornuto (I am here repeating his own words) should die of want and a broken heart, I shall console myself likewise.—

Nevertheless, thus much must be observed by the way; that we no where hear of the Ferrari's and the Perazzi's in the field of battle.

By this time the month of January was half over, and the king, who was alike industrious in the cabinet and in the field, had contrived to negotiate a treaty with the archbishop of Bremen, with George duke of Lunenburg, and William landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

What next came upon the carpet were the articles of alliance between France and Sweden, the whole of the negotiation being left to the management of De Charnacé on the one part, and the generals Horn and Banier on the other. This affair was transacted at the camp of Berewalt, in the marquisate of Brandenburg, having been projected in Sweden the preceding year †. The French ambassador still insisted upon one part of his old nonsense, about refusing the king his regal titles; but Gustavus gave him to understand, *That if he brought nothing in his portmanteau but such foolishness, he was master of the day and hour of returning to France without further ceremony.*

An English ambassador likewise made his appearance before Gustavus, and presented letters in behalf of his master, explaining, in a long series of deductions, the motives that induced him to ask the restitution of the Palatinates: but the proposals he made were so chimerical (the supplies of men and money being likewise forgotten) that Gustavus gave him leave to retire without delivering his papers, giving him his promise of honour to take the affair into his own hands, and act therein as to himself appeared best, or, in other words, as matters appeared most reasonable and most convenient.

The tenor of the confederation between Sweden and France ran to this effect; that it was to continue in force for five years next ensuing, being to be ratified without delay by the two respective kings. Its principal articles were as follow *: “That his majesty of Sweden should maintain an
“ army on foot consisting of 30,000 infantry and 6000

† *Annalibæi Arma Suevica*, p. 100. This appears likewise from the 10th article of the treaty.

* See the original treaty in the APPENDIX, Art. XIX. *first edit.* 4^o.
“ cavalry;

“ cavalry; and that the French king should furnish him
 “ annually with 400,000 crowns, payable at Paris and Am-
 “ sterдам in two separate payments, at the choice of the
 “ king of Sweden.—The object of this armament was to be
 “ the liberty of Germany, the re establishment of oppressed
 “ princes and states, the demolition of new forts and har-
 “ bours on the coast of the Baltic, with an eye likewise to
 “ what had happened in the Valteline and the country of
 “ the Grisons: that a free reciprocal commerce should be
 “ established between the subjects of France and Sweden:
 “ that the catholic religion” (in support of which article
 Richelieu laboured extremely, with a view to render himself
 popular at home) “ should continue *sub eadem forma* in
 “ those places where it had been antiently professed; and
 “ that a good understanding should be cultivated with the
 “ elector of Bavaria” (at whose court some private intrigues
 were then carrying on to the detriment of Sweden); “ that
 “ neutrality should be granted to such princes of the league
 “ as desired it, or that they might enter, as parties, into the
 “ said confederation;—And, lastly, that the treaty should
 “ be renewed; if a general peace was not concluded on,
 “ within the time expressed for its continuance.”

This convention was fully assented to, January 13, 1631, yet the ratifications were not exchanged in due form till the May following. The whole cast and form of this treaty hath been considered as a master-piece in the political science; nor must it be here forgotten, that England and Holland, some few weeks afterwards, acceded thereto †.

During the debates, which naturally attended this treaty, his majesty took the field by day, and maintained his argument with De Charnacé in the evening; during which interval, or rather a few days before, Lesly had rendered himself master of the castle of Lignitz, which the king made him a present of by way of country villa; and Bauditzzen, by a general storm, took Piritz (which in the Vandal language, signifies abundance of corn) a town of considerable importance, situated on the frontiers of Outer-Pomerania, and gar- risoned at that time by 1400 Imperialists.

Mean while Melk, a native of Mechlenberg, who from a simple soldier rose to be a *partizan* of repute, being a person often made use of in such affairs, performed an uncommon exploit upon Malchin, a strong fort situated upon the banks of the Pene, and defended by two companies of dragoons. His little army consisted only of 300 foot and 36 horsemen;

† Terzeri Chron. S. in Vitam Gust. ad annum 1631.

but having asked a good number of peasants to assist him, and giving each of them two lighted matches in their hands, dispersing them at the same time here and there in small parties, and especially along the grand avenue over a morass that approached the town, he summoned the garrison about four in the morning to capitulate, in the name of the king and all his forces, protesting at the same time, that if they hesitated a single moment, no quarter should be given them. The *commandant* soon complied, not permitting himself to examine into Melk's assertions: and thus he and his two companies were made prisoners of war; who, with the same facility they surrendered the town, enlisted themselves in the Swedish service, not caring to rejoin their ancient companions, nor undergo their sharp military sarcasms. Nor must another slight example of this *lesser kind of war* be here omitted; and the rather, as Gustavus considered it as the very grammar of the art military, and the only sure and expeditious method of obtaining the knowledge of men's abilities. One Braun, an ensign in young Thurn's regiment of musqueteers (which regiment at that time carried wheel fire-locks, and not match-locks) taking with him just fifteen resolute companions, crossed the Oder in a small boat, and attacked by night the quarters of 200 Croatian horse, with a colonel at their head. Entering the village without noise, he marched directly to the grand guard, and, missing the commander in chief, shot the ensign of the regiment dead with his own hand. His few men soon made terrible havoc, and by the suddenness and terror of the onset put the Imperialists to flight; who knew neither the number nor strength of their assailants. Braun presented the colours (on which was drawn a *sable bipartite eagle in a silver field*) to the king his master at Berewalt, and received from him a very magnificent gold chain, and a commission to take upon him the command of captain in his own regiment; the stipend of captain in the Swedish service being at that time a small matter more than double the pay of an ensign*.

The extraordinary advances of Gustavus, (who paid no regard to one of the severest winters, as by this time it proved, that Germany had felt for many years, but on the contrary derived even advantages from the frost, by transporting his artillery over deep morasses otherwise impassible, as happened particularly in the siege of Damin, which we are going to relate) gave some faint glimmerings of hope to the protestant electors and princes, whom the terrors of the

* *Cbennitius*, tom. i. lib. ii. p. 95.

house of Austria had almost frozen into a state of inactivity, and emboldened them to venture on an assembly, which was actually opened at Leipzig the eighth of February.

Whilst the politicians at Bernwalt employed themselves in the cabinet, his majesty being joined by Knipphausen, with a body of 2000 foot and 1000 cavalry, invested Damin, a place of great importance on the banks of the Pene, situated between the duchies of Mechlenburg and Pomerania, and belonging at present to the king of Prussia. It was the key of admission to the first named duchy; and had been pitched upon likewise to be the grand Imperial magazine on the coasts of the Baltic*. This town had been fortified by the Imperialists at a great expence; but the castle, which was seated in a deep morass, most men considered as not to be besieged in form; yet the Swedes found means to approach it by the assistance of the frost. No less person was governor than the duke of Savelli, and the garrison consisted of 1700 veteran troops, selected from his own regiment, and that of Holk. He had likewise provisions and military stores in great abundance, not to mention a new supply of artillery, which he had received from Gripswald; insomuch that Tilly, who then lay near Francfort upon the Oder, and purposed to raise the siege of Damin, concluded the town, in his own judgment, capable of making a resistance of twenty days. But the king (not that we have need to blame Tilly's opinion) was a warrior, who chose very compendious methods of proceeding; though, to speak the truth, part of his success was justly owing to the frost.

The Swedes arrived, invested the town, and besieged it in form in one day. Upon the good or evil turn of this siege depended more than half the success of Tilly's future operations: for as it was that general's design to make a powerful diversion about Magdeburg, and recal the enemy from advancing southward (since otherwise the northern powers would naturally withdraw their allegiance from the emperor, having the Swedish army between them and Vienna) he chose, at the time of making this irruption, to maintain a secure retreat into Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Saxony, with a view not only to check the progress of Gustavus, but to keep the princes of the last named countries under due subjection. And here it must be observed, that the road of his retreat lay directly through Damin.

His majesty thundered against the town from his batteries all the first afternoon and night on the side next the river,

* *Heylmanni Leo Arctici*, p. 20.

where he placed himself: and Teüffel next morning made a lodgment in an half-moon, and repulsed the enemy in a general sally, which Savelli ordered: Mean while Kniphausen played with equal fury upon the castle, having full room to spread himself round it, as the frost supplied the place of bridges, which the Imperialists had broken down. By break of day, a lieutenant, at the head of 400 chosen musqueteers, began the storm; and being well supported by his companions, made a lodgment in the fortifications: upon which the garrison secured the remainder by cutting off all connexion, and retired principally to an old tower, whose walls were so thick, that it seemed impossible to apply cannon against them. The king surveyed this antique structure with great attention, and gave immediate orders to undermine it, in spite of all the severity of the weather: and when some progress had been made in that work, the commandant thought proper to surrender with seven companies of Holk's infantry, who, as their colours could not be preserved, consented to enter into the Swedish service.

It may be asked, why this garrison did not retire into the city, where Savelli greatly wanted such a re-inforcement? To resolve this question, it must be observed, that the castle, situated in a deep morass, was removed from the city about 1000 paces, and had no communication with it but by means of a causeway, in the middle of which a strong *sconce* was erected. His majesty soon discovered the importance of such a post, and ordered Teüffel's lieutenant-colonel, on the very afternoon of his arrival, to make himself master of it sword in hand. The service was extremely obstinate on both sides; and one Heatly, an English officer, gained good applause: for though he received on the first onset a very dangerous musquet-shot, he still continued to press on, and entered the fortress before the rest of his comrades; nor could any one persuade him to retire till the Imperialists were cleared to a single man*.

Nor must I forget here what happened to a Scottish officer, one Robert Ross, who the first day of the siege, in the midst of a sharp cannonade on both sides, *sate blowing tobacco* † (to use the words of the author I am copying from) at the head of his regiment, which lay within full reach of the enemy's artillery: but being suddenly struck with a cannon-ball, he dropped his pipe with great tranquility, and crying only, *The Lord receive my soul!* expired in an instant.

* *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii. † *By Jonson* has the same expression.

His majesty having made himself master of the castle, took care to display Holk's crimson ensigns on one of his batteries, and then possessed himself of two important out-works; upon which the besieged made a second desperate sally, but Banier repulsed them with considerable loss, conducting the whole engagement with so much valour and presence of mind, that the king, who stood at a distance, and rarely cared to act the part of a spectator, passed the whole time in contemplating his conduct, and bestowing upon it due commendations. A part of Monro's regiment, commanded by major Potley, an English cavalier, performed a gallant action in this rencounter; for a soldier of Banier's being in danger of remaining on the field mortally wounded, (his countrymen refusing the desperate service of bringing him off) the Scots formed themselves by consent into one body, recovered him from the enemy, and restored him to his comrades. The poor man died that night in great pain, admiring the generosity of strangers, and inveighing against his countrymen the Swedes.

A ridiculous circumstance happened in this skirmish; for as the British troops were marching down a steep hill, exposed to a furious cannonading of the enemy, one Lisse, an ensign, happened to tumble forwards, and the wind being extremely high carried away his peruke; upon which Potley swore a great oath, that an unfortunate cannon-ball had taken off the cavalier's head. The king laughed when he knew the whole. Nor did he about the same time escape from a certain adventure without difficulty*: for having an inclination to survey in person the enemies works by the assistance of a perspective glass; the ice of a sudden gave way, and down he sunk to the arm-pits. One captain Dumaine, who lay at the most advanced guard, ran immediately to his assistance; but the king with extraordinary composure of mind, made a signal to him with his hand to retire to his post. In spite of this precaution near 1000 musquet-shots (at a considerable distance it is true) were discharged against his majesty, who at length, with uncommon patience, wrought himself free from his incumbrances, and making the best of his way to the guard-fire, called for cold meat and a goblet of Baccharah wine, and, having afterwards changed his cloaths, joined his troops, who were employed in repulsing the besieged in a sally.

Dumaine, who was a gentleman of spirit and good manners, took the liberty to remonstrate with his master upon

* *Monro's Expeditions, part ii.*

this adventure, representing to him, that the well-being of Europe depended upon the safety of his single person. The king heard him with great complacency; *But, captain, said he, I have a foolish sort of a fancy, which tempts me to imagine, that nothing can be better seen than when I observe it myself.*

On the fourth morning after the siege, major Greenland, an English officer in the Imperial service, waited upon the king from the duke de Savelli; and Gustavus seemed to listen to his proposals, as the governor's defence had not been obstinate: nevertheless it was stipulated, that Savelli and his officers should give their promise in writing, not to serve against Sweden or its allies for the space of three months. Conditions, in other respects honourable, were soon granted. The Swedish army felt a particular joy upon this capitulation; for Quinti Aligheri (whom Chemnitius calls Quinti del Ponte) the traitor that attempted to destroy the king in an ambuscade, had been admitted lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of Savelli, and was well-known to be in the city, when it was first besieged. By what methods he contrived to escape hath never appeared; all we know is, that he was killed the May ensuing in storming the town of Magdeburg. Nevertheless, on the surrender of Damin, the generals in a body represented to the king, that the wealth of the assassin, (tho' he was only such in his intentions) ought to be confiscated to his majesty's uses, (for, as we observed before, Aligheri was partly tempted to destroy Gustavus, in order to save the rich harvest of ten years plunder lodged by him in this city:) but the answer was, *That all transactions in matter of capitulation implied sacred and punctual observance; and as the exception had not been made during the conferences, the king chose rather to enrich a villain, than seize an advantage, which by the laws of religion and reason justly belonged to him*.*

His majesty, it is said, received a slight wound during the present siege, and lost about 300 very excellent soldiers. Letters were intercepted from Tilly to the governor, wherein he besought him to hold out only four days longer, and promised him certain assistance. Be that as it will, the Imperial general lodged a process against him before the council of war at Vienna, and brought his life in question: but Savelli made it appear he had private orders not to sacrifice such a chosen handful of troops; and the emperor, by way of approving his conduct, dispatched him on an honourable embassy to Italy, and employed him afterwards in military

* *Memorabilia Suec. Gentis*, p. 85.

services: nevertheless he was to the last either injudicious in war, or unfortunate.

When Savelli quitted the town at the head of his garrison with ensigns flying, and attended by all his baggage-wagons, and two pieces of cannon, Gustavus received him on horse-back, and having first made a courteous speech to the magistrates, turned round, and desired him to present his compliments to the emperor, with assurances, that he waged war against him merely for the sake of civil and religious liberty, since he bore no personal ill-will to him. He then told the duke, *That he looked upon him as a man intended by nature to shine rather at courts than in the field of battle**. It must be owned that this speech has the appearance of wanting good-breeding. Savelli's defence of the town was neither a good nor bad defence. But supposing the latter, the king was a better politician than to reproach an enemy for surrendering a town upon easy terms. The probable cause of this asperity was as follows.

Duke Savelli, as I have seen by a painting and some prints of him, was almost the only general in those wars (don Baltazar di Marradas excepted) who wore a large perriwig of that fashion, which was afterwards called *Chedreux** amongst us in the beginning of the reign of Charles II. Now Gustavus thought this dress of the head rather too fantastic for a great commander; and therefore, not without some little indignation, pronounced him *a better courtier than a warrior*.

It is probable also that the king bore him some ill will, as Savelli's character was unbecoming a nobleman of his rank. No person was more sordid and avaricious in plundering the country, though to outward appearance the fine gentleman of that age. Once having received a quantity of horses from the gentry and farmers of the district round him, by way of levying contributions, (in which point the Imperial generals were very sharp-fighted) and finding them by reason of their leanness and ill-plight, neither worth selling, nor worth redeeming, he ordered the hangman of his regiment to flea them, and put the money the hides sold for into his pocket †. In a word, he was always considered as one of the inquisitors of the duchy of Mechlenberg, and was also so odd a mixture of bigotry, as well as cruelty, that he would allow no child in his district to receive the rites of baptism from

* *Soldat Suedois*: and the *Swedish Intelligencer*.

† Hence the expression of *Chedreux-critic* in the finest English prose-writer.

‡ *Chemnitius*, lib. i. p. 97.

the hands of a Lutheran minister. Upon leaving Damin, he was obliged to deliver to the king abundance of provisions and military stores, together with sixty very fine pieces of brass ordnance: and as Tilly was expected to march that way, and a general action supposed to be coming on, his majesty made no less person than Banier commander of Damin, and prepared himself in every shape for giving battle to Tilly. With good precaution therefore*, he fixed Kniphausen with his own regiment, and six companies of English and Scots, at New-Brandenburg;—placed major Sinclair with a small body of infantry at Trepto †; lodged the royal regiment of horse, and Monro's detachment of foot at Malchin; recalled Gustavus Horn from the blockade of Landsberg, with orders to encamp at Fridland, (each officer having express orders in writing, without any discretionary powers of departing from them) and lastly, rested himself for a few days with the main army at Passewald, a strong pass, which commanded the road between Pomerania and Mechlenberg.

Thus the king, in eight months time (which to many readers will appear incredible, considering what a force the Imperialists had to produce against him) had made himself master of fourscore cities, forts, and castles, and cleared the whole passage behind him even to the Baltic ocean; being a district of near 140 miles in breadth, not to mention the command of all the rivers and important passes. And these conquests may be considered as entire ones, if we except Colbergen, which surrendered at this juncture, and the town of Gripswald, which Banier had first blockaded, and then Todt; nevertheless, it held out till the middle of summer.

Colbergen had resisted a blockade formed by Horn and other Swedish generals, for the space of five months: at length provisions growing scarce, and all hopes of relief vanished, colonel St. Julian †, the governor, an old officer of repute at the battle of Prague, thought fit to surrender upon terms of honour, and preserved a garrison of about 1500 men, (of which one third were dragoons) whom the Swedes agreed to escort to Landsberg. They were stopped at Friedburg in the New March, by way of reprisal for Tilly's cruelty to the garrisons of New-Brandenburg, and

* *Ritratti & Elogii di capitani Illustri*, p. 381.

† This place must not be confounded with Tripto in Out-r Pomerania.

‡ *Cbennitius*, tom. i. p. 100, calls him lieutenant-colonel Mors; which seems to be a mistake. Mors and Boetius signed the articles of capitulation, the former being an Irishman, and belonging to the regiment of Hardeck.

Feldsberg; but it does not appear, that any man was put to death; they were only disarmed. Colbergen, next to Stralsund, was looked upon as a town of the most consequence of any in the whole dukedom of Pomerania. It was also strongly fortified, according to the practice of those times, and was one of the keys of the Baltic ocean, which made Gustavus excessively desirous to call it his own. And indeed Bauditzen got it at a most critical time; for three days afterwards four ships well supplied with soldiers, and laden with provisions, touched at Colbergen, (supplies which might have preserved the town, had they arrived in proper time); but the Imperial sea-officers perceiving the town to be no longer theirs, suddenly changed their course, and returned to the ocean. Yet his majesty had taken all proper measures against an expedition of this nature; for vice-admiral Ulpar lay in the harbour, with two ships of force, being protected on each side by a new-raised mole, which was flanked with batteries and fortifications, erected by the care of colonel Boëtius. This officer, by his master's orders, was particularly cautious in the form of wording the capitulation, and carried his point in two affairs, that were partly useful, and partly matter of punctilio: the one related to the preservation of all the Pomeranian archives, ecclesiastical and civil; and the other related to the giving back a pair of colours, that belonged to a Swedish regiment of cavalry, and which Gustavus could not bear to see in the enemy's possession: so jealous was he of the slightest disgrace! Four hundred soldiers of the Imperial garrison took the oaths of allegiance to the crown of Sweden, having the liberty to follow the fate of their colours, which Horn took care to see surrendered by article.

In the mean while Tilly decamped from Francfort on the Oder, with an army of 20,000 combatants; paid his men (contrary to the Austrian custom) promptly and cheerfully; and advanced to raise the siege of Damin, or give Gustavus battle. But hearing the town had capitulated, he turned short on the castle of Feldsberg, near New-Brandenburg, took it by storm, and after that slaughter which naturally happens in an obstinate resistance, put fifty of the surviving Swedish soldiers to the sword. He then dispatched camp-master general Cratz with 12,000 men to invest New-Brandenburg, and followed him with the remaining part of the army. The garrison consisted of 2000 selected troops, and serjeant-major general Kniphausen, an approved officer, commanded them, who made an incredible resistance. He was a soldier of slow but excellent parts, and looked upon

as the best general under whom a young man could form himself. It was his maxim to leave little or nothing to fortune; and when other men were prosperous by meer chance, he used to say with emotion, "That a dram of good luck enabled a commander sooner to reach his object, than an ounce of good sense." He had an incurable aversion to the Scottish nation, which created him some enemies. It is true, the king had ordered him to retire and save his men; but the messenger and the letter happened to fall unfortunately into Tilly's hands. Of course Kniphausen, though destitute of artillery, acquitted himself like a man of service, concluding from the king's silence, that he should certainly be relieved: and hence it was, that he refused honourable conditions, when the Imperial general proposed them. The town was battered several days in a manner as furious as had been observed during the preceding course of the war; yet the breach was not assailable, and the rampart-wall was too high for scaling-ladders to be fixed against it with any hopes of success. Nevertheless, chance and rashness brought about a strange event; for as Tilly on the eighth day of the siege was riding round his lines, and making some necessary remarks, the soldiers rushed into the breach without orders, maintained their ground, and poured into the town, being supported by all the infantry of the army, who crowded to the walls in order to support them. The young count of Montecuculi*, being now in the twenty-third year of his age, and having served from sixteen in the capacity of a common foot soldier, was the first man, who mounted the walls, and presented one of the keys of the city-gates to his general. Kniphausen, with his lady, daughter, and niece, his son, and several gentlewomen of condition, four captains, some lieutenants and ensigns, and sixty common sol-

* Raymond, count de Montecuculi. His ardour in the first battle of Leipzig carried him in so far among the Swedes, that he was taken prisoner: and it is a certain fact, though few historians know it, (he being then only a colonel of horse) that he had a principal hand (serving then under Mercei and John de Wert) in defeating Turenne at the battle of Mergentheim, or Mariendal, as the French historians are pleased to call it. His abilities and penetration at that time were so very great, that it was a common saying with the Swedish and French generals, that Montecuculi entertained a familiar spirit in his service, who made him acquainted with all their designs. From this period his history is tolerably well known; his campaign against Turenne being in itself an abridgment of all that is refined and exquisite in the science of war. His two favourite authors were Euclid and Tacitus. Nevertheless, his *Military memoirs* no ways answer the idea of what he really practised. The truth is, they were drawn up in his earlier campaigns against the Turks; and it would have been no injustice to this great man's memory, to have omitted their publication,

diers, threw themselves into the town-house, and obtained quarter. He had not time to destroy his papers, which was looked upon as a matter of ill-fortune, and lost nine colours, which gave his master no small regret, as it was the first considerable accident of that kind, which had befallen him in Germany. Near 2000 Swedes and Germans were put to the sword. Half lord Rea's regiment (which said half consisted of 600 persons) was here cut to pieces almost to a man. Lieutenant-colonel Lindsey, who commanded this corps in his colonel's absence, was killed on the breach, as were also Moncrief, Keith, and Haydon, all Scots. Such as had the good fortune to survive were promoted immediately, by the king's express orders.

It is thought Tilly lost 2000 men in storming the town, which in fact was little more than a large unfortified village*: nor did he shew himself that great commander the public expected to find him, in marching directly to Magdeburg, leaving the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony a sacrifice to the Swedes, and allowing Gustavus free passage to Frankfurt, and the hereditary dominions. But the truth was, he saw too many superior abilities in his Swedish majesty, and dreaded at that juncture the fatal decision of a general battle.

The king, who had arrived as far as Anclam, in order to relieve his serjeant-major general Kniphausen, was so enraged at this massacre and that of Feldsberg, that he declared he would repay Tilly in his own kind, and teach him to make war like a person of humanity, and not like a Croatian. But the latter, agreeably to what we have observed before, finding it difficult to advance, (as a detachment of the Swedish army lay directly in his way, namely, at Schwet) turned back, and made an appearance of directing his course towards Magdeburg, in whose neighbourhood Pappenheim then lay. Upon this the Swedes soon repossessed New-Brandenburg, and the rather, as the Imperialists had just dismantled the principal parts of the fortification.

A general, who had parts like Gustavus, soon saw the evil effects of the siege of Magdeburg, in case the Imperial general should venture to undertake it, and determined within himself to relieve that city after the reduction of Frankfurt, in case the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony did not counterwork his generous intentions. But this event was

* This passage confirms what the king remarked afterwards to the Nurembergers in the great distress and anxiety, when he left Kniphausen to be their governor: *Gentlemen*, said he, *this man*, laying his hand on the general's shoulders, *has defended a walled village against all the efforts of Tilly.*

left to fortune, for no considerations could deter him from advancing southwards.

Tilly now lay at Rappen, undetermined whether to raise the intended siege of Francfort *, or invest the town of Magdeburg. The king, for excellent reasons, had lessened the main body of his forces upon this occasion; one part being detached into Pomerania and the *March*, in order to hinder the Imperial troops, which lay in great numbers about Landsberg, and in Silesia, from intercepting two little armies, which he expected from Prussia and England; and the other part under the conduct of Gustavus Horn, being stationed at the important pass of Schwet (which commands the crossing of the Oder, and gives an opening either to Stetin or Francfort) with a view to prevent Tilly from attacking him behind. These precautions being thus wisely taken, his majesty, at the head of 18,000 men, shaped his course along the banks of the Oder up to Francfort, carrying with him 200 pieces of cannon, and a bridge of boats, which he had built at Stetin, being 180 feet long, and of breadth sufficient for five horsemen to march over it abreast. Schomberg, as we observed before, commanded in Francfort, and had a garrison under him of 9000 horse and foot, (Curre says, near 10,000) all chosen veteran troops: but Tieffenbach, then just declared camp-master general of the Imperial army, had thrown himself, by Tilly's orders, into the town at this conjuncture †, namely, on the first day of the month of April; which occasioned no small matter of mirth among the Swedish forces, being, saith a grave historian, *veteri Germanorum consuetudine ludibrii plena die* ‡. His first business was to ruin the suburbs, country-houses, mills, vineyards, and orchards round the town, which many considered as a mark of fear.

