

- Asked if he had a meeting with ITAGAKI and YONAI after hearing of the the Changkufeng Incident (sometime in July 1938), Witness answered he had no recollection. (Cross-examination of Kazushige UGAKI - 23,884; 23,885)
  - ITAGAKI stated that the dissolution of the Renovation Government would constitute a peace maintenance problem and Wang Ching-wei did not converse with Wang Keh-ming on the basis of what ITAGAKI said. (Cross-examination of Sadaaki KAGESA - 24,008; 24,128-9)
  - About the middle of July 1938 as Foreign Minister, I was informed by General ITAGAKI that Soviet forces had entered the territory of Manchukuo at a point near the border of Korea. I immediately sent telegraphic instructions to the Embassy in Moscow giving instructions to protest and to demand a withdrawal. (Direct examination of Kazushige UGAKI - 23,859; 23,868-69)
- During the Incident I met with War Minister ITAGAKI many times at Cabinet meetings and Five Ministers' Meetings. From all I could observe, the War Minister was loyal to the policy of the government to localize the Incident and assisted in the efforts to settle it by peaceful means as soon as possible. (23,870).
- Asked if he knew that according to Foreign Vice Minister HORINOUCHI, Kensuke, about the 9th or 10th of August, SHIGEMITSU had sent an official telegram to witness which he described as one which a military man might have sent, witness replied he did not hear of such a thing. (Cross-examination of Kazushige UGAKI, pp. 23,884, 23,899).
- Asked if he, Admiral YONAI and ITAGAKI sat up all night waiting for news as to whether he carried out witness' instructions, witness replied he never did such a thing. (p. 23,899).
- Asked who were the central military authorities that made some amendments to the plan proposed (Nov 1938) by Mr. Kao and Mr. Mei SSu-piang, witness replied it was the Army General Staff and the War Ministry. The Chief of Staff was Prince Kan-IN and the War Minister was General ITAGAKI. (Cross-Examination of Sadaaki KAGESA, pp. 23,970; 24,030).
  - Asked who gave Witness and Colonel IMAI orders to go to Shanghai on 19 November, 1938, Witness replied the order to him was issued by the War Minister after consultation by the War Minister at the Five Ministers' Conference. (Cross examination of Sadaaki KAGESA - 24,008-24,032)

- "The Outline of the Settlement of the Nomonhan Border Incident" made on 31 May 1939 was planned and drafted by a committee of which he was a member, also studied by the Army Ministry and the General Staff Office and put into effect with the approval of our Chief (Direct examination of Gen HASHIMOTO, 22,575; 22,576).

- ITAGAKI was War Minister in the KONOYE and HIRANUMA Cabinets during June 1938-August 1939 (Record p. 17,700, Exhibit No. 2344) among 21 Prime Ministers, 30 Foreign Ministers, 28 Home Ministers, 23 Finance Ministers, 19 War Ministers, 15 Navy Ministers, 17 Justice Ministers and 27 Education Ministers (Record P. 17,699, Exh. 2344). MUTO was never a member of a Cabinet (Record p. 17,701, Exh. 2344). The evidence was offered obviously to show that with the continual change of Cabinets which fell and rose due to conflicting views among themselves there could not have been a conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

- From about January 1940 under the supervision of ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Army in China, peace negotiations with Chungking were actively held. By the end of March the possibility of their succeeding was so great that Chief of Staff ITAGAKI after consultation with Wang decided to postpone the formal establishment of the latter's government for several days. Wang's government was formally set up on March 30th after the negotiations failed. (24,000-001)

Even after the establishment of the Wang government, maneuvers for peace through Sung Tzu-liang were enthusiastically continued by the Chief of Staff ITAGAKI. These maneuvers proved unsuccessful and in October of the same year it was decided to discontinue the endeavor for peace. (24,001).

E R R A T A S H E E T

AFFIDAVIT OF: ITAGAKI, Seishiro



Please insert the number "7" at the top of page 29 in front of "The battle".

Page 16, line 2, "Governor or" should read "Governor of".

Also on the same page the last paragraph should be numbered "10" instead of "9".

Page 22, 5th line from the bottom of the page the words "Kwantung Army" should be changed to "Chinese Nationalist Army".

Page 23, beginning with the 3rd paragraph "Judging from the situation" and ending with the words "programs into action" please change as follows:

"Judging from the situation stated above, if the principle of co-prosperity advocated by Japan and Manchukuo should succeed in forcing out the designs of the communist power, Japan, Manchuria and China would be able to pursue permanently the way of prosperity in peace.

Whereas, the three nations would be thrown into the guagmire of war and revolt, if Japan's advocacy should fail and the situation should develop in favor of the communists. The above prospect became all the more probable after the commintern, holding a general meeting at Moscow in July 1935, passed a resolution to concentrate on efforts to overthrow Japan and accomplishing world revolution, and the Chinese Communist party issued a proclamation on the basis of the said resolution, to substitute the principle of "resist Japan and save the Nation movement" for that of "Bolshevize and save the Nation movement", and also by their threat to resort to the tactics of the anti-Japanese united front and announcing its resolution to put these programs into action."

Also on Page 23, the last line change "Manchuria" to read "Manchukuo".

Page 24, 1st line, delete "the ability by real ability" and insert "ourself by:"

Page 24, sentence marked "(c)" should read as follows: "The realization of harmonious co-operation of the races in Manchukuo in order to achieve the above mentioned principles,

Page 24, 1st paragraph under "4" should read thusly: "While I was Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, Manchukuo had many persons of broad views and high personal-ity, such as Premier CHIANG and successive Chiefs of General Bureau. As for me, I trusted and co-operated with them in their policy in accordance with the intentions of my superior officers."

Same page as above, 4th and 5th lines from the bottom of the page, "Manchurian" should read "Manchukuo"; and 3rd line from the bottom "rejection" should be "dismissal".

Page 25, 7th line from top of page "I" should be "We", and add to the end of this sentence the words "and Mongolia",

Page 25, 2nd sentence under "6" should read as follows: "Accordingly the trends in the Outer and Inner Mongolia involved sharp repurcussion on the Mongolians living in Manchukuo, and became problems of the domestic peace and of the defense of Manchukuo."

Same page, 20th line from top of page insert after the words "Kwantung Army" the following:  
"dispatched intelligent agents and"

Also on the same page, 7th line from botton, delete the word "co-prosperity" and insert "local self-government".

Page 26, 3rd line from top of page insert after the word "fortification" the words "of Manchukuo" and in the 4th line insert the year "1935" after "December".

Page 26, 1st sentence under "III" delete the word "personally"; and in the same paragraph, 2nd sentence the word "preparation" should read "administration".

Page 27, 4th line from top the word "train" should be "contingents".

Page 27, at the end of "5" please add the sentence "And thus I tried to enhance the prestige of the Army."

Page 27, the 1st paragraph under number "IV" should begin as follows:  
"1. The circumstances of my appointment as War minister,"

Same page, 2nd line from bottom the words "had been" should be changed to "was".

Page 29, 8th line from top of page delete "finally assumed" and insert "were increasingly assuming".

Page 30, please change paragraph marked "(a)" to read as follows:

"(a) The peace terms to be offered to China should not be so exacting as the ones we had proposed when Mr. TRAUTMAN acted as go-between. Unless the Japanese authorities would molify the terms and make them more certain and reasonable, it appeared unlikely that the Chinese would accept them. However, both the Japanese public opinion and the Government's policy had still been far from further reducing those terms."

Page 31, 13th line from top, "its" should be changed to "his".

Page 34, 9th line from top of page, please insert after "Navy and War" the words "and Foreign Affairs".

Page 34, lines 12 and 13 from the top, delete the following "co-operation with the Chinese Administrations, to promote".

Same page as above, 15th line from top change "a minimum" to "the minimum"; last 4 lines on page 36 to read as follows: "about inevitably in order to make this blockage operation more effective, and it was hoped that same would accelerate the solution of the incident."

Page 41, 4th line from top, add after "Foreign Office" "They sailed on 2nd February".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

8 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. F. S. Tavenner, Jr.  
Acting Chief of Counsel

FROM: David Nelson Sutton

SUBJECT: Chronological Statements of Prosecution's Evidence

I hand you herewith a copy of the Chronological Statement  
of the Prosecution's Evidence as to each of the seven following  
defendants:

DOIHARA, Kenji  
HATA, Shunroku  
HIRAHARA  
HIROTA, Koki  
ITAGAKI, Seishiro  
MUTO, Akira  
TOSO, Shigenori

DAVID NELSON SUTTON

-2570 - B ✓

644 - B ✓

644 - C ✓

1242 - B ✓

1242 - C ✓

1242 - D ✓

820 - H ✓

-1005 - 21

-1519 - K

-1519 - B

3 Eng Copies

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION  
Philippines Division


18 July 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Frank S. Tavenner, Jr.; Mr. D. N. Sutton  
FROM : Captain Robinson, Mr. W. E. Edwards, Mr. Lopez  
SUBJECT : Statement of Prosecution's Evidence as to Each  
Defendant (MUTO, Akira; ITAGAKI, Seishiro)

1. Attached hereto are chronological summaries of Prosecution evidence for MUTO, Akira and ITAGAKI, Seishiro, as requested in Mr. Tavenner's memorandum dated 6 June 1947.

Capt. Robinson  
Mr. Edwards  
Mr. Lopez

By:



Attach.  
Chronological summaries  
- MUTO; ITAGAKI.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE

ON

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

- \* Lt. General MIYAKE's testimony that the plan of occupation of Manchuria was the most important part of the general plan of a war against the USSR drawn up by the Japanese General Staff. (Exhibit No. 699, Record p. 7501). MIYAKE, Mitsuharu, was Lt. General of the Japanese Army, was Chief of the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters from July 1928 to May 1932. (Record p. 7500). MIYAKE stated that the plan of operation was signed in Manchuria by HONJO, the Commander of KWANTUNG Army, by MIYAKE himself and his assistants Colonel ITAGAKI and Lt. Colonel ISHIHARA. MIYAKE found out the existence of a plan to attack the USSR when he started out for his new post as Chief of the Staff of the KWANTUNG Army in July 1928. (Record pp. 7501-02).
- \* 14 May 1929 - Appointed staff officer of KWANTUNG Army. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715).
- \* Asked if he knew the accused ITAGAKI, witness answered: "Yes, I am very much indebted to him. He was my Section leader in the same company when I entered the Military Academy." He had a talk with him in Port Arthur in June 1930. Witness said that ITAGAKI told him that pending questions in Manchuria between Japan and China were so serious that their settlement could not be arrived at by diplomatic means and that there was no alternative in solving those problems except the use of armed force. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record pp. 1984-5-6).
- \* Asked where he found out that the aim of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria (1931-1945) was to make Manchuria a military base against the USSR and China, Prosecution Witness TAKABE, Rokuzo replied: "This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and the KWANTUNG Army. I know that the problem of preparing for a war against the USSR was discussed at the headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army. I heard about it from the Commanders of the KWANTUNG Army, Generals UMEZU, UEDA, MINAMI and Lt. General IKEDA." (Exhibit No. 670, Record pp. 7581-82).

Note that ITAGAKI was consecutively Staff Officer, Vice-Chief of Staff and finally Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army covering a period from 1929 up to 1937. (Exhibit No. 110, Record pp. 715-6).

- \* In 1930 and 1931 Colonel ITAGAKI, Chief of the KWANTUNG Army, was one of those in the Army who advocated the resort to force in driving out the Chinese from Manchuria if diplomatic negotiations were of no avail. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record pp. 1945, 1959-60).
  - \* From the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet until the summer of 1931 the influence of this element of the KWANTUNG Army in governmental policies grew progressively stronger. During this period Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, was among those in the KWANTUNG Army who became definitely identified with the leadership in this group. It held strong opinion that the use of armed forces was necessary to preserve and protect Japanese interest in Manchuria, and to occupy it and to establish a government there separate from China proper which would be subservient to Japan. The Consulate there made the greatest efforts to settle these incidents by negotiations but were frustrated by the Army clique. (Testimony of MORISHIMA, Morito; Record pp. 3010, 3016-17).
  - \* Among the KWANTUNG Army clique that could be classified as leaders in the Manchurian Plan (1931) was Colonel ITAGAKI, the Chief of Staff. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record pp. 1945, 1965-6). In the fall of 1934 the accused HASHIMOTO told me that the Manchurian Incident was planned by the KWANTUNG Army. HASHIMOTO further stated that Colonel ITAGAKI carried out the plan in Manchuria. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record pp. 1968-70). HASHIMOTO further said that the central figures in the KWANTUNG Army were Colonel ITAGAKI and Lt. Colonel ISHIHARA. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record p. 1970). Again HASHIMOTO said that together with ISHIHARA, ITAGAKI was a key figure in the KWANTUNG Army. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record p. 1975).
- The intention of the KWANTUNG Army was to bring about the economic exploitation of Manchuria under Army occupation and to place this area and Japan on the basis of inseparable relationship. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record p. 1976). HASHIMOTO stated that with respect to the Manchurian Incident ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA are the central figures in the KWANTUNG Army. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record p. 1981).
- \* Some time in August (1931), Doctor OKAWA was drunk with sake, and he told me that he and a certain Colonel KOMOTO, Colonel AMAKASU of the KEMPEITAI together with Colonel ITAGAKI, Vice Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army, would bring about an incident in MUKDEN some time later on. (Testimony of Prosecution Witness Konosuke SHIMIZU; Record pp. 1399, 1404).



\* Questioned who of the Japanese military leaders played the most active role in the seizure of Manchuria (in 1931) witness answered: "General HONJO, the Commanding General of the KWANTUNG Army directed the operations of the seizure of Manchuria. Besides, an active role in initiating war in the Far East was played by the group of the so-called young officers. Among them were Colonel ITAGAKI who occupied the post of Deputy Chief of the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters..." (Page 7 of the Affidavit of SEMYONOV, G. M., former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Eastern Frontier Area; Exhibit No. 668, Record p. 7319).

\* After the MUKDEN Incident of September 18, 1931, had already happened TANAKA had another talk with ITAGAKI in the fall of 1935. TANAKA was then Staff Officer of the KWANTUNG Army while General ITAGAKI was Deputy Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army. ITAGAKI told him that before the outbreak of the incident on 18 September, NAGATA, Tetsuzen, Chief of the Military Affairs Section in the War Office, sent two heavy guns to Manchuria to be set up in MUKDEN, and one of these guns was used in the bombardment of the MUKDEN Air Field when the incident occurred. The one set up in the North Docks was concentrated on the MUKDEN Air Field when the incident broke out. (Testimony of Ryukichi TANAKA; Record pp. 1987-89).

Prosecution Witness Ryukichi TANAKA (Record p. 1945) testified that ITAGAKI had knowledge of the installation of guns at MUKDEN under the pretext of building a well. Strict secrecy was being observed and the placement date was 10 September 1931. TANAKA said that according to ITAGAKI himself it was Colonel NAGATA who suggested the installation of those guns which had a maximum range of 15 miles. Fired from their location their shells could reach the particular spot on the South Manchurian Railroad where the explosion occurred on 18 September. (Record pp. 1990-91). At the time ITAGAKI was Colonel attached to the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters.

\* 19 September 1931 Secret telegram No. 623 sent by Consul General HAYASHI at MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA which proves that ITAGAKI was deaf to any plea to prevent the unnecessary aggravation and expansion of the MUKDEN Incident. (Exhibit No. 2193, Record p. 15,734). Reported Consul General HAYASHI: "However, the said Staff Officer (ITAGAKI) replied, that it was a matter concerning the prestige of the state and of the Army; although efforts would be made for the protection of foreign residents, the Army's policy was that, as the Chinese Army had attacked our troops, it had to be dealt with thoroughly". (Record pp. 15,735-36).

- \* 21 September 1931 Secret cablegram from Consul General HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA (Exhibit No. 2194, Record p. 15,736), which proves that ITAGAKI was a Staff Officer of the KWANTUNG Army that set up municipal administration with the Japanese military man as mayor. (Record p. 15,736).
  - \* As early as the latter part of September 1931 the Self-Government Guiding Board was set up in MUKDEN. Long before the military occupation of Manchuria was completed, puppet governments were set up in the provinces of LIAONING, KIRIN and HEILUNGKIANG. The machinery for performing this function was planned long in advance. (Testimony of Prosecution Witness Ryomei KASAGI; Exhibit No. 221, Record pp. 2786-7, 2791).
- KASAGI testified that: Although the board had a Chinese chairman, it was controlled by the Japanese and financed by the KWANTUNG Army, and that all of its policies and activities had to be approved by ITAGAKI, and the information as to which Chinese would be friendly to Japan's plans and would serve as willing collaborators was furnished by DOHIHARA. (Record pp. 2793-4).
- \* In October 1931 accused DOHIHARA had a meeting with Henry PU YI at Tientsin. He was sent to Tientsin for the specific purpose of contacting Henry PU YI. Colonel ITAGAKI arranged the details of the meeting between DOHIHARA and PU YI. (Exhibit No. 2190-A, Record pp. 15,713, 15,726-27).
  - \* 12 November 1931 cable sent by Consul General HAYASHI of MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA reporting on the activities of ITAGAKI with reference to the coming of PU YI to Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 2196, Record pp. 15,739-41).
  - \* 26 November 1931 Telegram from Councillor YANO to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA which among others related that "according to the rumors heard between court attendants of the Empress SHUAN TEH, KAWASHIMA, Yoshiko, acting on the request ITAGAKI, Chief of Staff of KWANTUNG Army, has recently arrived in Tientsin disguised in male attire and has attempted to abduct the Empress to Manchuria." DOHIHARA confirmed this to the attendants of the Empress. (Exhibit No. 303, Record p. 4401).
  - \* While at Port Arthur (in the winter of 1931) for about half a year, Colonel ITAGAKI came to see me. (Testimony of PU YI; Record pp. 3952, 3957). ITAGAKI said he came to see me on the order of Commander-in-Chief General HONJO and asked me to have a new political regime in Manchuria. (Record p. 3959). The conversation lasted over two hours, and I refused the offer because ITAGAKI

then demanded that as soon as the new Manchurian regime is set up we shall employ Japanese as Manchurian officials. ITAGAKI told my two advisors later that if I refused, the KWANTUNG Army would adopt drastic action against me. (Record p. 3964). All my advisors advised me to accept as there was danger against my life. At that time ITAGAKI was assuming a very stern and forceful attitude. (Record p. 3967). I had no freedom of movement whatsoever. (Record p. 3981). When I interviewed Lord LYTTON, many of the KWANTUNG officers were beside me supervising. (Record p. 3983). I was supposed to appoint all military officers under the law, but in fact, I was not in the position to appoint anyone. (Record p. 3990). For more facts on the puppetry of PU YI's Government, see Record pp. 3991-96, 3998-4051). Asked who was in control of Manchuria when he became Regent on March 1, 1932, witness answered that Colonel ITAGAKI was the powerful man. (Record p. 3977). Witness further stated that on the founding of Manchukuo, ITAGAKI and his people assured him it would be an independent state and that he would have the right to administer it of his own will; as a matter of fact, witness could do nothing whatsoever. (Record p. 3977).

