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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Can you now state, Admiral, the category in  
3 which Midway was placed?

4 Admiral Stark: That would be in the same category in  
5 the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

6 Mr. Keefe: And what about Samoa?

7 Admiral Stark: Samoa would be also in D.

8 Mr. Keefe: The same category?

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: Now, at the time of the attack on Guam and  
11 the capture of Guam by the Japs were improvements on the  
12 harbor being made at that time or had they been completed?

13 Admiral Stark: They had not been completed. Of course,  
14 I recall very clearly the legislation with regard to that.  
15 I do not know just what their status was at this moment. I  
16 had obtained from Congress the appropriation, I believe it  
17 was \$6,000,000, for certain improvements to the harbor. You  
18 recall the first year I lost it by six votes, and the following  
19 year it went through almost unanimously, only one vote being  
20 opposed to it. Just how far we had gotten along with that  
21 I do not recall at the moment.

22 Mr. Keefe: With those improvements completed, Guam would  
23 still be in Category F, would it not?

24 Admiral Stark: In the same category, Category D. The  
25 improvements were not such as improved the defense of Guam

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2 but very little.

3 Mr. Keefe: Even with the improvements that were requested  
4 and contemplated the Island of Guam, in the opinion of the  
5 Joint Army and Navy Board, could not be successfully defended  
6 due to the power that Japan had in the mandated islands sur-  
7 rounding it, is that right?

8 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

9 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

10 Admiral Stark: May I state for the record when I said  
11 Category D a minute ago that should be F, which Congressman  
12 Keefe mentioned.

13 Mr. Keefe: Now, just a couple of other questions to make  
14 the record clear, Admiral Stark: You have referred repeatedly  
15 to the experience which you have had over the period of time  
16 that you were Chief of Naval Operations in coming to the  
17 Congress for appropriations.

18 Admiral Keefe: And I would like to make this record crystal  
19 clear as to that procedure, which I am sure you are familiar  
20 with and which I know many members on this committee are  
21 quite familiar with. When the Navy or the Army prepares  
22 its annual request for appropriations, they must first be  
23 submitted to the Bureau of the Budget, is that not true?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: And the presentation of requests for appropria-

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 tions is always first made to the Bureau of the Budget?

3 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

4 Mr. Keefe: And the Budget tells you how much money you  
5 can spend?

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: So far as they are concerned?

8 Admiral Stark: Yes. That is our guide from then on.

9 Mr. Keefe: And that action of the Bureau of the Budget  
10 is then translated into the President's budget which he  
11 submits to the Congress?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: Whether it be his annual budget or supple-  
14 mentary budget?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. It is our guide. When we are  
16 through with the Budget and they tell us how much we can  
17 have, my own naval experience is we stick within that.

18 Mr. Keefe: That same thing holds true for any supple-  
19 mentary estimates. The same procedure is indulged in, is  
20 it not?

21 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. We cannot come up here for  
22 supplemental estimates without first getting the permission  
23 of the Budget.

24 Mr. Keefe: So, when you made the statement about coming  
25 up to the Hill for money, asking for appropriations on the Hill,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 you had to proceed first and get authority from the Bureau  
3 of the Budget and the Bureau of the Budget transmitted your  
4 request to the Congress in the form of a budget estimate?

5 Admiral Stark: That is true.

6 Mr. Keefe: By the President, isn't that true?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. There were times, of course,  
8 when I went directly to the President without going through  
9 the Budget for money, and he would grant it to me.

10 Mr. Keefe: And then submit a supplementary estimate to  
11 the Congress?

12 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. Then, we would inform the  
13 Budget.

14 Mr. Keefe: Now, then, you appeared before the House  
15 Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations, did you not?

16 Admiral Stark: Yes, I have, at a great many hearings.

17 Mr. Keefe: And also before the Senate Committee?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: When you appeared before either the Senate  
20 or the House subcommittees on appropriations asking for  
21 funds, were you not under a direction and injunction from  
22 the President not to justify any item that was not contained  
23 in the Presidential Budget?

24 Admiral Stark: Well, I knew that I could not do it.

25 Nobody ever had to give me an injunction. I just did not have

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 to do it, and I did not do it. The Commander in Chief having  
3 set for us a limit, we stayed within it.

4 Mr. Keefe: So everytime you came to a committee of the  
5 Congress you came up to justify and defend the Budget esti-  
6 mate submitted to the Congress by the President?

7 Admiral Stark: That is correct.

8 Mr. Keefe: Yes. And that has been the universal  
9 practice, has it not, during all the period that you were  
10 Chief of Naval Operations?

11 Admiral Stark: Once or twice in response to questions,  
12 we went outside, when the question was asked us, initiated  
13 by someone on the committee.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, if a member of the committee, or the  
15 committee itself, saw fit to ask you questions as to whether  
16 or not you did request additional funds from the Bureau of  
17 the Budget you would answer those questions?

18 Admiral Stark: If the committee asked me, I would.

19 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Otherwise not?

20 Admiral Stark: Otherwise, I would not initiate it.

21 Mr. Keefe: Now, as a matter of fact, there has been  
22 placed in the record here a statement of the appropriation  
23 request made by the Navy and Army to the Bureau of the Budget,  
24 the action taken thereon by the Bureau of the Budget, and the  
25 action taken thereon by the Congress. You have seen that

1 Witness Stark

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2 calculation, have you not?

3 Admiral Stark: I have seen it, yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

5 Now, in both cases, in the case of the Army and Navy,  
6 over the fiscal years 1934 to 1941, inclusive, those  
7 figures show that the Congress exceeded the Presidential  
8 Budget estimate, do they not, in the matter of appropriations?

9 Admiral Stark: Which years did you say?

10 Mr. Keefe: The total years from 1933, I believe, or  
11 1932. I think those figures start from 1932 and go to 1941,  
12 inclusive, excluding the contract authorizations provided for  
13 by the Congress and referring to just cash appropriations.  
14 Leave out, if you please, the contract authorizations.

15 Admiral Stark: Well, assuming that the arithmetic here  
16 is correct --

17 Mr. Keefe: Well, those are my figures, and I think they  
18 are correct.

19 Admiral Stark: They show appropriations requested by  
20 the Navy Department \$9,434,271,533. Budget estimates submitted  
21 to the Congress, \$7,428,240,190. Amounts made available by  
22 the Congress, appropriations, \$7,256,896,276, along with a  
23 contract authority for \$1,029,038,112. The total of appropria-  
24 tions plus contract authority from Congress was \$8,285,934,388,  
25 as opposed to I believe to what you want to check it on, a

1 Witness Stark

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2 budget of \$7,000,000,000-odd.

3 The Chairman: Congressman, don't those figures speak  
4 for themselves, and is it necessary to make Admiral Stark add  
5 them up again?

6 Mr. Keefe: Yes, I think they speak for themselves.

7 The Chairman: Yes, assuming they are correct.

8 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: And nobody has challenged it.

10 Mr. Keefe: I am asking these questions because of the  
11 fact that Admiral Stark himself sort of indicated the diffi-  
12 culty that he had experienced in getting appropriations in  
13 order to increase the personnel of the Navy. You made refer-  
14 ence to that in your testimony, did you not?

15 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

17 The Chairman: That may have        a different item from  
18 the ones in these categories of figures. They were more or  
19 less sporadic efforts, on your part, as I understand it, to  
20 get more men.

21 Admiral Stark: Well, they were continuous. We finally got  
22 authority to ask for what we needed.

23 Mr. Keefe: One other question, Admiral Stark, and perhaps  
24 you can clear this up. It is minor in character. When  
25 Admiral Wilkinson was on the stand, there was placed in

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Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 evidence a written or printed statement showing his responsi-  
3 bility as Chief of Naval Intelligence. A dispute arose  
4 between Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval  
5 War Plans, as to whose responsibility it was for certain  
6 things. Admiral Wilkinson contended that the written  
7 orders or printed orders specifying the duties of the Chief  
8 of Naval Intelligence had been changed, the Schedule of  
9 Organization, I believe it was called, had been changed  
10 by you in verbal instructions to Admiral Kirk, his predecessor,  
11 so that when he, Wilkinson, came into the office and tried to  
12 ascertain what his duties were he went over this schedule of  
13 orders, and so on, that were issued by you as Chief of Naval  
14 Operations but was told by Kirk that there were certain things  
15 in there that he did not have to do, that were transferred  
16 over to Turner, Chief of War Plans, and Turner specifically  
17 denied that any other change had taken place, so far as  
18 he was concerned, and stated that that schedule of organiza-  
19 tion was the law, so far as he was concerned, today, and  
20 that there never had been any change made, and thus Admiral  
21 Wilkinson and Admiral Turner clashed very definitely on that  
22 issue.

23 Now, I want to ask you the simple question whether or not,  
24 when a written order was issued by you as Chief of Naval Opera-  
25 tions specifying the duties and responsibilities of an office --  
whether those orders were subject to be changed by verbal  
communication to the



Questions by: Mr. Keefe

Witness Stark.

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Admiral Stark: Where one or two people were concerned and there was a mistake in understanding, they would naturally go, as provided in the publication, to Admiral Ingersoll, which they did, as I understand, in this instance. And what was referred to, I believe, was that it was War Plans' duty to make up the war plan, including the estimate of the situation. It had to be funneled through one source. It couldn't be sent out from two. Ingersoll spoke to me about it. I was in complete agreement with him. I never felt that there was any real difficulty there. In the first place, these people were working together every day. Intelligence had to give the material, all it had, to War Plans, on which they could base their estimate. I think they continued to do it and continued to evaluate it for that purpose. I know that they did and were continually working together. But the final estimate, which went into the war plan, on that sort of thing, rested with War Plans. And, so far as I know, as a result of that, there was never any gap or hiatus that was created anywhere, or any conflict or any trouble about it. I was surprised when the situation developed the way it did up here.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, Admiral, I still don't have an answer to my question. Was that written order ever changed verbally in any respect? Admiral Wilkinson claimed it was. Admiral Turner claimed it was. You are the one who is supposed to

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 have changed it verbally to Admiral Kirk. All I want to know  
3 is, did you change the order verbally or didn't you?

4 Admiral Stark: Well, I know that when it came to me  
5 with Ingersoll's recommendation, and with regard to the get-  
6 ting out of the probable intentions for incorporation into  
7 the war plan, that I stated that that was War Plans' duty,  
8 but that the material in connection with it would continue  
9 to be supplied, as it had been in the past, by Intelligence.  
10 I don't--

11 Mr. Keefe: Do you mean by that the evaluation of the  
12 material was to be the duty of Intelligence who would in turn  
13 transmit that to War Plans?

14 Admiral Stark: They continued to give it, with their  
15 evaluation, but the final over-all setup in the war plan was  
16 Turner's.

17 For example, in the Fortnightly Summaries we got out  
18 there were evaluations there being made right along by Intelli-  
19 gence.

20 I would like to read, in that connection, if I might,  
21 three paragraphs in this same publication.

22 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't care for that myself, Admiral.  
23 All I want is an answer to a very simple question. If it  
24 can't be answered, all right. We have gone all over that with  
25 Admiral Wilkinson and Admiral Turner, and they were in complete

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 disagreement as to the proposition, and Admiral Wilkinson had  
3 gone to the trouble to send over and get some statement from  
4 Admiral Kirk over in the Mediterranean, as I recall. It was  
5 a question as to their respective responsibilities, one claim-  
6 ing that he was complying strictly with the order as written,  
7 the other claiming that that order had been changed verbally  
8 by you to Admiral Kirk, predecessor to Admiral Wilkinson.

9 Admiral Stark: I remember some of their testimony, and I  
10 thought they were nothing like as far apart as might appear.  
11 There was one part of Admiral Wilkinson's testimony in par-  
12 ticular with regard to the meat of it, and one part of Admiral  
13 Turner's testimony, as I studied it, that were very much in  
14 line. I never felt there was any real difficulty between  
15 them.

