

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

bottom of the page, the next to the last sentence on page 27 -- do you find it there, "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch"?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

The Vice Chairman: Six lines from the bottom.

Admiral Kimmel: I have it.

The Vice Chairman: "The so-called 'war warning' dispatch I also discussed with the Senior Task Force Commanders, Admiral Pye (Commander of Task Force 1), Admiral Halsey, (Commander of Task Force 2), Admiral Brown (Commander of Task Force 3), Admiral Calhoun (Commander, Base Force), and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch or discuss it with Admiral Newton or Admiral Bellinger."

That is correct, then, is it?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, that is a correct statement.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Newton was a commander
3 of one of the task forces?

4 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Bellinger was the Air
6 Officer of your Command, was he?

7 Admiral Kimmel: With headquarters at Ford Island,
8 across the bay from where I was, and in constant telephone
9 communication with me.

10 The Vice Chairman: He was your Air Corps officer?

11 Admiral Kimmel: He was. He was the commander of
12 patrol planes. Patrol Wing Two.

13 The Vice Chairman: He is the same officer who had
14 prepared the so-called Bellinger report.

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

16 The Vice Chairman: Which was an air defense of Hawaii
17 wasn't it?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but you must remember -- I
19 would like to just correct what may be a misapprehension.
20 Admiral Halsey, then Vice Admiral Halsey, was the senior
21 Naval Air Force Commander in the Hawaiian area, and as such
22 the rest of them looked to him more or less for guidance and
23 assistance. He had command of the carriers, the airplanes
24 afloat.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, wasn't it about the day you

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1 received the war-warning message, or the following day,
2 that you sent Halsey off to Wake?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes; and in the afternoon Halsey
4 came over, he spent the day with me before he went to Wake
5 and his recollection and mine, I have talked to him about
6 this, is that he saw the war warning before he sailed, and
7 we discussed it briefly.
8

9 The Vice Chairman: What I am getting at is, Admiral,
10 why didn't you show the war warning message or even discuss
11 it with your air officer Bellinger, who had prepared the
12 air defense for Hawaii?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Admiral Bellinger was a subordinate
14 of Admiral Wilson Brown in the organization and also a
15 subordinate of Admiral Bloch. I knew what Admiral Bellinger
16 was doing. I didn't consider it necessary and I didn't
17 consider it necessary to discuss it with a great many other
18 admirals that I had in Pearl Harbor with me.

19 The ones that I discuss it with were by no means all
20 the admirals that we had out there.

21 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Bellinger was the man who
22 had prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii, wasn't
23 he? The Bellinger report shows that.

24 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, Admiral Bellinger did the work
25 under the direction of Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bloch was the

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h3 man who was responsible for that report.

The Vice Chairman: All I know, Admiral, is what I have heard here.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, Admiral --

The Vice Chairman: I know it has been referred here throughout the hearings as the Bellinger report for the air defense of Hawaii.

Admiral Kimmel: That report was prepared by Admiral Bellinger, and General Martin, and they submitted it, whether it was revised or not, I don't know, but it had to be approved by the Commandant of the District, Admiral Bloch, and by the Commanding General in Hawaii before it could have gotten past them, and they were, therefore, responsible for that publication.

The Vice Chairman: But Admiral Bellinger is the man who prepared the report?

Admiral Kimmel: I presume he is. He signed it.

The Vice Chairman: He prepared the plan for the air defense of Hawaii?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, he prepared it for Admiral Bloch's approval.

The Vice Chairman: And he was your air officer there at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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The Vice Chairman: You didn't show him --

Admiral Kimmel: I didn't tell him because I didn't consider it necessary.

The Vice Chairman: You didn't tell him about the war warning message or didn't show it to him?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right, I did not.

The Vice Chairman: You didn't consult with him about it at all?

Admiral Kimmel: No.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

In that connection, Admiral, I might ask you, did you show the war warning message or discuss it with Admiral Newton?

Admiral Kimmel: No, I did not show it to Admiral Newton.

The Vice Chairman: He was one of your task force commanders?

Admiral Kimmel: No, he was not a regular task force commander. His task force was organized by Admiral Brown at my direction, and Admiral Brown issued Admiral Newton's orders.

The Vice Chairman: Well, Admiral, whether you issued the orders, or some man you told to issue the orders, did so, Admiral Newton was the commander of one of those task

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forces?

Admiral Kimmel: That is right, and before he went to sea with his task force, according to his testimony, he had an interview with Admiral Brown, and I have no doubt that Admiral Brown told him everything he needed to know. I don't know whether he told him about the war warning message or not.

The Vice Chairman: I don't have his testimony before me, but I have a recollection that he says he wasn't told.

Admiral Kimmel: He said he was never told about a war warning message. He also says he was in conference with Admiral Brown, who had seen it.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

You never did tell him about it, never did show it to him?

Admiral Kimmel: I did not, and I did not tell a great many other admirals out there, and I didn't show it to them, this war warning.

The Vice Chairman: All right sir. I certainly understand you, but he was one of your task force commanders; he was in command of one of your task forces?

Admiral Kimmel: Excuse me, sir. All I am trying to do is to give you the facts.

The Vice Chairman: That is all I am trying to get.

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1 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

2 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I will yield.

3 Senator Lucas: Just for a question.

4 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

5 Senator Lucas: I think it is important right here to
6 ascertain whether or not Admiral Newton had the same orders
7 that Admiral Halsey had in his task force.
8

9 The Vice Chairman: Will you answer that question for
10 the Senator's benefit, please, sir, and I will be interested
11 in it to.

12 Senator Ferguson: May I also, in the same question,
13 put this, whether or not it was in writing, whether the
14 orders were in writing.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I told Admiral Brown, and the dispatch
16 is in the file, showing exactly what I said to Admiral
17 Brown, to send Newton with a certain detachment up to Midway
18 to land these planes, and Brown issued his orders. Just
19 what they were, I don't know. I haven't seen them.

20 The Vice Chairman: Were there any written orders
21 about it?

22 Admiral Kimmel: My orders to Brown I have here, but
23 I have never seen the orders Brown gave to Newton. I suppose
24 he gave him adequate orders.

25 As far as Halsey is concerned, I gave him written

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2 orders, and he was in my office, as I told you, for pretty
3 much all day of the 27th, and in the course of the conver-
4 sation, and having seen these warnings returned to me and
5 he said, "How far do you want me to go in this business?"
6 "Well," I said, "all I can tell you is to use your common
7 sense."

8 Those were the orders that he sailed with, according
9 to conversations I have had with him since. I had forgotten
10 some of the details myself. And the next I knew about his
11 orders was after he returned to Pearl Harbor subsequent to
12 the attack on Pearl Harbor. And then Halsey told me he
13 had sailed under war orders, as I testified before, I think,
14 one of the other -- the Roberts Commission, perhaps -- that
15 he had sailed under war orders.

16 He had armed all of his planes, and he had given
17 orders to sink every Japanese ship he came in contact
18 with. Those were the verbal orders, as I recall his conver-
19 sation with me, and that is all I know about it.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, getting back -- do you want
21 some time to look at something there?

22 Admiral Kimmel: They just called my attention to some-
23 thing. I have here, if the committee wishes to look at it,
24 the orders issued to Admiral Brown, directing him to send
25 Newton to Midway, if you would like me to read them.

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I have no desire to put them in.

The Vice Chairman: You might just read it for us.

Admiral Kimmel: On 4 December, 1941 --

The Vice Chairman: You issued it, you probably know more about it than anybody else; so you go ahead and read it.

Admiral Kimmel: These are already included in an exhibit on page 41.

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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 2 The Vice Chairman: I understand, but you wanted
 3 specific attention called to this, and I think you might go
 4 ahead and read it.

5 Admiral Kimmel: No, I didn't.

6
 7 The Vice Chairman: In response to the question, Admiral,
 8 by the Senator, maybe it would be well to read it.

9 Admiral Kimmel:

10 "FROM: CINCPAC

11 "ACTION: COMTASKFOR 3 (
 12 COMFOURTEEN (MAILGRAM
 13 COMPATWING 2 (
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15 "INFO: COMBATFOR (
 16 COMBASEFOR (
 17 COMAIRBATFOR (MAILGRAM
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21 "MYSER Ø1825 of 1Ø NOV MARINE SCORON TWO THREE ONE WILL
 22 BASE EIGHTEEN PLANES MIDWAY X LEXINGTON PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION X
 23 ON 5 DEC AFTER SORTIE PEARL FORM TASK FORCE TWELVE UNDER
 24 COMCRUSCOFOR CONSISTING OF LEXINGTON CHICAGO ASTORIA PORTLAND
 25 DESRON FIVE LESS DESDIV TEN X TASK FORCE TWELVE PROCEED BY
 DIRECT ROUTE TO ARRIVE FOUR HUNDRED MILES 13Ø DEGREES FROM
 MIDWAY AT 223Ø GCT ON 7 DEC X FROM THAT VICINITY FLY OFF
 MARINE PLANES TO MIDWAY X RETURN OPERATING AREA AND RESUME
 NORMAL OPERATIONS AFTER PLANES HAVE ARRIVED MIDWAY X COMTASKFOR
 NINE DIRECT PATROL PLANES FROM MIDWAY COVER LEXINGTON FLYING

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2 OFF POSITION PROVIDE SECURITY WHILE THAT AREA AND GUARD
3 MARINE PLANE FLIGHT X COMMUNICATIONS RADIO CONDITION 19."

4 Et cetera.

5 The Chairman: Is there an English translation of that
6 available?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon.

8 The Chairman: I am just trying to be funny. Is there
9 any English translation of all that available.

10 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I don't blame you, sir.

11 That means we sent the Lexington, three heavy cruisers,
12 five destroyers from Honolulu to 400 miles from Midway,
13 where he was going to fly off 18 Marine planes to form part
14 of the garrison of Midway.

15 The Vice Chairman: What it finally means is that you
16 ordered an Admiral to take his task force to within 400 miles
17 of Midway?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. I wanted the Admiral to form a
19 task forces from his forces to go to a point 400 miles from
20 Midway.

21 The Vice Chairman: And you had to use all those technical
22 and all those other words and signs and ciphers to tell him
23 that?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

25 The Vice Chairman: Then there is some question raised

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 about whether people understand naval orders or not.

3 Admiral Kimmel: You must understand that that order
4 went not only to the people who were in that particular task
5 force but they were to go to Admiral Bellinger's outfit who
6 were to cover his advance up there and to cover him while
7 he was on the way up there?

8 The Vice Chairman: Then, to get back to the point I
9 was seeking some information on, Admiral, Admiral Newton
10 left with his task force without ever seeing the war warning
11 message or having it discussed with him?

12 Admiral Kimmel: So far as I know he did. That is
13 what he said.

14 The Vice Chairman: That is what he said.

15 Admiral Kimmel: I have no reason to doubt it.

16 The Vice Chairman: You said in your prepared statement
17 you didn't show it to him or discuss it with him.

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is right. You know, in this
19 business about Newton going up there, he only got about 700
20 miles from Pearl Harbor, I don't know whether you realize
21 that or not. Midway is only 1100 miles from Pearl Harbor
22 and he was going about 400 miles from Pearl Harbor. That
23 wasn't so far away to run off.

24 The Vice Chairman: I understand that. The fact is --

25 Admiral Kimmel: And Halsey's condition was considerably

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 different.

3 The Vice Chairman: He was going to Wake?

4 Admiral Kimmel: 2,000 miles away.

5 The Vice Chairman: Which was much further.

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

7 The Vice Chairman: But as events finally transpired
8 Newton was much closer to the line of approach of the Japanese
9 attacking forces than Halsey was.

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct, yes.

11 The Vice Chairman: In fact Newton's task force was
12 the one closest to the line of approach of the Japanese
13 attack force?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, yes. I wish he had been closer.

15 The Vice Chairman: I am sure we all do.

16 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, will the Congressman yield?

17 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I yield.

18 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman permit me to read
19 something into the record right on this point?

20 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

21 Senator Lucas: I am reading from Appendix to Narrative
22 Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations,
23 page 87:

24 "It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart
25 in his investigation" --

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 Admiral Kimmel: May I inquire what you are reading
3 from, sir?

4 Senator Lucas: I am reading from Appendix to Narrative
5 Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations.

6 Admiral Kimmel: That has never been submitted in evidence
7 and it has never been reviewed by anybody in authority.

8 Mr. Murphy: It was admitted in evidence last week.

9 Senator Lucas: It is Exhibit 107.

10 The Vice Chairman: It is in evidence in this hearing,
11 Admiral.

12 Admiral Kimmel: I beg your pardon.

13 Senator Lucas: If these facts are not correct, Admiral,
14 why, you can so state, but I am reading this statement.

15 Admiral Kimmel: Thank you, sir. I didn't understand.

16 Senator Lucas: It was prepared by the Navy and I thought
17 it was information upon this point that might well be developed
18 here.

