

Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: In reaching such a judgment, Admiral, do you have to consider the possible result of a mistake?

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Admiral Kimmel: You should, yes.

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Mr. Richardson: And if the mistake of the one hand might result in the destruction of the Fleet as against a delay in training what have you to say to that?

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Admiral Kimmel: It was not a delay in training that was involved in this. The primary thing that we had in mind all the time was to be ready for offensive action.

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Mr. Richardson: Well, then, let me re-state my question.

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In reaching a judgment as to what you were to do, what weight would you give the fact that a mistake with respect to a possible air attack on Hawaii which might result in the destruction of your Fleet as compared with the preparation of your Fleet for future offensive action outside of Hawaii?

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Admiral Kimmel: In the first place, I never believed that an air attack on Hawaii, on Pearl Harbor would result in the destruction of the Fleet. I was firmly convinced at the time that torpedoes would not run in the waters of Pearl Harbor and if it had not been for the destruction accomplished by the torpedoes at that time the damage would have been comparatively negligible.

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Mr. Richardson: Weren't you told, Admiral, in the letter of June 13th, which was the second letter in the series with



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2 respect to torpedoes launched from planes, that it cannot be  
3 determined that any preexisting depth of water is too shallow  
4 to dispose of the possibility of torpedo attack?

5 Admiral Kimmel: You have not stated that exactly cor-  
6 rectly. What it did state --

7 Mr. Richardson: Would you mind reading it?

8 The Vice Chairman: Permit the chair to inquire. That is  
9 a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to you as Com-  
10 mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that correct, Mr.  
11 Counsel?

12 Admiral Kimmel: No, that is not a letter from the Chief  
13 of Naval Operations to me as Commander-in-Chief. It is a  
14 letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants  
15 of the various Naval Districts, with a copy sent to me for  
16 information.

17 The Vice Chairman: You received it?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I received it.

19 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now read it.

20 Admiral Kimmel: I might state, since you brought that  
21 question up --

22 The Vice Chairman: I just wanted to identify what you  
23 are fixing to read, that is what I had in mind.

24 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but you have reminded me of some-  
25 thing.



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 The Vice Chairman: All right.

3 Admiral Kimmel: That was a letter that was addressed to  
4 me as Commander-in-Chief on February 13th, if I remember the  
5 date correctly, and in it the Chief of Naval Operations told  
6 me as Commander-in-Chief that the minimum depth of water of  
7 75 feet may be assumed and that 150 feet is what they would  
8 most likely need; that is the essence of it. At the same time  
9 the Chief of Naval Operations wrote a letter to the Commandants  
10 of the districts, in which he included approximately the same  
11 information.

12 Now, when the change came in this letter of June 13th  
13 he did not write anything to me. He wrote a letter to the  
14 Commandants of the Districts and sent me a copy of the letter.  
15 I got the letter, there is no question about that. I just  
16 want to show you the difference.

17 The Vice Chairman: All right. Read it, please, sir.

18 Admiral Kimmel: Paragraph 2 of this letter of June 13,  
19 1941 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of  
20 the various Naval Districts states:

21 "Recent developments have shown that United States  
22 and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at  
23 heights of as much as 300 feet, and in some cases may  
24 initiate dives of considerably less than 75 feet, and  
25 make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it



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2 cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valu-  
3 able vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of  
4 attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance  
5 to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run  
6 to arm the torpedo."

7 Paragraph 3:

8 "While no minimum depth of water in which Naval  
9 vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as  
10 providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be  
11 assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors  
12 considered by any attack force, and an attack launched  
13 in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much  
14 more likely.

15 "As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched  
16 by the British at Taranto, were, in general, at thir-  
17 teen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several tor-  
18 pedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fath-  
19 oms."

20 Now, there is no information, definite information in  
21 there anywhere that you can launch a torpedo at less than  
22 ten fathoms.

23 Mr. Richardson: And you concluded --

24 Admiral Kimmel: Now, I would like to add to that just  
25 a little bit.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead.

3 Admiral Kimmel: I was not the only man who read this  
4 letter. I had a very competent staff. Their accomplishments  
5 during this war have proved that beyond doubt. Admiral Bloch,  
6 who was more directly concerned with this, any protection that  
7 should have been afforded in the harbor because he would have  
8 been the one to install it, all of my staff, Admiral Bloch  
9 and I considered the torpedo danger negligible after receiv-  
10 ing this letter.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, in connection with the  
12 subject of information and referring to information from ex-  
13 ternal sources and what I may call information from internal  
14 sources, is it correct to say that the external sources would  
15 be, first, intelligence reports to you, both local and from  
16 other sources; second, information you might get from spies  
17 or espionage of your own if you had any such; third, a formal  
18 declaration of war.

19 Now, what other sources of information would there be from  
20 the exterior to the commander of a fleet as to a possible com-  
21 ing attack than may fall within those three categories?

22 Admiral Kimmel: The Commander-in-Chief and the Command-  
23 ant of the Naval District had in Hawaii an Intelligence unit  
24 and this Intelligence unit was primarily concerned with infor-  
25 mation which they could obtain in the Hawaiian Islands. The



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2 only exceptions to that were what is known as the traffic  
3 analysis method of locating ships. That was a radio- direction  
4 finder hookup which permitted them to make certain traffic  
5 analyses.