No troops ever made a finer approach than the Swedes did in investing the town. Gustavus marched his whole body of forces, formed upon several columns, in complete battle-array; for he feared some obstructions from a garrison, that might be considered as an army, and bore Tilly likewise in remembrance, who lay behind him. • He performed himself

* Francfort upon the Oder is a large town, eighty miles from Berlin, remarkable for its fairs. Its university is not without learned men. The professors of theology are of the Calvinistical persuasion: but two extraordinary professors of Lutheranism are allowed.

† Curre says, he threw himself into the town *opportuni & dispositi quasi divina*; but how, or why, one cannot say. *Ilin. b. i. c. 11. p. 60.*

‡ *Cbennitius, &c. p. 106.*

upon the occasion the duty of serjeant-major *di battaglia*, arranging every officer and band of soldiers in their proper places; and having appointed a body of commanded musqueteers to make the forlorn hope, and placed small *peletons* of fifty foot-soldiers between every Squadron of horse, arrived without obstruction under the city-walls, leaving all the cavalry, excepting only the Rhingrave's regiment, well-posted behind him at some miles distance, for fear Tilly should approach unexpectedly. In this order he paid his visit to the town the afternoon before Palm-Sunday; and having made all proper dispositions both for a siege or an assault, approached with Teüffel very near the enemy's works, in order to view the town-walls and the Guben-gate. In the midst of their observations, the baron received a musquet-shot in his left-arm; and to shew of how much consequence a great general thinks some individuals are upon certain occasions, his majesty perfectly changed countenance, and cried, *Alas! now Teüffel is disabled, what shall I do!** Upon this the besieged made a sally; but major Sinclair, who stood just by the king at the head of a body of commanded musqueteers, soon repulsed them, taking a lieutenant-colonel and a captain prisoners, and making a lodgment afterwards in a church-yard, which lay near to the enemy's out-works.

Next morning divine service was twice celebrated throughout the Swedish army; but the Imperialists, who gave themselves very little trouble about religion, took this omission of hostilities for the forerunner of a retreat, and in the coarse military way of drollery, hung out a wild-goose on the ramparts, intimating, that the northern birds of passage ought now to think of leaving the country. Upon which some Scottish officers remarked pleasantly enough, in the phrasco-

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, vol. i. p. 88. The four first parts of this work, which of themselves make two considerable volumes in quarto, reach down to the death of Gustavus. To these is usually prefixed *the Swedish discipline, religious, civil, and military*, consisting of ninety pages. This book, though drawn up in a quaint and most inelegant style, (for nothing can be meaner than its composition) is a treasure intirely peculiar to our own nation: for great part of the accounts, till the king's decease, were delivered to the author (who, I believe, was a clergyman, see *Pref.* to the second part) by Hepburn, lord Rea, Masham, Astley, and other English and Scottish officers, who bore command in Germany. But after the unfortunate decision of Lutzen, the performance groweth less valuable; for the first writer desisted from his undertaking at that period; so that the continuation of it in various volumes is chiefly an extract from the *Mercurius Gallo Belgicus*, the *Mercurie François*, &c. &c. As the several parts came out periodically, it is very rare to find the whole complete. The right honourable Mr. Nugent has an entire set, which belonged to secretary Craggs.

logy of their own country, *That for their own part they hoped soon to see an Imperial goose well-roasted, and well-sauced.*

The king, who had made neither lines nor approaches, being inclined to allow the enemy small time for reconnoissance, determined to storm the town sword in hand that day, supported by twelve huge pieces of cannon directed against the Guben-gate, several other batteries playing at the same time, in order to create a diversion. Towards the gate the Swedish soldiers turned all their fury, whilst the yellow and blue brigades were commanded to approach on the side of the vineyards next to Custrin (a part lying by in order to repulse the enemy's sallies): mean while the white brigade was appointed to lodge in the fore-town to support the commanded musqueteers, which lay between them and danger; and Hepburn's brigade (the commanded musqueteers belonging to it being conducted by major Sinclair) was destined to carry on the work as before-mentioned; whilst the Rhingrave's regiment of cavalry protected such part of the train of artillery as was not used, and kept the approach of Tilly constantly in their thoughts.

His majesty reserved himself for the main attack at the Guben-gate, leaving the conduct of other divisions to approved commanders. He told his men, with a cheerful countenance, *that he only besought their patience a few hours longer; and that then he hoped to give them wine to refresh them, and not common water out of the Oder.*

The officers shewed so much alacrity on the occasion, as to undertake this enterprize without their armour; but Gustavus, who had before mixed in the beginning of the assault with the common soldiers, careless of himself, but uneasy for his commanders, remonstrated to them in the kindest terms, *That he, who loves the king his master's service, will not hazard his life out of pure gaiety. If my officers are killed, who shall command my soldiers?* Giving them therefore express orders to wear their armour, the fascines and scalding-ladders being all duly prepared, he called for Hepburn and Lumfdel by name: *Now, said he, my valiant Scots, remember your countrymen slain at Old Brandenburg;* who both in an instant, by the help of two petards, shivered the gate to pieces; and (as the astonished enemy forgot to let fall the portcullis on the inside) entered the town unhurt at the head of their respective regiments. Close at their heels general Banier crouded in with a fresh body of musqueteers; and forming themselves as well as the streets could allow them, they cut to pieces one regiment in the Imperial service with
very

very little mercy*. Upon which a detachment was dispatched to secure the bridge, but it arrived rather too late. Lumsdel's men alone took eighteen colours, and after the engagement was over, *his majesty bade him ask what he pleased, and he would give it him.*

Mean while major Sinclair and one Heatly an English lieutenant, passed the walls in the quarter of the vineyards by scaling them, and upon entering the town at the head of only fifty musqueteers, were attacked by an equal body of cuirassiers completely armed; but they ranged themselves against the walls of the houses, and gave their enemies such a continual fire, that they forced them to retreat. Nor must the conduct of one Andrew Aner a Saxon lieutenant, be here forgotten, who crossed the town-ditch, and gave chase to some Imperialists, that guarded it. The king, though naturally short-sighted, had soon eye-sight enough to seize one of those fortunate moments, which, when critically laid hold of, are equal to days and weeks in military operations. He pointed to his troops to follow Aner. The combat was renewed on either side with incredible fury; at length the besieged gave ground, and the assailants entered the town with them. The Imperialists beat a parley twice, but the confusion was so great no one could hear it. His majesty gave Aner a handsome gratuity of about 150 l. and as he was a man of such alacrity told him, *he should remove him from the infantry, and try what exploits he could perform in the capacity of captain of horse.*

At length the yellow and blue brigades entered, two bodies of troops highly esteemed in the Swedish army. It was their fortune to attack the quarter, where colonel Butler lay with his Irish regiment, who gave the Imperialists an example of resolution, which might have saved the town, if it had been followed; for he stood his ground at push of pike till he had scarce a soldier left alive; nor did he submit till he was shot through the arm with a musquet-ball, and pierced with an halberd through the thigh. All things being thus secured, his majesty, who made the tour of the several attacks on the outside of the walls, entered the town at the head of the Rhingrave's regiment of horse. Tieffenbach, Schomberg, and Montecuculi escaped over the bridge (which was fortified with a strong redoubt on the opposite shore) and conducted their flying troops to Great Glogaw in Silesia, which was distant from Francfort at least sixty miles; 1700 Imperial soldiers were left dead in the town, almost as many more

* This was Walter Butler's Irish regiment, as will appear hereafter.

were never heard of; fifty colours were lost; the colonels Wallstein, Jour, and Heydon were killed; and about sixty officers and seven lieutenant colonels taken prisoners. Amongst the latter were found likewise general major Spar a native Swede, and the colonels Morval (some say Waldo) and Butler, [not the elder brother who had a hand in Wallstein's death] to which we may add about 700 common soldiers. His majesty took infinite pains to prevent pillage, and exercised his baton upon his followers without remorse; yet they plundered to the amount of 30,000 l. in spite of all his endeavours; for many valuable goods were lodged in the town on account of the approaching fair; yet no woman's honour was violated, and only one burgher killed, merely through his own imprudence and obstinacy.

Ten baggage waggons were taken, which contained the plate, &c. that belonged to the Imperial generals; for the flight was so precipitate, that the carriages choaked up the passage, when they came to cross the bridge.

The king felt inexpressible uneasiness to see his troops disband in hopes of plunder, (for several ensigns were left alone without a man to guard the colours) and determined within himself from that time some to administer some effectual remedy to this notorious violation of military discipline. But the tumult being at length composed, he distributed corn and wine to all the citizens out of the Imperial magazines, telling them that he hoped they would supply something towards his soldiers good supper and kind reception. A public thanksgiving was decreed next day in all the churches; and one circumstance afterwards much delighted the whole body of protestants throughout the empire; for the *Leipsic conclusions* * were signed at or near the time when Francfort was taken.

The Imperial garrison upon this occasion suffered greatly in their fortunes, as well as their persons; for as this town was an asylum, where they had deposited most of their ill-gotten wealth; the streets, and bridge particularly, were so crowded with baggage and waggons, that the streets were not passable; whence it happened, that numbers were taken prisoners. Some threw themselves into the Oder, and there were lost; some were killed with the sword (for the Swedes could not quite forget the massacre at New-Brandenburg); so that one way or other no very considerable part of the garrison escaped. The Swedes lost about 300 men, but no officer of note. Indeed Teuffel and Hepburn were wounded,

* They were ten in number, and may be seen (together with the whole transactions of the diet) in the APPENDIX to the first edit. 4^o.

(the former circumstance we mentioned before) and colonel Dargitz was shot through the sides. Nine hundred quintals of powder were found in the arsenal, abundance of arms, and eighteen pieces of great ordnance. A large body of troops was placed in the town by way of garrison, and Lesly commanded it, having received orders to repair the fortifications, and improve them.

Since the first publication of this work, the author has discovered some fresh information relating to the storming of Francfort, and the behaviour of the besieged.

The Butler that made such heroical resistance was named *Walter*. He was of the Ormond family, and nearly related to James then Earl of Ormond. Take him in every respect, and he was one of the bravest officers in the Emperor's service. As the Imperialists envied this gallant foreigner, care was taken to place him in the very weakest part of the fortifications; or, to speak more to the purpose, in a part that hardly deserved to be called a fortification. Butler cut trenches, and threw up parapets with incredible diligence; but being quite dissatisfied with all he could do in one day, (and that only with his own regiment) he went in the evening to Schomberg, and told him that the post was not defensible, except a sally was made *that very night*, and the Swedes hindered from advancing their works. He then offered, at the peril of his life, and loss of his reputation, (which was still more) to conduct the sally himself, at the head of five troops of cuirassiers, and as many of dragoons; alledging also, that by the success of this attack he would compel the Swedes to raise the siege. But, as we observed before, the Germans envied him any honour, and received his gallant proposal very ungraciously: for they committed the undertaking to one of their countrymen, and he miscarried; losing his own life imprudently, as also the lives of many of his men.

At twelve o'clock next day Gustavus fell upon Butler's quarter, which he knew to be the weakest. Schomberg, Tieffenbach, Montecuculi † and Herberstein, the four great Imperial officers then in the town, were just set down to dinner; and so much did they affect to despise the Swedes, that not a man of them rose from table. Butler made a resistance that is hardly credible: infomuch that Gustavus

* He was so called by the best historians, but in a list of the Swedish colonels made public about six months before, we find no such name: he therefore must have been a lieutenant colonel, or is mistaken for Damitz, who commanded the white brigade that day.

† This was not the famous Raymond Montecuculi, but his uncle.

asked a soldier whom he had taken prisoner, *Who those men could be that behaved so gallantly?* and being informed, that it was Butler and his Irish regiment, (in which many English and Scottish were incorporated) he immediately drew his soldiers off, and proposed to make the attack elsewhere. This was about half an hour after one.

Mean while Gustavus changed his plan, and having refreshed his men, resolved to attack a strong part, which in all probability might not be defended so vigorously. Therefore, at four in the afternoon, he directed his main force against the Guben-gate, and entered the town: for he well foresaw, that about that time the Imperial generals would be sacrificing to Bacchus instead of Mars. This was confirmed to him by people who had deserted that day.

When his majesty broke into Francfort, Butler was almost the only officer of repute who was at his post. Two Imperial regiments who guarded the part where the Swedes entered, after having made a tolerable resistance, were pushed on till they came near to Butler's quarter; who, not knowing whether they were friends or enemies, learnt from lieutenant colonel Wade, that they were Imperialists. Upon which, as they still kept advancing towards him, he ordered his regiment to fire on them, and then sent Wade to assure them, that if they would maintain their ground and fight like men, he would lend them an hundred musqueteers, and Wade should command the whole corps; for it did not appear that their colonels were with them. Butler then received these troops into his own, and maintained an obstinate engagement for two hours. At length, Wade was killed, and Butler grievously wounded: with difficulty he obtained quarter, and saved the small residue of his troops. During which time, neither the governor Schomberg, nor field-marshal Tieffenbach, nor the generals Montecuculi and Herberstein, ever came near them. On the contrary, they rose abruptly from table, mounted on horse-back, and fled to Silesia. Three Irish lieutenant colonels were killed, namely, Patrick, Carthy, and O'Neal: as also, the captain-lieutenants Grace and Brown; and ensign Butler; all Irish.—And now Gustavus sounded a retreat, and called off his men.

Notwithstanding all that has been related to the honour of Butler, yet so *capricious* and *unfortunate* is the service of war, that the Imperial generals, to exculpate themselves, laid the whole blame upon Butler; pretending, (which was not true) that the enemy entered the town at his quarter, because it was the weakest: and had it not been for a providential ac-

cident, he might have been degraded and beheaded, in spite of all his gallant services. But Gustavus, having that night all his chief officers at supper with him, protested, *That he could not eat a morsel till he saw the brave Irishman.* Upon this, an invitation was sent to him; *And yet* (added the king) *I have something to say to him, which perhaps he may not chuse to hear.*

Butler not being able to walk, by reason of his wounds, which we have before specified, was carried to the king upon a couple of pikes, according to the soldier-like manner.

When he came in, Gustavus looked upon him sternly and angrily. *Sir,* (said he) *are you the ELDER, or the YOUNGER Butler?* “May it please your majesty, (said he) I am the “younger.” *God be praised! O thou brave man,* answered Gustavus; *had you been the elder, I had reasons to have passed my sword through your body*.* *But now my physicians shall attend you, and nothing be wanting that can administer to your ease and happiness.*

Had this officer been a *protestant*, it is probable Gustavus would have tempted him into his service; for he was as remarkable for piety, as for bravery.

And here we must beg leave to mention an incident which is truly curious. The Imperial generals, before they ran away, left word with the troops that staid behind, “That Butler “had occasioned the loss of Francfort.” [Every Shibolet of faction has a uniform watch-word, and this was theirs.] Butler, in the little conversation he was able to hold with Gustavus, expressed an uneasiness at such a cruel piece of slander. *Sir,* (said the king) *it is in MY power to do your character a piece of justice in that respect, which, I flatter myself, will NEVER be controverted. I will bear full testimony to your valour under my hand and seal.* Then calling for pen, ink, paper, &c. he drew up a certificate in the amplest and strongest form: setting forth the heroic behaviour of Butler, and adding also, “that if the Imperial generals, instead of acting like poltroons, had performed but a fifth “part of what this gallant Irishman performed, he never “should have been master of Francfort, but after an obstinate siege.” *But, Sir,* (continued he) *more than this is due*

* What unsoldier-like action of the elder Butler is here alluded to, is not to be known from history. It must have been somewhat very notorious, or else Gustavus would not have threatened to have killed him with his own hand. The story showed us afterwards that the king knew men and their characters very well. For *this* Butler (whose christian-name was *Jama*) had a principal hand in the assassination of Walstein and his four favourite colonels, notwithstanding he had very great obligations to Walstein. More shall be said of him in a note, when we speak of that general's death.

to a brave and injured man. Every general now in the room will take a pride to sign this paper as well as myself. And this accordingly was done.

The four Imperial generals still held their first language at Vienna. Even Butler's elder brother James, failed like a good courtier with the stream of the court: and before he had heard any thing of Gustavus's certificate, writ his brother a letter full of the most ungenerous reproaches: telling him in particular, "That he had tarnished the lustre of the Imperial arms, as well as that of his own family; and that *Cæsar's court-martial* would make his name a by-word of reproach." Walter, touched to the quick with this insolence and unkindness, went to Gustavus with what haste he could, and showed him the letter. The king, comforting him with a gracious smile, said only this: *Butler, send my testimonial to the Emperor (for you have full leave) and give yourself no more trouble about the matter* *.

* All we know of Walter Butler after this period is, that when he left the Swedish army, his first business was to send a challenge to colonel Behem, who had commanded a regiment at Francfort, and whom his enemies had pitched upon to be his accuser. But the Swedish testimonial had terrified Behem, and he signed a full retraction. Butler then went into Poland, and raised a very fine troop of cavalry at his own expence; but ran the risque of being killed every day by the enraged peasants. On his return, he took Prague, which made him more and more a favourite with Wallstein; and afterwards he married the countess of Phondona. He decided the victory in favour of the Imperialists at the famous battle of Nordlingen; where he stood firm, without losing an inch of ground, for three and twenty hours, during a continual fire, and though 16000 soldiers were killed in that engagement. Soon after he died.

Our Butler was at Prague when Wallstein was assassinated. The court of Vienna strongly suspected him to be in the generalissimo's interests; but in truth he was neither *for* him, nor *against* him. He saw Wallstein's faults, but knew how to preserve his own personal *gratitude* at the same time. Not that he had any objection to his being removed, (if the emperor so pleased) or tried in a *judicial* manner.

Had Butler not been a *very honest* man, he might have made a *great fortune* just before Wallstein fell: for that general (who always gave the preference to foreign troops) besought him to go to Ireland and raise a body of infantry; adding, that he had bills of exchange at Hamburg, and ready money at his palace of Sagan, to make good the sum he intended for that purpose; namely, *thirty-two thousand pounds*, and upwards. But Butler declined the employment, and turned it off very politely, by saying, "That poor Ireland had been drained too much of her men already."

This anecdote I learned at Vienna, but the memorandum was mislaid. I infer it now, because Curre confirms it; with this difference, that he labours to make Walter Butler a well-wisher to his brother James's *glorious conspiracy*, as he calls it. But to *that* matter, one confutation may be given, even at this distance of time, namely, that Walter Butler never rose in the army after Wallstein's death, nor obtained any place at court; though his *noble* family gave him pretensions, that have great weight in Germany.

The taking of Francfort was a point of extraordinary consequence to his majesty's affairs. It extended his elbow-room into the rich provinces of Saxony, the Marche of Brändenburg, Lusatia, and Silesia, and made him master of the Elb and Oder on both sides. And thus having cleared the neighbourhood of the two electors from the enemy, he reduced them to the necessity of joining with him from the rules of self-preservation, because he was eventually, and in effect their master and conqueror. It delighted him also not a little to have gained this important place on Palm-Sunday, and at the critical period when the protestant *confederators* were assembled at Leipzig; to whom he wrote the very next morning, April the fourth, with uncommon satisfaction*; but, unfortunately for him, the assembly was dissolved the day before.

Schomberg and Tieffenbach merited no great praise in defending Francfort. Their greatest efforts ought to have been before the town was attacked sword in hand. They had too many cavalry in the garrison, which caused more confusion than advantage, when once the enemy entered the town. They had also, according to the Imperial custom, an immoderate number of females and superfluous attendants on the army: and it may be observed farther, that they confided too much in their number of troops, and despised the besiegers to such a degree, that when the Swedish army appeared before the town, the officers thought proper to continue their mirth, and not rise from table. But this gallantry and gaiety of the besieged upon the first investing a town, very rarely keeps up the same spirit to the finishing and serious conclusion of the affair: and perhaps the Austrians might have defended Francfort better, if they had been more sparing of their petulancies and vain-glorious speeches. It may suffice therefore (being more to the purpose) to remark here, that during this siege his majesty ordered colonel Monro to employ himself and his regiment all night in forming what was then called a *running line of approach*. Monro kept his soldiers to their duty, as well as he could, and never sat down till break of day. Yet the king was extremely displeas'd the next morning, when he saw how slowly the trench was advanced. Upon which two very good observations have been made by persons then employed in the Swedish service; that Gustavus being himself the best engineer of the age, expected a great deal from his officers in all sieges, and was more impatient upon those occasions than

* See the Letter in *Arma Suecicis*, p. 126, 127.

in the day of battle. The second observation was that the Scots, however excellent in the open field, were too lazy and too proud to work, even in cases of the utmost extremity; which abated some considerable part of their military merit.

Tilly had actually began his march in order to give a diversion, but receiving upon the road the melancholy news of the ill fate which had befallen Francfort, he returned and invested Magdeburg, hoping thereby to draw Gustavus out of Pomerania: but the king continued firm, nor did he choose to receive his motions from Tilly's dictating: on the contrary, he renewed his applications to the protestant princes lately assembled at Leipzig, and exhorted them to make a peremptory decision in behalf of their civil and religious liberties. He then wrote to the magistrates of Magdeburg, and conjured them to acquit themselves like men of honour and principle; assuring them, that if they could maintain their ground for two months, he would certainly relieve them; observing likewise, that before the time specified, he could neither make the necessary dispositions with regard to his new conquests, nor collect together a body of forces sufficient to face Tilly.

It was now indeed high time for *that* general to take the field, and attempt to stop the torrent of Gustavus's conquests. By orders therefore of the emperor, and his friend and patron the elector of Bavaria, he had drawn together all the troops he possibly could from the land of Juliers and East-Frizeland, the duchy of Bremen, and the circles of Suabia and Franconia. His first scheme was to give Gustavus battle; but that the Swedish hero prudently declined. He then purposed to hinder his enemy from disturbing Pappenheim, who formed a sort of blockade round the town of Magdeburg. But new commotions broke out in the inward parts of the empire, which he thought himself obliged to compose in good time; and this unhappy movement gave Gustavus an opportunity to fix his footing at the courts of Dresden and Berlin.

Gustavus now leaving a part of his army at Francfort under Banier's command, cast a desiring eye towards Land-sperg, garrisoned with 3000 foot, and 1500 dragoons. He had long wished to make himself master of this important place; for as it lay between Prussia and Poland, it was a great thorn to him in his late Polish wars. He made one fruitless attempt upon it on his first arrival in Germany, but the detachment he sent to surprize it miscarried in the attack. A second essay succeeded the foregoing, attended with the like ill-success. The town lies on the Warta, and it must be observed

observed here, that three years had been employed in its fortifications, and the peasants for ten miles round had performed the duty of pioneers and labourers all that time. The king and Hepburn posted themselves on one side; and Horn, who had commanded the blockade, lay on the other.

This undertaking of Gustavus's was a very extraordinary attempt in two particulars; for he took with him only 3,200 commanded musqueteers, and 800 horsemen; so that the garrison exceeded him in number by 500 men: nevertheless we must not reckon the people that attended the train of artillery, which consisted of twelve pieces of battering cannon, under the direction of that excellent officer colonel Leonard Torstenfon*.

He likewise contrived to march his troops near forty miles in two days †; transporting his artillery through roads then supposed to be impassable ‡; and after he had effected his business returned to Francfort in the same time. In the way to Landsperg his advanced guard defeated a regiment of Croats, the colonel that commanded the party being mortally wounded: nevertheless in their retreat they had the precaution to break down every bridge after they had passed it.

There lay a strong fort, well-guarded with cannon, betwixt the king and the town. Monro invested it the first night, and the king left two horsemen with him, giving them express orders to come and wake him, in case the enemy attempted to sally. Next morning the batteries played violently against it; but the parapet of earth was so compact and hardened, that it was soon thought proper to discontinue the attempt on that side. Under this difficulty, his majesty made himself acquainted with a blacksmith, who advised him to throw a float-bridge over one part of a wide morass all covered with water: (and here it must be observed that the king brought a small bridge from Stetin, as well as that large

* Monro calls him Leonard Richardson; but such a person we can nowhere find either before or after this period. But the Christian name soon enabled me to correct the mistake; for Leonard Torstenfon was then general of the artillery. And here it must be observed, that the valiant Monro, who was no great master of orthography, hardly speaks any name right of man or town, usually following the German sound in pronunciation. His very style is likewise German, as *Spruce* for Prussia, *Polack* for Poland, *leaguer* for camp, *still stand* for truce, and *consbasts* for intelligence. Nevertheless our northern historian is very veracious in all his facts, and rarely relates any thing, which he did not see.

† *Diary of marches by Monro.* This little piece has been of extraordinary use to me throughout the whole; though, to avoid tediousness, I quote it only on this occasion. It has proved in effect one of my best chronological tables.

‡ *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri, 381.*

one we have mentioned before. Thus advancing over shallow passes, which the honest mechanic well knew, the Swedes posted themselves unexpectedly on the weak side of the fort, between that and the town. Lieutenant-colonel Dewbatel and Monro followed the blacksmith with 500 men, half dragoons and half infantry, and Hepburn moved slowly after them (for his last wound was only a contusion) at the head of one thousand musqueteers; the enemy's guard being soon routed, the fort surrendered by capitulation, and the king's troops made a lodgment under the town-wall. Young Cratz, the governor, a spirited officer, whom the soldiers much confided in, being killed in a sally, and 300 Imperial troops being taken prisoners, proposals of surrender were soon offered to the king. This shameful capitulation was owing to that great error which ran through Tilly's and Wallstein's discipline; namely, the allowing every regiment an undue number of servants, sutlers, and unnecessary dependants of all sorts. These useless mouths were of no use in the field, and starved them in besieged towns: for when this garrison marched out (and they were reputed some of the best troops in the Imperial service), there were amongst them half as many prostitutes as soldiers. There was one circumstance hardly to be paralleled in this capitulation. The king had once a mind to send for a detachment from his main army, before he allowed the Imperialists to march out of the town; for as the garrison out-numbered him; he was not sure but that they might give him battle in plain ground.

The town being thus evacuated, and the Imperial troops having marched to Great Glogau, in Silesia) his majesty, who seldom indulged in repasts but with politicians and ambassadors, in order to extract points of knowledge from them, allowed Banier, Bauditzen, and the other generals to take a cheerful glass, as they had nothing material to do, and no enemy to fear that evening. Nevertheless he did not honour them with his presence; however, by way of gaiety, he gave his guide the blacksmith one hundred pounds, and made him burgo-master, or in plain English, lord-mayor of Landfperg; who, in the late secret attack, marched with a serene countenance at the head of the detachment, and bore the whistling of the cannons and musquet-balls very well: but when the service grew serious, and several soldiers fell by him, finding, as he said, that the Swedish musquets (the powder being wet) did not make so brisk a report as the enemy's, he begged leave to run to the king, and bring a supply of better powder. It was well known what he meant by that good office.

