# The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by Edward C. Hegeler

VOLUME XLI (No. 4) APRIL, 1927 (No. 851)

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The Open Court Publishing Company

Wieboldt Hall, 337 East Chicago Ave., CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Per copy, 20 cents (1 shilling). Yearly, $2.00 (in the U.P.U., 9s. 6d.)

Entered as Second-Class Matter March 26, 1887, at the Post Office at Chicago, Ill., under Act of March 3, 1879

THE HOME OF THE CAVE MAN

BY W. KRANZ

*Frontispiece to The Open Court.*

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## RELIGIOUS AND MORAL TRAINING AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

BY FLETCHER HARPER SWIFT

> The fact is, there has not been a single tribe, no matter how rude, known in history, or visited by travellers, which has been shown to be destitute of religion in some form.
> Brinton, D. G., *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 30.

### I. General Characteristics of Primitive Life

OUR study of the history of religious and moral training begins at what is undoubtedly a late stage in human culture. Thousands of years of unchronicled development preceded the savagery of today. Nevertheless, a study of the question, "What place do religion and religious training occupy in the life of primitive peoples and to what extent do they represent universal experiences," may throw some light upon earlier unrecorded stages and upon the larger questions which are our fundamental consideration. Because the religion and the religious education of primitive man are inseparably interwoven with his social, moral, industrial, and intellectual conditions, it is necessary to consider these at this point, however, briefly.

"'Primitive', to the ethnologist, means the earliest of a given race or tribe of whom he has trusty information. It has reference to a stage of culture, rather than to time. Peoples who are in a savage or barbarous condition, with slight knowledge of the arts, lax governments, and feeble institutions, are spoken of as 'primitive', although they may be our contemporaries."[1]

The life of primitive man is largely one of physical conflict with men, beasts, and the forces of nature. Possessing only crude weapons, he is obliged to depend chiefly upon cunning and physical

[1] Brinton, D. G., *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, p. 11.

strength for securing food and for defense. Among the beasts, he finds not only his equals, but his superiors. Only through cooperation with his own species are conquest, pleasure, and survival possible. The need of aid in caring for offspring and his social instinct demand association with his fellows. Whence it comes that the earliest social unit is some form of association.[2] The aim of this association is the preservation of the group and the fundamental law of this group, horde, clan, phratry, or tribe is cooperation.

The actions of primitive man appear in two groups and under two different ethical aspects: (1) actions relating to the members of his own tribe; (2) actions relating to the members of other tribes. Cruelty and craft characterize his conduct toward the members of other tribes; cooperation and kindness, his conduct toward members of his own. "The strong savage does not rush into his weaker neighbor's hut and take possession. . . . . In the West Indian Islands where Columbus landed lived tribes which have been called the most gentle and benevolent of the human race."[3]

Filial, parental, and tribal affection, hospitality and truthfulness are virtues taught and practiced within savage tribes often with a diligence which puts to shame civilized man. "'Why should I lie to you,' asked a Navajo Indian priest of Washington Matthews. 'I am ashamed before the earth; I am ashamed before the heavens; I am ashamed before the dawn; x----x; x----x. Some of these things are always looking at me x----x. Therefore, I must tell the truth. That is why I always tell the truth. I hold my word tight to my breast.'"[4]

There is no evidence to show that the mind of primitive man differs in respect to native traits, tendencies, or capacities from that of civilized man. Reasoning, inhibition, and choice (capacities which some writers have denied the savage) . . . are common to the whole of humanity.[5] Nevertheless, the savage uses his capacity for logical thinking seldom and to a slight degree. This explains the fact that his world is, for the most part, a world of individual and unrelated objects. Each tree, each stone, each hut stands alone, dimly related, if at all, to others of its kind. Genera and species he knows

[2]Kropotkin, P. A., *Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution*, p. 79.

[3]Tylor, E. B., *Anthropology, An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization*, p. 406.

[4]Matthews, W., Ethics Among the Lower Races, *Journal of American Folk-lore*, XII:1-9.

[5]Thomas, W. I., *Source Book in Social Origins*, Part II, pp. 155-173.

not[6] Moreover, he has discovered no subjective standards drawn from a knowledge of the processes of thought by which to test the validity of his own reasoning. He therefore tends to base his conclusions upon analogies. "When the natives of the Lower Murray first saw pack oxen, some took them for demons with spears on their heads, others thought they were the wives of the settlers because they carried the baggage."[7]

This lack of standards leaves the savage without means for distinguishing between real experiences and experiences which are purely fictitious, imaginary, or subjective, such as dreams. In his dream, weapon in hand, accompanied by his faithful dog, he travels through the forest, swims the turbulent stream, and fights with his enemy. Awakening suddenly, he finds himself with weapon and dog lying in his hut. The intense reality of his dream cannot be shaken off. How can he reconcile his dream and waking experience? A ready explanation suggests itself, namely, that while he slept, his physical body remained in his hut, but another invisible self left his body and actually performed the dream feats. Dreams, trances, swoons, temporary or prolonged cases of insanity, all tend to support this explanation and to establish it as a general interpretation of the world in which he lives. Thus, there grows up in the savage mind a primitive philosophy or interpretation of the world and of life, known as animism which attributes to every object, whether animate or inanimate, an invisible or spiritual double. Some doubles are friendly, others hostile. How to summon and gain the support of his invisible friends? How to avoid, exclude, or nullify the desires and acts of his spirit enemies? These are questions which confront him continuously. It is upon luck, magic, and religion that the savage depends for the solution of these questions.

## II. Luck, Magic and Religion

It is not within the province of the present article to enter upon a discussion of the nature of luck, magic, and religion, nor to attempt to establish their genetic relation, nor the extent to which they overlap one another. Whether or not the three, in essence and in origin, are different aspects of the same thing, the fact remains that in time they tend to become differentiated and their extremes, at

[6]Welton, J., *Logical Bases of Education,* pp. 8-9.

[7]Taplin, The Narinyeri, p. 53 (cited here from Sir John Lubbock, *The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condition of Man,* p. 7).

least, are easily distinguished. In this state, "religion is prescribed, recognized, and thoroughly respectable. Magic is prohibited, secret; at most, it is permitted without being prescribed." The savage is ever subject to the influence of his belief in luck. As to magic, he turns to it as certain Christians of today turn from seeking Divine guidance through prayer to mediums and fortune tellers. His magic and religion are greatly influenced by his animistic beliefs and by the character of his reasoning processes. Failing to distinguish the abstract from the concrete, the object from its symbol, he considers shadow, portrait, image, or name as an integral part of the thing for which it stands. Anyone of these representatives or symbols may be used to control the thing itself. To possess the portrait, to know the true name of a person or thing is to possess an integral part of it through which consequently, it may be controlled. The belief upon which Rosetti bases his poem, "Sister Helen", namely, that an enemy may be injured by making an image of him and destroying it, is almost universal among the savage tribes.

The existence of savage tribes totally destitute of religion has often been asserted. Brinton, discussing such assertions, writes, "The fact is, there has not been a single tribe, no matter how rude, known in history, or visited by travelers, which has been shown to be destitute of religion in some form."[8] It is impossible here to attempt to show the extent to which primitive society is dominated by religion. From one point of view, every savage tribe may be regarded as a secret religious society bound together by mystic rites. In many tribes, as among the American Zuni, the supreme political power is in the hands of the priests. The influence of religion perhaps can be most easily realized by a brief consideration of the prevalence of rites and ceremonies.

Every important act must be preceded or accompanied by some religious rite. Before the hunt, a prayer must be offered, an incantation chanted, a sacrifice made, or a dance performed, to give the hunter power over the game and to propitiate the spirits of beast, wood, and jungle. Before the battle, before the meal, before the tree is cut, or the stream entered, a sacred rite must be performed. From sunrise to sunset, from day to day, from season to season, in connection with every activity, there is an almost unbroken succession of such rites.

[8]Brinton, D. G., *op. cit.*, p. 30.

## III. Aim and Organization of Education

The aim of primitive education is two-fold: (1) to preserve and transmit the occupations, rites, traditions, and customs to which the tribe credits its preservation: (2) to develop in the individual those qualities and capacities, physical, social, industrial, moral and spiritual necessary for those who would preserve and transmit the tribal institutions. The reverence for custom, the fear of trespassing upon the unknown and of offending unseen powers all tend to prevent variations from what the past has established. The preservation of what has been and is, rather than progress, is the social, and consequently, the educational aim. Independent thinking and intellectual initiative are at a discount. It is incorrect, however, to say that there is no desire to develop the individual, but this development is absolutely limited by social aims and standards.

Prior to that division of labor which develops with the rise of distinct industrial and social classes, every member of the group must be able to fulfill all tasks which fall to the members of his sex. Consequently, to each child is insured the opportunity of whatever training, instruction and development the tribe affords. This training, crude as it is, includes every aspect of child life, physical, social, industrial, intellectual, moral, and religious.

In the earliest stages of primitive life, there is no teaching class. Every adult is a teacher. The women train the girls in weaving, preparing food, etc., and the men train the boys in hunting, fishing, war, and other occupations. Soon, however, certain members of the tribe, owing to a superiority of gifts, come to be recognized as directors, leaders, and so, in a very real sense, teachers, in the dance, in religious ceremonies, in games, hunting, and war. At length, as the number and complexity of occupations, religious rites, and the mass of tribal lore become too great to be mastered by every member of the tribe, it becomes necessary to select certain individuals to be trained for this purpose. It is not to be inferred, however, that parents, relatives, and elders surrender their educational and religious responsibility: on the contrary, they continue to be the child's first teachers and models. Nevertheless the beginnings of three factors of great educational significance now appear: (1) a teaching class; (2) the distinction between lay and priestly education; (3) the religious character and control of education.

There are neither schools nor text books among the primitive peoples. War, the hunt, the council, feasts, religious festivals, and

the meetings of the tribe are among the most important educative institutions. The men's house, found in many tribes, arose out of the tendency of the sexes to separate. It became at once an important institution in the training of boys and young men. It serves as the council chamber of the adult males, a town hall, a social club, and a sleeping resort. Among the African Unyamwesi, there are usually two in each village. At seven or eight, the boy throws off the authority of his mother and spends most of his time at the men's house, usually eating, often sleeping there.[9]

All primitive peoples recognize with differing degrees of clearness that the life of the child is divided into distinct periods. Consciously or unconsciously, primitive man, in striking contrast to the practice of civilized nations, adapts, as far as conditions permit, the activities, occupations and responsibilities of the child to the needs, interests, and capacities of these periods. Evidence of such recognition may be found in the Mexican rock-writings, depicting child training,[10] and in the American, Australian, and African graded series of tribal initiations.

The African Kafirs recognize at least four distinct periods in the life of the child:

(1) Infancy, from birth until the child is weaned.

(2) Interdention, from the time the first teeth are cut, until the second teeth are cut.

(3) Childhood, from the cutting of the second teeth to puberty (from five to seven to approximately twelve years).

(4) Puberty and adolescence (from twelve years ——).

A brief summary of Kidd's account of Kafir childhood will show many of the important features of primitive education prior to adolescence.

The Kafir mother begins to guard her child against evil influences even before birth. She binds up her ankles with small yellow flowers to break evil spells. In her hut, she keeps pots of medicine from which she drinks occasionally. She refrains from eating the flesh of certain animals lest the child should have their characteristics. The birth of the child is attended and followed by a series of rites. That on the first day is for the purpose of imparting to the child the ancestral spirit, *itongo*. Other ceremonies are held on the second, fifth, and seventh days following birth. Some have

[9] Webster, H., *Primitive Secret Societies*, 1, 13.

[10] Bureau of American Ethnology, *Tenth Annual Report*, 1888-'89, pp. 542-550.

for their object the purification of the mother; others, the binding of the child with the spirits of his dead and living relatives; still others, to protect him against evil spirits.[11]

The second period of training, interdention, is "par excellence the age of innocence and charm." Boys and girls of the same age play together. The little Kafir continues under the care of his mother. He learns almost exclusively through play. He does not work, or at least, is not compelled to work until the second teeth are cut.[12]

The physical changes which mark the entrance upon adolescence are accompanied by a quickening of the emotional, intellectual, and social life of the child. Hall writes, "True and deep religious experience is almost impossible before adolescence. . . . The birthday of the strongest passion (the sex passion) is also the day of the greatest need of religion."[13] "Childhood must be selfish in the sense that it must be fed, sheltered, clothed, taught, and the currents of its environment set toward and not from it. . . . Youth seeks to be, know, get, feel all that is highest, greatest and best in man's estate."[14] In emotions, desires, and intuitions, the individual is no longer a child. He is an adult in nearly all things except knowledge and experience. Now is the time when members of the rising generation desire to be tested to determine whether they possess the qualities necessary to survive life's combat. Now is the time for choosing a life occupation. The change in the youth's nature demands a change in occupation and in social relations. He craves an interpretation and an explanation of all that surrounds him. Now is the time set by the laws, physical and psychological, of his own nature, for instruction in social relationships and all that pertains to an intimate view of life. At no other period in life is the individual so sensitive and so responsive to religious stimuli. This is *par excellence* the time for religious instruction and expression.

No recognition that primitive peoples give to the periods in child life is more significant from the religious and social standpoint than that which is accorded to adolescence. There is, on the whole, little organized or conscious effort to teach children before adolescence, but primitive peoples universally recognize that adolescence marks the time for assuming social responsibilities and consequently, for

[11]Kidd, D., *Savage Childhood A Study of Kafir Children,* pp. 7-8; 12-13; and 20-29.

[12]*Ibid.*, pp. 81, 87.

[13]Hall, G. S., *Adolescence,* II:300.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 301-302.

special instruction in religion, morals, and the mysteries of life. The adolescent rites are, first and last, tests to determine whether or not the youth is able to measure up to the physical, moral, and intellectual standards set by the tribe. But they are more than this, they are periods of religious and moral instruction. In passing through ordeals, the youth is not only tested, but he is given most severe training in the qualities demanded by these ordeals, courage, obedience, perseverance, loyalty, concentration, indifference to pain.

### IV. The Content and Methods of Education.

The tasks and occupations of primitive life may appear exceedingly simple at first glance, nevertheless, the process of learning them is by no means an easy one, and in many cases requires prolonged effort, persistence, skill, concentration and courage. Even among the most primitive people, the amount of lore of forest, field, stream, and lake to be mastered, in connection with procuring food, is by no means small,—the names of birds, beasts, and fish, the habitat of each and how to locate and capture the same; the preparation of skins for clothing. In higher stages, the knowledge of fire and metals brings in a host of new occupations.

With respect to the political and social life of the tribe sooner or later, the prospective tribesman must know something of its social organization, government, and history. The unwritten laws of the council, customs regarding marriage and property, customs and forms concerning the sending and receiving of messengers. Formal instruction in these matters is postponed until adolescence; nevertheless, the small boy undoubtedly begins to pick up a large amount of information from his earliest years.