6 Mr. Richardson: These were Hawaii originated activities?

7 Admiral Kimmel: No, they were not Hawaii originated ac-  
8 tivities. They were part, - Hawaii was part of a net, - I am  
9 talking now about traffic analysis, - which included Guam and  
10 Manila.

11 Mr. Richardson: Oh, I see.

12 Admiral Kimmel: But I think what you are driving at and  
13 what I hope to answer is that practically all information that  
14 we could hope for from spies abroad, from intercepts, from  
15 diplomatic exchanges, from Naval attaches' reports and from  
16 the multitudinous means that Washington had of obtaining in-  
17 formation had to be supplied to me by Washington. I had no  
18 way to get it.

19 Mr. Richardson: If there had been a formal declaration  
20 of war and you had been advised of that, would that have been  
21 information which would have changed your Hawaiian disposi-  
22 tions?

23 Admiral Kimmel: If we had had a formal declaration of  
24 war my troubles would have been practically ended.

25 Mr. Richardson: Now, so far as internal sources of in-



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2 formation against an attack you would have radar?

3 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

4 Mr. Richardson: You would have your distance patrol?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

6 Mr. Richardson: And then you would have the military de-  
7 ductions that you as the Chief might eventually make on the  
8 information you had?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: Now, let me run over with you the know-  
11 ledge that you had in Hawaii on December 6th. You knew at  
12 that time of the fundamental importance of the Pacific Fleet?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, I had known that for a long  
14 time.

15 Mr. Richardson: And you knew at that time of the vulner-  
16 ability of the Pearl Harbor base?

17 Admiral Kimmel: I did not know that the Pearl Harbor base  
18 was nearly as vulnerable as it proved to be, as I have just  
19 tried to explain in regard to this torpedo business.

20 Mr. Richardson: Except for the liability of torpedo at-  
21 tack was there any other vulnerability of the base that you  
22 did not appreciate?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Well, not that I can recall at the pre-  
24 sent moment.

25 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, you knew at that time that



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Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 your armament, whether considered as patrol planes or fighter  
3 planes or bombers or anti-aircraft guns was insufficient to  
4 permit you to make a full, satisfactory defense of Pearl Har-  
5 bor?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I will answer that this way: A full,  
7 satisfactory defense of an island base can never be assured  
8 no matter what you have there. The element of surprise, the  
9 element of a fast moving, superior air force coming down on  
10 you, - and although we would have been in much better case had  
11 we had the additional forces which you have outlined here  
12 previously, we could not have had absolute security there. And  
13 we were not entirely helpless out there. I do not want any-  
14 body to get the idea that I thought we were.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, insofar as your armament avail-  
16 ability was lessened your ability to defend also lessened,  
17 did it not?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes, of course.

19 Mr. Richardson: Now, you had at the time a Fleet suf-  
20 ficiently inferior in size so that it had to remain general-  
21 ly in a defensive position?

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

23 Mr. Richardson: You knew that war was imminent?

24 Admiral Kimmel: I knew that the relations were badly  
25 strained. I knew that war had been predicted time and again



Witness Kimmel

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2 during the past year. Just how imminent was just what I did  
3 not know and I did not know that a dead line date had been  
4 set, I did not know that after a certain date things were  
5 going to happen automatically; I did not know but that the  
6 situation had eased somewhat in the ten days since I had re-  
7 ceived the warning.

8 Mr. Richardson: You knew of the Japanese reputation  
9 for surprise attacks?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: You knew how closely they corresponded  
12 to a declaration of war?

13 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, yes, I had known that they had  
14 corresponded closely to a declaration of war.

15 I think there has been a little misconception about the  
16 Japanese attack on Port Arthur. My recollection of that  
17 Japanese attack is they had broken off diplomatic relations  
18 some two or three days, I think it was four days, before they  
19 made the attack on Port Arthur.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, was not one of the things, Ad-  
21 miral, constantly discussed by you and your staff that Japan  
22 was just the kind of a nation that might attack without warn-  
23 ing?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

25 Mr. Richardson: Now, you knew at that time of the ap-



Witness Kimmel

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priateness from a military standpoint of an air attack on Oahu?

Admiral Kimmel: No, I cannot say that I fully appreciated the appropriateness of an air attack on Oahu at that time. In the first place, there were very many difficulties that the Japanese had to overcome in order to be able to make that attack. I had been warned of a surprise attack. I had been told where that surprise attack was coming, at least by implication; that it was to be against Thai, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, Philippines.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Well, now, did you understand, Admiral, that the attack on Thai or Borneo or the Philippines, or down to the China Sea was a surprise attack?

Admiral Kimmel: Why yes. Why not? We did not know which place they were going. They could have attacked many places. They could have made a surprise attack in many places.

As a matter of fact, one of the most productive places for them to make a surprise attack was in the Philippines. That, I think, was mentioned by the Chief of Naval Operations to me as one of the most embarrassing things that could happen to us.

Mr. Richardson: He said it would be embarrassing, but did he say it would be a surprise?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, the surprise could very easily be gotten from the tenor of all of the dispatches, yes, a surprise attack in the Philippines.

