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004,04

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Government Section

APO 500
3 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

The attached paper was prepared at the direction of the Chief of Staff with a view to informing the Japanese authorities what industries are prohibited absolutely, what items may be produced within certain limits, what industries are unrestricted and what items should be produced to the maximum extent possible.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. The Japanese authorities have stated that some industries manufacturing agricultural implements are presently closed and have requested guidance on what may be re-opened.

2. At a later time it is proposed to direct an inventory of specialized facilities and stocks on hand of ostensible non-armament character but readily usable for military purposes.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

1. That Japan should not be permitted to retain specialized facilities for the production of repair of implements of war, naval vessels or aircraft of any type and should be deprived of its heavy industry capacity in excess of normal peacetime requirements and of designated key industries of high military importance.

2. At the appropriate time an inventory of critical materials and preservation of industrial records should be required to serve as the basis for the development of a long-range program to demilitarize Japanese industry.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS.

That so much of the attached document that is necessary to prevent cessation of production in industry producing necessary items for the civilian population be communicated immediately to

the Japanese Government. After staff concurrence and at the appropriate time, this document will be recommended for incorporation into Directives to the Japanese Government.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief Military Government Officer

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Military Government Section

APO 500
3 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To inform the Japanese authorities what industries are prohibited absolutely, what items may be produced within certain limits, what industries are unrestricted and what items should be produced to the maximum extent possible.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. The Japanese authorities have stated that all industries are presently closed and have requested guidance on what may be re-opened.

2. No controls have been imposed to prevent Japan from again developing an economic war potential, or otherwise to demilitarize Japanese industry.

3. No inventory has been directed of specialized facilities and stocks on hand of ostensible non-armament character but readily usable for military purposes.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

1. That Japan should not be permitted to retain specialized facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, naval vessels or aircraft of any type and should be deprived of its heavy industry capacity in excess of normal peacetime requirements and of designated key industries of high military importance.

2. That an inventory of critical materials and preservation of industrial records should be required to serve as the basis for the development of a long-range program to demilitarize Japanese industry.

IV. RECOMMENDATION.

That the attached directive be issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Japanese authorities as an interim measure.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief Military Government Officer

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
September 1945

DIRECTIVE)

NO.....)

1. General. The Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters are hereby directed to comply, or to insure the compliance as the case may be, with the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers stated in this directive.

2. Prohibited Research. You will close immediately all laboratories, research institutes and similar technological organizations, except those proved to my satisfaction to be necessary for the protection of public health and safety.

3. Prohibited Items. No production will be permitted of the following types of items:

a. Arms, ammunition or implements of war.

b. Parts, components or ingredients especially designed or produced for incorporation into arms, ammunition or implements of war.

c. Naval vessels.

d. All types of aircraft, including those designed for civilian use.

e. Parts, components and materials especially designed or produced for incorporation into aircraft of any type.

4. Restricted Industries. You will prohibit and prevent the production of the following items except to the extent proved to my satisfaction to be necessary for meeting the needs of the

occupation forces or for preventing starvation and such disease and civil unrest as would interfere with the objectives of the military occupation:

a. Iron and steel.

b. Chemicals.

c. Non-ferrous materials.

d. Aluminum.

e. Magnesium.

f. Synthetic rubber.

g. Synthetic oil.

h. Machine tools.

i. Radio and electrical equipment.

j. Automotive vehicles.

k. Merchant ships.

l. Heavy machinery and important parts thereof.

5. Unrestricted Industries for Domestic Consumption. You may produce the following items but not in excess of that required for domestic consumption, for the occupation forces, or to meet export programs approved by me:

a. Textiles, clothing, footwear and shoe repair materials.

b. Silk.

c. Soap and insecticides.

d. Medical, dental and veterinary supplies.

e. Sanitation supplies and drugs.

f. Lumber, wood pulp and paper.

g. Items required for the operation, maintenance or repair of rail, water and road transportation and rolling stock,

and of gas, electric, water, communications and other public services.

h. Items required for the emergency repair and construction of buildings and housing.

i. Ceramic products.

j. Other items not listed above proved to my satisfaction to be necessary to meet the requirements of the occupational forces or to meet minimum essential civilian requirements, except items prohibited under paragraph 3 or restricted under paragraph 4 of this directive.

k. Any other items the production of which is specifically directed by this Headquarters.

6. Items to be Produced in High Priority. You will use all means at your disposal to maximize the production of:

a. Foodstuffs. In this connection you will utilize large estates and public land in a manner which will facilitate the accommodation and resettlement of the Japanese people or will increase agricultural output.

b. Coal and charcoal.

c. Crude Petroleum.

7. Inventory and Records Required.

a. You will as rapidly as possible submit to this Headquarters an inventory of significant plants in the industries listed in paragraph 4 of this directive and of plants producing or intended to produce products listed in paragraph 3 of this directive. This inventory will include detailed reports specifying condition and capacity of plants and equipment, and the extent of the stocks of raw materials, finished goods and

004.04

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Military Government Section

APO 500
5 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. In accordance with your instructions there is submitted for your consideration an outline program to pave the way for an ultimate restoration of Japanese economy to the extent that the reasonable peacetime requirements of the population will be met.

2. Permitted Industries. It is believed that, consistent with the aim of preventing Japan from again developing an economic war potential, the Japanese government should be directed:

a. To use all means at its disposal to maximize the production of all foodstuffs and the canning and other processing of foodstuffs.

b. To reactivate the lumber, wood pulp, paper and other forest industries.

c. To encourage the fishing industry.

d. To produce soap, drugs and sanitation supplies.

e. To manufacture medical, dental and veterinary items of all kinds.

f. To produce clothing, shoes and other footwear and shoe repair materials.

g. To manufacture silk and textiles and other consumer goods for domestic consumption.

h. To produce items required for the operation, maintenance and repair of rail, water and road transportation and rolling stock and of gas, electric, water and other communications services and public utilities within Japan.

i. To make ceramic products.

j. To make items required for the construction and emergency repair of housing and buildings.

k. To produce coal, charcoal and other solid fuels.

l. To produce crude petroleum, liquid fuels and lubricants.

m. To produce materials equipment and supplies necessary for the production, processing and distribution of food, including fertilizers, agricultural machinery, insecticides and fungicides, bags and binder twine.

3. Prohibited Industries. With a view to destroying the existing economic basis of Japanese military strength and not permitting it to revive, it is recommended that you refuse to permit at this time the production of the following items and the operation of the following enterprises:

a. All goods designed for the equipment, maintenance or use of any military force or establishment, including all arms, ammunition and implements of war and parts, components or ingredients specially designed for incorporation in arms, ammunition or implements of war.

b. All specialized facilities for the production or repair of, implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft or parts or components designed or produced for incorporation in aircraft of any type.

c. All specialized research and instruction directed to the development of war-making power.

d. All laboratories, research institutes and similar technological organizations not definitely shown to be necessary to the protection of public health and safety.

e. Synthetic rubber, aluminum, and magnesium.

4. Restricted Industries. It is further recommended that a system of inspection and control over selected elements in Japanese economic activity be instituted. Upon the activation of such a production control agency, it should be possible to permit the limited production of or repair of production facilities for:

a. Iron and steel.

b. Chemicals.

c. Non-ferrous metals.

d. Machine tools.

e. Radio and electrical equipment.

f. Automotive vehicles.

g. Heavy machinery in addition to that listed in Item h of pragraph 2, above.

h. Merchant ships, especially those designed for inland waterways or coastal-type or fishing vessels.

i. Synthetic oil.

j. Other products deemed desirable by this headquarters.

5. Japanese Responsibility. It is suggested that Japanese authorities be informed that the burden is imposed upon them to develop and submit for the approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers a plan for production programs that will serve the following purposes:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

c. To meet the requirements for reparations and deliveries agreed upon by the Allied governments.

d. To facilitate the restoration of Japanese economy so that the reasonable peaceful requirements of the population can be satisfied.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief Military Government Officer

FILE UNDER: MEMOS TO CHIEFS

INDEX SHEET

DATE: 7 Sep 45

FROM: W. E. CRIST
CHIEF MIL GOVT OFF

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: MEMO FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF - Comments on the Japanese suggested substitute for the proposed Proclamations Nos. 1,2,&3

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: 461 Publications
CLASSIFIED FILE.

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X

FILE UNDER:

Memo for Chief of Staff

INDEX SHEET

DATE:
8 Sept 45

FROM:

W. E. Crist
Brig Gen

TO:

Chief of Staff

SUBJECT:

Memo for Chief of Staff

What policy and procedure should this Hdqts adopt as to permitting members of the Govt Sec to contact Japanese Officials?

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER:

CLASSIFIED FILE.

091.1J

4

Y.L.O.
NO: 10

9 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER

SUBJECT: Supplementary military yen currency.

It was desired by the memorandum from the Supreme Commander under the date of September 6th that the Imperial Japanese Government place in effect immediately, as a law, decree or other appropriate measure certain matters concerning the supplementary military yen currency.

It is necessary, under the Japanese Constitutional Law, to go through legislative or other prescribed formalities to declare a currency other than Japanese yen as legal tender and to impose necessary penalties to secure its circulation, and this involves some necessary delay. While on the other hand the necessity of preparing the Japanese people for the new situation created by the issuance of military yen currency marked "B" is pressing, as this currency is already appearing in circulation. Under the circumstance the Imperial Japanese Government deem it appropriate, instead of enacting law or decree, to announce immediately to the Japanese people in the form of a statement of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the content of which I attach herewith. This will achieve the objective of the above referred memorandum from the Supreme Commander, which is, it is understood, to secure the smooth and effective circulation of the military yen currency marked "B" already issued by the Occupying Military Forces.

Under instruction from the Imperial Japanese Government I convey the above to the Supreme Commander whose early approval is earnestly desired.

For the Imperial Japanese Government

/s/ T. SUZUKI

Tadakatsu S U Z U K I

Chief of the Yokohama
Liaison Office

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STATEMENT BY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE

(1) The Allied Occupational Forces will use the regular yen currency issued by the Bank of Japan and Japanese state notes and coin in so far as practicable.

(2) The Japanese Government will exercise their best efforts to assure the circulation of the military currency marked "B" used by the Allied Occupational Forces in the same smooth and effective manner as the Japanese currency. It is advised that the people of Japan will also accept the above occupational currency willingly thereby avoiding any unnecessary friction with the Occupational Forces.

(3) The Japanese Government will convert the aforesaid military currency marked "B" into Japanese currency at face value and without limitation upon the demand of bearers of such currency.

(4) Inasmuch as the Allied Occupational Forces declare all military and all occupational currency which has been issued by the Japanese Government, Army or Navy as void and valueless in Japan and prohibit the giving and accepting of such currency within Japan, the people of Japan is warned not to give or accept such military and occupational currency.

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COPY

YOKOHAMA LIAISON OFFICE

September 12, 1945

Y.L.O. No. 31

MEMORANDUM to Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces

SUBJECT: Information wanted regarding Amount of Allowances to Officers and Men

For reference purpose as to delivery of necessary funds to the Allied Forces, the Bank of Japan desires to be informed of the amount of allowances to you officers and soldiers.