The morals and moral standards of primitive peoples are those which experience has shown necessary for the preservation of the tribe. Unquestioning obedience, self-control, cooperation, trustworthiness, including the ability to keep the tribal secrets, courage and indifference to physical pain are not qualities to be gained in a week or a fortnight, but through long years of continuous training. Among the American Indians, learning self-control began with learning not to cry at night, one of the first things which the infant savage must be taught, for to do so might reveal the whereabouts of the tribe to an enemy. The education of the American Indian boy was a continuous process of physical and moral discipline. *Needless* fear and physical pain were voluntarily sought and inflicted.

When a savage punishes his child, he does so with cruel severity; holding him in the smoke, tying his hands behind his back, leaving him in a swamp, sticking thorns into his flesh.[15] Darwin relates that a Fuegian struck and "killed his little son when the latter dropped a basket of fish into the water."[16] Such acts as the above are not, however, representative. Primitive man's customary attitude toward his child is one of tenderness, love and deep concern. No more striking evidence of this can be given than the fact that when a European wished to secure a Bushman woman as a slave, he would lurk in wait and steal her child, knowing that the mother would come after the child, preferring capture to the loss of her infant.[17]

Primitive man employs fear to a much greater extent in the training of his children than his civilized brother. Witches, bogies, ghosts, and an entire host of unseen spirits furnish an abundant source of moral suasion. The Zuni Indians of North America initiate the children into a tribal secret society, the Kok-ko, at approximately four years of age. Adult members of the tribe, wearing hideous masks, pass from hut to hut, interview the children and later, in the actual initiation service, continue farther the frightening process.[18] Needless to say, implicit obedience is a virtue not difficult to instil where such means are employed.

Scarcely second in importance to training and instruction in morals is the training and instructions in manners. The earliest instruction given to Kafir children includes manners. Proper forms of address must be learned. Children are taught to address older people as "uncle" or "aunt". Detailed instructions are also given as to how the little Kafir should conduct himself when visiting another kraal.[19]

Any distinction between religious training and other forms of education must be primarily a subjective and arbitrary one, for in the mind, life, and education of primitive people, no such distinction exists. On the one hand, many industrial tasks carry with them religious rites; on the other, many religious rites include instruction in such arts as making fire, cooking, capturing wild animals.

[15]Bureau of American Ethnology, *Tenth Annual Report*, 1888-'89, pp. 542-550.

[16]Thomas, W. I., *op. cit.*, p. 151.

[17]Kropotkin, P. A. *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

[18]Stevenson, T. E., The Religious Life of the Zuni Child, Bureau of American Ethnology, *Fifth Annual Report*, pp. 533-555.

[19]Kidd, D., *op. cit.*, pp. 108-112.

The child's religious education begins in infancy and continues until he has mastered the rites, forms, and prayers which every tribesman is expected to know. The character and detail of his training will, of course, depend upon the character of the religion of the tribe. If consecration and a lofty conception of sacrifice occupy an important place, the growing boy will be called upon very early to sacrifice his dearest possession. Eastman, as a boy, was required to offer up his pet dog as his first sacrifice to the Great Mystery.[20]

The channels and activities through which the child receives his religious training are many and varied. Almost every aspect and activity of child and adult life contributes its modicum. The religious songs of the tribe he hears from his earliest years. Its myths and legends teach him the names, attributes, loves and hatreds of the unseen beings which people his religious world.

In his play, he imitates practically every activity of adult life and consequently many religious rites and festivals. Some rites and symbolical acts he picks up; others are taught him directly. Sometimes on the boundary, sometimes in the midst of a festive group, he observes tribal rites, sacrifices, and dances. Often, he assists in the preparations for these occasions. Many times, he makes his way through the throng and for a few moments, takes part in the religious dances. As soon as the play period is past, the learning of the occupations and industrial activities of the tribe, closer contact with its institutional life, war, the hunt, council meetings, all bring him into more intimate association with its religious life and continue and deepen his religious training.

As stated above, every primitive tribe is, in a certain sense, a secret society bound together by ties of blood and religion. Admission to this society can be had only through sacred initiatory rites. Such rites constitute one of the most important factors in the religious education of the primitive child. Some tribes limit these rites to adolescence; other have a series of rites; marking off the life of the child into distinct periods.

"There are three distinct steps or periods in the initiation of the Central Australians. At the age of ten or eleven, the boy is seized by a number of adults who are marked out for this special work by the position which they hold in their tribe. He is painted

[20]Eastman, C. A., *Indian Boyhood*, pp. 101-112.

with the totemic symbols, tossed up into the air and severely beaten."[21]

"A few years later, he is seized again and subjected to mutilation. The form of mutilation varies: it may be the knocking out of the front teeth, a piercing of nasal septum, or the lips, or a loosening of the scalp by biting. The ceremony usually culminates in smoking or burning over a fire. During the period of these ceremonies,—lasting some days,—the youth is given little to eat. By hunting he must secure certain animals used in the ceremonies. The entire period is taken up with a variety of complex totemic dances and ceremonies. During the ceremony, he, (the Australian youth), has a guardian to direct him, but for the most part he must observe absolute silence."[22]

"The third phase of the initiation follows after an interval of some months. It consists of elaborate dances and performances participated in by large numbers, often representing several tribes, and sometimes lasting for several months with ceremonies every day. After this, the youth is admitted into full membership of the tribe and, henceforth, associates no longer with the women and children."[23]

In various preceding paragraphs, different aspects of the educational significance of tribal initiation rites have been indicated. It has been shown that they represent the first organized educational effort on the part of primitive peoples; further, that they are essentially tests, public examinations to determine whether the youth measures up to the physical, social, religious, moral, and intellectual standards set up by his social group; that they indicate also a recognition of the periods in child life and especially, of the deep social and religious significance of adolescence.

"Here education began", writes Hall, "and extended upward toward more mature years and downward toward infancy, almost in exact proportion as civilization and its luggage of cultures and skills increased. Of the importance of this state of transition, religion which is so pre-eminently conservative has preserved the best and most adequate sense. It still maintains the idea that the great change is fixed, brief in time, radical in nature, and mediated to a greater or less extent by external pious offices. Secular and intellectual education has broken so radically with the concensus of the

[21]Condensed from Monroe, P., *A Brief Course in the History of Education*, pp. 3-4.

[22]*Ibid.*

[23]*Ibid.*,

past as to retain no vestige of recognition of this great revolution."[24]

Primitive man and the training he gives his children are continuously religious. From the hour of his birth, the care and instruction of the little savage rest with those who are ever conscious of their own and of the child's responsibility to unseen powers. The voice of these powers can be heard in storm, stream, and brook, and can be felt in the awe that creeps out of the recesses of the forest or steals down from the mountain at the close of day. All nature is the child's teacher and guide. Every occupation and activity of life contributes its share toward developing in him an attitude of reverence and a religious consciousness destined to permeate all acts, feelings, and thoughts and unite him by well nigh indissoluble mystic religious ties with the community in which he lives.

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[24]Hall, G. S., *op. cit.,* II:232-233.

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# THE NEED FOR ETHICS

BY OLAF STAPLEDON

IT IS A commonplace that ours is an age of disillusionment, and that we follow on an age of complacency. In the days before the war optimism was maintained only by setting the telescope to the blind eye. For, apart from the social problem, which few even in those days could entirely shun, three less urgent but more subtly disturbing troubles were becoming widely noticed.

First, even by the plain man it was beginning to be suspected that the universe was indifferent to human desires. Man, it seemed, must outgrow his trust in a celestial protagonist, and must depend on himself alone both for his daily comfort and for the achievement of his ideals.

Second, it was already rumored that man was doomed not only to failure but also to insincerity. He was charged with being at heart careless of everything but the satisfaction of crude animal instincts. He valued his ideals, we were told, only so far as they afforded "symbolical fulfillment" to his primitive cravings.

Third, and most unsettling, if this vew of human nature were true, all judgments of ethical good and evil were vitiated. For whenever we judged anything to be objectively good, our value-judgment was determined (it was said), not by the objective character and relations of the thing itself as a whole, but by some superficial and irrevelant feature which happened to stimulate instinctive or childhood cravings. Thus the considered judgments from which the ethical distinction was derived appeared invalid as data for ethics. And this view, that the distinction between good and bad was after all meaningless, was also strongly suggested by the chaotic state of ethical theory itself. For some writers defined "good" in one way, and some in others. Some on the other hand, said it was indefinable; and some explained it in such a modern and "scientific" manner

that they explained it away. Thus the very distinction on which any ideal must be based, the distinction which religion and common sense alike had assumed to be objective and universal, was beginning to seem arbitrary. All causes, all ideals, all obligations and enthusiasms were suspect in the suspicion that "goodness" itself was after all meaningless.

Such were the three doubts, cosmological, psychological, and ethical, that were creeping into the minds of thoughtful persons even in that distant age which ended in 1914. Today they are more prevalent.

Now the first of these questions is perhaps of no great importance. During the rise of modern science there was much anxiety among the intelligentsia as to whether the world was really good, bad or indifferent; or as to whether it was "on our side" or not. When the more intelligent were as yet only beginning to wake from the dreams of the more naive religious orthodoxy, this issue was bound to seem urgent. Today we are perhaps no nearer an answer than in the days when Huxley first opposed the ethical to the cosmical; but we are more ready to shelve the question and tackle other matters. For it becomes clear that, if by "world" we mean "the whole of being", the answer must wait until we know something of the real nature of that whole. Moreover, the *ultimate* fate of our race and our ideals seems now more remote and less important than in the days before we realised the vastness of the future. But if by "world" is meant the natural world, we are becoming reconciled to the knowledge that Nature, our ever-fascinating mother, is more resourceful than virtuous. We begin to cease from looking to her either as a model or as a protagonist. True to the modern fashion in filial piety, we are prone rather to correct than respect her. It is for us, not for her to say what it is that is good, and to discover if possible whether or not goodness is but a delusion. As to her maternal protection, we are alternately braced and grieved to find that we must depend on ourselves alone. But we are no longer appalled.

The cosmological question thus deserves less attention than perhaps it gets. For, granted that the good-bad distinction is valid, Nature, as our intellectual and moral inferior, must simply be brought to heel,—animal that she is. But as to the Whole, whether it is "on our side" or not, how dare we pass judgment on it? For, granted the validity of the ethical distinction, none but a universally informed mind is entitled to judge the universe. It is

possible that, though in our ethical distinction we truly grasp a universal principle, yet *that which* in the cosmical view must be seen to be good is far beyond the appreciative powers of our little minds. Much that seemed to Queen Victoria very bad is judged by us to be very good. Yet (though some of us easily forget it) the difference between the Queen's horizon and our own is perhaps less than the difference between ours and the span of all being. Who are we, that we should judge the heavens by our childish values? Shall we, because the "gods" neither please us nor make themselves intelligible to us, dub them insensitive or stupid? Parents, it is said, are justified in fulfilling, not merely in pleasing their children. And the "gods", if there be such, are to be justified not by the sweets they give us, who indeed are very simple children, but by the judgment of the fully enlightened mind, which may (conceivably) be theirs, but very surely is not ours. For these reasons it is as well to leave the cosmological question untouched.

But the other two questions rightly become more insistent in the plain man's mind every year. In the days when the teaching of the churches was accepted at least intellectually by the congregations (and even by the great uncongregated) there was no ethical problem in the plain man's mind. Spiritual advisers told him what was good, and he accepted their verdict, in theory, if not in practice. Love was the good; and the plain man accepted is as good, not because he saw that it was so, but because the churches said that God had said it was so.

Even before the war, however, very many had already ceased to take their professed religion seriously, even on the side of theory. The startling and bracing discoveries of science began to make us incredulous of the old teaching, even if also far too credulous of the new. But perhaps the main effect of science was that it made the old hopes look trite and even childish. For the doctrine of science was austere; while the doctrine of the old faith was by now padded over with comfortable devices. Comfort cannot stir us to loyalty. Thus, while to some the orthodox view was merely unbelievable, to others, though they had accepted it as true, it had ceased to be commanding. Consequently, while in some quarters there was a purely intellectual scepticism, in others there was a purely emotional disillusionment. Elsewhere these two dissatisfactions were combined. And so the ethical questions began to whisper themselves in many minds. Those who felt most strongly the objective validity of the good-bad

distinction, but had lost the old faith, craved most eagerly an ethical theory not incompatible with their new cosmology. Those who were still intuitively convinced that love was the best thing in the world sought some justification other than the word of a God whose existence they were beginning to doubt.

Then came the war. It gave us something large to do and vivid to think. It pushed those doubts from the focus of our attention. Already in the years before the war the only vivid ideal was nationalism, and patriotism was the only compelling religion. The one thing bigger than themselves which most men could both believe in and care for was their "country"; and they readily accepted the war as the supreme religious rite of sacrifice to their romantic god.

It is true, of course, that the motives that led men to fight were diverse. Not in all, perhaps not in many, was this strictly religious impulse the main factor. Many, no doubt, went simply to stamp out a conflagration that seemed to threaten their homes and all whom they loved. Some, on the other hand, went to escape the tyranny of the economic mill; some to escape mere boredom; some to be quit of their families or their friends; some to assert their manhood in the eyes of women. The white feather flicked their self-esteem, and drove them to accept without enthusiasm the sacrament imposed by the only living orthodox faith, the faith in nationalism. But these, who fought primarily for their own good name and not for the romantic ideal, would never have been herded into khaki had they not *assumed* that to shirk this ordeal was in fact shameful. Self-pride alone will not force normal persons to swim Niagara or swallow poison. They must feel that the deed is expected of them, and rightly expected. They must expect it of themselves. In fact, they must feel that to serve in the cause really is obligatory on all self-respecting persons. They must *admit* the "ought", even though they fulfill it only for self-pride. Of course, there were many who went to the front for no reason whatever, but in response to herd-suggestion,—with no more loyalty than sheep who follow their leader. But how did that suggestion ever come into being? It arose amongst those for whom "duty" was a meaningful word, who judged, however reluctantly, that there is *something* other than the person of each that has a "claim" on each because of its intrinsic goodness.

Some of us, perhaps, are over cynical about war, or at least about the motives of those who fought. For we incline to forget that, in

an age when the spur and the comfortable promises of religious faith were both of them less compelling than of old, when the objectivity of good was doubted and the hope of immortality fading, men freely gave themselves for the only ideal which seemed to claim them. As the religious faiths waned, the national faiths waxed. Traditions of national dignity, righteousness and might seemed less improbable than the doctrines of the churches, and far more vivid. Moreover, patriotism was well within the capacity of the schoolboy culture which alone was general, even among the educated. For the appeal of nationalism was two fold. It was easily assimilated to our egoism; yet it offered us something to serve, something other than, and greater than, our private selves. This was just what we craved; on the one hand salvation for our self-esteem (so crippled in the petty round of life), and on the other hand a clear obligation, a duty of service, however humble, in a great and vivid cause. Had the war offered satisfaction to one only of these impulses, its hold would have been less constant. But it fulfilled now the one and now the other as our need varied; and in no mood could we escape it.

