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ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

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CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Mistreatment of prisoners of war, violation of rules of land warfare, and Geneva Convention

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1) Standard of treatment of American prisoners of war by Japan was below that adhered to by civilized nations under accepted rules of warfare. Conditions were worse in the Philippines, Formosa and Thailand where the brutality was greater in the overseas command and in the early years of the war.

2) Reasons for this treatment include:

a) Prisoners of war, Japanese or allied, are considered to have forfeited all rights.

b) Japanese class system places the Caucasian prisoner below the Japanese soldier.

c) Facilities furnished Japanese soldiers are far below American standards.

d) Personnel assigned PW camps were of the lowest variety.

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e) The Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau and Prisoner War Management Office had no effective system of providing information, assuming responsibility or of effectuating orders.

f) PW's were publically humiliated to show the oriental superiority over the white man.

Report prepared by General Lerch while in the Philippines, Japan, Korea and China in October, 1945, after research, conference and study.

Attached is a chart of systems of the interrelated organizations relative to the PW management under the Japanese Government.

/NOTE: No letter of transmittal on this report./

Analyst: E. Jackson

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EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT NO. 914

JAPANESE HANDLING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR -

A LETTER BY MAJOR GENERAL ARCHER L. LERCH



HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



30 NOV 1945

SUBJECT: Japanese Handling of American Prisoners of War

THRU: Commanding General, ASF

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WDGS

I. Japanese Administration of Allied Prisoners of War. While in the Philippine Islands, Japan, Korea, and China in October 1945, Major General Archer L. Lerch, accompanied by two members of his staff, Lieutenant Colonel Ben H. Powell and Captain Richard E. Guggenheim, inquired into the administration of American prisoners of war by the Japanese. In the course of this inquiry extensive interviews were conducted in Tokyo with the Japanese Army officers primarily in charge of prisoner of war matters at the Japanese national headquarters, as well as with the Swiss consular officers who, as representatives of the United States, had dealt with the Japanese Government during the period of the war, and the local representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross during that period. Considerable assistance was given by various Allied officers, principally Major Crandall of the Tokyo Branch Office, Recovered Personnel Division, Adjutant General's Office, AFPAC; Major H. S. Williams, Australian Army Liaison Officer; and Major John P. Robinson, Canadian Army Liaison Officer, who attended the various conferences with the Japanese officers, after first giving us the benefit of the information which they had already received in previous conferences.

The following Japanese officers attended the conferences at the Tokyo Prisoner of War Information Bureau and Prisoner of War Management Office which were then located in the village of Suginami-Ku, on the outskirts of Tokyo:

Lieutenant General Tamura, Chief
Colonel Tadashi Odajima
Colonel Takakaski
Major Masaru Takata
Captain Takauchi

II. Japanese Military Organization and its Relationship to the Handling of Enemy Prisoners of War. The Japanese National Government was so organized that the War Ministry was coordinated to the Imperial General Headquarters, both agencies being responsible to the emperor.

It appears that the Imperial GHQ controlled all overseas combat commands, whereas the Ministry of War was primarily responsible for general administrative matters throughout the Army, including the administration of Army activities within the main Japanese islands. Accordingly, the promulgation of regulations pertaining to the administration of prisoners of war wherever held by Japan and the operation of the prisoner of war camps within Japan proper, Korea and Manchuria were the responsibility of the Ministry of War, whereas the Imperial GHQ was primarily responsible for the administration of prisoner of war camps in all other overseas areas.

The Imperial Naval Headquarters, under the Navy Ministry, had direct jurisdiction over all prisoners of war held by the Navy until such time as they were transferred to permanent prisoner of war camps. In addition to these agencies, various other Japanese Government offices, both within and without the military establishment, had some interest and authority to lesser degrees in matters concerning prisoners of war. The division of authority among these several agencies is of considerable importance in considering the explanation for general Japanese policies. The officers and individuals who were immediately charged with responsibilities for prisoner of war administration and who were assigned to these duties on a full time basis were within the War Department, and comprised the staff of the Prisoner of War Management office and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

III. Establishment of and Relationship Between Japanese Army Organizations Handling Prisoner of War Matters. Upon the Japanese declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau was established by the Japanese Government for the purpose of supplying information in accordance with the Geneva Convention. This Bureau was established separate from the Ministry of War yet under the War Minister's supervision. Being a newly established agency outside of the normal channels of communication of the War Ministry, Naval Ministry, and Imperial GHQ, the Prisoner of War Information Bureau received very little information from those agencies concerning Allied prisoners of war, and principally handled inquiries received from foreign governments through Geneva. In March, 1942, there was established within the Ministry of War, a Prisoner of War Management Office whose functions primarily were to plan and supervise the internment, transfer, liberation, punishment, utilization and treatment of prisoners of war. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau and the Prisoner of War Management Office have always been situated together and operated principally by the same personnel. General Tamura, the present head of these two offices, states that his predecessor, who was head of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, was instrumental in establishing the Prisoner of War Management Office within the War Department in order that these officials would be within War Ministry channels of distribution, could

utilize the facilities and personnel, and gain the prestige of the War Ministry. The Prisoner of War Management Office was supervised within the War Ministry by a general planning bureau, known as the Military Affairs Bureau, and General Tamura stated that although the establishment of the Prisoner of War Management Office within the War Ministry improved the position of officials handling prisoners of war, there were still many disagreements and disapprovals of their proposals by other agencies within the War Ministry.

Thus, the chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, an agency outside both the War Ministry and the Imperial GHQ, maintained records pertaining to individual prisoners of war; whereas the chief of the Prisoner of War Management Office, a Bureau of the War Ministry, was responsible both for the promulgation of plans and policies on the administration of prisoners of war and for the supervision of prisoner of war camps; and finally, Imperial GHQ was responsible for the operation of prisoner of war camps and all other matters in overseas combat commands. Prisoner of War camps in Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria, were inspected and visited by officers from the Prisoner of War Management Office, representing the War Ministry, whereas prisoner of war camps in overseas commands could only be visited by these Tokyo officials after approval by and as representatives of Imperial GHQ. Similarly, instructions from the Management Office were sent to prisoner of war camps in Japan proper, Korea, and Manchuria by order of the War Ministry, whereas such instructions to prisoner of war camps in overseas commands had to be cleared with Imperial GHQ and sent out with their approval. There is attached a Japanese Army organization chart furnished by General Tamura which outlines these functions and areas of responsibility.