- \* December 6, 1931, telegram from Acting Consul General MORISHIMA at MUKDEN to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA (Exhibit No. 305, Record pp. 4402-3), which reported the activities of the National Guard Unit, a wicked element that had been plundering at various places prior to entry in the city. Hence, China's merchants and people felt very uneasy. It was discovered to be a got-up affair, based on the so-called high policy centering around Staff Officer ITAGAKI of the KWANTUNG Army and executed with the collaboration of the adventurers and brigands. (Record p. 4403). Trying to keep it secret, but the Guard Unit itself appears to be proudly announcing to the Chinese that they have the support of the Japanese Army. (Record pp. 4404-5).
- \* 14 December 1931 Secret cable sent by Consul General HAYASHI at MUKDEN to Foreign Minister INUKAI which reveals that ITAGAKI was represented to have negotiated with CHIANG KAI SHEK, thus showing his great importance in the scheme of things at the time in China. (Exhibit No. 2195, Record pp. 15,738-9).
- \* Table of the Increase of the Strength of the KWANTUNG Army and of the Japanese Army as a whole from 1932 to 1945. (Exhibit No. 706, Record pp. 7530-31). Excerpts: By January 1, 1932, the KWANTUNG Army was 50,000 men strong, and the Japanese Army as a whole was by that time 256,000 men strong. (Record p. 7531).

By January 1, 1937, the strength of the KWANTUNG Army was increased more than five times and totalled 271,000, and by that time the Japanese Army as a whole had the strength of 872,000 men. (Record p. 7531).

By January 1, 1942, the strength of the KWANTUNG Army was 1,100,000 men. (Record p. 7532).

KWANTUNG Army had on January 1, 1932, 40 tanks, by January 1, 1937, 439 tanks. (Record p. 7532). KWANTUNG Army had in 1932, 180 planes, in 1937, 500 planes, in 1942, 1,500 planes. (Record p. 7533).

Note that on 14 May 1929, ITAGAKI was appointed Staff Officer of the KWANTUNG Army (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715); on 8 August 1932 he was appointed Major General and attached to the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715); on 29 April 1934 he was decorated with the Order of the Rising Sun with Double Rays in recognition of services of 1931-1934 Incidents; on 1 August 1934 he was still attached to the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715); on December 10, 1934, he was appointed Vice Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715); and on 23 March 1936 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 716); and on 28 April 1936 he was appointed Lt. General (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 716).

\* January 11, 1932, entry of KIDO's Diary which proves ITAGAKI's inner connection with Japanese activities in Manchuria (Exhibit No. 2191, Record p. 15,731). KIDO narrated: At the Imperial Palace KIDO heard from Colonel ITAGAKI, Staff Officer of the KWANTUNG Army, the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia. (Record p. 15,731). KIDO continued: "Hearing this from ITAGAKI, I was rather astonished to find that there is a wide difference between my 'head' (T.N. idea) and that of theirs". (Record p. 15,732).

\* Exhibit No. 731-A is one of the chapters of the book giving history of the KYO-WA-KAI. On page 1 of the exhibit appears the following: "In April 1932 (DHA-TUN-1st Year) in MUKDEN a special committee for the foundation of the KYO-WA-KAI was formed. The committee was composed of Colonel ITAGAKI and others.

"The committee fulfilled their responsible mission with exceptional zeal and successfully accomplished it by elaborating the basic instrument of the KYO-WA-KAI and the plan of its activities". (Record p. 7606). Attention of the Tribunal was called to the fact that ITAGAKI was one of the initiators of the KYO-WA-KAI (the Concordia Society). (Record p. 7606).

The contents of the book shows that the Japanese Command paid great attention to the ideological, organizational and military training of the Manchurian population for the purpose of a war against the USSR. (Prosecutor's Statement, Record p. 7605).

ITAGAKI and HONJO were the staunch supporters of the Concordia Society, and it was they who had established this society. (Testimony of PU YI; Record pp. 3945, 4045).

- \* 8 August 1932 - Appointed Major General and attached to the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715).
- \* 29 April 1934 - Decorated with the 3rd Class Order of Golden Kite with an annuity of ¥700; decorated with the Order of the Rising Sun with Double Rays in recognition of services of 1931-1934 Incidents. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715).
- \* 1 August 1934 - Attached to the KWANTUNG Army Headquarters. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715).
- \* 30 November 1934 - Note from the American Embassy to the Japanese Foreign Ministry where the American Government expressed its belief that the Japanese denial of having anything to do with the proposed control of the oil industry in Manchuria is unconvincing. (Exhibit No. 939, Record p. 9406). American Government formally stated that the proposed control of the petroleum industry in Manchuria would constitute a monopoly of the sale and distribution of oil in that area, and would impinge upon treaty rights, violative of Article III of the Nine-Power Treaty to which both Japan and the United States are co-signatories. (Record pp. 9407-08). Note that on 10 December 1934 ITAGAKI was appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of KWANTUNG Army. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715).

- \* 10 December 1934 - Concurrently appointed Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 715)
- \* 10 December 1934 - Relieved of Post, attached to the KWANTUNG Army. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 715)
- \* Until 1935 when the Opium Control Board was set up, the opium trade in Manchuria was controlled by the various Special Service organs of the Army. (Testimony of Prosecution Witness Ryukichi TANAKA; (Record pp. 15,853, 15,855-56).  
  
General MINAMI, General ITAGAKI and General TOJO were responsible for taking away the control of opium traffic from the various Special Service organizations and for establishing the Opium Monopoly Bureau. (Record pp. 15,857-58).
- \* May 30, 1935, entry of the KIDO Diary which proves that ITAGAKI and others were endeavoring to have the Military, instead of the diplomatic circles, undertake negotiations with the Chinese Government (Exhibit No. 2192, Record pp. 15,732-33). KIDO narrated that for the attainment of such an end, ITAGAKI and others were going to utilize the Manchurian Railway Company and the Japanese Garrison at Tientsin, as has indeed been revealed by the recent action of that garrison. (Record p. 15,734).
- \* In connection with the efforts to conclude a Military Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy covering the period from 1936 to 1939 inclusive, attention of the Court was called to the fact that ITAGAKI, Seishiro, was Minister of War from 5 January 1939 to 29 August 1939. (Record pp. 5900, 5902-3).  
Note: This must be a mistake as ITAGAKI was War Minister from 3 June 1938 (See Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 716).
- \* "I was Minister for Home Affairs in the OKADA Cabinet

in 1936. During this time the so-called Army Rebellion of 1936 (February 26) occurred in Tokyo. An attempt was made by the insurgents to assassinate the Prime Minister OKADA. I remember very distinctly that Admiral OKADA and his Cabinet experienced difficulties with the Army. Among the highest officers in the Army at this time was Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army, General ITAGAKI." (Testimony of GOTO, Fumio; Record pp. 1639-40).

- \* 12 March 1936 - Date of the Protocol of Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Mongolia People's Republic, offered in evidence to prove that it was negotiated by Russia and Mongolia as a wedge or safeguard against the Japanese program of aggression and domination upon the main line of Asia (Exhibit 214, Record pp. 2713-14). Article II of the Protocol reads, "In case of military attack on one of the contracting parties, the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the Mongolia People's Republic obligate themselves to render each other every possible assistance, including military" (Record p. 2717). Note that on 23 March 1936 ITAGAKI was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716); that on 28 March 1936 he was appointed Japanese member of the Japan-Manchuria Economic Joint Committee (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716).
- \* \* 23 March 1936 - Relieved of additional post as Military Attache of the Imperial Embassy in Manchukuo; and relieved of post as Vice Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 28 March 1936 - Appointed Japanese member of the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 28 March 1936 - Record of the talk of Chief of Staff ITAGAKI, of the KWANTUNG Army, with Ambassador ARITA concerning the importance of Mongolia to Japan and Manchuria (Exhibit 761-A, Record pp. 7829-31). Important excerpts of document: "Outer Mongolia is a secret zone. The Czarist regime had already stretched out its evil hand and made this secret zone a protectorate" (Record p. 7830). "If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchuria,

Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed almost without fighting" (Record p. 7831).

- \* 28 April 1936 - Appointed Lt. General. (Exhibit 110 Record p. 716)
- \* 20 February 1937 - Decision of the Ministries concerned regarding "The Third Administrative Policy toward North China." Excerpt from the document: "The object in view. 1) The principal object of administering North China is to complete our aim of making Manchukuo quite pro-Japanese and pro-anti-Comintern, procuring defense materials, enforcing transportation, preparing the defense against USSR. (Exhibit No. 218, Record p. 2746-7). On March 1937 ITAGAKI became Lt. General in Command of the 5th Division. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 716).
- \* 1 March 1937 - Assigned as Commander of the 5th Division. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 6 March 1937 - Relieved of post as Japanese member of Japan-Manchukuo Economic Joint Committee. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 25 May 1937 - Attached to Army General Staff Office. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* In June 1937, JAPAN created the Fuel Bureau charged with the conduct of all matters with the discharges and use of coal, together with the regulation of transportation, the development of coal resources, and the technique of coal mining. Normally, JAPAN is a substantial exporter of coal except coking coal, which is important. However, in spite of a plentiful supply of coal, JAPAN regulated the use of coal for production purposes in conformity with the national policy of preparing for war (testimony of Prosecution witness John Granville Liebert, Record pp. 8296-8300). Note that on 25 May, ITAGAKI was attached to Army General Staff Office and that on 3 June 1938, ITAGAKI became War Minister and President of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)



Exhibit 383 - Excerpts from the records of the 22nd session of the League of Nations Advisory Committee on opium and other dangerous drugs held at Geneva from May 12 to June 4, 1937 (Record pp. 4711-4712). Excerpts from that document: "When we come, however, to the provinces under Japanese control or influence, we find a very different state of affairs. In the three northeastern provinces -- that is to say, Manchuria -- we find that the area designated by the regime now functioning in that region for lawful opium-poppy cultivation in 1937 was 156,061 acres, as compared to 133,333 acres in 1936, an increase of 17 per cent; and that unlawful cultivation had reached a point such that the regime referred to found it necessary, on February 6th, 1937, to issue a public warning to unlicensed cultivators. The anticipated gross revenue from Government opium sales in Manchuria in 1937 is estimated at a figure over 28 per cent greater than the gross revenue realized in 1936. As interest in the welfare of the people seems inconsistent with a policy of selling them more opium, one is necessarily led to see in this drive against illicit poppy growing nothing more than an effort to destroy business competition" (Record p. 4713.) Note that on 25 May 1937 ITAGAKI was attached to the Army General STAFF office (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716).

- \* 7 July 1937 - Decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun for services in the 1931-34 Incidents. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* When cross-examined, GOETTE reiterated that sometime in August, 1937, in an interview with General ITAGAKI the latter said that it was possible that the Japanese forces might turn South toward the Yellow River. (Testimony of John GOETTE; Record pp. 3772, 3784).
- \* Accused OSHIMA in his interrogation giving account of the negotiations for the Tri-Partite Military Alliance beginning in January 1938, (Exhibit No. 497, Record pp. 6049-50), related that upon the return of Major General KASAHARA he talked about the fact with the General Staff which in turn took the matter up with the Foreign Minister UGAKI. UGAKI in turn discussed the matter with the Five

Cabinet Members Committee which usually discussed important matters. By then a telegram was received by OSHIMA from the General STAFF stating that they were more or less in accord and that the five-man committee was also agreeable to the suggestion. (Record p. 6055-56). War Minister ITAGAKI was member of the five-man committee. There were other telegrams and communications wherein they stated that they would be willing to conclude a pact in which mutual aid was promised in case one of the signatories was a victim of unprovoked aggression. (Record p. 6056-7).

\* 3 June 1938 - Relieved of post, attached to the Army General Staff Office and appointed War Minister and concurrently President of Manchurian Affairs Bureau. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)

\* During the first KONOYE Cabinet - June 1937 to January 1939 the Army and Navy were in favor of aggression in China, so stated the accused ARAKI in his 10 July 1946 interrogation. (Exhibit No. 2216, Record pp. 15,831-32). ARAKI also stated that during wartime what the Cabinet wishes and what the Army do are two different things. KONOYE, who was not in favor of aggression, was outnumbered by the Army and Navy within the Cabinet. (Record p. 15,832). Since forces cannot be sent overseas without the consent of the War, Navy, Finance, Foreign Ministers and Premier, I believe that it was approved by these Ministries that the China Affair be carried through. (Record p. 15,833).

Note that ITAGAKI was War Minister on the KONOYE Cabinet.

\* March 23, 1939 - Telegram sent from Tokyo to Berlin by German Ambassador OTT, reporting that the Japanese Conference of the Five Ministers under the Presidency of the Prime Minister had decided to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against Third Powers. (Exhibit No. 780, Record pp. 7909-10).

Note that ITAGAKI was the War Minister at the time and that he always attended the Five Ministers' Conference. (Record pp. 6056-7).

The following reference was made to Exhibit No. 499:  
"I see the Japanese Ambassador. He confirms what ATTOLICO wrote concerning the Japanese reply on the Tri-Partite Alliance. Many reservations and the intention of regarding the pact as exclusively Anti-Russian." (Record p. 7910)

\* On 23 June 1938 the First Secretary of the Cabinet KAZAMI notified ITAGAKI, the War Minister, that the problem of acquisition of foreign exchange in order to acquire essential materials was very serious. The enforcement of ordered measures vital to general mobilization was advocated (Exhibit 856, Record p. 8492; Testimony of John Granville Liebert, Record p. 8491).

\* June 26, 1938, issue of the "Japan Advertiser" (Exhibit No. 2197, Record p. 15, 741), which carried a news story entitled "Long Preparedness is Urged by ITAGAKI," revealing that ITAGAKI on his first important press interview since joining the Cabinet as Minister of War, expressed no need for formally declaring war on China, a determination to prepare for a war of more than ten years' duration with China and the resolve to fear not Third Powers' interference in China. (Record p.p. 15,741-2-3).

\* August 9, 1938 entry in the KIDO Diary: "I attended the Cabinet meeting held at 10:00 a.m., and heard about the progress of CHANGKUFENG Incident from the War Minister and the Foreign Minister." (Exhibit No. 2262, Record pp. 16,225-26).

Note that ITAGAKI was the War Minister at the time.

\* 2 October 1938 issue of the "Japan Advertiser" which carried the news story on the congratulatory telegram sent by ITAGAKI to Adolph Hitler that: "The Imperial Army expresses deep admiration and felicitations for Germany's successful conduct of the Sudeten issue and prays that Germany's national fortunes will ever rise and that the friendship of the German and Japanese Armies, united on the Anti-Comintern front will be strengthened more than ever." (Exhibit No. 2199, Record p. 15,745).

\* 2 November 1938 - Minutes of the Privy Council which unanimously approved discontinuing the participation of the Japanese Imperial Government in international enterprises that were carried out through the League of Nations.

(Exhibit 271, Record pp. 3641, 3649, 3650, 3651) The resolution, however, directed that the mandatory rule of the South Seas Islands by the Japanese Empire be continued in accordance with the 22nd article of the League covenant and the mandatory rule article (Record p. 3648.) ITAGAKI, as Minister of War, was among those present in that meeting of the Privy Council (Record p. 3642.)

\* 3 November 1938 official declaration issued by the Japanese Government (Exhibit No. 1291, Record p. 11, 695) which proclaimed that Japan had practically achieved her aim in China, with the national government reduced to a local regime, and the main territory conquered, but would fight on until it is completely destroyed. Japan warned other powers to change their attitude to suit the situation. (Record pp. 11,695-97.)

Attention was called to the fact that ITAGAKI was the Minister of War at the time. (Record p. 11,695.)

\* 22 November 1938 - Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting regarding the conclusion of a cultural treaty between Germany and Japan. The belief was expressed in the minutes that "this cultural intercourse has a tendency to contribute valuable service to achieve the general aims of diplomacy" (Exhibit 589, Record pp. 6573, 6,575.)

Minister of War ITAGAKI was among those present (Record pp. 6573-74.) Note that after the excerpts from the minutes were read into the record, the President of the Tribunal said, "Apparently the Japanese Privy Councillors, or some of them, thought that the whole purpose was not purely cultural and it may have been a cover for political action. You invite us to hold that it was a cover for political action." To which Mr. McKinney, Assistant Prosecutor, replied, "Yes, sir." The repartee was concluded by the President saying, "A political action that ultimately led to a pact with Germany and to war." (Record p. 6577)

- \* The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at the Five Ministers' Conference on 25 November 1938 upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new SINO-JAPANESE relationship. (Exhibit No. 612, Record p. 6731). Among the major decisions reached was that "As for the Hainan Island, it will be captured by military action in case of necessity". (Record p. 6731).

ITAGAKI attended the Five Ministers' Conference (Record pp. 6056-7).

"February 10. Hainan Island, off the South China Coast is surprised by the Japanese landing forces under Vice-Admiral Nobutake KONDO, Commander of the Imperial Naval Forces in South China..." (Exhibit No. 613-A, Record p. 6,732, copy of the "Tokyo Gazette", Volume III, No. 10.)

- 10 December 1938 - Report of United States Treasury Attache at Shanghai regarding the illegal traffic of opium by the Japanese military through the MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA in the International Settlement and French Concession in Shanghai. Persian opium was imported from Persia by MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA which the latter sold to the Japanese military at about \$5.00 per ounce, and the latter sold to the opium hongers at about \$7.00. The hongers would retail the opium at about \$9.00. In this way the Japanese military could make \$3000. or \$4000. per chest. (Exhibit No. 418, Record pp. 4867-8). Note that on December 1938 ITAGAKI became concurrently Vice President of the China General Affairs Board. (Exhibit No. 389, Record pp. 4761, 4762, 4764).
- \* December 29, 1938 entry in the KIDO Diary: "War Minister ITAGAKI was already present. The War Minister explained the development of the scheme and the international situation". (Exhibit No. 2266, Record pp. 16,232-33).
- \* January 1939 - Issue of "TOKYO Gazette" which gave details of the program for economic development of China (Exhibit 461-A, Record pp. 5267-77). Note that on 5 January 1939 HIRANUMA was appointed Prime Minister and ITAGAKI retained his portfolio on the HIRANUMA Cabinet as War Minister.
- \* Minutes of 22 February 1939 meeting of the Privy Council held in the presence of the Emperor (Exhibit 491, Record p. 6037) which unanimously approved the participation of Hungary and Manchuria in the Anti-Comintern Pact (Record p. 6043).

ITAGAKI as War Minister attended the meeting (Record p. 6037).

- \* March 17, 1939 issue of the "Japan Advertiser" containing news and editorial round-up entitled: "Japanese Press Comments", where ITAGAKI, as War Minister, expressed on the floor of the Diet the belief that friction with Third Powers was inevitable in the execution of Japanese policy for the creation of the so-called new order in East Asia. (Exhibit No. 2200, Record pp. 15,746-48).
- \* Questioned about the attack by Japanese troops on Mongolian People's Republic in the Nomongan area May 1939, the accused HIRANUMA in his April 24, 1946 interrogation (Exhibit No. 768-A, Record pp. 7853-4) stated that as the Supreme Command of the Army was not controlled by the government, he could not give orders for the cessation of hostilities, but he expressed his views on the necessity of ceasing hostilities to War Minister ITAGAKI orally who had previously informed him about the outbreak of the incident. (Record p. 7855.) Asked about ITAGAKI's reply to his suggestion on ceasing hostilities, HIRANUMA answered: "Since ITAGAKI's view was at variance with mine, he considered that hostilities should continue". (Record p. 7856)
- \* 1 May 1939, date of "The Basic Regulation of Strengthening an Expansion of the Mongolian Army - GHQ of the Expeditionary Forces to Mongolia". (Exhibit No. 274, Record pp. 3688-9). Important excerpt: "Article 1. The basic principle of establishment of the Mongolian Army is to defend Mongolia under the control of the Japanese Commandant..." (Record p. 3689).

Note that ITAGAKI was War Minister at the time on the HIRANUMA Cabinet.