Had the peoples been able to take Christianity to heart, they would not have needed the psychical "release" afforded by passionate nationalism. Their egoism would have found fulfillment in the certainty of eternal salvation; and their loyalty might have found in the Christ-god an object both vivid and universal. But since this could not be, the nation was taken as a substitute, and war was the great rite. And the war, even if it has done nothing else of value, has, I should say, underlined in red two facts of human nature. It has shown, on the one hand, how subtly egoism can disguise itself even from itself, accepting even agony and death for mere pride. But, on the other hand, it has shown that self-disregarding loyalty is a quite normal capacity of man, and a capacity which can become active even on a superb scale when a clear call comes. "Cant!" says the sceptic. But is it cant? Looking back to those days, remembering the details of the behaviour of our friends, and for that matter our own heart-searchings, can we deny that each of us was determined to a greater or less extent by the cognition of values in relation to which our private needs were seen to be irrevelant.

But the nation is a sorry substitute for the God of Love; and the war disillusioned many. Nationalism, of course, is not yet seriously in decline. Even today most of us but seldom and hesitatingly

transcend it. Indeed on the fringes of our Western civilization it spreads alarmingly; and now it threatens to inflame even the East. But, in the regions where it was born, patriotic zeal is perhaps tempered slightly. We may hope that in time it may be reduced from a conflagration to a wholesome warmth in our hearts.

But the failure (or impending failure) of nationalism as a faith, and of the nation as the supreme object of practical loyalty, forces once more on the attention of thoughtful persons those ethical problems which they had sought to ignore in a period of urgent action. Those who are consciously troubled about these questions are indeed few. Most folk consider ethical inquiry a priggish and futile occupation. Yet these questions lurk in the background of all minds; and so they tend to get themselves answered inattentively, and to become the secret source of prejudice and savage behaviour.

Consider the outstanding movements of the day. They seem to be Facism, Bolshevism, and a recrudescence of the more superstitious and preposterous "religious" sects. Fascism is accepted by those who, still paying respect to the older religion of Europe, but finding in nationalism the only commanding ideal, can only conceive loyalty in terms of fear and hate of rival nations and parties. Fascism assumes its ideal uncritically. It also uncritically assumes the validity of the fundamental ethical concept. It offers a faith, and exacts devotion; and therein lies its power. Bolshevism equally makes ethical assumptions. Although it affects to despise ethics and metaphysics, and to reduce obligation to egoism, yet it is evidently *felt* as a faith, and as an ideal which has an absolute claim on the faithful. Thus in the days of widespread disillusionment any ideal, however crude, however rationally indefensible, is felt to be better than no ideal at all.

Both these movements owe their strength in part to a dread of doubt that increases as doubt becomes more insistent. Both satisfy the craving for activity in a cause conceived as objectively important. This phobia of uncertainty is perhaps also one source of the increase of the cruder kinds of religious fanaticism. In this case, of course, as in the others, one motive is the desire for mere personal salvation, in this world or another; but it can scarcely be questioned that the average fanatic, of whatever persuasion, does honestly feel that it is supremely important, not for him, but *for the world*, that the flood of doubt be dammed, and that his policy be followed as the only means of world salvation. And thus it happens that an age of in-

creasing scepticism is also an age of increasing fanaticism. Very many persons have desperately shut their eyes and swallowed whole whatever comforting or commanding creed was available. They have willingly exposed themselves to religious suggestion, or political suggestion, till in time they have attained a real, but artificial, state of faith. On the other hand an increasing number have definitely freed themselves from every kind of theological allegiance; while on the political side also there are signs of a growing disillusionment with established social ideals. Thus in both spheres, religious and political, it is lip-service that wanes; faith and frank unfaith alike increase.

It is not surprising that in an age of intellectual perplexity men should take refuge either in irrational dogma or in a hand-to-mouth pursuit of pleasure. And mere pleasure-seeking is evidently an increasing fever today. The old-fashioned unreasoned restraints are being removed; and there is an unabashed claim to free life, free thought, free love, in short for the free "creative" exercise of all human faculties. And this is wholesome as a reaction from an age of stuffy clothes and stuffy morals. But is freedom an end or a means? To the released captive it indeed seems for a while a sufficient end. And to those who lack pleasures, pleasure seems the end. Yet this pleasure grows stale; and an aimless freedom becomes a prison. It is being well proved in these days that a life of *mere* impulse-satisfaction leads nowhere, and moreover is strangely unsatisfying. In our present disillusionment the only freedom to be sought is, it seems, a free fling before the crash. Surely it is this conviction of the futility of all things that is at the root of our fever to snatch joy before we die.

Some indeed have assumed a very different attitude in the general disillusionment. They have devised a stoical ideal, which, by emancipating man from all passing impulses, should enable him to gain a kind of tragic triumph over the universe. They have said: "Man himself creates the distinction between good and evil. We will take as our ideal (just because it pleases us to do so) freedom from the tyranny of desire, and fearless contemplation of reality." Clearly if pessimism is intellectually justified, this is the only sane attitude. And even if the pessimistic view is mistaken, the stoic's is a wholesome error. It was very necessary that we should learn not only the irrationality of the older optimisms but also their banality. The only way to an optimism of finer mood, if it be intellectually possible

at all, is perhaps through heartfelt acceptance of pessimism.

What, then, is the most significant feature of our age? Shall we be remembered chiefly for our social conflicts, for our international confusion, for the brilliant adolescence of science, or for our disillusionment? These are the features that we, who are immersed in today, see most clearly. Yet there is a more memorable fact about the modern world, a fact which we scarcely notice. Ours is the age, not simply of disillusionment, but of the vindication of man's capacity for loyalty even in the teeth of disillusionment. For what has been happening since the days of secure faith? First, when the ancient fear of hell was removed, men were discovered on the whole not less but more responsible. And when later all the old beliefs began to seem legendary and even petty, men did not plunge into individualism light-heartedly. Desperately they made of individualism itself a kind of topsy-turvy ideal, and tried to be loyal to it; or at the very least they found excuses for it, as being a means to some universal end. But presently they began to tire of it, and to look round for some more commanding object of loyalty. And so today, alongside of the old religious objects, and the old uncriticised individualism, thrive the cults of nationalism, bolshevism, fascism,—movements which, though deeply infused by man's self-regard, would none of them be what they are, were they not also irradiated by his unquenchable capacity for loyalty. But of these faiths bolshevism is the most glorious example of devotion in disillusionment. Sown in contempt of human nature, it has flowered into a self-forgetful enthusiasm by which, in spite of its intellectual wrong headedness, human nature is vindicated.

None of these faiths can withstand dispassionate criticism. Each in turn must sooner or later seem incoherent and petty. And so, in conflicting waves of disillusionment and devotion to new objects, and again disillusionment, we live out our stormy age. Never before, perhaps, have the objects of loyalty been subjected to such keen criticism. Never before has loyalty been driven so desperately from object to object in search of that which, of its own nature, can command allegiance. Even when, in the last extremity, men try to live without any devotion whatever, they prove their essentially loyal nature by a sense of futility and guilt that they cannot explain away. On the other hand the stoic, disillusioned with all other objects, is driven to conceive in his own mind an ideal of conduct, and to achieve a precarious peace by *pretending* with all his might that

this, which he believes to be a figment of his personal taste, is yet somehow of intrinsic and universal excellence.

Thus on all hands man's loyalty is vindicated. But to see that loyalty is a real factor in human nature is not to answer those ancient ethical questions which all thoughtful persons needs must face today. Indeed, the mere prevalence of devotion to causes does not itself prove even that loyalty ever is, as it purports to be, called into being by the intrinsic value of its object, and not merely by some secret and primitive itch of the experient himself. Still less is it clear that the ethical distinction between good and bad, on which loyalty claims to rest, is an intelligible distinction. What do we really *mean* when we speak of things as good and bad absolutely or universally? What, if anything, *can* we mean intelligibly by such phrases? Has "good" ultimately no meaning at all but "good *for*" some conscious being or other? Or is our delight in the goodness of a thing, not prior to its goodness, but consequent on it? And in what sense "ought" a man to act so as to bring goods into being and abolish bads? What does it mean to say that he ought to do so whether he wants to or not, and even that the act itself ought to be done whether anyone admits the obligation or not?

And further if the ethical distinction is not simply a delusion, what *kinds* of things is it that in this actual world are good, and what bad? And what is it that would be the ideal, the best of all? What is the end for which we all ought to be striving? These latter indeed are the really interesting questions; but clearly the others are more fundamental. And perhaps the true answer to these fundamental ethical questions might turn out to be after all simply that they are meaningless.

Such briefly are the well worn theoretical problems which, I suggest, have today become practical problems. Just because no ethical theory is now taken for granted, a sound ethical science is needed, whether its findings be positive or negative. Ethics has not hitherto been a live issue; and so the works of ethicists have mostly been abstract and remote. Only lately has ethical scepticism been not merely propounded but deliberately put into practice. Only lately has it begun to break down well-established habits of behaviour. For today, while much human conduct is still based on the old assumption of the universality of good and bad, much also springs definitely from the conviction that this distinction is invalid. Now that theoretical differences are carried into practice, our practice becomes more

radically and bitterly discordant than ever before. May our theory in turn be revivified by its new practical import!

Not all of us, indeed, are aware of the ethical problems explicitly, but all our lives are influenced by the fact that there is no agreement about them. And probably every intelligent person is at some time or other painfully conscious of them. They have, of course, been faced many times in the past, and many times answered in terms of successive cultures. Yet they remain for most of us still unsolved, and we cry out for a solution of them in our modern speech. For just as physical science is finding itself no longer able to avoid philosophical questions, so politics, social reform, and even the private life of each man and woman, are being influenced by doubts whose nature is philosophical. In fact, there lurks in the background of every mind today a profound ethical perplexity.

Of all these problems, one which is not strictly ethical, demands consideration before the others. Since ethical theories must be founded in our everyday ethical experience, they must seek a true psychological account as to the nature of that experience. It is suggested by some psychologists that though to himself a man seems to judge things good and bad intrinsically, and to render allegiance to his ideals without reference to his private needs, really he does nothing so simple. His ideal, whatever its form, appeals to him, not because he sees that the world needs it, but because it "symbolically satisfies" primitive or instinctive needs of his own which consciously he would probably dismiss as irrelevant, puerile, and perhaps even base. Thus our most admired "good" is displayed as but a pale approximation to the sweets of our childhood, or to the simple pleasures of the instinctive animal. Who defends the oppressed does so, not because it really is "good" that these oppressed should be freed, but because, meddling thus, he satisfies his secret itch for the "feel" of revolt.

If this account is the whole truth about our ethical experience, further ethical inquiry is a waste of time. For ethics derives from our value-judgments about things. And if, when we judge a thing good, our judgment is determined not by that aspect of it which we consciously declare to be good, but by some unnoticed and superficial similarity between the present situation and some situation forgotten and irrelevant, clearly our value-judgment is no ground for a science of ethics. For every value-judgment that claims to be dispassionate, and rationally determined in relation to the objective

world, is condemned as mere "rationalization" cloaking some instinctive prejudice.

Instinct psychology, however, in claiming to be a complete account of human behaviour, falls into the same extravagance as the rationalist psychology which preceded it. For it claims that all behaviour is of one type. Now possibly very much of our behaviour and our valuing is as the instinct psychologists declare; though we might be more readily persuaded by them if they could agree amongst themselves as to what an instinct is, and what instincts are. Waiving this protest, however, we may grant that many value-judgments are formed "automatically", not in relation to *all* the tendencies of the field of experience, but in relation only to an instinctive or primitive core of *organic* or *personal* tendencies. It is, indeed, very evident that every man often values and behaves, not in relation to the greatest need which he himself cognizes in the real world, but only in relation to needs cognized in a certain part of the real world, namely in his own organism or in that system of objective needs which constitutes his private self.

But we have attended lately too much to the abnormal and to the primitive vestiges in man, forgetting his distinctively human attributes. We are not justified in regarding intelligence as *solely* a purveyor to instincts. Even the purest instinctive conation involves an environment, organic and extra organic, and involves cognition of some tendency objective to the conative act itself. At *every* stage, then, tendencies which are conated are tendencies cognized in an objective environment, private or public. At every stage conation presupposes cognition of an objective tendency. We have no reason, then, to declare that one mode of cognition, and in fact the most developed mode, is alone unable to determine conations. The office of intelligence is, not merely to find means for the satisfaction of the more familiar tendencies (apprehended by a more primitive cognition), but to penetrate further into the environment and discover new tendencies which, *in their own right* shall be accepted as grounds of conation.

Thus it is that the goals of instinct are progressively criticised and subordinated to wider ends, which in no significant sense are simply "derived" from the ends of instinct. But, of course, it may well be, as was admitted above, that established automatic modes of behavior often resist control by newly cognized tendencies. Similarly, it may well be that many value-judgments are mere "auto-

matisms", in that they are valuings of things merely for unessential characters that happen to afford instinct satisfaction. But to suppose that all value-judgment is necessarily determined only by cognition of innate organic tendencies, or by innate "psycho-physical dispositions", is to misunderstand the essential nature of conation, and to misrepresent human behaviour for the sake of a theory.

Of the three grave doubts which were noted at the opening of this discussion we have dismissed the cosmological problem as irrelevant, and the psychological attack on ethics has now appeared invalid. We are left with the strictly ethical questions as to the status of goodness and obligation, and the concrete nature of the ideal. All that has been done is to show on the one hand that these questions are urgent and on the other that they do not appear meaningless when we look closely into the psychological nature of the experience which gives rise to them. It is clearly impossible to discuss these problems here. But there is a task preliminary to such a discussion, and it may now fittingly be undertaken. Ethicists have often strayed, I think, through making false assumptions as to the character of the fundamental ethical experience. They have distorted their data to fit their theories. The only hope of advance seems to lie in a more careful introspection of the ethical situation as it appears to the ordinary man when he is not sophisticated by any doctrine. I venture, therefore, to summarize my own experience as follows, and to suggest that it is typical.

To be faced with a moral choice, I find, is to be forced to choose between fulfilling one tendency cognized as in the world and fulfilling another tendency cognized as in the world. For instance, it may be that on the one hand my person, which is one factor in the world, cannot freely act and develop without a certain thing, and that on the other hand my having that thing would prevent the free activity of another person, or of society, or the world as a whole. In such a situation, I find that I call that course the better which would (I believe) result in the objectively most complete fulfilment of the world as a whole, whether the seat of that fulfilment be within my private person or elsewhere. What I *mean* by "good" thus turns out to be simply the fulfilling of objective tendencies. And by "the ideal" I find that I *mean* the most complete fulfilment of the capacities of the universe.