IV. Operation of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. Japanese regulations required combat units to have prisoners of war fill out cards and forward shortly after capture, reporting the prisoner's name, nationality, unit, rank and health. In theory, both Army and Navy units forwarded such capture cards through channels to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau. The Information Bureau then prepared a master card on the new prisoner of war. According to the Japanese officials of the Bureau, this procedure was not followed in actual practice and only a small percentage of prisoners captured were so reported. Permanent or base prisoner of war camps were required to submit a monthly report of change in prisoner personnel, and it was from these roster reports of change that the Information Bureau often first learned of new prisoners of war.

It was thus more common for the Information Bureau to receive the first report concerning a prisoner of war after he had arrived in a permanent prisoner of war camp.

Prior to 1944 no attempt was made by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau to list the names of all prisoners in any systematic manner. Information concerning individual prisoners was left in the particular camp roster or Navy or Imperial General Headquarters communication which transmitted the original lists of names to the Information Bureau. In order to identify any individual, it was necessary to search through each of these rosters, resulting in considerable error, incomplete information, and prolonged delays. Accordingly, there remained several alphabetical indexes and the Bureau never established any single master index which would enable individuals to be identified immediately. Further, inspection indicated that all records of the Information Bureau were substantially incomplete and in many cases out of date by as much as a year or more. For example, a check of the names of several prisoners who were known to have died more than a year previously revealed that the Information Bureau continued to carry them as living. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau contained no modern office equipment or machines of any nature, and in general exhibited a degree of inefficiency to an extent exceeding mere carelessness.

On 1 January 1944, Major Takata, a graduate of Columbia University and a business executive in civilian life, was assigned to the Information Bureau. He established a central card file system for prisoners of war. A card for each prisoner of war showed his name, nationality, rank, date of birth, family, military unit, place of capture, prisoner of war camp, and occupation. The cards were first separately filed according to each of the seven administrative areas of Japan Proper and the various overseas commands. Within each of these groups the cards were then separated into nationality groups. Within each nationality group the cards were arranged alphabetically.

The work of the Information Bureau with respect to prisoners of war was allocated among three sections in the following manner: (1) the first section answered inquiries from enemy powers about their nationals, (2) the second section furnished lists of prisoners of war and reported deaths, and (3) the third section maintained the central card file system.

The Information Bureau also handled records of civilian internees, and disposed of the effects of deceased prisoners of war and civilian internees. At the time of our inspection there were 1532 packages containing effects of individual Americans, 1000 of which contained only money. In reply to an inquiry as to the disposition of the effects of the other thousands of deceased American prisoners of war, the Bureau officials replied that often the personal effects were handed directly to the friends of the deceased, and also that during the period when a large amount of shipping from overseas commands to Japan was being sunk, instructions were

issued to cease forwarding the packages to the Bureau. It was also pointed out that many of the deceased prisoners of war were killed under such circumstances that there were no personal effects left, such as in the sinking of ships and the burning of aircraft.

The Prisoner of War Information Bureau officials have admitted that certain of the records stored at the Bureau were burned on and after 15 August 1945 in compliance with a telephone order received from the Japanese War Ministry. A similar order was issued to the seven administrative areas, and each of the base prisoner of war camps in those areas are believed to have burned certain of their records. No reliable descriptions of the records so destroyed have been received.

V. Transmission of Reports of Prisoners of War.

It was not until February 1943 that the United States received any substantial number of names of Americans who had been captured by the Japanese during the first quarter of 1942 and the information submitted has never been completed. Our allies apparently received similar treatment. The Australian liaison officer pointed out that various groups of Australians who were known by the Bureau to be dead and about whom repeated inquiries had been made through the Protecting Power and the International Red Cross, were reported by the Japanese until the end of the war as unknown - "no information available". One of these instances involved approximately 1042 Australians captured by the Japanese at Rabaul. The vessel transporting these prisoners of war was the Montevideo Maru, which was sunk on 1 July 1942, and the Japanese Information Bureau was informed of the vessel's sinking and the loss of all prisoners of war in May 1943 and did not transmit this information to Australia. The reason for the withholding of this information is not apparent. It may well be, as contended by Japanese officials, that a mistake was made originally through carelessness or negligence, and rather than admit or indicate any mistake or dereliction of duty, they subsequently intentionally concealed this information. A second group of Australians were captured on Ambon, New Guinea, and were lined up and shot by personnel of the Japanese Naval Command. When Australia made repeated inquiries through the Protecting Power as to the fate of these prisoners of war, the Japanese Naval Ministry sent several radiograms to the Ambon Command for a statement as to the whereabouts of these prisoners of war. The Australian liaison officer feels that Tokyo was not informed by the Ambon Command of the atrocity for several years and when finally informed, determined to conceal the atrocity. A third instance involving 1200 natives, who were transferred to mid-Pacific islands as laborers and never reported to Australia, appears to have been a mere oversight of the fact that these natives were Australian subjects.

When pressed for an explanation of the failure to report the names of the Australians, such as those in the Montevideo Maru sinking and the Ambon massacre, particularly when the records concerning these individuals were on file in the Bureau, General Tamura stated that he regretted these incidents and that a mistake had been made, probably through negligence.

General Tamura also stated that there was a continued backlog in the reporting of names of prisoners of war and that he had assigned the following priority in the reporting of individuals: (1) prisoners of war who were alive, (2) deceased prisoners of war, and (3) missing prisoners of war.

It would appear that several factors were involved in the consistent failure by the Japanese to report names or deaths of prisoners. (1) The lack of interest of the Japanese people in prisoner of war matters, (2) the general inefficiency and inaccuracy in the operation of the Information Bureau, reflected in a lack of a system until 1944 and a continuous deficiency of personnel, (3) failure of overseas commands and naval installations to report the names of prisoners as required by the regulations. This failure of local commanders appears to have been due to negligence in some cases and in others, particularly those involving incidents or atrocities of a nature unfavorable to the local commands, to have been deliberately suppressed. The attitude of the allied powers in continuously pressing the Japanese for lists of prisoners of war may have caused the Japanese to withhold and delay information which they otherwise might have given had they not been so pressed. Although there is no direct evidence thereof, it is possible that some lists of prisoners of war were suppressed or delayed in accordance with instructions of authority higher than the Information Bureau.