It is amazing to imagine how much pioneer-work was done during this short siege, and with a few hands, in so much that it was observed on the occasion, That Gustavus made his soldiers perform for nothing what would cost another power many thousand pounds*.

By this time the Imperialists began to find the Swedes a different sort of soldiers from what they had first imagined. The emperor himself thought fit to lower his tone, and at length resolved to give Gustavus the appellation of king of Sweden, which he had formerly bestowed on Sigismund his rival. Thoughts were also conceived of restoring Wallstein, who at that time threw out certain innuendo's, as if he had a mind to pass into the Spanish service.

The court of Vienna and the Catholic league began now to tremble in good earnest; for Pappenheim, who seldom wrote in the dejected and desponding style, informed the elector of Bavaria, "That the emperor must fall, except
" the whole united body of catholics supported him with all
" their money and forces; That Gustavus at present was
" sovereign arbiter of the fate of Germany; That Franc-
" fort and Landsperg were both in his possession; that his
" Swedish majesty probably (as there was no sufficient
" separate army to oppose him) might attempt to raise the
" siege of Magdeburg; and then perhaps the flower of the
" Imperial soldiery might be cut off all at once: That he
" had it in his power to shape his victorious course whatever
" way he pleased: in a word, that the remaining towns
" ought to be well garrisoned; and that nothing less than
" two strong armies could stop the violence of Gustavus's
" progresses: That the league only, and not the emperor,
" could preserve the empire: That money, either in specie
" or in bills of good currency, must be conveyed to Tilly
" and him; and that 6000 horse, and foot proportionable,
" must be raised forthwith in the bishopric of Liege or duchy
" of Lorain."

Pomerania and the *March* being now cleared, his majesty had a fair entrance into Silesia and Brandenburg. Into the first he dispatched the Rhingrave and Bauditzzen, who took Crossen, a considerable city on the Oder, and made excursions to Great Glogau and Wallstein's palace at Sagan. Into the second his majesty entered, throwing a bridge of boats over the Spree, and by a trumpeter summoned Wittenborst, governor of Brandenburg, to surrender to him in

* The expression is a ton of gold, which denotes in the historians of that age, if I mistake not, about 9000 pounds sterling.

twenty-four hours. Wittenhorst desired a few days respite, in order to send an express to Tilly; who first commanded him to acquit himself like a man of honour, but then directed him to capitulate, and hasten with all his garrison to him at Magdeburg. The mention of that town always brought a cloud upon Gustavus's brow: his natural sprightliness had never deserted him before; but he foresaw its ruin, and could not prevent it.

Nevertheless, in order to leave no human methods untried (having concluded a sort of alliance with the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and duke William of Saxe-Weymar) he from Brandenburg pointed his course to Copnick, and about noon sent count Ortemberg to Berlin to demand of the elector the two towns of Custrin and Spandau; and insist likewise upon subsistence and one month's pay for his army, with a promise to redeliver those places at two months end, or when the siege of Magdeburg should be raised. This demand not succeeding, Gustavus Horn was dispatched the next morning at break of day to renew the solicitation, but returned unsuccessful: his orders were to make the elector an offer of the reversional possession of the dukedom of Pomerania; but this prince, who was remarkably reserved and shy in advancing a single step towards his Swedish majesty, excused himself by alledging, That he could enter into no engagement without the participation and full consent of the elector of Saxony. The king wasted the two succeeding days in contriving what to do, and then marched briskly towards Berlin at the head of five cornets of horse, and one thousand musqueteers, and four field pieces, not to make use of apparent force and compulsion. He had some objection to the undertaking this enterprize on a *Sunday*, but the approaching fate of Magdeburg determined him.

Gustavus had extraordinary reasons to wish to possess Custrin, (not only as it was one of the strongest fortifications in the empire, being protected with 150 pieces of cannon, having an arsenal furnished with arms sufficient to equip 20,000 men, and stored with provisions in abundance) but because it was also that very important pass, by means whereof the Imperial army had been preserved, when it fled before him from Gartz; when he had not interest enough to obtain it.

Gustavus had other great designs in possessing Custrin; for as, through the timidity of his allies, he began to suspect he should not be able to raise the siege of Magdeburg, it was then plain, that Tilly, after making himself master of that town, might by this passage march directly to him without interruption, and shake the good faith of his expected ally.

It was at length agreed, that his majesty and the elector should have an interview in Cognick-grove, about a mile from Berlin. The elector made no advances; for, to say truth, the cruelties and rapines, which the house of Austria exercised according to antient custom, had frightened the German princes out of all common presence of mind; so that Gustavus was on the very point of breaking off the conversation, which had lasted an hour, when the elector begged a single half-hour to re-consider the affair. Sir, said the king, *I perceive your mind to be greatly agitated, and compassionate the irresolution you labour under. It must be acknowledged, that my proposals are alarming and hazzardous; but the necessity of times and circumstances demand them: it is you I am extricating from destruction, and not the subjects of Sweden:—*And then turning round to Albert duke of Mechlenberg, who stood by, *Cousin,* added he, *be pleased to observe I take this extraordinary step for the preservation of poor Magdeburg and the protestant religion. For if I think fit to retreat to the Baltic, where are the troops, that can obstruct my retiring? If I entrench myself on whatever tract of ground I chuse, the renowned and invincible Tilly will reflect twice or thrice before he attacks me: and if peace can once be imagined to have taken possession of my thoughts, certain it is, I may have the power of prescribing every single condition to his Imperial majesty. But how will you two sovereigns answer at the last day for the total extirpation of the reformed and evangelical religion? Forget me as much as you please—but remember the gospel: and remember too, that the type of your temporal destruction makes its first and certain appearance at the downfall of Magdeburg*.*—During the sudden astonishment, which this speech occasioned, the electress, accompanied by her mother and some court-ladies, came into the room and surprized Gustavus †, who was too well bred not to listen to the representations of the fair-sex, especially as the electress discovered that spirit of heroism, which her husband wanted. Terms now were soon agreed on, and his majesty was desired to sleep in Berlin that night, and bring with him his thousand musqueteers for his guard, and the five troops of horse.

At parting, his majesty, laughing very heartily, told the electress and her train of ladies, *That they did mighty well to bring about this accommodation; for in case they had not been inclined to such measures, his intention was to have sent them and the elector to have passed a summer in the cooler regions of*

* *Hist. or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. p. 49.

† *Pietro Pom;* Guerre di Germania, lib. i. p. 19.

Sweden: and when the cavalcade retired to court, Gustavus paid his honours to the fair-sex by a general salvo of his little train of artillery; but as the engineer had forgotten to turn his cannon from Berlin, (the approach being first made in an hostile manner) he dismantled the tops of one or two houses; which vexed the king, and put the ladies into some confusion*. Nevertheless, nothing now remained for the elector but to convey his apology to the court of Vienna, from whence it was coldly answered him, That the Swedes would spare the *Marches* no more than the Imperialists had done formerly.

In the course of this negotiation Spandau was granted in all appearance to his majesty during the continuance of the war, and colonel Axel Lilly was pitched upon to be governor; but Custrin could not be obtained, except for the space of a single month. But without dwelling on this incident, firm assurances were given, that its gates should always be open at his majesty's command, who was allowed unmolested passage throughout the whole electorate. The elector made a copious libation that night to Bacchus, and Gustavus parted at break of day for Stetin, where he had some business to transact with the Muscovite ambassador.

In one of the pauses of the conversation above mentioned, as the elector was timorous and unwilling to consent, Gustavus gave a sudden start, and turned his eyes towards Magdeburg: *Let us march yonder, Sir,* said he, *without a moment's delay or hesitation: let us free Magdeburg, not only for our own sakes, but for the sake of the protestant cause. Upon supposition, that no man assists us, and the attempt should prove unsuccessful, (which neither you nor I ought to fear) at worst, Sir, we can return hither; place strong garrisons in all the conquered towns; and make a peace with the emperor upon our own terms: Thus are you safe at all events. But invert the telescope, and contemplate things in another manner. I can retire to Stockholm, and live and die peaceably in spite of the emperor. And then there will remain a certain prince, who must be exhausted and plundered without remorse, who has sacrificed the protestant religion in the most considerable part of Europe, and who must one day answer for his neglect or timidity at God's tribunal.* To this the elector either durst not, or could not answer.

Gustavus marched next to Potsdam, and thence summoned the elector of Saxony to join him, or allow him free passage, as he was fully determined to raise the siege of Magdeburg; both which requests this prince denied him: This

* *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg.*

pretext was, that he could not absolve himself from the oath of fidelity he had taken to the emperor. When an interview was pressed on him, he declined accepting it, as being obliged to make a review of all his army: He dreaded another circumstance too; the drawing the war into his own country; in a word, he was like a man bewildered in a dangerous forest, who knew not which track to pursue. By this fatal resolution Magdeburg was lost, which gave many a pang to a generous and manly heart like that of Gustavus, who unbosomed himself to the public in one of the best reasoned manifestos * of that age, and then (to waste no farther time in fruitless complaints) sat himself seriously, earnestly, and inflexibly, to make amends for the defaults of others. He forced the elector of Saxony to see his error, and formed a plan, which made him prosperous and victorious against his will, and contrary to his first intentions.

During Gustavus's political transactions at Stetin, it may be worth while to observe, that in the month of February †, the elector of Saxony, in the name of all the protestant princes, had convened the friends of liberty and Gustavus to one general assembly at Leipsic ‡. This meeting was both august and formidable: it consisted of the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, the margrave of Bareith, the dukes of Weymar, John, Bernard, and William; the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the margrave of Baden-Dourlach, the prince of Anhalt, the dukes of Altenberg, Coburg, and Sultzbach. All these appeared in person. The archbishop of Bremen sent his deputy, as did the dukes of Brunswick, Lunenberg, and Mechlenberg, the margrave of Anspach, the new administrator of Wirtemberg, (duke Julius not being yet settled) and, though last, not least in protestant zeal; The good princess, the abbess of Quedlingberg §. Deputies appeared

* See the APPENDIX, Art. XXI. *first edit.* 4°.

† *Bougeant*, tom. i. p. 229, 8°. misplaces the period of this convention under the articles of the year 1630.

‡ History of the diet of Leipsic, translated from the Latin, and published at London, 4°. 1632, containing 19 pages. See the APPENDIX Art. XX. *first edit.* 4°. This diet began February 8, 1630, and ended April 3, 1631.

§ The abbess of this illustrious protestant convent is always a princess, and holds immediately under the empire. The emperor Henry the Fowler founded the convent, and his daughter Matilda was the first abbess. It is endowed with a pretty territory that lies round it. The principal persons in it. after the abbess, are a prioress, deaness, and canoness, who have all handsome houses and good revenue. The number of conventual ladies depends upon the will of the abbess, who at present is Anna Amelia, princess of Prussia; whose brother is now protector for the elector of Saxony, who sold his right in 1697, against which the late abbess Maria Elizabeth of Holrein-

peared likewise from the circles of Suabia and Franconia, from various sovereign counts of the empire, and from the free towns of Straßburg, Nuremberg, Francfort, Lubec, Bremen, Brunswick, Hildesheim, Northausen, Müllhausen, and Augsberg, &c. Dr. Mathias Hoe, the elector of Saxony's domestic chaplain, opened the assembly with a very spirited discourse, nor was his text ill-chosen :

*Deus, quis similis erit tibi? Nè taceas neque compeſcaris, Deus : quoniam ecce inimici tui sonuerunt : & qui oderunt te, extulerunt caput. Super populum tuum malignaverunt consilium, & cogitaverunt adversus sanctos ; dixerunt, venite, & disperdamus eos, &c **. The streets were all barricadoed, the city-keys delivered every night to the elector, and no man allowed to enter the town, whose business was not known : for nothing was so much dreaded upon this occasion as an Imperial spy. Yet the zealous, able, and turbulent ecclesiastic, Mathias Hoe, notwithstanding the fine spirit, which appears from his text, was supposed (being director of the elector's conscience) to have received some gratuities from the court of Vienna. Thus much is certain, he traversed Gustavus on the present occasion, though the full intent of it tended to establish a closer union between the Lutherans and the Calvinists : to which purpose one Duræas, as Grotius calls him †, had been sent to the assembly held at Francfort upon the Mayne not long before, furnished with conciliatory letters from the English prelates. And the opinion of Grotius concerning this convention was as follows : *Rex Sueciæ Magnus Gustavus . . . non multum ante mortem, Lipsiæ conventum instituerat utriusque sententiæ protestantium . . . Effecit sua auctoritate ut amice discederetur, cum magna spe restituendæ unitatis. Sed tristis exitus tanti regis salubre hoc cœptum intercidit.*

Nevertheless, the house of Austria made no great efforts by way of opposing this assembly ; taking it for granted, injudiciously enough, that the protestant princes had no other point in view than to propose some mitigations in regard to the *edict of restitution* ; whereas the objections made by them under this article were little more than a meer pretext ; for every person convened had a private view to form some con-

Holstein Gottorp, protested more times than once, but always in vain. This abbey sends a deputy to the diet ; and its contingent, upon the military establishment of the empire is one horseman and ten foot soldiers ; a small number of knight-errants, considering the fine ladies of family and consequence they are to protect.

* *Brachetii Hist. Nestr.* temp. p. 246. Psalm lxxxiii, 1, 2, &c.

† *Ejusd. lxxv.*

nections (as far as he durst) with the king of Sweden. Yet no prince had the courage to be the first proposer of any public spirited and generous resolution, being fearful of becoming the immediate victim of the emperor's resentments, before the protestants could join their forces effectually, and with a sincere intention of making good their engagements*.

The first points agitated were these that follow: To obviate the schemes, which the catholics proposed to form at their assembly, intended to be held at Francfort upon the Mayne; and next to implore the emperor either to annihilate the edict of restitution, or abate its rigour. And upon supposition the court of Vienna should remain inflexible, then to conclude on proper measures for diverting the stroke, that hung over them: as also how to clear their respective dominions of the Imperial soldiers, who ravaged and destroyed every thing within their reach, contrary to the laws of the Germanic system, and the *Pacta Conventa* of the emperor solemnly sworn to at his coronation.

It was represented likewise, in a memorial transmitted to the emperor, That the Imperial constitutions and the laws of the Golden Bull had been violated, and the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg cruelly oppressed, the latter of which persons (though the king of Sweden possessed good part of his territories, namely, the Old and New Marches) being obliged to pay his *whole* contribution without abatement; which reduced him to such difficulties, that he was compelled to make retrenchments at his own table and diminish his family; nor was he able to maintain a sufficient garrison for the protection of his capital: and that several princes of the house of Saxony, for example, those of Altenberg, Weymar, and Coburg, had, upon complaining of their inability to discharge their respective contributions, been threatened with the exaction of a quadruple proportion; whereas the emperor behaved with great mildness and partiality towards the subjects of his own hereditary dominions. It was agreed further, that the protestant clergy had been used with an unbecoming severity, and that new impositions were produced every day, at the arbitrary discretion of the Imperial commissaries, without consulting (conformably to the Germanic constitutions) the parties and provinces, whom the thing concerned: that the catholic armies defended shamefully to-day the very countries they devoured but yesterday; and that lands had been assigned to generals and soldiers upon the footing of a conquest: that they had

* *Le Barre, Hist. d'Allemagne*, tom. ix. p. 604.

been obliged to contribute to the support of ineffectual or imaginary regiments; and that sums had been levied, after the nullity of the demand had been evinced: upon which military exaction ensued: that the commissary-general entered countries, and assigned quarters, without leave first obtained from the respective sovereigns: that outrages, thefts, and rapes, were matters of common practice; and that agriculture and commerce were both banished from the territories of the empire. Nevertheless, the whole was represented in the supplicatory style, with an air of modesty; each person being determined (so far as was consistent with public good and private conscience) to maintain due loyalty and obedience to the emperor*.

Gustavus took care to apply fuel to this protestant flame, and sent privately Chemnitius and other politicians, charged with these secret instructions; “First, by way of preliminary, (having mentioned the alliance concluded with France) to cultivate the elector of Saxony’s good graces with particular attention, as the princes and deputies all took the lead from him: and then, secondly, (upon which the king most set his heart) to induce the several assembled protestants to take off the mask at once, unite themselves with him, and declare war against the emperor: but, thirdly, if some should think these measures over-violent, and inconsistent with that obedience, which the Germanic body owes its chief, then to persuade them to raise troops for the protection of their respective territories, and allow him (Gustavus) who alone defended their religion, lives, and properties, a certain annual pension or subscription for the support of the common cause, as also free passage, provisions, forage, and permission likewise to enter into fortified towns in case of a retreat: and, lastly, if neither the *bold* nor the *moderate* proposal should please them, then to suggest a still gentler method, and insist upon their forming separate alliances amongst themselves, which they were to keep secret till time of need.”

Never were proposals better calculated, either by a brave man or a cautious one: how they were relished, or how they were answered, cannot be ascertained from history; but sure we are, that this account of the affair was allowed by Oxenstiern to be genuine. But what could be done with a prince of such strange dispositions as the elector of Saxony? who, though he opened the assembly with a promising speech, was

of such a temper, that it was extremely difficult to manage him. He hated war, and was greatly addicted to the pleasures of hunting and drinking: he had an implicit confidence in the king of Denmark, and a radical disgust to the king of Sweden; and the rather, as their pretensions clashed with respect to the bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt. He had, moreover, conceived both dread and jealousy against the house of Weymar, under pretence, that the princes of the union, in the *Anhaltine* papers found at the battle of Prague, had promised his electorate (concerning which promise we know nothing certain) to a duke of Sax-Weymar, descended from that line, which Charles V. had deprived: he was partial likewise to the Imperial interests, through ancient habitude; and was induced thereto by some private reasons: for Bohemia and the incorporated provinces lay contiguous to his territories, and he always hoped to obtain some grants upon them, in case the house of Austria grew prosperous in her victories. To complete all this, he professed an aversion to all foreign interferences in the empire, and, what was still more, had one favourite principle at heart, which was to bring about a general peace in Germany, and transfer the seat of war into some foreign country, as Sweden, Poland, the Valteline and Italy. In this object he had two views, to give a diversion to the enterprising ambition of the Austrian family, and maintain his own country in repose till he could indemnify himself for the fatigues, expences, and depopulations of a tedious war. These were Arnheim's maxims rather than his own. And besides all this, the landgrave of Hesse-Dramstadt, who was the elector's son-in-law, held a strict correspondence with the Imperial ministry; and Francis Albert duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, who then served under Gustavus, was still more liable to suspicion. What embroiled matters more at the court of Dresden, was, that Arnheim, general in chief of the Saxon army, had served many years under Wallstein, in the capacity of his obsequious creature and most implicit follower. This mean compliance of his temper might not have made him formidable; but his artifices and dissimulation were unparalleled. Richelieu used to say, "The church lost in him " the completest Jesuit that ever lived *;" and (having been often

* Or, as Grotius has delivered down the anecdote in a private conference, "Robbed the world of a more insidious and negotiating cardinal, than the " see of Rome could ever produce."

John George Arnheim was a gentleman of Brandenburg. He had an inventive head in matters of dissimulation, artifice, and deceit, and may be considered

often perplexed with his tergiversations and shifting parties) rejoiced and made little gesticulations like a child, when the Swedes took him prisoner. Nor was the general alone insincere to the Swedish cause; for the elector's chaplain had his share, and the ministry likewise.

Upon the whole, it may suffice to observe, that the elector of Saxony wanted to please, and not displease the contending parties; a task unworthy of a great man, because of the improbable success which attends it; and too difficult for a weak or timorous man to execute; the result of whose wonderful cunning and address is, to render each party discontented;

After various debates, it was at length agreed by universal consent, "To petition for the revocation of the *édit*, to relieve the protestant princes and states, that were oppressed;

considered as the prime author of all the elector of Saxony's duplicity. Amongst other things, he betrayed the Swedes in 1633, and negotiated the alliance between his master and the emperor; being always a creature who subjected himself to the *ferula* of Wallstein. His behaviour to count Thurn and Dewatel was highly ungenerous; for he attacked them in the night whilst they were his allies and serving him; took all their soldiers prisoners, and transferred them to the Imperial service. Wallstein, who was magnificent in every thing, where his private passions were unconcerned, was so ashamed of this action, that he dismissed these officers without ransom; a piece of private history, which few historians have been able to account for, as no prisoner would have been so acceptable to the emperor as the *former*.

Arnheim being taken by the Swedes in some rencounter about the year 1638, was conducted with great joy to Stockholm, and made a state-prisoner in the castle there. M. du Maurier tells us*, that he often saw him at his window reclining his head on his hand, and musing like a man that seemed lost in meditation. He at length gave a new proof of his abilities in stratagem; for pretending to be in a sort of dying condition, he signified to the ministry, that he could make a disposition of part of his estate by sale greatly to his advantage, if they would grant a passport to one of the gentlemen of his retinue to cross over into Germany, having invested the said trusty person with proper authorities. The agency made no difficulty of complying with so reasonable a request, and Arnheim artfully chose a day to dispatch his agent, when great rejoicings were made for the birth of a dauphin of France. Upon this pretext Arnheim's retinue made a public dinner, and distributed rich wines in great abundance to the persons that guarded their master, and in the close of the evening Arnheim (who was supposed to be dying) issued out with the gentleman his agent in the character of his lively foot-man, well muffled in a large riding coat. He reached the sea-coast with great celerity, and transported himself in a little vessel into Germany. The remainder of his family at Stockholm carried on the farce with great solemnity; and as his pretended illness kept him from visitors, too much time elapsed to give the ministry any opportunity of re-taking him. The success of this artifice threw Oxenstiern into great inquietudes †.

* *Mémoires*, p. 259. † *Lotichius de rebus Germanicis*, fol. tom. ii. p. 521.

“ and maintain the Augsburg confession in its full vigour
 “ and purity: to demand, that the Imperial troops should
 “ be removed; otherwise not to grant them passage, pro-
 “ visions, or quarters: to preserve the liberties of the Ger-
 “ manic body without infringing the prerogative of the em-
 “ peror; to restore peace consistently with law, and renew
 “ old friendship with the papists: to find expedients, where-
 “ by they might make good the proposals made at the diet of
 “ Ratisbon; and, above all, to put themselves in a posture
 “ of defence, in order to preserve their ecclesiastical posses-
 “ sions, and oppose the edict of restitution.”

Each circle, prince, and state, was to subscribe a certain contingent of men and money in defence of their lives, their properties, religion, and liberty, conformably to the laws of the Germanic system, and the common principles of self-preservation.

They then entered into a common treaty to assist and vindicate one another, and a chosen juncto (of a few only) was appointed for the more speedy dispatch of important businesses, vested with full authority to act for the rest. And lastly, it was resolved, by way of corroborating their interests, and giving sanction to their determinations, to invite the king of Denmark, the duke of Holstein, and the maritime towns of the Augustan possession, to accede; and that letters should be addressed to all foreign protestant princes and states upon the same subject. Nor must I here omit, that it was determined to raise an army of 40,000 men*, which (as to appearance) was to act only in a defensive capacity. Care was taken likewise not to mention a single syllable with reference to the irruption of Gustavus into Lower-Saxony; nor was the least promise made of affording any assistances to the emperor.

Thus ended the famous Leipsic conclusions; and the assembly was dissolved on Palm-Sunday, the 3d of April. Of all which proceedings the elector of Saxony sent the emperor and the catholic electors a seemingly minute and circumstantial account; imploring the former in terms as strongly conceived as can be imagined, to exert the greatest power the Supreme Being had been pleased to bestow on any

* The number of this army can only be guessed at, but not positively ascertained. All we find is, (making an equal proportion of foot and horse, the regiments of the former being ordained to consist of 3000 men, and those of the latter 1000) that Saxony was to raise six regiments, Brandenburg three, the circles of Suabia, Franconia, and the Rhine, three each; and the circle of Lower-Saxony to levy money for raising one regiment and paying it.

prince in Europe, in a manner worthy of the giver and the possessor, so as to restore the empire to its ancient peace, and prevent a scene of blood-shed and ruin, the largest in extent, and the most dreadful in its consequences, that the world perhaps ever see. He then observed, that the confederations made at Leipzig turned purely on the defensive side of the question; and what had been there determined, related only to personal preservation, and not the destruction of others. Be that as it will, this last attempt was unsuccessful; for the emperor would not expunge one tittle in the edict of restitution. Of course the Saxon letter was filled with a repetition of old complaints, and the Imperial answer (which consisted of two monitory epistles, conceived and expressed with great acrimony against the several princes lately assembled at Leipzig) breathed nothing but resentment and indignation. To this succeeded a prohibition of raising troops; directed against each and every potentate of the evangelical, and the reformed persuasion; and strict injunctions were addressed to the catholic powers, commanding them to with-hold all assistances from the protestants, under pain of confiscating their respective fiefs. During this contrariety of sentiments, some foreign powers interfered, with a view to make these distractions more unfavourable to the house of Austria, at whose overgrown power they had reason to be alarmed; and all the good Gustavus could obtain from the elector of Saxony was, permission to transport provisions and powder through his dominions to the distressed garrison at Magdeburg. As for money he refused to contribute a single farthing; nor would he agree to unite his troops with those of his majesty, and raise the siege. The king petitioned like a suppliant for free possession of Dessau-bridge, and besought the elector to meet him and his army on the opposite banks of the Elb, from whence he purposed, that they should march conjointly to Magdeburg; requesting likewise to have leave given him to embark his artillery and heavy baggage at Wittemberg, and promising to give him draughts in the banquiers of Hamburg or Amsterdam for immediate payment of all the expences. But the elector continued like a man petrified, and referred all to the example of the elector of Brandenburg*.

During this interval Gustavus had no patience to see the distress of the unhappy town of Magdeburg, and renewing his solicitations by a second letter, far more urgent than the former, told the elector, that he considered his first denials

* *Clementius*, tom. i. p. 120.

as marks of politeness and respect to the emperor; but that a higher obligation now ought to influence his actions, namely, his duty to God, and his affection to his faithful subjects." As to the approach of Aldringer and the German army, that had served in Italy, he confessed himself to be no ways dismayed at such an event, and recommending a personal interview to his electoral highness (as business of consequence could not be carried on by the intercourse of letters and the tedious perplexities of public ministers) besought him in one word *to remember his sons and the archbishopric of Magdeburg* *.

