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COERCION COMPLETED,
OR
TREASON TRIUMPHANT.

REMARKS,
BY JOHN C. HAMILTON,
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On the fifth of December, 1860, President Buchanan, acknowledging a correspondence which I sent to him between Madison and Hamilton—the subject, the right of a State to withdraw from the Union—wrote to me: “I have read the Hamilton and Madison Correspondence to several friends both in the Senate and the House, with, I think, a good effect upon some of them.”

In the letter thus acknowledged, I proposed to communicate to him the opinions of Washington and Hamilton—Jefferson and Madison—asserting the right of the Coercion of refractory States. This overture was declined. On the 7th of December I informed the President of a communication from Charleston, which had come to my knowledge, seeking minute information as to the military defences in that harbor; and on the following day, not apprized of the President’s false views, and therefore ignorant of his motives for declining my overture, I sent to him the opinions previously referred to. Subsequently, at the request of General Scott, I transmitted to him a copy of my last letter to the President. This noble patriot—anxious, as he observed, “for some practical scheme of compromise” which would meet the crisis, yet fully prepared, in the grievous emergency, to put forth the military arm of the nation—wrote to me on the 22d of December: “In a long interview, a week ago, with the President, I endeavored to bring him out on General Washington’s and Mr. Jefferson’s doctrines on the Coercion of States, but could not make him touch the subject or allude to your letter. Of course, I did not. He declined even to say that he would enforce (after secession) the revenue laws.”

The effort had been made and had failed, and the nation was permitted to drift into a civil convulsion. Subsequently I was informed that my father was quoted for opinions hostile to Coercion. I gave so preposterous a statement little heed until recently, when I met the pamphlet hereafter referred to. I felt it was a duty to the public not to be silent, and therefore these remarks.

New York, September 24th, 1864.

JOHN C. HAMILTON.

COERCION COMPLETED

OR

TREASON TRIUMPHANT.

I am neither a partizan nor a politician. I voted for Buchanan to exclude Fremont—then apprehensive of the crisis which has since occurred—and I did *not vote* at the last Presidential election, influenced by the same apprehension.

Recognizing the Government of the United States as existing in the Constitution of the United States as a “Representative Democracy,” for all its officers are directly or indirectly “the choice of the people,” and the Constitution itself is “revocable and alterable by the people,” I am a Democrat—and, as “the Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State Governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate; and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of the sovereign power,” is a “Federal Government,” I am a Federalist.

In both these aspects, I am compelled to be and am an UNIONIST—for in addition to the value of the union in all other respects, I know that a “firm union is of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.” Believing in the preservation of this “Firm Union,” as containing the life of our nation, I regard the doctrine of SECESSION as a doctrine of political SUICIDE. So I utterly reject it. Assured that COERCION by the laws of the nation, and when the necessity has arisen—by the arms of the nation, is indispensable to the preservation of its life, the motives which oblige me to reject the doctrine of secession, equally oblige me to assert and vindicate the right and the duty of COERCION.

The idea of secession—the power of secession, the right of secession—the duty of secession, are unknown in the history of

the American people, until two years before the close of the last century; even the word secession, used in a political sense, is believed until that time to have been unknown. To "secede," means "to withdraw from a fellowship." In no one of the constitutions of the several States of this Union, was the right "to withdraw" reserved. All of these constitutions look to the continuing existence of these several States in Union,—and the Articles of Confederation declaratory of their common opinion and exigent purpose, are defined by themselves to be "Articles of Confederation and PERPETUAL UNION." Not only do not the constitutions of any of the States reserve a right "to withdraw"—a right of secession, but in the restrictions imposed on themselves as States, by themselves as States, when entering into this "confederation and perpetual Union," they erected barriers to such withdrawal, and to secure the perpetuating those common united interests, imposed common united duties, and established common united powers. It was not in the absence of a common sense of the value of a Union, that the Articles of Confederation were defective, it was in an *absence* of the *means* of rendering that Union a common blessing, by its mild operations through the medium of all pervading laws, thus provoking foreign aggressions and internal conflicts, without adequate powers to repel or subdue them. This was the disease of the confederation; and the present Constitution of the United States was offered to the people of the United States, and was accepted, as the remedy for this disease, by "the people of the United States." Setting forth in its preamble the great purposes in their view, they "ordained and established this constitution for the United States." Framed and proposed by the general convention of the people, of which Washington was the head—recommended by the Congress of the several States—adopted by the people of the United States in conventions, called by the State Legislatures, this adoption was not the act of the several States,—nor of the people of the several States—agreeing *with* each other, but it was the act of the people of the several States agreeing *to* the Constitution—and thus ordaining and establishing it. The words "ordain and establish" here used so prominently, were well understood by the framers of this constitution. They were words derived from the scriptures—used in a scrip-

tural sense, used most solemnly in all their significance, in their application to the highest of human acts—the creation of a government—to express an act of Supreme power by the people of the United States—“decreeing and settling firmly”—a complete and final act—a constitution of government for “themselves and their posterity.” The Constitution sought two primary objects. For the insufficient and conflicting powers of war under the confederation, it substituted a plenary sovereign power of war, making the President of the United States, “Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” thus empowering him to fulfill the obligations of his inaugural oath, “to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.” To prevent a conflict with this plenary power by the State governments, the Constitution declares that “no State shall, without the consent of Congress, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace—enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

The other primary object of the Constitution was to substitute within the domain of the United States, a government of law, instead of a government by arms. “The great and radical vice,” it is stated in “The Federalist”—the great American commentary on the Constitution, “in the construction of the confederation, is in the principle of LEGISLATION for States or governments, in their CORPORATE OR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom they consist—a principle in itself evidently incompatible with GOVERNMENT, a principle, in short, which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.”