VI. Handling of Prisoner of War Mail.

Late in 1942 instructions were published by the Japanese regarding the addressing of mail to prisoners of war. These specified that if the prison camp was known, it should be stated in the address. If the camp was not known, the letter was to be addressed in care of the Japanese Red Cross Society, which would endeavor to trace the whereabouts of the man and re-direct the mail. The Japanese Red Cross Society in fact, made no attempt to handle this mail, but merely passed it directly to the Information Bureau. The Japanese were swamped with mail after the publication of these instructions, and established a mail sorting center, operated by prisoners of war, in the Prisoner of War Camp at Omori. This mail sorting center operated from May 1943 until July 1944, at which time it was discontinued because the Japanese feared the prisoners of war were collecting too much information on the strength and location of prisoners of war. Thereafter, the mail was handled by the Information Bureau. The prisoner of war mail was sorted in Tokyo, first by the mail sorting center and later by the Bureau, and then shipped to the prisoner of war camps where it was to be censored and delivered. However, when the prisoner of war camps were first visited by allied PW recovery teams, sacks of mail, dating back to 1942, were found in numerous prisoner of war camps and it appears to have been the practice to deliver only a portion of the mail which reached the prisoner of war camp, the remaining mail either being burned or left undelivered. It is possible that the censorship of mail was causing too great a burden and the task was evaded by nondeliverance of mail. A large percentage of the mail addressed to prisoners of war was not delivered to them. During the period that the mail sorting center at Omori was in operation the percentage of letters delivered to prisoners increased greatly, but again dropped after the dissolution of the center.

With regard to the outgoing letters of the prisoners, the individual camps were responsible for censorship and forwarding of the letters directly to the post office, the mail thereafter being handled through normal postal channels.

In reply to an inquiry regarding the undelivered mail, General Tamura stated that, "We tried to handle this and encouraged delivery. However, many details were not known to this Bureau".

VII. Handling of Red Cross Parcels.

The allied liaison officers reported that generally these parcels were not delivered to the individual prisoners of war although there was considerable variance between prisoner of war camps, apparently depending upon the whim of individual camp commanders. In some camps many parcels were sold by the camp officials on the black market. When Red Cross parcels were given out to the prisoners at Omini Camp, which was the best camp on Kyushu, the camp commander required all cans to be opened when the parcels were delivered.

Occasionally parcels were delivered as a matter of publicity, as when it was deemed desirable to impress visiting officials. General Tamura was informed at our conference that Red Cross parcels were mishandled by prisoner of war camp commanders and that this must have been known to the Bureau, and accordingly he was asked to explain what action had been taken by the Bureau to correct this unsatisfactory condition. General Tamura admitted that there were instances of "petty Japanese officials" stealing some of these parcels or a portion of their contents; however, when these officials were caught, they were severely punished. He stated that there were records in the Bureau files of such punishments. He stated further that a system of joint supervision by the camp commander and the prisoner of war spokesman over these parcels was directed by the Prisoner of War Management Office as a corrective measure. In reply to a question as to the failure to distribute the bulk of the Red Cross parcels among prisoner of war camps, General Tamura stated that, after the allied sinking of a ship which carried Red Cross parcels, it was decided that no further Red Cross parcels could be expected and that those on hand should be stored and distribution carefully controlled in order that they might be allocated over a longer period of time.

VIII. Food.

The Japanese prisoner of war regulations required a minimum main ration for prisoners of war which was obligatory in all camps. This main ration consisted of certain staple foods which were furnished by the War Department directly to the prisoner of war camps and could not be altered. In addition to this main ration, the regulations specified that a supplemental ration was to be furnished to the prisoners by each camp, and for this purpose a monetary allowance was granted by the War Department to be

used by camp commanders in purchasing food locally to supplement the diet furnished by the main ration.

The Japanese prisoner of war regulations prescribed that prisoners of war will receive a daily minimum of 400 grams of food, or 600 grams of food if performing heavy work. On 3 March 1945 a letter of instructions was sent to all Area Commands in Japan Proper and to overseas commands reminding them of the necessity of complying with food regulations as prescribed in the regulations. The Prisoner of War Management Office sent these instructions by order of the War Ministry in an attempt to improve the rations actually being issued to prisoners of war. In January 1945, the Intendance Bureau of the War Ministry, which bureau is charged with supplying food for the Army, prepared and distributed a master menu. Occasionally the Prisoner of War Management Office required areas to furnish sample menus of their base PW camps for examination and approval. When a menu was found insufficient in a camp or area, the PW Management Office took corrective action, it was stated.

It appears that the quality and quantity of food prescribed by the Japanese War Minister for prisoners of war approximated that of the average Japanese soldier and worker. However, it is customary for Japanese army personnel to misappropriate a portion of the rations issued to any unit. Further, the average Japanese worker or soldier from birth has been used to a meager ration not much in excess to that insufficient quantity prescribed during the war. In addition, the Japanese civilian and soldier regularly purchased on the black market and naturally, the black market was not available to prisoners of war. The effect of this sub-Japanese war time standard of food on Americans, who since birth had been used to the high American standard of food, is apparent.

IX. Canteens. The Allied Liaison officer stated that in those few camps having canteens, the canteens were never normally stocked. During visits by the International Red Cross and other outside agencies, and probably during the inspection by Japanese officers from higher headquarters, the canteens were filled or partially filled. This statement was confirmed by Dr. Bernhard, and Dr. Wurth of the Swiss Legation. There may have been a few camps in which a limited stock of supplies were maintained in the canteen, such as beer, since conditions varied according to the desires of the individual camp commander.

X. Prisoner of War Regulations.

In preparation for the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese issued regulations pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war. These regulations were revised slightly in 1905, 1909, 1914, and on 23 December 1941, were revised "to meet the requirements of the present war." The most recent revision to the regulations appeared in 1943. Inapplicable regulations were cancelled and various new provisions were added in the

1941 revision which appeared in the form of a printed book about 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ inches thick. These Prisoner of War Regulations are designed primarily to govern the handling of prisoners of war in the Zone of Interior in base camps, although as they are issued with the approval of the Imperial General Headquarters and Minister of War, they are mandatory in overseas combat commands as well as in Japan Proper. However, during the periods of initial capture of prisoners of war in the field and during their movement to base prisoner of war camps, the Prisoner of War Regulations are not applicable and the very general statements in the Japanese Army Field Regulations govern the treatment of such prisoner personnel during those early phases. Copies of the Prisoner of War Regulations were distributed to all Area commands in Japan Proper and to overseas commands and were redistributed to base prisoner of war camps. New regulations and amendments were normally originated by the Prisoner of War Management Office, either on its own initiative or at the suggestion of higher authorities. A proposed regulation had to be approved by the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Department, and then by the War Minister, before it could be officially published. In addition to the staff supervision which was exercised by the Military Affairs Bureau over the Prisoner of War Management Office, regulations touching on certain specialized fields also had to be cleared with the offices responsible for those fields. For example, regulations concerning courts martial or military discipline were also concurred in by the Judicial Bureau of the War Ministry, regulations on medical care were referred to the Medical Bureau, and regulations concerning pay and supplies to the Intendance Bureau. After a prisoner of war regulation had been approved by the War Minister, it was binding upon prisoner of war camps under War Ministry supervision. However, for purposes of making the regulations effective in overseas commands, it was necessary to forward the regulation to Imperial Army Headquarters for approval and distribution overseas. The procedure described above for the promulgating of regulations was also applicable to any general directive issued concerning prisoners of war. It may be noted that considerable authority, insofar as final approval of a regulation was concerned, rested in the Military Affairs Bureau, even though the Prisoner of War Management Office was chiefly responsible for initiating new regulations or changes. General Tamura repeatedly stated that many difficulties were encountered in attempting to push any regulation or instruction through the War Ministry which granted improved conditions to prisoners.