Mr. Richardson: In view of the fact that pretty near all of the dispatches that you had from Washington, and in view of your suggestion that those dispatches misled you because they constantly talked of the Philippines, Thai Peninsula, Indo-China, Malasia, you still think that those attacks would be a surprise attack similar to what a surprise



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 attack would be on Oahu that had never been mentioned?

3 Admiral Kimmel: They could very easily have made a  
4 surprise attack on any one of the places I mentioned. They  
5 could have made a surprise attack on the ships of the  
6 Asiatic Fleet, as far as that goes.

7 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, in your correspondence with  
8 the Chief of Naval Operations, including your conversation  
9 with President Roosevelt on your visit to Washington, one  
10 form of attack on Hawaii that was constantly mentioned  
11 was an air attack?

12 Admiral Kimmel: That is right, and there was just one  
13 reason that was constantly mentioned, and that reason was  
14 because we wanted to be sure they could not make a success-  
15 ful air attack, and we felt reasonably certain that any  
16 other form of attack would not have been successful because  
17 we had the means to combat it, and we were emphasizing our  
18 deficiencies.

19 Mr. Richardson: Well, now, Admiral, it would seem  
20 from an examination of the dispatches that after about  
21 October, say the first of October, there seems to have  
22 been no more mention of air attack in the correspondence  
23 and the dispatches that passed between you and Washington.

24 Have you any explanation of why, for a period of six  
25 months or more, there should be such constant reference to



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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1  
2 air attack and then a sudden cessation of reference to  
3 it in the trend of dispatches after about the first of  
4 October?

5 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I presume that you have been  
6 over the correspondence, and that what you say is indicated.  
7 However, I think I read a dispatch here this morning of  
8 November 29, and in that we were talking about anti-aircraft  
9 guns, 37 millimeter guns.

10 In my correspondence with the Navy Department, and  
11 particularly with the Chief of Naval Operations, I asked  
12 for many things. I pointed out many deficiencies.

13 The one that you have emphasized the most, - and as  
14 a matter of fact it has been emphasized the most since  
15 Pearl Harbor- - was that it had to do with anti-aircraft  
16 and an air attack.

17 I was equally concerned about the lack of bombs in  
18 Pearl Harbor. We had no bombs. There were not any out  
19 there when I took over -- a handful, perhaps. We had no  
20 replacement ammunition for the ships. We had no transporta-  
21 tion to get that ammunition, and those bombs out there and  
22 I remember in the early months of my time there I issued  
23 orders that every ship that came out there was to bring bombs  
24 and ammunition.

25 Of course, that is explosive, and I had to take that



Witness Kimmel

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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responsibility.

There were numerous other things I asked for besides anti-aircraft stuff. I was trying to and did emphasize a great many other things besides anti-aircraft. I tried to emphasize everything that we were lacking in.

Mr. Richardson: I simply wanted to ascertain whether the fact that an air attack seems to have not been the subject of comment after about the first of October, was due to any change in your belief that an air attack, which had been feared for six months during 1941, was no longer to be feared after October?

Admiral Kimmel: You have said I feared an air attack. I felt always that an air attack was a possibility. I felt that I would have been remiss if I had not called the attention of the Navy Department and the War Department, with all of the force at my command, to the necessity of providing against every contingency in Hawaii.

At no time did I consider that an air attack was any more than a possibility under the conditions that we had out there. What the events of a war might bring forth was quite a different thing.

Mr. Richardson: We might just as well explain it now. Why do you suggest that you did not think an air attack was more than a possibility? What were the reasons why it not



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 only could not have been limited to a possibility, but  
3 that it was not a probability?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I knew the difficulties of an  
5 overseas expedition such as that. I knew the short range,  
6 the steaming range of the Japanese aircraft carriers. I  
7 very much doubted their ability to plan and execute an  
8 attack such as they made. We had had various reports on  
9 the Japanese air force, and I think not only I, but all the  
10 Navy Department were very much surprised at the efficiency  
11 of their air force and the manner in which they conducted  
12 that attack.

13 Now, the hazard that they undertook when they came  
14 there was something that I thought they would never take  
15 a chance on.

16 Mr. Richardson: You also knew by December 7 --

17 Admiral Kimmel: And I might add that I gathered this  
18 opinion after a great deal of thought and a great deal of  
19 consultation with the best naval minds we had, and I think  
20 those naval minds were right in Hawaii at the time I was  
21 there.

22 Mr. Richardson: You knew, Admiral, of the burning  
23 of the Japanese codes by December 7, did you not?

24 Admiral Kimmel: You mean the message of December 3rd?

25 Mr. Richardson: That is one of them. There was more



Witness Kimmel Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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than one with reference to the burning of codes, was there not?

Admiral Kimmel: There was only one that I recall at the moment. There was a message of December 3rd which said the Japs were burning most of their codes and ciphers in London, Hongkong, Batavia, Washington, and so forth.

Mr. Richardson: What would that indicate to you?

Admiral Kimmel: At that time it indicated to me, in conjunction with the other messages I had that Japan was taking precautionary measures preparatory to going into Thai, and because they thought that the British or the Americans, or both of them, might jump on them and seize their codes and ciphers after they went into Thailand.

