


Doc. 2647 Evid

Folder 2

(217)



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 7647

Date 12 Sep 46.

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Documents relating to Massacre of CHINESE in Malaya in 1942, ~~and~~ and Investigations Thereof.

Date: 1942-1946. Original (X) Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No (X) Japanese.
Has it been photostated? Yes () No (X)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Prisoner of War Investigation Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

Imperial Japanese Government.

YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki; SUZUKI, Sasaki, et al.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Arocities; Class B offenses.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

~~Doc~~ Items include excerpts from Imperial Headquarters Greater East Asia Operations' Diary, 1942-1945, and "outline of investigation concerning ~~Crimes~~ Cruelties toward Chinese, Principally in the Malayan Operations (SINGAPORE)." (cont. p. 2)

Analyst: W.H. Wagner

Doc. No. 7647

p. 2

#2647

conducted by the POW Investigation
Central Committee by the POW Investigation
Division, ^{6 and} ~~and~~ 22 November 1945.

~~and~~

In the former, testimony by
officers ~~involved~~ in charge of various
commands at the time ^{the} in Singapore
area is included.

X 2647
(TRANSLATION)

CLASS 1.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MASSACRE OF
CHINESE IN SINGAPORE

1. Date 6 November, From 1000.
2. Place Kyōsō First Conference Room (3rd Floor)
3. Officials attend

- a - Army Investigators (War Department)
- b - Officers were called in.

Lt. Gen. Kawamura

Col. Hongō

Col. Kera

Lt. Col. Kato

Lt. Col. Kagoshima

Lt. Col. Fujiwara

Lt. Sato

Maj. Yamanaka

- c - Forth Section

Col. Sugita

Lt. Col. Kunitake

Lt. Col. Hashizume

The investigation of the Massacre of
Chinese in ~~Sing~~ Singapore.

1. Date 6 November, From 1000.
2. Place Kyōsō First conference room (3rd floor)
3. ~~Attendants~~

Officials attend

a- ^{Army} Investigation (. War Department)

b- Officers were called in

Lt. Gen. Kawamura

Col. Hongo Col. Kera

Lt. Col. Kato Lt. Col. Kagoshima

Lt. Col. Fujiwara Lt. ~~St~~ Sato

Maj. Yamanaka

c. Forth Section

Col. Sugita

Lt. Col. Kunitake

Lt. Col. Hashizume

新嘉坡華僑處新調查（第一組）

一日時 十一月六日一〇〇〇ヨリ

二場所 總務第一會議室（三階）

三召集官

(1) 陸軍省調査委員

(2) 召集官

河村 中將

本郷 大佐 解良 大佐

加藤 中佐 鹿子島 中佐

藤原 中佐 佐藤 丕 中佐

山中 少佐

(3) 第四班

杉田 大佐、國武 中佐、橋詰 中佐

#2647
(TRANSLATION)

CLASS 2.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MASSACRE OF
CHINESE IN SINGAPORE.

1. Date 6 November, Time 1400 hours.
2. Place Kyō sō First Conference Room (3rd Floor)
3. 1. Jap. Army Investigators (War Department)
2. Officers were called in.

Maj. Gen. Nomura

Col. Kandhara

Col. Oishi

Lt. Col. Asakuno

Lt. Col. Kimura

Lt. Col. Tsukushi

Maj. Hayashi

Col. Toda

Col. Kitayama

Lt. Arikawa

Class 2.

The investigation of the Massacre of
Chinese in Singapore.

1. Date 6 November Time 1400. Time hour
2. Place Kyōsō First Conference Room (3rd floor)
3. ~~Officers were called in.~~
 - ① Jap. Army investigators (War Department)
 - ② Officers were called in.

Maj. Gen. Nomura

Col. Kanakura

Col. Oishi

Lt Col. Asakura

Lt. Col. Kimura

Lt. Col. Tsukushi

Maj. Hayashi

Col. Toda

Col. Kitayama

Lt. Aritawa

田中少佐、少計 (木村武臣)

新嘉坡華僑處斷調查 (第二組)

一日時

十一月六日一四〇〇三リ

二場所

教總第一會議室 (三階)

三參集官

(1) 陸軍省調查委員

(2) 召集官

GA 野 村 恭 木 少 佐 將

MP 大 石 大 佐

A 木 村 拙 中 佐

林 (勳) 少 佐

GP 金 康 大 佐

A 朝 久 野 中 佐

A 筑 案 中 佐

戶 田 大 佐 (GO 高級別官)

北 山 大 佐 (秋 長)

A 大 有 川 中 佐

(3) 第一組參集諸官

DOCUMENTS REFER TO MASSACRE OF CHINESE

ORIGINAL AND OTHERS

ORIGINAL

(CONFIDENTIAL)

To: POW Investigation Central Committee
POW Investigation Division

OUTLINE OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CRUEL ACTIONS OVER
CHINESE (PRINCIPALLY IN MALAYAN OPERATION (SINGAPORE)).

Forth Section
22 November 1945

Signed by Col. Sugita
Col. Oishi
Lt. Col. Hashizume

DOCUMENTS REFER TO MASSACRE OF CHINESE
ORIGINAL AND OTHERS

ORIGINAL
(CONFIDENTIAL)

To: POW Investigation Central Committee
POW Investigation Division

OUTLINE OF INVESTIGATION CONCERNING CRUEL ACTIONS OVER
CHINESE (PRINCIPALLY IN MALAYAN OPERATION (SINGAPORE)).

Forth Section
22 November 1945

Signed by Col. Sugita
Col. Oishi
Lt. Col. Hashizume

華僑事件參考書類

その他

維持スヘク努メツツアリ即チ此ノ爲大日本軍當局ハ軍ヲ市内ニ入レシ
メス唯一般市民及難民ヲ保護スル責任ヲ負ヘル憲兵ノミヲ市内ニ入レ
ンメテリ然ルニ若干叛亂ノ徒和平ヲ擾亂シ利敵ノ舉ニ出ツ因ツテ軍ハ
是等惡化及叛亂ノ徒、軍用武器ヲ擁スル者、暴行掠奪ノ行爲アル者ニ
對シ嚴重ナル處罰ヲ課シ全居民ノ和平ヲ維持セントス而シテ己ニ逮捕
セル叛徒ノ領袖及某々人ハ本月二十一日及二十二日某處ニ於テ銃殺ニ
處セラレタリ

茲ニ昭南警備司令官ハ今後尙收斂セス惡行ヲ續クル徒輩ニ對シテハ同
ノ嚴罰ヲ以テ臨ムコトヲ公告ス

華僑難民ノ歸郷ニ關スル軍當局ノ佈告（二月下旬）

昭南島ニ於ケル治安ノ確保ト生活物資需給ノ圓滑化ヲ圖ル爲避難中ノ
全華僑ハ三月四日ヨリ數ヘテ十日以内ニ原住地ヘ復歸セヨ
若シ正當ノ理由ナクシテ期間内ニ復歸セサル者ハ嚴罰ニ處ス

72647

||

ARTICLES OF INVESTIGATION

1. Investigations for apprehension and the personnel.
2. The handling of the apprehended persons and proceedings.
3. The commands concerning execution.
4. The unit to carry out the execution.
5. Number of persons to be executed.
6. The time of the execution, place, and the methods.
7. Reasons for execution and the circumstances.
8. Reasons for the handling of the executions without courts-martial.
9. Disposals after the executions, reports, manner of burial of the corpses.
10. Etc.

調 査 事 項

- 一 檢索ノ準據及其ノ人員
 - 二 被檢索者ノ取扱及檢索要領
 - 三 處斷ニ關スル命令
 - 四 處斷實施部隊
 - 五 處斷人員（内容共）
 - 六 處斷ノ時期、場所、手段等
 - 七 處斷ノ理由、動機
 - 八 處斷ノ手續特ニ軍律會議ニ附セサリシ理由
 - 九 處斷後ノ處置
- 報告、死體、隱匿狀況
- 一〇 其ノ他

#2647

To ATIS.
For translation.

FINAL REVISED COPY

5 April 1946
By POW Inv. Division.

Sub-Committee Report on Malayan
Massacre dated 22 Nov. 1945, signed by
Col. SUGITTA, Ichiji, Col. OFSHI,
& Lt. Col. KUMITAKE, Michio

Lt. Col. Rudisill - Inv. Div File #890

Legal Sec SCAP
wish for the original
documents to be returned
to them.