Nor is the evidence wanting that such was deemed the true theory of the Articles of Confederation. Madison and Jefferson have been regarded as the especial guardians of American liberties as the founders of the school of strict constitutional constructions—as the friends, above all others, of STATE RIGHTS, and thus became the idols of Democracy. What were their opinions as to the right and the power of COERCING STATES?

Madison, then a member of Congress sitting at Philadelphia,

thus writes to Jefferson, on the 16th of April, 1781.—“Madison Papers, vol. 1, p. 86.”

“The necessity of *arming* Congress with COERCIVE POWERS arises from the shameful *deficiency* of some of the States, which are most capable of yielding their apportioned supplies—and the military exactions to which others, already exhausted by the enemy and our own troops, are in consequence exposed. Without such powers, too, in the General Government, the whole Confederacy may be insulted, and the most salutary measures frustrated by the most inconsiderable State in the Union. As the Confederation now stands, and according to the nature of alliances much less intimate, there is an implied right of COERCION against the delinquent party.”

“As long as there is a regular army on foot, a small detachment from it, acting under civil authority, would at any time render a voluntary contribution of supplies due from a State, an eligible alternative. But there is a still more efficacious mode. The situation of most of the States is such, that two or three vessels of *force* employed *against* their trade, will make it their interest to yield prompt obedience to all just requisitions on them.”

What is this but an express assertion of the right of *coercion* of a State or States to enforce the “contribution of supplies” to the common treasury, by detachments from the regular army, or of a squadron from the navy?

Nor is the assertion of this right of coercion less explicit by Jefferson: “It has been so often said,” he publicly writes, “as to be generally believed, that Congress have no power by the Confederation to *enforce* anything, for example—*contributions of money*. It was not necessary to give them power expressly, THEY HAVE IT BY THE LAW OF NATURE. When two parties make a *compact*, there *results* to each a *power of compelling* the other to execute it. COMPULSION was never so easy, as in our case, where a *single frigate* would soon levy on the commerce of any STATE, the deficiency of its *contributions*.” Here again is an assertion of the right of coercion without any reserves whatever, and for the mere purpose of enforcing “contributions of supplies.” This right of coercion, it must be remembered, was avowed by both these public men, *anterior* to

the adoption of the existing Constitution—and by both as resulting from a *compact* between the States. Nor can this result, as fairly deducible from the position of a government existing by *compact*, be denied. Ancient and modern history agree in showing, that in the case of one of several confederates combined in a league, the sword, in the event of a delinquency, is the only arbiter, and CIVIL WAR the necessary consequence. It was to prevent this resort and the inevitable consequence, that the present Constitution was established, creating a National Government, to be executed by laws passing “into immediate operation upon the citizens themselves.” By this instrument it is provided, that, “this Constitution and the laws of the United States, which will be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the LAND; and it is further provided that, “the people in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of the State to the contrary, notwithstanding.” In further pursuit of this object, it declares that the representatives of the States and of the people in Congress, “the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution.” Thus it is, that any evil acts of any of the States in contravention of the Constitution were made inoperative. All, therefore, that it was possible to do, according to the structure of the Constitution of the United States, to secure its legal supremacy, was done—postponing to the great emergencies of “*domestic violence*,” the employment of the military arm of the nation.

While these formal avowals of Madison and of Jefferson of the right of coercing States, have been carefully kept out of view by the partizans of the Rebel Confederates, the language of Hamilton, in the Convention of New York, held in 1788, has been quoted in denial of that right. His argument, truly stated and truly understood, *recognizes* the right as existing under the Confederation; *objects* to the Confederation, as making the resort to coercion a necessary means of compelling the success of its ordinary operations; and points to the then proposed, now existing Constitution—as providing the peaceful remedy. The quotation employed most unwarrantably omits the preceding and following sentences, which fully explain its import:

“Sir,” Hamilton remarked, “if we have national objects to pursue, we must have national revenues. If you make requisitions and they are not complied with; what is to be done?” It has been well observed, that to coerce the States is one of the maddest projects that ever was devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single State. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? Here is a nation at war with itself! A government that can exist only by the sword. Every such war must involve the innocent with the guilty. This single consideration should be sufficient to dispose every peaceable citizen against such a government. * * What is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the States do.”