I certainly do not mean by "good" the pleasant feeling that I have when I am aware of the fulfilment of some tendency of my

person or of the world at large. I mean the fulfilment itself. Nor do I suppose for a moment that the ideal is simply that all folk should be pleased always. Everything depends on what it is that pleases them. If they are pleased with the fulfilment of petty tendencies only, the ideal is not realized. A universal tipsy beatitude would not be ideal.

Nor do I mean by "good" simply the fulfilment of my own personality, unless by "my personality" be meant the real of which my mental content is but a fragmentary and distorted appearance. But to call this "my personality", and its tendency toward fulfilment "my real will" is confusing. Of course, *I* can only judge that to be the ideal which would constitute the greatest fulfilment of *my* mental content; but I call it so, not because it is *my* fulfilment, but because it purports to be *the world's* fulfilment.

Faced with a moral choice, I may see quite clearly which course would lead to the better result, and yet I may choose the other. I may, that is, cognize tendencies that are more important objectively than those which alone determine my conation. On such occasions there may be a painful discord in me. But I do not suppose that the wrongness of my choice *consists* in my having produced this discord in myself, or in my having violated my own "real will" for self-fulfilment. The wrongness of my choice is experienced as consisting in the fact that certain objectively minor tendencies of the world have fulfilled themselves through my will at the expense of certain objectively major tendencies.

The moral experience, then, is less truly expressed by the proposition, "I feel that I ought to do so and so", than by the propositions, "I judge that so and so ought to be done; and further that it ought to be done by me". The "ought" is experienced as deriving not from my nature as a "moral agent", but from the world's nature as pressing toward fulfilment. Or, lest this phrase should seem to imply some theory as to the nature of the world as a whole, perhaps it were better to say simply that the "ought" is experienced as deriving from the nature of whatever objects are cognized as pressing toward fulfilment.

In some such terms as these the moral experience must be described. And whatever difficulties are thus raised, the essential features of this description must be respected by any theory that claims to solve those difficulties. For instance, we must of course ask how the tendency of the world, or of objects in the world can

have any "claim"on me unless it is in some sense *my* tendency, unless in some sense *I* really will it. And we must answer in the first place that indeed the tendency of the world has no "claim" on *me* unless *I* cognize it as "demanded" by the world. But whether it is a claim "on me" or not, it is a claim; that is to say it is a tendency of the world. And when it is felt as a claim on me, it is so felt simply *because* it is cognized as a tendency of the world. There is really no more mystery in my being moved to conate a tendency of the "external" world than in my being moved to conate any "private" tendency, say the tendency of my body to rest when its tissues are exhausted. In conating at all I accept a tendency cognized in some part of the world. Were there no such cognition I should have nothing to conate. It is the objective tendency itself which arouses me to conate at all, and sets the direction of my conation. Thus the true mystery is, not that I should ever conate the greatest fulfilment of my cognized world, but that I should ever conate anything less. Anyhow, whatever be the true solution of the difficulties raised by moral experience, no solution can be true which mis-states the data found in the plain man's daily life.

These problems as to the abstract form of goodness and the logical ground of obligation constitute only the first and least interesting task for the ethicist. Having arrived at some solution of them we should be entitled to pass on to discover, so far as in our present naive ignorance we may, the concrete nature of the objective ideal. Taking into account all that we know of our world, and all that we have good reason to surmise, we must try to fashion, as precisely as may be, an image of our goal. Such an image, vivid, believable, all comprehensive, is very urgently needed today. When idols were accepted there was no will to seek the gods. But when the idols rot, and despairingly we find no good in anything, then at least there is hope that we may glimpse true values.

# THE CONCEPTION OF EDUCATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

BY DR. MEYER WAXMAN

IN attempting to delineate the conception of education as embodied in the Old Testament, the first great literary collections of Judaism, it is well to be aware of the difficulties one is apt to meet in the course of such an attempt, and which by their very nature circumscribe and delimit if not the intensity or depth of the conception, at least its extent and scope.

The difficulties are as follows: First, that the Old Testament is primarily the instrument of expression of a religion and not of a philosophy, and as such, thoughts and views are expressed not in a systematic or coordinated way, but rather in jets of sentiment and outbursts of feeling. Secondly, that the Old Testament is not a homogenous production of one period and age, but represents a creation of the spirit of a people, spread over a period of at least seven hundred years, and reflects accordingly, different tendencies and different thought currents.

There is yet a third difficulty to be taken into account, and that is that those parts of the Old Testament wherein that conception is embodied, namely the prophetic and the poetic-didactic are entirely of an educational character, for Judaism, above all other religions of antiquity was intended to be a discipline for a distinct people, to train it for its destined role, which is not only to follow in the ways of God but also to point the way to others to follow Him. It becomes, therefore, a hard task to extract from this great mass of literature which is entirely colored with an educational tendency those very threads which really form the woof of an educational view in the strict sense. The conception must therefore be of a more general character, merely inferred as a corrolary of the views of the world, of life, and of the purpose of man in the world as expressed in the Old Testament literature.

### THE VIEW OF THE WORLD

The basic conception of the view of the world as reflected in the Old Testament is, of course, that of Monotheism. Whatever be the development of that idea, whether it had been revealed on Mt. Sinai, or that it had gone through a long process of development from a modified polytheism through henotheism to the final view of unity, the fact is clear that when we come to the Bible, especially to the prophetic and poetic-didactic portions, we are on the *terra firma* of the belief in one God, irregularities and ambiguous expressions notwithstanding. It is this idea which colors all the expressions of Biblical Judaism and all its manifestations. Without taking the idea of Monotheism as the underlying one, it is impossible to speak of a moral view of life, whether that of the Prophets or of Judaism. This view presupposes the idea of one God, who is the God of the world. How could the Prophets speak of a moral order in the world, and urge men in the name of God to conform to that order without assuming that the God who insists on this moral order, and who threatens chastisement for disobeying it, is also the one, who alone brought order into the world as well? If the case were not so, how could He enforce the chastisement threatened for the infraction of the moral law? Might not other powers interfere? We must conclude, therefore, that the moral order of the Prophets, which included in its scope not only Israel but all nations, had as its basis the monotheistic idea which posited God as the master of the world, and its creator, even when that is not definitely pronounced by them, that is when they do not speak of Him as creator.

The Biblical view of the world, which as stated is based on Monotheism, posits only one true existence, namely—God. The other things, such as the world of nature and man are only created things. Their existence is entirely dependent on Him. God is not only the source and ground of inanimate nature, but also the source of life as the Psalmist says, "For with Thee is the fountain of life."[1] The God of the Old Testament is not an abstract philosophic principle such as the "one" of Parmenides, or "The idea of the Good" of Plato, but a God of life (Elohim Haiim). This appelation which is so common in the Old Testament[2] is not a mere adjective, but expresses the deep thought that life and activity are the very essence of God, for is He not the One who is constantly active? "Who stretcheth out the Heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to

[1] Ps. xxxvi. 10.

[2] Deut. x. 24; I Sam. xvii. 26, 36, and in many other places.

dwell in."[3] Is He not the one whose activity is depicted in such a poetical way by the Prophets, poets and sages?[4]

This view freed man from the constant fear which the world had always engendered in his heart in primitive times. This world of nature, that in ancient times presented to man such an impenetrable enigma before which he stood awe stricken, and to the solution of whose mysteries the best minds of the Greeks had devoted their energies, was suddenly deprived of its mysterious power, and relegated to a secondary place in the scale of existence, namely a *created* thing subjected to the will of the one God. True, He fixed laws in nature, but the existence of the laws like that of nature itself is not absolutely permanent, but dependent on the will of the Creator. Hence, follows the importance that man assumes in the Bible. In Greek thought, man is only an insignificant link in the chain of nature, subjected to the "all" before whose mysterious laws man stands terrified. In Biblical Judaism, man breaks these chains and rises on a par with nature and even higher than it. According to the view of the Old Testament, there are only two forces in the universe, God and man.

Man created in the image of God is superior to nature for he is intrinsically closer to Him in his character and essence. True, when we compare man in his physical smallness with nature in its majesty and beauty, he may suffer by the comparison as the Psalmist says, "When I consider Thy Heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou hast ordained, what is man that Thou art mindful of him? But, on the contrary, when contemplating his spirit, the same poet exclaims, "Thou hast made him a little lower than God, and hast crowned him with glory and honor" even above nature.[5] The lowering of nature in the Biblical view of the world had undoubtedly been the cause for the absence of any philosophy of nature in Judaism. There was no need for one, since every thing was given and every puzzle solved. But the loss of such a pursuit is partially made up by the excessive importance which man assumed. Man and his life become henceforth the very foundation of the world, the axis around which all thoughts and sentiments turn. The question of questions, in Judaism, become the query, how and in what way shall man live?

And the man spoken of by the Bible as next to God, the most

[3]Isa. xl. 22.
[4]Isa. xl. 12-22; Ps. civ; Job, xxxvii, xxxviii.
[5]Ps. viii. 4, 5 6.

important subject in the world is not necessarily the entire human race, the genus homo, nor even the chosen people of Israel as a whole, but each particular and individual man. Judaism, even in its early Biblical stage, placed a great value on individuality. It is to be regretted that the current opinion of almost a majority of Christians, Old Testament scholars, and quite a number of Jewish scholars has accepted, as quite a truism, that Biblical Judaism emphasized only the nation as a whole and paid little attention to the individual as such. This opinion while it may be apparently supported by a considerable number of passages, where the destiny of the nation is spoken of, and its prosperity or downfall is the burden of the prophecies, yet, on closer examination it will be discovered that it is not as solidly founded as its sponsors claim it to be.

The theory of creation which had ultimately become not only an integral part of the Old Testament, but a most prominent part, inasmuch as it was placed at its very beginning, contains a most elevated conception of individuality. It speaks of man being created in the image of God. The image of God belongs not only to the human race in a general nor to any race in particular, but to each individual man, hence the importance of individuality. And even assuming that the pronouncement of this theory in its latest outlines is the product of the authors of P. Source who are said to have lived in exilic times, yet, it is impossible to posit that the creation story of P. Source was a mere invention by a later priest or priests. At the utmost, it is only a recasting of ancient beliefs. That the doctrine of creation inculcates implicitely the high value of individuality, was already long ago pointed out by the great teachers of the Mishnah. It is asked by them, "Why was only one man created?" The answer is given "The creation of a single man only, teaches us that one who preserves or saves even the life of one person, his act is considered as worthy as if he preserved the existence of the whole world.[6] That this is not a mere homiletic remark, is evident from the fact that the statement is incorporated in the Mishnah, a work which deals primarily with law, and is sparing of words. The inclusion of the statement is intended to emphasize a fundamental point in the Biblical conception of man as understood by the great teachers of later Judaism.

Against this opinion, of making the nation all inclusive in Biblical Judaism militate also the words of Micah, who turns to the

[6]Tractate Sanhedrion Ch. 4, .5

individual and says, "He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly and to love mercy and walk humbly with God.[7] The appeal is here clearly addressed to the individual man and the program mapped out is likewise for the individual. We may, though concede to a certain extent that the Prophets dealt mainly with national-social aspects of life. This, however, is explained by the fact that they were primarily preachers, and as all preachers their center of attention is the group. Yet, as pointed out, they have not neglected the individual, and from time to time, they deal extensively with his life and morality. Thus, we see Ezekiel and Jeremiah before him emphasizing again and again individual responsibility, and inculcating repeatedly that each man will reap the fruit of his action, and no ancestral merit will save him.[8]

But there is still another current in Biblical Judaism, the sponsors of which are no less authorative than the Prophets—and that is the one of poetry and wisdom, which is embodied in the Psalms, Proverbs, and Job. This literary current is permeated with a strong sense of the value and worth of the individual. Whatever can be said about the age of final redaction of these books, there is no doubt that they contain largely elements of a much earlier age—especially Psalms and Proverbs, where the bulk can be said to be pre-exilic. In these two books it is the individual which holds the central place. It is in the Psalms, where we hear the palpitation of the soul of the lonely man, the lost individual who looks to God as the guide and shepherd.[9] And they all bear an early stamp. On the contrary, all those Psalms, possessing the ear-marks of later ages, exilic and post-exilic deal with the nation as their subject. The theory often propounded that many Psalms though speaking in the name of the individual, are really of a national-collective character, can be said to represent the wish of the propounders which is the father of the thought. Proverbs and Job bear almost entirely the stamp of individualism. The first is intended to be a guide for the individual in his private life as well as in his life within the group. The second has for its subject the problem of the suffering of the individual. The attempted symbolization of Job as suffer-

[7]Micah, Ch. 6 ,8.

[8]Jeremiah, xxxi. 29. Ezekiel, xviii, and xxxi, 1-20. They both denounce vehemently the proverb current in Jerusalem "The fathers have eaten a sour grape and the children's teeth shall be set on edge; the purpose of which was to merge the interests of the individual with that of the group.

[9]See for instance Psalms xi, xv, xvi, xxxii, cii and many more.

ing Israel is pure imagination. The setting of Job, the prologue, his being a non-Israelite exclude such an intention. The book of Job, in its ultimate form represents the last stage of a problem which grew in Israel for ages and finally was given some kind of a solution. But the problem itself shows clearly what place of importance the individual held in Biblical Judaism.

Summing up, we can safely assert that the Biblical view of the world and man represent a view which conceived a world wherein nature held a secondary position, and in this world there were two powers, God and man. The man, who was thus elevated above nature is not the collective man, the group, the chosen nation of Israel, though the latter occupies a special position, but it was the individual who was invested with worth and dignity.

## II.

### VIEW OF LIFE

Out of the view of the world and man propounded by Biblical Judaism there follows its exalted view of life. The one God, the Creater of the world is simultaneously the ground and source of morality. This idea flows directly from the very conception of the Godhead as embodied in the Old Testament. The essence of God is expressed through His attributes, but the thirteen attributes enumerated in the famous passage in Exodus xxxiv. 6-7 are all ethical. The other attributes found in the Bible which are of a more corporeal nature are merely figures of speech used by the writers to convey to the people the meaning of the power of God and the extent of His providence in the ordering of life.[10] And since the creator of the world and the very source of life is essentially ethical, it follows that man who is to order his life in a manner satisfactory to the Creator, the ground of his existence, cannot have any other aim in life except morality which is the very essence of God. In other words, the purpose of the life of man is to emulate God and be like Him. God becomes thus the arch-type of life.