By Henderson
Lt Col.
OC. Brit MWCS

Headquarters of the 25th Army
Commander General YAMASHITA ^{Tomoyuki}
Chief of Staff Lt. General SUZUKI ^{Sosaku}
Assistant Chief of Staff Maj. General MANAOI Kei
Staff officers of the Section I.

Senior: Col. IKETANI Hansaburo
Operations: Lt. Colonel TSUTI Masanobu
" : Major KUNITAKE Terundo
" : Major ASAEDA Harushige
Information: Lt. Col. SUGITA Kazutengu
" : Maj. HAYASHI Tadahiko
Aviation: Lt. Col. HISHIOKA Shigeru

Staff officers of the Section II

Senior: Colonel YAMATSU Hyobunosuke
Ordnance: Maj. KATO Masahiei
" : Maj. HASHIZUME Isamu
Railway: Lt. Col. HONGO Takeshi
Navigation: Lt. Col. KERA Shichiro
Communication: Lt. Col. HORIUCHI Hideo

Subordinate
Commanders

Commander of Singapore Garrison Maj. Gen. KAWAHARA Saburo
Commander of the 2nd Field MP Unit Col. OISHI Masayuki
Commander of the Imperial Guard Division Lt. Gen. NISHIMURA Takeuma
Commander of the 5th Division Lt. Gen. MATSUI Takuro
Commander of the 18th Division Lt. Gen. MUTAGUCHI Rinya

Other personnel concerned
Chief of staff of the Imperial Guard Division
col. KOBATA Nobuyoshi

The 5th Division

Staff officer for operation
Lt. Colonel OGATA
" for information
Captain YAMANAKA Tokuo
Commander of Battalion
Maj. TCHIKAWA
" Maj. MIYAMOTO

The 18th Division

Staff officer for operation
Lt. Colonel HASHIRO TO Hiroshi
" for information
Major SATO Fujio
Battalion Commander
Maj. HAYASHI Kakizo

mopping up campaign on the Island of Singapore

- ① Channel through which orders are given
- ② arrest and disposition of anti-Japan Chinese

A. Change in the Army's policy ^{toward} ~~against~~ the Chinese residents

B. Collection of material regarding suspected anti-Japan Chinese

A list was made and between 20 Feb to ~~20 Feb~~ the end of March 6800 were arrested.

C. Disposition of the anti-Japan Chinese
About 1500 were released and about 5000 were punished. Most of them are those who put up signals to lead the enemy planes and chief of various anti-Japan associations and communists.

2. Conditions of purging in the Malayan Peninsula.

① Conditions of public peace and order very bad due to the Chinese activities.

② purging operation
The 5th and the 18th divisions were transferred to Johor and other parts of the peninsula.

① Report on Investigation regarding the affair pertaining to the Chinese residents during the Malayan (Singapore) operation.

5. April.

1. Preface
2. General situation in the Malayan area before the commencement of war and the army's policy regarding the disposition of the residents.
3. General situation during the operation
 - (1) Conditions of anti-Japan maneuvers of the Chinese during the Malayan operation.
 - (2) Condition of public peace and order in Singapore after the British surrender.
4. Cleaning up of the battlefield and mopping up campaign after the enemy's surrender.

It was considered advisable to set up military government in Singapore as soon as possible. The 9th Brigade Infantry, 2nd Field HP unit were ordered to take charge of Singapore Island.

The main body of #5th and #18th divisions advanced into north Malaya and Johor and took ~~the~~ similar duty.

3/5.

Appendix

a map showing the position of
the M.P. unit.

Appendix NO. 1.

Some examples showing the activities
of the Chinese during the Malayan
operation

Appendix NO 2.

Situation in Singapore as described
in Mr. Wu's book entitled

"New Life of the Chinese Overseas"

Proclamation issued by the Governor-
General Thomas on 16 Feb. 1942

Statement of the commander of
the Singapore garrison made on
24 Feb 1942

Statement issued by the above
commander regarding the
maintenance of public peace
in the island

Supplement NO 1.

List of unit personnel related to
the affair concerning the Chinese
residents

1
X 20 47

Revised Copy

2647

~ of 30 copies,

Title: Investigation on the incidents toward Chinese residents ~~abroad~~ in the Malay operations,
Investigation Division on the Matters of P.O.W.

Date: April 5, 1946.

Contents

1. Teft. (P. 1 - P. 7)
2. Enclosed map showing the stationing of the ^{Japanese} Army immediately after the occupation of Singapore in 1942.
3. Enclosure 1. (P. 8 - P. 9) Actual examples ~~of the~~ ~~condition~~ of manoeuvres by Chinese residents ~~abroad~~ in the Malay operations.
4. Enclosure 2. (P. 10 - P. 13) Situation of Singapore as seen from "New Life Records of Chinese Residents Abroad" written by Hu Shih.
[胡適]
5. Appendix 1. (P. 14) List of staffs of the corps interested in the incidents toward Chinese residents, ~~abroad~~.

6. Appendix 2. (P. 15 - P. 17) Outline of the reports from the side of Great Britain on the conducts toward Chinese residents ~~abroad~~ in the Malay district.

Brief summary.

1. Investigation on the incidents toward Chinese residents ~~abroad~~ in the Malay operations.

A. Foreword, This investigation has been compiled by arranging and supplementing the investigation which was drawn up by the staffs of the former 25th Army on Nov. 22nd, 1945.

B. General condition of the Malay (Singapore) district before the war and principle of the ^{Japanese} Army dealing with the inhabitants etc.

The condition of the Malay district before the war was generally unfavorable for Japan.

The principle of the Japanese Army dealing with the inhabitants, was first ^{of all} to caress them.

But the Army decided to take severe steps in case they should hinder the action of the Army.

C. General conditions during the operations.

(1) Condition of anti-Japanese manoeuvres by Chinese residents in the Malay operations.

As shown in enclosure 1, Chinese residents made frequent and obstinate resistances to the Japanese Army.

(2) Condition of the peace and order in Singapore after the surrender of the British Army.

no so good in reality as seen on the surface. Many anti-Japanese manoeuvres were carried on by Chinese residents etc.

D. Sweeping of battle-fields and sweeping operations of the enemy after the surrender of the enemy.

The Japanese Army speeded up these works so that it might establish the peace and order promptly and prepare for the next operations.

- ① Sweeping operations in the Singapore Island.
- a. System of command and outline of stationing.
 - b. Examination, search and disposition of anti-Japanese Chinese residents.

Owing to the anti-Japanese attitude of Chinese residents during the Malay operations, the Japanese Army was compelled to change its first principle toward them and take severe attitude for them.

- ② Condition of sweeping operations in the Malay Peninsula.
- a. Condition of peace and order.

Even after the fall of Singapore, anti-Japanese manoeuvres by Chinese residents were as active as ever, and the condition of peace and order was still bad.

- b. Sweeping condition.
outline of sweeping operations.

- c. Mr. Hu Shih published "New Life Records of Chinese Residents Abroad," and in this book, he gave various explanations on the situation of Singapore at that time.

2. Enclosed map showing the stationing of the Japanese Army immediately after the occupation of Singapore.

3. Enclosure 1. (P. 8 - P. 9) Actual examples of the condition of manoeuvres by Chinese residents ~~abroad~~ in the Malay operations, (1 - 10)

4. Enclosure 2. (P. 10 - P. 13) Situation of Singapore as seen from "New Life Records of Chinese Residents Abroad", written by Hu Shih.

outline of Hu's description on the situation of Singapore immediately before and after the fall of Singapore. Following 2 documents are introduced here.

① Proclamation of Governor-general Thomas on February 16th, 1942.

② Declaration of the Japanese Governing Commander on February 24th, 1942.

Appendix 1. (P. 14)

5. List of staffs of the corps interested in the incidents toward Chinese residents, ~~abroad~~.

The names of Japanese officers responsible for the

incidents toward Chinese residents, are ranked.