Now, that was the interpretation we gave on it at that time.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 Now incidentally, I would like to add another thing  
2 to that. That message came to me. It had nothing in it  
3 directing me to pass this on to General Short. That was  
4 a procedure that the Navy Department always used when they  
5 had an important message that they wanted me to give to  
6 General Short. I tried to give everything that I thought  
7 would be of interest to General Short to him anyhow.

8 But when the Navy Department sent me an important message  
9 which they thought should be conveyed to General Short they  
10 put that in the message. They did not put it in this  
11 message, and that in itself lent some weight to my construction  
12 of it.

13 Mr. Richardson: Did you advise General Short about it?

14 Admiral Kimmel: I did not personally, no, but you will  
15 hear from him about whether he heard about it or not.

16 Mr. Richardson: Did you instruct any of your staff  
17 to advise General Short?

18 Admiral Kimmel: I did not. I did not advise my staff  
19 to instruct General Short to do a great many things, but they  
20 did.

21 Mr. Richardson: They did what?

22 Admiral Kimmel: I say I did not instruct my staff to  
23 instruct General Short to do a great many things that they  
24 did automatically. Most of his information he got from the  
25 Commandant of the district.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 As I have tried to tell you, his liaison with the  
3 District on matters of that kind was more direct than it  
4 was with my Fleet Staff.

5 Now the District got everything that I did.

6 Mr. Richardson: I was just going to ask you, do you  
7 know that Admiral Bloch got this information with reference  
8 to the burning of codes?

9 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, yes.

10 Mr. Richardson: Then from your plan of operation that  
11 you had there you would expect that information to go from  
12 Bloch to Short or his staff?

13 Admiral Kimmel: To exchange the information, yes.

14 Mr. Richardson: Now you knew also on December 6th  
15 about the status which we spoke about this morning of the  
16 Jap espionage in Hawaii. You had all the knowledge you ever  
17 had up to December 7 about the presence in Hawaii of a flock  
18 of Japanese spies that were transmitting information into  
19 Tokyo as to the situation in Hawaii?

20 Admiral Kimmel: We knew about that, yes.

21 Mr. Richardson: You knew also on December 6 about these  
22 reports which had frequently come to you of military movement  
23 by Japan on the Asiatic Coast?

24 Admiral Kimmel: Oh yes, yes. That was following the  
25 pattern that was laid down in the messages of the 24th and



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 27th.

3 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, it is also a fact, isn't  
4 it, that on December 6 it was reported to you by one of your  
5 staff, under circumstances showing his nervous interest in  
6 the fact, that for six days the Japanese carriers had been  
7 lost?

8 Admiral Kimmel: I thought I covered that pretty com-  
9 pletely.

10 Mr. Richardson: You did. Let me finish.

11 And in response to his anxiety about it you made the  
12 remark, "Do you expect me to believe that the carriers are  
13 coming around Diamond Head?"

14 Now do you recall the incident and will you give us  
15 your version of it?

16 Admiral Kimmel: You are talking about the twinkle in  
17 my eye, I suppose.

18 Mr. Richardson: Well, that is part of it.

19 Admiral Kimmel: I do not recall the exact words that  
20 I used to Captain Layton, but I was very much interested in  
21 the location of all Japanese ships, not only the carriers but  
22 the other types. I felt if I could locate the carriers I  
23 would be able to determine pretty closely where the main  
24 Japanese effort was going to be. I went over these traffic  
25 analyses reports with Captain Layton every morning. Captain



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Layton was a very excellent young officer. He was very  
3 intense, and I have no doubt that I made such remark as that  
4 to him, not in any way to decry his efforts, or to treat the  
5 matter lightly, I did not treat the matter lightly, and he  
6 would be the last one to ever say that I treated the matter  
7 lightly.

8 Mr. Richardson: But you had a very different reaction  
9 to the suspected fact than he did?

10 Admiral Kimmel: No, I had no different reaction from  
11 what he had. If you have gotten that impression I think it  
12 is entirely erroneous.

13 Mr. Richardson: Did he come to you with a twinkle in  
14 his eye when he told you that he had not heard anything of  
15 the carriers for six days?

16 Admiral Kimmel: He came to me because I told him to  
17 come.

18 Mr. Richardson: Well, that is all right.

19 Admiral Kimmel: He came to me every morning. The  
20 first thing I did when I reached the office in the morning  
21 was to go over everything that had come in during the night.

22 Mr. Richardson: Did you get any idea from him when he  
23 came that he was not serious in this report about the loss  
24 of the six carriers?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Serious?



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: Of course he was serious. There was never any question of being serious. Not about the loss of the carriers. As far as we were concerned the carriers were never lost, and when people say the carriers were lost they might as well say the whole Japanese Fleet was lost.

Mr. Richardson: Well, Admiral --

Admiral Kimmel: Just one second, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Admiral Kimmel: We had during this period a wealth of traffic. There was a great deal of traffic. The only trouble was we were unable to identify it, and we were not only unable to identify the Japanese carriers, we were unable to identify pretty nearly all the Japanese Fleet. It was not that we had lost six carriers, that was not the thing. We did not even know we had lost them. We could not identify them.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Did not Layton use the word "lost"  
3 in reporting to you?

4 Admiral Kimmel: As far as I remember, no. All he  
5 said he was unable to identify them.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, you also had on December  
7 6, and the morning of December 7, various information with  
8 respect to real, or fancied submarine activities at the  
9 Hawaiian base?