XI. Treatment of Prisoners of War.

In many prisoner of war camps, prisoners of war of various nationality groups were housed in separate compounds of a single camp or were organized into different companies according to nationality where there was only a single enclosure. For example, the prisoner of war camp in Jinsen, Korea, contained 138 Americans, 26 British, and 4 Australians at the time of liberation. The Allied Liaison officers reported that there was much

Jealousy and ill feeling between most nationality groups. For instance, the Dutch did not get along well with Canadian prisoners of war; however, Canadians got along excellently with Americans.

a. Treatment of PWs by Japanese Civilians. The crews of B-29 Bombers received far worse treatment by the civilian population than any other class of American prisoners. The Allied Liaison officer stated that the Japanese Army saved many of these prisoners of war from massacre by the civilian Japanese. Prisoners of war other than B-29 Bomber crews apparently received fairly good treatment from the average civilian who was not connected with a Prisoner of War Camp, particularly the civilians in rural areas. Many complaints were registered by prisoners of war against civilian guards at factories where the prisoners were employed, the basis normally being that these guards were harder task masters than were the Japanese military guards. An extremely large number of complaints have been registered by prisoners of war against civilian interpreters. In almost every instance, these interpreters either were former citizens of or residents of various Allied countries, and it was possible that those civilians had been discriminated against on a racial basis when they had resided in Allied countries before the war. Lieutenant Colonel M. Elrington, British Army, Spokesman for the Keijo Camp, Seoul, Korea, complained bitterly of the contemptuous, arrogant, and brutal treatment received by British and American prisoners of war from civilian interpreters, all of whom had been United States citizens of Japanese ancestry and had attended American Universities on the West Coast.

b. Guards. There was considerable discussion with the Japanese officers concerning the widespread physical mistreatment of prisoners of war. Although the Japanese would not admit serious beatings and abuses, except in rare exceptions, they agreed that slapping and minor beating of prisoners were prevalent. In this connection, the Japanese pointed out that the slapping of inferiors as a reprimand or mild form of punishment, although now officially outlawed, was a common practice in Japan. The Japanese claim that it was a natural reaction for guards to slap the prisoners who had irritated them slightly and a difficult practice for the camp commander to eradicate, although it was claimed that consistent attempts were made to prevent such actions. The Allied Liaison officers, Major Robinson and Major Williams, complained to General Tamura about several instances in which mentally deficient guards had brutally treated or killed certain Canadian and Australian prisoners. General Tamura admitted "with regrets" that such instances had occurred. He stated that every time such incidents were reported to the Bureau, corrective action was taken. He stated that there were many cases of guards having been punished numerous times as a result of their ill treatment of prisoners. The Australian Liaison officer retorted that the notorious Sergeant Watanabe had merely been transferred from one prisoner of war camp to another whereas he should have been court-

martialed and severely punished. General Tamura replied that this guard had finally been removed from prisoner of war duty. General Tamura stated that slapping "was not punishment, but a sign of a person's having lost his temper," and an unfortunate practice in the Japanese Army which he hoped at some time would be completely eradicated. The General further stated that the differences in language and customs between the guards and the prisoners added materially to the causes of poor treatment. For example, the position of standing "at ease" was not recognized by the Japanese Army, and the guard often misinterpreted such a position when assumed by a prisoner as an indication of lack of proper military respect and accordingly became angry, losing his temper and slapping the prisoner. The Japanese officials also explained that prisoner of war guard duty had one of the lowest priorities on manpower in the Japanese Army. Often Formosans and Koreans were employed overseas as guards. Thus, the Japanese officers and guards at camps were taken from the bottom of the Japanese manpower barrel. General Tamura stated further that it was most difficult to supervise adequately these prisoner of war officers and guards who had such low mentality and ability, particularly after the establishment of a large number of branch prisoner of war camps for the employment of prisoner of war labor over a widely scattered area. General Tamura was unable to explain the extremely brutal treatment which Major Williams contended had been exhibited by various Japanese Marine Units overseas, the personnel in such units being of the highest quality in the Japanese Army. Although some weight should be accorded the explanations made by the Japanese officers, it was obvious that an attempt was being made to minimize the extent of the brutality exhibited in Japanese prisoner of war camps generally.

Another factor in the treatment of prisoners was a result of the very definite system of class distinction practiced in the Japanese Army. In the prisoner of war, the Japanese private had, at last, found an inferior to be subjected to his will. And, in addition, he was a white man. Mr. Paul Wirth of the Swiss Legation stated that he felt that the ill treatment was due, in most cases of small disagreements, to the oriental nature of the Japanese and to their definite inferiority complex. It is very probable that many acts of ill treatment towards prisoners of war resulted from actual misinterpretation, by lower ranking Japanese officers and men with a definite inferiority complex, of actions involving at the most only minor infractions of the regulations.

The Geneva Convention prescribes that prisoners of war shall receive the same type of sentences by general courts martial as those received by military personnel of the detaining power for similar offenses. However, the Japanese regulations prescribe a separate standard of punishment or sentences to be applicable in courts martial of prisoners of war.

It appears that the Japanese guards were normally corrupt and established a system whereby the prisoners of war on work details and in warehouses would steal food which was distributed to the guards upon the return of the

prisoners to camp. Prisoners frequently established prohibited relationships with guards, usually accompanied by bribes, in return for which the guards furnished the prisoner with extra food, preferential treatment, or news of the outside world. Organized rackets of this nature became common in many camps even though the guard involved would not protect the prisoner against other guards or camp officials. The guards at prisoner of war camps were changed very frequently.

The Allied Liaison officers enumerated the following additional reasons which might explain the ill treatment by the Japanese:

Allied prisoners of war, particularly during the early years of the war, would not learn Japanese and through lack of knowledge of the language they received much bad treatment as a result of misunderstanding; the temperament of many individual persons prevents them from "getting along" under the strained and unusual circumstances of prison life; many Allied prisoners of war chose to sabotage the Japanese War effort whenever possible thus assuming risks to their safety and treatment; possibly there was a Japanese plan during the early part of the war that much of the ill treatment received by prisoners of war would be communicated to the allied troops and accordingly might adversely affect their combat ability; and finally any person who surrendered in combat particularly in the early days, was considered by the Japanese to be of the lowest class, not deserving due respect or treatment.