16 Mr. Keefe: I guess you weren't here in the room then to  
17 see the clashes that passed when that incident occurred or  
18 you wouldn't think so.

19 Admiral Stark: I wasn't here.

20 Mr. Keefe: I thought they were very much disturbed at  
21 each other.

22 Admiral Stark: I would like to read these three para-  
23 graphs, if I may.

24 Mr. Keefe: Can't you answer my question, did you or  
25 did you not change that order through verbal instructions to

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Admiral Kirk?

3 Admiral Stark: I decided, when it came to me, that the  
4 estimate of the situation in War Plans would be made by War  
5 Plans, and War Plans would be responsible for it.

6 Mr. Keefe: Is that in accordance with the written order?

7 Admiral Stark: That is where they seem to have a good  
8 deal of trouble. In my opinion it is not--

9 Senator Lucas: It is not clear.

10 Admiral Stark: It is not clear and it is not worth  
11 while. The written order states:

12 "Secure all classes of pertinent information,  
13 especially that affecting disposition and probable  
14 intentions."

15 Wilkinson continued to get all classes of information  
16 and he continued to give it to Turner, who, where the main  
17 war plan was concerned, finally evaluated it and put it in.

18 The paragraphs that I mentioned are overriding considera-  
19 tions and I would like to read them to you. This was not  
20 given on the sheets that were given you. I would like to  
21 have you have them.

22 "Matters which are of paramount interest to any  
23 one division shall be handled by that division.

24 "Responsibility for necessary liaison with other  
25 interested divisions shall rest with the director of

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
Senator Ferguson

Witness Stark.

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2 the division having paramount interest, who shall keep  
3 other divisions informed of action taken.

4 "The director of each division is responsible, in  
5 matters assigned to its cognizance, for necessary  
6 liaison and coordination of effort within the Navy  
7 Department."

8 Now, the staff was an integrated staff. It is almost  
9 impossible to write up a set of regulations where things dove-  
10 tail in as closely as they do in an organization such as we  
11 have, so as to lay down just what each person will do speci-  
12 fically.

13 Those paragraphs were meant to cover and get the people  
14 together on them, and my feeling is that Turner and Wilkinson  
15 always did work together closely and without any trouble on  
16 this.

17 Senator Ferguson: Might I inquire, Mr. Chairman, where  
18 these three paragraphs are from?

19 Admiral Stark: They are from the same pamphlet.

20 Mr. Keefe: It is the Operational Order?

21 Admiral Stark: The Operational Order. It is sort of an  
22 over-all picture to show that you just can't get down and  
23 say, "Well, you stop there, and you stop there," when people  
24 are working together and seeing each other all the time.

25 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I want to express my thanks

1 Witness Stark.

2 to Admiral Stark for his great patience, he having been here  
3 a long time, and I am not going to ask him any further ques-  
4 tions.

5 Admiral Stark: There is only thing that occurred to me  
6 this afternoon in Mr. Keefe's questioning. Whether it would  
7 be helpful or not, I don't know. I would just like to take a  
8 minute or so to glance at the so-called tasks assigned in  
9 WPL-46 or in Kimmel's orders.

10 (Short pause.)

11 Admiral Stark: This is reading--

12 The Chairman: What are you reading from?

13 Admiral Stark: From Admiral Kimmel's war plan, which  
14 in turn was based on WPL-46.

15 Mr. Mitchell: It is not labeled that way officially.  
16 Identify it for the record.

17 Admiral Stark: It is U. S. Pacific Fleet Publication  
18 WP. Pac. 46, promulgated July 25, 1941.

19 Mr. Keefe was asking about just prior to plans coming  
20 in, and I remembered that Admiral Kimmel had covered that,  
21 and thought possibly this might be of assistance, and, regard-  
22 ing which, of course, he will have a more intimate knowledge  
23 than I have, but I had remembered that he had done that.

24 Chapter II, page 25, under the heading, "Tasks Formulated  
25 To Accomplish the Assigned Missions." It is an outline of

1 Witness Stark,

2 tasks.

3 "It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the  
4 previous chapter are based upon Assumption A2 of para-  
5 graph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks  
6 the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption  
7 A1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the  
8 Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

9 "a. PHASE I -- Initial tasks, Japan not in the war.

10 "b. PHASE IA-- Initial tasks, Japan in the war.

11 "c. PHASE II, etc., -- Succeeding tasks.

12 "Phase I tasks are as follows:

13 "a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant  
14 operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant  
15 readiness for distant service.

16 "b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages  
17 and at sea.

18 "c. Transfer the Atlantic reinforcement, if ordered.

19 "d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific force, if ordered.

20 "e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small  
21 tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to  
22 Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day.

23 "f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue  
24 vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on  
25 M-day.

Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East."

Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, at this point:

You are referring to the plan of Admiral Kimmel now, which relates to M-day, are you not?

Admiral Stark: This is Phase I, which he designates as "Initial tasks, Japan not in the war."

Mr. Keefe: But he refers to M-day? You just referred to it.

Admiral Stark: Yes. "Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific southern and a similar force to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier, on M-day."

I read this: "Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific northern naval coastal frontier on M-day."

"Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups



1 Witness Stark.

2 as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces  
3 south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155 degrees East.

4 "h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake  
5 and Midway."

6 And you might recall that he had already done that. He  
7 call it a defensive submarine patrol.

8 "i. Observe, with submarines outside the 3-mile  
9 limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese  
10 mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Depart-  
11 ment.

12 "j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of  
13 subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa,  
14 Guam, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized."

15 And you will note that he was strengthening those, some  
16 of those places, by sending planes.

17 "k. Continue training operations as practicable.

18 "l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second  
19 Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing opera-  
20 tions.

21 "m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan."

22 That is in his Phase known as "Japan not in the war."  
23 He has covered there some of the things that have been talked  
24 about, and it occurred to me, when you were asking me ques-  
25 tions, that it might be of interest to you to know about that.

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Chairman

2 I assume that he will be able to testify on it.

3 The Chairman: Does counsel for Admiral Stark wish to  
4 ask any questions?

5 Mr. Obear: No.

6 The Chairman: Does counsel wish to ask any further  
7 questions?

8 Mr. Mitchell: No.

9 The Chairman: I have one or two questions.

10 Senator Lucas, you may go ahead if you have some ques-  
11 tions.

12 Senator Lucas: No, you go ahead.

13 The Chairman: Admiral Stark, Admiral Richardson testified  
14 that when he was relieved of command of the Pacific Fleet, he  
15 submitted to the Navy Department a list of men whom he recom-  
16 mended from whom the successor be chosen, and he testified that  
17 on that list was the name of Admiral Kimmel; is that your  
18 recollection?

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. There was universal regard  
20 for the high caliber of Admiral Kimmel. I think he would have  
21 been on anybody's list. He was on mine also.

22 The Chairman: Was the appointment of Admiral Kimmel  
23 made by you or the Secretary of the Navy?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That appointment always goes to the  
25 President for the final selection or at least the O. K.

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Chairman

2 I remember, when the President mentioned Kimmel, he said, "He  
3 has been a White House aide," he remembered him very well.

4 The Chairman: A good deal has been said about this word  
5 "deployment." It is not a new word in military and naval  
6 matters, is it?

7 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

8 The Chairman: It has been used ever since Hannibal,  
9 hasn't it?

10 Admiral Stark: I think so, yes, sir.

11 The Chairman: Doesn't every Naval Academy graduate,  
12 when he goes out, know what it means?

13 Admiral Stark: He certainly learns what it means before  
14 long from war games.

15 The Chairman: It is used in the arrangement of ground  
16 forces, in military matters, as well as upon the high seas,  
17 in regard to ships, isn't it?

18 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, it is used; it was used in our  
19 war plans. It was incorporated in Kimmel's war plan. I  
20 didn't read it this afternoon. That was another thing I  
21 thought of. But it is there.

22 The Chairman: In other words, it is the arrangement of  
23 troops or ships in order to accomplish a definite purpose,  
24 whether it is defense or offense?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: And the word "deployment", as I have read in the history of battles in all our wars, it has been used in the sense that General so-and-so deployed his forces by putting so many over yonder on the right and so many over on the left, so many in the rear, depending upon the character of battle it was to be, and whether he was to defend his ground or whether he was to make an attack upon the enemy.

Admiral Stark: That is true, and it occurs particularly in our tactical instructions where we deploy for battle.

The Chairman: Any naval officer of the rank of admiral or vice admiral or rear admiral would know, where he was instructed to deploy his forces, what that meant, wouldn't he?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, in my opinion he would.

The Chairman: He might be, of course, expected to use his own judgment as to how he deployed them, but the particular arrangement under which he was to carry out the instructions was within his discretion, was it not?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Admiral, you were asked if it was your duty to see to it that the orders were carried out. When you gave an order to a naval officer in any part of the world, you had the right, under his responsibility, to expect that he would carry it out?

Admiral Stark: That is right.

Witness Stark.

Questions by: The Chairman

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The Chairman: You couldn't see that they were carried out, yourself, unless you went out there and did it?

Admiral Stark: Or unless I directed him to report whether or not he had done it.

The Chairman: Even if he reported that and hadn't done what you ordered him to do, you could reiterate your orders, but if you saw they were actually executed personally you would have to be on the ground, would you not?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. The details were his.

The Chairman: And the Navy Department, and you, had confidence in all our officers in all theaters of war, so far as the Navy was concerned, that they knew what orders would mean and how to carry them out?

Admiral Stark: I did, yes, sir.

The Chairman: In regard to the situation in the Atlantic that has been talked about, there was nothing secretive about that at the time, was there?

Admiral Stark: No, sir.

The Chairman: About the orders to shoot in defending the shipment of our materials which Congress had authorized, there wasn't any secret about that?

Admiral Stark: No, sir. It was wide open.

The Chairman: The President made speeches, my recollection is that he reported to Congress on it.

Questions by: The Chairman  
Senator Lucas

Witness Stark.

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Admiral Stark: I don't remember about that, but his speech in September was wide open on that.

The Chairman: Anyhow, at the time it was going on, the American people knew it, and the President issued public statements and made speeches about it, so that there was nothing secret at all in regard to it?

Admiral Stark: That is correct.

The Chairman: I believe that is all.

Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas: Admiral Stark, have you ever had a conversation with Admiral Kimmel since December 7, 1941, about what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Stark: No, I have not talked to him about it at all in detail.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: When you left the service as Chief of  
3 Naval Operations you went directly to London?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: And there became the Admiral of the  
6 American Fleet?

7 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: That was operating then with the English?

9 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. The Operational commanders,  
10 of course, were those in immediate command, like Kirk for  
11 the Normandy Invasion, the forces we had at Scapaflo had  
12 their own Admiral, we had a man in command of Air Forces.

13 Senator Lucas: What was your exact title there?

14 Admiral Stark: Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe.

15 Later on, I was given the conditional title of Commander  
16 of the Twelfth Fleet of which these other forces would be made  
17 a task force under the commander of the Twelfth Fleet.

18 Senator Lucas: How long did you remain in that position?

19 Admiral Stark: I reported there, it was the last day  
20 of April, in 1942, and I was detached on the 16th of August  
21 1945, something over three years.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, I take it that in that important  
23 position which you held it required that you exercise superior  
24 judgment, did it not, from time to time?

25 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir, I think so. I think the Army

WLC2  
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1                    Witness Stark                    Questions by: Senator Lucas

2                    citation on that -- apparently the Army thought so.

3                    Senator Lucas: For exercising that superior judgment  
4                    during those long years you were awarded several citations by  
5                    different governments and our own?

6                    Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

7                    Senator Lucas: You said in the early part of your  
8                    examination that you failed to send Admiral Kimmel any of  
9                    the Ultra or Magic codes because it might compromise the  
10                    source, did you not?