Morality which is the supreme end of life is primarily according to the Old Testament a matter of action and not of contemplation. God Himself realizes His essence through creation, He is thus re-

[10]There is a unanimous consent among all ancient interpreters of the Bible that the anthropomorphic expressions in the Old Testament are merely figures and were never meant literally, and all the ancient versions from the Septuagint to Aquila took care to change these expressions in such a manner so that they conform to the more exalted conception of God. Especially zealous in this regard is the Aramaic translation modeled after that of Aquila, and known as the *Onkelos*.

vealed to us; hence the Bible comes to attach such importance, value, and even sanctity to an active life in particular, and life in general. In no other literature, whether religious or secular do we find such enthusiasm for life as in the Bible. Life, according to it, is the greatest boon for man. The Psalmist has no other request from God but life, as it is said, "He asked life of Thee and Thou gavest it him, even length of days forever and ever. . . ."[11]He likewise pleads with God, "I shall not die but live and declare the words of the Lord."[12] It is not that the poet is afraid of death or that he does not believe in immortality. The terror that death holds for him is in the fact that it brings with it a cessation of activity, an eternal life without action is of no importance. This idea is clearly expressed in the words, "The dead do not praise God nor all those that go down into silence."[13] They may enjoy there a life of bliss, but as long as it is an inactive one, it is of no value for the Psalmist. The great striving then is for a life of action, a life which brings an ethical goal. This great enthusiasm for life expressed itself in the numerous epithets joined to the word life, such as "Source of life"[14], Book of Life[15], Tree of Life,[16] all such expressions which connote activity and its continuation.[17]

A life of constant activity leading to an exalted aim is certainly of a serious nature. Biblical Judaism never views life with disparagement or depression, nor do we find there any traces of weariness with life or a sense of its heaviness. The feeling of the "burden of life" which is such an essential trait in the religion and philosophy of some Aryan peoples such as Hindoos, and even played an important part in some currents of Greek life[18] is totally strange to Judaism. The pessimistic expressions found in Ecclesiastes are not only few in number, but are not really as pessimistic as some suppose them to be, for they do not negate life proper, but only belittle the striving after imaginary material happiness. But while that Judaism passed over any negative attitude to life in silence, it expressed itself very vehemently against the attitude of light-mindedness toward life, and considered it a great sin. The scorner, or more

[11]Ps. xxi. 4.
[12]*Ibid.* 118. 17.
[13]*Ibid.*, 115. 16.
[14]*Ibid.*, 52. 7.
[15]*Ibid.*, 69. 29.
[16]Proverbs, iii. 18.
[17]Even the expression Book of Life does not mean a book in the modern sense, but a roll which is constantly being inscribed and unrolled.
[18]See Friedrich Nietzsche Die Geburt der Tragedie.

correctly the mocker, (Letz in Hebrew)[19] is pictured in the wisdom books as the symbol of all evil. He is considered beyond redemption and several warnings are given to the preacher not to admonish him.[20] Even the fool is preferable to the mocker for he will ultimately learn by chastisement but not the latter. To view life with lightness, to mock at it, this Judaism could not forgive.

Added to the value and earnestness of life, there is also its sanctification. The dictum which is always added to the most important precepts "Ye shall be holy, for I, your God am holy,"[21] shows distinctly the sense of reverence towards life. Holiness implies not only the raising of the value of life, but also a sense of distinction and separation, which flows out of a clear concept of the worth of personality. A thing which is insignificant has no defined personality, it is only the noble and the exalted which becomes distinct and separated from the environment which surrounds it. The concept of holiness in turn further elevated the value of personality to a still higher degree. Every individual is a personality which occupies a distinct place and it is not to be infringed upon. And hence, we note that the repeated injunctions concerning family morality are prefaced with an admonition regarding holiness, for every infringement upon these laws which leads to promiscuity, violates also the sense of distinction implied in personality. And above the sanctity of the personality of the individual, there stands the sanctity of the life of the group or the nation of Israel. "Ye are a kingdom of priests and a holy people,"[22] the Jews were told frequently. These epithets raise not only the nation but the individual Jew. If the individual is a member of a sanctified group his responsibility is only the greater, for by deviating from the mapped road of life, he not only brings injury to himself, but to the group as a whole.

## III.

### THE EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTION.

These two outlined views of Biblical Judaism, that of the world and man, and that of life, supply the necessary foundation for the con-

[19]The word scorner used by the A. V. and other translators for Letz seemsd to me incorrect. The root Litz is taken by all grammarians to mean mock, and Gesenius in his dictionary gives for Letz accordingly the German equivalent Spötter.

[20]See Prov. xix. 25. Where it is said: "Smite the scorner and the simple will beware." The scorner will not heed it for he is beyond redemption, the smiting will only serve as a deterrment for the fool.

[21]Leviticus xvix. 2.

[22]Ex. xvix. 6.

struction of a conception of education.

If life is a very serious business, and the more, it is sanctified and exalted, and especially since life according to the Old Testament view is always understood in terms of action, it follows then, that for a life of this kind, man must needs have a strenuous preparation, namely, a long and rigorous education. Education, consequently, occupies a very prominent place in the Old Testament. The difficulty is only that the limits of such education are not defined, and that it embraces all life, both the entire life of the individual as well as that of the nation. The life of man stretches from the day of birth to the day of death, and daily, according to the Old Testament he is to search his way in life. This kind of search is almost the constant occupation of the prophets, poets, and sages of Biblical Judaism. The Prophets, who come always in the name of God, and who are saturated with the spirit find the task easier. They, at times, see the way, and even point it out, in a fiery manner, to others. Yet, at times, even the greatest of them is perplexed. Did not Moses beg of God, "Show me now Thy way."[23] But more difficult was the task for the poets and sages, they are perplexed and plead often, "Mayest Thou show me the path of life," or "Give me understanding that I may live."[24] And thus they search all their lives, search and by this trained and educated.

However, we must not construe this search of the way of life as a mere aimless search. On the contrary, the way is more or less clear to the searchers. It is the way of ethics, piety and morality, the general outline of which is repeated many times through the Old Testament. The searchers only ask for help from God, for the way is very difficult. The man who is to follow such a way of life, needs first of all a strong unbending will, which shall help him to overcome all obstacles. Without a strong will, it is impossible to lead a life of strenuous action. The way of life, as defined requires then a strong discipline moulded by fixed law and a definite plan, or as the book of Proverbs expresses it, "The reproofs of instruction is the way of life."[25] The word instruction, which in the original is *musar,* and connotes besides instruction also the meaning of morality and discipline in general, is to be understood not in a theoretical sense, namely abstract ethics or instruction in abstract principles, but in a limited sense as practical instruction in life conduct, and at

[23]Exod. xxxiii. 13.
[24]Ps. xvi. 11, 119, 144.
[25]Prov. vi. 23.

times even reproach and rebuke. The word *Musar,* which is found in the Book of Proverbs alone more than thirty times, implies in its oft-repeated usage an exalted educational thought, namely, that man requires instruction not only in his childhood, but throughout his life, for all life is one constant discipline.

The Old Testament certainly took cognizance of the great struggle in the human soul. Man is not good by nature. On the contrary, "The thought in man's heart is evil from his youth,"[26] and it is also said that, "Man is born like a wild ass' colt,[27] yet he has to become good, for that is his aim in life. It is this inner struggle to overcome his natural propensities which raises man to his high plane. Hence, we obtain the educational ideal of the Old Testament which is, the education of the will. To the inculcation of this ideal, the entire Book of Proverbs, large portion of Psalms, and Prophetic writings are devoted. The heart which occupies such a prominent place in the Old Testament is considered not only to be the seat of thought and feeling, but primarily, the seat of the will. Hence, the oft-repeated injunction for the education of the heart. The sage who begins by the call to his disciples, "Hear ye, children, the instruction of a father"[28] ends by the emphatic admonition, "Keep thy heart with all diligence for out of it are the issues of life,"[29] namely, the very life of man is dependent on his good will.

But, in addition to the education of the will, there is inculcated in the Old Testament another educational ideal, and that is wisdom, or still better, the acquisition of wisdom. A good will alone is not sufficient, it must needs have knowledge, and without it education is not complete. But what is this wisdom without which man cannot find life? "For whoso findeth me findeth life,"[30] declares wisdom herself. This wisdom is of a double nature. First of all, it is the means by which man can know the will of the Creator. And this, according to the conception of the Old Testament is of paramount importance. Since there are only two powers in this world, one independent and one dependent, namely the one God and man, it follows that without the knowledge of God and His will, man cannot realize the purpose of his life. Therefore, the sage repeatedly admonishes his pupil to acquire wisdom and understanding, for

[26]Gen. viii. 21.
[27]Job ii. 12
[28]Prov. iv. 1.
[29]*Ibid.*, 23.
[30]*Ibid.*, viii. 35.

then he will be able to acquire the fear of the Lord.[31] This fear of the Lord is not merely the plain truism that there is a God in the world who is all potent and that He is to be feared, for the words contained in the passage cited (Prov. ii. 1-9) "And you will find the knowledge of God" (V. 5) and the very closing words, "Then thou shalt understand righteousness, and judgment, and equity, yea, every good path," show that the fear of the Lord implies a much wider meaning, practically a whole ethical program of life.

The second aspect of wisdom is of a much higher nature. It is in a way synonomous with the total intelligence reflected in the great creations of God, namely, the world and life. It sums up all forms of order and harmony seen in nature and life, nay, even more, it is their very source. Does not Wisdom declare "When He prepared the Heavens, I was there, when He set a compass upon the face of the earth—When He gave to the sea His decree that the waters shall not pass His commandment—Rejoicing in the habitable part of His earth and my delights were with the sons of men."[32] Here is a clear attempt to personify the divine intelligence manifested in the world and life, and name it wisdom. This attempt gave later a great impetus to Philo and his followers to formulate and perfect the Logos theory.

But this higher kind of wisdom is hardly for man to conceive it fully, for as it is said, "Where shall wisdom be found? and where is the place of understanding?"[33] It has no special place, for it permeates the world and the inner essence of life. "Only God understandeth the way thereof, and He knoweth the place thereof.[34] What is left for man is only the wisdom conceivable by him, as it is said, "Behold the fear of the Lord is wisdom, and turning from evil is understanding,"[35] namely, practical wisdom leading to the way of life. Hence, the practical character of wisdom which is the great factor in education. This is that wisdom which teaches through pointed sayings, directions in all ways of life, both that of the individual and the nation.

There are many bible scholars who are wont to characterize the Hebrew wisdom as extremely practical and prosaic. In reality, however, there is no intrinsic difference between the practical aspect of wisdom and that kind, of which ethics and the fear of the Lord are its

[31] See Prov. ii. 1-9.
[32] Prov. viii. 27-29-31.
[33] Job. xxviii. 12.
[34] *Ibid.*, 23.
[35] *Ibid.*, xxviii.

essence. These are two phases of one thing. Both have one purpose, to teach the way and ordering of life in conformity with the higher wisdom which is the universal intelligence. The order of life is after all a reflection of the order and harmony in the world. True wisdom, therefore, will bring to man not only spiritual happiness but material as well, as it includes also the very minutae of daily life.

This conception of wisdom gives rise to the formation of an ideal type in education, and that is the wise man, or rather to call him by the Biblical name, the *wise son.* It is this son about whom the sage said, "A wise son maketh a glad father. . . .[36] This wise son is not identical with the *homo sapiens,* the ideal type of the Stoics. The wise man of the Stoics has only reason for his guide, and keeps himself aloof from the life which surrounds him even looking down upon it, his morality, which though stern, is not of a social nature but a personal one. The Hebrew wise son is a son of his people, his way of life is the way of social ethics. But above all, his wisdom is not derived from abstract reason, but from the fear of the Lord, which rightly interpreted means a recognition that the world is ordered by a unique being possessing will and purpose.

The wise son, though at times given in the Book of Proverbs the appelation righteous (Heb. Tzadik) is also practical in a considerable measure. He is the same wise son "That gathereth in the summer,"[37] and the very same one who remembers that "The hand of the diligent maketh rich."[38] But this practicality is not mere petty shrewdness, only one which is a result of an all embracing observation in the ways of life and the world, which recognizes a purpose in life in all its aspects, in its material form as well as in the spiritual and ethical ones. This wise son at times can rise to the height of the righteous (Heb. Tzadik) and the pious, who moves solely in a world of justice, righteousness and the fear of the Lord.

In a way this ideal type symbolizes the character of the Jewish people as a whole which has produced, on the one hand, prophets, saints and martyrs, and on the other hand, keen business men and sharp traders. It reflects the spirit of a people which managed to survive by means of flexibility, at times compromising with life, and at times braving the adverse current and suffering intensely for the sake of its ideals.

[36] Prov. x. 1.
[37] *Ibid.,* 5.
[38] *Ibid.,* 4.

# MORE LIGHT ON THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

THE scientific discussion of the enigma of Jesus, or of the historicity of the alleged founder of the Christian religion, has been renewed with a vigor, earnestness and candor that are worthy of the great and fascinating theme. Scholarly thinkers continue to reach divergent conclusions, but the controversy is far from being sterile. Certain points are to be cleared up, the whole question is being simplified, and the tolerant spirit which the disputants evince in their respective contributions to the growing literature on the subject is not only creditable and reassuring, but full of promise for the future of intellectual and moral progress.

The little book of M. Couchoud—reviewed in these pages a year ago—on the enigma of Jesus and the mystery of Christianity did not escape critical notice. Attempts have been made at refutation of the startling proposition that Jesus was a myth and the account of his mission, sacrifice, death and resurrection an imaginative piece of fiction inspired by religious zeal and ecstatic visions.

We shall not deal here with certain magazine articles by French theologians and professors of biblical research which M. Couchoud's bold challenge provoked or elicited. But it would be unfair to ignore the more solid and analytical book of Prof. Maurice Goguel, doctor of theology and member of the faculty of Free Protestant Theology of Paris, which bears the significant title, "Jesus of Nazarene: Myth or History", and which is available in a good English translation. Although the arguments advanced by M. Goguel in favor of the historicity of Jesus do not always carry conviction, or resolve serious doubts, they are not without weight or force, and should receive the thoughtful consideration they merit.

M. Gougel is satisfied that Jesus was *in every sense a real personage and an historical character.* How does he dispose of the ob-

jections which so many students have advanced against that view?

So far as the silence of Josephus on the whole drama of Jesus is concerned—a silence which has seemed to warrant negative conclusions—M. Goguel points out that Josephus is equally silent concerning the birth and development of Christianity. The explanation of the complete silence, M. Goguel holds, is to be sought in the character of the historian and the object of his work.

Josephus, Prof. Goguel contends, "desired to flatter the Romans and gain their good graces. To do this, he expunged from the picture he drew everything likely to offend or excite their apprehension. Thus it is that he has scarcely at all spoken of the Messianic cult which nevertheless constituted the center of Jewish thought in the first century. . . . The silence of Josephus is not, therefore the silence of ignorance; it is the silence of prudence and fear—the silence actuated by interest."