XII. Medical Treatment.

The Japanese Army medical service operates on a very low standard, particularly as compared to the American and British medical services. As a result, not only were the physical equipment in their hospitals and their medicines inferior and almost in continually short supply, but also their doctors stationed at prisoner of war camps were particularly incompetent. The surgeon general of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, stated that the Japanese doctors who are now handling the large groups of surrendered Japanese troops in the Western Pacific consistently refuse to visit their wards, stating that Japanese medical doctors never visit their wards as this would result in "losing face." In addition, a Japanese soldier who allows himself to become ill through disease or becomes involved in an accident in combat, has committed a wrong against the Emperor and is a burden on the Army, and therefore the policy of the Japanese Army officer is to eliminate all hospital patients through starvation or neglect. These practices of the Japanese medical services towards their own personnel go a long way to explain the very poor medical service afforded to prisoners of war. The competent prisoner of war doctors at various prisoner of war camps were often hampered in diagnosing illnesses of prisoners of war through the combination of an incorrect diagnosis of the illness by the Japanese doctor and subsequent refusal to correct his diagnosis even when shown to be wrong, as such a change of diagnosis would be embarrassing.

CHAPTER 2. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM OF PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS

The Japanese system of prisoner of war camps was based on the principle of self-sufficiency and discipline. The camps were organized into units, each with its own command structure. The Japanese believed that a well-organized camp would ensure the health and efficiency of the prisoners, while also maintaining strict control over their activities. The system was designed to be a model of order and discipline, reflecting the Japanese military ethos. The camps were often located in remote areas, and the prisoners were required to work on the land to support themselves. The Japanese officials believed that this system would prevent the prisoners from becoming a burden on the host country and would instead make them a self-sufficient community. The system was based on the idea that the prisoners should be treated as a unit, and that the camp commander was responsible for the overall well-being of the prisoners. The Japanese believed that this system would ensure that the prisoners were treated with respect and dignity, while also maintaining the discipline and order that they considered essential for a well-organized community. The system was based on the idea that the prisoners should be treated as a unit, and that the camp commander was responsible for the overall well-being of the prisoners. The Japanese believed that this system would ensure that the prisoners were treated with respect and dignity, while also maintaining the discipline and order that they considered essential for a well-organized community.

General Tamura was one of the most important figures in the Japanese system of prisoner of war camps. He was a former prisoner of war himself, and he had a deep understanding of the needs and desires of the prisoners. He believed that the Japanese system of prisoner of war camps was the best way to treat prisoners, and he worked hard to ensure that it was implemented correctly. General Tamura was a firm believer in the idea of self-sufficiency and discipline, and he believed that this was the best way to ensure the health and efficiency of the prisoners. He believed that the Japanese system of prisoner of war camps was a model of order and discipline, and he worked hard to ensure that it was implemented correctly. General Tamura was a firm believer in the idea of self-sufficiency and discipline, and he believed that this was the best way to ensure the health and efficiency of the prisoners. He believed that the Japanese system of prisoner of war camps was a model of order and discipline, and he worked hard to ensure that it was implemented correctly.

XIV. Recurring Reports from Japanese Prisoner of War Camps to the Tokyo Management Office.

The Japanese officials were asked what recurring reports were required by the Prisoner of War Management Office from prisoner of war camps as part of their supervision of prisoner of war administration. In reply, it was stated that prisoner of war camps made a monthly report on such items as food, health, and labor, to their area commander in Japan Proper or to the appropriate overseas commander with a copy transmitted directly to the Prisoner of War Management Office. These monthly reports are required by Chapter 18 of the Japanese Prisoner of War Regulations. Based upon these monthly reports, a consolidated annual report by the Management Office was compiled for submission to the War Minister. The consolidated annual report to the War Minister for one of the war years was approximately six inches thick. In addition, prisoner of war camps were required to report directly to the War Minister and to the Prisoner of War Management Office any incident of an unusual nature.

General Tamura was asked what action, if any, was taken by the Prisoner of War Management Office when an analysis of the monthly reports from certain areas disclosed a high death rate due to such cause as malnutrition. He replied that under such circumstances, the Prisoner of War Management Office had a directive issued from the War Minister or the Imperial General Headquarters, such as the one dated April 1944 which was transmitted to the Japanese Commanding General in China, directing that immediate action be taken to curtail the high death rate which had been reported. In addition, inspectors from the Prisoner of War Management Office went to the Chinese Theater to investigate conditions. However, as pointed out above, the results of the Tokyo directives and visits by inspectors were perhaps not too great under the inspection system which prevailed in the Japanese Army.

Thus, the Prisoner of War Management Office admits responsibility for supervision of the operation of the prisoner of war camps in Japan proper and overseas areas, under the restraints and limitations which have been outlined, and they utilized the media of inspections, of recurring and special reports, and letters of instructions, in exercising this supervision. However, the effectiveness of this supervision is questionable.

XV. Prisoner of War Activities of the Swiss Legation and International Committee of the Red Cross.

Throughout the war, representatives of the Swiss Legation, as protecting power for the United States, and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, as a service agency for the benefit of prisoners, made continuous efforts to visit regularly all prisoner of war camps in which Allied personnel were held. In the case of the International Committee of the Red Cross, permission for such visits was requested directly of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau and Prisoner of War Management Office, which then obtained the necessary clearance from the War Minister. In the case of the Swiss Legation, permission had to be requested through the Japanese Foreign Office which in turn referred the matter to the War Minister for decision. In both cases the decision of whether to permit the visit

was made by personnel of the Prisoner of War Management Office.

According to the Allied Liaison officers, the International Red Cross staff in Tokyo was increased in size during the early part of 1942 in order to handle the many prisoners of war who were captured by the Japanese. The civilians who aided the staff were afforded a semi-diplomatic status of employees of the International Red Cross. The chief delegate of the International Red Cross in Tokyo until he died in 1943 was Doctor Paravicini, who had been, at one time, a member of the Swiss Legation in Tokyo. Doctor Junod replaced Dr. Paravicini in 1943.

