COMMUNIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION AND EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PRISONERS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

JUNE 19, 20, 26, AND 27, 1956

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COMMUNIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONERS

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:20 a.m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 188, agreed to February 16, 1956, in Room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas, chairman; Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota; Senator George H. Bender, Republican, Ohio.

Present also: Robert F. Kennedy, chief counsel; James N. Juliana, chief counsel to the minority; Donald F. O’Donnell, assistant chief counsel; Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning we are beginning a series of public hearings concerning the treatment of prisoners, both civilian and military, by various Communist governments.

The subcommittee further expects to show the techniques that are employed by the Soviet Union in the handling of those of its prisoners accused of crimes against the state. All aspects will be fully explored, including the arrest procedure, the detention of the suspect, the imposed physical isolation, and the mental pressures that are applied.

Because of the large number of prisoners, both civilian and military, that have been held by Communist China over the past 5 years, the subcommittee expects to place particular emphasis on the treatment of these individuals.

During the 3 years of the Korean war some 7,190 Americans were captured by the Communists. Approximately one-third of this number died while in Communist hands. Of the 4,428 that survived and were repatriated, over 95 percent were subjected to a well-planned and well-organized campaign to destroy their belief in God, their loyalty to the United States and their faith in the democratic way of life.

We expect to establish that the Chinese Communists, by their immoral, unethical and illegal methods of interrogation and indoctrination, attempted to create in the prison camps an environment of fear, confusion, and mutual distrust.

By these series of hearings we expect to expose not only for the people here in the United States, but for the people throughout the
rest of the world, that it is the aim of the Communist system to not only control the land areas of the world, but the minds and souls of the members of the human race.

The Americans and other free peoples can best combat this so-called brainwashing weapon of the Communists by understanding its techniques and methods. We hope these hearings will make some progress in that direction.

Mr. Counsel, who is your first witness?

Mr. KENNEDY. Dr. Harold Wolff.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Harold Wolff, will you come around, please, sir. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. WOLFF. I do so swear.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Hinkle will also perhaps have something to say on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hinkle, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. HINKLE. I do.

TESTIMONY OF DR. HAROLD G. WOLFF, PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL COLLEGE, IN CHARGE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NEUROLOGY; AND DR. LAWRENCE E. HINKLE, JR., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE, CORNELL UNIVERSITY MEDICAL COLLEGE

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated, gentlemen.

Dr. Wolff, will you state your name, your place of residence, and your profession or occupation?

Dr. WOLFF. Dr. Harold G. Wolff, home address 355 West 246th Street, New York City. I am professor of medicine at the Cornell University Medical College, in charge of the department of neurology.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hinkle, will you also state the same for the record?

Dr. HINKLE. Dr. Lawrence E. Hinkle, Jr., of 248 South Main Street, New Canaan, Conn. I am an assistant professor of medicine at Cornell University Medical College.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

I may ask you, Doctor, if both of you are familiar with the nature of these proceedings and understand the purpose and objectives of the committee in holding these hearings.

Dr. WOLFF. I believe I do, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have conferred with members of the staff and therefore you know generally the line of interrogation to expect?

Dr. WOLFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume neither of you cares to be represented by counsel?

Dr. WOLFF. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Counsel, proceed.
Mr. Kennedy. Dr. Wolff, would you give the committee a little of your background, and what your experience is in this field which we are going to explore today?

Dr. Wolff. I have been head of a group of some 20 civilian and military scientists who have been interested in the topic that we are going to review, which grows out of my awareness of its public significance as well as my interest in this general department of mental health and disease.

Mr. Kennedy. How long have you been associated with Cornell University, Doctor?

Dr. Wolff. Since 1931.

Mr. Kennedy. Doctor, you have a statement that you have prepared and which you have reviewed with the staff of the committee.

Dr. Wolff. I do.

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, if it is satisfactory, could he read that statement?

The Chairman. The statement was submitted under the rules? All right, Doctor, you may proceed and read your statement.

I might inquire, would you prefer not to be interrupted until you have concluded?

Dr. Wolff. I would be delighted to be interrupted.

The Chairman. In the course of the reading of your statement some question may be asked by members of the committee for clarification.

Dr. Wolff. I would be very happy to respond to any questions.

The Chairman. All right, sir. Proceed.

Dr. Wolff. It is my purpose to report in bold outline the methods and procedures used by the Communist state police in interrogation and indoctrination of persons regarded as enemies of the state. This report will be relatively free of detailed case incidents, but emphasis will be placed on the techniques as applied in general in their major variations and the anticipated effects produced.

As I said before, the data here assembled are the outcome of over 2½ years of effort of about 20 civilian and government scientists, made possible through private funds and under the auspices and with the complete collaboration of the Department of Defense, which made all possible facilities available to us.

It should be said at the outset that one of the chief tasks of the group was to separate the results of official and effective practices from the effects of accident, clumsiness, lack of facilities, lack of experience, lack of discipline, and lack of personnel. The more important the suspect or criminal or the propaganda effects, the more time, personnel and procedure were applied in obtaining information and statements of guilt. Inversely, if the yield was likely to be low from the police and political standpoint, an individual prisoner might be able to avoid all but minimal pressure. It was, therefore, necessary in each instance when appraising whether a man withstood a great deal or offered unusual resistance, to ascertain how much pressure was applied.

The Communists are skilled in the extraction of information from prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding. It has appeared that they can force men to confess to crimes which have not been committed and then apparently to believe in the truth of their confessions and express sympathy and gratitude toward those who have imprisoned them.
Many have found it hard to understand that the Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques of psychological manipulation. Some have recorded the confessions of men such as Cardinal Mindszenty and William Otis and the usual behavior of the old Bolshevik purge trials in the thirties and have seen an alarming parallel. These prisoners were men of intelligence, ability, and strength of character. They had every reason to oppose their captors. Their confessions were palpably untrue. Such behavior is, if anything, more difficult to explain than that of some of our prisoners of war in Korea.

The techniques used by the Communists have been the subject of speculation. A number of theories about them have been advanced, most of them suggesting that these techniques have been based upon some modification of the condition reflex techniques of Professor Pavlov, the Russian neurologist.

The term “brainwashing,” originated by Mr. Ed Hunter who interviewed Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, has caught the public fancy and has gained wide acceptance. Various authors have attempted to provide a scientific definition for this term. This has had the effect of confirming the general impression that brainwashing is an esoteric technique for the manipulation of human behavior designed by scientific investigators on the basis of laboratory experiments and controlled observations and producing highly predictable results.

Many of the public speculations about brainwashing are not supported by the available evidence. However, the Communists do make an orderly attempt to obtain information from their prisoners and to convert their prisoners to forms of behavior and belief acceptable to their captors. They have had some success in their efforts and this success has had a great deal of propaganda value for them.

For this reason, if for no other, it is important that we have as clear an understanding as possible about how these methods originated, how they are applied, their effectiveness, and their purpose.

The information contained in this report was obtained from a number of sources. Details of the Communist arrest and interrogation systems and a great deal of information about the purposes, attitude, and training of those who administer them, were obtained from the experts in the area who for security reasons must remain anonymous. Knowledge of the prisoners’ reactions to their experiences was obtained by the direct observations of persons recently released from Communist prisons; that is to say, before they returned to this country. Some of these observations continued for weeks and were supplemented by followup observations over periods of months. They included complete medical, neurological, and psychiatric examinations and often psychological testing as well.

This information was supplemented by that supplied by families, friends, and former associates. Among those studied intensively were military and civilian prisoners of diverse ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors and resisters, some who admittedly cooperated with their captors and some who said they did not.

In supplement to this information we obtained additional data from investigations carried on by the United States Army and by the United States Air Force and from the material assembled for the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. A very large public literature on these subjects was reviewed and drawn upon when helpful.
Finally, various laboratory and clinical investigations have been carried on in my unit in order to throw light upon the psychological and physiological processes involved in some of the interrogation and indoctrination procedures.

The evidence from every source has been consistent with that from the other and provides a basis for confidence in the validity of the statements which I am about to make and the conclusions which have been drawn. I think I would like to say at this point the following in this regard:

First, the interrogation methods used by the state police in Communist countries are elaborations and refinements of police practices, many of which were known and used before the Russian Communist revolution.

Secondly, the principles and practices used by the Communist state police in the development of suspects, the accumulation of evidence, and the carrying out of arrests, detention, interrogation, trial, and punishment are known. The effects of these upon prisoners are also known.

Thirdly, the so-called confessions obtained by Communist state police are readily understandable as result of the methods used.

Fourth, Communist methods of indoctrination of prisoners of war were developed by the Russians and subsequently refined by the Chinese. These methods and their effects are also known.

Fifth, Chinese methods of dealing with political prisoners and enemies of the state were adapted from those of the Russians.

Sixth, the intensive indoctrination of political prisoners is a practice primarily used by the Chinese Communists and the methods used in this indoctrination are known and their effects are understandable.

All of these points I will develop as I go along.

Are there any questions, sir?

Mr. Kennedy. I think, Dr. Wolff, as you start going into some of the details of this whole matter, the committee will have further questions. You have some charts, as I understand it, that you will use in developing your thesis, is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. Yes. Perhaps with your permission I might be allowed to step up there later to be nearer my charts.

The Chairman. Yes indeed. You have very great latitude in presenting the subject, Doctor. We will observe whatever method you think necessary for your convenience in making the presentation.

Mr. Kennedy. Should we put the charts up now?

Dr. Wolff. Would you put up the first chart?

The Chairman. Dr. Hinkle will assist you with the charts?

Dr. Wolff. Yes, please.

With your permission I will turn to him for detailed information which I don’t happen to have at my fingertips.

(Exhibit No. 1 follows:)

Exhibit No. 1

Background of Communist Methods

15th century Byzantine heritage:
1. Unrestricted autocracy
2. Internal intrigue and espionage

16th century:
1. Permanent body of private retainers responsible only to Czar
2. Central control of all aspects of the state
3. Purges

17th to 18th century: Central directorate with mission to guard the internal security of the state

19th century: Most highly organized, effective, and powerful secret police of any European state:
1. Sudden arrest
2. Dossier
3. Repetitive interrogation
4. Isolation technique developed

20th century Cheka:
1. Highly organized and refined methods
2. Communist ideology and logic
3. Abandonment of direct brutality
4. Development of persuasion techniques; exploitation of intimate interrogator-prisoner relationship

OGPU–NKVD–MVD (KGB):
1. Purges
2. Public trials
3. POW indoctrination (exposure to nothing but Communist interpretation of history and current events)

Chinese system:
1. Group pressures
2. Self and group criticism (applied to nonparty personnel and to prisoners)
3. Prisoner indoctrination:
   - Rote learning
   - Autobiography and diary writing

Dr. Wolff: This chart is designed in general to give the background of the practices and procedures. Without boring you with details of history, in which I have no special competence, of course, I would like to point out that the practices which have become refined and developed in the 20th century as regards the Russian state police have had their roots in a very long background of experience. You see in the 15th and 16th centuries the general philosophy and orientation of the state and its attempt to centralize control of all aspects of its functions. But in the 17th and 18th centuries we see for the first time the central directorate with a mission to guard the internal security of the state actually highly organized.

In the 19th century we come in contact with the most highly organized, effective, and powerful secret police of any European State. Some of the practices which I will discuss with you this morning are already developed.

For example, the study and arrest, the development of a complete dossier on an individual so that much about his past may be presented to him when he becomes a prisoner, the effects of repetitive interrogation and the techniques for such, and the fourth item, the interesting and elaborately developed isolation technique which plays such a large part in subsequent practice.

In the 20th century and again before the Communist appeared on the scene we find the Czarist Russian state police system developing further the methods which I have just mentioned. On top of that you have now the Communist ideology and logic. Interestingly enough, item 3, the abandonment of direct physical violence. This has an interesting background. One is that the Communist Government, presumably reformers, were interested in eliminating some of the brutal practices of the Czarist police and did so officially.

Incidentally, it became clearer and clearer that these methods were less effective than others which could be introduced. So there was a further reason for giving them no official status.
You will see that this plays more and more a part. Occasionally physical violence would creep through during periods of great pressure or where it was thought to be especially effective with a particular individual, but it seldom had official support.

The fourth item, the development of persuasion techniques and the exploitation of the intimate interrogation prisoner relationship is defined, is begun at least, with the Communist state police system.

As we go into the second quarter of the 20th century, with its various versions of the state police indicated by these various initials, the most recent being the MVD. The KGB, which is the committee of state security or, now, the state police system, has recently been separated from the MVD and has its own administrative organization. But throughout its history the Communist state police has been linked with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It has had more or less intimacy and now again is in a period of relative separation.

Finally, we come to the idea of indoctrination of prisoners of war, which was developed by the Russians in dealing with their large German Army population. A good deal of experience was gained. Lastly, the development of the Chinese system which is a direct outgrowth of the Russian, with its own special variations.

As you will see later, group pressures are applied far more than they were in the Russian. Self and group criticism was again refined, and more emphasis on prisoner indoctrination during the period of detention as contrasted to the Russian, was a feature.

I won't stop further to give details at this point because I hope to touch upon all these matters later.

Mr. Kennedy. May I ask you one question there, Doctor: The system which was used against the prisoners in Korea, then, was not a new system, but it was also used against the German prisoners who were captured by the Russians in 1940, is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. Yes. I should say that it had additional features. The Russians used their method, which is different from the Chinese in detail, against the Germans. Then the Russians transferred or communicated their methods about 1949 to the Chinese, and then the Japanese were exposed to the earliest experience of this sort, the Japanese prisoners. All the time this was being worked up in more detail. Finally, the last product of this effort is in relation to the Korean. So we come to this via the Russians through three prisoner-of-war populations, really.

Now I would like to turn to the next chart.

The Chairman. The Chair will order that these charts be printed in the record as presented. The chart to which the witness has just referred in his testimony will be made exhibit No. 1. The one now being presented will be identified as exhibit No. 2 and printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 2 follows:)

Exhibit No. 2

Important Communist Attitudes

1. Anyone who is a threat to party or state is a criminal.
2. Potential criminals may fall into broad categories:
   (a) Dissident members of the Communist Party.
   (b) Ethnic groups suspected of nationalist aspirations.
(c) Social groups inimical to the state.
(d) Bureaucratic groups out of favor.
(e) Members of reactionary classes.
(f) Foreign nationals.
(g) People who have had contact with foreign nationals.

3. KGB decides who threatens party or state.

4. Crimes may be objective; committed accidentally or with innocent motives, or consequential; potential consequences of acts or attitudes.

5. “Evidence” of criminality includes—
   (a) Membership in a suspect group.
   (b) Minor infractions.
   (c) Suspicious acts.
   (d) Unverified reports of informers.

6. KGB does not arrest a man without evidence of criminality.

7. Therefore, anyone arrested by KGB is a criminal.

The Chairman. All right, Doctor, you may proceed.

Dr. Wolff. In order to understand the procedure, I am afraid it will be necessary to take another excursion into the politics and attitudes of the Communists, which seem to be somewhat remote from our topic, but I feel essential to an appreciation of the procedure.

I have written out rather simply what I think to be pertinent.

As regards political crime—and what I have to say today has this alone in its implication—as regards political crime, anyone who is a threat to the party or the state is a criminal. You will see how that can be elaborated. Potential criminals, therefore, may fall into broad categories: First, dissident members of the Communist Party. That requires no explanation.

Second, ethnic groups suspected of nationalist aspirations.

Third, social groups inimical to the state.

Fourth, bureaucratic groups out of favor.

Fifth, members of reactionary classes, now very few, of course.

Sixth, foreign nationals.

Seventh, those Russians who have had contact with foreign nationals.

The KGB, that is to say, the State police, decides who threatens the party or the State. I think we have to pause to consider what is political crime. There are three general categories. The crime may be actual in the sense that a man is caught redhanded, so to speak, with the evidence of giving information to an enemy state or of actually committing sabotage, and so forth. That is actual. That is really not relevant to our topic and out of the area of discussion. More important are the crimes that are known as objective, which are committed accidentally or with innocent motives. That is to say, a factory manager may go to overuse of a part or machinery and cause the structures to break down and delay the ultimate production. Under those circumstances he is liable to criticism and actually is considered guilty of a crime. Or through lack of experience something may be broken or damaged.

The second type is the consequential crime, in which utterances or acts that apparently are quite far removed from having political implications are viewed or can be seen as having repercussions that are of an ominous or destructive nature. This is quite different from the western point of view and I think it must be emphasized, since it becomes very relevant to the kind of relationship that is developed between the interrogator and the prisoner in some of our subjects.
What constitutes evidence of criminality. As mentioned above, membership in any of these suspect groups, minor infractions, acts that can be looked upon with suspicion, and unverified reports of informers.

The next point is an extremely important one and I can't over-emphasize it. The KGB does not arrest a man without evidence of criminality. When I say criminality, I have in mind just what I have included above. This is important psychologically because a man who is being arrested knows that they have some evidence of some kind or interpret his acts in some way to make him a criminal. He doesn't know exactly what it is, but already his mind is prepared for trouble and he knows he is not innocent. Therefore, any one arrested by the KGB is almost by definition a criminal.

The Chairman. In other words, once he is arrested, once the police decide to arrest him as a criminal, there is no hope then for vindication or acquittal?

Dr. Wolff. No.

The Chairman. Judgment is made and in effect sentence is passed as to guilt or innocence prior to arrest.

Dr. Wolff. That is right. He can make a dicker and come off with as little as possible.

The Chairman. I beg your pardon?

Dr. Wolff. He can make some sort of arrangement or have barter or work as hard as he can about making his crimes minimal, but he is coming out of it with some sort of guilt.

The Chairman. He is already convicted in the minds of his accusers prior to his arrest.

Dr. Wolff. Right.

The Chairman. That conviction stands for all purposes.

Dr. Wolff. Right.

The Chairman. Whether he can get off with a light sentence or some reprimand or whether he is shown some leniency, depends on how he might cooperate?

Dr. Wolff. That is right, sir.

This gives both the interrogator a great advantage and softens, so to speak, the prisoner because he knows that he is guilty.

Senator Bender. How long, Doctor, has this process been in effect? That is, how long have the Communists practiced, not in China but in Russia itself, this system of punishment?

Dr. Wolff. I can say it was probably highly organized and fully developed by the time the famous purge trials in the thirties were generally publicized. I would say somewhere in the late thirties. Dr. Hinkle, is that your impression?

Dr. Hinkle. This development of this attitude toward criminality was developed in the late twenties and early thirties, but to a certain extent it floated out of the old Russian law which had a presumption or at least laid a certain amount of the burden on the prisoner to prove his innocence at the time of his arrest in any case.

Senator Bender. Doctor, while all this was going on, it is obvious that in this country the impression of many educators and even some clergymen was that this was a great experiment in democracy and they were very sympathetic to the whole Communist program. Certainly, since you have been engaged in this work for so long, why was it that so many intelligent people, or allegedly intelligent, and so many people who were well educated, cultured people in this country, fell for this business?
Dr. Wolff. It is difficult to answer the question.

Senator Bender. You are aware that such is the case?

Dr. Wolff. Yes indeed. I think many of them were unaware of this kind of relation to the political criminal. They saw something of the management of the common crime or something of the attempts to deal with the needs of the law-abiding citizen according to the Russian concept, but perhaps they were quite ignorant of this orientation. That would be my guess about it, as well as a general delight in confusion.

Senator Bender. These purges inside of Russia were going on and people generally throughout the world were aware of the hundreds, in fact thousands, of people who were being exterminated by the government itself who disagreed with their point of view. I can't quite understand why we had so many people in this country who almost prided themselves on defending a system which you describe here.

Dr. Wolff. I am afraid I can't help. It is really extraordinary.

Senator Bender. But you are aware of that.

Dr. Wolff. Yes.

Senator Bender. Has this system which you describe ever been used by any governments other than Russians and Chinese?

Dr. Wolff. Of course, as the influence of these states has spread, it was obviously introduced in the new states. They are the two chief kinds of methods, the Eastern European method or what might be called the Asiatic or Chinese states, and each of these principal states, the Chinese and Russians, are imposing these practices on their newly acquired communities. But I have no knowledge of any other of the western societies introducing such methods or using such methods.

The Chairman. All right, Doctor, proceed.

Dr. Wolff. Could we go on, Dr. Hinkle.

The Chairman. The chart now being presented will be exhibit No. 3 and will be printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 3 follows:)

Exhibit No. 3

Crucial Feature of Legal Operation

If a man is arrested his case cannot be settled until a protocol ("confession") has been prepared. This protocol must be signed by both prisoner and interrogating officer.

Dr. Wolff. The next point to be emphasized is indicated in the chart. The crucial feature of legal operation explains why so many of our informants have to make some kind of confession, since in a sense it is written into the law and practice. If a man is arrested his case can not be settled until a protocol "confession" has been prepared. This protocol must be signed by both prisoner and the interrogating officer.

The Chairman. I would like to inquire at this point, Doctor, does that mean where they commit what they judge to be a capital offense?

Dr. Wolff. This has to do with political crime or state crime, nothing else.

The Chairman. Whatever they determine is a capital offense. Is this followed meticulously in those instances? Before they are executed they obtain a confession?
Dr. Wolff. I believe they have the right to make administrative decisions. If a man absolutely refuses to sign or cooperate in any way, under special circumstances the police have the right to execute without further discussion or without printed confession.

The Chairman. But they do undertake in each instance to obtain a confession?

Dr. Wolff. Yes.

The Chairman. Until that becomes hopeless they do not abandon the effort?

Dr. Wolff. That is true.

The Chairman. All right.

Dr. Wolff. With the two points to be remembered: The conviction of guilt on the part of the interrogator and the prisoner, plus the fact that some sort of deposition must be made before the case can be closed, I think we begin to see the direction in which the process is going to move.

The Chairman. The chart being presented now may be made exhibit No. 4 and printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 4 follows:)

EXHIBIT NO. 4

A TYPICAL TIME TABLE

EASTERN EUROPEAN SECRET POLICE SYSTEMS (COMMUNIST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weeks</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Reaction of Prisoner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1. Suspicion</td>
<td>p Anxiety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Accumulation of evidence</td>
<td>p Suspension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surveillance</td>
<td>p Awareness of being avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2. Report of informers</td>
<td>p Feelings of unfocused guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3. Seizure of associates</td>
<td>p Fear and uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4. Detention</td>
<td>p Bewilderment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rigid Regimen</td>
<td>p Hyperactivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Increasing pressure</td>
<td>p Diminishing activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>v Increasing depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>v Fatigue (pain)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>v Humiliation, loss of self esteem</td>
</tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>s Filth, mental dulling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>s Despair</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>s Frustration tolerance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>s Great need to talk</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>o Utter dependence on anyone</td>
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<td>o who &quot;befriends&quot;</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>r Much more pliable</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>r Great need for approval</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r of interrogator</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ranged</td>
<td>r Repeatedly frustrated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>r by interrogator's refusal to</td>
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<td>r accept statements</td>
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<td>r by interrogator's alternating &quot;help&quot;</td>
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<td>r and withdrawal of approval</td>
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<td>r Increased suggestibility</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r Confabulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r Rationalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>r Profound relief</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr. Wolff. I would like to say a word now about the KGB organization and who are the interrogators. The interrogator is usually a young man, somewhere between 20 and 30. It is not a job that is particularly sought for. The state police senior, so to speak, looks around and tries to find a suitable person. The suitable person may have to be, so to speak, drafted for the job or he may volunteer. He is usually an individual with strong convictions about communism. He is apt to be a person with no more than 2 years of secondary school education. He is exposed to training on the spot. He gets a certain amount of formal education in the practices we are going to talk about, but this is largely at the elbow of a senior officer. He has no special training in psychology, psychiatry, neurophysiology, neuropharmacology or any of the other so-called scientific procedures that might be relevant to this. This is an apprentice system imposed upon a not too well educated young man, who is not very enthusiastic about the job, but who is an avowed Communist.

From the start it must be appreciated that the KGB interrogator has his own vulnerabilities. In the first place, he is obliged to get a confession from his prisoner. In the second place, this confession must have certain elements of plausibility. It can't be absolutely ridiculous or absurd. It has to have a certain substance. It has to hold together in a certain way. This is particularly true of the Russian and less true of the Chinese system.

In the third place, he must not allow his prisoner to commit suicide or be pressed to the point where he becomes psychotic. He can press and press short of an irreversible mental change. A certain number of people do become psychotic and I don't believe that has special relevance to this method but only the fact that prisoners in jail often in the past have become psychotic.

At all events, he loses his prisoner when the prisoner becomes psychotic. He loses face, also, so to speak.

The prisoner may not be mangled or allowed to die of disease-relevant to the treatment. He must do this all within a limited time, 3 months usually being the outside limit.

Lastly, he must not let himself get so involved in the prisoner's case and in his own personal relations with the prisoner as to become oversympathetic or so disturbed as to become himself ineffective and no longer capable of pursuing the purpose of the state. So he carries a number of hazards in presenting himself to his prisoner.

If we assume that that is the kind of young man who gets started on this, I need only to say that under special circumstances when a high-ranking official or a prince of the church or some important personage is under consideration, a correspondingly schooled and experienced person of the interrogation force will be assigned, but for the average run of cases it is unlikely that one will receive a specially experienced or sophisticated or knowledgeable interrogator.

I have put before you an oversimplified—

Mr. Kennedy. May I interrupt at this point, Doctor?

Often the interrogator knows that the confession that he is trying to obtain is false, is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. Would you explain to the committee why, even though he knows it is false, he attempts to get the confession, what the reason or the explanation for that is in his own mind?
Mr. Wolff. I would be glad to, Mr. Kennedy.

The interrogator realizes that the prisoner is guilty of something. He also realizes that he is probably not guilty of the severe crimes with which he is likely to be charged. On the other hand, he feels in applying his pressures and in devoting himself to this task that he is serving communism and the party and that he therefore will rationalize his behavior for the good of the party, and not necessarily for the validation of the evidence.

The Chairman. Does he have the prospect of advancement or favors from the party if he becomes proficient in the art of obtaining confessions?

Dr. Wolff. Quite so. He has a skill and a pride and his own opportunities for advancement depend upon the type of evidence he turns in and in some instances the number of cases that are reported by him.

The Chairman. In fact, he is on trial himself more or less.

Dr. Wolff. Precisely.

Mr. Kennedy. And also communism being a type of religion to him, he feels that the suspect should make the sacrifice of confessing to the crime for the good of the party and for the good of the country.

Dr. Wolff. Yes, being convinced and he is of the cause and of communism, he feels free to try to persuade the prisoner of his criminality and to extract a confession which will indicate his attrition and reform him so to speak, and make him a better citizen. All of that can be very readily rationalized by a man who is also eager to get ahead.

The Chairman. All right.

Dr. Wolff. The left-hand chart—

The Chairman. That will be made exhibit No. 5 and printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 5 follows:)

**Exhibit No. 5**

**EASTERN EUROPEAN SECRET POLICE SYSTEMS (COMMUNIST)**

**SCHEMA OF TIME TABLE**
Dr. Wolff. The vertical line at the left-hand side of the chart indicates the degree of disorganization of the person. Along the bottom, along the horizontal line, I have indicated in weeks the time involved in the process from the moment the individual is supposedly under suspicion officially until he is a prisoner.

The first part, the period of surveillance usually lasts about 4 weeks——

The Chairman. You mean during that period he is under suspicion. In other words, they are building up a case against him.

Dr. Wolff. Yes. He is not informed.

The Chairman. He is not informed, but during that period he is a suspect.

Dr. Wolff. Quite. The party has decided for one reason or another that this man is a potential enemy of the state and they are trying to collect evidence about him.

That in itself has effects, as you will see later, because he becomes aware of it secondarily and wonders what is going on and what he is guilty of and what his friends are saying about him. This is all a build-up in the process which will ultimately——

The Chairman. You say he is not informed, but because of certain treatment or attitudes of his friends he becomes conscious that something is developing against him, that he probably is under suspicion, and he begins to wonder and to try to rationalize to himself what it is, What have I done? That puts him in a state of anxiety.

Dr. Wolff. Quite so. He is not officially informed but it is very likely that he knows something is going on.

The next period beginning at about the fourth week with his arrest begins the period of detention. A part of the communist philosophy is that the individual who is suspect or prisoner or arrested is supposed to be taken to a house of detention where he and his interrogator can sit down and talk this over and consider what has been done and how he deviated from the true faith and how this could be corrected. That was the philosophy behind it. But as you will see, this has become perverted and other steps have been introduced.

This detention usually lasts from the fourth to the twelfth week, let us say, or eleventh week, which would be about 6 to 8 weeks. He still has not come to trial. At the end of that time, as you will see, during the pressures which have been applied, he has become a more and more disorganized person and finally makes a deposition, makes a confession, that is, and then comes to trial.

At the trial about a week or so after the confession, his punishment begins. Under the Russian system indoctrination doesn't play much part in this first period of detention. There is not much in the way of instruction or indoctrination except secondarily.

As you will see with the Chinese this will change. They start their indoctrination right from the start. This period of detention is one of extracting information by one means or another.

Then finally with the assignment of a punishment the case is closed and the man goes off to Siberia or is shot or is sent to some remote corner of the state for reeducation or reform or what-not.

So the process in general is 1 of 3 months. I like to emphasize that it has a certain timetable about it.

If you switch your eye to the next chart to the right you see the same data in an upright position. The time is on the side. The operating
steps are in the second column, and at the extreme right are the reactions of the prisoner.

As you suggested, Mr. Chairman, the first part of his period of surveillance arouses suspicion in him, and the accumulation of evidence makes him very uneasy and the reports of informers he is sure are beginning to be accumulated and his friends begin to avoid him and he becomes uneasy and uncertain. Then the arrest process. When sufficient evidence has been collected by an interrogator and presented to his superior if his superior accepts this as sufficient for potential criminality or for arrest, then the arrest is made. The arrest is made, as you know, usually in the middle of the night. The original idea was to avoid embarrassment for the prisoner and for the community, but this has changed. It is actually another way of terrorizing the individual. He may actually be arrested on the street or he may be sent to a distant city and arrested on the train. When he is arrested he is not told the reason. He is not given a specific offense. He is told that he has committed some crime against the state, and he knows what he has done and no statement of specific guilt is made.

When he is brought to the police station or to the detention house, as it is called, in a very legalistic manner, all his property is indexed and filed away and if he comes out 20 years later it is likely to be in a most meticulously well-kept form, with every detail and every stitch of garment returned. The legalistic aspects of the practice are very striking in contrast to the completely arbitrary nature of other procedures.

He is given an initial interrogation in some manner. He is already so disturbed that he tells much of his story at that time. They will get what evidence the individual is willing to give about himself at that moment when he is already so shaken.

If we take a man who has a reasonably serious offense or one who is potentially a serious criminal, we would take him through this difficult program.

First, the period of 3 to 6 weeks is one of complete isolation. This sounds benign enough to us in this room, but yet isolation under the circumstances is a very fearful experience. The individual is completely uncertain as to his fate. He enters the period of isolation in a small room, 6 by 10. The light is apt to be kept burning in the ceiling at all times. He has no opportunities to consult anyone about his case. He is out of contact with his friends and with his influential associates. He may have various pressures applied at this point. He may be a little too cold or a little too hot. He may sleep with his hands exposed outside the covers, lying rigidly on his back. He is not allowed to sleep except at fixed hours. The food is adequate and exceedingly simple. His 6 by 10 chamber usually contains a receptacle for urine and feces which is shocking to many people, perhaps not to the members of the Russian state.

If the individual has behaved in an uncooperative way according to the interrogator, this privilege may be withdrawn and he may be allowed toilet privileges at arbitrary and fixed and rather brief times during the day. He may be obliged to stand in one position if it is considered desirable to further bring pressure upon him.

What is the effect of all this? He goes through a period of being bewildered and demanding explanations and wanting to see people,
and trying to understand what it is all about and how strange it is that he should be so abused. Actually during this next period he passes into a second phase known as one of adjustment during which he quits this overactivity and no longer tries to get from his jailer any statement of his fate. He becomes more and more depressed and humiliated and uncertain. He becomes dull and his frustration certainly mounts.

At the end of the third to the sixth week of this complete isolation and utter loneliness and boredom, this individual is in a state of wishing, above all else, to talk to another human being and at least to make some contact with anyone who will talk to him. A person who then comes in the capacity of a friend or someone who would act as his counselor, finds him in a very ready state to talk, much more than he was in the beginning, and much more ready to comply.

Now the work of the interrogator begins. He may never have appeared until this moment when he comes as his friend. During the next 6 weeks the relations with the interrogator are developed and, as I will show you in subsequent charts, he comes out with a deposition somewhere along about the fifth or sixth week, and so on.

Now if we will turn to the next chart I think we can take these steps up in a little more detail.

The CHAIRMAN. The chart will be printed at this point.

(Exhibit No. 6 follows:)

**Exhibit No. 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Surveillance</th>
<th>Reaction of subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Under suspicion</td>
<td>Anxiety, suspense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Accumulation of evidence</td>
<td>Awareness of being avoided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reports of informers</td>
<td>Feelings of unfocused guilt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Seizure of associates</td>
<td>Fearful and suspicious.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seizure of associates. Complete uncertainty as to fate.

Dr. WOLFF. Without pausing very long to review this, the first portion of the curvilinear arrangement on the extreme left, the first 4 weeks, the period of surveillance during which he is increasingly anxious and becomes already filled with unfocussed guilt and wondering what it is going to be all about and certainly uncertain as to his fate. He already is being prepared for what follows. Then the arrest. Now we come to the period of detention. Some of these I have touched upon already: the kind of cell, the routine of the day. Attempts are made to disconnect him from his civilian status, to make him fully aware of the fact that he is under complete control. Many of the pressures that are of a slightly painful or painful nature are more designed to bring home to him his helplessness and isolated state than indeed they are designed to damage him or to injure him.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the record show that the chart from which you are now testifying is exhibit No. 7, and may be printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 7 follows:)

**Exhibit No. 7**

**The Detention Regimen**

1. Total isolation: No communication of any sort with any person.
2. Cell: 6 by 10, barren; no view outside; light in ceiling burns constantly.
3. Rigid regimen—strict timetable. For example:
(a) Early rising.
(b) Short time for washing.
(c) Eat (no utensils).
(d) Sit (fixed position).
(e) Exercise (walk alone).
(f) Sit (fixed position).
(g) Eat (no utensils).
(h) Sit (fixed position).
(i) Sleep (on back, hands out, face to light).

4. Immediate punishment for infractions.
5. Food: Plain, distasteful, just sufficient to sustain nutrition; sometimes excessively salty.
6. Elimination: Slop jar in cell, removed for infractions, thereafter, taken to latrine only at pleasure of the guard.
7. Temperature: May be hot, or cold and damp.
8. Pain may result from fixed positions during sleep and when awake.

Dr. Wolff. I might say a word about food. I think in many instances or in most instances the food is probably adequate according to the national practices, but many foreign nationals find the food distasteful and perhaps look upon that as one of the features that cause a reaction.

It is very important throughout all this discussion in trying to collect from our informants those effects that are not designed or have no diabolic end but are either due to the local custom or some deficiency of some sort, some clumsiness or awkwardness or peculiar local custom, not necessarily a part of the design.

The pain that is used is not a major part. Individuals may be caused to stand in 1 position for a long period up to 20 or 22 hours, in which you get very severe joint and muscle pains, and in some cases such swelling of the extremities as to make them very painful. Rarely this may interfere with circulation sufficiently to cause a man to collapse or to develop delirium. I should say these were ancillary and not primary features of the Russian or Eastern European method.

Very well, now that we have an idea of the detention regimen, we will go on to the consideration of the effects upon the individual during this period.

The Chairman. The chart now being presented is exhibit 8.

(Exhibit No. 8 follows:)

Exhibit No. 8

Effects of Detention Regimen on Prisoner

Initially: Fear, uncertainty.
1 to 3 days: Bewilderment and discouragement followed by overalertness, expectancy, demanding. Rejects food, complains, attempts fraternization (rejected or punished).
3 to 10 days: Anxiety, hyperactivity, sleeplessness, nightmares, compliance, steadily increasing loneliness, boredom, fatigue, hunger, pain, weight loss, gradual compliance.
10 days to 3 weeks: Decreasing activity. Increasing dejection, automatic behavior, repetitive acts, intense fatigue, drowsiness, pain, weight loss, constipation, edema, craving for companionship, humiliation, loss of self-esteem.
3 to 6 weeks: Despair, utter dependence, inactivity, filth, soiling, mental dulling, loss of discrimination, muttering, weeping, praying, delusions, hallucinations (delirium), "confabulation," need for companionship, great need to talk, frustration tolerance greatly reduced, suggestible, eagerly grasps at any help. Pliable.

Dr. Wolff. He is now still in complete isolation, the first 3 to 6 weeks. Fear and uncertainty are built up. As I said, he is overactive
for the first 3 or 4 days. From the 3d to the 10th day he is becoming less and less active, more and more resigned and hopeless and desperate. Then from the 10th day to the 3d week he becomes less and less active and tries to keep himself integrated in many circumstances by repetitive acts. He may cleanse the floor over and over again or meticulously dress and undress or spend long periods of time washing and rewashing—something to fill the day by repetitive automatic acts.

Fatigue, drowsiness. Mind you, sleep may be deprived by interrupting him or waking him. The jailer can do this if it was thought to be desirable. Then toward the end of that time I would say that his state was one of utter dependence, thoroughly disorganized. He may be weeping or praying and may actually have delusions and hallucinations and confabulates. “Confabulates” is a word meaning he constructs a fantasy according to suggestion; that is to say, the interrogator introduced at this time might be able to introduce an idea which is the basis of a fantasy developed by the prisoner.

The need to talk is the outstanding feature and the conviction of frustration due to his lack of ability to make a contact with anyone.

At this point the interrogator enters the scene. Now we may go on to the next chart.

The Chairman. The chart now being presented will be exhibit 9 and printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 9 follows:)

Exhibit No. 9

Interrogation Procedures and Prisoner Reactions

Begin: When interrogator decides prisoner is ready to talk—usually when he has become dejected and dependent.
Carried out: According to plan—usually at night.
Lasts: Until deposition is signed.

State II: Interrogator uses episode from life history as evidence of crime. Disapproves of prisoner's denials. Punishes him. Prisoner frustrated. (If made to stand many hours may develop circulatory collapse and uremia.) Hurt by rejection. Strives to please interrogator. Increasingly suggestible.

Stage III: Interrogator rewards and approves of the prisoner's cooperation. Persuades him, suggests half truths, and helps him to rationalize as only way out.

Stage IV: Repetition of stages II and III several times, if necessary. Prisoner repeatedly and increasingly frustrated by interrogator's refusal to accept statements and by his alternating "help" and withdrawal of approval—becomes more and more suggestible, readily confabulates, rationalizes half truths.

Stage V: Successful rationalization. Satisfactory protocol. "Gentleman's agreement." Prisoner feels great relief, may have gratitude and admiration for interrogator.

Dr. Wolff. The interrogator usually does his work at night. I understand originally this was introduced because they were so busy with other things during the day they could not get around to interrogation until night. It now is a fixed practice because it is believed to have special effects, which I think it does. This continues until a deposition has been made. These are arbitrary stages that I have used, and I have no use except for pedagogical purposes.
The first thing the interrogator does is to befriend him. Let me remind you, you have a man who is utterly dependent and very eager for human contact. So he reviews the life history in great detail, asks him about all sorts of personal incidents in his early life, childhood and development, and the family life of the prisoner. The prisoner is encouraged to talk. A kind of patient-physician relationship is established by this long intimacy and is the medium or the means by which the interrogator partially mollifies and controls the prisoner.

From the beginning he persuades the prisoner that his aim is to help and befriend, with the reiteration that we know everything already and if you will simply be frank and cooperative and confess, we will quickly close this case and you can be discharged.

The interrogator is never completely satisfied with the information rendered, and he is apt to ask more and more. So if a man tells more at once it doesn't seem to save him very much because he is pressed for more and more. On the other hand, if he holds back he can protract this process and even repeat it in some instances.

Any discrepancy in the telling of a life story is interpreted as a lie. Of course it needn't be because discrepancies in life history are common, but it is exploited as lack of cooperation. The prisoner during this period is very eager to talk as, I suggested, and is also very pliable.

In stage two the interrogator begins to use episodes or incidents from the life history of the individual concerning his vulnerability. He may use some incidents or episode of feeling or circumstance out of the prisoner about which he feels rather guilty or self-conscious or uneasy. Then it has the function of further disorganizing him and makes him overly active and anxious and guilty and fills him with conflict.

The next device an interrogator may use is to threaten to withdraw his support unless more cooperation and greater frankness is exhibited. He may use the punitive symbols of causing him to stand or obliging him to sit in certain positions simply to indicate that he is in control and if he doesn't cooperate he may find himself in great trouble.

So the process of befriending and rejecting and befriending and rejecting keeps the prisoner in a very uneasy state, plus the fact that this man has now cemented a very important relationship due to this long and intimate contact, often hours and hours and days, and usually at night. He certainly aims to please the interrogator.

Stage three is one in which there is this backing and filling, rewarding and approving on the one hand and withdrawing support on the other, and finally and with greater and greater emphasis persuading him that, after all, he is a criminal, he has committed certain offenses against the state, and according to the laws of the country, let us say, or the laws of the state he is a criminal and if he would only admit this, this matter could be closed. Therefore Communists and Christians and Catholic all have the same general purpose of helping the common man, and so on. He is gradually able to help him rationalize his position as to the only way out of an intolerable and as far as he is concerned an everlasting experience.

Meantime, the interrogator is looking at his watch, so to speak, because time is closing in on him. He is pressing for conclusion of the case and is bearing harder and harder. The advantage is of
course on his side since he gets the powers of rest. The prisoner never has certainty about his hours of rest and is completely uncertain about the turn of events that the next day may bring.

At any rate he becomes more and more suggestible. He is tired, alone, he has no one to support him. He is sure his friends have let him down. Finally, he rationalizes that half-truth which may be edited by the interrogator so that finally more and more words are taken out and he is left with the fact that he is guilty of, let us say, espionage according to the law or of some political crime.

With this rationalization of his behavior he signs the protocol and is allowed to sleep and rest and is better fed. He is given a week or two weeks during which he is prepared for his trial, at which time he confirms for the most part the depositions he has made because he realizes that if he does not he is likely to go through the process again. If he should finally decide in court that he just can’t take what has been said about him, the case will be closed at that time, he will be returned to this period in the detention house and the matter will be reviewed until he is again willing to accept the deposition.

Relatively few, probably less than 1 percent of all prisoners ever get to the point of having a public trial. It is a rare and unusual occasion. A certain number of them get to a trial. On the other hand, there are some who never get to trial because they do not confess. There are individuals who under these circumstances do not make a deposition, and they may be arbitrarily dealt with or allowed to remain in detention for an undefined period. But that is uncommon.

The Chairman. What percentage confess in some manner?

Dr. Wolff. My guess would be well over 90 percent. What do you think, Doctor?

Dr. Hinkle. Yes, I would think it would be a very small group who do not sign some form of protocol, which is called a confession, because once a man is being placed in a Russian detention prison his case cannot be closed and he cannot be released from this detention prison until a deposition has been prepared which is signed by him and by the interrogator. So except for those very few hardy souls who are prepared to stay in detention indefinitely—and people have been known to stay in these detention prisons as long as 7 years—except for them and those prepared to be shot forthwith, nearly every one signs some form of a deposition. The nature of the deposition is always such that some crime is specified and, therefore, it always amounts to a confession from our point of view.

Senator Bender. Doctor, you are not theorizing here. You actually have interviewed approximately 30 persons who had these experiences. So this is based on fact and not any book reading, but actual contact with the persons who were so victimized.

Dr. Wolff. Yes. I would like to add to that that the actual procedures and practices come from the mouths of those who have done them, not only the informers. We have had contact with individuals who have been involved in these procedures.

I would like to emphasize that these people have a very strong and great pride in their background as policemen and as experts in this process. They have no truck with long-haired notions and theories. They are like good cooks who open the stove and see when the cake is right and so on, and they know how to proceed from there.
are out of sympathy with many of our gadgets, polygraph, for example. They have very little feeling about such things.

The Chairman. Doctor, did you mean to say that you have interviewed only 30 people?

Dr. Wolff. That is quite right. We have a certain number of individuals who are practitioners of this craft which I can't specify. Then we have examined about 30 intimately, and we have another less intimate contact with another 30 or so. So I should think our experience is based on 70 or more people.

The Chairman. Seventy or more. Have you ever interrogated any of their interrogators?

Dr. Wolff. Yes. I mentioned that as among the experts. They are the experts I have in mind. They are the defectors that I had an opportunity to work with.

The Chairman. In other words, they actually participated and were assigned the duty of getting confessions from the prisoners, and you have talked with them?

Dr. Wolff. Precisely.

The Chairman. Does the information they gave you confirm what the victims had reported?

Dr. Wolff. Precisely.

Mr. Kennedy. Doctor, I think it was also a point that you made that the suspect who signed a confession might be talked into signing by the interrogator saying this is a crime in this Communist country, so let us sign first that you committed this crime under Communist law or under the Russian law, and then they eliminate under Russian law until finally you are signing a statement saying "I am a spy" or "I committed espionage," when in fact you started out originally with never any such thought. Is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. Quite so, sir.

The Chairman. That is one of the systems that is used?

Dr. Wolff. Precisely. The prisoner becomes less and less critical as he gets more and more exhausted and fatigued and hopeless. So what he would reject at first he is likely to accept at the end.

The Chairman. For those who may read this record or those who may hear you testify we want to make it very clear that, as I understand it, that this is not just theory, not just something that has been guessed at or there is a possibility it may be so, but it is actual facts, substantiated by the sworn testimony of people who have had the experience, both those who have had the experience as victims of the system and those who have participated in the perpetration of the system and administering the system. Is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed.

Dr. Wolff. The next chart, please.

The Chairman. The chart being presented will be made exhibit No. 10 and printed in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 10 follows:)

**Exhibit No. 10**

The primary work of the interrogator is to convince the prisoner that what he did was a crime.
Dr. Wolff. Let me repeat once again what I have said earlier several times. The primary work of the interrogator is to convince the prisoner that what he did was a crime. That is repeating what I have said many times before.

The Chairman. That is his conception of the responsibilities and duties with which he is charged. If he fails I wonder what happens to the interrogator. If he is unsuccessful, what punishment or reprimand does he suffer? Do we have any information on that?

Dr. Wolff. Yes, a little. I tried to find out. If he demonstrates his lack of capacity he is taken out of the work. He isn't actually punished but his chances of promotion are certainly very small and he may be given some secondary role in the police system. I don't believe that he is actually imprisoned unless he has shown some deviation in his own ideas.

The Chairman. In other words, if he just doesn't have the capacity to do the job he is demoted. At least that much happens to him.

Dr. Wolff. Yes. There is this much to say about it: If a man has falsified his evidence he is liable to be punished.

The Chairman. You mean if he makes a report that the prisoner later repudiates?

Dr. Wolff. Or if his superiors for political reasons or otherwise decide this is no longer the way this is to be viewed, in either case he may be punished for this falsification. We had that sort of evidence about the doctors' trials. As you may remember, a certain number of doctors were accused of having taken part in the bad management of important people, and they were tried for that. Then later it was discovered that the evidence was not correct. The interrogators in those instances were punished.

Senator Bender. Was this the experience, Doctor, of the boys who embraced communism, who were prisoners, American boys who voluntarily said they didn't want to come back to this country?

Dr. Wolff. No, sir.

Senator Bender. That wasn't true in that case.

Dr. Wolff. No. They didn't have very much pressure applied, practically none of this.

Senator Bender. None of this?

Dr. Wolff. No.

Senator Bender. That is a wholly different situation. Did you study that at all?

Dr. Wolff. We have had some experience with some of those people, yes, sir.

Senator Bender. What would you say motivated them?

Dr. Wolff. In some instances I am afraid it was due to the fact that certain advantages were gained by cooperation and that they had the conviction, rightly or wrongly, that they would be very severely criticized, if not punished, if they returned. They thought that their chances were somewhat better if they remained with the enemy. At least some of them have felt that after making that choice the decision was a bad one and they were willing to take their chances and to come back. Our experience with them has been that they are not exposed to a great deal of pressure.
Senator Bender. Where our citizens are involved as prisoners and are brainwashed and given this treatment what has been the Government's attitude when confessions were obtained? Is the Government inclined to be lenient and consider the ordeal and experience that they have had?

Dr. Wolff. Yes. I am out of my area of competence. It is my understanding that where military people are involved, the department of the particular individual is very carefully reviewed, and where it is considered by military judges that the pressures were very great, these men have been accepted and compassionately dealt with.

On the other hand, if this was felt not to be so, I think certain punishments were meted out. I think it was in terms of the individual case and the amount of pressure applied. I don't think there is an overall policy. Am I right about that?

Dr. Hinkle. Yes, sir. I think, Senator, if we get ahead with the next part of our presentation it will become clear where the Chinese procedures are different from those of the KGB, which we have been describing, and you can also see to what extent the Korean prisoner-of-war experience flowed out of the Chinese experience.

Dr. Wolff. May I have the next chart?

The Chairman. Chart No. 11 will be made exhibit No. 11 and will appear in the record at this point.

(Exhibit No. 11 follows:)

Exhibit No. 11

Comparison of Methods of Chinese With Methods of KGB

1. KGB goal is to produce a satisfactory protocol in preparation for trial. Additional Chinese goal is to produce long lasting changes in the basic attitudes and behavior of the prisoner.
2. Prolonged isolation not used routinely.
   (a) To obtain information.
   (b) To apply pressure; to persuade.
   (c) To indoctrinate.
4. Use of public self-criticism and group criticism for indoctrination of non-party persons.
5. Use of diary writing, repeatedly rewritten and rejected autobiography, and rote learning as means of interrogation and indoctrination.
6. Detention greatly prolonged after initial interrogation—indoctrination may continue years before trial, with exposure to nothing but Communist interpretation of history and current events.

Dr. Wolff. If you will accept what I have said as background of what has been developed in the Asiatic Communist society, I will emphasize differences right from the start.

Before going in detail I think we might say just how they contrast. The KGB stands in general for the Eastern European Communist methods. You will see that the goal in the KGB has been to produce a satisfactory protocol in preparation for trial.

The Chairman. That is, a confession.

Dr. Wolff. Yes, sir. Excuse me.

The Chairman. When you say, "to produce a satisfactory protocol," you mean, in our terminology, a "confession" from the prisoner?
Dr. Wolff. Yes, sir.

You will remember that the indoctrination procedures or the attempt to reform was not a major point, and it was assumed that in the ultimate disposition in Siberia in the salt mine or in factory or whatnot, the individual's continued education would be a part of his future life.

The additional Chinese goal is to produce a long-lasting change in the basic attitude and behavior of the prisoner. So the timetable, as you will see, is very different. They are not only interested in getting a satisfactory protocol but they want to produce a different attitude or a different ideological system. You might speculate as to why that is, but apparently they feel that they have used this as a means of diffusing education in the Communist value system when they let these people go. The Russian society doesn't seem to be dependent on that since it feels it has a better contact with these discharged people and will treat them as they show evidence of defection.

At any rate, the second major difference is that prolonged isolation such as I described is not used routinely. It may be used in some instances, but not as routinely as it is in the Eastern European system.

Strikingly different is the intensive use of group interaction. I will describe that in detail. There is a greater dependence on disorganizing effect of group rejection and hostility in detention. There is a complete lack of privacy in contrast to the extreme privacy of isolation. These means are used to obtain information, to apply pressure to persuade and to indoctrinate.

The variations are the use of public self-criticism and group criticism for indoctrination and the use of diary writing. There is much more pencil and paper work in the East. Repeatedly rewritten and rejected autobiographic statements, and the rote learning as means of interrogation and indoctrination.

The Chairman. What is that rote learning?

Dr. Wolff. As I will point out later, they get up to 56 hours of lectures or talks a week when they are in detention, and they have to be able to repeat almost as one would in the primary or elementary schools some of the lessons that are being delivered.

The Chairman. Suppose they fail or refuse or are not very proficient in learning, what happens to them?

Dr. Wolff. As you will see, the interrogator or the teacher spending, as he will, up to 56 hours of his time in teaching, will then turn the prisoner back to his cell. You will find there are 6 or 7 or 8 people in the cell. If he comes back with evidence that he has done poorly or has been uncooperative in relation to his classwork, then the group really gets a workout. The pressure that they bring down is really enormous. I will elaborate on that.

The detention may be greatly prolonged after the initial interrogation. The indoctrination may continue for four or more years before trial, during which time the individual is exposed to nothing but Communist interpretation of history and current events. With that superficial appraisal of the differences, let's go into a little more detail.

The Chairman. The chart now being presented will be marked exhibit No. 12 and will be printed at this point in the record.

(Exhibit No. 12 follows:)
**EXHIBIT NO. 12**

**A TYPICAL TIME TABLE**

**CHINESE COMMUNIST SECRET POLICE SYSTEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weeks</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Reaction of Prisoner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1. Suspicion</td>
<td>Anxiety and suspense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2. Preparation for arrest:</td>
<td>Awareness of being avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Denunciation by neighbors and associates covertly and at local group criticism sessions.</td>
<td>Feelings of unfocused guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Restrictions and annoyance by police.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3. Seizure under dramatic circumstances</td>
<td>Fear, complete uncertainty as to fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>initial interrogation by 3 &quot;judges&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4. House arrest</td>
<td>Reaction like that of KGB prisoner, leaving subject feeling defeated, humiliated, mentally dull, pliable and with great need for talk and approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>5. Sudden transfer to detention prison isolation resembling KGB procedure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer to group cell</td>
<td>Emotional nakedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total absence of privacy</td>
<td>Unfocused feelings of guilt and unworthiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Helpless, degraded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reviled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By fellow prisoners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brutalized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>because of background and attitudes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public self- and group criticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diary and autobiography writing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Constant reading, discussion and repetition of Communist material, with total absence of other information</td>
<td>Increasing dejection, fatigue, sleep loss, pain, hunger, weight loss, mental dulling, confusion (occasional delirium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intermittent sessions with one or more interrogators</td>
<td>Increasing difficulty in discriminating between this material and that from earlier memory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attempts at self justification.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dr. Wolff. Again you have before you a timetable, the weeks on the left, the steps involved in the middle, and the reaction of the prisoner, this time in terms of the Chinese Communist secret police system. Again we go through a period or 3 or 4 weeks of surveillance and preparation for arrest, with certain local peculiarities which we need not dwell upon. They have about the same effect upon the prisoner. Making him increasingly aware of his impending arrest and uncertainty as to his future.

In contrast to the Russian system, the seizure is done under rather dramatic circumstances. Instead of the middle of the night, on the train or on the street, or a knock on the door, a truck may approach, often in daylight, again at night, armed troops may jump down and a
great to-do is exhibited about the arrest of the individual. Dramatic or stagy circumstances in contrast to the other type of secretive circumstance.

He is immediately taken before three judges, who are also interrogators. Whatever immediate information he is prepared to give he will give.

A new feature is the so-called house arrest. This may be the outgrowth of a lack of facilities. At any rate, the individual may be kept in his own dwelling for weeks, in one room or part of the house, under guard. Ultimately he is taken to a detention house. Again, unlike the Russian system, the detention house may be part of a prison or not. I might say again and again that when we are talking about things Chinese we have a much less organized and stabilized and refined system. It is much more fluid, it is much more in the process of making, far less experienced, much more accident, much more clumsiness, many more fortuitous circumstances.

Through this period of house arrest the individual again is exposed to a certain amount of indoctrination. When he gets to the detention house, in fact, or the detention prison, again his property is taken away from him and carefully kept for him.

Incidentally, some of our informers, prison informants, Americans who came back after 4½ years, received their garments in excellent condition and in good, clean state. Everything was returned.

It is uncertain as to whether he will be put into a period of isolation. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. He is certainly going to go through a period of interrogation from this point on. In many instances, in a few instances in the case of some of our important military personnel, they have been completely isolated, not unlike the Russian system.

The group cell I think should be very carefully kept in mind. This is a group of 6 or 8 people with a leader. They are all prisoners, political prisoners. The leader and the group are intensely competitive in bringing to bear upon the newcomer the evidences of his defections and inadequacies. They are all doing their best to get out of this situation. They bring every pressure that a hostile group can bring upon a newcomer to comply, to accept, to confess, and to express approved opinions.

The individual has no privacy. He has a little bundle of garments and a toothbrush which he puts under a kind of table on which all the individuals sleep. He is exposed from morning until night to the views and impressions and opinions of this ostensibly hostile group.