6. Appendix 2. (P. 15 - P. 17) Outline of the reports from the side of Great Britain on the conducts toward Chinese residents ~~at~~ in the Malay district.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2647

12 September 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Documents relating to Massacre of
CHINESE in Malaya in 1942, and Investigations Thereof

Date: 1942-1946 Original Copy Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Prisoner of War Investigation Division,
Imperial Japanese Government

PERSONS IMPLICATED: SMITH, Tomoyuki; SUZUKU, Sasaku, et al

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Atrocities, Class B
offenses

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Items include excerpts from Imperial Headquarters Greater
East Asia Operations' Diary, 1942 - 1945, and "Outline of
Investigation concerning Cruelties Toward Chinese,
Principally in the Malayan operations (SINGAPORE)", conducted
by the POW Investigation Central Committee of the POW
Investigation Division, 6 and 22 November 1945.

In the former, testimony by officers in charge of various
commands at the time in the Singapore area is included.

Analyst: W.H. Wagner

Doc. No. 2647

DOCUMENT DIVISION
Route Slip

Asada	_____
Asada	_____
Barc	_____
Chiba	_____
Garden	_____
Kajiwara	_____
Kawashima	_____
Kobayashi	_____
Mason	_____
Mattison	_____
Maxon	_____
McLain	_____
Murphy	_____
Nagatori	_____
Nordquist	_____
Ohberg	_____
Stefanelli	_____
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Wagner	_____
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was a passenger, crashed
as per Miss Petchner

L. Buckho

No. 2647

Checked by
Cecil Upthara

SECRET

SEC-II

A ^{procès-verbal} ~~protocol~~ concerning the
~~state of punishment of~~
Chinese residents in
Singapore

By the 4th unit,
23 Oct., 1945

Circumstances & manoeuvres

1. ~~State of movement~~ by Chinese residents

in the Malay campaign.

~~at our military operation in Malaya~~

During the MALAY campaign,

~~When our military operation was taken~~

in Malaya, Chinese residents ^{were very} ~~had active~~
active in their

manoeuvres from ^{the} beginning to ^{the} end around

the battle fields and ^{especially} in the rear, ~~and~~

structing our ~~operation~~ ^{campaign} and ~~this~~ causing

no much difficulty.

~~our activities very difficult.~~

That is to say,

Near the battle-fields, they chiefly communicated with the enemy, consequently our ~~acted~~ ~~in~~ ~~necessarity~~ ~~betrayal~~ ~~and~~ ~~our~~

plan

~~project~~ of operations was perceived by

placing ^{us} in a very disadvantageous ~~enemy and our war situation~~ became

position; or ~~areas~~ where our troops ~~were~~ ~~very~~ ~~handicaped~~. ~~It was not one~~

concentrated were bombarded thus it was not ~~time~~ ~~or~~ ~~so~~ that places of our massed

only once that our troops had to suffer ~~to~~ ~~be~~ ~~attacked~~ ~~with~~ ~~common~~

meaningless sacrifices; or in the rear, ~~our~~ ~~bombing~~ ~~and~~ ~~accordingly~~ ~~our~~ ~~many~~ ~~soldiers~~

comrades any lines, were attacked, lines of ~~were~~ ~~killed~~ ~~in~~ ~~vain~~.

At the rear communication, military communication lines of the battle-fields, Chinese attacked

were destroyed; and ~~damaged~~ ^{our} military materials, ^{(damaged}
~~our commissary lines); destroyed our~~
 delaying the arrival of those materials, especially
~~communication lines and military~~
 ammunition, at the battle-fields, consequently
~~correspondence lines; and damaged~~
 after ~~the~~ the MALAY ~~operation~~ campaign which necessitated
 munitions. ~~These Chinese activities~~
 speed, was obstructed and made difficult.
~~made arrival of our munitions and~~
~~especially ammunition to the battle-fields~~
~~delay.~~ The Malay operation which needed
 rapid action was obstructed and
 the Chinese had our operation very
 difficult.

Examples are as follows:-

1. ^{Toward} ~~At~~ the end of December, 1941 ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ a
 battle near ^{KAMPAR} ~~Kantab~~ ^{phonetic} ~~phoetic~~, signal
 bombs were fired ~~many times~~ at night
 near our reserve artillery position
 immediately ~~our position~~ was shrouded with
 and ~~our victims increased as the result~~
 enemy shells, causing many useless sacrifices
~~of centralization of enemy's following~~
 on our side.
 artillery bombing. ^{We} ~~our side~~ searched
 the ^{vicinity} ~~position~~ and captured two ~~men~~
 Chinese residents at one place. ~~and~~
 found out that most ^{of the} activities were
 done by the Chinese residents. (~~the~~ ^a part

~~was undertaken~~ by ~~the~~ British troops.)

2. In the above
 At the ~~said~~ battle, a battalion of the
 ANDO regiment ^{intending} ~~tried~~ to ^{cut off} ~~the~~ ~~back~~ of
 KAMPAR (phonetic)
~~Kantel~~ from the ~~western~~ ~~regions~~ and

made a detour at night, ~~maneuvered~~,

but a signal ^{shell} ~~shot~~ was fired ^{from a} ~~at~~
 village which was ~~settlement~~ ^{Consequently, not}
~~where they passed.~~ ^{their}
 only was ~~our~~ plan discovered making ~~their~~ ^{our}
~~project~~ was perceived, and ~~their~~ ^{work}
 rear isolation ^{unsuccessful,} but when
~~that the back was failed and when~~

~~they were~~ crossing the river ⁱⁿ ~~of~~ the south-
 west of KAMPAR (phonetic) ~~Kantel~~ (around the place ^{were} ~~was~~)

swampy lands ~~along ground~~), they ^{were} meet by a fierce ^{enemy} counter-
 attack. Thus

Our operations went to pieces and we
 suffered a ^{great loss.} ~~lot of loss.~~ Immediately after the
~~the~~ signal bomb was fired, ^{about one company} ~~one~~ ~~company~~
 searched the ^{village} ~~settlement~~ and captured
 a Chinese who failed to escape.

Accordingly we found that the incident
 was done by the Chinese residents.

3 At the battles near Gemas / ^{phonetic} ~~gem~~ / and
 Segamat / ^{phonetic} ~~seg~~ / ⁱⁿ ~~at~~ the middle of
 January, 1942; battles at ~~Kuluan~~ ^{KULAN} / ^{phonetic} /

~~Yong Peng~~, ^{YONGPENG} ~~phonetic~~ / ~~and~~ ^{BATU PAHAT} ~~Babathabat~~

~~phonetic~~ / ~~at~~ ⁱⁿ the end of January, ⁸⁸ the

same year; ~~little~~ at Singapore ⁱⁿ ~~the~~ ^{beginning} first part and middle of February,

of the same year, ~~the~~ signal bombs were

incessantly fired. Artillery positions,

~~the places of~~ reserve ^{units} ~~bodies~~ and

higher command ^{posts} ~~sections~~ were suddenly ~~received~~ ^{received} bombarded causing many meaningless casualties.

~~sudden gun fire and it created~~

It was discovered - that

~~lot of victims.~~

~~these were all done~~

most of these acts were committed by the Chinese ^{residents} by the Chinese residents.

8
4. When the enemy ~~made an~~ ^{attacked} Kuala Lumpur
~~at enemy's night air-raid to~~
/phonetic/ by air at night in the middle
~~Kuala Lumpur / 1942 - 1944 / at the~~

~~middle of January, 1942,~~ a signal
shell ^{from} ~~was~~ fired ~~at~~ the aerodrome
of Kuala Lumpur / phonetic / using this as a target
~~of that place and enemy planes~~
the enemy bombed / the aerodrome / burning
~~bombing on this target.~~ ~~Our several~~
several of our planes, and causing many
~~planes were burned and soldiers~~
casualties among the troops.
~~were damaged considerably.~~

TRANSLATED BY
H. TANISAKI

P. 1

As the result of ^{the} Capture of Chinese
residents, ~~the fact~~ ^{it} was disclosed
that the signal - ~~crackers~~ ^{shells} were
~~operated~~ ^{fixed} by ~~the~~ Chinese residents

(5)

In
~~at~~ the middle of January, 1942,
Imperial Guard
when the ~~KONO~~ Division
was ~~under~~ ^{crossing} the River Muan
rh ~~crossing~~ ^{phonetic}, Chinese resi-
dents, indicating the ~~point~~ ^{point}

to be crossed and guided the night-bombing
~~of its divisions, landed the line-~~
~~of the enemy planes,~~
~~my planes to the night-bomb-~~