Tadakatsu SUZUKI, Chief
Yokohama Liaison Office

s/ Illegible

6 COPY

20

FINANCE DIVISION

14 SEPTEMBER 1945

MEMORANDUM: #1

1. This office made no committments as to what the currency recived from the Japanese Government is to be used for.

2. I do not believe that the Japanese Government should be informed as to its purpose. This should be settled at the peace table unless specifically directed by the CinC or C/S.

3. I do not believe we should make any statements with reference to Pay or Allowances of our personnel.

M. E.

Memo #2

To Dew Crist:-

It is recommended that the information requested not be furnished, as in the opinion of Col Kades, Mr. Thomas and myself, it is an improper question and should not be a subject of discussion with the Japanese Government.

M. E.

See attached check sheet for the Chief of Staff for your initial

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
Government Section

12 September 1945

MEMO FOR DEPUTY CHIEF-OF-STAFF:

1. Latest figures which were received tonight of personnel for Military Government Section Japan are as follows:

(a) To be moved from Manila to Japan -

Officers	- 113	(6 Off. to come later)
Nurses	- 2	
E.M.	- 60	Approx. (300 to come later)
E.M.(WACs)	- 5	

(b) To remain in Manila pending further orders -

Officers	- 40	(Pool)
E.M.(Pool)	- 300	

2. Arrangements are being made for the immediate shipment to Japan by air of 23 officers and 34 enlisted men, included in the above totals.

3. Request authority for the shipment to Japan by air of 84 additional officers (male), 2 nurses, and 30 additional enlisted men, at the earliest possible date. When this movement is completed, only 6 officers and a few enlisted personnel will remain in the rear echelon of the Military Government Section.

W. E. CHIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief Military Government Section

7 18 2D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

A.P.O. 500
20 September 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

1. THE PROBLEM:

To answer the attached message from the Japanese Government, CLO No. 73, 15 September 1945, regarding confiscation of arms in civilian hands.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. In CLO No. 73, the Japanese report that they have taken the following action in pursuance to Article XI of G.O. No. 1, which directed that they be prepared, on instructions, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of Japanese civilians:

(1) As regards rifles and revolvers in the hands of civilians, they are already under strict police surveillance as a result of the normal governmental licensing system. They can be collected and taken over whenever necessary.

(2) As regards privately owned swords in the hands of civilians, police authorities have commenced their collection for custody, except such swords as are of particular value as objects of art. These latter swords are being registered with the police for strict custody by the owners.

b. The Japanese Government requests that privately owned hunting guns in the hands of civilians be not confiscated for the following reasons:

(1) They are low powered and have no military significance.

(2) They are used for destruction of harmful birds and beasts, and by persons that make their living by acquiring meat, skins and hides.

(3) They are used only by persons granted government licenses and are controlled also under ammunition purchase restrictions.

(4) The extermination of harmful birds and beasts is important to the production of food in Japan, to the extent of approximately 9,000,000 Yen per year.

c. G-4 is preparing a proposed directive to the Japanese Government covering instructions as to delivery and disposition of all Japanese arms and equipment. This proposed directive makes no exceptions and calls for confiscation of all arms in the hands of civilians.

d. The Military Government Section is also preparing a proposed directive relative to possession of arms by civilians. This proposed directive calls for confiscation of all arms in the hands of civilians, except swords that were in museums as objects of art on August 1, 1945.

e. Although hunting guns have no military significance as claimed by the Japanese, they are dangerous as individual weapons and could be used to kill Allied occupied personnel.

f. The Military Government Section reports that the loss of hunting guns would not be a matter of major importance to Japanese civilian economy. Our present policy, however, is to adopt measures whenever practical that will improve rather than interfere with food production in Japan.

g. Any swords left in the hands of civilians will tend to represent the old order (Bushido), which is objectionable.

h. In general, arms delivered to us by the Japanese will be destroyed.

3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Imperial Japanese Government should continue to collect and prepare for delivery all swords in the hands of civilians except those that are genuine objects of art. Genuine objects of art can be considered as being swords that were in museums on August 1, 1945.

b. Hunting guns in the hands of civilians are a potential source of danger at the present time and they should be collected. In order, however, that they will not be destroyed and can be returned to their owners at a later date, they should be registered and remain in the hands of the Japanese police authorities pending further instructions.

c. Further instructions to the Japanese Government are required in the near future to cover fully the matter of delivery and disposition of civilian arms.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that the attached message be dispatched to the Imperial Japanese Government in answer to their CLO#73, 15 September 1945.

Incls: S.J.C.

Radio C.L.O. #73.
Memorandum C.L.O. #73.

Concurrences

G-4 _____
Mil. Govt. _____

IN THE CLEAR

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

CC-P ADV BWB/gcv

OPNL PRIORITY

21 SEPTEMBER 1945

FROM : THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

TO : THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

INFO : CG SIXTH ARMY
CG EIGHTH ARMY----------VIA COURIER
COM THIRD FLEET
COM FIFTH FLEET
CINCPAC
CINCAFPAC MANILA

Reference your CLO No. 73, 15 September 1945, it is noted that your police authorities can collect such arms as revolvers and rifles in the possession of civilians whenever necessary and that they have already commenced the collection of privately owned swords, except those having particular value as objects of art.

In connection with this collection of swords, only those swords that were located in museums on August 1, 1945, shall be considered as being genuine objects of art. All other swords will be collected and prepared for delivery pending further instructions.

Regarding your further request that private hunting guns be retained in the hands of the civilian population, it is deemed advisable not to make any exceptions in this collection of civilian arms at the present time. A plan, however, is being formulated whereby these arms are to be collected and centrally held for custody in regional locations. They will thus be preserved from destruction and may then be returned to their respective owners, if advisable, at a later date.

Further instructions covering in detail the subject of collection, delivery and disposition of civilian arms and equipment will be issued in the near future.

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Adjutant General.

APPROVED BY:

S. J. CHAMBERLIN,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Copies to:
C of S
G-2 (2)
G-4 (3)
Mil Govt
C.I.C.
FLTLOSCAP
Economic Control Board

3

7-4

Disarmament of Japanese Civilians.

G-3 G-4 Mil.Govt. 20 Sept. 1945

Comment and Concurrence.

S. J. C.

From: Mil Govt TO: G-3 22 Sep 45

Concur provided the last two sentences in paragraph 3 of message to Imperial Japanese Government are deleted. Proposed plan for disarming civilian population now being circulated for concurrence.

- W. E. C. - - - - - - - - -

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FILE UNDER: MEMO FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

INDEX SHEET

DATE: 1 Oct., 1945

FROM: GEN. CRIST TO: —→

SUBJECT: ~~Subject~~ ABOLISHMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT GENERAL

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER: CLASSIFIED FILE:

MEMO FOR CHIEF GOV.T. SECTION

9

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500
6 October

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

I. PROBLEM PRESENTED

The Japanese Government has requested by CLO 144 that steps be taken to prevent misunderstanding concerning "nori" cultivation operations in shallow marine waters along the coast of Japan.

II. FACTORS BEARING UPON PROBLEM

1. Nori is a type of sea algae grown throughout Japan in shallow protected marine waters less than three meters deep at high tide. The finished product, "asakusa nori", is a brown, paper-like substance much used in winter as a substitute for vegetables, with rice and in soups.

2. Nori production, which is carried on completely by small boats, is presently permitted under existing Navy orders, which specify adherence to certain rules.

3. The Navy, FLTLOSCAP, agrees that existing rules are clear, adequate and not unduly restrictive.

III. ACTION RECOMMENDED

That the attached letter confirming present Navy regulations concerning cultivation of Nori be approved and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief Government Officer

1 Incl:
Proposed ltr to Jap Govt
subj: "Cultivation of Nori".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500,
9 October 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

To consider methods whereby the interests of the Occupation Forces and United Nations nationals can be safeguarded with a minimum of interference with Japanese courts.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM

1. Under the present circumstances, offenses by Japanese against the persons and property of the Occupation Forces or against the persons and property of United Nations nationals in Japan can only be tried in Japanese courts under Japanese law. Similarly, Japanese public safety agencies and courts have not been deprived of jurisdiction over United Nations nationals and members of the Occupation Forces who commit offenses against the Japanese.

2. It would safeguard the interests of the Occupation Forces and United Nations nationals if the Japanese Government could be required to direct its judicial agencies to notify the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all cases which arise involving the Occupation Forces or United Nations nationals or property. Permission of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers would be required before such cases could be tried and power of veto would be reserved over the decisions. Such a directive is attached as Inclosure No. 1.

3. An alternative solution would be the establishment of Military Occupation Courts with jurisdiction over all cases involving the Occupation Forces and with power to take jurisdiction over cases involving United Nations nationals or property. The establishment of such courts will also require defining the offenses over which they would have jurisdiction. Since Occupation Courts would be an instrumentality of the Supreme Commander and the offenses to be tried are established by the Supreme Commander rather than by Japanese law, an ordinance would be published to the Japanese people by the Supreme Commander. Such an ordinance is attached as Inclosure No. 2.

4. The establishment of Military Occupation Courts would cover the possibility that ordinary Japanese law and the Japanese penal code do not provide sufficiently severe penalties for offenses against the Occupation Forces or United Nations nationals or property. However, the establishment of such courts and the crimes which they are to enforce at this time, after a period marked by complete Japanese cooperation, might be considered by the Japanese as an unjustified step towards direct Military Government and indicate lack of confidence in the ability or willingness of the present Japanese Government to maintain order and administer justice in cases involving United Nations nationals.

9-B

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the order to the Imperial Japanese Government (Inclosure 1) be signed and dispatched; or as an alternative,

2. That Ordinance No. 1, "Offenses Against the Occupation Military Occupation Courts" (Inclosure 2) be approved and published.

W. E. CRIST,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief Government Officer.

Concurrences:

Legal Section

G-1

G-3

SECRET

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan,
October 10, 1945

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff.

There is enclosed a detailed memorandum of conversation of October 8, 1945 with Prince Konoye, in regard to the question of the revision of the Japanese Constitution and General MacArthur's suggestion to him on October 4 that he take the lead in this matter and in connection with other desired reforms.

It would be helpful if you could kindly let me have any comment in regard to the Constitution or its revision which you would wish me to put forward to Japanese seeking guidance in this matter. I am requesting the Department of State by telegraph to expedite the sending to us of material being written into the Governmental directive on this subject.

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation with
Prince Konoye on October 8, 1945

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 775012
By SB NARS, Date 3-2-77

SECRET

S E C R E T

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER

Tokyo, Japan,
October 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Revision of Japanese Constitution

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 225012
By 38 NARS, Date 3-22-77

Present: Prince Fumimaro Konoye, formerly Premier and recently Minister without Portfolio;
Dr. Yasaki Takagi, Professor of American Constitutional Government, Imperial University;
Mr. Tomohito Ushiba, Secretary to Prince Konoye, acting as interpreter;
Mr. Shigeharu Matsumoto, formerly managing editor of Domei.

Mr. Atcheson:
Mr. Bishop.

Prince Konoye called informally upon me last evening at his request, accompanied by the Japanese named above. He referred to his call on General MacArthur on October 4 (at which I was present), to his suggestion to General MacArthur on that occasion that we have "routine" meetings to discuss various questions, and to General MacArthur's statement that we would be glad to see him at any time. Konoye said there had not been time at that meeting to discuss in detail ways to proceed in connection with General MacArthur's statement that the Japanese constitution should be revised. He said he was much interested in getting forward with the revision; that the Emperor had indicated to Marquis Kido that he, the Emperor, wished the constitution revised; and he had come on this occasion to discuss this question and to seek suggestions and advice.