Mean while Tilly employed himself seriously about the siege of Magdeburg †, a town of great strength, in one of the most populous and fertile parts of North-Germany, situated between the electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg. This scheme of the Imperial general was not amiss. He wanted to strike some stroke of consequence to counterbalance the glory of Gustavus, and raise the reputation and spirits of his own army. He hoped likewise by a decisive action of this sort to fix the two wavering electors to the interests of the house of Austria, but overturned all this plan hereafter by his own eagerness and indiscretion.

Pappenheim had formed a blockade round this city some weeks before, and, as he always relied upon the pen as well as the sword, had made the governor an offer by letter of vast sums of money, and the title of count of the empire. Upon this occasion, Falkenberg acted both with prudence and spirit; for he examined the trumpeter, who delivered the letter in presence of all his officers, sending word back to Pappenheim (for he did not write) "that he might find at home the sort of men he wanted, but that Falkenberg was not a person of that character; and, friend," (said he, to the messenger) "whoever comes here again upon such an errand, shall receive an halter, instead of a gold chain;" which in those days was the present of honour †.

* *Stenmitius*, tom. i. p. 120.

† Magdeburg, or *Maiden-town*, bears for arms a virgin crowned, supposed to be Venus, who was worshipped in this country till the reign of Charlemagne, who converted some of the Saxons to Christianity. Its duchy is 180 miles long and 96 broad. In the town there is a copy extant of a painting of Venus, which was preserved here in a place unnoticed till the year 780. In this picture was a golden car, drawn by two swans, and two white doves. A naked Venus leans forward, having a rose in her mouth, and a myrtle-garland on her head; the tresses of her hair waving. In her left-hand she holds the terrestrial globe; in her right three golden apples. On her left-breast is a pointed dart, on her right a blazing torch. Behind the car stand the three Graces with their arms folded.

‡ *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 123.

Tilly invested Magdeburg about the beginning of March, and soon made himself master of various forts and outworks: one by way of peculiar strength was called *Pappenheim's Fort**, and was so named in order to imply, that it was an object worthy to be attacked by that general. Nevertheless, Pappenheim took it sword in hand. Another was called *Tilly's Disgust*, which underwent the same fate. The Toll-fconce, which the Imperial general attacked last, cost him the lives of 500 men. It was defended vigorously by Falkenberg † the governor; who had thrown himself into the town in the habit of a peasant several weeks before; yet he ought to have maintained this outwork (which commanded the bridge) at all hazards, since from the moment it became a prize to the enemy, the city, which was of great extent, though commanded by no eminence, was left naked to the enemy, being defended only by the town-walls and a rampart, not extremely strong.

But though the governor was a good officer, matters went not extremely to his satisfaction within the walls. His garrison was weak, consisting of but 2000 foot and 250 horse, new-raised levies, and ill-paid. The money promised by Gustavus to the administrator ‡ could not be conveyed to him at the day appointed; for the enemy had surrounded the town somewhat sooner than was expected. Tilly had pensioners among the magistrates, who discovered what was debated in every council. The town was ill-supplied with provisions. The commander moreover wanted powder; which was partly owing to an indiscreet enterprize in one of his officers, who, just before Tilly's army environed the town, went with a detachment to fetch 200 quintals, that were lodged in the bailywic of Gomern, ten miles distance from Magdeburg: and then out of pure gaiety of courage, hearing that count Ladron a Bavarian colonel, was coming down the Elb with a party of troops, quitted the object of his journey, and killed him and most of his escort within sight of Dessau-bridge, in whose fortrefs the Imperialists had a garrison; whilst the powder very unfortunately fell into the enemy's hands.

Amongst other views, this rash adventurer conceived a vain hope of seizing papers of great consequence from the

* *Waffenbergii Florus Germ.* p. 229.

† Falkenberg was a German born, and grand maréchal of the court at Stockholm.

‡ Christian William, uncle of the elector of Brandenburg, administrator and archbishop of Magdeburg, was a layman. The emperor had proscribed him for not giving way to the edict of restitution.

elector of Bavaria to Tilly : but a single line of consequence was never discovered ; and not being able (by reason of going out of his way) to pass through the enemy's troops, to enter Magdeburg, he retired with great disorder of mind to Leipsic, for it is thought he killed Ladron and his men in a very unfoldier-like manner, and being there seized with the plague, died delirious in remorse and horror.

Mean while, according to the custom of the times, many furious sallies were made, some successful, and some otherwise. Falkenberg conducted one or two, which shewed more zeal than discretion. However, Pappenheim in a particular rencounter had like to have been killed or taken prisoner ; which single event might have given a turn to the whole state of affairs.

In about a month Tilly began to cannonade the town very furiously ; having raised four batteries against the new city, each mounted with sixteen pieces of large artillery. On the seventh day from that period, he carried his entrenchments to the foot of the wall (the town-ditch being dry*) yet the breach was not practicable. Nevertheless he flattered himself, that the city would then surrender ; having negotiated an accommodation by the means of the Hanse-towns ; but it was only the amusement of false hope. The troops did their duty with incredible spirit on both sides, so fierce and so uninterrupted a firing had not been seen in those wars before. There was likewise great mining and counter-mining ; for Gustavus had taught both enemies and friends to be more compendious in the affair of sieges. Tilly wrote divers letters to the administrator and chief magistrates, but they rejected all accommodation, and ordered the cannoniers to fire with double diligence. He had observed particularly, that Falkenberg owed an allegiance to the emperor, as being a German born ; to which the governor returned this short answer : *I agree with the administrator and the senators ; and will take care neither to hurt my conscience as a Christian, nor my reputation as a soldier* †. In consequence of this, Tilly, on the eighth of May, sent a trumpeter in form to propose a capitulation, who was detained in town till the tenth before a proper answer could be dispatched to the Imperial general. During this interval, the batteries played night and day without intermission : at length the tower and bastion of the

* *Brief, but Authentic Relation of the Siege and Storming of Magdeburg, in High Dutch, &c.* This work must not be confounded with the *Hist. but Authentic Relation, in Low Dutch, three tomes, fol.*

† *Chemnitius, tom. i. p. 127.*

new gate were overturned; the Imperialists crowded from all parts to begin the storm, but the breach was not to be entered with common safety. By this time powder grew so scarce within the city, that the inhabitants were forced to grind it with hand-mills.

During the detention of Tilly's trumpeter, the administrator dispatched another to him, offering to enter into terms, on condition Tilly preserved the privileges of the city, and left him in possession of the archbishopric; protesting further, that he would abide by any subsequent articles, that the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg should agree to. But the Imperial general did not chuse to assent to this proposal, having previously felt the pulses of these princes on the occasion, who excused themselves, and requested the favour of continuing neutral, partly through fear of disobliging their protestant brethren, and partly because the aspect of things appeared at that time somewhat disturbed on the Imperial side.

Thus Tilly kept up still an uninterrupted fire, and made galleries along the fossé, that fronted the Sudenburg and the new town. He then ceased firing.

The citizens vainly hoped, that the Imperialists had formed a design to raise the siege. It is more than probable, that Tilly intended they should think so: be that as it will, the same night he summoned a general council of war; of which the result was, that an universal attack should be given the next morning at break of day, when it was supposed, (and not without reason) that half the garrison would be asleep; not only because the besieged were extremely fatigued, but because most of them were persuaded, that the enemy was determined to shift his quarters; a circumstance, which Tilly's agents within the walls took care to propagate with additions and improvements.

The tenth of May the Imperial general held another council of war at one in the morning, with a view, that no secret might have time to spread itself abroad. The important affair was debated and re-considered once more: and the majority, with Pappenheim at their head, resolved (as at the last council) in the affirmative; though all agreed, that the breaches were not in that condition, which a prudent besieger would wish to have them. But Pappenheim, who had an appetite for danger, and *who thought many things were done by the mere dint of resolving to do them*, declared strenuously (as was usually his custom) for the fighting part. His personal courage made him the darling of the soldiers, and his great experience, prudence, presence of mind in danger, and

and above all his inventive faculty in military stratagems, made the other generals listen to him with respect and pleasure.

At the head of Savelli's, Wrangel's and Gronsfelt's regiments (and when we speak of Imperial regiments it must be observed, that they were at least double in number to those of Gustavus) he began the attack, on the late-erected fortifications of the new city (which was near the banks of the Elb, and where the administrator commanded) precisely at five in the morning, one piece of cannon being discharged by way of signal to all the troops. His watch-word was *Jesu Maria* (the same afterwards used at the battle of Leipzig) and each soldier wore a white ribbon on his right-arm*.

At the same instant two other attacks were commenced with an equal number of troops, conducted by Adolphus duke of Holstein, and count Mansfelt: the latter attempted the Sudenburg-quarter near the great cathedral, where Falkenberg commanded, and the former directed his force against the Cröcken-gate, which watch-master general Amsteroth undertook to maintain. The defence of the banks of the Elb (that river not being supposed passable by reason of its depth, and through want of boats) was left to the care of fishermen, and some few other inhabitants †. Tilly dismissed his officers with a short speech, and kept aloof at the head of a body of reserve, in order to convey supports and assistances wherever they might be wanted.

Mean while all things kept as quiet within the town, as if nothing had been in agitation. Falkenberg, after watching the whole night in the ramparts, was unfortunately gone to a council held at the town-hall, in order to dispatch the trumpeter above-mentioned to Tilly, as was also the administrator.

Pappenheim the mean while, in the post of honour allotted for him, having ordered all his cavalry to dismount in an instant, drove the city-soldiers out of the *faussebraie*, and obliged them to retreat behind the upper wall. He next caused the new work to be attacked, and then filing along under the town-wall, upon which was ranged a battery of cannon, made one furious effort upon the left parapet. Hither Falkenberg flew from the senate-house, with all the troops he could collect together, and pushed him back be-

* *Brief, but Authentick Relation of the Siege of Magdeburg, in High Dutch* 4^o. Magd. 1709.

† *Gibemnius, 126. Brachel, 251.*

yond the new work, marching over the bodies of a hundred slaughtered Imperialists. At length being mortally wounded, he was obliged to be carried back to the nearest part of the town, where he continued to give his orders with unparalleled resolution*.

Mean while Pappenheim perceiving the courage of the besieged to slacken, and making a second attempt with greater success than he could have flattered himself, entered the streets about seven in the morning †. It was then that Falkenberg greatly wanted his cavalry, which might have overborn the enemies before their own horse were admitted; but he found to his great mortification in his dying moments, that some perfidious citizens had barricaded the streets with chains. All we know further with respect to him is, that his body perished in the flames.

During this rencounter one captain Smith greatly signalized himself: he repulsed the Imperialists a second time, but an unfortunate shot soon put an end to his generous efforts; and when the alarum-bell began to sound, the citizens lost all courage, and each man provided for his private safety by retiring to his own house, or attempting to abscond and shelter his person elsewhere. The duke of Holstein ‡, by Pappenheim's assistance, then entered the Hamburg-gate, after having made several unsuccessful attempts before, and pointed the cannon of the ramparts against the streets. At length Mansfelt got into the town, and in the interim the cavalry broke in like a torrent through the Hamburg-gate. This hindered the remaining part of the garrison from uniting, and making one general defence in the public square.

The administrator, at the beginning of the first attack, had his thigh ruffled with a cannon-ball, and received afterwards several musquet-shots, one particularly in the left-leg: he was at length taken prisoner, under promise of kind and humane usage suitable to his quality; yet soon after some fresh soldiers fell upon him, who not only killed his domestics that attended him, but gave him two wounds in cold blood, one with a pistol on the leg, and one with a battle-ax on the head. They then stripped him almost naked, and had dis-

* In this conflict the traitor Quinti Aligheri was killed, who, as Chemnitz tells, was lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of Savelli: but a subsequent account [page 237] gives that post to don Joseph de Ainsa. Nevertheless the difficulty may be easily solved. Theodanus in his narrative calls Ainsa the lieutenant-colonel, some days after the action, by which time the general might have filled up the vacant commission.

† *Ritratti & Elogii di capitani Illustri*, 4^o. 377.

‡ Afterwards killed at Leipzig.

patched him without remorse, if Pappenheim had not flown to his assistance, and ordered him to be carried on two pikes to his tent, fainting; and half-naked. Next morning Pappenheim conveyed him in a coach to Wolmerstadt, and ordered his own chaplain and gentleman of the bed-chamber to attend him. The dukes of Holstein and Saxony* had the unpoliteness to reproach him in gross terms; but he defended the justice of his cause with manly answers, and acquitted himself conformably to the spirit of a prince and man of honour.

Some time afterwards Pappenheim asked him, how he could be so ill-advised as to expose his life, and all that he possessed, for the sake of persons, who sold him every day, and informed the besiegers of the order of the guard, the numbers destined to the support of each station, the weakness of the fortifications, and the several inconveniences they laboured under? That, agreeably to these reports, he had laid the plan of the last attack, and thereby judged precisely when and where to make it.

When the administrator was brought before Tilly, he told him and his generals boldly; *That the Supreme Being would take vengeance upon them: that blood could only be expiated with blood: that acts of cruelty were fatal to armies; and that sooner or later the catholic forces would suffer justly an equal degree of chastisement with what they had inflicted: that the Imperial cause was verging towards its decline, and the glory of Tilly lay interred in the ruins of Magdeburg.*

And now began a massacre not to be paralleled in modern ages. I know nothing approaches to it but the storming of Drogheda by Cromwell, who seems to have copied Tilly in the very meanest part of his character. The soldiers fired promiscuously in the streets, churches and squares, upon persons of all ages, sex, and conditions, with the same fury as in the day of battle. The very best troops, the old Walloons, behaved the least like men, and, as there may be a justice sometimes in cruelty, spared not their own friends within the town, namely, the informers, in the general massacre. The Croations exercised barbarities unknown to savages. The young men and the new-raised soldiers were the only people, that shewed any visible signs of compassion. When the streets and public places were filled with dead bodies, (and this scene may be considered as the very mildest

* Rodolph duke of Sax-Lauenberg. He performed wonders at the battle of Leipzig, and with two or three horsemen rescued Tilly when taken prisoner.

part of their cruelty) the troops disbanded themselves, and began to enter the houses. Here began a more deliberate perpetration of murder: even the aged, the sick, and the young, found no mercy. One soldier held an infant by the legs, with the head downwards, and another cleft the body with his sword. Eight Croatians violated a poor girl, and then transfixed her to the ground with an halbert. A young lady of quality was seized by an officer, but as he dragged her over the Elb-bridge, she begged leave to have the use of her hands to take out her handkerchief and wipe her eyes, and that instant plunged herself into the river, and there expired. Another young woman of fashion, remarkable for her beauty, knowing that in such a case her charms were the least part of her protection, deliberately plunged herself into a well: and twenty young girls, who were assembled together* at a house near the banks of the Elb, rushed out of the doors all at once, and embracing each other, threw themselves into the river.

By this time the whole city was in flames. Most historians attribute this to accident; but as the fire began in various places at once, many may be inclined to consider it as a part of the besieger's cruelty. Thus the few perished, who had concealed themselves, and by the justice of Providence, the Imperialists lost the greater part not only of what they had plundered, but of what the inhabitants had hidden.

Nothing remained of the town but the cathedral, the church and convent of Notre Dame, some few houses that stood round it, and about eighty or an hundred fishermen's cottages on the banks of the Elb. Out of 40,000 inhabitants † it is thought, hardly the number of 800 escaped. Some

* The author of the *Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg*, is pleased to do more honour to the heroic virtue of the fair sex than my collections can authorize me to set forth; for he makes the number of these *Clelia's* amount, according to some relations, to 1200.

† When I say 40,000 inhabitants, I speak only from others, it being my own private opinion, that (including the garrison) there could not be above that number in the town: nevertheless sure it is, that many gentry in the neighbourhood, and many country people, who had connexions with the citizens, refused themselves therein. It may be proper therefore upon this occasion, to give a transcript verbatim from the German relator, whom I have twice quoted already. "It is impossible, saith he, to ascertain the number of persons that perished in the city; for the sword and fire made equal ravages, and the flames, perhaps, destroyed as many persons, if not more, than the cruelty of the barbarians; for when the vaults and cellars came to be opened, in most of them were found three, four, or five women and children, who had been suffocated. The number of the
" dead

Some retired to the cathedral; some obtained quarter, in hopes of ransom; some escaped over the walls; some were dug out of the ruins; and some few were preserved by the seeming interposition of Providence. An handful of the garrison, which held out to the very last man, obtained conditions; but all the officers were put to the sword, excepting Amsteroth, who was taken prisoner, and died the next day, and a lieutenant-colonel and major, whose lives were spared.

When one considers Tilly's bigotry and extreme aversion to the protestants, Pappenheim may be easily excused from being the author of this monstrous scene of cruelty. Why else did Tilly make but a moment's visit to the town, when his presence was necessary there for two or three days? or why, when some of the officers made remonstrances to him, did he reply coldly and unconcernedly: *The town must bleed: it hath not yet made sufficient atonement. Let the soldiers persist another hour, and then we will reconsider the matter!*

Some have said in behalf of the Imperial general, (and Cromwell is reported to have made the same excuse) that severities of this kind were exercised only *in terrorem*. But if that had been the case, the garrison alone was the true object of resentment; an act, even in that light, highly unjustifiable, being disgraceful to common humanity, and irreconcilable with the prudence of a great commander, who knows the revolution of chances in war, and never desires to make it more bloody than it is well known to be in its own nature.

Three days after the assault, the Imperial general made his public entrance into the town, and went directly to the cathedral, where about 400 people of both sexes had locked

“ dead cannot be judged from the list of burials; for some suppose 6,440
 “ bodies to be thrown into the Elb, not to mention those, which the fire
 “ consumed, and others, that were buried in the ruins; so that a quarter
 “ of a year elapsed before many could be found. From the few survivors
 “ we might have received some certain intelligence, but most of them were
 “ carried into different camps, from whence they escaped and dispersed
 “ themselves over Germany and Europe. According to the common opinion
 “ and report, it was judged, that about 400 citizens remained alive,”
 “ (meaning those that Tilly found in the great cathedral) “ part whereof were
 “ detained prisoners with their wives and children: some were consumed,
 “ and others made their flight under favour of the night, and by means of
 “ fire, which broke out in Tilly's camp at Fermerleben, on the fourth day
 “ after the town was taken, which consumed the greatest part of that plun-
 “ der, for whose sake the soldier had exchanged his honour and his humani-
 “ ty.—In a word, the destruction of the beautiful and illustrious town of
 “ Magdeburg, can only be compared with the destruction of the cities of
 “ Troy, Saguntum, and Jerusalem.”

in and barricaded themselves, having neither eat nor drank since the city was storm'd. He order'd them some provisions, imprison'd the men in the administrator's palace, and sent the women and children into his camp. He is said to have repeated the following passages from Virgil on the occasion, which might very well happen, as he had received his education among the Jesuits;

Venit summa dies & ineluctabile fatum.

—*fuit Ilium, & ingens*

Gloria Parthenopos.*

He examin'd the few surviving soldiers of the garrison with great attention, being determin'd to make an example of all deserters, and reproach'd them (for which there was no reason) for making, as he said, so poor a defence; and then gave his orders, that plundering should cease from that moment. Next morning a dreadful fire broke out in his camp, fortunately enough for Stalman the Swedish resident, who had been confin'd there under a close guard; for amidst the extraordinary hurry and confusion he recover'd his liberty, and rejoined his master †.

These barbarities touch'd the king of Sweden to the very heart, and rais'd his indignation to such a pitch, that he protest'd, with a tone of anger, That he would be revenged on the old corporal for this massacre, or lose his life in the attempt. To give vent to his passion, he publish'd a sensible and well-reasoned manifesto, wherein he plainly shew'd, that the citizens of Magdeburg in general had behaved very insincerely with him, having made no subscription for their common defence, nor given any proper accommodations to the garrison till the town was actually invest'd; and then such assistances were granted grudgingly, and came too late.— That they had turn'd a deaf ear to the representations of the administrator last summer; who, if his remonstrances could have carried any weight with them, would have frustrat'd Pappenheim in the blockade he then form'd; and allow'd his majesty to have planned out some fortifications, which might have render'd the town impregnable, and consequently have remov'd the seat of war into some other country.— He tax'd the inhabitants with infidelity to the protestant cause, and remind'd them of the supplies he formerly drew for them from the banks of Hamburg and

* Translated literally Parthenopolis; Magdeburg signifying in the German language, *Virgin's town*.

† *Brief but Authentick Relation*, 4^o.

Lübeck.—As to any promise of raising the siege, he desired the public to reflect, that such engagements are, in the nature of war, conditional; and must be regulated by convenience, possibility, and the state of things. And here he observed occasionally, that after having made himself master of Gartz and Griffenhagen, he had certainly ruined the separate army under Schomberg, and in consequence thereof raised the siege of Magdeburg too, if the governor of Custrin, (which belonged to the elector of Brandenburg) had not denied him the possession of that town at so critical a conjuncture. He then continued to remark, that it was incumbent upon him, before he marched to relieve Magdeburg, to take Francfort; clear the Imperial troops dispersed along the banks of the Oder and the Silesian side of the Warta, and defeat Schomberg, who was superior to him in cavalry; and consequently, had the power of harrassing the rear of his army, or disturbing his quarters every moment.—That Tilly during this interval had greatly strengthened the *army of observation*, which lay near Francfort; so that it was dangerous to make long marches, when a superior force had always the power to tread on his heels.—Nevertheless, such was his Swedish majesty's zeal, that for the sake of relieving Magdeburg, he made that hasty and furious storm on Francfort, and thence marched to Spandau, where he found a cold reception from the elector of Brandenburg: adding likewise, that the duke of Saxony had denied him provisions and boats to convey his troops down the Elb, and had refused him a passage over that large river, either at Wittemberg or the Dessau-bridge; so that hitherto he could conclude nothing with certainty concerning those two princes, till they had spirit and magnanimity enough to take off the mask, and act as open enemies or declared friends. * Lastly, all the world might see, that his interest and inclination were both equally concerned in the relief of Magdeburg, since upon the news of its being taken, he was obliged to cause his army to retreat, and vary the whole plan of his operations. Nevertheless, he even then had relieved Magdeburg, if the said electors had co-operated with him, or indulged him only with a free passage through their territories †.

Many preceding accidents and prodigies were called to mind when Magdeburg was taken, according to the reigning

* *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illustri*, 382.

† *Chemnit. de Bello Sueco Germ.* tom. i. 134, &c. *Swedish Intelligencer*, part i. p. 96, &c.

disposition of that age. Some weeks before the blockade was formed a part of the city-wall tumbled down without any assignable reason*.

When the administrator mounted his horse at Hamburg, in order to take possession of the town, two loud sudden thunder-claps were heard in a clear sky.

Whilst Tilly held his council of war at Hamelen in company with Pappenheim, Gronsfelt, commissary-general Rupa, and others, and determined at once to undertake the siege, immediately arose a hurricane, which overturned a magazine of powder with such force, that the falling stones struck fire, and such an explosion ensued, that they all fell down on their knees, and offered up their prayers, supposing it to be an earthquake. The same storm reached Magdeburg; for Falkenberg, who happened at that time to be riding in the fields, was thrice-blown off his horse: and the statues of the wise virgins (which stood in Paradise-chapel, belonging to the great cathedral) were overturned, and their lamps thrown out of their hands †.

But the prodigy, which puzzled all men, and concerning which we have spoken incidentally in another place, was what happened to an *exempt* corporal's wife, who died in labour with inexpressible agonies, in the new city which Pappenheim stormed, requesting above all things, that her body might be opened; where was found a boy as large as a child of three years old, cloathed in armour of flesh like a coat of mail; and, if the reader chuses to peruse the account in its original form (for all authors mention it); he may find the exactest description in the places referred to at the bottom of the page ‡.

But to return to the massacre at Magdeburg: In the opinion of many judicious readers, I may be thought to violate the dignity of history, by inserting here two narratives, which contain a distinct account of the storming of Magdeburg: The one written by M. Theodanus, then minister of the church of St. Catharine, and the other by a fisherman, who died about the year 1720, having survived the destruction of his native town at least ninety years. But the two relations appear to me so very interesting, and so strongly marked with authenticity, that I cannot allow myself to suppress them.

* *Waffenbergii Florus Germ. de Bello Magdeburgico*, 12°. Francofurt, 1648.

† *Arma Suetica*, p. 66, 67.

‡ *Brief, but Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, 4°. *Chemnitzius*, tom. 4. p. 254.

“ Going * out of church, immediately after sermon †, some people of St. James’s parish passed by, and told me the enemy had entered the town. With difficulty could I persuade myself, that this was any thing more than a false alarm; but the news unfortunately proved too true. I then lost my presence of mind, and as my wife and maid-servant were with me, we ran directly to my colleague M. Malfio’s house, and left our own house open. At M. Malfio’s we found many people, who had fled to him in great perplexity. We comforted and exhorted each other, as far as the terror of our minds would give us leave. I was summoned thence to discharge the last duties to a colonel, who lay dangerously wounded. I resolved to go, and sent my maid to fetch my gown: but before my departure from my wife and neighbours, I told them, that the affair appeared to me to be concluded, and that we should meet no more in this world. My wife reproached me in a flood of tears, crying, *Can you prevail on yourself to leave me to perish all alone? You must answer for it before God!* I represented to her the obligations of my function, and the importance of the moments I was called upon to give my assistance in.

“ As I crossed the great street, a multitude of matrons and young women flocked round me, and besought me, in all the agonies of distress, to advise them what to do. I told them, my best advice was to recommend themselves to God’s protecting grace, and prepare for death. At length I entered the colonel’s lodgings, and found him stretched on the floor, and very weak. I gave him such consolation as the disorders of my mind would permit me: he heard me with great attention, and ordered a small present of gold to be given me, which I left on the table. In this interval the enemy poured in by crowds at the Hamburg-gate, and fired upon the multitude as upon beasts of prey. Suddenly my wife and maid-servant entered the room, and persuaded me to remove immediately, alledging we should meet with no quarter, if the enemy found us in an apartment filled with arms. We run down into the court-yard of the house, and placed ourselves in the gateway. Our enemies soon burst the gate open, with an eagerness that cannot be described. The first compellation they bestowed on me was, *Priest, deliver thy*

* *Angeli*; *Hist. de la Ville de Magdeburg*, 12°. 1714.