10 Admiral Kimmel: That is right, I did.

11 Mr. Richardson: Now, in that connection, without refer-  
12 ring to those submarines which had been reported at an earlier  
13 date and referring to what we may call the Ward submarine --

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

15 Mr. Richardson: How many submarines were there dis-  
16 covered in the immediate Hawaiian-Pearl Harbor area on  
17 the morning of December 7?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, on the morning of December 7,  
19 there must have been a half-dozen altogether. There was  
20 one which came into the harbor and which was promptly  
21 sunk by one of the airplane tenders, and destroyer -- well,  
22 somebody else got into it, I forget now, but they hit him  
23 all about the same time.

24 Mr. Richardson: How far did that one get in?

25 Admiral Kimmel: He got all the way in to Ford Island.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Kimmell

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 He apparently did no damage at all. They got him right  
3 away.

4 I have never investigated this myself, because I left  
5 out there too soon to go into things like that, but my  
6 recollection is that he was supposed to have followed the  
7 Altair into the harbor, not the Altair -- one of the  
8 tugs into the harbor earlier in the morning when she came  
9 in through the gate, through the anti-torpedo net.

10 Now, mind you, this was a submarine of a type that we  
11 did not know existed, and we did not believe any submarine  
12 could get into the harbor without showing its periscope as  
13 it came in. That was the reason they got in.

14 Mr. Richardson: When was it sunk?

15 Admiral Kimmel: It was sunk inside

16 Mr. Richardson: I know, but when? Do you know  
17 the precise time? Could you tell me?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Just about the time the attack started  
19 or within five minutes of it, when I think it was sunk.

20 Mr. Richardson: All right, go ahead.

21 Admiral Kimmel: Then, there was another submarine  
22 which ran aground up in Bellows Field, the north side of  
23 Oahu, and they got the skipper out of it. He was the  
24 one that the FBI finally decided had been around Pearl  
25 Harbor and had reported the location of the ships in there.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson  
The Vice Chairman

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1  
2 Mr. Richardson: What time did he go ashore, about  
3 as compared with the attack?

4 Admiral Kimmel: I do not remember.

5 Mr. Richardson: Was it before the attack or during  
6 the attack?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I think it was after the attack.

8 Mr. Richardson: All right.

9 Admiral Kimmel: The Army found him over there and we  
10 sent over there and got him.

11 Mr. Richardson: Describe those submarines that you  
12 refer to that were of a new type.

13 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know too much about them  
14 because I had a great many things to do out there at that  
15 time.

16 The Vice Chairman: Were they both these midget sub-  
17 marines?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Sir?

19 The Vice Chairman: Were they both these midget sub-  
20 marines?

21 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, they were the midget submarines,  
22 the two-man submarines. The submarine is about 10 or 12  
23 feet in diameter and about 60 or 70 feet long. It is so  
24 small that a white man could not get into it. They had  
25 to cut the thing apart in order to get a white man in



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1  
h4 2 to the seat where they drove it.

3 I think it was air-driven and it was capable of  
4 about 20 knots under water, which was something far in  
5 excess of any submarine we knew anything about. It was  
6 a ship very much like a torpedo and could have, I think,  
7 about a 100-mile cruising radius, or something of that kind.

8 Mr. Richardson: Now, there were two, Admiral --

9 Admiral Kimmel: Now, Draemer went out --

10 Mr. Richardson: Who is he?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is Rear Admiral Draemer. He  
12 was in command of the destroyers, of the battle force at  
13 the time. I forget the details, but anyhow, he got a  
14 distress call in one of the bays over there. He started  
15 in and two submarines fired at him torpedoes. They were  
16 trying to get him in there to shoot at him.

17 Mr. Richardson: When was that with respect to the  
18 attack?

19 Admiral Kimmel: What is that?

20 Mr. Richardson: When was that with respect to the  
21 attack?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, maybe a couple of hours after-  
23 wards. I cannot recall all these things off the bat, but  
24 I should say there were conservatively a dozen or more  
25 submarines in the Hawaiian area at the time the attack took



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 place that we discovered, and maybe more than that.

3 Mr. Richardson: When did the Ward episode happen  
4 with respect to the attack?

5 Admiral Kimmel: The Ward episode I have since learned  
6 -- I think she fired depth charges at this submarine around  
7 about 6:30 or a quarter to 7, and she made some kind of  
8 a report.

9 Mr. Richardson: Whom did they report to?

10 Admiral Kimmel: The report went to Admiral Bloch.  
11 The report was, "Have attacked a submarine." It was not  
12 as clearly stated at that time as it was in a subsequent  
13 message about a half-hour or three-quarters of an hour  
14 later.

15 When Admiral Bloch received it, he was waiting for  
16 verification, because we had had various attacks, or inci-  
17 dents where our people had dropped depth charges on sus-  
18 pected submarines, after I had issued the order there  
19 on the 27th of November.

20 I thought his action was quite all right. He did  
21 seek verification before he did anything else.

22 Mr. Richardson: I call the committee's attention  
23 to the fact that there is a log which is in the record as  
24 Exhibit 119, giving the radio log with respect to some  
25 of this submarine activity.