I said I would be glad to offer some personal and unofficial remarks and opinions, general in character, in regard to the constitution which might provide some ideas which would be helpful as a starting point. I referred to the second sentence of paragraph ten and to paragraph twelve of the Potsdam Declaration and also to the second sentence of the third paragraph of Secretary Byrnes' statement of September 1. I said that flowing from these statements it seemed pertinent to remark as follows:

1. The House of Representatives, the only branch of the Government which purported to represent the will of the people, enjoyed but very limited powers. The Cabinet was not responsible to it. There was, for ~~example, no provision~~ in the constitution whereby the Cabinet must possess the confidence of the House of Representatives and must fall on a vote of censure. The contrary was true; the House of Representatives was subject to dissolution by a higher authority and to facing reelection at the dictates of a higher authority. The House of Representatives had but limited control over the budget and none whatever over the expenditures of the Imperial Household although certainly one of the fundamental rights of the people was to have

voice in

voice in regard to governmental expenditures based upon taxes. The House was not competent to pass a bill into law after disapproval thereof by the House of Peers which could interminably and arbitrarily block desirable legislation.

2. In such "bill of rights" as existed, each so-called right was strictly restricted to "within the limits of the law." There was no specification of the electorate in the constitution. There was no provision guarding the people from the evils of centralization of police control in the central government or from the evils of centralized and arbitrary governmental control of education.

3. In addition to the derogation of the people's rights beforementioned, the House of Peers was not democratic in any sense; it exercised extraordinary control without support of the will of the people; it represented only the nobles and financiers and certain payers of high taxes.

4. The constitution lacked provision whereby the judiciary could and should protect the rights of the people as against the Government and there was no provisions for impeachment and recall of high officials.

5. The constitution lacked provisions to regulate and control the War and Navy Ministers (if there should be any such officials in the future) and to make them responsible to the Government. A democratically conceived constitution would deprive the militarists of their grip on the Government and the powers they had not acquired by constitutional means: right of direct access to the throne, power to block formation of a Cabinet by refusing to serve. uch a constitution would also require that those ministers be civilian officials rather than active generals or admirals.

6. The Privy Council was an extra-governmental body which had served in restraint of the House of Representatives--in restraint of the people's rights.

7. It was difficult to see howthere could be a government reflecting the "freely expressed will of the people" unless the people, through their duly elected representatives, could initiate and adopt amendments to the constitution and if the Emperor could override the veto and enact laws when the Diet was not in session and keep the Diet out of session in order to continue the force of such laws.

Konoye mentioned that, under constitutional procedure, only the Emperor could initiate amendments to the constitution. I said I understood that, but if the Emperor was in favor of revision he could appoint a commission to draw up a new draft which he could introduce as an amendment. I referred to the theory that the Meiji Constitution was a "gift" from the Emperor to the people; the Emperor could now make a "gift" to the people of, among other things, the right to amend the constitution through their representatives. Konoye said that the present Diet did not reflect the "freely expressed will of the People" and questioned whether a revised constitution would be acceptable if brought into being through its agency. I said that it seemed to me that the sooner the constitution was revised the better; future Diets representing the people would have opportunity to

make changes

make changes if desired by the people. I said that this was about all I had in mind for the moment and reiterated that my comment and remarks were personal, unofficial and general in character.

Konoye referred to General MacArthur's statement during his call of October 4 that he, Konoye, should come out openly and publicly and take the leadership for revision of the constitution and other reforms. He inquired whether General MacArthur wanted him to undertake the formation of a new political party. I said that I had not interpreted General MacArthur's remarks as having that implication; there was certainly a lack of leadership in Japan and my assumption was that General MacArthur hoped that Prince Konoye come out in the open as a leader advocating and working for necessary reforms. Upon a word from Prince Konoye, Mr. Ushiba said that Japanese lived under very strict laws; it was set forth in the constitution that only the Emperor could initiate amendments to the constitution and Prince Konoye could not therefore take upon himself the public advocacy of revising the constitution. I replied that there were doubtless many questions of internal Japanese politics which would have to be resolved; as for this particular question it would seem that a simple solution would be for the Emperor, especially as he favors revision of the constitution, to order Prince Konoye to be a public advocate therefor and lead the way in the matter in its practical aspects. I suggested also that the Emperor might set up a commission for this purpose.

After some further discussion Konoye thanked me, asked if we could have further meetings and if I would also receive Professor Takagi for discussion on constitutional problems to which I replied in the affirmative. I went on to say that it was our desire that the Japanese themselves institute the many needed reforms; such procedure would best, we considered, serve Japanese interests as well as American and other Allied interests. I remarked that I was sure that he would agree that such procedure would be far preferable from the Japanese point of view than to have the Supreme Commander take direct action. General MacArthur was, for example, fully empowered to abolish noxious laws, including provisions of the constitution which were obstacles to the revival and development of democratic tendencies. Konoye indicated that the matter of the issuance of American directives to the Japanese Government, without forewarning, had worried him greatly and that the loss of prestige by concerned Japanese officials mitigated against their effectiveness. I said that as regards the recent directive concerning freedom of speech and release of political prisoners, the Japanese Government had had sufficient time to take action but had not. I repeated that it was our hope that the Japanese would themselves move forward rapidly in doing what was necessary. He said it would be helpful to have some advance knowledge of the American Government's specific desires and I indicated that I would consult with General MacArthur with a view to seeing what might appropriately be done in this respect to facilitate his work.

George Atcheson, Jr.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

19 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

The problem is to define, for the purpose of ensuring Japanese compliance with appropriate orders, the "United Nations", "Neutral Nations" and "Enemy Nations" and to list the nations whose status has changed as a result of the war so that they do not fall exactly into any of the categories just mentioned.

II. DISCUSSION.

Various orders of the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government require steps to be taken by the Japanese with respect to property of the United Nations, Neutral Nations and Enemy Nations, and with respect to their nationals and their property; as yet, these categories of Nations have not been defined for general reference.

III. CONCLUSION.

In order to ensure compliance with directives, the Japanese Government should be informed by a general memorandum what nations fall into each category.

IV. RECOMMENDATION.

That the Memorandum to the Japanese Government (Incl. 1) be signed and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

V. CONCURRENCES.

1. Political Advisor (GA D.S. Rigaud GA)
2. G-3 (Jnl 3)

11

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GOVT SECTION COME-BACK

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

31
~~29~~ October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Definition of "United Nations", "Neutral Nations", and "Enemy Nations".

1. Whenever reference to the "United Nations" is made in any order, memorandum or directive, that term, in the absence of indication to the contrary, shall be taken as meaning and including the nations which are signatories of the United Nations Declaration dated 1 January 1942, and nations associated with them in this war. They are:

(1) Australia
(2) Belgium
(3) Bolivia
(4) Brazil
(5) Canada
(6) Chile
(7) China
(8) Columbia
(9) Costa Rica
(10) Cuba
(11) Czechoslovakia
(12) Denmark
(13) Dominican Republic
(14) Ecuador
(15) Egypt
(16) Ethiopia
(17) France
(18) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
(19) Greece
(20) Guatemala
(21) Haiti
(22) Honduras
(23) Iceland
(24) India
(25) Iran (Persia)
(26) Iraq
(27) Lebanon
(28) Liberia
(29) Luxembourg
(30) Mexico

BASIC: GHQ, SCAP, file AG .009(19 Oct 45)MG, dated 19 Oct 45, subject: "Definition of 'United Nations', 'Neutral Nations', and 'Enemy Nations'".

(31) Netherlands
(32) New Zealand
(33) Nicaragua
(34) Norway
(35) Panama
(36) Paraguay
(37) Peru
(38) Philippine Commonwealth
(39) Poland
(40) Salvador
(41) Saudi Arabia
(42) Syria
(43) Turkey
(44) Union of South Africa
(45) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(46) United States of America
(47) Uruguay
(48) Venezuela
(49) Yugoslavia

2. Whenever reference to "Neutral Nations" is made in any such order, directive or memorandum, that term, in the absence of indication to the contrary, shall be taken as meaning and including the following nations:

3 (1) Portugal
4 (2) Spain
5 (3) Sweden
6 (4) Switzerland

1- afghanistan
2- Ireland (Eire) } added

3. Whenever reference to "Enemy Nations" is made in any such order, directive or memorandum, that term, in the absence of indication to the contrary, shall be taken as meaning and including the following nations:

(1) Bulgaria
(2) Germany
(3) Hungary
(4) Japan
(5) Roumania

BASIC: GHQ, SCAP, file AG .009(19 Oct 45)MG, dated 19 Oct 45, subject: "Definition of 'United Nations', 'Neutral Nations', and 'Enemy Nations'".

4. The nations named below, whose status has changed as a result of the war, will not be treated as falling into any of the three categories of nations referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 or 3 above unless such a classification of one or more of them is specified. They will be referred to collectively as "nations whose status has changed as a result of the war". Such nations are:

(1) Argentina
(2) Finland
(3) Italy
(4) Siam (Thailand)

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

by AG
Mailed 11/7 40 Hours

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Government Section

2 November 1945

Distribution list for Memorandum to the Japanese Government, subject: "Definition of "United Nations", Neutral Nations", and "Enemy Nations", Dated 31 October 1945.

WARCOS (5)
C/S
Political Advisor
Statistical & Reports Sec (2)
Govt Sec (Return 3)
CINCPAC (5)
Balance Staff, SCAP (15)
CG, Eighth Army (3)
CG, Sixth Army (3)
CG, XXIV Corps (3)
CG, FEAF (1)
CG, USASTAF (1)
CG, AFWESPAC (1)
Com Fifth Fleet (3)
Com Seventh Fleet (3)
FLOSCAP (2)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

HER/CLK/ARH/jmh

APO 500
22 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM

1. Action to be taken regarding C.L.O. No. 97, dated 28 September 1945, notifying the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers that the Japanese Government plans (1) to abolish the Regional Government General and (2) to establish a Regional Administrative Affairs Bureau (Tab "A").

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. Regional Administrative Councils were established in Japan in July 1943, for the purpose of (1) imposing close national supervision and control over local government, and (2) coordinating civil administration with the war effort. The plan was essentially bureaucratic and authoritarian.

3. In June 1943, the Regional Administrative Councils were abolished and Regional Governments General set up. These were organized "with the exclusive object of meeting the exigencies of the war situation. They were given the form and complexion of a centralized government, with the object of administering local affairs with authoritarian thoroughness." (The quotation is from a memorandum submitted by the Japanese Government). The changes merely tightened the central controls. The real purpose of the change was to provide for the anticipated invasion emergency, when the central government might become disorganized.

4. On 19 September, the Supreme Commander instructed the Japanese Government to provide certain information relating to the structure of government, including by specific reference the eight Regional Superintendencies General (Tab "B").

5. On 28 September, the Japanese Government submitted C.L.O. No. 97 of 28 September, giving notice of their plan to abolish the Regional Government General, (there is a slight difference in terminology, due probably to difficulties of translation) and to establish Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaux.

6. On 1 October, the Supreme Commander notified the Japanese Government that it had not complied with the original request of 19 September (Tab "C").