- \* 4 May 1939 telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to the Reich Foreign Minister. (Exhibit No. 503, Record p. 6103). In order to enable the continuance of negotiations taking place in Berlin and Rome on the Anti-Comintern Pact which was deadlocked ten days ago Prime Minister HIRANUMA directed a statement to the Fuehrer Hitler expressing great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will of Hitler. (Record pp. 6103-04).

Note that ITAGAKI was Minister of War from June 3, 1938 to 29 August 1939.

- \* 6 May 1939 - "Most urgent" and "very secret" telegram sent by Ambassador OTT to the State Secretary in Berlin (Exhibit No. 504, Record p. 6108) relating that HIRANUMA had obtained a compromise which the army indicates as the highest possible

- \* offer under present conditions in the conflict of the Five Ministers' Conference (War Minister and Finance Minister against Foreign and Navy Ministers). OTT then quoted the army declarations on the obligatory aid suggested in the proposed treaty and stated that it is hoped that the HIRANUMA declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty. (Record pp. 6108-11).

Note that ITAGAKI was then the War Minister under HIRANUMA. (Exhibit No. 110, Record p. 716).

- \* ITAGAKI-KOISO interview presented on 8 May 1939 by DOMEI Radio. (Exhibit No. 2214, Record p. 15,815). Excerpts of the interview: "War Minister ITAGAKI declared it to be a welcome fact that Germany and Italy had bound themselves through their military alliance still more firmly to the maintenance of peace in their joint efforts to build up a New Order in Europe." "Asked whether the possibility existed that Japan might enter the Italo-German Military Alliance, ITAGAKI declared that the spirit which animated the conclusion of the Tri-lateral Anti-Pact was very deeply rooted and in case for that reason Germany and Italy wanted it it was not impossible that Japan might conclude a military alliance with the Axis Powers." (Record p. 15,816).

- \* 28 May 1939 - Telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo, where Ambassador OSHIMA reported to the German Foreign Minister that he had received a telegram from Foreign Minister ARITA, according to which the Japanese Government wishes to reserve entrance into a state of war in case of European conflict. "In a very energetic telegram to ARITA, OSHIMA has refused to pass this point of view to the German Government at all. Thereupon the War Minister requested OSHIMA by wire to hold off until later against ARITA in order not to disturb the discussions among the various factors in Tokyo. The Army is firmly resolved to fight the matter out quickly and even at risk of a cabinet overthrow." (Exhibit No. 2230, Record pp. 15,990-91).

Note that ITAGAKI was War Minister at the time under HIRANUMA.

- \* July 7, 1939 issue of the "Japan Times and Mail", second edition, which carried a news story "ITAGAKI, YONAI Score Powers' Interference". (Exhibit No. 2201, Record p. 15,748-49), revealing that ITAGAKI was for stamping out interference by Third Powers in what he considered as Japan's mission of constructing a new order in East Asia. (Record pp. 15,748-51).

- \* August 4, 1939 entry in the KIDO Diary: "At noon, I presented the following views to War Minister ITAGAKI on the question of the Military Alliance with Germany and Italy, and on talks of political changes connected with it, and he agreed with them. According to general rumor the Army has decided to conclude the Military Alliance as soon as possible, and if the proposal is not accepted at the Cabinet Meeting, the War Minister is determined to resign, notwithstanding the fact that it will unavoidably result in the resignation of the entire Cabinet." (Exhibit No. 2271, Record p. 16,237).
- \* 30 August 1939 - Relieved of present post and additional posts at his request. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 6 September 1939 cablegram sent by German Ambassador OTT addressed to the Army High Command and Air High Command in Berlin (Exhibit No. 2198, Record pp. 15,743-4), revealing the determined efforts of ITAGAKI as War Minister to bring about an alliance between Germany and Japan (Record pp. 15,743-45). OTT in his report stated: "ITAGAKI pointed out his most sincere efforts on behalf of the close German-Japanese connection which had failed as a consequence of European developments". (Record p. 15,744).
- \* 29 April 1940 - Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of the Golden Kite in recognition of the services in China War. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 716)
- \* 7 July 1941 - Appointed General and appointed Commander of the Korean Army. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 717.)
- \* March 1, 1942 secret telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to the Minister of War (Exhibit No. 1973, Record p. 14,512) proposing that 1,000 British and 1,000 American prisoners of war be interned in Korea, "as it would be very effective in stamping out the respect and admiration of the Korean people for Britain and America". (Record pp. 14,512-13).

The above proposal was approved by the Minister of War (See telegram No. 518 from the Vice Minister of War to the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army, Exhibit No. 1973, Record pp. 14,513-14).



- \* 23 March 1942 memorandum from Commander in Chief of the Korean Army ITAGAKI, Seishiro, addressed to the Minister of War Hideki TOJO regarding the plans of the Korean Army for the internment of prisoners of war. Our purpose for interning American and British prisoners of war in Korea is to contribute to psychological propaganda work for stamping out any ideas of worship of Europe and America which the greater part of Korea still retains at bottom, said ITAGAKI. (Exhibit No. 1973, Record pp. 14,514-15).
- \* Report 13 August 1942 from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to the Vice Minister of War KIMURA (Exhibit No. 1975, Record pp. 14,520-21) which describes in great detail how 120,000 Koreans and 57,000 Japanese who were lined on the roads at Fusan, Seoul and Jinsen (presumably in Korea), as they gazed at 999 Allied prisoners who were paraded around. (Record p. 14,522). The report on the reaction of one Japanese was: "Their spiritual state is pitiful. They feel no shame in being exposed to public show". (Record p. 14,526). Note that at the time ITAGAKI was the Commander in Chief of the Korean Army. (Record p. 14,514).
- \* 4 September 1942 report of the provisions in regard to the Korean prisoners of war internment camps from ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Korean Army Commander, to Hideki TOJO, War Minister. (Exhibit No. 1976, Record pp. 14,529-30). Among the many features of the regulations which were contrary to the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War were those that directed prisoners of war, including officers, to work (Record p. 14,531); using them for propaganda purposes (Record p. 14,532); using them for labor on air fields (Record p. 14,533); using them as guards to lessen the burden of the military (Record p. 14,533); to make them take oath against destroying properties and establishing severe penalties therefor (Record p. 14,533).
- \* 1 February 1945 - Appointed Commander of the 17th Military District Army and concurrently Commander of the Korean Military Area Army. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 717)
- \* 7 April 1945 - Appointed Commander of the 7th Military District Army. (Exhibit 110, Record p. 717).

\* From 7 April 1945 until the surrender he was in command of the 7th Army in Malaya. While he held this command at the end of the war serious outrages against prisoners of war occurred. It covered Malaya, Java, Sumatra and Borneo (Exhibit No. 2282, Record pp. 16,257-58). As an example, out of 827 prisoners of war at Sandaken camp, Borneo, on 29 May 1945 only five survived, the rest having been murdered or died of ill treatment or starvation. (Record pp. 13,421-25). For atrocities in Borneo, see Record pp. 13,312-42; 13,510-27; Malaya, see Record pp. 13,667-72; 12,952-62; Java, see Record pp. 13,622-90; Sumatra, see Record pp. 13,554-13,820.

6 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Col. Woolworth; Mr. Sutton  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS.  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - DOHARA

*Reviewed*  
The attached information has been taken from the compiled report prepared by MIS. The report was previously classified secret however this classification has been cancelled and at the present time does not carry any classification. It will be noted that much of this information has been furnished in curriculum vitae obtained from the Cabinet Secretariat's office.

WITNESS

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Info from MID report

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

General Seishiro ITAGAKI: Former Minister of War

1885 Born Iwate Prefecture. Son of Masanori Itagaki. Married Kikuko, daughter of Kenkichi Ogoshi

1904 Graduated Military Academy

1916 Graduated Military Staff College

1924 Assistant Military Attache in China

1928 Colonel, Infantry. Commander 33rd Infantry Regiment

1929-31 Senior Staff, Kwantung Army Headquarters

1932 Major General. Attached to Kwantung Army Headquarters

1933 Attached to General Staff Headquarters

1933 July-  
Jan Made extensive trip through Europe and America

1934-35 Vice Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army; concurrently Military Attache in Manchukuo.

1936 Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army

1937-38 Commanded troops in North China

1938 June-  
1939 Aug. War Minister in first Konoye and Hiranuma Cabinets; concurrently president, Cabinet Manchurian Affairs Bureau.

1939 Sept Chief of Staff, Japanese Army in China.

1941 July Promoted to General. Commander in Chief, Chosen Army.

1945 Apr Relieved as Commander in Chief by Lt. General Yoshio Kozuki.

A shrewd schemer and an able commander and staff officer. Identified with Manchuria for many years and credited with a major part in Manchurian Incident of 1931. A leader of the so-called "Young Officer" Group. Known as advocate of vigorous execution of so-called continental policy. An authority on Chinese Affairs. A close friend of former Premier Tojo, the two have been associated in the Kwantung Army during the 1930's. (70, 71)

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Reported to be one who assisted in engineering the Manchuria Incident in 1931 and, together with Generals Doihara and Okamura, was most influential in creation of puppet state of Manchukuo.

He served as War Minister in the Konoye and Hiranuma Cabinets.

Not under arrest. Reported to be in Singapore or Bangkok. Request for his arrest forwarded by radio to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia Command. To date, no reply.

Through Hq. of the Kwantung Army	Through Number 31 Aug. 1934
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Received by the Headquarters of the 7th Expeditionary Division 5 September 1934 Way of Receipt - ordinary
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TOP SECRET

MUKDEN Special Mission No. 44

28 August 1934

DIVISION COMMANDER	signature
CHIEF OF STAFF	seal
STAFF OFFICER A	signature
STAFF OFFICER B	seal
STAFF OFFICER C	
OFFICER IN CHARGE	
OFFICER CONCERNED	

From: DOHIHARA, Kenji  
Chief of the Army  
Special Mission at MUKDEN.

TAJIMA (Seal)

(Seal)

CHIEF OF ARMY SPECIAL MISSION At MUKDEN
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SUBJECT: (POLITICAL) CURRENT POLITICAL  
SITUATION IN CHINA (GENERAL).

OPERATIONS  
SECTION

Copies to be distributed

Army 19  
Sub. Chief  
of General Staff 2  
Vice-Min. of  
War 2

/p.1/

Outline of SUZUKI, Nobuo's Letter.

(Received on 27th of August)

Mr. SUZUKI, after visiting various places in the south for about three weeks, has come back to TIENTSIN recently.

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/p.6/

III. One or two social observations:

- 1) In South China mere mentioning the names of Major Generals DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI tends to cause great alarm.
- 2) This year it is extremely bad in South China; not only most of the cultivated areas but also most of the rivers in various places have dried up. This year's crops, therefore, is expected to be very poor.
- 3) In South China ill feeling toward Japan is very deep-rooted and it seems that it is not likely to be wiped out so easily as in North China.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 1763-B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Non-regular of the Archives and Document Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 28 Aug., 1934, and described as follows: "(Political) Current Political Situation in China (General)" FROM: DOIHARA, Kenji, Chief of the Army Special Mission at Mukden.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this2 day of Aprl. 1947.Witness: /s/ Shinaji Kobayashi

/s/ Kaneo Ishitashi  
 Signature of Official (SEAL)  
 Non-regular of the Archives and  
 Document Section of the 1st Demobi-  
 lization Bureau.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this2d day of April, 1947.Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt., Inf.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
 NAME  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Sitting at Tokyo, Japan

Case No. I

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

Prosecutors

- v -

Paper No. 720

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Defendants

APPLICATION ON BEHALF OF ITAGAKI, Seishiro,  
FOR AN ORDER FOR PRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Comes now the accused ITAGAKI, Seishiro, and makes known to this Tribunal that he is desirous of obtaining from this Tribunal an order and process for its production of the following named persons as witnesses in his behalf at this trial.

This application was not made earlier as required by this Tribunal for the following reasons:

In the case of the first three witnesses, their addresses, even probable, were not known until now. In the case of the second set of two witnesses, the matter concerning which these witnesses may testify did not arise until after the said accused had submitted his application for process.

Han Yun-chieh - Nationality is Chinese.  
Present address believed to be at  
ChungKing, China.

He was born in Manchuria and was carrying on business in several parts of Manchuria such as at Harbin until the outbreak of the Mukden Incident. After the incident he served the Manchukuo Government as the mayor of Sinkiang Special City. The Finance Minister of the new state and represented Manchukuo Government in Europe.

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are: - That as a native and resident of Manchuria during the period before and after the Mukden Incident he will be able to testify as to the unsettled and unsafe conditions of

civil life in Manchuria; that popular feeling was against Chang regime; that the independent state in Manchuria was but a creation of the Kwantung Army or any other Japanese organization, but that Manchukuo was demanded and created by the Manchurians themselves with the help and advice of the Kwantung Army and some Japanese civilians whose ideals were for the creation of concordia of races in Manchuria.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in that it will dispute the charge of Manchukuo being a puppet state of Japan and the claim that it was created as a result of a common plan of Itagaki and other defendants.

Kan Tzn Siang - Nationality is Chinese  
Present address - believed to be living in Peking, China.

Kan Tzn Siang was a native of Manchuria and was the head of a prefecture in Mukden Province before the Mukden Incident in 1931. He later served the Manchukuo Government as the Chief of the road construction section of civil engineering department of Civil Administration Office in 1935 and in 1937 he became the Chief of the Educational Department of Autung Province, in 1938 as the Vice-Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Government and then became the Minister of Civil Administration of the same government.

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are: - That as a native and resident of Manchuria during the period before and after the Mukden Incident he will be able to testify regarding the unsettled and unsafe conditions of civil life in Manchuria, that the popular feeling was against Chang's regime; that the independent state of Manchukuo was not a creation of the Kwantung Army or any other Japanese organization, but that Manchukuo was demanded and created by the Manchurians themselves with the help and advice of the Kwantung Army and some Japanese civilians whose ideals were for the creation of concordia of nations in Manchuria.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in that it will dispute the charge of Manchukuo being a puppet state of Japan and the claims of the prosecution that she was created as a result of a common plan of Itagaki and other defendants.

Chang Kai Yung - Nationality is Chinese.  
Present address - believed to be in Changchun, Manchuria.

He is a native of Fukien, China. He served the Manchukuo Government as a secretary to the commercial representative of Manchukuo in Europe for three years. After returning to Manchukuo he served as a Councilor of the Publication Department of the Government until the end of the war.

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are: - That as a native and resident of Manchuria during the period before and after the Mukden Incident he will be able to testify regarding the unsettled and unsafe conditions of civil life in Manchuria, that the popular feeling was against Chang's regime; that the independent state of Manchukuo was not a creation of the Kwantung Army or any other Japanese organization but that Manchukuo was demanded and created by the Manchurians themselves with the help and advice of the Kwantung Army and some Japanese civilians whose ideals were for the creation of concordia of nations in Manchuria.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in that it will dispute the charge of Manchukuo being a puppet state of Japan and the claim of the prosecution that she was created as a result of a common plan of Itagaki and other defendants.

Noguchi Yuzurn - Nationality is Japanese  
Government position - Colonel  
Present address - Sugamo Prison  
Tokyo

He was appointed the commander of the Prisoner of War Camp in Korea in 1942 and served as such up to the end of the war.

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are: - That he was the commander of the Prisoner of War Camp in Korea during almost the entire period of the Pacific war, and that he is able to describe the conditions of Prisoner of War Camp in Korea.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in that the defendant Itagaki was the Commander in Chief of the Korean Army from March 1941 to April 1945, and that he is charged for "some responsibility" for the mistreatment of Prisoners of War.

Uchida Goro - Nationality is Japanese  
Government position - Military doctor  
Present Address - Sugamo Prison  
Tokyo

He was assigned to be the doctor in charge of Prisoner of War Camp in Korea from the beginning of the establishment of such camp there until the end of war.

The facts concerning which this witness can give testimony are: - That he was the camp doctor during the entire period of the existence of Prisoner of War Camp in Korea and that he is able to testify the actual health condition of prisoners of war in Korea.

The relevancy of this testimony lies in that the defendant Itagaki was the commander in chief of the Korean Army from March 1941 to April 1945, and that he is charged for "some responsibility" for the mistreatment of prisoners of war.

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

By YAMADA, Honzo

SASAGAWA, Tomoji

BANNO, Junkichi

Floyd J. Mettice  
His Counsel

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Sitting at Tokyo, Japan

Case No. I

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

Prosecutors

Paper No. 745

- v -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Defendants

APPLICATION ON BEHALF OF ITAGAKI, Seishiro;  
OKAWA, Shumei; MINAMI, Jiro; UMEZU, Yoshijiro;  
HOSHINO, Necki; for an ORDER FOR PRODUCTION  
OF WITNESSES

Comes now the accused ITAGAKI, Seishiro; OKAWA, Shumei; MINAMI, Jiro; UMEZU, Yoshijiro; HOSHINO, Necki; by their counsels of record, and respectfully request the Tribunal, in accordance with Section III, Article 9, Par. (e) of the Charter, to order the production of the following witnesses for their common defense in the Manchurian Division. Most of these witnesses have furnished affidavits or statements.

1. TAKEUCHI, Ayayoshi - Ogiya, Kamakura-shi, Kanagawa-ken, Japan  
Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was the editor of Mukden Branch of Asahi Newspaper and will testify as to the civil conditions before and after the incident.

Relevancy - The Kwantung Army did not plan the Mukden Incident.

2. YAMAGUCHI, Juji - - No. 1,007, Shimoshinden, Negatamura, Kimitsu-gun, Chiba, Japan.  
Nationality - Japanese.

Facts to be proved - He was one of those who founded the Kyowakai (concordia society) and will be able to testify as to the attitude of the public to the new state.

Relevancy - The nature of the Kyowakai and the aims and activities of the new state.

3. SHIMAMOTO, Shoichi - No. 872, Nakajima, Mononobe, Sumoto-shi, Hyogo-ken, Japan  
Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Guards Corp which carried out the attack on the North Barracks at the time of the Mukden Incident, and as such he will be able to testify the facts about the incident.

Relevancy - The attack by the Chinese Army was a surprise and the Japanese Army did not plan the incident.

4. KAWABE, Torashiro - c/o Mr. Teizo Takano, No. 2, Nichome, Higashi Sotoboricho, Higashiku, Nagoyashi, Japan.

Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was a staff officer attached to the General Staff office at Tokyo, at the time of the incident, and later served as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army, and will be able to testify the attitude of the general staff office at the time of the incident, and towards North China and Inner Mongolia.

Relevancy - The reasons why Kwantung Army resorted to arms in Manchuria and their activities in North China and Inner Mongolia.

5. TAKEDA, Hisashi - - No. 9,215, Ina, Ina Machi, Kamiinagun, Naganoken, Japan

Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army and connected directly with the operations at Chinchow, Nonni Bridge, Harbin and Angangchi, Manchuria. He will be able to testify the causes of these operations.

Relevancy - The Kwantung Army did not carry out these operations with aggressive plan.

6. NAKAMURA, Kotaro - No. 630, Aza Teira, Shimoyamaguchi, Hayamamachi, Miuragun, Kanagawaken, Japan.

Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was the chief of the Personnel Bureau, War Ministry and will be able to testify the changes of military personnel during the establishment of Manchukuo.

Relevancy - The attitude of the War Ministry towards Manchukuo.