Sometimes there are individuals in this group who are very eager, as I put it, to help the individual to come to a new point of view, which certainly makes it difficult for the newcomer to resist. The pressure here is the pressure of an individual exposed to a small group of persons with whom he must live for 24 hours a day for weeks or months or years and with which he must make some sort of working arrangement to have a little self esteem and peace of mind.

Again physical violence is not approved officially, and if a jailer or an interrogator happens to strike a man it is not condoned except where it is not known. Occasionally the less well prepared and less
well trained and less experienced people use physical violence where in the Eastern European system it would be less apt to appear.

A few points of special interest.

If a man comes back from his session with the interrogator in hand or leg manacles, it indicates he is not doing very well. That is the signal for the group to bear down on him and to prepare him for better attitudes. He may stay in these manacles for long periods, and skin abrasions and infections of the skin have resulted in many of our own nationals who have been prisoners under these circumstances.

The prison group, the cell group, on the other hand may be so out of patience with a prisoner as to actually beat him and occasionally the jailer has to protect the prisoner against his own cellmates if that cellmate has proven to be refractory. Sometimes the patient himself may encourage the cellmates to be violent in their actions.

All of this has a comparable effect to the isolation and the interrogation pressures that we are now familiar with in the Russian system.

These 56 or more hours of public lectures and demonstrations the group repeats and reviews and asks for statements of opinion of each of the group, and anyone who is uncertain or withholds or doubts is very much borne down upon.

The writing of diaries and autobiographic material is another way of obtaining information and causing the individual to state his deviant opinions. Such writings are rejected numerous times until ultimately one that is acceptable is prepared.

The effects of all this on the individual must be apparent. He feels utterly helpless, defeated. He is fatigued, he is in pain, hungry, dull, confused. He loses his capacity to make sharp discriminations. He accepts as likely what formerly he thought or believed was unlikely. Ultimately, I believe in all instances that I know about, some sort of deposition is made since time seems to be of no moment, 4 or 5 years.

I have shown you on the next chart, which is a continuation of the one which I have just completed, how time stretches out.

The Chairman. It may be made exhibit No. 12-A.

(Exhibit No. 12-A will be found on the following page.)

Dr. Wolff. We end up with 250 weeks as the likelihood of the longest probability. There may be others much longer.

Unlike the Russian system, a man's period of detention may be considered at trial, assuming that he is not executed, as evidence of time spent in incarceration. Some of our United States citizens who have been so incarcerated have had this time considered their period of detention just before they were shipped across the border.

At any rate, with the acceptance of the proper attitudes the trial before a group of three interrogators is carried out and release or punishment is then begun. The punishment may be death or it may be labor camp or it may be some other assignment.

Mr. Kennedy. Doctor, are you thinking of a particular case where it went on for 5 years?

Dr. Wolff. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. Are there also instances where the suspect attempts to commit suicide as a means out of the situation?

Dr. Wolff. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. This one individual tried it?
## EXHIBIT NO. 12A

### A TYPICAL TIME TABLE

**CHINESE COMMUNIST SECRET POLICE SYSTEM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time (in days)</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Preparation of &quot;confession&quot; (some fellow prisoners sincerely helpful) Some respite from pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rejection of &quot;confession&quot; by interrogator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Resumption of pressures in group cell Alternating hopefulness, frustration and degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Preparation of new &quot;confession&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rejection of new &quot;confession&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>(9, 10, and 11 may be repeated as many as 3 to 6 times over as many as 4 to 6 years. Usual duration, 6 months to 2 years.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Final achievement of &quot;proper&quot; attitude and acceptable &quot;confession&quot; By rationalization, and tentative partial belief is able to conform and obtain group acceptance and approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group acceptance and approval Profound relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Continued study and discussion of Communist materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>&quot;Trial&quot; and &quot;confession&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250</td>
<td>Release, or punishment Gradual readjustment of attitudes and behavior to the new reality situation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dr. Wolff. Yes. It has been very interesting that several persons who were being detained for longer periods, Americans, have been there for somewhat different reasons. In one case a priest found it extremely difficult to accept the accusations and the viewpoints and withheld deposition and approved statements for 4 or more years. In several other instances individuals who were moderately sympathetic to the Communist point of view, who really felt themselves from the start to be friends of the Chinese people, and who in a sense had dedicated their lives to furthering the ends of the Chinese, especially put upon to be considered spies and enemies of the state. Therefore, for opposite reasons these individuals held out for very long periods. One of these several times recanted confession and several times was thrown back into this mill of destruction. Finally, in a desperate state he made a suicidal attempt in a very unattractive way. He attempted to drown himself by putting his head into a bucket of urine, which was thwarted. He did ultimately make a deposition and was sent back to us.
If you will allow me, I would like to point to the next chart, and just say a word about those few who seem to be most amenable to this kind of abuse and who make statements that cause a good deal of attention in the public press.

The CHAIRMAN. The chart now being presented will be made exhibit No. 13.

(Exhibit No. 13 follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 13

SOME FEATURES OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY AMENABLE TO CHINESE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION

1. Strongly sympathetic to communism.
2. In rebellion against family, church and society in which they originated.
3. Rootless (home, family, person, church and nation).
4. Uncommitted—work, value system.
5. Ready rationalizers.
6. Politically naive.
7. Guilt laden and excessively dependent upon authority.

Senator BENDER. In connection with these 70 cases, Doctor, what was the average length of time involved in this process?

Dr. WOLFF. Are you speaking of the Chinese?

Senator BENDER. Yes.

Dr. WOLFF. Anywhere from a few weeks to about 2 years. I think 6 months would be near the average.

Dr. HINKLE. I think for most of those held by the Chinese the detention period averaged between 6 and 8 months. Four or five years would be a long time. There were a number of instances in which it was just a few weeks.

Dr. WOLFF. Some features of those who have been especially amenable to Chinese Communist indoctrination. The first one I have not written down there, and it is very important. I would say they are persons who spoke Chinese fluently. That made them especially vulnerable, shall we say, because the number of English speaking Chinese interrogators is not excessive and their use of the idiom is not complete. So their contact with those who spoke English only was less telling and less effective than with individuals who could speak Chinese.

First, those who are sympathetic to communism to begin with or at least not out of sympathy with it were much more apt to find that this was a possible way out.

Senator BENDER. In that connection were any of these persons Catholic and Protestant missionaries?

Dr. WOLFF. Not in this group, sir, not the ones I am talking about. They were among the others I mentioned previously. No, those who held strong religious views were not in this group.

Secondly, they seemed to have in common, let us say, evidence of rebellion against their family or church or the society in which they originated—not only Americans, but French, Belgian, and other Europeans.

Third, they were rootless, in the sense that they had no commitment to home or family or person or church or nation. They were uncommitted to a worth and value system in many instances.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, are you stating or strongly implying that those who had a strong religious faith could stand or offer greater
resistance to this system or form of indoctrination? In other words, those who didn't have a strong religious faith and convictions about their way of life were more susceptible to this indoctrination?

Dr. Wolff. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. To fortify our people and the free peoples of the world against this vicious system of destruction and indoctrination of communism, a strong religious faith and conviction is a great bulwark against it?

Dr. Wolff. That is my opinion, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Proceed, sir.

Dr. Wolff. Very often many of these individuals were ready rationalizers and intellectually facile and, on the other hand, politically naive. For the most part they were guilt-laden and excessively dependent—guilt-laden for personal reasons having to do with their own backgrounds and family experience.

The opposite side of the coin has been suggested by your question, Senator McClellan, which is to say, negatively, that the absence of these features is found in those who did rather better.

What is the effect of all this—Eastern European and Chinese? What is the durability of the changes induced and the confessions extracted?

For the most part the effects are transient. Just as soon as individuals came out of the environment where this kind of statement and attitude was necessary and where they had a chance to relate themselves to situations as they were, not as interpreted by the Communists, these individuals rather quickly, in from 6 to 8 weeks or 2 to 3 months, fell into a place in society not very different from that which they had originally held.

Conversion experiences in the sense perhaps comparable to a religious one is one of the features of the Chinese Communist system. The individual sometimes felt quite exalted and felt perhaps he had come upon a vision of life. Those who have had this experience have somehow been integrated by it without necessarily adhering to the Communist viewpoint. It stands to reason that any one who has been through such a grueling experience would come out somewhat fortitude and strengthened by his belief in himself.

That is about what I have to offer, sir. If you have not had too much of me I have a brief summary statement which I have written and prepared for your information.

The Chairman. I would appreciate that. I have a note here from some members of the press reminding us that there have been many stories to the effect that United States prisoners of war were starved and beaten by their captors. Do you care to make any comments on that, or is that covered in some other phase of the presentation?

Dr. Wolff. Precisely, sir. I believe there are others more competent to discuss that.

The Chairman. You will have someone else do that?

Dr. Wolff. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I didn't know whether you could comment on that. If some other witness is to present that aspect of the inquiry we will pass it for the time being.

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, we have two witnesses this afternoon. The second one will go into that field.
Senator Bender. Doctor, the people who did the interrogating were Chinese police, is that correct?

Dr. Wolff. Yes, sir, state police, sir.

Senator Bender. How competent or qualified were they? Were they educated, cultured people, that is, in Communist culture?

Dr. Wolff. In terms of the Russians they were far less so, less well prepared, less well trained, less experienced, less knowledgeable in the whole process. Many of the stories we hear, many of the events which have come to pass I think represent this lack of skill in the effort rather than any organized attempt to destroy or to damage. It is much less sophisticated.

The Chairman. We will be ready to hear your summary in a moment. A thought occurs to us here. I know from my own thinking that we have regarded this system over there of indoctrination and the treatment of prisoners and accusations and punishments for crime as having some great mystery about it. It is shrouded in mystery. Perhaps we have not fully understood it. One of the purposes of these hearings is to bring the truth to light in this area which you have studied and investigated, so the free peoples of the world, not only Americans but all people, may have first-hand information and gain knowledge as to what actually transpires and how the system works and how it is administered. You would say from your study of it that there is no longer any great mystery about it?

Dr. Wolff. Precisely, sir. I hope I have communicated that idea.

The Chairman. You have been most helpful, sir. I think great good can flow from hearings of this kind. They are somewhat detailed, of course. At times the testimony may not be so spectacular, but it does disseminate information that the free peoples of the world should have.

I am very grateful to you and to all of you who are cooperating with the committee to that end. You have obviously given great study to it. You have gone to great pains to make the preparation to present this intelligently, factually, and effectively to the committee and for the information of the public. I think we owe you, and all of those we shall hear who are coming here to help us, a sincere debt of gratitude.

Senator Bender. Doctor, you as a neurologist certainly are expert to answer this question. What can the average GI do to withstand this treatment? What are we doing in the matter of training our people who are in the military service in the event of any hostilities? Do we have a program on that? Do you care to comment on that?

Dr. Wolff. There is one statement I can make without equivocation, and that is it is my conviction that knowledge about the process and the steps involved have the greatest defensive value. That can be made available and should be soon to all of us.

Secondly, I know that there is a program in the Armed Forces to do more than that, to work out in detail steps better to prepare a man for this kind of abuse. I can’t go into that further at this time.

It is my hope, also, that out of this kind of experience something can be done at the level of the United Nations that might bring this to the attention of the world at large and that the real problem can be tackled at its source. I believe that is the program I would envisage as having the greatest effect.
The Chairman. The Chair may say one thing that gives this committee jurisdiction of the subject matter, and that is what is our Government doing to prepare our Armed Forces for these eventualities or contingencies and to inform our people, even the prospective soldiers, to acquaint the prospective draftee with what can be anticipated in the event he should ever become a captive of a Communist military force or government. I think this committee may be rendering some service not only to our Government but to our people in getting this information out and disseminating it and giving it from a factual standpoint and not just on some theory or what somebody has guessed or speculated upon.

I hope that some real good is going to come from the hearings that we are having.

You may proceed with your summary, Doctor.

Dr. Wolff. The methods used in Communist countries for the interrogation and indoctrination of persons regarded as enemies of the state have their roots in secret police practices which go back for many years. These methods have been refined and systematized by much use and experience. The general dynamic features which underlie them are understandable.

Men under the complete control of Communist police have been made to say and do many things which their captors desire and some people have proved to be much more ameliorable than others. But under the most strenuous circumstances some men are remarkably refractory and refuse to cooperate with their captors up to the point at which they develop confusional states and delirium.

Those who live in Communist states recognize there are times the state police are almost unlimited in their power and their acts may be swift and arbitrary. When residents of such communities become aware that they are suspected by the police, their feelings are impotence and uncertainty are greatly augmented. As they are increasingly avoided by their friends and associates they feel isolated and rejected and develop intense anxiety, often colored by feelings of guilt. Their sudden seizure under dramatic circumstances is additionally traumatizing. They usually enter upon their prison experience feeling fearful, vaguely guilty, helpless, and completely uncertain of their fate.

When the initial period of imprisonment is one of total isolation, such as used by the KGB, the complete separation of the prisoner from the companionship and support of others his utter loneliness and his prolonged uncertainty have a further disorganizing effect upon him. Fatigue, sleep loss, pain, cold, hunger, and the like augment the injury induced by isolation.

The cumulative effects of the entire experience may be almost intolerable. With the passage of time the prisoner usually develops intense need to be relieved of the pressure put upon him and to have some human companionship. He may have a very strong urge to talk to any human, be utterly independent upon anyone who will help him or befriend him. At about this time he also becomes mentally dull and loses his capacity for discrimination. He becomes ameliorable, suggestible, and in some instances he may confabulate.

The interrogator exploits the prisoner's need for companionship. He uses items from the prisoner's biography derived from police files.
and from hours of interrogation to arouse further guilt, conflict, and anxiety. He makes use of the dependence of the prisoner which is strengthened by the intimate sharing of information about his life. He frustrates and further disorganizes the prisoner by rejecting his statements. He scolds, punishes, and threatens him when he does not cooperate and approves and rewards him when he does.

Then by suggesting that the prisoner accept half truths and plausible distortion of the truth, he makes it possible for the prisoner to rationalize and thus accept the interrogator's viewpoint as the only way out of an intolerable situation.

The methods of interrogation and indoctrination used in Communist China are in many respects similar to those of the Russian state police from which they were in part derived, but in some respects they are quite different because of the special needs and traditions of the Chinese. In the Chinese prison the individual interrogator is still important and in occasional cases the management of the prisoner may quite closely duplicate that of the KGB. But in most instances the efforts of the interrogator are supplemented by the effects of the interaction between the prisoner and 6 or 8 of his fellow prisoners with whom he is incarcerated in a crowded cell. Here the group replaces the interrogator as the focus of the prisoner's relationships. In this setting of complete lack of privacy there is an unremitting routine of self-criticism sessions, group discussion sessions, rote learning, and constant repetition of Communist viewpoints, and the repeated rewriting and rejection of autobiographical essays. The group exploits the feeling of emotional nakedness and unworthiness which the self-criticism sessions engender, dwelling upon items obtained from the prisoner's life history during those sessions which arouse in him guilt, conflict and anxiety.

These feelings are greatly potentiated when the group rejects, isolates, and reviles him because of his improper attitude and past behavior.

The prisoner is thus placed in a situation in which he cannot avoid having his past life reviewed and questioned and cannot avoid hearing an exposition of the Communist position. Moreover, for a period sometimes of years' duration he has access to nothing but Communist oriented history and Communist interpretation of current events.

Like the KGB interrogator, the group rewards and approves the prisoner when he cooperates and behaves in accordance with their aims, and thus indicates to him that the only plausible way out of his intolerable situation is the acceptance of their point of view.

Under pressures such as these prisoners usually rationalize a change in attitude and hold it for an indefinite time. In general this change in attitude is only so great as the prisoner feels it must be to enable him to relieve himself of the intolerable pressures under which he labors. In the KGB pretrial interrogation the achievement of a successful rationalization and a satisfactory protocol is usually accompanied by a profound feeling of relief and unspoken agreement with the interrogator that may even have overtones of want and friendliness. In the Chinese group cell where the pressures are much more prolonged and the demands upon the prisoner are correspondingly more intense, the ultimate achievement of a proper rationalization and group acceptance is associated with feelings of relief that are occasion-
ally exhilarating and sometimes show some of the features of a religious conversion.

The most effective features of the Communist procedure are those which would operate even in the absence of brutality or complete control. Prisoners who were not excessively abused and who encountered men who appeared to be dedicated, selfless and even idealistic in their attachment to the ostensible goals of communism, have acknowledged these features of their captors, and those who were presented with apparently plausible evidence have accepted it tentatively. When they have discovered they would be rejected, reviled, and punished for non-cooperative behavior, they have refrained from doing or saying anything which would bring such treatment upon them when they were in Communist control.

Those whose past lives have been colored by feelings of much guilt, by lack of purpose or commitment, and those who were previously sympathetic to Communist views have been more amenable to Communist methods.

Finally, prisoners who have been released from Communist control and have been able to assure themselves that they will be no longer punished for improper opinions have gradually readjusted their attitudes to their new environment. Their memories of the punishments and brutalities which they have endured have been lively, and in most prisoners these memories override all of their other memories. When they have felt safe to acknowledge their resentment they have expressed extreme feelings of hostility toward those responsible for their bad prison experiences and they have nearly always rejected communism and all of those connected with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Wolff and Dr. Hinkle. Senator Bender, any further questions?

Senator BENDER. Not at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. I will say to you again that we not only deeply appreciate but are grateful to you for your cooperation and your presentation. I regret that other members of the committee could not be here this morning and hear you. I am sure they will read your testimony. Unfortunately the work of a United States Senator today and his duties and responsibilities with so many committee assignments and so many Government activities and legislation awaiting his attention, make it just impossible for any of us to be everywhere that we should be all at one time.

I thank you very much.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon, when we shall resume.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

AFTER RECESS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

(Members of the subcommittee present at the convening of the hearing were Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hinkle, will you return to the stand a moment, please, sir?

Doctor, did you have some other documentary exhibits that you thought would be helpful to us which you would like to place in the record?
Dr. Hinkle. Yes, sir. We have a report which embodies the substance of Dr. Wolff's testimony this morning and additional elaborations which I think it would be helpful to place in the record.

The Chairman. It would not be necessary to print all of it in the record, would it? He read a great deal of that this morning, did he not?

Mr. Kennedy. It is just as an exhibit for reference.

The Chairman. Will you identify it? What is it?

Dr. Hinkle. This is a report of an evaluation of the Communist interrogation and indoctrination techniques carried out by the group of which we are the representatives.

The Chairman. This is the report of the group of whom you are representative. It may be filed for reference as exhibit No. 14. After examination by the staff, there may be excerpts from it that we would like to print in the official record of the hearing.

(Exhibit No. 14 may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Thank you very much, Doctor.

Who is the next witness?

Mr. Kennedy. Capt. Bert Cumby.

The Chairman. Capt. Bert Cumby, come around, please.

Captain, will you be sworn? Captain, you do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Captain Cumby. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. BERT CUMBY, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Chairman. Be seated. Please state your name, your place of residence, and your occupation or profession.

Captain Cumby. My name is Bert Cumby, captain, United States Army. I live in Washington, D. C.

The Chairman. How long have you been in the Service, Captain?

Captain Cumby. 14 years.

The Chairman. You have talked with members of the staff and of course know the general purpose of these hearings?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Also you have an idea of the line of interrogation that will be followed?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I assume you do not feel the need of an attorney to counsel you while you testify?

Captain Cumby. No, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Counsel, proceed.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain Cumby, you have done a good deal of work with the prisoners who came back from Korea, is that correct?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir, I have had some experience.

Mr. Kennedy. Will you outline to the committee the experience which you have had in that connection?

Captain Cumby. My experience with this problem extends back to operation Little Switch of 1953. It terminated in December of 1955. When I say terminated, I no longer was working on the problem.
Mr. Kennedy. What was your job in Little Switch? Will you give us that?

Captain Cumby. On Little Switch my assignment was that of an interrogator.

Mr. Kennedy. To question the prisoners who came back from North Korea?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Then what were you doing in Big Switch?

Captain Cumby. On Big Switch I was chief of an interrogation team.

The Chairman. Chief of the interrogation team?

Captain Cumby. Chief of an interrogation team; yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Will you explain to us what occurred at Little Switch? What was the purpose of that, and what actually were the results of the Switch?

The Chairman. Tell us what the difference is between Little Switch and Big Switch, first.

Captain Cumby. As you know, we had two intelligence operations in the Far East. We referred to them as Little Switch and Big Switch. Little Switch dealt with the exchange of prisoners in the sick and wounded category. That operation was conceived in the spring of 1953 as a result of agreement between the Communist forces and the United Nations forces in Korea, whereby they would exchange all sick and wounded prisoners held by the opposing forces.

The Chairman. What did Big Switch refer to?

Captain Cumby. Big Switch was the general prisoner exchange which resulted from the armistice agreement whereby all prisoners held by the opposing forces, that is, the Communist forces and the United Nations forces, would be exchanged 30 days after the armistice was signed. The armistice was signed in July, and we started operation Big Switch on the fifth of August 1953.

The Chairman. I think that identifies and differentiates between Little Switch and Big Switch. So now let us go back to the question that counsel asked you with respect to Little Switch.

Mr. Kennedy. Did the Communists in fact return the sick and wounded at that time?

Captain Cumby. They allegedly returned all sick and wounded prisoners in Little Switch. We returned all sick and wounded. But we received information during Little Switch that they did not return all the sick and wounded. We had information that there were a number of Americans left behind who didn't have legs, who didn't have arms. According to the information we received, they did not repatriate all of the sick and wounded prisoners because they didn't want to give the impression that the release of those badly wounded and maltreated prisoners would reflect cruelty and brutality on their part. So what they actually did, they sent back about 2 or 3 actually sick and wounded prisoners of the 133, I believe, and the rest of them were more or less cooperators, were persons who had supported them and given them their cooperation.

The Chairman. Let us see if we understand that. They only sent back 130-some-odd prisoners altogether in Little Switch?

Captain Cumby. Sir, I don't have the correct figure, but it was about 125 or 130.
The Chairman. It does not have to be exact, just in round numbers.

Captain Cumby. It was about 125 or 130 on Little Switch.

The Chairman. You say only 2 or 3 of those were actually sick——

Captain Cumby. I would say it was less than 10 who were actually sick and wounded.

The Chairman. And the others were what?

Captain Cumby. The others were healthy individuals that we found had been the cooperators or collaborators or whatever you choose to call them.

The Chairman. In other words, they had been sufficiently indoctrinated that they thought they could release them and that their release would be to the advantage of the Communists?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir, to give the impression that there had been no maltreatment of Americans, that here you have 120 well and hardy individuals. That information was told to us. It was verified. It was supported.

The Chairman. Did not the very fact that only a few, some 8 or 10, had had the experience of being sick or wounded arouse your suspicions immediately that the Communists were not acting in good faith?

Captain Cumby. Oh, absolutely. There never has been any doubt in my mind as to the trustworthiness of the Communists. That was just another indication that their word didn’t mean anything and that you could not deal with them.

That holding back of those prisoners was deliberate and it was by design.

The Chairman. Just by way of building background here, how many prisoners did we return to them in the operation Little Switch?

Captain Cumby. I don’t have the figure, sir, on that, but I would say it was probably a couple of thousand.

The Chairman. Senator McCarthy.

Senator McCarthy. I am not sure if you are in a position to answer this question or not, Captain Cumby. We have had testimony before the committee previously by the Defense Department and the State Department that Communists still hold—I do not have the exact figure in mind—I think it is 457 Americans. Could you shed any light on that? It is a very important matter if they are still holding Americans in Communist prisons.

Captain Cumby. Senator McCarthy, that certainly is an important question. There were more than 7,000 prisoners in North Korea. I am giving round figures. There were something like 7,000 or close to 8,000. We got back something like 4,000. What happened to the other prisoners I don’t have the vaguest idea.

Senator McCarthy. The testimony we got, if I can rely upon my memory, was that they had 944, I believe, in their prison camps where prisoners were living. Then I think that figure dwindled to 450-something. You would not be in a position to give us any information on that?

Captain Cumby. No, sir, other than that every prisoner who was interviewed during Little Switch and Big Switch, we made a very serious effort to try to find out from them what prisoners were withheld, where they were located, what they were doing. We got all kinds of answers that they believed that they were withholding some
prisoners. Where they were or what they were doing I don’t know, sir.

Senator McCarthy. I think Judge Jackson might be able to shed some light on that. If the Chairman does not mind.

The Chairman. I was going to ask the judge to identify himself for the record. He may comment at any time he wishes to do so.

Mr. Stephen S. Jackson (Assistant General Counsel, Department of Defense). My name is Stephen S. Jackson. I am Assistant General Counsel for the Department of Defense. I am present here through the kindness of the committee to be of assistance to them and also to represent the Department.

I have, Mr. Chairman and Senator McCarthy, the most recent statement that we have, concerning which there has been no substantial change.

Concerning the 450 who are not accounted for as of the time of this information—and I believe it is up to date—it is not contended that these people are necessarily alive but it is contended that they have failed ever to give us a satisfactory accounting, although they were known at one time to be in their hands.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, Judge Jackson, if I may interrupt you, we do know that the 450 were living prisoners of the Chinese Communists at one time. They have given no accounting as to whether they have died or have been killed or whether they are still in Communist prisons.

Mr. Jackson. They have never given any satisfactory answer to our demands, even though we have information to the effect that at some time all of these people were in Communist hands. We are most careful not to indicate necessarily as to how many of these may be alive at this time in the interests of the next of kin because we are not stating they are all alive or what percentage, but we are stating that the Communists have failed to account for them.

Senator McCarthy. We do know that they were healthy young men, and normally if properly treated they should be alive and should be returned. Or am I overstating it?

Mr. Jackson. Whether or not they were healthy the last time seen, I dare say, Senator, some of them may have been wounded. All of them, however, were known by reasonably substantial evidence to be in the hands of the Communists, and they have repeatedly failed to account for them, even though we have demanded and are still pursuing that course.

Senator McCarthy. There is no reason, is there, why they should not give some accounting?

Mr. Jackson. No, sir.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, if they died, if they are in prison, they should give us a report.

Mr. Jackson. Absolutely.

Senator McCarthy. That was the agreement at Panmunjom?

Mr. Jackson. Absolutely.

Senator McCarthy. No further questions.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Counsel.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, how many prisoners did you talk to or how many records did you review of these prisoners who came out of North Korea?
Captain Cumby. I interviewed about 35 or 40. I had access to approximately 100 reports of interrogation and investigations.

Mr. Kennedy. You made a study, did you not, of the organizational system set up by the Communists in the prison camps of North Korea?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Could you outline to the committee what procedure they followed and how their organization was constructed?

Captain Cumby. The Communists in North Korea had a major command, not necessarily a major military command but they had a major command for control. The exact designation of that command we don't know, but according to reliable information it was something like the Communist prison command of North Korea.

This command was commanded by a full general officer, a full general Chinese officer, a major general, if I recall. His name was Chang. They had at Pyongyang, North Korea, the general headquarters for this North Korea Communist command. In that same city was located Camp 5. This command controlled tightly and rigidly every prison camp in North Korea. Under this Chinese general was a staff comparable to the general staff in the nomenclature of our military service. He had his G-1, he had his G-2, he had his G-3 and G-4, and other staff sections.

Under the officer who most nearly compared with our G-2 was a section designated as the education and training section. Under this section there were 2 primary functions: 1 for interrogation, 1 for indoctrination. Although these 2 sections overlapped in their duties, for all practical purposes they were 2 separate commands.

Under that same section of education and training was a section for propaganda. So you had the commanding general and his staff, and under his G-2 you had a staff responsible for interrogation, indoctrination, and propaganda.

Senator McCarthy. Captain, I hate to interrupt you, but I am going to have to leave shortly to go to a meeting of the Appropriations Committee. I should like to ask you a question, much as I hate to interrupt you. One of those in charge of propaganda was a British Communist writer; is that right?

Captain Cumby. No, sir, Senator McCarthy. Soviet Russia had key personnel in every major section of that Communist prison command. Although they had a Chinese officer as the director, there was a Russian who served as liaison for interrogation, for indoctrination. For propaganda, the importance of propaganda can best be indicated by the fact that the chief of interrogation and the chief of indoctrination reported to the chief of that educational director section. However, the chief of propaganda did not. Even though he was under that section, he reported directly to the commanding general and was responsible to him. That was a Chinese officer with a Russian officer as liaison officer.

The point that you brought up was this Caucasian Burchett. There were 2 Europeans; there were 2 Caucasians in that propaganda setup. One was a fellow by the name of Allen Winnington, an Englishman, who was a newspaper correspondent for the Communist Daily Worker of London. Then we had Wilfred—

Senator McCarthy. His name was Winnington?
Captain Cumby. Allen Winnington.

Senator McCarthy. He was the correspondent for a Communist paper in London?

Captain Cumby. He was a foreign correspondent, allegedly, for the Daily Worker of London. Actually he was part and parcel of the apparatus in North Korea. Wilfred Burchett was another Caucasian from Australia. Burchett had a very important hand in slanting, in writing, in drafting, in making the propaganda appealing to the western prisoners, the Americans and all other United Nations prisoners. That is where Burchett came in. He served more or less as a consultant.

Senator McCarthy. Burchett was from there?

Captain Cumby. From Australia.

Senator McCarthy. Winnington was from?


Senator McCarthy. Thank you. I did not want to interrupt you, but I am going to have to leave as soon as we have another Senator here to give us a quorum. I wanted to get that straight in my mind first. Thank you very much. Now, if you will proceed.

Captain Cumby. That generally, Mr. Kennedy, was the command structure. The implementation of the program flowed from that point.

Mr. Kennedy. What about the Central Committee for World Peace?

Captain Cumby. I am coming to that.

If we had an organizational chart you would find a line from the commanding general out to a central committee. This central committee was designed as the Central Committee for World Peace. It was the organization through which indoctrination, interrogation, and propaganda were implemented. As a matter of fact, the Central Committee for World Peace was the responsible agent for the program. It was located in Pyongyang, North Korea, the capital of the North Korean People’s Government.

Senator McCarthy. By the North Korean People’s Government you mean the Communist Government?

Captain Cumby. The Communist Government; yes, sir. This central committee was made up of prisoners, United Nations prisoners. As far as the area of responsibility was concerned, it was divided into 2 major sections, 1 section for indoctrination, and 1 section for propaganda. This central committee gave the orders, gave the direction, and gave the instructions for all activity going down as far as the squad.

Mr. Kennedy. What do you mean by “activity”? Is that for propaganda?

Captain Cumby. For propaganda, for indoctrination. For example—

Mr. Kennedy. I understand that was run by the prisoners themselves?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Specifically who were the officers in charge?

Captain Cumby. There were two officers.

Mr. Kennedy. American officers?
Captain Cumby. American officers; yes, sir; one in charge of propaganda, another one in charge of indoctrination.

Mr. Kennedy. What were their ranks?

Captain Cumby. They were lieutenant colonels when they came back.

Mr. Kennedy. They were in charge of distributing the propaganda through the prison camps of North Korea?

Captain Cumby. The central committee was a front. They had the prison command. Over here they had this separate organization, the Central Committee for World Peace, which was nothing more than a front. Through this front they operated.

Mr. Kennedy. Let me see if I understand it. That was the front made up of prisoners?

Captain Cumby. That was the front made up of prisoners.

Mr. Kennedy. They took their instructions from a Chinese?

Captain Cumby. They took their instructions from a Chinese, and above the Chinese was again this Russian officer who served as liaison, who told them precisely what to do. The Chinese told the Americans precisely what to do, and that is the way it went.

The Chairman. Actually the Russian officer was running it?

Captain Cumby. He was running the show, yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Then the advice as to how to turn the propaganda so it would be more interesting to the West was given by the Australian newspaperman and the English newspaperman, is that correct?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What did the American officers do?

Captain Cumby. Sir, they were in charge of a committee.

The Chairman. That is, a front committee?

Captain Cumby. That was the front, the Central Committee for World Peace.

The Chairman. That committee was composed of prisoners?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Apparently as a front it was directing the activities?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That was to make it more impressive?

Captain Cumby. It directed the activities, and it was more effective because they knew the minds and the attitudes and the mores and the culture. The stuff would come from the GHQ to the central committee. The central committee would work it over, would give it the Western slant with the assistance of Burchett. From the central committee it would go down to the camp committee, which is another level. That camp committee would further modify that stuff to make it appealing to those in the camp. Leaving the camp committee it would go down to the company committee, which would further modify it to appeal to the people in the company. In the case of the early days of it, all prisoners were segregated, so they tailored their material to appeal to that particular national group, racial group, or what have you.

When it left the company committee it was further broken down. It was broken down and forwarded to the squad committee.

So what you had, Senator McClellan, was one committee superimposed on another right on up to the very top. It even went further than that. I am trying to explain the organization of it.
In addition to the wings of the central committee, you had committees for recreation, committees for sanitation, committees for food—all for the purpose of control and for the purpose of pursuing their objective.

Mr. Kennedy. When propaganda came down from the central committee—

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Kennedy, could I interrupt? I am going to have to leave in about 2 minutes to go over to the Appropriations Committee. Mr. Hollister is testifying. I would like first to ask 1 or 2 questions. Is it correct that one of the lieutenant colonels who was engaged in spreading Communist propaganda to the prisoners was promoted while he was engaged in that activity?

Captain Cumby. I don't know, Senator McCarthy, when he was promoted. I think he was promoted while he was in prison, but there were a number of prisoners who were captured in one rank and came back in another rank. They were automatically promoted. We didn't have any cases against those individuals, as I recall, but I think they were promoted, yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. In any event, one of the colonels who was handing out the Communist propaganda under the direction of a Russian or a Communist Chinese was promoted either during the time he was handing out the propaganda or after he came back, is that correct?

Captain Cumby. He was promoted during his period of captivity.

Senator McCarthy. How about the other? Was he promoted?

Captain Cumby. I am not sure.

Senator McCarthy. I do not think he was. I thought you might have some information on that.

Captain Cumby. No, sir, I don't. I know there were a number of prisoners, enlisted men as well as officers, who went in as privates and when they came back they were corporals. They had been promoted without their knowledge. I am not familiar with the promotion procedure. I don't feel that I am competent to speak on that.

Senator McCarthy. Let me ask you this, if you know. Am I correct in my assumption that both of these colonels, one I believe a lieutenant colonel, that both of them are still serving in the military and that no action has been taken against them whatsoever?

Captain Cumby. No, sir, that is not correct, sir. A number of prisoners who were prosecuted in 1954 and 1955 were people who had committed certain acts—

Senator McCarthy. No, let us stick to the two. I am not trying to cross examine you. I am just trying to get this information because I frankly do not have it. I have just gotten rumors. I have not talked to the staff about this. So I may be misinformed. Am I correct that they are both still in the military and that they never have been court-martialed?

Captain Cumby. That is not true, sir. They have been courtmartialed.

Senator McCarthy. Oh, they have?

Captain Cumby. One was courtmartialed last fall.

Senator McCarthy. What was his name?

Captain Cumby. His name was Colonel Lyle, L-y-l-e. He was courtmartialed at Fort Lewis and they found him guilty of the charges.
What disposition the court takes in a case I am not qualified to say, but they had a case against Colonel Lyle and he was brought to trial. The sentence was reduction 2 years on the promotional list and something else that I don't recall. The other—

The CHAIRMAN. The sentence was what?

Captain CUMBY. He was found guilty of the charge and the sentence was 2 years on the promotion list or something. I don't recall specifically.

Senator McCARTHY. Was it not merely a reduction of 100 numbers in his promotion list, if you know? If you do not know——

Captain CUMBY. I don't know, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. In any event he is still in the military at this time?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. You do not know whether his sentence was merely a reduction of 100 numbers on the promotion list?

Captain CUMBY. Specifically, I don't know what that sentence is, but I do know he was tried and I know he was convicted. I know the other officer was tried.

Senator McCARTHY. Let me interrupt there. I hate to do this, but I have to leave. I am very much disturbed to find that a colonel who preached communism in a prison camp was reduced only 100 numbers on the promotion list and some privates got as much as 20 years. I do not think I should ask you to comment on that, but just for the record I should like to make my position clear on that.

How about the other colonel?

Captain CUMBY. The other officer was tried.

The CHAIRMAN. Give his name. We do not have his name here.

Captain CUMBY. Major Nugent, N-u-g-e-n-t, Ambrose Nugent. Major Nugent was courtmartialed at Fort Sill, Okla.; and he was acquitted. As I say, sir, I am only too glad to give you what information I have, but I don't feel I am competent to question the merits of the judicial system in the Army. I can only say that they were prosecuted, the cases were built against them, I think the Army fulfilled its duty by bringing them to trial. They had no choice but to do that, and I think they shouldered that responsibility most admirably.

Colonel Flemming was another officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel who?

Captain CUMBY. Colonel Flemming.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, before I leave may I say that I hope the witness understands that because I have been examining him a bit vigorously that it is no reflection upon him. I think you have one of the most outstanding records in the military.

Captain CUMBY. Thank you.

Senator McCARTHY. I want to compliment you for what you have been doing.

Captain CUMBY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will take a 5-minute recess at this point.

(Whereupon, there was a brief recess.)

(Members of the subcommittee present at this point in the hearing was Senator McClellan.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to make this announcement. Under the rules of the committee sworn testimony must be taken in the presence of a quorum composed of at least two members of the committee. Unfortunately this afternoon the committee members are engaged in other work and other duties and it is not convenient for another one to be here right at the moment. We are expecting another Senator as soon as he can finish a broadcast program that he has. In the meantime, rather than delay I am going to ask the witness to proceed not under oath. He may make a statement continuing his testimony, but not under oath as of now. When another Senator appears to make a quorum, the Chair will then ask you appropriate questions to bring the testimony during the suspension of the oath, back to the record as sworn testimony.

So, Captain, you may proceed.

Mr. KENNEDY. We were discussing the organizational system, Captain, that the Communists introduced in North Korea. Again, the Central Committee for Peace had charge of the propaganda through the various prison camps, is that correct?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. You have described how it went down to the divisional level, the company level, and down to the squad. Did you reach the conclusion from your study that this was a very well organized system that the Communists followed?

Captain CUMBY. Absolutely.

Mr. KENNEDY. Can you give us some information now as to how the prisoners were treated as they were captured and how they fitted into this whole system, what was done about their activities and what they were subjected to?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir. I am afraid you can't realize the significance of this propaganda thing until I mention this workshop which was attached to the central committee. I think that is important.

Mr. KENNEDY. Please.

Captain CUMBY. The extent to which they went to push this propaganda effort. Under this central committee they had what we designated as Camp 12. That was a propaganda workshop. It was an area about a couple of city blocks wide and long, and in that area they had a modern swimming pool, they had tennis courts, they had modern day-rooms, and they had every piece of recreational facility that we have in our installations in this country. Assigned to that workshop were 25 or 30 prisoners whose only duty was to pose for prop shots, manufacture petitions, make recordings which were subsequently disseminated to the free world and to the Communist world. For example, they would get 10 men playing basketball at this workshop. They would make a photograph of them playing basketball. They would send that picture out, and many of them were published in our papers here. So you got the impression that prison life in North Korea was not very much different from what life was in this country of ours. They manufactured petitions, three major petitions. One in June of 1952 which they sent to the United Nations, one in July 4, 1952, which they sent to President Truman asking him to withdraw the troops from North Korea, and one the latter part of July which they sent to the World Peace Congress in Peking. Those petitions were manufactured there in that propaganda workshop. I thought that was important.
Mr. Kennedy. Is that workshop run by Americans also?

Captain Cumby. There were a number of British and a number of Americans, 2 or 3 from Australia, I believe. It was a United Nations group.

Mr. Kennedy. Who was in charge of the workshop?

Captain Cumby. The workshop was a propaganda organ which came under the officer of the central committee who was responsible for propaganda.

Mr. Kennedy. What was his name?

Captain Cumby. Nugent.

Mr. Kennedy. That was Colonel Nugent?

Captain Cumby. Major Nugent. I was in error when I said he was a colonel. He was captured as a captain. He was promoted to a major. He is not a lieutenant colonel. I am sorry, I was in error on that.

Mr. Kennedy. He was a captain and then was promoted to a major, is that right?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. He had charge of the workshop?

Captain Cumby. The workshop was under his area of responsibility because he was in charge of propaganda.

Mr. Kennedy. Did he have the responsibility for arranging these pictures?

Captain Cumby. Arranging the pictures, taking tape recorders for recordings, drafting of petitions for peace, everything that went on in the workshop.

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say he was acquitted?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir, he was acquitted.

The Chairman. Is what you are stating now with respect to his activities and his responsibilities and his cooperation and work for the Communists in connection with the workshop that you refer to a matter of proof, a matter that has been definitely established? Have those activities and his cooperation with the Communists who were operating that workshop been definitely established?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yet he was acquitted?

Captain Cumby. He was acquitted, sir.

The Chairman. All right, proceed.

Mr. Kennedy. What was the responsibility of the lieutenant colonel, then, who was in charge of the workshop? What, specifically, were his responsibilities?

Captain Cumby. When I say responsibility I mean actually the responsibility was the Chinese and the Russians. But one man was put in charge of this or that activity. Lyle was more or less in charge of the indoctrination.

Mr. Kennedy. The indoctrination of the individual prisoner?

Captain Cumby. That is, the indoctrination of material. It came to him and from him it went down to the lowest level.

Mr. Kennedy. He would help write the material that went down to other prisoners in the various camps throughout North Korea?

Captain Cumby. He is known to have helped write some, yes, sir, and revise it.

The Chairman. I understand you have really three branches: indoctrination, propaganda; and what was the other?
Captain CUMBY. We had interrogation. They were all the same, the same techniques, the same procedures.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but as I understand one of these American officers was in charge of propaganda, and another was in charge of indoctrination, supervising as far as the prisoners were concerned?

Captain CUMBY. Yes; but no American had anything to do with interrogation. That was exclusively a Chinese operation. There is no record that any American ever had anything to do with interrogation.

The CHAIRMAN. But they could use the Americans who were defecting, we may say, very effectively for propaganda purposes and for indoctrination purposes?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And did use them for that purpose?

Captain CUMBY. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. Captain, do you think we are ready now to get into the procedure which was followed when the individual prisoner was captured, as to how the Chinese treated him?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. I want to know if you have finished your discussion of the structure?

Captain CUMBY. That was the general structure.

Mr. KENNEDY. Fine. I think we are ready now to go into how the individual prisoner was treated and what happened when he was captured.

Captain CUMBY. When a prisoner was captured by the Chinese Communists this is generally what happened. When a prisoner was captured by the Chinese Communists usually he was given a pat on the back. He extended his hand. He said, "We are friends. We are not enemies." If he searched him, he would not deprive him of his personal items such as cigarettes or other personal articles.

Mr. KENNEDY. Have you established the time? That was not true of the first 8 or 9 months of the Korean war, was it?

Captain CUMBY. The first 6 or 7 months of the Korean war our people were under the brutal handling of the North Koreans. The Chinese came into the conflict the latter part of 1950 just as we made that push up the Yalu River and the Chinese came over. From that point on the Chinese controlled every phase of prison life in North Korea. The Koreans had nothing to do with administration, had nothing to do with indoctrination, had nothing to do with interrogation. As a matter of fact, the Koreans themselves were segregated up until the very last day of repatriation. So it was a Chinese effort from the time the Chinese entered the conflict until the war was over.

After he had been captured by the Chinese he was carried or they were carried to what we refer to as an assembly point, where the captives from other areas were assembled. There he was subjected to a vicious and violent anti-American attack by a Chinese officer who spoke the English language, who in many cases was educated in this country. He called that briefing a welcome address. "We are going to welcome you into our fold." He would tell the prisoners that "This is a civil war between North Koreans and South Koreans, similar to the war that you had in the States in 1865. This war is no concern of the United States." He would tell the prisoners that they should
have turned against their officers in the field for waging what we called a brutal war against the innocent people of North Korea. He would tell the prisoners that “You are not prisoners. You are students, and as students we are going to educate you. You will be educated. You will be enlightened” by what he called the generosity of the North Korean Government and the Chinese Communist Government.

After he received that briefing he was then subjected to what you might call his first or preliminary interrogation. He was given a form similar to this [indicating]. This is not the original copy, but it was similar to this form, to fill out; a form that contains his name, the names of his parents, the names of his brothers and sisters and friends, their occupations, their economic income, their social standing in their community, the organizations to which they belong, their religion, everything under the sun.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the form you are testifying from there before you?

Captain CUMBY. This is a form that I made up from a copy of an original form that was given to me during Big Switch.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fairly accurate to make it a part of the record and say that is the form you used?

Captain CUMBY. It is an exact copy of the form that I had to give.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an exact copy?

Captain CUMBY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will suggest and direct that it be made exhibit No. 15 to the testimony and be printed in the record so we will have the full information.

(Exhibit No. 15 will be found in the appendix on p. 201.)

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you know who originally made up that form?

Captain CUMBY. I don’t know who made the form up. They had the form on exhibit as exhibit A, I believe, over at one of the trials at Meade. It is reported that an American made it up. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. Will you continue.

Captain CUMBY. In addition to this personal information about the man’s family, his friends, his relatives and what have you, they have such questions as: Your military organization, where is it located, the name of your commanding officer, the number of people in your organization, the types of weapons your organization uses, and the overall objective of your organization.

Many of the prisoners filled these forms out. How many I don’t know. What percentage I don’t know. But they filled this form out. Then it was placed into a folder. The man’s name was written over it, his serial number, and so on.

This form constituted the basis of what we refer to as a 201 file or a dossier as Dr. Wolff mentioned this morning. They built this dossier from this form, adding to it as they proceeded with their subsequent interrogations.

Mr. KENNEDY. Now would you tell us about the interrogations and what took place, how the interrogations were carried out? After the prisoner was welcomed as a friend rather than as a prisoner of war, then what occurred as far as the indoctrination and interrogation? Would you go briefly through some of the outlines and tell us what happened to the prisoner?
As I understand it, the prisoner went into a system where he was interrogated continuously, is that right?

Captain CUMBY. Interrogation as such in North Korea was a never-ending process. There were some prisoners who were interrogated as much as 50 times during their captivity. I talked with a man who had been interrogated 48 times, and he was interrogated for 3 days, 3 full days, just before he was repatriated.

The CHAIRMAN. At one time? Continuous interrogation for 3 days?

Captain CUMBY. For 3 days.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess there were different sessions, but it continued over a period of 3 days.

Captain CUMBY. They had him in a house and they would feed him. They gave him some food 2 or 3 times a day. He got some sleep. They would go back to their business of interrogation. This happened 3 days before he was repatriated. He was interrogated 48 times. It was a never-ending process. It started from the time he filled out this form until his captivity terminated.

The Chinese used a number of techniques: Harassment, deception, repetition, the so-called 201 file, the walking conference, and the question of writing essays or personal histories. These techniques were used in indoctrination, too. They were used in propaganda. They used some fear. They used some of the techniques of the old Mutt and Jeff stunt.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean, Mutt and Jeff stunt?

Captain CUMBY. Where an interrogator comes in and he is very cruel, he is very brutal. It is a stunt. Then the second man comes in and criticizes the first interrogator, releases him or dismisses him, and proceeds to interrogate the man with kindness and consideration, alleged kindness and consideration. It is an old police agency technique. There is nothing new about that. But they didn't use that to any great extent.

Mr. KENNEDY. What about the essay? I think that is a point of your testimony which you might discuss. How did they use the essay?

Captain CUMBY. The essay technique in my opinion was perhaps the most profitable to them and the most damaging to us. A man would be subjected to an interrogation, ordered to the interrogation room, and the Chinese would ask him a few routine questions. They seemed to have a sense of the type of individual they were talking to. Suddenly they would say, "Suppose you just take a piece of paper and pencil and write down anything you want to write. Write about your life, write about any aspect of American life. Write about anything you want to."

Many of them did that. They proceeded to write these essays.

Mr. KENNEDY. They would write essays on all types of things, is that right?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. The history of the American Army or about their particular city, how the school system works, how roads are built, any facet of American life they would be asked to write essays on?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. Then they would submit the essays for approval by their interrogators?
Captain Cumby. They would write the essay, turn it in to the Chinese, and they could never give them enough information. They were always calling them back, which brought in this element of harassment. He could have written a masterpiece on American banking, but it would not have satisfied the Chinese. They want more and more. That is part of their harassment. That is part of their control. That is part of the discomfort that they deliberately inflicted on the Americans.

Mr. Kennedy. So they would write a little bit more about this particular point?

Captain Cumby. They would call them back and say, "I want you to clarify this particular point." They would proceed to ask questions. Also, they would get additional information. It was impossible for them to talk to a person time and time again without their picking up something new each time they talked with him.

Mr. Kennedy. Did you estimate there were some 1500 of these essays written during the Korean war by prisoners of war?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. At the same time they would write these essays did they also put out a camp paper to which the various prisoners were supposed to contribute essays for the camp papers?

Captain Cumby. They had a camp newspaper which also came under this propaganda setup. The newspaper was called Toward Truth and Peace. That was run by the prisoners with the Chinese in charge. They got 500 or 600 letters a week to be published in the newspaper. They could not publish them all in the newspaper, so they put them on what they called a blackboard newspaper, a bulletin-board newspaper.

Mr. Kennedy. So each week they encouraged the prisoners to contribute to the newspaper?

Captain Cumby. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. What sort of thing would they want them to write about for the newspaper—how the United States started the war?

Captain Cumby. Of course, their central theme was peace. Another theme that was equally important to them was to accuse the United States of starting the war in Korea. There were probably more essays written on those two subjects than any other.

Mr. Kennedy. As I understand also, Captain, they had debates which they arranged among the prisoners?

Captain Cumby. They had the Stalin Debating Society. They had the Lenin Dramatic Society. They had the oratorical contest. All these were instrumentalities through which this propaganda flowed. Let me give you an example. Suppose I sit down here and write the history of the United States Army and give it to this Chinese. It is a good paper. It goes through the various channels of propaganda. So they sponsor an oratorical contest. Which prisoner can deliver this oration better or best? So you parade 4 or 5 prisoners up there who are going to orate on this essay that was written by a prisoner. The winner is given a prize. The same thing comes up on the debating society. "Resolved, That the United States started the war in Korea." They would divide it between two opposing sides and the side who took the position that the United States didn't start the war was obviously the weaker. So the side that took the argument that the United States did start the war was most effective, according to their design.
Mr. Kennedy. Those chosen to debate that the United States did not start the Korea war were actually those who had collaborated to the greatest extent, so they could tell them exactly what to say?

Captain Cumby. It didn't make any difference. This activity was carried on by the progressives. It didn't matter whether they actually believed it or not. It wasn't important. It was a question of setting up the team, the opposing factors.

Mr. Kennedy. What about the walking conference?

Captain Cumby. That walking conference was a technique of interrogation that was designed for a specific purpose for specific people. It was designed for those prisoners who were sad, who were upset, who seemed to be worried about something, who were very unhappy. The Chinese would select those people and invite them to go for a walk in the woods away from everybody, away from the interrogation room, away from the recording machines, away from the Chinese women taking down the dictation, away from all the apparatus there in the interrogation room in GHQ. So this is very private, a very intimate thing. He starts talking with this prisoner. “What is on your mind? You seem worried.” He knows what is on the man’s mind before he asks him because he has censored all of his mail. If his father is out of work, the Chinese knew it. If his sweetheart wanted to leave him, the Chinese knew it. If his wife wanted a divorce, the Chinese knew it. Because they had censored his mail. They had withheld his mail. They had read his mail. They knew exactly what was worrying him. So they played on that by manipulating the mail in these walking conferences.

As a result of that in many cases a prisoner opened up and told him many, many highly personal things that he never could have gotten in a straight interrogation face to face, man to man. That particular technique did something else. It obligated a lot of prisoners where they could not withdraw or they could not oppose the enemy for the things that he had told them intimately during this walking conference. Of course the threat, the potential blackmail, was present.

Mr. Kennedy. As I understand it, talks were given to the various prisoners, which lasted for a year or so, is that correct. They would give lectures and talks to the prisoners?

Captain Cumby. That is indoctrination. We have been talking about interrogation. Now do you wish to go over to indoctrination?

The Chairman. Is there anything else on interrogation which has not been covered that you think is pertinent or important?

Captain Cumby. I can't think of anything right now, Senator McClellan. If you have any questions, I would be glad to answer them.

The Chairman. I just thought maybe we had not covered everything in the questions. If something comes to your mind, of course, we will ask you to go ahead and divulge it and report it. Now you may go on to the indoctrination, if you like.

Captain Cumby. Indoctrination was a well-organized effort by the Communists. It was conducted by trained, skilled, dedicated Chinese, dedicated to communism and dedicated to revolution. They divided this indoctrination into two general phases. The first phase was more or less the softening up or the conditioning of the prisoners, and the second phase was more or less the implementation.
The first phase was characterized by violent attacks on the United States and our economic system. The second phase was characterized by the technique of comparison.

It was during the first phase that the most vicious propaganda came out of North Korea. It was a cleverly done thing and in my opinion it was effective, for example, in not attacking the United States as such, but attacking the political and military leadership of the United States. This was during the first phase.

They said, "Your Secretary of Defense is chairman of the board of General Motors. You think he makes automobiles. General Motors doesn’t make automobiles. They make tanks. They make tanks to kill these innocent Koreans." To add some authenticity to that—this is all in this indoctrination—he would flash out the financial page of the New York Times which says General Motors produced so many tanks for the first quarter of 1951. "I told you they were making tanks." He doesn’t say anything about refrigerators, or radios, or televisions, or automobiles, the things for civilian use. But they make tanks, and they make tanks to kill people with. They emphasize that word “kill”—kill.

They said, "Glenn L. Martin, you think, makes aircraft for civilian use. He doesn’t make aircraft for civilian use. He makes bombers—bombers from which you Americans have dropped the germ bombs on innocent Korean people, to kill innocent Korean people."

He said, "You think General MacArthur was ousted. He wasn’t ousted. He resigned to go back to become chairman of Remington Rand, to make the almighty dollar. You think Remington Rand makes typewriters. They don’t make typewriters. They make a rifle with which you Americans have been killing innocent Koreans," still harping on killing innocent Koreans.

To give authenticity to that propaganda they manage to flash, as I said, copies of legitimate magazines, such as Fortune, and say this is how many tanks, this is how many rifles, these are how many aircraft that those people produced in a given period of the year.

With information being a one-way street, where there was no other side to it but that particular side, and with the limited information and limited knowledge of many of our younger soldiers, in this particular instance, in the absence of the correct information, many of them I think accepted that as a matter of fact.

Carrying further this vicious anti-American attack, they would take a map of the world and post it on the board. On that map they would plot every military base that we have throughout the world. They would say "These military bases spell aggression, and the United States is the aggressor nation. If you don’t believe it, look here. You have bases in Japan, in England, and so forth. Here is a map of the Soviet Union. We don’t have any bases."

Again in the absence of information about Russia and her expansion, these average soldiers were inclined to believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to that time did we have any course of information that we gave to our soldiers before they went over there, alerting them to these situations as far as we knew of them at that time, I mean to build up resistance? Was any action taken to fortify our soldiers with the facts so they would not be so susceptible to these lies? What were we doing? Do you know?
Captain Cumby. It has been a policy in the services that all men are briefed prior to their departure overseas, but, Senator McClellan, this is something that the Army has never faced and the Air Force has never faced and the Navy never faced anything like this in North Korea.

The Chairman. It was not anticipated and therefore we had made no special preparation for it. Is that correct?

Captain Cumby. I am not qualified to say that we didn’t make any preparation for it, sir.

The Chairman. Not having anticipated it, obviously we could not very well prepare for it.

Captain Cumby. I know this uncivilized treatment, I know this type of enemy that is characteristic of the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans, I know that the United States Army has never faced anything like that before.

The Chairman. All right, we had never experienced anything like it before.

Captain Cumby. No, sir.

The Chairman. Now we have had the experience.

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. When we come to the proper time in the hearing—I do not know whether you can comment on it—what are we doing now? May I just ask, are we taking some action now?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir; absolutely, sir.

The Chairman. All right. That may be more proper at the conclusion of the other basic information that we are getting. So you may proceed. I think it is of great interest to all of us, to all Americans, as this story is revealed and unfolded here, to have some assurance and be satisfied that we are now at least counteracting that and fortifying our troops so as to prevent them from being so vulnerable as they were possibly when confronted with this unexpectedly without any previous anticipation of it.

You may go ahead with your basic information.

Captain Cumby. I was speaking about the indoctrination, this vicious and willful attack against Americanism, everything American. The idea of the Communists during this indoctrination, in my opinion, was not to indoctrinate every American prisoner as a dyed-in-the-wool Communist. I think they had two objectives. I think the first objective was to indoctrinate a small number of prisoners, hard core if you wish to call them that. I think their second objective was to so shake the confidence and loyalties of another large number that when they returned they would probably be less opposed to communism as such.