An interview was had with Dr. Bernhardt, Dr. Paul Wüth, and Mr. Bischoff, of the Swiss Legation, all of whom had been active in prisoner of war matters in Japan during the war. Mr. Bischoff handled financial matters for the Legation and Dr. Bernhardt and Dr. Wüth were concerned with inspections and reports concerning the Japanese handling of prisoners of war. It appears that both the International Red Cross and Swiss Legation had made vigorous and continuous efforts to obtain information concerning the identity and welfare of Allied prisoners, to visit the camps, to furnish the prisoners food and other necessities, and to aid them in all other possible ways. These efforts encountered evasion, rebuffs, and lack of cooperation by the Japanese authorities with the result that the benefits actually achieved for the prisoners amounted to very little. There are exceptional cases. As an exception, rather than a rule, the Japanese would cooperate to allow certain visits and to follow up certain complaints. For example, the International Red Cross made many direct inquiries of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau regarding the location and fate of certain individual prisoners, or requesting lists of groups of prisoners. The Swiss officials state that normally a cold and arrogant attitude was encountered. If the written inquiry was not presented in a manner pleasing to the personnel of the Information Bureau, it might be returned unanswered or simply ignored. The Prisoner of War Information Bureau often delayed replies even to pleasingly phrased inquiries an unreasonable length of time. Thus, Dr. Wüth of the Swiss Legation stated that, on one occasion, the Information Bureau had furnished a list of names "containing 52 names," but which on examination was found to contain only 51 names, and when this discrepancy was brought to the attention of the Information Bureau, no more lists were furnished by the Information Bureau to the Swiss Legation for six months. The Swiss representatives stated further that they had never been furnished a list of all the prisoner of war camps, and even by the end of the war, when the Japanese became considerably more cooperative, the Swiss had only been officially informed of 36 main prisoner of war camps out of the 102 camps which were actually in operation. They had ascertained the names of the remaining camps by listening to Japanese shortwave broadcasts. The Swiss further stated that the Japanese officials had never permitted a second visit to any prisoner of war camp, so that the Swiss never knew what action had actually been taken to correct any deficiency which had been complained of by the Swiss to the Japanese. (However, the IRC were allowed to visit camps a second time.)

It should be noted that in addition to the many verbal requests made, the Swiss Legation made a formal or written request or complaint on an average of every three days throughout the period of the war, and the International Red Cross made equally persistent efforts to obtain information desired. The Swiss addressed all complaints to the Foreign Office and they were then forwarded to the Information Bureau, or the Prisoner of War Management Office. The Foreign Office often told the Swiss that it was unable to obtain the requested information from the War Department and was not in a position to do anything further. Thus the Foreign Office showed little interest in following up inquiries of the Swiss which had not been answered by the War Ministry and attempted to prevent the Swiss representative from having direct contacts with officials of the Prisoner of War Management Office. It was apparently essential for the Swiss to be very tactful in approaching the Foreign Office as several of their complaints concerning the incompleteness or inaccuracy in certain Japanese reports were returned by the Foreign Office to the Swiss with a statement that these complaints were discourteous and hence would not be considered. The Allied Liaison officers were under the impression that the Swiss finally concluded that the visits to prisoner of war camps accomplished little good and antagonized the Japanese and that, therefore, the Swiss did not push the matter of visits during the later years of the war. When visits were permitted, the representative of the Swiss or Red Cross was never permitted to speak to a prisoner of war privately but only in the presence of the camp commander. In addition, the visiting neutral representative was accompanied by an official from the Prisoner of War Management Office. The prisoner of war to be interviewed by the representatives of the neutral agencies normally was selected by the Japanese.

When one of the neutral representatives visited the prisoner of war camp in Manchuria which held high-ranking American and British officers, he was informed that he would be allowed to ask only one question of General Mainwright and would not be permitted to speak to General Percival of the British Army who was the ranking officer and spokesman, even though he might be spoken to by General Percival. Similar instructions on questions which could be asked the prisoner and limitations on the prisoners of war who could be interviewed were imposed during other visits by neutral representatives. The visiting representatives were forced to comply strictly with these limitations lest they jeopardize any future visits. In addition, it appears that the prisoner of war camp to be visited was warned, in advance, and prepared for the visit by momentarily stocking the prisoner of war canteen, issuing unusually good rations to the prisoners, or issuing some Red Cross parcels, thereby creating a false picture of conditions. The experienced neutral inspectors were seldom deceived by the staged effects; but because of the limitations imposed upon them and the difficulty of their relationship with the Japanese Government officials, were unable to comment upon or investigate the rehearsed performance which was presented to them.

The Allied representatives made these further comments on the approach to the Japanese which was utilized by the Swiss and the International Red Cross: These neutral agencies could not tell the Japanese representatives that they were positively wrong about anything; they could only report factually the actual conditions in a Japanese prisoner of war camp and, in a tactful manner, report factually the conditions in prisoner of war camps operated by the Allied Powers for Japanese prisoners, suggesting that Japan, as a great nation, of course, would come up to the standard of the Allied Powers. Dr. Bernhardt of the Swiss Legation described the meeting which General Tamura called soon after he assumed responsibility as head of the Prisoner of War Management Office and Information Bureau. General Tamura is said to have discoursed in a semi-argumentive manner for two hours, promising better relationships between the Japanese Government and the neutral agencies and a more liberal attitude in allowing more visits to camps. However, Dr. Bernhardt noticed no marked change in attitude or relationships thereafter. The Swiss on many occasions attempted to gain concessions from Major Takata of the Prisoner of War Management Office, who was the most understanding Japanese official in that office. However, no real lasting concessions were gained and Major Takata was soon retired from the Army, perhaps, as stated by Dr. Bernhardt, because of his relatively considerate attitude towards prisoner of war problems. Dr. Bernhardt commented on the great variance between standards in different prisoner of war camps depending upon the temperament and ability of the individual camp commanders and prisoner of war spokesmen. He felt that the camps in Hokkaido were, on the whole, the most satisfactory camps. As to the utilization of prisoner of war labor, Dr. Bernhardt stated that few, if any, Allied prisoners were employed on Japanese military reservations and that they were used mainly in war industry, including coal mines. Although the Japanese officials stated that the prisoners of war worked only eight hours per day, Dr. Bernhardt said that this limitation was not observed, working hours depending on local conditions.