~~ing of the position.~~ Course given

crossing the river was ~~very~~ extremely
~~our river crossing~~ ~~difficult~~

difficult and with a great loss

~~was encountered with~~

~~uneasy task and we have~~

~~got a lots of men sacrificed.~~

Between ^{and}
 (6) ~~at~~ the middle ~~to~~ end of Ja-

nuary, 1942, during the battle,

around Malacca and Bato-

/phonetic/, in which the Imperial Guard
Bahato, ~~which are operated by~~
Division is involved,
~~KONO Division~~ Chinese resi-
dents, ^{communicated} ~~conspiring~~ with ~~the~~

enemy submarines on the sea of

Malacca and other than assisting in the ^{smuggling} ~~practice~~
guiding and protecting of spies from the submarines,
~~the help of hideouts in~~

~~Asian~~, and guiding of enemy

spies etc, ~~of which~~ for them

~~values~~, Chinese residents, ^{they} indi-

~~cat~~ ^{ated} the location of our units,
and made it easier and more
~~but it took easy and adva-~~

advantageous for naval bombardment from ~~the gun attacking~~

~~from the enemy side of way on~~
 ships in the straits of Malacca. As a result of the ~~the~~ ^{bombardment,} ~~above~~ the operations of the Imperial ~~re-mentioned~~ ^{re-mentioned} facts, the staff-
 Guard Division was not only made ~~ic~~ ^{ic} operations of Komal Divi ~~extremely~~ difficult and disadvantageous ~~was not only extremely~~

~~disadvantageous~~ but also, ~~the~~ a large amount of munitions and weapons ~~sacrificed~~ ^{sacrificed} officers and soldiers were damaged and many casualties and arms and ammunitions etc was among the troops ~~counted as a tremendous amo-~~
~~unt~~

(17) While the ŌGAKI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring ~~the~~ a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the N.W. in the fighting around BATOBAHATO ~~placetic~~ toward the end of Jan. 1942, was discovered ~~by the enemy~~ as a result of the Chinese residents' communication with the enemy. Subsequently they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack, and becoming isolated, the battalion ^{commander} and most of ~~the~~ ^{the} men were killed.

(7)

~~Toward
 the end of January, 1942,
 in the fighting around Bato-
 babato, ^{phonetic} the OGAKI battalions
 of the Imperial Guard Division
 was under encircling in the
 rubber-plantation fields to cut
 the back of enemy forces from
 the north-west direction of Bato-
 babato. By the espionage of
 Chinese residents, ~~to be found~~
~~by enemy~~, it caused the Tra-~~

gedy which put to the death of the
 chief-battalion and his subor-
 dinates by the entire damage of
 its battalion, in countering the
 counter-attacks of the powerful
 enemy forces, to fall into a
 helpless isolation.

(8) ~~at~~ⁱⁿ the end of December, 1941

in ~~the location of the north~~ for-
 est to the north of /phonetic/ a hundred odd
 miles of Taipei, armed Chinese
 residents were planning
~~was~~ preparing

~~Our motor-car transportation~~

~~was caused to stop and making~~

ing good use of ~~its~~ ^{these opportunities}

fired from the forests on both sides. As ~~trying~~ ^{the valley of firing}

result many men were killed, the ~~from the inside of forests of~~

valuable munitions being stolen, thus ~~its~~ ^{as the conse-}

quence, our ~~office~~ ^{and soldiers}

~~has got a lot of casualties,~~

~~plundered the valuable amuni-~~

~~tions and instead of the forests~~

being sent forward ^{and made} ~~making~~ ^{our} operators

~~ding of supplies and our strat~~

very difficult.
~~gic operations reduced to unfa-
 vorable situation.~~

~~(10) There were ~~of the~~ disruptions of the
 Interference of Railroads,
 among which in
~~one of them~~ at the end of Janu-
 ary, 1942, in the south of IBO/phonetic
 and in the forest between CE-
 LENBAN and GEMAS, the dest-
 ruction of Railroads caused
 the tremendous influence for
 transportation of in Comienienle,
 unfortunately, as it was~~

urgent time to transport for
the arms and ammunition of
Singapore Strategic operation.
By this very reason, the
Singapore Strategic opening
day was obliged to prolong.
Feb 9, original, planned on
Feb 8 and additional, the
supplies of arms and ammunition,
esp. ammunition was not
carried as it was planned.

The tremendous shortage of ammunition, it caused. to fall into critical condition of risk of strategic activities, temporality.

(10) There were after destruction of the rail-
roads, ~~and~~ but ^{as} the destruction

of the railroad in the forest south of IB5

/phonetic/ and ~~between~~ ^{in the} forest between

SERENGBAN and GEMAS /phonetic/ ~~just~~ ^{happened}

just at the time when ~~the~~ munitions were

to be forwarded most urgently for the

Singapore campaign, it had a tremendous commencement of

effect. As a result, not only did the

^{the} Singapore campaign have to be postponed

from the 8th Feb to the 9th Feb, but the

forwarding of ^{supplies} ~~munitions~~, especially ammunition

after the commencement of the campaign did not operate ~~smoothly~~ as desired. Therefore

front line ammunition was so scarce that

temporarily the campaign was endangered

~~/omitted/~~ and brought about

~~/omitted/~~

In each case of obstruction the offender

was ~~so~~ captured and it was discovered

that this was mainly the work of

Chinese residents.

(II) There ^{were} numerous cases of the destruction

of military & communication lines that

there was not time to arrest ^{the culprits} ~~them~~...

The above-mentioned are only a few examples,
the manoeuvres of the ^{insurgent} Chinese residents
during the MALAY campaign are beyond
description and have ~~cut~~ cut deep down
into the hearts of our troops.

checked
by [unclear]



Translator T. EBIMARA

129 The state of public peace centered ^{in and} around Singapore

after English ^{the} surrender of the British forces.

Though ^{British} the English forces in Singapore surrendered ^{on} the

15th February; ^{and} the island immediately after finishing ^{the}

fighting actions, ^{was} were covered with uneasy atmosphere.

What is to be noted is the fact that

Especially, ^{was} there were two or three days gap between the ^{the} British

day of English surrender and the day of triumph ^{the} Japanese

entry into that city by Japanese army. ^{Thus,} During ^{this} these

intervals, implements of war such as rifles, ammuni-
equipment,

tions, machineguns, revolvers, wireless midget
light ^{etc.} ^{moved away}

automobiles, ~~etc.~~ were dispersed and concealed ^{the} of Chinese and natives.

in Chinese houses. Such state became clear gradually.

it transpired ^{frequently}, 2
And there appear such state that the telegraphic wires from
running between the
headquarters of Corps in ^{all the army} suburb ^{and} to the city were cut ^{off} rendering it impossible to maintain
down intentionally, and could not ^{the} communication
between them.

And it became clear that ^{the} Chinese in ^{the} suburb or in
^{the urban districts of the} City of Singapore plundered provisions, clothes and fuel
e.t.c and concealed these things in their store-houses
or above ^{the} ceiling or under ^{the} floor e.t.c.,
^{of individual houses}

In these ^{mean} while, what ^{constituted} we take much ^{our primary} consideration is ^{was}
^{was} that it is impending to draft out influential
a major proportion ^{prepare for} corps from our forces to ^{the} ^{approaching} ^{operation} next war, and
that we were to maintain
we must sustain the public peace in the occupied
^{area} ^{advance} ^{the} places with a minor force. The attack towards south

On the other hand, 3

Not only

of our army ^{was} are very speedy. (There were many base
still a number of bases

of operation aiming many bandits in ^{the} west coast of
left for hostile groups plotting brigandage)

Malay peninsula; ^{on top of this} we can look the situation that the
hostile

Chinese opposing Japan, dispersed ^{the} in Rhio islands,

the south ward of Singapore, Linga island and the

Anambals islands after the fall of Singapore
seemed to be preparing for their future action in
and make these islands as their base and cooperation

with ^{their} comrades in Singapore islands and Malay peninsula

and to prepare to future activity; and the rumours
about the British reinforcements to arrive

that ~~the~~ English relief force will reappear were

circulating. So we feel keenly the necessity to

secure public peace ^{with some drastic measure and} by strict and immediate

to check the 4
controlling of false rumours in Singapore island.