This small group that they desired to indoctrinate constituted the leadership of the POW’s who cooperated during their captivity.

Mr. Kennedy. Do you think their program was a success, Captain?

Captain Cumby. Mr. Kennedy, I think it was; yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, after the compulsory attendance at these lectures for a period of approximately a year, did they then make attendance at these lectures and these study groups voluntary?

Captain Cumby. No, sir. When the indoctrination started in the spring of 1951 it was a compulsory thing. Everybody had to attend the lectures. It ran for about a year. After they had covered those 12 courses, what they called the 12 phases, it was no longer required. No one was required to continue to attend the lectures.
Mr. Kennedy. The lectures continued, nevertheless, did they not?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. From the study that you have made and from the figures that you have, approximately how many of the prisoners continued to attend lectures even though they were not forced to attend them?

Captain Cumby. Approximately one-third.

Mr. Kennedy. Approximately a third continued to attend the lectures?

Captain Cumby. Approximately one-third continued to attend the lectures after the Chinese said that was no longer required.

Mr. Kennedy. These are the lectures you have been describing here as being so viciously anti-American and teaching that the war in Korea was started by the United States and that the North Koreans and the Chinese and the Communists generally were peace-loving people, is that right?

Captain Cumby. Some of that and related questions, yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. After it became voluntary, still a third of the American prisoners continued to attend those lectures?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you think they may have been urged to attend by that hard core element that had been developed?

Captain Cumby. The whole thing was a conspiracy, Senator. When they reached the tenth course or the ninth course they said they were going to suspend them and this was going to be something of a lenient treatment move on the part of the Chinese. But those who had been trained, those serious individuals, were directed and advised by the Chinese to continue the lectures. When they continued them after it was no longer compulsory by the Chinese, the Chinese did not assume responsibility for their attending. They said then that is the will of the people, the will of the prisoners.

The Chairman. Before they made it voluntary and not compulsory they had already indoctrinated and they thought at least they had a hard core element in that camp?

Captain Cumby. I think they felt after a year of indoctrination that they had just about accomplished part of their purpose, that is, to get a few hard core people, if you wish to use that term.

The Chairman. I do not know, but it occurs to me that after they had some of our prisoners indoctrinated, that they had gone over, so to speak, to the Communist faith, obviously in their voluntary program they relied upon that hard core element within our prisoners to encourage and promote their attendance.

Captain Cumby. Precisely.

The Chairman. So it was not necessary. I mean they could get a great deal of results without making it compulsory, making it appear they were coming voluntarily?

Captain Cumby. Absolutely.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, the one-third figure has some significance, has it not, in that it shows approximately the percentage of the prisoners who accepted in some measure at least the Communist teachings?

Captain Cumby. Mr. Kennedy, this number business—

Mr. Kennedy. What does it mean to you, Captain? I will let you put it in your words. What does it mean to you that a third of the
prisoners continued to go to lectures after it became voluntary rather than compulsory?

Captain CUMBY. It means that apparently they wanted to attend the lectures.

Mr. KENNEDY. Does it have any further significance to you? I am not trying to get out some figure that is going to be critical, but I think if we are to understand this whole problem and understand the effectiveness of what the Communists did during this period we might as well find out what the facts were and then we can all better adjust ourselves and decide what we are going to do.

Captain CUMBY. If they terminated the indoctrination program in the spring of 1952 and roughly one-third continued to attend the program, I have only one conclusion, that they were cooperator, collaborators, or whatever you want to call them, in some degree or other, if you want my personal opinion. I have always felt very strongly about this whole thing. If you want my personal opinion, I would say that they were cooperator, collaborators, or whatever the term that you want to use, in one degree or another. They might not have been a leader. They might not have made speeches. But the fact that they continued to give their presence to a program that was designed for one purpose and one purpose only, to discredit our country, I have no opinion other than that they were collaborators, cooperator, or whatever you want to call them.

Mr. KENNEDY. Captain, during the period of time when these two newspaper men, one from Great Britain and the other from Australia, were present were they seen frequently around the prison camps lecturing to the prisoners?

Captain CUMBY. They were part of the command, Mr. Kennedy. They had free run of the camp. They even interrogated Americans.

Mr. KENNEDY. They did some of the interrogation themselves?

Captain CUMBY. They did some of the interrogation.

Mr. KENNEDY. They were there as newspapermen from other countries, is that correct?

Captain CUMBY. They were there as newspapermen allegedly, but I don’t think there is any question as to what ideology either one of them embraced. They were part of the command. They were part and parcel of it. They conducted interrogations. In many instances they talked to Americans, and westerners could talk much better than the Chinese. They assumed that responsibility. They were VIP’s as one prisoner told me. They were VIP’s. They were treated as such. They had houses near the headquarters. One was married to a Chinese and he had his family living right there within the area of the GHQ.

Mr. KENNEDY. It is also true since they were seen frequently and played a frequent part, there were Russians present at many of the camps and they were in evidence?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KENNEDY. The individuals you talked to, the prisoners you have talked to who came back and the files that you have examined have led you to the conclusion as to the presence of the Russians commanding this whole system?

Captain CUMBY. That is the impression I got. It was more than an impression. I consider it factual. All the information we have we got from the people who were there and they said they saw them.
Some of the people who gave the information I have the utmost faith in.

Mr. Kennedy. You reached the conclusion that this was a system which was directed from Russia; implemented by the Chinese, but directed from Russia?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir. In January 1954 I interviewed a man who left that original 23. I talked with him for a couple of hours every day for about a month. There are two other officers in this room who joined me on certain occasions. This man was as high as you could go in that setup. He was the undisputed leader of the 23 who elected to remain in North Korea.

Mr. Kennedy. I think his name has come out before. I do not think there is any problem. Would you name him?

Captain Cumby. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Kennedy. Would you name him?

Captain Cumby. Claude Batchelor. He was the elected or appointed leader by the Chinese to lead the 21 Americans and 1 British in this nonvoluntary repatriation. He was called by the Chinese a young Lenin. They said he had a mass line of 95. He was on the inside of this organization for more than two years and a half. He brought the group into the neutral zone in North Korea. He knew all about it. He told me that if the Soviet Union had wanted to stop the war they could have stopped it, but he said why stop it? There is a purpose behind it. He told me that it was as common to see Russian officers in the headquarters as it was to see other prisoners working there, and the Chinese were as obedient to the Russian officers, more so than a United Nations prisoner was to his captor.

He not only told me this. He told me this at the public trial. This is public information.

He also told me something else that didn't register at the time that I talked to him because I had never heard of the name, the name Khrushchev. When he was relating how they were required to virtually memorize the works and the histories of Russian Communists, Stalin, Malenkov, Lenin, Khrushchev, which at the time didn't register.

He mentioned this name Khrushchev. He said—this is according to my raw notes—he was one of the five most powerful men in the Soviet Union at that time. That is the same man who is now downgrading Stalin.

To come back, this man told me that there was no question that the war in Korea was directed by Moscow, that there was no question that the armistice talks dragged out because that was the way the Russians wanted them, that they didn't intend to sign any armistice agreement within the first period of time that they indicated. He also told me when they came into the neutral zone it was nothing more than a formality, that they had no intention of requesting repatriation. He escaped out of fear of his life and so did the other one.

To answer your question as to the relationship of the Korean conflict with Soviet Russia, I don't think there is any doubt.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, on these prisoners who became susceptible to Communist propaganda, would you say that the methods used to get them was characterized by brutality or not?
Captain CUMBY. No, sir, Mr. Kennedy, I don't think the interrogation, I don't think the indoctrination was characterized by brutality or by torture.

Mr. KENNEDY. Again I would like to have your opinion on the high percentage, according to the study that you have made, who accepted in some degree the Communist teachings, the high percentage of American prisoners. Do you think that that was due to something that can be remedied, perhaps not in the Army but otherwise? Do you have any feelings about how an individual can be prepared for the type of treatment that these people received, whether it was interrogation or indoctrination or whatever they had to undergo?

Captain CUMBY. I subscribe to Dr. Wolff's explanation of this morning when he said knowledge of this stuff, knowledge of this nonsense, knowledge of the propaganda, an understanding of it. I think if we have that it will prove a very excellent defense.

Mr. KENNEDY. So that would not be a responsibility merely of the military services but must be a responsibility of the schools and elsewhere, is that correct?

Captain CUMBY. We get a man after he has reached maturity. Of course, the Army doesn't have the average soldier for more than 2 or 3 years. I don't subscribe to the idea that it is the sole responsibility of the Army to remake an individual once he has come into the Army. The Army can try to revitalize some of his home training or some of his other characteristics, but to say that it is the sole responsibility of the military services to so indoctrinate a man in some of the fundamentals of Americanism, I don't think it is wholly the job of the Army.

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you have any views as to what might be done in this field, Captain?

Captain CUMBY. I stand on and support our program, which is not in the area of this discussion today as far as the military is concerned.

Mr. KENNEDY. From the study that you made do you feel that the degree of collaboration or cooperation with the Communists by American prisoners was unusually high or was disturbingly high?

Captain CUMBY. Would you repeat that again, sir?

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you feel from the study that you have made of the various records that the degree of cooperation or collaboration with the Communists by American prisoners was disturbingly high?

Captain CUMBY. This is my personal opinion. I think if one American collaborates with the enemy it is too high.

Mr. KENNEDY. We can't have perfection certainly, but based on the record that you have studied of the prisoners who came back, what is your impression as to the success of the Communists in this field and whether the rate of collaboration or cooperation with the Communists was disturbingly high?

Captain CUMBY. I would be naive to say that their indoctrination program was not successful. I would be very naive to say that their propaganda was not effective.

The CHAIRMAN. May the Chair interrupt for a moment now to make the record clear. From the time of the recess of the committee earlier this afternoon you have been making statements not under oath because we did not have a quorum of the committee present for the purpose of hearing testimony under oath. The Chair will now ask the captain, in view of the fact that a quorum is now present, if the
statements that you have made as statements to the committee during
the period to which I have referred since I announced that you would
proceed but not under oath—if the statements you have made and the
answers you have given to the questions are true and you so swear
under your oath.

Captain Cumby. I do.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. We had to make this ex-
ception or deviation from the rules of the committee in that fashion
this afternoon in order to expedite the hearing, due to two circum-
stances, that so many members of the committee are pressed with other
obligations and, too, because of the fact that it isn't anticipated that
any testimony given in this hearing by you high officials in the mili-
tary and those who have already testified would lead to any contro-
versy or possibility of perjury. For that reason the Chair deviated
from the rule in this fashion so we might proceed with the hearing.

Now 3 members of the committee are present, 1 more than a quorum.
So we can proceed.

(Members of the committee present at this point: Senators McClel-
lan, McCarthy, and Mundt.)

Mr. Kennedy. There is another matter I wanted to touch on with
you.

Senator McCarthy. Bob, could I make a very brief comment to
keep the record straight here?

We are talking about the collaboration of the prisoners with the
Communists. I think we should keep in mind that a man who is a
prisoner under the complete control of the enemy may well do things
that he normally would not do. I don't think we should judge him
by the same rules that we would judge a man who is completely a
free agent. I say that merely because I have been somewhat dis-
turbed by some of the court-martials that we have had. This is no
discredit whatsoever to your investigation. I think you are doing a
tremendous job here in exposing this situation, but I do think we
should keep that in mind.

Mr. Kennedy. I think what we are trying to inquire into, Senator,
is if the Communists were more effective with prisoners than anybody
has been in the past, what is the reason for that?

Senator McCarthy. They are more ruthless and, being more ruth-
less, I assume they would be more effective at getting some of the pris-
oners to deviate to their side.

Captain Cumby. Mr. Kennedy, I didn't want to give the impres-
sion to this committee that there were no acts of brutality or acts of
torture when I said I didn't think that was characteristic. There
certainly were acts of torture by both the Chinese and the North Ko-
reans, such as starving a major to death and watching him and laugh-
ing while he reached the point of insanity; such as beating a sergeant
until blood ran from his eyes, nose, and ears. The Chinese and the
Koreans did that kind of thing. I don't want to give the impression
that all was sweet and nice and that everybody did everything simply
because that is exactly what they wanted to do.

There was a mixture of brutality which was fantastic, some of it
unbelievable, committed against Americans by the Chinese and by the
North Koreans. The North Koreans were not the only people who
committed those acts of brutality.
The Chairman. Did you mean to imply that was the exception and not the rule?

Captain Cumby. When brutality and torture were used in direct connection with an interrogation or indoctrination it was the exception rather than the rule; yes, sir. I will stand on that.

The Chairman. In other words, they did not rely on it and that was not their principal means and method.

Captain Cumby. They relied 100 percent on deception. Let me read you this. This is an extract from a document, a captured document. This was part of a directive that the Chinese send down to their interrogators. This is what the Chinese sent down to their interrogators. I am quoting this part of a captured document:

The American newspapers are calling us uncivilized because of the way the Koreans treated the American prisoners before we took command of the people's struggle in Korea. Don't give the prisoners any excuse for getting information out of North Korea to support the Americans in their charge that we are not civilized. Be kind to the American prisoners. Share what you have with them. Pretend that you are their friends. Don't threaten them, but use deception.

The Chairman. Use deception.

Captain Cumby. That is the key to their indoctrination. That was the key to their interrogation, not brutality.

The Chairman. You understood when I referred to torture and brutality I was referring to physical torture and brutality?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Of course, there was mental torture and mental brutality imposed upon them in the process of deception and the other fringes that went along with it. Is that correct? You regard the process they followed as a mental torture?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir; that is involved. This harassment, this humiliation, which I didn't go into, those are all factors that operate on the mentality of the individual.

The Chairman. They have a depressing and demoralizing effect.

Captain Cumby. That element of humiliation was most degrading. They used that and employed it very, very widely.

Senator McCarthy. Let me ask you this question: While they may not have physically tortured some of the prisoners, did your interrogation indicate that—I don't know how to describe it—that there was not mental torture but mental strain put upon the man to get him to confess to something that wasn't true?

Captain Cumby. I can only speak from those cases that I handled. I saw no widespread use of that. I think that is one of the misconceptions that we have, that every time a man has committed an act he did that simply because somebody hit him over the head or somebody punished him. That just is not true.

The Chairman. Is there anything further?

Senator Mundt. When you say that they employed deception, do you mean that they placed before the prisoners false promises of reward, trying to lure them through their avarice, greed, ambition in some way, promising that if they would come over on the side of the Communists they would get some handsome reward which otherwise would be denied to them?

Captain Cumby. Take this, Senator Mundt, as an example. Take the 201 file that they built up, the dossier that they built up on every
prisoner over there. Say they called a man in to interrogate him. The interrogator has this file. He has the man's name written on it. In many cases they had "confidential" in English. He said "All right, I have all the information I need about you. I know everything about you. I know everything about your mother, father, brothers. I know everything. But I want to talk with you about something just in general."

So he starts asking him a few routine questions. Then he will suddenly say, "How many men were in the company when you were captured?"

He says, "Gee, I don't know, sir. We operated in platoons, 10 over here, 10 over there. I don't know."

"What is the strength of a typical infantry company?"

Many soldiers don't know. Actually, they don't. He says "I don't know," or he might make a stab at it. Then he will come up with a facsimile of one of our army manuals. He will say, "The authorized strength of an infantry company is thus and so. I told you I had the information. I just wanted to see if you were honest."

Some fell for that. Feeling that he had the information, in many cases he proceeded to tell him what he wanted, thinking that he had it, when actually in most of those cases they didn't have the information that they were asking. If they had it they wouldn't have asked for it in the first place.

I talked with a prisoner who said, "I was interrogated by a Chinese and the first thing he told me was, 'Now, look, it doesn't make sense for us to be enemies. We are not enemies. We are friends. You are here with us. We are going to try to make your stay here as pleasant as possible. There is no point of difference. You are a working man. I am a working man. We both are members of the so-called proletariat. There is no difference between us. The difference is with your capitalists back on Wall Street who started this war.'"

This fellow told me that he believed that this Chinese was his friend.

That is deception, just as that directive said. That is how it worked.

The CHAIRMAN. He pretended to be his friend when he wasn't his friend, pretending to be helpful and sympathetic when all he was trying to do was to destroy the man's faith in his own country and thus convert him to communism.

Captain CUMBY. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Was there any evidence, quite apart from physical and mental torture, of the fact that the Chinese employed constant use of repetition, a long drawn-out series of interrogatories, so the person became so mentally fatigued so that his alertness failed to function?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir; that was employed.

Repetition, humiliation, deception, the 201 file, the walking conferences. All of those were techniques and tactics and procedures that they followed.

Senator McCARTHY. Just 1 or 2 questions. I have been rather surprised at the fact that the Turkish soldiers so far as I know didn't succumb to any of the tortures, either mental or physical, and a sizable number of American soldiers did. I don't know whether the Turkish
people are educated better in the evils of communism than our American youth, but would you say that if we had a better indoctrination of the soldiers on the evils of communism, if our professors in the colleges taught the evils of communism, perhaps in another future conflict we would have less of what we had in Korea?

Captain CUMBY. Indoctrination, yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. The chairman points out to me that I merely mentioned colleges. The public schools should have indoctrination in regard to the evils of communism. If and when a young man enlists or is drafted the indoctrination should continue. Then we might have much less deviation if and when they are captured. Would you say so?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir. I don’t think you have a chance to fight communism unless you have an awareness of what it is all about.

Senator McCarthy. I should perhaps use the word “teaching” instead of “indoctrination.”

Could I say one further thing: How do you account, if you can—you need not answer this if you don’t feel qualified—how do you account for the fact that the Turkish soldier didn’t deviate at all as far as we know, and so many Americans did? Is it because of their closeness to the Communist menace, or what?

Captain CUMBY. There are a number of reasons, Senator McCarthy, but Major Pannel is a specialist in that. He is an expert on that. He has done considerable work on it and he is to testify before this committee. It probably would be unfair for me to muddy the water since he has it down perfectly.

Senator McCarthy. All right. I will withdraw the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. Kennedy. There is one further matter I wish to discuss with you, and that is the question of the special treatment of Negro troops by the Chinese Communists. Did they segregate them, when they were captured?

Captain CUMBY. The Chinese and the Communists had a very rigid system of segregation, segregated according to rank, segregated according to race, segregated according to nationality. That system of segregation serves two purposes, first for control, second, to achieve their objective, that is to make a direct appeal to certain national groups and racial groups.

They had the Negro separated. They had the Filipino segregated. They had the Turks segregated.

Mr. Kennedy. Did they have special propaganda?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir. To each segregated group their propaganda, their indoctrinational material was tailored to fit that particular group, to appeal to that particular group.

Senator McCarthy. Could I ask a question, Bob: Am I correct that from your investigations and interrogations you are convinced that the Communists have no respect whatsoever for the rules of the Geneva Convention insofar as the treatment of prisoners of war is concerned?

Captain CUMBY. They had absolutely none. As far as they were concerned, that didn’t exist.

Senator McCarthy. Just one further question: Was the New York Daily Worker distributed in the camps of the prisons?

Captain CUMBY. Regularly, yes, sir.
Senator McCarthy. That is the Communist paper, of course.

Captain Cumby. Yes.

Senator McCarthy. I think I have no further questions, Mr. Kennedy.

Senator Mundt. No questions.

Mr. Kennedy. Is there anything else on this whole matter that you think we should bring out?

This is a booklet, Mr. Chairman, which was prepared by the Army on this subject on which the captain did more than half the work. I didn't know but that we should put that in as an exhibit for reference.

Senator McCarthy. It does look exceptionally good, Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Will you identify it, Captain?

Captain Cumby. This is a pamphlet on Communist interrogation and indoctrination and exploitation of prisoners of war.

Mr. Kennedy. You did about 60 or 70 percent of the work on that?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That will be received as exhibit 16.

(Exhibit No. 16 may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Senator McCarthy. Before you leave, Captain, I want to say I think the committee should thank you for the cooperation you have given the staff and compliment you and for your intelligent testimony.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to ask you one or two more questions for clarification before you go, Captain.

You have been referring to roughly one-third of the prisoners who continued to cooperate or attend the indoctrination meetings, and so forth. Did you mean one-third of all the American prisoners that were captured or to what group do you relate the one-third?

I didn't want an erroneous impression to go out. Did you have in mind one-third of all prisoners or did you have in mind one particular camp?

I am trying to get it clarified.

Captain Cumby. I am afraid, Senator, I can't break down that whereby it will reflect anything other than I stated, that roughly one-third attended the courses after it was no longer compulsory.

The Chairman. You are referring in that statement to one particular camp or to all the camps insofar as you have information?

Captain Cumby. That was the prison population of the North Korean prisons under Communist command.

The Chairman. All the prisons, is what you had in mind?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I wasn't sure about that. I didn't know whether you were speaking of the information you had with respect to the one particular camp. I think you identified Camp 12, didn't you, or something?

Captain Cumby. I identified Camp 12 and Camp 5. There were a number of other camps.

The Chairman. It wasn't quite clear in my mind and I don't think it was with the press, as to whether you were relating that one-third to one particular camp or if you meant to include all of them.

Captain Cumby. It was the total population.

The Chairman. The total prison population?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I would like to ask you one other question. From your study of this subject and your observations since, would you say that the indoctrination had a lasting and permanent effect in most cases, or that it had only a temporary effect and afterwards the influence of it dissipated and didn't continue? What would you say about that?

Captain Cumby. Frankly, sir, I just don't know.

The Chairman. You would not be able to comment on that?

Captain Cumby. No.

The Chairman. But it did serve their purpose for the time being.

Captain Cumby. Oh, absolutely.

The Chairman. You referred to the one who was the leader, I believe Batchelor—

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Who later repented or at least returned to this country.

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. He apparently was one of the hardest of the hard core, because he was chosen the leader?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir; that is true. He admitted that.

The Chairman. But we still have some over there who have not returned?

Captain Cumby. You have 14, I believe, sir.

The Chairman. Fourteen that are still there?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

Senator Mundt. By "still there," do you mean they are still there of their own volition or still there because they can't come back or can't get out?

Captain Cumby. I don't know that. They elected to remain. Whether they are being held there now against their will I don't know.

The Chairman. Did Batchelor give you any report on that?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What was his comment about it?

Captain Cumby. He said they stayed because they wanted to stay. He stayed because he wanted to stay. He didn't come back because of any deep-rooted patriotism. He came back because they threatened to kill him within the neutral zone. He told me that.

The Chairman. You mean other Americans threatened to kill him or was it the Communists who threatened to kill him?

Captain Cumby. This Communist business is a conspiracy where one group watches another. They went there in 23 and separated themselves into three groups of 7. Each group of 7 was under a leader. Batchelor was the leader of all of them. But each group had instructions from the Chinese to watch the other group to see that nobody deviated. So you had everybody informing on everybody else. Batchelor was a corporal. There was another man who was a sergeant. I won't call his name. General Gramiy, who was in charge of guarding the prisoners in the neutral zone, said he was not going to recognize a corporal as leader of a group when he had a higher ranking noncommissioned officer there. So General Gamaya appointed this sergeant to take charge. As a result of that, Batchelor couldn't stand
taking second place and according to his own words he escaped being killed by just 2 hours.

The Chairman. Who was going to kill him?

Captain Cumby. A fellow by the name of Lowell Skinner, who is one of the 14 who is there now.

The Chairman. It was a personal quarrel?

Captain Cumby. It was a personal quarrel and jealousy over the leadership. Those fellows all aspired to be leaders of something, somewhere, some time, and they could not stand the idea of being demoted. Batchelor was demoted from his leadership and it was given to this sergeant.

The Chairman. So he lost face.

Captain Cumby. He lost face and they were going to get rid of him.

The Chairman. One other question with respect to the one-third. Could you tell us how you arrived at that estimation or ratio of the number who continued to attend the indoctrination meeting?

Captain Cumby. I would like to preface this answer by this: When I say that roughly one-third continued to attend the meetings I am not saying that we were told that every one of those one-third constituted a hard-core Communist.

The Chairman. No, I didn't understand that.

Captain Cumby. He might have written one petition. I don't want the impression that here you have one-third of the captives in North Korea outright hard-core Communists. Obviously there was some degree of cooperation and collaboration. Otherwise they would not have stayed. If you want to know how I arrived at that, it was arrived at by this manner: This came from people who were rather high in the inner workings of the organization. There was a flat number mentioned of the total number of persons who had attended the compulsory training. Then when the compulsory training was no longer required, how many continued to attend the meetings? He gave a guess, and that figure came to one-third or roughly one-third of the total number who attended the meetings under compulsory conditions.

The Chairman. So your best judgment and belief from the information you have is that the one-third figure is substantially accurate?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. But you do qualify it by saying that it doesn't necessarily mean that every one who attended on a voluntary basis had become converted to communism, but it certainly indicated to some degree cooperation and collaboration with them. Is that correct?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. That is a correct statement?

Captain Cumby. Yes, sir.

Senator Mundt. When you stated that you got this information from someone, to whom does the "he" refer, a loyal American or some member of the Communist organization who became an informant?

Captain Cumby. Sir, I wouldn't want to categorize it at all. The man gave me a 14-page sworn statement and that information was checked by the Japan Joint Intelligence Processing Board. The agency that handled all prisoners on Big Switch. It was checked against the results of interrogations, that same question. I think other witnesses who will follow me will testify that that number is considered accurate.
Senator MUNDT. Then you didn’t get it just from a “he.” You got it confirmed by some other evidence and some other facts. Tell us how you got the information.

Captain CUMBY. None of the findings are based on what any one man said. That is dangerous to arrive at a conclusion by.

Senator MUNDT. That is why I was curious to know. You said you got it from a man and he told you.

Captain CUMBY. I merely mentioned “he” because this was the first man who gave me the information. He came clean about everything else.

Senator MUNDT. You subsequently corroborated that through other persons?

Captain CUMBY. Yes, sir. It was corroborated by the two prisoners who escaped and came back to our side. It checked all the way down the line.

Senator MUNDT. How would any 1 of the 3 or all 3 together come to have possession of statistics relating to the entire prison population in Communist China or Communist Korea? It would seem to me that in a large-scale operation like that they must have had prison camps or prison cages in substantial numbers.

Captain CUMBY. Sir, I explained in the beginning of my testimony that there was a North Korean Communist command, which was the GHQ. In that GHQ they had a number of sections, one of which was a section comparable to our personnel. There was an American sergeant who worked in that headquarters. He saw every strength report. He saw many of the classified documents. That man had access to practically every type of information that was held in this headquarters. He had placement and he had access.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further with this witness?

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, in just 10 seconds I would like to say I think the testimony of this witness demonstrates the importance of this hearing. I believe the significant part of his testimony is the testimony concerning Burchett, head of a Paris Communist paper, Winnington, head of a London Communist paper, the fact that Russian officers were in every prison camp, and the Daily Worker being distributed shows without question the nature of the world Communist conspiracy that was behind the Korean fight. I think if nothing else were accomplished, that alone would certainly justify the chairman in calling these hearings. I wish to commend him for doing so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair felt, after being briefed by the staff on its preliminary study of this subject, that it obviously would be worth while to hold these hearings and get as much as possible of this information disseminated throughout America and as far as we can throughout the free world. We had Dr. Wolff and Dr. Hinkle testify this morning. They made quite a study of this. I think if every American and every freedom-loving human in the world could hear this and get the significance of it, it would help to build a great fortress against communism. I don’t feel that what we are doing is a waste of time or a waste of your time. I think, as someone has facetiously said, maybe we are striking a blow for liberty as we carry on the proceedings.

When I came into the room a few minutes ago, Captain, Senator McCarthy was commending you for your testimony and I join in
those sentiments. The Chair on behalf of himself and the committee thanks you very much for your cooperation. If you care to say something else, we would be glad to hear you.

Captain CumBy. One thing. I would like to correct the figure on the number of nonrepatriates that are still in China or wherever they are, not in our control. I said that their number was 14, but actually it is 18. It was originally 23. Batchelor and Dickenson came back. Then three others came back. One is supposed to be dead. That is the report. So actually it is 18, and not 14 as I said.

There is one other thing I would like to say. The results of all the interrogations reveal and point toward one thing: That Red China had two ambitions. Number one, she wanted to get in the United Nations. Number two, she wanted to establish diplomatic relations with the United States. That is her desire and her wish. It was indicated in every report that indicated what does Red China want. She wants international respectability and she expects to get it through the United Nations and by establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you agree with us, at least with the Chair, and I imagine I speak for all the committee, I hope she never realizes that ambition.

Captain CumBy. I hope not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Hunter.

(Members of the committee present at this point: Senators McClellan, McCarthy, Mundt, and Bender.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, please. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before the Senate Investigating Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Hunter. I do.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD HUNTER

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated.

Mr. Hunter, state your name, your place of residence and your occupation or profession, please.

Mr. Hunter. My name is Edward Hunter. My home is in Port Washington, Long Island.

I have been studying this question and what has led up to it for perhaps 30 years. I began with almost the birth of modern psychological warfare when in Japan I joined the newspaper there, the Japan Advertiser, when Premier Gi-ichi Tanaka took over the government. He is the author of the Tanaka Memorial, the outline for the conquest of the world which ultimately led to war and Pearl Harbor. I had a part in disclosing that.

I later saw the creation of the State of Manchukuo, how a puppet state was created through mind manipulation and war.

By some peculiar destiny that I can’t explain, I found myself wherever this sort of thing was being advanced. I was in two civil wars in Spain, witnessing the same type of warfare with mind manipulation. I was in Ethiopia when the Italians took over that heroic kingdom of Abyssinia.
During the war I was with OSS where I saw psychological warfare from the inside, and then after a short period at home, doing foreign editing in America, I went back to Asia where, with my background of experience, I had the privilege of discovering brainwashing, the fundamental strategy of international communism for expansion and control. I put those facts into a book called Brain-Washing in Red China, at that time all I knew of how a mind could be destroyed. That was what I had found.

To my great thrill later on, I came upon a second pattern, how a mind could be preserved. That is what can save the free world and the United States. I put that material into a second book, Brainwashing, which has just come out.

That, in brief, is the story.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair didn't get the opportunity to ask you all the preliminary questions, but I assume you have already started testifying and it is not necessary for the Chair to further qualify you. You may proceed.

You have mentioned two books. I do not know whether the committee has copies of your book. If not, I would be very happy if you would let us file a copy of each volume with the committee as exhibits for reference.

Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to give you the second book. I do not have a copy of the first book with me. I will have it sent to the committee tomorrow or get it for you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It will be helpful to us, I am sure. These books may be filed for reference without any further identification.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Hunter, you are the one who coined the expression "brainwashing" as I understand it. Is that correct?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, but I will have to explain that. Because of the word "coined."

Mr. KENNEDY. You are the one who first used the word "brainwashing"?

Mr. HUNTER. Yes.

Mr. KENNEDY. Will you tell the committee briefly how that came about?

Mr. HUNTER. I am usually introduced as the man who invented the word "brainwashing," who coined the word "brainwashing." I think in these hearings we have heard reference to the word "brainwashing" as a sort of coined, laboratory word.

Mr. KENNEDY. Before you start, I would like to say that Senator McCarthy has to leave early and he has some questions that he wants to ask you about some of the things you are going into later on. So if you could get through this preliminary part—

Mr. HUNTER. It is terribly important to understand.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Kennedy means be a little more brief.

Mr. HUNTER. I am happy to say I brought the word into use. I was the first man to put the word into writing in any language. I was the first person to use the spoken word in any language—except in Chinese. The word came out of the sufferings of the Chinese people.

Mr. KENNEDY. Would you tell the committee how it was that you came about using the word?

Mr. HUNTER. I had been following the events that constitute brainwashing for quite a long period. I had no realization except a pe-
culiar feeling of how it all linked together. A young man came out of Red China whose family I had known before as an editor in China, and who let slip the Chinese for brainwashing—Hsi Nao. I immediately pinned him down to find out what that meant and that gave me the clue that linked together a number of what seemed almost wholly irrelevant events and developments.

Mr. Kennedy. You made a study of that since that time, have you?

Mr. Hunter. Since and before.

Mr. Kennedy. You have written two books on the subject?

Mr. Hunter. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. Briefly can you tell us what you understand is brainwashing?

Mr. Hunter. Brainwashing consists fundamentally of two processes, a softening up process and an indoctrination process. It is an effort to put a man's mind into a fog so that he will mistake what is true for what is untrue, what is right for what is wrong, and come to believe what did not happen actually had happened, until he ultimately becomes a robot for the Communist manipulator.

Mr. Kennedy. What are the methods that are used in order to achieve that? You were here for Dr. Wolff's testimony this morning?

Mr. Hunter. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. Can you add anything to that?

Mr. Hunter. Yes. I have to precede it with this explanation. We have been talking only about the military. These methods are applicable to civilians and military alike, men or women, people from China or people from Czechoslovakia. I found in all cases, when I talked to a person or when I got information on what has been done in brainwashing, the same separate, distinct elements were all used to greater or less degree of intensity. They constitute brainwashing.

These elements were, first of all, and in all cases, hunger. Hunger could range between starvation on the one side and simple malnutrition or excess feeding, with a diet that was lopsided, on the other side. Anything in diet that would injure the alertness of a man's mind.

Then in all cases, whether civilians, military troops, men and women, it made no difference, you had fatigue, the pace that kills. There again it did not have to be conscious fatigue that was being used against a man. The man might do a day's work and then be told, "You like to play baseball. Play four hours of baseball. You have to study, too. You know you have to improve your mind." Day in and day out, without a proper amount of sleep, gradually increasing that and making it a torture.

Another element, which is present in all cases, as I have to stress again and again, is what I call tenseness. The man who becomes a prisoner wonders, "Why are they holding me?" "What are they holding me for?" They never tell a man why he is held in the beginning, or what he is guilty of. His tenseness includes worry about his family. They tell him, "You have to help the 'people,' or your family will get into trouble." His tenseness is increased by the diabolical and unfortunately too often true statements that he was not being given any help by anybody, that his country had let him down, that everyone had simply ignored him, in effect, as far as he was concerned.

I put tenseness under a separate category because it was used so frequently in different ways. Threats constitute a separate element.
Threats range very differently under brainwashing than what normally appears. A threat might be when a man puts his pistol on the table or says, “I am going to kill you,” but a threat can be very different. A threat can be simply listening to a buddy shrieking with pain in another room, being beaten up, while you are being given a cigarette and being treated well while being asked the same questions as he.

The brainwasher might not say a word that threatens the man himself. He will just let him hear the agonizing cries of the man in the next chamber being put under torture.

The Chairman. That is somewhat like being in a room next to someone who is dying and you have the same disease.

Mr. Hunter. Exactly.

Then there is violence. I have been horrified by our lack of knowledge of what modern violence constitutes under communism. Violence is not merely the old-fashioned atrocity in which you take an ax and chop a man's finger off. That is old-fashioned. Modern violence of the Communist type is to take a man who has been frozen, whose hand has gangrene, and say “I want to send you to a hospital, but you have to help me send you to a hospital. You have to cooperate. The people's beds are very few. We have given you a book to study. You haven't done your lesson. Now hurry up, be a good boy, study your lesson and we can send you to a hospital.”

Meanwhile a finger drops off. That brainwasher hacked those fingers off just as much as if he had an ax. That is the modern type of atrocity which seems to confuse so many people. They say there is no atrocity although that sort of pressure went on constantly.

Then you had more intense cases, more in Russia than in China, not because there was any essential difference in the technique but simply because the Russians were more trained in it, both drugs and hypnosis. There were cases of use of drugs and there was hypnotism, too. We had a hint of it during the previous testimony when witnesses spoke of the constant reiteration on one theme. That is a sort of hypnotism in the way that the Reds imposed it.

These elements, together, can be found in greater or lesser extent in all cases of brainwashing, not always every one of them, but a group of them, enough of them to be brainwashing.

Mr. Kennedy. As I understand it, under your theory and study that you have made of the subject, not only individual prisoners but whole groups can be brainwashed; is that correct?

Mr. Hunter. Yes. This is not merely a theory, because I have used no material in any of my writings that did not come either from witnessing it, my own sight of it, or from first-hand evidence. If somebody said to me, “My buddy did so and so,” I did not use it. Everything came from the individual who himself had experienced it.

Brainwashing—and this is the misconception that can be terribly dangerous to us—is not a strategy used against prisoners alone. It is not a strategy intended for foreigners. It is the basic strategy that is used by Communist regimes for their own people. That is the fundamental purpose of brainwashing.

Mr. Kennedy. You made a study of that?

Mr. Hunter. I made an intense study of it.

Mr. Kennedy. As far as what happened in the schools?

Mr. Hunter. In the schools in Communist countries, in China specifically.
Mr. Kennedy. Could you give us some examples?

Senator McCarthy. Don't be so brief. Give us a little more detail.

Mr. Hunter. The way the Communists have kept this secret is by making it so complicated that it cannot be told in brief form. When one makes it brief, one only takes out the doubletalk and makes it what the Reds wanted us to believe all along. We voluntarily—that is the Red word, "voluntarily"—indoctrinate ourselves the way they want often even when we are against communism.

I have with me some little school books and magazines from Red China that I will offer in evidence. These are all for use among the Chinese people. Yet the identical subject, the identical themes, the identical cartoons were also used, day in and day out, on the POW's in Korea. The same magazine which was distributed and sold in China was one of the main elements in breaking down the minds of POW's in Korea.

I have here a very delightful little color book that any child would like to see. You have on one page how to hoe cabbage. You have on another page something about beautiful farm land. Then you have another page on which there is an American plane dropping dolls and fountain pens which explode and blow up little children. Then on the next page you have a lot of children cheering and there is a Communist Soviet plane. This page is divided into two halves—first the Red plane is shown dropping DDT and fertilizer and then it is seen dropping spawn fish, bringing prosperity to the people of China.

The Chairman. Would you say documents of that character or propaganda of that character is calculated to instill hate in the hearts of the children?

Mr. Hunter. It is intended as a long-range program, making sure that, no matter what these children hear later in life, they will hate America. America will be a symbol of unpleasantness deep in their mind. That is a part of the brainwashing. The same kind of thing was done to the POW's to make them ashamed and guilty and to hate the society from which they came. There was no difference essentially.

This color book is one of the very pretty little pamphlets for all the children in the standardized schools in China. This was used all the way from Dairen in the north down to Canton in the south.

The Chairman. That may be filed as an exhibit. You are going to leave it with us, I assume. That may be filed as an exhibit for reference. Let all of the documents of his that are filed, including his books for reference, be made the same number. They can be kept in a group together.

Mr. Hunter. I have one more of these little pamphlets.

The Chairman. We will make them "Exhibit No. 17" for reference. (Exhibit No. 17 may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. Hunter. This one stresses the point the Senator brought out, and it is something that a young mind will never, never forget. You have a picture of a happy home on one of the pages, with pretty color pictures. Then you have the American soldiers coming. They are shown breaking into this home, maltreating the family and they are shown—mind you, this is for little children of 6, 5, 7—having raped the women of the family and leaving the bodies strewn while the American soldier, unmistakably, walks out casually. That is long-range brainwashing for children.
The Chairman. May I ask you one question: Is that official government propaganda?

Mr. Hunter. There is no difference between government and other propaganda. This is a part of the textbooks used at government instruction in all the schools of Red China, for little children, and is on sale in the Red bookshops.

The Chairman. I just wanted for the record to make it clear that it has official sanction.

Mr. Hunter. It has official sanction and is under official instruction. That brings me to my next point—one of the most difficult things for American minds to conceive. The official sanction is given through a very subtle means. Whereas other countries traditionally issue their propaganda directives, if they had such, secretly, marked secret, distributed only to a certain number of people, in Red China under communism you had these instructions simplified and made available as magazines to be sold all over the country, which were obligatorily used as instructions for cartoonists, writers, any one who had anything to do with communications.

I have two such publications here, titled "Reference Material for Propagandist Drawings." Each month they take up a different subject. You will find, within a month, these things showing up everywhere, in different cartoons, how to represent the United States, how to represent the American flag, every symbol, first in the Chinese papers and then in Chinese magazines, and then within a few months you will find the same propaganda cartoons in the Communist and fellow traveller publications everywhere from New York to Paris.

I have two copies of these propaganda directives here. One has to do a great deal with the United States, showing how to represent the American flag, so a young child can learn how to draw, or a member of a propaganda organization or writer for a blackboard newspaper can know how to represent the United States. These two I will present to the committee.

The Chairman. They may be filed.

Senator Mundt. In your study of that material did you come across any evidence indicating whether its inception was indigenous to China or Russia?

Mr. Hunter. Either in greater or lesser extent, according to the area, it is duplicated wherever communism extends its control.

Senator Mundt. It is part of the worldwide Communist apparatus?

Mr. Hunter. It is part of the worldwide indoctrination strategy and propaganda technique of communism.

The next is something that I am unhappy to bring forth. It is something that not merely circulated in China but in the POW camps in Korea. Many an American POW who came out of the camps told me it had a great effect in weakening his mind and at times in breaking him—it is the magazine called "China Review," that was gotten out by an American staff in Shanghai. All the Reds had to do was say, "Look, these writers are Americans. Look at their names. They write for American newspapers, too. Read what they say. Read how your country dropped germs. Read how you invaded Korea."

The American POW's after sitting with nothing to read month after month except heavy Communist propaganda, being shown this, would look at it and study it and try to evade it, and then they would
say, first, "It can't all be lies. There is a picture of a dam, of a bridge. That must be true."

Gradually, this constituted one of the more important factors in breaking down the minds of Americans who were prisoners. I have two copies of the "China Review" here.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be filed.

Senator McCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I hate to leave but I have an appointment at 4:30, and I am 10 minutes overdue. You have a quorum here without me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator McCarthy.

Mr. KENNEDY. Did Senator McCarthy play any part as far as the Chinese propaganda?

Mr. HUNTER. One of the symbols that was universal was called McCarthyism, and McCarthy. He had perhaps more publicity in China than he got in America.

Senator McCARTHY. Perhaps I should run for office there.

Thank you very much.

Mr. KENNEDY. Were there other means, other than reading material? Loudspeakers?

Mr. HUNTER. The means that were used on the people of China were these elements I have been telling about that I listed, all included in the type of indoctrination called "learning." There you have subtlety. They had a new word for learning. "Learning" as they meant it was political learning and only political learning from the Marxist viewpoint. While the word was pronounced the same, they had a new character for it so they could always tell it apart, but in translation there was no way of showing that the word was a different word, so their propagandists were helped very much in confusing our minds.

This "learning" was an indoctrination process that went along with the prisons. In a Communist country more and more, the distinction between life in a prison and life in a village is gradually so evaporating that you can hardly tell the difference nowadays. In China, for instance, the man who is in a reform prison has his indoctrination lessons, has his group discussions. He is allowed to go out to work in a factory, or in a field. He must not go any farther. The man in the village does the same. He is allowed to go into a factory and field and work and is not allowed to go any farther, either. Except for terminology it is identical. It is all what they call learning and all part of brainwashing.

You have in Soviet Russia an additional element to it. We had not realized, or are only beginning to realize, that the huge prison labor camps, slave labor camps, were part of this whole brainwashing picture. The whole brainwashing picture, the unity of it, the oneness of it, is what makes it new and different. Brainwashing is not what took place in the past, as many people seem to think, as was shown very, very thoroughly by the exposure of the Pavlovian experiments and by a moving picture that the Soviet Government made itself on this subject that I happened to see.

Mr. KENNEDY. Do you have anything further on that?

Mr. HUNTER. On the movie? That showed the fundamental strategy of what brainwashing is, the unity of it. This is a film made by the Soviet Government in 1928. The film was not for public showing.
It is for hospitals, for training people in this technique. In one scene you have a dog with Pavlov, and you have the dog shown with a little glass tube in its mouth so saliva can come through. You have different lights or bells ringing so that the dog is accustomed to identify these lights or bells with food and then we see its saliva flow. In another scene which was first concealed and hushed up and which is still being concealed and hushed up from the American people although the movie is in America—you have a human being—a human being—with a long pipe in his mouth, a hose, rather, a long thin hose, with the same gadgets, the same experiment.

He is inclined back, and tiny little food pellets are poured into his mouth. Gradually, after he has been accustomed to that, the food pellets are not dropped but the bell or the light with which the food pellets were accompanied is allowed to ring or light up and the saliva flows just the same as it did when the food was there.

This is brainwashing. If we had seen that and had been told that, I would not have had so many POW's come to me later and ask, "Why wasn't I told?"

Mr. Kennedy. What is your feeling about brainwashing itself? Is it a true system? Can it be combated?

Mr. Hunter. The reason I wrote my second book is that I came across a second pattern. The people who answered the questions I asked, the brainwashed men and women, very many of whom are now very good friends of mine, when they were telling me how all this had been done to them, as I finally understood, were telling me also how they were able to combat it. I realized first of all, in the elements that went into the destruction of a mind that it was a tremendous hoax. I use the word "hoax" as a synonym for a quack activity. It was a tremendous reality, but it was a hoax insofar as the Communists themselves created nothing new in it. All they did was to take all the various discoveries and improvements we had made in medical lines, in publicity lines, in teaching lines, in pedagogy and to mix them all together into a calculated group and then to apply them in a way which we never intended, in an upside down manner. It is as if St. Elizabeths' Hospital here, which I believe is one of the leading asylums in the world for the mentally unbalanced, would retain exactly the staff that it has now, but no longer treat the mentally upset in order to restore their balance, but only treat those who have a strong mind, a balanced mind, in order to upset them.

Mr. Kennedy. That is the system?

Mr. Hunter. That is the system.

Mr. Kennedy. From your study what do you feel can be done to combat this?

Mr. Hunter. That is the subject of my new book, and I can answer you in the same brief fashion that I listed the elements that went into the destruction of a man's mind.

It made no difference whether I was talking to a man or a woman, whether it was a man from Prague or a man from China or a POW camp or from Siberia, I found when I asked, "What was responsible for your being able to beat this thing to the extent you did?", they all gave me the same answer. I found a number of elements went into preserving a mind, which I have enumerated.

The first element is one that I—and I believed myself to be a callous newspaperman—was first stunned to hear: Prayer and faith. It
was something to hear a tough top sergeant or a lawyer or an engineer, when you asked them, "What enabled you to come out and survive this thing?", say prayer and faith first of all.

The next element was clarity of mind. The man who was able to say A is A; A is not B. The moment A is B, if only for the tiniest bit of a second, it is no longer A. That man could not be brainwashed. The Reds first had to put his mind into a fog so he would be unable to distinguish the A from the B and say "Why, yes, B can be A." With that wedge cut in the break was sure to follow. Unfortunately, a great deal of our so-called objective schooling softened up our men to accept this even before the Reds got hold of them.

The next element that gave what I call mental survival stamina was a closed mind, a mind closed on what is bad, on communism. Many, many people have worried about that phrase, on what I mean. One man who went under this and who broke and whose quick confession enabled the Reds to pick up a number of his coworkers and have them arrested and executed, said, "You can't have a closed mind on anything, can you?" I asked him whether having a closed mind was expected on such matters as whether one may attack a young girl. That we don't even discuss. I asked him whether there was any difference between that and what I had heard over the radio piped into the Chinese schools, to little children. You could almost see them as you heard children screech, "Kill them, kill them!", at public trials of their own father and mother. Was that not evil? I still remember how his jaw dropped. "I never thought of that," he told me.

The Chairman. The Chair wishes to announce that there is not a quorum present for the purpose of taking testimony under oath and therefore the remainder of your statement will be that of a statement without the oath applying. You may proceed. I think we are about to conclude.

Mr. Hunter. Another element required for mental survival stamina is a purpose. One of the prisoners of war who went through Hell in the "Death March" told me how, as he was marching along and saw his buddies in front and behind him being hit over the head the moment they stumbled, so that they would fall dead and be kicked off the freeze road to the side, how he was hoping to feel the same quick thud on his head so he would be out of his misery. Then an American officer exclaimed, in language I cannot repeat here, "The so-and-so Communists! Men, I know why we are here. We are here because this thing can never be solved at a conference table. It has to be solved by force. We are here to see the face of communism so we can go back home and tell our people what it is." This man and others like him who went through this, have told me that what had seemed to them unendurable the moment before, what had seemed wholly impossible to go through, so that you wanted to die, became a privilege the next moment. They looked forward to going through it, because they had been given a purpose, a sense of mission.

These elements for mental survival stamina must be taught. These things must be made known.

Another such element is keeping one's mind busy. One of the main strategies of communism, no matter where, is to deprive the individual of all possibility of thought except on the one subject of commu-
nism. I know one case when they took an American lady and put her into an empty room. They knew she had a very alert mind. They took everything away from her that she could use to keep her mind busy. She defeated them very simply. She made a hair belt of her own hair, of the combings of her hair. We have heard of General Dean, how he swatted flies and kept score to keep his mind busy.

Each of these elements came out of the experience of the people who went through it. I have seen hundreds of them. Another element is what I call high jinks, which is different from just wisecracks. Some of us have heard about crazy week in prisoner-of-war camps, when suddenly all the prisoners would engage in this sort of thing. The Reds would see a prisoner walking down a path in the camp holding out his arm, escorting his girl friend or wife, and having a beautiful conversation, or sitting and having a flirtation, or riding a bicycle, except there was no girl there and no bicycle there. This had the Reds going simply wild. In fact, I know of one case where a Red indoctrinator, a Red brainwasher, was sent back to Peiping because he had been broken by the men he had been sent to brainwash by being given such an experience, one of these high jinks that I am afraid would take too long to tell. It would take about 5 minutes to tell.

The next point is deceit. This is something like the closed-mind aspect. We have softened our public up not to understand this. We shy away from this deceit, not realizing that what I have explained, this sort of brainwashing, has a streak of insanity in it. Therefore, exactly as you humor an insane man—if an insane man walked in the door waving a gun or a knife, no one would sit down and have a nice logical discussion with him, but you would humor him—to lie to and humor the Reds is exactly the same thing. A missionary, Dr. Olin Stockwell, told me, for example, “I lied like a trooper.” He knew he was dealing with insanity. Communism has a streak of insanity in it, which only today Moscow is admitting in their mutual accusations.

You have other elements of extreme importance, such as moral convictions. There are a number of these elements, and we have to learn them the same as our high school boys had to be taught physical survival stamina, what to do if lost in a jungle, what berries to eat, how to bunk up for the night. You now has to know what to do if lost in an ideological jungle. One of these elements is adaptability, the ability to adapt himself to circumstances as they change. This was done in the POW camps where in the beginning the prisoners did not allow an individual act of defiance because then the whole group would be punished. It wasn’t worth the candle. But later on when the Reds tried the carrot part of the carrot and whip strategy, they adapted themselves and allowed individuals to engage in frustration activities against the Reds.

Group feelings is still another element of mental survival stamina. The Reds use every possible means to break up any sort of group feelings, so you have nowhere left to go but to the Communist group. The Negro prisoners beat that with one of the most heroic things I ever heard of in my life. Suddenly overnight they appeared with punctured earlobes, with little bits of straw or little bits of tin, anything they could put through that earlobe. They called themselves the Golden Cross Club Against Communism. It still exists. I have seen colored men in America, in Baltimore, with a little golden cross
in their ear. The Reds didn’t know what it was, but it was a group, and they couldn’t do anything about it. The Reds were trying to tell these people, “You have no hope. Everyone has let you down. There is nothing to which you can belong.” Then they would open their arms and they would say, “Come to us. Come to papa.”

Being yourself is the last of these elements I am listing just now and it would be useless for me, for instance, to try throwing my physical weight about if I were in a POW camp, to start throwing punches. I don’t have that sort of force. But another man who has a ham of a hand, for him not to hit back under certain circumstances would be evidence that he was weak and vulnerable. To be yourself and to adapt your own character to your surrounding’s sticks to the needs of a prison or a camp.

These are various elements which in a prison in Prague, in a POW camp in Korea, anywhere, enabled the people who did come out honorably to do so.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much, Mr. Hunter.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. We appreciate your testimony. I am sure your books and your writings and your experience will be very valuable if we can get all that before the American people.

The staff advises that you have cooperated remarkably with it, and for that the committee is grateful and we extend you our thanks.

The Chair will announce that we will recess until in the morning at 10 o’clock. It may be necessary later to postpone that hearing, but we will undertake to proceed in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, June 20, 1956.)
COMMUNIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 188, agreed to February 16, 1956, in room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas, chairman; Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; Senator George H. Bender, Republican, Ohio.

Present also: Robert F. Kennedy, chief counsel; James N. Juliana, chief counsel to the minority; Donald F. O'Donnell, assistant chief counsel; Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

(Committee members present at convening of this session: Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD HUNTER—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter, yesterday afternoon because of the absence of a quorum we continued hearing your statement but not under oath, from the time that I announced that you might continue to make your statement until you concluded. Do you state this morning on oath that the statements you made yesterday for the record were true?

Mr. HUNTER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you very much.

Are there any further questions?

Call the next witness.

Mr. KENNEDY. Dr. Segal.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. SEGAL. I do.
TESTIMONY OF DR. JULIUS SEGAL, RESEARCH PSYCHOLOGIST, HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH OFFICE, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

The Chairman. Doctor, state your name, your place of residence, and your profession or occupation.

Dr. Segal. My name is Dr. Julius Segal, and my home address is Silver Spring, Md. I am a research psychologist on the staff of the human resources research office of George Washington University, which is a civilian research agency doing research under contract for the Department of the Army.

I conducted my agency's research project on Army prisoners of war in Korea about which I am to testify this morning.

The Chairman. You have discussed your testimony with members of the staff and therefore you know generally the line of interrogation to expect?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. All right, sir; you may proceed.

Mr. O'Donnell. Doctor, will you please tell us under what circumstances you arranged for a contract with the Army and what in essence your study entailed?

Dr. Segal. This research grew out of the need by the Army, recognized by us at the Human Resources Research Office for a comprehensive survey of the experiences and behavior of Army prisoners of war held by the Communists in Korea. I should state, at the outset that the research is based solely on Army POW's and has no relevance to members of the other branches of the Armed Forces.

The Chairman. Or for civilians?

Dr. Segal. Or for civilians. Our study was based solely on the experiences and behavior of United States Army POW's in Korea.

Mr. O'Donnell. As a psychologist it is primarily an analytical study?

Dr. Segal. It is primarily analytical and beyond that it is primarily statistical, as I can attempt to describe in the briefing presentation which I have prepared.

Mr. O'Donnell. I understand you have some slides which will assist you in your presentation. Would you care to start with your slides and go forward?

Dr. Segal. Yes, I am prepared, and Mr. Runge, of the Human Resources Research Office, will aid me in presenting these slides.

Mr. O'Donnell. Will you identify Mr. Runge.

Dr. Segal. This is Mr. Dean Runge, R-u-n-g-e, on the administrative staff of the Human Resources Research Office.

The Chairman. You might let the record show that the assistant General Counsel of the Defense Department, Mr. Stephen S. Jackson, is present. I believe, Mr. Jackson, you represent the Defense Department at these hearings?

Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Let the record show your presence again today, please.

If you are going to show slides I am sure they can't be placed in the record of the hearings, so you will have to give a word description of them if you mean to have the record convey their import.
Dr. Segal. Mr. Chairman, copies of these slides in another form are available if you should desire to place them in the record.

The Chairman. Very well. The Chair will instruct the reporter that in each instance where a slide is presented and you can copy or incorporate it in the record of the hearing, that you do so. Without any further instructions from the Chair, incorporate them in the record at the proper place, so that he who reads may understand what the witness is talking about.

Dr. Segal. Before describing the major findings and conclusions derived from our research I shall present a brief statement of the problem which we attempted to solve in our research and the manner in which we conducted our research program.

The mission of our research was directed at the military problem of increasing the resistance potential of Army troops who may one day be taken prisoners by the Communists. Specifically, the Korean prisoner of war experience indicated a need for a program of Army orientation and training which would provide our troops in the event of their capture with appropriate defenses against exploitation by the Communists. In order to aid in the development of such a training program this research was directed toward two goals as indicated on the chart.

(Chart No. 1 follows:)

<table>
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<th>PROBLEM</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military Problem:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>To increase the soldier's resistance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Research Problem:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>To differentiate resister and participator PW's.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To describe the Korean PW experience.</td>
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Dr. Segal. First we attempted to identify those attributes, those traits or skills which are required by soldiers to aid them in resisting the enemy if captured. In order to do this, we identified those characteristics which differentiated resister and participator prisoners in the Korean experience.

I should state at the outset that we use the term "participator" in lieu of collaborator, and "participation" in lieu of collaboration. That terminology, as I will explain later, is comparable for purposes of this presentation.

The Chairman. Do you mean that instead of saying that he cooperated, you say he participated in whatever program that was prescribed for him by his captors?

Dr. Segal. Exactly.