Mr. Bischoff handled the financial matters for the Swiss Legation during the war. He explained the procedure whereby money furnished by the United States to the Swiss in Geneva was ultimately made available to the prisoner of war camps. The Swiss transmitted by wire from Geneva to Tokyo a credit in Swiss francs of the amount given the Swiss by the United States Government. The Japanese Government established a rate of exchange between the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen which was much more unfavorable to the Swiss than this rate had been prior to the war. After various deductions, the Swiss francs were converted into Japanese yen and the Yokohama Specie Bank telegraphed money orders to the commanding officers of prisoner of war camps in Japan and in overseas commands. Often the prisoner of war camp leader countersigned the money order certificate. Mr. Bischoff stated, however, that money was of little value to prisoners of war in improving their conditions. When queried for an explanation of the low level of treatment which the Japanese afforded American prisoners of war,

Mr. Bischoff stated that as for food, the civilian Japanese and the military prison guards had very little food during the war and had the prisoners been allowed any considerable increase in their food rations, the prisoners would have eaten far better than the average Japanese. Even with his diplomatic advantages and liberal supply of money, Mr. Bischoff lost thirty pounds during the war due to being unable to obtain sufficient food through regular or black market channels. His only explanation for brutality was that the Japanese were orientals. Dr. Paul Wurth confirmed the statement as to the meager rations allowed prisoners of war and made the following statement: "The standard of food and housing for prisoners of war was about the same as the average worker and soldier of Japan. The average Japanese worker and soldier had been used to a meager ration from birth and during the war this normal meager ration was maintained only by black market purchases. Not only was the black market inaccessible to the prisoners of war, but also a portion of the meager official ration allowed the prisoners of war was diverted by the guards into their own mess or sold on the black market."

Statements of the Japanese Prisoner of War Management Office
Officials on Relationships with the International Red Cross and Swiss.
General Tamura explained that prior to each individual visit by representatives of neutral agencies, permission had to be obtained from the War Minister. He stated that when requests for these visits were referred to him for recommendation, he "always tried to have the visits approved." The visits to prisoner of war camps on the Thailand railroad were refused by the War Minister upon the recommendation of the field commander. He further stated that no limit was placed on what was seen by the International Red Cross inspectors, except that one day was the maximum length of a visit to any one prisoner of war camp. The inspectors could not talk to prisoners of war regarding the status of the war, and the prisoner of war camp commanders might otherwise limit the questions and activities of the neutral visitors. General Tamura stated that an inspection form which was originally devised in Germany was used by the neutral inspectors in making their inquiries at the camps. The International Red Cross and Swiss inspectors made comments in these reports on overall conditions at the camps. In the summer of 1944, Dr. Bernhardt, accompanied by Major Takata, visited Omori Prisoner of War Camp No. 2 in the Tokyo area and several complaints on slapping were made in the report. Major Takata said that "every effort was made to get to the bottom of this complaint."

As to the number of visits by neutral inspectors, the Japanese officials stated that the Swiss had told the Management Office that the United States required the neutral representatives to visit a prisoner of war camp twice a month. Accordingly, the Japanese official stated that every effort had been made to allow an inspection of a prisoner of war camp once every month by neutral powers. The following table shows the number of visits in each year to prisoner

of war camps in Japan by neutral representatives:

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Individual Visits</u>
1942	14
1943	94
1944	40
1945	7.

General Tamura made the following explanation of the limitation of the visits to prisoner of war camps and the great variance in the number of visits to prisoner of war camps during the various years. The War Ministry and Imperial General Headquarters during the early years of the war refused to allow visits to prisoner of war camps upon the recommendations of overseas commanders because the camps were just being established and, therefore, were not ready to receive visits from outside agencies. The camps in Japan Proper likewise were established in the summer of 1942 and not ready for visitors. More visits were allowed to prisoner of war camps in 1943 than any other year because by that time the camps had then become established and stabilized. However, during 1944 the Japanese allowed less than half the number of visits which had been allowed during 1943, and the Japanese officials explained that this was because bombing by the American Air Forces had forced the Japanese to move the prisoner of war camps during that year to the interior of Japan and to various rural areas where they would be somewhat protected from the bombing. General Tamura stated during this transition the camps were again "not in order." He explained the extremely small number of visits in 1945 on the same basis and further stated that transportation had become extremely difficult during the later years of the war. In discussing the many requests for information and the complaints which had been transmitted to his office by the Red Cross and Swiss, General Tamura stated "There was some feeling by this office that it was being pushed too much on inquiries and that some individuals were too persistent in their demands."

XVI. Separate Interrogation of Major Takata.

As Major Takata appeared to be the Japanese official who was most considerate of the treatment to be afforded prisoners of war, he was interrogated informally alone after he had explained the operation of the Master Card File System which he had established. Takata was educated at Columbia University in the United States, had no apparent inherent resentment along racial lines against Americans, and was intelligent enough to have a broad outlook which extended to an understanding of American customs and standards. It is believed that much of the following information which he has given us may be of value. "There appeared to be a vast difference in the relatively good treatment given prisoners of war by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese and

first world war and the relatively poor treatment given prisoners of war during the current war. During the prior wars, our enemies were generally surprised at the relatively kind treatment received by their prisoners whereas during this war, we have received many complaints from our enemies on the treatment which we have afforded prisoners. Basically, the difference is that this was a total war whereas the last two wars were not, and that civilians have suffered shortages in clothing, food, and other items. I first noticed the extreme brutality and hatred of prisoners of war while on duty in China, during the China incident. It was difficult for me to understand the desire of many Japanese officers and soldiers to mutilate and decapitate helpless Chinese prisoners of war and civilians. I also was in China when American and British prisoners of war were moved to China and forced to parade down the street to show the Chinese that white people could be captured by the yellow races. I am unable to say who is responsible for the feeling of hatred towards prisoners of war which generally existed throughout Japan during this war."

Major Takata also answered the following specific inquiries:

a. "Routing of communications by the Prisoner of War Management Office and overseas and area commands. All policy matters were routed through the War Ministry whereas routine matters were transmitted from the Bureau direct to the overseas commands and to the area commands in Japan Proper.

b. "Guard Personnel. The guards were under the local area commands and were not military police personnel. The area commander was responsible for the administration of the camps.

c. "Interrogation. Interrogation of prisoners of war was conducted by G-2 of the Imperial General Headquarters, not at a special interrogation center but by taking special trips to the camps holding the prisoner personnel to be interrogated. The Navy Ministry had a "temporary camp" near Yokohama where interrogation was conducted. Normally, prisoners of war were interrogated prior to the time that they came under the jurisdiction of the Prisoner of War Management Office by being transferred to a regular prisoner of war base camp.

d. "Treatment of Officer Prisoners of War and Payment for labor of all prisoners. Officer prisoners of war were not required to work. However, pressure was often put upon the officers to produce their own food. There was deducted from the pay of officers the regular deductions applying to Japanese officers for rations, clothing and quarters. The officers were paid in part in yen which was used for limited canteen expenditures and the remainder of the pay was credited to the individual prisoner's account in the postal savings system. The "privilege" of purchasing Japanese War Bonds was also offered in preference to investment in postal savings. Officers were allowed to keep about fifty yen on their person. Noncommissioned officers were

allowed to keep twenty yen on their person. Enlisted men were paid in yen for their labor. Only a limited amount could be held on their person (ten yen), the remainder being credited to their savings account. One Japanese camp commander turned over the entire proceeds of the savings account to one of the Allied Recovery teams, according to the Allied representatives.

e. "Security Standards. The standards of security at prisoner of war camps were entirely up to the area commanders who were responsible for the custody of the prisoners of war. Apparently, the standards of security were not inspected by the Tokyo Japanese officials.

f. "Housing Conditions. Standards of housing were likewise up to the area commander, but the Bureau Inspectors did include housing standards within the scope of their inspections."