The abuse of Hamilton’s language, the purpose of which is clearly shown by the context, is resorted to in order to denounce the administration for employing the military power of the Government in resistance to a military attempt to subvert it. For it must always be remembered, that this war was not begun by the United States, that it is not a war merely of coercion, that the right or duty of the initiatory coercion of States is not at all the question; that, on the part of the Government, it is the exercise of a power necessarily incident to all government, the power of self-defence, and the exercise of an express constitutional power—a war against a war begun—a war against “TREASON,” which the Constitution declares “consists in LEVYING WAR against the United States.” Was ever treason marked by more overt acts; the attack on Fort Sumter; the occupation of the other forts; the seizure of the public property of the United States; the compelling the troops of the United States to surrender on parole; the firing on the militia of the United States called forth for the defence of the capital; the project to ASSASSINATE the President on his journey to the seat of Government; and the organized bodies of troops in Virginia to SEIZE HIS PERSON. All of these acts of treason are patent facts, with the exception of the two last; and as to one of these, I quote the declaration of General Scott: “Those who deny the intention to *assassinate* the President are little acquainted with the facts;” and as to the last, the plot to seize his person, I refer to

the authority of General Wool. They live to confirm these statements.

But to return to the chief topic of these remarks. I will now show by their positive, explicit declarations, that Washington and Hamilton both asserted the power under the present Constitution to COERCE one or more rebellious States, and approved the exertion of that power.

Treason most often raises its head in the moments of a nation's danger—moments when patriotism quickens the roused current of its blood, and raises its mighty arm. The doctrine of a subsisting *compact* between the States is seen to have been the ground upon which Madison and Jefferson asserted a power in the confederation to COERCE a State. The same doctrine of a subsisting COMPACT, not applicable to the existing Constitution of the United States, is the basis used by the same persons, Jefferson and Madison, to assert to a State or States a right to NULLIFY—that is, render inoperative, and to resist “laws of the United States,” declared by the Constitution to be the “*supreme law of the LAND*”—a term as broad as the limits of the American Republic—comprehending all its States and all its territories, and even its adjacent ocean waters. France was waging a practical war against the United States, seizing the ships, and depredating on the commerce of the nation, as England has recently been depredating upon it through confederate corsairs. The leaders of the democratic party—then in the interest of France, as now in the interest of Great Britain, seeking to dissolve the Union—were then engaged in exciting sedition, as they now are engaged in exciting sedition, employing then as now, as its principal instruments, aliens, and recently naturalized aliens. The National Government found it necessary to pass laws to restrain sedition and to control these aliens—laws expressly approved and vindicated by Washington, when retired from office. To clamor against and to oppose these laws was the policy of Jefferson and of Madison, whom Washington, in the first draught of his “Farewell address” denounced to the world. This hostility to the Government gave birth to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions: the former from the hand of Jefferson, the latter from that of Madison.

In the first of these Kentucky resolutions, Jefferson declares,

that the States were united by a *compact* under the title of a Constitution—that “to this compact each State *acceded*, as a *State*, and is an integral party, its co-States forming as to itself, the other party—and that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to *judge for itself*, as well of infractions, as of the *mole* and *measure* of redress.” Then follows the declaration, that in the assumed cases—“NULLIFICATION of the act is the rightful remedy.” (See Jefferson’s Works, IV., 344—Letter of Jefferson, admitting himself to have been the author of these resolutions.) Madison followed; and on the same ground of a *compact* to which the States were parties, asserted their right to interfere.

On this very theory of a *compact* of States, as if it warranted one or more States to *nullify* a law of the United States—as “one party” to that compact, it warranted the “co-States” as “the other party,” to *enforce* that law. The non-feasance or resistance of “the one party” justifies and compels coercion by “the other party.” According, therefore, to their own theory—the States Rights theory—as applied to the Constitution of the United States, Jefferson and Madison are the advocates of coercion. But such is not the true theory of the Constitution. This doctrine of a *compact* of States is *diametrically* in opposition to the Constitution. It was the doctrine made use of to prevent its being adopted. Judge Wilson, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, repelled it in the Constitution of Pennsylvania, in 1788: “I cannot discover the least trace of a compact in that system. There can be no compact unless there are more parties than one: I know no bargains that could be made there,” (in the General Convention.) I am unable to conceive who the parties could be. The State governments make a bargain with one another! *Far other* were the ideas of the Constitution, and *far other* are those conveyed in the system itself. This is *not* a government founded on *compact*. It is founded on the power of the people. They express in their name and in their authority—“We, the people, ordain and establish.” From their ratification alone, it is to take its constitutional authority. These expressions declare in a practical manner, the principle of the Constitution. It is “ordained and established” by the people themselves.”

This doctrine of a *compact* is the *false* and gratuitous assumption upon which this rebellion wholly relies to prove its rightfulness. This is the ground upon which it is justified by its advocates among us, while waging open and barbarous war.