† Hübner mentions the text, that was preached on;—*The snare is broken, and we are delivered*, Psalm cxxiv. 7. which proved to be unfortunately chosen; nevertheless, it plainly shews, that the prevalent opinion then was, that the enemy intended to raise the siege. *Geogr. de Hübner*, tom. vi. 190.

" money. I gave them about four-and-twenty-shillings in a
 " little box, which they accepted with good-will; but when
 " they opened the box, and found only silver, they raised
 " their tone of language, and demanded gold. I repre-
 " sented to them, that I was at some distance from my
 " house, and that at present I could not possibly give them
 " more. They were reasonable enough to be contented
 " with my answer, and left us, after having plundered the
 " house, without offering us any insult. There was a well-
 " looking youth among the croud, to whom my wife ad-
 " dressed herself, and besought him in God's name to pro-
 " tect us: *My dear child*, said he, *it is a thing impossible:*
 " *we must pursue our enemies*; and so they retired.

" In that moment another party of soldiers rushed in,
 " who demanded also our money. We contented them
 " with seven shillings, and a couple of silver spoons, which
 " the maid fortunately had concealed in her pocket. They
 " were scarce gone, before a soldier entered alone, with the
 " most furious countenance I ever saw. Each cheek was
 " puffed out with a musquet-ball, and he carried two mus-
 " quets on his shoulder. The moment he perceived me, he
 " cried with a voice of thunder, *Priest, give thy money, or*
 " *thou art dead*. As I had nothing to give him, I made my
 " apology in the most affecting manner: he levelled a piece
 " to shoot me, but my wife luckily turned it with her hand,
 " and the ball passed over my head. At length, finding we
 " had no money, he asked for plate: my wife gave him
 " some silver trinkets, and he went his way.

" A little after came four or five soldiers, who only said,
 " *Wicked priest, what dost thou here?* Having said thus much,
 " they departed.

" We now resolved to shelter ourselves in the uppermost
 " rooms of the house, hoping to be there less exposed, and
 " better concealed. We entered a chamber, that had seven-
 " ral beds in it, and passed some time there in the most in-
 " supportable agonies. Nothing was heard in the streets
 " but the discharge of musquets, and the cries of expiring
 " people: nor were the houses much more quiet; every
 " thing was burst open, or cut to pieces. We were soon
 " discovered in our retirement: a number of soldiers poured
 " in, and one, who carried an hatchet, made an attempt to
 " cleave my skull; but a companion hindered him, and
 " said, *Comrade, what are you doing! Don't you perceive, that*
 " *he is a clergyman!*

" When these were gone, a single soldier came in, to
 " whom my wife gave a crape handkerchief off her neck:
 " upon which he retired without offering us any injury.

" He

" He that followed was not so reasonable ; for entering the
 " chamber with his sword drawn, he immediately discharged
 " a blow on my head, saying, *Priest, give me thy money.*
 " The stroke stunned me, the blood gushed out in abundance,
 " and frightened my wife and servant to that degree,
 " that they both continued motionless. The barbarian
 " turned round to my wife, aimed a blow at her, but it
 " glanced fortunately on her gown, which happened to be
 " lined with furs, and wounded her not. Amazed to see us
 " so submissive and patient, he looked at us fixedly for some
 " moments. I laid hold of this interval to represent to him,
 " that I was not in my own house, being come to the place
 " where I was, to discharge my duty to a dying person ;
 " but if he would grant us quarter, and protect us to our
 " home, I would then bestow upon him all I had. *Agreed,*
 " *priest, said he, give me thy wealth, and I will give thee the*
 " *watch-word: it is Jesu Maria; pronounce that, and no one*
 " *will hurt thee.* We went down stairs directly, highly
 " contented to have found such a protector. The street
 " was covered with the dead and dying ; their cries were
 " enough to have pierced the hearts of the greatest bar-
 " barians. We walked over the bodies, and when we
 " arrived at the church of St. Catherine, met an officer of
 " distinction on horseback. This generous person soon dis-
 " covered us, and seeing me covered with blood, said to the
 " person, who conducted us, *Fellow soldier, fellow soldier,*
 " *take care what you do to these persons.* At the same time he
 " said to my wife ; *Madam, is yonder house yours ?* My wife
 " having answered it was : *Well,* added he, *take hold of my*
 " *stirrup, conduct me thither, and you shall have quarter.* Then
 " turning to me, and making a sign to the soldiers with his
 " hand, he said to me, *Gentlemen of Magdeburg, you yourselves*
 " *are the occasion of this destruction ; you might have acted otherwise.*
 " The soldier, who had used me ill, took this opportunity to
 " steal away. Upon entering my house, we found it filled
 " with a multitude of plunderers, whom the officer (who
 " was a colonel *) ordered away. He then said he would
 " take up his lodging with us, and having posted two sol-
 " diers for a guard to us, left us with a promise to return
 " forthwith. We gave, with great chearfulness, a good
 " breakfast to our centinels, who complimented us on the
 " lucky fortune of falling into their colonel's hands ; at the
 " same time representing to us, that their fellow-soldiers
 " made a considerable booty, whilst they continued inactive ;

* He was only a lieutenant-colonel.

“ merely as a safe-guard to us, and therefore beseeching us
 “ to make them some equivalent more or less. Upon this
 “ gave them four rose-nobles, with which they were well
 “ contented, and shewed so much humanity, as to make us,
 “ an offer to go and search for any acquaintance, whom we
 “ desired to place in safety with us. I told them I had one
 “ particular friend, who had escaped to the cathedral, as I
 “ conjectured; and promised them a good gratuity on his
 “ part, if they saved his life. One of them, accompanied
 “ by my servant-maid, went to the church, and called my
 “ friend often by name; but it was all in vain, no one
 “ answered; and we never heard mention of him from that
 “ period.

“ Some moments after our colonel returned, and de-
 “ manded, whether any person had offered us the least in-
 “ civility. After we had spoken well of the soldiers in this
 “ respect, he hastened abroad to see, if there was any pos-
 “ sibility to extinguish the fire, which had already seized
 “ great part of the city: he had hardly got into the street,
 “ when he returned with uncommon haste, and said, *Shew*
 “ *me the way out of town, for I see plainly we shall perish in the*
 “ *flames, if we stay here a few minutes longer.* Upon this we
 “ threw the best of our goods and moveables into a vaulted
 “ cellar, covered the trap-door with earth, and made our
 “ escape. My wife took nothing with her but my gown; my
 “ maid seized a neighbour’s infant-child by the hand,
 “ whom we found crying at his father’s door, and led him
 “ away. We found it impossible to pass through the gates
 “ of the town, which were all in a flame, and the streets
 “ burnt with great fury on either side. In a word, the heat
 “ was so intense, that it was with difficulty we were able to
 “ breathe. Having made several unsuccessful attempts, we
 “ determined at last to make our escape on the side of the
 “ town next the Elb. The streets were clogged with dead
 “ bodies, and the groans of the dying were insupportable.
 “ The Walloons and Croatians attacked us every moment,
 “ but our generous colonel protected us from their fury.
 “ When we gained the bastion, which stands on the banks
 “ of the Elb, we descended by the scaling ladders, which
 “ the Imperialists had made use of in the assault, and arrived
 “ at length in the enemy’s camp near Rottensee, thoroughly
 “ fatigued, and extremely terrified.

“ The colonel made us enter into his tent, and presented
 “ us some refreshments. That ceremony being over; *Well,*
 “ said he, *having saved your lives, what return do you make*
 “ *me?* We told him, that for the present we had nothing

“ to bestow, but that we would transfer to him all the
 “ money and plate that we had buried in the cellar, which
 “ was the whole of our worldly possessions. At this instant
 “ many Imperial officers came in, and one chanced to say
 “ to me, *Ego tibi condoleo, ego sum addictus Fidei Augustanæ.*
 “ The depressed state I found myself in, made me unable
 “ to give a proper reply to the condolences of a man, who
 “ carried arms against those, whose religion he professed,
 “ and whose hard fortune he pretended to deplore.

“ Next day the colonel sent one of his domestics with my
 “ maid-servant to search for the treasure we had buried in
 “ the cellar; but they returned without success, because,
 “ as the fire still continued, they could not get near the
 “ trap-door. In the mean while the colonel made us his
 “ guests at his own table, and during our whole stay treated
 “ us not as prisoners, but as intimate friends.

“ One day at dinner an officer of the company happened
 “ to say, *That our sins were the cause of all the evil we suffered,*
 “ *and that God had made use of the catholic army to chastise us:*
 “ to whom my wife replied, that the observation perhaps
 “ was but too true: *However, take care,* continued she, *lest*
 “ *God in the end should throw that very scourge into the flames.*
 “ This sort of female prophecy was fulfilled soon afterwards
 “ on the self same Imperial army, which was almost totally
 “ destroyed at the battle of Leipsic*.

“ At length I ventured one day to ask our colonel to give
 “ us leave to depart; he complied immediately, upon con-
 “ dition we paid our ransom. Next morning I sent my
 “ maid into town to try, if there was any possibility of
 “ getting into the cellar. She was more fortunate that day,
 “ and returned with all our wealth.

“ Having returned our thanks to our deliverer, he imme-
 “ diately ordered a passport to be prepared for us, with per-
 “ mission to retire to whatever place we should think proper,
 “ and made us a present of a crown to defray the expence
 “ of our journey. This brave Spaniard was colonel of
 “ the regiment of Savelli, and named Don Joseph de
 “ Ainsa †.

I shall

* There is reason to think our Spanish officer was killed there, for many accounts reckon Savelli (in whose regiment he served as lieutenant colonel) among the dead: but Savelli in truth was then absent, being gone to Vienna in order to be examined concerning the surrender of Damin: and thus the substitute might be confounded with the commander he represented.

† I find Don Joseph de Ainsa only once mentioned in the thirty years wars, and that was in 1625, when Spinelli and he commanded a body of troops
 of

I shall next give my readers the fisherman's short narrative verbatim, in its own natural cast of expression*.

“ The 10th of May, early in the morning, at the time
 “ the regent or master of our school was reading prayers, a
 “ report flew through the streets, that the town was taken,
 “ which was confirmed by the ringing of the alarum bells.
 “ Our regent dismissed us all in a moment, saying, *My dear*
 “ *children, hasten to your homes, and recommend yourselves to the*
 “ *protection of God; for it is highly probable we shall meet no*
 “ *more except in heaven.* In an instant we all disappeared,
 “ some one way, and some another way. For my own
 “ part, I took my course with speed along the high street,
 “ and found, where the public styllyards are, (and where
 “ the grand guard of the city was kept) a considerable body
 “ of troops, with their swords drawn; and saw near them,
 “ and at a distance round them, a great number of soldiers
 “ stretched dead on the pavement. Terrified with so melan-
 “ choly a sight, I shap'd my course down the street, called
 “ Pelican, with a view to conceal myself in my father's
 “ house; but had hardly advanced a few steps, before I fell
 “ in with a band of soldiers, who had that moment mur-
 “ dered a man, whom I saw weltering in his blood. This
 “ sight shocked me to such a degree, that I had not power to
 “ move forwards; but sheltering myself in an house oppo-
 “ site to the Pelican-inn, found a kind-speaking aged man,
 “ who said to me, *Child, why comest thou hither? Save thy-*
 “ *self before the soldiers seize thee.* I was strongly tempted
 “ to put his advice in practice; but in that moment a party
 “ of Croatians rushed in, and holding a sabre to his throat,
 “ demanded his wealth. The old man immediately opened
 “ a coffer to them full of gold, and silver, and precious
 “ stones. They crammed their pockets with his riches;
 “ yet, as the coffer was not emptied, they filled a small
 “ basket with the part that remained, and then shot the poor

of 5000 men, and had a design to attack Mansfelt near Namur. The reader at this time of day may consider our Spanish hero, as no such example and pattern of generosity; and may be surprized at the gratitude the good pastor shews him in his narrative, and at the expressions of protector, deliverer, &c. And the rather, as the said officer, after all his courtesies, took from him the whole he possessed, if we except liberty and life. But the state of war, and the manners of that age, were greatly different from what hath since been practised. The commanders then made no ceremony of living by their swords: many of them considered conquest as matter of real right and property: but political œconomy, natural humanity, and public utility (not to mention the example of Gustavus) soon changed these practices to a certain degree: yet room for amendment still remained, and yet remaineth.

* *Angeli; Hist. de la Ville de Magdeburg, 12^o. 1714.*

“ old man through the head. I stole away behind them,
 “ hoping to seek a place of safety amongst some empty
 “ casks; and found there a young lady, perfectly handsome,
 “ who conjured me to remove, and make no mention of
 “ her. Anxiously reflecting where to dispose of myself, the
 “ same Croatians surprized me again, and one of them said,
 “ *Bastardly dog, carry this basket for us.* I took it up imme-
 “ diately, and followed them wherever they went. They
 “ entered several cellars, and rifled women, maidens, and
 “ all persons, that fell in their hands, without remorse. As
 “ we ascended from one of these cellars, we saw, with asto-
 “ nishment, that the flames had seized the whole fore-part
 “ of the house. We rushed through the fire, and saved our-
 “ selves. In all probability, every soul was destroyed, that
 “ remained within doors. As to my father, mother, and
 “ relations, I never heard a syllable concerning them from
 “ that time to the present.”

Thus ended the siege and storming of Magdeburg; the latter of which may be looked upon as the most amazing and most bloody scene in modern history. Upon this occasion it was said of Tilly with great justice, that most generals, who have enjoyed uninterrupted prosperity in battle, become cruel and revengeful upon the first reverse of fortune. For Tilly, long before the storming of Magdeburg, saw the die of fortune very inclinable to vary to his disadvantage; his temper grew sour and reserved; his natural cheerfulness deserted him. He beheld, with infinite regret, a young, vigilant, intrepid, and able adversary, resolved to make a trial of skill in the sight of all Europe against an old man, who was obliged to see with other people's eyes, and commit the execution of the most important actions to inferior commanders: and, finally, what completed his unhappiness was, his troops began to withdraw their confidence and obedience from him; for being glutted with rapine, and fleshed with cruelty, like children over-indulged in vices by a fond parent, they despised that lawful authority, which had a sort of natural right to their services. And here it may be observed, that Cromwell's cruelty at Drogheda was not much inferior to that which was exercised at Magdeburg; and even Turenne's character will for ever be tarnished by the fatal irruption made by him into the Palatinate; in all which cases one cannot help lamenting with the historian, *ne tanti facinoris immanitas aut non extitisset, aut non vindicata fuisse videatur.*

The siege of Magdeburg being over (which little success on the Austrian side did not deter the states of Holland from subscribing

subscribing 50,000 guilders a month to the use of Gustavus *,) all things fell into new confusion between Brandenburg and Sweden: for the elector, much dismayed at Tilly's success, re-demanded the fort of Spandau, the time stipulated being rendered void by the reduction of the aforesaid city.

Spandau was a place of extreme consequence both to Tilly and the King; since, to all human appearances, the possession of it seemed to determine the fortune of these two contending warriors. His majesty had his *own* garrison in it, consisting only of 400 men (for fear his neighbours might think him too encroaching on one hand, or too diffident of their sincerity on the other); and from the rights of convenience and urgent necessity, he might have kept the same, and justified his conduct to the public. Less matter would have furnished out a very plausible manifesto; and a timorous or unconscientious person would have seized this opportunity at all hazards; especially as the elector of Brandenburg was no less than brother-in-law to the king of Sweden: but Gustavus, determined to observe the strictest rules of honour, knew not how to purchase success (though the fate of his army and his whole military character lay at stake) at the expence of his reputation and good faith. And considering likewise, that his garrison had taken an oath to the elector, which he looked upon as matter of indispensable obligation even in the emergencies of war, he, who had always the gift of deciding in an instant, sent the elector word, by a trumpeter, with an air of anger and disdain (for the mortification he felt was inexpressible), *That he was at full liberty to repossess Spandau; but that himself in person would make a visit to Berlin; protesting, in the same breath, that the effusion of innocent blood should not be laid to his charge.* At the heels of this messenger he dispatched count Thurn with more ample orders, commanding him to tell the elector, *That the neutrality between them was now understood to cease: and as whatever turned out to the detriment of Sweden and its allies, must consequently prove advantageous to the house of Austria; of course the elector must excuse him, if he seized passes, took towns, and quartered his troops according to his own convenience: for he now made a declaration of hostilities in form, and allowed him only three days to return a definitive answer, without any regard to the future concurrence and co-operation of the court of Dresden.*

The elector no ways relished such compendious methods of proceeding; but Tilly's removal into the forest of Hartz

† *Historical and Authentic Relation, &c.* in Low Dutch, fol. Part ii. 77.

(which

(which may be considered as an *indiscretion*) with a view to terrify the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, lessened the terrors he had conceived of the house of Austria; so, as Arnheim happened to be then at Berlin, he besought the favour of him as to all appearance, though not in truth so, a disinterested person, and one well known to the public in the character of a dexterous negotiator) to undertake to mollify the king, and induce him to enter into some new agreement. Arnheim, (who in fact was sent to Berlin in order to *counterwork* the Swedish measures) took post-horses, and reached the king forthwith, but could obtain *no* concessions. His majesty then, conformably to his plan, soon brought matters to a short conclusion; for he marched directly to Berlin at the head of five troops of horse, one thousand commanded musqueteers, and four field-pieces, thinking it most prudent not to make use of too much force and compulsion. The astonished elector negotiated three days to very little purpose: at length his consort * and the exiled mother of the elector Palatin, (who had made Berlin her place of refuge) accompanied by some ladies of distinguished quality, addressing themselves a second time to Gustavus, soon made some impression on his heart; and effected, partly by persuasion and partly by tears, what the men had in vain laboured to bring about. In consequence of this application, Spandau was granted to the king during the continuance of the war, the gates of Custrin were ordered to be open to him upon all demands, and the elector was obliged to pay a certain contribution to the Swedish army (amounting to about 3000 l. a month †) till articles of treaty could be completed in form. Soon afterwards the whole royal army crossed the Spree, and encamped round Berlin ‡; for the new assignment of Spandau and Custrin determined the king to pass forwards into Saxony, inasmuch as he possessed Spandau in reality, and Custrin in effect; having full power to march southwards (that being his private desire) and little to fear in returning northwards, in case the elector of Saxony should join Tilly, and reduce him to the necessity of retiring nearer towards the Baltic; it being then his intention to carry on a defensive war in the duchies of Mecklenberg, Pomerania and Magdeburg.

* She was sister to the unfortunate Frederic V. king of Bohemia and elector Palatin.

† *Arlambæi Arma Suecica*, p. 161.

‡ *Danckwaert's Historical or Authentic Relation*, &c. published in Low Dutch, 1642, folio, with fifty maps and plans; besides heads.

Yet the king, in spite of his successes, met with more difficulties and afflictions than one; for the pestilence, which then raged violently in Berlin, made surprizing havock in his camp, which lay near the city walls, infomuch that some regiments lost each of them thirty men in the course of a week. About this time the soldiers too began to grow insolent and rapacious, being much elated with an uninterrupted series of success and prosperity, and took the liberty to plunder some Hamburg and English merchants of a considerable quantity of valuable effects, that were then carrying (as is most probable) to the ensuing fair at Leipsic. Upon this the king added eighteen new articles of a more severe nature to his military code*; and compelled his men to restore all the goods unembezzled, and in the state they seized them. Struck with such an high example of justice and humanity, the German traders were soon prevailed upon to lend his majesty a sum (then precisely convenient for the purposes of the war) amounting to something more than 30,000*l*. But the English merchants could *not* be induced to advance him a single farthing: nevertheless out of respect to their brave countrymen, who then fought under the Swedish ensigns, Gustavus took the opportunity to acknowledge his gratitude, and made no difference between the merchants of London and those of Hamburg †, &c.

Mean while the general Tilly, besides removing into the forest of Hartz, had committed *another* oversight on the very day that Magdeburg was taken, which shews, that he wanted spirit to run a hazard, and procured likewise but indifferent intelligence: for not being sure of mastering the town, and fearing upon some false alarm, lest Gustavus should approach him unexpectedly, he *destroyed the Dessau-bridge*, a pass of great importance ‡, lying cross the confluence of the Multa and the Elb, consisting of several fortifications, *that* on the Elb side being extremely large and strong. After his success in storming Magdeburg, he looked back with much affliction on this timorous precaution ||, since it excluded him from obstructing the conquests of the Swedes on the other side of that river, and debarred him from the opportunity of approaching to the assistance of the two fluctuating electors, namely, those of Saxony and Brandenburg.

* They are preserved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 96, &c.

† *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii. p. 45.

‡ Here Walstein beat Ernest count Mansfelt in 1626.

|| *Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Germania*, lib. i. p. 22.

The Imperial general found himself sufficiently exhausted and fatigued with the siege of Magdeburg, which had thinned his army in *that* respect, where the loss is most considerably felt; for good part of his *veteran* troops were destroyed. He therefore judged it more convenient to omit sieges of long duration for the future, and decamping from Magdeburg in the end of May, left 5000 men in the town by way of a garrison; and then pointed his course through the country of Hartz, taking Allensleben* and Mansfelt in his way; and entering into conference with several deputies from the free towns and the elector of Saxony, proceeded onwards as far as Erfurt, where the magistracy entered into some engagements with him. In his passage through the forest of Hartz, the peasants, in order to be revenged for the cruelties exercised at Magdeburg, killed him such a number of dispersed and straggling soldiers, that the fields adjoining the road were strewn with dead bodies; so that he lost as many men in this march, as if he had engaged himself in a moderate battle †. At length he turned his thoughts to devise by what means he might alarm and terrify the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, who had given some indications of having a secret good will to the Swedish cause. Of course he formed a scheme of entering that prince's territories sword in hand; but a letter from Pappenheim, giving him an account of the king's progress on the banks of the Elb, made him change his plan, and reflect seriously on the conduct of *another* potentate, of much greater importance in the Germanic system than the *landgrave* could be: but the letters he sent to the elector of Saxony on the occasion, seemed rather to put him on his guard than dismay him; for that prince, merely on account of this letter, raised an army of 20,000 men, and placed Arnheim at their head. The troops were young, healthy and vigorous; they were well paid and well clothed; but wanting the habit of valour, and being destitute of experienced and good subaltern officers, they were hardly able at the battle of Leipzig to look Tilly's hardy and experienced veterans in the face, *whose cloaths*, as somebody hath remarked, *were torn and dirty, but their musquets always clean and bright.*

Tilly not being able, or not having means to gain over the elector of Saxony, only hurt himself and the catholic

* I fancy it must be read Alversleben, that town lying directly in his road on the banks of the river Bever: nor must it be confounded with Ascherleben in the principality of Halberstadt.

† *Brief, but Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, 40.

league, by alarming him just so far, as to force him to embrace some salutary measures at so critical a juncture. Of this we have a manifest proof; for the elector by letter soon signified to the emperor, "That the *edict of restitution* deserved well to be revised, before it was carried into full activity: that, by preceding capitulations and Imperial constitutions, the princes and states of the Germanic body were not obliged to subsist and re-inforce the emperor's armies: that the protestants at Leipzig had only formed an union in contradistinction to a prior league among the papists, with this difference, that the former proposed to proceed *de-sensively*, as the latter had determined to *act the part of aggressors*." The court of Vienna understood the import of this letter without an interpreter.

Mean while his majesty having been splendidly entertained in the electoral garden at Berlin (that evening being devoted to extraordinary rejoicings) and having appointed Horn, with an army of 10,000 men, to watch Schomberg's motions, and cover the conquests lately made on the frontiers of Silesia, parted from Berlin at break of day, and making a speedy visit to Stetin, gave audience to Fedor Adreovitzki*, the Muscovite ambassador, who coming from a barbarous part of the world, then less known than at present, astonished the Swedes with half a dozen coaches and six, and a retinue of one hundred and fifty persons extremely well dressed. With respect to his embassy, one can pronounce nothing distinctly. An offer was made of soldiers and money, and Gustavus appeared to be highly delighted therewith. But the ambassador died in the August following, and the whole proposal and agreement vanished into air †. With the same pestilential fever, in the same month, died the beautiful and virtuous Christina, wife to Gustavus Horn, and daughter of the high chancellor Oxenstiern. She thought it her duty to attend her husband in all his wars: and indeed they were a shining example of reciprocal conjugal happiness and fidelity. She breathed her last breath in the arms of her consort, yet he had the good fortune to escape the contagion; and though young, rich, accomplished, and handsome, yet never could prevail on himself to venture on a second marriage. The body of the deceased was sent to Sweden in a marble coffin.

As soon as the king had concluded his conference with the Muscovite ambassador, and regaled him at an entertain-

* *Historical but Authentic Relation*, tom. ii. p. 104.

† *Chemnitius*, lib. i. p. 143.

ment full as magnificent as a soldier ought to give, or as times would then admit, he hastened with his usual industry to the camp before Gripswald, which town had been blockaded some months by Banier, and was the only city that remained to the emperor in all Pomerania. Perusi, a colonel of Croats, knight of the Golden Fleece, commanded in it; he was brave to a degree of gallantry, but the country hated him, for he had the misfortune to be miserably avaricious. Nevertheless his love of military fame always got the better of his passion for riches, especially in such competitions, where the honour of a soldier was concerned: and for this reason, though he had heaped up much wealth in the town, he shewed himself quite inflexible to surrender, having never once allowed that idea to enter into his thoughts. To relieve the exigencies of his garrison in so long a blockade, he had coined tin-money with this inscription, NECESSITAS GRYPHISWALDENSIS; and had opened some old salt-springs, that lay within the city walls, which proved of great use in preserving provisions for the garrison. Over and above all this, he was an excellent military architect, and had fortified his town so well, that Gustavus (no ill judge in those matters) confessed himself greatly surprized, when he examined the works, having seen nothing amongst his enemies contrived upon the same principle before.

Banier, who had been sent hither to assist Todt, (who formed the original blockade) wrote a civil letter to colonel Perusi, insinuating, that he had interest enough with the king his master to procure for him very soldier-like conditions, in case of a capitulation. He exhorted him not to sacrifice a body of brave troops under his command; and represented to him the unchristian depopulations and cruelties, which he had exercised throughout the whole district that lies round Gripswald*. Perusi's answer was very laconic; "That it was not convenient for him to leave the town so suddenly: nevertheless, if permission was given him, he would consult Tilly on the occasion."