11                    Admiral Stark: Senator Lucas, will you repeat that?

12                    The Chairman: I think you have the wrong man.

13                    Senator Lucas: I will withdraw the question.

14                    Admiral Stark: I didn't testify to that.

15                    Senator Lucas: Anyhow, you realized and appreciated the  
16                    the secrecy of Magic as it was being intercepted by our  
17                    Government?

18                    Admiral Stark: It was a very powerful weapon or might  
19                    be one, yes, sir.

20

21

22

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25



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1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: And you had a certain group of officers  
3 in the Navy here in Washington that knew about the secret code?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: Let me ask you whether or not Admiral  
6 Kimmel knew about the secret code at the time?

7 Admiral Stark: Of our breaking the codes in Washington?

8 Senator Lucas: Yes.

9 Admiral Stark: Senator Lucas, I have asked myself that  
10 question. I took it for granted, not that he had them but  
11 that he knew that we were breaking them, because I have found  
12 out since that messages showing these were being sent out  
13 there, and some of the messages that we sent showed where  
14 these dispatches were coming from. So, I am under the  
15 impression that he did know, but I have never asked him  
16 personally whether he knew. At least, I don't recall it.  
17 I would rather that he would clinch that with you.

18 Senator Lucas: One other question that intrigues me a  
19 little. They have some bearing upon my own judgment and may  
20 not be of particular importance here. It is in respect to the  
21 Battle of Midway. Who was in command, who was the commander  
22 of the Pacific Fleet at that time?

23 Admiral Stark: That was about six months after Pearl  
24 Harbor, something like that, and Nimitz was in command.

25 Senator Lucas: You were not Chief of Naval Operations?

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

WLC 2

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Admiral Stark: No. King had relieved me by that time, and  
3 Nimitz was Commander in Chief of the Pacific.

4 Senator Lucas: I was just wondering what kind of an  
5 order King gave to Nimitz with respect to the Battle of Midway,  
6 if he gave him any order at all.

7 Admiral Stark: I don't know. I know that King published  
8 a paper when he was Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet  
9 calling attention to the fact that people should not give  
10 specific detail to subordinates, but what I said earlier,  
11 tell them what to do, not how to do it.

12 Senator Lucas: The only reason I asked the question was  
13 to try to determine what kind of an order King may have  
14 given to Nimitz at that time, to make a comparison with the  
15 order you gave to Kimmel and to see whether or not Nimitz  
16 carried through the responsibilities and whether the orders  
17 were similar and just what responsibility was given to that  
18 command at that particular time.

19 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Do you have any notion about that at all?

21 Admiral Stark: No, I have nothing, but I do know that in  
22 the Normandy Invasion, the plans were worked out entirely  
23 in Europe and copies simply sent back to the Department. Our  
24 relations with the Department at that time were simply in the  
25 plea for the material, men, ships, equipment, et cetera, that

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

material

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 we needed to implement orders which we had drawn up.

3 Senator Lucas: In other words, you drew up the orders?

4 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir; the Operational people. Kirk,  
5 for example, drew up the orders for the actual ships and  
6 which came down the line for higher authority.

7 Senator Lucas: And the subordinates in the Normandy  
8 Invasion assumed the responsibility, after they got the command,  
9 for either success or failure?

10 Admiral Stark: The subordinates down the line drew their  
11 cue, so to speak, from over-all orders higher up, and they  
12 in turn issued their own orders.

13 Senator Lucas: Now, one other question with respect to the  
14 breaking of the Japanese code. Who, in your immediate Naval  
15 family, knew that we were breaking the Japanese code at that  
16 time?

17 Admiral Stark: The President knew it. Colonel Knox knew  
18 it. Ingersoll, of course, knew it. The radio people, certain  
19 ones, knew it. Intelligence and certain people there knew it.  
20 War Plans people, I don't know just how many of them, such  
21 as Turner, as the head of War Plans, knew it.

22 The Chairman: May I interject? When you say, "radio"  
23 you mean naval radio?

24 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I am speaking about our communica-  
25 tions division. Perhaps that would have been a better term to

WLC4

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1  
2 use. But it was kept rather close. For example, in the  
3 morning sessions which we had we were very careful about  
4 talking about anything of that sort; or in the big conferences,  
5 which we held on Thursday, with all the chiefs of bureaus,  
6 materiel bureaus, and so forth, that sort of thing was never  
7 mentioned.

8 Senator Lucas: Did you give any specific and direct  
9 orders to your subordinates that knew about Magic with  
10 respect to keeping it a secret?

11 Admiral Stark: I think at that time we had to sign up a  
12 paper. I am not sure. I know we have since. For example,  
13 Lieutenant Commander Richmond, assisting me here, he has  
14 pretty near signed his death warrant, and if he were to give  
15 anything out about it, he would be doing that, but it is all  
16 out now.

17 Senator Lucas: I understand. Practically, everything  
18 that has ever been known about breaking the codes is known  
19 now to the world.

20 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Primarily, through this Pearl Harbor  
22 hearing.

23 Admiral Stark: Before that happened, anybody who was let  
24 in on that had to sign a paper never to disclose it, practically  
25 so long as he lived, or ever to talk about it. And, as a

WLC5

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 matter of fact, people coming to Europe, we did it there, too.  
3 Not only people coming to Europe, but if anybody came in my  
4 office and I started to talk to them about things, regardless  
5 of their rank, I would not discuss such things with them  
6 because I didn't know whether they knew the codes were being  
7 broken or not, and I didn't dare bring up subjects which  
8 might be unknown to them, because of that.

9 Senator Lucas: Did it ever come to your attention at  
10 anytime while you were Chief of Naval Operations that there  
11 was a leak in any part of your Department with respect to  
12 giving away this secret to someone?

13 Admiral Stark: Not in my Department. There was an  
14 incident that occurred, I am not very clear on it, where a  
15 reporter, or someone connected with the press in the Pacific,  
16 mentioned the breaking of codes, while the war was still on.  
17 The Navy Department could give you the details. I recall only  
18 the one incident.

19 Senator Lucas: Well, there was nothing that ever came  
20 to your attention, as I understand it, that would imply  
21 that anyone under your immediate control was letting the  
22 secret out?

23 Admiral Stark: No, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: Now, there have been a lot of questions  
25 asked you, Admiral Stark, about the so-called purported agree-

WLC6

1 Witness Stark Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 ments that were made between this country and the Dutch  
3 and the British.

4 Admiral Stark: I did not get the first part of that.

5  
6 Senator Lucas: I say, a great many questions have been  
7 asked you by members of the committee with respect to the  
8 so-called agreements that were made between America, the  
9 British and the Dutch.

10 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: And some assumptions have been made here  
12 from time to time in this committee that there might have been  
13 some agreements of some kind. But, if I understand you  
14 correctly, insofar as you know, while you discussed, you  
15 and your officers in the Navy discussed, from time to time  
16 matters with the British and the Dutch about what should be  
17 done in the event that you all got into war, at no time was  
18 there any formal agreement drawn up or any commitments made  
19 that were approved by the President of the United States?

20 Admiral Stark: And on which would be predicated a fore-  
21 cast that if Britain or the NEI were attacked we would come in?

22 Senator Lucas: Yes.

23 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I know of no such agreement.

24 Mr. Keefe: Do you include the Canadian agreement?

25 Senator Lucas: No, I do not include that.

Mr. Mitchell: The Canadian agreement was a defensive agree-

Witness Stark

Questions by: Senator Lucas

WLC7

1 ment for defending our own territory. I imagine the President  
2 could do that without a declaration of war.

3 Mr. Keefe: I ask so that there would not be any question.

4 Senator Lucas: I do not include the Canadian agreement.

5 The Dutch didn't have anything to do with the Canadian  
6 agreement.

7 Admiral Stark: No, sir, these ABD are the American  
8 Dutch British.

END  
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4:40 p.m.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Senator Lucas: It was a necessary procedure for the Navy  
3 to make all plans that it could possibly conceive of for the  
4 defensive purposes of this nation of ours at that time?

5 Admiral Stark: That is the way I felt about it and that  
6 is what I thought.

7 Senator Lucas: And you did more or less what the country  
8 was doing at that time in view of the passage of Lend-Lease and  
9 other measures to aid England and the Dutch; you were working  
10 out or at least you were talking about plans that might come  
11 into being in the event that we were drawn in?

12 Admiral Stark: That is true, and in that connection  
13 there is a distinction between the so-called hemispheric de-  
14 fense plans and WPL-46.

15 Senator Lucas: I want to direct your attention to exhib-  
16 it 33, which is the estimates of the Military Intelligence,  
17 and read a paragraph or two from that exhibit with respect to  
18 economic sanctions and whether or not you agree or disagree.

19 Admiral Stark: What page, sir?

20 Senator Lucas: It is on page, - well, it is the July  
21 25th memorandum that was prepared by General Miles for the  
22 Chief of Staff, entitled, "Sanctions against Japan", exhibit  
23 33. I do this because there has been so much insinuation or,  
24 rather, so many questions asked of you about economic sanctions  
25 and I want to read paragraph 9 on page 2 of that letter.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 "Effective economic sanctions against Japan imposed  
3 by us, today, would not, in the opinion of this Division,  
4 force Japan to take any steps in the way of aggressive  
5 action which she does not plan to take anyway, when a  
6 favorable opportunity arises, nor would they precipi-  
7 tate a declaration of war on us by Japan. Such action  
8 on our part need not and should not distract our atten-  
9 tion from the main theater of operations. On the con-  
10 trary, by adopting such a policy we will be able to con-  
11 serve for Britain and for ourselves supplies which from  
12 the viewpoint of our national defense, are being worse  
13 than wasted when we place them in Japanese hands."

14 And then on the bottom of that:

15 "Recommendation: That this paper be referred to  
16 the Joint Board with a view to initiating plans whose  
17 execution will place a complete export and import embargo  
18 on our trade with Japan."

19 Then the latter was stricken out and there is a penciled  
20 notation which says:

21 "This memo was written prior to receipt of informa-  
22 tion regarding embargo decision."

23 In other words, it appears here at that time that the  
24 G-2 of the Army was in full accord with the economic sanction  
25 program that was then being discussed by the State Department

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 and I was wondering whether or not you agreed at that particu-  
3 lar time with Miles with respect to economic sanctions?

4 Admiral Stark: Well, in the last analysis under the  
5 conditions obtaining in the government of Japan I felt that  
6 the military would control. Nevertheless, I did think that  
7 certainly the impositions of economic embargoes, economic  
8 sanctions might possibly precipitate hostilities, if not  
9 make the time closer when they would occur inasmuch as they  
10 might throttle Japanese life. Now, against that had to be  
11 balanced an opinion that ultimately we would go to war with  
12 them anyway and if we did not impose these they might take  
13 it as a sign of weakness, it also might hasten it and it also  
14 might have them better equipped if war did come about.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, there were two schools of thought.  
16 on that question at that particular time.

17 Admiral Stark: Well, there was a balance there and the  
18 economic sanctions, as I recall, were imposed after Japan  
19 had made her move into Indo-China and it may have been just  
20 another way of saying, "Keep this up and here is our reply to  
21 your going on the rampage."

22 Senator Lucas: Well, I would like to call the com-  
23 mittee's attention to this same exhibit. From time to time  
24 Miles expresses the same opinion as I just read, without read-  
25 ing them. I will turn to the one of December the 5th, 1941,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 in his memorandum to the Chief of Staff, the latter part of  
3 it, in which he says:

4 "Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in  
5 the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our  
6 economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against  
7 Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner."

8 In other words, I merely call attention to the fact that  
9 even up to the very last the Intelligence Chief of the Army  
10 was asking and recommending to the Chief of Staff economic  
11 sanctions against Japan.

12 Now, I have placed these matters before you in the record  
13 for the purpose of more or less answering some of the ques-  
14 tions, at least some of the insinuations that have been placed  
15 here in the record that economic sanctions was the thing that  
16 more or less drove Japan into this war.