19 Admiral Kimmel: All right, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

21 "It appears from the testimony secured by Admiral Hart
22 in his investigation that Admiral Newton left Pearl Harbor
23 on 5 December 1941 with a powerful force consisting of the
24 LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, PORTLAND, and five destroyers, to deliver
25 a squadron of planes to Midway.

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3 "He testified that on that mission he gave no special
4 orders regarding the arming of planes or regarding prepara-
5 tion for war, other than the ordinary routine. He said
6 that he never saw, nor was he ever informed of the con-
7 tents of the October 16 dispatch concerning the resignation
8 of the Japanese Cabinet, of the November 24th dispatch
9 advising of the possibility of a surprise aggressive
10 movement by the Japanese in any direction, including attack
11 on the Philippines or Guam, or the November 27th war warning.
12 He said that except for what he read in the newspapers, he
13 did not learn anything during the period November 26 to
14 December 5th which indicated the increased danger of
15 hostilities with Japan."

16 Admiral Kimmel: I think, if you want to get -- this
17 is a version, this version was prepared in the Navy Depart-
18 ment. The testimony in regard to this, I am sure is avail-
19 able to the committee, and I think it would be well to
20 examine that and not to -- I have endeavored, in the testi-
21 mony I have given to tell you what I know about.

22 The Vice Chairman: Admiral, is this information here
23 that the Senator from Illinois just read, is it in conformity
24 with your knowledge of the facts?

25 Admiral Kimmel: In this account, I think they should
have added that the testimony before Admiral Hart showed

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 that Admiral Bellinger had a conference with Admiral Brown
3 -- with Admiral Newton -- wait a minute.

4 That Admiral Brown had a conference with Admiral
5 Newton before he sailed on this expedition to Midway and
6 I did not attempt to inform all of the admirals in the
7 Fleet of this. I informed the senior task force commanders.
8 And I was enjoined to preserve secrecy and not to alarm
9 the people and I restricted the information to the officers
10 that I have indicated.

11 The Vice Chairman: But that didn't mean you couldn't
12 tell an admiral in the United States Navy about it, did it?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Neither did it mean that I was obligated
14 to tell every admiral out there.

15 The Vice Chairman: But here was an admiral going off
16 on a mission under your orders, in command of a task force,
17 with some of the most valuable vessels of the United States
18 Navy in that force, and you didn't tell him, or you don't
19 know that anybody else ever told him?

20 Admiral Kimmel: I have every reason to believe, and
21 I believe, that Admiral Brown gave him the information
22 which he needed to put him in proper shape.

23 Now, it says in here that he proceeded in the routine
24 way. Well, the routine way, as a matter of fact was to
25 take all precautions at sea. He also testified that he

1 Witness Kimmel

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2 zigzagged on the way up there. He testified that he put
3 up an airplane patrol, and that he maintained an airplane
4 patrol constantly. I don't know myself how many more
5 things he could have done. He also had my order, which
6 was issued to all the fleet, in regard to exercising
7 extreme vigilance in regard to submarines and to depth
8 charge everyone that came in the operating area.

9 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether
10 Admiral Brown will be a witness? If he isn't listed, I
11 think he should be.

12 The Chairman: Counsel may answer that, whether Admiral
13 Brown will be a witness.

14 Mr. Richardson: We expect to call everyone of these
15 members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, both those in charge
16 and those that were subordinates.

17 The Vice Chairman: Let me ask you, Admiral, what day
18 was it that Admiral Newton left with his task force for
19 Midway?

20 Admiral Kimmel: December 5.

21 The Vice Chairman: December 5. What day was it that
22 Admiral Halsey left with his task force for Wake?

23 Admiral Kimmel: November 28th.

24 The Vice Chairman: Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor
25 under your orders on November 28th with his task force to

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 go to Wake?

3 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

4 The Vice Chairman: And --

5 Admiral Kimmel: He was going into an area where a
6 contact with the Japanese was much more probable than in
7 this 700-mile jaunt of Newton's.

8 The Vice Chairman: But Admiral Halsey left with his
9 task force on November 28th under your orders, with full
10 orders and instructions to ship every Japanese ship in
11 aight?

12 Admiral Kimmel: I have just given you the facts in
13 the case, and they are not as you have stated it.

14 The Vice Chairman: How was it you stated it?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I stated that Admiral Halsey, after
16 seeing these warnings, turned to me and asked how far he
17 should go, and I said, "Use your common sense," and he left
18 with those orders.

19 The Vice Chairman: That is all he had from you?

20 Admiral Kimmel: That is all he had from me, was to
21 use his common sense. He interpreted that as I have told
22 you.

23 The Vice Chairman: He interpreted that as full battle
24 orders, didn't he, and so issued it to his command?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Well, that is what he did.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: And based on the war warning mes-
3 sage?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

5 The Vice Chairman: All right. And Admiral Newton,
6 who left on December 5, which was some seven or eight days
7 later, left without any knowledge of the war warning mes-
8 sage, without any information about it, or without any war
9 orders; is that right?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I don't think that is right, no.

11 The Vice Chairman: What is right?

12 Admiral Kimmel: You will have to ask Admiral Brown,
13 because he gave Admiral Newton his orders.

14 The Vice Chairman: And you don't know?

15 Admiral Kimmel: No. I have told you that.

16 The Vice Chairman: He was under your command, and
17 you don't know what orders he went under or what his in-
18 structions were?

19 Admiral Kimmel: The details, no; I trusted Admiral
20 Brown and I have no reason to regret that trust.

21 The Vice Chairman: And you don't know whether Admiral
22 Newton had war orders when he left Pearl Harbor or not?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No, I don't; not personally.

24 The Vice Chairman: Now, I would like to invite your
25 attention, Admiral, to page 47 of your statement presented

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here to the committee, the second short paragraph there, just three lines, or two and a half.

Perhaps I can read it to you quicker than you can find it.

Admiral Kimmel: Page 47?

The Vice Chairman: Yes.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: (Reading)

3 "In these circumstances no reasonable man in my
4 position would consider that the war warning was intended to
5 suggest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area."

6 That is the way you felt about it at the time?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I cited the circumstances in the p re-
8 oeding pages, if I remember correctly.

9 The Vice Chairman: Yes, I think that is true; that is
10 your conclusion there.

11 Admiral Kimmel: That was my conclusion.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right. Then why didn't you so
13 advise the Navy Department?

14 Admiral Kimmel: It never occurred to me to notify the
15 Navy Department of every conclusion that I reached.

16 The Vice Chairman: Well, they had sent you a message
17 they called a war warning message and made reference to a
18 tense, critical situation, and so forth. You did not consider
19 it as such? You did not construe it as such?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Did not construe what as such?

21 The Vice Chairman: As a war warning message?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, if anybody will define for me what
23 a war warning message is I would be better able to tell you
24 whether I construed it as such.

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, I have certainly understood

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 from you, - and if I am mistaken I want you to correct me, -
3 that you did not consider it as a message indicating that war
4 was imminent or that there would be any probability of any
5 attack on your command.

6 Admiral Kimmel: The two are considerably different.

7 The Vice Chairman: All right.

8 Admiral Kimmel: Now, war was getting closer, we could
9 see that, there was no question about that, I have never tried
10 to get away from that at any time and I took all steps in
11 Pearl Harbor which I considered the probabilities justified
12 and what my forces permitted.

13 The Vice Chairman: Then just to get back to the words
14 of your own statement here:

15 "In these circumstances no reasonable man in my
16 position would consider that the war warning was in-
17 tended to suggest the likelihood of an attack in the
18 Hawaiian area."

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20 The Vice Chairman: And you said it did not occur to you
21 to ask the Navy Department about that?

22 Admiral Kimmel: No.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, I believe you state
24 that you did not know about General Short's reply to General
25 Marshall's message.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Kimmel: I knew that he would make a reply because
3 he was ordered to.

4 The Vice Chairman: I see. You did not make any reply to
5 the message you received?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I did not because none was required.

7 The Vice Chairman: That was not customary in the Navy,
8 was it?

9 Admiral Kimmel: It has been done.

10 The Vice Chairman: Well, was it customary in the Navy to
11 reply to messages of that type?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Not unless a reply was asked for.

13 The Vice Chairman: I see. I think that is what Admiral
14 Stark testified here, that it was not the custom in the Navy,
15 as it was in the Army, to ask for acknowledgment or --

16 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I wouldn't say that. When you
17 speak of customary, whenever the situation demanded a reply. I
18 have seen such messages where a subordinate was given instru-
19 tions or information and directed to report the measures taken,
20 but it was not done in this case. If he had wanted a reply he
21 would have asked for one.

22 The Vice Chairman: And it never did occur to you to ask
23 for any further information or anything further after you re-
24 ceived that message of the 27th?

25 Admiral Kimmel: I thought I understood the situation.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 The Vice Chairman: All right.

3 Admiral Kimmel: If I had not I would have asked for fur-
4 ther information.

5 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, testimony has been
6 given the committee here, Admiral, by the first witnesses who
7 appeared at this hearing, Admiral Inglis for the Navy Depart-
8 ment and Colonel Thielen, I believe his name was, for the War
9 Department that no searches were made by airplanes on December
10 6, 1941. Is that correct?

11 Admiral Kimmel: I have covered that exhaustively in my
12 statement, the searches that were made prior to December 7th,
13 and on December 7th, and on December 7th Halsey's force did
14 make a search in the early morning and were in process of mak-
15 ing that search when the attack took place.

16 The Vice Chairman: I understand that is the 7th, Admiral.
17 I am asking you if there were any searches made by aircraft
18 from Pearl Harbor --

19 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, from Pearl Harbor?

20 The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- on December 6, 1941.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, there were searches made of the oper-
22 ating area.

23 The Vice Chairman: On December 6, 1941?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

25 The Vice Chairman: What searches were made?

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Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 Admiral Kimmel: Of the operating area.

3 The Vice Chairman: Well, just what was that?

4 Admiral Kimmel: A distance of about 300 miles out and an
5 area to the southward.

6 The Vice Chairman: On December 6th?

7 Admiral Kimmel: On December 6th and December 7th, too.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, there were not any searches made
9 beyond the 300 miles?

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

11 The Vice Chairman: The Navy had the responsibility for
12 long range reconnaissance, didn't it?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, they did under the agreement.

14 The Vice Chairman: And none were made on the 6th beyond
15 the 300 miles?

16 Admiral Kimmel: With the important qualification that it
17 had been stated and had been given to the Navy Department,
18 and which the Army and all interested parties understood, that
19 you could not maintain a search except when we knew that an
20 attack was expected within narrow limits, narrow time limits.

21 The Vice Chairman: You did not make any searches or re-
22 connaissance unless you expected an attack within a limited
23 time?

24 Admiral Kimmel: That is what we said. That is all we
25 could do. We told them that months before and the situation

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 had not changed.

3 The Vice Chairman: So there were never made at any time
4 then?

5 Admiral Kimmel: On occasions we made some searches, yes.
6 On one occasion Admiral Bloch came to me and suggested we
7 scout down to the southward.

8 The Vice Chairman: When was that?

9 Admiral Kimmel: It was probably in September. I do not
10 recall exactly.

11 The Vice Chairman: About how long a range search did you
12 make?

13 Admiral Kimmel: We sent them about three or four hundred
14 miles and we took as a median line a line betwixt Oahu and
15 Jaluit and our object was to try to catch on the surface some
16 of these submarines that we suspected as operating in the area.

17 The Vice Chairman: Well, now, these flights that you
18 referred to, Admiral, on December 6th within a distance of
19 three hundred miles, that was part of the training program,
20 wasn't it?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No.

22 The Vice Chairman: It was not?

23 Admiral Kimmel: No. That was --

24 The Vice Chairman: It was not connected with training?

25 Admiral Kimmel: That was an established patrol of the

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 operating area to discover any submarines that might be there.

3 The Vice Chairman: You were looking for submarines?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Primarily.

5 The Vice Chairman: But there were not any searches made
6 looking for any surface vessels?

7 Admiral Kimmel: We had forces operating around Hawaii both
8 to the northward and to the southward at all times and they
9 made searches with their observation planes from the battle-
10 ships and by the planes from the carriers almost constantly.

11 The Vice Chairman: There wasn't any made to the north?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Some were made to the northward, yes.
13 In the case of people who went up there we had planes operat-
14 ing to the northward and they reported everything they saw,
15 not as a regular patrol you understand, but it served the same
16 purpose.

17 The Vice Chairman: Now, wasn't there something connected
18 with the Martin-Bellinger report and the Bloch report and
19 those related to the possibility of an air attack --

20 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

21 The Vice Chairman: (Continuing) -- on Hawaii?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, yes.

23 The Vice Chairman: Yes, - that rather emphasized the
24 northern direction?

25 Admiral Kimmel: No, it never emphasized the northern direc-

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 tion. It emphasized an attack on Hawaii.