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: You must realize, in reading this  
3 log -- I have never read it in detail, but I have been  
4 told approximately what is in it -- that we were con-  
5 stantly receiving reports of suspicious objects to be  
6 investigated, of possible submarines, and this kind of  
7 thing was going on several times a week.

8 Mr. Richardson: Well, should that report that came  
9 in on this so-called Ward submarine to Admiral Bloch  
10 have been immediately relayed to you?

11 Admiral Kimmel: It was relayed to me. I do not know  
12 how immediately, because I got it around 7:30, between 7:30  
13 and 7:40, something of that kind, or 7:20 to 7:30, something  
14 of that kind.

15 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, you had also on  
16 December 6-7, information with reference to the change in  
17 the call letters of the Japanese fleet?

18 Admiral Kimmel: That is right, yes. On December 1st  
19 that change was made.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now, the previous change had been made  
21 on November 1st.

22 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

23 Mr. Richardson: And before that, those call letters had  
24 been changed about every six months, were they not?

25 Admiral Kimmel: At irregular intervals, as I recall it.  
The first one in 1941 was made in May, 1941. The second one  
in November, 1941, and the third in December, December 1, 1941.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Would the fact that there had been such a short period from the change on November 1 arouse any apprehension in your mind that it had any particular significance?

Admiral Kimmel: We thought that was a prelude to their moving down the China Coast.

Mr. Richardson: Then you did think that the change in call letters had some call reference to future military operations with Japan?

Admiral Kimmel: Well, in that way, yes. It was entirely consistent with the advice we had received from the Navy Department.

Mr. Richardson: Now you also knew on the morning of December 7 that you were not conducting any distant patrols other than those which attended the operations of your task forces?

Admiral Kimmel: On that particular morning, yes.

Mr. Richardson: That is right.

Admiral Kimmel: I think that has been very thoroughly covered in the previous testimony that I have given.

Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, there is another thing I wanted to talk to you about. It was quite generally understood, was it not, during 1941, in discussing the question of air attack upon Hawaii, that the dangerous sector, the origin

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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of those attacks was the northern sector?

Admiral Kimmel: No, I think that that is a misconception, and it is a natural misconception which seems to be inevitable after a fact. I know that my predecessor did not consider the northern sector the most dangerous, if you take the sector that he covered during his patrol, which was to the westward, northwestward and around to the southwestward. I know that Admiral Halsey's idea even on the day of the attack was that they would probably come from the Marshalls.

I testified before the Roberts Commission as to the north being a dangerous sector, and I gave the reasons which appealed to me at that time.

Mr. Murphy: If I can help counsel, pages 605 and 606.

Mr. Richardson: What is that?

Mr. Murphy: Pages 605 and 606.

Mr. Matson: Is that the typed number?

Mr. Murphy: That is the little typed number, on the bottom of page 605 and the top of page 606.

Admiral Kimmel: Are you ready for me to go ahead?

Mr. Richardson: Just let me clarify your recollection, Admiral Kimmel, with this testimony. I am reading from typewritten page 605 and pencil page 622. This is the Kimmel previous testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Senator Brewster: Could we have what Admiral Kimmel



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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was saying at the time he was interrupted?

Admiral Kimmel: Beg pardon, sir?

Senator Brewster: You made a statement as to having predicted an attack in the north and having given reasons for it. I think you were in the process of stating the reasons when you were interrupted by the gentleman on the other side.

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I started to give an answer but I was diverted.

Senator Brewster: Will the reporter read the statement to see how far you got?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Admiral Kimmel: Then I started out to say I did not wish to make an alibi after the fact, and maybe I leaned over a little too far the other way.

In any event, I gave the reasons why an attack from the northward might be successful. I did not give it in any detail at all, in fact I scarcely touched upon the disadvantages of the northern route, and those disadvantages were well-known to me at the time.

The principal disadvantage of the northern route is that it is a 3500-mile pull from the homeland; it is through rough seas at that time of the year; the 3500-mile pull would require refueling, and an expedition of that kind had no better than a fifty-fifty chance of getting through due to weather alone.

WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON D C



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2           You have heard testimony here to the effect that this  
3 task force was very lucky in being able to get through, I  
4 mean in being able to refuel and come down there, because  
5 they struck some smooth weather, which was very unusual at  
6 that time of the year.

7           In view of all the circumstances before and since I  
8 feel, and I felt then, that no arc, no sector could be ruled  
9 out as a possible way for them to come in.     I quoted Admiral  
10 Nimitz on that, who relieved me, and he agreed in toto with  
11 the conception that I had of that. They could come in from  
12 the east without too much trouble; they could come from the  
13 Marshalls, and come in from the southeast. There was no  
14 sector that they could not come in from.

15           If they could come in after a 3500-mile trip through  
16 the northern seas, the rough seas up there, there was certainly  
17 no deterrent to their coming in from any direction. We  
18 know that now better than we did before Pearl Harbor, as a  
19 matter of fact.

20           Mr. Richardson: Well, now, Admiral, just to keep the  
21 record straight, do you think that this answer should be  
22 qualified:

23           "The Chairman: Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding  
24 force to come from the southward, what would you do?

25           "Admiral Kimmel: The air raid force on this place would



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from  
3 the northward than they did from the southward, but no part  
4 should be disregarded."