17 I want to state this for the record while I am discuss-  
18 ing economic sanctions: You will recall, Admiral Stark,  
19 that there were a great number of people from 1936 to 1941  
20 that were asking that we do apply the embargo on oil and scrap  
21 iron and other things, do you not?

22 Admiral Stark: Among the general public, yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: And, on the other hand, there was another  
24 group of people, big business and small business, that were  
25 insisting that we sell to Japan oil and scrap iron and these

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 other things.

3 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. I remember them very well be-  
4 cause I expressed myself strongly against the imposition on  
5 oil unless we were prepared to fight.

6 Senator Lucas: All right. Now, here are the figures  
7 that I want to offer into the record for whatever they are  
8 worth:

9 In 1936 this country sold to Japan, - I don't say this  
10 country, but the business interests of this country sold to  
11 Japan 27,781,999 barrels of crude petroleum, natural gasoline,  
12 gasoline and other petroleum motor fuel in bulk, and so forth,  
13 besides millions of pounds of greases and paraffin wax, and  
14 so forth.

15 In 1937 the business interests of this country sold  
16 28,377,381 barrels of the same commodities.

17 In 1938, 31,354,050 barrels.

18 In 1939, 28,012,000 barrels.

19 In 1940, 22,796,748 barrels, and this does not include,  
20 and I will not read it, the millions of pounds of lubricating  
21 greases and petroleum coke and petroleum jelly and other  
22 things that were used in connection with getting ready for war.

23 In 1941 it fell off to 6,986,517 barrels.

24 In other words, you have one group of people in this  
25 country that was doing everything that they knew to sell this

Witness Stark

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1  
2 oil to Japan knowing that they were aggressors at that time  
3 and doing what they were doing. On the other hand, you have  
4 another group that are attempting to apply economic sanc-  
5 tions for the purpose of stopping the aggression, and right  
6 along that line, if I may, I will read this into the record.

7 Right at that particular time American business firms  
8 made shipments of scrap iron to Japan:

9 In 1936 - 1,057,000 tons.

10 In 1937, 1,900,000 tons;

11 In 1938, 1,380,000 tons.

12 In 1939, 2,000,000 tons.

13 In 1940, 960,000 tons.

14 So we did pretty well as far as supplying the Japs in  
15 those years with oil and scrap iron and I am not so sure but  
16 that if we had applied economic sanctions sooner it would have  
17 been better for us. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

18 The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Stark, I hate to detain you at  
20 this late hour but this is my last chance, I suppose, to  
21 tender interrogatories to you.

22 Yesterday when I was examining you I referred to the  
23 story which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of October  
24 of 1942, an article which was written by Lieutenant Clarence  
25 E. Dickinson, United States Navy, and which was entitled,

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 "I Fly for Vengeance." At that time my questions were from  
3 memory. Today I have had the Congressional Library send me a  
4 photostat of that article and with your indulgence I will read  
5 the first two paragraphs:

6 "You would darn well remember Pearl Harbor if you  
7 had seen the great naval base ablaze as we of Scouting  
8 Squadron 6 saw it from the air, skimming in ahead of our  
9 homeward-bound carrier. The shock was especially heavy  
10 for us because this was our first knowledge that the Japs  
11 had attacked on that morning of December seventh. We  
12 came upon it stone cold, each of us looking forward to a  
13 long leave that was due him.

14 "It wasn't that we pilots didn't sense the tension  
15 that gripped the Pacific. You could feel it everywhere,  
16 all the time. Certainly the mission from which we were  
17 returning had the flavor of impending action. We had  
18 been delivering a batch of twelve Grumman Wildcats of  
19 Marine Fighting Squadron 211 to Wake Island, where they  
20 were badly needed. On this cruise we had sailed from  
21 Pearl Harbor on November twenty-eighth under absolute  
22 war orders. Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., the  
23 commander of the Aircraft Battle Force, had given instruc-  
24 tions that the secrecy of our mission was to be protected  
25 at all costs. We were to shoot down anything we saw in

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Geafhart

2 the sky and bomb anything we saw on the sea. In that way,  
3 there could be no leak to the Japs."

4 Now, assuming that the then Lieutenant and now Commander  
5 Clarence E. Dickinson correctly records in this paragraph the  
6 nature of the orders under which he flew, absolute war ord-  
7 ers as he calls them, orders which directed him to sink with-  
8 out a trace any Japanese ships that he encountered, to shoot  
9 down any Japanese planes he countered in the air, would you  
10 say that those orders did not constitute an overt act against  
11 the Japanese?

12 Admiral Stark: When you previously questioned me on  
13 this I did not have the detail which you give there. I do not  
14 know the route they took and I would rather not express an opin-  
15 ion unless I knew more about it. For example, I stated that if  
16 I had been on the Island of Oahu and Japanese planes came over  
17 I would shoot them down. Kimmel stated and informed me that  
18 he had given orders to bomb any submarine which came in that  
19 area. I thought it was a perfectly proper order.

20 Now, if I had been going close by a Japanese mandate and  
21 a scouting plane had appeared within reach of my guns I do not  
22 know that I would have shot it down unless I had felt that there  
23 was pretty good reason to believe that it was going to attack.

24 It is a rather difficult thing to answer but if Bill Halsey felt  
25 that it was necessary from where he was going to give those ord-  
ers I would not differ with him until I knew more about why  
he issued them.

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1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Well, there isn't so much left out of this  
3 paragraph that I have read to you. You know from it that the  
4 mission was from Hawaii to Wake and from Wake back to Hawaii,  
5 do you not?

6 Admiral Stark: Yes, sir. Well, regarding the overt act,  
7 anything that he did in self-defense he was authorized to do.  
8 The Navy Regulations covered that.

9 I had invited Kimmel's attention to that when he asked me  
10 about shooting orders in the Pacific. I think I put it in my  
11 statement. Anyway, it is available to the committee in my  
12 correspondence. He told me what he was doing. I agreed with  
13 him on every point, as to what he was doing.

14 But if out on the high seas, out of sight of everything,  
15 to take the other extreme, that force had run into a Japanese  
16 merchant ship on the horizon and a plane saw her and deliberately  
17 bombed her and sank her, I will say it would be an overt act.

18 If a Japanese submarine had popped up close aboard, I  
19 would say it would be self-protection to have sunk that sub-  
20 marine and not an overt act. Between the two is a line of  
21 judgment which must be left up to the man in the field.

22 Mr. Gearhart: But under this order that was issued it  
23 would have been the duty of Commander Dickinson and his co-  
24 pilots to have sunk a merchant ship, if it had encountered it  
25 on the sea, because they were under absolute orders to keep



Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 their mission secret at all costs. That is an absolute war  
3 order, is it?

4 Admiral Stark: I would say so if it were issued, but I  
5 would like to have Halsey's version of that before I would be  
6 prepared to accept it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: All right. But assuming the facts as they  
8 are stated here by Clarence E. Dickinson, who has been twice  
9 promoted and never recommended for this article or criticized  
10 for writing it in all the years since it was published, if  
11 these facts are accepted as true, that he, as he said, was  
12 "flying on absolute war orders with instructions to keep my  
13 mission secret at all cost," "under orders to sink any Japanese  
14 ship I encountered on the surface of the seas and to shoot down  
15 any Japanese airplanes that I encountered in the air," that is  
16 war, isn't it?

17 Admiral Stark: Well, from the illustration that I have  
18 given you of what might be regarded perhaps as an innocent  
19 merchant ship on the horizon, not bothering anybody, perhaps  
20 even headed home for Japan, why, I just have difficulty in  
21 understanding that Halsey would have expected them to sink  
22 such a ship.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Well, Admiral, how could he keep his  
24 mission a secret if he allowed a merchant ship to observe him  
25 in the air, allow it to radio the information that he had gone

1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 by? If he did not sink such a ship, he would certainly not  
3 have lived up to the letter of the war orders that had been  
4 given to him, would he?

5 Admiral Stark: He would not have lived up to the orders  
6 that he states were given him.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

8 Admiral Stark: He might, however, change the course of  
9 his flight so that the merchant ship could not see him. If  
10 he had spotted the merchant ship from the air, perhaps 100  
11 miles away, in that case he would not have had to change his  
12 course.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Does the fact that Admiral Halsey gave  
14 that order to Commander Dickinson when he had before him your  
15 message, "This is a war warning," have any influence on your  
16 answer to these questions?

17 Admiral Stark: No, I have not been thinking of it in  
18 that connection, except for the tenseness of the period. I  
19 think in all those cases a matter of judgment comes in. If  
20 there were no question of being seen, and coming back to the  
21 merchant ship example, where a plane might be well up in the  
22 air and where a merchant ship might not see the plane because  
23 the plane could see her a long ways off, for the plane to go  
24 out of his way to sink that merchant ship, I just rather  
25 doubt that Halsey intended that to be done.

WLC1

15

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Witness Stark

Question by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: That is all right. Let us doubt it,  
3 but assuming that Vice Admiral Halsey ordered Lieutenant  
4 Dickinson to keep his mission secret at all cost, what would  
5 you say then?

6 Admiral Stark: Then it comes to whether it would have been  
7 a secret or not. With all the assumptions that you put in  
8 there, and on the merchant ship example which I have given  
9 it might be regarded as an overt act.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Then, it follows as a logical conclusion,  
11 assuming all that Lieutenant Dickinson says is true, that  
12 we were at war in the Pacific on the 28th day of November,  
13 1941?

14 Admiral Stark: No, I would not say so.

15 Mr. Gearhart: All right. Then, point out why.

16 Admiral Stark: Because we were not.

17 Mr. Gearhart: When we are directing our fleet commanders  
18 to sink without a trace we are not at war?

19 Admiral Stark: Well, you are drawing up a premises here  
20 which I do not think holds.

21 Mr. Gearhart: I am asking you to assume what Lieutenant  
22 Dickinson said. Assume that that is true; I am asking you  
23 as a naval expert, based upon that assumption, that carries  
24 with it the acceptance of the idea that Clarence Dickinson  
25 was under orders to sink without a trace any ship that he

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 encountered upon the sea, I want to know whether or not, on  
3 that assumption, you will say we were not at war on the 28th  
4 day of November, 1941 in the Pacific?

5 Admiral Stark: And you are assuming that he sees the  
6 ship and he is sure that ship would have information of him,  
7 and that that information of one single plane which he might  
8 never see, would disclose --

9 Mr. Gearhart: You are asking me to pass on the question  
10 of whether or not --

11 Admiral Stark: I am asking you, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: You are asking me to pass on the  
13 question of whether or not a certain situation constitutes  
14 keeping his mission a secret at all costs. Now, you can  
15 pass on that same situation. Is he keeping his mission a  
16 secret at all costs if he flies by a merchant ship that he  
17 might encounter on the sea?

18 Admiral Stark: What do you consider keeping his mission  
19 a secret? If his main body is here (indicating) and off  
20 here on the horizon, maybe 100 miles away, is a merchant ship  
21 and which the plane can see probably from such a distance and  
22 the merchant ship cannot see him, I would say that is not  
23 giving the secret away.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Then, he is under orders to sink that ship,  
25 isn't he?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Stark: May I finish, sir?

3 You said that his orders are such as to have him go out  
4 of his way to sink that ship, and I say in that case it might  
5 be regarded as an overt act. Somebody might ultimately have to  
6 pass judgment on it. But in my opinion, also, under those  
7 conditions, the merchant ship would not discover what Admiral  
8 Halsey's mission was.

9 Mr. Gearhart: That hasn't got anything to do with the  
10 question I am propounding to you. If he is under orders to  
11 keep his mission secret is he not under orders to sink every  
12 ship that he encounters carrying the Japanese flag?

13 Admiral Stark: No, sir. In the first place, the Jap might  
14 not see the plane, and, in the second place, if he did see it  
15 what can he gather from it?

16 Mr. Gearhart: How would Lieutenant Dickinson or any  
17 American officer know whether the Jap saw him, or if he  
18 saw him plainly on the sea? Would not he, as a reasonable  
19 man, have to assume that the ship saw him?