3 The Vice Chairman: Didn't it call attention to any extent
4 to any particular direction?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Not to my best recollection at the pre-
6 sent time, because I think they felt that it was dangerous to
7 predict which sector the attack was coming in from.

8 The Vice Chairman: Well, I am sorry to have detained you
9 as long as I have, Admiral. I would like to ask you this,
10 though: I understood you to state this morning that you issued
11 notices on November 27th to sink all submarines that were
12 sighted.

13 Admiral Kimmel: No, I issued no such order as that.

14 The Vice Chairman: What was it?

15 Admiral Kimmel: I issued an order to depth bomb every
16 submerged contact in the operating area. If a Japanese sub-
17 marine had appeared on the surface, that would have been an-
18 other story.

19 The Vice Chairman: Well, you issued that order on Novem-
20 ber 27th?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I thought it was the 28th. It may have
22 been the 27th.

23 The Vice Chairman: All right.

24 Admiral Kimmel: It was the 28th.

25 The Vice Chairman: You issued the order on the 28th?

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

3 The Vice Chairman: To sink Japanese craft of any kind
4 that was encountered, was that it, or found?

5 Admiral Kimmel: No, no. I had better read it to you.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right.

7 Admiral Kimmel: This is CinCPac to Pacific Fleet. This
8 is to everybody; and, incidentally, I thought it was a pretty
9 good alert in itself. (Reading)

10 "EXERCISE EXTREME VIGILANCE AGAINST SUBMARINES IN
11 OPERATING AREAS VICINITY OAHU ESPECIALLY DURING SORTIE
12 AND ENTRANCE X OUR SUBMARINES WILL CONDUCT SUBMERGED
13 OPERATIONS IN AREAS CAST 5 AND CAST 7 ONLY PROCEEDING
14 ELSEWHERE ON SURFACE X DEPTH BOMB ALL SUBMARINE CONTACTS
15 SUSPECTED TO BE HOSTILE IN OAHU OPERATING AREAS EXCEPT
16 AREAS CAST 5 AND CAST 7."

17 The Vice Chairman: All right, thank you. Describe what
18 you mean by "operating areas". Is that the three hundred mile
19 limit?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, no.

21 The Vice Chairman: All right, what do you mean by the
22 operating limit there?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Have you got that chart you had this
24 morning?

25 The Vice Chairman: Well, you can tell me, can't you, what

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 it is?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I think if you have that in front
4 of you you can see it. Just put it right in front of him.

5 We carved up the ocean area in all directions from Pearl
6 Harbor, north, south, east and west, into rectangles or
7 squares in order to be able to designate these particular
8 areas and those we had, - you see there "Cast 5 and Cast 7", -
9 that is C-5 and C-7. "Cast" is a naval term.

10 When I issued this order that said depth bomb them every-
11 where except in those areas which were very definitely laid
12 down on that chart and such a chart was in the possession of
13 each ship in the Fleet, they knew exactly what I meant, the
14 areas in which they were not to depth bomb submarines and
15 they were to depth bomb them in all the rest of the areas in
16 which they were discovered.

17 The Vice Chairman: They were to depth bomb submarines in
18 all of the areas except those that were excluded?

19 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

20 The Vice Chairman: All right.

21 Admiral Kimmel: And we used that in order to assign a
22 detachment of the Fleet to some particular locality to carry
23 out certain exercises and during that time they had that area
24 clear and we put others in other areas where they would not
25 interfere with each other.

1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 The Vice Chairman: And you issued those orders for that
3 on November 28th?

4 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

5 The Vice Chairman: And Admiral Halsey issued orders to
6 shoot every Japanese vessel in sight?

7 Admiral Kimmel: So he told me.

8 The Vice Chairman: All right. And you issued orders to
9 get into action on twenty-four hours notice, didn't you?

10 Admiral Kimmel: What is that? I don't know what you
11 mean now about twenty-four hours.

12 The Vice Chairman: You referred to something. I think it
13 is on page 60.

14 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, you mean my plans of exactly what
15 orders we expected to issue, or at least what things we ex-
16 pected to cover in case we had war with Japan in twenty-four
17 hours? Yes, I did.

18 The Vice Chairman: You issued those, prepared those plans?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I had those plans. I had that drawn up
20 as a memorandum and kept it in my headquarters for quick re-
21 ference in case anything should happen.

22 The Vice Chairman: And I believe you stated, didn't you,
23 that Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions?

24 Admiral Kimmel: As nearly as I could make out from his
25 description in his testimony.

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Well, you say on page 28, line 5:

3 "Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war condi-
4 tions."

5 Admiral Kimmel: The information I have of that is Admiral
6 Newton's testimony before Admiral Hart.

7 The Vice Chairman: All those things happened after you
8 received the war warning message of the 27th?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. What you have referred to here, yes.

10 The Vice Chairman: These specific things that I have re-
11 ferred to all happened under your orders and instructions af-
12 ter you received the war warning message on November 27th?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

14 The Vice Chairman: Did you at any time after November
15 27th order long-range airplane reconnaissance?

16 Admiral Kimmel: I covered that completely and the an-
17 swer is "No".

18 The Vice Chairman: Thank you, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: Now, will the gentleman yield for just one
20 question?

21 The Chairman: Well, under the order of the committee 3:30
22 having arrived the hearing will be suspended in order that
23 the counsel may file some documents here that they said will
24 take about an hour. Admiral, if you have got another word
25 here put it in.

4813

1 Witness Kimmel

2 Admiral Kimmel: I just wanted to add the answer is "No"
3 with the qualification that I have set forth completely in
4 my statement.

5 The Vice Chairman: At this point, Admiral, I think you
6 may be excused until ten o'clock in the morning.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Thank you, sir.

8 The Chairman: The hearing is not suspended. It is
9 simply diverted here for the next hour or so in order that
10 certain official documents may be filed.

11 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.

12 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, in the statement filed by
13 General Short he refers to an exhibit which consists of a
14 statement made by him and filed with the Roberts Commission
15 and which exhibit also has been filed with the Army and Navy
16 Board as an exhibit. The document is very, very long. There
17 are six copies of this document, one in the possession of
18 General Short, three in the files of the War Department and
19 two in our files and we were wondering whether this exhibit
20 may be used without having duplicated the necessary copies
21 for all of the members of the committee. We have five that
22 can be made available to the committee and many of the docu-
23 ments referred to in this exhibit are already in evidence
24 here and have been copied and copies are in the possession of
25 all of the members of the committee.

1 The Vice Chairman: I am sorry, Mr. Kaufman. Due to
2 the confusion I did not catch just what the description of
3 this is.

4 Mr. Kaufman: General Short in the statement that he has
5 filed, which he will read when he takes the stand next week,
6 refers to an exhibit, which exhibit he tendered to the Roberts
7 Commission in December of 1941. That exhibit was also re-
8 ferred to in the hearings before the Army and Navy Board.

9 Many of the documents making up this exhibit are already
10 in evidence and copies of them have been supplied to members
11 of the committee. Other parts of it have not been marked in
12 evidence.

13 There are in existence six copies of this exhibit, one in
14 the possession of General Short, two in the possession of
15 counsel and three in the War Department and we were wondering
16 whether we could avoid the duplicating of this entire exhibit,
17 most of which is already in the record in various parts.

18 The Vice Chairman: And there are five copies available
19 for members of the committee?

20 Mr. Kaufman: That is correct, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: Is there objection to not having
22 this duplicated?

23 (No response.)

24 The Vice Chairman: The chair hears none. It is so
25 ordered. Proceed with the next item.

4815

1 Mr. Hannaford: Mr. Chairman, I have here a number of
2 matters which I would like to insert in the record. They are
3 for the most part in response to inquiries made by various
4 members of the committee.

5 The first matter is in response to an inquiry of Congress-
6 man Murphy at page 1952 of the record where he asked for in-
7 formation regarding the establishment of Pearl Harbor as a
8 Navy base.

9 The Navy has submitted a two page memorandum here which
10 I would suggest be made a part of the record or I can read
11 it if the committee cares to have me read it. It goes back
12 to 1899 and brings the history of Pearl Harbor up to date.

13 Do you wish to have it spread on the record, or do you
14 wish to have it read, Mr. Chairman?

15 The Vice Chairman: It is something that Mr. Murphy called
16 for, isn't it, or inquired about?

17 Mr. Hannaford: That is right.

18 The Vice Chairman: Do you have some preference about this?

19 Mr. Murphy: I did not hear what was said.

20 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, do I understand that when
21 they are marked as exhibits that we will get copies of them,
22 each member will get a copy? If it goes into the transcript,
23 naturally we get the copies and are able to read them.

24 Mr. Hannaford: That is correct.

25 Senator Ferguson: But if they are just put in as exhibits,

1 then we must go to the office of counsel in order that we may
2 read them or get them from him to read, that is the distinc-
3 tion.

4 Mr. Hannaford: I would suggest that this be made part of
5 the transcript.

6 Senator Ferguson: It is not very long, is it?

7 Mr. Hannaford: It is a two page exhibit.

8 The Vice Chairman: Do you suggest that it be spread on the
9 transcript?

10 Mr. Hannaford: I suggest that it be spread on the tran-
11 script.

12 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it will be spread
13 on the transcript at this point.

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, it might be better to put it
15 in tomorrow because I am going to go into it, but it can be
16 spread now in order to get it in for reference.

17 The Vice Chairman: All right.

18 (The document above referred to is in words and
19 figures as follows, to-wit:)

20 "DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

21 Office of the Secretary

22 WASHINGTON

23 1083A
24 R#-5

14 January 1946

24 MEMORANDUM

25 To: Mr. William D. Mitchell.

1 "1. In response to the request of Congressman Murphy,
2 noted at page 1952 of the 'Report of Proceedings of the Joint
3 Committee's Investigation', for information regarding estab-
4 lishment of the port and base at Pearl Harbor, the following
5 information is submitted:

6 The Naval Station Hawaii was established in 1899 and
7 in 1902, the Navy Yard Halawa was established in Pearl Harbor. .
8 The name was changed to Navy Yard Pearl Harbor about 1912. In
9 1909 construction of a dry dock and improvement of the channel
10 was begun. To improve security Pearl Harbor was declared a
11 'closed port' in 1912 and a defensive sea area was established
12 in 1939. A submarine base was established in 1919 and the
13 Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, in 1920.

14 Following World War I, reestimates of Naval Base require-
15 ments were made by Navy and Army-Navy planning agencies cul-
16 minating in the report of the 'Rohman Board'. The Secretary of
17 the Navy approved this report and forwarded it to the Chairman
18 of the Committee on Naval Affairs House of Representatives,
19 with copies to other appropriate committee and subcommittee
20 chairmen of the Senate and House. This report recommended 'An
21 advanced base to be developed on Oahu capable of serving the
22 entire fleet to the maximum, subject only to the natural limi-
23 tations imposed by the size and character of this island....
24 This advanced base should have priority of development over
25 the fleet bases named in paragraph 19 (San Francisco, Puget

1 Soun^d, New York-Narragansett Bay region, Chesapeake Bay, and
2 Canal Zone)^t. This recommendation gave the Hawaiian base
3 first priority.

4 Development of the base facilities was slow until the mid-
5 twenties when the surface fuel storage was begun, additional
6 dry docks were constructed, industrial facilities were ex-
7 panded, and the channel was improved. During the thirties,
8 further dredging and industrial expansion occurred, the radio
9 station and ammunition depot were moved out of the Navy Yard,
10 and moorings were constructed in Pearl Harbor. The Aiea Hos-
11 pital was built and the underground fuel storage was begun.
12 Incident to the latter, an independent water supply system
13 for the Navy Yard and the adjacent activities was installed.
14 Supply Depot facilities were also progressively developed.
15 Several air fields were built on Oahu and one on Maui. Avia-
16 tion repair capacity primarily on Ford Island was also increased.
17 This base development proceeded in the forties at an ever-
18 increasing tempo before and during hostilities until it became
19 apparent that the war was nearly over.