(Reference).

It seems that the status of ^{the} activity of ^{De Gaulle's group} ~~Duval's~~ party
was likely to have been made
by the ^{February} 28th; and

they detain by force and investigating the

following; ^{printer} Klay, a Jew, ^{the printer} Lumor, a spy of

the military ^{commission} committee of ^{the De Gaulle's} ~~Duval's~~ party, and ^{1 party} Cocall

the manager of ^{the} French India ^{China} Bank were then

arrested and detained.

Translated by
HIATATE

P. 4-5

3 Regarding investigation and execution of Chinese,
resident in "Singapore"

Under the consideration that simultaneous advance of

the various corps of the expedited ^{forces} armies into the city

of Singapore should rather cause a difficulty in

keeping peace and order of the city, the military order

was given, on Feb 17, to ^{detail a force in a size nearly} settle ^{of} three infantry

battalions ^{plus} and the 2nd detachment of Field ^{Military Police} KEMPEITAI

to the posts under the command ^{of} of major-general
Infantry

KAWAMURA, commander of the 9th ^{of} Brigade; with an
while the major part ^{plus}

aim that main unit ^{of} of the military operation ^{plus} should
was placed back to

retire to and station at the northward ^{suburb} of the vicinity

thus to have

of "S" city, and only small number of the unit

put on duty for
should ^{be} in charge of the guard of the city. The
said guard commander, on ^{the} following ^{day, viz. the} 18th, visited
the General Headquarters and did the required liaison.

(1) Posting

The posting at the beginning was as shown ^{on} the attached
^{showing the status of disposition}
~~separate map of posting~~, but afterward the guard
was extended all over the ^{island} island on March 2nd
^{occurred since then}
with the ^a movement of military strengths.

^{Search for hostile Chinese.}
(2) ~~Drawing up a black list of suspicious~~

~~Anti-Japanese Chinese.~~

The investigation was executed during ^{the} 4 days ^{passed}

from Feb 17 to 20 ^{mainly on} at the basis of "a ^{list} roster
of the anti-japanese chinese" which had been
secured at "~~IPAM~~" ^{IPAM} and ^{with} at the reference of to
research materials of the ~~roster~~ ^{roster} of the detective
bureau, criminal lists of the Police office and
statements made by
the advices of ~~the~~ rescued Japanese.

^{police officials}
The ~~persons~~ in charge of the Malay detective
bureau and ~~the~~ ^{police} station ^{were caused to} attended to in this
occasion.

(b) The number of ^{persons searched} investigated chinese during
series lasting for
The First time ^{3 days}, Feb 21-23, about 5,000 persons
The Second " Feb 18 - March 3 " 1,500 "

The third ^{series} time at the end of march about 300 persons
Among them, about 2,000 persons were released
after the investigation.

(c) Reason for the ^{search} investigation and the execution.
There exists no written
Although the military order given to the guard com-
mander was not existed as written one; it is, however,
almost clear the situation that the guard commander
had ^{issued} given orders ^{cope with} subject to the ^{idea} aim of the military
Army ^{in the light of} authorities, and ^{thinking from} the situation of
the ^{mopping-up} ~~mopping~~ operation throughout the ^{MALAY} ~~malaya~~
peninsula, it is clear a fact that the guard
commander ~~ordered~~ ^{based on} ~~it~~ from ^{his own} his personal view.

It is, however, very doubtful whether the
^{mass} execution ~~en bloc~~ of Chinese was ^{due} subject to
the order of the Commander-in-Chief or not.

As Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI who was
^{Chief} general staff in charge at that time, ~~was~~
died ~~at~~ ^{on} the field, it is impossible to seize find
the fact.

^{execution}
(D) Enforcing of ^{the} punishment.

The objects of the punishment ^{constitute} ~~is~~ mainly those one
who communicated secretly with ^{the} enemy (those one
who ^{led} ~~leads~~ ^{hostile} ~~to~~ ^{of} our airground; those
^{fields} ~~to~~ ^{targets}
who did marking of destinations of Artillery
^{fire} ~~there~~ ^{near}
gun power; who disturbed ~~backward~~
^{transport} ~~those~~
commissary line; who did not change the
^{of opposition to}
attitude ~~to~~ ~~oppose~~ Japan and self confessed
the continuance of the act to oppose Japan at
our investigation). These were the leaders of
^{Federated}
the combined association of Chinese volunteers
to oppose Japan, and member of Communist's

partys in Malay; and those who were punished
strictly ^{total} amount ^{up} $\&$ about 5000 ^{end} to the last of
March.

1106

Translated by E. KASAHARA

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ckj
by [signature]



4. The Present Situation of Regulating operations in MALAYA Peninsula

(1) The Present Situation of the Public Peace in MALAYA ~~MARAY~~ Peninsula

We have already ~~above~~ mentioned the conditions of ~~the~~ ^{of Chinese} manoeuvring of Chinese during our MALAYA operation.

Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE many anti-Japan Chinese have entered secretly ^{into} cities and jungles and declaring ~~the~~ Communism and communicating with each other, some of them ^{have} continued to ^{be active} ~~do~~ activities in order to develop the systematic anti-Japan movement

under the strict and strong system and try hard to obtain weapons, ammunitions, provisions, money and members, while looting our stock of weapons obtained in the battle field, killing secretly our ^{soldiers} privates and officers, and were ~~acting~~ ^{acting independently} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ destroying the networks of ^{communications} ~~correspondence~~ and traffic and killing, threatening, looting ~~toward~~ good citizens.

Though the battle was over there was a great anxiety about the public peace in MALAYA

(2) The Present Situation of Regulating Operation.

Our Army has recognized the importance and necessity of subjugation operations after ^{the} surrender of

SINGAPORE and till nearly the end of February
despatched the 18th Division to "JOHORE" Province,
the 5th Division to other provinces in MALAYA ~~except~~
~~outside of~~
"JOHORE" Province from SINGAPORE Island and
made each of them stand ^{guard} ~~guard~~ over the Public peace
in the district in charge, ^{also} carrying out the subjugation
operation against the anti-Japan Chinese. ~~to~~.

The 5th Division divided the districts in its
charge into several parts and made the detachments ~~to~~
take charge of portion.

"MALACCA" Province, "NEGRISEMBILAN"

Province

11th Infantry Regiment

"SELANGOR" Province 41th Inf. Reg. 5A, 5T.

"PERAH" Province 42th Inf. Reg.

"PAHANG." Province 5th Cavalry Regiment

"KEDAH" Province, "TRENGGANU" Province,

"KELANTAN" Province 21th Inf. Reg.

The 5th and 18th Division commenced the subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of March. Carrying out the research and subjugation of anti-Japan Chinese in cities and jungles we caught wicked Chinese

till the end of April; about 1,000 in "JOHORE"
Province, about 1,500 in "SEREMBAN", "MALA-
CCA", about 300 in "SELANGOR", about 100
in "PERAH" about 50 in "PAHANG" and about
200 in "KEDAH" and "PENANG", and confiscated
many weapons but after investigation ^{released} ~~released~~ most
of them ~~at~~ the same way everywhere. There were
however, many cases in which at the arrest, the
Chinese ^{resisted} ~~resistance~~ by firing guns ^{which} induced us to return
a fire and ^{persons} ~~some people~~ on both ^{sides} ~~parts~~ were
injured and killed. (leaders) Many people, were there who

committed suicide, recognizing their unfavourable
circumstances.

Chd
by B.

(11)

Chin
by B

(Translated by M. Tajawa.)

Since the beginning of May also, the anti-Japan
Chinese still continued anti-Japan activities,
hiding themselves from the eyes of the Japanese,
and the public peace was often ^{jeopardized} ~~broken~~. Our
army carried on subjugations and tried to
keep the public peace, often traversing jungles
and meeting with great difficulties and
suffering considerable damages, but never
succeeded ^{in entirely} ~~to~~ sweep away the anti-Japan
Chinese. ~~truly~~

The subjugation which is ^{noted} ~~from~~ among those

since May is that in the forest to the north of KWALA LUMPUR. Finding out a report that about 300 anti-Japan Chinese were planning the assassination of Japanese soldiers and the burning of Japanese barracks, we ^{sent a punitive force to} subjugated them, taking the initiative against them. After a battle, the defeated Chinese fled away deep into the forests. In this battle, the ~~left~~ ^{left dead} bodies in the field numbered 200.