20 Admiral Stark: Not necessarily, no, sir. But in any  
21 case, suppose he did see him, would the short picture of one  
22 plane indicate what Halsey's mission was 100 miles away?

23 Mr. Gearhart: He was flying with the squadron.

24 Admiral Stark: Well, you are further amplifying it now.  
25 Was he deployed on the scouting line?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: That does not make any difference, Admiral.

3 It does not make any difference at all. The question is:

4 We are officially issuing orders to keep a mission secret

5 at all costs, to sink all ships encountered.

6 Admiral Stark: Which might --

7 Mr. Gearhart (Interposing) No, no, there is not any

8 "which might" there. There is no question as to whether the

9 Japs saw or not.

10 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I think the witness ought

11 to be treated with some courtesy here.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Do you think I am discourteous, Admiral?

13 Admiral Stark: I have no objection. That is all right.

14 Mr. Gearhart: You do not need the protection of the

15 gentleman from Illinois?

16 Admiral Stark: No.

17 Mr. Gearhart: You have got a pretty good reputation  
18 as a fighting man, yourself, haven't you?

19 Admiral Stark: In some ways.

20 The Chairman: Let us not get into an argument on that

21 either.

22 Mr. Gearhart: I am asking you to assume that the orders  
23 issued to Clarence Dickinson were as he says they were. Now,  
24 can a man fly on the Pacific under those orders and next be  
25 flying under absolute war orders, as he says he was, himself?

1 Witness Stark

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Stark: Congressman Gearhart, I understand that  
3 the orders were premised on the fact that the objective was  
4 that Halsey's mission should not become known to the Japs.

5 Mr. Gearhart: That is right.

6 Admiral Stark: Well, I submit that one plane -- you say  
7 there was a squadron, but if they were out searching they  
8 would not be bunched, I do not believe. It might be that  
9 they were looking for an enemy, and if an enemy came close  
10 by, if he had discovered a Japanese force at that time heading  
11 eastward, that would have been one thing, but if they were  
12 deployed on the scouting line and the ship, way outside of  
13 Halsey's force, were to see a Japanese merchant ship -- we  
14 have gotten into that phase of it, that that would disclose  
15 Halsey's intentions, but I do not believe it would, and assum-  
16 ing that, if he were out there for the purpose of protecting  
17 the secrecy of Halsey's position, he would not have been  
18 required, under the orders, I would say, to sink the ship.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

END  
SHACK  
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LA CHARITY  
gib-1  
flShack  
5:05pm

Witness Stark.

6592  
Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Gearhart: We were to shoot down anything we saw in  
3 the sky?

4 Admiral Stark: Anything.

5 Mr. Gearhart: And bomb anything we saw on the sea. Is  
6 there anything equivocal about that?

7 Admiral Stark: Isn't that, "shoot down anything we saw  
8 or bomb anything we say on the sea which might disclose our  
9 mission or threaten it"?

10 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, that is the purport of it.

11 The Chairman: In view of the fact that Admiral Halsey  
12 is going to be here as a witness, wouldn't it be advisable to  
13 let him in on this?

14 Mr. Gearhart: I want a definite answer. I think you  
15 can answer the question definitely. Can those orders be  
16 issued and not be war orders?

17 Admiral Stark: Under certain circumstances, yes, sir.  
18 If I had been in Halsey's shoes -- and he didn't need anybody  
19 else's shoes -- and he had started on this mission, say a  
20 couple of hundred miles, or a hundred miles, from Oahu, and  
21 he had met this Japanese task force headed eastward, Bill  
22 would have hit it, and so would I, and I believe anybody else  
23 would. Under that circumstance he was justified in it.  
24 How far he would have gone, and of which I drew an extreme  
25 one way and an extreme the other way, I don't know. Just

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Stark.

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 whether his orders to shoot down what he saw were further  
3 qualified by some reasoning as to position and threat, I don't  
4 know.

5 In other words, I am telling you frankly where I would  
6 have shot. You might stretch it. Say they were 400 miles  
7 away. I still think I would have let him have it. Supposing  
8 he were 800 miles north of Oahu and were headed south. I  
9 certainly would have let him have it then. But if I saw a  
10 single merchant ship--

11 Mr. Gearhart: You are not talking about the order. You  
12 are talking about what you would have done. You say you  
13 expected Admiral Kimmel to do certain things under your very  
14 loosely drawn order. Here is a positive order. You are  
15 finding ways of avoiding observing it by pointing out fanciful  
16 situations which fly in the face of the order to sink every-  
17 thing encountered on the sea and shoot down everything encoun-  
18 tered in the air.

19 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

20 Mr. Gearhart: I yield, and that is all.

21 The Chairman: What you are being asked, Admiral, is, if  
22 that article in the Saturday Evening Post is true, and the  
23 orders were given, it constituted an overt act which justified  
24 an attack on Pearl Harbor. That is what you are being asked.

25 Mr. Gearhart: I am trying to find the facts. I have no

1 Witness Stark.

2 one to defend, no one to prosecute, and no cause to serve save  
3 the truth. Let's have it.

4 The Chairman: Are there any further questions?

5 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, as part of the record of  
6 Admiral Stark, he has brought in and given to counsel these  
7 maps showing the location of the ships --

8 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Turner.

9 Senator Ferguson: Admiral Turner -- but he was also  
10 asked about it, whether or not they show the ships, and they  
11 are here, from the 1st to the 6th, inclusive, and I would  
12 like to have them in evidence as an exhibit.

13 The Chairman: Yes, they will be marked. What is the  
14 next number?

15 Mr. Hannaford: 109.

16 (The document referred to was  
17 marked as Exhibit No. 109.)

18 The Chairman: Admiral, have you any further statement  
19 that you would like to make in addition to what you have  
20 already stated?

21 Admiral Stark: No, sir, I can't think of anything that  
22 I know that I haven't told you or of anything that I can sug-  
23 gest that hasn't been covered.

24 The Chairman: The committee thanks you for your very  
25 manifest effort to give it all the information within your

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knowledge. You have been patient and courteous and you have demeaned yourself before this committee as befits your rank and your record as an admiral of the U. S. Navy, and we appreciate it.

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Admiral Stark: Thank you, sir. I also appreciate the opportunity to come before you all. I was hoping that it would happen, both for Admiral Kimmel and myself, and I am delighted to have the opportunity; and I also want to thank the committee for its courtesy in every instance.

11

The Chairman: All right; good luck, Admiral.

12

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman--

13

Admiral Stark: I take it you will not want me again?

14

The Chairman: No, not so far as the committee knows.

15

Senator Lucas: We might want you here when Admiral

16

Halsey is here to answer that last question.

17

Admiral Stark: I think Bill can take care of himself.

18

Senator Lucas: It is very important.

19

Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, we have a great number of

20

documents here that have already been distributed to the

21

committee, and instead of holding the committee, I would like

22

the committee's permission to have Mr. Hannaford dictate

23

certain statements to the stenographer referring to those

24

exhibits and place them in the record. They are not things

25

that you would want to rule against or anything of that kind.

1 They are before the committee members but they are to be put  
2 in as formal exhibits, and I thought, with your permission,  
3 Mr. Hannaford could dictate that into the daily transcript  
4 and you would have the record.

5 The Chairman: Without objection, they will go in as part  
6 of the daily transcript.

7 I would like to say to the committee that I possibly  
8 might want to have a brief executive session Tuesday in regard  
9 to a matter Mr. Richardson might want to bring up.

10 - - -

11 Mr. Hannaford: First, I have two letters from the Chief  
12 of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet,  
13 dated December 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941. The committee  
14 will recall that Exhibit 9 contains the correspondence between  
15 Admiral Richardson and Admiral Stark. There are two letters  
16 in this exhibit from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark, to  
17 which the two letters to which I have just referred are  
18 replies. I would, therefore, like to have these two letters  
19 of December 17, 1940, and February 10, 1941, inserted in  
20 Exhibit 9 at the appropriate places.

21 In Admiral Stark's prepared statement he quoted excerpts  
22 of certain letters he had written to Admiral Hart. In order  
23 that the records of the committee may be complete, Admiral  
24 Stark has requested that the file containing the complete  
25 copies of the letters be introduced in evidence as an exhibit.

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I therefore offer these letters from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart as Exhibit 110.

(The letters referred to were marked as Exhibit No. 110.)

Mr. Hannaford: Admiral Stark has asked that the following documents be inserted in the daily transcript of the hearing. They are the following:

First is his letter of June 11, 1941, to the holders of WPL-46.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

SECRET

## OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

Op-12B-5-MoC

(SC) A16/EM

Serial 063712

June 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Distribution List (attached).

Subject: Order of priority in the preparation of war plans.

Reference: (a) CNO Secret Letter Op-12B-5-MoC, (SC)A16/

EN, Serial 03112 of January 8, 1941.

(b) Paragraph 3302, WPL-8.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled.

2. In accordance with the provisions of reference (b), the highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to the plans required by WPL-46. It is directed that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay.

3. WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44, and subordinate plans, are placed in an inactive status. WPL-1 is also placed in an inactive status.

4. The subject matter of subordinate plans prepared in accordance with the directives of WPL-42 and WPL-44 may be used where applicable in the subordinate plans required by WPL-46.

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5. A copy of this letter will be placed in the front of each volume of WPLs-1, 13, 14, 42, and 44, in your custody.

6. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/S/ H. R. STARK

- - - - -

Second, his memorandum of January 9, 1941, to the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, relating to the installations of aircraft-detection equipment.

(The letter referred to is as follows:)

gib-1

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Op-12A-4-dro 1/9/41

2 (SC) H1-16

3 Ser. 04312

January 9, 1941.

4 S E C R E T

5 Memorandum

6 From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

7 To: The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

8 Subject: Installation of Aircraft Detection Equipment.

9 1. The Navy Department considers that improvement  
10 of the antiaircraft defenses, and particularly of the air-  
11 craft detection components of those defenses, in the Hawaiian  
12 Islands is urgently necessary for the protection of the  
13 fleet units there present. It is believed that in the spring  
14 and summer of 1941 enemy air operations are much more likely  
15 to take place in the Hawaiian area and in Alaska than in  
16 Puerto Rico, Panama and the Continental United States.

17 2. For the foregoing reason the intended priority  
18 of permanent installation of the fixed antiaircraft detection  
19 equipment being procured by the Navy is as follows: - Midway,  
20 Johnston, Guam, Palmyra, Samoa, Wake, Guantanamo. It is  
21 requested that consideration be given to revising schedules  
22 of delivery so as to provide Army installations in the Hawaiian  
23 Islands and at Kodiak, Dutch Harbor and Sitka before com-  
24 pleting installations at Panama and before proceeding with  
25 installations in Puerto Rico and the continental United



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States.

3. Confirmation is also requested of the understanding reached on 8 January 1941 in a conference between the Director of Naval Communications, the Chief Signal Office, and representatives of the War Plans Divisions of both services, that the Navy Department will be given priority in deliveries of seven sets of mobile equipment and at least eight of the eighteen sets of antiaircraft equipment for the use of Marine Defense Battalions.

4. It was learned in the conference on 8 January that delays are anticipated in obtaining steel for use in completing this equipment. It is recommended that the highest priority be given to production of this equipment and supplying the material needed. The Navy Department will be glad to cooperate in obtaining the necessary priorities.

R. E. Ingersoll,  
Acting.

Copy to:

Op-12

Op-20

Op-23

Op-30

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Hannaford: Third, a memorandum of July 25, 1941,  
 2 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, with reference to  
 3 WPPac-46, and Admiral Stark's reply thereto, dated September  
 4 9, 1941.

5 (The documents referred to are as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Op-12B-2-djm  
2 (SC)A16/EF12  
3 Serial 098912  
4 D-33956

SEP 9 1941

SECRET

7 From: The Chief of Naval Operations.  
8 To : The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.  
9 Subject: The U.S., Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow  
10 No. 5 (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46,  
11 review and acceptance of.  
12 Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 064W of 25 July,  
13 1941.