20
21 The Naval Base facilities on Oahu and other Hawaiian Islands
22 were before the war, and continued to be, the most important
23 in the Pacific. Fleet concentrations for combined training
24 occurred in the Hawaiian area in 1925, 1928, 1932, 1933, 1935,
25 1937, 1938, and 1940. In 1939, a large number of ships called

1 the Hawaiian Detachment, were sent to Hawaii and remained un-
2 til joined by the remainder of the fleet in 1940. These
3 fleet visits tested the capacity of the base and indicated
4 necessary improvements. Prior to the war, repair and supply
5 facilities were especially deficient to maintain the fleet.
6 During the war it was necessary to limit repairs to emergency
7 work, largely battle damage, and to return ships to West
8 Coast ports whenever time and the ship's condition permitted.
9 Pearl Harbor was the port of departure and return for prac-
10 tically all Central Pacific and the early South Pacific Task
11 Force Operations prior to our capture of the Marshalls.
12 Subsequently, individual ships returned there for permanent
13 or temporary repairs and replenishment. The supplies stored
14 there both in the Naval Supply Depot and the Aviation Supply
15 Depot were invaluable to support the routine and emergency
16 requirements of our forces in more forward areas. All Cent-
17 ral Pacific Submarine Patrols originated at Pearl Harbor
18 until the secondary base at Midway was ready for service
19 in late 1942, after which major overhauls continued to be
20 accomplished at Pearl Harbor until the end of the war, minor
21 refits being conducted in forward bases. A large part of
22 the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, the Iwo Jima, and
23 the Okinawa operations were mounted in Pearl Harbor.
24
25 In addition to serving the material requirements of the

1 fleet during the war, Pearl Harbor, with its extensive com-
2 munications facilities, was the Pacific Fleet operational
3 command center from December 1941, until early 1945, when
4 CinCPac moved to Guam. Many of the CinCPac staff functions
5 continued to be performed in Pearl Harbor as well as those of
6 the various type commanders. CinCPac's operational staff has
7 now returned to Pearl Harbor.

8 John Ford Baecher,
9 Lieut. Comdr., USNR."

10 - - -

11 The Vice Chairman: All right, go ahead.

12 Mr. Hannaford: The next item I have is a letter from
13 Admiral Stark in response to a question submitted to him by
14 Representative Gearhart at page 6121 of the transcript. I
15 might read the letter. (Reading)

16 "In my testimony during the afternoon session of 3
17 January 1946, at page 6121 of the transcript, Represent-
18 ative Gearhart asked whether there were any so-called
19 'shooting orders' applicable to the Pacific. I stated
20 that there was such an order applicable to the Southeast
21 Pacific, and Mr. Gearhart asked that I produce it for the
22 record.

23 "Accordingly, I am enclosing a photostat copy of
24 CNO's secret despatch 282121 of 28 August 1941, which
25 was sent to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and other

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a addressees."

I would suggest that this letter and the attachment also be spread upon the record at this point, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

(The attachment above referred to is in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

W "NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

MESSAGE
PRECEDENCE

FROM CNO

CINCPAC

Priority
PPPPPPP
Routine

RELEASED BY: ADM. STARK
28

COMMANDER PANAMA
NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER

Deferred

DATE AUGUST 1941

TOR CODEROOM

CINCLANT; SPENAVO, LON;
COMMANDER PACIFIC
SOUTHERN COASTAL
FRONTIER;

ENCODED BY OBANNON-PURDY

COMMANDER CARIBBEAN
NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
COM 11

Paraphrased by ALLENSWORTH

- - -

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

NOTE: THIS DISPATCH SENT TO SPENAVO LONDON AS OPNAV
282128 282121 CR (84)

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. NOTED IN BAW JUAN & DRAW

1 ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL
2 DELIVERY

3 DATE TIME GCT
4 TEXT

5 CERTAIN OPERATIONS PRESCRIBED FOR THE ATLANTIC BY WPL
6 51 ARE HEREBY EXTENDED TO AREAS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN AS
7 DESCRIBED HEREIN IN VIEW OF THE DESTRUCTION BY RAIDERS OF
8 MERCHANT VESSELS IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITHIN THE WESTERN
9 HEMISPHERE NEUTRALITY ZONE AS DEFINED IN THE DECLARATION OF
10 PANAMA OF OCT. 3, 1939. FORMAL CHANGES IN WPL 51 WILL BE IS-
11 SUED. BUT MEANWHILE ACTION ADDRESSEES WILL EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY
12 THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS. CINCPAC CONSTITUTE THE SOUTHEAST
13 PACIFIC FORCE CONSISTING OF TWO 7500 TON LIGHT CRUISERS AND
14 DISPATCH IT TO BALBOA. FOR TASK PURPOSES THIS FORCE WILL
15 OPERATE DIRECTLY UNDER CNO AFTER ENTERING THE SOUTHEAST
16 PACIFIC SUB AREA AS DEFINED IN WPL 46, PARA 3222 EXCEPT
17 WESTERN LIMIT IS LONGITUDE 100 DEGREES WEST, WITHIN THE
18 PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER AND WITHIN
19 THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB AREA THE COMMANDER PANAMA NAVAL
20 COASTAL FRONTIER AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE WILL
21 IN COOPERATION AND ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF
22 THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS EXECUTE THE FOLLOWING TASK
23 COLON DESTROY SURFACE RAIDERS WHICH ATTACK OR THREATEN UNITED
24 STATES FLAG SHIPPING. INTERPRET AN APPROACH OF SURFACE RAIDERS
25

1 WITHIN THE PACIFIC SECTOR OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
 2 OR THE PACIFIC SOUTHEAST SUB AREA AS A THREAT TO UNITED
 3 STATES FLAG SHIPPING. XX FOR THE PRESENT THE FORCES CONCERNED
 4 WILL BASE BALBOA BUT CNO WILL ENDEAVOR TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS
 5 FOR BASING ON SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS AS MAY BE REQUIRED XX
 6 ACTION ADEES AND COMMANDER SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE INFORM
 7 CNO WHEN THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN EFFECT. XX
 8 DISTRIBUTION

9 12...ORIGINATOR CNO FILE. SHOW FILE.. FILE...
 10 COPIES TO 16. 24. 34.. 38.. 38W.. WPD, US ARMY.. BRIT.
 11 NAV. STAFF IN WASHINGTON

12 S E C R E T

13 SEE ART 76 (4)

14 NAV REGS

15 MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY. DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH
 16 OFFICER IN PERSON

17 RETURN TO F-105."

18 - - -

19 Mr. Hannaford: The next item that I have is also a letter
 20 from Admiral Stark in response to a question propounded by
 21 Senator Ferguson with respect to whether or not the shooting
 22 orders issued in the Atlantic had been also sent to the
 23 Pacific. Admiral Stark has submitted a letter here and has
 24 attached to it the dispatch which advised the Pacific Fleet
 25 Commander of the issuance of these orders to the Atlantic.

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Senator Ferguson: What is the date of notifying the Pacific?

Mr. Hannaford: The dispatch is dated October 9, 1941.

I would suggest that this letter and the dispatch also be spread upon the daily transcript.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

(The documents above referred to are in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Washington 25, D. C.

14 January 1946

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley

Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Barkley:

In my testimony during the afternoon session of 5
January 1946, at page 6488 of the transcript, there appears
the following colloquy with Senator Ferguson:

"Senator Ferguson: Do you recall whether or not you
ever notified CINCPAC and CINCAF of the orders to the Atlantic
Fleet to start shooting German subs?"

"Admiral Stark: I think I covered that in my statement,
about telling them about the order.

"Senator Ferguson: There was no official order?"

"Admiral Stark: No, sir.

"Senator Ferguson: It would be in that letter that I read
to you this morning, or that you read to me?"

"Admiral Stark: I do not recall having informed them
officially. I believe I sent them copies of the order and told
them in a personal letter."

WLC2

1 I have checked up on this matter and I find that the
 2 Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet was a holder of Western
 3 Hemisphere Defense Plan No. 5 (WPL-52), which contained the
 4 so-called "shooting orders" with respect to the Atlantic. A
 5 photostat of the distribution list of Hemisphere Defense Plan
 6 No. 5 is enclosed.

7 When WPL-52 was placed in effect, a despatch was sent by
 8 the Chief of Naval Operations to "ALL US HOLDERS OF WPL FIFTY
 9 TWO OUTSIDE OF NAVY DEPARTMENT". Therefore, Commander-in-Chief,
 10 Pacific Fleet was informed officially of these so-called "shoot-
 11 ing orders" in the Atlantic. A copy of CNO's secret despatch
 12 082335 of 9 October 1941 is enclosed.

13 Respectfully,

14 /s/ H. R. Stark

15 Admiral, U. S. Navy

16 cc: The Hon. Homer Ferguson

17 Rear Admiral O. S. Colclough, USN

18 (without enclosures)

19 - - - - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

20
21
22
23
24
25

U. S. NAVY WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE PLAN NO. 5 SECRETDISTRIBUTION LIST

	<u>OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED</u>	<u>REGISTERED NOS.</u>
1	Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet	1
2	Commander, Battle Force	2
3	Commander, Battleships, Battle Force	3
4	Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force	4
5	Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force	5
6	Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force	6
7	Commander, Scouting Force	7
8	Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force	8
9	Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force	9
10	Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force	10
11	Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet	11
12	Commander, Southeast Pacific Force	12
13	Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet	13
14	Commander, Battleship Division Three, Atlantic Fleet	14
15	Commander, Battleship Division Five, Atlantic Fleet	15
16	Commander, Cruiser Division Eight, Atlantic Fleet	16
17	Commander, Cruiser Division Seven, Atlantic Fleet	17
18	Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet	18
19	Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet	19
20	Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet	20
21	Commander, Patrol Wings, Atlantic Fleet	21
22	Commander, Submarines, Atlantic Fleet	22

	<u>OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED</u>	<u>REGISTERED NOS.</u>
1		
2	Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet	23
3	Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet	24
4	Commander, Train Squadron Three, Atlantic Fleet	25
5	Commander, South Greenland Patrol	26
6	Officer in Charge of U. S. Naval Shore Activities in	
7	Iceland	27
8	Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet	28
9	Commanding General, Atlantic Amphibious Force	29
10	Commanding General, First Marine Division	30
11	Commanding General, First Marine Brigade (Provisional)	31
12	Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Iceland	32
13	Operations - Director, War Plans Division	33
14	- Director, Naval Intelligence Division	34
15	- Director, Naval Communications Division	35
16	- Director, Fleet Maintenance Division	36
17	- Director, Ship Movements Division	37, 38
18	- Director, Naval Districts Division	39
19	- Director, Naval Transportation Service	
20	(Issued to Director, Ship Movements	
21	Division	40
22	Chief of the Bureau of Navigation	41
23	Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance	42
24	Chief of the Bureau of Ships	43
25	Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks	44

1	<u>OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED</u>	<u>REGISTERED NOS.</u>
2	Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics	45
3	Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	46
4	Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	47
5	Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy	48
6	Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps	49
7	Director, Shore Establishments Division (Office of	
8	Assistant Secretary of the Navy)	50
9	President, Naval War College	51
10	Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard	52
11	War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department	53
12	Commandant, First Naval District	54
13	Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland	55
14	Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R.I.	56
15	Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier	57, 58
16	Commandant, Third Naval District	59
17	Commandant, Fourth Naval District	60
18	Commandant, Fifth Naval District	61
19	Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda	62
20	Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier	63
21	Commandant, Sixth Naval District	64
22	Commandant, Seventh Naval District	65
23	Commandant, Eighth Naval District	66
24	Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier	67
25	Commandant, Tenth Naval District	68

	<u>OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED</u>	<u>REGISTERED NO.</u>
1		
2	Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba	69
3	Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad	70
4	Commandant, Eleventh Naval District	71
5	Commandant, Twelfth Naval District	72
6	Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District	73
7	Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District	74
8	Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier	75, 76
9	Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District	77
10	Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District	78
11	United States Military Mission in London	79, 80
12	United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada	81
13	Registered Publications Section - Working Copy	82
14	Registered Publications Section - Library Copy	83
15	Registered Publications Section - Reserve Copies	84, 85
16		86, 87, 88, 89
17		90, 91, 92, 93,
18		94, 95, 96.
19		
20	<u>OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED BUT NOT TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR TO RPS.</u>	
21	British Joint Staff Mission in Washington	97, 98
22	The British Admiralty (To be issued through the U. S. Military Mission in London)	99
23	The Canadian Chief of Naval Staff (To be issued through the U.S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada)	100
24		
25	The Canadian Chief of Air Staff (To be issued through the	

OFFICIAL TO WHOM ISSUED BUT NOT TO BE ACCOUNTED FOR TO RPS.

REGISTERED NOS.

U.S. Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada)

101

The Naval Attache to the Canadian Legation, Washington,

D. C. (To be issued through the Office of Naval

Intelligence)

102

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

ADDRESSEES

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE

FROM CNO

FOR ACTION

ALL U.S. HOLDERS OF

PRIORITY

RELEASED BY

Adm H.R.Stark

WPL FIFTY TWO OUTSIDE

ROUTINE

DATE 9 OCT. 1941

OF NAVY DEPARTMENT

~~DEFERRED~~

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DECODED BY

IVANYSHYN

PARAPHRASED BY

ALLENSWORTH

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS

SATISFACTORY

082335 CR 0786

TEXT

ON OCTOBER 11TH AT 0200 GCT CANCEL WPL 51 AND PLACE WPL 52

IN EFFECT

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GENERAL FILE

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Mr. Hannaford: The next item that I have is at page 6438
2 and 6442 of the transcript various portions of two dispatches
3 produced by Admiral Stark which related to the dispatch of
4 December 2nd on page 39 of exhibit 37, the so-called order
5 of the President to establish a patrol in the Western Pacific,
6 various portions of these dispatches were read on those
7 pages that I have just cited and I think in the interest of
8 clarity for the transcript we might have the two dispatches
9 spread upon the record in full at this point.