A second major premise underlying this research was that resistance potential would be enhanced if military personnel were made aware of the experiences they might expect to meet in the event they became prisoners of war. So a second research mission was to provide a comprehensive statistically based description of the experiences and behavior of Army troops captured in Korea. What were the enemy's goals? How did they go about achieving them? And with what success did they go about achieving them?

The Chairman. May I inquire if this covered the entire period of the war?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Both before and after Red China's entrance?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir.

May I have the second slide, please.

(Chart No. 2 follows:)

**Chart No. 2**

**The Sample**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>P=15%</th>
<th>M=80%</th>
<th>R=5%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>ALL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL = 579 PW'S

Stratified by:
- Rank
- Race
- Length of Military Service
- Length of Captivity
- Principal Places of Internment

Dr. Segal. As for the sample of prisoners we studied in our research: In the prisoner exchanges following the Korean war, 3,323 Army prisoners of war were repatriated. It was these men, as indicated on the top bar, who served as the population from which our sample was drawn. I should make clear at the outset that not included in this population from which we drew our sample are those 50 percent of the Army prisoners of war captured in Korea who died during their captivity. We do have some fragmentary data about those deceased POW's but they did not serve as a base from which the sample was drawn.

Senator McCarthy. If I may interrupt, you said "died." As I recall it, was General Hodges the person who gave the information that over 6,000 were murdered while captured?

Dr. Segal. The matter of the circumstances of death, Senator McCarthy, is something of which we have, as I say, only fragmentary data. I think I can offer this much: A large proportion of the Army prisoners of war who died in Korea, died during the early phases of the war during the time that the North Koreans were the captors. They died during the death marches, being captured in a wounded condition. They died before the Chinese entered the war during the initial stages of captivity before the well-planned exploitation program of the enemy went into effect.

There is other evidence which I understand will be presented by subsequent witnesses regarding the nature of the deaths of other
prisoners of war during the whole effort. But our data indicate that the largest proportion of men died early, men who were captured under the North Koreans during the brutal death marches early in the war.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, the treatment was worse under the North Koreans than under the Chinese?

Dr. Segal. Yes, physical abuse was much more current under the North Koreans than under the Chinese.

Senator McCarthy. I may be in error, but I think not. I have information that a sizeable number died during interrogation, that they were tortured to the point of death.

Dr. Segal. Our data, sir, with regard to interrogation are something that I will go into subsequently, but for the moment I might say that we have no evidence of any deaths which occurred among Army POW's during the interrogation procedures.

Senator McCarthy. How would you know? If Hodges is right that over 6,000 were murdered and the reports are that some of them were murdered during interrogation, where would you get your evidence that this was or was not true?

Dr. Segal. These data, as I shall describe subsequently, come from the interrogation records, the debriefings taken of American POW's who returned from Korea. I should state again that our data are not based on the experiences of the men who were deceased. I can only offer whatever information I have in that regard, and from these data we find that the largest proportion of those deaths, of those 3,000 deaths among the Army POW's took place early, before interrogation procedures, indoctrination procedures, and other exploitative techniques became current in the camps. However, I do not have the data, sir, comprehensively, on the deceased POW's, and I must say again that our research is based only on repatriated men, with whatever fragmentary data we have on the deaths coming from those men.

I understand, sir, that other witnesses will be able to testify regarding the deaths which occurred far better than I.

Senator McCarthy. If the Chair will bear with me for one more question:

What information do you have as to what, if any torture, either physical or mental, was imposed during the interrogation?

Dr. Segal. I do have certain data on that, again based on the reports of the repatriated POW's. With your permission, may I answer that in the context of my presentation when I deal with that problem.

Senator McCarthy. Certainly.

The Chairman. Will you give us an explanation of the chart that you have on the board.

Dr. Segal. Yes; I am about to do that. I should say that all of the 3,323 repatriated prisoners of war were interviewed, debriefed by the intelligence branch of the Army immediately upon their repatriation.

The Chairman. All of them?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir. Late in 1954 when we undertook this research the Army had completed its study of most of the files of these prisoners of war, studying, that is the debriefing interrogations conducted with each of them. Based on the prison camp experiences and behavior of each of the repatriated prisoners of war they had determined at that point, although not completely—this is a current process even now—what action, if any, should be taken in each soldier's case.
For example, court-martial, dishonorable discharge, or decoration for meritorious behavior.

Mr. O'Donnell. What is the date of that, Doctor?

Dr. Segal. Late in 1954, roughly, November of 1954.

These determinations by the Army—

Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt to ask this question: You may not be able to answer this. I don't know. If you feel you can't, I will understand.

We had testimony yesterday to the effect that two colonels were teaching communism to the prisoners of war. One of them was promoted while he was doing that or immediately afterward. The punishment meted out to the one was that he was demoted with a reduction of 100 points in his promotion grade, nothing else. Then we read about privates who got as much as 20 years for even less. Would you be able to shed any light on the reason for that, or the reasoning behind it?

Dr. Segal. No, sir; absolutely none. May I make this clear at the outset?

Senator McCarthy. I thought you might not be able to answer that.

Dr. Segal. No, sir. In elaboration of that response I simply want to state that each prisoner of war who fell into our sample, which I wish to describe now, and all of the men who returned from Korea whose files we might have looked through, became for our research purposes a number punched on an IBM card for statistical analysis. There was never, after the initial survey of a man's dossier, any attempt on our part to identify a man as a man, but only to have him part of a group to serve for statistical analysis.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

Dr. Segal. From this processing that the Army conducted with the repatriated prisoners of war, we grouped these men into three criterion groups. Fifteen percent of the returning prisoners of war were categorized as participators or, as I said earlier, as cooperators or collaborators.

I think it is important at this point to explain very carefully the bases of these criterion groupings. As I say, 15 percent of the 3,323 were categorized as participators by virtue of these criteria: These were men who either were recommended for courts-martial at the time we began our research or who had already been courts-martialed, men who were suggested for dishonorable discharge or who were already dishonorably discharged, and also men who were discharged from the military service upon their repatriation prior to the processing of these files; that is, men against whom some administrative action would have been taken had they not already been discharged from the military service.

There is an apparent discrepancy between this 15 percent and the data which have been presented by the Defense Department committee on prisoners of war contained in the Code of Conduct which they developed, but it is only an apparent discrepancy, and if I may, I should like for the record to clarify that discrepancy.

This 15 percent of the returning prisoners of war who we termed "participators" in actual numbers comprised roughly 500 cases. For purpose of bringing the committee up to date I would like to read
from the Code of Conduct developed by the Defense Department committee on prisoners of war. These data, unlike our data, apply to all prisoners of war, irrespective of the branch of the military to which they belonged.

By joint action of the services, all of the prisoners recovered were screened by military intelligence agencies.

Mr. O'Donnell. What page are you reading from?
Dr. Segal. Page 25, sir.

Of these 565 whose conduct was questioned—and here the number is larger than our 15 percent of 3,323, simply because this dealt with all of the branches—of these 565,375 were cleared or dropped after investigation. Of the remaining 192 suspects, 68 were separated from the services, 3 resigned, 1 received reprimand, 2 were given restricted assignments, 6 were convicted by courts-martial. As of July 20, 1955, 112 cases are pending.

I mention this simply to note that the processing of these cases was a dynamic thing, something which was not at an end at the time we conceived and began our research, and therefore the 15 percent who fall into our category include a larger number than that small proportion which Army administrative agencies have brought to trial and have dishonorably discharged, and so forth.

Mr. O'Donnell. I think you said in November 1954 when your study began these were cases which were scheduled for courts-martial, dishonorable discharge, and other disciplinary action by the Army.

Dr. Segal. Or men who had already been through that process by the time we began our research.

Mr. O'Donnell. All right.

Senator McCarthy. If I could interrupt, Mr. Chairman, for a very brief comment.

I must leave shortly to interrogate Secretary Wilson. May I say it seems rather unusual that we court-martialed and gave dishonorable discharges to men who under torture may confess certain activities, and at the same time Army Secretary Brucker issued an order to the effect that even belonging to the Communist Party in this country, where there is no pressure whatsoever, is no ground for a discharge from the Army. I am not asking you for a comment on that. I just wanted to make the observation for the record because I have been somewhat disturbed by the unusual picture which develops.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. That remark might include the Supreme Court. It seems to me that it is beginning to hold that you can't discharge one from Government service just for the mere fact that he is a Communist.

Senator McCarthy. Yes. This is neither the time nor the place to comment on it, but I think the Supreme Court has come to a new low since Governor Warren became Chief Justice. Again I say it is certainly unbelievable that we would court-martial and dishonorably discharge a man who succumbs to the torture of the enemy and at the same time have the Army Secretary and the Supreme Court hold that you can't discharge a man who is a member of the Communist conspiracy in this country who is under no pressure.
Again I say I am not asking for any comment from the witness unless you care to.

The Chairman. Let us proceed.

Mr. O’Donnell. Doctor, in reference to what you just said, you indicated that 565 were questioned, 375 were dropped after investigation. Do you have any information relating to that 375?

Dr. Segal. None at all; no, sir.

Mr. O’Donnell. Has your report been filed with the Department of Justice?

Dr. Segal. Our report has been submitted to the Department of the Army for review and approval just about 10 days ago, sir, and at the same time it was submitted to the Director of my agency for his review. Two copies of this report were submitted to members of the committee staff for review prior to this testimony.

If I may now jump to the extreme right of that second bar chart: 5 percent of the prisoners we termed resisters. These were men who were actually decorated for meritorious behavior in captivity as well as those men who were, at the time we began our research, suggested for decoration by the Army. Some of these cases may have reached fruition in the sense that these men were decorated. Some of them, the Army has judged, were not liable for decoration. In any case, the resister group included all those cases then decorated or suggested for decoration.

(Committee members present at this point: Senators McClellan, McCarthy, and Bender.)

Dr. Segal. Eighty percent of the returning prisoner population, 80 percent of the 3323 cases, we termed a middle group, or middlemen, as I shall refer to them in this report. These were prisoners concerning whom at the time we began our research the Army had little or no derogatory information, and those cases which were temporarily marked “undetermined” by virtue of the conflicting evidence then available regarding these men.

This I hope explains the basis by which these criterion groupings were derived.

In our sample for research we studied every second participator randomly chosen from among the 15 percent. We studied every 13th middleman randomly chosen from the 80 percent, and we studied all resisters who fell into the resister group. A very important point in terms of our research analysis and design is the technique of sampling which was utilized. Just a brief word about that.

The Chairman. I would like you to state how you determined what a resister was, how you judged them. By what criteria did you determine that one was a resister whereas the other larger groups were perhaps “middlemen,” as you term it.

Dr. Segal. The resister group, sir, contained all these men who were decorated for meritorious behavior while in captivity and those who at the time we began our research were suggested or slated for decoration although their cases had not been fully processed. None of the 80 percent of the middle group were so categorized.

The Chairman. How was it determined that they were entitled to a medal? They were in prison. Who knew?
Dr. Segal. On the basis of the interrogations of returning prisoners of war contained in dossiers on each prisoner of war, the Army judged the merits and demerits of each case. We as researchers, of course, were not involved in those administrative procedures.

The Chairman. I understand. The resister, though, is the man who refused to conform, who was obstinate, and who gave the captors the most trouble insofar as their being able to regiment the group and indoctrinate them.

Dr. Segal. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that a priori when we began our research and categorized these men we didn’t know what traits the resister had. We had some hypotheses but the results will indicate answers to those questions. We accepted Army criteria, the ones which I just described, for designating or slotting a man in one of the three groups.

The Chairman. All right, proceed.

Dr. Segal. It is important to note in the sampling procedure that these 579 prisoners of war which comprised our sample, 238 participants, 138 resisters, and 203 middlemen, were statified on the basis of their rank, race, length of military service, length of captivity, and their principal places of internment. That is to say, our final sample of 579 prisoners of war reflects the same proportions of rank, et cetera, as obtained in the total prisoner of war population of 3,323 repatriated PW’s.

May I have the next slide, please.

(The chart follows:)

Sources of data:
2. Medical statistics—SGO.
3. Walter Reed graduate school—SGO.
4. Battle casualty data—AGO.
5. Personnel forms 20 and 66—AGO.

Dr. Segal. Just a brief word about the sources of the data for our research. Not one prisoner of war was available to us for direct interrogation or psychological testing. Our data were derived from the following sources:

Primarily, they came from those dossiers which the Intelligence Branch of the Army compiled in their postrepatriation interrogation of these prisoners of war. These were made available to us at HUMRRO, the Human Resources Research Office, for careful research analysis.

In addition, we used four secondary sources: From the Surgeon General’s Office of the Army we gathered medical statistics about the PW’s, the physical and medical conditions under which they lived, and clinical, medical, and psychiatric evaluations made with the PW’s when they returned. From the Walter Reed Graduate School of the Surgeon General’s Office we gathered certain psychological test data derived from some of these prisoners of war. From the Adjutant General’s Office, the Battle Casualty Branch, we got certain vital statistics about the prisoners. And we requested the Adjutant General’s Office of the Army to provide us with photostatic copies of each man’s personnel form 20 or 66 giving certain pertinent civilian and military background characteristics.

May I have the next chart, please.
Dr. Segal. The treatment of those data contained in these very voluminous dossiers posed a problem, and just a brief word about how we did this. From each of these 579 dossiers, for each of the prisoners of war in our sample, we codified over 300 items of information, information ranging from background characteristics, civilian, and so on, to actual experiences and traits evidenced during captivity. These data were punched on IBM cards for machine analysis.

In addition, because it was difficult to obtain quantitative assessment on factors deemed to be of great importance, we developed 27 rating scales whereby each prisoner of war was rated on 27 factors thought to be important. I shall cite just one example.

Each man's dossier contained descriptions of the kinds of mistreatment and pressure to which he was subjected, but no overall assessment of this man's pressure compared to other prisoners was available. By means of rating scales we were able to assess the degree of pressures, for example, to which this prisoner was subjected as compared to other prisoners of war. Additional rating scales had to do with, for example, degree of preferential treatment received, et cetera.

May I have the next chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

Chart No. 5

Medical and Psychiatric Data

Civilian and military background.
Vital statistics on capture and internment.
Acts of participation.
Acts of resistance.
Interrogation experiences.
Indoctrination experiences.
Preferential treatment.
Mistreatment.
PW relations.
Contacts with outside world.
PW traits and attitudes.
Dr. Segal. Overall, as a summary statement, these are the categories of information which our study includes:

Data on civilian and military background and characteristics, vital statistics on capture and internment, acts of participation committed by men in captivity, acts of resistance performed by these men, their interrogation experiences, their indoctrination experiences, kinds of preferential treatment they received, mistreatment, relationships among the prisoners, their contacts with the outside world, certain traits and attitudes evidenced by the prisoners.

Before going to the next chart I want to add this note about our technique of analysis. In comparing the three groups of prisoners, the participants, the middle, and the resistors, on any one item of information from among the over 300 we gathered, rigorous statistical analyses were used in order to determine the reliability or the statistical significance of any differences found among these groups.

Because of the sampling procedures used it was possible also to describe the total prisoner population, all 3,323 men, with regard to any and all items of information which we gathered.

If I may hold off the next chart for a moment, I should like to describe some of the characteristics of the total prisoner population which may be of interest, some from among the many which are available in our report regarding the total repatriated prisoner of war group.

May I have the next chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

CHART No. 6

WHO WERE OUR PW'S?

Average age at capture—21 years.
Average education—9th grade.
Three-fourths single men.
67 percent—Protestant.
30 percent—Catholic.
3 percent—no religious preference.
75 percent—Regular Army.
85 percent—over 3 years' military service.
50 percent—less than 1 month foreign service prior to Korea.
84 percent—no combat prior to Korea.
1 percent—were PW's before.

Dr. Segal. Who were our prisoners of war? Before going into this one additional note might be mentioned. It was mentioned yesterday but it bears repetition, I feel. The Korean effort was a unique kind of war, it would appear, a new kind of war for American fighting men who served as a component of a U.N. police action. As was indicated yesterday, men who were fighting in Korea were not necessarily drawn together and put into combat under the same conditions which might obtain under a large-scale effort such as World War II.

In any case, who were our men? Their average age at capture was 21 years. Twenty percent were 19 years or younger. Fifty-nine percent were between the ages of 20 and 25, and 21 percent were over 26 years old. Their average education was the ninth grade. Forty-four percent of these prisoners of war had completed the eighth grade or less. Thirty-six percent had some high-school education. Fifteen percent had completed high school, with 5 percent having been to college for a year or more.
In terms of their religious preferences, two-thirds were Protestant, 30 percent Catholic, 3 percent no religious preference. Less than 1 percent were Hebrew.

Seventy-five percent of the Army prisoner population who returned were members of the Regular Army. Seventy-five percent had over 3 years of military service. Half had less than 1 month of foreign service prior to Korea. Eighty-four percent had no combat prior to Korea. Only 1 percent were ever incarcerated by an enemy before.

In terms of their rank, 5 percent were officers, 38 percent were non-commissioned officers, and 57 percent were enlisted men.

These were some of the characteristics of our Army prisoners of war who were confronted with a captor who viewed each of them as having a mission to perform for the Communist cause.

What were the Communist goals with respect to this body of men? May I have the next chart, please?

(The chart follows:)

**CHART No. 7**

**THE ENEMY’S GOALS**

1) TO SECURE PROPAGANDA MATERIALS
   - 39% signed propaganda petitions
   - 22% made records
   - 11% wrote articles
   - 5% wrote petitions
   - 5% circulated petitions
   - 16% had full-time propaganda jobs

2) TO CONVERT PW’S TO COMMUNISM

<table>
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<th>Acceptance of Communist Ideology</th>
<th>88%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3) TO EXTRACT VALUABLE MILITARY INFORMATION

Dr. Segal. Essentially, the enemy had three goals with regard to these men. First and perhaps foremost, to secure propaganda materials for psychological warfare efforts directed toward friendly populations, populations who were sought in the Communist camp.

Overall among our total prisoner-of-war population, 70 percent of the Army prisoners of war contributed wittingly or unwittingly to some degree to the Communist psychological warfare efforts. Thirty-nine percent signed propaganda petitions, 22 percent made recordings, propaganda recordings, 11 percent wrote articles for enemy newspapers, 5 percent wrote petitions, 5 percent circulated petitions, 16 percent had full-time propaganda jobs.

Mr. O'Donnell. Doctor, will you please explain what you mean by the 70 percent? It is not on the chart. Can you go into a little detail on that?
Dr. Segal. Yes, sir. 70 percent of all of the repatriated Army PW's made at least one contribution to the enemy's propaganda effort. By that I mean signed one petition or made one confession or made one recording. We have no data on the number of times that each man or any man did such an act. These percentages running from 39 to 16 total more than 70 percent simply because some men may have made and in fact did make more than one propaganda contribution. Does that clarify it?

Mr. O'Donnell. Yes, except for one thing. Would you explain how you arrived at the 15 percent from the overall standpoint and deleted from the 70 percent down to that 15?

Dr. Segal. Our analysis as I indicated earlier was in two parts: First, a description of the total prisoner population, irrespective of their criterion grouping; that is, whether they were resisters or participants or middlemen. These data apply in other words to the total prisoner population. Secondly, I can provide data which describe the proportions of each of the three groups who committed such acts, and, of course, the results are obvious. Those men categorized as participants much more frequently than men identified as resisters or middlemen contributed to the enemy's propaganda function. But for the moment I am not dealing with a comparison of the three groups. I am simply describing the activities overall, irrespective of their grouping.

A second goal of the enemy with respect to our prisoners of war was this: By means of a heavy barrage of indoctrination the captor attempted to convert our men to communism as a way of life. There are considerable data in our final report regarding the techniques of indoctrination, and the content of indoctrination which the enemy utilized. May I ask, considering the testimony I heard yesterday, whether you would want me now to go into some detail regarding the indoctrination efforts of the enemy directed toward our prisoners of war?

Mr. O'Donnell. I might ask you to explain. You said to convert POW's to communism. Was that material or ideological?

Dr. Segal. Ideological. To make these men accept communism as a social and economic system above and beyond their prior beliefs and concepts. This is entirely ideological.

Ninety-seven percent of all Army prisoners of war were subjected to indoctrination of one type or another, and those few, those 3 percent who came away from their captivity with no indoctrination, were captured for the most part in the spring and early summer of 1953 just a few months before the end of the war, at the time when the captors' exploitation program was coming to a halt.

The most common method we find used by the captor in his indoctrination program was the simple lecture approach which was experienced by virtually all the prisoners of war.

In addition to these lectures, 83 percent were required to attend group study periods, usually conducted following the lecture session as a part of the regular daily regimen of indoctrination. Smaller discussion groups or conferences were held at various intervals with almost half, 43 percent of the prisoners. Twenty-seven percent took part in so-called spontaneous public gatherings called by the captors.

Beyond these primary techniques the captor used less frequently such subsidiary methods as discussion groups run entirely by the pris-
oners themselves. These were experienced by 9 percent of the POW's. Special or voluntary study groups were experienced by 11 percent, and rarely, in 4 percent of the cases, personal individual contacts.

In addition they used a number of indoctrination aids or teaching aids, such as movies, plays, posters, pictures, exhibits, charts, and recordings.

Estimates of the most effective of these techniques were made by some of the prisoners upon their return, and according to the prisoners of war who returned those techniques which connoted a degree of face-to-face contact, of intimacy, between the captor and the captive, were regarded as the most effective. Forty-five percent of the prisoners regarded the lectures as most effective, and beyond that personal contacts were thought of as an effective indoctrination technique.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Doctor, does the personal contact refer to the walking conference which was explained by Captain Cumby?

Dr. SEGAL. Yes, sir; I would guess this as analogous to Captain Cumby's description.

What about the content of the indoctrination, the themes which were expressed: In general, the social and economic merits of communism and the sins of American capitalism served as a major current of thought stressed in indoctrination. What communism had done for China and the well-being of the Russian farmer, for example, were contrasted with the exploitation of the American worker and social discrimination in the United States. The peaceful intentions of the Communist world were detailed against the backdrop of American aggression, germ warfare, atrocities, and corruption in American politics and government. Instruction in the idealistic lives of famous Communist personalities such as Stalin, Marx, and Lenin, were presented together with the descriptions of warmongering predispositions of Roosevelt, Truman, and the Wall Street capitalists.

The indoctrinators may have hit closer to the immediate concerns of the prisoners by stressing also the uselessness of the Korean war as a concrete demonstration, along with the occupation of Formosa by the Seventh Fleet, of the American propensity for starting imperialistic wars—I am quoting now—for the benefit of the minority ruling class.

To what degree these ideas stirred in the prisoners a personal acceptance of communism as a way of life is something which I will describe in just a moment.

The captor also made special concerted attempts to persuade Army prisoners that the United States had used bacteriological warfare techniques during the Korean War. 82 percent of the Army prisoners heard bacteriological warfare lectures, and these were given primarily by the Chinese themselves, but less frequently by Air Force prisoners of war.

Ten percent of the returning Army prisoners of war report having heard bacteriological warfare lectures by Air Force personnel. It may have been the same Air Force man or any number of men. We have no data on that score.

It is significant, we feel, that only 3 percent of the prisoners of war were allowed to have personal contact with these Air Force prisoners. The avoidance by the captor of this personal informal approach when overall in his indoctrination efforts he used this to some degree may have indicated to the Army prisoners that their lecturers were not entirely convinced of their text.
Very briefly, very much a part of the indoctrination program was the heavy diet of Communist news received by the prisoners in contrast to the virtual absence of non-Communist sources. All but a handful of the Army prisoners were exposed to enemy news media during their internment. Without going into the percentages this included radio broadcasts from Korea, a large number of periodicals from China, from Western European countries, from the United States, radio broadcasts, loudspeaker broadcasts—any number of media were utilized by the enemy in flooding the American Army prisoners of war with a steady unrelenting diet of communist controlled news.

Mr. O'Donnell. Was the Daily Worker among that group?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir. The Daily Worker of the United States and of London.

Mr. O'Donnell. San Francisco publication?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir; a number of American publications. I don't have the data on that but I recall a number of such publications being mentioned by returning POW's.

In contrast to this heavy flood of Communist news only 11 percent of the prisoners received non-Communist news of any type during their internment. Over half of these were simply in the form of sports and local clippings from letters that came from home. Of the 11 percent, twenty percent received non-Communist magazines sent from the United States, five percent got non-Communist books, and only a small handful of prisoners ever heard unbiased news broadcasts on POW-built radios, radios which the prisoners themselves managed to build.

It is significant that only 1 percent of the Army prisoners of war in Korea ever received friendly psychological warfare leaflets from the UN or the United States psychological warfare team in Korea.

For the most part non-Communist news delivered to the prisoners were innocuous kinds of things unrelated to the steady line of propaganda and indoctrination given in the Communist news sources. We have also data on a percentage basis which need not be detailed, on the restrictions which the enemy placed on the amount and the quality and the content of letters which the prisoners were allowed to receive. These were censored in most instances, and the number which they got was severely limited as well. Six percent of the prisoners got none, and of the remainder half got less than 30 letters during their entire internment. We have no data on the number of letters that were written to these men.

Mr. O'Donnell. That would indicate a very strong censorship; is that correct?

Dr. Segal. There is evidence of a completely strong censorship on the part of the captor; yes, sir.

Mr. O'Donnell. Do you have any data as to the type of letter that might have been available to the prisoner of war whether it might have been disheartening to him in any way?

Dr. Segal. I have no data on that, but I have heard reports on that, and I believe one of the subsequent witnesses has a firsthand account of such purposeful malicious type of censorship.

One point should be made clear, that there is a great deal of evidence from basic psychological research, not on prisoners but just in general, that when an individual is subjected to a homogeneous flow of opinion and news, even the most intelligent individual, has a tendency
to modify his own opinion and even to reject known facts and conform to the group, to the large majority.

Returning prisoners frequently reported that in the restricted environment of the prison camp they soon began to doubt what they knew to be true with regard to the ongoing Korean war, the battles and so on. Some of them felt the need to check with new prisoners to find out whether the captor was really telling them the truth in his news reports and others said that one of the first things that they wanted to do after liberation was to validate or reject the news that they had been getting.

Under the circumstances in Korea it is not surprising to find prisoners doubting their own opinions and facts. This is an outgrowth, as basic research has shown, of the intense one-way news and opinion to which they were subjected.

The question which remains, considering this heavy flow of indoctrination and news, is to what degree our prisoners of war, speaking now again of the total prisoner population who returned, showed evidence in their repatriation interviews of a conversion to communism as a way of life.

Before identifying these figures, I want to describe the basis by which we arrived at these figures.

Our results in this connection are based on the statements made by returning prisoners of war, statements in response to direct questions of attitude as well as descriptions by the prisoners of their response to the enemy's indoctrination program and content. There was room here, of course, for defensiveness on the part of the prisoners of war in not relating their true attitude, but we culled together every bit of information relating to this that a prisoner of war may have given in his interrogation by the Army.

As an example, a prisoner of war may have indicated that communism is a fine system for an underdeveloped country like China, but would never work in a country like the United States and should be rejected obviously in a country like the United States. There were large numbers who scoffed and jeered and rejected completely all of the ideas which the enemy attempted to flood them with while they were in captivity. There was also a small proportion who made statements like, "Communism is the highest system which man can attain on this earth."

I cite these quotations simply to indicate the kinds of data on which we based the results shown on this chart.

Our results indicate that 88 percent of the returning prisoners of war accepted none of the ideology of the captor.

Of the remaining 12 percent, over half accepted little. That is, 7 percent. 4 percent gave evidence of a moderate degree of affection for communism, and only 1 percent can be regarded as being converted to communism to a large degree.

Mr. O'Donnell. Do you have any information as to whether or not those particular individuals before they went over had any degree of affinity for communism?

Dr. Segal. None whatsoever, sir. There are only fragmentary data in these men's dossiers, not enough for us to treat statistically. We have no data regarding their previous attitudes toward communism, nor, moreover, their attitude toward communism at the present time.
Mr. O’DONNELL. Then the Defense Department or the Department of the Army particularly does not know what the present-day status is of that 1 percent?

Dr. SEGAL. I have, sir, no idea what the Army or Defense Department knows. I only know that as researchers we stopped our research and our evaluation of these men at the point that we processed these data, and that there was no attempt by us as members of a civilian research agency to follow through on these men.

What steps have been taken by military and civilian legal officers is something on which I have absolutely no knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to make an announcement.

There is not a quorum of the committee present at this time. We will proceed as we did on yesterday. You may continue making your statement. It will not be under oath at this time. When a quorum is again present, you will be asked then if the statements you make during the absence of a quorum are true under your oath.

Dr. SEGAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed. We are making this departure from the regularly established rules and procedures simply to expedite this hearing, because the nature of the testimony is not controversial in the sense that we anticipate that any one is going to take the fifth amendment or to try to withhold information. Our witnesses are all cooperative.

You may continue with your statement, and later you will be asked to state under oath if it is the truth.

Proceed.

Dr. SEGAL. A third major goal of the enemy was to extract valuable military information from the prisoners of war during the interrogation procedure. Again we have certain data descriptive of these interrogation procedures covered in part yesterday. I shall summarize them at this point.

Virtually all of the prisoners of war who returned from Korea were interrogated to some extent by their captors. The most common number of separate interrogations among the prisoners as a whole was two. Twenty-eight percent of the prisoners experienced two interrogations, although 18 percent had five or more. The number reached 100 or more in the cases of some resisters who, from our data, we find were resistive in yielding military information and therefore had to be interrogated by the enemy to a larger degree. In other words the resisters were interrogated to a larger degree, more intensively and more extensively than were the participators, by virtue of the fact that they were slower in yielding the information which the enemy desired.

Very briefly, the enemy covered autobiographical information in their interrogatory procedures with virtually all of the prisoners of war. That was presented explicitly yesterday.

In addition, they sought the following kinds of information: Half of the prisoners were questioned about matters dealing with tables of organization and equipment, Army organization techniques and other military unit data; 40 percent report being asked their name, rank, and serial number and only isolated cases, less than one-half of 1 percent of all the prisoners, report being asked only this information.
One-fourth of the prisoners were interrogated about military equipment and supplies, and 15 percent about Army tactics and strategy. In addition, data regarding the prisoners' personal political attitudes and psychological attitudes were gone into to some degree by the enemy captors, in addition to the written autobiographical statements which were provided by the POW's.

Mr. O'Donnell. Can you tell us to what extent resisters or collaborators were subjected to interrogation insofar as percentages?

Dr. Segal. As I noted earlier, every prisoner of war, with the exception only of those few captured late in the war, was subjected to enemy interrogation to some degree. The only contrast I can draw between resisters and collaborators is that the resisters were interrogated more than the collaborators, but to some degree virtually all POW's were interrogated.

Mr. O'Donnell. Under indoctrination were more collaborators subjected to indoctrination than resisters?

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir. Collaborators, or participators were subjected to more indoctrination than resisters by virtue of the fact that they volunteered for more. In other words, there was a required indoctrination procedure by the enemy which all prisoners had to attend. Beyond that, the enemy chose those seemingly cooperative prisoners of war to engage in voluntary indoctrination procedures run by the prisoners themselves about which descriptions were given in prior testimony.

Mr. O'Donnell. Doctor, do you classify what happened to the prisoners of war as brainwashing and would you define the term?

Dr. Segal. Yes. There are a number of definitions of brainwashing which I have read and which are available. For my purpose I would prefer to use the definition of brainwashing which is given in the publication "Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of Prisoners of War," which was presented in evidence yesterday by Captain Cumby, and to which Captain Cumby contributed the major effort.

On page 51 of that publication we find this statement:

The term "brainwashing" has caught the public imagination and is used very loosely to describe any act committed against an individual by the Communists. Actually, brainwashing is a prolonged psychological process designed to erase an individual's past beliefs and concepts and to substitute new ones. It is a highly coercive practice which is irreconcilable with universally accepted medical ethics. In the process of brainwashing the efforts of many are directed against the individual. To be successful, it requires among other things that the individual be completely isolated from normal associations and environment.

We cannot say that the environment in which the prisoner in Korea lived was normal; but by abnormal is meant here, I am certain, complete solitary isolation, deprivation of food and water, and face-to-face indoctrination for long periods of time under conditions of extreme mental and physical duress.

In terms of this definition, although of course we made no attempt to draw parallels between this definition and the experiences of our POW's, I would say in answer to your question that very few of the prisoners of war in Korea met experiences which fit this definition of brainwashing.
Mr. O'Donnell. Based on your study I understand you submitted to the Defense Department 10 days ago, would you submit any specific recommendations you made for the Defense Department?

Dr. Segal. Sir, that will form the final portion of my presentation as soon as I conclude the description of the major findings of our research.

There is a point in elaboration of my response to your question about brainwashing. Everything I say this morning has to do with the Army prisoners who were the sole subjects of our research. This does not apply to the experiences of members of the Air Force, Marines, Navy, etc.; or certainly to civilians, some of whom were in fact by this definition brainwashed. We have no data to present from my agency regarding these other personnel.

What were the over-all techniques utilized by the captor in their attempts to exploit the prisoners of war for these purposes?

May I have the next chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

**Chart No. 8**

**The Enemy's Techniques**

1. Rewards and punishments.
2. Divide and conquer.

Dr. Segal. The primary technique utilized by the enemy was a simple system of rewards and punishments to be described in more detail subsequently. The Communist captor called upon no hypnotic powers to influence our men, nor did he wantonly physically mistreat and abuse all prisoners of war. In their very debased and deprived condition in captivity, the very deprived conditions which obtained within the prison camps in Korea, the enemy instituted a system of rewards and punishments and appealed to the drive among human beings to search for pleasure and to avoid pain. By cooperating with the enemy the drives were satisfied. Cooperation meant reward. Resistance frequently meant punishment.

A secondary overriding technique is what we might call divide and conquer. Quite apart from the normal prison camp separation of officers and men, the captor successfully encouraged divisiveness and suspicion among the prisoners. The prisoners themselves hardly helped the situation since, as will be shown later, there was a glaring lack of espirit and cohesiveness and mutual concern among them. Among the more potent techniques with regard to divide and conquer was the encouragement and rewarding of informers by the enemy.

Our data indicate that 10 percent of the Army prisoners of war in Korea informed on a fellow prisoner at least once during their internment.

The Chairman. What percent?

Dr. Segal. Ten percent, sir.

The Chairman. Informed on their fellow prisoners?

Dr. Segal. Yes.

If I may, we shall now contrast the groups of prisoners whom we studied, the resisters, middlemen, and collaborators. For the purpose of clarity we shall speak first about the comparison between the two extreme groups, between the resisters and the participators, and sub-
sequently I shall describe how the middle group, that large proportion of the prisoner population, differed from both of the extremes.

Did the participators and resisters differ in their civilian background? Very little. No significant differences between these two groups were found with respect to age, education, civilian occupation, marital status, or geographic origin, that is, the region of the country from which they came or in which they were born. We did find that the intelligence level of the participators was somewhat lower than that of the resisters.

Mr. O'Donnell. Was any pattern established as to geographical location, religious conviction, education, or anything like that?

Dr. Segal. No, sir; there are no statistically reliable distinctions between these two groups based on those points.

May I point out just this: Our data on religious preference concerned only those data on a man's personnel form or dogtag indicating simply what his religious preference is. We have absolutely no data to indicate a man's religious orientation within any preference, within any denomination or the intensity of his religious experience. These were data which we would very much have wanted to have, but were nowhere to my knowledge available for this large sample of prisoners of war.

The same applies to education. We have data describing the level of education which a man achieved, his grade, but nothing to describe the quality or content of that education. That was nowhere available to us.

What about the military background of the prisoners? No significant differences were found between participators and resisters when they were compared with respect to their ranks, their branches of the Army, or the degree of their prior military experience or their prior combat experience. One major difference did appear. We found that the resisters were more frequently decorated by the Army prior to Korea than were the participators. The implication of this finding is simply that the aggressively resistive prisoner tended to act in a meritorious fashion even before he was captured as far as the Army was concerned, and lends support to the efforts of the Defense Department to view soldiers in no different light as combatmen in the field and as men who are fighting the enemy behind barbed wire enclosures.

Altogether the few differences in background found between resisters and participators give us little insight into the dynamics of their behavior in captivity.

What role did attitudes toward communism play? We found little relationship between the degree to which a man accepted communism as an ideology and the extent to which he complied with the captor's demands for collaboration. All of our results point to the conclusion that participation with the enemy was based on grounds other than ideological ones.

How did the participators and resisters compare on this score? May I have the next chart.

(The chart follows:)
Dr. Segal. Upon their repatriation it was found that 45 percent of the participators gave some evidence of accepting Communist ideology to some degree. Again the bases for these data are the very same as I described earlier for the total prisoners population. Only 4 percent of the resisters gave any evidence of accepting communism to any degree.

Among these 45 percent of the participator group who accepted communism to some degree over half accepted little of the captors teachings and only a few were strongly sold.

The Chairman. Will you suspend for a moment? A quorum of the committee is now present.

Will you state under oath that the testimony you have given during the brief period that a quorum was not present is the truth?

Dr. Segal. I do.

The Chairman. All right. You may proceed.

(Committee members present at this point: Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

Dr. Segal. To summarize our findings with respect to ideological orientation of prisoners of war: as I said earlier all of our results point to the fact that participation with the enemy was based on grounds other than ideological. It is questionable, in other words, whether more than a handful of our prisoners behaved in the way they did either out of love or contempt for communism as a way of life.

What role did preferential treatment play? This is the next question which we will discuss. It is here in the character of the prisoner’s response to the blandishments of the enemy, that we find the major key to the riddle of the prisoner’s behavior. It was material rather than ideological inducements or considerations that made a strong difference.

How susceptible were our prisoners of war to the material inducements of the enemy? How prone were they, in other words, to bend to the captor’s demands in the face of offers of special treatment and privileges?
The contrast here between the participator group and the resisters is a very striking one. 91 percent of the resisters were not in the least swayed by the enemy's promises of reward. The same can be said of only a minor handful of participators. The participators were by and large opportunists in their behavior. It is important to point out at this point, as Secretary McCarthy mentioned yesterday, that this type of behavior, of accepting a reward in return for cooperation with the enemy, of collapsing in the face of the enemy's blandishments and coercion, did not take place in the middle of a metropolis like Washington or any other city, but in an environment of deprived and unwholesome and physically and psychologically sick conditions which obtained in the Korean prison compounds.

So when we say that a proportion of our men succumbed to the enemy's blandishments, in return for cooperation, this has to be put in the setting in which it occurred. It occurred in the Korean prison compound, and everything that the Korean prison compound entailed.

The question is now raised, opportunistic for what? Were the rewards of the captor real or just promises? Our data indicate they were very definitely real for those who paid the price. The Communist captor in other words was not so unrealistic as to think that a prisoner of war would cooperate if the rewards which motivated him were found to be unreal.

May I have the next chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

**CHART No. 10**

**PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPATORS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>42 %</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>32 %</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>26 %</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESISTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dr. Segal. This is the degree of preferential treatment meted out to our prisoners of war comparing the two groups, the participators and the resisters. Forty-two percent of the participators received a great amount of preferential treatment. Only 26 percent received little or none. Among resisters, only 4 percent can be described as having received an extensive amount of preferential treatment with
95 percent having seldom or never been the recipient of any rewards given by the captors.

The nature of those rewards included cigarettes, candy, alcohol, better food, better medical care, parties, sleeping late, freedom from physical labor details, and so on. Again I must repeat that all of this is not to say that the life of the participator prisoner was plush by any normal standard, but only that it was improved considerably by his yielding to the enemy's demands.

For those who craved such rewards or whose value systems permitted it, somehow the bargain was worth making.

Now, if we may, let us turn to the other end of the captor's pain and pleasure technique, the mistreatment. It has been commonly believed that participators cooperated with the captor only after they were subjected to cruel mistreatment and tortures of a physical sort. This was not the case. May I have the next chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

**Chart No. 11**

**PRESSURE**

**PARTICIPATORS**

Great

Moderate

Little or None

77%

20%

3%

**RESISTERS**

Great

 Moderate

Little or None

37%

40%

23%

Dr. Segal. On the contrary, participators who returned from Korea were rarely the victims of any considerable mistreatment or physical abuse. It was not the participator but the resister, the prisoner who never really did give in, who actively thwarted the enemy, who bore the brunt of the enemy's pressure, including both threats and actual physical abuse and mistreatment.

As shown in this chart, over three-fourths of the participators who returned from Korea received little or no pressure in their internment and only 3 percent were severely mistreated. Roughly three-fourths of the resisters received moderate to extreme pressures and less than one-fourth got by with little or none.

This should be made clear: It was not necessary of course for a prisoner to personally experience mistreatment at the hands of the captor to know that the threat of punishment was always present.
The loaded pistol on the table between the interrogator and the prisoner spoke its own message. We found that participators were very much more susceptible to threats, direct and implied threat, than were the resisters.

In summation, one of our most important conclusions, supported by many specific items of information analyzed, is this:

Participators, those few participators who cooperated with the enemy, did so so as to avoid the threat of pressure and, moreover, to reap the reward of preferential treatment. The resisters resisted in spite of considerable pressure to participate, while at the same time refusing the offers of rewards which the captor extended.

Senator McCarthy. Do I understand you correctly to say that aside from any physical torture there was the mental torture, the threat of physical torture, the thought that there might be torture?

Dr. Segal. Senator McCarthy, even the experience of being captured itself, without any explicit threat being made, and the stories of brutal abuses that the Koreans early in the war meted out, was itself an anxiety producing situation. But quite beyond that, as you point out, sir, implied and explicit threat was very tellingly used by the captor in inducing cooperation among our prisoners of war. So it didn't necessarily take actual tissue damage to induce cooperation.

What were the relationships among the prisoners of war in Korea themselves? In other words, in what setting did the enemy's system of reward and punishment operate? Our data indicate that 38 percent of the prisoners showed little or no concern for their fellows and that only 13 percent showed an extreme concern and compassion for their fellow prisoners.

(The chart follows:)

**Chart No. 12**

**CONCERN AND COMPASSION FOR FELLOWS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PARTICIPATORS</th>
<th>RESISTERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or None</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr. Segal. In this connection there are some remarkable differences between the resisters and participators. Almost two-thirds of the participators showed little or no concern for their fellow prisoners as compared to only 9 percent of the resisters and at the other extreme a third of the resisters evidenced strong concern for their fellows as against only a very small proportion of the participators. I should point out, however, that the concern for fellows which the resisters showed was reserved primarily for fellow resisters. Toward participators, toward men whom the resisters saw and knew were accepting rewards in return for collaboration and even in some instances informing, the resisters felt very little other than hatred and contempt; in fact many of the resisters' organizations which sprang up in the Korean compounds, cliques in which resisters banded together, many of these were designed primarily for the abuse, mistreatment, and even murder of collaborators. These attitudes remained evidently beyond repatriation, for in their post-repatriation interviews these resisters give strong evidence of feelings of hatred and contempt for their fellow POW's who were participators.

Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. I was absent for half an hour over in appropriations. See if I understand your testimony. You are using a lot of statistics which I have difficulty following. Is it safe to say that the vast majority of the soldiers who fought in Korea refused to go over to the Communist cause and remained good loyal Americans?

Dr. Segal. That is correct, sir. There was only a small proportion who behaved in the ways which I have just described, who cooperated in return for rewards.

Senator McCarthy. And the reason for the cooperation, I gather, was in many cases their mental or physical torture? Largely mental?

Dr. Segal. Largely mental, defined by the environment in which they were living, and in part, perhaps, by the personality traits and value systems which these men had, traits which we might find in any civilian population as well. Opportunistic behavior is not restricted to Korean prison camps, but is to be seen in civilian life as well, from which life these men were drawn.

Senator McCarthy. The reason I asked that question was that I was afraid that from these statistics the story might go out that a sizeable number of the soldiers were easily misled and disloyal. I understand now, if I may repeat, that your testimony is that the vast majority were good, loyal Americans even under tremendous pressure.

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir. Up until this point, Senator McCarthy, I have contrasted the very small percentage of men who were participators against the small percentage of men who were out and out active resisters. I shall say something in a very few moments about the large mass of our prisoners, the 80 percent who fell into neither category. That will fill in the picture.

In summarizing this particular item of information we might say that there was little esprit or cohesiveness or mutual concern among the POWs, this by design of the captor and not helped by the situation which obtained among the prisoners of war, by the suspicion and divisiveness which the captor encouraged among our men.

May I have the next chart, please.
CHART No. 18

THE MIDDLE MEN

(1) Did less
(2) Got less
(3) Were more isolated and withdrawn
(4) Background:
   - less active in sports
   - less entertainment talent
   - smaller percent married
   - less education
   - less intelligent
   - lower rank
   - higher proportion AUS
   - shorter military service
   - less foreign service and combat
   - interned for shorter period

Dr. Segal. It is at this point that we get to the description of the middlemen, the large majority of prisoners of war, those 80 percent who were neither participators nor resisters; it is a subject of some concern since, as I say, these are 80 percent; the largest proportion of the men who returned.

First of all, a word about their behavior toward the captor. These men simply did less than their fellows in either direction. Like the participators, they infrequently performed acts of resistance. Like the resisters, they seldom committed acts of participation. Neutrality best describes their position. How did they fare with the captor, the captor who had rewards in one hand and punishments in the other? In the same way that they did less they got less. Like the participators they were seldom the objects of physical pressure. Like the resisters they were seldom the recipients of preferential treatment. In the same way as I say that they did less in either direction, they got less of either of the captor’s “rewards.”

The Chairman. Would you describe that large percent, or middle group as you speak of them, as passive resisters?

Dr. Segal. Perhaps that is a term that might be used, sir, but not if we were to use the term “resisters” to mean men who actively thwarted the enemy. Perhaps we can draw an analogy between this and combat. The man who charges the hill at all costs may be analogous to our resister. The soldier who doesn’t go AWOL but who doesn’t actively charge that hill either—and this is pure analogy—may be a middleman. It is hard to describe. I can only describe the middleman in the terms in which we found them and also the terms by which we categorized them—men toward whom or against whom the Army had little or no derogatory information or minor derogatory information or conflicting kinds of evidence.

The Chairman. At least they were not active participators.

Dr. Segal. That is true.

The Chairman. Whatever participation, if you use that term, they engaged in was of a passive nature. There was no enthusiasm in it. It didn’t reflect any conviction on their part with respect to accepting or embracing communism or any of its ideology.

Dr. Segal. That is exactly right. And this is in response to Senator McCarthy’s question of a moment ago, filling in the picture. It was
only a very small proportion of our POW's who actively participated with the enemy under those conditions, with another small proportion actively resisting. The remainder were these middlemen who by no means and under no circumstances can be described as participators or cooperators.

The Chairman. They were just making the best of an unhappy and unfortunate situation. They didn't want to do anything to antagonize their captors, and thus bring punishment upon themselves, and at the same time they didn't want to cooperate and assist their captors in their program of indoctrination.

Dr. Segal. That is right, sir.

How did they get along with their fellow prisoners? This pattern of isolation from the captor, of refusing to move in either direction, applied interestingly enough to their relationships with their fellow prisoners of war. They were more isolated and withdrawn from their fellows than were either resisters or participators. They joined organizations less. They were more often alone than with others in captivity. They were a withdrawn group.

As a matter of fact, psychological test data gathered by the Surgeon General's Office, Walter Reed Graduate School, would indicate that these men were in fact more introverted and withdrawn. When faced with a conflict situation their mode of adjustment was to withdraw into a position of neutrality and, as you pointed out, sir, to ride the storm in the best way possible.

We went, as we did with our other prisoners, into the background data on these men, and here we have evidence that this tendency to withdraw, this tendency to remain neutral and not mix either with their fellows or with the captor in either direction, is in line with their civilian attributes. We found, as indicated there on the chart, that they came into the Army less frequently with records of sports activity, and with less entertainment talent. We find that a smaller proportion of the middlemen were married than were either participators or resisters. In a lighter moment, we have interpreted this as another indication of the propensity of these middlemen to avoid conflict, no matter what the cost. [Laughter.]

This may sound facetious, but we could hypothesize, if we view marriage as a willingness on the part of the male to enter into close social and physical contact with another member of a social unit, that this may be another piece in the puzzle, although up to now we have viewed it rather facetiously.

The middlemen were also less educated and less intelligent than either the participators or the resisters. In terms of their military backgrounds they were lower in rank. There was a higher proportion of draftees among them, members of the Army of the United States. They were in the Army for a shorter time than either of the other groups. They had seen less foreign service and combat. They were interned for a shorter period by virtue of the fact that they came to Korea at a somewhat later date than did men of the Regular Army or Enlisted Reserve.

This is the pattern of the middlemen.

In concluding this presentation I should say that the final portion of our technical report submitted to the Army fulfills the purpose for which our research was done. There we draw certain implications and
conclusions and recommendations from these findings which would aid the military in their ongoing program of devising training procedures to implement and help a soldier in resisting the enemy's exploitation when and if he becomes a prisoner of war.

This is recorded in detail in the final chapter of our technical report, and I should like to summarize some of these items here.

The last chart, please.

(The chart follows:)

**Chart No. 14**

**Implications**

1. Orientation—Specific recommendations for content:
   - Interrogation
   - Indoctrination
   - PW treatment
   - Captor's demands
   - Avenues of resistance
   - Group cohesiveness
   - Physical hygiene

2. Training
   - The "price" for opportunism
   - Simulated pressures
   - Resistance skills
   - Organizations
   - Escape and survival
   - Physical care
   - Ideological training
   - A mission

Dr. Segal. As indicated yesterday and this morning, one of the major premises on which we based our research was that the stand that a prisoner takes toward the enemy is considerably strengthened by a knowledge of the facts, a knowledge of the enemy that he is to face. In this instance any and all findings derived from our study are translatable into items of information which Army educators in training programs may utilize in the training of men. So in our report we make specific recommendations for orientation procedures either through film or lecture, regarding what the potential prisoner can expect with regard to enemy interrogation, indoctrination, and treatment, what kind of demands he may face, what avenues of resistance are open to him, the importance of group cohesiveness and of physical hygiene.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, what you are saying in effect is that it is fairly easy to be a hero in this country but a little more difficult if you are in the hands of a brutal enemy.

Dr. Segal. Yes, sir; and a knowledge of that brutal enemy is what we hope the items of information of our study are translatable into. As I pointed out earlier, we studied over 300 items of information, and it would be unrealistic I believe, sir, for me to go into every finding which is translatable into orientation content for the training soldier. But the major categories of orientation content which are covered in our technical report are presented, as listed earlier, on the chart.

Beyond orientation there are certain training procedures which are implied from the findings and conclusions of our research. I would like simply to summarize those very briefly.

We found, as noted earlier, that the single factor which served most clearly to differentiate the participant from the resister was the
degree to which each behaved in an opportunistic fashion. In other words, the participator somehow was easier prey for the lures of rewards than the resister. We find also that very few among any of the prisoners of war knew the implications of their behavior.

That is, for example, the participator who signed a petition in return for an extra meal did not in all instances view that petition as something inimical to the interests of the United States. It was somehow a bargain that was well worth making. He was, he thought, getting something for nothing.

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest in view of the fact that we have some very important witnesses waiting to be heard sitting in the room that the witness—I appreciate the detail he is going into, but I would suggest to the chairman that maybe he could cut it down a little more and summarize it and make it briefer.

The Chairman. Be as brief as you can. I don’t want you to leave out any vital or important factor in your report.

Dr. Segal. I am about to conclude with this statement:

To summarize very briefly, one of the recommendations made as a result of our research is that soldiers should be taught the price that is paid for opportunism. That is, the soldier should know the real meanings of these propaganda contributions which he might make in captivity.

Secondly, because of the fact that participators were more susceptible to threat than other prisoners of war, because they acted in such a way as to avoid the possibility of pressure, and because in many instances they viewed the pressure that would have been theirs had they resisted as worse than in fact it may actually have been, the question of simulating the pressures of internment in resistance training is brought to light in this report. That is something worthy of study.

In addition, we recommend from the results of our study that certain resistance skills are necessary for the captured soldier: techniques by which he can implement the organization and activation of resister organizations, of cohesive units, in captivity; techniques for escape and survival under difficult conditions; and techniques of physical hygiene which were glaringly absent among many prisoners of war, techniques by which he can care for his body in order to live and be a resister.

The matter of ideological training, that is, training with regard to Communist ideology, is something which from the results of our research would appear to have a rather low priority. This does not mean that it should be absent altogether, but only that it was less important than some of the other glaringly important factors which differentiated these two groups.

Finally, it is apparent from our research that each soldier must feel that he has a mission to perform as a prisoner of war. That is to say, his role as a combat man is not ended when he becomes a prisoner, but he is fighting the enemy at the psychological level in internment, a level equally as potent as bearing arms.

The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Segal. Are there any other questions of the witness?

We thank you very much. I think you have made a splendid contribution to the study and inquiry that the committee is making.

Call the next witness.

Mr. Kennedy. Major Anderson.
The CHAIRMAN. Major Anderson, will you come around, please. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major Anderson. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. CLARENCE L. ANDERSON, UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL CORPS, LETTERMAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

The CHAIRMAN. Major, state your name, place of residence, and your profession.


The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the military service?

Major Anderson. Approximately 11 years.

The CHAIRMAN. You have discussed with the staff the information which you have to present to the committee?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.

Mr. Kennedy. Major Anderson, you are a doctor, is that correct?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. You served in the Korean war?

Major Anderson. Yes; I did.

Mr. Kennedy. You were captured; were you not?

Major Anderson. Yes; I was.

Mr. Kennedy. For how long a period of time were you in a prison camp?

Major Anderson. About 34 months.

Mr. Kennedy. Since you have come back you have been making a study, have you not, of some of the treatment of the prisoners in prison camps and particularly as far as the medical picture is concerned?

Major Anderson. After we returned, the five American physicians who returned made a comprehensive study of their own experiences along medical lines.

Mr. Kennedy. Would you give the committee the benefit of the study that you have been making and the experiences some of the prisoners underwent in these prison camps? I think you are going to tell us something about what the different phases that the prisoner went through first after he was captured at the beginning of the Korean war, how he was treated at that time, and then carry it along.

Major Anderson. I think before we can understand and evaluate the conduct of the prisoners of war in Korea it is necessary to have some basic understanding of the time divisions of this war.

Insofar as the prisoners were concerned, approximately the first year of the war ending in the late spring or early summer of 1951 may be looked upon as a softening-up period, a period during which, as I will describe in more detail later, living conditions were so substandard as to cause a high death rate. The second period, which started in the spring of 1951 and ended in the spring of 1952, was a period of intensive indoctrination, which has been described by previous witnesses. The period following the spring of 1952 and on to the time of repatriation may be looked upon as a period of reflection or a period of individual
indoctrination, certainly not a period of any large group indoctrination.

I would like to discuss in considerable detail the first period, or the softening-up period, because virtually all the deaths occurred during this time.

The military discipline and control of the prisoners and the intimate liaison between the prisoners vanished during this time. Suspicion of other persons within the prisoner group was created during this time.

Senator McCarthy. Did I understand you correctly to say that most of the deaths occurred during the first year?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir, with the exception of 1, 2, or 3 deaths, all of the deaths occurred prior to September 1951.

How was this softening-up period accomplished and what were the purposes of the softening-up period?

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt again? When you say practically all of the POW deaths occurred during the first year, do you mean in the camp in which you were imprisoned or do you mean all over Korea?

Major Anderson. All over Korea, among all of the American prisoners of war in Korea.

Insofar as the softening-up period, the first year of captivity is concerned, the general living conditions were extremely poor. Food, as an example: The basic food which was given out by the captors was either corn or millet, occasionally kaoliang, which is an equally tasteless grain. Very little, almost nothing, in the line of vegetation was given out during this time, also almost nothing in the line of meat or protein substitute.

From the caloric standpoint the average caloric intake during this time was somewhere between 1,200 and 1,600 calories. To bring this into understandable perspective, if any of us were to stay at complete bed rest we would probably be able to maintain our weight at approximately 1,600 calories or a bit more than that. These men were active, primarily actively scrounging for food and heat.

As a result of the absence of adequate quantities of food, virtually all of the men who were prisoners during this time lost up to 40 or 50 percent of their body weight. There was much illness associated with malnutrition.

So far as clothing was concerned, a good number of the prisoners were captured during the summer of 1950 or during the fall of 1950 before winter clothing had been issued to our troops. No supplementary clothing for all practical purposes was given to the prisoners during the first intensely cold winter.

The housing also contributed to keeping the prisoners cold all the time. Men froze to death literally. The housing for the most part was these typical small Korean farm-houses constructed of mud with a thatched straw roof. The heating system was a floor vent system which allowed for 1 extremely hot room in the house and 2 or more freezing cold rooms.