(3) Conclusion.

In short, the regulating operation in the Malay Peninsula was not only for the Japanese army itself, but was an action for the purpose of ~~toward~~ the guard^{ing} of the public peace which was carried on for the ~~purpose~~ of protection of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens (including the ordinary Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, etc.,) and though it is to be regretted that the circumstances ~~in~~ are not clear on account of lack of material details, it is plain enough that all those dead Chinese died by the bullets during the battles of subjugations.

During these difficult subjugations a considerable number of victims appeared on the our part also.

∇ About the ^{handling} ~~management~~ of this investigation of punishment of the SINGAPORE Chinese.

I. The enemy's protest has not yet come, but the reports concerning this problem is as follows:

(1) The story by Major Morris Deeton ^{1st Lt} and Captain Thomas Ellis ^{1st Lt}

"We were pushed into ^{freight-cars} ~~goods-waggons~~ and brought to SIAM, after the fall of SINGAPORE.

5

and were used ⁱⁿ to the construction of the
railroad between BANGKOK and MOUJIMEIN.

~~There were~~ Many died on account of
^{hunger} famine and the tropic diseases, the
medicines for which were very scanty.

According to the talk of a member of
the Australian advance-party, all of
1840 in number except 34 members
died before they reached the spot 130
miles off to the west.

(2) The report sent from London on Sept. 5.

The announcement of the terrible cruel

actions of the Japanese toward the
 prisoners of the allied powers and those
 detained people ^{have} ~~has~~ caused the anxiety
 of thousands of families in the world.
 Every evening papers in London has
 reported, "the SINGAPORE radio has said
 that when a complete document is made
 public, the civilized world will be
 against the cruel deeds of the Japanese.
 A Chinese was forced to drink petroleum
 and a Japanese threw a kindled
 match into the mouth of the Chinese."

A great massacre of the Chinese ^{troops} ~~army~~
~~civilians~~
 and the ordinary citizens by machine-guns
~~took place~~
 was held in SINGAPORE, and Dr. Bedler, ^{physician}
~~former~~
 the employed physician by ^{of} The Sultan of
 JOHORE believes that more than 150,000
~~Asians~~ ^{military men} (not including soldiers) were
~~or~~ tortured
 punished to death ~~or died by torture~~
 by the Japanese secret police. The
~~largest~~
~~majority~~ of them are Chinese and the
 doctor said that, in the small area of
^(Johore) ~~Dabon(?)~~ ^{some} alone, about 30 thousands men
 were killed by the Japanese secret

that was
 police, and it is a matter of course
 that the Chinese hated the Japanese so
 much.

Telling the story of the ^{ill} cruel treatment,
 the PWs released in HONGKONG said that
 they received only the small portion
 of the packages sent by the Red Cross
 San Francisco,
 (Sep. 5, HONGKONG)

on board an American hospital ship
 A correspondent reported the ~~barbaric~~
 barbaric
 deeds of the Japanese toward the Australian,
 British
 English, and Dutch prisoners who worked
 in oil-refineries and machine-factories.

atrocities committed while
 The ~~cruel~~ ^{atrocities} deeds ~~while~~ ^{during} the ^{road} construction
 was under way,
 of roads in BURMA and SIAM ~~were also~~
~~reported such as~~ were also reported as to
 the effect that
 follows: "Even patients ⁱⁿ ~~were~~ forced to
 walk to the place of construction ^{work} and break
 stones." (Sept. 5. Australia.)

According to the report reached to the Army
 in South
 Headquarters of the ~~Eastern North Asian Army,~~
~~allied power prisoners~~ were greatly ~~distressed~~
~~the prisoners of the allied powers were~~
~~much~~ suffering from malaria, beriberi,
 consumption and dysentery. (Sept. 5 San
 Francisco.)

3 Singapore intern^{ment}-camp

London broad cast station reported, on sept 6,

about the Japanese ^{atrocities} cruel acts at the Singapore

intern^{ment} Camps as follows:-

(1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all nationalities

including men, women, ^{and} children were interned, but

Red cross has never been permitted to visit there.

All ^{males} men above 10 years old were compelled to change

^{undergo} with heavy labour and were supplied ^{with} food-stuff

at the lesser rations ^{even less} than even a half ^{of that} quantity issued

by the "Malay" Prison Bureau as punishment

before the war

- When the rescue arrived at, all persons have just begun to roast snails.

(2) During the period of more than 3 years,

there was only ^{a single} ~~one~~ ^{when} ~~period~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{logical} ~~rational~~ control was prevailed; ^{this occurred in the period} when the commandant was a Japanese "civilian".

P.1

G. Takei

Doc. No. ⑧

3. There existed ^{always} incessantly the terrors of ^{many} numberless atrocities and ~~all persons were~~ ^{everybody was} beaten day and night ~~because~~ for not saluting properly of a slight offence of not having made a respectful salutation.

4. Spy suspects were especially ill-treated. On October 2nd, 1943, ~~the~~ ^{the} police station ~~started~~ ^(started) a barbarous search to find ~~the~~ evidences of spy suspects in the camp.

57 men and women were confined in a small guard-room, and for many hours they were made to sit with their legs bent in Japanese style.

~~for many hours~~ ^{and} (without being given even ^a minimum ^{of} decency they were forced to stay) ^{months} there for many. The one European

^{tortured for} was ~~examined~~ 155 hours and the other was struck 146 ^{a record with}

times. There was the full particulars of the devilish torture,

which Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and ^{(recorded} ~~stated~~
 in which) ~~that~~ a Japanese poured water into the mouth and nostrils of
 one of the suspects and then pressed the swollen stomach
 of the latter ^(with his leg foot) or jumped on the upper part of the stomach.

Some of the prisoners of war will bear the scars of the
 Japanese torture for ever.

5. The captives released at Singapore talked of the ill-
 treatments: ^{forced} ~~compulsory~~ labour, worst food ration and
 beating.

(2) Judging from ^{the attitudes adopted by the} ~~the~~ United States and British ~~attitudes~~,
 especially ^{the} ~~their~~ ^{prevailing in those countries} ~~interior~~ public opinions, (the British protest
 as the United States,
 against Japan is not so bitter at present, but Britain

will file a protest upon ^{or} ~~the~~ completion of ^{further} close investigation after the recovery of the ^{or} occupation area. It is, therefore, necessary for us to take a measure to cope with the situation ~~previously~~.

1. Though it is not necessary to produce these investigation materials at present ^{as long as} ~~as~~ ^{as Britain} ~~the United States~~ does ^{and yet} not make any request, preparation should be made so as to ^(changing) meet the ~~of~~ ~~the~~ situation.
2. The execution of Chinese residents at Singapore to some extent was unavoidable ^{considering the circumstances} ~~arising in the objective situation~~ which arose ^{since the execution had reached} ~~at that time, but with regard to the execution of a con-~~ siderable number, Britain (the United States) and China

P.4

announce
will ~~propagandise~~ it as a big massacre and will lodge a
protest with us. So that it will ^{also} be necessary to make a
general preparation ~~also~~ for the punishment of those responsible.

EX. 476

Doc. No. 2647

Page 1.

The Excerpt from the Diary.

February 18th.

I was appointed the commander of the guards in Singapore and was ordered to command the 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, and military police including assistant gendarmes, and to take charge of the defense of Singapore.

At 10 a.m. I reported at the army headquarters and received orders and instructions on defense and also received news of the attachment of the extra staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.

I have issued orders concerning the general guarding.

February 19th.

I heard reports from the OHASHI unit, military police, which was in charge of guarding and inspection of the city.

The pillaging by citizens is still going on.

Towards evening, the defense headquarters were removed to Fort Canning in the city, the former general headquarters of the British forces.

The same evening, according to instructions, I issued orders requiring the wholesale rounding up of undesirable Chinese residents, which is to be enforced from the 21st.

Especially I urged the gathering of Chinese malcontents in a certain restricted area to be separated from the rest of the citizens.

February 21st and 22nd.

The wholesale round up was enforced.

February 23rd.

At 11 a.m. the meeting of commanders was held and we heard the various reports from each party, on the conditions of arrest and later reported the information to the army commander.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361



February 24th.