10 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

11 (The dispatches above referred to are in words
12 and figures as follows, to-wit:)

WLC2

2 DECEMBER 1941

FROM: CINCAF

ACTION: OPNAV

INFO:

Ø21332

URDIS Ø 12356: MY VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS: THE JAP MOVEMENT DOWN THE INDO-CHINESE COAST IS ALREADY DEFINED BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER AIMED AGAINST THE MALAY PENINSULA, BORNEO, OR BOTH. THAT THE BRITISH CAN MEET THEIR COMMITMENT TO GUARD AS FAR AS CAPE PADARAN AND WE SHOULD USE WHAT HAVE LEFT AFTER GUARDING AGAINST DESCENT ON LUZON IN WATCHING FOR ONE ON BORNEO. AM RECALLING ISABEL FROM CURRENT MISSION AND SENDING TOWARD PADARAN. SHE IS TOO SHORT RADIUS TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH AND SINCE WE HAVE FEW FAST SHIPS HER LOSS WOULD BE SERIOUS. THEREFORE HAVE TO RECOMMEND AGAINST CARRYING OUT ISABEL'S MOVEMENT THOUGH IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT CAN START ANY CHARTERED CRAFT WITHIN TWO DAYS. AM SEARCHING FOR VESSELS FOR CHARTER THAT ARE SUITABLE BUT CANNOT YET ESTIMATE TIME REQUIRED TO OBTAIN AND EQUIP WITH RADIO ARMY PLANES ARE RECONNOITERING SECTOR NORTHERLY FROM LUZON AND EASTWARD FROM SANBERNARDINO. NAVY PLANES NORTHWESTERLY FROM LUZON, ALSO COVERING BALABAC STRAIT AND JOINING UP WITH DUTCH TO COVER MINDANAO - HALMAHERA LINE, EFFEC- TIVENESS IS PROBLEMATICAL BUT AS GREAT EFFORT AS AVAILABLE FORCES CAN SUSTAIN CONTINUOUSLY. TWO CRUISERS, TWO DESDIVS ARE DEPLOYED WELL SOUTH, REMAINDER SURFACE FORCES ON LOCAL

WAIRD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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OR REPAIRING.

HAVE FIVE SUBMARINES OUT NOW, REMAINDER EITHER PLACED IN READINESS FOR DEFENSIVE MISSIONS OR HELD HERE PREPARED FOR OFFENSIVE TASKS. WHEN IT IS CONSIDERED CALLED FOR WILL INCREASE AIR PATROLS AND SEND OUT MORE SUBS.

- - - - -

NAVAL MESSAGE

MESSAGE PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY

3 DECEMBER 1941

FROM: OPNAV

TO : CINCAF

SECRET

031540

ISABEL MAY BE REPLACED BY CHARTERED VESSEL AT YOUR DISCRETION AS PER MY 012356. REF YOUR 021332.

REDISTRIBUTION:

38.....ORIG

RECORD COPY....12....GEN FILE CNO FILE 20 OP FILE

WARD A PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

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Mr. Hannaford: The next, Mr. Chairman, is another letter from Admiral Stark in which he asked that certain corrections be made in his testimony. I would request that the letter and the corrections be spread upon the record at this point as we have done in the past.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

(The documents above referred to are in words and figures as follows, to-wit:)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington 25, D. C.

Room 3028

11 January 1946

The Honorable Alben W. Barkley
Chairman, Joint Committee on the Investigations of the
Pearl Harbor Attack
Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Barkley:

I am enclosing a list of corrections to my testimony before
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack.

I understand the record is to be printed, and I trust these
changes will be approved and made in the transcript before
printing.

There is also enclosed an errata sheet issued by Ward & Paul,
correcting the time of the attack, which was erroneously
stated by me in a colloquy with Representative Murphy. I
assume this change will be included in any made in the
transcript before printing.

Respectfully,

/s/ H. R. Stark

H. R. Stark
Admiral, U. S. Navy

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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CORRECTIONS IN TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL H. R. STARK, U.S.N.VOLUME 31.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
5687	4	Insert a period after "time". Begin new sentence with "I".
5695	22	Change "to use his eyes" to "for use as eyes". Change "For example" to "However".
5696	3	Change "extent" to "intent".
5696	8	Add "reconnaissance" after "distance".

VOLUME 32.

5722	14	After "recollection" add "that it was".
5723	22	Change "Mr. Stark" to "Mr. Mitchell".
5728	19	Change "what" to "which".
5731	12	Change "UPNAV" to "OPNAV".
5734	13	Delete "Yes".
5745	12	After "is" insert "a letter".
5745	14	After "Two" add "dated 10 November 1941".
5750	25	Change "6 o'clock" to "11 o'clock".
5790	14	Change "sak" to "say".
5790	18	Change "apetite" to "appetite".
5814	25	Change first "He" to "General Marshall".
5815	16	Insert period after "it".
5815	18	Insert period after "phone".
5833	22	Change "Admiral Keefe" to "Admiral Stark".
5839	17	Delete the period.

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
5839	18	Change "With" to "with". Insert period after "population" and begin new sentence.
5845	15	Place period after "were tense".
5845	16	Before "might also" insert "To have brought it back".
5845	20	Change "reaction" to "recreation".
5855	22	Change "change" to "chance".
5856	19	Insert "in connection" before "with".
5868	17	Change "term" to "time".
5869	22	Change "jointed" to "joined".
5870	18	Change "by" to "we weren't".
5870	19	Change comma to period after "more" and begin new sentence.
5870	20	Change to read, "we were playing for time. In the fall of 1941, it".
5886	24	Insert "10:40" after "somewhere around".
5889	5	Change "craft" to "aircraft".
5894	7	Insert "and" after "Admiral Hart".
5896	10	Change "blowed" to "flowed".
5899	11	Change "absent" to "absence".
5907	20	Change "to include" to "I included".
5911	21	Insert "Not" before "separating".
5913	15	Insert "now" after "I have seen it".

J1

VOLUME 33

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			
3	5989	23	Correct spelling of "accompanying".
4	5990	2	Change "158" to "58".
5	6008	8	Change "Commander-in-Chief" to "Commandant".
6	6009	25	Change "2613" to "261331".
7	6016	11	Delete "proper".
8	6016	13	Insert period after "WPL-46". Change
9			"in foreign" to "Inform".
10	6022	12	Insert "if" before "I". Insert "had" after "I".
11			Change period at end of line to a dash.
12	6035	22	Delete "from this type of attack".
13	6036	4	Change "Commander" to "Commanders" and delete
14			"in Chief".
15	6044	10	Correct spelling of "Congress".
16	6047	3	Delete "in which".
17	6051	19	Insert "But" before "Once".
18	6052	11	Change "board" to "Board" and "he" to "we".
19	6052	12	Insert "overcrowding" after "to".
20	6052	14	Change "He had that report" to "The President
21			had that report."
22	6052	15	Insert "for" before "every".
23	6054	17	Change "and" to "because"; insert "that the"
24			after "found" and delete "a".
25	6054	18	Insert "into commission" after "coming" and

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VOLUME 33

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			
3	5989	23	Correct spelling of "accompanying".
4	5990	2	Change "158" to "58".
5	6008	8	Change "Commander-in-Chief" to "Commandant".
6	6009	25	Change "2613" to "261331".
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8	6016	13	Insert period after "WPL-46". Change
9			"in foreign" to "Inform".
10	6022	12	Insert "if" before "I". Insert "had" after "I".
11			Change period at end of line to a dash.
12	6035	22	Delete "from this type of attack".
13	6036	4	Change "Commander" to "Commanders" and delete
14			"in Chief".
15	6044	10	Correct spelling of "Congress".
16	6047	3	Delete "in which".
17	6051	19	Insert "But" before "Once".
18	6052	11	Change "board" to "Board" and "he" to "we".
19	6052	12	Insert "overcrowding" after "to".
20	6052	14	Change "He had that report" to "The President
21			had that report."
22	6052	15	Insert "for" before "every".
23	6054	17	Change "and" to "because"; insert "that the"
24			after "found" and delete "a".
25	6054	18	Insert "into commission" after "coming" and

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			"delete "in that they".
3	6057	25	Delete "with".
4	6067	11, 12	Change "2:30" to read "1:25".
5		13, 14	Change "1:57" to read "1:25".
6		15	Change "Shortly before 2:00" to "1:25".
7		17	Change "1:57 to 2:00" to "1:25".
8		21	Insert a dash after "Communications".
9	6084	9	Change "18" to "A/T".
10	6088	15	Delete "it to"; change "that" to "to which",
11			and delete "not".
12	6098	15	Insert "definite on that" after "anything".
13	6117	25	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
14	6118	23	Change "Grear" to "Greer".
15	6119	5	Change "Caesar" to "Sessa".
16	6121	19	Insert "steps" after "similar".
17	6129	4	Insert "I wrote" before "that".
18	6129	5	Insert period after "anywhere" and begin
19			new sentence with "In my opinion".
20	6131	13	Change "southern" to "southward".
21	6141	14	Change "he" to "Secretary Stimson".
22			
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VOLUME 34

	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			
3	6151	11	Change "right or" to "rights of".
4	6152	20	Change "men-o-war" to "men of war".
5	6154	20	Change "hunt" to "hung".
6	6160	14	Change "as" to "at least".
7	6169	16	Change "inferring" to "endeavoring".
8	6180	7	Change "did not" to "indicates I tried to".
9	6182	12	Change "ascertain" to "ascertained".
10	6183	5	Change "Maxwell, Hamilton and Ballenger" to
11			"Maxwell Hamilton and Ballentine".
12	6185	6	Change "on" to "in".
13	6186	13	Insert "officer" after "executive" and
14			before the comma.
15	6201	10	Change "ready" to "read".
16	6201	17	Change "about it" to "right".
17	6203	6	Delete "and"; insert comma before "that".
18	6204	3	Insert "it" after "governments".
19	6207	17	Insert quotation marks before "is there etc".
20	6207	19	Insert quotation marks after "out?".
21	6207	24	Delete "answered the question and", and
22			insert before "The answer" the word
23			"Assuming".
24	6207	25	Delete quotation marks after "affirmative".
25			Insert a comma after "affirmative", and

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			delete "in answering you, but".
3	6208	5	Add quotation marks after "our effort".
4	6209	4	Delete "not" and the second "for".
5	6214	22	Insert "a" before "guess".
6	6279	20	Change "July" to "January".
7	6281	8	Change "short" to "shore".
8	6287	17	Change "attack" to "attached".
9	6290	3	Change "Jerry" to "Dudley".
10	6293	8	Change "briefly" to "sharply".
11	6322	12	Change "made" to "implemented".
12	6331	22	Delete comma and insert dash at end of line
13	6331	23	Change "understand" to "understanding".
14	6333	20	Insert "if it is" after "defend".
15	6338	14	Change "The use" to "They use".
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VOLUME 35

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
1			
2			
3	6370	17	Change "Mr." to "Pa".
4	6376	6	Change "that" to "them".
5	6377	15	Change "outlay" to "outline".
6	6377	20	Insert "up" before "to the".
7	6379	7	Change "in" to "into".
8	6379	9	Change "tought" to "tough".
9	6379	18	Change "tried" to "had".
10	6379	19	Change "to, on" to "to go on".
11	6380	10	Change "That" to "The".
12	6382	15	Change "McCollough" to "McCollum" and "Cramer"
13			to "Kramer".
14	6384	4	Change "but" to "that".
15	6389	4	Change "bearing" to "bear".
16	6389	5	Delete ", and" and insert dash after "27th".
17	6393	17	Insert "it" after "that" and "and" after
18			"properly".
19	6393	18	Change "they" to "by".
20	6394-A	5	Change "me. Not" to "me -- not" and change
21			period at end of line to dash.
22	6394-A	6	Change "As" to "as", change "Wellborne" to
23			"Wellborn" and "is" to "was".
24	6395	6	Change "couldn't get" to "came".
25	6395	25	Change "busy, we" to "busy. We"

VOLUME 35 (contd.)