So far as the few and meager references of the Roman authors of the time of Jesus and his mission or fate are concerned, Prof. Goguel argues that, since those writers all regarded Christianity as contemptible and silly superstition, there was obviously no reason why they should say much about Jesus or the religion his disciples founded. They were interested in Christianity as a cause of political and social disturbances, and, naturally enough, they mention it only in connection with the measures adopted against it. As to the failure of Pilate to report to the emperor his rôle in the execution of Jesus, M. Goguel observes that Pilate was a cruel, arbitrary and vindictive ruler, and must have sent many agitators or rebels to their death. Jesus was to him only a dreamer and disturber, and there was nothing exceptional in the sentence imposed upon the strange person accused of blasphemy and treason.

M. Goguel deals elaborately with Paul and his epistles. His conclusion alone can be quoted here. It is as follows:

"The epistles of Paul afford, then, precise testimony in support of the existence of the Gospel tradition before him. They presume a Jesus who lived, acted, taught; whose life was a model to believers and who dies on the cross. True it is that in Paul was found only fragmentary and sporadic indications concerning the life and teachings of Jesus, but this is explained, on the one hand, by the fact that we possess no coherent and complex exposition of the apostle's preaching, and, on the other, by the character of his interests. He had no special object in proving what no one in his time called

in question—namely, that Jesus had existed. His unique aim was to prove—what the Jews refused to admit—that Jesus was the Christ."

The general and final conclusions of M. Goguel in regard to Jesus may be thus summarized:

Jesus was an actual, historical figure. He did not create the Church nor found a new religion. He had no quarrel with the traditions of his people; he combated abuses and excrescences, but was faithful to the law and the prophets as he interpreted them. He desired to announce the accomplishment of the promises of God to Israel and preached the nearness of the kingdom of God.

But Christianity was a new religion, and it was so from the day after the death of Jesus. It was the religion of the worshippers of Jesus, and "it was the personality of the master which linked together the gospel preached in Galilee and the religion of the primitive church. It is through the impression produced by Jesus that the church professed her doctrine of redemption. The historical reality of the personality in Jesus, coupled with the belief in his divinity and his mission, enables one to understand the birth and development of Christianity, which otherwise would indeed remain an enigma and a miracle.

M. Goguel is apparently an orthodox Christian and an uncritical believer in the divinity of Jesus. Not satisfied with affirming the *historicity* of the Nazarene, he goes on to contend that the mystery of Christianity is *most peculiar and radically unlike* the mystery of any other religion, ancient or modern. Just why the fancies and interpretations of some ignorant Jewish fishermen, peasants and other humble and uneducated folk, including the notion that Jesus was no mortal, but the son of God, the Heaven-sent redeemer and savior, are entitled to greater weight and credence than the imaginings and superstitions of other groups of uncultivated men and women devoid of all scientific knowledge, as of the faintest conception of the methods and canons of science, it is impossible to perceive. It is distinctly irrational for the adherents of the theory of the *historicity* of Jesus to connect that theory, or make it dependent on, the belief in the *divinity* of the peripathetic preacher, dreamer and moralist who, admittedly, had no intention of founding a new religion and who never called himself God or alluded to any miraculous circumstance about his conception and birth.

We have, indeed, a very scholarly work on "Jesus of Nazareth" from the pen of a Jewish thinker and writer, Dr. Joseph Klausner,

now of Jerusalem, in which a powerful case is built up for the historicity of Jesus from the viewpoint of a devout Jew who, unlike so many other noted rabbis and learned theologians of his race, is fully prepared to accept Jesus and all his essential teachings while finding *not a scintilla of proof in favor of the divinity of Jesus.*

Dr. Klausner's book, written in Hebrew and translated into English by an admirer of its solid qualities, its valuable data and its fine catholic spirit, should be heartily welcomed by thoughtful Christians, despite its negative conclusion as to the divine origin and divine mission of Jesus. It has already convinced not a few Jewish scholars that *"Jesus was"*—that he really lived and worked, suffered and died, as the Gospels in the fragmentary and unsatisfactory way allege that he did. This is a very important service to the ethical and practical sides of Christianity.

The salient merit of Dr. Klausner's work is that it draws on rich sources of evidence not readily accessible to writers unfamiliar with Hebrew literature, as well as on Greek, Latin and early Christian sources. The conclusion reached in the book is supported by an impressive amount of proof, and nowhere in the process of demonstration is a difficulty overlooked or slurred over.

It is impossible to give even a summary of the evidence adduced by Dr. Klausner, and those earnest seekers of truth who are interested in the subject will naturally read his book. But the conclusions reached therein may be briefly set forth.

The patient examination of Hebrew, Latin, Greek and Christian sources, *not including the canonical gospels,* leads Dr. Klausner to affirm without the slightest hesitation the historicity of Jesus. True, the information gathered is meager, disappointing and not always consistent, but, says Dr. Klausner, it is perfectly safe to conclude "that Jesus did indeed exist; that he had an exceptionally remarkable personality, and that he lived and died in Judea during the Roman occupation". Dr. Klausner continues:

"It was quite impossible for a purely fabricated presentment of the figure of Jesus so firmly to have gripped people's imaginations that historians like Josephus and Tacitus and men like Eliezer ben Hyrdanus should believe in his existence and refer to him as one who had lived and worked quite recently and made friends and disciples; or that Paul should have had such a complete belief in him and never doubted that James was the brother, and Peter and his fellows the disciples, of Jesus.

"That much is clear; and those who would utterly deny not simply the form which Jesus now assumes in the world, or that which he assumes according to the gospels, but even his very existence, and the great positive, or negative, importance of his personality—such men simply deny all historic reality.

The proof advanced by the adherents of the view that Jesus is a myth is dismissed by Dr. Klausner as pseudo-scientific and lacking in substance. He is satisfied that "there is no step in the life-story of Jesus, and no line in his preaching, on which is not stamped the seal of prophetic and Pharisaic Judaism and the Palestine of his day". Jesus was not a Christian, but a Jew. His ideas, however, were opposed to the fundamentals of the politico-social system in which the Jews believed, and had *no practical significance for organized states and nations.* His ethical teachings were sublime, but only a few persons could practice them—or can practice them today. Jesus, in Dr. Klausner's view, was at once a mystic and a realist; he knew life and human nature, and his vision was clear even while he taught the most idealistic of doctrines. His nature was full of contradictions, and that is what appealed and still appeals to so many diverse elements. He could be gentle and he could be harsh and violent; he could be subtle, direct, evasive, pungent, simple, profound, in turn or all at once.

But to account for the Jesus of the gospels and of Christianity it is necessary to bear in mind the intellectual and emotional effects of his tragic and dreadful death. That, in Dr. Klausner's words, "added a crown of divine glory both to the personality and teaching of Jesus. Later arose the legend of the resurrection, heightening every value, obscuring every defect, exalting every virtue—and Jesus the Jew became half-Jew, half Gentile, and began to hold that supernatural rank which is his today among hundreds of millions of mankind."

Dr. Klausner does not take the view of Prof. Goguel—that the mystery of Christianity is a very peculiar kind, different from any other mystery at the basis or core of other religions. He thinks, on the contrary, that given the conditions of the time, the beliefs of the Jews in a Messiah, the relations between Rome and the Jews, and the courses which confronted any high-spirited, learned, sensitive, enthusiastic, fervent patriot who realized the futility of force and insurrection—given all the conditions and factors, nothing was more natural than the choice made by Jesus and all that it entailed

in his career and his subsequent place in history. Dr. Klausner fails to perceive why a perfectly rational view of Jesus does not explain every difficulty or reconcile every contradiction to which attention has been directed by scholars and theologians.

M. Couchoud and other thinkers and writers of his school cannot afford to ignore Dr. Klausner's erudite and judicious work.

Meantime men of letters and students of psychology have taken up the enigma of Jesus in their own fashion, and while their contributions contain nothing original from a strictly scientific or historical point of view, they cannot be said to lack interest or significance. The late George Brandes, for example, the eminent Danish-Jewish critic and publicist, felt constrained to write a little book on Jesus and to express his own conviction that the Christian redeemer and savior is a pure myth. Dr. Brandes will not convince those who have read Dr. Klausner's work, and, moreover, some of his arguments are strangely superficial. Thus he says that it is no more imaginable that the British viceroy in India should sentence a Hindu to death for expressing heterdox opinions concerning the teachings of Buddha than it is that a Roman procurator should interfere on account of an accusation which only orthodox Jews could resent as heresy. This is manifestly fallacious. Jesus was charged with rebellion and treason; he was not the first of the Jewish rebels to cause Rome apprehension and anxiety; he was accused of pretensions and teaching that were subversive of the Roman power as of the religious traditions and tenets of the Jews.

Jesus, on his way to his execution, according to the Gospel story, was jeered and railed at as "the King of the Jews". Rome was not interested in mere doctrinal squabbles, but it *was* interested in order, peace, respect for its soverign power. Besides, as critics of Brandes' book have pointed out, religious issues often assume a political character, and when they do, the government, whether alien or national, has to intervene and prevent civil warfare.

Dr. Brandes does not seem to have studied the latest discussions of the historicity of Jesus, and at times permits himself to go beyond the evidence he adduces or has found in scholarly works.

Of a character and quality very different from those of Dr. Brandes' little book is a notable work of John Middleton Murry, the British critic and essayist, entitled "Jesus, Man of Genius."

Mr. Murry has his own original conception of Jesus. It is a conception based on psychology, on a study of religious and spiritual

mysticism, and on what may be called the probabilities of the case. Mr. Murry is not an orthodox, but he has deep sympathy with mysticism, and does not shrink from miracles. To him, all the anomalies and contradictions in the accounts of the life and mission of Jesus present little difficulty, provided we dismiss as a myth the Christ of the churches and the theologians, and regard Jesus as simply a man of genius, a man who knew sin and who brought about his own martyrdom, or suicide, by acts that in an ordinary person would be unpardonable. Mr. Murry builds up a plausible and interesting case, and, curiously enough, there is much in common between his Jesus and that of Dr. Klausner, who, as we have seen, in his own and different way arrives at the conclusion that Jesus was a most extraordinary man, a man of preternatural genius and strange but fascinating contradictions.

The objection of some conventional Christians, that neither Dr. Klausner's Jesus nor Mr. Murry's can be worshipped, prayed or confessed to, sought salvation from, is question-begging and foolish. If Jesus *was a man,* no matter how gifted, astute and myriad-minded a man, the idea of worship or prayer, of salvation or redemption, in connection with his life, is of course, absurd. Between those who choose to believe that he was "the son of God", or God himself in a certain manifestation, and those who believe that he was a lonely, dreamy idealist, a bold innovator, a revolutionist in thought, a misunderstood genius, there is nothing in common, no possibility of compromise. There never will be anything in common between them, and controversy under those circumstances is idle. We must, however, separate the question whether "Jesus was"—whether he is a true historical character—from the question *what he was* if he lived at all.

If he is a myth, that fact must be acknowledged, and we shall have to find purely ethical and practical grounds for the doctrines associated with Christianity. If he is a real historical figure, then the question as to his alleged "divinity"—if the word means anything whatever—arises naturally and simply enough, because of the belief of millions of men and women in that divinity, and must be settled scientifically and philosophically. It is hardly necessary to point out that the agnostic cannot in any case accept Jesus save as a man—not an ordinary man, certainly, but a man so rich and complex, so exceptional intellectually and morally, if not also physically, as to be capable of arousing admiration and wonder.

# EDUCATING THE SLAVE—A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF CIVIL WAR HISTORY

BY CHARLES KASSEL

IN the installment of the biography of Edwin Miller Wheelock which appeared in the November issue, 1926, of the *Open Court,* we followed the subject of our narrative, and his associate in the supervision of negro labor under General Banks during the crop season of 1863, in their unique journeys of inspection through the plantations, the account ending as Vicksburg and Port Hudson fell and the opening of the Mississippi divided the Confederacy into two parts. The story of those momentous episodes in the terrific struggle had occupied the installment in the March number, 1926, and in the issues of February and July, 1922, March, August and September, 1923, March and July, 1924, and April and September, 1925, we had led up to those surpassingly interesting events, carrying the recital through the anti-slavery agitation and the early years of the Civil War to the emancipation of the slaves by the proclamation of President Lincoln.

With the grandiose plan for cutting the Confederacy in twain fully consummated, the military command in the Department of the Gulf could turn its attention whole-heartedly to pressing internal problems. A comprehensive scheme for the management of plantation labor was evolved, which will form the subject of the next chapter of this biography, and there was put into effect—for the first time we believe, in any age, under such circumstances—a humane experiment for the enlightenment of the enfranchised negro slaves. It is this last experiment, rich with human interest, and with which the name of our minister is intimately bound up, that must engage us chiefly in the present installment. It is a story which well deserves to be perpetuated but which our annals have left almost wholly unchronicled, and upon which even the histories of education in Louisi-

ana—so far, at least, as those works have been accessible to the present writer—are regrettably silent.

With the fall of Port Hudson and the removal of the Confederate menace to the lower Mississippi, the dramatic and spectacular fade from the history of the Department of the Gulf, and with the dramatic and spectacular there fades out also the figure of Geo. H. Hepworth, who now returned to his home and pulpit in Boston that he might exploit by books and lectures his first-hand knowledge of the exciting episodes in the conquest of the Mississippi.

In December, 1864, it is true, Hepworth's name flares up like a dying ember in our record, for we find among the loose papers of our subject the original of a petition in Hepworth's heavy hand, addressed to the Commanding General of the Department of the Gulf, suggesting the "detail" of our minister to the pastorship of the Unitarian church at New Orleans. The Unitarian ministers who signed the petition—thirty-three in number, including no less a personage than Edward Everett Hale—had learned, as we read, of "a movement for the reorganization of the religious societies of New Orleans on the basis of loyalty to the United States Government", and as they believed the meager congregation then worshipping in the Unitarian church would make no effort to re-establish the society upon its ancient foundations because of prejudices of a purely political character, notwithstanding there were a sufficient number of Unitarians in New Orleans to form an influential society, these gentlemen urged the designation of some "chaplain or other officer belonging to our denomination to labor in this providential field." The signers expressed the belief that the movement would be of "great practical benefit to the community in the development of Union sentiment", and they suggested the name of our minister as that "of a man in whom we have full confidence".

It is a safe inference that this petition was not prepared with the knowledge of him whom it chiefly concerned, and as nothing came of the movement we may conclude that the petition was never presented and remained among the papers of Mr. Wheelock merely as a testimonial of the esteem in which he was held by the Unitarian ministers of New England.

The place of Geo. H. Hepworth as an associate of our minister in work for the negro was taken by an individual of very different character and we stay the current of our story long enough for a swift glance at the life of this capable and eminently worthy man.

Born at Newton, Pennsylvania, in 1816, thirteen years before our minister, Benjamin Rush Plumly was named for that Benjamin Rush who had in 1775, with Benjamin Franklin, established the first society for the abolition of slavery in America, and his name-sake in the nineteenth century was, therefore, dedicated from before his birth, by the anti-slavery feeling of his parents, to the great cause.