People of America, I invite you, I conjure you to read the words of Washington, who never deceived you—as applied to these resolutions and to the authors of them—and as *now applicable* to the party opposing the administration. Washington thus writes to La Fayette, December 24, 1798: “The sum amounts to this—that a party exists in the United States, formed by a combination of causes, which oppose the Government in all its measures, and are determined, as their conduct evinces, by clogging its wheels, indirectly to *change the nature of it*, and to *subvert* the constitution.” Of the alien members of their party, Washington wrote, declaring their express purpose to be, that, of “poisoning the minds of our people, and sowing dissensions among them, in order to alienate their affections from the Government of their choice, thereby endeavoring to dissolve the UNION.” “It is somewhat equivocal still,” Washington wrote to Charles Carroll, “whether that party, who have *been the curse OF THE COUNTRY*, and the source of the expenses we have to encounter, may not be able to continue their delusion. What a pity it is, the expense could not be taxed on them.” “That the object of this party, was “to *facilitate* the design of *SUBVERTING THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT*, I have no more doubt than that I am now in the act of writing this letter.” And then looking the danger full in the face, Washington points to *COERCION*. It is in a letter addressed by Washington, a Virginian, to Patrick Henry, formerly Governor of Virginia, the eloquent patriot—looking to coerce Virginia: “But at such a crisis as this, when everything dear and valuable to us is assailed, when a party hangs upon the wheels of Government as a dead weight, *opposing every measure that is calculated for defence and self-preservation*, abetting the nefarious views of another nation upon our rights, preferring, as long as they dare contend openly against the spirit and resentment of the people—the interest of France—(now the interest of England)—to the welfare of their own country—measures systematically and pertinaciously pursued, which must eventually *DISSOLVE THE UNION OR PRODUCE COERCION*.”

Read these words of Washington, people of the United States, and ask yourselves whether, if written at the present time, they could more aptly, more truly have depicted the party now in opposition to the Government. Read these words, and then see whether Washington would not have advised coercion. Read these words and compare them with the submissive, disorganizing, sympathizing platform of the recent Chicago Convention. Read them; and then doubt, if you can, whether Washington would not have again accepted the command of your armies, leading them on to victory as Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan are now doing. A few words more will close this paper.

In a recent pamphlet entitled "A Great Statesman speaking to the People. Alexander Hamilton on Coercion and Civil War"—the passage previously *partially* quoted from his speech in the New York Convention, is strangely adduced in favor of *non-coercion*, in other words, in favor of permitting States to rise in rebellious war, thus "to overturn the Government." The purpose of that quotation has been shown, by quoting it in full, as an argument in favor of the existing Constitution. Was Alexander Hamilton, therefore, of the opinion that the National Government could not justly, constitutionally, and if it could, ought not to suppress a rebellion? A single historical fact is decisive—Hamilton, with Washington's assent—when Secretary of the Treasury—proceeded with an *army* into the far interior of Pennsylvania, which *suppressed a rebellion*; the object of which, it is stated in an intercepted despatch of the then French Minister (Fauchet), was to initiate a "civil war" in the United States. Nor is this the only evidence of Hamilton's opinion. Within a little more than a month after the last quoted letter of Washington, pointing to the coercion of Virginia, on the second of February, 1799, Hamilton wrote to Sedgwick. In this important letter he urges a report by Congress, "exhibiting with great luminousness and partiality, the reasons which support the constitutionality and expediency of the law," (to restrain sedition and control lawless aliens)—the tendency of the doctrines advanced by Virginia and Kentucky, to DESTROY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, and with calm dignity, united with pathos, the full evidence which they afford of a *regular con-*

spiracy to OVERTURN THE GOVERNMENT. A little pamphlet," he adds, "containing this report, should find its way into every house in Virginia. This should be done, and NOTHING TO COURT A SNOCK should be adopted. In the meantime," he observes—looking to the eventual necessity of coercing Virginia—"the measures for raising the military force should proceed with activity—whenever the experiment shall be made to *subdue* a REFRACTORY and POWERFUL STATE by militia, the event will shame the advocates of their sufficiency." Under his advice, the then slender means of Government were called into exertion. A small body of troops *was* stationed in Virginia; and the contemplated rebellion was abandoned. If a similar measure, urged at the beginning of the present crisis, had been adopted, and a small body of troops been detached to Richmond to protect the friends of the Union in the convention there, from being overawed by a mob, Virginia would have refused her concurrence, and this great rebellion might have been averted for a time.

The historical statements here given shew the direct, irreconcilable antagonism between the two great parties of this country—the States right, as they call it, or Democratic party—asserting on the supposition that "a State is clearly the ultimate judge of infractions of the Constitution;" that it has a right "to judge for itself of the mode and measure of redress," and, therefore, the party of DISUNION—and the NATIONAL or UNION party, which asserts the power of the National Government over every individual of the United States, without regard to the particular locality or State in which he may reside, to compel obedience to this National Government, exercising the powers vested in it by the Constitution, to preserve that Union.

To say of the friends of the Union that they never have been the advocates of a policy detrimental to the Union, were not more untrue than to charge the members of the Democratic party, *without distinction*, with being the advocates of Disunion.

Happily for the permanent welfare of the Nation there are checks in the Constitution, and in the education of the popular mind under it, that can be safely and certainly appealed to against any temporary misconstructions of the powers of the Constitution. This can be done, and often done; and yet the Constitution WILL LIVE. Happily for the permanent welfare of

the Nation, among the Democratic party there are numerous and glorious exceptions of men, on many points having strong opinions as to a national policy, who deny utterly the theory of State secession,—who affirm boldly the doctrine of coercion,—who cling proudly to the unbroken integrity of the Union. But again, there are among their leaders those who declare that “the whole scheme of Coercion is *impracticable*,—that it is *contrary* to the genius and spirit of the Constitution.” Give such men sway, and the Constitution CANNOT LIVE.