7. KANAI, Shoji - - No. 4,376, Babacho, Uedashi, Naganoken, Japan
- Nationality - Japanese
- Facts to be proved - He was the Chief Medical Officer of South Manchurian Railway, and later he became the Chief of the General Affairs office, Mukden Province, Manchukuo, and as such he will be able to prove the general conditions before the incident and the administration of the new state.
- Relevancy - The nature of the Manchukuo administration.
8. ISHIMARU, Shigumaro - No. 791, Unanecho, Setagayaku, Tokyo, Japan.
- Nationality - Japanese
- Facts to be proved - He was the Chief court official of the Emperor Pu-Yi, and as such he will be able to testify as to the ideas and conduct of the Emperor.
- Relevancy - The Emperor Pu-Yi's position as an Emperor of Manchukuo.
9. MATSUKI, Kyo - - Yutagawa, Nishitagawa-gun, Yamagata-ken, Japan.
- Nationality - Japanese
- Facts to be proved - He was the Vice-Chief of the General Affairs office of Manchukuo, and as such he will be able to prove the extent to which Japan assisted Manchukuo.
- Relevancy - Japanese policies towards Manchukuo and the nature of the administration of the new state.
10. ONODERA, Naosuke - c/o The Kameyama State Hospital, Beppu Shi, Oitaken, Japan
- Nationality - Japanese
- Facts to be proved - He was the doctor in charge of the Manchukuo State Hospital and attended the wife of the Emperor Pu-Yi before she died.
- Relevancy - The cause of the death of the Emperor's wife.
11. TAKAMURA, Iwao - c/o Identification Section, Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board.
- Nationality - Japanese
- Facts to be proved - He is an expert of handwriting in Chinese brush and ink and has studied the handwritings of the ex-Emperor Pu-Yi in question.
- Relevancy - The credibility of Pu-Yi's testimony.

12. HAYASHIDE, Kenjiro - No. 371, Nichome, Kitagawa,  
Setagayaku, Tokyo, Japan

Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was an interpreter attendant on the ex-Emperor Fu-Ya and wrote the Diary entitled "Travel in Company with the Emperor of Manchukuo".

Relevancy - The attitude of the ex-Emperor towards Japan.

13. KASHIWA, Toku - No. 102, Miyashitecho, Fushimashi,  
Fukushima-ken, Japan

Nationality - Japanese

Facts to be proved - He was the Commanding Officer of the Independent garrison troop in Jehol, Manchuria, and as such will be able to testify as to the alleged massacre of the inhabitants in Jehol.

Relevancy - The facts relating to the allegation of killing of innocent population in Jehol.

Wherefore, your petitioners pray that appropriate order be entered herein for the issuance of process of this Tribunal ad testificandum for the production of each of the witnesses at this trial.

The precise date upon which such witnesses testimony will be given is not known to the petitioners, but they state that their presence for the purpose of interview and consultation is current.

ITAGAKI, Saishiro  
by his counsel

YAMADA, Honzo

Floyd J. Mattie

OKAWA, Shunel  
by his counsel

OHARA, Shinichi

Alfred W. Brooks

MINAMI, Jiro  
by his counsel

OKAMOTO, Toshio

Alfred W. Brooks



UMEZU, Yoshijiro  
by his counsel

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MIYATA, Mitsuo

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Ben B. Blakeney

HOSHINO, Naoki  
by his counsel

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FUJII, Goichiro

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George C. Williams

Paper No. 726  
Disposes of  
Paper No. 720  
in part only,

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
SITTING AT TOKYO, JAPAN

Case No. 1

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al ) ORDER:  
  ) THAT FACILITIES TO INTER-  
  ) VIEW OR INTERROGATE CERTAIN  
  ) WITNESSES REQUESTED BY THE  
- vs - ) ACCUSED ITAGAKI, SEISHIRO,  
ARAKI, Sadao; et al ) BE PROVIDED; AND FOR 2  
  ) SUMMONSES.

This matter coming on to be heard on this 10th day of February, 1947, before The Honorable Sir William Webb, President of the Tribunal, upon the application of ITAGAKI, Seishiro, one of the defendants herein, for the production of certain witnesses necessary to the defense of the said ITAGAKI, Seishiro, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3, Article 9, Paragraph (e) of the Charter, the names of said witnesses being set forth in said application, which is Paper No. 720; and after hearing statements and arguments of Counsel for the said ITAGAKI, Seishiro, and the Tribunal being fully advised in the premises, it is

ORDERED: That said application as to each of the following named persons be granted, as prayed:

1. NOGUCHI, Yuzuru
  - (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
  - (b) The present address of the witness is Sugamo Prison, Tokyo;

2. UCHIDA, Goro

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Japanese;
- (b) The present address of the witness is Sugamo Prison, Tokyo;

and that a summons be issued by the Secretary General of the Tribunal, commanding each of said persons, to-wit: NOGUCHI, Yuzuru, and UCHIDA, Goro, to attend and testify before said Tribunal as a witness for the accused ITAGAKI, Seishiro, at a time indicated to the Secretary General of the Tribunal, by Counsel of record for the said accused, as a probable date when the witness will be actually required.

It is further ORDERED: That every facility and assistance be provided to Counsel for the accused ITAGAKI to submit written interrogatories to or verbally interrogate each of the following named persons at the place where said person is now located or held:

1. Han Yun-chieh

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Chinese;
- (b) The present address of the witness is believed to be Chungking, China;
- (c) He was born in Manchuria and was carrying on business in several parts of Manchuria such as at Harbin until the outbreak of the Mukden Incident. After the incident he served the Manchukuo Government as the mayor of Sinking Special City. The Finance Minister of the new state and represented Manchukuo Government in Europe.

2. Kan Tzn Siang

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Chinese;

- (b) The present address of the witness is believed to be Peking, China;
- (c) He was a native of Manchuria and was the head of a prefecture in Mukden Province before the Mukden Incident in 1931. He later served the Manchukuo Government as the Chief of the road construction section of civil engineering department of Civil Administration Office in 1935, and in 1937 he became the Chief of the Educational Department of Autung Province, in 1938 as the Vice-Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Manchukuo Government and then became the Minister of Civil Administration of the same government.

3. Chang Kai Yung

- (a) The nationality of the witness is Chinese;
- (b) The present address of the witness is believed to be Changchun, Manchuria;
- (c) He is a native of Fukien, China. He served the Manchukuo Government as a secretary to the commercial representative of Manchukuo in Europe for three years. After returning to Manchukuo he served as a Councilor of the Publication Department of the Government until the end of the war.

It is further ORDERED: That the application of the accused for the issuance of a subpoena for each of the persons named in his request for the production of witnesses is indefinitely continued, awaiting results and disclosures of the interrogations hereinbefore authorized and ordered and the

accused is granted permission to file a supplemental application for the issuance of subpoenas for such witnesses selected from those named in this Order as may be found necessary to his proper defense in this case as a result of said interrogations.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan, this 10 February 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

(Signed) W. F. WEBB  
PRESIDENT



to attend and testify before said Tribunal as a witness for the accused ITAGAKI, Seishiro, at a time indicated to the General Secretary of the Tribunal, by Counsel of record for the said accused, as a probable date when the witness will be required.

Dated at Tokyo, Japan, this 19 February 1947.

BY THE TRIBUNAL:

/s/ W. F. WEBB  
PRESIDENT

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30251 Direct examination of ITAGAKI, Seishiro by Mr. Mattice

30254 \*The accused identified and verified Exhibit 3316 as his affidavit. The affidavit stated that the accused was appointed staff officer of the Kwantung Army on 1 May 1929 and held it until 30 July 1932. The C-in-C of the Kwantung Army at the time of his appointment was Lt. Gen. HATA Eitaro. At the time of the Manchurian Incident the C-in-C of the Kwantung Army was Lt. Gen. HONJO, and the chief of staff was Maj. Gen. MIYAKE.

The duties of the accused were to receive orders from the Chief of Staff and to maintain contact between staff officers and manage the staff office and attend to liaison business. The duties and privileges of the C-in-C, Chief of Staff and Staff Officers were according to regulations of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. (Exhibit 1415).

30255 \* Regarding the situation in Manchuria before the Manchurian Incident, since 1925 a movement for the recovery of alleged lost national rights had started in China and anti-Japanese actions increased. There were also violations of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria. In June 1928 Chang Tsuo-lin was killed by a bomb and Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded him. In that year the Chang Hsueh-liang regime affiliated with the Nanking Government and let influence of the Chinese Nationalist Party penetrate into Manchuria.

The anti-Japanese movement there was organized under the Kuomintang direction and became active and intense. Japanese rights in Manchuria were infringed and Japanese nationals were squeezed in a strip along the South Manchurian railway. Extreme pressure against Korean immigrants, violence and oppressions of the Japanese and obstruction to communication etc. had intensified. In spite of Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA's sincerely cooperating policy no prospect for relaxation of anti-Japanese activities in China was in sight and the situation was aggravated.

30256 \*Just before the Incident several hundred questions were pending. In the military field Chang Hsueh-liang after taking office as vice-commander of the Kuomintang Army in the fall of 1928 planned to strengthen his army increasing it to 200 odd thousand, enlarged the Mukden Arsenal, equipped the army with modern arms and strengthened discipline. As compared with the Kwantung Army at that time, his army was far superior in strength and equipment.



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Since then anti-Japanese sentiments influenced Chinese troops and they assumed a contemptuous attitude toward the Japanese troops, boasting of their superiority and their greater experience in fighting.

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\* The disposition of Chinese troops was changed so as to encircle Japanese garrison areas along the South Manchurian RR and the dispersed Kwantung troops fell into a dangerous military situation. While no more than ten odd thousand inferiorly armed Kwantung troops were stationed dispersedly on a peace time footing in that area, nearly one thousand kilometers along the South Manchurian Railway they came to be under seige by the large and well-equipped Chinese troops and assumed a provocative attitude.

30258

Under this situation the danger of collision between the armies gradually fermented. Its solution seemed difficult unless either would concede or compromise. The situation was a collision between conflicting demands, the recovery of China's alleged lost rights \* and maintenance of Japanese rights and interests. But the Chinese had no intention to compromise. The situation was that anti-Japanism by force of arms would be inevitable. To avoid it there was no solution except to abandon the special rights and interests they had. But he would never would undertake this abandonment nor would public opinion/permit it. Therefore the Kwantung Army tried to avoid friction and sought all means of appeasement and admonished its officers and men to be patient and cautious, prohibiting rash acts.

On the other hand they had to work out an emergency counter-measure in case of collision by positive Chinese military actions. The army desired to increase its strength, change the disposition of its troops and replete its equipment. But this was not approved by the central army authorities. Therefore the army mapped out a plan with the then existing strength and equipment and established an operations plan that in case of collision the main forces would be centered in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese troops in Mukden and thus settle the matter within a short period. They decided to make preparations in accordance with this plan and to make up for shortcomings in fighting power by utilizing the material for military operations which was in Manchuria. As a part of this plan they set up two heavy guns in the Mukden Independent garrison barracks which had become needless when Port Arthur fortifications were decreased. It was natural to make up their shortage of fighting power and it was not to stimulate the Chinese that they concealed the setting up of these guns.

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30257 Since then anti-Japanese sentiment influenced Chinese troops and they C-in-C HONJO who arrived in August 1931 witnessed repeated occurrences of incidents due to the intensification of anti-Japanese feeling, especially such serious cases as the killing of Capt. NAKAMURA, the Wanpaoshan Incident, and disturbances against troops guarding railways and practicing maneuvers. He strictly warned against any rash act. He also instructed them to execute their duties positively once emergency arose.

30261 The accused was accompanying HONJO on an informal inspection trip of his troops and finished the trips with the inspection of troops at Liaoyan September 18 1931. On that day HONJO was informed by Chief of Staff MIYAKE that Maj. Gen. TATERAWA, chief of the First Department of the General Staff was coming to Mukden. MIYAKE requested him to send either ISHIWARA or ITAGAKI to Mukden to meet TATERAWA, either would concede or compromise. The situation was a collision between <sup>two</sup> #Assuming that the matter would be in connection with the terms of negotiation on the NAKAMURA case, HONJO ordered the accused to Mukden. Toward evening TATEKAWA arrived and ITAGAKI greeted and dined with him. TATEKAWA did not mention his business immediately except to say that the superiors were worrying about the unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. ITAGAKI told TATEKAWA he would hear him at leisure the next day because he seemed tired.

30258 end sought all means of appeasement and <sup>men to</sup> On the way to his billet after taking leave of TATEKAWA, ITAGAKI went to the Special Service Section of Mukden to get further information about the NAKAMURA case and chatted a while there with the staffs. 30262 \* As ITAGAKI was about to return to his billet there was a telephone call from the garrison troops to the Special Service Section reporting a blasting of the railway line at Liuchiaokou. By several following telephone calls ITAGAKI understood that just after 10 PM Chinese troops blasted the S.M.R. at the western side of Peitaying, north of Mukden and Japanese patrols were fired on by the enemy in ambush. vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese troops in Mukden and thus settle the matter within a short period. The Hushihtai went to their rescue and battled the Chinese. The Hushihtai company was hard pressed by the enemy machine guns. From the railway guard's report it was clear the Incident was not a mere infringement upon the rights and interests in the shape of blasting the railway but a planned challenge of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese army and it was judged that the Seventh Brigade of Peitaying was in action against them. Chinese that they concealed the setting up of these guns.

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30263 ITAGAKI felt the risk was so close that if they hesitated \*the leased territories attached to the South Manch.RR. and the Japanese troops would be encircled and attacked, by the Chinese Army in Mukden.

30264 \* At that moment SHIMAMOTO the Second Battalion Commander of the Independent Infantry Garrison and Col. HIRATA sent word to the C-in-C and others through the Mukden Special Service Section. SHIMAMOTO stated his troops would go to the rescue of the Hushihtai Company which was in desperate battle and the 29th Regimental Commander HIRATA declared he would cooperate with SHIMAMOTO by taking the Mukden Wall.

In the capacity of a staff officer ITAGAKI accepted their determination and took steps to report to the C-in-C. The reason ITAGAKI accepted was that the determination of the two commanders was absolutely necessary in line with the operations plan in case of emergency not only for self-defense of the Mukden troops but also for the benefit of the main forces.

30265 \*He thought it necessary to give these commanders assurance since he was fully conversant with the C-in-C's intentions. When ITAGAKI reported to the C-in-C HONJO as the Army Hdqrs moved to Mukden Sept 19th he approved the steps as they coincided with his intentions.

On the night of Sept 18th they informed the Consulate General of Mukden of the outbreak and of the army actions and asked Consul MORISHIMA to come to the Special Service Office where they explained in detail the circumstances and asked his cooperation. ITAGAKI also talked about the matter with Consul Gen HAYASHI several times by telephone. HAYASHI said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered upon war and as the Chinese through Consultant Chao Hsin-pe had announced their adoption of non-resistance, he hoped the army would arrange the matter so it could be dealt with through diplomatic agents putting an end to military actions.

30266 \*ITAGAKI then explained in detail and asked his reconsideration. The Incident was different from preceding ones because the regular Chinese Army had challenged the Japanese Army. Fighting was already under way and it was impossible for the present to separate the forces. Unless the present military actions would be settled it was practically impossible to rely on diplomatic negotiations. Though the Chinese were saying they were abiding by the principle of non-resistance, according to the report from the frontier they were attacking at Hushihtai causing dead and injured.

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ITAGAKI could not imagine that Chao Hsin-po would be able to arrange a cease-fire agreement because he was a mere civil official with no influence in military affairs. It could not be known whether it might not prove to be the enemy's habitual trick to rearrange the situation by gaining time. ITAGAKI told HAYASHI they had to be careful and that the grave situation permitted no hesitation. He pointed out that the realization of \*HAYASHI's contention was practically impossible.

The battle around Mukden ended Sept 19th. As Chinese administrative officials of the city had fled, the police, communications and banking services came to a standstill. The citizens closed their doors and the city became chaotic. Convicts ran rampant on the streets. They could not leave the situation that way in the interests of public safety. Because of these circumstances and to cope with the desire of the citizens HONJO, to maintain public safety promulgated immediately an emergency municipal administration and appointed DOHIHARA as temporary Mayor.

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The army had no intention of instituting a military administration and admitted no other soldiers except DOHIHARA to take part in it and apart from a few Japanese advisors, the great part of the functionaries were Chinese. Its purpose was to maintain public peace as a temporary measure with the arrangement that whenever a qualified Chinese was \* available the administration should be immediately transferred to him.

DOHIHARA served as mayor only one month and on October 20th Chao Hsin-po became mayor and almost all of the advisors were removed. HONJO had been too cautious to disclose his political opinions during the Manchurian Incident. However, when the independence declaration of each Manchurian province as well as of influential persons therein created a general tendency for the establishment of a new state, HONJO at the end of October 1931 made an important statement. This was that in view of the fact that the Sino-Japanese conflict which had existed before the Incident lead to the present all out clash they must make certain that an incident of this nature would never recur. They must devise measures to settle the incident to the satisfaction of both countries.

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\* The first step would be to pay high regard to the expressed desire of the Manchurian people. The anti-Japanese movement had contributed to the development of bitter enmity. That feeling seemed to have been eliminated but they must completely wipe it from their minds by enhancing racial harmony.

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So long as Japan maintained her special rights and interests in Manchuria it cannot help causing a sense of inequality and sense of oppression among the Manchurians no matter how legal those rights and interests might be. Therefore Japan should voluntarily give them up by renouncing extra-territoriality and return Port Arthur and Dairen to Manchuria... If by doing so relations between the two countries could attain such a standard where the interests of both became identical and where racial discrimination no longer exists.

30270

\* Since Japanese and Manchurian people constituted Manchuria based on equal footing, Japan should abandon their superior complex and the sense of special rights. They must realize they were on an equal footing with the Manchurians in the new state. Those who served the new country as government officials should determine to naturalize themselves to that country.

Maladministration of Chang Hsueh-liang caused hatred of Manchurian and Japanese government authorities and of the 30 million Manchurian people. His failure lay in his adoption of a sole party policy. Manchuria should be careful in the future to respect the peoples' will by rejecting the return of Chang Hsueh-liang and his party.

30271

Restoration of imperial regime in Manchuria would be an anachronism and was apt to give birth to an evil cause depriving Manchuria forever of a possible opportunity to harmonize with China in the future. \* Even if Pu-Yi were to become head of the new state in compliance with the request of the Manchurians there must be clear distinction between his assumption as head of the state and the restoration of imperial regime.

30272

Independence was a result of a people freeing itself from the nation to which it belonged and this did not violate any treaty. Influential Manchurians should be fully responsible to the people. It was feared that independence might overshadow cooperation between China and Japan but it was possible for the new state to contribute to China-Japan collaboration and they hoped this would be the case. Everything depended upon good administration and the people's welfare. The government of the past administration by the former military clique should be improved. The heavy extortion of taxes should be abolished or alleviated. \* Anti-Japanese laws should immediately be abolished. The Kwantung Army should be indifferent to Manchurian politics and should leave administrative matters to the independent and autonomous regime of the Manchurian people and should limit its action to assisting the Manchurians in law and order. National defense should be a joint problem of Japan and the new state and meantime the army should appoint itself to this task.

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30273 It must gain the absolute confidence of the Manchurians. So far the Japanese government gave prohibitive instructions only and no definite indication as to future policy of the army had been shown by them. What they should do at this juncture was to make close observation upon the future relations between Manchuria and Japan so as to report the true aspect of the situation to the central government and should not \* interfere with their political movement representing the unanimous desire of the Manchurian people. While they should not be reluctant in giving assistance they should never force themselves upon the Manchurians.