	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Correction</u>
2			
3	6397	13	Insert "the" before "King".
4	6421	23	Correct spelling of "seriousness".
5	6424	7	Delete "that".
6	6446	3	Change "He" to "We".
7	6448	24	Change "if available" to "is available".
8	6449	9-10	Change "depending on the scale" to "defending ourselves".
9			
10	6463	6	Delete "about 200,".
11	6471	19	Insert "it" after "put".
12	6474	21	Insert "recently" after "not".
13	6477	11-12	Change "as sizing up under all" to "after sizing up all".
14			
15	6477	14	Correct spelling of "heart".
16	6483	21	Change "I" to "he".
17	6502	12	Capitalize "Allied Naval Commander in Chief."
18	6502	20	Change "Transport" to "Task Force".
19	6521	7	Change "of this" to "indicated an".
20	6525	9	Change "were they" to "where they".
21	6527	5	Change "assume" to "assumed".
22	6546	4	Change last word of line to "as".
23	6547	18	Delete "Admiral Keefe".
24	6567	15	Change "conditional" to "additional".
25	6587	19	Change "premises" to "premise".
	6592	8	Change "say" to "saw".

1 Mr. Hannaford: At page 4346 of the transcript Senator
2 Ferguson requested all Japanese intercepts in addition to those
3 set forth in exhibit 1, which were transmitted between August
4 16 and August 29, 1941 and which pertained to Japanese-American
5 negotiations.

6 I would just like to note at this point that these dis-
7 patches have been sent to Senator Ferguson and they are so
8 bulky that I do not think it is worth while making them part
9 of the transcript, but I just want the record to show that
10 they have been sent to him and we have another copy available
11 for any member of the committee that wishes to see them.

12 Mr. Murphy: I would like to see them.

13 Senator Ferguson: They are going to be made an exhibit
14 now?

15 Mr. Hannaford: They are not an exhibit as yet, Senator.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, I would certainly like to have
17 them an exhibit.

18 Mr. Hannaford: We can make them an exhibit at this point.

19 The Vice Chairman: The Senator requests that?

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I request that. It is very ma-
21 terial to the issue.

22 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.
23 What will be the number?

24 Mr. Hannaford: I request then that this document be marked
25

1 exhibit 124, Mr. Chairman.

2 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it will be so num-
3 bered.

4 (The document above referred to
5 was marked Exhibit No. 124)

6 Mr. Hannaford: The next item, Mr. Chairman, is an answer
7 to Mr. Murphy's request at page 160 of the transcript in
8 which he asked for a comparison of the actual damage to the
9 battleships at Pearl Harbor as compared with the statement
10 issued by Secretary Knox on December 15th.

11 A photostatic copy of this comparison has been placed
12 before each member of the committee and I would suggest that
13 the actual document be made part of the transcript at this
14 point.

15 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

16 (The document above referred to is in words and
17 figures as follows, to-wit:)

18
19 "COMPARISON OF ACTUAL DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE FLEET AT
20 PEARL HARBOR AND THAT STATED IN THE REPORT THAT WAS
21 RELEASED BY SECRETARY KNOX ON 15 DECEMBER 1941

22 <u>Name</u>	<u>Actual Damage</u>	<u>Reported by Knox</u>
23 ARIZONA	Sunk	Destroyed
24 CALIFORNIA	Sunk	Not mentioned by name
25 WEST VIRGINIA	Sunk	Not mentioned by name

<u>Name</u>	<u>Actual Damage</u>	<u>Reported by Knox</u>
OKLAHOMA	Capsized	Capsized but can be righted and repaired
NEVADA	Heavily Damaged	Not mentioned by name
MARYLAND	Damaged	Not mentioned by name
PENNSYLVANIA	Damaged	Not mentioned by name
TENNESSEE	Damaged	Not mentioned by name
HELENA	Heavily Damaged	Not mentioned by name
HONOLULU	Damaged	Not mentioned by name
RALEIGH	Heavily Damaged	Not mentioned by name
SHAW	Heavily Damaged	Not mentioned by name
CASSIN	Heavily Damaged, Burned	Lost
DOWNES	Heavily Damaged, Burned	Lost
VESTAL	Badly Damaged	Lost
OGLALA	Sunk	Lost
CURTISS	Damaged	Not mentioned by name
UTAH	Capsized	Lost

In addition, Secretary Knox made a general statement of damage as follows: "Navy sustained damage to other vessels. This damage varies from ships which have already been repaired, and are ready for sea, or which have gone to sea, to a few ships which will take from a week to several months to repair. In the last category is the older BB OKLAHOMA which has capsized but can be righted and repaired."

- - -

4830

1 Mr. Hannaford: The next item that I have is a response
2 from the Navy Department in answer to a question of Senator
3 Ferguson at page 177 of the transcript, in which he asked
4 for a table showing the times at which various points in the
5 Pacific were attacked.

6 The Navy Department has submitted a chart showing the
7 times in local time, Greenwich time and Washington time and
8 a photostatic copy of this chart has been placed before each
9 member of the committee and I would suggest that it be made
10 part of the transcript at this point.

11 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

12 (The chart above referred to is in words and
13 figures as follows, to-wit:)

TIME OF JAP ATTACKS IN THE PACIFIC 7 AND 8 DECEMBER 1941

<u>Place</u>	<u>Local Time</u>	<u>Greenwich Time</u>	<u>Washington Time</u>
Pearl Harbor	7:55 am - 7th	6:25 pm - 7th	1:25 pm - 7th
Singapore	3:00 am - 8th	8:00 pm - 7th	3:00 pm - 7th
Khota Baru	3:40 pm - 8th	8:40 pm - 7th	3:40 pm - 7th
Davao Gulf, P.I.	7:10 am - 8th	11:10 pm - 7th	6:10 pm - 7th
Guam	9:10 am - 8th	11:10 pm - 7th	6:10 pm - 7th
Hong Kong	8:00 am - 8th	Midnight-7-8th	7:00 pm - 7th
Wake	12:00 noon-8th	1:00 am - 8th	8:00 pm - 7th
Clark Field, P.I.	9:27 am - 8th	1:27 am - 8th	8:27 pm - 7th
Midway	9:30 pm - 7th	9:30 am - 8th	4:30 am - 8th
Nichols Field (Manila)	3:00 am - 9th	7:00 pm - 8th	2:00 pm - 8th

Notes: (1) The above times are compiled from existing records. Minor inaccuracies are possible.

(2) There were other attacks on Army and foreign installations of which the Navy has no records."

- - -

Mr. Hannaford: The next item that I have relates to the question of watertight integrity of ships at Pearl Harbor and inspections of the ships, which have been raised by several members of the committee at pages 160, 242 and 2821 of the transcript.

At page 4437 of the transcript we inserted a partial answer to this inquiry, which was supplied to us by the Navy

1 Department and which show the schedules of inspections of
2 the various vessels at Pearl Harbor.

3 We have also received one additional memorandum from the
4 Navy Department, to which we wrote a subsequent memorandum
5 asking for additional information. I would request that
6 these two memoranda be spread on the record at this point so
7 that each committee member may have it.

8 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

9 (The document above referred to is in words and
10 figures as follows, to-wit:)

11 "DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

12 OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

13 WASHINGTON

14 R-#16

15 11 December 1945

16 MEMORANDUM

17 To: William D. Mitchell.

18 Subject: Condition of water-tight integrity of major vessels.

19 1. Pursuant to your request concerning the above matter,
20 the following information has been obtained and is submitted:

21 (a) An examination of the logs and records of the
22 major vessels at Pearl HARBOR indicates that only one vessel
23 did not have an equivalent of the condition 'all water-tight
24 openings below the third deck closed' at the time of the
25 attack. That vessel, the USS California, had ten inner and

1 outboard valves open for maintenance work. Its remaining
2 water-tight openings below the third deck were closed.

3 (b) The logs of the USS Oklahoma and USS Arizona
4 were destroyed. However, information has been obtained
5 through Commander Fuqua, the Damage Control Officer of the
6 Arizona, that on his ship all water-tight doors below the
7 third deck were closed. This was also the condition that pre-
8 vailed in the USS Oklahoma, according to information stated
9 by the Commanding Officer of that ship.

10 (c) Material conditions of readiness referred to
11 as conditions 'Baker' or 'X-Ray' or 'Yoke' are higher than
12 the minimum. The minimum requirements are considered to be
13 those prescribed by Navy Regulations, that is, that all water
14 tight openings below the third deck be closed from 1600 to
15 0800.

16 (d) According to the best available analysis in
17 the Navy Department, the USS California is the only ship
18 that might have been saved from sinking by the closing of
19 manhole covers that had been left open for maintenance.

20 (e) The USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock and is
21 not included within the above general statements concerning
22 the conditions of water-tight integrity that prevailed at
23 that time.

24 2. If more specific and detailed information on these
25 matters is desired, an attempt will be made to locate and

1 have present necessary witnesses.

2 John Ford Baecher

3 Lt. Comdr., USNR."

4 - - -

5 "December 11, 1945

6 MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL COLCOUGH

7 I have just received from Lt. Commander Baecher a
8 memorandum dated December 11, 1945, entitled 'Condition of
9 water-tight integrity of major vessels.'

10 The inquiry from members of the Committee was broader
11 than this. They have inquired about the charge that some or
12 more of the ships in Pearl Harbor were undergoing a Sunday
13 'inspection', that some had ammunition on shore, for that
14 purpose. The report of December 11th seems too meager on
15 this.

16 Water-tight floors are only one feature. An ordered 'in-
17 spection' might indicate a general state of mental unalert-
18 ness to a possible attack.

19 Can you not at least answer specifically the 'inspection'
20 charge, and name witnesses from the ships who could testify
21 about each vessel.

22 William D. Mitchell."

23 - - -

24

25

1 Mr. Hannaford: I would like to comment on the final
2 answer in response to our final request, which we have re-
3 ceived from the Navy Department.

4 They have compiled a statement of 20 December 1945
5 from the logs of various ships, that show that inspections
6 occurred on December 5th and 6th, 1941. I would request that
7 this chart showing the various inspections that were held
8 on the battleships to the extent that logs are available be
9 spread upon the record at this point.

10 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

11 Mr. Hannaford: I would like to make this additional
12 statement, that the extracts show that on December 5th or 6th
13 each battleships whose log is available held some type of
14 inspection ranging from a daily inspection, which I take it
15 is a minor type of inspection, to a monthly inspection, which
16 I assume is a more important one.

17 We have been advised by the Navy Department that the
18 logs for December 7, 1941, which are not extracted in this
19 document which will be made part of the record, were not
20 included in the extract because the attack occurred earlier
21 than inspections would normally have been held if they were
22 to be held on December 7th. The Navy is checking further to
23 find what the actual logs of December 7th show and additional
24 information will be forthcoming.

25 Senator Lucas: What do the inspections show with re-

1 spect to water-tight integrity?

2 Mr. Hannaford: The water-tight integrity aspects are
3 covered in this memorandum which I have asked to be spread
4 upon the record rather than reading it, Senator. I can read
5 it if you wish me to.

6 Senator Lucas: No, I will read it.

7 (The document above referred to is in words and
8 figures as follows, to-wit:)

9 "20 December 1945

10 Inspections made on U.S. Battleships which were at Pearl Har-
11 bor on 7 Dec 1941. These inspections occurred on 5 or 6
12 Dec 1941 as designated.

13 USS ARIZONA

14 No log received for Dec 1941.

15 USS CALIFORNIA

16 5 Dec 1941

17 1149 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
18 powder samples; conditions normal.

19 6 Dec 1941

20 1020 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
21 powder samples; conditions normal.

22 Made monthly inspection of all indices of smokeless powder
23 on board; conditions normal.

24 USS MARYLAND

25 5 Dec 1941

1 0710 Food inspection.
 2 6 Dec 1941
 3 0800 Made daily visual examination of all smokeless powder
 4 samples, violet paper, and test for local heating of
 5 magazines on board ship; conditions normal.
 6 1330 By order of the Commanding Officer, Lt (jg) Nelson
 7 H. Randall, C-V(S) USNR, was suspended from duty for a
 8 period of five days from and including this date for im-
 9 proper performance of duty as Communication Watch Officer
 10 failing to deliver a despatch to the Commander Battleships
 11 Battle Force. The Commanding Officer further ordered
 12 that, due to the exigencies of the service Lt (jg) Randall
 13 is restored to duty for the duration of the Annual Mil-
 14 itary Inspection and Damage Control Practice of this ves-
 15 sel on December 8, 1941 and December 9, 1941.

16 USS NEVADA

17 5 Dec 1941

18 No inspections.

19 6 Dec. 1941

20 0705 Food inspection.

21 0900 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
 22 powder samples; conditions normal.

23 USS OKLAHOMA

24 No log received for Dec 1941.

25

1 USS PENNSYLVANIA

2 5 Dec 1941

3 0800 Food inspection.

4 1150 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
5 powder samples; conditions normal.