Now, how does the issue of this election stand before the people in reference to the respective candidates? The position of McClellan is anomalous. What it actually is may be ascertained from two sources. Immediately previous to the assembling of the Chicago Convention, several of its delegates from different States sojourned on their way at Saratoga Springs. At this time and place was present a correspondent of the British Ministerial paper, “*The London Post*.” The Convention was organized at Chicago at noon of the *twenty-ninth of August*, 1864, by Auguste Belmont, now Chairman of “the National Democratic Committee,”—a few years previously, consul of Austria at New York. The day before the opening of the Chicago Convention—on the 28th of August—a letter of that date was written from Saratoga Springs by its correspondent to *The London Post*, whence it is extracted in the *New York Herald* of September 25th, speaking of McClellan as the probable nominee of the Convention. This language is used: “As for his principles, it is difficult to say what they are. Avowedly, McClellan is a Unionist. *Openly*, he professes to be willing to give the South every necessary guaranty, provided the Southern States consent to return into the Union. *Privately*, he assures those friends who discourage the prosecution of the war that he desires peace, and that he will advocate an armistice and a convention of the States, should he receive the nomination at Chicago. He urges, as a reason for not openly avowing these sentiments, that the people are not yet ready to endorse them, and considers it impolitic to take any step *too decidedly in advance* of the popular feeling. He feels assured, however, that the triumph of the Democratic party must end in peace, for he says, that, if even it wished to carry on the war, there would be *no*

army of any magnitude left at the disposal of the Government by the 4th of March next. What these opinions and professions are worth it is hard to say.

There are not a few who distrust McClellan, and who fail to place confidence in the assurances of a man, who was one of the first in the commencement of this revolution to set the example of the violation of personal liberty; as he did, by the arrest of the members of the Maryland Legislature; who has made all the reputation he has as a war man by the prosecution of the war, and who is still drawing pay from the republican Government as an officer of the army now engaged in carrying on a war, which he pretends to regard as ruinous to the country."

Was ever any passage more significant than this of the plot to deceive the people, and of the character of the chief instrument of the plotters? How could there be a more complete, entire solution of the *practice* of the Chicago Convention's resolutions and of McClellan's letter of acceptance? Every line—every word is replete with meaning. McClellan, with a double voice, for war and for peace. *Openly* for war—*privately* for an armistice and for a convention; but fully assured of peace, not because of the success of our arms and of the reduction of the rebels to terms—not because of the willingness of the rebels to make terms—he knew the contrary,—but because the Government of the United States would be obliged to surrender itself to the rebels, he being at the head of the Government to make that surrender—because "there will be no army of any magnitude left at the disposal of the Government on the 4th of March"—the day of his hoped for inauguration!

One more fact, and it is a fact of great pertinence, also of historical analogy. It is the fact, that the clearest, fullest knowledge possessed of the opinions and views of the candidate of the Chicago Convention for the Presidency, is derived from the official Gazette of the British ministry—"The *London Post*."



Is there no complicity? Questioned in this letter merely for his uncertainty, were England only assured of his being in favor of the dissolution of the Union, McClellan would be the favored, supported candidate of the British Government. And, knowing, as Great Britain must know, fearing as Great Britain must fear, the triumph of the Union over the rebellion, in all its tell-

ing consequences, who can doubt that McClellan is the favorite candidate of England? "Several of the LEADERS of the Democratic party," Lord Lyons, the British minister, writes to his Government, "sought interviews with me, both *before* and *after* the arrival of the intelligence of General McClellan's dismissal." "This intelligence *dashed* the rising hopes of the conservatives. The General, McClellan, had been regarded as the representative of conservative principles in the army. *Support of him* had been made *one of the articles* of the *conservative electoral programme*. . . . The irritation of the conservatives at New York was certainly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmixed with *consternation* and *despondency*."

Seeking "*foreign intervention*," they appeared to hold that it would be essential to the success of any *proposal from abroad*, that it should be deferred until the *control* of the *Executive Government* should be *in the hands of the conservative party*. I listened with attention to the accounts given me *of the plans* and *hopes* of the conservative party. At the bottom, I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, *even at the risk of losing* the Southern States altogether!"

Ye interpellaters of "foreign intervention," the record of your names is not lost. The time has not come yet, but the day is not far distant when all will be disclosed; when your "*consternation* and *despondency*" because of the dismissal of McClellan from the command of the army, will be traced to a purpose more deeply interesting to the great body of the American people than they are aware of.

The other source of information is from the lips of an astute, close observing, deeply interested member of the Chicago Convention—no less conspicuous a person than FERNANDO WOOD.

Fernando Wood has defined in public, in a recent speech on the 17th of September, the position of McClellan with singular clearness, accuracy, and precision. There are those who would regard his terms as terms of utter contempt. He then and there declared that, "if elected, I am satisfied, he (McClellan) will entertain the views, and execute the principles of the great party he will represent,  *without regard to those he may himself possess.*  He will then be our *agent*, the *creature* of our voice." If, then, McClellan is to be looked to as the agent—

the creature of the voice” of the Chicago Convention, of which Wood was a member—and who will doubt it—the enquiry arises, what is that voice? Nor is the answer difficult. The declaration above quoted, that “the whole scheme of coercion is *impracticable*,” that “it is *contrary* to the genius and spirit of the Constitution,” is a declaration made by George H. Pendleton in a speech in the House of Representatives on the 18th of January, 1861 (reported in *The Congressional Globe*—Appendix, p. 70,) after four States had seceded, and when three others were menacing secession. Why he thought coercion *contrary* to the genius of the Constitution, Mr. Pendleton does not leave to conjecture. In his studied speech, just referred to, he declares “this Union is a Confederation of States;” and on the first day of March of the present year, he declares more fully. “I hope that we may maintain the integrity of our system of government—the system of confederation—the system whose foundation is State rights. The Constitution is a *compact* of government made by sovereign States.”