These houses had been abandoned by the North Koreans and were in an extremely poor state of repair. On occasion an entire wall was missing.

These housing conditions took place during the winter of 1950 when the temperature got down to 30 and more degrees below zero.
Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt you, Doctor. As I understand your testimony on this point, if I may summarize it, these men were housed in houses in which sometimes an entire wall would be out, they had nothing but summer clothes, and the temperature was 80 degrees below zero?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. You say a number of them froze to death under those circumstances?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; that is true.

The Chairman. In that connection, would you say any actually starved to death?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; I think a fair number of men actually starved to death. A much larger percentage of deaths may not have been due directly to starvation but were certainly due indirectly to starvation.

The Chairman. In other words, sometimes a combination of the two?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The cold and the hunger.

Major Anderson. Probably the majority of the men who died with pneumonia, for example, died as a result of both cold and hunger.

As far as individual and group sanitation was concerned, as Dr. Segal has pointed out in previous testimony, individual and group sanitation was glaringly absent. This was true in the face of extremely low outside temperatures. The inability to secure adequate heated or boiled water even for drinking, let alone for washing, the obvious difficulty of taking one's clothes off for purposes of delousing, the fact that if one were to merely wash his hands it would usually have to be accomplished, one, without soap, two, in water of just above freezing temperature—I think under these conditions it is somewhat understandable that individual sanitation was deficient.

Insofar as group sanitation was concerned, there was no adequate provision whatever for latrine facilities. What latrines were present were for the most part constructed for the size of one Korean family, whereas the number of individuals who would be living in that house as prisoners of war would be 60, 70, or 80 men. Therefore, group sanitation was lacking.

Insofar as medical care was concerned, I was allowed to practice under the auspices of the captors during the first eight months of my captivity. During this time I had considerable personal experience with the problem of attempting to fight the illness of the prisoner without proper, without, for practical purposes, any facilities. Compounds were designated as hospital compounds. I would like to describe one such compound for you.

It was an abandoned temple. It was of wood construction. The average distance between boards in this wood construction was about half-inch. A half-inch of cold air came in between each two boards in the sides and floor and roof of this temple building. The hospital patients were quartered on the floor of this hospital building with a straw mattress affair which was used. They were housed, more or less stacked side by side in this hospital building. There were no provisions for help insofar as getting these men back and forth to the latrine, for example. Therefore, this building soon became a
stinky mess. It was for practical purposes a death house, not a hospital.

The Chairman. In that connection, Doctor, were you provided with medicine for the men that you were permitted to treat? If so, in what quantities?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; I am going to cover that point now.

Insofar as medications were concerned, we were given sporadically on a day-to-day basis a few sulfonamides. On one occasion we were given enough penicillin to adequately treat one individual. We were told to use this penicillin on 300 individuals who at that time were suffering from pneumonia.

The Chairman. It was adequate to take care of just one patient?

Major Anderson. No, sir.

The Chairman. You had 300 patients suffering from pneumonia?

Major Anderson. Right. The sulfonamides were given out more or less along the same line. The total dosage of any sulfonamide which the captor would allow at any given time for the treatment of one patient with pneumonia was 6 grams. This, translated to understandable figures, when we were using sulfonamides in this country to treat pneumonia, 6 grams would be the average dose for the first day. We would treat the pneumonia for approximately 7 days.

Senator McCarthy. May I ask a question at this point. How about anesthetics? When you operated did you have an anesthetic or did you have to operate without them?

Major Anderson. Some operations were carried out without anesthesia. In my own case I did one amputation of a finger without anesthesia, an unfrozen finger. Many amputations of frozen extremities were carried out without anesthesia. The surgical equipment which was available and the anesthesia equipment which was available were available briefly from time to time. The most ether I saw during the time I was practicing was approximately 2 ounces in a vial. This we used on one individual, and it was not enough for him.

Insofar as other anesthetic agents were concerned we had approximately a half dozen vials of pentothal, an intravenous anesthetic agent.

Insofar as doing any surgery was concerned, if it were done it was done again in a mud hut with no means of adequately preparing for the sanitation of the wound. On one occasion where an amputation of a leg was carried out the total surgical equipment available consisted of one rather badly used and old scalpel, two hermostats, or blood vessel clamps, one small-sized butcher-shop saw which was used as a bone saw, and one wood rasp which was used as a bone rasp.

Getting back to the medication for one moment, the medications which were available were never available in sufficient quantity to be of any significant importance in curing illness.

Going back one step further, the basic problem in curing the illness of the American prisoners of war in Korea had to do with lack of proper food, lack of proper clothing, lack of proper housing and heating. Without medication the death rate would have been far, far smaller if there had been any attempt on the part of the captor to adequately feed and clothe the men.

The Chairman. You spoke a few moments ago about having, I believe, 300 pneumonia patients at one time.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. How many of those survived? You may not have the figure.

Major Anderson. I don’t have the exact figures. I am reasonably certain that not over 10 survived. I can think of only about half a dozen at this moment.

The Chairman. Possibly 10 survived. If you had had the medication and other facilities comparable to what we provided for our prisoners of war, how many of those lives might have been saved?

Major Anderson. In the first place, if we had had proper facilities, if we had had comparable facilities, the chances are slight that we would have had 300 cases of pneumonia at one time. We should have had perhaps 3 or 4 cases of pneumonia.

The Chairman. I understand.

Major Anderson. We should have had no deaths if they were properly cared for. These were healthy young soldiers. Their native resistance to disease should have been good. Therefore, we should have had no deaths out of this group.

The Chairman. If they had provided comparable facilities as we provided and if they were given comparable medical attention and service as we did for their prisoners, first you say if they had been given proper food and clothing and housing, there probably would have been only 2 or 3 cases of pneumonia rather than 300, and in the second place if they had provided the medical facilities comparable to that which we furnished there would have been no deaths.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Whereas practically all died or some half dozen to a dozen survived.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; that is true.

The Chairman. All right, proceed.

Major Anderson. After the spring of 1951 the American physicians were prohibited from practicing medicine. They were sent back to the prison compounds with the statement that “After all, you are here to learn.” When questioned about this by one of my colleagues, one of the English speaking Chinese said, “Your education in the past has been very inadequate. You have been taught only how to cure. At the present time we will teach you whom to cure.”

Senator McCarthy. If I may interrupt to go back a step, Mr. Chairman, you referred to 300 pneumonia cases, that was merely in your camp, and I assume there were like number in other camps.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; that was in one camp at one time.

Senator McCarthy. So you can multiply that many times over if you wanted to get the full picture?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

Major Anderson. After we were sent back to the prison compounds for the indoctrination program, the Chinese doctors took over the treatment of the American prisoners.

The Chairman. I was going to ask—and maybe you will point it up at this time—why the privilege of treating the patients was withdrawn from you.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. That was so we could learn who to cure.

The Chairman. Learn whom to cure?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Give us a little explanation of that.

Major Anderson. The Chinese felt that, although we were properly indoctrinated in how to cure illness, we were not properly indoctrinated in what types of people we should practice medicine upon.

The Chairman. In other words you had not had proper instruction as to whom you should let die?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; right.

Senator McCarthy. Could you tell us roughly what percentage of the prisoners died?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. Approximately 38 percent of all the prisoners of war in Korea died.

Senator McCarthy. At what camp were you?

Major Anderson. I was first at a camp known as the Valley Camp. Following that I was at Camp 5. Following that I was at Camp 2. Camp 5 was at Pyukdong. Camp 2 was at Pichong-ni. Camp 5 at the time I was there was a major collecting camp and a major effort camp insofar as getting prisoners together and starting the indoctrination program.

The Chinese doctors who practiced medicine on our prisoners of war were a sort of motley crew insofar as their background in medicine was concerned. On the average, although there was one exception to this, their medical training had consisted of everything from no formal training whatever to approximately 6 months in a hurry-up aid-man course designed for bandaging, something similar to the course which we send our aid men to.

These men did several interesting things insofar as the practice of medicine was concerned. One of them whom we called the needle doctor was a pure out and out quack. Any prisoner who would come on to sick call complaining of pain in any part of the body, for example, I will say headache, was treated by the needle doctor in the following manner:

A short, rather blunt needle, which was connected to a spring device and a handle, was placed immediately under the skin in various mysterious spots on the head. After the needles were placed the doctor would very scientifically thump the handle of the needle so the spring would cause a vibration of the needle. This was hardly scientific medicine, but it did cure some headaches.

The Chairman. Was the purpose of that sort of treatment to discourage the prisoners of war from complaining and coming for treatment?

Major Anderson. I am certainly not sure about that. I believe that that treatment was probably a manifestation of the ignorance of medicine which was present among the so-called doctors who were practicing medicine on our American prisoners.

The Chairman. I think that would tend to discourage a fellow from going on sick call for a headache.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; it certainly would.

Another practice of Chinese medicine was the administration on a group of some 50 American prisoners of chicken-liver treatment. In this case a piece of chicken liver approximately the size of a 25-cent piece was implanted in the prisoner under his skin at a site on the right side of the chest wall somewhat in the region of the liver. This treatment was designed as a sort of cure-all. It would cure anything.
The prisoners who were selected as subjects for this treatment were men who were suffering for the most part from malnutrition and the various diseases associated with malnutrition.

This, incidentally, was a purely voluntary treatment. The Chinese doctors would come around to the various patients and say, "If you don't want this treatment you don't have to have it. Of course this is treatment under controlled conditions. If you get this treatment we will feed you well. If you don't get this treatment you get the same old food."

Amazingly enough, with the simple addition of proper food, the caloric content, the vitamin and mineral content of the prisoners' diet, that is, those people who had been subjected to the chicken liver treatment, was boosted up tremendously and, strangely enough, those people didn't die. Those people survived.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you attribute that to the chicken liver or to the better food?

Major ANDERSON. I would attribute it to the better food entirely. Had the general nutritional quality of the food been present, these men would never have suffered from the disease of malnutrition to start with.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but after it having been present and they were suffering, would improving the dietary quality of the food produced the cure without the chicken liver?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir. The chicken liver in each of these individuals did 1 of 2 things. It was a foreign body. Either it became liquified into a pus and was sloughed out of the abscessed cavity or it was surrounded by a layer of calcium and scar tissue and became a hard, somewhat tender knot. For practical purposes, either the growth qualities or the vitamin content of the chicken liver itself were not utilized, were not capable of being utilized by the sick men. The chicken liver treatment was another pure hoax.

This, incidentally, was a demonstration of the fact that although the Chinese were capable of giving us an adequate diet, they were not doing it. This occurred during the midsummer of 1951, when the death rate was still quite high among the prisoners of war.

The CHAIRMAN. That interests me a bit. You say they were capable of giving adequate diet to the prisoners, but there was a willful withholding of it?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about it?

Major ANDERSON. Not in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. You were there.

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

There were numerous other examples of inept diagnosis and treatment among the so-called Chinese doctors. I will give you only one additional example.

During the second and third summers of the prisoner experience, the suffering from dietary insufficiency, that is, in the case of vitamin insufficiency, was still quite prominent. This was particularly manifest in the loss of day vision and night vision. The Chinese felt that the loss of vision on the part of the prisoners was probably due to glaucoma. This was entirely incorrect. They used a treatment which I think in some previous time has been used for the treatment of glaucoma. This was injecting a strong salt solution into the eye just outside the globe of the eye.
Again, this was a treatment which discouraged men from going on sick call. So far as I know, only 4 or 5 men received this particular treatment.

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that we are going to adjourn, I understand, at 12:15, I would like to go back to a very interesting statement you made, Doctor.

That is, you say, you were being indoctrinated on whom you should treat.

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. I would like to know whom you were instructed to treat.

Major Anderson. This statement was made by one of the English-speaking Chinese in all seriousness. In actual fact the physicians were certainly given no special indoctrination course. They were merely shuttled into the regular indoctrination program which was designed to point out that our American leadership is composed of warmongers and that their interests and operations are inimical to our own interests. We were given the routine indoctrination. We were not specifically told who not to cure.

Senator McCarthy. Roughly, what impression did you get? Who did you think you should allow to die and whom did you think you should treat?

Major Anderson. The obvious intended impression was that any member of the proletariat was deserving of our sympathy and our best efforts in administering medical care and that any of the wealthy, any of the directors of our Government—I don't think in that connection your name was specifically mentioned. However, it was mentioned in many connections.

Senator McCarthy. I would not have gotten treatment, is that it?

Major Anderson. No, sir; I don't believe so.

The Chairman. You understood that was more or less a criticism of your profession here generally, that while you may have learned the science of medicine, you had not accepted the right ideology, and so forth, in the practice of medicine?

Major Anderson. Right; we had not learned "Truth," in capitals and quotes.

The Chairman. May I inquire, Major, how much more testimony you are prepared to give us? I was thinking of recessing soon.

Major Anderson. I can summarize briefly.

The Chairman. All right. Understand, I am not trying to have you omit anything that you think would be helpful to the committee at all. I just am trying to ascertain about adjournment.

Senator McCarthy. May I suggest, the doctor has been giving some very interesting testimony, and I wonder, instead of rushing him now, if we should not ask him to come back this afternoon.

The Chairman. That is why I was trying to determine how much more time you required. We can finish, I am sure, within a reasonable time this afternoon, and I believe we will recess until 2 o'clock, if you can be back at that time.

Major Anderson. All right, sir.

The Chairman. The committee stands in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Major Anderson, if you will resume the stand, please.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. CLARENCE L. ANDERSON, UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL CORPS, LETTERMAN GENERAL HOSPITAL, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.—Resumed

Major ANDERSON. All right, sir.

I would like actually to make one or two summary remarks. I would like to start them off by saying that my impression is a subjective impression in spite of the fact that I have access to objective data. The fact of being a prisoner of war is an emotional state, and it is impossible to get away from that. Therefore, some of the things I say may appear to contradict what again appears to be objective data. I think it is more apparent than real, but I would like to make a few specific comments with that idea in mind.

From the standpoint of the goals of the enemy in relation to the indoctrination program and in relation to the conduct of the prisoners of war, I believe on the chart you saw this morning two goals were listed: No. 1, propaganda; and No. 2, conversion. I think these are both secondary problems. I think the No. 1 goal of the Chinese in approaching the prisoners of war was control or neutralization. They did not want an effective force behind their own lines. Therefore, their program was primarily designed at neutralization of the destructive ability of the prisoners. I think in that respect they were quite successful.

In that connection I think it is worth while to look at another chart which was used this morning and the terms resisters, participators, and middlemen. I think that the effectiveness of the Chinese in their No. 1 aim, neutralization, may be shown in this large number of so-called middlemen.

Obviously there is no such thing as a middleman in relation to the ideological warfare or the interrogation program which the Chinese came out with.

Senator McCARTHY. Could I interrupt you?

Major ANDERSON. Yes, sir.

Senator McCARTHY. You just used the phrase saying the neutralization of the destructive ability of prisoners. I don't quite understand what that means.

Major ANDERSON. The potential ability of a group of any enemy behind the line for harassment, for the demand to have large numbers of troops, who would otherwise be on the fighting lines, guarding them is great. This potential was tremendously reduced by the interrogation and indoctrination program by the neutralization of this potential for harassment of the enemy and therefore for forcing the enemy to utilize large numbers of troops to guard and control relatively small numbers of prisoners.

Senator McCARTHY. In other words, you mean by that taming down the prisoners so they would need less guarding?
Major Anderson. I think in this respect they were effective in their No. 1 aim of their program. I think propaganda certainly was an aim. However, the value of propaganda obtained under these circumstances is somewhat limited to us in the United States and even to people in Communist and non-Communist nations other than the United States.

As far as conversion is concerned, a very small number of prisoners were converted. I think part of this has to do with the fact that this was a low priority item. Neutralization was the main part.

It has been previously mentioned that 10 percent of the prisoners were informers. One out of every ten men informed on his fellow prisoners. I have no statistics to back up my impression, but my impression is that there were actually very few informers. Ten percent is not very few. I think that this information and the statistics in this line are probably not correct statistics. They are based in part at least on uncorroborated accusations by other prisoners.

In the prolonged, intimate contact at interrogation and indoctrination sessions, it was relatively easy, in fact it was difficult not to—it was relatively easy for the prisoner of war to inform on himself without having any idea that he was doing it.

The Chairman. If your viewpoint is correct, isn’t that evidence of the fact that the Communist captors were able to create suspicion among the prisoners, that caused them to suspect each other? Therefore, it may have been reported and the statistically based reports and information given us this morning may be correct, but that could be I think, perhaps, from what you say, because of the very fact that suspicion was instilled in the prisoners, suspicion of each other, of their fellow prisoners. Therefore some may have been suspect who were actually innocent.

Major Anderson. I feel that the majority of those suspected of informing on their fellow prisoners were probably not guilty of doing that.

The Chairman. Although they may have been accused by some of their fellow prisoners who had been repatriated?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir.

In that connection I would merely like to re-emphasize that a situation such as a prisoner of war camp where the enemy is holding the power, there can be no such thing as a middleman or a neutral force. I feel that all nonparticipators were not middlemen but resisters, and the degree of resistance varied tremendously with the amount of fear that had been instilled in the individual through the phase one, the softening up phase.

In very brief summary I would like to point out that the death rate among prisoners of war in Korea is officially estimated at 38 percent. Over 1 man out of 3 died. This is roughly compared to 1 man out of 10 among the prisoners of war in World War II. These deaths were caused by starvation, exposure, and harassment by the enemy. It is quite true that torture in its classical form was not common. Every prisoner, however, was the victim of prolonged, calculated cruelty and inhuman treatment.

With these facts in mind, it is not at all surprising to me that a minority of our men can be legitimately looked upon as cooperators with the enemy. It is surprising to me that the majority acquitted themselves with honor.
Senator McCarthy. Just one question: You said that 38 percent of the prisoners held by the Communists died. How does that compare with the death rate of the Communist prisoners held by us?

Major Anderson. I have no figures on that score at all, sir.

The Chairman. Can we get those figures?

I think they should be inserted in the record at this point if we can get them.

Mr. Jackson. We will get them for you, sir.

The Chairman. Will you get them so they may be inserted at this point?

Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. Without having the figures available maybe Judge Jackson might be able to answer this: Am I correct in the assumption that there is no comparison at all, that the death rate of the Communists held by us was extremely low compared to the 38 percent of our men who died?

Mr. Jackson. Knowing what I know about the facilities and the care that we gave the prisoners under our control and knowing from what we have heard here this morning, I would certainly assume that there would be a very marked difference. I don’t have the figures, sir, and I will be glad to get them for you.¹

The Chairman. You were given some commendation or some certificate of merit for your resistance to the enemy during your prison stay?

Major Anderson. No, sir; I was given a commendation for my conduct as a medical officer while a prisoner of war.

The Chairman. After you were denied the right to practice medicine what duties were assigned to you?

Major Anderson. No duties other than that of the so-called student. However, within the confines of my own compound I continued to practice medicine and continued to see patients.

The Chairman. Did you see patients and consult with them and advise them? Were you prohibited from doing that?

Major Anderson. No, sir; not within my compound.

The Chairman. But you had no medicine with which to treat them?

Major Anderson. There were several medical officers within a relatively small compound, the officer compound, and we cooperated to the extent of sending men on sick call with specific complaints in an attempt to get and secure adequate amounts of medicine so when our men actually became ill they could be properly treated as far as possible. This was attempted.

The Chairman. Any other questions?

Senator McCarthy. Just one question, Mr. Chairman. Would you care to relate your own experiences as a prisoner and how you were treated or would you rather not do that?

Major Anderson. I have no objection to going into it at all, Senator McCarthy. However, no generalization can be made from my personal experiences. They are not in any way comparable to the experiences of the majority.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, you don’t think it would be of any benefit to the committee to consider your own personal experiences?

¹ The information supplied by Mr. Jackson will be found on p. 139.
Major Anderson. No, sir; I don't think so.

Senator McCarthy. No further questions.

Major Anderson. May I say one thing in partial answer to Senator McCarthy's previous question. This was told me by physicians who were working on the Communist prisoners held by us. They were working under the control of the International Red Cross. On one occasion we were reprimanded for using penicillin which was out-dated, and this was corrected. As I have emphasized before, on one occasion in our experience we received penicillin sufficient for treatment of one person and we weren't particularly concerned about the date of that penicillin.

Senator McCarthy. So far as you know we gave the Communist prisoners good medical care?

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; so far as I have been able to find out, we gave them excellent medical care.

Senator McCarthy. As far as food was concerned, did they get sufficient to eat?

Major Anderson. I can't answer that question.

Senator McCarthy. Very well.

No further questions.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, major.

Major Mayer, will you come around, please, sir.

You do solemnly swear the evidence you shall give before this Senate Investigating Subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major Mayer. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. WILLIAM E. MAYER, MEDICAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY, SAN ANTONIO, TEX.

The Chairman. Major, state your name, place of residence, occupation or profession, please.

Major Mayer. Dr. William E. Mayer, Major, Medical Corps, United States Army. I live in San Antonio, Tex. I am permanently assigned to the faculty of the Army Medical Service School where I teach psychiatry. I am temporarily assigned at the Continental Army Command Headquarters at Fort Monroe, Va., for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of doctrine relating to the teaching of the Code of Conduct.

The Chairman. How long have you been in the military service?

Major Mayer. Thirteen years.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. Kennedy. Major Mayer, you have been working, have you not, with some of the prisoners who came back from the conflict in Korea?

Major Mayer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. You did some of the interviewing, did you not?

Major Mayer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Will you outline some of your background in that field, briefly?

Major Mayer. My attention to this problem began when it became possible that there would be a prisoner exchange of sick and wounded. That is at the time of Operation Little Switch, which Captain Cumby described yesterday. At that time I was placed on a board called the
Joint Classification Board in Japan, set up for the purpose of both conducting and reviewing and supervising the interrogations and examinations of all people recovered from the Communists in Korea.

Subsequently, I served in the same capacity as the medical member of a board set up to supervise the examination and inquiries of all the United States and U. N., with the exception of British, personnel repatriated during operation Big Switch, the principal prisoner exchange. I continued this study of data that we derived from those studies and in addition in connection with this, in order to provide material of value within the military, I reviewed much of the literature available written by and about prisoners of war from World War II, to give us a basis of comparison and I have interviewed a number of them.

Mr. Kennedy. Supplementing what has been said already, do you have any information regarding the method used by the Chinese Communists and North Koreans in interrogation and indoctrination of American prisoners of war?

Major Mayer. Yes, Mr. Kennedy, I think I can possibly throw light on the entire process from a slightly different point of view. I should like to explain what that is.

First of all, I am concerned, as is every member of the medical service, with the implications of Communist handling of these prisoners from the standpoint of what it does to the man himself, what effect it has on him. Our primary mission is to conserve his well-being. So we have examined the whole procedure from the standpoint of its effects on him insofar as it is possible.

Secondly, however, my principal area of concern has been with the military implications and fairly strictly limited to the military implications of Communist handling of prisoners in relation to how these methods affect our fighting strength and in relation to what advantages the Communist method gives him in the battle which is represented by a prisoner of war camp.

We have heard from Dr. Wolff a magnificent discussion of Soviet methods in the police state, particularly as they relate to the individual state criminal and the adaptations the Chinese have made of this same procedure. I would like to emphasize that one of our initial findings was that while the war criminal, individual criminality subject did come up, was introduced by the Communists in their handling of Americans, in spite of this the handling of these people by and large was not exactly similar to the methods Dr. Wolff described but was clearly derived from those, some of them very ancient police methods.

Mr. Hunter's interesting exposition of the Communist indoctrination procedure also throws a good deal of light on what actually was done to Americans, however, with certain qualifying remarks.

For example, he talked a good bit about hunger and fatigue. These undoubtedly affect behavior and can affect behavior very profoundly. In fact, many ordinary, well-adjusted people react emotionally if they miss a meal. You multiply this by hundreds of instances and by a generally inadequate diet such as Dr. Anderson described, and you can imagine what the effect is.

These things were factors in Korea in whatever happened to the American soldier, unquestionably. However, to be realistic about the
whole situation and to put it into its proper perspective it is necessary to remember that this is probably going to be the case against the Communist enemy. There is certainly no indication that he is going to start giving people plenty of food and the kind of good treatment we give them. Secondly, it is undeniable that in Japanese and German POW camps the inadequacy of the diet, the terrible conditions of working in coal mines, on road gangs, and so on, particularly in Germany, were comparable at least to these elements of hunger and fatigue among the Korean prisoners.

Also, the subject of the use of drugs and of hypnosis and of the Pavlov conditioned reflex have been introduced here. Our findings based upon what now amounts somewhere between 800 and 1,000 complete files of intelligence and medical data on returned United States and U. N. prisoners indicates that drugs and hypnosis were not in the Korean POW camps significant factors in the handling of these soldiers.

Relative to the Pavlov conditioned reflex which does play a part in human learning, it is dangerous, I believe as a psychiatrist, to over-emphasize this kind of human learning. We can demonstrate the conditioned reflex even in the unborn child. It certainly has been demonstrated on all kinds of laboratory animals. Dr. Pavlov, when he described it, pointed out how inconsistent this response is, how easy it is to extinguish. I would merely like to add a cautionary word relative to the Pavlovian conditioned reflex, namely, that its use or its absence, neither, says anything about the inevitability of succumbing to something that the Communists have.

I would like to try to avoid any implication that they have something magic, because that is what Pavlov sounds like, or something you can't resist because that is what Pavlov sounds like. That simply isn't true.

One other thing that was mentioned was destruction of the mind and the word "insanity," which is not a medical but legal term, was introduced several times. This issue was fought out at great length in relation to at least one trial that I know of, and it is an important one, because this, too, lends credence to the idea that the Communists have something which can destroy people's minds and drive them insane and relieve them of their personal responsibility for their actions. This, too, I don't believe to be true in any sense in this restricted environment of the Korean prisoner of war camp.

I am not talking about the rest of the Communist world.

Mr. Hunter did say something about tenseness, which, as a psychiatrist, I call anxiety. Whatever you call it, this is a tremendously important factor in determining what behavior is going to be. Every prisoner of war is anxious. He comes ultimately to a realistic realization that the captor can do anything he wants to him. He is relatively defenseless. He is unarmed, certainly, in the face of a captor who may exercise any form of brutality. No prisoner ever really forgets this. To a lesser extent we see the same kind of anxiety among prisoners in county jails and in penitentiaries.

Captain Cumby emphasized the minimal use of physical torture. It was quite natural, therefore, to turn to a consideration of mental torture. I think this needs some defining. I don't know exactly what mental torture is. Certainly a great many mental patients who come
to me, particularly in a combat zone, who are emotionally disturbed and who feel that they can no longer function for some reason, describe things that to them are torture of a mental sort. For example, the separation from their home and their family. Sometimes it is the food. Sometimes it is what they consider to be a punitive superior. These things to different men constitute mental torture.

If I am right in assuming that by mental torture implied a system of actively terrorizing people, of trying to create in them horrifying images of what might occur if they don't absolutely toe the line, I don't think we can say properly that mental torture in this horrendous atmosphere was a very important nor a necessary part of the Communist method for handling prisoners.

I have said a great deal about what it isn't. I would like to try to point out as simply as possible some of the important things that the Communist handling of prisoners does involve.

Dr. Segal this morning talked about dividing and conquering, and certainly every opponent in history who wants to conquer has tried some variation of this and the Communist is no exception to this. However, there is a limit on how many solitary confinement cells you can build for prisoners, and if you can possibly divide them without physically isolating them from one another you have accomplished a miracle, certainly a great achievement.

So they set out—again I am talking from this somewhat provincial point of view of applied psychiatry—they set out to isolate them from one another just as effectively as if they were in cells. The informing that you have heard about was part of this. As Dr. Anderson pointed out, any figure that you give about informing is likely to be misleading, because informing in these camps was given an entirely different atmosphere. You will recall that someone has described the reception of the prisoner by the Chinese that frequently he was received in a more or less benign fashion. He was told that they were glad to have him, glad to have liberated him from the clutches of the Wall Street warmongers, glad that he was free from further dangers on the battlefield, that they would demand nothing of him, that they weren't going to mistreat him, that they merely wanted to give him a chance to learn the truth as they understand the truth to be.

This goes further than just mere propaganda. This begins to alter the soldier's preconceived idea about the captor in a significant way, and a relationship begins to develop between the prisoner and the captor which is somewhat new from the standpoint of our previous experiences with how prisoners feel about those who catch them.

In line with this rather privileged and more secure, unusual relationship, seemingly, between the captor and the prisoner, the prisoners were encouraged to talk about themselves principally, secondarily about others, not as an exercise of some vindictive, punitive police state. It was always interposed as talking about your own activities or the activities of other people. It was always interpreted as a worthwhile service to the people, you see. This was an evidence of your increased civic consciousness in the sense of civic responsibility. So much informing, if you can even call it that, was simply the unwitting dissemination of material by prisoners who were in a very real sense seduced into this since it was called something else and it wasn't done in a bitter or vituperative manner. Had the original
stages of informing led to severe punishment of other prisoners, the informers would have suffered the same fate as in previous wars. Men who have been informed upon or their friends would have ganged up on the informers and destroyed them. This has been almost invariably true.

The informer holds the lowest run of our social hierarchy. But people didn't ordinarily suffer when some of this information came out beyond being required to have one of these walking conferences or a heart-to-heart chat with one of the Chinese instructors, who generally begged him to try to see the error of his ways and improve his sense of responsibility for the welfare of the group. That was misleading. Ultimately, of course, it was possible as a result of informing for serious things to happen, but by then the whole process had gone too far. It was typified by the statement by many returnees, "While there was a lot of informing, they seemed to know everything we were doing and sometimes I even had the feeling they even knew what I was thinking, but I don't know who was informing."

As Dr. Anderson clearly pointed out, sometimes you were informing on yourself, sometimes on others with nothing punitive intended. This wasn't a renunciation of principle on the part of the man who did it.

Another method of isolating these people from each other was through their selection of mail, which you have also heard described. This effectively separates people one from another by shearing away what ordinarily serves as a common basis for unified effort and unified activity. When two soldiers get together and compare their letters from home about their kids and about their family and about their house, this has a unifying effect. This binds men closer together. But when your letters are restricted to letters very often which announce some major or minor domestic crisis, when your letter turns out to be a notice from a collection company, or what a soldier calls a "Dear John" letter, this isn't the kind of thing you get together with your buddy and talk about. Consequently, men were deprived of this common emotional basis for sticking together.

They also used this control of the mail to make men feel that what the Communist says about capitalism and what it does to its members was demonstrably true, in this respect: It said that our system of free enterprise leads to selfishness, grasping, caring only for what is in it for you, little regard for another individual, especially if he is not there. They said, "Your people at home have forgotten about you. They don't really care about you." What little mail you got was likely to bear this out. Of course this helped make men feel that they were alone and abandoned and isolated.

The self criticism meeting is still another step and an important one psychologically.

Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt at this point? By control of the mail, you mean censorship?

Major Mayer. Yes, sir. Not only censorship, Senator McCarthy, but withholding of mail, allowing only certain letters to go through. In other words, not just censorship in cutting things out. It was interesting that they routinely did not allow a photograph to come through. A man might get an intact letter in which it said "Here is a picture of me and the kids." No picture. This was almost invariably true, because they didn't want this kind of reminder. They didn't want to give him supports of an emotional kind. It is a diaboli-
cal kind of censorship and it is bound over a period of time to be ex-
tremely effective.

They cut these people apart, making them isolated and thus ob-
viously much more helpless by this self-criticism which has received
a good deal of attention. I think even Mr. Molotov published a self-
criticism only a few months ago.

The self-criticism is not so different from the exportation of your
minister to look inwardly and see what you have not been doing that
you should have been doing, and vice versa, except that like every-
thing in the Communist state, it is collectivized. You are gathered
together in a group frequently for a self-criticism meeting. Some of
the Chinese prisoners that we captured on the front lines told us this
was being done in the Chinese army, right within the combat unit,
that they had self-criticism meetings. This was certainly done among
the prisoners.

In a self-criticism meeting, which resembles in some ways group
psychiatric treatment, group psychotherapy, in this meeting you exam-
ine and criticize your defects of attitude or of character or of behavior
in terms of the standards which are often impossibly high, which are
stated to be the ideal standards of a people’s state.

First, this seems or seemed at least to many of our soldiers to be a
kind of a joke, kind of ridiculous, but inevitably over a period of time
something occurs when you do this. This is why this group psycho-
therapy in the treatment of patients we control such sessions very
carefully. What would happen otherwise is that eventually you be-
gin to run out of superficial or joking things to talk about. Eventu-
ally you begin to talk about beliefs I have which maybe you can’t
support logically but which you nonetheless have.

You begin to talk about rather personal things. You may even be-
gin to talk about your family and how they developed your attitudes.
Pretty soon you do indeed feel naked and vulnerable, and you are
not quite so sure that your listeners are as friendly as you once thought.
You have the feeling that you have talked too much, you have gone
too far. They know too much about you.

This produces not only the tendency to withdraw from other people,
but a real feeling of guilt and a feeling of anxiety which you can’t
pin down and therefore you can’t solve. You don’t know exactly what
you are guilty about, but you do know you have this feeling which is
very unpleasant. This, of course, as Dr. Wolff pointed out, is one of
the factors that makes people vulnerable to Communist pressure. The
individual with a sense of guilt.

One other thing about the self-criticism. Oral self-criticisms are
one thing, but a frequent next step was to say, “You have now said
this. We want you to write it out. There can be no harm in this.
You have said it publicly in front of witnesses. So write it down, not
an essay on it exactly, but describe it in writing and sign it.” These
were carefully picked up. Of course they found their way into the
dossier that was kept on each man. Self-criticism might be for some-
thing minor, selling a turnip, let us say, but 100 self-criticisms—and
this was somehow communicated to the prisoner—might eventually
add up to enough to constitute a real indictment of you as a war crimi-
nal, you see, or certainly at least as not a worthwhile member of the
people’s democracy.
Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt again at this point. I read once about the attempts to induce a man to sign a confession, and after he signed the confession he would then be told he was no longer a prisoner of war, but he was treated as a war criminal. How much of that was there, if you know?

Major Mayer. Not very much.

Senator McCarthy. There was not too much of that?

Major Mayer. No, sir; although it happened enough that a great many people knew about it. So it is the kind of thing that undoubtedly affected people, but you can't say exactly how much it affected people.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, if I understand it, as I get it from reading various articles, they would promise a man special consideration if he would sign a confession, and once he signed the confession about germ warfare or something along that line, he was then told "You are no longer a prisoner of war, you will now be treated as a war criminal."

Major Mayer. Which of course means you have none of the protections of a POW. I believe this was true, Senator, in relation to the people who were handled individually or specially. These people were mostly not in the Army. My data, perhaps I should emphasize this, is almost entirely restricted to Army plus about 300 U. N., other than United States. It is not drawn to any significant degree at all from the experiences of Air Force people or any other group.

Senator McCarthy. You would not have any idea how many times this occurred, I suppose?

Major Mayer. No, sir. There may be someone in a subsequent hearing who will have direct access to that information.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

Major Mayer. Yes, sir.

The educational program has been well described. I would like merely to add to its previous description that this education program is not just to disseminate information. Obviously, by the results which have been described by, for example, Dr. Segal, it isn't very effective in selling people ideas or at least political philosophy. It certainly didn't succeed in turning Americans into Communists. But the education program psychologically is a step beneath that, a step deeper into the individual, by devaluing those values which really are the strength of a democratic nation, the dependability of the individual and his right to function as an individual and his sense of individual responsibility. By devaluing these things, one takes away or whittles away at personal character traits which otherwise could defend a man in this situation.

In other words, having nothing to do with politics, having to do with the immediate reality of being in a POW camp. If you no longer think that American principles of fair play and of intense personal loyalty and of speaking your mind individually—that these things are no longer so important, then——

Senator McCarthy. I hate to interrupt the witness too often, because he is a very intelligent witness, but I would like to get some additional comment in this connection.

I understand that the Turkish soldiers deviated practically not at all. Is that right?

Major Mayer. Yes, sir; that is correct.
Senator McCarthy. Regardless of what type of mental or physical torture was inflicted, we have practically no record of any Turkish soldier deviating.

Major Mayer. That is correct, sir, and we interrogated them all.

Senator McCarthy. How about the Marine Corps? I ask that as a marine.

Major Mayer. As a former marine psychiatrist——

Senator McCarthy. There isn't such a thing as a former marine.

Major Mayer. I agree. Among the Marine ground troops held prisoner—and I must point out that I have had access to only probably less than 60 of their complete reports—among these men the incidence of giving in to Communist pressures was almost—well, it certainly was extremely low.

Senator McCarthy. That might indicate, taking the Turkish troops and the Marine troops, that the indoctrination and the esprit de corps had a tremendous amount to do with whether or not they would give in; right?

Major Mayer. I think most emphatically, Senator. There are other factors involved, surely, but here is one factor that we think is undeniable and it is something we can work on in any branch of the military service and something we can work on in fact throughout the whole society. I would like to come to that in a couple of minutes, if I may.

Senator McCarthy. I understand that there were only 230 marines captured during the entire Korean war; is that correct, if you know?

Major Mayer. The figure to the best of my recollection is approximately 231. That may be 10 numbers off one way or the other.

Senator McCarthy. I am not here now to extol the virtues of the Marine Corps over the Army, because I have tremendous respect for all the boys who serve in the Army, but how do you account for the much lower percentage of Marines and Turkish soldiers who surrendered as compared to the percentage of Army boys? Was that the result of the indoctrination they got during training or the esprit de corps?

Major Mayer. I think there are a number of possible factors in this, Senator, although training, esprit de corps, and the quality of leadership and discipline in particular are, we believe, of critical importance in preparing a man to stand anything that the Communist tries to do, in fact, that any enemy tries to do to him, whether on a battlefield or in a POW camp.

Senator McCarthy. The chairman just mentioned a point which I think is very important, the fact that all of the Marines are volunteers might also have some effect, I assume.

Major Mayer. I have some interesting data on that, Mr. Chairman. When I was a psychiatrist in the First Marine Division in Korea this was largely true, yes. Most Marines have volunteered. If you pick apart the reasons why they volunteered, sometimes the reasons are fairly simple ones or immature reasons. Nonetheless they are voluntarily in this situation, and this undoubtedly makes them a good soldier.

The Chairman. I did not quite understand that.

Major Mayer. They are voluntarily in the position of being committed to be a marine, and therefore this can help them to become better soldiers. On the other hand, we in Korea did serve with drafted marines. We had drafted marines in the Marine division.
The Chairman. Did they elect their branch of the service after they were drafted?

Major Mayer. I don't believe this was true, sir.

The Chairman. I was just inquiring. Or were they assigned to fill in?

Major Mayer. They were assigned, sir. Most of them were of Puerto Rican extraction and had come from New York. Many of them spoke very little English. I merely want to say about these drafted marines that they became quite good marines. So you can't write it all off just by the mere fact of their being volunteers.

The Chairman. I did not think that was a factor exclusive unto itself that might control, but it just occurred to me than one who volunteers to serve in the military has possibly weighed the responsibilities and obligations, and he more readily can be indoctrinated than one who perhaps is drafted. This is no reflection upon those who are drafted. Many who are drafted have purposes or ambitions in life. They have a different code. Their career and plans are disrupted or interrupted for a brief time in the military, whereas the voluntary marine has chosen that for at least his immediate occupation. Therefore, some may be drafted who are reluctant to go in the first place. In other words, they have not that buildup of character and resistance to conditions that maybe the marine volunteer who chooses that profession would naturally have by reason of his stronger conviction about it.

Major Mayer. I agree wholeheartedly, although I believe that even among drafted citizens, with more emphasis upon the service aspects of being in the service on the part of the public in general, we would get something that more closely approaches, even in the men who have been drafted, an attitude that while he didn't initiate the act, he voluntarily and wholeheartedly puts himself into it.

The Chairman. I am sure most of those who are drafted do that. Major Mayer. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I am sure the majority of them do. But I can appreciate that in a draft you occasionally bring somebody in who is very reluctant and unhappy about it in the first place, and unless he actually gets in combat where he has to defend himself, he is a little bit lukewarm about the training and discipline and all of the other things associated with military life.

Senator McCarthy. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I did not bring up this question of the Marine Corps and the Turkish soldiers for the purpose of comparing them with our excellent Army. It is merely because we are here studying what can be done to prevent defectees in some future war, and I thought we should at some time try to find out why, for example, none of the Turkish soldiers and none of the marines defected. I understand three marines were tried, but all were found not guilty, and not a single marine prisoner defected. So I think it might be well for the military to examine the different type of training and to determine, if possible, how we can prevent as many defectees as possible in a future war. It was not just because I was in the Marines that I was bringing this up.

The Chairman. I think at this point I would like your comment—or perhaps you would rather wait until you have concluded your formal presentation—about what we are doing now in the military.
What lesson have we learned from this and what are we doing about it? That is the important conclusion to this.

Major Mayer. I should like to comment on that, sir, if I may wait just a moment or two.

Mr. Kennedy. May I say something in regard to your statement, Senator McCarthy? During the course of the study which we have been making together with the Army they have been most cooperative so far as turning over records and making people available. As far as we can find, they are realistic enough to see that there are certain problems. I think they are aware of certain facts which are coming out in these hearings which perhaps are not most favorable to certain people or certain branches of the service, and they are trying to take steps to correct them. I think that before they have finished they are going to outline what steps they have been taking and are taking.

Senator McCarthy. I am sure you are right, Mr. Kennedy. They are taking whatever steps they think are necessary. I am sure that these hearings will help.

I should like to take up with the chairman a matter which he may not wish to decide now. I think we should make a part of this record the hearings which we held about 2 years ago, I believe, in which we introduced a sizable number of the books used to indoctrinate soldiers, some of which were just rank and complete Communist propaganda. We had them as part of the record then, and I think they should be put in this record to make it complete. I do not wish to ask the chairman to rule on it now, but I should like him to look over the books which we now have in his committee and decide whether or not they should be put in this record. I think indoctrination by the type of books which we found were being used may have had a considerable effect on many of the soldiers who defected.

As I said, I am not asking for a ruling at this point.

The Chairman. I assume that the books which the Senator refers to are already on file.

Senator McCarthy. Yes; they are.

The Chairman. We will give proper consideration to that later. I will say at least that some of the books are not conducive to making American soldiers more patriotic, and this committee severely condemned their use where those were found. Of course you have in mind, I am sure, that much corrective action has taken place since, just as we expect to occur as we explore and develop the facts in connection with how our prisoners of war were treated, how they responded, the defections which came about. We are learning from our experience of the past and expect to take every corrective measure indicated to be necessary or proper to prevent a recurrence in the future.

Senator McCarthy. May I say, Mr. Chairman, in fairness to those in charge in the Army that while I have no proof of it, I have been informed that they have withdrawn many of the books that were introduced before the committee at the previous hearings.

The Chairman. All right, you may proceed, Major.

Major Mayer. Up until now I have been discussing some of the things we heard about before in the context of isolating people psycho-
logically from one another in an attempt to make them alone and help-
less. The next logical area to examine is, Did it work? Was it effec-
tive? What was achieved by doing this? This must be done with any
enemy weapon, whether that weapon is made of metal or whether it is
a technique or a set of techniques like this.

In relation to this it is necessary to review just momentarily what
the Chinese objectives were in the whole program. I wish to second
most emphatically Major Anderson's contention that all desires to
communicate ideas and develop propaganda to the contrary not-
withstanding, the Chinese principal objective was the control of the
prisoners. It is dangerous to have several thousand enemy soldiers
behind your lines even when they are not armed. The Germans found
that out. The Japanese found it out. Americans in captivity are not-
ably difficult to control.

So, in terms of this objective, did the Chinese accomplish what the
program primarily, in my opinion, was designed to accomplish?

They did to a degree to which you cannot assign a precise value.
However, it appears that it was possible in North Korea to maintain
security in the prison camps holding Americans with less expenditure
of enemy military strength than we expected them to have to expend
to control these people. In other words, it didn't take as many guards
or as many guns or as many barbed wire fences. That is important to
us from the standpoint of simple military operations.

As far as their selling ideas, getting acceptance of communism by
Americans, one can only speculate about this. You certainly can't
assign degrees of acceptance of Communist indoctrination, particularly
from a man's own statements if he is under the emotional stress of
just coming out of a prison camp and is being questioned by an Intelli-
gence agent. It is impossible to get anything except a wild guess at
best. It is my impression that, as Dr. Segal pointed out, they were ex-
tremely unsuccessful in selling the ideas. They did, however, accom-
plish the production of a certain amount of propaganda material and
they did, I repeat, manage to control these men with less expenditure
of troops and materiel on their part than we think would have been
ideal.

You heard all kinds of discussions of what the results are in terms
of resisters and collaborators. I don't honestly think that is our area
of principal interest, at least not in my particular field of endeavor.
I am interested in the 80 percent that they said were in the middle. I
am interested in the average soldier, if there is such a thing, the ordi-
nary fighting man who finds himself in this situation, who is not a
hero of the Nathan Hale variety and is not an out-and-out oppor-
tunistic informer or collaborator. You will find a few such people in
any large collection of men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean we are not interested in the defectors?
Major MAYER. I am interested, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not quite get the significance of that.

Major MAYER. I mean that my primary area of concern is with the
large general group in the middle rather than either of the two ex-
tremes. In considering the future welfare of soldiers in the American
Army in this situation this is going to be the majority. These are the
people that possibly the most can be done with. These are the ones who
deserve a good deal of our attention. I don't mean that the others are
inconsiderable. I just mean that this is where I have focused my principal interest in terms of corrective measures.

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt to ask a question which I asked a witness this morning? I should like to ask you the same question, if I may. Am I correct in the assumption that the vast majority of the men who served in Korea—Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Corps—proved themselves really good Americans, good soldiers, and that the group who defected or did not come through were just an infinitesimal part of the military?

Major Mayer. You are certainly correct in saying that the great majority of Americans—

Senator McCarthy. So, as a whole there is no reason that we cannot be proud of the military conduct in Korea.

Major Mayer. Yes, sir; we can be proud of the behavior in Korea, but we have to recognize what lessons are still involved, because no matter how well they did, we would like ideally, if we are going to have to fight this enemy, to do even better. Otherwise there would be no point in improving any of our weapons.

With this large central group, the 80 percent you have heard described before, we came across a number of things which we would like to correct from the standpoint of the welfare of the soldier himself. For example, we found that apparently they had some difficulty in developing close buddy relationships. We would like to see these relationships as we have in previous wars, because they give strength to the soldier. They protect him. They help keep him alive. The more and the better your buddy relationships are, the more strength you have against any threat.

Secondly, we would like to see active and continued resistance on the part of soldiers who are in enemy hands. Our new code of conduct says almost at the very beginning, "If I am captured by an enemy I will continue to resist." This, of course, is the mission of the soldier, whether he is in a POW camp or on the battlefield.

We would like to see more engineered escapes. We would like to see a continuing, active program to get people out, because not only does this demoralize the enemy but it does good things even for the men who don't escape. It does good things for the emotional life of the man left behind in camp. For every man who escapes, the fellow left behind escapes just a little bit. At least he knows there is somebody going home who is going to fire up the people about what is happening to us. Maybe it will hasten our repatriation. So we would like to see that.

The Chairman. What are the chances of escape?

Major Mayer. The chances of escape, Mr. Chairman, are related very closely to the presence or absence of escape groups. Escape as a solitary individual pastime is doomed to almost certain failure. However, even under the conditions existing in Korea, with the escaping prisoner being surrounded by people of a different race and therefore he is more easily recognized, even there it is conceivable. Based upon what Americans have done in previous wars in similarly difficult situations, if enough people work on the preparation and enough people cover up his movements, if enough people are engaged in the escape committee, it is conceivable that a man can escape. In fact, we expect escapes to occur in this fashion.
The Chairman. Did they succeed in escaping from our compounds?

Major Mayer. I am not qualified to answer that in any quantitative sense, sir.

The Chairman. I can appreciate this one point which is made. I don’t know how tremendously important it is, but, of course, the more resistance the more threat of escape, the more danger of escape that the prisoners can create, the more it taxes the strength, the manpower, and so forth, of the enemy, and thus insofar as combat that many troops are neutralized, so to speak. They are occupied with something other than on the front line killing. Taking it overall, I don’t know how big a factor it would be, but I assume that in war everything that taxes, obstructs, or hinders the enemy from putting his maximum force of destruction where our troops are, which detracts from it to any extent, therefore helps the cause.

Major Mayer. Absolutely; but also it is important for what it does to the prisoner himself.

The Chairman. To the man himself.

Major Mayer. Even if no escape ever actually takes place, the constant sustained activity—you remember Mr. Hunter said something about keeping your mind busy—is a good defense against the best the Communists have. Escape and preoccupation with it is an important part of it.

Senator McCarthy. If I may interrupt again, Mr. Chairman, there is a big difference, of course, between urging your soldiers to try to escape when the enemy is following the Geneva Convention rules of warfare. You know if a man is apprehended he will not be mistreated so badly. But as far as the North Koreans were concerned, as far as the Japanese were concerned, frankly I would not have advised any of my men to try to escape. Am I right in that?

Major Mayer. Certainly it is a point very well taken. The Japanese used to threaten, for example, if 1 man did escape they would shoot 9 others. This has a deterrent effect on escapes, but not a total deterrent effect. I can’t believe that we can ever retreat from the position that one of the primary duties of the soldier who is for the moment held captive is to try in some way to escape. This is an opinion.

The Chairman. That has to be left up to the soldier.

Major Mayer. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. He should not be directed to try to escape because it might mean immediate death not only to himself but to some of his fellow prisoners. It is something which has to be left to his discretion after he has been properly trained and indoctrinated and has become a good soldier. When he is on his own like that he certainly has to be the final judge.

Major Mayer. This emphasizes the fact that escape has to be done as an organized community effort, that it cannot be just the isolated efforts of individuals.

The Chairman. All right; let us go ahead.

Mr. Kennedy. Major, on the question of the participation or cooperation with the Communists are you using the figure 15 percent or have you used in the past a larger figure? I want to get it straight now for the record.

Major Mayer. I have in the past said that the total number of people that the Communists managed in one way or another to get
to engage in activities ultimately detrimental to the prisoner himself or to the country was probably closer, in my opinion, to 30 percent. Based on this, 15 percent were the hard core that we have heard described several times before. From the point where one is completely cooperative with the enemy to the point where he does absolutely nothing is not just one big jump. It is a series of little steps. It is possible, therefore, to have an opinion as to the seriousness of any given amount of cooperation. It seemed to me that an additional 15 percent beyond the hard core were active enough in what the Communists wanted them to do, like the study group.

Mr. Kennedy. Major, isn't that other 15 percent one of the problems or difficulties, and to a lesser extent those who did not participate or those who did not resist? Isn't that group one of the biggest problems that we have to face?

Major Mayer. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. I wanted to make sure we understood that that is one of the difficulties. I don't think we should pass over it as just the 80 percent, but this other group which did participate and did cooperate.

The Chairman. The Chair will have to announce at this time that a quorum is not present, and therefore you may proceed and make a statement for the record. If later a quorum returns, we can then verify what you now say under oath.

Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to have to leave shortly, we have one other witness who has to leave the city. How long will you be, Major?

Major Mayer. I was going to leave tonight. You mean how long here? Just a very few minutes.

Mr. Kennedy. We have another witness also.

The Chairman. The Chair has to go to a conference at 4 o'clock, a meeting of conferees on the public works appropriation bill. I have a little interest in the outcome of that conference, and I think I had better be present to look after that interest.

All right, go ahead, Major. We will proceed as expeditiously as we can.

Major Mayer. In relation to what you were just asking about, Mr. Kennedy, invariably the question arises, Did this experience in Korea reveal that there was something defective about Americans or that our people can't stand up to the Communists? I wish to say emphatically that this is not what the Korea experience showed at all. It did, however, point out for us areas for maximum effectiveness of our fighting forces in any future conflict, particularly against a Communist enemy—areas that, however good they are now, desirably could be strengthened. This is what the Code of Conduct in the military service attempts to do.

We know in studying combat soldiers and what makes them fight and why they break down during battle that there are certain factors which defend a man against terror and anxiety and being unable to go on in the face of this terrible threat of being dismembered or killed in battle. These factors are pretty simple, and they are classical. They are not the private property of the psychiatric department.

They include certainly adequate, firm, consistent, predictable leadership.
They include a definite, well-defined system of discipline, and by this I do not mean punishment. I mean the kind of discipline that is internalized, a system of values, as Mr. Hunter talked about and as Dr. Wolff even suggested, the kind of discipline that arises from within the individual and makes it possible for him to function effectively as a member of a group and as actually a member.

We know that the sense of group identification, of belonging, is extremely important in defending a man against fear and anxiety in battle. We know that morale and esprit de corps are essential. We know that his training and his knowledge of the situation of the enemy can defend him.

The Code of Conduct simply reemphasizes, in relation to each of those things I have mentioned, what we have been trying to teach all along. The Code of Conduct, although it uses the language of a prisoner of war, talks about loyalty to other individuals. It talks about continuing to resist. By Executive order of the President it states, "I will try to escape and assist others to escape." The Code makes other statements, such as keeping faith not only with one's comrades but with the United States of America in prohibiting any statement which would hurt the United States.

The Chairman. Perhaps a copy of that should be supplied for the record.

Major Mayer. Yes, sir. I have a copy right here which belongs to the judge.

The Chairman. I think it might be printed in the record at this point for the information of those who read the record.

(The document referred to follows):

**CODE OF CONDUCT**

For Members of the United States Armed Forces

I

I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

II

I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

III

If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

IV

If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information or take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

V

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
VI

I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

Major Mayer. In summary I would like to say that this Code of Conduct, which is new as a document, is simply a restatement of the very things we have been trying to teach and emphasize in the military all along. The Korean experience more than anything else has emphasized the fact that these things need continuous and increasing attention on our part. So we are attempting to do this, not just in reading people a Code of Conduct, but every branch of the military service has devised a program of formal instruction, a program of field instruction, not just to teach people how to be prisoners but how to be the kind of soldier who will also be a good prisoner on the basis of these same principles.

One thing needs to be said in addition, and it was said by the men who drew up the Code of Conduct and by many others who have reviewed this. We don't pretend that we can teach the elements of character within the limits of the military service strictly. We can't teach a man about loyalty or dedication to a cause or continuing to resist in the face of adversity, unless he has within him from his previous 18 years of education, particularly in his home, some understanding of those same values. Those values basically are moral and ethical principles. They are not things restricted to fighting a war. They are things which give the country its strength as it is. We are trying to teach it within the service, but we need a great deal of help, mostly from parents, and public attention to this code.

The Chairman. In other words, if they have had the proper training at home, if it has been instilled in them from childhood, you have much better material to work with in making the kind of soldiers that we need and that we desire.

Major Mayer. Yes, sir; because in any future conflict, particularly against a Communist enemy, if he further refines and further develops his techniques, which is predictable, and if we don't take the lessons from the battlefield of the Korean war, then particularly if we are engaged in a general war, if he can manage to isolate these people from one another and neutralize them and not have a problem holding them and extracting information from them, this can be an extremely serious fact from the standpoint of the consequences militarily.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Major.

I hope we may be able to get through the next witness. Will you come around, please?

Mr. Kennedy. Major Panell.

The Chairman. Major, will you be sworn? You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Major Panell. I do.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. MARION R. PANELL, ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY

The Chairman. Be seated, Major Panell. Will you state your name, your place of residence, your occupation, how long you have been in the service, and what your duties are at the present time?
Major Panell. Marion R. Panell, major, Artillery, United States Army. I am presently assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, at the Pentagon. I have been in the Army for 16 years, and I am presently residing in Baltimore, Md.

Mr. Kennedy. You are in Army Intelligence, are you?

Major Panell. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. One of your duties in the past has been to interrogate all the United Nations troops who fought in Korea, other than American and British; is that correct?

Major Panell. That is not entirely correct. While in Japan I served on two joint boards of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, which processed the results of the interviews and interrogations of all the American prisoners of war who were returned to Japan and all of the United Nations prisoners of war who were returned, with the exception of the British.

Mr. Kennedy. Then you have examined the records of all the prisoners of war other than the British; is that right?

Major Panell. That is correct.

Mr. Kennedy. Specifically were you working on the other United Nations troops who fought in Korea and were captured?

Major Panell. No; I was not working specifically on that.

Mr. Kennedy. You did work with their records.

Major Panell. Right; and I did examine in detail the record of each returned United Nations prisoner of war.

Mr. Kennedy. Will you give us the number which you have examined?

Major Panell. During the first sick and wounded exchange there were approximately 14 Turkish prisoners. During the general prisoner exchange, referred to as "big switch," there were 299 Turkish prisoners returned, 40 Filipinos, 22 Colombians, 12 French, 2 Greeks, 2 Netherlanders, and 1 Belgique, a total of 307 prisoners other than United States and British.