Some Swedes, knowing well the governor's appetite for fighting right or wrong, presented themselves in *bravado* before the walls, and tempted him to make a very rash and desperate sally, in the execution of which, according to the custom of war at that time, he was drawn by degrees into an ambuscade. He was imprudent enough, upon this occasion, to wear his gold chain and *order* above his armour;

* This letter is preserved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 107.

which in all probability cost him his life, as every common soldier strove to possess so valuable a booty; and from hence most people conclude, that he believed his body, (according to a report propagated concerning him in both armies) to have been rendered invulnerable by incantations and magical signatures *, and being a native of Italy he gave more easily into these vain imaginations; for the Italian astrologers were greatly respected among the German troops, of which we have an uncommon example in Walstein's practice, who undertook nothing of moment, till he had first consulted Battista Seni, to whom he allowed a table, a coach and six horses, and all the appointments of a general officer.

Though Perusi had the misfortune to be drawn into an ambushade, (accompanied by his *camerade*, a knight of Malta, who fell first) yet he died heroically, and fought with his colours by him to the last gasp, though his Croatian cavalry, according to custom, had deserted him, and thrown themselves into the river Rick, which divides the beautiful valley of Rosendal into two parts.

Perusi's successor, whoever he was, (though, if I mistake not, he was only a captain, and named Dracksted) made a good shew of resistance: for being required to surrender, he sent word back, that the loss of the late commander was merely personal, and that the honour and resolution of the garrison did not expire sympathetically with him. Nevertheless, after some rencounters, (not to mention a very furious sally, which missed little of succeeding) he thought it prudent to capitulate, and marched out with more military distinctions than are usually allowed in such circumstances: (for the Croatians, upon this occasion, as the Swedes greatly wanted to possess Gripswald, were permitted to *receive conditions*) but as the escort, which conveyed the governor and his soldiers, was not strong enough to prescribe laws to him, for it consisted only of one hundred and fifty horsemen, he changed his mind on the road, and shaped his course to Havelburg, and not to Rostock, the place agreed upon in the articles of surrender. • By way of punishment for thus violating the laws of honour and good faith, colonel Hall thought it allowable to attack him, and so

* His body was supposed to be rendered shot free by mystical words and charms of magic, which the Germans elegantly enough call *gefrorn*, i. e. *frozen*. He bore the first musquet-ball very well, but the second killed him. Honest Lotichius, unwilling to give up the doctrine of incarnations, pretends, that Perusi was only *gefrorn* with respect to swords and pikes; for though the ball, saith he, transpierced his body, he expired without bleeding, and only groaned once or twice. *De Rebus Germanis*, tom. i. 915.

much the rather, as Banier, under whom he then served, had a particular desire to secure Havelburg, as it helped to protect the camp, which his master proposed to fix at Werben. In this rencounter, a considerable number of the German garrison (which was very numerous) lost their lives, particularly Drackstedt, who commanded them in chief; and about fifteen hundred soldiers submitted to be disarmed; of whom the greater part enrolled themselves under the Swedish ensigns. Thus the generality of writers recount the story; yet I have some doubts concerning its exactness in one or two particulars, my private conjecture being, that the officer who commanded the escort (for Hall's action seems to be out of the question) had committed some outrage, which induced the Imperial commander to think, that he might absolve himself from making good the remaining part of the conditions. For had not the fact stood precisely thus, it is not to be comprehended, why the king (though it is certain his mercy always kept pace with his valour) should order general Todt to imprison captain Smith, who commanded the escort, as also all the officers and soldiers, who had been employed in that expedition, with this remarkably severe clause, that they were to be sent to the royal camp either dead or alive! And yet after all this, a new doubt presents itself, for it does not appear, that Smith or any of his soldiers were ever punished; but one historian * tells us, that private notice had been given them of their master's resentment, and that they all absconded till the king had forgotten his anger; who immediately summoned the Imperial officers to appear before him, assuring them, that if any soldier belonging to their garrison had entered into the Swedish service contrary to his real inclinations, he from that moment might consider himself as *free*, and had leave to *depart without ransom*: but, gentlemen, continued he, *if my men have injured you, your complaint must be lodged in my court-martial; for I alone am the legal and competent judge; and you must sign a paper, as cavaliers of honour, not to traduce even in private conversation, by the most distant innuendos, me, or my army in general, merely for the transgression of orders in a few individuals.*

But to leave the further discussion of this matter to more enlightened historians (for Chemnitius's † way of solving the difficulty gives me no content, as it is the assignation of *non causa pro causa*, except it relates to Smith, and not to Hall) it may suffice to observe, that the Swedes at length, by pos-

* Chemnitius de Bello Suec. Germ. tom. i. p. 144. † Idem, ibidem.

selling Gripswald, had rendered themselves masters of every inch of territory in the duchy of Pomerania; in consequence whereof Gustavus appointed a solemn thanksgiving to God throughout all his dominions*.

It was about this time, that his majesty entertained some fresh suspicions of the king of Denmark, who sent forth a fleet of twenty ships under pretence of guarding his dominions from pirates and invaders: but Gustavus asked such pertinent questions concerning the destination of this naval armament, that his Danish majesty soon promised to be a true and faithful neighbour, in proportion as such conduct was consistent with the allegiance he owed the emperor. True it was, he hated Gustavus, but then he dreaded him likewise: and the report of re-inforcements from France, England, Sweden, and Holland, quite deterred him from pursuing the resolutions, whatever they might be, which he had first conceived †.

Mean while John-Albert and Adolphus, the two dispossessed dukes of Mecklenberg, who had lived the life of exiles at Lubec, remained not idle; for neither they, nor their subjects, could persuade themselves to acquiesce with common patience under the insolence of Walfstein.

Having gathered together a small army, and united themselves with colonel Todt, who by this time had given the finishing stroke to the reduction of Pomerania, they made themselves masters of several towns and fortresses. At length Gustavus generously joined them, so that the new usurper possessed nothing in their territories, except Wismar, Rostock, and Dæmitz. Nevertheless, at the same time it must be observed, that the two first of these places were the largest and fairest towns in the duchy. Dæmitz indeed was only a small fortress, but its situation was fortunate, and its importance great; for (besides commanding the Elb, just where the Elda falls into it) it was possible likewise to float the country all round it, and convey private supplies into it by means of the river first mentioned.

His Swedish majesty being arrived at Gustrow, which journey he undertook merely to relieve the oppressed, applied himself in good earnest to re-instate the two proscribed princes into their lawful dominions †. As that age loved

•pomp,

* *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, p. 105.

† *Laccenii Hist. Svecan.* lib. viii. 583.

‡ The emperor conferred this duchy on Walfstein, together with the duchy of Sagan in Silesia, as a fief, towards the latter end of the year 1628. The Imperial general soon made sure of his investiture, for he dispatched immediately two lawyers, well furnished with edicts and manifestos,

and

pomp, the ceremony of their second inauguration was more splendid and expensive than one could have imagined in the midst of a war. The clergy, the senators, and the nobility (the latter only amounting to the number of eight hundred) began the procession; then succeeded the elder duke, attended by thirty-six halberdiers. [To shew his humility, he wore that day a suit of black cloaths.] Next came the same number of trumpeters in different liveries. Then followed the king of Sweden on horseback, dressed in green, with a blue and white plumage in his hat, attended by twenty-four running footmen, and eighteen horse-soldiers. Him the junior duke of Mechlenberg marched after, accompanied by the prince of Denmark *, the dukes of Pomerania and Courland, the princes and princesses of the house of Mechlenberg, and two colonels. The ladies of quality and fashion closed the procession in one hundred and thirty coaches, guarded by a body of eighteen hundred horsemen, all well mounted and well clothed. This cavalcade marched first to the great church, where divine service was performed, and a sermon preached on the following text, *They that sow in tears, shall reap in joy: Psalm cxxvi. 5.* Departing thence they ranged themselves in the town-hall, where the great-chancellor Oxenstiern made his appearance, and exhorted all the subjects of the duchy to disclaim Walstein, and acknowledge their natural masters; which request was complied with universally and joyfully. Medals were thrown to the populace, which had the heads of the two reigning princes on one side, and a pelican upon the reverse, piercing two human breasts with its beak, and feeding its young ones with streams of blood. Gustavus commanded expressly, that all parents should explain the nature of this restoration to their children, that they might remember, with transports of thankfulness, the restitution of their lawful masters, of their religion, and of their liberty †.

and three favourite colonels, namely, Aldringer, St. Julian, and Walmrode, to secure his possession. The crime of these unfortunate princes was assisting Christian, king of Denmark. In vain the elder brother made an offer of humiliating himself before the emperor. The court of Vienna had acquired an habitual deafness, and Walstein, to say the least of him, wanted to shine as a second or third rate star in the German hemisphere.

* Ulrich, third son of Christian IV. He was killed afterwards with a pistol-ball by Piccolomini's buffoon, as he came out of that general's tent, with whom he had conferred upon business in behalf of the elector of Saxony, in whose army he served as volunteer.

† *Arsenibæi Armæ Suecicæ*, p. 167, &c.

His majesty in the midst of all these rejoicings had his eye constantly fixed on the transactions of the campaign, and having issued out orders for the blockade of Rostock and Wismar, returned without delay to his separate camps, at and near New Brandenburg. From thence colonel Bernard Oxenstiern, (a relation of the chancellor's) was dispatched in a public character to the French king at Lyons, being privately instructed to see the finishing hand given to the treaty of Berewalt, and solicit the speedy and punctual payment of the contingent subscribed to the German war. This minister was received with great marks of esteem at Lyons, and entertained at the public expence during his whole continuance there, though Curtius, the Imperial resident, in conjunction with an agent sent from Munich, tried to perplex him, and overturn his measures more than once; but all their efforts were unsuccessful. At length being thoroughly baffled, they had the mortification to see all the promises on the part of France fulfilled duly; (for Richelieu as yet had not conceived a jealousy against Gustavus) and Oxenstiern returned with a considerable sum of money, which the court of Versailles had advanced for the support of the protestant cause in Germany.

By the persuasion likewise of Louis XIII. or in consequence of his becoming responsible for other people, the chevalier de Rache was dispatched by Gustavus to the republic of Venice; but the refined and self-interested politicians of that government concluded (not unreasonably) that the scene of war lay too far from them, to be looked upon as dangerous. They alledged likewise the inability of the state to undertake campaigns, when the pestilence had made such ravage in all the dominions that belonged unto it; and discovered at the same time a determined unwillingness to engage in such measures; inasmuch as the peace of Italy, far from being matured, could be considered only in a progressive state of ripening at a distance of time then uncertain.

Mean while the emperor wrote to all the confederators, who had lately assembled at Leipzig*, requesting them to disband their troops, or unite all in one common alliance, in order to expel Gustavus out of the empire. He entreated them likewise to grant the Imperial armies free passage, and supply them with provisions, forage, and money: observing,

* Diet of Leipzig, 4°. Lond. 1632. Vide APPENDIX, Art. XX; first edition, 4°.

that the former licentiousness of his soldiers (supposing that allegation to be true) could not justify them in undertaking an avowed rebellion against him, who was their sovereign, chieftain, and head; and that their real intention, though concealed under a cloud of pretexts, was literally and truly to elude the edict of restitution, and extort a new religious peace from the catholics. Then followed a mandate directed to all princes, magistrates and commanders of note, enjoining them to issue out no fresh commissions for the enlisting of soldiers; but, on the contrary, to deny passage and quarters to such as had been lately levied, absolving them by his own plenitude of power from the military oath they had taken to Gustavus and his allies †. The catholic electors wrote one and all to the same effect, and conjured the new associators not to push matters to the extremities of a rebellion.

But these sort of anodynes were not sufficient to compose the uneasinesses among the protestants: on the contrary, they considered them as the effects of timidity and despondence in the emperor. The people of Misnia, Franconia and Suabia levied troops with fresh vigour; and the free towns (where manufactures, trade, and arts flourished) exerted themselves with a degree of zeal still more distinguishable. Nettled at such obstinacy, the emperor now began to lose his temper, and ordered Furstenberg, at the head of the army lately arrived from Mantua, to march directly into the territories of the more zealous protestants, and destroy all before him with fire and sword. That commander fulfilled his instructions to a tittle, and soon obliged the towns of Memmingen, Kempten and Ulm, the inhabitants of Franconia, and even the duke of Wirtemberg, to renounce the *conclusions* of Leipzig: but as these submissions proceeded from fear and compulsion, rather than from a sense of obligation and obedience, they immediately revoked all their promises upon receiving the account of Tilly's defeat in Saxony.

And here perhaps, without being thought to violate the dignity of history, it may be allowed me to introduce the recital of a ridiculous accident, that happened at Hildesheim, which the Imperialists (who were then superstitious to a surprising degree) interpreted in a manner very inauspicious

† A second edict was published afterwards to absolve all feudatory persons from complying with the commands of their respective sovereigns, inasmuch as the emperor only was *supremus feudorum dominus*,

to their cause. Most people know the low taste of the German drama. The jesuits college in this city acted a farce, where two hobby-horse men represented Gustavus and Tilly. The latter gave the former very ill language, and reproached him for presuming to have any thing to do with the Holy Roman Empire. Words, according to the poet's plan, soon came to action and blows; pistols, laden with powder only, were reciprocally discharged: but unluckily (and against the intention of the dramatist) he that personated Gustavus was the better cavalier, and more valorous combatant, for in the heat of his theatrical fury he gave Tilly a violent blow, and unhorfed him. Upon this the house broke up in disorder, and every spectator returned dissatisfied home; and fearing *something* that might prove as disastrous as the battle of Leipzig did*.

Some authors tell a similar story with farther circumstances, varying the year wherein the event happened, and laying the scene at the town of Cham in the Lower Bavaria. It was permitted the children (say they) by the burgomaster, to enroll themselves into two mock-armies, each boy being left at full liberty to enlist himself under the Imperial or Swedish ensigns; and as the town was entirely in the Bavarian interests, the *Pseudo-Tilly*, son to the chief magistrate, soon collected one hundred and fifty well-looking followers, whereas the *mock-Gustavus* (who had been forced to take the name by drawing lots) could gather together no more than thirty combatants, of smaller stature, and mean appearance. But the personated king copied his original in the very shining part of excellency; for having well entrenched his companions in a field adjoining the city, he invited the enemy by sound of trumpet to force his lines. The priests gave a blessing to the Tillian party as they marched from the town, and exhorted them to acquit themselves like warriors of spirit. After repulse upon repulse, they still persevered to lead the children on, till at length the whole corps disunited, and the unconquerable Tilly became a prisoner. On this the young Gustavus commanded his hands to be bound, and having led him to the house of his father, refused to deliver him without a ransom †.

By this time ~~his~~ majesty began to open his grand project of advancing southwards, and having united into one army his several little camps, which lay round Brandenburg, shaped his course towards Saxony, carefully securing his

* *Arlanibai Arma Suecica*, p. 175.

† *Theatr. Europæ*, p. 518, &c. by Mat. Marian.

progress as he went along. On this account, with a view to procure more certain intelligence of the enemies motions, he first explored the country at the head of all his cavalry and one thousand commanded musqueteers, as far as the monastery of Jericho, and then to the bridge of Magdeburg city, into which place he forced Pappenheim to retreat for shelter; and finding no signs of being much molested from those parts, he took care to leave Oxenstiern behind him with one army in Prussia, and Horn with another in Silesia, and crossing the Elb by fording, took the town of Tangermund (a place of great importance to him) by fixing a petard to one of the gates. Upon this event the garrison lay at the mercy of the assailants, and such as survived, (being about threescore in number) threw themselves in a croud round Gustavus, (for the Swedish soldiers could not yet forget the slaughter at Magdeburg) and begged for quarter: which the king granted them in a moment, observing at the same time, *That he should not presume to counterwork God's providence, which had preserved them from the rage of his soldiers by a sort of miracle**. He then flung a bridge of boats over the Elb, for the convenience of passing his infantry; but ordered his cavalry and artillery to go through the river; the bare recital of which act of intrepidity (for nothing was lost, but here and there an empty waggon) amazed Tilly beyond measure, for the stream in that part was not supposed to be fordable.

It was here the king, who loved great strokes in the military way, conceived the idea of astonishing Europe by retaking Magdeburg †, and the rather, as it was thinly garrisoned, and as the fortifications had not been thoroughly repaired since the late disaster. The town likewise lay convenient for him, as it afforded an excellent passage across the Elb, which half determined a campaign in that age, and as his majesty was then circumstanced: and something there was of the illustrious and magnificent in the very action itself. But serious and mature reflexion soon threw a gloom over these dazzling appearances; for Pappenheim was in the town, whom Gustavus considered in the character of a second garrison, though it consisted only of one man;

———— *concurrere bellum,* ————
Atque virum ————:

Nor was Tilly far off, who lay incamped at Mulhausen; but what he feared most, was allowing the elector of Saxony

* *Heylmani Leo Arctouii*, p. 30.

† *Cbennit, de Bello Succ. Germ. tom. i. p. 147.*

time to indulge his private disinclination to the Swedish cause, as also his natural timidity and inconstancy. Therefore, making a sacrifice all at once of his ambition, he preferred convenience to glory, and progressive security to fortunate rapidity; which is the more to be wondered at, as the natural turn of his temper was hafty and enterprizing.

Upon this present plan the possession of Havelburg and Werben were considered by him as two excellent preliminary steps: for being encamped at, or near, one of those towns, (the latter indeed was his object, as it lay almost upon the angle of the Elb and the Havel where they join, his back being guarded by both those rivers) he had the command of the archbishopric of Magdeburg, and the Old Marche in front, and on his right hand; and his left side was protected by the Havel, which run through a friendly country; namely, the Middle Marche. By means of this river, he had power to convey down stream what provisions and forage he thought necessary for the subsistence of his troops. He was environed likewise by rich and plentiful towns: and, what was still more, the post he had chosen was so protected by nature, that though the Imperialists had two armies, one on his right hand in Thuringia, and one on his left hand in Silesia, he feared neither, inasmuch as it was in his power to dispute the passage of the rivers, before any great action could be brought on.

In order to fix himself in this desirable situation, he commanded Banier to take Havelburg by assault, since by possessing that place he became master of the Havel on the eastern side, having secured already the western banks of that river as far upwards as Spandau. The attack was made sword in hand at break of day, and Winkel's blue brigade of infantry not liking the enemy's fire at a distance, crossed the river with astonishing resolution, though the water reached up to the men's shoulders. The action was brisk on both sides whilst it lasted. Four hundred and forty of the garrison were taken prisoners. Colonel Cag was appointed governor, who had under him his own regiment, and Fowle's regiment of Scots. Why Pappenheim left Havelburg a few days before, cannot be accounted for, except he considered it as a place indefensible, at least as matters were then circumstanced.

Havelburg being thus secured, his majesty, according to his original plan, employed two good officers; namely, Bauditzen and count Ortemberg, to take the town of Werben sword in hand, who carried their point, after having met with a very obstinate resistance, killing and making prisoners two hundred

dred horsemen belonging to the regiment of Munichhausen. As the dispute had continued long, and the weather proved then extremely warm (it being the last day of June) these two officers had a fancy to bathe themselves in the Elb, and then crowned the performance with a debauch in Baccharah-wine. Of course they both fell into violent fevers; the former escaped by the skill of his physician, or the dint of constitution; but the latter expired soon afterwards at Berlin, to the great regret of Gustavus, who loved him extremely for his abilities in the cabinet, as also for his courageous and enterprising disposition. He commanded the royal regiment of foot-guards.

By this time the Imperial general found himself obliged to give some check, if possible, to the progresses made by Gustavus on the banks of the Elb, and having dropped his enterprize against the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, advanced as far as Wolmerstadt, a small town ten miles north-west of Magdeburg, and about forty miles from the Swedish camp. Mean while the van-guard of his army, consisting of four chosen regiments * (the very flower of the Imperial cavalry) had advanced a considerable way before their general, which Gustavus being apprized of, immediately conceived the thought of giving them an attack in an evening or two, for he never failed of procuring the best intelligence. To this purpose he ordered two thousand five hundred chosen troops, horse, dragoons, and musqueteers, to assemble themselves at Arnsherg in the Old Marche, and at nine at night joined them privately, and conducted them to a village four miles beyond Tangermund. Nevertheless, whatever secrecy this expedition might require, as the next day proved to be *Sunday*, and as the enemy's advanced troops happened to be stationed at sixteen miles distance, the king chose to lie by privately, and set apart a certain number of hours for his devotions: dispatching the watch-master general of the army with the royal regiment of horse-guards to procure intelligence. This officer returned about five in the evening with several prisoners, who gave information, that the Imperialists had taken up their quarters within the distance of two hours easy marching.

They were conducted by colonel Bernitein, a brave and enterprising commander, who took up his lodgings at three different villages, at a slight distance one from the other: and as these places happened to lie upon a line, the Swedish party divided itself into three bodies, it being their inten-

* Pappenheim, Montecuculi, Holk, and Coronini.

tion to cut off all communication between the Imperial regiments at the right and left, the very instant the attack was begun.

At the point of time agreed, one body of Swedes gave a furious onset on the regiment of Montecuculi *, which was partly routed and partly cut to pieces, before the men could mount on horseback, and range themselves in any tolerable order. But as no concerted attacks can well commence at a precise moment, Bernstein heard the explosion of the first firearms, and having caused his men to mount immediately, made a judicious disposition of the better half of them; and at the head of one troop of his cavalry, marched to the entrance of the village, and gallantly received the enemy; but the impression was so violent, the Swedish troops being prepared and fresh, and Bernstein's men both hurried and fatigued, that after a very brisk and obstinate dispute, the latter soon broke and began to shift for themselves. The chance of escaping under favour of darkness is a great temptation to soldiers thus attacked, to behave themselves *ill*; (especially when in such confusion it is hardly possible to distinguish particular offenders:) consequently the advantage is at least two to one in behalf of the assailants, who have fixed their resolution and advance like men determined. Be that as it will, Bernstein stayed till the very last man, and was killed probably without being known. In him perished a family, for he had no kindred. He was an officer of approved service, or otherwise Pappenheim would not have allowed him to have conducted his own regiment of cuirassiers, and a body of troops, that belonged to his *own* separate army.

Mean while Holk † made a resistance, which appears incredible; for during the other attacks he had some leisure-minutes to draw out his men. He received the Rhingrave

* The count de Montecuculi, who belonged to this regiment, was the uncle of him who served against Turenne. He was not present in the action.

† Holk (Henry) served the king of Denmark as governor of Stralsund, but on some disgust accepted of a regiment of infantry under Walfstein. It was thought matter of levity in him to espouse a young wife, at the time when the town he defended was reduced to the utmost danger. He gained immense wealth in the plunder of Leipzig. As to his religion, he changed it twice; for on his death-bed, being seized with the plague, he declared himself a protestant, and dispatching round the country several troops of horse, offered 100 l. for the charitable assistance of a Lutheran minister in his last hours; but he had committed such outrages, that no ecclesiastic would come near him till it was too late; and though he was at the head of an army of 10,000 men, all his officers and domestics deserted him, excepting a young woman, whom some supposed to be his mistress. In the Imperial patent, by virtue of which he was created a count, his name is spelt *Holka*.

with firmness : and disputed the honour of the field inch by inch. In this rough engagement he had the unhappiness to lose two pair of colours, on one of which was painted the goddess *Fortune*, and the word *AUDACTER* inscribed beneath; but the other was still more elegant, and more particular both as to its emblem and motto; for a *serpent* wreathed in spires rolled itself round a *drawn sword*, (alluding to the wisdom of the animal, and the bravery which the weapon implied,) and the device was, *HIS DUCIBUS, SITIS IMPERTERRITI*.

His majesty, for fear the soldiers might quit their ranks in quest of plunder, gave private orders to set the villages on fire: for if the men had deserted their station in hopes of booty, a detachment from the enemy's camp, part of which lay hard by, might have robbed the Swedes of a considerable victory. Yet much plate was found, and a private soldier seized one thousand pounds in Hungarian ducats. Abundance of excellent horses fell likewise into the hands of the conquerors *.

His majesty commanded personally in this engagement, but where or how far cannot be learned. Nevertheless, as the post of importance was the attacking the middle village, and cutting off the communication, it is natural to think, that he fell upon Bernstein's quarters †. He was extremely afflicted at the death of Charles, prince Palatin of Lautrech ‡, his own sister's son, who received two pistol-balls in that obstinate resistance which Holk made. He fought at the head of the Rhingrave's regiment, and a few moments before his death had killed a cornet of the enemy's hand to hand; but the cornet's *camerade*, (as most officers in that age had a gentleman-volunteer, who served with them under *that* title) soon revenged his friend, according to the manner above related. His corpse was carried to Stetin, where the queen of Sweden (of whose arrival in the empire we shall speak immediately,) thought fit to honour it with a magnificent funeral.

It must be observed, that this victory at Rheindorf- or Angern (such being the names of the principal villages where the Imperialists lay) was chiefly gained by the means of musqueteers *intermingled with the cavalry*; and by the assistance

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 173.

† Since my writing this passage, I find the conjecture verified. *Rex cum suis, in Rheindorfium, Bernsteinianæ legionis hospitium, impexit, &c. Lottichius*, Tom. i. 720.

‡ That branch of the Palatin family became extinct in the year 1694. It had three little possessions, the duchy of Veldentz, the town of Lautrech, (which now belongs to the elector Palatin) and the county of Lutzelstein; which at present is divided between the houses of Birkenfeld and Sultzbach.

of small parties of them, who filled up the avenues, where horsemen could not well be stationed. Fifteen hundred men were killed, and twenty-eight colours taken, Tilly being advanced almost within hearing the discharge of the fire-arms; which mortified him not a little.

This action, not to mention the gallantry thereof, did the king great service; for it astonished the Imperialists to such a degree, that he gained four days to make additions to the intrenchments and fortifications round his camp at Werben; for which labour he was afterwards repaid with abundant interest. He procured opportunity likewise to draft all the neighbouring garrisons, and summon to his assistance several scattered regiments, that lay near him; so that in truth (and thus it often happens in the conduct of great generals) the little action at Rheindorf facilitated the prudent *encampment* made at Werben, and both together *paved the way* to that more important decision, which happened at Leipzig, which completed the operations of the year 1631. For all good campaigns, if rightly and thoroughly considered, are nothing less than one continued series of judicious causes, and fortunate effects*.