30274 \* ITAGAKI had been taking every opportunity to talk with leading Chinese to ascertain their views so that he could report them to the military commander. He learned that among them was a strong feeling against Chang Hsueh-liang, a dislike of Kuomintang politics and an urgent desire for the independence of Manchuria. Lo Chen-yu of the Restoration Faction came from Lushun (Port Arthur) to call on ITAGAKI September 23rd in Mukden. He told ITAGAKI that the Restoration Faction wished to call Emperor Hsuan Tung to Manchuria. He then went to see Hsi Chia in Kirin, met Chang Hai-peng at Taonan and returned to Mukden September 26th. He told ITAGAKI that at Kirin Chang Hai-peng who was preparing for the independent movement was desirous of welcoming Emperor Hsuan Tung to Kirin and of the firm decision of Gen. Chang Hai-peng for independence and support of Emperor Hsuan Tung.

30275 \*Yu Chung-han interviewed HONJO November 3rd and suggested the necessity of establishing a new state. A short time after the incident independence was declared in many provinces and districts. They got information that independent movements were growing among the principal political leaders since the general tendency in the Mukden, Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces had been settled by the entry of the Japanese Army into Tsitsihar in the middle of November, 1931.

30276 ITAGAKI interviewed, on HONJO's orders, between the latter part of November to mid December certain political leaders who supported independence \* and heard their opinions. Without exception they were against the return of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime to Manchuria as they hated the politics of the Kuomintang and did not want the Nanking Government in Manchuria. Their common desire was the establishment of an independent state on the principle of border security and peace for the people. They told ITAGAKI that Japan's support was necessary for the construction of a new state. For the time being Japan must assume the defense and the new state required knowledge for which they would depend upon Japan's aid and both Japan and China should stand on equal footing.

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ITAGAKI (DIRECT)

There were differences of opinion on the question of its polity and sovereignty. Well known personages of the Restoration Faction strongly advocated Pu Yi as the sovereign after making Manchuria independent rather than persistently sticking to a mere theory of restoration.

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\* Representatives of the Mukden faction were strongly opposed to the mal administration of Chang Hsueh-liang and though they believed in border security and peace for the people, did not agree to the monarchical restoration but desired a republican regime. They would agree to install Pu Yi as president rather than to decide the ruler by election.

Ma Chan-shan was not the Governor of the Heilunghiang Province but was a man of real worth and possessed his own troops. It was said he would yield to the opinion of Chang Ching-Hui who had almost the same view as the Mukden faction, was against the restoration but in favor of a republic system. Mongolian princes were of the same opinion as the Kirin faction. Authoritative persons of the Mukden and Kirin factions were in a position to dominate the trend of affairs as to polity and sovereignty.

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\* It was clear that all political leaders unanimously agreed on an independent state. This was mainly due to the peculiar geographical and historical position of the East Four Provinces and to the fact that they had previously often declared themselves independent and that by the Japanese declaration of non-occupation of Manchuria the unsatisfied political leaders who were indignant with Chang Hsueh-liang over his maladministration came to the surface and moved by political aspiration desired to solidify their position and reject Chang's return to Manchuria.

ITAGAKI made a detailed report of these matters to HONJO. ITAGAKI having been called by telegram from the Central authorities left Mukden for Tokyo on January 4 1932. He reported to military headquarters the general tendency of Manchuria was toward an independent state. After having sounded prominent persons he could affirm they all advocated independence and the general public was against the return of Chang Hsueh-liang's regime and the advance of the Kuomintang Government to Manchuria.

He reported that the Kwantung Army was entirely absorbed in maintaining public peace and placed no limit on the political desires of the natives. If matters went as they were an independent state would be formed and Japan should be prepared to meet the situation.

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HONJO was of the opinion there remained no way than to adopt the theory of an independent state. War Minister ARAKI told him that though the government policy was not yet decided, his principle was to observe the actual situation on the spot but he did not interfere as to the issue of independence.

During ITAGAKI's stay in Tokyo he explained the new conditions in Manchuria and the army authorities well understood. Returning to Mukden ITAGAKI submitted his report to HONJO and on HONJO's orders ITAGAKI interviewed Pu Yi in Port Arthur January 29 1932. An enthusiastic desire for an independent state had become extremely strong among the powerful as well as the general public of Manchuria at that time. The tendency to form a new state apart from the Restoration movement reached a high pitch with the probability of having Pu Yi the ex-emperor of Hsuan Tung as the sovereign of the new state. HONJO ordered him to meet officially with Pu Yi and ascertain his intention regarding this matter. He first gave Pu Yi general information and asked his opinion. Pu Yi was already aware of the trend for a new state.



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Pu-Yi declared it was of great necessity to establish an independent State in Manchuria and have a good administration in close cooperation with Japan. He stated he had the intention to accept the sovereignty of the new State and insisted upon restoration.

His reasons were that the conditions afforded to the Ching family did not abolish the title of Emperor. He was still an Emperor and could not accept any post which did not carry that title. The cultural level of the Manchurian people being low, Imperial Rule was necessary. A general cabinet had to be established subordinate to a political organization directly under the Emperor who should decide himself all state affairs.

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Itagaki wondered whether Pu-Yi's real intention was to decline to accept the sovereignty if the State was not formed according to the principle of Monarchical Restoration or whether he would accept the offer anyway. \* Itagaki took leave of Pu-Yi and met Cheng Chui, the son of Cheng Hsiao-hsu, and asked him if Pu-Yi had any idea to refuse to become head of the new state. Cheng said that could not be so; but Pu-Yi understood the political situation and was ready to accept though he did not know the true meaning of Pu-Yi's talk to Itagaki. He thought it must have been a simple expression of his desire. Cheng was asked if Pu-Yi's attitude meant he would agree to become the head and if he could so report to HONJO. Cheng said yes, and Itagaki went to Mukden reporting to HONJO. The object of the interview with Pu-Yi was not to persuade him to head the new state, but merely to learn his intention. He had no notion to act so as to intimidate Pu-Yi or cause Cheng Chui to make Pu-Yi agree.

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\* On 21 February, Lo Chenyu and son came to see Itagaki at Army Headquarters, saying they were sent by Pu-Yi. They said that he was still contending for the Imperial Rule. At that time the Northeast Administration Committee had already issued the Declaration of Independence on 18 February and decided on the 19th that they would establish a republican state and that Pu-Yi be requested to accept the administratorship.

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\* They considered this move of Lo Chen-yu due to inadequate knowledge on Pu-Yi's part of the atmosphere of the Northeast Administration Committee. They saw the necessity of communicating to Pu-Yi the actual situation of the committee, and on HONJO's orders Itagaki went to Port Arthur, meeting Pu-Yi on the 22nd and conveying that information. Pu-Yi understood the circumstances and expressed his approval. In spite of his former views, he gladly accepted the decision of the Northeast Administration Committee and the decision in regard to the title of the state, national flag, etc. In the midst of the talk HONJO telephoned and Itagaki reported the interview.

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\* The Incident of 18 September was an accident and the Kwantung Army did not plan it. As to the establishment of Manchukuo and installation of Pu-Yi, they were carried out by the natural enthusiasm of the natives and there was no so-called puppet administrator created by the Japanese Government or Kwantung Army.

The allegation that the accused and a few other staff officers schemed and acted arbitrarily without following the desires of HONJO was a fabrication and no truth in it.

Regarding his second period of service in the Kwantung Army, the affidavit stated that Itagaki was attached to Army Headquarters as Chief of the Military Intelligence from 1 August 1932 to June 1933. In June he made a tour to Europe. He was Supreme Advisor of the Military Administration Department of Manchukuo from 1 August 1934 to 10 December 1934, and then became Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army \* and Chief Staff Officer.

30286

After the Tangku Truce, continuous efforts were made by Chinese and Japanese to alleviate tension. Communication was established between the two after September 1934. HIROTA spoke on the reproachment before the Diet in January, to which Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei replied, and in June an Amity Law was promulgated.

Page

In view of the Chinese Communist Army's northward expansion to intensify strain between the two nations, China issued an order in February 1935 to exterminate that army with Yu Hsun-Chung to head the expeditionary army. Nevertheless the Communist Army broke through the Nationalist Army and drew near the Mongolian Region.

30286

\* The USSR accused Japan of being imperialistic and aggressive. It was double tracking the Siberian Railway and fortifying bases in the Far East. The strength of the USSR was four times that of the Kwantung Army and was being still further increased. Armed communists and bandits in Manchuria were much curbed by Japanese and Manchurian forces but not entirely suppressed. Some notables of Japan and Manchuria began to advocate the abolition of extraterritoriality. If the principle of co-prosperity should succeed in forcing out communist plans, Japan, Manchuria and China could pursue the way of prosperity in peace. If Japan's advocacy should fail, the three would be thrown into war and the situation would be in favor of the communists. This prospect became more probable after the comintern meeting in July 1935 passed a resolution to concentrate on efforts to overthrow Japan and bring about world revolution.

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\* The Chinese Communists issued a proclamation on the basis of this resolution and threatened to resort to an anti-Japanese united front. Army headquarters' opinion was that the basic policy was to strengthen Japan and Manchukuo by a co-prosperity society, financial construction, and securing national defense power. By diplomatic means, international friendship should be established.

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\* While the accused was Chief of Staff, he cooperated with many persons in Manchukuo in this policy. In June 1936 the first abolishment of extraterritoriality came. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, he had favored this and had tried to aid in facilitating its materialization. In accordance with the Commander's orders, he assisted in the personal affairs of Japanese officials in Manchukuo's service but had nothing to do with internal personal administration and the personal affairs of Manchukuo officials. The Army

Page did not coerce Manchukuo in selecting or dismissing officials. The basic duty of the Army was to implement defense against the USSR. This principle was established at the time of NISHIO, whom he succeeded as Chief of Staff. \* The program of the Army was based upon General Staff instructions and was of purely defensive nature against the USSR. They never made any aggressive war plan.

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There were many Mongolians in Manchuria and the trends in outer and inner Mongolia had sharp repercussion on them and became a problem. Accordingly, the Army and Manchukuo had a special interest in outer and inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was assigned to the Army for collecting information concerning the USSR and Mongolia and the Army sent intelligence agents and collected information near the frontier.

30291 \* The northward expansion of the Chinese communist army, the foundation of Manchukuo and other factors gave rise to Inner Mongolia's voluntary movement for local self-government. Japan and Manchukuo hoped for its healthy growth for defense against the USSR and the spread of Bolshevism but the Army did not seek to induce or suppress the movement as far as Itagaki knew.

The Army was interested in the North China problem to secure peace in the rear but this interest was concentrated on defense of northern and internal fortifications of Manchukuo toward December 1945. The Kwantung Army did not send troops to North China.

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30293

\* Regarding the period when he was Commander in Chief of the 5th Division from 1 March 1937 to 3 June 1938, he was transferred on the earlier date from Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to Hiroshima as 5th Army Commander. The division was on a peace-time footing and the divisional commander was in charge of controlling subordinate units and military administration. He was in no position to state his opinion with authority or give advice.

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\* When the Lukouchiao Incident occurred on 7 July 1937, Itagaki was on duty in Hiroshima. He learned about it from the newspapers and did not think it was serious or dream it would develop into the China Incident. He expected it would settle on the spot. However, negotiations on the spot, based on the Japanese policy of localization, were ineffectual and because of the defiant attitude of the Chinese, the situation was not reassuring.

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On 27 July an emergency mobilization order was issued to the 5th Division, and this was completed on 2 August with the first and second contingents leaving harbor by 7 August. \* They reached Peiping and took part in battles in North China. At the end of May 1938, ITAGAKI left command of the 5th Army and returned to Tokyo. In December 1937 the main force of the 5th Division was concentrating in the direction of Paoting from Shansi. When he was in Paoting on 17 December he heard of the Japanese entry into Nanking but he had no responsibility or knowledge of the Nanking Incident. As Division Commander he only did his duty in accordance with the order of his superior and he paid special attention to military discipline, warning against misbehavior. Wrong doing was punished according to military law and in addition, the wrong doer's commander was punished.

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\* At the end of April or early May 1938, when he was in Shantung Province as Division Commander, FURUNO, Inosuke visited him as Premier KONOYE's representative. KONOYE's desire was that despite the cabinet policy of localization, the

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Page war was extended from north to central China. It was necessary to have a War Minister who would be able to change the China policy to one of peace. KONOYE thought ITAGAKI the best man and wished to know whether he would accept. He knew that KONOYE's intention coincided with his own, namely, the withdrawal of the entire Japanese forces \* and peaceful settlement of the conflict. At 30297 the end of May, ANAMI, Chief of the Personal Affairs Bureau, visited him, carrying the official order for his appointment as War Minister, which had been recommended by the big three of the Army. ITAGAKI decided to accept and took office on 3 June.

30298 As War Minister his fundamental attitude was that Japan and China should join hands. However, Japanese efforts toward local settlement were in vain and the conflict gradually developed to a large scale war. While Japan was thus reluctantly forced into such a situation \* the Soviet increased her strength. Her armaments in the Far East were overwhelmingly superior, threatening the Japanese rear. The Anglo-American powers increasingly assumed an attitude of aiding Chiang and interrupting military movements.

They were especially concerned about U.S. pressure on Japan. If things went on, Japan should be doomed to stand alone against encirclement by Britain, U.S., the Soviet and China. Therefore, she must immediately make peace with China. He believed the two must end all past conflict and rebuild mutual diplomacy on a broad point of view.

30299 \* As for the policy for the fighting forces it was to establish discipline and to maintain fighting power against the Soviet Menace. As the policy of the state, it was to alter peace terms with China and accomplish a peaceful settlement. There should be an innovation in the management of government, recognizing the situation was grave, to reinforce defense against the Soviet and supreme fighting materials to attempt transfer of military strength and adjustment of the front line stabilizing the situation in the occupied area and to try to bring about peace with Chiang Kaishek. They should keep watch of the Soviet's debouchment and maintain peace with her. They should try to get Britain and France to stop their aid to Chiang. They should ask Germany

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Page and Italy to cooperate in the settlement of the war and they should maintain friendship with the U.S. as a means to bring about an end to the conflict.

30300 \* ITAGAKI took office as War Minister immediately after the Hsueh Battle. At that time it was believed that the Hankow Operation would be unavoidable. In June 1938 the circumstances were that the peace terms to be offered China should not be so exacting as the ones proposed when Trautman was go-between. Unless the terms were modified, Chinese acceptance appeared unlikely, but both public opinion and the government policy had been far from further reducing the terms.

30301 To conclude peace it had to be made possible to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. Confronted with the KONOYE declaration of 16 January 1938, which included the statement that Japan would not deal with the \* Kuomintang Government, things were not likely to develop a tendency favorable to a further re-examination of this declaration.

\* UGAKI, who succeeded HIROTA as Foreign Minister on 26 May, was one of the important keys for the reorganization of the KONOYE Cabinet. However, no progress had been made on UGAKI's policy when ITAGAKI became War Minister.

China asked the League for help and it resolved to do so.

30302 The Japanese Supreme Command had counted on the Hsueh Battle being decisive for ending the war, but due to great differences in strength and the extent of the fighting area, the strategic object could not be achieved. The Chinese concentrated great strength before Hankow \* and prepared for counter-attacks, exposing the Japanese forces to extreme danger. The Supreme Command considered the only thing to do was to deliver another counter-attack and prepare for the Hankow Operation.

They could discern important defects in defense preparations against the Soviet. ITAGAKI was aware of the extreme difficulties of the talk of leading the situation to peace. They had to aim

Page at the end of the Hankow Operation, and on the other hand devise measures for a peace settlement.

30303 They were required to replace the fighting materials \* and not neglect national power for defense against the Soviet.

30304 The reinforcement of the various emergency policies necessary for national mobilization (Exh. 857) and revision of the plan of demand and supply of important materials (Exh. 857) were made to remedy defects of defensive strength and not for preparing for aggressive war, although the Hankow Operation was planned and executed to cover the High Command's weak points and making a turning point for termination of hostilities and peaceful settlement. Its object could not be attained even after the fall of Hankow on 27 October 1937. As War Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet, ITAGAKI was confronted with the problem of keeping Soviet relations tranquil. \* Japan was quite astonished therefore when the Chang Ku-feng Incident broke out in July-August 1938. In dealing with the Incident, ITAGAKI hoped for a diplomatic settlement and tried to achieve immediate local settlement with accord of views between the War Ministry and General Staff.

The Army, in spite of disadvantages, stuck to the principle of localization and was barely able to end the Incident before it became too serious. It brought greater attention to the menace in the north and realized Soviet superiority. Thus, it resulted in Japan's preparedness.

30305 After the outbreak of the China Incident, Japan refrained from establishing military government \* and left civil administration to the Chinese. Not a few such accomplishments were due to the management by Japanese in the Department of Special Affairs, placing a considerable load on the Army. The China Affairs Board was proposed by the Army and adopted by the Cabinet to relieve the Army of these tasks. The board was established on 18 December 1938 with the Premier as President and the Minister of Navy, War and Foreign Affairs as Vice Presidents. About mid-March the liaison offices on the spot started



Page their work in cooperation with the Chinese administration to promote political, economic and cultural measures. Army intervention was held to the minimum. It was sine qua non for the realization of peace to amend the peace proposals and convert Japan to a policy of dealing with Chiang Kai-shek. ITAGAKI attached prime significance \* to re-examining the national policy regarding adjustment of relations with China, making Japan's intentions understandable, demonstrating to the world that it embodied the national policy.

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In the KONOYE statement of 3 November 1938 (Exhibit 268) Japan hoped to establish relations of mutual aid, ranging over all fields to realize these policies. The policy of adjusting new relations between Japan and China (Exhibit 269) was decided on the 30th. As a detailed explanation, the KONOYE statement (Exhibits 268 and 2535) was issued on 22 December 1938, declaring that what Japan wanted of China was not territory nor reimbursement of war expenses. Japan was willing to respect China's sovereignty and withdraw extraterritoriality. He \* did his utmost as War Minister to promote that policy but China's reaction, especially Chiang's, was very weak and it was not a suitable time for peace negotiations. Before that, it had been deemed advisable to join hands with important Chinese believed to possess an ardor for peace. In July 1938, KONOYE instructed BANZAI to make liaison with Tang Shao-i and Wu Pei-fu to ask for their cooperation. The Army sent DOHIHARA and the navy, TSUDA, to cooperate, but the plan failed due to Tang Shao-i's assassination.

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The problem of coalition of Japan, Germany and Italy was already under study before the accused became War Minister. \* Ribbentrop's proposal arrived in early August 1938 and they sent a formal answer after consulting the Five-Ministers Conference and waited for Germany's formal proposal. The initial proposal arrived in November. ITAGAKI wanted to use it to obtain peace with China immediately after the Hangkiao Operation and proposed this before the Five-Ministers Conference on 11 November, but the proposal met with difficulty and they were unable to conclude negotiations with Germany to accomplish peace with China.

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Japan's withdrawal from the League, which was decided through consultation on 2 November 1938 (Exhibit 271) was carried out because she could not continue to cooperate with the League and maintain national integrity. The accused made no statements in the conference deciding on this.

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The agreement with Germany on cultural cooperation, which was discussed in the Board of Council Conference on 22 November 1938 (Exhibit 589, page 309) was not an intention to conclude this sort of treaty with Germany alone but with other nations as circumstances dictated, and contributed to general purposes of diplomacy, and had no political meaning.