Thus has this nominee of the Chicago Convention placed himself on the very *heresy* proclaimed in 1798 and 99, which Washington and Hamilton denounced, as tending “to SUBVERT THE GOVERNMENT, to DESTROY THE CONSTITUTION.” The declaration of Pendleton, made openly in 1861, has been followed by a series of relevant votes. Mr. Pendleton voted *against* the bill for the collection of the revenue in the seceded States—*against* the bill to provide the Government with additional revenue—*against* approving and confirming the proclamations and orders of the President, and the movements of the army and navy for subduing the rebellion. These votes were in the year 1861. Again, in 1862, he voted *against* the internal revenue bill, *against* the Treasury note act, *against* the imposition of taxes on the insurrectionary districts, and *against* all bills raising revenue for supporting the war. Again, in 1863, his votes were of the same character; and in the last session of Congress, in this present year, 1864, he voted *against* a test resolution of *loyalty* or *disloyalty*—that “it is the political, civil, moral, sacred duty of the people to meet the rebellion, fight it, crush it, and forever destroy it,” and all his votes on practical measures were in complete accordance with that nega-

tive vote *—in complete accordance with his declaration that “armies, money, war cannot maintain this Union”—in complete accordance with his language, “If our differences are so great, that you cannot, or will not reconcile them, let the seceding States *go in peace*; let them *establish* their *government* and **EMPIRE**, and work out their destiny according to the wisdom which God has given them!!”

Of such declarations and of such votes, the unanimous nomination of Pendleton as Vice-President by the Chicago Convention, is the most emphatic approval possible. It is also a most explicit interpretation of their resolution, that “justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that *immediate* efforts be made for a *cessation of hostilities*, with a view to an *ultimate* convention of all the States.” Thus, in “a cessation of hostilities *immediate*, and in a convention *in view, ultimate*,” and in the *gap* a dissolution of the Union, we have “the voice of the great party, McClellan, if elected, will represent” to be its “agent” “the creature.”

Pendleton has defined the position of this party. The Chicago Convention approves the definition, and nominates its candidates; and McClellan, with this resolution before him, accepts the nomination.

Thus, before us stand in their proper guise the two *conjoint* candidates of the Chicago Convention. Pendleton—a gentleman grievously in error, dangerously in error, but to be respected at least for his unhesitating consistency—voting against every measure to carry coercion into effect, and avowedly willing to assent to a dissolution of the Union. McClellan, foiling in the field the efforts of the Government by success of arms to sustain the Union: and when too late dismissed from command, still living on the bounty of the nation as a soldier, though believing that no services of a soldier can be of any value, inasmuch as “on the 4th of March next, there will be no army left of any magnitude at the disposal of the Government.” I have called these men “conjoint candidates,” and rightly so, for under the perversion of the Constitution by previous party nominations, a vote given for the electors of the *one* is given for the electors of

* *N. Y. Times*, Sept. 23, '64.

both; and a vote for McClellan as an advocate of UNION is a vote for Pendleton as an advocate of DISUNION.

And here an enquiry presents itself of no small unmeaning moment. Why has the Chicago Convention declared itself still in existence ready to be convened again? To ascertain the opinions of its candidates!! That was supposed. But we see that those opinions were all well known. Pendleton had avowed them openly—and there is evidence from another source than that quoted, that McClellan's were also previously known. For what, then, is the Convention still in being, if it is not lowering over the liberties of our country—if it is not, like “The Convention of France,” of which we read—“They have their agents out all over, speaking in town houses, market places, highways and byways, agitating, urging to arm.” Was this still existing Chicago Convention meant to be a body, under certain contingencies to *usurp* the Government—perhaps in the person of McClellan, should he consent to be the usurper? Have no whispers been heard—no significant hints been thrown out that such a purpose has been entertained? Whence the threats that our streets would yet swim with *blood*? Why the drillings of excited men still kept up in our villages at night? Why the organization of our National Guard, such as it is alleged to be? Wherefore the inflammatory menaces of Horatio Seymour? Why his urged re-nomination? Projects such as these, may be abandoned under the mighty force of public opinion encouraged by the great successes of our armies. But in the onward march of society, such movements are to be noted and well remembered, whether as precedents or as warnings.