One cannot sufficiently admire the king's great military judgment, in fixing his camp precisely on that spot, which he had long wished to occupy: for having thrown a bridge of boats over the Elb, he had it in his power at one and the same time to attack either the Imperialists, or the elector of Saxony, who could not well conclude a treaty at such a distance and under such circumstances; nor could Tilly advance without giving Gustavus the *choice* of a battle. I have before observed, that the camp of Werben could not easily be distressed for want of provisions and forage, and shall remark here, that it had two the best *natural* fossés behind it, that a general could wish for, namely, the Elb, and the Havel. These rivers protected likewise its flanks: and as to the front, it was guarded one part in three by the town of Werben, which was fortified; so that a small tract of ground only required the assistance of art, and that the king strengthened by deep intrenchments, disposing large batteries of cannon here and there. In this situation he commanded not only

* I remember in my youth to have heard the great earl of Peterborow make a very lively comparison upon the occasion: "Pope" said he, (for Mr. Pope was then sitting at table) "always fixes first on the last rhyme of his couplet, and the general cast of the second line; and thus, (continued he) a good commander, at the very dawning of a campaign, should prefigure to himself by what action he proposes to conclude it; for the last stroke always reckons for something in the year ensuing."

the Elbe and the Havel, but had an eye likewise to the Oder and the Warta; and, at the same time, the whole electorate of Brandenburg lay directly under his protection*.

During these occurrences, Maria Eleonora, queen of Sweden †, like a consort worthy of the hero she had espoused, left the pleasures of the court of Stockholm, in order to alleviate the fatigue and cares of her husband, and brought with her a re-inforcement of 8000 men, half of whom joined the grand army, and the other half was employed in the service of the dukes of Mecklenburg, with a view to facilitate the conquests of Rostock and Wismar. This lady, who was a pattern of conjugal affection, had her share likewise of resolution and magnanimity: for instantly on her embarkation from Sweden, one large ship, furnished the *VASA*, laden with heavy artillery and military stores, in a day entirely calm, at about two miles distance from shore, sunk directly to the bottom, without any previous warning, and never striking upon shelf or rock. The sudden unaccountable loss of a vessel, that bore such an illustrious family-name, might have terrified a poor woman, especially in an age so unfortunately ingenious in expounding omens and prodigies: but the queen heroically pursued her course; nor did she balance a moment between female fears, and the assistance that was due to her great Gustavus ‡.

On her arrival at Wolgast, where she made some short stay, (for the duke of Pomerania had sent his deputies to see her well entertained, and her husband had taken care that a palace should be fitted up for her reception, she was agreeably surprised with the celebration of a public thanksgiving throughout all Pomerania, on account that it was the day *twelve-month* after Gustavus landed in Germany. And about the same time, by way of counter-check for the satisfaction she felt, her tenderness was alarmed and put to the trial; for it was indiscreetly told her by some of her courtiers, that a jesuit, disguised in the habit of a cavalier, had been discovered by Bauditzen: and that he had three more companions of his order with him, who had a design probably to assassinate the king.

Mean while Tilly, touched to the heart with the late disgrace his troops had received at Angern, wished to repay the Swedes in like manner; and the rather, as he found himself still at the head of 24,000 soldiers, who breathed nothing but

* *Laccenii Hist. Suecan.* lib. 8. p. 582.

† Daughter of John Sigismund, elector of Brandenburg. She survived her husband three and twenty years.

‡ *Schefferi Memorab. Succ. Gentis*, p. 21, 22.

revenge and fury. It was time likewise to perform something of the shining kind; all Europe expected an action of this nature, and his very soldiers demanded it. In addition to this it must be observed, that Pappenheim had persuaded him to crush the king of Sweden first, and then reduce the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel to reason at some more convenient opportunity. He therefore marched his army in full battle-array up to the Swedish lines, and made his enemy the offer of an engagement upon equal terms: but the king, who never transgressed military prudence, when the welfare of the system was concerned, and who husbanded the lives of his officers and soldiers, though he dealt freely enough with his own person, chose rather to confide in his intrenchments, and gave Tilly the choice of running, if he pleased, upon his own destruction; which he hoped might happen from the extraordinary ardour of Pappenheim. Besides, his grand object was, first to fix a firm alliance with the two *protestant* electors; and then give battle whenever a favourable opportunity presented itself. What he thus wisely foresaw, was very soon brought to pass; for Tilly being determined to make one trial of skill, led his troops up to the front of the king's camp at Werben, which, according to a plan * I have seen of it, was completely fortified by art and nature, being something in the shape of a bow, protected on the strait side by the town of Werben (which had walls and outworks) as also by strong redoubts and ditches; and guarded on the elliptical part by the river Elb, and part of the Havel.

When Tilly brought his greater artillery to act, the cannonading was desperate on both sides. From one battery of thirty-two pieces, he raked the king's camp in such a manner, that the major part of the troops was obliged to draw up in battle-array behind the walls of Werben. Yet the king, who could only oppose the Imperialists with half the number of forces that they had, (for his whole army amounted to little more than 12,000 men) never lost his vivacity and presence of mind for a single moment: nor did he call in his advanced guards of cavalry and musketeers, relieving them only at proper distances of time, and giving each and all the officers at parting these particular instructions, namely, "to retreat inch by inch, in case the Imperialists should overpower

* One thing is remarkable in this plan; the king's tent was erected in a large area, defended with a ditch and parapet, almost in the center of his camp. Some general officers had their tents likewise in the same enclosure; but whether this was his majesty's constant practice I cannot say.

“ them by numbers; but never to turn their backs to the enemy.”

Wearied out and chagrined with skirmishes that decided nothing, Tilly at length determined to force the king's lines: and though this general had dealt too long in realities to rely greatly upon visionary expectances, yet on this occasion he had amused himself with the hope of corrupting some peasants to nail the Swedish cannon, and set fire to their camp in sundry places, just before the grand attack should begin. But it was not easy, even by the most clandestine correspondence, to frustrate the vigilance of Gustavus, who upon this and all occasions had the presence of mind to turn to his own advantage those very incidents, that were calculated to distress him; for having discovered both the conspiracy and the conspirators, (one of them, from what motive I know not, making full confession of the fact) he ordered fires to be kindled in various parts of his camp, and instructed the rabble of the army to imitate confusion, and make horrid noises. What is more remarkable, he imparted the discovery of this treachery to no one of his generals*, but allowed his assailants to approach the very mouth of his cannon, without returning any fire excepting that of his musqueteers. Then, in an instant, broke forth a terrible discharge of grape-shot; the consequences of which, far from being described, cannot well be imagined. It is true, the Imperialists advanced with determined resolution and an air of confidence; but after this unexpected reception, it was impossible for their commanders to restore the ranks, or bring the men on to action a second time. In this scene of confusion and slaughter, some Swedish troops, conducted by Bauditzen and the Rhingrave, passed the lines, and fell upon the enemy's rear with great resolution; but Tilly, with equal bravery and capacity, made his soldiers halt, and having brought his artillery to act, soon convinced the assailants, that every *retreat* was not a *flight*. Thus for once he escaped a disgrace, which might have proved as mortifying as that which befel him afterwards on the plains of Leipzig. The conflict was extremely sharp and obstinate. Bauditzen, in the transports of courage, mixed so far among the enemy's troops without reflexion, that at length he was taken prisoner by two horsemen; but young Wilsdein, a youth of quality (for in point of years he hardly merited the name of a man) who served under him in the capacity of a volunteer, soon rescued his general, who fought

* *Mercure François*, Tom. xvii. 170.

his way back with unparalleled resolution; and having killed an Imperial commander of note, brought little more than the haft of his sword out of his body. His good fortune, all things considered, was very particular, for he escaped without a wound; yet two balls carried away the pommel of his saddle, and the rowel of one of his spurs, and his horse was shot in four places. Here Bernard, duke of Saxon Weymar *, gave

* This gallant prince inherited an irreconcilable hatred to the house of Austria, being descended from *that* elector of Saxony, who was taken prisoner at the battle of Muhlberg, and deprived of his electorate and the greater part of his other possessions. He was the youngest of eleven brothers, who all (excepting such as died young) carried arms against the emperor. His mother Dorothea, daughter of the prince of Anhalt, was left a widow in his infancy, yet gave him, and all her children, a most accomplished education. His last action, the siege of Brisac, may be considered as one of the finest military performances of that age; for he won four pitched battles, whilst he invested the town; and sent the four Imperial generals, namely, John de Wert, the duke Savelli, Furstenberg, and Sperrcuter, prisoners into France. In the last of these engagements, he was obliged to mount six different horses; and one being dazzled with a pistol, that was fired close to his eyes, reared up and fell backwards upon his rider; but the troops formed themselves round their general to such a degree, that it was impossible for the enemy to take him prisoner. Afterwards, John de Wert and he singled out each other, and maintained a combat hand to hand with so much bravery and obstinacy, that the troops for a short time paused, as it were, by consent, to observe the behaviour of two such distinguished warriors.

When he took Brisac, and chose not to convey it by way of depositum into French hands, his answer to Richelieu was very noble: *Ask a virgin to make a sacrifice of her chastity?* Upon this, the cardinal lost all patience, and observed decorum no longer. One remonstrated against the advancement of money, and one urged the *quantum meruit* of the performance. Great proposals were made the duke, if he would come to Paris; but he saw the net that was spread for him, and refused peremptorily to undertake the journey. He knew the court of Versailles, and that court had known him before this period; for he did not chuse, in the year 1636, to give precedence to Richelieu: and when he had his audience from the king, well considering what honours were due to his birth, as prince of the house of Saxony, and supposed to descend, by the Misnian branch, from the race Imperial, he thought proper to rank himself on the same footing, upon which the French had lately placed the duke of Parma. (*Memoires touchant les Ambassadeurs*, tom. i. p. 122.) This event was foreseen and dreaded; but the ministry did not care to sound his sentiments upon that topic, for fear of suggesting an idea to him, which perhaps had not then found an entrance into his imagination. Trusting therefore to pure chance, they thought it safest to allow him admission without any previous discussion of difficulties. Of course, the moment the king covered himself, he, with great composure, put on his hat: upon this, the court was struck dumb with astonishment; but there was no room at that time for open resentment, since France needed more the duke's assistance, than the duke wanted her's.

Upon occasions of a like nature, there were some misunderstandings too between him and Oxenstiern, to whom, after the king's death, he gave the lead with great reluctance; and it was in consequence of that unfortunate competition, that he threw himself into the arms of France.

This

gave the first distinguishing marks of that military genius, which procured him afterwards the surname of *successor to the great Gustavus*. He had one horse killed under him with a cannon-ball, and mounting a second was forced to quit him, for the horse was wounded whilst the duke was mounting him. The king, who had the quickest eye to discover merit of any prince or general upon earth, gave *him* orders immediately to raise three regiments, and repair to the assistance of the landgrave of Hesse; yet gently reprimanded both him and Bauditzen, partly for acting without orders, and partly for exposing their persons with too much confidence. Happy, could he have *practised* himself what he *taught* others with so much affection, and such great clearness of reason!

Tilly now began to feel the manifest superiority of Gustavus, and discovered at length, that it was equally in *his* power (I will not say in his choice) to act the offensive or defensive part; being composed and phlegmatic, warm and active, just as *such conduct* best agreed with his *present* situation. He learned moreover, by bitter experience, after having served

This heroic prince died in 1639, in the thirty-sixth year of his age, having waged war against the emperor just half that time. Upon the approach of death he made his will, performed all the duties of a good Christian, and pronounced a dying speech to his officers on the subject of expiations, avarice and military jealousies. These brave men all shed tears on the occasion. It was thought about that time he was entering into some negotiation with the emperor; but it is more probable, as I have observed fully in another place, that he was attempting to carry on the grand project of marrying the unparalleled Amelia, landgraves of Hesse-Cassel, who had just then quitted her weeds of widow-hood; which alarmed the French minister beyond all description. He complained of a fish-sauce he had eaten. And if there be any thing dishonourable in that circumstance, it must be attributed to Richelieu. His body was full of livid spots, which some physicians called the plague: the reader must take that part of the probability, which agrees best with his judgment. He bequeathed *Raven*, a poor miller's horse, he always fought upon, to count Nassau; and his sword to Guébriant: he left colonel Ohem 3000*l.* and then devised to Nassau, Rosa, and Erlach, 2000*l.* each, 800*l.* to his chaplain, and something considerable to all his friends and domestics. He constituted the four colonels above-mentioned commanders of his army provisionally, till France and Sweden should agree upon a proper general; commanders, I say, of that very army, which Richelieu, by the means of Erlach, seduced into the French interests; as he did also, the town and garrison of Brisac. He bestowed on every other colonel that served under him, 1000*l.* and having ordered the soldiers to take an oath to their new leaders, bequeathed to each man a month's pay, which made upon the whole a sum not much less than 20,000*l.* *Itinerarium Thomæ Caræ*, Tom. ii. c. 40.

It is certain, that M. de Turenne always acknowledged the duke de Weimar to have been his preceptor in the art of war: and the prince de Condé professed the same obligations to another disciple of Gustavus, namely, Galion. *Mémoires de la Farre*, p. 23, 24.

upwards of *fifty* campaigns, and gained no less than *six and thirty battles*, that a superior genius, with an army not half equal in number to that of the assailants, cannot be *compelled* into a decisive action, except he chuses to embrace the offer. But besides all this, it was manifest to Tilly, (even in his own judgment) that the king greatly exceeded him in the methods of *subsisting* an army, in the arts of *entrenchment*, and in the management of his *artillery*; and for these reasons bent his thoughts from this moment to tempt him to an engagement on *plain ground*. Conformably to this plan, he afterwards sent him a romantic sort of a challenge, and desired to have the honour to dispute the fate of the empire with him in open field, drawing up his troops in fair battle-array at half a mile distance from the Swedish lines; but the king was reserved, and checked his natural ardour with great command of temper, for he expected Horn and Todt to join him with a re-inforcement of 14,000 men, drawn from the garrisons of Pomerania and Brandenburg.

Mean while, Tilly, correcting his judgment at the expense of losing 6000 men, the very flower of the Imperial army, in the two actions last recited, gave over, for the future, all thoughts of forcing his Swedish majesty's intrenchments, and waited with impatience for the reinforcements, that were coming to his assistance from all parts, in order to give the decisive stroke at once, expecting success from some fortunate unforeseen event, or hoping by the dexterity of his marches, and the frequency of shifting from place to place, to surprize his majesty unprepared, and upon equal ground. For these reasons, and partly for want of provisions to support his army (whilst Gustavus drew food and forage in great plenty from the district round Havelburg, not to mention the actual arrival of Horn and Todt) he marched directly to Halle, with an intention to take Leipsic, and compel the elector of Saxony to give up the cause of Sweden. But the king penetrated into these designs, and having passed the Elbe at Witttemberg, joined the Saxons, as will appear hereafter; whilst general Banier kept all open behind him, even to the Baltic ocean. Upon this, Tilly retired to Tangermund, and from thence to Magdeburg: and the king, not contenting himself to continue idle a single moment, requested the states-general of the United Provinces by letter, not to discharge their troops then in pay, but on the contrary exhorted them, to maintain them for the safety of the continent a little longer, or allow him to hire them*.

* *Historical Authentic Relation*, vol. Part i. p. 113.

And now, that we may not break the context of our history, we will resume our narrative for a short space backwards, taking notice of the expedition of the marquis of Hamilton from England, and concluding that piece of British history once for all, though it reaches till the middle of the month of September in the ensuing year. And though perhaps I may disagree with bishop Burnet * in various places, yet I shall express myself with the same candour, as if the author were now living, and had the opportunity of perusing these papers; since it is impossible to be too guarded, or too modest, when one reviews the performances of a writer, who can no longer justify himself. The marquis of Hamilton had the honour to be allied to the royal family, and was so much esteemed by the queen of Bohemia for an attachment to her interests, and a certain heroic gallantry in his disposition, that she treated him as a kinsman, an adviser, and a friend. But Charles I. had not spirit enough to levy and transport abroad a body of troops openly and avowedly for the restitution of the Palatinate: of course he supplied the marquis with money, and the means of raising money underhand; and desired, (indiscreetly enough) that Europe should consider him as a *person removed entirely out of the question*. This method of proceeding seems to me to have arisen purely from timidity and irresolution, even though it contradicts that unhappy prince's past conduct: for certain it is, that he sent Sir Thomas Roe ambassador to Gustavus merely upon the subject of the *German invasion*, which said public minister continued at Stockholm till the month of June 1630 †. As he was a man of parts and spirit, he greatly relished a Swedish expedition into Germany, and upon all occasions informed his court, that Gustavus was an intrepid and judicious commander; one, who sustained in his own person all the offices of soldier and statesman, being (to use his own words) *Vir ad magnas res & revolutiones natus* ‡.

He represents farther, with no small uneasiness, the strong necessity of supplying Gustavus with no inconsiderable sums of money, in order to determine him to undertake the *invasion*, which at that time employed his thoughts, and appears much discontented lest De Charnacé should || conclude an agreement between France and Sweden, and rob England of an honour which ought to belong to her.

* *Memoirs of the Duke of Hamilton*, by Burnet. Fol,

† *Sir Thomas Roe's MS. papers*.

‡ *Letter to the earl of Carlisle*, October 27, 1629.

|| *MS. Letter to lord viscount Dorchester, secretary of state*, April 20-30 1630.

That Sir Thomas comprehended fully the true part he was to act, may be inferred not only from the jealousy he conceived against De Charnacé, (who performed *that* for France, which our countryman wished to effect in behalf of his own nation) but from the regard Gustavus had for him, who honoured him with a present amounting to the value of two thousand five hundred pounds, esteeming him doubtless as the promoter and encourager of the German expedition *. This present was accompanied with a letter from Oxenstern, wherein are to be found these remarkable words; *Quæ inter nos mutuis colloquiis ac discursibus acta sunt ratione belli à S. R. majestate, domino meo clementissimo, in Germaniam transfereudi; cujus auctor & impulsor illustritas vestra NOMINE serenissimi regis sui strenuus extitit.*

Nevertheless, whatever commission his Britannic majesty might give Sir Thomas, it is plain, that minister (as such instructions were conformable to his own sense of things) promoted their taking effect with so much sincerity and vigour, that the king his master was startled, when he began to think of realizing them in good earnest. By way of expedient therefore to get clear from such bold and enterprizing measures, he allowed himself (as indeed he had done at intervals for two years before) to be amused by his enemies, almost as much as his father had been, and lent a listening ear one while to Spanish, and one while to Austrian cajolements; and this, notwithstanding the steps he had taken to persuade Gustavus to interpose in the empire, who, to do him justice, laid open his whole plan to Charles, and pressed effectual (not superficial) assistances from England in the strongest manner, partly by the applications of the elector Palatin, and partly by the representations of † Spence, his ambassador, and Curtius, his resident,

His Britannic majesty in the second place had *great expectancies* from the negotiations of Sir Robert Anstruther, who, according to the last-named plan, was dispatched to the diet of Ratisbon, and laboured to bring about the restitution of the Palatinate in an amicable manner, at the very moment when Gustavus first set his foot in Germany; and to give a new turn to the ill successes, which attended this minister, Sir Henry Vane was deputed ambassador extraordinary to the king of Sweden, and landed at Hamburg in the month of

* MS. Letter to the earl of Dorchester, secretary of state, August 16, 1631. (In the Paper Office.)

† I take this person to be Sir James Spence, who was colonel of a Scottish regiment in the Swedish service.

October 1631, some few weeks after the battle of Leipsic. This gentleman was considered as a more proper political implement to work with at *that* time, and on the system *then* adopted, than Roc appeared to be: nor did Vane obtain his new employment, but by the old court-trick of undermining his predecessor, who, in a letter to the queen of Bohemia, explains the whole mystery, and gives vent to his just resentments in that sort of language, which usually occurs to an honest man, who thinks himself supplanted. He calls Sir Henry Vane “*a bold undertaker* ;” *Though I know*, continues he, “*he cannot build upon my foundations. This blow came from Vienna upon new pretences, That the prosperity of the king of Sweden would make our treaty easy, if a man were employed, that would advance peace, to which I was esteemed an enemy.— I have honour enough in the sincerity of my negotiations, and that God had blessed them, and made me one instrument ; though I boasted not, until another would take my honour of bringing the brave king into Germany, which I had rather have inscribed on my tomb, than titles dearly bought at the loss of honour*.” And some months before this, he wrote to my lord Dorchester in the following words ; “*I have received the enclosed from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein I have honour enough done me, that I was the agent to bring that brave king into Germany* †.”

At length his Britannic majesty, amused by restless shiftings to and fro, but not relieved, gave the marquis of Hamilton private instructions to levy a body of troops, and conduct them into Germany. Upon this the Scottish nobleman dispatched colonel Alexander Hamilton ‡, (Chemnitz gives him that Christian name) brother to the earl of Hadinton, to the king of Sweden, and employed afterwards David Ramsay on the same errand the May following. Gustavus took the proposal in good part, and writ back immediately his own limitations and conditions of acceptance, of which (if I am allowed only to remark, with the above cited historian §, that the king reserved to himself the *supreme power of command*) the more material substance was as follows ; “*That as the marquis had generously proposed to raise 6000 men at his own expence, to be employed against the Imperialists, and any other enemies of Sweden, it was highly proper, by way of*

* London, Nov. 20, 1631. (*Paper Office.*)

† August 16, 1631. *Ibidem.*

‡ There were five Hamiltons colonels under Gustavus ; Alexander, Frederic, James, John, and Hugh. The four former were knights.

§ *Chemnitz*, Tom. i, p. 160.

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“ preliminary, that the intended place of landing should be first
 “ specified; that 4000 infantry should conduct him to the
 “ Swedish army, or wherever his troops were commanded to
 “ act; and that this escort was to be paid one whole year at
 “ the Swedish expence; that as the marquis supposes 2000
 “ horse absolutely necessary for the protection of his infantry,
 “ *expedients should be sought for*, to procure such a number of
 “ cavalry; that the marquis shall not only have full com-
 “ mand over this army in the king’s absence, *but a counsellor*
 “ *shall be added to him, in order to render his deliberations more ex-*
 “ *peditious, and less liable to objections*: whatever the marquis
 “ *conquers shall belong to Sweden*, but the emoluments and con-
 “ tributions shall appertain to him and his army; provided,
 “ at the same time, that no outrages or extortions be commit-
 “ ted. Lastly, *the said marquis and his troops shall take an oath*
 “ *of fidelity to the crown of Sweden* *.”

I never could procure a sight of the marquis’s original pro-
 posals, which produced these conditions and limitations on
 the part of his Swedish majesty; but there is a spirit in the
 latter, and a political ability, which shew Gustavus consider-
 ed not himself in the situation of a *suppliant* prince. Not one
 syllable is mentioned in regard to the *Palatinate*, the only true
 and ostensible object of Great Britain’s interference. Never-
 theless, it is probable, notwithstanding all that Burnet insinua-
 tes to the contrary, that the promise of an escort, and the
 assistance of 4000 men in Swedish pay, was always intended
 (as will appear more fully by and by) because it was after-
 wards made good, which the bishop allows not. But
 as to the clause relating to the addition of 2000 cavalry to
 the marquis’s infantry, it is conceived in such vague and in-
 determinate expressions, namely, *that, upon condition they should*
be found necessary, expedients shall be sought for to procure them;
 that it appears to me, (and ought so *then* to have been un-
 derstood) as a sort of offer merely eventual, which the king
 intended to fulfil, or omit, as best agreed with the exigencies
 of war. *The joining of a counsellor* (who probably was a man
 of the sword,) *with the marquis* is a plain proof too, that it
 was never proposed, that the British general should have the
supreme command: And that no *conquests* should belong to him,
 or the parties whose cause he more immediately espoused,
 was a farther proof, that nothing he *might do* could have any
 effect in procuring the recovery of the Palatinate. The last
 article, *that of taking the oath of fidelity to the crown of Sweden*,
 proves the least exceptionable of any one, that is to be found

* See the treaty at large in Burnet’s Memoirs of the duke of Hamilton.

in the whole collection; yet even that gave some *additional* weight to his majesty's power; nor is it usually insisted upon, when a lesser allied army co-operates with a larger body of troops; yet in this case Gustavus asked no more than he granted himself in relation to the garrison, which he placed in Spandau.

In the body of the treaty, I passed over a circumstance, which at that moment seemed too minute to be taken notice of, but because in the course of making these remarks one cannot but be struck with the independent spirit, and superior air of authority in Gustavus, (not to mention the firmness of his mind, even at a time when he was greatly distressed, and requesting a favour) I must here just observe, that though the king had promised the marquis bills of exchange to buy ammunition, and had also agreed to provide him with a great number of musquets, pikes, cannon-balls, and a certain quantity of iron and utensils to make some warlike instruments of that nobleman's own invention; yet in the same paragraph it was also stipulated, that if the treaty then agitating at Dantzic between the Swedes and Imperialists should *take effect*, and a general peace be concluded, the marquis should *refund* to his majesty the particular sums of money, that had been expended in making these military instruments. Be that as it will, Gustavus chose to *prescribe* laws, and not *receive* them: and as he perceived the king of England wanted magnanimity to appear as he ought in so glorious a cause, he therefore chose either to make him subservient, or not depend on him at all.

The March following, in the year 1631, the marquis at length, with the concurrence of the king his master, accepted of the above-mentioned proposals, and engaged to land his troops at the place agreed on, in the month of June next ensuing*. He commented a little upon here and there an article, and made a few slight explanations and enlargements upon several passages, to which *no* answer was returned, so far as I can discover at this distance of time: but nothing systematical was advanced upon the whole, nor any one objection duly urged against *those* various clauses, which I have made my observations upon, as carrying with them the marks not only of great ability, but of superior commanding authority in Gustavus. Nevertheless, this omission must be referred to the king and his ministry, as in truth it ought, and not to the marquis of Hamilton.

* He left England July 16, touched at Oresund, and landed at Wolgast the second and third of August.

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Donald, lord Rea (whose family name was Mackay) and David Ramsay, who both served in the Swedish army, were now employed by Gustavus in Great-Britain to facilitate the turn of affairs in his behalf, and encourage the new general in raising recruits; and on this account (in respect to some words spoken of the marquis) arose that noted quarrel between them, which ended in an appeal to single combat, authorized by a royal commission*, concerning which all our historians express themselves with so much minuteness, that I shall purposely pass it by without further notice. It is true bishop Burnet gives them both extremely bad characters, which representation at this distance of time it is not in my power to contradict. All I know of them is, they were soldiers of approved service; and Gustavus valued them both, especially the former; a circumstance many people will think sufficient to confront an hearsay report, delivered down to us by a very able, but prejudiced historian, who paints with great warmth, and snatching one point of view finishes his portrait, without consulting what particular lights and attitudes the subject may admit of.