XVII. Standard of Housing.

On the basis of the information obtained from Allied Recovery teams, the Allied Liaison officers, and personal inspections of former American prisoner of war camps in Japan Proper, Korea, and Shanghai, it appears that the Japanese generally furnished prisoners of war the same standard of housing which they furnished their own troops. All prisoner of war camps of new construction followed the same standards and pattern as other Japanese Army temporary construction which were seen. In those prisoner of war camps where the prisoners were housed in previously existing building, such as factories or other permanent structures which had been requisitioned, the conditions compared to billets furnished the Japanese troops in similar areas. No general complaints were received that prisoners of war had been discriminated against in the matter of housing. However, it must be understood that the standard of housing, including sanitary facilities, of the Japanese Army was and is far below the standards of the American Army. The difference in customs also worked a hardship on the Americans. For example, the Japanese sleep on a "pallet" rather than a bed. Japanese barracks contain a long low platform or shelf, along each side of the building, covered with thin mats upon which the occupants sleep side by side. The same type of facilities were furnished prisoners of war. The sanitary facilities in Japanese barracks are not only of the most primitive type but are not maintained in a state of cleanliness. It appeared that the Japanese resisted any attempts by the prisoners to improve the type of sanitary facilities, considering such attempts to be an insult to their way of life. For example, the Japanese repeatedly required the removal of wire screens which the prisoners had improvised to control flies. On the other hand, Japanese barracks in prisoner of war camps generally provided rather generous facilities for taking warm baths, since this was an accepted Japanese custom. Liberated American troops who have entered Japanese barracks recently evacuated by guards at prisoner of war camps or regular Japanese garrisons have quickly discovered that the former Japanese barracks are infested with vermin and that the Japanese troops lived under conditions

of filth and disorder, far below any American standard. Thus, even though the standards of the Geneva Convention may have been complied with insofar as housing was concerned, in that facilities equivalent to those furnished Japanese troops in base camps were provided for prisoners of war, living under such conditions was in itself a hardship for Americans.

XVIII. Conclusions.

1. Standard of Treatment of American Prisoners of War by Japan.

The treatment afforded American prisoners of war by the Japanese during the war was unsatisfactory and generally below the standard of treatment adhered to by civilized nations under accepted rules of warfare. However, in most established prisoner of war base camps in Japan Proper, Manchuria, and Korea, the food ration authorized and the housing, medical service, and other facilities provided prisoners of war were not far below the same type facilities and services authorized and officially provided personnel in the Japanese Army. In the overseas areas, particularly the Philippines, Formosa, and Thailand, the facilities and services provided Americans by the Japanese reached an indescribably low standard, far below that of the Japanese. The indignities and brutality normally practiced by the Japanese in all their prisoner of war camps against the prisoners of war in some respects did not exceed the practices developed to maintain discipline within the Japanese Army. These practices, however, do not include the atrocities and excessive brutality practiced on prisoners in many instances. It appears that brutality was more extreme and primitive in the overseas commands, particularly during the early years of the war, than in the camps in Japan Proper, Korea, and Manchuria.

2. Reasons for Low Standard of Treatment. Based upon our observations and the conclusions of various Allied officers, and the Swiss and International Red Cross representatives who have been in Japan throughout the war, the reasons for this low standard of treatment are believed to be:

(a) Prisoners of war, whether Japanese or Allied, are considered by the Japanese to have lost their honor and status as soldiers and to have forfeited any rights of citizenship or claim to considerate treatment.

(b) The Japanese Army's very definite class system was naturally extended to place the white prisoner of war in a new low category beneath the Japanese Army private, and therefore, the American prisoner of war was subject to the whims of any rank in the Japanese Army.

(c) The food, shelter, clothing, medical and other facilities and services furnished by the Japanese Army to its own soldiers were far, far below American standards. The facilities and services accorded prisoners of war never exceeded the standard of the Japanese Army.

(d) The officer and enlisted Japanese Army personnel assigned to prisoner of war camps was the poorest type in the Japanese Army. Often Formosans, Koreans, and Okinawans were utilized. The quality of this low priority personnel is unbelievably low in comparison to any American standard. Oriental personnel having this level of intelligence and standard of living generally are extremely primitive and any veneer of Western civilization is practically non-existent.


(e) The Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau and Prisoner of War Management Office did not establish an effective system of providing information concerning prisoners of war and did not effectively carry out their responsibility for supervision of prisoner of war activities.

(f) To further the Japanese concept of a "Greater East Asia for Orientals," the prisoners of war were publicly humiliated as a living exhibit of an oriental victory over the white race. A combination of the inherent inferiority complex of the Japanese and their oriental indifference to cruelty was in part responsible for the degree of brutality and indignities committed against prisoners of war. In this total war, Japan realized that all resources, both food and personnel, would have to be most carefully rationed and the official allowances to the Japanese civilian were based upon the minimum requirements for oriental existence. The Japanese would never have allowed any substantial portion of the Japanese resources to have been diverted to prisoners of war. It is believed that the basic policy governing the treatment of prisoners of war was in accord with the desires of the Japanese people as a whole.

1 Incl
Photostatic copy Japanese
Military Organization Chart

Archer L. Lerch
ARCHER L. LERCH
Major General
The Provost Marshal General


UNDER WAR MINISTER SUPERVIS



24

A GENERAL CHART OF SYSTEMS OF THE INTER-RELATED ORGANIZATIONS

RELATIVE TO THE P.O.W. MANAGEMENT AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES



Direct Command

Indirect Command

Report, Liaison, Enquiry, and answer

DUTIES

Affairs of Systems, Regulations, Military Administration, International Covenants, and Foreign Policies.

Affairs of Hygiene and Medical.

Pay, Maintenance, and Supplies.

Affairs of Court Marshall, Military Discipline and Prison.

General Plannings (Internment, Supervision, Exchange, Liberation, Punishment, Prof Treatment, and Treatment.)

FORM 11