123A

7. On 16 October, a conference was held between officers of this Section and representatives of the Japanese Government, at which conference detailed information concerning the Regional Administrative Councils, the Regional Governments (Superintendencies) General and the proposed Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaux, was presented. At this conference, the representatives of the Japanese Government were asked to submit the drafts of the proposed ordinances (1) abolishing the Regional Government General, and (2) setting up the Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaux.

8. On 17 October, drafts of two Imperial ordinances were submitted, one setting up the Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaux, the other setting up Regional Administrative Bureaux of Commerce and Industry. Nothing on the abolition of the Regional Governments General has been submitted.

III. DISCUSSION

9. The existing system is clearly all that the Japanese say it is, i.e., an arrangement for providing complete control of civil administration by regions in the event of invasion; it was anticipated that the military would assume command of each region.

10. The proposed system purports to promote the unity of local administration by facilitating coordination and adjustment between the prefectural offices and the central government. It is quite clear that no real change from the existing system is contemplated. No effort or desire on the part of the Japanese Government to decentralize and to promote local autonomy in civil administration has been evident.

11. Under the post surrender policy for Japan, the Supreme Commander is charged with the duty of permitting and promoting the establishment of democratic institutions. Changes in the present structure of government initiated by the Japanese themselves which have the effect of modifying its feudal or authoritarian character are to be favored. The proposed change, however, puts one more obstacle in the way of securing local self-government and delays decentralization.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

12. It is concluded that:

a. The Regional Government General should be abolished.

b. The Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaux should not be established.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

13. It is recommended that the attached memorandum, (Tab "D"), be approved and returned to this Section for stencil and dispatch.

VI. CONCURRENCE

G - 3 ( )

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

4 Incls:
Incl 1. - Tab "A" C.L.O. No. 97 dated 28 September
Incl 2. - Tab "B" Memo to Japanese Govt dated 19 September
Incl 3. - Tab "C" Memo to Japanese Govt dated 1 October
Incl 4. - Tab "D" Proposed Memo to Japanese Govt

C O P Y

To: Offices of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

From: Central Liaison Office

Subject: Abolishment of the Regional Government General

C.L.O. No. 97

28 September 1945

This is to notify that the Imperial Japanese Government plans to abolish the Regional Government General in the early part of October.

The above Regional Government General was established in June of this year with the primary object of co-ordinating and controlling the various local administrations to cope with new developments arising in the war situation and its structure is purely wartime in nature. (The Regional Gov't General is a strictly bureaucratic structure and gives no provisions for autonomous local assemblies as existing in the prefectures, cities, towns and villages.) Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government takes this opportunity to abolish this system.

To co-ordinate and adjust regional administration to meet peacetime needs the Imperial Japanese Government plans to establish aRegional Administration Office in a simplified form.

For the Director General

(T. Katsube)
Liaison Office,
Central Liaison Office,
Tokyo.

COPY: arw

Tab A

TAB "A"

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

19 September 1945

AG 091 (19 Sep 45)MG

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Japanese Government Organizational Reports

1. In order that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may be accurately informed with respect to the current composition of the Imperial Japanese Government and its principal sub-divisions, charts of present organization, accompanied by statements outlining functions, duties and principal officials by name, title and rank of the following are necessary.

a. The Cabinet of the Imperial Japanese Government and each of its Bureaus and Boards.

b. The Ministries of the Imperial Japanese Government and each Bureau thereof.

c. The Board of Audit.

d. The Privy Council.

e. The Court of Administrative Litigation .

f. Each of the eight (8) Superintendencies General.

g. Each of the forty-three (43) prefectures and the Metropolitan Districts of Kyoto, Osaka and Tokyo.

h. Cities which are prefecture capitals or have a population in excess of one hundred thousand (100,000).

i. Extra-constitutional offices and any major policy-making or administrative agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government not specified herein.

2. This required information should be prepared immediately and delivered without delay in sections as completed.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ Harold Fair
/t/ HAROLD FAIR
Lt Col, AGD
Asst Adj General

COPY: Arw

Tab B

COPY

OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG-091 (1 Oct 45)MG

1 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Abolishment of the Regional Government Generals.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers desires to be informed with respect to the Regional Government Generals pursuant to paragraph 1, item f, of Memorandum AG-091 (19 Sep 45) to Imperial Japanese Government prior to permitting the abolition of the Regional Government Generals disclosed by C. L. O. Number 97.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ Harold Fair
HAROLD FAIR
Lt Col, AGD
Asst. Adjutant General

COPY: arw

Tab C

THIS PAGE

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091 (1 Nov 45) GS

1 November 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Abolition of the Regional Governments General and Establishment of Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaus.

The proposal of the Imperial Japanese Government to abolish the Regional Governments General and establish Regional Administrative Affairs Bureaus, as set forth in its memorandum of 28 September 1945, C.L.O. No. 97, on the above subject, is approved.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H.W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

MAILED 1150 NOV 3 '45

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COPY

FILE UNDER:

Memo for the Chief of Staff

INDEX SHEET

DATE:

23 Oct 45

FROM:

W. E. CRIST
Govt Sec

TO:

Govt Sec

SUBJECT:
Action to be taken regarding C. L. O. No. 251 of 12 Oct 45, requesting that the requests contained in C. L. O. No 199 of 7 Oct 45 for permission to enter buildings and areas occupied by the Allied Forces for the purpose of taking a census for the forthcoming National Elections), be enlarged to permit entry into additional areas and for additional purposes.

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER:

CLASSIFIED FILE.

091.1J

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(3) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that very few instructions were received from GHQ at Eighth Army relative to the field of Military Government.

Recommendation: That the Eighth Army liaison officer handle this by asking for instructions when required.

(4) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that this Headquarters, in some instances, had not informed the Japanese of some orders issued to Eighth Army which had direct bearing on the Japanese, and he indicated that it would assist the Eighth Army in carrying out these directives if the Japanese Government was informed because the Japanese would then have instructions from Tokyo on the matter.

Recommendation: That whenever an order issued to the Eighth Army calls for a direct relationship between Eighth Army and Japanese authorities, the Japanese Government be instructed accordingly.

(5) Problem: Colonel Patterson mentioned briefly that he knew of cases wherein a Chinese and a Korean should be tried for criminal offenses and that no means for trying these people had been adopted.

Recommendation: That one of the plans relative to Military Occupation Courts submitted by this section, now under consideration by the Legal Section, be adopted.

(6) Problem: Colonel Vance inquired whether Military Government, Eighth Army, would operate on a territorial or a tactical basis, and when or if Military Government would take over from the tactical troops.

Recommendation: That Colonel Vance be informally advised that Military Government, Eighth Army, will operate on a tactical basis, and that there is no present plan for Military Government taking over from tactical troops.

B - PERSONNEL

(7) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that the Eighth Army has not as yet received those companies and groups from the U.S. that were earmarked for Eighth Army.

Recommendation: That Colonel Vance be informally advised of a cable received from the War Department today to the effect that the companies and groups in question were now enroute.

TAG DCS ops
1 Nov 45 0930
for approval

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500
31 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS:

SUBJECT: Military Government Problems in Eighth Army.

1. Conference was held in the office of the Chief, Government Section, on 30 October 1945, from 1530 to 1700 hours, on the above subject.

2. There were present at the conference, in addition to the undersigned, Colonel Vance, Chief of the Military Government Section of the Eighth Army; Colonel Patterson, Assistant to Colonel Vance; and Colonel Leslie, of the Government Section.

3. There is listed below the problems raised by Colonel Vance at the conference and the action this section recommends be taken with reference to each of Colonel Vance's points.

A - POLICY

(1) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that he did not know what responsibility Military Government, Eighth Army, would have in the field under present conditions.

Recommendation: That each special staff section submit to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations what responsibility Military Government, Eighth Army, will have with respect to its particular function.

(2) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that he did not know whom he should consult at GHQ with regard to Eighth Army Military Government Problems.

Recommendation: That Colonel Vance be informally advised to take up his questions with the appropriate special staff section.

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4A

(3 copies)

(8) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that Eighth Army was dispatching a radio requesting sixty officers possessing various skills and special qualifications be assigned to that headquarters; this radio resulting from a directive which they received from the Economic and Scientific Section regarding liquidation of banks.

Recommendation: That G-1 handle this matter

NOTE

(Colonel Vance brought out the fact that Eighth Army at first was informed that it was to have no responsibility for financial affairs; however, as a result of the directive from the Economic and Scientific Section mentioned above, it will now be necessary for Eighth Army to procure immediately expert accountants and experienced bankers.)

(9) Problem: Colonel Vance stated that the ASR point system was one of the major factors in the present acute shortage of personnel and that officer specialists were consequently not available to carry out the directives issued by GHQ. Colonel Vance accented the importance of personnel qualified in special fields of Military Government work, stating that the tactical troops have not the requisite training to carry on certain phases of Military Government activities.

Recommendation: That the personnel requirements calling for civilian skills be surveyed with a view to obtaining qualified civilian experts. It is understood that Lt Col Buell of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, and Mr. James Mead, of the Civilian Personnel Division, War Department, are on temporary duty at GHQ for the purpose of making a comprehensive study of civilian personnel requirements.

(10) Problem: Colonel Vance inquired concerning the allocation of the Eighth Army's portion of the 774 grades which were to be made available to Military Government activities for Sixth and Eighth Armies, XXIV Corps, and GHQ.

Recommendation: That this matter be handled by G-1.

C - COMMUNICATION

(11) Colonel Patterson requested information relative to the type of communication permissible for Eighth Army representatives to use in contacting this headquarters, declaring that wires and letters are sometimes too slow; he specifically inquired as to the use of the telephone.

Recommendation: That Colonel Vance and Colonel Patterson be informally advised that the use of the telephone is permissible.

D - CLAIMS

(12) Problem: Colonel Patterson inquired what is being done to process claims against the Japanese filed by Allied personnel.

Recommendation: That this matter be referred to the Legal Section for consideration and advice.

E - REGISTRATION OF NATIONALS

(13) Problem: Colonel Patterson inquired how the question of registration of foreign nationals should be handled.

Recommendation: That since the undersigned referred Colonel Patterson to General Thorpe on this matter, nothing further be done.

F - EQUIPMENT

(14) Problem: Colonel Vance was concerned with what equipment would be allocated to military government and he asked that he be allowed to look over the T/E intended for Eighth Army Military Government, in order that he may have the opportunity to suggest necessary changes.

Recommendation: That this matter be handled by G-4 and that consideration be given to the transfer to Military Government, Eighth Army, of Military Government equipment now assigned to Sixth Army.

4. General Recommendation. It is recommended that, if the recommendations mentioned above are approved, the undersigned be authorized to communicate the action recommended in each case to Colonel Vance and, where appropriate, to

discuss the problem with the other staff sections concerned.

W. E. CRIST,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Chief, Government Section

21 1 Nov 45

0945

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

1st. November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

Under existing instructions, to bring about the dissolution of militaristic, ultra-nationalist and secret organizations which are inimical to the achievement of the objectives of the occupation or the development of democracy in Japan.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. Under the statement of policies in Parts II and III of "UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-DEFEAT POLICY RELATING TO JAPAN (SWNCC 140/4A)", the following is recommended:

* * *

"Part I - Ultimate Objectives"

"(b)...Institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be suppressed."

* * *

"Part III - Political"

"1. Disarmament and Demilitarization:. . . . . Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited."

"3. Encouragement of desire for individual liberty and democratic processes. Freedom of religious worship shall be proclaimed promptly.....at the same time, it should be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion."