Mr. Kennedy. Did you find from an examination of their records that these prisoners were subjected to the same kind of indoctrination and interrogation that the United States prisoners were?

Major Panell. As far as we could determine, all these prisoners were subjected to the same treatment, lived under the same conditions, and were subjected to the same indoctrination and interrogation procedures.

Mr. Kennedy. Major, was there one particular group which stood out as far as resisting the interrogation and indoctrination of the Communists?

Major Panell. There was. Actually I think there were 2 groups that stood out, although 1 group, the Turks, being in the number that they were, are the only one from which I think we can draw a comparison to the conduct of our own prisoners of war.

Mr. Kennedy. What was the second group?

Major Panell. The second group that I remember specifically were the 22 Colombians.

Mr. Kennedy. They did very well also?

Major Panell. Yes; as far as we could determine, in the degree of acceptance of indoctrination or cooperation.

Mr. Kennedy. Would you tell us a little bit about what you found as far as the Turks were concerned?
Major Panell. I said the Turks were subjected to the same conditions that our people were, and I think that is accurate. These 229 were captured in two increments. Roughly one-half of them were captured in November of 1950, and the second half were captured in April of 1951. So they were in prison with our people at the same time that we had a very high death rate. They were on the same so-called death marches that some of our people were on. During both experiences they had a very high survival rate. In fact, on one march it is alleged that we lost about a man a mile, as it was referred to. I think it was about a 90-mile march, and about 90 Americans died during the course of this march. I believe there were approximately 900 Americans in that group, so approximately 10 percent of them died during the course of the march. There were 100 Turks who made the same march, and no Turk died.

Also I might mention that, although I do not have any specific figures, the large majority of the Turkish prisoners who were captured were wounded. Although I have nothing to compare it to, I believe probably a larger percentage were wounded than our own people.

Mr. Kennedy. They were wounded prior to capture? Is that the point?

Major Panell. Yes. After both groups went into temporary camps where we had a very high death rate between October of 1950 and, I believe, approximately the 1st of September 1951, no Turk died or is known to have died during that time, although at 1 camp it was reported by various prisoners that we had about 1,600 Americans die in that 1 camp. I think this can be attributed to several factors. One is that the Turks were possibly in better physical condition than our people. Their unit was no doubt one of their best because it was a brigade which represented their country, whereas we had initially in Korea the troops that were immediately available, that had to be pulled out of other duty, occupation in Japan, and put in piecemeal into Korea. It was from this group that the majority of our people were captured.

The Chairman. Major, have we learned the lesson to keep our men trained and to keep them in physical condition?

Major Panell. I hope we have.

The Chairman. Were they in this instance?

Major Panell. Initially I don't believe they were, sir.

The Chairman. So you attribute part of the loss of life to that very fact.

Major Panell. I think there is no doubt about it.

Mr. Kennedy. Is there any other factor that you want to mention in connection with that?

Major Panell. Yes. The Turks had a very high esprit de corps. They were very much concerned with the health and welfare of each other. If one Turk happened to get sick he was babied and nursed back to health by his fellow prisoners.

Another thing is that they live in their army under a very rigid disciplinary system whereby the line of authority goes from the top down to the lowest man. Whoever happens to be the ranking individual in the group assumes command, and there is no question about it. Although the group may be all privates, the man who has been in the army the longest or the oldest person, one of them assumes command and the other people recognize that command authority.
A little bit of it may be attributed to the fact that these people knew that if they didn’t follow the orders of this individual in charge, when and if they were repatriated they would have to answer for their failure to do so.

Another factor, I think, is the fact that in their own country they had probably lived a little closer to the earth than we had, for instance. Because their native life is a little more primitive generally than ours, I think maybe they are just a little bit more rugged. They recognized the fact that they could supplement the diet which Dr. Anderson mentioned. They supplemented it by boiling various herbs, weeds, and so forth, which I think possibly contributed to their high survival rate.

They were subjected to the same indoctrination program. They attended forced indoctrination lectures. There was a language barrier. As far as we could determine, the Chinese had only one well qualified, fluent Turkish linguist, who was of Turkish descent and whom the Turks had very little respect for. Apparently they paid no attention to his lectures. He didn’t accomplish much. As far as could be determined, they didn’t accept to any appreciable degree the ideology that was being preached.

It must be kept in mind also that this whole program was more a hate America campaign, and certainly it was not a hate Turkey program. So they might have had a little less interest in it than our people.

Mr. Kennedy. Was their degree of cooperation or collaboration, or whatever word you wish to use, with the Chinese Communists or the North Korean Communists slight or negligible?

Major Panell. There were two Turkish prisoners who were accused fairly universally by their own fellow prisoners of having cooperated.

Mr. Kennedy. Just two out of the group?

Major Panell. There were a few more who were accused by one or two individuals, but universally only two.

Mr. Kennedy. What was the degree of cooperation that these two had given to the Communists?

Major Panell. These people participated in the preparation of a petition. Actually we considered it pretty minor. They signed a statement, a sort of selfcriticism statement, in which certain derogatory or uncomplimentary remarks were aimed at their Government. It was something that I certainly would not generally consider to be very serious. However, after reading this before the assembled Turkish prisoners, these two were completely ostracized by the group.

Mr. Kennedy. By the rest of the Turks?

Major Panell. By the rest of the Turks. When they were repatriated, after they were brought back to Tokyo, these two particular Turks asked for and received from the Americans protective custody against their own fellow prisoners. They were repatriated to Turkey. At least they got on the ship and started to Turkey and I have often wondered if they did get back to Turkey.

Mr. Kennedy. There was that much hatred and feeling toward those acts on the part of the rest of the prisoners.

Major Panell. That is right.

Mr. Kennedy. To what do you attribute that, Major?
Major Panell. Of course their discipline and their esprit de corps certainly were factors. Another thing. They had lived next door to communism. Possibly they didn’t know too much about it from the theoretical standpoint, but certainly they had seen it in operation. They had no use for it. I think those were the primary factors. They just did not buy it.

While the Turks were incarcerated they pretty well flaunted the authority of the Chinese captors. They broke rules. They refused to obey actually pretty reasonable requests. They just refused to cooperate in any way, to the degree that eventually the attendants left them pretty much alone. In fact, I think it was generally believed that they were a little bit afraid of them because they stuck together as a group and resisted as a group. A lot of them underwent a degree of punishment, having to stand out and face the sun for a long period of time, or stand on rocks or sticks or stand out in the cold, and so forth. Things that are commonly referred to as brutality were inflicted on them for breaking the camp rules and regulations.

The other group that made an impression on me was the group of Colombians, although there were only 22, certainly not enough to make an accurate comparison with the Americans or the British or any other large group. There again of course there was a little bit of a language barrier because these were Spanish-speaking people, and the Chinese had few, if any, fluent Spanish linguists to deal with these people. So they had to rely on English-speaking Filipinos or in some cases some of our people who also spoke Spanish, to relay their messages to these Colombians.

These people were 100 percent devout Catholics. From all appearances they did not succumb to the indoctrination and seemed to hold on to their religious beliefs, which I believe certainly was a factor, and I believe that any person who had a similar belief or hold on anything would have resisted equally well. The result would have been the same with any person with strong family ties or any person who was strongly patriotic. Their lack of cooperation was certainly noticeable.

Mr. Kennedy. Major, from examining the files of our troops and also those of the Turks and Colombians who had resisted, did you come back with any ideas as to our training or as to what could be or should be done in the field?

Major Panell. Yes, I think I did. I think anyone in the same circumstances would have. I believe a lot of our people who were captured initially had no strong unit identifications. They had been in the unit for a small period of time and hadn’t had an opportunity to train on maneuvers and really become a part of the team. During the last war and up to the Korean conflict we have used a system of individual replacements within the unit, so eventually there is nobody left in the unit who was in it originally. They don’t become attached to the unit, as do the Turks and the British, for instance, who use a unit rotation system. Since that time, as is commonly known, we have adopted the divisional and large unit rotation system. When we replace a division overseas, we replace it with an entirely new division and bring the old division back to the States, which I think is partly an outgrowth of our experience in Korea. I think it will aid immeasurably in creating the pride of unit and strong unit identification.
Mr. Kennedy. Having some attachment to some person or some group or organization, or whatever it might be, you think is a major factor.

Major Panell. Yes, I do.

Mr. Kennedy. Have you anything else on this whole situation?

Major Panell. No, I have not.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Major.

We appreciate the attendance of all witnesses and the help they have given us.

The committee will resume hearings on this matter early next week, possibly Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. Unfortunately and unhappily, the Chair has some other committee work to do, and we will have to alternate between this committee and another one which has a function to perform. Therefore, we will have to defer further hearings on this until sometime next week.

The committee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, the subcommittee recessed at 3:45 p.m., subject to call of the Chairman.)
COMMUNIST INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION OF AMERICAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

TUESDAY, JUNE 26, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 2:07 p.m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 188, agreed to February 16, 1956, in room 357, Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas, chairman; Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin.

Also present: Robert F. Kennedy, chief counsel; James N. Juliana, chief counsel to the minority; Donald F. O'Donnell, assistant chief counsel; Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

(Members of committee present at convening: Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Sander, will you come around, please.

Mr. KENNEDY. And Mr. Biderman.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Biderman. Will you both come around.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, if I may before you start the testimony, at your request at the last hearing during the testimony of Dr. Anderson you asked for information concerning the number of prisoners whom we held who died and also some data on the food. I have it, sir, if you would like to have me read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one moment. Let me get the witnesses sworn. You have a seat by them there, Mr. Jackson, and we will proceed.

The witness will be sworn. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. SANDER. I do.

Mr. BIDERMAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Have a seat, gentlemen.

All right, now, Mr. Jackson. You have some information the committee requested. You may supply it.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to your request at the hearings before your committee on June 20, 1956 2 the following information is submitted:


2. Total personnel who died while in United Nations Command

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2 See p. 116.
custody in Korea after being processed and prisoners of war, 3,432. This figure includes deaths from all causes, including disease, battle injury, riots, and other causes.

If you will accept my arithmetic, this percentage of deaths of prisoners in our custody is slightly under 2 percent, as opposed to, if you recall, 38 percent of our people who died in their hands.

In line with a question concerning the food provided, the prisoner of war food ration established by the United Nations Command was designed to take into account the national diet of the prisoner and to be of such quality and quantity as to maintain their weight and health. This ration was subject to seasonal fluctuations but generally consisted of the following primary components for one prisoner for one day: Rice, 0.7 pound; other grains, barley, wheat, et cetera, 0.7 pound; vegetables, 0.6 pound; fish, 0.1 pound; meat substitute for fish, 0.1 pound; dried beans or lentils, 0.2 pound; condiments, 0.1 pound.

That adds up to approximately 2½ pounds of this varied diet per day. Prisoners who performed work involving arduous physical labor received supplementary rations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson.

Mr. JACKSON. You are welcome.

TESTIMONY OF DR. HERMAN J. SANDER AND ALBERT D. BIDERMAN, OFFICE OF EDUCATION RESEARCH LABORATORY, THE AIR FORCE BASE AND RESEARCH CENTER, MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will note for the record that there is not a quorum, but we will proceed to hear the testimony of the witnesses, and thereafter when we do have a quorum present you will be asked under oath if the testimony you have given is true. We do that in order to expedite this hearing. It is not a matter which is controversial as far as any of the witnesses are concerned. It is a matter of instructive information which the committee is trying to develop and record. It is not anticipated that we will have any problem with the witnesses who are testifying and, therefore, to expedite the work of the committee we are proceeding in this way.

The questions I now ask are directed to both witnesses, and each of you may answer.

You gentlemen have discussed with the members of the staff of the committee the nature of these hearings and the information that it is hoped that you will give to the committee. Have you?

Dr. SANDER. Yes.

Mr. BIDERMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You therefore have a general idea of the line of the questions and interrogation that will be followed?

Dr. SANDER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BIDERMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On that basis, you have no desire to have counsel present representing you when you testify? I understand Mr. Jackson here, representing the Defense Department, is an observer and is not counsel for the witness.

All right, Counsel, you may proceed.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you tell us with which unit you are affiliated.
Dr. SANDER. I am the Director of the Maxwell Field Research Unit of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, which is in an air research and development command unit.

Mr. O'DONNELL. In what capacity is Mr. Biderman?

Dr. SANDER. Mr. Biderman is one of my section chiefs and the project officer of the subject under discussion.

Mr. O'DONNELL. This particular subject that you are going to discuss is in relationship to the Air Force exclusively?

Dr. SANDER. Right, sir.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you please proceed with it in essay form, if you will.

Dr. SANDER. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I should like to give the general background of our work and studies carried on the subject of Communist exploitation of our Air Force personnel, but since I am the Director and have other problems under my jurisdiction of this research unit, Mr. Biderman will be better able to answer questions regarding details which may come up.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed and give the general background and basic information.

Dr. SANDER. In the fall of 1953 after the return of the large group of Air Force prisoners under Big and Little Switch our unit was charged with the responsibility of making a long-range study of the nature of Communist exploitation techniques as they were experienced by Air Force prisoners.

The purpose of our studies which, incidentally, are still going on, was to supply information and guidance or advice as it became available for the formulation of Air Force policy and training materials for the handling of air crew personnel.

The committee has heard much testimony during the past week, I understand, regarding general Communist methods of controlling, handling, indoctrinating, and using prisoners of war for propaganda purposes. Much of what has been described and said applies to Air Force prisoners as well, but there is enough distinction, we feel, about the way Air Force prisoners were treated and handled so that we do not need to bore you with repetition of what has gone on and still be able to contribute something to your committee's concern here.

Practically all Air Force POW's, 235 of which returned, were considered by the Communists as useful subjects for special attention and particularly rigorous and persistent pressure toward two objectives. The primary objective was to use them for propaganda purposes, particularly in connection with the obtaining of confessions from them on germ warfare activities.

Second, they selected Air Force prisoners for particularly thorough interrogation for military information.

The reasons for these emphases on Air Force prisoners, I think, are fairly obvious, but I will enumerate them. In the first place, the air weapon, the airplane and what it drops, is, of course, a dramatic one. It is able to go behind enemy lines and affect civilian populations as well as military forces. So, Air Force personnel would logically be selected as susceptible for charges of having dropped germ warfare bombs behind enemy lines.
In the second place, Air Force personnel generally are higher range than ground-force prisoners. Our figures show that 70 percent of the Air Force returnees, 161 out of 235, were officers and were, therefore, more valuable for propaganda purposes and as intelligence information sources than the mine run of ground prisoners.

In the third place, Air Force prisoners generally are, I think we can say, more knowledgeable than ground-force prisoners. They have a high degree of specialized training and technical skills. They have generally, our figures again indicate, a better education. Fifty-three percent of our returnees had at least some college training. The Army comparable figure is 3 percent.

Air information also has a very high priority for enemy interrogators because it is one of the primary and fast-moving weapons. Information about aircraft, new equipment, as well as information about training for air-crew duty, does not become obsolete quite so rapidly as tactical information that ground-force prisoners normally are able to furnish, if at all.

So for these reasons, Air Force personnel were particularly suitable and were selected and separated or segregated and given isolated treatment for the purpose of gaining primarily false confessions for having carried bacteriological warfare or for military information.

For the same reason, however, they were less apt to be subjected to group indoctrination because they were either isolated as individuals for interrogation or they were isolated in small groups or they were put, later on in the course of the Korean campaign, about October 1951, into a special camp which came to be known as a reactionary camp, one that was rather intractable to enemy efforts.

As to the nature and sources of information for our study: Most Air Force prisoners, as I have indicated, were segregated in one form or another after October 1951, including the 68 captured prior to that time. Forty-five of those captured after 1952 never got to an organized camp at all. They were kept completely in isolation throughout their whole prisoner-of-war experience.

Our study, therefore, felt itself called upon to concentrate mainly upon Communist pressures exerted on the individual in isolation. Since the number of our cases was relatively small, that is, 235, we could make a more intensive study than some of the other studies which have been carried on of this type concerning which the committee has already heard.

The nature of our development responsibility under Air Research and Development Command also caused us to focus on the intelligence, propaganda, and psychological warfare methods employed by the enemy in dealing with our prisoners.

The sources for our information were of course 235 returnees, the interview reports on these that we had available to us. We also sent out a questionnaire shortly after their return and received a 90 percent response. This was a questionnaire on their attitudes and opinions regarding certain things that happened in their captivity.

We had the opportunity of conducting personal interviews with approximately 30 of the 235. These were very intensive, lasting from 4 to 40 hours per person. A small selected number of interviews conducted by other services of their personnel was also available to us as comparative samples. We, of course, carried on coordinated studies
with the Army organization, the Human Resources Research Office, which I think was represented here by Dr. Segal. We agreed with them that they should be most concerned regarding the activities and reactions and methods used upon the prisoners in the mass camps, while we would concern ourselves primarily with Air Force prisoners who were largely kept in some form of segregation or isolation.

Mr. Biderman, my project officer, who is with me, also acquainted himself with a considerable amount of background information on World War II, slave-labor camps, purges, trials, and pertinent information of this type.

We should like to call the committee's attention to the fact that of all the Air Force personnel known or believed to have been captured, we had only the cases of 235 returnees. As someone has said, obviously we could not interview the dead.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand from that that the 235 are accounted for? Other Air Force personnel are missing and you have no account of them? They could be prisoners or they could still be in the custody of the Communists, is that it?

Dr. Sander. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information about that?

Dr. Sander. We have not.

The CHAIRMAN. How many Air Force personnel are missing or are not accounted for?

Dr. Sander. Sir, I think I am not in a position to answer this question. Our concern was not with these data, but I think that we can get the answer for you.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to ask anything that would be improper or to hamper any effort to locate them or bring about their repatriation. If that information can be made available for the record, I would be very glad to have it.

Mr. Biderman. Senator, we were primarily interested in the cases in which we had some very definite information on the people who didn't return, where we knew something about the background of these people who didn't return, where other prisoners could tell us about what had happened to them. As far as those on whom there was no information whatsoever, this material obviously we could not handle as part of the particular kind of study we were doing.

The CHAIRMAN. I will leave it to your discretion in this matter to supply such information and figures as you think proper.

Mr. Jackson, did you have something?

Mr. Jackson. In the total of 450 for whom we have not had a satisfactory accounting, which we mentioned previously—

The CHAIRMAN. That is Air Force personnel?

Mr. Jackson. This is the total, sir. In that 450 whom we do not say are living necessarily but we say "You have not given a satisfactory accounting," there are listed 190 Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. 190?

Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In a comparison of the number of personnel from each service, there is a much higher percentage of Air Force personnel in that 450 than from any other one, Army, Navy, or Marines. It would be a much higher percentage, in fact, practically 45 or 50 percent Air Force personnel.
Dr. Sander. It is clear from the record of the experiences of Air Force prisoners and the events which took place during the period of the Korean War that much of the use that Communists can and do make of prisoners for their own objectives is quite independent of what the prisoners themselves do. We should like to call particular attention to that. Obviously Communist methods can get prisoners to do many things themselves for their own purpose, such as give intelligence information, engage in propaganda activities, and participate in indoctrination sessions. But using the prisoners in ways in which they themselves have very little to say or do about it simply because of the fact that they are prisoners, is something that is often lost sight of.

For example, they used them as hostages, as every one knows, during the peace negotiations; and used them as hostages after the Korean armistice in connection with possible negotiations with the Chinese Communists at Geneva. They also used them to humiliate the West in the eyes of their own people by marching prisoners in haggard, ragged, unkempt, bearded conditions through the streets of Seoul to let the population of Seoul see that these imperialistic conquerors, so called, were not such conquerors after all.

Conversely, for dissemination to the outside world, propaganda use was also frequently made in a distorted fashion of taking snapshots at unexpected moments of prisoners when they had a smiling face or perhaps when the Communists were making propaganda efforts at trying to have a special dinner or a special celebration for outside benefit for the prisoners and took pictures of this occasion.

The objectives of Communist exploitation methods varied from time to time and were not followed through in any logical and systematic order, but as I have indicated, our findings indicate that the most persistent and important objective, at least so far as the Air Force prisoners were concerned, was that of making propaganda use of them, particularly in connection with the germ warfare confessions.

The Chairman. That signal is a rollcall vote on a conference report on the road bill. For that reason the Chair will have to suspend these hearings briefly so I can go over there and vote. I will return as early as I can so that we may continue.

(Brief recess for rollcall vote.)

Senator McCarthy (presiding). The committee will come to order. Mr. Kennedy?

(Member of the committee present: Senator McCarthy.)

Mr. O'Donnell. Will you please continue with your testimony, Dr. Sander.

Dr. Sander. Just before the interruption I had pointed out that the main objective of the Communists as far as Air Force personnel was concerned in exploiting them was to make propaganda use of them in connection with the germ-warfare confessions. The second objective in importance so far as Air Force prisoners were concerned was that of obtaining military and intelligence information from them. Our findings indicate that the effects of the attempts of political indoctrination upon Air Force personnel were practically negligible because so few of them were kept in the mass camps where the majority of that type of indoctrination was carried on.

In order to make clear the Communist treatment of Air Force prisoners it might be well to divide the Korean war into three phases.
The first phase I need only mention, from June 1950 to December of 1950, which was the period when all prisoners fell into the hands of the North Koreans. As we recall, this was the period of death marches and executions, in which the captors resorted to the most inhuman treatment and physical brutality, physical neglect, malnutrition, and complete disregard for wounded and sick. So of the total Air Force prisoners only 14 of the returnees were captured during this period, and we presume they were lucky to come back alive.

The pattern of their treatment is about the same as was that of most other prisoners concerning which you have heard.

Military interrogations from point to point after capture were frequent but not very thorough until they arrived at one or the other of the small interrogation centers such as the notorious Pak's Palace. As a general bit of information over 50 percent of all military interrogations during the Korean war were performed at these small centers which were little more than a Korean house surrounded by huts, shacks, caves, or holes which had to serve as places where the prisoners were kept.

(Senator McClellan entered the hearing room.)
Dr. Sander. Roughly 75 percent of all military interrogations were conducted on prisoners while they were in solitary confinement as far as the Air Force is concerned, and the remainder had communication with only a small number of prisoners and a few were returned to the prison compound.

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt to ask you to describe the solitary confinement, the type of facilities, the type of place they were kept in solitary?

Dr. Sander. During the early period when the North Korean captors handled them, these places of confinement were the crudest sort of shacks, holes, caves. Often the holes were half filled with water, and then after interrogation they were compelled to remain in them for long periods of time. Wounds of course were untreated, and many died.

Senator McCarthy. Does long periods of time mean hours or days?

Dr. Sander. Sometimes days, in some cases 7 or 8 days.

Mr. Biderman. There are cases of weeks at a time in that sort of condition.

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, may I?
The Chairman. Go right ahead.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, they would be in a cave filled with water and sometimes they would be kept there for days, sometimes for weeks, and many of them died as a result of that?

Mr. Biderman. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. Pardon me for interrupting your statement.

Dr. Sander. We know of five officers who died as a result of mistreatment under interrogation during that period.

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt again for a question?

Roughly what type of mistreatment?

Dr. Sander. Of the type that we have mentioned: sheer neglect, malnutrition, no treatment of wounds, and long interrogations in which the men had no rest whatever.

Senator McCarthy. How about any beatings and that sort of thing?
Dr. SANDER. Beatings were quite prevalent under the North Koreans. The treatment there was direct and brutal.

Senator McCARTHY. Thank you.

Dr. SANDER. The North Koreans, you see, had Russian advisers in their camps to help direct the proceedings.

From January 1951 until January 1952 was a slightly different story. During this period Chinese Communists began to take over control of prisoners, and this marked a transition from the overtly obvious brutal methods to the more subtle psychological and wearing methods which were just as unscrupulous, of course, but were more apt to make better use of the prisoners for Communist objectives than the direct methods.

This was the period of the so-called leniency policy. During this period 84 of the 235 Air Force returnees were captured.

Methods of controlling and getting prisoners to cooperate changed from sheer brutality to the friendly approach. The prisoner, perhaps half expecting the kind of treatment that he had heard his predecessors captured under the North Koreans had received, would be faced with a grinning, smiling interrogator, who told him, "Brother, you are now at the crossroads. You are to be congratulated that you have finally been freed from the control of imperialistic powers and are now in the hands of peaceful people. We leave it to you in the crossroads that you are facing. If you cooperate with us you will join the movement for peace. If you fail to cooperate we can't guarantee the results. You might be considered war criminals."

Food, shelter, and medical care were always at a premium and prisoners suffered for lack of them during this period also, but at least the Chinese made some effort to keep them in good enough condition to make better use of them. Their efforts were more calculated and rational.

The rod of punishment was alternated with the carrot of reward and relief occasionally.

Interrogations for military information was also much more thorough, calculating, and rational than under the North Koreans. There were still kicks and slaps and positions of attention for long periods which were applied, but these were more clearly alternated with a pattern of what one might call efforts to gain the prisoner's cooperation through the promise of rewards and the easing of the situation by an occasional cigarette and the improvement of food, conditions, and so on.

The Chinese seemed to know what they wanted and that the patient, persistent approach would get more results than direct brutality.

Incidentally, one of the, we feel, rather startling findings of our results on at least the Air Force prisoners was that the North Korean methods of sheer brutality less frequently failed to get results than the more subtle methods of the Chinese Communists. That is, when a man was directly and brutally treated he was apt to be more resistant and hold out longer than if these brutal treatments and threats were alternated with rewards and easing of the situation.

Much emphasis in the interrogations was placed upon the personal background data on the prisoner, and lengthy forms were frequently placed before him for completion of his personal history.

During the Korean war in entirety Air Force interrogations, of course, were usually very long and many interrogators were used up
in the process. For example, each prisoner would have 1 interrogator virtually living with him and sometimes it took 2 or 3 to give him the conveyor method of interrogation around the clock 24 hours without relief by having one interrogator relieve the other, but not the prisoner.

Many Air Force prisoners kept a whole platoon of guards busy keeping them under guard in their separate isolated camps.

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt again, Mr. Chairman?

The interrogations were designed to obtain military information, is that right?

Dr. Sander. During this period primarily, yes.

Senator McCarthy. In other words, to get the disposition of our units, the size of them, the type of armament being used, and that sort of thing.

Dr. Sander. Yes, sir.

Mr. Biderman. There was tremendous emphasis on getting detailed background, the entire life history of the individual. They wanted all information about the kind of organizations to which he belonged, about what his parents did for a living, how much property they owned, the nature of the property, the kinds of recreational activities in which he participated, and so on and so forth, building up an entire biography of each man.

Senator McCarthy. I have heard that from a number of prisoners and I have always been curious to know why they would spend so much time trying to get the life history from childhood on up of a war prisoner. I wonder what use they thought they could make of that.

Mr. Biderman. I think it is part of the tremendous emphasis they place upon things political. I think they were trying to satisfy their own ideas about the nature of American society by getting this kind of information from the prisoner, and what the vulnerabilities of the United States and its armed forces were.

Senator McCarthy. Am I correct that this was a complete departure from the type of interrogation that was conducted by the enemy during World War II? There they restricted themselves to an attempt to obtain military information, information about equipment, the dispersal of various forces, and that sort of thing.

Mr. Biderman. Yes, sir; the Russians in handling Japanese and Germans, however, also placed a great amount of emphasis on this social and political background of prisoners whom they interrogated.

Senator McCarthy. Thank you.

The Chairman. Did it also serve the purpose of creating anxiety on the part of the prisoner and also possibly instilling a measure of fear as to what might happen to his family?

Mr. Biderman. Sometimes they were very explicit in making threats against the prisoner’s family. They would say that they had ways of getting at his family.

The Chairman. I would assume they would make the threat after they had secured this information or at least part of the threat.

Dr. Sander. Another factor that should not be overlooked is that very often personal information about an individual, also personal information that he may be asked concerning other people in the Air
Force could be used in dossiers in the interrogation of other prisoners, playing one man against the other.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Dr. SANDER. Patterns of the coercive practices followed in these interrogations were similar to the general patterns of pressure which I can either discuss later or leave in evidence inasmuch as I believe previous witnesses from other services have gone into these in considerable detail.

In October of 1951, as I have previously indicated, all but a few officers captured from the United States forces and also the Air Force enlisted men were transferred to a single camp which was considered later a reactionary camp, camp No. 2, near Yalu River.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that where they placed those who offered the most resistance, whom they regarded as hopeless so far as being able to break them down?

Dr. SANDER. That was one of the recalcitrant, resistive camps. Some of the Air Force enlisted men were surprised when they found themselves in a camp with officers and couldn't understand why this was so, but they later determined that it was, for one, because the Communists wanted to give them special treatment in the way of interrogation, and so on, along with the officers, and didn't want them to mingle with the masses of prisoners in other camps.

This camp at first attempted a mass indoctrination program, but it was so unsuccessful, there was so much ridicule from all the officers and airmen, that it was given up after a few months and was then labeled as a reactionary camp.

Almost all prisoners at this camp were, however, subjected to considerable interrogation for military information prior to 1952. They were taken out of the camp compound and put into one of the huts, with no other contacts except the interrogator or the guard. Here some of these long interrogation sessions which I have mentioned which ran something like 61 hours at a stretch without relief, conveyor system, day and night, were carried on.

The purpose of these was, as has been pointed out, Senator McCarthy, to obtain military information on the equipment and organization of the Air Force and one item of particular interest was Air Force training methods, particularly that of B-29 crews. Then the personal history information which we have mentioned.

We come now to the climax, the final period from January 1952 to the end of the war. For those prisoners who had been captured earlier conditions had improved by January 1952 to the point where life was a little more secure because they had been moved to this reactionary camp, although it still wasn't very pleasant. For fliers captured during this period, that is, from January 1952 on, the situation was anything but rosy.

On February 21, 1952, as we know, the Communist's worldwide germ warfare propaganda campaign went into high gear and its impact was experienced by all Air Force POW's captured during this period, but particularly those who were selected for intensive pressure to obtain confessions from them for having participated in germ warfare missions.

We can establish with certainty that 48 Air Force prisoners who have returned and one other enlisted man who died as a result of brutal efforts to coerce a confession from him were involved in a highly
deliberate, systematic, centrally directed campaign carried out by the Chinese Communists to extort false germ warfare confessions from them.

The one airman who died, from the records which were turned in to the peace negotiations at Panmunjom, had a rather macabre twist because the Communists recorded him as having died—one, from tetanus, lockjaw, and fracture, when in actuality he did die from lockjaw but because he locked his jaws and wouldn't talk and the fractures amounted to the beatings and mistreatment that he received during the process.

The Chairman. Did they imply that his fractures were occasioned by war service?

Dr. Sander. That was the implication on the report.

Eighteen other Air Force prisoners were also subjected to intense pressure for confessions, although we can't quite link these cases to the centrally directed propaganda effort, because many of them were carried on by a North Korean at another location who apparently was interested in forcing confessions from people on his own and was not part of the regular campaign. But the pressure and the system were equally severe and just as serious so far as these men were concerned.

Senator McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt for one or two questions?

I wonder if you would care to comment on this. It is something which has disturbed me considerably. You were talking about the beatings, the punishment, the brutality in connection with the attempt to get confessions in regard to germ warfare, et cetera. We find that some of those people who under this tremendous pressure confessed to things that were not true as a matter of escaping the courts-martial were courts-martialed and some of them given considerable punishment. At the same time I read in the paper about 3 days ago that Secretary Wilson has adopted the Brucker rules on loyalty and security. One of the Brucker rules, which apparently has been adopted by Wilson for all branches of the service, is that you could not consider membership in the Communist Party as a ground for giving a man a dishonorable discharge or any punishment. I just wonder if you would care to comment on this contradictory situation where the head of our military says we won't in any way discriminate against a member of the Communist conspiracy, but we will court-martial loyal Americans who succumbed to the pressure and brutality of the North Koreans and the Chinese. You might rather not comment on that. I don't know. I would like you to comment if you feel free to do it.

Dr. Sander. Sir, as the representative of the Air Force research organization I would not care to comment on that question, if you don't mind.

Senator McCarthy. I won't press the question.

Dr. Sander. It would be only my own opinion on the subject, which would not be worth anything.

Thirty-eight of the total number of 59 Air Force personnel who were moderately or severely pressured made some kind of confession after duress and the Communist used 23 of these for propaganda purposes. The confessions of the two Marine fliers were also widely broadcast by the Chinese. As you know, and as everyone knows,
all confessions were publicized throughout the world. Films of the confessions of six of these men were shown as part of the major propaganda effort.

There appeared to be quite a broad range of variation in the ability of Air Force people to hold up under this stress and duress of extorting false confessions from them, but the wide variations was sometimes just as much dependent upon the variations in scale and persistence on the part of the interrogators as it was on the part of the prisoner, whereas, it is obvious that in any situation of this sort the foreman of the interrogators would expect some results, and if a man botched the job, as he often did, it was of course something of a victory for the prisoner.

Whatever those differences may be, some men, we know, gave in rather quickly to the demands for a false confession. Fifteen percent of those pressured agreed to confess after 1 month of pressure or less. Others held out, however, for extremely long periods of time. I should like to point out that almost one-fourth of those pressured still refused to confess after 24 weeks of intensive interrogation and treatment of the type that we have mentioned and which has been described before this committee previously.

If one wants to compare the ability, for example, of our own personnel to hold out in the course of such duress under pressure, one could do it by referring to the time it took, for example, the Bolshevik leaders in the Moscow trials to break down such people as Karl Radek who was pressured for 3 months before he finally confessed to his "crimes" and B. O. Norkin 2 months, A. A. Shestin 5 weeks, N. K. Bukharin over a year. Cardinal Mindszenty, as everyone knows, in his final plea, spoke of his 35 days of "meditation"; in other words, roughly 5 weeks of intensive pressure. One other British source estimated the duration—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that called pressure or meditation?

Dr. SANDER. That is what he was forced to call it in his statement.

One other British source estimated the duration of imprisonment previous to confession at something in the nature of 3 months, which seems the likely average for the most rugged individual to be able to hold up in a situation of this sort.

In the face of these comparisons, I think we can say that our Air Force and Marine people hold out pretty well.

I would like to illustrate just a few cases, not mentioning names but indicating some of the incidents that occurred.

In one case a first lieutenant, who is an example of perhaps some of the most directly brutal treatment that the Chinese Communists gave, even though their practice was generally a little more subtle and prolonged, after being classified as a war criminal was interrogated and pressured for 4 months by the Chinese Communists. Eight times he was ordered to confess, offered relief if he did, death if he didn't. Eight times he refused. He was stood at attention for 5 hours at a time, confined 8 days in a doorless cell less than 6 feet long, held to the ground by two guards while a third kicked and slapped him, stood at attention at another time 22 hours until he fell and then hit while lying down with the side of a hatchet and stood up for 2 hours. He was interrogated 3 hours with a spotlight 6 inches from his face. He was ordered to confess while a pistol was held at the back of his head.
He was placed under a roof drain all night during a rainstorm. He was left without food for 3 days. He was put before a firing squad and given a last chance, hung by hands and feet from the rafters of a house. When he still refused, the Chinese Communists let him alone. They had apparently given him up as an impossible case. He came back alive.

Another first lieutenant was interrogated over 50 times, was tried four times for being a war criminal and sentenced to death three times. The Chinese Communists repeatedly told him he could avoid all these trials and pressures by a simple confession, but he never confessed.

Another first lieutenant was interrogated for over 1,800 hours. He was tried twice for refusing to confess to germ warfare activities. The first trial ended in a sentence to death by a firing squad. This was a bluff. The second trial ended in a sentence to a corrective labor camp. This was also a bluff. But at all times he was kept in solitary confinement. He never wrote a confession.

We know that among those who did confess were two officers who held out for almost a year until Big Switch was already in progress, and then when they were threatened in the last few weeks with not being repatriated they finally agreed to sign some sort of confession.

The pattern of pressure through all of these ordeals, varying in intensity, length and sequence, of course are generally familiar. They usually began after capture and initial interrogation, and the prisoners were accused of having participated in germ warfare missions. For this reason they would now have to be considered, they were told, as war criminals. They were also told that they were not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war unless they repented. They would have to be held in solitary confinement and discuss their alleged crimes with the interrogators until they were ready to confess them.

At this point I would like to suggest to the committee that since Dr. Wolff and I believe several other witnesses that you have had have already given lengthy testimony on the Communist assault against the individual, that the techniques that were applied against these men for germ warfare confessions as well as to obtain military information were essentially the same. Variations of course to suit different objectives.

So I would like to put into evidence this document that we have here, which is a detailed account of Communist pattern of interrogation and an outline of this document, and then I have concluded my testimony, if that is satisfactory.

The CHAIRMAN. The document will be marked "Exhibit 18." (Exhibit No. 18 will be found in the appendix on p. 202.)

Mr. O'DONNELL. Dr. Sander, do you consider this brainwashing and, if not, will you please explain why?

Dr. SANDER. You have reference to the treatment of our prisoners with reference to getting germ warfare confessions out of them?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Yes.

Dr. SANDER. Frankly, we don't particularly care for the term "brainwashing" because it has been misinterpreted. The reason that we do not is that wrong inferences can be drawn from this term. We know that terror is a prominent weapon in the hands of the Com-
munists, and the mere misinterpretation of the word "brainwashing" has, for example, lent additional terror to people who have the idea that the system that is used has some mysterious, irresistible techniques for converting minds and bending people's wills to their purpose which are impossible to do anything about, and therefore creates additional terror.

This is one reason why we are very dubious about using the term or any other, such as menticide, which might give people the idea that the methods that have been used here are different from methods that have been used for hundreds of years and that are prevalent in the Communist arsenal all along. This is our conception on that point.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Do you think the methods used by the Chinese Communists were successful?

Dr. Sander. Successful to the extent that they were persistently applied, to the extent that they were willing to give the time, and the continuous application of these methods in obtaining certain objectives. Obviously they did get some germ warfare confessions.

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?

Did I understand you correctly to say that the methods were more brutal than anything that has been known for several hundred years?

Dr. Sander. No, sir. I would qualify that by saying that the methods are not any more mysterious or irresistible than have been known for some hundreds of years. The methods that were used in Korea are not too much dissimilar from those practiced by the Communists against their own personnel in political extortion of confessions.

Senator McCarthy. In view of what you related here about the brutality of the Communists and the methods they used, what would you think about a suggestion that we furnish military aid to a Communist country? Would you care to answer that?

Dr. Sander. Sir, I am not competent to answer that question.

The Chairman. Do you want to ask Dr. Sanders or Mr. Biderman further questions?

Mr. O'Donnell. Doctor, is there any method that you can think of which would aid in training our men to offset this type of treatment?

Dr. Sander. Here I am offering only my own opinion in as much as the object of our research was to furnish information to the Air Force for implementing its own training program, but I would say the best thing we can do is to acquaint our potential personnel in the Air Force, for example, our United States fighting forces, and the people generally with Communist methods of treating them. To be warned is to be forearmed. The kind of thing this committee is doing right now in exposing the methods that have been used is the best kind of preparation.

The Chairman. I was going to ask you, do you think public hearings of this nature, spreading on the record for every one to see and know, including all the civilized world as far as we can disseminate the information which is being recorded here, might build world opinion and resentment that would be calculated to deter any such further practices?

Dr. Sander. I should think it would have a good chance of doing so. I was answering Mr. O'Donnell's question primarily in terms of the kind of preparation that we were advocating for our own Air Force personnel.
The **Chairman.** Yes, I realize that. Sometimes I find myself asking the question, are we accomplishing anything? We are taking a great deal of time here to spread this on the record. Is it a constructive job the committee has undertaken, assuming we can get this information on the record and make it available as information not only to our own troops and those who may come into the service hereafter and who may some day have to face similar conditions and experiences, but to the world at large? Would there not be some resentment among civilized countries that probably places a different evaluation on communism and different appraisal of it from what we have had heretofore? Would they not realize that there is associated with it such inhuman treatment and brutality as has been demonstrated?

**Dr. Sander.** I would concur in that personally, certainly. I would also like to add that I think one of the main services that this committee is rendering by exposing these methods is to show that the methods were so severe that if any blame is to be assessed upon the returnees, whether they be Air Force, Marines, or Army, that the blame should be placed upon the Communists rather than upon the personnel who returned.

The **Chairman.** In other words, it is very easy for those of us who sat over here in comfort and safety, not exposed to such treatment, to condemn those who may succumb under such circumstances without knowing the ordeals that they have endured.

**Dr. Sander.** Precisely.

The **Chairman.** I think it is well that we should keep that in mind. You might say to yourself, “I wouldn’t,” but we don’t know what we would do until we had to suffer it.

**Are there any further questions?**

**Senator McCarthy.** I have just 1 or 2 more questions.

**Doctor,** we have had testimony from the Defense Department and the State Department and I believe from some other branch of the military—I don’t recall which—before the committee to the effect that the Chinese Communists are still holding 481 prisoners who are unaccounted for. Of course some of them may be dead, but they are not accounted for. They were known to be living and in the hands of the Communists at one time. I think that figure has now decreased to 465 or thereabouts. It is somewhere in that general area. Do we have any way of knowing what is happening to those prisoners now?

**Dr. Sander.** In this relationship we are completely dependent upon the Department of Defense and the casualty departments of the various services. I believe Mr. Jackson gave some figures a while ago. I have nothing further to add to that.

**Senator McCarthy.** Could you tell me how the Department of Defense feels about my proposed legislation that we cut off any aid to countries shipping to the Red China area as long as they hold American uniformed men prisoner?

**Dr. Sander.** Sir, I can’t speak for the Department of Defense. I am sorry.

**Senator McCarthy.** You are working for the Department now?

**Dr. Sander.** Yes.

**Senator McCarthy.** I guess under the circumstances I should not ask you to give your personal opinion.

The **Chairman.** Before you go the Chair would like to ask each of you: During the course of giving your testimony there was a short
period of time this afternoon when we did not have a quorum present. I should like to ask you if the testimony you gave during that period of time you stated under oath is true?

Dr. Sander. Yes, sir.

Mr. Biderman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much. We appreciate very much your cooperation and your appearance and the assistance you have given us in trying to do this, we hope, constructive legislative job. Thank you very much.

Captain Harris? Will you come around, please.

Captain, will you be sworn, please. You do solemnly swear that the evidence you shall give before this Senate investigating subcommittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Captain Harris. I do.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. THEODORE HARRIS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

The Chairman. Captain Harris, will you state your name, your rank, and the service that you are in, please, sir?

Captain Harris. Theodore Harris, captain, United States Air Force.

The Chairman. How long have you been in the Air Force, captain?

Captain Harris. Active duty 8 years, no months.

The Chairman. Have you talked to members of the staff and do you know generally the line of interrogation that may be followed?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you not desire personal counsel present?

Captain Harris. No, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

Captain, you may proceed.

Senator McCarthy. May I ask one question first. I think for the record, Captain, it might be well for you to tell us what decorations you received. I see you have a sizable number.

Captain Harris. Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star, Air Medal, Purple Heart. That is all in the way of medals.

Senator McCarthy. I noticed there was a sizable number. I was anxious to have them made a part of the record.

The Chairman. I think that was very appropriate.

Mr. Kennedy. What is your home address, Captain? Where are you from?

Captain Harris. At present it is 710 West 12th Street, Reno, Nev.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, did you fly in Korea during the war?

Captain Harris. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. What were you flying?

Captain Harris. I was the aircraft commander on a B-29 aircraft.

Mr. Kennedy. You were shot down in Korea, were you?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. What month of the war?

Captain Harris. July 4, 1952.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, based on what you saw and the experiences that you had, would you tell the committee what the treatment of the
American prisoners was in the Korean war, based on your personal experience? Would you tell us first about what happened to you after you were shot down? What happened to the plane? Evidently you were badly burned at that time; is that correct?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. Would you tell the committee the circumstances?

Captain Harris. While we were on a normal night reconnaissance mission we were attacked by five of the at that time MIG's with radar equipment. After the third pass they had set seven separate fires in our aircraft and we were forced to abandon it.

As Mr. Kennedy said, prior to abandoning the aircraft, most of the crew were wounded in one way or another, and I had quite a few burns.

Senator McCarthy. I have some difficulty hearing you. I wonder if you could speak a little louder.

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Shortly after midnight we were forced to abandon the aircraft. I was the last to leave. I parachuted out and landed in a rice paddy, which everybody lands in in Korea. I was in quite a state of shock.

Mr. Kennedy. Could I go back just a minute, Captain. As I understand from your record, you received a message from one of your other crew members that he was trapped in the plane; is that correct?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. And you were trying to put the fire in the plane out or keep it away from where he was?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. I will back up just a little.

As I said, after the third MIG attack we had seven separate fires burning in the aircraft. When I finally decided it was hopeless to get out of North Korea—we attempted to get out over the water away from the mainland—I gave the crew the order to bail out. When that happened my tail gunner called and said that he was trapped, that he had fire all around him and couldn't get out. I notified him to stand by until the rest of the crew got out and I would ship the aircraft, or attempt to, and blow the fire away from his escape hatch so he could make a successful escape. About that time the intercom went out and I couldn't contact him any further. I continued to try to fly the aircraft and blow the fire away from him. Since I had no contact with him I didn't know if he was in the aircraft or had gotten out. As it turns out, he had gotten out quite a while before.

The Chairman. Does that mean that you stayed with the aircraft longer than was necessary for you to except that you were trying to save and protect him?

Captain Harris. That is the way it worked out; yes, sir.

When I finally couldn't stand the fire any longer I abandoned the aircraft. In doing so I knocked myself unconscious. I hit my head on a part of the aircraft. I came to about three or four thousand feet above the ground, opened my parachute and landed.

As I said before, I was in what I considered a severe state of shock and, being quite badly burned, I had to cut myself out of my parachute. I couldn't open the buckles and release myself from it. So I cut myself out of the chute and stomped it into a rice paddy to hide it and went up to the highest terrain I could find in that area, which was about a half or three-quarters of a mile from the scene of my landing.
I soon realized that I wasn’t in any shape to travel right then, primarily due to my burns and shock. So I elected to conceal myself in the brush and try to rest and get my mind cleared up to where I could formulate some type of escape plan.

Mr. KENNEDY. How badly were you burned, Captain?

Captain HARRIS. Most of my face was burned. That was more or less flash burns which just took the skin off. It didn’t get into the flesh too deeply.

Senator McCARTHY. You say “just” took the skin off? That is rather serious.

Captain HARRIS. Unfortunately I had my flying suits rolled up and no gloves, violating all the rules of the Air Force, and both hands and arms were burned fairly severely. My oxygen caught fire and I breathed it before I discovered it so my mouth and throat were pretty badly burned inside and part of the way down my back.

The parachute had eight panels burned nearly completely out of it. It was a little lopsided but it worked pretty well.

After I concealed myself in the brush I can’t say I went to sleep. I either went to sleep or passed out. When I woke up it was about 5 o’clock in the morning. The first thing I noticed were UN aircraft on one of their early missions. I had no way to contact them so I decided — incidentally, that hill was right next to the Chong Chong Gang River and I decided I would use my Mae West after dark that night and attempt to move down the river by the aid of my Mae West and possibly steal a sampan or some kind of a boat and possibly get out to an island off the west coast.

At that time the local militia, as I assumed they were, Koreans in varied uniforms — it seems like every one designs their own uniform there — were searching the area quite extensively. I had no particular difficulty in evading them. They are just normal like everyone else. They soon tired of the chase and left the area. But my burns, particularly my throat and mouth, began to give me a lot of trouble. I was rapidly becoming dehydrated from the burns weeping. I attempted to get water at a Korean home. I approached a woman working in a field and indicated I wanted water, which she furnished through her little girl in the house. After drinking the water an old man, who I assume probably was the grandfather, came up and was quite upset at my presence. I thought maybe they were just afraid they would get in trouble if they helped me any further. Since they had given me the water that I needed so badly, I didn’t press the issue. I just left.

Later on in the early afternoon I decided if I didn’t get some kind of medical attention I couldn’t go ahead with any attempt to escape. I just wasn’t physically up to it.

By that time my tongue had swollen to where I couldn’t keep my mouth closed. It was pushing my mouth open, just about like having a hardboiled egg in your mouth. So I started down the trail toward a small village which was close to Sinanju. In the meantime I had buried all identification and as I approached the village I discarded my .45. I felt that I would have less chance of getting shot if they did pick me up without the weapon in view rather than obviously being armed. I felt if I could get help I would come back out the same trail and gather my weapon on the way and go ahead with my original plan.

I ran into an old woman coming up the hill carrying a water jug. She appeared quite shocked at my appearance. I used my hunting
knife and drew a cross similar to a Red Cross on the ground. She acted as though she understood and indicated I should follow her. Sure enough, she took me to a doctor.

As soon as she took me to this doctor—he had a small type hospital, just a Korean house, but there were several patients lying around—the old woman disappeared. I was pretty sure that she was probably running for the authorities, but I was a little bit desperate at the time. I was trying to get the doctor to give me some medical attention. Before I could accomplish anything with him two Chinese troops appeared on the scene with Russian burp guns and picked me up. They took me to a small square in the center of the town where all the militia had gathered and for the next 4 or 5 hours they attempted to interrogate me but they had no one who could speak English clear enough for me to understand and none of them could understand me.

Later that afternoon they took me about 12 or 15 kilometers up the river to, I assume, a corps headquarters. It was a larger military organization and appeared to be the regular Korean Army. There I met a civilian who had a white Western style suit. He spoke fairly decent English. For the rest of the night he interrogated me for each one of the branches of their service. They all asked identical questions, strictly military questions, name, rank, what type of aircraft, and so on. When I would fall asleep during the interrogation they would wake me up and continue.

Early in the morning they took me to a small house which was part of the headquarters and let me rest for about an hour. By that time the peasants from around the local area evidently had gotten wind of me and they came in and, curiosity seekers, wanted to see the prisoner. They began to peer at me. A few of them spit at me and chewed the fat with their neighbors about the situation. I was feeling so rough then they didn't particularly bother me. Later that day they took me out in the middle of the crowd and sat me on a little three-legged stool so they could all get a good look at me.

Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman.

Had you received any medical attention?

Captain Harris. No.

Senator McCarthy. No medical attention at all?

Captain Harris. No, sir.

The Chairman. I am sorry, Captain, we will have to suspend at this time. That is a signal for a roll call vote. We will return just as soon as we can.

(Brief recess for roll call vote.)

(Members of the committee present upon reconvening: Senators McClellan and McCarthy.)

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

You may resume. We probably will have to return for another vote in a few minutes but we will proceed as promptly as we can.

Mr. Kennedy. They had taken you to the square and you were sitting in the middle of the square. Senator McCarthy just asked you what medical treatment you had received up until that point.

Senator McCarthy. I believe your answer was no medical treatment whatsoever, even though you were badly burned in your throat and mouth and the skin was all burned off your face. So they started to interrogate you and interrogated you all night long. They gave
you an hour’s rest and then took you to the square. I think that is as far as you had gotten.

Captain Harris. After they left me out with the civilian population for an hour or so, they let me return to the board that they had me lying on to rest and left me alone except for the guard. Shortly after noon, as near as I can recall——

Senator McCarthy. Could I interrupt you, Captain. I hate to because your story is extremely interesting, but when you were in the square you said they sat you on a three-legged stool so the populace could look at you?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Senator McCarthy. Did you get any mistreatment from the civilian population?

Captain Harris. Nothing in particular, Senator. Once in a while one of them would be particularly upset and spit in my direction or something like that, but nothing violent at all.

Senator McCarthy. Just one more question, combining two questions, if I may: How cold was it and how were you dressed?

Captain Harris. I was dressed in a summer flying suit. It was in July and quite warm.

Senator McCarthy. The clothing was satisfactory.

Captain Harris. Yes, sir; at that time.

Senator McCarthy. Pardon the interruption.

Captain Harris. After I went back the flies were beginning to bother me pretty bad. It seems they have several billion flies per square inch in Korea anyway. Of course they were getting all over me and giving me a bad time. A girl walked in. Everybody says this is Harris’ “Dragon Lady.”

The Chairman. This is what?

Captain Harris. Everybody I have told about this says this is Harris’ “Dragon Lady.” She was outstanding in the fact that she was dressed in smart western clothing, even down to high heels and hose. I wasn’t so bad off I couldn’t notice a few things. [Laughter.]

Senator McCarthy. I am curious. You say this is Harris’ “Dragon Lady”?

Captain Harris. That is what several of my friends have called her after hearing the story.

Senator McCarthy. Your name is Harris?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. As I say, she was western all the way. Her hair was curled, and she was a very attractive woman. She spent the rest of the afternoon and early evening fanning the flies off me with a piece of cardboard and talking to me. It was strictly friendly talk. It was not in the form of interrogation at all. She appeared anxious to help me and to do anything she could for me.

I asked her if there would be any possibility of getting medical attention. She turned around and asked the Korean who was guarding me and he shook his head negative. So she said “Would some morphine help you?” I thought it would. So she disappeared and shortly came back with a hypo which I assume had morphine in it and gave me a shot. She said that she had to go to work. She was the telephone operator of that particular headquarters, but she would return later with a doctor.

Late that night or possibly it was early in the morning she did return with a civilian in tow who was also dressed in western style
clothing, and he was obviously quite perturbed because she had brought him over there. He was obviously doing it against his will.

Senator McCarthy. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?

Was this girl a Korean?

Captain Harris. She was oriental. I can't pin them down too close.

Senator McCarthy. And the man also oriental?

Captain Harris. Yes.

Senator McCarthy. Pardon me.

Captain Harris. The guard didn't want to let the doctor attend to me, but she said something in, I assume, Korean, and evidently she had some authority or power because the guard backed off and he told the doctor to go ahead. About all he did, he had some dirty white material that looked like sheeting or shirt material. He opened the blisters on my back and drained them and wrapped my hands and arms quite tight with that material. He wouldn't clean anything or put any kind of medication on it. I knew I was going to get infected badly because when I lit in the rice paddy I jackknifed and rammed both my hands and arms down into it, so I was covered with filth to start with.

After he bandaged my arms she told me that is the best she could do and stayed there a little while and left. But she appeared early the next morning and continued to fan the flies off me. In the early afternoon some time a truck with soldiers in it came and picked me up and told me that they were going to try to find a doctor. We spent the rest of the day and all that night until about five in the morning riding about the countryside under the pretense of looking for a doctor.

We went up and down the same roads and crossed the same spots innumerable times. I finally got to recognize them. Of course they didn't find any doctor.

One thing that happened en route, they stopped at a civilian house and had them prepare a meal. There was enough food for 20 people. The soldiers didn't eat. So I assumed it was all prepared for me. I kept trying to explain to them that I couldn't eat, that my mouth and throat were burned. I indicated to the civilian lady that I would like some water, in sign language. She brought me a glass which I assumed had water in it and gulped down without looking at it and it was some kind of a liquor, a clear liquor, because it made me quite ill. I felt like a bomb had gone off in my stomach.

Anyway, very early in the morning, 5 or 6 o'clock, we stopped and rested an hour and then another civilian appeared and told me that they were going to take me to a hospital, that I didn't have to worry about anything.

We drove all that day again in an open vehicle. It was raining, and naturally we got quite drenched. Toward evening they did place me in, I think, a schoolhouse. They had a troop of soldiers there. One of them was obviously mentally affected in some way. He wasn't all there. They called him Russky. Evidently he was of Russian-Chinese extraction. He was far enough mentally unbalanced that he would try to get by trying to push you around as though you were teasing an animal of some kind, just meanness. They kept him away from me pretty well.
Later that evening a corpsman appeared and worked on my face and neck. Actually I think he did the best job that he was capable of doing. He did clean me up and put some kind of petroleum jelly on and bandaged my head and neck. Later that evening they brought my copilot in and we conversed just for a couple of minutes and they took him away.

Senator McCarthy. Were they Chinese or Korean?

Captain Harris. They were Koreans.

Senator McCarthy. Koreans.

The Chairman. The Chair has concluded that we cannot finish this afternoon and therefore we will take a recess until in the morning. We have to go back and vote again and I don't know how long we will have to be there.

Can you return in the morning, Captain?

Captain Harris. Yes.

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

We will reconvene at 10 o'clock in the morning. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m. Wednesday, June 27, 1956.)
COMMUNIST INTERROGATION,indoctrination, and exploitation of American civilian and military personnel

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met at 10:12 a.m., pursuant to Senate Resolution 188, agreed to February 16, 1956, in room 357 Senate Office Building, Senator John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas, chairman; Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, South Dakota.

Present also: Robert F. Kennedy, chief counsel; James N. Juliana, chief counsel to the minority; Donald F. O'Donnell, assistant chief counsel; Ruth Y. Watt, chief clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We will proceed with Captain Harris. Will you come around, please.