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The policy of adjusting new relations with China was discussed at the Five-Ministers Conference on 25 November 1938 and decided by the Imperial Council on the 30th. The Navy proposal to secure Hainan Island was approved by the same conference as a temporary measure to make the blockade more effective and it was hoped it would hasten solution of the Incident. Japan should pay careful attention regarding the observance of laws of war, respect and protect third power interests and remove temporary obstacles and restore former conditions after the war. Japan would stand by the principle of equal opportunity. This was often declared by Japan in answer to third power complaints \* and she tried faithfully to carry it out. However, the third powers pressed for strict observance of treaties which did not conform to the current situation, utilizing it as an excuse to assist Chiang and the tendency of the powers against Japan and to aid Chiang became more pronounced. Thus the KONOYE Cabinet, unable to accomplish peace, was forced to resign.

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When the HIRANUMA Cabinet succeeded the KONOYE Cabinet, ITAGAKI remained as War Minister upon HIRANUMA's request. His fundamental attitude as War Minister remained the same. It became almost impossible to bring about a speedy peace and there was nothing left to do but to take measures to gradually break down the Chinese anti-Japanese attitude. This meant the demonstration on one hand of the determination not to shun even a long war,\* and on

Page the other, to lay great importance on urging their policy by measures other than military. Although this doctrine had been carried out in the KONOYE Cabinet, it was intensified during the HIRANUMA Cabinet. Principal matters dealt with while he was War Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet included the bill "General Principles of the Replenishment of the Productive Faculties" (Exhibit 842) drafted by the Planning Board and approved by the Cabinet January 1939. It had been previously studied at the War Ministry on the basis of a Five-Year Industrial Plan proposed by the General Staff about April 1937. Its real purpose was to establish Japan's economy, secure defense against the Soviet, and the safety of Manchukuo so that the Five-Year Plan for developing Manchurian industries projected by Manchukuo could be realized. \* The plan was changed to a 4-Year Plan and its scope diminished. Their plans were such that they could not keep pace with the new situation.

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As to the participation of Manchukuo and Hungary in the anti-Comintern Pact discussed by the Privy Council on 22 February (Exhibit 491), in view of the pact's aim, an increase of participating powers was always welcome and Japan merely intended to strengthen the pact.

Negotiation was also under way with Germany about the method of strengthening the pact to meet the attitude of the Comintern and the Soviet. The accused attended this Privy Council session but made no statement.

30313 \* Concerning the newspaper story of 17 March (Exhibit 2200) purporting to report a Diet speech of ITAGAKI, he never made such a speech.

Concerning the question of closing the British Settlement at Tientsin, HIRANUMA informed him in June that the British had proposed a question be carried to diplomatic negotiations at Tokyo, but as the army's idea must be predominant, HIRANUMA wished to know its intention before consulting Foreign Office authorities. ITAGAKI then summoned army representatives for a talk so that differences between authorities at the center and at the spot could be eliminated. On the problem of general principles, they succeeded in the issue of the Anglo-Japanese Joint Declaration on July 24.

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In view of the success of the Anglo-Japanese talk, ITAGAKI believed \* they could find a solution of the problems vis-a-vis the British in regard to relations with the U.S. He believed they might improve them when the loan negotiations with the U.S. then pending should succeed.

As he felt a good opportunity for peace was approaching, he asked Wang Ching-wei to accelerate the peace movement.

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\* As to the Nomonhan Affair, after deliberation with the Supreme Command, and with the consent of the Cabinet, he tried to bring about a speedy settlement approving the Kwantung Army's policy to settle the matter locally and defensively. He thought the negotiations with Germany and Italy were the best way to relieve the Japanese from death by suffocation, to save continental China, elevate Japan's international position, cause the Chinese Government to give up tolerance of communism, resistance to Japan, give the Powers opportunities to turn China to the cause of anti-communism, co-prosperity and co-existence, and strengthen her defense against the Russian menace.

At the Five-Ministers Conference of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, the Foreign Office's counter-proposal against the German proposition was discussed. After revision it was made the instruction and it was decided to send to Europe special envoys from the Army, Navy and Foreign Office. The instructions which the envoys took were that the main objective was Russia, but Britain and France might sometimes come within the objective. Military assistance would be given if the matter concerned Russia, but would depend upon the situation in the case of Britain and France. If those two were Bolshevized, military assistance and its extent would subjectively be decided. Another mission of the envoys was to explain it as an extension of the anti-communistic agreement. However, the Germans requested relaxation of the limitation on military assistance against third powers except Russia. HIRANUMA sent a message to Hitler around 5 May, telling him that Japan's position was such that

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Page she could not relax the limitation and asked Germany to concede that point. Just at that time complications set in. Wang Ching-wei visited Tokyo on 1 June and the problem of the blockade of the British Settlement in Tientsin occurred on the 14th, \* followed by the attack of Nomonhan on 15 June by Russian and Mongolian troops. In view that there was no alternative but to require Germany to concede, ITAGAKI sent MACHIJIRI, Chief of the War Service Bureau, on 11 August to request German Attache OTT to make a concession on Germany's part. The conclusion of the non-invasion treaty between Germany and the Soviet on 22 August ended the matter of the proposed pact. On the 23rd, HIRANUMA indicated his intention to resign, with which ITAGAKI agreed. After presenting the resignations to the Throne, he conferred with the three army heads and recommended TADA, who advocated peace, to become War Minister.

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After his resignation, ITAGAKI was appointed a member of the General Staff. \* During the time he was War Minister, he sincerely desired the restoration of peace with China and evacuation of Japanese forces from Chinese territory. He took every possible measure to attain this but it was regrettable that he was obliged to resign with the Incident unsettled.

On 12 September 193, when Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Army was organized, he was unexpectedly appointed Chief of Staff under NISHIO and left for Nanking where he remained until 7 July 1941. Here he tried to bring about a speedy settlement. As to military operations, they were small ones to strengthen the blockade of the supply route. They tried to secure the occupied areas, maintain public order and stabilize the living of the people.

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\* The collaboration with Wang Ching-wei's government was chiefly in charge of Ambassador ABE with the assistance of the Expeditionary Army to the extent it did not interfere with military operations. In particular it supported Wang Ching-wei's National Salvation Peace Movement and wished the Nanking Government to aim ultimately at joining with the Chungking Government.

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Since the possibility of negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek through the offices of Sun Tzu-chieh was found by the Hongkong Organ early in 1940, ITAGAKI supported it enthusiastically and was ready to meet Chiang in Changsha. In anticipation of its success, he requested the delay of the establishment of Wang's Government but despite their wishes the negotiation failed.

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In 1941 Chang Yen-hsiang told ITAGAKI of the desire of Doctor Steward, President of the Yenshing University, to talk with him. ITAGAKI thought this desirable and sent a staff member to Steward, who agreed to convey their wishes \* to the President of the US that she would act as mediator to solve the Incident. The accused advised the central authorities to that effect but later, American-Japanese negotiations became aggravated and they could obtain no result.

The South China Expeditionary Army in Canton was released from command of the China Expeditionary Army on 5 July 1940, and placed under Imperial Headquarters. At the end of September a detachment of the South China Army was ordered to proceed to North Indo-China. Neither the accused nor the Expeditionary Army requested or advised this and had no control or responsibility concerning it.

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ITAGAKI commanded the Korean Army from July 1941 to April 1945. \* As the Army had been organized on a peace-time footing up to February 1945, he had no concern in the promotion of the Pacific War and had no operational duties concerning it until the Korean Army was reorganized on a war-time footing as the 17th Area Army and detailed to protect Korea on 1 January 1945.

Regarding the telegram of 20 February 1942 from the Chief of Staff of the Korean Army to the War Vice Minister, requesting the sending of POWs to Korea, and the telegram of 23 March 1942 from the Army Commander to the War Minister reporting on the plan of accommodating POWs, they were sent at the request of the Director of the POW Information Bureau, according to the report of TAKAHASHI, Chief of Staff of the Korean Army. The accused had been

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Page told that the purpose was to transport the POWs from the southern fighting areas to the quiet atmosphere in the Japan areas. He made it a rule to treat the POWs fairly and give them as many facilities and provisions as possible. He never saw the two despatches, did not know of their being sent and did not want them sent.

30322 \* He was appointed Commander of the 7th Area Army in Singapore. He took command from 22 April 1945. Its duty was to defend its area, but before they could open hostilities, the war ended. Such conditions existed that communications with various quarters were destroyed by the enemy.

The accused stated that he never became a Supreme War Councillor throughout his career.

30323 \* He stated that he had no connection with the March and October Incidents. He had no connection with the Sakura-Kai, nor did he even know about its existence. He knew OKAWA \* but had no occasion to meet him during a period five or six years prior to the Incident on 18 September, nor had he ever conducted correspondence with him.

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He knew General TANAKA, but did not meet with him nor have any conversation with him regarding the Manchurian Incident.

He knew Port Arthur well, but he did not meet nor talk with TANAKA there about June 1931.

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\* Reference was made to the testimony of TANAKA (page 1985) where he said that he conversed with ITAGAKI, in which ITAGAKI said that the situation between China and Japan in Manchuria was extremely aggravated. However, after Chang's death it became even more so. The pending questions in Manchuria were so serious they could not be settled diplomatically and there was no alternative but the use of armed force to drive out Chang Hsueh-liang and afterward establish in Manchuria Chinese-Japanese cooperation to create a model state. When asked if he made any such statement to TANAKA or anyone else, the accused stated \* that he was not in Port Arthur, but on a trip in Tsingtao, Peiping and Tientsin during June.

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Page The opinion of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, including himself, was that in spite of anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria, they must at all times uphold the policy of settling pending issues by all means but that armed clashes must be avoided. The NAKAMURA Incident shocked the Army, but even in this case settlement was through diplomacy. This should be proof that he could not make such a statement a year and three months before.

30327 \* The witness stated he had no conversation with TANAKA at Port Arthur or any other place in June 1930 or June 1931 or any other time.

30328 \* DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KATO  
COUNSEL FOR DOHIHARA

The accused stated that at the end of October 1931, DOHIHARA, under C-in-C HONJO, went to meet PU-YI at Tientsin, at which time ITAGAKI was a senior staff officer of the Kwantung Army.

Reference was made to Exhibit 300, which alleged that DOHIHARA at that time spent 50,000 yuan to bribe the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps and plain-clothes men and handed over to plain-clothes men arms sent by the Kwantung Army. The accused was asked if the Army ever sent money or arms to DOHIHARA for such purpose, and he replied that so far as his knowledge was they sent absolutely none.

30329 \* When he was War Minister in the KONOYE Cabinet, a general peace with China was planned through Tang Shao-i and Wu Pei-fu. In November 1938 the peace effort came to a dead stop because of the assassination of Tang Shao-i.

30330 \* He knew that after that Incident, DOHIHARA tried to further the peace movement until March 1939 and it was his understanding that DOHIHARA did not succeed and then returned to Tokyo. In March 1939 DOHIHARA became C-in-C of the 5th Army in Manchuria.

30331 \* DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOZUMI  
COUNSEL FOR KIDO

The accused recalled calling on KIDO, the



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Page Minister of Welfare, in the KONOYE Cabinet on 18 June 1938, in which the general subject of conversation was how to settle the China Incident speedily. KIDO explained that the recent reorganization of the KONOYE Cabinet was to bring about a prompt settlement. KIDO's personal opinion was that it must be settled speedily and the accused agreed with him.

30332 \* ITAGAKI was present at the Cabinet meeting on 2 August 1938 when the policy with regard to the Changkufeng Incident was discussed. KIDO was present at this meeting. On the previous day USSR aircraft had attacked Korean territory simultaneously with attacks from the ground causing serious doubts as to Russia's intentions. At the meeting it was decided to localize the Incident and effect speedy settlement. The policy was to transfer the matter to diplomatic negotiations and the Army's attitude was to effect a local settlement even though Japan might have to withdraw from the line the USSR claimed to be the frontier. KIDO agreed with the Cabinet decision.

30333 \* DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. WARREN  
COUNSEL FOR HIRANUMA

The accused stated that HIRANUMA asked him to remain in his Cabinet as War Minister. On 5 January the accused received a message from HIRANUMA asking him to go to cabinet formation headquarters. There HIRANUMA told him that the principal task of his cabinet would be a speedy settlement of the China Incident.

30334 \* This plan was also the policy of the previous cabinet and therefore the new cabinet was merely continuing this. HIRANUMA said that since the accused was being asked to remain as War Minister, the retention of his office was important.

30335 The accused understood the intentions of HIRANUMA, told him he would have to discuss the matter with the three army chiefs. In this connection, he said there was one point of doubt \* and he asked HIRANUMA if he had heard from KONOYE anything with regard to strengthening the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact. HIRANUMA replied that he had heard nothing of

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Page the question yet but would like to dispose of it  
after the Cabinet's formation.

At the three chiefs' conference it was concluded that HIRANUMA's intentions were clear and the accused was induced to accept the post as War Minister. Following the decision, the accused had HIRANUMA notified of his acceptance.

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\* When asked if it could be assumed from his answer that he did not name any conditions to HIRANUMA that must be promised before acceptance, the accused stated that what he had narrated constituted everything. He did not know anything about the witness YAMAWAKI's testimony that as Vice War Minister he handed to the headquarters for formation of the Cabinet a paper as to which the prosecution asked him if it did not contain seven conditions of acceptance.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. SHIMANOCHI  
COUNSEL FOR OSHIMA

30337

The accused stated that with regard to negotiations for the Tripartite Alliance, he never sent a message to OSHIMA in Berlin, nor had he ever sent a telegram to \* OSHIMA asking him to refrain from taking any actions or working on ARITA.

Page CROSS-EXAMINATION BY JUDGE NYI.

- 30338 \* The accused stated that the statement made by HONJO in October 1931 was not in writing. The accused  
30339 memorized every word of it. \* It was given by way of explanation from HONJO many times. It appeared HONJO had a memo, but he didn't know of that.
- Regarding the operational plan of the Kwantung Army before the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, the operational plan was drawn up by officers in charge of operations, in accordance with orders from superiors in the General Headquarters. The accused had no direct connection with drawing up the plan.
- 30340 \* It is a customary practice in all nations for operational plans to be drafted in accordance with General Staff Headquarters instructions. The Kwantung Army requested of the central authorities an increase in troop strength, the granting of newer and more modern weapons, or to change the disposition of the forces to meet actual  
30341 conditions. \* In spite of the army's desire, central authorities did not take the request up, so the Kwantung Army had no alternative but to draw up a plan in accordance with the troops, equipment, and material that it had available.
- 30342 \* The plan was reported and approved by central authorities in Tokyo. The accused did not know of the Kokusui-Kai. He stated he could not answer whether consular authorities in Mukden ever took steps to check his activities in association with members of the Kokusui-Kai Society, because he had never heard of the Kokusui Society.
- 30343 \* The telegram from Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA to Consul-General HAYASHI dated 5 September, 1931, was quoted to the witness. This said that they had heard that ITAGAKI and others of the Kwantung Army were exerting themselves in various activities with ample funds, and were manipulating Japanese adventurers in China and members of the Kokusui-Kai. In view of the tardy progress of the negotiations regarding the NAKAMURA Incident, especially, they have decided on a concrete move the middle of the month. HAYASHI was to take steps for controlling the activities of the Ronin. After hearing this, the accused said the contents of the telegram were groundless, but in connection with the subject matter, he did have some knowledge.

- Page He thought it was after the Manchurian Incident  
30344 \* that the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, MIYAKE, placed a telegram before him and told him to read it. MIYAKE felt that it was ridiculous to explain, but he could not quite withhold his indignation and went to HAYASHI and cast various sarcastic jokes about it. There were absolutely no facts to prove there were ample funds, or anything which would show any connection of himself with the Kokusui-Kai. He stated he had always been a poor man.
- 30345 \* He did not particularly notice the Kokusui Society when he read the telegram, but did recall charges that many adventurers were being used.
- 30347 \* The accused stated he had read the contents of a telegram handed him, and when asked if it had the same contents as the one shown him by MIYAKE, he stated this was different. Chief of Staff MIYAKE talked with Consul-General HAYASHI about it, and the talk ended more or less in a joke, but MIYAKE asked HAYASHI if he might not be shown the original and make a copy, consisting of two or three pages. He had these pages when he talked to the accused, and told the accused it contained such and such and asked him if he might not look at it. He did so, but could not recall whether the contents were the same as in the document shown him just now.
- 30348 \* He had no recollection as to the form of the document, or whether the contents mentioned the name Kokusui-Kai. He did recall such words as "adventurer" or "ronin". It was not true that the carrying out of his  
30349 plan involved actions of the garrison at Fushun. \* He heard afterwards of the emergency defense meeting on 14 September at Fushun in anticipation of something to happen. He heard this after the outbreak of the Incident.
- 30350 He had no exact recollection, but thought Gen. TATEKAWA arrived in Mukden late in the afternoon. He thought that he himself arrived at Mukden from Liaoyang about two or three in the afternoon, and between his arrival and TATEKAWA's arrival he was in a Japanese inn. \* When he met TATEKAWA at the inn, he was attired in a Japanese cotton lounging kimono supplied by the inn to relax in. Until this interview, he did not know that he had an important mission with TATEKAWA. He spent about two hours  
30351 with TATEKAWA. \* It was perhaps true that it was customary for a special emissary like TATEKAWA to deliver his message without delay. Asked if TATEKAWA apparently did not do so, the accused stated that he did not learn anything in regard to TATEKAWA's mission in addition to what he had already stated in his affidavit.

Page

When asked why he made an effort to tell TATEKAWA there was no need for worry, the accused stated he replied to a question of TATEKAWA in accordance with his belief. That night TATEKAWA stayed in the same inn. Regarding why he called at the Special Service Organ if he told TATEKAWA there was no need to worry, he stated that he did so because it was too early to retire.

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\* Because there was no new information which had come in to the Special Service Organ, he had an informal chat with staff members. It was when he was on the point of leaving for his billet that an urgent message came in reporting the outbreak of an incident. This prevented him from returning to the billet. He thought the chat at the Special Service Organ lasted about an hour and a half.

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\* It was customary that any communication with army headquarters had to be requested through the Special Service Organ. The Organ had a telegraph code form which everyone did not have. If there was any need to send a coded telegram, it was necessary to call up the Organ.

When asked if the Organ had any activities besides collecting information and issuing press releases, the accused stated he thought its functions had already been fully explained. Whenever any negotiations relating to military matters had to be conducted, the important ones were relayed to the Consulate-General, and the less important were dealt with by the Organ with the Staff Office of the Chinese in Mukden.

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\* After SHIMAMOTO and HIRATA told him they were ready to fight, he immediately approved that plan. He tried to ascertain the situation as much as possible, and

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\* heard every telephone call that came in from the front at the Special Service Organ. He made every effort to obtain data upon which to make a sound judgement. The Incident was unexpected, and the messages from the front were fragmentary and at times inconsistent. Though they tried hard to ascertain the true nature of the situation, it was difficult because the signal corps was constantly moving and it took time to establish contact with them.

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It was not he who recommended DOIHARA to be mayor, but the appointment was by General HONJO. When asked if he recalled that MORISHIMA advised against setting up the municipal administration, he stated that it was the Chief of Staff who called MORISHIMA, and he was just present at the meeting, \* and Consul MORISHIMA did not present to him anything that would require his acceptance.

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MORISHIMA asked the Chief of Staff whether a military administration was going to be established. The Chief replied that no military administration was contemplated. Other than this, the accused had no recollection as to what transpired.

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Asked if HAYASHI called on HONJO to point out that it was a mistake to set up a municipal administration, the accused stated that he had not directly heard anything from HONJO, but what he had heard from the Chief of Staff was similar to what was said at the conversation between the Chief and MORISHIMA. \* His recollection was that HONJO told the Consul-General that no military administration was being established.