2. In the "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper, JCS 1380/15"; Part I, paragraph 5.-g, the following policy is proposed:

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"g. Throughout Japan, you will assure the dissolution of the Political Association of Great Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Taisei Seijikai), their affiliates and agencies or any successor organizations, and all Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic and secret patriotic societies and their agencies and affiliates."

3. Not only the above policies, but the successful accomplishment of the objectives of the Supreme Commander in Japan, will require an effective dissolution of all existing societies which have ultra-nationalistic, militaristic or secret purposes, or whose activities, irrespective of their declared purposes, support doctrines or actions contrary to the interests of the occupation forces or to the establishment of an healthy democratic system, or the support of militarism. In order to make this effective, it will be necessary to dissolve organizations known to be of the above mentioned types and also to provide the Japanese with standards for determining whether or not other organizations are ultra-nationalistic, militaristic or secret.

4. There is some indication that the leading spirits of organizations already dissolved by the Japanese Government have joined together again under new names and with the statement of new purposes to further activities similar to those which brought about the dissolution of their original organization. Effective action in this field will therefore require public declaration of the purpose and membership of newly formed societies in the field of politics, so that it may be determined whether or not the organization perpetuates proscribed purposes or embraces such a proportion of members of illegal societies that a continuation of former activities may be presumed.

III. CONCLUSION.

That an appropriate order be issued to the Japanese Government, directing it to dissolve all organizations whose purposes or activities are of a militaristic, ultra-nationalistic character, and all organizations whose purposes or activities are secret. The Japanese Government should be given a preliminary list of organizations whose purposes are at present known to fall within those categories and a definition of the kinds of organizations whose purposes or activities are proscribed for application to others. The order should require the Japanese Government to prohibit the activity of organizations which tend to perpetuate the militaristic, ultra-nationalistic or secret purposes of dissolved organizations. In order to insure the effectiveness of

this directive, the order should require existing organizations, concerned with politics or the relations between Japan and foreign countries which are permitted to continue and new organizations, formed for political purposes, to declare their purposes, officers and membership. For practical reasons, the declaration of membership should not be required in the case of groups of employees, meeting informally, to discuss or take action with respect to wages, hours and working conditions. Such an order has been prepared, together with an Appendix indicating the organizations specifically dissolved, and is attached as Tab "A".

IV. CONCURRENCES:

This Memorandum has been submitted to the Staff Sections listed below. All of them with the exception of G-2 Section have concurred (See Tab "B"). The Check Sheet summarizing this Memorandum considers the comment of G-2 Section.

V. RECOMMENDATION.

That the order to the Japanese Government, as at Tab "A", be approved and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

CONCURRENCES:

G-2
G-3
GPA
CIS
PH&W
E&S
LS
CIAR
NR
Pol Advr

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

7 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To consider the problem of (a) cooperation and agreement with any Allied reparation agency which may be established for Japan and, (b) regulation and control of the Japanese Government in carrying out reparation policy in Japan.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. At the Crimea Conference in February 1945, it was agreed by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. to establish a commission for the compensation of damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in the war. Pursuant to this agreement, the Reparation Commission was created to work in Moscow and instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods of compensating for damage caused by Germany to the Allied Powers.

2. The U.S. Representative on the Reparation Commission (Ambassador Pauley) is understood to be coming to Japan to discuss with the Supreme Commander the Japanese reparation problem. It is not known whether the jurisdiction of the Reparation Commission has been extended to cover securing reparation from Japan. The Potsdam Declaration contemplates (in point 11), however, the exaction of just reparation in kind for the benefit of the Allied Powers.

3. Closely related to reparation is the restitution of identifiable looted property. The handling of claims for restitution in turn requires consideration of the status and condition of Japanese and other enemy property as well as United Nations' and neutral property.

4. Blocking control has much in common with reparation and restitution. Foreign trade policy is also directly affected by reparation policy. However, the functions of advising on policies for (a) fixing requirements for reparation and making allocations therefor, (b) receiving claims for restitution, (c) controlling Japanese and enemy property, and (d) protecting the

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property interests of the United Nations and neutrals, constitute a single basic responsibility; namely, the accomplishment of partial compensation for damage to Allied governments and nationals caused by Japanese aggression.

III. CONCLUSIONS

It is concluded that:

a. Responsibility for recommending policies as to (1) reparations, (2) restitution, and (3) property control and protection should be concentrated in a single staff section and should not be distributed among several sections.

b. The staff section charged with the responsibility of recommending policies on the above subjects should, (1) maintain close liaison with the staff sections concerned with the Japanese economy, foreign affairs and foreign trade, and (2) coordinate the policies and activities of such sections to the extent they are of significance in connection with reparation, and (3) cooperate with any Allied reparation agency which may be established for Japan and for implementing reparation policy in Japan.

c. The Chief, Government Section, should confer with the A C/S, G-4, and the Chief, Economic & Scientific Section, for the purpose of determining, (1) whether a new staff section should be activated to accomplish this mission, and (2) if not, which existing staff section should be charged with this responsibility.

d. That a joint report and recommendation should be submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations embodying the conclusion reached at such conference, together with a draft of an appropriate general order.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the above conclusions be approved and this memorandum returned for necessary action.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

Readmit
Pub

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

8 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED

Action to be taken respecting C.L.O. No. 445 (1), subject: creation of "Society for the aid and guidance of the demobilized," a foundational juridical person under the jurisdiction of the Welfare Minister.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM

1. The Ministry of Welfare now has jurisdiction over Health Bureau; Social Bureau; Labor Bureau; Department of Occupations; Unemployment Department; Relief Board of Military Affairs and Sanitarium and Convalescent Homes Division which maintains the Vocational Guidance Centers for Disabled Soldiers. It is charged with enforcement of the Military Relief Act of 1917 with revisions and similar laws. These bureaux carry on substantially the same functions as are proposed for the new organization. If organized, it would duplicate these existing services.

2. The proposal contemplates employing career officers of the Army and Navy purportedly on the basis of their knowledge of the character and background of applicants. This reasoning is inconsistent with established principles of welfare administration according to the Public Health & Welfare Section and also appears inconsistent with the policy of not granting special benefits to ex-members of the armed forces.

III. CONCLUSIONS

This organization would further complicate the organization of the Welfare Ministry, would duplicate existing services and would serve no need readily apparent. In addition, it would tend to preserve an organization of ex-members of the armed forces led by career officers holding public office which could be easily used to revive a spirit of nationalism.

Pub. Adm. - File

17

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED

That the enclosed memorandum to the Japanese Government (Tab "A"), disapproving the application for permission to establish "Fukuin Hodokai", or "Society for the Aid and Guidance of the Demobilized", be signed and dispatched.

W. R. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

CONCURRENCES

Public Health & Welfare Section (Col. Sams)
Civil Intelligence Section (Gen. Thorpe)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091 (8 Nov 45)GS 8 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR : IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Setting Up A Foundational Juridical Person For Aid and Guidance of Demobilized People.

The proposal of the Imperial Japanese Government to set up a foundational juridical person for the aid and guidance of demobilized people, as set forth in its memorandum of 2 November 1945, C.L.O. No. 445 (1), on the subject as above, is disapproved.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

Nov 8 1945

Mailed 1950

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Government Section

5 November 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Memo per Imperial Jap Government 14 Oct 1945 AG 388.3 (10 Oct 45)DCSO approved demobilization plan submitted by Imperial Japanese Government on 2 Oct 45. This plan included statement: (p.8)

> "The Japanese consider it a matter of great social importance to find jobs or to provide professional education for those men who are returned as well as to adopt measures to take care of the ill and wounded, the families of the bereaved and missing, with a view to preventing possible cases of discontent."

In making recommendations on C.L.O. No 445 (1) the above was considered and deemed not in conflict with the recommendation.

M. E. ROWELL
Maj. AUS

In conference on 5 November 1945 Lt. Louis Hasch (USNR) PH&W Section informally agreed with the facts and conclusions expressed in memo to COS.

M. E. ROWELL
Maj. AUS

TO : Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Setting up of a foundational juridical person for the aid and guidance of demobilized people.

C.L.O. No. 445 (1) 2 November 1945

The Japanese Government, desirous to aid and guide the demobilized people, wishes to set up a foundational juridical person on the following line.

1. The formerly proposed "Organization for Aid and Vocational Guidance of demobilized soldiers and civilian members of the Army" ("Hodokai") and the proposed "Organ For vocational guidance of demobilized navymen and civilian members of the Navy" ("ENGOKAI"), under the auspices of the army and the navy respectively will be abandoned.

2. In their place, a new foundational juridical person "FUKUIN HODOKAI" or "Society for the Aid and Guidance of the Demobilized" will be set up under the jurisdiction of the Welfare Minister.

The aid and guidance of this Society will be given to the retired offices, demobilized soldiers and sailors and the enlisted people including the ship-crew.

3.

3. The administration

a. The Welfare Minister will concurrently serve as President of the Society.

The posts of Vice-President and Director-General will be filled exclusively by civilians. Other important posts will be occupied, as a rule, by civilians.

b. Branch offices will be set up in Hokkaido and in every prefecture. The Governor of Hokkaido and the Governors of prefectures will serve as Chairman of branch offices.

The Deputy-chairman of a branch office will be appointed by the Welfare Minister from among the local officials or citizens.

c. In conformity with the policy of the G.H.Q. it will be made an established principle not to take demobilized career officers of the Army or the Navy as officials or otherwise into the personnel of the organization, excepting the case where their employment is absolutely necessary.

It is believed that some persons who are directly and intimately acquainted with the individual characters and backgrounds of the demobilized soldiers and sailors - for instance former

career

career officers connected with the personnel sections of the Army and the Navy - are needed within the proposed organization for a smooth and successful execution of its mission - especially at its initial stage.

The presence of these ex-officers will be helpful in many ways to the demobilized service men, who will be made thereby to put greater trust and reliance upon the society.

Accordingly it is planned to include in the personnel of the Central office and branch offices a certain number of former career military or naval officers to help facilitate the initiation of the enterprise.

These former career officers will be transfered as rapidly as circumstances permit from the position of responsibility to advisory posts, and the vacancies will be filled by civilian members of the staff.

The Japanese Government is planning to set up under the foregoing principles "the Society for the Aid and Guidance of the Demobilized" as soon as possible, and

requests

requests that favorable consideration be given to the project by the General Headquarters for the Allied Powers.

For the President:

(S. Iguchi)
Director of General Affairs
Central Liaison Office.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

WEC/CIK/DSB/deg

APO 500
12 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To advise the State Department of the situation respecting Japanese diplomatic properties in the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies and to advise the Netherlands Government of the means by which custody of the property and archives of Japanese diplomatic and consular establishments is to be taken over by it.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM.

1. Responsive to the directive from this Headquarters of 25 October 1945, requiring the surrender of diplomatic and consular property and archives held by protecting powers, the Japanese Government has advised that in the case of the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies there is no protecting power in charge of such property and archives. (See undated letter from the Japanese Government, attached as Tab A).