In the spring-months of the year 1631, Hamilton employed himself with great diligence to raise an army; and the *cause in itself* was so agreeable to the people of England and Scotland, that his drums soon drew together a considerable number of troops, and many experienced officers flocked to him both from Holland and the Low-Countries. He then dispatched an agent, saith Burnet, to beseech Gustavus to order the escort of 4000 men to be ready to join him on his first landing in Germany; and, in case such a body of forces

* At the day of trial, Ramsay called Rea *liar, and barbarous villain*, and, throwing down his glove, protested, *to gar him dy for what he had said, if he had him in a place for that purpose.* But Rea preserved an intire dominion over his temper, and replied only, without signs of passion and discomposure, *Mr. Ramsay, we will not contend here; answer my bill.* Sanderson's *History of England*, p. 167.

Upon the whole, it was improbable that Rea should want to attach himself to the marquis any further than out of pure affection to a nobleman of his own country; for he knew the king of Sweden would never allow Hamilton a separate command, and he had better employments under Gustavus (being a colonel of two regiments) than he could hope to obtain in the British army. So that if there was any treason at bottom, (which I no ways suspect) it certainly lies at Ramsay's door.

The dress of the appellant and defendant on the day of trial was very conformable to the taste of chivalry at that time. Ramsay was clothed in scarlet, laced with silver so thick, that the ground of the cloth could hardly be seen. The lining was a sky-coloured plush. Lord Rea was apparelled in black velvet with silver trimmings and buttons, his sword hung in a silver-embroidered belt; and he wore the order of a Scottish baronet about his neck. *Ibid.*

could

could not be spared, to send him letters of exchange, whereby he might be enabled to levy the aforesaid number of men.

On the other hand, as matters now drew near their crisis in the empire, (for the generals knew by the interpretation of each other's motions, that a decisive battle must soon happen) the king wrote several pressing letters to the marquis, conjuring him to complete his levies, and embark with all possible expedition. At the same time lord Rea was sent into Denmark and Holland to raise recruits; and a like commission was given to colonel Farenbach, concerning whose designs on the king's person we have spoken more distinctly in another place*. This bold and unaccountable adventurer (who had orders likewise to pass into England, and levy troops there) received his majesty's money to raise four regiments, and then very mysteriously disappeared, and returned to the Imperial service, where he had borne command under the emperor Mathias, and thence passed into the service of Sigismund king of Poland.

It is more than probable, that *these* regiments were intended to join Hamilton; for the countries, in which they were to be raised, lay near the place, where the junction was to be made. Their number likewise corresponded with the number of troops promised; for as a Swedish regiment then contained 1008 men, of course this body of soldiers amounted precisely to the due contingent, with an addition only of two and thirty persons more than were mentioned in the stipulation. Nor could Gustavus expect any use or assistance from these new-raised recruits, but upon supposition they were to unite themselves with the marquis; and then both these little armies might render themselves superior to insults, and march on to the place assigned them, according to the king's orders. For 4000 men, raised in Holland, Frizeland, and Bremen, and unsupported by the British troops, could not, (without great good fortune) have joined the king or Banier; inasmuch as Tilly lay between them and the former, and Pappenheim and Boninghausen betwixt them and the latter. These are little remarks, which tend much to the explanation of history, and cannot easily be made, except one understands the subject thoroughly, and knows precisely what each general was about, and where every body of troops was stationed at a certain period. My exactness here is due to the MILITARY TABLE AND DIARY OF THE WAR †.

* Vide supra, p. 37, 38.

† It was written about the year 1632, by some English, Scottish, or Irish officer, in Gustavus's service.

By this time Gustavus began to find great inconveniencies in the situation of his affairs, inasmuch as Charles was so extremely cautious in the declaring his intentions. And upon this occasion, the protestant princes in Germany put on a cold, reserved, and ambiguous air, reflecting (not without wisdom) how extremely dangerous any armament, or the publication of any one simple memorial, might prove to them, when the king of Great-Britain, environed by the sea, and removed at so considerable a distance from every ill effect that could proceed from the houses of Austria and Spain; ventured only to act behind the scene, and guarded himself with subtleties and excuses. Besides, they discovered plainly, that as he declared not boldly and avowedly for them, he was to be understood as acting to a certain degree against them. Upon this account Gustavus pressed hard by the means of Camerarius his ambassador in Holland, and Salvius his agent at Hamburg, to bring Charles into an explicit and open treaty, by which 10,000 men (to be paid by Great-Britain) were to be added to the marquis's army, and the escort abovementioned: over all which troops the marquis, *in case these proposals were accepted*, was then to be declared general in chief, with this subsequent provision, (for the honour of England) *that no peace should be concluded with the emperor, till the elector Palatine was re-instated in his patrimonial dominions*. Charles listened to these proposals with an air of approbation, allowing himself at the same time to be cajoled by the Austrian and Spanish ministry: but instead of consenting in a compendious manner, (which single stroke of politics, and not a very bold one, would have crushed all the ambitious projects formed at Vienna and Munich, and produced in short time the restoration of the Palatinate) he promised, in imitation of his father, to send an ambassador to finish the agreement. Whether any such minister went merely at that time, and on that errand, is more than I can take upon me to assert. Henry Vane was charged with a public commission to Gustavus, about half a year afterwards: but the critical opportunity had then vanished, and the elector of Saxony had declared for Sweden.

On July 16, the marquis, after having reviewed his troops, set sail from Yarmouth with a fleet of forty ships. In his way he stopped at Elsinöur, and went ashore to deliver letters from his master, in order to obtain a free passage, and pay his respects to Christian, king of Denmark. Gustavus had appointed him to land at Bremen, and had dispatched thither Lesly (afterwards earl of Lieven) to negotiate with the archbishop concerning the means of supplying the Eng-
lish

lish army with provisions; and it was well known, that he amassed great quantities of bread and beer from Bremen and Hamburg. But when the marquis found, that the escort of 4000 men had not been sent him according to promise, and that the enemy's troops covered a large tract of country between him and the grand Swedish camp, he thought proper, from his own impulse, having just touched at Oresund, to proceed onwards in his voyage, and landed in the mouth of the Oder, between Wolgast and the isle of Usedom; at which Gustavus was greatly piqued, for the archbishop of Bremen privately favoured the Swedish cause; and as the Imperial troops were but weak in, and near that diocese, he wanted above all things to carve work for Tilly on the banks of the Weser, and divert him from marching into Saxony *. But Burnet either knew nothing of the king's reasons for being angry, or kept them a secret.

Indeed I cannot say there was any considerable body of Swedish troops then in Bremen; but Lesly, governor of Stralsund, appeared there in person by his master's orders. Todt likewise, and Banier, lay at some distance with no contemptible armies; and all the world knows, Gustavus was too good a general to run the risk of sacrificing such a brave body of allies, by leaving them in a forlorn and defenceless state. Mean while, Lesly was not a little astonished to see the king's plan broken in the very first step the marquis took. Therefore, without ceremony, he embarked in a small vessel for Stetin, and thence hastened by land to the king, in order to know what he proposed to do, as his original design was frustrated. His majesty from that moment disliked the marquis for not placing a due confidence in him; but having the talent never to be surpris'd by common accidents, he changed his plan in an instant, and ordered the British troops to serve on the banks of the Oder instead of the Weser.

The fame of this little army, whose numbers were trebly magnified, struck great terror into the Imperial troops, and contributed more than can be well imagined, to the obtaining the battle of Leipzig: for Tilly thought himself obliged to detach six or seven thousand men into Silesia, to strengthen his army there, and re-inforce several garrisons on the occasion; the want of which soldiers greatly distressed him, when the decisive hour of action arrived.

The marquis landed 6000 men, English and Scottish, all in good health and spirits, for only two had died during the voyage. This diminutive army consisted of four regiments,

* *Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-Germano*, Tom. i. 160.

each of which contained ten companies, and every company amounted to 150 men *. Burnet, who naturally favours his hero the marquis, no where allows, that the stipulated escort of 4000 Swedes joined the English after their landing. But this mistake arose either from ignorance or design; for 4000 Swedes joined him, according to stipulation †, and arrived some few days after the re-inforcement that the queen brought; and then the combined troops marched first to Stetin, and afterwards into Silesia, where Horn lay at that time, and whom Banier replaced.

It is true, numbers of the English perished by eating German bread, which is heavier, darker-coloured, and sourer than that of their own country: they suffered too by an immoderate fondness for new honey, of which they found great abundance in those parts; nor did the German beer agree with their constitutions. They came fresh likewise into a country, that was infected by the pestilence. Of course this body of troops proved but of little service in the sequel of the war. For they were new-raised recruits, the very off-scouring of the people; and, in order to justify this assertion, it must be observed; that Gustavus had no intention to make use of them upon trying occasions, and about his person, till they had been better seasoned and disciplined in the art of war.

The magnificence of Hamilton's table, his equipage, and liveries, appeared to have more the air of a prince, than of a subject. He had forty gentlemen's sons, by way of pages and volunteers, and a body of guards, which amounted to 200 men. He was received in the camp at Werben (for thither he went without his army) in a manner the most affectionate and most polite, that can be conceived. Gustavus made him a thousand apologies, for the bareness and scantiness of the quarters allotted to his troops; and having conferred with him many hours in private, shewed him the dispositions he had made in order to give Tilly, a soldier-like reception. By this time the British troops were advanced to the banks of the Oder, and thither the marquis hastened to take the command of them upon himself ‡; but never could obtain the power of being declared general in chief, when the junction was to be formed betwixt him and the Swedish commander; that honour being strenuously denied him, except his Britannic majesty should think fit to add 10,000

* *Chebnitius de Bello Sueco-German. Tom. i.*

† *Swedish Intelligencer, Part i. p. 109.*

‡ *Monro's Second Expedition, Part. ii. 52, 53.*

resh men, according to the proposal lately made by Gustavus, which we mentioned transiently as we passed along.

Some little time after the decisive engagement at Leipzig, the king ordered the marquis to supply the deficiency amongst his British troops with German recruits, for the expences of which he promised to become responsible; and from thence we may infer, that his Britannic majesty only sent an army into Germany, but was not extremely punctual in remitting the payment that belonged to it. Soon after this, the marquis received instructions to quit the banks of the Oder, and make what acquisitions he could in Silesia: but his army, from causes above assigned, was reduced to little more than two complete regiments; and what was worse, had subsisted ever since its arrival, in countries infested with the pestilence, and where the provisions had been twice consumed by enemies and friends: nor could he, in this new expedition, obtain more than 500 auxiliary troops to co-operate with him. Nevertheless, he and his Britons were delighted with the thoughts of making an invasion into Silesia, a duchy * extremely fertile in itself, and little, if at all, impoverished by the preceding wars. He had there the good fortune to raise the siege of Crossen, which was more easily effected, as most of the inhabitants were protestants. He then took Guben (the second and best-peopled town in Lower Lusatia) by surprize; and had probably made himself master of Glogau †, if Gustavus, for political reasons, had not recalled him; at the same time giving him to understand, that the elector of Saxony had undertaken to make the conquest of Silesia, as that province lay most convenient for him.

The Scottish nobleman was quite in a rage, to see himself obliged to quit so plentiful a country. He had once a mind to have continued there in opposition to his majesty's orders; but that design would have amounted to nothing, for the Swedish commanders in the several garrisons, had authority given them, in case of his being refractory, not to acknow-

* Some modern writers have assured us, that this duchy, which is about 240 miles long by 60 broad, more or less, contains 100 well-peopled cities and towns, 353 small market towns and larger villages, 4000 gentlemen's houses, including 863 castles, and an infinite number of little villages and hamlets. The reader is desired not to take this account upon my authority, for the computation appears to me to be exaggerated.

† This town gives name to a considerable duchy, which the emperor had conferred on Wallstein, as a remuneration in part for his great services. Wallstein had fitted up the castle with his usual magnificence. There is one particularity in this duchy; the daughters inherit preferably to the collateral males. The present princess of Furstenberg, (as the prince her husband informed me) is an heiress of the house of Wallstein,

ledge him as an ally. If this conduct of Gustavus should chance to puzzle the reader, he will upon a moment's reflection discover that the Swedish policy was not amiss in this respect: for as no explicit agreement had been made about re-instating Frederic, either as elector Palatin, or king of Bohemia; and as Silesia belonged to the crown of Bohemia, as an *incorporated* and *annexed* province, Gustavus wisely foresaw, that what the English conquered there, would be supposed by that nation to be conquered for the Palatin's use. Besides, his scheme was not to contract for the restoration of Frederic (though he had that event sincerely and really at heart) till Charles thought fit to engage more avowedly and strenuously in the war, and advanced larger and more regular supplies of men and money.

Hamilton therefore, with manifest ill will, marched to Magdeburg at the head of 1500 British troops, and 2000 or more German infantry, which he had levied according to the orders of the king of Sweden, and at his expence. His instructions were to join Banier, who conducted about the same number of troops, and act with him in forming the blockade of the aforesaid city, about six months after Tilly had taken it by storm. There was little good to be expected from this project, for the soldiers within and under the walls (not to mention out-guards and advanced parties) were almost as numerous as those that blockaded the avenues of the town; so that the most Gustavus could propose (fortunate chances excepted) was to reduce the garrison, and the troops encamped under the walls, to the straits of hunger, and hinder them from making excursions and levying contributions round the country.

And now the marquis's resentment was thoroughly awakened; for he found, that Banier not only affected the superior command, but was determined to possess it; for he carried the king's authority in his pocket, to be produced and used in case disputes should proceed to extremity.

Upon this, coldness and reservedness soon gave birth to expostulations and recriminations; at length their reciprocal ill-will to each other amounted to a mortal hatred, and each would have been glad to have sacrificed his antagonist to private passion; for Banier, who was extremely well born, would not bate the marquis one jot in our articles of pride, and self-opinion: not to mention, that he considered himself (and justly too) as one of the ablest generals then in Europe. And though the marquis possessed all the gallantry, magnificence, and personal bravery, that ought to adorn a man of quality; yet he was then only entered into the

twenty-

twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth year of his age, and for that reason Gustavus, in the original draught of the articles between them, chose to join an adviser or counsellor with him; that is to say in other words, an able man, and an elder general. In vain the British nobleman added remonstrance to remonstrance, in order to obtain the supreme direction of the armies: it was told him by Gustavus, that the contrary practice was highly expedient to the public service; and in consequence of this declaration, letters were dispatched to London, desiring Charles to recommend the doctrine of subordination to his general, and exhorting him likewise to transmit the pay of the troops, (not to the marquis of Hamilton) but to the king of Sweden: which proposals were agreed to, as some historians assert *. This, I think, was acting upon too high a footing, even in Gustavus Adolphus.

In the course of these negotiations, the marquis behaved in a very spirited manner against Banier, who, contrary to the judgment of his British colleague, had declined giving Pappenheim battle, who then advanced in order to raise the blockade of Magdeburg. Banier produced his orders not to hazard the Swedish and German troops, and immediately commanded a retreat to be sounded. The truth was, which either Burnet knew not, or chose to suppress, that Boninghausen, after an obstinate conflict, had thrown 1300 men into the town. Banier then passed the Sala, and besought the marquis to do the same, who refused him positively, being assured by Sir Jacob Astley, as an eye-witness, that the pass, through which he was to march his division, was so secure and so defensible, that he might pursue his journey at a quarter of an hour's notice, and give defiance to all Pappenheim's attacks. Be that as it will, Pappenheim in truth (whose army was much weaker than that of the combined nations, though it was always his policy to double the number of his men in common reports) had no other object in view, than to raise the blockade and carry off the garrison, which amounted to 2000 well disciplined troops: not to mention such bodies of soldiers as were stationed in strong posts and important passes round the town.

Thus ended the campaign of 1631, with respect to the marquis, who paid a visit to the king, and was received with politeness.

And now, about the middle of September 1632, Henry Vane arrived at Wurtzburg in his ambassadorial capacity. His proposals were, that Gustavus should give the marquis a

* *High Dutch Historical and Authentic Relation*, Part i. p. 113.

separate army, and a separate command; and that the said army, in conjunction with such troops as might hereafter be sent from England, and with such as were levied and supported with English money, should act uniformly and zealously for the recovery of the Palatinat. But Gustavus took the matter in a higher tone than he had made use of formerly; so that Vane and he parted upon very ill terms: in consequence whereof, he declined giving the marquis a commission to levy a new army, and excused himself from paying the money, that was expended in Silcisia to form a body of recruits there; and Oxenstiern told the British general, with some warmth, that he had received great sums from Charles his master, and must not pretend to amuse them with an account of having advanced a great deal of money from his own private fortunes.

Thus that nobleman, as early as the month of April, in the year we are now speaking of, found himself to be neither a *general* nor even a *colonel*, for his whole corps was reduced to one English regiment and one Scottish. Bellandin, afterwards created a peer, commanded one, and Hamilton, brother to the earl of Hadinton, commanded the other: both which regiments being incorporated into duke Bernard's army, the marquis contented himself to follow Gustavus as a volunteer.

His Britannic majesty made an indistinct reply to all the embroilment which Oxenstiern's rough speech had occasioned. He gave the money as king, and did not give the money as king; he acted one day openly, and one day with reserve. The marquis in one light was accountable to the nation, and in one light was not accountable to the nation. But the postscript of one of the king's letters at this period contains something that appears uncommon. The words are these:

"I hope shortly you will be in a possibility to perform your promise concerning pictures and statues at Munechen (Munich): therefore now, in earnest, do not forget it."

Now as this letter bears date April 30, 1632*, it is plain the king of Sweden had entered Bavaria, and even passed the Lech almost a month before it was written. The seeming appearance of the letter is, that his majesty had a mind for something, out of that collection, which was worth sending.

Nothing farther need be said upon this occasion; and if the bare mention thereof had not fallen immediately and essentially within the course of my narrative, I should have passed by a circumstance relating to a prince whom, in the character of a restorer and protector of the fine arts, every man of taste ought to esteem as a benefactor. Nevertheless, it

* Memoirs by Burnet, p. 111.

scheme or idea, whatever it might be, was in all probability rendered abortive by a peremptory disapprobation on the part of Gustavus; which one cannot affect to be sorry for, since the Trenks and Mentzels of our own age, when they made an irruption into Bavaria at the head of a rapacious band of Croatians, Pandours, and Talpatches, made no scruple to behave like men of honour in this respect at least.

*Non obtusa adeo gestabant pectora Pœni,
Nec tam averfus equos Tyriis sol junxit ab oris.*

Not but that the elector of Bavaria deserved such usage from the elector Palatin more than any prince then alive; for he had plundered and sent to the Vatican the library at Heidelberg, which was the protestant glory of Europe.

Much more happened at this time with reference to Great-Britain (wherein the marquis was partly concerned) and his Swedish majesty; but that will present itself more naturally, when we shall undertake to give a full account of Sir Henry Vane's embassy. It may suffice therefore to conclude with observing, That some months before Oxenstiern had shown such warmth of temper, Charles had conceived a strong inclination to recal the marquis, perceiving plainly, that he stood on no good footing with Gustavus, and that there was little hope of procuring for him a separate command; and as he had, in common with his father, a mighty turn for new negotiations, visionary projects, and temporary expedients, he proposed to his general, to send him with a new army into the Lower Palatinate, in order to assist the French, who had promised to conquer, and make it over to him by way of *depositum*; though at the same time he adds, that he cannot consider French promises as matters of authenticity. Nor did he judge amiss in this respect; for as the scheme was chimerical, so it ended in nothing.

And now the chancellor Oxenstiern proposed a fresh league, offensive and defensive between Sweden and England, but in a higher tone, and with more exceptions and limitations than he had used formerly: for *then* the power of concluding peace was to be vested reciprocally in each contracting party, but now it was to reside entirely in his Swedish majesty's breast. As this altered the whole ~~face~~ of the question, Vane and he parted with much ill-will. The marquis petitioned for a new army, and Gustavus amused him with a new delay: He urged remonstrance upon remonstrance; but all was vain. Gustavus spoke of Charles, his brother-king, in terms of anger and bitterness, but at the same time told the marquis, that he was thoroughly sensible of his services; and at all distances,

distances, and in all places, should consider him as one, that peculiarly belonged to him. Upon this, the English general (all accommodation being cut off) respectfully took his leave, at Neustadt; about the middle of September 1632, six weeks before the king's death, being escorted four miles by all the English and Scottish officers in the Swedish service; and taking with him the colonels Sir James Hamilton and Sir James Ramsay (which latter was surnamed the Fair)* as also the valiant colonel Hepburn, who, as we shall observe hereafter, in spite of all representations and applications, never could be induced to forgive the king the affront, real or imaginary, which lay upon his spirits. In a word, as matters stood upon this disagreeable footing between the sovereigns of Great-Britain and Sweden, one cannot blame the marquis for declining the post of volunteer for life. Nevertheless, his few remaining soldiers entertained no thought, that their general, or their country had been ill used; for they all incorporated themselves into the Swedish service. Nor did the Scottish nation withdraw themselves from Gustavus's service upon this occasion, though at that time three or four of them were *officers of the field* (as the language then ran) and upwards of twenty served the king in the capacity of colonels; not that so many occur in the course of this history, for some acted in separate armies under Oxenstiern, Horn, Banier, and others, and some were quartered in Livonia and Sweden*.

Thus ended the fortunes of the separate army, chiefly English, which the marquis commanded; whereas, if Charles had made a bold and explicit treaty at first, in his own name, and authorized it by regal sanction and that of a parliament; if a proper fund had been settled for the support of these auxiliary troops, and a British commissary been sent to pay them weekly or monthly; if the disposal of all vacant commissions had been vested in the national general, and him only; then Charles, I say, might have made points of the recovery and restoration of the Palatinat. He might have employed his own soldiers in that particular destination; he might have flattered the partiality of his subjects, by giving them a commander of their own island. And had he insisted upon this, and many other points of a like nature, at that time, when assistance would have come with its true grace, and at a proper season, certain it is and undeniable, that Gustavus and Oxenstiern would have embraced his proposals with an uncommon joy. But the misfortune of our king was, that he often

* *Monro's Expedition.*

saw and did what was right; but was always unlucky both in the *manner of proposing*, and the *time of performing*.

But to return to our German part of the history. Whilst Gustavus lay intrenched within the angle, which is formed by the confluence of the Elb and Havel, and as he was walking on the banks of one of these rivers, all alone, in a meditating mood, according to his custom; he was surpris'd with hearing the voices of ten or twelve young cavaliers, who were talking with a great deal of vivacity, and seem'd to shape their course towards the Swedish quarters. The king dispatched a centinel or two to summon them to him; but as these volunteers talk'd neither German nor Swedish, they could only answer by signs. Gustavus guessing their errand, spok'd to them very politely in Latin, and offer'd to incorporate them that very day into the best body of troops then in the service. For it was remarkable in this prince, that he studied the physiognomy, and watch'd the conduct of every young man of fashion, that carried arms under him, and ask'd the respective colonels every day, what sort of turn of mind, and what kind of military genius they discover'd in these new adventurers, during their apprenticeship in the art of war. Nor was this all; for he often convers'd with the meanest of his soldiers, and knew numbers of them by their names. Having well consider'd these new volunteers, he conceiv'd a very favourable opinion of one of them, and present'd him soon afterwards with two fine war-horses, saying at the same time, *Sir, I do not give them you; I only pay you for the merit I see you have.* This young man was Gassion, afterwards maréchal of France, one of the most intrepid and enterprizing warriors of that age*. The king gave him a variety of employment, made him a sort of brigadier in his own regiment of guards, destin'd him for the sharpest services, and honour'd him with a great share of his private confidence †.

In one of those sharp rencounters, which happen'd almost every day between the two armies, his majesty recommend'd him

* Gassion, John, had the good fortune, though a protestant, to arrive to the honour of being a maréchal of France. He serv'd first in the Genoese war, under the constable Lesdiguières; act'd afterwards with the duke de Rohan, in Languedoc, and bore a share through all the campaigns in Savoy and Piedmont, till the peace of Querasque was concluded. He then conceiv'd a desire of asking a command under the emperor, but the maréchal de Thoiras dissuad'd him; and in the 27th year of his age, he present'd himself to the king of Sweden. Richelieu mortally hated the abrupt impetuosities of this officer; and being advis'd one day to confer the command of Rantzau's army upon him, repli'd hastily in the negative, *I know Rantzau gets drunk sometimes, but Gassion was born drunk.* See more in Folard, Tom. i. 219.

† *Hist. du Maréchal Gassion (par Michel le Peire) Tom. i, 45, &c. 120.*

very particularly to the care of the commander of the party. Gassion had the good fortune to take a German officer prisoner, a young man of considerable estate and quality: and as ransoms at that time ran very high with respect to people of fashion, Gustavus gave the whole profit to *the young Frenchman*, as he used to call him; and was greatly pleased, when Gassion told him, that he liked the air and manners of his prisoner so well, that, poor as he was, he was determined to forgive him all the debt, provided the said officer would do him the favour to instruct him in the Swedish and German languages, that thereby he might be the better enabled both to give and receive orders. Upon this event, in concurrence with some other promising indications, Gustavus in a few days conceived so high an opinion of Gassion, that he ordered him to come privately on horse-back to his tent at midnight, where, after some short discourse, he sent him out on an expedition of consequence, which was conducted by the baron de Teuffel, one of his favourite colonels.

By this time the affair of Werben came to an end; for Tilly found himself greatly exceeded, not only in the military art, but in the method of encamping and subsisting an army. In vain he had boasted of having defeated and ruined two kings, and that he should crush a third, who was a young man; but the event did not justify the false hope. True it is, he attacked Gustavus more times than one, but was never able to carry his point. He tempted him to fight upon plain ground: but the king kept his post with inflexible firmness; for, though naturally brave and jealous of affronts to the highest degree, yet he had too great a game at stake to allow the warmth of his temper to get the better of his judgment; and as it was now no time to indulge a romantic gallantry, he submitted patiently to become an object of astonishment to his own troops, whose ardour, as we observed before, he could but just keep under on this occasion. Nevertheless, that he might the better convince his officers, and compose their minds, he convened a council of war (a practice not very frequent with him) the night before Tilly attacked him, and there explained his whole plan to his generals, with such superiority of reasoning, that every person retired to his tent not only contented but entirely satisfied.



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