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It was not true that HONJO told him that on the whole he agreed with him, but since the order had been issued he had no way to alter it. He didn't know who was Chief of the General Affairs Section. A person by the name of IORIYA was president of the Japanese Residents' Association. \* but he didn't recall whether he had taken such an office. He did remember that several Japanese worked in the municipal administration, but could not recall whether any was a chief of any section or department.

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When asked why he could be so certain that the Japanese served only as advisors, he stated that responsible Chinese were not around. If they had been, there would have been no need for Japanese helping set up the administration.

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\* When asked if certain named Japanese did not consist of key personnel of the administration, he stated that there were no responsible Chinese to undertake municipal administration, and there was no alternative but for the Japanese to take it over for the time being. \* He didn't know exactly who was chief of certain sections.

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\* If he had replied previously that he was familiar with the personnel who were chiefs of sections, it must be some misunderstanding. He did know the name IORIYA very well, and the other names mentioned to him were Japanese.

He did not know that to raise funds, the municipal administration under DOIHARA had planned an opium monopoly and the issuance of lottery tickets. He did not remember if the Kwantung Army Headquarters had no objection but instructed the municipal administration to make clear stipulations to get Headquarters approval for this before the plans were put in operation.

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\* To the accused was read a telegram from Consul-General HAYASHI in Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA dated 13 October, 1931, which stated that according to reliable sources, the municipal administration office planned a monopolization of opium and the issue of lottery tickets to raise their funds, and asked Army Headquarters for approval. They were also informed that though Army Headquarters had no objections, they instructed the office to state the stipulations and get Headquarters approval before the plans were put in operation and to report these to the Consulate and the police station. Not only are opium monopolization and the issuing of lottery tickets unfavorable for international relations, but a materialization of a part of army plans marked Secret 781 of 2 October. HAYASHI was asked to call on the top military to check the movement and in consideration of the delicate situation preserve absolute secrecy from the army as to receipt \* of the telegram and the contents of the official letter mentioned.

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The accused stated that he had never been approached on this subject, and he did not know if the army had been. Asked if DOIHARA was guiding the local Peace Preservation Committee in Mukden, he stated that the mayor handled only city affairs. It was true that DOIHARA was chief of the Organ up to the outbreak of the Incident, as there were no Army Headquarters there. This is why the organ was necessary. \* As soon as Headquarters moved to Mukden, there was no need for the Organ and it went out of existence. Therefore, DOIHARA was no longer Chief of the Organ, but exclusively the mayor. There was automatic abolition of the Organ when he became mayor.

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When reminded that MINAMI had testified that the abolition of the Special Service Organ did not take effect until 1935, the accused stated that that was different. While Kwantung Headquarters was in Mukden, the Organ was abolished. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Headquarters moved to Changchun or Hsinking, and there was a short period when there was neither a Headquarters nor an Organ in Mukden. A necessity for the Organ arose, and it was revived in October or November 1932. Therefore, during MINAMI's tenure \* there was a Mukden Organ.

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The accused stated he did not know if DOIHARA prohibited setting up another political regime with the Four Peoples' Preservation Committee as the basis, headed by Kan Chao Hsi.

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\* He did not know if the local Peace Preservation Committee issued a declaration on 5 November, 1931, in which Kwantung Headquarters ordered the insertion of words that relations should be severed with Chiang Hsueh-liang's former regime and the National Government of China. He didn't recall that because of the Army's insistence on these words, influential persons like Yuan Ching-Kai and Yu Chung Han were placed in a dilemma. He thought Yuan was associated with the Peace Preservation Committee, while Yu Chung-Han was with the Self-Government Guiding Board.

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It was not true that on 28 October, the Army called together garrison commanders and provost marshalls to support the policy. \* He did not know if at that time Chief of Staff MIYAKE instructed that the enforcement of local autonomy and guidance by Japanese should never be revealed outwardly. Before and after the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, Tsang Shi-i was confined at home because of illness. It was not true that he was arrested and imprisoned and killed 15 December for refusing to help in establishing an independent government.

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\* Asked if Yuan Chin-Kai was next approached, the accused stated that from the outset of the establishment of the Peace Preservation Committee, its president was Yuan Chin-kai. It was not true that about mid-November, 1931, Yuan was under strict watch by the Army because he was complaining to foreigners.

Chang Hai-peng was firm in his decision to support Pu-Yi. He learned that from Lo Chen-Yu. It was not true that he received Japanese aid in the form of money and rifles.

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Asked \* if he knew that the Consul-General in Mukden was told by Shih that Chang Hai-peng would enter Tsitsihar and declare Heilungkiang independent on condition of receiving Japanese aid, the accused stated he had no knowledge as to who told this to Chang.

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\* There was no case in which the Japanese participated in discussions about what form of government the new state was going to take. Reference was made to exhibit 3296-A, which described a meeting in Mukden on 11 January, 1932, attended by both Japanese and Chinese notables, which discussed the form of government to be established in Manchuria. The accused stated that this was a meeting sponsored by a Japanese newspaper. It was purely unofficial and had no responsibility.



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\* He understood that it represented that Kwantung Army members attended, but this was in a private capacity and they had no official responsibility.

When he stated that political leaders agreed on an independence movement unanimously, these people had actual authority, being chiefs of provinces and army commanders. All had responsibility toward the people. It was necessary for Headquarters to understand the desires of these people of responsibility.

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\* Asked if he meant that they derived their authority and responsibility from the army, he stated that was not the case. He was speaking of the masters of the people living on soil not occupied by the Army.

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DOIHARA was sent to Tientsin to see Pu-Yi by order of HONJO. \* He had understood the general outline of exhibit 2190, DOIHARA's interrogations, in which he stated that details of this meeting were arranged by ITAGAKI. With respect to DOIHARA's trips, matters such as travelling expenses were looked after by the accused. Asked why DOIHARA was given this assignment, he stated that it was to collect information in the Tientsin-Peiping area. At that time the position of mayor previously held by DOIHARA was delegated to a responsible Chinese and DOIHARA was free. He was especially considered the most suitable because his main task related to collecting intelligence.

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\* Asked if before DOIHARA was sent, a certain UEZUMI was sent to Tientsin to contact SAKAI to take Pu-Yi to Yinkow, the accused stated that he didn't recall the name UEZUMI. There were many named SAKAI in the Army, but he didn't know whether a person by that name was in Tientsin then.

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Asked if it was not because the previous plan had not materialized that he found it necessary to send DOIHARA to enlarge the project, he stated that he knew nothing of a previous plan or a project. Inasmuch as DOIHARA's trip would require travelling expenses, the accused looked after that and minor details. \* He didn't know what was referred to when other arrangements were spoken of. The accused was not the treasurer of the army.

In looking after these details, he gave orders to the intendance officer to provide necessary expenses. There was nothing more than this.

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He did not know if the assistant on the trip was OTANI. DOIHARA was free to take his assistant from Mukden or employ him after arrival in Tientsin. \* Asked what would affect the finances over which he seemed to take charge, he stated he had no supervision over finances. He had stated that he ordered the officer in charge of funds to give them sufficient money for two men for one month.

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Asked if he didn't know what DOIHARA was going down to Tientsin for, the accused stated that he knew only that DOIHARA was given the assignment by HONJO and left on it. \* He went first of all to collect intelligence on the Tientsin-Peiping area. There were some troops of Chiang Hsueh-liang north of the Great Wall, and it was necessary to avoid clashes, to ascertain the true situation there, inasmuch as these troops might withdraw within the Great Wall. There was much information flowing into Manchuria to the effect that Pu-Yi desired to return to Manchuria. Since DOIHARA was going on this assignment to Tientsin, \* he was given the additional assignment to ascertain whether this reported desire of Pu-Yi was true or false.

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Asked how he found out the purpose of the trip, he stated that the assignment was made by the Commanding General, and all staff officers were informed. He did not give DOIHARA any particular advice, but being friends, he should think he told him not to overstrain himself.

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Asked if he was not in charge of intelligence in the Kwantung Army, the accused stated that Headquarters divided the staff office into sections. He was Chief of the General Affairs Section. The First handled operations, and the Second intelligence. \* As Chief, the Intendance Officer was a subordinate, and it was only natural that he should give the orders regarding travelling expenses.

Reference was made to exhibit 2196, a telegram from HAYASHI to SHIDEHARA, dated 12 November, which asked the Army Commander regarding Pu-Yi's coming to Manchuria. He replied that not only had he heard nothing of it, but he had had ITAGAKI notify the Tientsin Garrison that they were not to hurry about the Emperor's coming to Manchuria. The witness stated he had some recollection of that.

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30382 Asked if he notified DOIHARA to quit, he stated that he was ordered by HONJO through the Chief of Staff to send this telegram. \* When he said he told DOIHARA not to overstrain himself, he meant that in connection with collecting intelligence in the Tientsin-Peiping area, there would be possibility of confusion as a result of possible troop withdrawal, and there was possible danger. It had no relation with the taking of Pu-Yi to Manchuria, because the assignment was to ascertain whether he desired to go to Manchuria.

Asked if the Kwantung Army ever occupied any area outside of Manchuria, the accused stated that he supposed the question related to his affidavit where he stated that the Kwantung Army sent no troops to North China. He meant that there was nothing of the kind while he held office in the Kwantung Army.

30383 \* During that time, the Army never occupied any area outside Manchuria.

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\* The accused stated that he recalled DOIHARA was in North China in November, 1935, on orders from the C-in-C of the Kwantung Army, at which time the accused was Vice-Chief of Staff. Asked if he had a duty to be informed about troop movements, he stated that the Vice-Chief had the concurrent duty of Assistant Military Attache and the Chief of Staff was in a position to know of these movements, but as for himself as Vice-Chief of Staff he had no power to make decisions and was not in a position to know of troop movements and planned operations.

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Regarding DOIHARA's mission, he was sent to North China, and extensive consultations with military authorities were held. When he went there, there was a regime headed by Wang Fu. They had heard there was a desire in North China for a new regime. From the standpoint of national defense, the Kwantung Army had always been concerned with it against the Soviet and its main objectives were always directed toward the Soviet and in other directions. \* Thus it was of the utmost importance that friendly relations be maintained with countries to the rear so they could obviate any feeling of anxiety.

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Since the people of North China desired a new regime, DOIHARA's mission was to make contacts with various people there to arrive at understandings, and by concluding friendly relations with them enable the army to feel secure in its rear. \* It was not true that DOIHARA went there to demand a formal proclamation of the new autonomous state by noon of 20 November 1935.

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Asked if it was a fact that the new state would include the five Northern Provinces, he replied that maybe the Chinese had some such plans, but he had not heard them. In view of the purpose of DOIHARA's mission, it was impossible for the accused to conceive that DOIHARA threatened the Chinese authorities, but if the demand was not accepted by noon he would cause Japanese troops to march into North China and remove Pu-Yi from Changchun to Peking. \* The routine in connection with this was that there was a staff officer in charge of reading newspaper reports, and all pertinent items were passed on by him to the accused.

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It was not true that Japanese newspapers in Manchuria printed the same news story as foreign papers did about the Incident. Asked if the army mobilized its troops and air force in mid-November, 1935, he stated that to mobilize troops it was necessary to gain the approval of the authorities, and he could not recollect that they ever took steps to request such authorization.

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\* When handed a document, the accused stated he had no recollection of ever having seen it, but it seemed to be a report from the C-in-C of the Kwantung Army to the War Ministry and was part of the Secret Great Diary of Manchuria. \* The accused was read a part of the document, which stated that according to the object described in separate telegram 762, they decided to concentrate a part of the forces outside the Great Wall to cooperate suitably with the China Garrison Army, in case of need, and issued orders at noon on the 12th to take certain measures. It stated that certain troops should be placed under the Commander of the First Mixed Brigade, and should be made to concentrate the forces near Shanghaikwan by November 15 so as to be prepared for advancing into North China. The advance to the south of Shanghaikwan should depend on orders.

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\* Exhibit 3317-A, an excerpt from the Great Secret Diary of Manchuria, which was just read, was received in evidence. \* Asked if the Army, on 16 November 1935, ordered the Air Force to be prepared for action by 20 November, 1935, the accused stated he didn't recollect that. The witness was handed a document, and stated it was an order issued by the Kwantung Army, and although there was no signature, MINAMI was commander at that time.

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\* Exhibit 3318-A, an excerpt from the Great Secret Diary of Manchuria, being the document identified by the accused, dated 16 November 1935, stated that in view of the subsequent situation in North China, the Army intended to gather part of its Air Force outside Shanghaikwan. \* The Air Force commander should order scout planes, fighters, etc., to advance by 20 November, and make preparations for marching toward the Peiping-Tientsin area. The railway line sector commanders should dispose railway transportation service to facilitate the transfer of the two air squadrons.

Asked now, after reading the two previous exhibits, if he recalled anything of that sort, he stated he heard later that there had been troop and air movements, but understood they were ordinary peacetime movements.

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\* Asked if the Kwantung Army had control over harbors, rail, and water transportation in Manchukuo, he stated this was so within the limits of the appendix attached to the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol. He did not think the word "control" was appropriate, but believed many were joint Japan-Manchukuo enterprises.

- Page Among the appendices to the Protocol, there was the HONJO-Pu-Yi Agreement, a clause of which stated that since Japan was to take charge of national defense, various facilities such as railways, harbors, and water transportation would be administered by the Japanese, and Manchukuo agreed to this. Therefore, although the Manchukuoan railroads were owned by a Manchukuoan company, their operation was entrusted to the SMR.
- 30398 \* The witness was handed a document which he identified as being from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice War Minister (Exhibit 3317-D). Asked if the railroads, harbors, and water transportation meant only railroads owned by the Japanese, he stated that Japan had powers of administration over the railways referred to in the document, under treaty provisions. In the beginning, the Army had a Special Service Department, and in it was a Communications Supervision Bureau. Under MINAMI, this bureau was abolished. The counts did not extend to railways not administered by the Japanese in pursuance of treaty rights.
- 30403 \* The accused stated that control of tariffs belonged to Manchukuo, and was an internal matter.
- 30408 \* Reference was made to his affidavit, which stated that KONOYE thought he was the best man for the post of War Minister, considering his career and ideas. He was asked how his ideas came to KONOYE, and he stated he did not know who recommended him to KONOYE. ISHIHARA had no reason to engage in such political activity, and he did not know whether it was he or whether it was KIDO. When he became War Minister, the Vice Minister was TOJO. He did not pick TOJO, but his consent was asked for later.
- 30409 TOJO became Vice-Minister before he became War Minister. He supposed this was about a week before.
- 30410 \* In regard to important policies, the accused received information from his predecessors which was applied to the policy for settling the China Incident. Asked if he was aware of the decision of the Imperial Conference of 11 January, 1938, he stated he didn't know what this conference was about, and didn't know what it decided.
- 30411 \* He heard, in connection with the statement of 16 January, that the true intent of the government was not necessarily destruction and non-recognition of the existing Chinese government. Asked if the government policy at the time of the declaration of 16 January, 1938, was continued when he became War Minister, he stated it had not yet been changed.

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\* Reference was made to the affidavit where he stated that the War Minister's policy was to alter the peace terms and that the terms should not be so exacting as the ones proposed through Trautmann. Asked if he made an effort to change or modify the terms, he stated that the result of his efforts was the declaration of November 3 and the outline adjusting new relations issued November 30. He did make efforts to change the terms. When the terms published in the outline on 30 November were compared with the terms offered through the Trautmann negotiations, they were as mild as they could be. \* Because the effect given by the January 16 statement at the time of its issuance was very bad, they now stated that even as regards the Chungking regime, if they would be willing to approach Japan, she would deal with them gladly.

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The main purpose of the Five Ministers' conference was to enable the Ministers concerned to meet and discuss major problems, and there were no special regulations.

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\* Asked if he made a statement to the purport that the aim of the meeting was to discuss the war situation to the Domei News Agency, he stated he had made such a statement, and it went without saying that a speedy solution of the Incident was fully discussed. He, as War Minister, occupied a very important position in that conference. The important declarations and policies which were adopted by unanimous decision at the conference were in conformity with his views.

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Asked if he attended the conference in June, July, and August, 1938, he stated that on the whole he did so.

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\* When handed a document, the accused stated that the title said that it contained the decisions of these conferences, but the results or decisions of the conference were not recorded at the meeting. His recollection of what took place was not accurate, and he did not know who

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recorded the decisions. \* It was not a practice to keep minutes of the decisions, and he could not recognize that these were the decisions reached by the Five Ministers' Conference.

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\* Asked if a sheet before him was a certificate, he stated that he could not tell, as he could not read

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English. \* The accused stated that he did not remember if the Five Ministers' Conference on 8 July, 1938, decided the measures to be taken by Japan in case China surrendered.

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30422 \* He didn't remember if it was decided that in that eventuality Japan would either adhere to the decision of 11 January and treat the Chinese Government as a local regime which would participate in the setting up of a new pro-Japanese Government. It was not true that it was decided then that Japan would not try to settle the Incident through negotiations. He had no recollection whatsoever as to this, and at that time no one had any such idea.

He didn't recall if on that occasion they decided that the Chinese surrender would only be accepted on certain conditions, one of them being the retirement of Chiang Kai-shek. He didn't remember if the conference of 8 July decided on measures to be taken in case China refused to surrender.

30423 \* It was not true that the policy was laid down that in that eventuality, Japan should concentrate her power on the destruction of the Chinese Government. He did not recall such a thing at all, and it was not so that it was decided that Japan would continue positive war operations so as to occupy all strategic points in China.

He didn't recall if it was decided that in case China continued to refuse to surrender, pro-Japanese regimes would be made to combine. Asked if the conference on 8 July decided on strategy toward China, he stated he didn't remember whether there was a conference on that date.

30424 \* and even if there was he didn't remember what was decided.

30425 \* He had not forgotten the policies of the government and his own views and ideas. It was not true that it was decided then to bring about Chiang Kai-shek's fall and destroy Chinese fighting power. They did not have the purpose of confiscating the funds in China, or any foreign concessions there.

30426 \* He did not remember whether the 15 July conference decided on the policy for establishing a new central government in China, and it was not decided that a new government be set up after the occupation of Hankow and Canton when the Chiang Government would have been reduced to a local regime.

Asked if the 15 July conference decided to provide for Japanese supervision of military affairs, foreign relations, economics, religion, and education in China, he stated they had no such plans, nor did the plan provide for appointing Japanese advisers and officials.



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\* Asked if the conference of 8 July decided that the main objective would be to stop British aid to Chiang, he stated he didn't recall exactly. The 12 July conference did not decide upon the attitude to be taken toward possible British and German proposals for mediation, and he didn't recall if there was any decision at any time to decline British proposals.

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Asked if the 22 July conference decided on the procedure for settling the Changkufeng Incident, he stated he felt there was no important decision on that date. \* He had stated in his interrogation that the Cabinet meeting of 2 August was devoted to that Incident. He did not remember if the 26 July Conference decided to set up a special commission for Chinese affairs.

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\* He had said in his affidavit that there was a special mission headed by DOIHARA, TSUDA, and BANZAI, but he could not recall whether it had a special name. The task of the Commission was not to draw up political and economic strategies for war against China.

He did not remember if the conference of 9 September, 1938, laid down the outlines for a joint commission of representatives of the local regimes. It was not decided on this occasion that complete guidance would be given to the Joint Commission by Japan, and he did not remember if that, in conformity with this decision, the Commission was established on 22 September, 1938.