From today, extending over three days, the meeting of the branch directors of the military administrations is to be held. I have today attended the meeting.

February 25th.

The commander of the forces made a round of inspections, and examined the defense situations in the city.

March 1st.

I have received orders to take charge of the guard of Changi district from today. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment was assigned for this purpose.

March 4th.

I have received an order to take charge of the defense of the entire island of Singapore. In accordance with the instructions of the army, I have issued orders for the refugees in Singapore to go back from where they came from.

March 5th.

We received information from the garrison on Bintan Island, telling of the landing of 1,000 Dutch troops on the neighboring island.

Immediately I dispatched the HAYASHI battalion (the former assistant military police) of the 18th Division.

March 7th.

In accordance with the removal of the Imperial Guard Division, Staff-officer HAYASHI who was attached to us, was ordered to be attached to the Guard Division.

March 8th.

Since the gendarmes were reverted to their original duties we have given orders to both air forces and railway corps for local defenses.

March 9th.

It became clear that the news of landing of enemy on Bintan Island and its vicinity was false, HAYASHI battalion dispatched to the spot returned here today.



March 13th.

The brigade headquarters and the 4th Infantry Regiment have been decided to be used for some other purposes in accordance with the new duties, and today I have received an unofficial announcement to prepare for this.

March 17th.

Handing over the defense duties to the succeeding brigadier commander, Major General SUGIURA began.

March 18th.

At noon, the relief of the defense was completed.



Extracts from the diary of Major General
KAWAMURA, the 9th Infantry
Brigade Commander.

February 16.

Despatched Major KOBAYASHI and approximately 100 officers and men under his command as an Emergency MP unit to the Raffles college by 10 a.m.

Got all units to clean the battlefield. This day, despatched the unit under Major MISHIBA's command to handle the PWs' matters.

February 17

Our headquarters were removed to the Clubhouse for the reason of inconvenience in command.

Late at night I was ordered to take command of both battalions of the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments and the Emergency MP unit as the newly-appointed commander of the Singapore Guard Force, and to take charge of the guarding of the city.

February 18.

Presented myself to Army headquarters at 10 a.m. to receive the order appointing me to be Guard Force Commander.

At 12 a.m. I went to Raffles College and issued the necessary orders. Staff Officer HAYASHI was assigned to me.

February 19.

Inspected the general situations within the city from 10 a.m. Listened to the report concerning the situations from MP Unit Commander OISHI and his men. (p.1)
(Was impressed with the imperfection of the military discipline of our officers and men.)

In the evening, our headquarters were removed to Fort Canning.

Issued an order to make wholesale arrests of delinquent Chinese from the 21st and thereby advocated their assembly in a certain area.



February 20.

Held a memorial service for those who laid down their lives and a ceremony of awarding certificates of merit.

February 21.

Started the wholesale arrests today. Held a memorial service in the Division. Later, inspected the situations of searching by the Central Area Unit.

February 22.

In the morning, inspected the situations of the East Area Unit, the camp for British non-combatants and the North Area.

In the afternoon, attended the memorial service of the OKABE Unit and later inspected the situations of the Central Area Unit.

February 23.

Held a Unit Commander meeting from 11 a.m. and listened to the reports concerning the situations of searching to the effect that those who had been punished numbered approximately 5,000, of which important persons are continuing to be detained and are under investigation.

In the evening, was invited to the dinner in the Division. Heard that the Division will shortly be dispersed to various areas. It was a farewell party for me.

Memory: It is in my memory that on the 23rd I went to the Army headquarters to report after the Unit Commander Meeting had adjourned.

February 24, 25, 26.

Held a meeting of chiefs of the Military Administration Department on 25th, the Army Commander called on us during his inspection tour.

On 26th, the Army Commander gave a speech to the effect that we should take up a far more positive attitude, instead of the heretofore internal guidance.

March 1.

From this day, the guarding of Changi was taken over by the 3rd Division, 11th Infantry Regiment.



March 2.

Inspected the PWs in Changi. Today, concerning the security precautions throughout the Shonan Island, I gave necessary orders.

March 4.

The guarding units throughout Shonan Island were changed, at 12 p.m. today. From this day, ordered the refugees to leave the place.

March 5.

Early in the morning I received information from natives that about one thousand Dutch troops had landed from Bintang Island, so I ordered the increase by half of the HAYASHI Battalion of the 8th Division, in order to prepare for their suppression. On the 6th we learned that it was a false alarm.

March 7.

HAYASHI changed his position as a staff on the Imperial Guard Division unexpectedly.

March 8.

According to the enactment of the M.P. Service Regulations, I ordered that status of M.P.s be changed so that they would be dispatched and hold an additional post in every District detachment.

March 9.

The HAYASHI Battalion in Bintang Island returned.

March 11.

Past 12 o'clock a captured Powder Magazine exploded. To prevent plotting by rebels, we enforced an emergency guard, and did our best to relieve the refugees.

March 13.

Today I and the 41st Infantry Regiment received an Army Order to depart again in the near future to fulfill new duties.

March 14.

For the purpose of gathering the troops together, I issued an order that ICHIKAWA Battalion should substitute in the position of emergency guard from the 15th inst.



March 16.

Major General SUGIURA arrived at Singapore.

March 17.

Transfer of duties.

March 18.

The relief finished at 12, and I reported to the
Commander in Chief about it.



Abstracts of the Subjects Concerned from the
Greater East Asiatic Top Secret Operation
Diary of the Imperial Headquarters

The following descriptions are what were reported to the Imperial Headquarters by the 25th Army, excepting the 2nd clause of March 13th, which is the report from the Southern General Army.

February 7.

The army enters at once into the next operation without the ceremony of triumphal entry.

February 18.

1. The army made about three battalions of infantry and the second field gendarmerie under the command of Brigadier KAWAMURA mount guard over the city of Singapore, and the main force located in its vicinity are engaging in cleaning the battlefield and preparing for the coming operation.

2. Each one company of 5 D successfully landed on the islands "Bukum" and "Sambo." /phonetic equivalents/

February 20.

SASAKI Battalion of 5 D landed on Bintang Island without bleeding.

February 21.

There are fairly many volunteers and Malaysians who joined the enemy's force as a volunteer army and the fifth column. The army is now in search of them.

Those who were taken in soon after the fall of Singapore: 16 Chinese volunteers, 360 Malayan volunteers.

February 24, 25, 26.

On this occasion when the main operation of Malay has come to an end, a meeting of the head officials of the branches of the military administrative department was held.

February 27.

With captives and captured arms was organized the Singapore Island Defense Corps. All of the seventy thousand



of captives cannot be consumed by this army. The army wishes to use them dispersed in each necessary field, and immediate instruction is desired.

February 28.

The state of activities of "de Gaulle" faction here is now being clarified by and by. "Glaire," /phonetic/ a Jew, "Remanl," /phonetic/ a spy of the military committee of the "de Gaulle" faction and "Causelle," /phonetic/ the Manager of the French Indo-Chinese Bank; have been subjected to internment and inquiry.

March 1.

As it has serious influence on the future action of the army, we wish to know if you have an intention to move the present captives here to any other places than Malay Peninsula. At present, 85,000 captives.

March 3.

The occupation of Singapore is going smoothly and the occupation business by committee members was completed at the end of February. State of affairs in the city of Singapore: Soon after the occupation, we arrested and executed about 5,000 delinquent persons as the first clearing and, further, we are preparing for the next clearing. The appeasing campaign to the citizens is as follows (the following: concerning the currency). The movement of the military administrative organs has been taking its regular course.

March 13.

The main force succeeded in landing at 0700 and YOSPIDA Detachment, at 0540.

2. The operation order of the Southern General Army No. 85: The head of the TOMI corps shall have the 41st Infantry, 2 Section/ 26 Ps under the command of the Chief of 9th Infantry Battalion enter under the command of the head of the WATARI corps.

March 17.