2. The Japanese Government explains the absence of a protecting power by pointing out that, at the time of the outbreak of war between Japan and the Netherlands that country was then subject to German Military Government and the Japanese were able to take direct action in protection of such properties. In the case of the Netherlands East Indies, Switzerland was at first requested to act as a protecting power but, when the islands were thereafter completely overrun by the Japanese, they again took direct action in protection of their diplomatic properties.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

That the State Department should be advised of the above facts and asked to inform the Netherlands government that they are at liberty to take direct action seizing Japanese diplomatic and consular properties in Holland and the Netherlands East Indies. A proposed form of cable to the WARCOS has been prepared and is attached as Tab B.

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

That the cable as Tab B be approved and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

CONCURRENCES.

Pol Advr ( )

18

IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Brigadier General Crist
Chief, Government Section, G.H.Q.

Sir,

With reference to the questions put to me on November 7, I have since looked into the matters and have the honor to submit my reports to you as follows:

1. As regards the protection of Japanese interests in the Netherlands, the Japanese Government first requested the Government of Switzerland to undertake it. But at the time the war was declared, the Netherlands had already been occupied by German forces, and the Japanese legation at the Hague was closed and left in the hands of a Dutch custodian. In view of the fact that the Japanese Embassy in Berlin would be in a position to exercise superintendance whenever necessary, no further step was taken to ask the Government of Switzerland to assume the custody of the Legation.

The custody of Japan's consular establishments in the Netherlands East Indies were at first entrusted with the Government of Switzerland. But following the occupation of the region by Japanese forces, these were taken by Japanese military authorities.

Under these circumstances, either in the Netherlands or in its colonies there exists no Japanese diplomatic and consular establishment being looked after by protecting Power. Accordingly, it is desired that the Government of the Netherlands takes over directly the properties and archives of Japanese diplomatic and consular establishments in the Netherlands and its colonies.

2. The Spanish Government has severed diplomatic relations with Japan on April 12, 1945, and Japanese interests in Spain are represented by Switzerland. On October 31 the Japanese Government sent out the necessary instructions relating to various countries, including Spain, where Japanese

interests are represented by Switzerland, and on the basis of the instructions our Minister to Switzerland communicated with the Swiss Government on November 1. It is therefore believed that the Swiss Government will turn over the properties and archives of the Japanese Legation in Spain to the disignated Allied representatives.

Sincerely Yours,

/s/ S. Matsuokima

R E S T R I C T E D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

WEC/CLK/DSB/deg
12 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: GHQ SCAP

TO : WARCOS. . . . . ROUTINE

TRANSFER OF JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROPERTY AND ARCHIVES IS SUBJECT REFER TO PARAGRAPHS TWO AND THREE OF OUR CHARLIE ABLE XRAY FIVE FOUR THREE THREE SEVEN PD PARA ONE PD JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS ADVISED THAT THERE IS NO PROTECTING POWER IN CHARGE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROPERTIES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES PD THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT AT THE TIME OF OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE NETHERLANDS CMA HOLLAND WAS SUBJECT TO GERMAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE JAPANESE WERE ABLE TO ACT DIRECTLY FOR THE PROTECTION OF SUCH PROPERTY PD IN THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES CMA UPON DECLARATION OF WAR CMA SWITZERLAND WAS AT FIRST ASKED TO SERVE AS PROTECTING POWER BUT CMA AS THESE ISLANDS WERE OVERRUN BY THE JAPANESE FORCES THE JAPANESE WERE ABLE TO ACT DIRECTLY PD THUS THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT POINTS OUT THAT THERE IS NO PROTECTING POWER IN RESPECT OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THAT THE NETHERLANDS MAY BE ADVISED TO SEIZE JAPANESE PROPERTIES AND ARCHIVES DIRECTLY PD PARA TWO PD REQUEST THAT YOU ASK THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO ADVISE THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT OF THE FOREGOING AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACT DIRECTLY IN SEIZING JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROPERTY AND ARCHIVES IN HOLLAND AND IN THE NETHERIANDS EAST INDIES PD PARA THREE PD THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN ASSURANCE THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS WAS INTENDED PD OTHER DISCREPANCIES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPHS TWO AND THREE OF REFERENCE CABLE HAVE BEEN CLEARED UP SATISFACTORILY PD JAPANESE HAVE YET TO TRANSMIT REPORTS OF ACTION TAKEN BY FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES BUT WILL DO SO WHEN THEY ARE RECEIVED PD PARA FOUR PD

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 723017
By SD NARS, Date 3-2-77

R E S T R I C T E D

~~RESTRICTED~~

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

OUTGOING MESSAGE

WEC/CLK/DSB/deg
12 NOVEMBER 1945

FROM: GHQ SCAP

TO : WARCOS. . . . . ROUTINE

WHEN MAY REPLY TO OUR PARA FOUR OF REFERENCE CABLE BE EXPECTED QUERY

OFFICIAL:

B. M. FITCH
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Adjutant General

APPROVED:

W. E. CRISP
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

Memo for Record 15 Nov 45

This cable follows up our cable CAX 54337 relating to treatment of Japanese diplomatic property and archives abroad. The Japanese reply to the directive of this Headquarters of 25 October did not require surrender by the protecting power of Japan property in the Netherlands. This cable explains why. No protecting power is involved in Holland and the Dutch East Indies.

D.S.B.

~~RESTRICTED~~

FILE UNDER:

Memo to Chief of Staff

INDEX SHEET

DATE:

17 Nov 45

FROM:

George Atcheson, Jr.

TO:

Supreme Commander and Chief of Staff

SUBJECT:

Political parties in Japan: Developments during week ending Nov 17, 45

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER:

CLASSIFIED FILE:

000.1

19

7

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF OF STAFF: 17 November 1945

I. the PROBLEM. Presented

Action to be taken respecting C.L.O. No. 538 (1) 11 November 1945 subject: Inspection of the Files and Documents of the Government Offices by Member of the Allied Forces. (Tab "A").

II. FACTS. Bearing on the Problem

1. C.L.O. No. 538 (1) recites that a Sergeant of the 1st Cavalry Division requested and was granted permission to inspect files in several Japanese Government agencies. No identification papers were presented.

2. No statement therein indicates or infers that inspection was not in the course of duty. No abuse of authority is indicated. No undue inconvenience to the agencies is shown.

3. In the accomplishment of assigned missions, tactical organizations need the maximum freedom from operating regulation in order to cope with the unusual and varying conditions encountered in the field.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

The institution of any control measures suggested in C.L.O. No. 538 (1) 11 November 1945 would limit the flexibility of operating organizations in the accomplishment of their assigned missions. Until abuse of authority occurs, no directive should be issued restricting the method of operation of any organization in the field.

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DRAFT

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

That the enclosed memorandum to the Japanese Government (Tab "B") stating that the requested restrictions will not be placed on operating units be signed and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

Concurrances:

G-3

CIS

Proposed policy prepared prior to issuance of AG 200.2 (10 Nov 45) CIS. Referred to CJS for action and subsequent action under above reference.

MKR.

2

DRAFT

17 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT1

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Inspection of Imperial Japanese Government Records.

The request of the Imperial Japanese Government to be notified in advance of any request for documents or records or that identification papers be required of any U. S. Army personnel requesting inspection of documents or records as set forth in its memorandum of 11 November 1945 C.L.O. No. 538 (1) on subject as above is denied.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ROUTING SLIP 18 Mar 1945

FROM: Government Section

TO:

Commander-in-Chief	Counter Intel O ✓
Military Secretary	Econ & Scien Sec
Aides-de-Camp	Fiscal Director
Chief of Staff	Gen Procurement Agt
Deputy Chief of Staff	HQ Commandant
G-1	Legal Section
G-2	Natural Resources
G-3	Public Relations O
G-4	Pub Health & Welfare
Adjutant General	Statistics & Reports
Civ I&E Sec	
Civ Communications Sec	

FOR:

Approval	Signature
Comment or Concurrence	Dispatch
Information	Attachment of Reference
Issuance of Orders	File
Necessary Action	
Note and Return	

Attn Major Marcum: Referred as a matter of primary interest and for interpretation under AG 200.2 (10 Nov 45) CIS.

GOVERNMENT SECTION

Office Memo

15 Nov 1945

FROM: Adm

TO:		FOR:			
Chief			Action		X
~~Exec O~~		K	Information		
Adm			Comment		
P A	X		Concurrence		
Korean			Approval		
M P			Note & Return		
File					

REMARKS:


Lilajo Rowell -
① Operations matters
will be yours also
② Your recommend-
ations requested.

EE

COPY

MEMORANDUM TO: OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

FROM: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Inspection of the Files and Documents of the Government Offices by Members of the Allied Forces.

11 November 1945

C.L.O. No. 538(1)

On November 6th a U.S. non-commissioned officer came to the Home Office and wished to inspect the files and documents of that Office. Upon request he stated that he was Sergt. Basil J. Bukko, Military Government Section, 1st Cavalry Division and also that he was sent there by Col. T. L. Petty of the said Division. He was not in possession of any paper identifying himself or his mission. The Home Office acquiesced to his request. The Legislation Board and the Investigation Board of the Cabinet both of whose offices are located in the same building were visited by the same sergeant later of the day, and they too acquiesced. However, the Information Board whose office happens to be also in the same building upon being visited by the same sergeant two days later refused twice to comply with his request on the ground that the visitor failed to bear indentification paper. On the third visit of the same sergeant, however, it acquiesced out of fear that the continued refusal might result in an untoward consequence.

In this connection, the Central Liaison Office would be much obliged if the General Headquarters would make an arrangement so that

(1) this office be notified by General Headquarters, Divisions or party concerned the date, nature of documents and other requirements well in advance so that the offiner concerned may be able to prepare them.

(2) In case it is impossible for General Headquarters, Divisions or the party concerned to make such notifications in advance it is requested, to avoid confusion that a bearer of an identification paper signed by a responsible officer be sent.

For the President,

(T. Katsube)

Chief of Liaison Section
Central Liaison Office.

FILE UNDER:

Memo for the Chief, Govt Sec

INDEX SHEET

DATE:

21 Nov 45

FROM:

Ken R. Dyke
Brigadier Gen, AUS

TO:

Chief of Staff

SUBJECT:

To determine an information policy on political parties

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER:

000.1

CLASSIFIED FILE:

21

Repatriation

mem to Jap Govt

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

25 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To reply to a memorandum from the Japanese Government which expresses concern for the relief and repatriation of Japanese nationals overseas, and incloses copy of the resolution adopted by a "mass meeting for the relief of overseas Japanese", (Tab "A").

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. In AG 370.05 (29 Oct 45)GC, the Japanese Government was informed that the return of Japanese repatriates from territories formerly occupied by Japan must be based on military necessity. (Tab "B").

2. In AG 091 (1 Nov 45)GC, the Japanese Government was advised that information regarding the condition of Japanese nationals under Soviet control had been forwarded to appropriate authorities in the United States. (Tab "C").

AG REC

3. In AG 311.7 (28 Oct 45)CIS, the request of the Japanese Government to establish a limited mail system between Japanese awaiting repatriation in areas formerly occupied by Japan and the home islands was approved. (Tab "D").

4. The incoming memorandum makes no specific request.

III. CONCLUSION.

The Japanese Government has been sufficiently informed of the policies of this Headquarters concerning treatment of Japanese outside Japan.

IV. RECOMMENDATION.

That no reply be made to the Japanese memorandum.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

CONCURRENCES.

22

G-3 (   ).