14 1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject  
15 Plan and accepts it.

16 2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such  
17 that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next  
18 available officer courier. The originator therefore au-  
19 thORIZES the transmission of this document by registered  
20 mail within the continental limits of the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK

- - -

UNITED STATES FLEET

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A16/WPPac-46(16)

1 **Serial 064W**

2 **Pearl Harbor, T.H.**

3 **July 25, 1941.**

4 **S-E-C-R-E-T**

5 **From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.**

6 **To: The Chief of Naval Operations.**

7 **Subject: U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan - Rainbow**  
8 **Five (WPPac-46).**

9 **Reference: (a) WPL-46.**

10 **Enclosure: (A) Six (6) copies of WPPac-46, registered**  
11 **numbers 1 to 6 inclusive.**

12 1. As required by reference (a), the subject Plan  
13 is submitted herewith for approval.

14 2. In order that the task force commanders of the  
15 U. S. Pacific Fleet might have a basis for planning, and  
16 for action in case of an early outbreak of war, this Plan  
17 has been distributed prior to its approval by the Chief of  
18 Naval Operations.

19 3. The Plan required by paragraph 3215 a.2 of  
20 reference (a) will be submitted when completed.

21 4. Plans for other operations are under investi-  
22 gation and will be submitted as they are developed.

23 5. This O-1 Plan is the best that this command  
24 has been able to evolve for carrying out the tasks assigned  
25 in the Basic Plan. Every investigation of prospective op-

f3 1 erations among the Japanese Mandated Islands shows that  
2 risk of serious damage from enemy submarines and shore-  
3 based aircraft must be incurred. The Commander-in-Chief,  
4 U. S. Pacific Fleet finds himself severely handicapped  
5 for any such operations, because of the limited forces made  
6 available to him, particularly by the small number of des-  
7 troyers and other anti-submarine vessels, and the lack of  
8 transports and a properly trained and equipped marine force.

9 6. If this Plan is put into effect in whole or in  
10 part the actual conduct of any particular operation must be  
11 adjusted to accord with the situation actually existing and  
12 the forces actually available.

13 /s/ H. E. KIMMEL

14 SECRET

15 - - -

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1 Mr. Hannaford: Yesterday, we offered as Exhibit 107  
2 the unpublished portions of the various Navy Pearl Harbor  
3 reports. The findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary  
4 of the Navy were not bound in the volume with the other reports.  
5 In order that the record may be perfectly clear I suggest  
6 that the findings, conclusions and action by the Secretary of  
7 the Navy, which is a separate document, be marked as Exhibit  
8 107-A.

9 (The document referred to was marked as  
10 Exhibit 107-A.)

11 Mr. Hannaford: Exhibit 8 contains various reports from  
12 General MacArthur's headquarters relating to the Japanese  
13 plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor. We have received a  
14 subsequent report from General MacArthur's headquarters  
15 dated December 13, 1945, with reference to this subject. I  
16 request that this document be received in evidence as Exhibit  
17 8-D.

18 (The document referred to was marked as  
19 Exhibit 8-D.)

20 Mr. Hannaford: From time to time, the witnesses who have  
21 appeared before this committee have submitted memoranda to  
22 counsel suggesting corrections in the transcript of their  
23 testimony. I have before me a memorandum from Mr. Grew dated  
24 December 18, 1945 which is in reply to a memorandum from Mr.  
25 Mitchell dated December 1, 1945; a memorandum from Lieutenant

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Colonel Harmon Duncombe, dated December 21, 1945, prepared on behalf of General Marshall; a memorandum dated December 21, 1945 from Admiral Wilkinson, and three memoranda from General Miles, dated December 12, 1945; and a memorandum from General Gerow dated December 26, 1945; all suggesting changes in the transcript of their testimony.

I request that these memorandum be spread upon the daily transcript.

(The memoranda above referred to are as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE  
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

December 1, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GREW:

Regarding changes you desire to make in the transcript of your testimony, it will not be possible to allow any changes in the existing transcript in matters of substance - only errors of spelling. Consequently, in order to record your desire to have changes made in your testimony, you should write us a memorandum referring to the pages of the transcript where you want the corrections to be made, and in that memorandum state the words you want stricken out and the words you want substituted. There will be no changes in the existing transcript, but your memorandum requesting those changes will be put in evidence and form a part of the transcript.

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL

WDM/CBN

- - -



2840 Woodland Drive,

Washington, D. C.,

December 18, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

With reference to your memorandum of December 1, 1945,  
I enclose two papers:

1. List of errors of spelling in the transcript of my  
testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

2. Corrections in the transcript of my testimony. I  
do not wish to change my testimony in any respect. Here  
and there the stenographer appears to have heard my words  
incorrectly and these corrections are intended merely to  
give an accurate record of what I actually said before the  
Committee.

/s/ JOSEPH C. GREW

Joseph C. Grew

- - -

CORRECTIONS IN SPELLING IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF TESTIMONY OF  
JOSEPH C. GREW BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGA-  
TION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

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November 26, 1945 (MORNING SESSION).

Page 1502; line 12: "Kasa" should be altered to "Kase".

Page 1503; line 19: "Gogi" should be altered to "Gogai".

November 26, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION).

Page 1554; line 16: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".

Page 1555; line 9: (same correction)

Page 1556; line 19: (same correction)

November 27, 1945 (MORNING SESSION).

Page 1648; line 18: "Toyda" should be altered to "Toyoda".

November 27, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION).

Page 1680; line 24: "Chaing" should be altered to "Chiang".

Page 1681; line 20: (same correction)

Page 1751; line 17: (same correction)

November 28, 1945 (MORNING SESSION).

Page 1839; line 5: "KGI" should be altered to "KGEI".

November 28, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION).

Page 1902; line 23: "Shanghi" should be altered to "Shanghai".

Page 1926; line 8: "Eugene F. Dooman" should be altered to

"Eugene H. Dooman".

Page 1929; line 17: "omniscient" should be altered to

"omniscient".

Page 1946; line 19: "Hiramuna" should be altered to "Hiranuma".

Page 1947; line 3: (same correction)

- - -

**CORRECTIONS IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF TESTIMONY. EACH LINE IS  
GIVEN COMPLETELY AS IT SHOULD PROPERLY READ.**

-----  
November 26, 1945 (MORNING SESSION)

Page 1474:

Line 14: Mr. Grew: Joseph Clark Grew.

Page 1497:

Line 6: army went into Manchuria and that inevitably  
brought the

Line 7: military into a position of control.

Page 1498:

Line 11: of Admiral Yonai, who was a naval officer.

Line 13: in Japan for many years.

Page 1501:

Line 6: telephoned to Mr. Dooman, the Counselor of  
the Embassy, to stand by.

Page 1502:

Line 7: Togo, the Foreign Minister -- and the Min-  
ister finally said, "I will present your

November 26, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION)

Page 1523:

Line 13: Mr. Grew: A military and a naval attache  
and

Page 1528:

Line 6: Mr. Grew: I said that is correct, sir.

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25**Page 1533:**

Line 17: garden, and just chatting about things, and  
I said:

**Page 1538:**

Line 8: Mr. Grew: No, sir, it did not.

**Page 1539:**

Line 15: called their co-prosperity sphere, first  
economic control, to

Line 17: by the Japanese military was in the way of  
implementing that

**Page 1542:**

Line 19: the more difficult their economic position  
became. They however had

**Page 1546:**

Line 22: his salt if, in case he felt he couldn't  
conscientiously carry out that

Line 23: policy, he should remain in office. There  
can be no question about that.

**Page 1557:**

Line 10: Mr. Grew: Yes, perfectly.

**Page 1562:**

Line 20: that they were ostensibly fighting for. I  
do not say what

**Page 1569:**

Line 11: Very probably, but I have had no evidence

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to be able to

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Page 1580:

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Line 9: before the Konoye Cabinet fell, Admiral

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Toyoda, the Foreign Minister,

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Line 10: asked me to call and said the Ambassador

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"was fatigued" and he

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Line 14: he could not mention his name to me, but he

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just wanted me to

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Line 15: know he was going to have to send somebody

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over for the reason he

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Line 16: had stated and he hoped I would cooperate

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in getting plans ready as quickly as

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Line 17: possible. Before he could act the Konoye

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Cabinet fell and

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Line 18: the Tojo Cabinet came in, and in my first

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interview with the

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Line 19: Foreign Minister, he brought up this point

18

at once. He

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Line 23: Nomura's reports of the conversations in

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Washington were always

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Page 1581:

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Line 14: an American wife, and I had negotiated with

23

him, and I had seen him

24

Line 15: in a personal way often. I always regarded

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him as

1 Line 16: pro-American in his outlook and sentiments,  
2 and the

3 Page 1582:

4 Line 10: him over here -- to support and cooperate  
5 with Admiral Nomura.

6 Line 22: conversations did not come to a satisfactory  
7 conclusion that

8 November 27, 1945 (MORNING SESSION)

9 Page 1625:

10 Line 5: absence in 1939 and when I saw the Presi-  
11 dent he said, "When

12 Page 1639:

13 Line 22: 1. Peace and War, United States Foreign  
14 Policy, 1931-1941, published in 1943.

15 Line 25: 2. Foreign Relations of the United States;  
16 Japan, 1931-1941.

17 Page 1640:

18 Line 3: 3. My book entitled "Ten Years in Japan".

19 Line 20: been misinterpreted by foreign governments,  
20 and points of

21 Page 1649:

22 Line 4: that record of a conversation with the For-  
23 eign Minister.

November 27, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION)

Page 1668:

Line 12: as comment in my diary. I considered that  
September was one of

Page 1669:

Line 10: Mr. Grew: No, sir, that is a telegram from  
our then Legation

Line 15: Mr. Grew: Mr. Steele was a prominent cor-  
respondent in the

Page 1674:

Line 16: It would be short-sighted, however, to deny  
their existence or

Page 1677:

Line 8: used. Once that conviction is shaken it  
is possible that

Page 1680:

Line 12: East and from time to time my recommendations  
as to what

Line 13: policy should be followed in Washington.

Page 1682:

Line 8: into East Asia. They were potentially

Page 1684:

Line 24: "Only insuperable obstacles will prevent  
the Japanese

r9

1 Page 1692:

2 Line 2: Mr. Grew: Yes, as I remember it, we might

3 Line 3: have. Let me see how that was stated.

4 Page 1740:

5 Line 17: Mr. Grew: Senator, I did not go into  
6 those stra-

7 Page 1753:

8 Line 20: with the responsibility for some of the  
9 worst acts of banditry

10 Page 1757:

11 Line 18: 29, Senator. I think I had better stick  
12 to the record here.13 November 28, 1945 (MORNING SESSION)

14 Page 1802:

15 Line 8: the United States inevitable may come  
16 with dramatic and

17 Page 1837:

18 Line 5: Mr. Grew: That would be 14 hours earlier.  
19 I understand

20 Page 1841:

21 Line 15: Mr. Grew: Fourteen hours earlier. That,  
22 in Washington,23 November 28, 1945 (AFTERNOON SESSION)

24 Page 1880:

25 Line 12: ing from Japan in August 1942 submitted a



report to Mr. Hull.

Page 1901:

Line 20: prime minister Hiranuma was also attacked.  
His throat was cut and

Page 1904:

Line 11: and it is all on the record -- I had better  
read you exactly what

Page 1908:

Line 13: Mr. Keefe: When did the Konoye Cabinet fall?  
Line 14: Mr. Grew: October 16, 1941.

Page 1909:

Line 6: this meeting with the President took place  
the Konoye Cabinet

Page 1917:

Line 7: a purely technical point; it is a point as  
to what is meant  
Line 17: in it so much as whether further negotiations  
continued after

November 29, 1945 (MORNING SESSION)

Page 1994:

Line 18: might have been the Counselor of the  
Embassy; it might have

- - -

## WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C.

21 December 1945

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

It is requested that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony of General Marshall.