When the husbandman on the far frontier is awakened in the dead of night by the voice of his faithful watch dog, or by the rushing in of his affrighted fold, he lights his lantern, and with peering eyes searches every corner of his disturbed homeyard, nor does he sleep; but closing his house bolts, with trusty fire-lock in hand, watches till morning opens to his view, rejoiced that his timely movements had alarmed the stealthy visitor of his broken slumbers. People of the United States, our homes, our house—our National House—the Constitution, in early days called “the *new roof*,” is disturbed, is threatened. We are its housekeepers. The bolts we cannot close as yet, for the foe not

only is *without* but is *within* its doors. But we can light the darkness. We cannot sleep in a false security. All prepared, we can watch. We must watch. We must hold at bay the foe, until, at the next Presidential election, we shall have asserted by our votes the supremacy of the Constitution which Washington signed—no “*ultimate Convention in view*” to change it to its overturning—and that done, on that day, the sun will burn with a quickened ardor, and as the night comes on, the national skies will brighten and gleam with glory from every star in the vast approving firmament, and then with thankful prayers we can lie down to sleep.

Meantime watching, let us look at the menaced dangers before us. With the lights held up full in the face of the Chicago candidates, let us survey the consequences to follow their election with a concurring House of Representatives. That ere a twelvemonth from this time, a severance of the Union, and the recognition of the Confederate States by England and by France will ensue, I have not a particle of doubt. What next? A Monarchy of these Confederate States, with Jefferson Davis the Emperor—under the protection of England, the establishment of which is rendered easy by the actual existence of an overbearing aristocracy in the slaveholding class—Dukes, Marquises, Counts of the Empire—a Monarchy on our Southwestern frontier, at the head an Austrian Prince—now Emperor—under the protection of France—a Monarchy on the north, with a British Prince on his provincial throne, and civil discord raging, revelling among us here, “anarchy ere long shooting into a monarchy,” probably, from its great necessities—*absolute*.

What other consequences would follow if (a very improbable supposition) the Union be not severed. With McClellan contemplating a bankrupt treasury—with Pendleton at the head of the Senate—after such his votes, and with a concurring House of Representatives refusing supplies to pay a debt chiefly incurred in the attempted suppression of the rebellion, the DEBT for that very reason would be REPUDIATED,—the CURRENCY of the whole country be rendered *worthless*, and while its capitalists are ruined, the laboring people would stand with empty hands cursing the causers of their sufferings, clamoring for food; the brave soldiers, meanwhile, of our glorious armies, disbanded without

their pay, moved by the common calamities, asserting their demands by violence, and wreaking their vengeance on the false men who had betrayed them with a false insulting assurance of "sympathy," while engaged in betraying the noble cause for which they had fought. Without supplies, not only would the army be disbanded, which McClellan looks to as the forerunner of peace, and Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan, with their brother officers be turned off with disdain and insult, but our Navy, too, must be dismantled, and Farragut be taught that to ascend the main-top and stand there the mark of some felon traitor's aim, amid the boom and crash of rushing war, has not raised himself far, far above the level of all naval warriors of yore and present, but that he too has incurred the frowns of those who find a virtue only in successful treason and rebellion. Meanwhile our commerce all destroyed, our sea-coast teeming with pirates, our sea-ports in ashes, would propitiate the Rebel South chanting forth, "Britannia Rules the Waves."

Nor are these consequences, all or any one of them, the figments of a disordered imagination or the offspring of exaggerated statement. Look back at our history and read the evidence there; see how its lines run in wondrous parallel with the future of a dismembered nation.

As now, the first full knowledge of "plans and hopes" against the Government of the United States is gleaned from the official gazette of the British Ministry, *The London Post* of the 28th of August, 1864, so the first full knowledge of "the plans and hopes" of the party in conspiracy against the Government, denounced by Washington, was found in a letter addressed to Mazzei, a Florentine, published in the *Moniteur*, the official gazette of the French Government, on the 28th of January, 1797.

Was the idea of a monarchy never entertained in the breast of a Southern statesman? Edmund Pendleton, the ancestor of the proposed Vice-President, thus writes to Carter Braxton, on the 12th of May, 1776: "Of all others, I own, I prefer the TRUE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, which consists of a proper combination of the principles of Honor, Virtue and Fear."* Nor was Hamilton unaware of the tendencies of the Southern mind. Recapi-

* *Richmond Examiner*, August 8, 1800.

tulating the dangers of not adopting a vigorous constitution, he portrayed to the General Convention "Dismemberment, with the instance of Poland,—Foreign Influence,—Distractions setting afloat vicious humours,—Standing armies by dissensions,—Domestic factions ;" and sums the evils, pointing to a "MONARCHY in the SOUTHERN STATES." *

Is the idea of a French government on our South-Western frontier new in the counsels of France? For what purpose was the expedition gathered at Boulogne in 1803, if not to reconquer Louisiana in all its vast extent and to hold New Orleans in the clutch of its first Napoleon and of his successors? As to the dangers of a vigorous government in Canada, the opinions of Washington, and Hamilton, and Winfield Scott, are pregnant. As to a repudiation of the debt, let the whole, long, vast difficulty of providing for the debt of the Revolution—Southern men urging its being *sponged*—be well considered. The history of that difficulty may easily be read. Nor is it silent as to the worthlessness of the currency and the impoverishment of the people, prompting stay laws and plunging headlong into insurrection. And who is not familiar with the story of the army at Newburg incited to "*redress* themselves" by one of the ablest after leaders of the Democratic party, and only restrained from excesses by their soldiers' affection to, and confidence in Washington. Can it not be imagined that Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan, and their fellow officers, may be the objects of political persecution, when it is remembered, that by the very men who asserted that the Constitution was a *compact*, and Secession a right, Anthony Wayne was sought to be deprived of his rank, or that Farragut could be treated with contumely, when we know that Truxton was insulted in the President's house by a President for having captured a French frigate. Wayne had fought, often fought—fought most successfully to establish the Union, and was a supporter of Washington while maintaining it; and Truxton was a naval conqueror in its good behalf, while France was seeking to dissolve it with the aid of her American partizans.