Early associated with William Lloyd Garrison in the abolition movement, Plumly devoted himself likewise during the period before the war to literary pursuits, contributing prose and poetical sketches to the magazines. A narrative poem called *Abdel Hassan* which appeared in the January issue, 1860, of the *Atlantic Monthly*, is a sufficient proof of his noble imagination and exquisite gift of expression. When the Civil War broke out he obtained a place on the staff of General John C. Fremont, whose consistent friend in the latter's troubles he remanied, as appears from the interesting account found in James Ford Rhodes' *History of the United States*, volume 3, page 479. Later, he served on the staff of General Banks at New Orleans, and it was in that connection our chaplain came into touch with him, although Bank's control of the Gulf Department ended when he was relieved of command in May, 1864, and Major Plumly continued under Bank's successors to render conspicuously useful service. After the war Major Plumly settled at Galveston, where for a time, too, our minister resided, and where their association continued, and he died at Galveston in 1887, leaving the world his debtor for several books he had found the leisure to write and publish before his death.

Major Plumly was a modest, tender, eminently just man. There was evidently a deep affection between him and the subject of our story and it is a sufficient token of the regard in which he was held by our minister that the little daughter born at New Orleans, November 1, 1866, but who died less than six months after, was christened Elsie Plumly Wheelock.

On August 29, 1863, as appears from the War Records, Series 1, Volume 26, Part 1, Page 64, Adjutant General Richard B. Irwin appointed Col. John S. Clark, Major B. Rush Plumly and Col. Geo. H. Hanks to regulate the enrollment, recruiting, employment and education of persons of color, and it was prescribed that "all questions concerning the enrollment of troops for the Corps D'Afrique, the regulation of labor or the government and education of negroes be referred to the decision of this Commission, subject to the approval

of the Commanding General of the Department". On October 29, 1863, Col. Clark, by order of the Commission, as appears from the instrument of appointment among our papers, designated "Lieut. Wheelock 4th Lou." as an Inspector of Schools, empowering him to visit all schools established by the authority of the Commission and report in writing weekly until further notice, with such suggestions as his personal observation might dictate, and he was instructed to report to Lieut. Stickney as the Superintendent of Schools.

The "4th Lou." was the Fourth Louisiana Native Guards. Mr. Wheelock had resigned as the chaplain of his regiment July 18th, 1863, and two days later had been appointed 1st Lieut. of 76th Regiment of United States Colored Infantry—evidently in the place of Lieut. Geo. H. Hepworth, who had resigned July 17th. This regiment, as we learn from the official army register, was organized originally during February and March, 1863, as the Fourth Regiment of Louisiana Native Guards, and on June 6th, 1863, its designation was changed to Fourth Regiment Infantry Corps D'Afrique, General Banks having on May 2nd preceding reorganized the regiments of colored troops which had been assembled by General Butler. The official title of this regiment was again changed on April 4, 1864, and the name adopted of "76th Regiment U. S. Colored Infantry", by which the regiment is known in the army records. The reference, therefore, to our subject as a lieutenant of "4th Lou." did not conflict with his designation in the records of the War Department as "1st Lieut. 76th U. S. C. Inf.", nor does his discharge from that regiment on December 31, 1865, as mentioned in that record, imply a relief from command, for on that date the entire regiment, as appears from the official army register, was mustered out. The entire matter of the connection of our minister with this regiment of colored troops is probably of small importance, as it is fair to suspect that the commission was largely honorary and served the purpose of conferring a salary while other work was being done.

It was in October, 1863, the month of the appointment as inspector of schools, that the first public schools for colored children were established by the Commission of Enrollment, and from that month until March following the work was probably in the experimental stage. On February 2, 1864, General Order No. 23, destined to much celebrity, had been promulgated by General Banks, and by the language of that order the negro was promised, not only food, clothing, medical attention and wages, but also instruction for his

children.

On March 22, 1864, experimental work having advanced sufficiently far to warrant the step, General Order No. 38 was issued by Major General Banks, creating a "Board of Education for Freedmen for the Department of the Gulf", with power to establish common schools, employ teachers, erect school houses and regulate the course of studies, and as an incident of their general powers the Board was given authority to levy and collect a school tax for the purpose of defraying the cost of the schools. Of the three members composing the personnel of the Board as named in the Order, one was Col. H. N. Frisbie, 22nd. Infantry, Corps D'Afrique, who, however, was relieved soon after his appointment and was succeeded by Major Plumly, which latter was made chairman of the Board by order of General Banks; and another was Isaac G. Hubbs, a civilian of New Orleans subsequently expelled from the Department of the Gulf by military order. The third member of the Board was our own minister.

It would appear from a report under date of May 25, 1864, made by the Board of Education, and which we shall have occasion to notice, that Col. Frisbie could not have been removed nor Isaac G. Hubbs expelled until after that date, since their names are signed with that of our minister. In the meanwhile, on April 1st, the schools established and conducted by the Commission of Enrollment had been transferred to the Board of Education, so that after the appointment of Maj. Plumly and the expulsion of Hubbs one of the most interesting experiments in history rested in the hands of Major Plumly and the subject of our biography.

"In Connecticut in 1833" we read in *Harper's Encyclopedia of United States History*, under the heading *Abolition*, "Miss Prudence Crandall of Canterbury opened a school for negro girls. The legislature by act of May 24, 1833, forbad the establishment of such schools and imprisoned Miss Crandall. Being set at liberty she was ostracised by her neighbors and her school broken up."

This incident from a forgotten era in the history of the North deserves a place, in justice to the Southern people, beside those discriminatory regulations enacted against the negro by the Northern states before the war, including separate accomodations for negroes on railroads and steamboats and negro seats in churches and theatres, which supplied to our minister the occasion for such fiery invective in his sermons upon slavery.

It cannot be matter for marvel that what had occurred in Connecticut should be repeated in Louisiana. The facts are compiled for us in a printed report of the Board of Education in 1864, evidently from the hand of our minister, to which we shall have occasion to refer more at length in later portions of this chapter. To teach the slave the art of reading and writing, we are told, was an offense under the statutes of Louisiana, as begetting a tendency to "excite insubordination among the servile class" and was punishable by "imprisonment at hard labor for not more than twenty-one years or by death at the discretion of the court". Notwithstanding the terror of this statute Mrs. Mary D. Brice of Ohio, a student of Antioch College, came to New Orleans with her husband in December 1858, to establish a school for negroes, and in September 1860, after many obstacles were met and overcome, the school was established. By June 1861, however, she had been forced under pressure of public opinion to suspend, and with her school thus deprived of a local habitation and a name Mrs. Brice stole around at night to the houses or resorts of her pupils and in that way carried forward her work. Upon the occupation of the city by the Federal forces the school was reestablished and protected—not, as the author of our report observes, by any direct action but rather by the moral sentiment of the army, "for so timid and so prejudiced were many of our commanders that long after that time General Emory sent for Rev. Thomas Conway to admonish him not to advocate publicly the opening of the schools for colored children as it would be *very* dangerous." The school of Mrs. Brice, we learn, continued to thrive and subsequently passed under the Board of Education by whom Mrs. Brice was employed at the date of the report—an efficient and honored principal. We quote now from the same report:

"When in April, 1862, the guns of Farragut transferred the city of New Orleans from rebel to national rule no such thing as a public school for colored children was found in the schedule of the conquest. No such thing had ever existed in the Crescent City. Even that portion of the colored population who for generations had been wealthy and free were allowed no public schools, although taxed to support the school system of the city and state. Occasionally a small donation was made from the public fund to a school for orphans attached to the Colored Orphan Asylum.

"The children of the free colored people who were in good circumstances, known as "Creoles", generally of French or Spanish ex-

traction, when not educated abroad or at the North, or from fairness of complexion by occasional admission to the white schools, were quietly instructed at home or in a very few private schools of that class. Even these, although not contrary to law, were really under the ban of opinion, and were tolerated because of the freedom, wealth, respectability and light color of the parents, many of whom were nearly white and by blood, sympathy, slaveholding and other interests were allied to the whites rather than to the blacks. For the poor of the free colored people there was no school.

"In the face of all obstacles, however, a few of the free colored people of the poorer classes learned to read and write. Cases of like proficiency were found among the slaves, where some restless bondsman yearning for knowledge which somehow he coupled with liberty, hid himself from public notice to con over in secret and laboriously the magic letters. In other cases limited teaching of a slave was connived at by a master who found it convenient for his servants to read. Occasionally, also, the slave was instructed by some devout and sympathizing woman or some generous man who secretly violated the law and resisted opinion for the sake of justice and humanity. The single attempt, however, to afford instruction through a school to the poor of the colored people had been that of Mrs. Brice. The advent of the Federal army weakened slavery and suspended the pains and penalties of its bloody code and a few private teachers began to appear in response to the strong desire for instruction".

The first schools were established, as we have seen, in October, 1863. The work was begun, as has been stated, by the Commission of Enrollment created by order of Major General Banks. The Board of Education organized in pursuance of the promise made by General Banks in the "Labor Order" took over on April the 1st the schools conducted by the Commission of Enrollment, and the report from which we have quoted was the report of the Board of Education for the year 1864, embracing the nine months of its work, and a printed copy of which, bearing the signature of Maj. Plumly as Chairman and of Lieut. Wheelock as Secretary, is in our hands.

The schools transferred from the Commission of Enrollment were, as we learn, employing 23 teachers with an average attendance of 1422 pupils. There were by that time a few colored schools in the city under the auspices of benevolent societies, but one by one these were taken over by the Board of Education. A schedule for weekly reports of teachers was prepared and issued and from these

reports tabulated statements for each month were made up. A system of inspection was instituted by which each department of the schools in the city and its vicinity was visited weekly and examined while the more distant schools received visits and examinations monthly.

Gen. Banks was not permitted to supervise the progress of the experiment so auspiciously begun. In May, 1864, he was relieved of the command of the Department of the Gulf and one of the last acts of his administration was an approval of the report of the Board of Education dated May 25, 1864, to which we have referred in another connection, signed, as we have seen by Col. Frisbie and Isaac Hubbs, and the original of which is before the present writer. Frisbie and Hubbs, as we know, lost very soon after all connection with the educational system and it is probable they had from the beginning merely a perfunctory relation with the Board. The report itself is plainly the work of our minister, whose signature it also bears and by whom, it is safe to assume, all the work had been done, and by whom, doubtless, it continued to be done until the appointment of Major Plumly as Chairman gave to the Board the invaluable aid of that gentleman's judgment and talents.

It is a tribute to the thoroughness and industry of our minister that as early as May 25th he could report 90 teachers in the employ of the Board actively engaged in 49 schools with an average attendance of 5200 pupils and with a maximum of about 300 more. Of these teachers, as we discover, 38 were laboring in the city of New Orleans and 52 in the various country parishes within the lines. It is a noteworthy circumstance, too, in the report of May 25th, and indeed instantly challenges attention, that the indebtedness incurred for April and May for the conduct of the schools, and the estimate of the funds which would be required for June, are absurdly low, and wholly out of proportion with the cost of education in these days. The Board, it would seem, had built no school houses but had extemporized for school purposes such vacant buildings as could be found and which with small repairs could be made to answer, but nonetheless the amount actually incurred per pupil spoke of a watchfulness in expenditure which did credit to the conscientiousness of those who administered the system.

For the month of April, we read, the amount incurred had been six thousand dollars, for the month of May eleven thousand five hundred dollars, and the estimate for June was about twelve thous-

and dollars—an average per student of about two dollars per month; and this included the cost of books purchased in New York by Hubbs and all expense incurred in establishing, furnishing and supporting schools, excluding alone the cost of constructing new houses where that was done. The devotedness, efficiency and absence of extravagance involved in these figures requires no commentary.

The most interesting paragraphs, however, are those concerning the character and antecedents of the teachers. "The Board takes pleasure in stating that thus far the supply of loyal teachers from Lousiana has proved adequate to the demand and will doubtless so continue. In thus giving the preference to Southern teachers whenever such could be obtained the Board has gained an unexpectedly strong moral support to their enterprise and they also believe that they have in this respect rightly interpreted the spirit of Order No. 38 and the expressed wishes of the Commanding General. . . . . The more intelligent of the planters also are comprehending that whatever contents and dignifies their labor is a reciprocal benefit to themselves and the instances are continually increasing where the planters not only willingly but cordially aid the Board in the location of schools upon their plantations."

These last quotations imply a back-ground of hostile feeling on the part of the native population and local interests which may easily be conceived, and there must have been something innately noble and inspiring in the attitude and labors of the man which could win over those alien in sympathy to an experiment so radically opposed to the whole current of their thought. Our minister, however, was in his natural element here. The work he was doing was properly the work of an apostle and missionary and in the crusade he was waging against the ignorance and degradation of the blacks his own earnestness and unselfishness could kindle the fires of enthusiasm where such a thing seemed hopeless before. It is little to be wondered at that neither the Southern women nor the planters themselves could resist the moving appeal he must have made for their cooperation.

The course of the experiment is reflected in a communication entitled *Education of the Freedmen* which appeared under the initials "E. M. W." in the *New Orleans Times*, on September 2, 1864, and which was quoted in the *Liberator* of the issue of September 23rd. A few paragraphs from that communication will suffice to show the growing confidence of our minister in the outcome of the venture.

"The country schools are prosperous and thronged and although they have been in being but a few months they are rapidly demonstrating the capacity of the African to receive our civilization. The children who eight weeks ago were beginning the alphabet are now reading in the first readers and solving with facility problems in the primary rules of arithmetic.

"The ages of the scholars range from five to eighteen, with several grown persons of both sexes, servants, teamsters and seamstresses who manage to save an hour or two from daily toil and devote it to gaining the elements of knowledge. About one half of these children, prior to last October, did not know their letters.

"The different members of the Board have frequently and thoroughly visited these schools and are conversant with the teachers and their methods of instruction.

"Certainly the general cleanliness of the children is to be remarked. Their parents are poor—most of them very poor—owning not even themselves until that ever memorable day in April 1862, when the serfdom of Louisiana vanished in the smoke of Farragut's guns—yet the little ones always enter the school room with their brown faces and hands shiningly clean and with shoes and clothing often woefully patched yet painstakingly neat.

"The pupils display great eagerness for knowledge and facility of acquisition. Their perceptive faculities are particularly good—too much so, perhaps, as in the reflective faculty and memory they seem somewhat deficient. No severity of discipline is used or required. the threat of expulsion from the privileges of instruction beng sufficient to tame the most mounting spirit. The weekly reports of the teachers show that the number of instances of absence and tardiness are less than and the average daily attendance fully equal to that in the white schools.

"No school buildings have been built but such quarters as could be devised on the spur of the moment have been obtained; such as confiscated houses, the attics of untenanted stores and in two instances the basements of churches. These latter were grudgingly given or rather not given at all but taken.