5 Admiral Kimmel: One reason I made that statement -- and  
6 these were not considered statements anyhow, I was called  
7 before this Commission and questioned at length, I had no  
8 time to prepare myself, I had been without sleep for some time,  
9 I was, to a considerable extent, strained, and all that must  
10 be taken into consideration here -- but what I probably had  
11 in mind at the time about coming in from the southward was  
12 that we had been operating from the southward.

13 Admiral Brown was down at Johnston Island, which is  
14 to the southward, he had been operating out of there, and  
15 I had had some patrol planes operating out of there, I had  
16 had some patrol planes sweeping betwixt Johnston Island and  
17 Midway, and I had patrol planes sweeping betwixt Oahu and  
18 Midway.

19 I thought their chances at that particular time for  
20 being able to get in were better than from the northward,  
21 and that probably influenced me considerably in what I had  
22 to say at that time.

23 Now I have attempted to reconstruct in my own mind a  
24 little about where the Japanese say they went. I am not  
25 sure that one of our sweeps missed them by so very much out



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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there. I have not plotted it on the chart.

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Mr. Richardson: Admiral, let me call your attention also for clarification to the further testimony of yourself on typewritten page 1547, in which the Chairman says this:

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"Now I think that General McNarney wants a question in order to avoid reading all that the order relates and having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect: Why, Admiral, did you suggest there was a probability or possibility of a carrier to the northward?"

11

12

"Admiral Kimmel: Because I thought that was the most probable direction of an attack coming against this place."

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Admiral Kimmel: Just what I have stated, sir, because we had covered a good many areas to the southward recently. And there was another thing. I had on that morning what might be termed a hunch and I did not know why, but I felt the carriers were to the northward, and I put that in a dispatch to Halsey. I did not want to make it much more than a hunch.

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22

Subsequently we got information which seemed to indicate the carriers were to the southward, and I had nothing more than this feeling, you might say.

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Mr. Richardson: Do you recall the subject of the northern sector being the most likely sector in which an air attack would approach in any dispatches or correspondence between



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 you and Stark's office?

3 Admiral Kimmel: No, I recall nothing.

4 Mr. Richardson: Do you remember any suggestion coming  
5 out of the Office of Naval Operations affirmatively stating  
6 that the northern area was the dangerous area?

(9) 7 Admiral Kimmel: No, I remember no such communication  
8 at any time.

9 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, I want to ask you another  
10 question. Do you know a man named Captain Zacharias?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir, I know him.

12 Mr. Richardson: There has been a suggestion made that  
13 he had conversations with you prior to the attack on December  
14 7 with respect to the probability of air attack on the Pearl  
15 Harbor base.

16 I would like to have you give us, if there were any  
17 such conversations, what they were, how they occurred, the  
18 circumstances, and generally tell the committee about it.

19 Admiral Kimmel: I will do so. Captain Zacharias is a  
20 Japanese language student. He is a very excellent Japanese  
21 language student. I will give you a little background.

22 Mr. Richardson: That is what I want.

23 Admiral Kimmel: He was an Intelligence Officer down in  
24 the San Diego District in October of 1940 when Admiral Richardson  
25 had a detachment of the Fleet consisting of two or three



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 battleships and some smaller craft at anchor at Long Beach,  
3 and Captain Zacharias sent a message to Admiral Richardson  
4 that there was going to be an attack by Japanese planes on  
5 the Fleet in Long Beach that night, that the Japs had an  
6 airfield down in Mexico, and that they were going to get  
7 the planes over here some way or another, I believe by  
8 carrier, and they were coming up there.

9 Richardson had this information. He did not believe  
10 it, but he had no choice but to get his detachment under way  
11 and get out, and subsequent investigation proved there was  
12 not anything down there and there were not any Japanese planes  
13 anywhere near the Coast.

14 Captain Zacharias had an interview with Mr. Nomura,  
15 Admiral Nomura, when he came over here, and he gave me a  
16 valuable resume of his conversation with Admiral Nomura by  
17 letter. Eventually he, in command of a cruiser, the SALT  
18 LAKE CITY, I think, came out and joined the Fleet, and along  
19 in March of 1941 I was back in the War Plans Section of my  
20 headquarters when Admiral W. W. Smith, my Chief of Staff,  
21 brought Captain Zacharias back there to talk to me.

22 I had a conversation with Captain Zacharias. Most of  
23 it was taken up with my asking him questions about the  
24 Japanese Navy. I have no recollection of Captain Zacharias  
25 having said anything about an attack on Pearl Harbor, and



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 least of all do I recollect anything about his having said  
3 that the attack was going to come at any particular time.

4 I might add if he had told me in March that the attack  
5 was coming on December 7, I would not have been greatly im-  
6 pressed. In any event, about two weeks prior to Captain  
7 Zacharias' conversation with me I had received from the  
8 Chief of Naval Operations a letter, which has been quoted  
9 here before this committee, to the effect that no Japanese  
10 attack on Pearl Harbor was planned for or projected in the  
11 foreseeable future. I think you will recall that letter.

12 I would have been very much inclined to take the estimate  
13 of the Chief of Naval Operations forwarding the views of  
14 the Chief of Naval Intelligence over those of Captain Zacharias.

15 Mr. Richardson: Well, don't you think, Admiral, that  
16 if he had specifically advised you of the probability of an  
17 immediate attack on Pearl Harbor that you would now recollect  
18 that conversation?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I should think so, sir, but I do not  
20 recollect it.