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
2766	4	Change McNary to McNair
2767	4	Omit "Of".
2767	18	Change priority to priorities.
2767	25	Change point to part
2769	9	Change the to their
2769	10	Change representation to presentation
2787	11	Change Hart to Stark
2790	6	Change Squadron to Squadrons
2790	18	Change times to time
2823	6	Change brough to brought
2825	14	Change known to not
2830	15	Change eacoh to each
2834	21	Change approved to approve
2836	7	Change operations to operation
2850	4	Change outweigh to outweigh
2868	11	Omit "for", change operation to operational
2874	9	Omit "Mr. Mitchell"

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2	2874	12	Change General Marshall to Mr. Mitchell.
3	2874	13	Change Mr. Mitchell to General Marshall
4	2874	14	Omit "General Marshall"
5	2885	20	Change "Aid de Memoirs" to "Aide
6			Memoire"
7	2891	12	Change far to for
8	2895	8	After Japanese, insert "Expedition"
9	2896	10	Change on to in
10	2986	18	Change on to at; capitalize Joint
11			Board
12	2901	5	Change sources to resources
13	2914	Page No.	Change from 2194 to 2914
14	2914	16	Change "from 7 to 9" to "before
15			dinner time".
16	2918	4	Change from to for
17	2925	11	Change is to was
18	2928	11	Change officers to opposite
19	2929	13	Change Dean to Deane
20	2930	4	Remove comma after authentic
21	2933	17	Change officer to opposite
22	2933	21	Change officer to opposite
23	2038	7	Change transportation to transmission
24	2939	5	Change Bundy to Bratton
25	2953-A	15	Change materiel to material

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2	2953-A	21	Change they to the
3	2956	25	Change B-ly's to B-17's
4	2960	18	Change Haway to Hawaii
5	2973	2	Change Ferguson to Lucas
6	2979	2	Change to to the
7	2989	2	Change Clark to Clarke
8	2994	24	Change "it a matter of record" to
9			"another effort"
10	2995	2	Change telephone to telephoned
11	2996	4	After Mr. Bell, insert "but not"
12	2997	12	Change Vissell to Bissell
13	2997	15	" " " "
14	2997	19	" " " "
15	2997	22	" " " "
16	2997	24	" " " "
17	2998	7	" " " "
18	2998	13	" " " "
19	2998	17	" " " "
20	3003	20	" " " "
21	3004	2	" " " "
22	3004	6	" " " "
23	3009	6	Change quadron to squadron
24	3016	8	Change measure to message
25	3037	14	Change "arrived" to "were away"

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2	3056	25	Change "to him" to "to me"
3	3061	14	Change Philippping to Philippine
4	3063	3	Change Backking to backing
5	3109	8	After "fact" insert "as far as I recall,"
6			(see p. 3515, line 9)
7	3111	24	Change ready to already
8	3112	24	Change some to someone
9	3113	4	Change "knew the" to "was the only"
10	3116	18	Change "there" to "then"; "any" to "it a"
11	3132	25	Change "chief of" to "General"
12	3145	6	Change "at 7:00 o'clock to "on the 7th"
13	3147	18	Change "suversive" to "subversive"
14	3156	14	Change "ythis" to "this"
15	3164	10	Change "his" to "my"
16	3171	17	Change "hear" to "head"
17	3172	3	Change "advise" to "advice"
18	3178	21	Change "8:30" to "6:30"; "American" to
19			"A.M."
20	3182	9	Change "presented" to "prevented"
21	3189	4	Change "applied" to "implied"
22	3194	5	Change "from" to "near"
23	3195	20	Change "on" to "all"; "and" to "on"
24	3195	25	Change "Hawaii" to "Panama"; "we" to "I"
25	3235	13	Change "attack" to "attacked"

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2	3353	6	Change "Marshall" to "Marshal"
3	3356	4	After "Washington" insert "to"
4	3360	23	After "that" insert "we"
5	3370	11	Change "concerning" to "concerned"
6	3376	11	Change "was" to "war"
7	3315	25	Change "though" to "thought"
8	3316	5	Change "emphazied" to "emphasized"
9	3321	4	Change "scope" to "slash"
10	3327	15	Change "sent" to "send"
11	3344	10	Change "night" to "morning"
12	3352	13	Change "C.S.O." to "C.N.O."; "S.O.S."
13			to "C.O.S."
14	3352	19	Change "C.S.O." to "C.N.O."; "S.O.S. to
15			"C.O.S."
16	3353	6	Change "see" to "see"
17	3359	8	Change "kept on with cur" to "felt no
18			fear for"
19	3364	15	Change "Winane" to "Winant"
20	3364	22	Change "7th" to "6th"
21	3371	12	Change "possible" to "possibly"
22	3405	17	Change "exchange" to "change"
23	3419	11	Change "chance" to "change"
24	3427	2	Change "indicate" to "indicative"
25	3451	22	Change "somewhere" to "interrupted with something"

<u>1</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
2	3253	6	Change "Marshall" to "Marshal"
3	3256	4	After "Washington" insert "to"
4	3260	23	After "that" insert "we"
5	3270	11	Change "concerning" to "concerned"
6	3276	11	Change "was" to "war"
7	3315	25	Change "though" to "thought"
8	3316	5	Change "emphazied" to "emphasized"
9	3321	4	Change "scope" to "slash"
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13			
14	3352	19	Change "C.S.O." to "C.N.O."; "S.O.S." to "C.O.S."
15			
16	3353	6	Change "see" to "see"
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18			
19	3364	15	Change "Winane" to "Winant"
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25	3451	22	Change "somewhere" to "interrupted with something"

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
3453	23	Change "terne " to "tern"
3455	16	Change "know" to "knowing"
3472	18	After "message" insert "indicate"
3472	20	Change "thatm" to "that"
3473	13	Change "too" to "to"
3480	4	Change "o" to "do"
3480	16	Change "Denny" to "Deane"
3501	6	Change "gto" to "to"
3506	23	Change "deligated" to "delegated"
3543	25	After "1941" insert "called"
3548	11	Change "point" to "joint"
3555	7	Change "proceedures" to "procedures"
3558	22	Change "MacArthur" to "Herron"
3565	14	Before "prompted" insert "that"
3621		Should be page "3622"
3622		Should be page "3621"
3627	2	Change "exhause" to "exhaust"
3640	2	Change "distributed" to "disapproved"
3652	3	Change "discussien" to "discuss"
3652-B	4	Change "Deoxmber" to "December"
3662	6	After "Yes, Sir" start a new paragraph and insert "Mr. Keefe", capitalize "And"
3680	17	Change "thought" to "though"
3685	18-20	Omit lines 18 to 20



	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2	3724	3	Change "siwht" to "with"
3	3729	7	Change "makking" to "making"
4	3734	8	Change "presumaly" to "presumably"
5	3747	6	Change "Simenko" to "Semanko"
6	3747	7	Change "Spearman" to "Speaman"
7	3754	12	Change "contract" to "contact"
8	3766	7	Change "Corp" to "Corps"
9	3971	14	Change "Dean" to "Deane"
10	3972	25	Change "is" to "was"
11	3983	18	Change "Short" to "Strong"
12	3984	20	After "to" insert "get"
13	4032	23	Change "Genera" to "General"
14	4040	10	Change "nto" to "to"
15	4057	7	Change "hour intc" to "out to"
16	4060	23	Change "Normany" to "Normandy"
17	4071	7	Change "vinal" to "final"
18	4073	3	Change "port and" to "important"
19	4075	5	Change "Dean" to "Deane"
20	4080	24	Change "be" to "me"

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE

Lt. Col., GSC

Navy Department

Washington, D. C.

21 December 1945

My Dear Mr. Mitchell -

In the record of my testimony in the current hearings before the Joint Committee I note a few stenographic errors, due doubtless to my over-rapid replies, which I believe should be corrected in the interest of clarity and accuracy.

Record of December 18:

Page 4754 Line 20. Change "a 55" to "the 5th".

Line 21. Strike out "The translation is inadequate".

Line 22. Change "which" to "each".

Page 4759 Line 21. Strike out "not".

Page 4766 Line 17. Change "Marshalls" to "Carolines".

Page 4773 Line 12. Change "for" to "by".

Line 15. Strike out "and again".

Page 4791 Line 8. Change "Kirk" to "King".

Page 4800 Line 1. Change "fleets" to "planes".

Page 4806 Line 5. Change "fleet" to "field".

Page 4897 Line 23. Change "not" to "now".

Page 4900 Line 24. Change "communications" to "intentions".

f2

Record of December 19:

- 1
- 2 Page 4947 Line 21. Change "but not" to "or".
- 3 Page 4963 Line 1. Change "certain" to "the Anglo-Saxon".
- 4 Page 4964 Line 11. Change "it" to "they" and "out of
- 5 the" to "on".
- 6
- 7 Page 4986 Line 14. Change "days" to "years".
- 8 Page 4996 Line 9. Strike out "Admiral Wilkinson".
- 9 Page 5018 Line 4. Change "20th" to "25th".
- 10 Page 5019 Line 3. Change "November" to "September".
- 11 Page 5033 Line 11. Strike out "and".
- 12 Line 12. Change "Ingersoll" to "Stark".
- 13 Page 5057 Line 3. Change "and it was an" to "in the".

14 Also, for clarity, though an emendation and not a steno-

15 graphic correction, there should be added to Page 5063, line

16 7, the following: "The fortnightly summary of that date,

17 but not the memorandum of December 1 discussing the Japanese

18 movements into the South China Sea".

19 Very truly,

20 /s/ T. S. WILKINSON

21 T. S. Wilkinson,

22 Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy

23 Mr. W. D. Mitchell,

24 Counsel to the Joint Committee

25

- - -

WAR DEPARTMENT  
 Washington, D. C.  
 Room 4D 761  
 The Pentagon

12 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 4 December:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2425	13	Insert period after the word "message".
2425	14	Delete words "so that".
2425	15	Insert comma after word "message".
2425	22	Change "this" to "that".
2425	23	Change "up" to "my attention to".
2428	21	Insert words "those two" after "except".
2450	4	Change first "that" to "with".
2454	7	Change first "it" to "there".
2481	24	Change "place" to "status".
2485	15	Change "have" to "had".
2485	20	Change "it" to "they".
2486	23	Insert comma after word "read".
2486	24	Change "over" to "addressed".
2487	16	Insert comma and the word "as" after "record".
2488	5	Change "written" to "read".
2495	20	Change "intercepting" to "decoding".

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2	2507	15	Insert comma and the word "then" after "one".
3	2507	16	Delete comma after "code".
4	2516	6	Insert comma after "checked"; insert "if" after "and".
5			
6	2516	7	Change "if" to "then".
7	2524	4-5	Change comma after "Japan" to period and delete remainder of sentence.
8			
9	2527	14	Insert "that" after the comma.
10	2527	15	Change commas around phrase "and I think I can say always" to parentheses.
11			
12	2527	16	Insert comma after "messages".
13	2536	16	Change "Atlantic" to "Pacific".
14	2543	18	Change "concentration" to "control".
15	2548	8	Change "would have" to "when it".
16	2554	6	Change "from" to "to"; change "at" to "after".
17	2574	15	Change period to colon; change "The" to "that the".
18			
19	2574	16	Change "indicated" to "indicate".
20	2574	17	Change "was" to "be".
21	2575	6	Line should read "... ABC (not D) agreement..."
22	2582	12	Insert "not" after "of".