Not Sent

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Trill a Red File

C O P Y

C O P Y

IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

TO: General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

FROM: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SEBJECT: Resolution of the "Associationfor Help War-Sufferers Overseas"

C.L.O. No. 621(5)

16 November 1945

With regard to the great number of Japanese overseas who were placed in difficult circumstances following the termination of the war, the Japanese Government has always been deeply concerned and is trying to do all that is possible for their relief and repatriation. At the same time, the Japanese people, having heard of the plight of their countrymen, are equally anxious about them and wish earnestly for a speedy amelioration of the situation.

For the information of the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers and by way of illustrating the acute anxiety entertained by the general public this office takes the liberty of forwarding herewith a copy of the resolution adopted by a Mass Meeting for the relief of Overseas Japanese held on the 10th inst. in the Hibiya Public Hall under the auspices of the "Association for Help-War-Sufferers Overseas".

FOR THE PRESIDENT,

(S. Iguchi).
Director of General Affairs,
Central Liaison Office.

enclosure: 1

C O P Y

C O P Y

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COPY

Resolution

Passed at the Mass Meeting for Rescuing Overseas Japanese, held under the auspices of the "Association for Help-War-Sufferers Overseas" in the Hibiya Public Hall.

November 10, 1945

Appeal to the Supreme Allied Headquarters:

1. That the overseas Japanese now being spitefully persecuted by alien races be liberated, and the safety of the life and property of those Japanese be ensured.

2. That the condition of the Japanese in Manchuria, Mongolia, North Korea, Saghalien, the Kuriles and other regions be made known here.

3. That relief goods and funds be conveyed to the sufferers.

4. That the Japanese people's anxiety for relief and rescue of their brethren be let known to the highest authorities of the Allied Powers.

5. That the representatives of the Japanese people be allowed to proceed to the regions in question in order to assist in the rescue work for their overseas brethren.

6. That facilities be given for the dispatch of messages by individual Japanese to their friends holding important positions in the Allied Powers.

7. That facilities be given for sending letters of consolation and encouragement to the Japanese war-sufferers overseas.

COPY

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

29 October 1945

AG 370.05 (29 Oct 45)GC

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Policies Governing Repatriation of Japanese Nationals in Conquered Territory.

1. Reference is made to your request in C.L.O. No 341, subject: "Policies Governing Repatriation of Japanese Nationals in Conquered Territory".

2. The return of Japanese repatriates from conquered territories must be based on military necessity. The policy to be used as a guide is announced in Memorandum this headquarters, AG 091 (16 Oct 45)GC, subject: "Policies Governing Repatriation of Japanese Nationals in Conquered Territory". The respective area commanders concerned may depart from this policy according to local circumstances.

3. It is not deemed advisable at this time to take action on request contained in letter referred to in paragraph 1 above.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

(MAILED 1430 Oct 31, 45) Adv Ech
Ag GHQ

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091 (1 Nov 45)GC 1 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Information Regarding the Conditions of Japanese Subjects in Regions under Soviet Occupation.

1. Reference is made to your C.L.O. No. 338, subject as above, dated 27 October 1945.

2. The information contained in reference letter has been forwarded to the appropriate authorities in United States.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Asst Adjutant General.

MAILED 1700 NOV 3 '45 ADV. ECH.
AG. GHQ.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 311.7 (28 Oct 45) CIS 28 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Establishment of limited Mail System for Japanese Awaiting Repatriation

1. The request of the Japanese Government to establish a limited mail system between Japanese awaiting repatriation in formerly Japanese occupied areas and the home islands is approved, subject to the following provisions:

a. Official correspondence will be restricted to matters which pertain to repatriation of Japanese forces and Japanese nationals.

b. Private correspondence will be limited to postcards, and will be of a personal nature only.

c. Commercial and financial communications are prohibited.

d. All mail will be routed through censorship stations at Tokyo, Osaka or Fukuoka.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, A. G. D.
Asst Adjutant General.

(MAILED 1100 Nov 2, 45) Adv Ech,
AG GHQ

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500
26 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

Should arrangements be made for reservation of seats in the galleries of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives for use by Allied Personnel during the session of the Diet, which has been called for 26 November 1945?

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM.

1. The Diet has been called for the purpose of passing a new election law and some labor legislation. It will be a short session, lasting probably only about three (3) weeks.

2. It seems desirable and necessary that gallery seats should be made available for use of representatives of the Allied Powers. This will be especially useful to the Government Section and also to other Sections, in order that observations may be made at first hand.

3. Normally about twenty-five (25) seats will be sufficient. Five seats should be retained for miscellaneous requests and the remaining twenty (20) assigned as follows:

Chief of Staff	3
G-2	2
C. I. & E.	3
C. I. S.	2
E. & S. S.	2
Government Section	3
Natural Resources Section	2
Public Health & Welfare Section	3
	20

III. CONCLUSIONS.

That arrangements be made with the Central Liaison Office for the allocation of seats for this purpose.

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

1. That the attached Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government be signed and dispatched. (Tab "A").

2. That the attached Staff Memorandum be approved. (Tab "B").

W. F. CHIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 091.1 (26 Nov 45)GS 26 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Admission of Allied Personnel to Diet Sessions.

In accordance with conversations had with the Central Liaison Office, it is desired that twenty-five seats be made available in each of the Houses of the Diet for use of Allied military personnel during the current session.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

26 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL STAFF SECTIONS, GHQ SCAP.

SUBJECT : Seats in the Diet Gallery for Allied Personnel.

1. Arrangements have been made for admission of official observers from this Headquarters to the forthcoming session of the Diet.

2. Upon application to the Adjutant General a limited number of passes for the entire Session will be issued to Staff Sections for use by their personnel solely as official observers on business related to the functions of the Section making application.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

FILE UNDER: Memo for Chief, O.B. Staff

INDEX SHEET

DATE: 29 Nov., 1945

FROM: Gen. Crist

TO: C/S

SUBJECT: Establishment of Legal Basis for Democratic Government

DOCUMENT FILED UNDER:

Diet

CLASSIFIED FILE:

S.A

24

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500
30 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the pending Japanese national election and to obtain guidance in respect of the area, off shore islands etc to which the election is applicable.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM.

1. In paragraph 9c of the proposed "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper" (JCS 1380/15 of 2 November 1945) the following is provided regarding the holding of a national election: "Free elections of representative local governments should be held at the earliest practicable date, and at the regional and national levels, as directed after consideration of your recommendation through the Joint Chiefs of Staff".

2. As used in the proposed Directive above mentioned, Japan is defined as comprising the four main islands and "about 1000 smaller adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands" (JCS 1380/15 paragraph 1b). Paragraph 4a of the same directive requires appropriate steps be taken to effect the separation from Japan of Manchuria, Formosa (and the Pescadores), Korea, Karafuto and "all Pacific Islands which she [Japan] has seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise, since the beginning of the world war in 1914". Neither the "1000 smaller adjacent islands" referred to in the J.C.S. paper nor the "minor islands" referred to in paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Declaration (which are to constitute Japanese territory have been precisely defined.

3. The Japanese have called a session of the National Diet beginning 26 November 1945 to consider, among other things, changes in the existing election law so as to extend the franchise to women and to lower the minimum voting age for both men and women. An election of Diet members is to be held early in January 1946. In view of the time when this national election is proposed to be held, changes in the election laws will also involve the fixing of new dates for the certification of persons eligible to vote, the certification of candidates for the Diet and for the other procedural steps leading to the national election.

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4. Since present directives from this Headquarters have barred transport to islands more than a given distance off shore the Japanese Government, through the Central Liaison Office (see Letter C.L.O. 401, attached as Tab "A"), has requested permission to circulate official election materials consisting of ballots, election lists, registers, etc., and unofficial material consisting of campaign literature, posters, etc., and to permit the travel of election officials and, possibly, candidates for election in the following areas:

a. The seven islands of Izu lying south of Tokyo which are part of Tokyo prefecture. These islands are under control of CINCPAC.

b. The islands in the northern Ryukus which are in Oshima-Gun (district) in Kagoshima Ken (Prefecture). These are the islands beginning with Yoron Island, not far north of Okinawa, and running northeasterly to the southern tip of Kyushu, with Amami O-Shima as the principal island and district capital. Information received from the Japanese indicated that these islands have a population of about 185,000 persons and, with a small area at the southern end of Kyushu, constitute one of the three election districts in Kagoshima Prefecture. In the past these islands have had a representative in the Diet. They are subject to Military Government under CINCPAC.

c. The islands in Hoppomaze-mura (township) which includes Suisho, Yuri, Shibotoro, Tara and Akuyuri Islands which lie close off shore, northeast of Numero at the eastern tip of Hokkaido Island. Information at hand indicates that the normal population of these islands is approximately 3,000. This may have been somewhat diminished by evacuation of women and children to Numero. These islands are occupied by Russian forces.

5. In the same letter, the Japanese Government advises the headquarters that they have abandoned the idea of holding an election in the islands in Okinawa prefecture and in the larger Kurile Islands lying northeast of Hokkaido, due to the "now prevailing conditions".

6. Due to the absence of a precise definition of the islands which are to comprise Japan, it is not known whether or not the islands referred to in items a, b, and c of paragraph 4 (in which the Japanese wish to hold the election) or Okinawa and the larger Kurile Islands further from Hokkaido (in which the Japanese Government renounces the election) are to be treated as part of Japan or whether they are to be treated as separated from Japanese sovereignty. On the other hand, the Japanese may construe the giving or withholding of permission to circulate election materials as an indication of Allied policy with respect to their ultimate disposition.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

a. That the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that no action be taken to prevent the holding of the election of Diet members after the election law is revised.

b. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the policy of the Headquarters with regard to the election and to furnish guidance with regard to the off shore islands ~~th~~ which it is to apply.

c. That, upon approval of the policy with respect to the election by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Japanese Government be permitted to circulate the materials necessary to make the election effective, as requested in their C.L.O. 401 (Tab "A")above 30°N.Lat.and except in the islands occupied by Russian forces, and that the Government be informed that the giving or withholding of permission is not to be taken as an indication of Allied policy with regard to the disposition of the islands in question.

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

It is recommended that the cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as at Tab "B" be approved and dispatched.

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

CONCURRENCES.

G-3 { }
Pol Advr { }

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

4 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

1. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To consider a letter dated 5 November 1945 from the Annamite Residents' Association inviting mediation of the Indochina question by the United States. (Tab "A").

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

1. The letter asserts that the Annamite Residents' Association has over 10,000 members who speak for over 25,000,000 people, that Viet-Nam (the portion of Indo-China occupied by the Annamites) was never under French sovereignty, that a return of French rule would be resisted, and that a period of international control would be preferable.

2. The letter cites a reported offer by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division, U.S. Department of State, of his good offices for mediation, and requests the United States Government to initiate mediation proceedings between the French Government and the Viet-Nam Provisional Government at Hanoi.

III. CONCLUSION.

Subject letter raises broad questions of international policy which should be considered on a governmental level.

IV. RECOMMENDATION.

That the following letters be approved and dispatched:

a. Letter to Ngayen Huu Hien, President of the Annamite Residents' Association (Tab "B").

b. Letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab "C").

a. disapproved
b. approved
} by D/S

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U.S.Army
Chief, Government Section

ANNAMITE RESIDENTS'
ASSOCIATION
412. HSIENG YENG LU. (EX. ROI ALBERT)
TEL. 73985
Shanghai-China

Shang-hai November 5th 1945

His Excellency, General Douglas A. MacArthur,

c/o American Embassy,

Tokyo - Japan.