6 6 Dec 1941

7 0833 Landing force left the ship to be inspected by
8 Commander Battleship Division TWO. 1045 Landing force
9 returned.10 USS PENNSYLVANIA

11 6 Dec 1941

12 1155 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
13 powder samples; conditions normal.14 USS TENNESSEE

15 5 Dec 1941

16 1010 Made daily inspection of magazines and smokeless
17 powder samples; conditions normal.18 1445 Secured boiler number 8 after having conducted tests
19 on safety valves.

20 6 Dec 1941

21 0745 Commenced embarking Landing Force for Annual Mil-
22 itary Inspection.23 1130 Landing Force returned aboard. Made daily inspection
24 of magazines and smokeless powder samples; conditions normal.25 USS WEST VIRGINIA

No log received for Dec 1941."

1 Mr. Hannaford: The next item that I have relates to an
2 inquiry by Representative Gearhart at page 879 of the tran-
3 script in which he asked for the log of the USS Wright from
4 November 27th to December 7, 1941.

5 The Navy has furnished us with two copies of this log,
6 which I think should be marked as an exhibit at this time,
7 exhibit 125 it would be.

8 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it will be received
9 as exhibit 125.

10 (The document above referred to
11 was marked Exhibit No. 125.)

12 Mr. Hannaford: And without objection I would like to read
13 two extracts from this log and also a memorandum from the
14 Navy Department with relation to them.

15 On November 27, 1941 the entry at 20-24 o'clock reads as
16 follows:

17 "Steaming as before. 2150 sighted unidentified ship
18 bearing 205 true, distance approximately 10 miles on op-
19 posite parallel course; average steam 200 pounds; average
20 RPM 87."

21 The second entry is one that appears at 1216 o'clock on
22 December 7, 1941 and reads as follows:

23 "Steaming as before. 1200 C-C 2, 109 degrees true
24 and gyro; 098 degrees PCC and 098 degrees PSTGC. 1305
25 secured No. 1 boiler. 1711 sighted plane, bearing 170 de-

1 . grees true on opposite parallel course, distance 8 miles.
2 Plane passed abeam to starboard. 1405 plane sighted off
3 starboard beam on parallel course, distance 8 miles;
4 average steaming 200 pounds, average RPM 84."

5 Now, the Navy has submitted us a memorandum attached to
6 which is a chart, a map, at which the location of the Wright
7 at those two points has been charted.

8 With reference to the entry on November 27th where they
9 sighted a ship, the Navy's memorandum says:

10 "As shown by the enclosed chart, the U.S.S. WRIGHT
11 was approximately 1600 nautical miles distant from the
12 assumed position of the Japanese striking force on 27
13 November 1941."

14 With respect to the entry on December 7th, where the
15 Wright sighted some planes, the Navy's memorandum says as fol-
16 lows:

17 "As shown by the chart, the U.S.S. WRIGHT was ap-
18 proximately 390 nautical miles from the assumed position
19 of the Japanese striking force on 7 December 1941."

20 I might add that the entry on December 7th does not show
21 whether the planes that they sighted was friend or foe.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Where was the Wright when it was 300 miles
23 from the assumed position of the enemy?

24 Mr. Hannaford: From the chart it appears as though it is
25 pretty nearly due west of the Hawaiian Islands.

1 Mr. Gearhart: How many miles?

2 Mr. Hannaford: I cannot read this chart. I would re-
3 quest that the chart be made part of the exhibit as well.

4 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

5 Mr. Hannaford: The last item I have is at page 6363 of
6 the transcript, where Senator Ferguson asked for the reports
7 of Mr. Curtis Munson. I would just like to note that we have
8 handled those to Senator Ferguson yesterday.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Before we get away from that, will you
10 tell me what detachment the Wright belonged to?

11 Mr. Hannaford: I am sorry, Congressman, I cannot. It
12 perhaps is shown by the exhibit itself, exhibit 6. Have we
13 got a copy of exhibit 6?

14 Senator Lucas: The Navy men can tell you that.

15 Mr. Murphy: The Wright was 22 North, 163 West C.V. as
16 seaplane tender 300 miles west of Oahu." That is on the morn-
17 ing of December 7th at 8 o'clock.

18 Mr. Hannaford: I am not sure what it was doing, Congress-
19 man. The Navy advises me that they believe the Wright was on
20 detached duty at that time.

21 Mr. Murphy: It was a seaplane tender.

22 Senator Ferguson: How do you explain that?

23 Mr. Murphy: May I inquire about this Munson business?
24 Is that very lengthy?

25 Mr. Hannaford: I actually have not seen it.

1 Mr. Murphy: Is it very lengthy, the Munson report? You
2 said you had it yesterday.

3 Senator Ferguson: 20 or 25 pages. I will have it here
4 in the morning.

5 The Vice Chairman: Is there anything further from coun-
6 sel?

7 Mr. Hannaford: No.

8 Senator Ferguson: Senator George has just asked what the
9 Munson report is. It is a report that, as I understand it,
10 the State Department, - or as an agent of the President they
11 had a special intelligence system and Mr. Munson was one of
12 the intelligence agents to go out and get information for the
13 State Department and for the President on the Japanese ques-
14 tion.
15

16 Mr. Murphy: Who has got an extra copy?

17 Mr. Hannaford: That concludes all that I have.

18 Mr. Murphy: Who has got an extra copy?

19 Mr. Hannaford: We have only one copy of it, Congressman.

20 The Vice Chairman: May I inquire? The copy furnished
21 Senator Ferguson is the only copy we have?

22 Mr. Hannaford: Yes, the copy furnished Senator Ferguson
23 is the only copy we have. We can have it spread on the tran-
24 script.

25 Mr. Murphy: It may not be material.

1 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I think it is material.

2 Mr. Hannaford: I haven't read it; I do not know.

3 The Vice Chairman: Well, we can decide that later.

4 Senator Ferguson: It shows this, that at least the State
5 Department and the President were not satisfied with the in-
6 telligence of the Army and the Navy and the FBI and they sent
7 out their own intelligence agents to get certain information
8 in relation to the Japanese both in Hawaii and the Japanese
9 on the West Coast.

10 Mr. Murphy: Wasn't it particularly as to the danger of
11 uprisings among the Japanese element?

12 Senator Ferguson: It covered that. It covered the whole
13 question of espionage and counter-espionage.

14 Senator Lucas: I suggest that it be spread on the record.

15 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas, do you request that it
16 be spread on the record?

17 Senator Lucas: It is only 25 pages.

18 The Vice Chairman: Is that your request, Senator?

19 Senator Lucas: That is right.

20 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

21 (The document above referred to is in words and
22 figures as follows, to-wit:)

23 Insert
Munson
report

24

25

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Secretary
Washington

11 January 1946

MEMORANDUM:

To: Mr. Seth Richardson.

1. In compliance with a request from your office, there is enclosed a photostatic copy of a "Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States" by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

/s/ John Ford Baecher
John Ford Baecher
Lt. Comdr., USNR

(Pencil notation) Received
1/15/46
JMH

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

OP-16-B-7

November 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM for the Director

Subject: A Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the United States by Mr. C. B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department.

A resume of this report by John Franklin Carter (Jay Franklin) is prefixed to Mr. Munson's report.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Munson stated that he spent about a week in the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts with the full cooperation of Naval Intelligence Representatives. Mr. Munson stated, "Our Navy has done by far the most work on this problem, having given it intense consideration for the past ten or fifteen years."

Although Mr. Munson's report is a little lengthy, I think it is worth reading.

A copy of this report has been routed to OP-16-F,

1 Op-11, Op-12 and Op-30. Copies will be sent to ComEleven,
2 ComTwelve and ComThirteen.

3 Hartwell C. Davis

4 Dictated November 27, 1941
5 Dictated by Commander Davis
6 Typed by R. Blalock

7 1st Endorsement

8 Op-13/PS
9 Serial No. 041813
10 (SC)A8-2/EF37

November 25, 1941.

11 From: Director Central Division.

12 To: Director Naval Intelligence Division.

13 Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the West Coast
14 of the United States.

- 15 1. Forwarded for information and file.

16 R. E. Schuirmann

17 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

18 Washington

19 In reply refer to

November 24, 1941

20 U-L

Strictly Confidential

21 MEMORANDUM

22 To: Director, Central Division, Navy Department.

23 From: Liaison Officer.

24 Subject: Confidential report on Japanese on the
25 West Coast of the United States.

At the direction of the Under Secretary, I enclose for the confidential information of the Chief of Naval Operations a copy of C. B. Munson's report entitled "Japanese on the West Coast", together with a covering memorandum summarizing the report. The report, a secret one, was given the Under Secretary personally.

Orme Wilson
Liaison Officer

Enclosure:

Copy of C. B. Munson's report.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 National Press Building
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM ON C. B. MUNSON'S REPORT

"JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST"

Attached herewith is the report, with supplementary reports on Lower California and British Columbia. The report, though lengthy, is worth reading in its entirety. Salient passages are:

- 1) "There are still Japanese in the United States who will tie dynamite around their waists and make a human bomb out of themselves ... but today they are few."
- 2) "There is no Japanese 'problem' on the coast. There will be no armed uprising of Japanese. There will be

1 undoubtedly some sabotage financed by Japan and executed
2 largely by imported agents. There will be the odd case of
3 fanatical sabotage by some Japanese 'crackpot'."

4 3) "The dangerous part of their espionage is that they
5 would be very effective as far as movement of supplies,
6 movement of troops and movement of ships ... is concerned."

7 4) "For the most part the local Japanese are loyal to
8 the United States or, at worst, hope that by remaining quiet
9 they can avoid concentration camps or irresponsible mobs."

10 5) "Your reporter ... is horrified to note that dams,
11 bridges, harbors, power stations, etc. are wholly unguarded
12 everywhere. The harbor of San Pedro could be razed by fire
13 completely by four men with hand grenades and a little study
14 in one night. Dams could be blown and half of lower California
15 might actually die of thirst.... One railway bridge at the
16 exits from the mountains in some cases could tie up three
17 or four main railroads."

18 J.F.C.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

JAPANESE ON THE WEST COAST

(C. B. MUNSON)

GROUND COVERED

1 In reporting on the Japanese 'problem' on the West Coast
2 the facts are, on the whole, fairly clear and opinion toward
3 the problem exceedingly uniform. In reporting, the main
4 difficulty is to know where to leave off and what to leave
5 out. One could gather data for fifteen years with fifteen
6 men and still be in the position of the Walrus and the
7 Carpenter:

8 If seven maids with seven mops
9 Swept it for half a year -
10 Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
11 That they could get it clear?

12 Whisking up the grains of sand is the wrong approach, yet when
13 your reporter declares there is a sea and a shore and some
14 sand, and that he has sampled the general quality of sand in
15 many varying beaches, do not be too hard in your judgment
16 for him if he has stopped far short of sorting out each layer
17 or tint or even each beach. You have to feel this problem -
18 not figure it out with your pencil. We only cite the sand
19 that our reader may never forget the complexities of even
20 a shovel full of sand.

21 Your reporter spent about a week each in the 11th, 12th,
22 and 13th Naval Districts with the full cooperation of the
23
24
25

1 Naval and Army Intelligence and the FBI. Some mention
2 should also be made of the assistance rendered from time
3 to time by the British Intelligence. Our Navy has done by
4 far the most work on this problem, having given it intense
5 consideration for the last ten or fifteen years. Your
6 reporter commenced in the 12th Naval District, which covers
7 Northern California, from thence to the 13th, covering
8 Washington and Oregon, winding up his observations in the
9 11th Naval District, covering Southern California, where to
10 his mind the whole 'problem' finally focuses. Your reporter
11 also turned the corner into British Columbia through a
12 member of the R.C.M.P. and the corner into Mexico through a
13 conference with our Consul at Tijuana.

14 Opinions of the various services were obtained, also
15 of business, employees, universities, fellow white workers,
16 students, fish packers, lettuce packers, farmers, religious
17 groups, etc. etc. The opinion expressed with minor
18 differences was uniform. Select Japanese in all groups
19 were sampled. To mix indiscriminately with the Japanese
20 was not considered advisable chiefly because the opinions
21 of many local white Americans who had made this their life
22 work for the last fifteen years were available and it was
23 foolish to suppose your reporter could add to the sum of
24 knowledge in three weeks by running through the topmost
25 twigs of a forest.

BACKGROUND

Unless familiar with the religious and family background of the Japanese, this rough background summary should be skimmed over as it has a bearing on the question. If the reader is familiar with the Japanese background, it may be omitted.

An American wit once said, "You cannot tell the truth about Japan without lying." This same witicism might be made with reference to the Japanese people, but, like all generalizations, it needs a corrective explanation. A study of Japan is a study in the category of social fully as much as of political science. The study of the Japanese people is one of absorbing interest.