"In organizing these schools many obstacles were met with and one after another overcome. The prejudices of the people were actively enlisted against the education of "niggers". It was thought impossible to procure teachers except from the North. Yet the true hearted women of New Orleans came forward promptly for the

work and quietly bore the load of calumny and sneers and social proscription that fell to their lot. Louisiana has furnished for the work seventy-five earnest and laborious teachers. All honor to them! The history of the state would be poorly written should it omit their names.

"A far better day is dawning here. The progressive triumphs of our arms have purified the political atmosphere. Many who were blind now see; and the community are perceiving that as the negro, bond or free, must still furnish the labor of the South, it is better to have that labor instructed than brutalized and to spend in schools in order to save in prisons.

"In these schools careful attention has been paid to the correct vocalization of the elementary sounds; pupils have been trained to a clearness and purity of tone creditable to Anglo-Saxon voices. The advanced classes have finished the primary books of reading and geography and are now reading the third and fourth readers with facility. They have acquired the knowledge of arithmetic as far as long division and fractions, the multiplication tables, the use of outline maps, and can write with commendable neatness.

"Such are the general features of these schools. If they were now closed, the work of self instruction with the more advanced classes could go on and nothing could eradicate the knowledge they have thus gained.

"Three years ago it was a crime to teach that race. Now they read the testament and the newspapers. They are learning the geography of the world. They are gaining the knowledge of figures with which to do the business of Labor and Life. They the singing the songs of Union and Freedom. They show a healthy mentality and have made it appear to reasonable minds that they are very much like the rest of mankind and are thus entitled to a fair chance in the world.

"The result of this new departure of human experience will be a general resurrection of body and mind through the worn and wasted South. Our military expeditions do the pioneer work of blasting the rock and felling the forest and education follows to sow the grain and raise the golden harvest. The most glorious work is now going forward—to lift up the freedmen with instruction, counsel, culture. The day of antagonism is over and that of befriending begins. Beyond the advancing lines of our forces follow the pacific army of teachers and civilizers; and the school house takes the place of the

whipping post and scourge."

Another document of which the original in faded ink is before us, bearing date October 27th, 1864, and signed by our minister as Lieutenant and Secretary of the Board of Education, gives evidence of the care and scruple which moved his every act where Southern feeling and Southern property rights were concerned. Among the buildings assigned for school purposes to the Board of Education was one at 194 Dumaine Street occupied at one time, it is evident, by a New Orleans family, and which had probably been seized by the military forces for the purpose of assignment to the Board of Education. The instrument we have is an inventory of personal property found in this residence, carefully receipted and containing a promise of return to "Captain N. S. Constable, a. q. m." in as good condition as when received, wear and tear excepted. Aside from the more valuable articles a "foot-furnace" is listed—an interesting memento of those days—and even the mouse-trap and "one tin can" are not overlooked by the conscientious Lieutenant and Secretary. Whatever abuses might have existed elsewhere there could surely have been no ground for complaint against the Board of Education on the score of disregard for property rights of the dispossessed Southerners.

Returning now to the printed report of the Board of Education for 1864, we remark some highly interesting facts and statistics. There were in existence, for example, at the close of the year, 95 schools for colored children with 162 teachers and 9571 pupils, representing, the author of the report observes an average monthly increase of 10 schools, 15 teachers and 805 pupils, and, in addition, over 2,000 colored adults of both sexes had received instruction in the night schools and Sunday schools conducted under the auspices of the Board. Of the colored children of school age within the lines of Federal military occupation in Louisiana—estimated at something over 20,000—no less than 11,000 were in actual attendance.

Something of the difficulty of establishing and maintaining schools in the country parishes may be deduced from the fact that on June 27th, 1864, General Banks was compelled to issue a circular calling attention to the refusal of planters and other persons to board teachers, resulting thus in the denial of the facilities of education to children of negro laborers and the consequent discontent of the parents. The circular notified the recalcitrants that whenever provision for teachers was required by the Board it must be accorded except where

the circumstances made it greatly inconvenient.

In the endeavor to provide accomodation for scholars and teachers every makeshift was employed: "Cabins, sheds, and unused houses were appropraited, roughly repaired, furnished with a cheap stove for the winter, a window or two for light and air", and the school started. Where board and lodging for the teachers could not be secured "a weatherproof shelter of some kind—very poor at best—was obtained, some simple furniture provided and a teacher sent who was willing to undergo the privations—often hardships—of boarding themselves in addition to enduring the fatigues of a school.

It was not a life to be envied and wonder grows as we read that devoted women could be found who were willing to undertake so ungrateful a task in the face of such forbidding obstacles. "Compelled to live on the coarsest diet of corn bread and bacon" says the report, "often no tea, coffee, butter, eggs or flour; separated by miles of bad roads from the nearest provision store; refused credit because she is a negro teacher; unable to pay cash because the Government is unavoidably in arrears; subjected to the jeers and hatred of her neighbors; cut off from society, with infrequent and irregular mails; swamped in mud—the school shed a-drip and her quarters little better; raided occasionally by rebels, her school broken up and herself insulted, banished or run off to rebeldom; under all this it is really surprising how some of those brave women manage to live, much more how they are able to render the service they do as teachers."

The Federal officers were by no means a unit upon the subject of negro education and the provost marshals were frequently indifferent or hostile. This subject is dealt with at page 8 of the report and the narrative is well worthy of quotation, not only as showing the prejudice against negro education which prevailed even among the Northern officers but because of the highly interesting sidelight we get upon the actual conditions surrounding the teachers.

"In a parish, some distance from New Orleans, a building was procured, an energetic teacher sent, scholars gathered and the work begun. The first week brought no report. It came subsequently, as follows: 'Arrived. Found a place to live a mile and half from the school-shed. Dreadful people, dirty and vulgar, but the best I can do. Went about gathering scholars, have forty. Did well enough till it rained, since then have walked three miles a day, ankle deep in thick black mud that pulls off my shoes. Nothing to eat but strong

pork and sour bread. Insulted for being a 'nigger teacher.' Can't buy anything on credit and haven't a cent of money. The school-shed has no floor, and the rains sweep clean across it, through the places where the windows should be. I have to huddle the children first in one corner and then in another to keep them from drowning or swamping. The Provost Marshal won't help me. Says 'he don't believe in nigger teachers—didn't 'list to help them'. The children come rain or shine, plunging through the mud—some of them as far as I do. Pretty pictures they are. What shall I do? If it will ever stop raining I can get along."

"Who ever has attempted to march through the adhesive mud of this delta, under a Louisiana rain-storm, will realize the accuracy of that report. It is one of a score.

"Another class of obstacles is fairly indicated by the following extract from the report of a country teacher:

"I have, in vain, attempted to form a night school. I never dared take more than two pupils, because some of the officers are so opposed to the instructon of negroes. One used to let his dogs loose after supper to bite the night-scholars, till I told him I would kill them if they bit my pupils. A great many would come to night-school only they are afraid."

'I had rather not contend with such people; but in a short time there will be another Provost Marshal here, and probably I can keep night school. Capt. ———— never interfered with the school, but he don't approve of it, and allows others in his house to annoy it."

"Where the parish Provost Marshal is indifferent or opposed to negro education, the annoyance, and even peril of teachers, is often great, from the remains of that class from which slave drivers and negro hunters sprang, a class that does not seem to be numbered and that hastens its own destruction with the madness of men pre-ordained to perish. This class hates the district schools with all the virulance of ignorance and complexional caste.

"In Thibodeaux the school house has been broken open, on successive nights, for months past, the furniture defaced, the books destroyed and the house made untenable by nuisance. Bricks and missiles have been hurled through the windows, greatly risking limb and life, and making general commotion. Complaint after complaint has not afforded relief or protection.

"General Cameron kindly and promptly sent a guard, on one or two occasions; but as the detection and arrest of the cowardly as-

sailants depends upon the disposition and vigilance of the parish Provost Marshal, the outrages continue."

That despite the increasing number of planters who accepted the new regime and entered sincerely into cooperation with the efforts of the Board of Education there were many still secretly antagonistic appears very plainly from this report. In the case of the country schools indeed, more removed from the protection of the military, raids were not infrequent.

"A Provost Marshal reported a large number of children in one locality in his parish, but no school, and very little possibility of establishing one, owing to the hostility of the residents and the proximity of the rebels.

"We resolved to try it. A young lady born in Louisiana, late of slaveholding associations, agreed to attempt the opening of the school. She managed to locate herself in the district, and there began her missionary visits to collect the children, alone, on foot, through mud and dust, rain and heat, to the several plantations. She succeeded in assembling seventy scholars, in spite of the usual protest of opposers, that they were either under or over the age.

"Her school flourished until, by a sudden irruption of rebels, the small Federal force was captured, or expelled, the post robbed, one of our best men killed, the school scattered, and the teacher driven to New Orleans.

"She reported to the Board, and was offered a situation in the city. 'Oh, no', said she with spirit. 'I don't lose my little children. I'm going back with the flag.' The flag went and the teacher with it. At the last account she had reassembled sixty of her pupils, and was doing well.

"In another instance, a school had been established by consent of the manager, upon the plantation of a gentleman of Northern extraction, said to be a Unionist, but who, to some extent, is an absentee proprietor. Upon his return he complained of the school and demanded its removal. By a singular coincidence in time with this demand, the rebels visited the plantation.

"The principal of the school, a brave woman, who has lived all her life in New Orleans, states with positiveness, of her own knowledge, that the rebels, upon the occasion of their visit, were hospitably entertained by the planter, possibly in conformity with the Christian injunction 'love thine enemies'. They came to the school, warning the teacher to desist from 'nigger teaching' and were about to en-

force their warning. The teacher defied and shamed them, so that they left. On a day or two following they returned, broke up the school, borrowed a buggy, captured the teachers, and prepared to leave with them to Dixie, amid the clapping of hands and general acclamation of the lady spectators. The more timid of the two teachers was alarmed and distressed, but the principal chided her companion for her fears, and vented her scorn in no measured terms. Laughing at her spirit, they ordered the girls into the buggy and set out, a black man driving, and a Confederate Captain and Lieutenant riding on either side of the vehicle.

"The colored people were greatly agitated at the prospect of the rebels taking their teachers, and gladly obeyed the principal's injunction to 'ring the bell' and alarm our pickets. The sympathizing and vigilant Africans had already sent a messenger to the pickets, but he was stopped and ordered back by somebody.

Many threats were made by the rebel officers against the negro driver for his tardy pace, which he could not be induced to hasten.

"When some miles on the way, nearing the rebel pickets, the brave girl, who never lost her presence of mind, seenig the case hopeless and rescue impossible, except by delay, and happening to observe a weak spot in the harness, snatched the lines from the driver's hands and struck the horse smartly. His sudden start broke the harness. During the delay and the hard swearing of the rebel officers, our pickets came up with the party, the rebels escaping. The teachers were restored, the school removed from the domain of the loyal planter to a confiscated plantation near by, where it has since been raided and broken up, possibly by the same influence. The teachers aver, and cannot be convinced to the contrary, that the rebels raided the school and captured them by collusion with the planter, whose hostility to negro education ,and to the policy of progress, may have induced him to overstep the easy barrier of quasi-loyalty.

"While the teachers in the city and towns are not subjected to the same sort of annoyance and outrage, they are still the objects of scorn and vituperation, from many of their early friends, who refuse to recognize them on the street, and place them under the social ban for accepting the new order of things".

In this report, as in that of May 25th, the most interesting passage, and one which reflects peculiar credit upon the wisdom and freedom from prejudice of the Board of Education, is that reiterating the determination of the Board to employ Southern women as

teachers, and the quotations we make from this remarkable documents may fitly end with that passage:

"The cases cited and many others have seemed to justify the Board in the adoption of the policy expressed in a previous report, and since adhered to—that of employing, not exclusively, but mainly, Southern women teachers. They understand the negro. They have a complete knowledge of the people. Their Southern origin and education fit them to combat the prejudices of their former friends and associates against negro education.

"If these women are willing to forego the hatred of race, the hostility of caste, the prejudice of education; if they are ready to bear the jeers and contempt of friends and kindred, and the practical exclusion from circles that hitherto have received them gladly, surely they are entitled to the first consideration. Therefore, of the one hundred and sixty-two teachers in the employ of the Board, in December last, one hundred and thirty are of Southern origin, thirty-two from the West and the North. It has been our aim to select the most capable and worthy, but we have not been unmindful of those whose loyal antecedents and consequent sufferings from the rebellion entitle them to sympathy and aid.

"Whenever colored teachers, with the requisite ability, have presented themselves, we have made no distinction whatever".

Lost as were these minor problems in the larger issues of the war as the conflict approached its climax, recognition was not wholly wanting at the North of the fine and disinterested work which was doing in Louisiana for negro education. Of the particular report with which we have been dealing a discriminating study appeared in the *North American Review* for October, 1865. "In the State of Louisiana", says this article, "under General Banks' much abused but really humane and intelligent arrangements, the military government assessed a local tax and established a system of education for the slaves. The Board of Education established under this order went steadily to work and extended its operations with the extension of the national domain in Louisiana. So steady and comprehensive was its work and so well sustained by the authorities, that the State of Louisiana, in the number of schools and the number of scholars, has been and probably still is in advance of all states lately in rebellion. It is hoped that no changes of administration may make any fatal change in a system that has thus far worked so well".

If it is possible to overstress the importance, it is certainly not

possible to overstress the human interest, of the labors of our minister and his associates as they are reflected in the report we have had before us. In this day, when the education of the negro in the rudiments of learning is a principle univerally accepted, the dubiousness of the thing in the eyes of the general public during the war period can not well be conceived. Nothng less than the invincible confidence of earnest natures like that of the Dover minister in the teachableness of the slaves would have sufficed to support the experiment.

In the case of Mr. Wheelock, moreover, the work held a peculiar and powerful nterest. It represented an opportunity for putting to practical test the lofty principles to which he had committed himself so unreservedly in the sermons before the war. Of all aspects of the slave system none had seemed so black in his eyes, and none had been denounced by him with such fire and passion, as the hopeless ignorance to which it consigned its victims. He must therefore have regarded it as a providential thing that in the hour of military victory the task of undoing this great wrong, and of demonstrating the capacity of the negro to receive and appropriate knowledge, should have fallen so largely to his hands. A sacred office he evidently felt himself performing, and no unprejudiced mind can rise from a study of the work without the feeling that the task was more than worthily fulfilled.

*Publishers:* WILLIAMS & NORGATE, London—G. E. STECHERT CO., New York—FELIX ALCAN, Paris—Akad, Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig—NICOLA ZANICHELLI, Bologna—RUIZ HERMANOS, Madrid—RENASCENCA PORTUGUESA, Porto—THE MARUZEN COMPANY, Tokyo.

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*Published at the beginning of JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, OCTOBER*

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