Excellency,

We, the Annamite Residents' Association in China, which has a membership of over ten thousand compatriots, beg to invite the immediate action of the United States offered mediation in settling the pending Indochina question, expressing our willingness to accept, next to independence, international control as a step towards complete independence, in order to maintain peace and order in Indochia, which is being disturbed by further coming of French troops and extension of French military operations.

Before making our appeal for the liberty and independence of our country, which has a territory of more than 700.000 square miles and a population of over 26 millions, we must congratulate the American people upon their victory of liberty and justice over aggression and imperialism, and thank the Government of the United States for its sponsoring and establishing the Charter of the United Nations, which provides equal rights and self-determination for oppressed peoples.

We are glad to read in the newspapers that the President of the United States believes in the eventual return of soverign rights and self-government to all peoples who have been deprived of them by force and that the Secretary of State objects to the use of lend-lease weapons by the French in their present military aggression at Saigon, Indochina; and the Chief of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department, although failing to question the soverignty of the French in Indochina, has offered his good offices for mediation. It is to our great regret that fair-minded Americans do not know the fact that France never had soverignty, but only imposed protection over all Indochina; which is composed of five parts; namely, Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina, Laos and Cambodia. We must make it clear that Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, all inhabited by Annamites, are together called

Viet-Nam by the native people. According to the Treaty of 1863 between the Kingdom of Viet-Nam and the Empire of France, Saigon and its three surrounding districts were ceded to the French. Only after 1885, when an undecisive war has been fought between China and France, the Kingdom of Viet-Nam was finally forced to become a protectorate of France. We still have our king, whose name is Bao-Dai and who holds his court at his capital, Hue, his government being the legal and legitimate authority over Tonkin, Annam and a part of Laos. As to Cambodia, it is now also a kingdom under the protection of France, which has never possessed territorial soverign rights over either Viet-Nam or Cambodia. During the last world war, France lost her control over all Indochina to the Japanese, and both Viet-Nam and Cambodia had taken the long sought opportunity to declare their independence and throw away French protection, nay, French yoke, which has been imposed upon the Indochinese people merely by military force. History has recorded many instances of uprisings and revolutions by Indochinese patriots against the despotic and corrupt French colonial rule during the past seventy years of protection and suzereignty.

As international publicists have observed, there are four probable ways of settling the Indochina question:

1°) Restoration of French colonial rule, as desired by the French imperialists.

2°) Complete independence, as desired by the Annamite nationalists.

3°) International control for a number of years before complete independence.

4°) Maintenance of status quo, leaving complete independence for the northern part, namely, Tonkin, Annam and Laos, and restoration of French rule in the southern part, especially Cambodia.

We beg to point out frankly that the restoration of French colonial rule over all Indochina, as intended by the French, will only lead to further bloodshed and endless warfare there, which will disturb peace in the Far East, and cannot be tolerated by non-imperialistic and peace-loving nations of the world, especially the great United States and the neighboring Republic of China. So the first suggested settlement cannot be allowed to take place, for it is not only against the wishes of the Indochinese people, but also against permanent peace of the world, as stipulated in the Charter of United Nations. The Viet-

Nam people who inhabitate Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina and constitute 80% of the total population of Indochina, are confident that they are capable of complete independence, as we were an independent state before the French invasion. France imposed imperialistic protection over our country in 1885, only after a war with us as well as a war with China. The late World War has proved that France cannot even protect herself against her neighbour; how can she and why should she protect a nation of entirely different race and culture, almost ten thousand miles away, in the other half of the world. French Colonial rule is despotic and corrupt and against the interests and wishes of the native people. The so-called French protection has only destroyed our civilization, exploited our resources and enslaved our people, and we cannot endure anymore.

During the World War France never fought the Japanese, nor reconquered any part of Indochina before the surrender of Japan. So the case is different as regards the United States and Great Britain in the Philippines and Burma, respectively, both of which had been reconquered during the war. Besides, the American rule in the Phillippines is beneficient to the natives and desired by most of the people. If the United States is willing to let the Philippines free in 1946, why should France try to reconquer Indochina, after the war is over, and disturb peace in the Far East? From the viewpoint of history, civilization and actual conditions, the Indochinese, especially the Annamites, deserve liberty and independence, just as well as, if not better than, the Filipinos and the Koreans.

Next to complete independence, we are, however, willing to accept international control, as announced by our leaders at Hanoi, not long ago, in order to prove our ability for self-government, as well for the sake of world peace. But international control must be limited to a certain period, say five or ten years. This is somewhat in accord with the Chinese proposal at Dumbarton Oaks Conference. We hope that the United States and China, and even Soviet Russia and Great Britain, will sponsor for this kind of settlement, for it is the only compromise that the Viet-Nam people are willing to accept. We can never accept French rule again, no matter under what disguise.

General De Gaulle once said that Indochina will have a new status, under the French Republic, just as Canada or Australia in the British Commonwealth of Nations. But he ignored the fact that the Indochinese are an Oriental people,

quite different from the French in race, culture, tradition and outlook; while the English, Canadians and Australians are all Anglo-Saxons and speak the same mother tongue. We Indochinese can never become French, nor the French can become Indochinese. The Viet-Nam people are closely related to the Chinese in race and culture, and their country was an integral part of China for over a thousand years, therefore highly civilized and capable of self-government. We want to be independent to preserve our own civilization and do not care to become French protegees anymore. Let the French mind their own business and leave the Indochinese alone.

But if France refuses to agree to international control of Indochina for a definite period, it proves that imperialistic France wants to enslave us again, and for an indefinite time. De Gaulle, d'Argenlieu, Leclarc, etc... are all die-hard imperialists who are trying to fool the world. Then we must beseech the democratic and peace-loving nations of the world, especially the great United States and the neighboring Republic of China, and even Soviet Russia and Great Britain, to help us in our struggle for liberty, democracy and independence; for an independent Viet-Nam is a sure guarantee of permanent peace and security in the Far East.

Even though we cannot help leaving, for the time being, southern Indochina, especially Cambodia, in the hands of the French, we can never allow northern Indochina, namely, Tonkin, Annam and Laos, now in the hands of Chinese troops, to fall again into the shackles of our French oppressors. As declared by our leaders, "the Annamites prefer to die rather than to live under French rule again; Indochina will be a land of freedom or a land of corpses". French troops must leave Indochina, including Saigon and must not reconquer our country by force.

The fact is that there has never been French sovereignty over the Kingdom of Viet-Nam, which was only a protectorate and not a colony or territory of the French. As stated above, both Viet-Nam and Cambodia had in the world war declared their independence of the French. And now the Provisional Government at Hanoi has re-affirmed this act of independence and is working for a democratic form of government. We are sure that the coming elections of the people will give unanimous approval. In the period of emancipation of oppressed peoples, are the French imperialists allwed to employ military force to reconquer Indochina, against the wishes of the Indochinese people and against the

very first Article of the Charter of the United Nations?

This is certainly an acid test whether the newly ratified Charter of The United Nations is a sure guarantee of equal rights and self-determination for oppressed peoples; and whether the newly created international Organization will seek effective measures to stop aggression and disturbance of peace in Far Eastern Asia. Otherwise the hypocritic French may politely refuse the American offer of mediation, but will harshly whip the Indochinese into submission.

Trusting that the above will receive Your Excellency's favorable consideration and that this appeal will be given attention in your international discussions, we, voicing the true wishes and aspirations of the Annamese people, earnestly request the United States Government to stand up, for the sake of peace, justice and humanity, and initiate mediation between the French Government and the Viet-Nam Provisional Government at Hanoi, in order to stop further aggression and the use of military force, and to bring about joint international control as a step toward independence, over all Indochina so that peace and order may be maintained in the Far East, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, which is now a part of international law, and the only hope of small and weak peoples over the world, we beg the honor to be

Your Excellency's most respectfully,

Nguyen Huu Hien

President of the Annamite Residents, Association

Doan Huu

Secretary of the Association

C O P Y

December 1945

Nguyen Huu Hien, President
Annamite Residents' Association
412 Hsieng Yeng Lu (Ex Rou Albert)
Shanghai, China

Dear Sir:

Your letter of November 5, 1945, in which you invite on behalf of your association "The immediate action of the United States' offered mediation in settling the pending Indo-China question" is acknowledged.

Since your letter raises broad questions of international policy, it has been referred to the appropriate governmental authorities for their consideration.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

Not Sent

TAB - B

AG 5 Nov 45-
(~~1 Dec~~ 45)GS

APO 500
December 1945

SUBJECT: Request of Annamite Residents' Association for Mediation by United States.

TO : Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington 25, D. C.

Transmitted for your consideration and such action as you may deem apporpriated, is a letter dated 5 November 1945, from the Annamite Residents' Association, Shanghai, China.

~~By command of General MacARTHUR:~~
FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

1 Incl: As indicated above
as corrected

TAB-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

APO 500
4 December 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To implement the termination of Japan's diplomatic and consular representation abroad by prohibiting all communication between the Japanese Government and its former diplomatic and consular representatives abroad, except as authorized.

II. FACTS BEARING UPON THE PROBLEM.

1. In Memorandum of 25 October 1945 to the Japanese Government, the latter was directed to recall Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives in neutral countries and to cease further relations with foreign governments, except as authorized. (Tab "A").

2. An examination of censorship comment sheets shews that the Japanese Government is continuing to communicate with its former diplomatic and consular representatives in neutral countries concerning matters other than these which are necessary to effect compliance with this Headquarter's Memorandum of 25 October 1945, e. g. daily reports concerning developments in Japan.

3. Such communications are inconsistent with the position of SCAP and tend to weaken the effect of the Memorandum of 25 October 1945.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

Communications other than these relating to termination of Japan's diplomatic and consular representation abroad should be prohibited.

IV. ACTION RECOMMENDED.

That the enclosed Memorandum to the Japanese Government be approved and dispatched (Tab "B").

W. E. CRIST
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief, Government Section

25A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

APO 500
6 Oct 45

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

1. Problem presented in the attached staff study and Memorandum for the Japanese Government in response to their CLO No. 144, 2 October 45, has been discussed with Capt Malgaard, USN, acting for Adm. Ballantyne, FLTLOSCAP, who concurs in the recommended action.

2. Mr. Mogami, Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, in concurrence with Mr. Nishimwa, Chief of the Fishery Products Section, assures me that the need for clarification of the "nori" culture restrictions is now passed.

3. The proposed Memorandum, therefore, is necessary merely to clear the record.

R. H. FIEDLER,
Lt Col, AUS,

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

6 December 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

I. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED.

To initiate action to carry out the injunctions of the Potsdam Declaration, the U.S. initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4-A, approved by the President as a statement of U.S. policy), and the JCS Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP(JCS 1380/15), to destroy the influence of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan by removing and excluding certain individuals from public office.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

1. Under the documents stating the objectives of the occupation, the Supreme Commander is directed to fulfill the following mission for the elimination of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan:

Potsdam Declaration

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

JCS Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP (JCS 1380/15)

Paragraph 5-B: "Except as indicated in paragraph 7-C below, in no circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprise who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, who have been influential members of any Japanese ultra-nationalistic, terroristic or secret patriotic society, its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in the activities of the other organizations enumerated in paragraph 5-G below, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation."

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