Senator McCarthy has sent word he will be here in a little while and we will proceed. I understand we have three other witnesses. After Senator McCarthy or some other Senator arrives to make a quorum you may again confirm that what you have said is true and we can move along and expedite the matter by starting now.

All right, Captain Harris, you may proceed and resume where you left off yesterday evening.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. THEODORE HARRIS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE—Resumed

Captain Harris. I believe I left off where I had just received the first medical attention from a Chinese corpsman.

As I stated before, I sincerely believe he did the best job that his skill and equipment allowed him to do.

Later on that evening my copilot was brought into the hut that I was being held in, and we exchanged just a few brief words as to what had transpired since being shot down.

Early the next morning my copilot and I were loaded into a vehicle and taken to a village, I would say approximately 30 kilometers to the south, where we were again marched several blocks through the village and the civilian population all gathered around to look us over. We were placed in a hut similar to a toolshed adjoining a Korean house, and a guard was placed right at the door of the hut.
Later the same day my engineer, Sergeant Rivers, was also brought in and placed in the attic of the same quarters we were in. He had a few slight burns, but other than that was uninjured.

We kept indicating to whoever stopped by—and there were several Korean and Chinese military who seemed to come in groups to look us over. However, they didn’t ask us anything in the initial stages. We kept indicating we desired medical attention. Finally, they had a guard march me to an aid station, and a young fellow, I imagine 14 years old, possibly a year or two one way or the other, took the bandage off my left arm and didn’t put any medication on it, but wrapped it again, this time with regular bandage material. He started on the right one, but evidently he had a change of heart in the middle of the proceeding, so he just wrapped it back up with the old bandage and sent me back.

The next day both my copilot and the engineer were called out for approximately 4 or 5 hours of interrogation. They were called out separately. I could still talk well enough that I told them to be sure and be military, if they reported before an interrogator, to salute and act as military as they possibly could. My engineer had no particular difficulty other than the fact that they had him quite frightened when he returned as a result of the interrogation. The copilot went in and evidently before he could salute he was struck in the face and they began to interrogate him from that angle. They were going to rough him up first, I guess.

Throughout the interrogation they both got the same idea from the interrogators, that as soon as they made complete statements and gave all the information that the Koreans desired they would be put on a shrimp boat and sent back to South Korea.

Neither was interrogated the next day, and I wasn’t interrogated at all at that stage. I believe it was due to the fact that I was so full of infection and smelling so badly that they didn’t want to get around me.

About the sixth day after being shot down, which was about our second day there, I guess, they did come in and sprinkle lime all over me and all over the hut that I was in, I assume in an effort possibly to cut the stench a little.

On the night of the seventh day we boarded a truck, and the last I could recall we were headed in a southerly direction. We traveled all night until about 4 or 5 o’clock in the morning. Most of the time I was unconscious, but I can remember coming to on occasions and finding my copilot beholding me. After we arrived at our destination, which turned out to be the interrogation camp in the Pyongyang area—I believe it was called the mines, occasionally the twin peaks, by the ex-POW’s—I was led up to a Korean house which served as a hospital. I was told to sit on the porch and wait for the doctor. At that stage I felt that I was in real bad shape. The maggots were beginning to just about drive me wild, a sensation similar to having ants crawling. They were getting in my nose and ears. I was just about to get panicky.

So I sat there from 4 until 7 with a stick digging the maggots out of the bandages, trying to relieve some of the pressure.

The doctor came and instructed a couple of the Chinese male nurses to remove what bandages I had on and to clean me up. They had to cut my flying suit off. It was stuck to the flesh. So they cut it off and buried it. After they had me stripped down naked—I was out in the
yard and all the Korean peasants around there came down to observe this thing. Two of the female nurses gave me a bath. Then they gave me an issue of the regular cotton POW uniform and put me to bed. They took a door off the building, actually, and laid it down in the tool shed, and that served as my bed.

The interrogator dropped by just momentarily, and he soon discovered that I wasn’t in any condition to be interrogated. He couldn’t get anything, anyway. So he left me. At that time they gave me the initial issue which I assume they give all the prisoners, a little bowl and toothbrush and a bar of soap.

We were in that hospital for approximately 2 weeks, and then for some reason they elected to move the hospital. They had a couple of nurses carry me down to an oxcart, and they moved us about 2 kilometers downstream to another set of civilian buildings that they had set up a hospital in.

I noted at the time that none of the hospital buildings either at that early stage or later while I was around the camp had any identification on them at all in the way of red crosses or anything to identify them as a hospital.

Altogether I spent about 5 1/2 weeks in the hospital before they felt that I was strong enough to be interrogated. At that time I was taken back about 2 kilometers upstream to the interrogation camp proper and placed in a trench dug back in the side of the hill. They were about 30 to 45 inches wide, and about 6 1/2 feet long. They had an A frame in front, a ridgepole, and a little thatch over the top. Those were the quarters that most of the prisoners were living in.

I spent the next month or month and a half in that particular trench, and during that time I was interrogated extensively, practically constantly. The method of interrogation employed then—well, I never forget the first question that was asked. It was “What is the SAC plan in the event of total war?”

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Captain HARRIS. They asked what was the SAC plan in the event of total war.

At that time I kind of laughed and explained to them I was a first lieutenant and not a general, so naturally I would not know what the SAC plan in the event of anything was. But for some reason they referred to me as “Major.” I don’t know what the object of it was, unless possibly it was to justify all the pains they were taking. They probably thought they had a very important deal there or were trying to leave that impression.

When they began to refer to me as “Major,” I told them then that I hoped the finance officer heard about it. That was strictly a capitalistic way of looking at things and wasn’t much of a joke to them.

Throughout the interrogation at that particular point the first interrogation lasted about 4 or 5 weeks. Our particular interrogation together ended when he struck me on the head with a board. He got upset about the way the interrogation was going. He had been using a board on his lap to write on. When he struck me I lost my temper and struck him back. I was immediately put in handcuffs and left alone the rest of the day.

Before dawn the next morning the same interrogator reappeared with six troops and they marched me down to a lower area where a
group of Army and Marine prisoners that they had been using for a work detail around there were constructing a basketball court. At that point they drew out a plot of ground approximately the size of a grave and instructed me to go ahead and dig. They had a pick and shovel lying there. I dug and got the approximate size and shape of a grave, approximately 3 feet deep. They told me to stop, that that was enough. Then they gave me the choice then of either signing a confession that I had been dropping bacteriological bombs on North Korea and northeast China and give them my word that I wouldn't strike any of their officers again and they would let me go, otherwise they were going to shoot me.

I agreed I wouldn't strike any of their officers, provided they didn't abuse me, but I couldn't confess to something I hadn't done.

They went ahead and lined up the firing squad and went through all the motions, but when they pulled the triggers their weapons were empty. Evidently I must have looked pretty badly shaken up because it must have been the funniest thing this particular interrogator had even seen. He just rolled on the ground laughing.

He went ahead after that, after he had calmed down and gotten hold of himself and explained to me that was just an example of what was going to happen to me if I didn't soon come to my senses. That was the last he interrogated me.

They sent another one and he approached it from a different angle. He started off being quite nice and went through a long rigmarole how he was trying to help me. The particular techniques I will skip because they would take up quite a bit of time.

He lasted approximately 2 months and he finally flew into a rage and declared me a war criminal and had me thrown in handcuffs again, in shackles, and left. It seems as though when they would reach a certain point where they would lose their temper, it must have been some sort of a sign of losing face or something because then they would change interrogators. The original one wouldn't come back any more.

Over the period of the remaining time I was in Korea, which was until early January 1953, I had 4 or 5 interrogators and was interrogated more or less constantly. There is one period right after they declared me a war criminal that they left me shackled for 30 days and never did come around. I didn't see any of them.

Mr. Kennedy. Were you in solitary all the time?
Captain Harris. Yes, sir; the 14 months I was a prisoner I never got out of solitary.
Mr. Kennedy. You were by yourself, other than the interrogators?
Captain Harris. Other than the interrogators.
Mr. Kennedy. You were shackled for this 30 days?
Captain Harris. For that particular period, yes, sir.
Mr. Kennedy. Your hands were shackled?
Captain Harris. My hands were shackled, handcuffed. The first time they had my hands handcuffed in front of me, and the second time when they declared me a war criminal they handcuffed my hands behind me.
Mr. Kennedy. For how long was that second time?
Captain Harris. Three or three and a half weeks. At that time my burns had healed and my system was pretty badly upset. I had a series of blood boils. I had about 30 or 32 altogether. I had about
18 on my back at one time. That is the time when they decided to handcuff my hands behind me so I couldn't do anything or give myself any treatment at all. And of course they wouldn't. So that was a rather bad period.

Mr. Kennedy. Did you get medical treatment during that time?

Captain Harris. No, sir; not at that particular time. At a later date, late September, I think, possibly early November, I developed a skin rash, and amazingly enough so did my interrogator. He came around completely upset and claimed I had given him some weird American disease. They thought possibly since both of us got it right away it might be an epidemic. So for the next 7 days we marched down to the hospital each day and received the latest Soviet treatment for everything from pneumonia to hangnails called self blood injection. After the completion of that that was the last I saw of the hospital or medical attention.

They moved me several more times about roughly the same area, but each time I would move the quarters would get worse and the food would get worse.

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, during this period of time were you under the control of the Chinese or the Koreans?

Captain Harris. These were Chinese so-called volunteers.

Mr. Kennedy. When you first came to the camp and they removed your bandages, were they giving you medical treatment when you were discussing about the maggots? Did they give you medical treatment at that time?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. As long as I was in the hospital, what they were using for a hospital, I am pretty well convinced that their doctors and nurses made the best efforts that they were capable of to treat me. I think they did the best they could.

Mr. Kennedy. What about when you were in solitary? The medical treatment ceased then, is that right?

Captain Harris. It ceased. The corpsman would come around once a week. He would take the old bandage off and replace it. It didn't take me long to see that I had better start saving everything I could possibly lay my hands on, so that time—this is backing up quite a way—he would throw the bandages into the brush by the latrine pit. Since they were quite full of infection, these large ants would get on them and eat the infection out and just leave holes in the bandage. So I would gather them back up and roll them up for future use. During the winter I used them for socks to wrap my feet in to keep from being frostbitten. So they did come in quite handy.

Mr. Kennedy. Were you in considerable pain during this period of time?

Captain Harris. I was for about the first month. It is just a matter of getting used to it. When they put us into the trenches they would make us sit on the floor, on the ground, and in the sitting position of attention, with your feet out in front of you. For the first few days you think your back is going to break, but you gradually get used to it.

Mr. Kennedy. Could you walk around?

Captain Harris. Just to the latrine and back or to the stream in the morning to wash your hands and face.

Mr. Kennedy. Otherwise you had to sit in that position the rest of the time?
Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kennedy. How long were you in that type of place?

Captain Harris. I was in that interrogation center for about 6 months or 7 months, from the first of August, roughly, until the latter part of January. At no time would they let us exercise or walk around. We had just to sit.

Mr. Kennedy. When you were sleeping could you lie down?

Captain Harris. Then they would let you lie down.

Mr. Kennedy. But the rest of the time you had to sit?

Captain Harris. That is right; yes, sir. On two occasions they caught a prisoner in the next hut—he and I were trying to get together and work out a little deal to share tobacco. They would give him tobacco and matches but they would just give me tobacco. They knew I smoked a pipe which I had in my flying suit. I had the pipe and the tobacco but no matches. This other fellow—I never have identified him—tried to leave matches for me by the latrine. They caught us on our little exchange and put us on a work detail for a couple of days. That is the only time we got any exercise at all. Actually it was a good deal for us because we did get a little exercise.

As I say, later as time progressed and I moved from one hut to another, the huts became worse and the food became worse. It seemed that when they wanted to move you they would do it under the pretense—everything was done under the pretense of improving your condition. One time, for example, in the middle of a pouring rain they decided to move me, so they had me gather up all my stuff and 2 guards marched me around for about 4 hours in the middle of the night, in the rain, and then put me in a different hut which was an old kitchen, which had been a Korean kitchen at one time. The floor was about 2 feet below ground level. Of course that was all full of water. But there was a little bench that they used for a stove. They let me sleep on that. That hut was so rundown and dilapidated that the rain finally washed the walls to the point where they fell in on me.

Each hut you went to was progressively worse. The last one was a lean-to outside of a Korean house, and that was in the real cold season. It was probably 20 or 30 below. I don’t know for sure, but it was mighty cold. There was no heat and the food was to the stage that it was rotten. I had a lot of difficulty getting it down then. Before I hadn’t had too much trouble, but that was real foul, souréd and filthy, full of pine needles. In fact, most of the time I shoved it back to the guard and he would throw it out. They had a little Korean dog there. They will eat anything, but that dog wouldn’t eat that stuff.

Mr. Kennedy. What about the weather at that time?

Captain Harris. It was bitterly cold by then.

Mr. Kennedy. Did you have clothes? Did they furnish you with clothes?

Captain Harris. They furnished us with regular POW Chinese winter uniform, two layers of cotton with cotton padding in between, a quilted affair, in late November, as near as I can recall. It was a mighty welcome sight because it was plenty cold already.

Sometime in January it got so cold that I got frostbitten, my toes and fingers. My toes turned black, and I thought they were frozen completely, but evidently they weren’t. They sent the medic up that
time. The medic had one remedy for everything and that was to paint it with iodine. Actually I believe all that kid knew was iodine, because that is all I ever saw him use.

I will bring up one thing. They made a great issue out of the lenient and their humane treatment. It is hard to explain, but everything that was done, regardless of whether it was good or bad, was done trying to give you the impression that it was either the best they had or you were very lucky, that they were really giving you a good deal. Little things like—evidently it was their policy to let the prisoners celebrate Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Years.

Those three times they gave us a very good meal. But they spoiled the whole meal. About the time you were eating it they would come around and work you over psychologically, showing you how good everything was and how nice you were being treated and what a lousy character you were because of all the crimes you had committed against the Chinese people and you wouldn't repent for them. That was just one of their techniques. That was one of the few that they pulled that I hadn't been more or less ready for. It was rather hard to cope with. I don't know how to explain it. Your mind evidently gets a little warped after a long period of solitary because they just about have you believing you are a kind of crummy character.

The CHAIRMAN. They almost convinced you?

Captain HARRIS. Yes.

I guess it was late in January that they came and told me I was going to be taken to the big camp in the rear, as they described it. They described it as a sort of a country club back there where all the good boys got to go. I was to be quiet and not shout or do anything like that while they were transporting me. So they blindfolded me and handcuffed and shackled me and put me in a truck and covered me up with a blanket. That was about 1800 in the evening. We traveled all night until daylight the next morning. Just about daylight we crossed a long temporary bridge. It was I would estimate a mile or a mile and a half long, just by the length of time it took us to cross it. I thought right then, huh-oh, this is Yalu. They are taking we out of Korea. As it turned out, I was right.

During the course of the next day we traveled. They would take the blanket off when we were out of towns, but they still left be blindfolded. But I could wiggle the blindfold just enough that I could peek out from under it on occasion and I could tell I was traveling northwest and I was absolutely certain I was out of Korea because the trains were running in the daytime, aircraft were flying, I could see transmission lines intact. As we came through cities or villages they would cover me up.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for that?

Captain HARRIS. I don't know unless they didn't want the civilian populace to see that they were taking an American or Caucasian through there. Evidently they wanted to keep it rather secret.

Mr. KENNEDY. Captain, may I ask you a question, going back to the other camp? Did you go on a hunger strike while you were at the other camp?

Captain HARRIS. Yes, sir. That was in regard to interrogation. I guess it was the third interrogator. He explained to me if I didn't change my hostile attitude and lay down my arms, as they called it,
he just didn’t see how they could afford to feed an individual like me and that my food would probably get progressively worse.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, was your copilot with you?

Captain Harris. He was in the same camp, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they move him with you?

Captain Harris. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they carry other prisoners along with you?

Captain Harris. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. You were the only one in the truck?

Captain Harris. As near as I know; yes, sir. I was the only prisoner. There were 6 or 8 guards, but I was the only prisoner.

Back to your question, Mr. Kennedy: He explained to me that if I didn't change my attitude the food would probably get worse and less. So from the time that they had me in front of the firing squad I made up my mind right then that the only way to beat them was to call every bluff that they threw. When he mentioned that, I said, fine, all right, I will end the interrogation now. I will starve. I won't eat any more. I said as long as you keep persisting on this ridiculous questioning and insist on confessions to something I haven't done, I just won't eat. I will starve. He just chucked and left.

I went somewhere between 12 and 13 days without eating. Evidently he though I was going to go through with it because I was getting pretty weak. I could hardly get out to the latrine. I drank the hot water in the morning and in the evening, but I wouldn't eat the food.

Finally he came back around with a big grin on his face. Well, he had had a talk with the commander, and through the kindness and generosity of the Chinese they decided to drop the subject. So I started eating again, and they didn't bother me as far as bacteriological warfare or atomic warfare or chemical or psychological or anything else they charged me with, for about a month after that. Instead, he changed his tactics and was trying to indoctrinate me. He brought literature for me to read, and he was explaining the blessings of communism. Actually we had a pretty fair month.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Kennedy. Yes. Was there another time that you had the same problem? What about the interrogators? Did they all speak good English?

Captain Harris. In most cases very good.

Mr. Kennedy. Did any indicate he had been in the United States?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir; one in Korea, we nicknamed him “Basketball Boy” because he ran around in basketball shorts a lot and claimed to be quite an athlete. He spoke pretty good English and used quite a good deal of slang. He spoke more American than English. Of course he knew I was from southern California, and he kept referring to the valley, which everybody knows is the San Fernando Valley. He just talked so much about it I asked him one day. I said, “Where did you go to school—SC or UCLA?” He said, “UC—Oh, I have never been to the United States. I have just read about it.” But he got the “UC” out, so I figured UCLA.

Does that answer the question?

Mr. Kennedy. Yes.

Now they were taking you across the Yalu.
Captain Harris. Probably about midnight of the 25th of January, as near as I could keep track, we arrived at a prison. I wasn't sure if it was Mukden or Port Arthur, because after dark I lost my sense of direction and I wasn't sure exactly where they had taken me. They put me in a prison and brought me some hot water and took all my filthy clothes and stuff. They brought me some bedding and put me in a large cell, probably 20 feet by 30 feet.

The next morning they called me in for my first meeting with them. They went through a long dissertation that they would allow no fabrications on my part, their typical jargon that they use when they interpret. At that time I asked them by what authority they had removed me from Korea, that if the Chinese Communists were not involved in the Korean campaign other than so-called volunteers, by what authority had they removed me or were we at war with China proper. Of course they told me that I was in no position to demand any explanations for anything, and passed it off in that manner.

For the next 6 weeks or so I was interrogated daily, but it was more of a formal interrogation. It wasn't just with an interrogator. Mostly the people sitting in judgment on the interrogation and asking the questions worked through an interpreter, and they had a recording clerk. It was a more formal type of deal.

However, it was quite similar as far as questions to the interrogations in Korea. However, they weren't quite as crude. They were more subtle about how they approached a question.

The food was better than it had been in Korea, and of course the quarters were far superior.

At times when the interrogation would not be going exactly the way they wanted it—they used a radiant type of heat. They built fires in the walls between the cells. The walls were about 4 feet thick. They built the fires in there for heating. They would build roaring fires and get your cell I would imagine away over 100 degrees. Suddenly they would put the fire out and open all the windows, and it was 30 below or so outside in Manchuria at that time. They would get you dripping with perspiration and then they would cool you off. It is a similar technique to that which the Germans used, only they didn't have the facilities to work it as smoothly as the Germans did.

On one occasion while I was in that particular cell they had one officer who used to come around daily and inspect the cells, but he evidently didn't speak English because he usually brought an interpreter with him. I don't know why but he continually was unhappy with me for some reason. Every time he would come in he would scream and rave and tear up the bed and act like a 2-year-old child. This one particular time he came in—what few clean clothes I had I had stacked in the corner in an effort to keep them as clean as possible. The Chinese have a bad habit of spitting and clearing their throat and blowing their nose on the floor. The guards walked outside. It was just sticky. He walked in. After he tore up my bed and stood me at attention and ranted and raved, he just walked over and wiped his feet all over my clothes. I couldn't—I kind of lost control for a minute and struck him. Of course the guard came rushing in and the interrogator and the particular officer rushed out.

Again they handcuffed me and shortly thereafter they brought in a box. Actually it was a folded up contraption about the size of this
table when it was folded out. It was about 30 inches square and hinged. They forced me to sit in the center square and then they folded up the sides and the ends and put a lid on it and made a box. I spent, as near as I can recall, about 9 hours. The guard changed every hour, and I counted nine changes of the guard before they let me out. It is very cramped. Your head is down between your legs and in just a short period your extremities go to sleep. It is quite miserable until you just get more or less paralyzed all over, and then you don’t mind it so bad.

In about 9 hours they let me out, but they left me handcuffed. I had a shackle, a peculiar type of shackle. They used a rope shackle, with metal ends, but a large rope, on my ankles. Then they handcuffed my respective arms to my ankles, so I was in a stooped position. Previously they had let me walk around the room and exercise, but of course now that was out. They left me in that position about 3 or 4 days, and then they removed the handcuffs from my wrists and my ankles and used them in the conventional manner, just handcuffed in front of me.

About 6 or 7 weeks of that went on. They would take down any testimony or any answers to any questions that I may have given. They would keep a record. They had a clerk keeping a record of the minutes, presumably, but always in Chinese. They would try to get me to sign the minutes. I refused to sign them. I said, “Anything I have said, if it is in English I will sign it, but I won’t sign anything in a foreign language.”

They would never put anything in English for me.

I guess it was the latter part of March or the 1st of April some time they handcuffed me and covered up my head and put me in a jeep and moved me to the center of the city into an old prison which evidently was below the water table because my cell had water in it. It was a musty, mouldy, slimy sort of place. The cell was just a little bit bigger than this table. There they called me in and informed me that I was going to stand trial for my war criminal activities and to conduct myself in a manner of respect to their military court. It was a different group of officers, and usually 2 or 3, again with a clerk. The so-called trial lasted 6 weeks, I guess, or a month.

The CHAIRMAN. How long?

Captain HARRIS. A month to 6 weeks. At that time——

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of it as a trial. What was it—just an interrogation?

Captain HARRIS. Actually it was no more or not a great deal more than normal interrogation.

The CHAIRMAN. They had no witnesses against you, did they?

Captain HARRIS. They had no witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. The trial was just an effort to get some confession out of you? That is what it amounted to?

Captain HARRIS. Yes. I was allowed no counsel, and the only way I could get a word in one way or the other was just to be able to shout louder than they could. On occasions like that when they would see that I was really getting angry and would begin to shout back, then they would take a recess and we would knock it off for the day and start again the next day.

The CHAIRMAN. Recess over until the next day?

Captain HARRIS. Yes, sir.
At one time, at one of the night hearings they showed me some pictures. One of them was my former operations officer, Baumer, who was shot down with Colonel Arnold’s crew. At the time they asked me to identify him and I refused. I said I didn’t know him and had never seen him before. But of course they knew what outfit I was from. I wasn’t really kidding anybody. I just wouldn’t admit it.

At that time Major Baumer looked like he was in real bad shape.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a recent picture of him?

Captain Harris. It was one that they had made, yes, sir. I mentioned, I think, in an interrogation at another place that he looked to me like he was insane. They must have really worked him over. His eyes were protruding. He just looked terrible.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you tell them that?

Captain Harris. No, since my return to the Z. I.

Mr. Kennedy. Did he come back afterward?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. Major Baumer came out through Hong Kong last year. They held them, as I recall, a couple of years after the war.

Mr. Kennedy. Was there any discussion during this time about your own family, about your people back home?

Captain Harris. No, sir; not at this time. I had forgotten about that. While I was in Korea they discussed it. One interrogator made quite a to-do—in fact it was the same one that I think went to UCLA—made quite an issue of the fact—worked on you from the standpoint he wanted to get you worried about your family, their well-being, derogatory remarks about the morality of your wife. They even got to the point where they suggested that if I didn’t come to terms they would be forced to have their people in the United States pay my family a visit. Just a vague threat. They didn’t say what they were going to do, but pay them a visit which, incidentally, affected some of my crew quite strongly. That same threat was used on others of the crew.

The CHAIRMAN. It did affect some of the other prisoners?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. I discovered that after I was released, talking to some of the boys.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did the so-called trials last?

Captain Harris. As near as I can recall, about 5 to 6 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the decision? What finally was the order?

Captain Harris. They finally called me in and said I had been found guilty and they would sentence me at a later date. After they said they would sentence me at a later date they moved me back to the original prison. It was just like going from black to white. The whole atmosphere changed. I was in a different wing of the prison, but I knew it was the same place. I was in a good-sized cell. I had a sort of GI type cot with a grass mattress. They brought me clean clothes. They gave me smoking material. The food was good or comparatively good, better than it had been. They began to bombard me with literature. Of course you will read the stuff because there is nothing else to do while you are in solitary. They also gave me a little book and a pen. They wanted me to record my feelings about some of the things I was reading. I was reading everything I could get hold of. I believe that some of their so-called geniuses—they say the line between genius
and insanity sometimes is pretty close, and I am not sure but what a few of theirs have slipped over the line. I would read the stuff, as much as I could stomach. Occasionally a meek little interpreter would come in and discuss the things I had been reading with me. I asked him one day how long they intended to keep me in solitary and was I ever going to be put in with other prisoners in a regular camp. He said that depended entirely on my political consciousness. So I got to adding 2 and 2 and figured, well, I will read this stuff a little more thoroughly now. I didn’t ask him as many embarrassing questions about it from then on as I had in the past.

During this period about every 2 weeks they would let me take a bath and about once a week they would let you wash some clothes. Actually things were pretty good then other than the fact that I was still in solitary.

About the 4th of September of 1953 they called me in one evening and told me the war was over, that I was going to be repatriated, but before I could be repatriated I would have to sign a document indicating how well I had been treated as a prisoner. So I wrote a little note saying that during my 14 months in captivity I had received more education than I had in the previous 29 years of my life, which was true. It was quite an education.

The CHAIRMAN. But they didn’t understand how you meant it, I suppose.

Captain HARRIS. They bought it anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will note now that a quorum is present. You may now state under oath, Captain, that what you have testified to this morning up until now is true.

Captain HARRIS. Yes, sir; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed.

(Members of the committee present at this point: Senators McClellan and Mundt.)

Captain Harris. The Major brought up something that I had bypassed.

While I was in the prison somewhere in the downtown section of Mukden about half the guards didn’t annoy you too much and the other half would pester the life out of you. You couldn’t shut your eyes or you couldn’t slump over. You had to sit straight up at attention. They would just bother you all the time, just keep you miserable. I told the court on two different occasions that they had one guard who was giving me a bad time and if they didn’t make him stop I couldn’t be responsible for what I might do. So they asked me what I meant by what I might do, just what did I think I was going to do. I told them that an insane man never knows what he is doing or what he is going to do next, and that guy has just about got me off the deep end. Evidently they took it lightly, because he kept after me and kept after me. One night after a particularly trying day at the court he finally got to me. He was standing outside of course in the corridor peeking through this little Judas window in the door. He would get his face right up in it and hiss. He didn’t speak English but he was always making you sit up and just annoying you in general. From the edge of the little wooden platform they had me sleeping on to the door was just one long step. I lost control of myself and took that long step and was swinging at him as I went.
The Chairman. You were what?
Captain Harris. I was attempting to strike at him through the door. He just pulled his head back out of the door and slid the little sliding panel shut, but it was too late for me to stop and I hit the panel with my fist and the panel was between my fist and his nose. He screamed like he had been killed. His nose evidently was broken, I am not sure, but it was cocked off to one side. I thought my hand was broken. My hand swelled up and turned black so fast that I thought I had really broken it. I was screaming around for medical attention for my hand and didn't get any effect out of them.

They took me from my cell that time down to another room where they had the box set up for me. They placed me in it that time for 16 hours as near as I can recall. I lost the count toward the end. That time they pounded on the lid all the time I was in it with sticks. When I came out that time I couldn't walk. In fact, I couldn't walk until the next day. I couldn't hear clearly for it must have been a month or so because of the buzzing in my head. I overlooked that and the Major brought it to my attention.

The Chairman. What became of that guard? What happened to him?
Captain Harris. I never saw him any more. They put him some place else, I guess.

The Chairman. Is that what they would term losing face?
Captain Harris. Possibly. It upsets them to lose any kind of an argument.

The night that we were instructed that we were to be repatriated they took each one of my crew members and put us in a weapons carrier. The rest of my crew were all up there with me.

The Chairman. During the time had you seen any of them and been able to converse with any of your crew members?
Captain Harris. No, sir. I do know that they had my navigator in the cell next to me because I could hear him spelling his name to the interrogator louder than normally, and I did the same so he would know where I was. I could hear my copilot screaming at the guards occasionally. I just recognized his voice. We were all in the same wing.

They put us on a train and we started toward Kaesong for repatriation. We traveled until the evening of the 4th of September. When we arrived at Kaesong we were still kept separated and isolated. On the trip down we had not been allowed to converse, but we could see one another in the train. As near as I can remember there were the 11 of us and about 50 guards. While we were in China proper they kept the shades drawn on the train and wouldn't let us look out. The minute we crossed the Yalu they raised the shades and instructed us to observe all the devastation and what-not that our Air Force had caused and keep it in our minds.

We got to Kaesong and they put us in separate tents. Each one of us had a guard, but also each one of us had a troop assigned with a Red Cross band on his arm. He would bring you anything you wanted, all the hot water you wanted. He brought you food. He was a kind of a batman. The next morning after we got there they called us up to a little open-air theater on the hill above the tents. I know that we were the only people up there. There were lots of
tents, but we were the only Americans or U. N. personnel. They called us into this open-air theater and got to reading a long document as to why we had been taken to Manchuria and what we had been suspected of, that they decided that possibly we were innocent of all and through the kindness and generosity of the Chinese they were going to release us. They also added that during this time:

Theodore R. Harris and the rest voluntarily admitted that the United States Air Force had been engaged in bacteriological warfare against the Northeast Province of China.

I remember those words verbatim.

About that time I jumped up and screamed that it was a lie and we hadn't admitted to any such thing. My copilot Lieutenant Strieby, also voiced objections to it. He couldn't go along with that, either. The rest of the crew remained silent.

I demanded a copy of the document they had just read in English with an amendment to it deleting that last phrase because it wasn't true. They refused to give it to me.

So they took us back to our tents. As we went back I mentioned that for 14 months I hadn't given them that, and I will be blankety-blank if I will now.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they expect you to sign that document?

Captain HARRIS. No; it was unsigned.

The CHAIRMAN. I know; but did they ask you to sign it?

Captain HARRIS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was just the declaration.

Captain HARRIS. That is right. After a period of time up there I found out there was only one thing they couldn't take away from you in one way or another, and that was your self-respect, and I wasn't going to give that up on the last day just to get back across the line.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any threat or implied threat that if you didn't agree to it you wouldn't be repatriated?

Captain HARRIS. No, sir. They just said that we had admitted it and we hadn't, or some of us hadn't.

Senator MUNDT. They said you had admitted it?

Captain HARRIS. They said we had voluntarily admitted it.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the penalty? What did they do to you when you protested?

Captain HARRIS. Nothing at the time. We stayed the rest of the night, and the next morning the trucks arrived. That was the 6th of September, the last day of Big Switch. The trucks arrived to take us to Panmunjom. During the previous afternoon I talked to the interpreter 2 or 3 times and I told him I wasn't going to go until I got what I wanted. Again he took it lightly, I guess.

Mr. KENNEDY. You said you wouldn't go back home unless you got what you wanted?

Captain HARRIS. That is right. I refused to be repatriated.

The CHAIRMAN. What you wanted was a document—

Captain HARRIS. I wanted a copy of the document in English and an amendment to it deleting that last phrase because it wasn't true.

Anyway, in the morning they came around and told us to pack up and get ready to go. I just sat down outside the tent and started smoking. My crew got all packed. They came around to march them
to the trucks. The interrogator seemed to be completely surprised that I wasn't ready to go. So he called one of the troops and they packed what few belongings I had and took the tent down. I still wouldn’t get up and go to the truck. So they went ahead and waved the trucks on out and my crew left. They brought some jeeps up, the new Russian jeeps. Several guards and interrogators were around. We went through the whole hassle again. They would tell me to get in the jeep and I would say “No,” and they would say why and I would tell them why, probably just like the truce talks, over and over and say nothing.

That went on for quite a period. Finally they tried to force me into the jeep. We struggled around a little bit and broke the windshield on the jeep and dented the hood a little bit. Evidently the driver of the vehicle is completely responsible for it because I thought he was going to cry. He was really upset about his vehicle getting banged up.

Finally they decided to leave me alone. So they brought my belongings back, put the tent back up, and left me. Just put me under guard and left me sitting there.

About an hour later the same political civilians, civilian Chinese and North Koreans and some military, some kind of political outfit that had sat in attendance at the theater the day before, returned. A whole string of jeeps came up and they stopped and all got out and stood out there and looked at me and conversed. One of the excuses they said that they couldn’t give me what I asked for was the fact that the people who could sign it were not available. So I changed my story a little bit when I saw all them. I asked for the same document in English but an amendment deleting my name. Since my crew had decided to accept repatriation under those conditions I was disgusted with them and decided I would just worry about me from here on out. They refused it. They all drove off. Shortly a jeep and an old truck arrived, with 20 or 25, maybe 30 troops. They all huddled around, and a brand new interrogator or interpreter I hadn’t seen before. We went through the same routine for about 15 minutes. Finally, he just said something in Chinese and they piled all over me and threw me in the truck and 5 or 6 of them sat on me and away we went to Panmunjom. The last regular repatriation vehicle was crossing. They took me out of the truck they had me in and put me in this last vehicle with a guard and we went to through to Freedom Village.

As far as my personal experience goes, that is about it.

Senator MUNDT. What happened to your copilot?

Captain HARRIS. He was repatriated with the rest of the crew about 4 or 5 hours before I was; 4 hours, I guess.

When I got to Freedom Village the officer who was checking off the list was quite surprised to see me because I was supposed to have come out several hours earlier and they had already checked me off the list as probably being held for some reason or other. They didn’t know.

The CHAIRMAN. Hadn’t the copilot reported to them as to why you were being detained?

Captain HARRIS. They just said I was still there. Maybe they thought that they had decided to hold me at the last minute. It is difficult to say.

That is generally the story. If the committee would be interested, I jotted down a general outline of techniques. After discussing it with
several other prisoners in my own crew, there seemed to be a set pattern as to the indoctrination methods or interrogation methods that the Communists use. Of course we have hundreds of concrete examples for every technique that I have here.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the list or memorandum with you?
Captain HARRIS. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to read it into the record or submit it for the record?
Captain HARRIS. I can just submit it for the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you generally covered it in your testimony?
Captain HARRIS. Generally; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It is short, apparently. Just read it into the record.
Captain HARRIS. This is just in outline form.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Use that as a kind of summation of your testimony, then, and read it into the record and comment on it as you care to.
Captain HARRIS. All right, sir.

Of course one of the prime techniques that the Communists appeared to use is that they go out of their way to wear the prisoner down prior to any extensive interrogation. They wear you down both physically and mentally, denying you sleep. If they are supposedly letting you have your rest, they usually will wake you up every hour through the night, trying to wear you down physically. Mentally, they wear you down by writing your biography, and not just once but over and over and over, or any answers to questions or anything that you should write they have to have it over and over.

Of course it just depends on your answers. If you are giving them true answers it is not too hard but if you are building up a big story, the second and third time you write it you might leave a word out here and there, and of course that is what they are after. Then they really jump on it.

They will deny you adequate medical attention. They always try to be subtle about their denying of the medical attention. They attempt to make you think you are getting the best that they have to offer or that there was some mistake and the corpsman didn’t get the word.

They always have some flimsy excuse for denying medical attention. Another one of course is one of their strongest weapons, the isolation. After you spend a few months in solitary, regardless of how well you think you are holding up, when I look back now I find that at times I wasn’t quite rational and wasn’t as clear thinking as I would be normally.

They attempt to keep your thoughts localized on your own situation and your own discomforts. In other words, they won’t let you close your mind to your particular predicament and try to forget it for a few hours. They force you just to sit there and think about that one thing. They deny you exercise or won’t let you read or write, little things like sitting on the floor at attention or sitting on the edge of your bed at attention, in very cramped quarters, with the door usually shut to where you can’t even see any outside light at all.

The attempt to keep you worried or distraught, referring to your family and wondering how they are getting along, or in some of our
cases telling us that they would have their people in the States pay our families visits. They told me on numerous occasions, particularly their commander of the first camp, that if I didn't cooperate and confess I would be kept in complete isolation for the rest of my life. They said, "We will just put you in a hut some place in the hills and keep you there. You won't be repatriated at the cessation of hostilities. We will just keep you."

Then of course they used the old war criminal threat, which denies you benefit under the Geneva Convention. Once they declare you a war criminal, evidently they feel they can just carry on and violate any of the principles if they so desire.

Of course, they will threaten you with death on occasion. In my case that mock firing squad. These are all attempts to keep you upset and worried and to keep your thoughts close to your own predicament and not let you forget the spot you are in.

They make a great issue of degradation. They attempt to degrade the prisoner just down to the animal state if they possibly can, if you will allow it, like existing in the filth that you have to live in, not being allowed to keep yourself or your clothing clean, things that Americans particularly are touchy about, having to answer nature's calls in public, and of course handcuffed and shackled a lot of the time; constantly being insulted in one way or another, derogatory remarks about your family or your wife, particularly about your country.

I got the impression that they got some kind of sadistic satisfaction out of particularly degrading white men. They capitalized on the fact of some people's feelings of white superiority when dealing with any other race. The shoe of course was really on the other foot over there. They really made capital of it.

They were always enforcing ridiculous or absurd demands, things that were of no consequence one way or the other, other than the fact that they upset the prisoner. I have listed just a few.

You were required to get permission from the guards even to change the position you were sitting in or to exercise or to stand up or if you were standing up, to sit or to go to the latrine, anything, if you moved, you had to get permission.

They would ask you completely irrelevant and ridiculous questions which had no basis whatsoever and make you continue to answer over and over and over.

From my experience about the only time that they ever resorted to open or direct violence or torture was, as I recall it, if you strongly resisted. Usually they get you so upset mentally or so angry that they force you—you either had to fight or crawl, take your choice. If you wouldn't crawl, you would have to fight back in some way, and I found that is what got me in trouble all the time. You either had to acquiesce or attempt to fight back. I think it was all pre-planned. They would just push you and push you and push you until you had to go one way or the other.

The Chairman. They put the pressure on you so you either had to confess or conform to what they wanted you to say or they provoked you into such action as warranted them in applying physical punishment.

Captain Harris. Yes, sir; that is true.
The **Chairman**. So there was no way to escape it under their technique. You had either finally to confess or to endure whatever physical torture they decided to apply.

**Captain Harris**. During World War II I used to chuckle at the Japanese and the extremes they went to to save face, as they called it, but during my tour of captivity I found out that it is very important to some people. It was to me. By saving face I mean I decided if I was going to return at all I would return with my self-respect and not ashamed of anything I had done. I figured if I couldn't come back that way I wouldn't come back.

As I say, it becomes very important. One of the other things that they do is the more subtle forms of discomfort. The quarters that you live in, unheated in the winter. Of course they explain to you that that is the best they have. They are doing the best for you they can. Or, as I mentioned, taking you for long walks in the rain and getting you completely drenched and then throwing you into worse quarters than you had before.

One thing that is difficult to cope with is that they will constantly show you evidence, as they call it, of other crew members or other Air Force people's confessions, regardless of what it may be. They might be confessing to flying a particular mission on a particular day. They bring volumes of that stuff around and show it to you.

The **Chairman**. Would that be in English?

**Captain Harris**. Yes, sir. They would have missions drawn out, targets and IP's. One in particular I recall that we were supposed to have flown was to Peking. They had the day and the time and the whole business, presumably submitted by one of my crew members. The man who presumably submitted it had signed a blank piece of paper. It wasn't the piece of paper that this mission was drawn on at all. It was a blank piece of paper, nothing on it but his signature. It was attached. That was supposed to be conclusive evidence that we had done certain things.

They also made an effort to rattle the prisoner or shake him up with the war criminal trials, for example, which I think were designed primarily to work on you psychologically and get you upset. One technique that they employed was a kind of mystery type of affair. They would call you out in the middle of the night, maybe at 1 or 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, and march you to a hut someplace where you had never been before. They had it decked out in very weird atmosphere. Usually it would be a long, narrow hut and they would have a long table down the center. It probably would be covered with blankets, completely blacked out. All you could see would be a high-ranking Chinese sitting at the far end with a candle on either side of him, with the candlelight glowing on his features, probably as far as from here to you, Mr. Chairman. Then he would go ahead and interrogate, that he was from higher headquarters and had come down to settle the case. One of my crew members particularly said that he was very susceptible to that. It really had him shook up. It was just a kind of Charlie Chan atmosphere. They worked on them psychologically.

Those are the main things that I think were used in the majority of the cases I have heard about. I suppose there are isolated cases of other treatment that I have not had a chance to become familiar with. That is all I have.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Kennedy. Captain, I am wondering why you were able to hold up so long during this period of time.

Captain Harris. Natural stubbornness, I suppose, had a lot to do with it. In my early life that was a kind of sore spot with my parents, but now they are kind of glad I am stubborn. I think a lot of it is just blind faith. In many cases I was unable to argue the point with them or refute things that they would say, particularly when they were making degrading remarks about our country, our social system, and form of government. Perhaps it is a little bit like religion. In some cases you are going on blind faith. I made up my mind that in the previous 29 years I had pretty well enjoyed life where I was in our system and I couldn't see changing it at that late date.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you, Captain, if you can give us any ideas or comments regarding any program that we should have in our military or even broaden it to include civilian, particularly the youth, young men of the country who may become soldiers and get into the service, any program of instruction or education that might fortify them and make them stronger and more able to resist what they might have to endure should they ever become prisoners? Have you any thoughts along that line?

Captain Harris. The only thing I wish I had particularly prior to my experience is a more thorough knowledge of the truth of communism, what it was, how it affected people, just exactly what they were accomplishing or not accomplishing. I don't think people can learn or understand too much about something which is making every effort to engulf them. I am a long way from a student of it, but I have sure studied it since I have been released.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would be worth something if our troops or servicemen and even our citizens could be better informed as to just what communism is and how it operates and how it functions?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir; I certainly do. The Air Force has recognized the need for that, particularly in the combat personnel, and it does have a program in being at this time out at the survival school. In fact, I am assigned to the school now.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you one of the instructors?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

Senator Mundt. Captain, may I ask how much education you have had before you went into the service?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir. High school graduate.

Senator Mundt. At any time in your high school studies did you have any instruction in school as to the vicious and malicious features of communism?

Captain Harris. No, sir.

Senator Mundt. You never had any training in that at all? Do you think it would be helpful to people who might have to undergo the same kind of experience that you underwent if in high school—because practically all Americans now go to high school and most of them graduate—some attention were paid to teaching these vicious features of communism? If you had had that training in high school do you think it would have been helpful to you in your period of captivity?
Captain Harris. I personally—again this is a personal opinion—I think anything that I had known about communism previous to my capture would have been an asset to me in protecting myself. I think it is important that we all become more informed so far as communism is concerned. Some people already seem to be getting caught up in the new smile campaign and being susceptible to this new friendly approach that we are getting lately.

Senator Mundt. There are two places, aren't there, where the average young man can get that kind of training: One would be in school, at the high school or college level, and the other would be through his church. It is not quite possible to expect the average parents to become authorities on communism and to tell children about it individually, but it seems that perhaps the tax-supported school system and the churches of the country might have some responsibility in that area. Don't you kind of feel that way about it?

Captain Harris. I don't feel qualified to answer that, sir.

Senator Mundt. You have said it would be helpful if you had the training, I am trying to find the place where we can give the people that kind of training.

Captain Harris. I believe it would have been helpful to me. I wouldn't want to go on record as saying that I advocate teaching communism in the schools.

Senator Mundt. I don't say teach communism in the schools. I say that in schools and churches perhaps the vicious features of communism should be pointed out, that they should take documented facts such as are now available as to the methods employed by Communists to subjugate people, so you couldn't have this kind of thing happen to you without having some forewarning if you were faced with that kind of situation.

Captain Harris. It might possibly be advantageous.

The Chairman. You received a decoration, did you not, for your resistance to the enemy while you were in prison?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What was that?

Captain Harris. The Bronze Star.

The Chairman. So your splendid record as a prisoner and the resistance you offered to your captors has been recognized by our Government, by your superior military authorities, and that recognition has been given to you?

Captain Harris. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are there any further questions?

We thank you very much, Captain. You have told us a story here which I wish every American citizen could hear. I hope many, many millions of them will read this record.

Thank you very much.

Captain Harris. Thank you.

The Chairman. Who is our next witness?

Mr. Kennedy. Colonel Frash.

The Chairman. Come around, please, Colonel. Will you be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give this Senate investigating committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Colonel Frash. I do.
TESTIMONY OF COL. WILLIAM N. FRASH, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

The Chairman. State your name, rank, and your record. Colonel, how long you have been in the service.

Colonel Frash. I am Colonel Frash, United States Marine Corps. I have been in the service 18 years.

The Chairman. You have discussed with the staff the subject matter of the inquiry?

Colonel Frash. I have, sir.

The Chairman. You have a general knowledge and idea of the questions which may follow?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You do not care to have counsel representing you when you testify?

Colonel Frash. No, sir.

Mr. O'Donnell. Colonel, how many marines were captured as prisoners by the Koreans or the Chinese?

Colonel Frash. There were 227 marines captured during the Korean conflict.

Mr. O'Donnell. How many marines came back?

Colonel Frash. We lost 31, who died in prison camps. The remainder returned.

The Chairman. The Chair will note for the record that a quorum is not present at this time. If later we have a quorum, we will confirm the testimony which has been given.

Mr. O'Donnell. One hundred and ninety-six were repatriated?

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. O'Donnell. Were all of the marines who were captured billeted in the same prison compounds as the Army after they were segregated as to officers and enlisted men?

Colonel Frash. That is right.

Mr. O'Donnell. Were they subjected to the same basic treatment as to interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir.

Mr. O'Donnell. How many marines were subjected to disciplinary action by the Marine Corps for their collaboration, if you want to say that, in Korea?

Colonel Frash. Fifty-two marines were investigated, and of that number three were subjected to—I wouldn't say discipline. One went through a board of inquiry, and two went through a court of inquiry. The two who went through the court of inquiry were cleared, subject to restricted assignments. The remaining one was given a letter of reprimand and is no longer in the service.

Mr. O'Donnell. Those who were cleared are still in the service at the present time?

Colonel Frash. That is right.

Mr. O'Donnell. How many marines took part in the Korean war?

Colonel Frash. 129,500.

Mr. O'Donnell. Was that the number constantly or was there an interchange of men and so forth?
Colonel Frash. There was a rotation of men. There were never 129,500 marines in contact with the enemy at one time.

Mr. O'Donnell. At any given time how many marines would there have been in Korea?

Colonel Frash. The 1st Marine Division was approximately 26,000 men, and the First Wing approximately 5,000.

Mr. O'Donnell. In addition to the three marines that you have mentioned, were there any other marines who may have been deemed to be collaborators with the Chinese or the North Koreans?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any of the marines participate in any Communist sponsored oratorical contests?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine take part in any Communist debating society?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine take part in any Communist sponsored play?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine participate in the Communist publication which was called Toward Truth and Peace?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine participate in any activity of the so-called Central Peace Committee?

Colonel Frash. No.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine sign any peace petition?

Colonel Frash. Fourteen marines admitted signing appeals or petitions of some nature.

Mr. O'Donnell. But not to the extent where that in itself would classify them as a collaborator?

Colonel Frash. That is true. This was thoroughly investigated by the Marine Corps to the satisfaction of the Commandant of the Marine Corps that these men had not degraded themselves, their country, or their Corps.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did any marine sign any confession other than the three that you have mentioned?

Colonel Frash. No. Marine signed any other confession, that is right.

Mr. O'Donnell. During the course of the activity of the prisoners were the marines fairly close together or did they adopt an attitude of every man for himself among the marines?

Colonel Frash. No, they did not adopt this attitude. They maintained their military organization within the prison camp.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did the marines generally take care of one another when an individual would become sick?

Colonel Frash. It is one of the prides of the Marines Corps that we take care of each other under any conditions.

Mr. O'Donnell. How do you account for the fact that the Marines did so well from the standpoint of not collaborating with the Chinese communists?

Colonel Frash. The basic fundamental upon which the Marines Corps relies is our training. From the day a man enters the Marine Corps he is under training of some sort or other. He is trained to
rely on his fellow Marine. He is trained to rely on his noncommissioned officers and on his officers. His officers are constantly under training. They are inspired to give the best leadership within their ability. So you get the combination of leadership, discipline and training combined, and leadership, discipline, and training wherever the individual may find himself and under whatever conditions he may be subjected, and the men hold up much better. They rely on each other. They have faith in each other, they have faith in their organization.

Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent does the command responsibility in the Marine Corps go down to the last man?

Colonel Frazh. The chain of command within the Marine Corps does go down to the last man. The private in the ranks is trained to realize that he might have to replace the corporal. The corporal knows that he might have to replace the sergeant. The sergeant knows that he might have to step in for the lieutenant. The chain of command is never excused. It exists wherever Marines might be, be it at a swimming pool in the States, in a movie, on a train, and certainly be it in battle or certainly be it in prison camp. The chain of command, the military organization, exists and continues to exist and Marines are trained that this is a fact and I believe they accept it, as demonstrated by the results in the Korean prisoners of war.

Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent would the esprit de corps of the Marine Corps have played a major part in that?

Colonel Frazh. I think esprit de corps has played a considerable part. I know Marines would do almost anything rather than bring dishonor to their Corps. Esprit de corps means to a Marine pride, and believe me there is nothing proud in being defeated and nothing proud in being captured.

Mr. O'Donnell. Colonel, how many Air Force prisoners were there?

Colonel Frazh. Do you mean how many Marine aviators or Marine aviation personnel?

Mr. O'Donnell. Marine personnel.

Colonel Frazh. Marine aviation had 31 pilots captured in the Korean conflict.

Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent were they subjected to the treatment that we have heard related by Captain Harris, as distinct from the Army's indoctrination?

Colonel Frazh. I didn't understand your question.

Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent were they subjected to the treatment related by Captain Harris as distinct from Army indoctrination?

Colonel Frazh. As distinct from Army indoctrination? I don't understand that phrase.

Mr. O'Donnell. Did you hear the testimony related here by Captain Cumby?

Colonel Frazh. I just heard Captain Harris, but I didn't hear the Army captain.

Mr. O'Donnell. All right, let's change the question. Did their cases parallel Captain Harris' or were they subjected to more indoctrination as distinct from one isolation?

Colonel Frazh. I think our people received the same treatment as an over-all group in the prisoner-of-war camps. I don't think they
were given easier treatment and I don't think as a rule they were
given any more difficult treatment.

Mr. O'Donnell. None of the Air Force, of your 31 personnel, other
than those who were subjected to the board of inquiry, in any way
gave confessions?

Colonel Frash. That is right.

Mr. O'Donnell. To what extent did you have any draftees in the
Marine Corps in the Korean war?

Colonel Frash. We had quite a few draftees in the Korean conflict
because of the great need of men in a hurry. Thirty-two of these
POW's were inductees. Thirty-one of them returned. One died in
prisoner-of-war camp.

Mr. O'Donnell. As I understand it, you had at least 26,000 Marines
at any one time, and you had captured a total of 227. The troops were
generally in front line activity. Can you explain why such a small
amount of prisoners were captured?

Colonel Frash. May I correct you on the figure. We had 26,000
Marines engaged on the ground and we also had 5,000 additional Ma-
rines in daily contact with the enemy in the air. Of those 5,000 they
were not all pilots. Those include enlisted men backing the pilots up.

The division of 26,000 men was out of the lines for only a little less
than 2 months during the entire Korean conflict, so they were in daily
contact, constant contact, with the enemy with the exception of those
2 months. The wing was never out of contact with the enemy.

Mr. O'Donnell. How do you account for the fact that a small num-
ber of Marines were actually captured?

Colonel Frash. I believe it goes back to the common code of the Ma-
rine and the esprit de corps you have mentioned, the training and the
leadership. We had companies out in Korea that were surrounded,
cut off completely by the enemy. The only contact they had was by
radio. Those companies held out, piling the Chinese dead in front of
them, using them as barricades. Since I talked to you I have had a
chance to investigate one of these companies, and I was really proud
to find out that when they got the word that relief was coming to
them the company commander sent word back to the battalion com-
mmander who was coming to his relief and wanted to know if he wanted
any help they would be glad to come on back and lead them up.

This is the undefinable spirit of which Marines are very proud.
Obviously those men weren't defeated. They weren't shaken. They
stuck together and they did not give prisoners to the enemy.

Mr. O'Donnell. Do you think that a training program patterned
after the Marine Corps adopted by the Army, for example, would
have resulted in less collaborators in China?

Colonel Frash. I think so. I would like to say that I have a great
deal of respect for the United States Army. I think their problem is
something different and certainly is in magnitude from the problem
that the Marine Corps has. Our program I think would have pos-
sibly reduced the number, but I don't think it would have eliminated
the problem. As you know, we have only two training establish-
ments, Parris Island and San Diego. Being relatively smaller than
the Army, we are able to supervise them better and the problem of
numbers of trained personnel is reduced and I think our problem is
easier.
Mr. O'Donnell. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Do you have any questions?

Mr. Kennedy. No.

The Chairman. As I understand you, no Marine made any confession or did anything to cooperate with the enemy at all, other than the few who signed some kind of petition.

Colonel Frash. Other than the three that Mr. O'Donnell mentioned, Senator.

The Chairman. In what way did they collaborate?

Colonel Frash. Two of these officers were subjected to treatment quite similar to that which Captain Harris outlined this morning. They were alleged to have signed germ warfare confessions. These officers appeared before a court of inquiry and were exonerated of the accusation by the Marine Corps and the Board. The finding of the Board was approved by the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of Defense.

The Chairman. Did they ever admit to having signed such a confession?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir; they did but the finding of the Board was such, they were under such duress that they were found—not being a legal man I am a little at loss for words here. They were exonerated.

The Chairman. I was asking if the Board of Inquiry found that under the pressure and the torture they were enduring they were at least justified from the humane standpoint in having protected their life by signing something that was not true. In other words, I would think the Board of Inquiry had enough compassion and understanding to realize that almost any human being under the same circumstances might have involuntarily signed a confession.

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir. You have stated the case better than I could. One of these men, as you possibly know, was of high rank and had possible knowledge or the Chinese thought that he had a great deal of possible knowledge. I know that he was subjected to a great deal of punishment.

The Chairman. Only one of them, then, was reprimanded?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir. This other man was reprimanded and is no longer in the Marine Corps.

The Chairman. He was dismissed from the service?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What was he found guilty of?

Colonel Frash. I just went through and picked out a few of the statements that were made against him.

The Chairman. Just in general terms.

Colonel Frash. These are very general. He pretended interest to gain favor. He was an opportunist. He talked too much but did nothing intentional. He walked with Chinese officials. He seemed to be seeking better treatment. He is described as having “oral diarrhea.” He talked politics. He visited with camp officials.

The Chairman. In other words, he took an attitude that he would do whatever was necessary to gain favors for himself and he didn’t play on the team, in other words.

Colonel Frash. That is right. I was interested to note an Air Force officer’s comment that the rest of the marines were very ashamed of this man.
The Chairman. I see. He didn’t have to cooperate. He didn’t have to show that interest.

Colonel Frash. They didn’t feel so, no, sir. He is no longer with the Marine Corps.

The Chairman. He was condemned by his own people?

Colonel Frash. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I am going to take a recess until 2 o’clock. I will ask you, if you will, Colonel, to come back at 2 o’clock. We will proceed then. The other witnesses will return at 2 o’clock, please.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.)

I, Colonel William Frash, do hereby certify that all of the testimony given by me on Wednesday, June 27, 1956, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in connection with “Communist Interrogation, Indoctrination and Exploitation of American Civilian and Military Prisoners” is true and correct.

WM. M. FRASH, Col., USMC.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of June 1956.

BEATRICE B. ENNIS.

My commission expires March 9, 1957.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,

ROBERT A. KENNEDY, Esq.,
Counsel, United States Senate Subcommittee of the Permanent Committee on Investigations of Government Operations.

DEAR MR. KENNEDY: In line with our telephone conversation last evening I am submitting the attached data giving the figures with respect to the Marine and Army personnel engaged in the Korean conflict.

