

Interr. To JO (4 March 46)

DOC 4172

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE**  
**WASHINGTON**



**DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.**

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 4 March 1946, 1345-1650 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo  
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator  
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter  
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly.

\* \* \* \* \*

Q On 1 March 1946, you gave us three pages of conclusions, which I dated and initialed in your presence. These have now been carefully translated and will be made a part of the record for that day. Do you wish me to translate these back from English now, or are you satisfied that the translation is a good one?

A I trust you. Thank you. /The pages were inserted in record for 1 March 1946./

Q You mentioned in a previous interrogation that in Japan, an official may, when he comes into office, approve of some policies of his predecessor and disapprove of other policies. Did you approve of your predecessor's policies as they related to the China Incident?

A In regard to the China Incident, there were policies that I agreed with and policies that I could not agree with, just as I explained before, in relation to the policies of preceding cabinets as a whole.

Q What policies in connection with it did you agree with and which policies did you disagree with?

A You mean policies with regard to China?

Q Yes.

A There were a great number of policies vis a vis China. If you ask me did I agree with this one or that one, I could answer, but I am afraid I cannot answer a question like this in general terms.

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*Exhibit # 244*

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- Q AS Minister of War and as Premier, you requested appropriations and troops to carry on the China Incident, did you not?
- A AS War Minister and Premier, I requested appropriations, as needed, of the government and the Diet assented. The number of troops needed was requisitioned by the Supreme Command and I, as War Minister, saw to it that the appropriations needed therefor were withdrawn from the budget.
- Q Was your assent required, as War Minister or Premier, to the number of troops requisitioned by the Supreme Command?
- A AS Premier, it was no concern of mine, once the money was appropriated. AS War Minister, the requisitions for troops came to me for approval. If there was enough money in the budget to permit, I would approve. /Read back to the witness and he approved as to its correctness./
- Q Shigenori TOGO, who was Foreign Minister in 1941, has stated that you, as Premier, received copies of all important cables. This is true, is it not?
- A Important wires had to be forwarded but I cannot affirm that they sent all important wires since the matter was done in the Foreign Ministry.
- Q Do you know of any important wire or cable that you did not receive during the time when TOGO was Foreign Minister?
- A TOGO was, by inclination, a man who liked to do everything himself without consulting others, so I won't undertake to say that he sent all important messages to me. SHIGEMITSU, who succeeded TOGO, was different. Both TANI and SHIGEMITSU came and consulted me about everything, cables and all. TOGO was a man who, by nature, wanted to do all the Foreign Office business himself.
- Q But do you know of a copy of any important cable that you did not receive from TOGO?
- A For example, in regard to the important 26 November reply from Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU to Japan, I have no recollection of

ever having seen it. Perhaps I am mistaken, but that is an example. Another example; when TOGO was succeeded by TANI and SHIGEMITSU, I began getting a great number of cables and dispatches. Hence, I believe that the least possible number were sent to me by TOGO. Another example; TANI and SHIGEMITSU made frequent reports to the cabinet. TOGO made the minimum number. I am not saying this by way of slander, but only to show the difference in character of the men. As I say, I don't intend to slander TOGO, but he was a type of man who wished to take all the responsibility for foreign affairs himself. That has some good points too, but what I am talking about is that it was his nature to be so. If you will ask the other ministers about this, you will find that they all have the same opinion.

- Q Did you, as Minister of War, also receive copies of important cables from the Foreign Office?
- A I probably received things that had a relation to military affairs. It is about the same as the others.
- Q Did you not, as War Minister, learn in the spring of 1941 that Germany desired Japan to enter the European war so that England might be defeated quickly?
- A I think that Germany did want to drag Japan into the war but Ambassador OSHIMA told the Germans that Japan could not. I was not premier or Foreign Minister, but, as War Minister, that is the way I recall it. /This was read back to the witness who approved as to its correctness./
- Q Do you not recall that Germany desired Japan to come into the war against Britain so that Britain could be defeated quickly and the United States would not enter the war?
- A Let's see, that was before the German-Russian War?
- Q Yes.
- A I don't just recall that. I do recall very definitely that, after the German-Russian war began, the Germans, and especially the German

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Army, wished very much for Japan to enter the war also against Russia. As I recall it, the German Army /gumbu/ wanted Japan to get into the war against Russia but HITLER understood Japan's position.

- Q Do you not remember that VON RIBBENTROP said to MATSUOKA in the spring of 1941 that Japan's entry into the war would quicken victory and enable Japan to fulfill its national aims in East Asia?
- A I don't remember it, but I think that, from Germany's point of view, it was both possible and probable /iisō na hanishi/. They wanted to get Japan into the war by any means possible. If you ask the Foreign Minister about that, he can tell you definitely whether VON RIBBENTROP said it or not. Japan was not to be taken in by such talk. Nevertheless, it was rather typical of the Germans.
- Q Do you not recall that when MATSUOKA returned to Japan, he reported to the cabinet regarding these ideas of VON RIBBENTROP?
- A No, I don't recall any such thing.
- Q Did MATSUOKA make any report to the cabinet on his return with respect to his conversations with VON RIBBENTROP or any of the German leaders?
- A There is a limit as to how much I remember at this date except on matters of the greatest importance. I do remember that the important thing that MATSUOKA reported about was the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Treaty. The reason for this is that we were trying very hard to keep from being drawn into the war with Russia, which Germany desired. Hence, that is why that thing sticks in my mind.
- Q Was not the main purpose of MATSUOKA's trip to Germany to talk with the German leaders and not Russia?
- A The main purposes, I think, were liaison with Germany and Italy, diplomatic courtesy, and the observation of the European situation.