Who are the Japanese people? From when did they come and what emotional concepts did they bring with them? While there might not be unanimity of opinion as to the various strains that go to make up the Japanese of today, one leading anthropologist, Dr. Frederick Star of the University of Chicago, a number of years ago said to the writer, "the Japanese are the most mixed race of people that I have ever studied." The Malay strain is pronounced in the Japanese, especially in the Province of Kumamoto. The Mongol is very pronounced in the upper middle as well as in the so-called higher brackets of society. Then there is the Aryan strain still to be seen in its unmixed form in the 17,000 and more Ainu who inhabit portions of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands.

1 These latter are related to the Aryan group in physiognomy
2 and in language. These three strains have produced the
3 Japanese of today.

4 The Ainu, in so far as we know, was the aboriginal. His
5 social status was changed from time to time as conquering
6 groups drove him farther and farther to the North. These
7 conquering groups came from China via Korea. Japanese history
8 begins with the conqueror Jimmu Tenno, who arrived on a
9 'Floating Bridge of Heaven' - a poetical expression for
10 his coming to Japan by boat. He found a tribal people with
11 a primitive animistic faith of nature worship. He had a
12 superior religion and he was shrewd. He told the conquered
13 people that their reverence for the tribal chief was a true
14 reverence and that he also revered the head of his clan
15 which was the Sun Goddess, whose beneficent rule was seen
16 in her health-giving rays. Thus began what is known as
17 'Shinto' ('The Way of the Gods'), as we know it today.
18 From the days of Jimmu (the first Japanese Emperor) to the
19 present, all Japanese have revered the Emperor as a
20 descendant of the Sun Goddess, whose appearance in Japanese
21 mythology is too complicated to be discussed here.

22 Another cultural element in Japanese life stems from
23 the introduction of Buddhism in Japan in the sixth and
24 seventh centuries. Buddhism is a foreign religion and made
25 little progress in Japan, even though it was fostered by

1 the Emperor Prince Shotoku. Buddhism had a very difficult
2 time until some wise propagandist hit upon the idea of
3 incorporating the Shinto Gods into the Buddhist Pantheon.
4 All the Shinto deities were recognized as avatars of Buddha
5 and we have continuing in Japan until the days of the
6 Restoration what is known as two-fold Buddhism - a union of
7 Shinto and Buddhism - a union so intricate that Buddhist God
8 shelves in the home have unmistakable Shinto deities and
9 Shinto God shelves have unmistakable Buddhist deities. Japan
10 can never repay Buddhism for its contribution to the cultural
11 life of the people. Its temples were schools wherein those
12 who wished might be taught. It developed the arts and
13 crafts, and was the developer and preserver of much that is
14 beautiful in the cultural life of the Nation today.

15 While the Shinto and the Buddhist influence, separate
16 and co-mingled, were moving forward, there developed in
17 Japan a feudal type of society. This society was organized
18 under the rule of a tribal person known as 'The Great Name'
19 (a land baron). He had warriors or knights known as Samurai.
20 They, the Samurai, preserved order and fought battles to
21 maintain the existence of the clan. Besides the Samurai
22 there was the farmer who raised the food, the artisan who
23 fashioned and fabricated the tools, not only of the farmer
24 but also of the warrior, and there was the merchant; below
25 them there was the eta, and lower still the hinin - whose who

1 for misconduct or through capture had been reduced in status
2 until they were not considered men, as the term "hinin"
3 implies.

4 For nearly 1,000 years, this state of society existed
5 with internecine wars of all too frequent and carnal occurrence
6 until early in the seventeenth century when a great man,
7 Ieyasu, appeared and became the founder of what is known as
8 the Tokugawa family. The story of this period is interesting,
9 but time and space do not permit the telling of it here,
10 other than to say it was a period of about 250 years of
11 great peace.

12 During the Tokugawa period, Confucianism had great vogue.
13 The Samurai children were privileged to attend the few
14 schools which were maintained and where the principles of
15 Confucian ethics were taught, but with one great characteristic
16 change - the Japanese substituted for the chief virtue,
17 loyalty for filial piety.

18 Chugi (loyalty) is loyalty, not to an idea nor an ideal,
19 but to a person. In this feudal society personal relation-
20 ships were supreme, and loyalty was the cardinal virtue.

21 In the feudal state, as well as throughout all Japanese
22 history, the individual as an individual did not exist. He
23 existed as a member of the clan. The family could dispose
24 of individuals at will, should occasion merit such action.
25 Even life itself could be taken, after the case had been

1 submitted to the family council. In this connection, one
2 should not overlook the tremendous influence of the dead.
3 The living succeed or fail, are happy or sad, through the
4 influence of the dead who live in the tombs of the village
5 or hover over their familiar haunts. It is well to keep
6 this in mind when estimating Japanese activity. The
7 Japanese believe that the dead remain in the World and that
8 all dead become Gods with supernatural powers, and that
9 happiness of the dead depends upon respectful services that
10 are rendered them by the living.

11 In a feudal society, the merchant cuts a very poor figure.
12 He was looked down upon by the Samurai and he was inferior to
13 the farmer and the artisan. It is significant that but a very
14 few families of merchants have maintained a good social posi-
15 tion. Of these there are the Mitsui, the Iwasaki (this latter
16 being represented by what we know as the Mitsubishi), and also
17 the Sumitomo family.

18 With the coming of Commodore Perry in 1853 and 1854, the
19 feudalism began to pass away and within 20 years was abolished
20 by Government edict. Although the feudal social system
21 was legally abolished, its influence continues even today.

22 With the Restoration there appeared a new influence in
23 Japanese life and that was the coming of the Christian
24 missionary with his doctrine of individual responsibility to
25 deity. This was something new to the Japanese system of

1 society. Heretofore religion centered in the family, and
2 family culture and family faith were a collective thing and
3 not individual. The success of the missionary movement in
4 Japan is remarkable because it brings this new element into
5 the social picture. Wherever Christianity succeeds, it also
6 succeeds in breaking the old family ties and hang-overs of
7 a feudal order. Japan's advance in Government, its develop-
8 ment educationally and the vast improvements that we see
9 in society today have been furthered by the application of
10 Western methods of teaching, of Government, etc. But, the
11 Christian influence must not be underestimated nor should
12 one go too far in overstressing its great importance.
13 Christianity is individualistic, and that is one reason why
14 the 'powers that be' in Japan today are endeavoring to
15 regulate its activities, if not to change some of its tenets.
16 The Christian Japanese understand America better than any
17 other group because they have been more and more weaned away
18 from the influence of feudalism.

19 The Japanese are a perplexing people and their study
20 is a very interesting and very enlightening one. They follow
21 the leader - they have done this throughout all the years
22 of their history. Even today, personal ties are stronger
23 than legal ones.

24 No estimate of the elements characteristic of the
25 Japanese is complete without a word about 'giri'. There is

no accurate English word for 'giri'. The nearest approach to an understanding of the term is our word 'obligation', which is very inadequate and altogether too weak. Favors or kindnesses done to a Japanese are never forgotten but are stored up in memory and in due time an adequate quid pro quo must be rendered in return. The clever and none-too-scrupulous individual often hangs 'giri' upon the unsuspecting, to their hurt and harm. 'Giri' is the great political tool. To understand 'giri' is to understand the Japanese.

ASSOCIATIONS

The Japanese is the greatest joiner in the world. To take care of this passion he has furnished himself with ample associations to join. There are around 1563 of these in the United States. Your reporter has before him a Japanese publication entitled "The Japanese-American Directory of 1941" at least two inches thick listing the Japanese associations in fine print. Your reporter also has before him lists furnished him in the various Naval Districts of some of the leading associations considered the most important, with full descriptions of their activities as far as known. It is endless to clutter up this report with them.

FAMILY SET-UP IN UNITED STATES

In the United States there are four divisions of Japanese to be considered:

1. The ISSEI - First generation Japanese. Entire

cultural background Japanese. Probably loyal romantically to Japan. They must be considered, however, as other races. They have made this their home. They have brought up children here, their wealth accumulated by hard labor is here, and many would have become American citizens had they been allowed to do so. They are for the most part simple people. Their age group is largely 55 to 65, fairly old for a hard-working Japanese.

2. The NISEI - Second generation who have received their whole education in the United States and usually, in spite of discrimination against them and a certain amount of insults accumulated through the years from irresponsible elements, show a pathetic eagerness to be Americans. They are in constant conflict with the orthodox, well disciplined family life of their elders. Age group - 1 to 30 years.

3. The KIBEI - This is an important division of the NISEI. This is the term used by the Japanese to signify those American born Japanese who received part or all of their education in Japan. In any consideration of the KIBEI they should be again divided into two classes, i.e. THOSE WHO RECEIVED THEIR EDUCATION IN JAPAN FROM CHILDHOOD TO ABOUT 17 YEARS OF AGE AND THOSE WHO RECEIVED THEIR EARLY FORMATIVE EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND RETURNED TO JAPAN FOR FOUR OR FIVE YEARS JAPANESE EDUCATION. The KibeI are considered the most dangerous element and closer to the

1 Issei with especial reference to those who received their
2 early education in Japan. It must be noted, however, that
3 many of those who visited Japan subsequent to their early
4 American education come back with added loyalty to the
5 United States. In fact it is a saying that all a Nisei needs
6 is a trip to Japan to make a loyal American out of him.
7 The American educated Japanese is a boor in Japan and treated
8 as a foreigner and with a certain amount of contempt there.
9 His trip is usually a painful experience.

10 4. The SANSEI - The Third generation Japanese is a baby
11 and may be disregarded for the purpose of our survey.

12 We must now think back to the paragraph entitled BACKGROUND.
13 This is tied into the family of which the Issei is the head
14 with more authority and hold over his family than an old New
15 England Bible-thumping pioneer. Their family life is disci-
16 plined and honorable. The children are obedient and the girls
17 virtuous. We must think also of the Associations, some
18 sinister, some emanating from Imperial Japan, some with
19 Japanese Consular contacts. It all weaves up into a sinister
20 pattern on paper. This pattern has been set up in a secret
21 document entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities
22 in the 11th Naval District", and may be scrutinized with
23 proper authorization in the Navy Department in Washington.
24 We only suggest this to our reader in case our words have
25 not built up the proper Halloween atmosphere. It is like

1 looking at the 'punkin' itself. There is real fire in it,
2 yet in many ways it is hollow and dusty. However, your
3 reporter desires to have you know that all this exists
4 before he goes on to the main body of his report on how the
5 Japanese in the United States are liable to react in case
6 of war with Japan.

7 THE TOKIO-SUN GOD - RELIGIOUS - FAMILY - ASSOCIATION PLUS
8 ORIENTAL MIND SET-UP SHOWS SIGNS OF THE HONORABLE PASSAGE
9 OF TIME.

10 There are still Japanese in the United States who will
11 tie dynamite around their waist and make a human bomb out of
12 themselves. We grant this but today they are few. Many
13 things indicate that very many joints in the Japanese set-up
14 show age and many elements are not what they used to be.
15 The weakest from a Japanese standpoint are the Nisei. They
16 are universally estimated from 90 to 98% loyal to the United
17 States if the Japanese educated element of the Kibei is
18 excluded. The Nisei are pathetically eager to show this
19 loyalty. They are not Japanese in culture. They are
20 foreigners to Japan. Though American citizens they are not
21 accepted by Americans, largely because they look differently
22 and can be easily recognized. The Japanese American citizens
23 League should be encouraged, the while an eye is kept open,
24 to see that Tokio does not get its finger in this pie -
25 which it has in a few cases attempted to do. The loyal Nisei

1 hardly knows where to turn. Some gesture of protection or
2 wholehearted acceptance of this group would go a long way
3 to swinging them away from any last romantic handering
4 after old Japan. They are not oriental or mysterious, they
5 are very American and are of a proud, self-respecting race
6 suffering from a little inferiority complex and a lack of
7 contact with the white boys they went to school with. They
8 are eager for this contact and to work alongside them.

9 The Issei or first generation is considerably weakened
10 in their loyalty to Japan by the fact that they have chosen
11 to make this their home and have brought up their children
12 here. They expect to die here. They are quite fearful of
13 being put in a concentration camp. Many would take out
14 American citizenship if allowed to do so. The haste of this
15 report does not allow us to go into this more fully. The
16 Issei have to break with their religion, their god and
17 Emperor, their family, their ancestors and their after-life
18 in order to be loyal to the United States. They are also
19 still legally Japanese. Yet they do break, and send their
20 boys off to the Army with pride and tears. They are good
21 neighbors. They are old men fifty-five to sixty-five, for
22 the most part simple and dignified. Roughly they were
23 Japanese lower middle class about analogous to the pilgrim
24 fathers. They were largely farmers and fishermen. Today
25 the Japanese is farmer, fisherman and businessman. They get