/s/ SHERMAN MILES

Maj. Gen., USA

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington, D. C.  
Room 4D761  
The Pentagon

12 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 30 November:

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2133	13	Change "the same" to "some".
2133	17	Change "in" to "with".
2133	20	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
2133	24	Change "hemispheric" to "hemisphere".
2134	3-4	Change the lines to read "Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, with eight subsections".
2135	3	Delete the "g" from "bulletings".
2136	3	Delete the word "controls".
2136	12	Insert a comma after the second "gauge".
2136	18	Change the line to read "for maps of all sorts, and we were coordinating -- we were the".
2137	23	Change "for" to "in".
2137	24	Change "for" to "with".
2137	25	Change line to read "Army--I mean the next to the last war. I served other times".

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
1			
2	2146	14	Insert comma after "Staff"; delete "and".
3	2146	15	Change line to read "of the War Plans Division,
4			and the Secretary of War, were, from then".
5	2153	19	Change "by that" to "on".
6	2157	12	Change "a" to "the".
7	2157	13	Change "twice" to "once".
8	2157	22-23	Change lines to read "the Dutch, the Siamese,
9			the British, the Chinese or the Russians".
10	2161	3	Change "message" to "messages".
11	2161	5	Change line to read "was only one of many.
12			There were more, actually, that indicated an
13			attack".
14	2161	6	Change "and" to "or".
15	2163	17	Insert "a" after "being".
16	2163	13-14	Change lines to read "Many times I have drawn
17			up a maneuver or war game situation on the
18			assumption of a Japanese attack fol-".
19	2164	15-16	Change lines to read "General Miles: Many times
20			I have drawn up a maneuver or war game
21			situation under the assumption of an all out".
22	2165	19	Delete the word "all".
23	2165	23	Change "in" to "or"; change "situations" to
24			situation".
25	2169	11	Change "wild" to "wide"; delete "in".
	2173	9	Insert quotation marks after "efficiency".

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2	2173	10	Delete quotation marks after "it".
3	2173	13	Insert the word "successfully" after "she".
4	2176	6	Insert the word "that" after "learn".
5	2182	5	Change line to read "the Commanding General
6			himself had put an alert in his".
7	2205	23	Change "Deputy" to "Chief of".
8	2205	24	Delete word "General".
9	2208	17-18	Consolidate lines and change to read "ference
10			by direction. In other words, I was the one
11			who was raising".
12	2209	3	Delete comma after "to".
13	2209	5	Delete words "limiting it only".
14	2209	6	Delete word "to"; change "against" to "about".
15	2210	15	Change "General" to "Colonel".
16	2214	19	Substitute "Japanese" for "American".
17			(Mr. Gesell's
18			question)
19	2238	4	Change "Staff" to "a division".
20	2238	11	Insert "there was also the" after "end".
21	2245	8	Change line to read "day that I have counted
22			56 of those that were deciphered....."
23	2246	19	Change second "the" to "that it is".
24	2246	20	Delete comma following "probable".
25	2251	16	Change "and would be a" to "since they were".



	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
1			
2	2251	17	Change line to read "meaningless messages to
3			the person sending them".
4	2254	3-4	Change lines to read "could add, however, of
5			course, that we knew the Japanese were
6			following".
7	2254	10	Change "there" to "it".
8	2258	10	Change "running" to "writing".

General Miles has also requested the following corrections in the reporter's transcript of his testimony on 3 December:

WARD & BYRNE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
11			
12	2314	24	Change line to read "General Miles: The
13			possibility or the probability of".
14	2314	25	Delete the word "it".
15	2315	22	Delete the words "Now" and "have".
16	2315	23	Change line to read "You ask me whether I
17			thought it was a".
18	2315	24	Change comma to period after "surprise";
19			capitalize "w" in "we".
20	2315	25	Change line to read "in war with us, might
21			attack Hawaii, and we took action".
22	2316	2	Change "This" to "The".
23	2316	3	Change "billeted" to "established".
24	2316	4	Change line to read "We also followed, I think,
25			the second principle. We".

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
1			
2	2316	6	Change "he" to "they".
3	2316	10	Change "very" to "great".
4	2316	11	Change "he" to "they".
5	2318	22	Change "Yes" to "No".
6	2319	6	Delete words "a mine".
7	2320	13	Change "control" to "controlled".
8	2323	7	Change "sent" to "seem".
9	2323	9	Insert word "by" after "believe".
10	2324	8	Delete words "or might not".
11	2332	14	Change "waters" to "province".
12	2337	18	Change "close" to "closer".
13	2338	15	Change "officially" to "generally".
14	2367	10	Insert word "was" after "question".
15	2367	11	Change "their" to "our".
16	2367	14	Change line to read "the risking of this secret
17			by using the two codes. We were".
18	2371	22	Change "Brunert" to "Grunert".
19	2373	15	Delete words "knew, and".
20	2374	24	Change "of the" to "and train".
21	2374	25	Change "people" to "the agents"; change "why"
22			to "what".
23	2383	18	Insert word "we" after "which".
24	2384	21	Change "he is" to "his".
25	2384	22	Delete word "good".

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	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
1			
2	2384	23	Change "You" to "I".
3	2389	17	Delete words "one of".
4	2389	18	Change line to read "sole function".
5	2390	20	Delete period and add "in our army".
6	2391	6	Add "--a" after "that".
7	2394	20	Insert "and" after "department".
8	2399	4	Change line to read "Marshall's warning mes-
9			sage of November 27. Concerning my message
10			of".
11	2399	5	Delete words "did" and "and".
12	2405	25	Delete "Admiral Turner".
13	2408	6	Change "authority" to "authorities".
14	2409	7	Change line to read "those codes. But the
15			Japanese could not jump our headouarters".
16	2409	24	Change "take" to "attack".
17	2419	13	Change comma to period after "citizens";
18			capitalize "b" in "but".
19			/S/ SHERMAN MILES
20			Maj. Gen., USA
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C.

Room 4D 761

The Pentagon

12 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the transcript of the testimony which I gave on November 29th:

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2065	16	Strike the word "the".
2066	16	Strike the word "general".
2067	9	Strike the word "with".
2067	10	Change "commanders" to "commands".
2074	23	Change "not" to "now".
2083	6	Change "nor was G-2" to "nor was Naval Communications".
2084	11	Change "Hugh" to "Jules".
2108	9	Change "of" to "or".
2111	17	Strike the word "few".
2111	24	Strike the word "it".
2115	10	Strike the word "preceding".
2115	11	Change "April" to "August".
2115	14	Change "battle for the Leyte Gulf" to "battle for Leyte Gulf".
2116	13	Change the line to read "gagged by the Chief of Staff or was it in any way suggested that I".

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2	2125	7	Insert "and" after "economic".
3	2127	23	Change the line to read "War Department, the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War that we".
6	2100	14	Change "right" to "light".
7			/s/ SHERMAN MILES
8			Maj. Gen., USA
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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C.

Room 4D761

The Pentagon

26 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GESELL:

I request that the following corrections be made in the reporter's transcript of my testimony on 5 December:

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
2603	10	Delete comma.
2603	22	Delete "of"; substitute comma.
2641	4	Change "means" to "mission".
2641	5	Change "means" to "missions".
2645	19	Change "means of" to "missions, the".
2668	8	Insert "that" after "conclusion".
2668	22	Change "earning" to "warning".
2668	22	Change "that" to "as".
2669	12	Change "article" to "obstacle".
2672	2	Change "aircraft" to "aircraft".
2672	5	Change "autmenting" to "augmenting".
2688	4	Change "there" to "these".
2691	13	Change "drafing" to "drafting".
2708	25	Insert "not" after "is" and before "necessarily".
2709	10	Change "sent" to "send".

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
1			
2	2711	6	Change "Galey" to "Galley".
3	2714	24	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
4	2714	25	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy"?
5	2715	9	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
6	2715	12	Change "Bandy" to "Bundy".
7	2725	6	Strike "from".
8	2728	25	Strike line (duplicated top of next page).
9	2743	2	Insert "I saw" between the words "time" and
10			"the".
11	2743	4	Delete "was".

The following corrections should be made in the transcript of my testimony on 14 December:

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	
14			
15	4248	3	Change "precipitate" to "precipitate".
16	4254	24	Change "Memoirs" to "Memoire".
17	4262	24	Insert "do not" before "believe".
18	4271	19	Change "Commanding" to "Command and".
19	4307	11	Change "Bad Nomen" to "Bad Nauheim".

/s/ L. T. GEROW

Lieut. General

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Hannaford: At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the transcript  
Congressman Gearhart requested information concerning any all-  
out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from December 1 to  
December 6, 1941. We have received two memoranda from the  
War Department, dated December 27, 1945, and January 2, 1946,  
in reply to Congressman Gearhart's request. I request that  
these memoranda, together with the attachments, be spread upon  
the daily transcript at this point.

(The memoranda above referred to are as follows:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington, D.C.

Room 4D757

The Pentagon

2 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

With reference to Congressman Gearhart's request for information concerning any all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6 December 1941, there is inclosed a further report from the Commanding General in Hawaii.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE

HARMON DUNCOMBE

Lt. Col., GSC

1 Incl.

- - -

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING CLEAR MESSAGE

From: CG USAF MIDPAC Ft Shafter TH

To : War Department

Nr : MP 18038

1 January 1946

To the Chief of Staff USA Washn DC Attn Assistant Chief

WARD 8 PAUL WASHINGTON D C

f1

f2  
1 of Staff Operations Div info CINCAFPAC Admin CINCAFPAC Adv  
2 MP 18038 MPGCT Richardson.

3 See following references:

4 A WCL 30471 DTG 200138Z Dec

5 B AFMIDPAC radio MP 17177 DTG 220554Z Dec

6  
7 An intensive and thorough search of all records of this  
8 Hqs and Air Corps Hqs on Oahu fail to disclose info requested  
9 in reference A).

10 End

11 NOTE: MP 17177 is MC-IN-62666 (22 Dec 45) OPD

12 ACTION: OPD

13 INFO: L & L D

14 MC-IN-50590 (2 Jan 46)

15 DTG 010720Z RMW

16 Unclassified

17 COPY

18 - - -

19 WAR DEPARTMENT

20 Washington, D. C.

21 Room 4D757

22 The Pentagon

23 27 December 1945

24 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

25 At pages 4164 and 5038-40 of the transcript, Congress-  
man Gearhart requested complete information concerning any

1 all-out air alert at Army airfields in Hawaii from 1 to 6  
 2 December 1941. A thorough search has disclosed no informa-  
 3 tion in the War Department files concerning such an alert.  
 4 Inclosed herewith are (1) a 19 December 1945 cable on the  
 5 subject from the War Department to the Commanding General  
 6 in Hawaii and (2) a preliminary reply dated 22 December  
 7 1945.

8 /s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE

9 HARMON DUNCOMBE

10 Lt. Col., GSC

11 Incls. (2)

12 - - -

13 C O P Y

14 WAR DEPARTMENT

15 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

16 OUTGOING CLEAR MESSAGE

17 Operations Division WDGS

18 Current Group WAROPDIV 74676

19 19 December 1945

20 COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft. Shafter T H

21 INFORMATION:

22 CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I

23 Number: WCL 30471

24 From WARSEC

25 Joint Congressional Committee has requested infor-

1 mation whether orders were issued placing Hickam, Wheeler  
 2 or any other Army airfield in Hawaiian Department on alert  
 3 during first week December 1941 and also whether any such  
 4 alerts were cancelled on or about 6 December. Request immed-  
 5 iate thorough investigation of available records and other  
 6 sources of information relating to any such alerts. If  
 7 alerts were placed in effect or cancelled, send by cable  
 8 the text of all such orders and specify by whose authority  
 9 they were issued. Give details as to nature of alerts and  
 10 any other pertinent information.

11 End.

12 ORIGINATOR: OPD

13 INFORMATION: L & L D

14 MC-OUT-30471 (Dec 45) DTG 200136Z 1s

15 C O P Y

16 unclassified

17 - - -

18 C O P Y

19 WAR DEPARTMENT

20 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

21 INCOMING CLEAR MESSAGE

22 URGENT

23 From: CG, Fort Shafter, Honolulu, TH

24 To: War Department

25 Nr: M 17177