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\* The accused stated that Premier KONOYE had sent DOIHARA to China in 1938. The accused did not recommend him as War Minister. The solution of the Incident was difficult, and it was a problem for the entire country and not the army alone. It was necessary to select the best man, and Foreign Minister UGAKI selected BANZAI. \* DOIHARA, with Admiral TSUDA, was appointed to assist BANZAI and cooperate with him.

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The purpose of DOIHARA's mission \* was to call on those who were earnest in their desire for peace and ask their cooperation. It was not true that one of his strategies was to work on retired statesmen and generals and set up a new government. It was not true that the government picked DOIHARA because he had had previous experience in setting up new regimes.

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\* Asked if the Special Commission was a secret organ, he stated he didn't recall the name "Special Commission on China".

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30434 The group of BANZAI, DOIHARA, and TSUDA had no special name, but its purpose was to get together the best men who had an earnest desire for peace. Asked if there was a name DOIHARA Kikan, or Agency, which maintained communication with the War Ministry, he stated that he had forgotten the name, but since DOIHARA was the youngest of the three and the only one in active service, he administered the business of the group, maintaining a house in China. \* The accused did remember that he used the name "DOIHARA Agency" when he communicated with the accused.

Asked if it was also sometimes called "Take Kikan", he stated he did not know. He did know the composition of the China Affairs Board, and as War Minister he was one of the vice-presidents and knew the important decisions of the Board.

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\* He did not know the anti-Comintern National Salvation League. Reference was made to the affidavit, where it was stated that the National Salvation Peace Movement, in particular, supported Wang Ching-wei's

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national peace movement. \* Asked if this peace movement was the same as the National Salvation League, he stated he did not know if there was such a league, and he hardly thought the salvation movement was financed by Japan.

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When shown a document, the witness was asked if it was a decision of the China Affairs Board. \* He stated that he had no recollection of it, and could not recall if

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it was decided that the necessary expense \* for the activities of the anti-Comintern National Salvation League should be appropriated from surplus funds of the Maritime Customs Revenue.

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\* He did not recall if it was decided that when utilizing the surplus funds, Japanese names should be used to maintain secrecy and cover up the fact that this was a genuine Chinese movement.

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When DOIHARA was working on Wu Pei-fu, they did not have some arrangement about the expenses. He did not recall a document shown him as a decision of the China Affairs Board on 23 June, 1939. He did not recall that the expenses for the Wu Project would be defrayed in accordance with the expenses required for the Salvation League. \* He had nothing to do with any matter concerning the arranging of money for launching these projects.

Asked if the DOIHARA Kikan was taken over by KAGESA, he stated the words "taken over" were not proper. The mission of the two was different, and there was quite an interval between when DOIHARA returned to Japan and the time when KAGESA was settled in China.

- Page' KAGESA was not sent by the accused. He did remember that KAGESA went for political work with NAGAI and others, on government orders. He was sent by all ministers connected with the Five Ministers' Conference, in accordance with a decision there. In this group there were naturally navy men, civilians, \* and Foreign Office personnel. In the beginning, his mission was to contact Wang Ching-wei and bring him from Hanoi to Shanghai.
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- In reply to the statement by KONOYE on December 22, 1937, Wang Ching-wei had escaped to begin a peace movement and was in Hanoi, but since he was in danger there and desired to come to Shanghai, an emissary was sent to bring him. \* The accused believed that Wang issued the statement a week after KONOYE's statement of 22 December, of his own accord.
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- The accused had heard KAGESA's testimony that KAGESA had informed Japan that the Chinese would expect a Japanese announcement on the peace terms, and that the KONOYE statement of 22 December, 1938, was prepared in view of the proposed escape of Wang to Hanoi.
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- \* Asked if he still insisted that the statement was Wang's own idea, the accused stated that he was convinced that it was. \* Asked if the Five Ministers' Conference on 26 August 1938, decided on the policy for propaganda in connection with the Incident, he stated not on that date. Asked if this decision stated that in view of the prospective fall of Hankow it was a pressing need to push long-term construction plans, he stated that he recalled that on 26 August the conference discussed plans for strengthening the anti-Comintern Pact, and he recalled no decision on any other matter.
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- Then shown a document and asked if it was the decision of 26 August, he stated that he did not recall it. \* As he had stated, he recalled only the discussion concerning the anti-Comintern Pact on that day. Even if he was told that the document was an official one, he still would say it was not the August 26 decision. \* He could not think that the paper presented to him purported to contain the decisions of the 26 August conference.
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- \* He could not recall a conference between himself and the Navy and Foreign Ministers. No records were kept of the Five Ministers' conference, or any other. He did not recall that on 28 October, 1938, he, the Navy, and Foreign Ministers, decided policies for administration of the recently occupied Hankow and Canton districts. They did not decide that new administrations would be set up there under Japanese guidance.

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30449 \* He did not recall if it was decided that in economics, emphasis should be laid on acquiring supplies for the army. \* He didn't recall that in the latter part of August 1938, the Five Ministers' Conference requested the various ministries to submit plans for establishing a new organization to deal with all Chinese matters. He did not recall if the Foreign Ministry at that time proposed a temporary organization for the duration of the China Incident, agreed to by the War Ministry.

30450 It was not true that in early September, 1938, the army submitted a plan to establish a permanent China Affairs Board, which would continue even after settlement of the Incident. \* Asked if Foreign Minister UGAKI strongly disagreed with the establishment of the China Affairs Board according to the army plan, he stated that UGAKI wanted to have a board set up within the Foreign Office, but the army felt it necessary to have an organization supported by the whole government. Asked if because of this disagreement UGAKI resigned on 29 September 1938, the accused stated that UGAKI did resign, but did not state his reasons. Asked if it was not because the Premier and Cabinet agreed with the Army plan, the accused stated that it was true that the other four ministers agreed with the army, but neither the Premier nor Foreign Minister said why UGAKI had submitted his resignation, and KONOYE said at that time he could not understand it.

30451 \* He believed it was around November that the China Affairs Board was finally set up, and he thought UGAKI resigned around 26 or 27 September. He did not recall if the army plan was approved two days after UGAKI's resignation. Since the Board was set up in November, he could be sure that the decision was made between the resignation and November, \* but he did not think it was immediately after.

30452 He did remember that at the beginning of April, 1939, the Liaison Offices of the Board were established in China, but he didn't remember if HIRANUMA addressed the chiefs of the Liaison Offices or if any such speech stated that the government adhered to the KONOYE statement of 22 December, 1938.

30453 \* He didn't recall if, in a meeting of liaison officers on the 10th or 11th of April, 1939, a director of General Affairs instructed that the guidance of the Chinese regime and the future Chinese government in political and economic affairs should be according to the principle laid down by Japan. The purpose of the Board was

Page not guidance, but the idea behind it was to take charge of politics and economics so far as they related to Japan, and maintain liaison with China. He knew that the accused SUZUKI was in the China Affairs Board, but didn't remember his title.

30454 He could not remember if he attended the meeting of April 10 and 11, 1939. \* He didn't recall if there was an instruction that in the guidance of China, the important points of Japan's desires had to be fulfilled, and he didn't recall if the decisions of the liaison offices were approved by the Board. \* He didn't recall if the directions and the speech were approved by the Board before the meeting in April, 1931. He did not know if the instructions given at the meeting of the chiefs of the Liaison Offices included an industrial three year plan for China, or if that plan was contemplated to fit in with Japan-Manchukuo production expansion plans to fulfill Japan's defense and economic demands.

30456 \* It was not true that after the establishment of the Board, the army tightened its control on Chinese and provincial local governments. Asked if he knew that it was reported that the Liaison Office of the Board in China still had to obtain the understanding of the local army before they could do anything, he stated that since the army was conducting military operations, it was glad to give all conveniences in its power to the administrative organs if they did not hinder operations. \* He did not recall if Foreign Minister ARITA had complained of the interference of the army in such matters before the Five Ministers' Conference.

The accused recalled that the Imperial Conference of 30 November, which decided on the policy of adjusting relations with China, took place after the capture of Hankow and Canton. He stated that he was present at the conference. The Foreign Minister explained the policy.

30458 \* When handed a document, he stated that it was similar to the decision of November 30, but he could not judge whether it was exactly the same. There was nothing in the document to show it was the original and he could not say it was the same, \* and he could not understand the certificate. He could hardly believe that such a lengthy decision was arrived at at an Imperial Conference, for he recalled that ARITA's explanation was very brief.

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- 30461 \* The accused repeated that he could not identify the document but he remembered that the decisions reached that day were items relating to the adjustment of new relations with China.
- 30462 \* The accused was asked if it was decided that the object of establishing a new order in East Asia should have conditions including general cooperation between Japan and Manchukuo, China, a special position for Japan in North China and Inner Mongolia, a special position along the lower Yangtze, Hainan Island and other islands along the South China Coast. He stated that was not accurate. In his recollection, the statement regarding establishment of the Co-Prosperity Spheres was set forth in the KONOYE statement of 3 November. Asked if the details were also laid down in the Imperial Conference decision, he stated he did not recall such details being carried out immediately. \* It was not true that the details provided for the creation of a new China government on the principle of cooperation among separate regimes. The first of the points provided for was the maintenance of good neighbor relations and friendship, cooperation against communistic and economic cooperation. It was not true that it was decided that Japan would send advisors to the new central government and the local regimes. The policy decided upon might be called the principles for adjusting new relations which might serve as conditions for peace.
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- 30464 \* Asked if it was decided that China would have to compensate Japanese subjects for the economic and financial losses during the China Incident, the accused stated it was exactly opposite. Japan was not going to take any reparations or indemnifications, entertained no territorial aggrandizement, and was firm on its stand of respecting the sovereignty of China. There was no idea of claiming any indemnity. She was determined not only to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity in China but even relinquish extra-territoriality rights and effecting the rendition of concessions. It was not decided that economic activities and interests of third powers would be restricted.
- 30465 \* Asked if HIRANUMA made a speech at which the Foreign Minister replied at the conference of 30 November

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Page 1938, he stated that such a matter was hardly possible at an Imperial Conference.

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\* The accused was handed a document and it was suggested to him that it was written on Imperial Household Ministry's stationery. He stated that stenographers could not enter the conference room and no stenographic transcripts could be made. He noticed that his name appeared at the bottom of the document as one who attended it but he stated he could not possibly identify it.

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\* Another document was shown him and he was asked if it included a speech by HIRANUMA. He stated that this was not possible in accordance with precedents. It was written on poor quality Imperial Household stationery and he was hard put to give any correct judgment as to what kind of document it actually was, and he placed no trust in it.

In regard to the purported speech by HIRANUMA in the document, he had no recollection of HIRANUMA stating that activities of Chinese troops in the occupied areas would have to be suppressed or otherwise the conference decisions could not be realized. He did not recall that HIRANUMA stated that the establishment of a new regime should outwardly be done by the Chinese but in reality it would depend on Japan. He did not recall if HIRANUMA stated that 'n areas where Japanese troops were to be stationed, administration would have to remain under Japanese supervision. He did not remember if HIRANUMA stated that in case third powers would oppose Japan, it would be necessary to deal with them resolutely.

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\* He did not recall a Five-Minister Conference on 6 June 1939, three days after he became War Minister. He did not recall if it was decided at this conference that the constituent elements of a new central government should be Wang, Wu, the existing regimes, and the Chungking Government, provided it changed its mind and reformed.

The accused stated he did not know about any decisions reached in early June 1939. In his recollection, Wang Ching-wei arrived in Tokyo in early June and if that was the case, he supposed the conference would be held prior to his arrival.

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Page He did not remember if after his arrival there was a second conference.

30471 \* He stated that at the time of the Changkufeng Incident in July 1938, TOJO was Vice-Minister. Asked if the Naval and Army High Command had intelligence reports that there were no indications that Russia was preparing for war against Japan, he stated that there was no clear-cut report to such effect. There were various reports but he could not recall anything in particular.

30472 The accused was asked if the Kwantung Army estimated the situation and declared that the Soviet forces must be compelled to withdraw from Changkufeng by force, and even if Japan resorted to force, Russia would not enlarge the Incident. The accused stated that this was not within the knowledge of the Kwantung Army because the Incident occurred on the Korean border \* which would be under the jurisdiction of the Korean Army and he had never heard of it. It was not true that the Kwantung Army Headquarters persistently urged the use of force to General Staff Headquarters. The Japanese attitude was clearly decided upon by the Cabinet. It was not true that he and the Chief of Staff fully agreed with the report and recommendation of the Kwantung Army and sought an Imperial audience on the 21st to obtain Imperial sanction. He did not know if he had been told by the Emperor through his Chief A'de-de-Camp that if the intention of seeing him was to obtain sanction for the use of force, then he need not come.

30473 \* The attitude at that time was decided upon definitely by the Cabinet. The policy was non-expansion, but because the Soviet took aggressive action, there was extreme danger and they had to take necessary measures to meet it.\* He did have an

30474 audience alone with the Emperor at which he reported the policy decision on the Changkufeng Incident as laid down by the Cabinet. Asked if he was severely reprimanded by the Emperor on that occasion for telling a falsehood, assuring the Emperor that the Foreign and Navy Ministers had agreed to the use of force in Changkufeng, he stated that the subject matter was entirely different. Before he reported to the Throne



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Page Foreign Minister UGAKI had an audience. The Emperor asked the accused if there was not some difference between UGAKI's report and his own. Although UGAKI and he had arranged their reports so that there could not be any difference,\* because the Emperor asked such a question pointing out that there seemed to be a difference, he assured him that he would look into the matter, and left.

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30476 \* When the Emperor asked him if there wasn't some difference, he stated he did not think so, but would look into the matter, but the Emperor did not say to him that thereafter he could not move one soldier without his command. It was not true that the Emperor excitedly told him that the actions of the Army in the past had been abominable and that in the Loukiaotou case and in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, there was absolutely no obedience to central orders. It was not true that the Emperor said that there were infrequent instances where arbitrary and sneaky methods had been used and he felt it was abominable.

30477 \* He denied that the reprimand was so strong that he went to the Chief Secretary of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and stated he could never look into the Emperor's face again and would like to resign.

In regard to the Nomonhan affair, at which he stated in his affidavit that he endeavored to bring about a speedy settlement, the accused stated that it was not true that he did not seek the approval of the Five-Minister Conference or Cabinet until the conflict had neared its conclusion.

30478 \* It was not true that he ever told HIRANUMA that hostilities should continue. It was not true that when he finally took the matter up with the Cabinet, YONAI stated it was a distasteful situation to start the Incident and then bring the problem after the Army had bungled it.

At first he approved wholeheartedly the actions of Kwantung Army Commander UEDA in connection with the Nomonhan Incident, but afterward he did not. UEDA was relieved from his post because after the rout of the Japanese forces, it was deemed impossible

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to continue military operations, but this was when the accused was no longer in office. He stated that he was War Minister during the Lake Khasan Incident.

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\* (The attention of the Tribunal was called to Pages 22599, 23057 and Exhibit 766.)

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\* The accused was asked in regard to the British Concession in Tientsin if it was true that five demands were presented to the British in July 1939, including the handing over of 50 million yuan to the provisional government in Peking. He stated that such negotiations were not handled by the Army but negotiations were conducted through diplomatic channels. He had no recollection of having an Imperial audience in connection with this topic. Asked if there was a condition demanding the handing over of 45 million yuan, he stated that in the French Concession, there was a Chinese Bank of Communications in which there was deposited money, but he did not know whether it was 45 million. The Peking government decided to inspect this fund but the Concession authorities refused. \* The money was federal reserve notes and it was natural for the Peking government to have the notes transferred to it. This had no connection with the Japanese Army and it was a problem of the provisional government. Asked if it wasn't the British rather than the French Concession, he stated that his recollection was that it was the French. Asked why the matter was discussed in Tokyo if it concerned the provisional government, he stated there were questions such as maintaining law and order and economics.

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\* It was not true that about 7 July 1939 the Emperor summoned him and inquired the reason for the demand for handing over 45 million yuan and it was not true that he was again rebuked by the Emperor.

(In lieu of cross-examination in connection with the problem of POWs, the attention of the Court was invited to Exhibits 1614, 1617 to 1622, 1655-8, 1668-75, 1686, 1691, 1712, 1720-22, 1758 and 59, p. 43, 1512-18, 1769, 1778 and testimony at 5418-5491, 13471, 13573 and 13756.

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\* The accused recalled that Exhibit 3177-A and Intelligence Report of the Kwantung Army Special Service Organ read that in South China, to hear the names DOIHARA and ITAGAKI was something like mentioning a tiger, and the people turned pale. Asked if at that time he was in the service of the Kwantung Army, which was on 27 August 1934, he stated that he thought at that time he had concluded his travel abroad and was attached to headquarters, but did not recall whether he was at his post at that time.

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\* The accused was asked if he recalled in the summer of 1939 when UEDA was Foreign Minister, if there was submitted to Japan a draft of the Tripartite Alliance, drawn up by OSHIMA and RIBBENTROP. He stated that the proposal was presented by RIBBENTROP but the words "military alliance" were not suggested. The purpose was to bolster the Anti-Comintern Pact. Asked if the Alliance originally dealt solely with Russia but was extended in November 1938 to apply also \* against England and France, he stated it was not an Alliance and the contents were different than this. Asked if he wired OSHIMA that UEDA agreed with the substance of the pact as extended against England and France, he stated that the War Minister did not directly send the telegram to an ambassador and he denied sending any telegram, nor did he recall that the War Ministry sent it.

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\* The accused was asked if the Five-Ministers Conference advocated strengthening the Pact by military alliance and if it also decided to have the anti-Comintern program directed solely against the Soviet. He stated that the official instructions to the Ambassador was that although the USSR was to be the objective, the pact might also be applied to third powers, depending on the situation. There could be various degrees of application. Such matters were decided by the conference and were not incorporated in the basic draft and this was forwarded by UEDA to OSHIMA with instructions. \* He thought this conference was in 1939. There were three meetings between the middle and end of January and decisions of this nature were made then. It was not true that the Emperor urged the Army to apply the

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program to the Soviet alone. It was not true that the Army advised the Emperor. It was not in favor of that course. He had not heard that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI held the view that the military alliance should be directed against England and France as well. Asked if OSHIMA and SHIRATORI opposed governmental directives issued on this subject, he stated that according to what he heard from UEDA, one of the ambassadors communicated his opinions to the central government before passing the draft on to Germany that there seemed to be doubts and they had to hold another conference.

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\* Asked if OSHIMA and SHIRATORI overstepped their authority and advised Germany that Japan would participate in war, he stated he had not heard that they did not submit to government orders.

The accused was asked if he as War Minister had an Imperial audience on 11 April at which the Emperor stated that it was an infringement upon Imperial authority for the ambassadors to express intentions of participating in war, he stated that the Foreign Minister was a competent minister on this matter and such inquiries would not be addressed to him as War Minister and there was no such audience.

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\* He had no recollection that the Emperor said to him that under such circumstances it was not favorable for him to take an attitude of supporting the ambassadors. He did not conceal the actions of SHIRATORI and OSHIMA at the Five-Ministers Conferences and try to give excuses for them. The Army on its part had its own position. \* Asked if after the conference, he asked the chief aide-de-camp who it was that told everything to the Emperor, he stated that he never had a talk with the Emperor on this question. He was asked if he knew that Foreign Minister ARITA, in reporting to the throne, told the Emperor that SHIRATORI and OSHIMA stated that Japan would participate in a war if England and France fought with Germany and Italy. He stated that he did not know what ARITA reported. \* ARITA was a competent minister and he may have made some kind of report, but he did not know its substance and had not heard that he ever made any such report as had been suggested. \* He did not remember that ARITA recommended that the statements of OSHIMA and

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