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- Q Did not MATSUOKA say, in reporting on the prime purpose of his visit, that VON RIBBENTROP and the other leaders of Germany wished Japan to enter the war?
- A He may have said it - I don't recall clearly, but, as War Minister, I had no interest in the idea.
- Q Do you mean to say that, as War Minister, you were not in favor of Japan going to war against England at that time?
- A Of course, I was not in favor of it at that time. If we went to war with England, America would certainly come in. Japan had already been at war with China for four and one-half years and if she got into a war with America, it would be very bad, therefore, it had to be avoided, if possible.
- Q What views did MATSUOKA have, as Foreign Minister, relative to war with the United States and Great Britain?
- A I think that he was opposed to war with America on the theory that such a war would be a Pacific war which would lead to the ruin of the Orient. I think he was opposed to it, even before he went to Europe.
- Q How did he feel about war with Great Britain?
- A Of course he felt the same way, I think. Of course, as Foreign Minister, he was trying to the extent of his abilities to avoid war with America and England. On the other hand, as Foreign Minister, he had the responsibility for the Three-Power Pact. Therefore, it must have been very painful for him.
- Q Did there not come a time in 1941 when MATSUOKA favored attacking Russia?
- A No.
- Q Why did the second KONOYE Cabinet fall in July 1941?

- A It was the problem of Japanese-American negotiations. The Army, the Navy, and the Prime Minister all wanted the negotiations to continue and to be able to achieve stabilization. As I have said, the Army, the Navy and the Premier all wanted the negotiations with America to proceed and the talks were actually started in the absence of the Foreign Minister, who returned about the middle of April, I believe. As Foreign Minister, he was responsible for the Three-Power Pact and was suffering a great deal at having to negotiate with America since the Three-Power Pact was closely related to the conversations with America. The Premier, the Army, and the Navy had various ideas for the Japanese-American talks, whereas MATSUOKA was distressed because of the relations of the Three-Power Pact and the talks with America. The Japanese-American talks did not make progress and this, I believe, was an important cause for the fall of the second KONOYE Cabinet. This is what I think; I was not Prime Minister at that time. This is my supposition of that time, as Minister of War; I was not Premier at that time.
- Q I notice that you use the word "sensei" in referring to Mr. MATSUOKA.
- A Yes, I call him that because we were close friends.
- Q Are you still close friends?
- A Yes, we are still friends, but I haven't seen him since I came here.
- Q Did MATSUOKA feel that, because of the Three-Power Pact, it was impossible to negotiate successfully with America?
- A The Prime Minister, the Army, and the Navy felt very strongly that the Japanese-American talks should be continued, but the Foreign Minister had a very strong opinion which did not agree with that of the others.
- Q What was this opinion that was so divergent to the other views?



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- A The Foreign Minister felt that, from the German point of view, talks with America would be regarded as a weakening of the Three-Power Pact. Also, from the Japanese point of view, they could be so regarded. The Premier, the Army, and the Navy felt that even if this did represent some weakening of the Pact, the talks ought to be continued. There were many opinions on the subject.
- Q What would MATSUOKA have done in lieu of negotiating with America?
- A MATSUOKA was not opposed to Japanese-American conversations in themselves, but he was, as Foreign Minister, responsible for both the Three-Power Pact and the Japanese-American talks. He had to consider German opinion and, since his opinion was strong in regard to the Japanese-American talks, he could not agree with that of the Premier, the Army, and the Navy and, for this reason, the talks could not proceed. This, I think, was the main reason for the fall of the second KONOYE Cabinet.
- Q Why did not MATSUOKA resign instead of causing the fall of the cabinet?
- A That is MATSUOKA's business. I can't answer for it. Of course, I can have a thought, but I can't answer.
- Q Is it not a fact that MATSUOKA was asked to resign because of this difference of opinion?
- A I did not ask him to resign. I do not know about the others. That was the Prime Minister's problem, whether to request one minister to resign or the whole cabinet to resign.
- Q Is that not what happened?
- A I don't think so. I think that KONOYE decided to have a mass resignation. This is as I recall it.
- Q But it was the difference of opinion between MATSUOKA and other members of the cabinet on these matters that caused the cabinet to fall?

A I think so. I believe that KONOYE's feeling was that the negotiations with the United States would proceed better if the cabinet resigned en bloc.

Q Germany had been fighting Russia since June of 1941. Did not MATSUOKA, in July of 1941 while Foreign Minister, favor Japan's attacking Russia?

A No, he had just concluded a neutrality treaty. It is not probable that he had such an idea, since he had just concluded a neutrality treaty. Even if for a time he had had such an idea, it could not have been realized in Japan without the assent of the cabinet and the Supreme Command.

Q Prior to the cabinet falling, had not MATSUOKA gone direct to the Emperor in connection with his views?

A He may have, but I haven't heard about it. I was War Minister at this time - not Premier, you know.

I have one thing I would like to say: a resignation en bloc in the cabinet is a problem of the Premier. Hence, in talking about resignations en bloc in the cabinet, I was not speaking as the one bearing responsibility for them. /Read back to the witness and he approved as to its correctness./

\* \* \* \* \*

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72  
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 8 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon  
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills  
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 4  
day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO  
Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO  
(Place)

12 August 46  
(Date)