I believe this material should be inserted at the close of Colonel Frash’s testimony given at the end of the morning session on June 27, 1956.

Sincerely yours,

STEPHEN S. JACKSON,
Assistant General Counsel (Manpower and Personnel).

Data referred to in above letter:

“The total number of Army personnel participating in the Korean conflict during the period June 1950-53 is approximately 900,000.

“The number of American Army personnel who became prisoners of war under the Communist forces has been reported to be 6,656. Included in this number, however, are 650 Army personnel who were isolated from their units for at least 24 hours. 63 of this group fell into the hands of the Communists but returned to United States control prior to Little Switch. The remaining 587 who in some instances were isolated from their units and without support for as long as 3 weeks fought their way back to our lines. The more accurate figure therefore is 6,006.”

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Chairman. Colonel, if you will stand aside for a little while until another Senator comes.

Colonel Grabb, will you come around. Just have a seat. I am going to let you make your statement. When another Senator comes and we have a quorum I will swear you in order to expedite it. Since we are making a record I will let you proceed with your testimony.

Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, may I at the conclusion of Colonel Frash’s testimony make this request on behalf of the Department of the Army with respect to certain areas of testimony that were given
by the Colonel. They would like to submit later on—they have not had an opportunity—figures along the same line as to the incidence of numbers of those captured and the numbers of those participating. There isn’t any intent, I am sure the Colonel would be the first to confirm, of any implication of odious comparisons. These figures aren’t very firm to draw conclusions. But to round out the record I would like to request when they are prepared merely to submit them to you, sir, for rounding out the record.

The Chairman. They may be submitted, and if prepared in such form as to permit it, they will be inserted in the record immediately following the Colonel’s testimony. That will give some continuity to the reading of the record. 3

Mr. Jackson. Thank you.

The Chairman. All right, Colonel, state your name, rank and position and so forth, please.

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. ROBERT F. GRABB, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY

Colonel Grabb. My name is Lt. Col. Robert F. Grabb, and I am in the International Affairs Division of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army. I am here not as one experienced in the Korean episode, but with two propositions; first, to point out to the committee for the record the legal status of the four Geneva Conventions during the Korean conflict and, second, to indicate those articles of the convention which may or may not bear upon the topic into which your committee is inquiring, sir.

Having heard you before, I have discussed the matter with the staff and am prepared to proceed if you wish.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. What was the situation as far as the Geneva Convention was concerned regarding prisoners of war in the war in Korea?

Colonel Grabb. Geneva Convention was not recognized as being legally in force with respect to the parties in Korea, although both sides did state that they would apply it stringently. As a matter of fact, at the time of the conflict neither North Korea nor the Communist Chinese regime nor the Republic of Korea were even signatories to the convention. We of course were signatories as were many of the United Nations countries involved.

However, upon the outbreak of hostilities the international committee of the Red Cross in Geneva urged upon both the North Korean regime and the Republic of Korea the application of the humanitarian principles of the convention. They specifically referred to common article 3 of all four conventions which in essence called upon belligerents to apply the humanitarian principles of the convention even in a civil war.

As a result of this inquiry or plea on the part of the international committee of the Red Cross—incidentally, sir, I have a copy of each of these messages in full if you wish that they be inserted in the record.

3 The information supplied by Mr. Jackson appears at the conclusion of Colonel Frash’s testimony on p. 186.
The CHAIRMAN. They may be inserted in the record at this point.
Colonel GRABB. The first one is a telegram from the international committee of the Red Cross to the belligerents.

[Telegramme]

GENEVE, le 26 juin 1950.

International Committee Red Cross Geneva, founded 1863, neutral and non-political institution composed exclusively Swiss citizens and whose humanitarian intermediary is provided for in cases international or civil war and internal disturbances, wishes assure you at your disposal to accomplish according means available traditional tasks in existing situation Korea. Intercross refers this connexion to two 1929 Conventions, Firstly for amelioration condition wounded and sick, Secondy relative to treatment prisoners of war, likewise Geneva Conventions 1949 same subjects, plus Convention protection civilians. In our opinion fact that Korea not party or signatory these international agreements signed by 61 states should not prevent de facto application humanitarian principles protecting war victims contained in said Conventions. Refer specially article three common to all 1949 Geneva Conventions reading:

"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply as a minimum the following provisions:

Primo. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause shall in all circumstances be treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth, or wealth or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:

(1) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture;
(2) taking of hostages;
(3) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(4) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions, without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilised peoples:

Secundo. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as Intercross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force by means of special agreements all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict."

Intercross anxious learn views and intentions Southern Korea Government this subject. Intercross prepared send delegate to your Government, to examine with you possibility humanitarian action, especially measures for application above principles. In view protection on both sides military wounded and sick, war prisoners, civilian internees and civilian population, we are sending identical telegram Pyongyang. Would appreciate your earliest reply with view further action. Highest consideration.

RUEGGER, President Intercross.

The President of the Republic of Korea in reply to this message announced on 4 July 1950 that his Government would apply the 1949 Conventions, specifically common article 3. His message back to the committee is my second insertion.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be inserted at this point.

Note.—On 5 July 1950 the International Committee of the Red Cross was informed that the President of South Korea had signified his acceptance to the application of the Geneva Convention and that, in witness thereof, he had subscribed on 4 July 1950, at 1230 hours the text of Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

This document is reproduced below.
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the parties to the conflict.

July 4, 1950.

SYNGMAN RHEE.

Colonel GRABB. On the 7th of July he also issued a public proclamation stating that Korea was proud to be a signatory and that Korea will live up to the conditions of the convention.

On July 5, 1950, then Secretary of State Acheson assured the international committee of the Red Cross of the United States Government's intention to abide by the terms of the convention. His reply I have here which is marked in my numerical sequence as "Tab D."

The CHAIRMAN. It may be printed in the record.

[Telegramme]

TOKYO, le 7 juillet 1950.

B/39. For your information. Copy press release G. H. Q. F. E. C. Public Information Office 13.30 hours 7th July:

"Korean President's proclamation. The Korean diplomatic mission in Japan announced today that the President of the Republic of Korea has issued the following proclamation:

"On behalf of the Republic of Korea, I signed the Geneva Convention of 1949. I also made an appeal to the International Red Cross for assistance in supplying medicine, food, and clothing to our suffering people, and I know this appeal will be answered generously. The Geneva Convention of 1949 has been signed by most of the civilized nations of the world. Our ally, the United States, has also announced its intention of abiding by these terms. Korea is proud to be a signatory and Korea will live up to the conditions of the convention. I therefore direct all soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, police, South Korean members, and all other citizens of the Republic of Korea that, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949:

"1. Enemy prisoners, whether soldiers or civilians, shall be treated humanely. They shall not be denied food, clothing, or medical care. Regardless of their barbaric attack, they shall be treated in a civilized manner.

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"2. No enemy, whether military or civilian, shall be punished, whatever his crimes, excepting by determination of a legally constituted court.

"We, the citizens of the Republic of Korea, will not model our conduct on the barbarism of the Communists. Our action, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1949, will be proof, not only of our high civilization, but also of our gratitude to other people of the civilized world who are aiding us at this tragic time.

"Signed Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea."

Note.—After "Police South Korean" not stated what members of.

[Telegramme]

WASHINGTON, le 5 juillet 1950.

United States Government appreciates assurance in International Committee message June 28 of readiness to act in humanitarian interest of victims of hostilities in Korea without regard to legal applicability to conflict of Geneva Wounded and Sick and Prisoners of War Conventions of 1929 and Geneva Conventions of 1949. United States Government will of course be guided by humanitarian principles of Conventions, particularly article 3 of Geneva Convention of 1949. Should Government of Republic of Korea see fit to accept International Committee's offer of humanitarian aid Committee would receive full cooperation of United States authorities. Request for assistance for International Committee delegate Bieri and instructions to proceed southern Korea via Tokyo forwarded to MacArthur for appropriate action.

ACHESON.

Colonel GRABB. He stated, inter alia, that the United States appreciated the assurance of the international committee that it would assist in the conflict and stated that the United States was ready to act in the humanitarian interests of the victims of the hostilities and that the United States would be guided by the principles of the Convention.

As you are aware, sir, the Senate did not give its advice and consent to ratification to the Geneva Convention until the 6th of July 1955. These conventions became legally binding upon the United States on the 2d of February of this year.

On the 4th of July of 1950, the commander in chief of the United States forces in the Far East issued a proclamation stating that North Korean personnel captured by armed forces under his command in Korea would be treated in accordance with the humanitarian principles applied and recognized by civilized nations.

Then on the 23d of July 1950, General MacArthur announced the handling of prisoners of war by forces under the command of General MacArthur as U. N. commander, will be in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention. This message is marked by me as "Tab F."

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

From: CINCFE, Tokyo, Japan.
To: COMCENARMYEIGHT (Adv), Korea.
Info: DEPTAR, Wash., D. C., Secretary of State, Wash., D. C., (Crypto DA PIs Pass), COMCENFEAF, Tokyo, Japan, COMNAVFE, Tokyo, Japan, COMGEN EUSAM, Korea, Pass to Muccio.
NR: CX 58474.

23 Jul 50.

Decided here that the handling of prisoners of war by forces under comd of Gen. MacArthur as U. N. Commander will be in accordance with 1949 Geneva Convention, copies of which are being safe-handed to your Hqs. Gen. MacArthur as Commander of U. N. Forces has accepted Mr. Frederick Bieri as international Red Cross delegate in South Korea. Mr. Bieri has been authorized by this Hqs to operate in South Korea under the provisions of the 49 Geneva Convention.
Desire Mr. Bieri be accorded nec logistic support including opportunity to carry out his mission assigned. Rqst extension of courtesies that would normally be accorded a gen off.

Note.—This message has been relayed to Dept. of State.
Note.—Dispatched Tokyo time: 231411. Dispatched Washington EDT: 230011.
Note.—Regraded unclassified as per DA Cir 127, 1953.
Action: G2.
Info: AF, G3, SEC DEF, OSA, CSA, NAVY, JCS, PMG, G1.
CM in 14857. (23 Jul 50) DTG: 230411Z rje/c.

On the 13th of July 1955, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated in a message to the Secretary General of the United Nations that:

I have the honor to inform you that the people's army of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is strictly abiding by the principles of the Geneva Convention in respect to prisoners of war.

This message, a copy of which I offer, is marked as "Tab G."

[Telegramme]

DOCUMENT No. 16

Le Secretaire General de l'ONU au CICR.

L'ABE SUCCES, le 15 juillet 1950.

2295. Reply your cable, Pyongyang Government sent message as follows:

"In reply your telegram 12 July, I have honor to inform you that People's Army of Democratic People's Republic of Korea is strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect to prisoners of war.


Note steps you have taken to send Intercross representative North Korea.

TRYGVE LIE,
Secretary General, United Nations.

There is no record indicating whether either the People's Republic of China or the commander of the Chinese Communist forces explicitly undertook to apply the terms of the convention to the Korean hostilities.

Nevertheless, the foreign minister of the Central People's Republic of China informed the Swiss Government on July 16, 1952, that the Central People's government had decided to recognize the 1949 convention with certain reservations. These reservations were in all respects identical to the four reservations made by the Soviet bloc to the convention at Geneva in 1949. These reservations are set forth in a message by the Chinese Communist regime which I have marked as "Tab H."

LEGATION DE SUISSE,
Washington, D. C., July 18, 1952.

The Honorable DEAN ACHESON,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Sir: Upon the instructions of the Federal Political Department, I have the honor to inform you that the Swiss Government has received from the Minister of China in Berne, on July 16, 1952, the following declaration:


Mr. Chou En-Lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, was authorized on July 13, 1952, to make the following statement:

In accordance with article 55 of the common program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which provides: "The Central People's Gov-
ernment of the People’s Republic of China shall examine the treaties and agreements concluded between the Kuomintang and foreign governments, and shall, in accordance with their contents, recognize, abrogate, revise, or reconclude them respectively.”

The Central People’s Government has examined “the convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field, the convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea, the convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war,” and “the convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war,” which were signed in Geneva on August 12, 1949, in the name of China.

The Central People’s Government considers that the contents of the above-mentioned conventions are basically conducive to a lasting peace amongst all nations and are in conformity with humanitarian principles and, therefore, has decided to recognize them.

The Central People’s Government declares at the same time, that, in connection with these conventions, there are certain principles which the Central People’s Government deems to be of extreme importance and must insist upon. These principles are, for instance, that the substitute for a protecting power shall be subject to the consent of the power to which the protected persons belong, that the detaining power shall not be allowed to be absolved of its liability even after the prisoners of war, or the wounded and sick, have been transferred to another power, that the protection provided for in the conventions shall be equally applicable to civilian persons outside the occupied territory, and that the prisoners of war who have been convicted as war criminals according to the principles established by the International Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo shall not be entitled to the benefits of the convention concerned.

The Central People’s Government is prepared to make reservations in regard to the provisions relative to these points, at the time of ratification, in order to assure more effective and satisfactory implementation of these conventions.

The Minister of the Republic of China to Switzerland has been instructed to transmit the present statement to the Swiss Federal Council by note, for communication to the governments of the contracting powers of these conventions.—PEKING, JULY 13, 1952.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

BRUGGMANN.

I will come back in a little more particular to one of those reservations in just a moment, sir.

The pertinent articles of the convention with respect to prisoners of war which have been touched upon in the testimony which you have heard are articles 13, 14, 16, 17, and 38. These articles are in some measure very specific. I don’t think that it would assist if I read them into the record, but I will tell you that they do require humanitarian treatment with respect to food, clothing, medical care, freedom from insult, public curiosity, the requirement that they give name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, that they are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their honor and person, and that they shall be treated alike by the detaining power, without adverse distinction based upon race, political beliefs, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. May I inquire whether any of those were contained in the reservations of the Communist countries?

Colonel GRABB. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They acceded to all of those?

Colonel GRABB. They are bound by all of those; yes, sir.

Article 38 I would like to read, however, which states:

While respecting the individual preferences of every prisoner, the detaining power shall encourage intellectual, educational, and recreational pursuits, sports, and games among prisoners and shall take the measures necessary to insure the exercise thereof by providing them with adequate premises and necessary equipment.
The convention thus allowed prisoners of war to participate in intellectual, educational, or recreational pursuits which might include activities which it actually were designed for Communist indoctrination or the fostering and development of attitudes favorable to such indoctrination.

The convention does prohibit the detaining power from compelling a prisoner to participate in such activity. There would, however, be no violation of the convention if a prisoner voluntarily engaged in these activities. Thus there is a slight loophole, if you would call it that, through which the Communist nations, engaged upon a program of mass indoctrination, might be able to drive a wedge if they were willing to overlook in many cases, as testimony before you has indicated, the fact that this must be a voluntary endeavor on the part of the prisoner.

The one reservation which I said I wanted to point out is the reservation by the Comunist bloc and by the Chinese Communists to article 85. Article 85 states that:

Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of detaining power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present convention.

This was, of course, an effort to make it certain that even if a so-called "war criminal"—I use it in quotes—were captured by one of the parties to the convention and tried by their laws, at least until the end of hostilities when things might be sorted out, he would continue to have the protecting power available to him, to have the right to clothing, food, and all the other privileges of the convention.

However, the Chinese Communists and the Soviet bloc stated as follows. They did not consider themselves—

bound by the obligation which follows from article 85 to extend the application of the convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the detaining power in accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the country in question for those who undergo their punishment.

It is my feeling that this reservation appeared to detract from the value of the ratification of the convention by the Communist states, that a prisoner of war convicted of war crimes by such state would no longer be regarded by them as protected by the 1949 prisoner of war convention. This reservation assumes particular importance in the event the prisoner has made an oral or written statement or confessions which could be used by his captors as the basis of charges against him of war crimes or crimes against humanity. It does not appear, however, although we heard this morning testimony from Captain Harris that he was accused of being a war criminal and he went through a sort of mock trial, that this particular, I will call it gimmick, was used in any marked degree by the Chinese Communists to attempt to escape the obligations of the convention.

In other words, these people had already been denied the very basic fundamentals of the convention, the basic protections, and they did not appear to go through the machinery of calling them a war criminal and having a mock trial.

The Chairman. They just didn’t go to that much trouble in most instances.
Colonel Grabb. Right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They treated them as war criminals, or substantially so, without any trial or anything else, while still retaining them as prisoners of war only. Is that correct?

Colonel Grabb. Yes, sir. It was suggested to me this morning while listening to Captain Harris’ testimony that I might take 2 or 3 minutes to point out to the committee what I consider to be violations of the convention specifically taken from his testimony. I can say at the outset that it is almost a catalog of utter and complete contempt for the convention as if you set out from the outset to violate it in toto.

Among others, the convention provides that solitary confinement may not be imposed except in the most rare of circumstances and then for the shortest possible period of time. Prisoners shall not be shackled. They shall not be exposed to the curiosity and insult of the local populace. They shall receive adequate medical attention. Their food shall be of sufficient caloric intake and quality to be able to maintain them in a healthy condition. Account shall be taken of their native diet. The clothing of the PW must be marked as must the hospital facilities and, more important, the prisoner of war camp itself must be marked to protect it from attack by the prisoner’s own side.

Clothing must be adequate. There must be permission to communicate with the homeland, the family, and friends. They must be paid. They must be given identity cards if they don’t have one of their own. They must be free from mental torture. They must be free from physical maltreatment. They must be given ample opportunity to exercise. Officers may not be forced to work, although I notice that Captain Harris said one time they were forced to work and he looked upon it as one of the better days that he underwent in the camp.

Most important of all, of course, is the failure of the Communist nations to provide a protecting power. There was no one to whom the prisoner could turn in the event that he felt he was being deprived of rights under the convention. The convention is very specific on the point that the prisoner must at all times have ready access to the representative of the protecting power who has been appointed to watch over his interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the protecting power?

Colonel Grabb. Throughout the entire conflict, sir, Switzerland did its best to get protecting power personnel into North Korea and never succeeded. They were met with such obvious push-offs as North Korea stating that they couldn’t get into North Korea except through China, and China would refuse to give them a visa. Then when China would give them a visa, they would be met with refusal by North Korea to give them a visa out of China into North Korea. The Swiss representatives spent months in Hong Kong trying to get in through China. They spent months in Russia, in Moscow, trying to get in through the North Korean and Chinese Embassies there. They were always told that no one was home.

Despite the efforts of this independent Swiss organization, the International Committee of the Red Cross, whom I am sure you are aware is an independent organization which has no real connection with the Red Cross as we know it, the American Red Cross—it is the International Committee of the Red Cross—the Swiss endeavored throughout the entire period of the conflict to get someone in and
never succeeded. As you are aware, we did permit the Swiss to police our camps.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Mr. KENNEDY. The matters that you have enumerated about Captain Harris' testimony are violations of the Geneva Convention, as you view it?

Colonel GRABB. Specific, clear and flagrant violations of the convention.

Mr. KENNEDY. Much of the testimony which has been given to this committee, which you have heard, have been violations of the Geneva convention regarding treatment of prisoners?

Colonel GRABB. Clearly, I would say, with the exception that in Captain Harris' testimony I am sure I missed a few incidents which I would consider as violations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel. You may stand aside. If we do not get another Senator present, we will just let the record stand as it is.

I, Lt. Col. Robert Grabb, do hereby certify that all of the testimony given me on Wednesday, June 27, 1956, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in connection with "Communist interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation of American civilian and military prisoners" is true and correct.

ROBERT F. GRABB.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 2d day of July, 1956.

HOWARD S. LEVIE, Colonel, USA.

The CHAIRMAN. General Erskine, you may come around, please. You may proceed by stating your name and your rank.

TESTIMONY OF GEN. GRAVES B. ERSKINE, MARINE CORPS (RETIRED), ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

General ERSKINE. Graves B. Erskine, General, United States Marine Corps, retired, now Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as Director of Special Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you have discussed with the staff the subject matter under inquiry and I believe you also appeared in executive session and testified?

General ERSKINE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are ready to proceed without counsel, you may do so, and give us your testimony.

General ERSKINE. I have a brief statement which I should like to read.

I appreciate the opportunity that you have offered the Department of Defense to present any additional information that might not have been brought out by previous witnesses.

You have heard a number of witnesses, many of whom are highly qualified in specialized fields and have had close personal observation and contact with many of the prisoners of war.

The conclusions which you will form as a result of the hearings will undoubtedly be similar to the conclusions which we have already reached within the Department of Defense and on which we have based corrective actions.

We have an abundance of evidence to attest to the fact that in Korea we faced, and we will continue to face in the future, a clever, deter-
mined enemy who, by any civilized standards must be classified as little better than common gangsters. They have shown utter disregard for international law except when it serves their own cynical purposes. Their failure to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War during the period of hostilities have been matched by their extensive violations of the Armistice Agreements for the last 3 years.

Since the Communists have given no indication of changing, we must be prepared for more of this in the future. The problem of resistance to Communist indoctrination by our military personnel requires corrective action in two different areas. The first of these is in the field of military training. For a military solution to this problem, we are turning to military discipline, more enlightened training, esprit de corps and morale. These are the most essential ingredients of any fighting force.

In May of last year, the Secretary of Defense appointed an eminently qualified committee of civilian and military membership to advise him concerning all aspects of the prisoner-of-war problem. The committee was in continuous session until they completed their report on July 29, 1955. On August 17, 1955, the President issued Executive Order 10631 which, for the first time in our history, established a Code of Conduct to guide and sustain our servicemen in the event of their capture. Under the guidance and supervision of the Department of Defense each of the services have developed a three-phase training program designed to strengthen the serviceman as to enable him to adhere to the principles of the code which are designed in his own best self-interest. Let me dispel any thought we are training young men to be prisoners of war. We are not. Our training is designed to teach our men how to evade capture, escape where possible, and if captured how to cope with the diabolical techniques known to be employed by the Communists.

The first training phase is designed to strengthen the character and moral fiber of all members of the Armed Forces. Each man is given a carefully planned program of motivational and educational training which extends throughout his service career. In addition, to the purpose and meaning of the Code of Conduct this training includes development of resistance to Communist political and economic indoctrination, a knowledge and appreciation of our American heritage, familiarity with our national war aims and character guidance including encouragement of religious beliefs.

The second phase is designed for all units and individuals in preparation for combat. Men are especially trained to develop mental and physical stamina under all conditions of combat, including capture. This phase stresses individual capability in evasion, escape and survival techniques. In addition, the serviceman is taught how to combat and survive the physical and mental conditions we know he must face as a prisoner of war under Communist control. He is taught to combat them individually and by organized resistance. He is taught to deal with informers, collaborators, and all other proponents of cooperation. He is trained to combat interrogation and indoctrination techniques such as false confessions, questionnaires and peace petitions. Technical training centers around the use of ruses, stratagems, evasion of disclosures, and the necessity for concealing vital
information. This phase of training also includes instruction as to his rights under the Geneva Conventions.

The third training phase is designed for specially selected units and individuals. These special operations are used to bring the aid and support of the United States Government to servicemen even while in custody of the Communists.

These are not mere plans which are under study. This training program has been in actual operation for nearly a year. It is now part and parcel of the normal training systems of the services. It is emphasized in realistic field exercises and in maneuvers. It is continuous, coordinated and now closely supervised.

We recognize that patriotic attitudes and character are largely formed prior to service entrance. In conjunction with other departments and agencies of the Government, assisted by representatives from labor, industry, and patriotic organizations, we are cooperating in extending our training in character and patriotism into the home, church, and school prior to entry into the service. We have continued in existence the Defense Advisory Committee which continuously audits progress in all phases of our program. They have reconvened only this month and reviewed in detail service operations and training over the past year. In addition, members have made personal field inspection. In their most recent assessment the Chairman called to the attention of the Secretary of Defense the commendable progress made to date.

In the event of another war—a thermonuclear war—the doorstep may become our Nation’s first line of defense. Under such circumstances the Serviceman’s Code of Conduct may well serve every American citizen.

I would like to emphasize that military training and education is not the complete solution. When our military personnel were captured in Korea they were removed from the field of military warfare. Under Communist control, however, they were immediately projected into the field of ideological and propaganda warfare.

If you examine closely the Communist utilization of prisoners of war in ideological and propaganda warfare and if you examine the Communist line of argumentation used in indoctrination, you will see that on the one hand they managed to hide the terrible cost in human life and misery of their own subjects that the Communist regimes willingly pay for each and every accomplishment. Slave labor for economic gain of the state finds its military counterpart in the use of “human sea” tactics through which they willingly accept the most frightful losses in order to take a tactical military objective. On the other hand, in their “hate America” campaign and in their efforts to cause dissension among Americans, they cleverly manage to distort out of all balance the small inconsistencies of the American way of life, thereby hiding its great accomplishments.

Not only among the military, but also among the American people as a whole, there is a lesson to be learned here. This one-sided line of argumentation leads us to various forms of self-criticism and to the guilt complex which some of our people displayed. To state it somewhat differently, we work ourselves into a position where we attempt to form American performance to match Communist promise. Inevitably this course becomes increasingly unprofitable.
I am very much gratified to note that the committee's hearings have managed to bring out the reprehensible and illegal nature of the deliberately applied techniques which the Communists used on our prisoners of war. To the degree that the responsibility for these uncivilized activities should be attached to the Communist regimes of China and North Korea, we should make sure that this is not forgotten. The Communist-bloc nations stipulated certain reservations when they signed the Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War. Through this subterfuge they have kept the door open for future classification of prisoners as "war criminals" when it suits their purposes. To this day, they have refused to admit their guilt for widespread violations of these conventions. As I mentioned earlier, we may expect more of this. We may expect them to use prisoners as hostages for bargaining and blackmail, and as mouthpieces and transmission belts for harmful propaganda whenever it is possible for them to do so.

To the extent that our military personnel were not prepared for this type of trickery and treachery, we intend to see to it that they are prepared to cope with it in the future.

That is my statement.

The Chairman. Thank you, General. I think it is very gratifying to the people of this country to know that a program is already activated and in effect and that this review of it made recently by the committee finds that it is operating with a considerable measure of success.

I don't know just what can be done. I wouldn't know the answer or the solution. Those of you who are trained in this area should certainly be complimented for doing everything you can to meet this problem in the future. I can hardly conceive of punishing someone after he is repatriated for maybe yielding under torture. I think they should be punished where they seemingly do it voluntarily in a spirit or desire to benefit and get some advantage for themselves over their fellow prisoners, but where a man is tortured, to the point he has to yield on some of these things to prevent pain and severe suffering, I don't know what I would do. I would hate to punish someone for doing something that under some circumstances I might do myself. I think, too, that a program acquainting military personnel with what they might expect if they become the captives of the Communist enemy would fortify them to meet those difficult situations much better than if they are not trained or not informed or prepared more or less by knowing what has happened to others and anticipating what they can expect if they are captured.

Is there anything further, Counsel?

Mr. Kennedy. I was wondering, General Erskine, if the story of the violations of the Geneva Convention and the mistreatment of at least a good portion of the troops has been told adequately, do you think, throughout the world? Have you any suggestions as to what might be done in that area?

General Erskine. I think we should do everything possible to bring the truth of this matter to the attention of the public and to the attention of the people of the world. I feel that it might be worth while if we could have this Code of Conduct which has been accepted by the Defense Department for our servicemen brought
before the UN in some way, to have it recognized there as a Code of Conduct at least by our allies. That would give us some propaganda advantage, I think, to show that we have this and this is where we stand in the future.

I was surprised to learn myself that we had never had a formal code adopted for our people in military service until after this Korean session when the President came out with his recent Executive order. I had always been under the impression, I had been instructed what to do, and so forth and so on, but I didn’t realize that we had no accepted and approved code of conduct.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Erskine.

General ERKINE. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly appreciate your comments. I think we have had an excellent summation in your presentation as well as in the testimony of other military personnel who have appeared before us.

I may say to the two of you who testified that I will have the counsel send you an affidavit which you may sign and return for the record stating that the evidence you have given is true. Thank you very much.

The committee is in recess.

I, Gen. Graves Erskine (retired), do hereby certify that all of the testimony given by me on Wednesday, June 27, 1956, before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in connection with “Communist Interrogation, indoctrination and exploitation of American civilian and military prisoners” is true and correct.

GRAVES R. ERKINE.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29th day of June, 1956.

E. W. HENL.

My commission expires December 29, 1959.

(Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m. the committee was recessed subject to call.)
APPENDIX

EXHIBITS

Exhibit No. 15

[International Red Cross stamp here]

This form will serve to give international organizations information with which to provide protection to prisoners in the custody of the People's Government of China.

Day  month  year

Name of prisoner  Number

Where born  Day  month  year of birth

Your military organization  Where located

Name of commanding officer  Personnel strength

What kind of weapons used  Objective

Name of mother and father

Father's occupation  Mother's occupation

Father's income  Mother's income

Radio, automobile, electric refrigerator in your home

Names of sisters  Address  City, Town, or Village

Names of brothers  Address  City, Town, and Village

What is your political faith

What is your religion  Education

What labor organization do you belong to

What was your monthly fee  Who was the leader of your local union

Address  City, Town, or Village  Political faith

Names of friends  Address  City, Town, or Village

Remarks: Note: Write your good impressions of the Chinese Volunteers and how they treated you when you were captured.

Sign your name here

(Exhibits Nos. 16 and 17 are on file with Committee.)
COMMUNIST PATTERNS OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION

By Albert D. Biderman, Intelligence Methods Branch, Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center, Air Research and Development Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., April 1955

INTRODUCTION

Terror is a paramount Communist weapon of conquest and control. A major objective of the Communists is to create the fear in the minds of their opponents that they possess mysterious, irresistible techniques for bending individuals to their will. Speculations about the extortion of false "bacteriological warfare confessions" from American airmen in Korea and about similar events have helped foster this fear. Labels such as "brain washing" and "menticide" reinforce the impressions of mystery and awe relating to Communist techniques of coercion.

In actuality, the means by which Communists extort false confessions or other compliance from persons under their power are neither new, mysterious, nor always irresistible. The various devices of coercive interrogation employed by the Communists have been known and used for centuries. They are based primarily on simple, easily understandable ideas of how an individual's physical and moral strength can be undermined, rather than upon subtle or startling psychological theories, Pavlovian or otherwise. Without ever capitulating, numerous individuals have withstood for months and even years the most determined Communist efforts to wring false statements from them and have survived to tell of their experiences.

This does not mean that men who have capitulated to such coercion, even after very short periods of time and seemingly slight duress, are weaklings, cowards, or fools. Cases of completely successful resistance to the most skilled and determined coercive interrogation represent spectacular feats of courage, endurance, and resolution. Not infrequently, extraordinary intelligence and insight have contributed as well. Sometimes, however, successful resistance is attributable as much to blunders of the inquisitors as to the singular strengths of the victim. For despite the fact that the Communists apply measures for inducing compliance in a more artfully calculated manner than has been encountered before, they are neither all-knowing nor all-powerful even when dealing with a seemingly powerless victim.

The impression that the Communist coercive methods create a zombie-like creature is a false one. Victims are not stripped of all independent will, of consciousness of what they are being forced to do, or of all ability to continue attempts at resisting and evading the demands of their captors. Men are seldom "broken," in theory a horse can be, so that they cease all attempts at resisting the demands of their masters. Their physical and moral strength may be so enfeebled that the amount of resistance and evasion to successive demands may appear insignificant in relation to the enormity of the acts they are compelled to commit. But however feeble the ability, the will to resist remains and reasserts itself as strength and means are found. Thus, one of the Air Force officers whom the Chinese Communists exploited most extensively for bacteriological warfare propaganda can be seen in the Communist film of his "confession" indicating to the world, by gesture, that he has his "tongue in his cheek." A recent analysis of the notorious Soviet purge trials of the late 1930's provides an extensive analysis of the veiled language the victims used in their "confessions" and in cross-examination to communicate what their real thoughts and feelings were.

There are several reasons for stating the above considerations, and for giving the description of Communist coercive methods which follows.

First of all, false notions should be combated which exaggerate the power of Communists over men and which contribute to the terror on which the Communists rely.

Secondly, the aura of mystery and dread which has long been associated with these methods is in itself a major factor in their effectiveness. The anxieties the victim may already have at the moment of his capture, from what he has heard about "brain washing" and the like, may be sufficient in themselves to weaken his ability to resist, with no particular effort from his captor needed. Disseminating...
realistic information may thus aid any who may fall into Communist hands in the future.

Thirdly, this is indeed a matter in which "to be forewarned is to be forearmed." The Communists place great reliance on the poor understanding of the victim of what is happening to him. Deceiving, tricking, and confusing the victim are important. It is also significant that certain individuals have maintained their moral strength under Communist interrogation and in similar stress situations by virtue of their ability to understand their experiences in a detached manner.\(^2\)

The description of Communist coercive methods, below, attempts to contribute to an understanding of the measures used by Communists to induce compliance from an individual prisoner. It is possible to do this since Communists, the world over, utilize a mode of pressuring the individual which is identical in its essentials and even in many of its details wherever and whenever used. Its application varies only slightly from place to place, from time to time, and from objective to objective. Soviet Russian secret police, Chinese Communist interrogators in Korea, and satellite purge trial "investigators" have all employed essentially similar methods. Slight variations make the techniques adaptable to such objectives as: extracting information from reluctant POW, extorting "confessions of guilt," making forced laborers more tractable, converting honest men into spies and false informers, or keeping domestic populations in line.

The dispassionate, generalized kind of description attempted here cannot substitute for the appreciation of the feelings experienced by a victim which only the personal accounts of the most insightful, honest, and eloquent victims provide. For anyone whose life involves the potential hazard of falling into Communist captivity, as is true of all Air Force combat personnel, the reading of such an account is recommended.\(^3\) Not recommended are accounts motivated by desires for self-justification and self-glorification, or laden with bitterness, vengeance, and propaganda, as many unfortunately but understandably are.

For the present purposes, different emphasis are required than in treatments of the same subject which aim primarily at informing the world of the monstrous barbarity of the Communist system. Probably no other aspect of communism reveals more thoroughly its disrespect for truth and the individual than its resort to these techniques. This, at the same time, is a demonstration of the fundamental weakness and insecurity of the Communist enemy—his unprecedented need to coerce the individual will, to falsify truth, and to attempt to reshape it and the individual man into that mythical world in which communism alone could thrive. No more important purpose could be served than to bring these facts home to the peoples of the world. To do this, the most brutal, ugly, and insane examples ought to be portrayed vividly.

This study, however, seeks to show that Communist attempts at individual coercion can be and ought to be resisted, and it is hoped that this paper will provide information which may help future victims resist. One important principle that requires emphasis here is that Communist purposefulness frequently limits Communist brutality. Although the Communists will attempt to utilize the anxiety which their notorious brutality has almost universally instilled, many interrogation victims will never be physically exposed to violence, even though they refuse to capitulate. The reasons for this vary, but an important one is that the Communists have learned that physical violence more frequently than not stiffens the resistance of the American prisoner, rather than the reverse.

Another significant principle which should be emphasized here is that communism assumes many disguises. At various times and places, it may seek to achieve its purposes by representing itself as a kindly, solicitous, smiling creature—at others, it may wantonly display its brutality in all its nakedness. Some prisoners have encountered communism in both guises; others in only one or the other. Many have been impressed by its abilities as a quick-change artist. Anyone falling into its hands should be well prepared to encounter communism in

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any of the forms it assumes—not even excluding indignant denials that it is communism at all.

The outline below is restricted to those measures which are used to undermine the resistance of the victim. This omits the positive, primarily verbal, measures which are used to fashion the victim's compliance in the manner desired for particular objectives; i.e., the verbal content of the interrogations themselves. A more extensive treatment than is possible here would be required to depict the plays on meanings, the verbal tricks and traps, the endless repetition of questions, the special language of Communist interrogation.

The material presented here is an outgrowth of a larger classified study of Communist exploitation of USAF prisoners of war being conducted jointly by the Officer Education Research Laboratory of the Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center and by the Evaluation Staff of the Air War College. While considerable reliance in preparing this outline has been placed upon the reports by USAF personnel who were POW of the Communists in Korea and Manchuria, a rather extensive review has also been made of the experiences of others who have been subjected to Communist coercive interrogations. Included were accounts by World War II POW of the Soviets, Soviet and satellite purge trial victims, and slave laborers. While this review indicated that the full repertoire of exploitative techniques was used against Americans during the Korean war, relatively few POW encountered them in their most skilled, intensive, and refined form. The North Koreans had comparatively few trained personnel for the effort. The Chinese Communists during the later stages of war were in some respects restrained in their methods by the likelihood of a truce and the necessity for repatriating prisoners.

It is likely that Americans who fall into Communist hands in the future will encounter captors who are better prepared. Perhaps the captives, too will be better prepared to thwart the captor.

OUTLINE OF BASIC COMMUNIST TECHNIQUES OF COERCIVE INTERROGATION

The major categories below are each essential elements of the Communist techniques for forcing false confessions, "self-criticisms," information, and other collaboration from reluctant prisoners. The major purposes believed to underlie the use of each element is given. Each general technique may take one or several of the various forms indicated. Almost all victims will encounter every one of the general techniques in some form or other. The success of the entire interrogation, however, frequently depends upon the careful combination of the specific kinds of stress into a pattern adapted to the particular victim and the particular objective. The selection and timing of the specific forms of the techniques are varied—apparently in accordance with estimates of the temperament and weaknesses of the subject, the nature and degree of his resistance, the character of his interrogator, the significance and urgency of the collaboration sought, and variations from time to time and place to place with regard to the overall policies governing the treatment of prisoners. Both the prisoner's compliance and the cessation of the interrogation process without any compliance have occurred after the application of only the mildest of these measures. On the other hand, many prisoners have had "the whole book thrown at them."

Purposes: To develop an intense concern with self; to make the victim dependent on the interrogator; to eliminate support of the victim's resistance, including mutual encouragement, praise, and blame from his fellows in terms of the moral standards of his own group.

(a) Complete solitary confinement: The prisoner is held for a prolonged period with no social contact whatsoever—not even with enemy personnel.

(b) Complete isolation: The prisoner is held with no contact with his fellows. The prisoner may live alone or together with his interrogator or with a guard.

(c) Semi-isolation: Two prisoners (less frequently, 3 or 4) under similar pressure are isolated from all others for prolonged periods. Frequently, one of the pair is regarded as more disposed to capitulation and hence likely to influence his partner in that direction.

(d) Group isolation: Small groups of prisoners (8 to 30) are held under extremely crowded and difficult conditions, with no communication outside the group. Individual prisoners are periodically pulled out for periods of intensive interrogation in complete isolation. Scarcity of space, food, and clothing are calculated to promote destructive competition and dissension among the group. Frequently, harsh punishments are inflicted for "violations of rules," which not only are expected to condition cooperation but are also calculated to alienate the members of the group from one another and to provoke fear of informers.
2. **Monopolization of attention**  
   Purposes: To fix the prisoner's attention upon his immediate predicament and discomforts.  
   (a) Physical isolation: The prisoner is held in a small, bare, windowless cell—sometimes in complete darkness.  
   (b) Other restrictions of sensory stimulation: The captors strive for control over the sights, sounds, and feelings that the prisoner experiences. Potentially gratifying or diverting sensations are reduced by denying the victim materials for reading, writing, or diversion; restricting the pleasure of movement by forbidding exercise or even, in some cases, any deviations from a fixed posture; serving monotonous food; etc. Exceptions are experiences which may orient the thoughts of the victim in accordance with some Communist purpose. Examples are the provision of the prisoner with Communist reading material as the only escape from boredom or worry; the hearing of real or feigned cries of anguish of another victim; a visit from a “friendly” interrogator; etc.  
   (c) Prolonged interrogation and forced writing: The thought and attention of the prisoner are concentrated in the manner sought by the captor through prolonged interrogation and through forced writing and rewriting of answers to very general questions. (See also 3 (f), below.)

3. **Induced debilitation, exhaustion**  
   Purposes: To weaken mental and physical ability to resist.  
   (a) Semistarvation: Rations restricted to minimum necessary to maintain life.  
   (b) Exposure: Subjection to intense cold, intense heat, or dampness.  
   (c) Exploitation of wounds and induced chronic illness: Dysentery, colds, skin disorders, and other chronic illnesses which do not present immediate threats to the life of the prisoner are allowed to progress unchecked to keep the individual in a state of intense discomfort and debilitation. Wounded prisoners may be told they can be treated only after completing the interrogation.  
   (d) Sleep deprivation: The victim is robbed of sleep when he is forced to attempt to rest in uncomfortable positions, with a minimum of protection from cold, and on a hard, vermin-infested floor or platform. Sleep is frequently interrupted by waking prisoners for interrogation or a “bed-check.”  
   (e) Prolonged constraint: Long periods of forced sitting or standing at attention or in other strained positions; confinement in a box, hole, or shackles permitting only painful, unnatural postures.  
   (f) Prolonged interrogation or forced writing: Persistent interrogation for many hours each day over a period of weeks or months; round-the-clock “conveyor belt” interrogation by successive interrogators; wearying, forced writing and rewriting of answers to interminable repetitious questions. (See also 2–c, above.)

4. **The cultivation of anxiety and despair**  
   Purposes: To develop disorganized and irrational responses; to make compliance appear trivial in relation to the victim's peril; to make eventual compliance appear inevitable, with not even death possible as an avenue of escape. (See also 5, below.)  
   (a) Threats of death: In addition to verbal threats, prisoners are forced to dig their own graves; undergo or observe fake executions; and to endure trial and sentencing to death by fake tribunals.  
   (b) Threats of nonrepatriation: Prisoners are told they will never be repatriated unless they comply.  
   (c) Threats of punishment as a “war criminal”: Prisoners are told that they will be considered “war criminals” until they comply; that they will be tried as “war criminals”; that they will be turned over to the civilian population for punishment.  
   (d) Threats of endless isolation: Prisoners are told that the interrogators are not in a hurry; that they will be held continuously in isolation and constantly interrogated until they capitulate.  
   (e) Vague threats: Threats may sometimes be vague, either with the interrogator is veiling his threats in an attempt to maintain the fiction that he has a benevolent interest in the prisoner, or when he is attempting to convey the impression that a fate more terrible than words can express is in store for the prisoner if he persists in resisting.
(f) Threats against prisoner's family: Some Korean war prisoners were told that injury would be inflicted on their families by the Communist underground in the United States if they did not cooperate.

(g) Mysterious changes of treatment or place of confinement: The POW may frequently be moved from place to place, either temporarily or permanently ("with belongings") with no explanation as to the reason for the move. The objective appears to be to make the prisoner anxious regarding the consequences of the move. Great changes in treatment occur for no apparent reason.

(h) Changes in questioning and interrogators: Interrogations frequently take new and puzzling directions. Interrogators may frequently be changed.

5. **Alternating punishments and rewards**

Purposes: To "condition" the victim to comply; to hinder adjustment to privation; to indicate possibilities of "a happy future" in captivity.

(a) Occasional "favors": Almost never do the Communists allow the treatment of the prisoner to be completely negative in tone for any long period of time. Even when the most extreme deprivations are being inflicted, the prisoner may well receive his customary tobacco ration; a surprisingly good meal; some liquor in celebration of an American holiday; solicitous inquiries from his tormentor; etc. The intent is probably to convince the prisoner that the Communists are really "good people," to remind him of how pleasant things can be, and to prevent him from completing an adjustment to "doing without" various comforts.

(b) Extreme fluctuations of interrogators' attitudes: Interrogators will frequently switch from a calm or kindly manner to violent excoriation of the prisoner. Frequently, different interrogators will take different attitudes. One, sometimes appearing as of higher authority, will pretend to be the prisoner's benefactor who does not quite approve of the methods of his subordinates.

(c) Promises of improved conditions: Prisoners are told that they will be given regular POW status, that their isolation will end, that they will receive mail, good food, medical attention, etc., if they comply with the interrogator's demands.

(d) Special promises: POW may be promised special jobs or privileged status as rewards for cooperation.

(e) Rewards given for partial compliance: Most improvements of the prisoner's condition are represented as a reward for cooperativeness. Short of complete capitulation, and generally even then, rewards are trivial—cigarettes, a blanket, somewhat better food, or merely a good word from the interrogator.

(f) Tantalizing: Prisoners may be shown rewards (e.g., good food, pictures of other POW at play, or a well-fed and well-groomed POW may be brought in), which they are told will be given them if they cooperate. Cigarettes may be given in quantity, but matches withheld. Tasty food may be given, but in miniscule quantities.

6. **Demonstrating “omnipotence” and “omniscience” of captor**

Purposes: To suggest futility of resistance.

(a) "Omniscience": Painstaking efforts are made to collect minute facts about the prisoner, his unit, his friends, and his previous life, generally. This information is fed to the prisoner to bolster the interrogator's assertions: "We know all about you!" Useful information for this purpose is gained from fellow prisoners; information given by the prisoner himself in previous interrogations and questionnaires; letters the POW has written or received; and United States newspapers and radio broadcasts. The interrogators attempt to create the impression that they already know the answers to all the questions they ask and that the interrogation is "a test of the cooperativeness and veracity of the prisoner." Subjects are constantly accused of lying and being caught in lies.

(b) "Omnipotence": The prisoner is shown evidence, real or false, that other POW have capitulated—especially those with whom the subject is acquainted. Other POW may be forced to tell him that resistance is futile. Interrogators behave at all times as if cooperativeness on the part of the subject is taken for granted. Refusals are reacted to with feigned surprise. Noncooperation is treated as a strange and foolish aberration. Interrogators may make frequent mention of the might of the Communists. Many heavily-armed guards are in evidence. Strict obedience to many rules is required of the prisoner. (See also 8, below.)

7. **Degradation**

Purposes: To make capitulation appear less damaging to self-pride than the indignities and debasement inflicted because of resistance; to reduce the prisoner to simple, "animal level" concerns.
(a) Personal hygiene prevented: Facilities for maintaining bodily cleanliness are withheld; combs and shaving equipment are taken away; in extreme instances the individual may be forced to live in his own filth.

(b) Filthy, infested surroundings: The problem of personal sanitation is aggravated by the deliberate choice of filthy, vermin- or rodent-infested places of confinement.

(c) Demeaning punishments: Slapping, ear-twisting, and other degrading, but physically mild, punishments may be inflicted.

(d) Insults and taunts: Interrogators verbally abuse the prisoner. An insult which appears to affect the prisoner will be repeated, e.g., information regarding the personal life of the prisoner which the interrogators possess from other sources will be distorted so as to cast aspersions against his own or his wife's morality; an ailment complained of may be falsely diagnosed as venereal disease.

(e) Denial of privacy: Prisoners may be subject to constant surveillance; if vulnerable to embarrassment, they may be forced to perform private functions in public.

8. Enforcing trivial and absurd demands

Purpose: To develop habit of compliance.

(a) Forced writing: Most POW are required to write and rewrite answers to numerous questions—frequently, exceedingly trivial questions. They are given only very general instructions and forced to rewrite answers over and over again until "an acceptable" version is completed. In this way, the tendency to seek to understand and satisfy the interrogator's wishes is fostered.

(b) Enforcing rules: Numerous rules are stipulated (and punishments are given for violations of rules which have never been stated). These rules may even include the position which is to be assumed when sleeping, the prisoner being awakened if he changes position. Permission may be required from the interrogator or guard for the performance of almost any act; to stand up, sit down, sit in the sun, wash, or go to the latrine.

(c) "Upping the ante": Either at the outset of an interrogation, or when faced with resistance to a consequential demand, the interrogators will pretend that all the prisoner needs to do to end the interrogation is to comply with a relatively trivial demand. In seeking a false confession, for example, the interrogator may ask a resistant prisoner to write a denial of the accusation, then successively more and more detailed denials, and finally, to eliminate all the negative statements in the denial, thus changing a "denial of charges" to a "confession of their truth." Similarly, in attempts to extract true information from prisoners who maintain a rigid silence, the interrogator indicates that no information is required from the prisoner, but that some simple statements are needed from him "for the record" or to "insure that you are a pilot and not really a spy," etc. The interrogator may plead with the prisoner not to remain endlessly in solitary confinement, or "be shot as a spy" because of such a trivial matter.

SUPPLEMENTARY COMMENTS

Violence and torture

Physical violence and torture have not been included in the above list, despite their frequent use by the Communists. This omission is intended to emphasize the fact that physical torture is not an essential part of the Communist repertoire. The available evidence suggests, in fact, that torture may intensify, rather than weaken, the resistance of the prisoner and that more skillful and experienced Communist interrogators avoid its use.

POW of the Communists are apt to encounter physical violence as a coercive measure, however. This seems especially likely to occur (a) when a prisoner displays unusually intense fear when threatened with violence; or (b) when the interrogator is poorly trained, inexperienced, or sadistically inclined.

POW of the North Koreans, especially in very early stages of the war, were more likely to encounter crude torture methods than the more calculated techniques described in the above outline.

Self-inflicted pain

Increased understanding of the patterns described above can possibly be gained by noting one characteristic of these techniques: The emphasis in the pattern is on the individual doing things to himself, rather than on things being done to him.

The assertion that physical violence is not an essential element of these Communist techniques should be qualified accordingly. In a way, it would be more
accurate to say that external violence—external torture—is not essential to the pattern, and in fact, seems to conflict with it. Self-inflicted torture is a frequent part of the pattern, however. Requiring the individual to stand at attention for extremely long periods or to assume other strained, painful positions is the typical form this takes.

Self-inflicted pain has distinct advantages for rendering the subject cooperative.

In the simple torture situation—the bamboo-splinters technique of popular imagination—the contest is clearly one between the individual and his tormentor. Can he endure pain beyond the point to which the interrogator is able to go in inflicting pain? The answer, from the standpoint of the interrogator, is all too frequently yes.

Where the individual is brought to inflict pain on himself, however, as when he stands for long periods at attention, an intervening factor is introduced. The immediate source of pain is not something the interrogator is doing to the victim, but something the victim is doing to himself. The contest becomes one of the individual against himself. The motivational strength of the individual is likely to exhaust itself in this internal struggle.

Bringing the subject to act against himself has other advantages to the interrogator. As long as the subject can be brought to do this, there is no showdown on the actual ability of the interrogator to injure the subject. Although a few former victims assert that they continue self-inflicted tortures out of pride, most have felt that something worse would happen to them if they disobeyed the interrogator's orders to assume some pain-producing position. More frequently than not, the extent to which the interrogator was willing or permitted to inflict physical punishment actually was very limited. In most of the Korean and Manchurian POW situations, it appears to have been limited to cuffs, slaps, and kicks. Frequently, it seems to have been limited to shouted threats and insults. Returnees who have undergone long periods of sitting or standing assert that no conceivable experience could be more excruciating.

A corresponding advantage of self-inflicted torture from the standpoint of the interrogator is that it is consistent with formal adherence to the mythical principles of legality and humaneness important to the Communists. These principles are important in the interrogation situation itself; for example, in facilitating the adoption of a positive attitude by the subject toward the interrogator and the forces he represents. Adherence to these principles protects the interrogator from potential punishment at some future time for mistreating prisoners. There also is considerable propaganda advantage when victims are released if to be truthful they must admit that no violence was actually used against them.

As a reading of the outline of coercive techniques will disclose, this emphasis on having the subject do things to himself, as against things being done to him, is not confined to the matter of physical punishment. The techniques, in general, seem to strive for a maximum enlistment of the subject's energies in the encounter. The environment of the prisoner is structured so that it is next to impossible for him to avoid thinking about things the interrogator wishes him to thing about. He is led to ask himself the questions of fact that are of importance to the interrogator. He himself must figure out what his crime was. He is brought to develop in his own mind the consequences of continued resistance. His own pride is the measure of the degradation he suffers. And, as is explained later, his own guilt is likely to become the key factor in the outcome.

**Ideological appeals**

An almost universal feature of Communist interrogations is the frequent injection of political and moral arguments. Appeals are made for the cooperation of the prisoner on the seeming assumption that he accepts the Communist viewpoint of the matter at issue. Almost all interrogations feature attempts by the interrogator to arouse the class consciousness, the "love of peace," or some similar attitude of the prisoner as a basis for securing his cooperation. This aspect of interrogation is necessary to the Communists when a confession is sought for propaganda use, since the confession must include expressions of repentance and other ideological references to fit its propaganda objective. In the case of interrogations of American POW by the Communists, when the interrogation objective was true information, the use of these Communist political appeals generally seemed to hinder the attainment of the objective. The alien political appeal generally intensified the prisoner's determination to resist. Not infrequently, it made the interrogator appear a ludicrous figure for believing in obvious absurdities.
Mind reform

It should be pointed out, however, that much of the interrogation which captives of the Communists experience is oriented toward gaining their total submission, rather than any single act of collaboration. As Communist interrogators put it: "You do not have the correct attitude. I am trying to help you adopt the correct attitude. You must change your attitude." The correct attitude, of course, involves viewing everything from the Communist political and moral perspective. It involves not only submitting to the expressed demands of Communist authority, but learning to act in terms of correct anticipations of what its demands will be. This is the broader concept of mind reform as it figures in the coercive interrogations of individuals. Analogous measures are applied to groups within Communist society and, through mass campaigns, to the society as a whole.

Much concern has been aroused by instances of victims of Communist coercion continuing to show an apparent acceptance of Communist political and moral beliefs for varying periods after they have been freed from coercion. Not even in cases where individuals had some earlier predisposition to Communist ideology is it readily comprehensible to many how these victims could have any feelings other than hatred for everything for which the perpetrators of the abominable outrages against them stood.

It is not the intention here to suggest that the behavior of these individuals, or human behavior, generally, is other than an exceedingly complex matter. Nonetheless, it is felt that a basic, readily understandable explanation of succumbing to mind reform exists. This is a principle upon which communism, and all states based upon terror, rely for whatever mobilization of the wills of their subjects they can secure. Communist terror confronts the individual with a choice between external punishment if he does or thinks what he regards as right, and internal punishment (guilt) if he begins to do or think as the Communists demand. One way out, of course, is for him to change his conscious ideas of what is right and wrong to accord with that of the Communists. The heavy emphasis in Communist coercive interrogation upon moral arguments attempts to provide the victim with a new moral justification for his behavior.

Paradoxically, the more morally outrageous the Communist demand, the more intense is the conflict for the individual when, as is almost inevitable under intense duress, he contemplates the possibility that he may be forced to comply. Similarly, the firmer the moral convictions of the victim, the greater is the internal torment during the effort to continue resistance.

In different cases, the moral rationalizations of unwilling compliance are of varying degrees of intensity. In some instances, reconciling the conflict may require only superficial rationalizations. In others, only by repressing intensely held values can the individual avoid what for him is intolerable self-reproach. How fundamental a self-delusion is required depends upon the nature of the demands made upon the victim by the Communists, upon the thoroughness and skill of the coercive tactics employed against him, and upon his own personality. Some have been able to regard each particular demand for collaboration separately and merely had to convince themselves that their submission was really of no particular consequence. Thus, some victims of pressure for false germ warfare confessions during the Korean conflict assured themselves that the confessions they gave the Communists were not really of any value and there was consequently nothing morally wrong with playing along to escape further duress. Others, faced with demands they could not regard as other than intensely repugnant, could not escape remorse through so easy a rationalization.

In the latter event, there were three possible outcomes. Some continued to draw sufficient strength from their self-esteem to continue resistance. Others, though brought to capitulate, were able to accept and live with their feelings of guilt. For others, only a reversal in consciousness of ideas of right or wrong could make their capitulation appear tolerable.

Recovery of true consciousness in the last type of case has frequently occurred as soon as the source of terror has been removed. In a very few cases, including the much publicized two most thoroughly brainwashed recently released by the Chinese Communists, recuperation is slower.

To the extent that the discussion here is sound, three kinds of solution to the individual's problem exist. Guilt can be minimized. Guilt can be accepted. Guilt can be avoided. All are possible. All are defensible.

Guilt can be minimized where the demands upon the individual are indeed of trivial importance in relation to the costs of resistance. Not infrequently, demands made by the Communists can legitimately be regarded as such. As has
been pointed out above, pressing trivial demands is one of the Communist tech-
niques. Vainglorious behavior in such circumstances may eventuate in inglorious
consequences. When demands are not trivial, guilt can also be reduced by the
recognition that better men than oneself have had to bend before Communist
pressures.

Judgments of one's own behavior are made in terms of one's own standards,
however. Where an individual feels that he has yielded too much or too readily,
and feels compelled to judge himself harshly in terms of his standards, insight
into the dangers of deluding himself to escape this judgment may help protect him
from a more devastating outcome.

The most desirable solution for the individual, and for what he represents, is
the avoidance of guilt by resisting all efforts to force him into behavior contrary
to his beliefs.

This paper assumes that an understanding of both the external and internal
pressures it has sought to describe will increase the ability of captives of the
Communists to attain this most desirable solution.

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