Since the commencement of Malay operation, we have been watching strictly the movement of the Chinese residents. After the capitulation of Singapore Island, their interest in Japan has been intensified. At the same time, rigorous measures were adopted to such anti-Japanese Chinese as the



volunteers. Thus, their movement has taken decisive direction. That is, they take an attitude to submit their lives, properties and all the rights and interests to the Japanese army and to wait penitentially for any orders, keeping these things for themselves. They propose that if the commander of the Japanese Army would exempt them from death and would give them a favor to carry on their occupations at ease, they would swear their future faithfulness and economical contribution and would contribute one half of their properties to the Japanese army. As to the offering of one half of their properties, we accept only their spirit and instead of one half we receive cash of fifty million yen. With the foregoing, the first step of the measures toward the Chinese residents in Malay is completed. Next, the second means shall be taken.

March 18.

From Colonel Tsuji:

I intend to take my post there after the inspection of battle condition of Burma and Philippine theatre about the latter part of March.

April 10.

Though the public peace of Malay Peninsula is going to recover by the activities of respective guarding units, still, secret movements of Chinese residents here have not entirely ceased yet.

March 27.

Approximately 1,500 persons in Celenban and Malacca were captured at once and a lot of arms were confiscated, and the majority who were captured were released after investigation.

March 29.

(At the distance of 16 k.m. to the north of Kwantan)
The den of communists was crippled entirely and 15 of its members were captured (the leader committed suicide) at the end of March.

At the location of 15 k.m. to the south-east of Kagayan approximately 500 hiding communists are being searched with the attempt of ousting.



April 5.

Fifty-three anti-Japanese radicals were captured at Taipin. At Penan, we are to make a round up before long.

April 16.

As the result of the search by our Gendarmerie, we have disclosed the plot movement of British battle beaten remaining soldiers and a certain party of Chinese communists (it seems to be under the leadership of CHENG-CHIEH-MIN). Accordingly, after the further searching out of the location of the wireless apparatus, we expect to capture this group.



SECRET

A proces-verbal concerning the punishment
of Chinese residents in Singapore

By the 4th unit
23 Oct., 1945

1. Circumstances of manoeuvres by Chinese residents in the Malay Campaign

During the MALAY campaign, Chinese residents were very active in their manoeuvres from the beginning to the end around the battle-fields and especially in the rear, obstructing our campaign and causing us much difficulty. That is to say, near the battle-fields they chiefly communicated with the enemy, consequently our plan of operations was perceived by the enemy, placing us in a very disadvantageous position, in areas where our troops were concentrated were bombarded, thus it was not only once that our troops had to suffer meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our commissary lines were attacked, lines of communication, military communication lines were destroyed, and our military materials damaged, delaying the arrival of those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-fields, consequently often the MALAY campaign, which necessitated speed, was obstructed and made difficult.

Examples are as follows:

1. Toward the end of December, 1941, in a battle near KAMPAR /phonetic/, signal bombs were fired at night near our reserve artillery position, and immediately /our position/ was shelled with enemy shells, causing many useless sacrifices on our side. We searched the vicinity and captured two Chinese residents at one place, and found out that most of the activities were done by the Chinese residents, (a part by British troops).

2. In the above battle, a battalion of the ANDO regiment intending to cut off KAMPAR /phonetic/ from the west, made a detour at night, but a signal shell was fired from a village which was passed. Consequently, not only was our plan discovered, making our rear isolation unsuccessful but when crossing the river in the southwest of KAMPAR /phonetic/ (around the place were swampy lands,) they were met by a fierce enemy counter-attack. Thus our operations went to pieces and we suffered a great loss. Immediately after the signal bomb was fired, about one company searched the village and captured a Chinese who failed to escape. Accordingly we found that the incident was done by the Chinese residents.

3. At the battles near Gemas /phonetic/ and Segamat /phonetic/ in the middle of January, 1942; at KULAN /phonetic/, YONGPENG /phonetic/ and BATU PAHAT /phonetic/ in the end of January of the same year; at Singapore in the beginning and middle of February of the same year, signal bombs were incessantly fired. Artillery positions, reserve units and higher



command posts were suddenly bombarded, causing many meaningless casualties. It was discovered that most of these acts were committed by the Chinese residents.

4. When the enemy attacked Kuala Lumpur /phonetic/ by air at night in the middle of January, 1942, a signal shell was fired from the aerodrome of Kuala Lumpur /phonetic/, using this as a target the enemy bombed /the aerodrome/, burning several of our planes, and causing many casualties among the troops. As the result of the capture of Chinese residents, it was disclosed that the signal shells were fired by Chinese residents.

5. In the middle of January, 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division was crossing the River Muarh /phonetic/, Chinese residents indicated the point to be crossed and guided the night-bombing of the enemy planes, consequently crossing the river was extremely difficult and with a great loss.

6. Between the middle and end of January, 1942, during the battle around Malacca and Batobanato /phonetic/, in which the Imperial Guard Division is involved, Chinese residents communicated with enemy submarines on the sea of Malacca and other then assisting the smuggling, guiding and protecting of spies from the submarines, they indicated the location of our units and made it easier and more advantageous for naval bombardment from ships in the straits of Malacca. As a result of the above bombardment the operations of the Imperial Guard Division was not only made extremely difficult and disadvantageous, but also a large amount of munitions and weapons were damaged and many casualties among the troops.

7. While the OGAMI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the N.W. in the fighting around BATOBANATO /phonetic/ toward the end of Jan., 1942, was discovered as a result of the Chinese residents communications with the enemy. Subsequently, they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack and becoming isolated, the battalion commander and most of the men were killed.

8. In the end of December, 1941, in a forest to the north of Taiping /phonetic/, a hundred odd armed Chinese residents were planning to disrupt our supply lines, and burn our munitions. As this was discovered beforehand, /the area/ was cleared of Chinese residents.

9. In the middle and end of January, 1942, the Chinese residents often felled trees and laid them across the road between GEMAS-SERENGBAN /phonetic/ and RABIS-SEGAMATT /phonetic/, so that our vehicle transportation was stopped, and making good use of these opportunities fired from the forests on both sides. As a result many men were killed, the valuable munitions being stolen, thus preventing munitions being sent forward, and made our operations very difficult.

10. There were often destruction of the railroads, but as the destruction of the railroad in the forest south of IBO /phonetic/ and in the



forest between SERENGBAN and GEMAS /phonetic/ happened just at the time when munitions were to be forwarded most urgently for the Singapore campaign, it had a tremendous effect. As a result, not only did the commencement of the Singapore campaign have to be postponed from the 8th Feb. to the 9th Feb., but the forwarding of supplies, especially ammunition, after the commencement of the campaign did not operate as desired. Therefore front line ammunition was so scarce that temporarily the campaign was endangered -- /omitted/ -- and brought about -- /omitted/. In each case of obstruction the offender was captured and it was discovered that this was mainly the work of Chinese residents.

11. There were numerous cases of the destruction of military communication lines that there was no time to arrest the culprits. The aforementioned are only a few examples, the manoeuvres of the insurgent Chinese residents during the MALAY campaign are beyond description and have cut deep down into the heart of our troops.

2. The state of public peace in and around Singapore after the surrender of the British forces.

The British forces in Singapore surrendered on the 15th of February and the island immediately after the fighting actions was covered with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to be noted is the fact that there was a two-three day gap between the day of the British surrender and the day of the Japanese entry into that city. Thus, during this interval, implements of war such as rifles, ammunitions, machine guns, revolvers, wireless equipment, light automobiles, etc. were moved away and concealed in the houses of Chinese and natives. Such state became clear gradually, and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic wires running between the headquarters of all the army corps in the suburbs and the city were cut off intentionally, rendering it impossible to maintain the communication between them. And it became clear that the Chinese in the suburbs or in the urban districts of the city plundered provision clothes and fuel, etc. and concealed those things in their store-houses or above the ceiling or under the floor of individual houses, etc.

In the meanwhile, what constituted our primary consideration was that it was impending to draft a major proportion from our forces to prepare for the approaching operation, and that we were to maintain the public peace in the occupied area with a minor force. The advance towards the south of our army was very speedy. On the other hand, there were still number of bases in the west coast of Malay peninsula left for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on top of this, the hostile Chinese dispersed in the Rhio islands, south of Singapore, Linga island and the Anambu islands after the fall of Singapore seemed to be preparing for their future action in cooperation with their comrades in Singapore and Malay peninsula and the rumors about the British reinforcements to arrive were circulating. So we feel keenly the necessity to secure public peace with some drastic measure and control to check the false rumors in Singapore island. (Reference).