These are but a few of the consequences to follow the success

* Hamilton's Works, II., 413.

of the approvers of McClellan and of Pendleton. People of America—you have read too little of the history of your country, or you would see that the hour of the election of these men would be the hour of signing the DEATH WARRANT of the UNION. And now cursorily consider the consequences of the success of the great UNION PARTY. First—the restored and permanently established Unity of this great Republic, and in this restoration the great prominent fact in the face of the whole world, that the United States compose a Republican Nation equal to and above all possible exigencies. 2d. The vindication of the cause of Freedom in its largest sense, and the practical assertion, beyond all casuistry, of the great principles of the Declaration of Independence—that “all men are born free and equal.” 3d. A provision for the redemption of the whole public debt, by an adequate sinking fund, within less than half a century—with taxation so light as not to be felt, and yet with ample revenue—the price of every useful commodity brought within the compass of the most moderate means—while labor, with new fields opened and opening, will increase largely all its proper gains, till all this great “*Land* with one supreme law” pervading—one LAND of one UNITED PEOPLE—one Nation under one National Government—will more than ever be a miracle among the nations of the world. 4th. Our glorious armies rewarded in every form of national gratitude with its growing power of reward, fields of glory with fields that never refuse a golden harvest. 5th. England, glad to escape the punishments due to her great offences by full reparation for the wrongs and losses inflicted with her ready connivance. 6th. The Northern British possessions, themselves seeking the boon, admitted into the Union—another make weight against the danger of Southern secession. 7th. The brave great men, who have led our armies to victory, sitting in the councils of a future Washington—vying with each other by a well measured policy, in the glorious rivalry of healing the wounds of this great Civil War, and of binding together by stronger ties those who have been misled with those who have never faltered.

These good results are not only possible. They will be accomplished—and why accomplished? I judge of others by myself. I must vote for President Lincoln, or I must be false to

all the convictions of my reason—false to all the earnest promptings of my heart—false, ungrateful to the memory of the illustrious men who founded our National Government—false in gratitude to those who have perilled their lives in this gigantic struggle. I cannot vote for George B. McClellan, for “his record” proves in him no strength of character—no force of will—no steadiness of purpose. From his very nature he must be “the agent and creature of his party”—as is openly avowed. The imbecility of Buchanan surrendered this government to traitor counsels—without purpose as he may be—reluctant as he may be—the imbecility of McClellan will surrender it to traitor hands—for traitor hands and traitor counsels behind the scenes have moved the puppets who would raise him to high office. I must vote for President Lincoln—because whatever may have been his errors—they have been the errors of a most kind, confiding nature; of a confidence often much abused—while his public principles and his public virtues, ever true to those principles, have been the stay and the shield of the American people in the midst of almost overwhelming dangers—principles which, in the exercise of the great powers conferred upon him by the Constitution, have met every contingency—have triumphed in every emergency. For such a man, so simple and direct—so free from vanity and ostentation—so courageous and so hearty—so faithful and untiring in his fidelity—so steady to the Union and alive to its perils—were his faults more and greater, his virtues are so great and many—so far overbalance all that paid partizanship or party prejudice have urged against him—that, as the issue now is, it is a privilege of patriotism to vote.

I will vote for President Lincoln for other reasons. Not to vote for him would be a proof of national unsteadiness fatal to our form of government—a *most dangerous precedent*—while to vote for his competitor would be to encourage, by his success, the example of elevation to office as the reward of stubborn incapacity, courting a most mistaken, misplaced sympathy—of great, frequent, inexcusable military failures being the high road to political preferment—a *most fatal precedent*. If my sympathies were to govern my vote, they would be with the man, who, while President of the United States, has been

treated, and this more than once, with *indignity* by the officer, now his rival candidate, upon whom he had conferred the chief command of the army! Of this the proofs are ready and instant. If my sympathies were to govern my vote, they would be with the man, who has been made the subject of the scoffs and of the gibes of the lowest creatures of the populace, while offering their noisy adulations to his feeble rival. If my sympathies were to govern my vote, they would be with the man whose fulfillment of duty has not only been opposed by all the energies of vigorous rebel war, but by the arts of specious demagogues, prating of and paltering with the Constitution and the laws, and recognizing as their "*friends*" a mass of rioters resisting the draft, recent from burning the hospitals of aged decrepitude and the dwellings of peaceful people, and on their return from this kind greeting—their hands yet reeking with the blood of murdered citizens—*cheering* for McClellan! If my sympathies were to govern my vote, they would be for the man, whom southern traitors sought to *assassinate* on his appointed way to the Capitol of the nation, and whose person they were plotting to *seize* to prevent his entering upon the high office to which the American people had chosen him. But sympathies out of the case, I must vote for Abraham Lincoln, because the question before us all is this—COERCION COMPLETED OF TREASON TRIUMPHANT.