21 Mr. Richardson: Now let me move on, Admiral, to ask you  
22 some questions as to the precise condition in Hawaii at the  
23 time of the attack.

24 Admiral Kimmel: I might add you will have Captain  
25 Smith before you and you can get his version of the same



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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conversation, because he was present throughout the conversation.

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Mr. Richardson: Now at the time of this attack on December 7 you had three task forces out: One to Johnston, one to Wake and one to Midway, is that right?

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Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

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Mr. Richardson: And they were out upon missions, they were not connected with fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

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Admiral Kimmel: Well, yes, that is true, not fear of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.

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Mr. Richardson: Now let me call your attention, Admiral, to this map. I place the pointer on Oahu. Now I place the pointer on Midway. One of these task forces was proceeding from Oahu to Midway (indicating).

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Admiral Kimmel: It was down about 400 miles, a little bit further down from where you are indicating. It is to the southward and eastward, along in there (indicating), about 400 to 500 miles.

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Mr. Richardson: What is this (indicating)?

Admiral Kimmel: The Newton task force, the Lexington.

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Mr. Richardson: I am not referring to any particular name, but there was a task force that went to Midway?

Admiral Kimmel: It did not go to Midway, it was only going about 400 miles from Midway, or put it about 700 miles from Oahu.

Larry follows



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Well, that task --

3 Admiral Kimmel: That put it about 700 miles from  
4 Oahu.

5 Mr. Richardson: To the west?

6 Admiral Kimmel: To the west of Oahu about 700 miles.

7 Mr. Richardson: But the course of that task force was  
8 to the west?

9 Admiral Kimmel: No, a little north of west.

10 Mr. Richardson: How many degrees north of west?

11 Admiral Kimmel: Oh, looking at it, I would say 20  
12 maybe.

13 Mr. Richardson: The other task force was going to  
14 Johnston Island?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. That is, Brown's task force.

16 Mr. Richardson: Then did you have a task force going  
17 to Wake?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

19 Mr. Richardson: And that would also be in a westwardly  
20 direction?

21 Admiral Kimmel: That was on its return at that time.  
22 That was about some 300 miles west of Pearl Harbor at that  
23 time.

24 Mr. Richardson: But that task force at no time would  
25 go appreciably north of a west line from Oahu, would it?

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Kimmel: Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h2 2 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

3 Mr. Richardson: Calling your attention to these red  
4 lines on this map as very inferentially illustrating the  
5 course of the Jap fleet which attack Pearl Harbor --

6 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: You had no task force or other patrol  
8 that was operating in the area covered by those red lines?

9 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

10 Mr. Richardson: So that on the morning of December 7,  
11 your three task forces and the supporting planes which were  
12 making reconnaissance with those task forces was very  
13 largely confined to a sector which might be called the South-  
14 west Sector from Oahu?

15 Admiral Kimmel: Well, it was the westerly sector, I  
16 should say, would be more appropriate.

17 Mr. Richardson: And you also on that morning had a  
18 plane patrol between four and seven a.m., that was covering  
19 only local areas for training purposes?

20 Admiral Kimmel: Yes. Covering the operation areas  
21 to search out the submarines.

22 Mr. Richardson: And you had on that morning also a  
23 radar operation schedule between 4 and 7?

24 Admiral Kimmel: The Army had.

25 Mr. Richardson: That is right. And, so far as you



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 know, and so far as the Navy is concerned, no method of  
3 getting a radar report to the Navy from that operation?

4 Admiral Kimmel: Why wasn't there anybody to get a  
5 radar report from them to the Navy?

6 Mr. Richardson: You didn't have a Navy man assigned?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That makes no difference, sir, that  
8 I can see. Anybody that could talk English could tell me  
9 where the planes were.

10 Mr. Richardson: There was no Navy man assigned to  
11 the Information Center on Sunday morning, was there?

12 Admiral Kimmel: The only Navy man that I had assigned  
13 to the Army at that particular time was Lieutenant Taylor.

14 Mr. Richardson: He was a technician?

15 Admiral Kimmel: No, he was an operating man. He was  
16 not a technician.

17 Mr. Richardson: You didn't think, did you, that he  
18 was to make reports?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I thought he was to be used by the  
20 Army in any way they saw fit. I turned him over to them  
21 completely, and they could give him any order they pleased.

22 Now, if they had the information, if the information  
23 was in fact available, anybody could have telephoned it.

24 Mr. Richardson: But nobody did?

25 Admiral Kimmel: So far as I know, they didn't. I



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 never received it.

3 Mr. Richardson: Now, on that Sunday morning of  
4 the attack, you had your ships so arranged in the harbor  
5 as to facilitate the use of your anti-aircraft batteries  
6 on the ships?

7 Admiral Kimmel: That is a fact.

8 Mr. Richardson: That was a matter of definite policy  
9 which you had worked out to guide your ships when in the  
10 harbor?

11 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

12 Mr. Richardson: So in event of an air attack they  
13 could concentrate their fire in the most scientific way?

14 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir; instantly.

15 Mr. Richardson: And you testified that your information  
16 is that your fleet guns, aircraft, anti-aircraft guns were  
17 firing on this attack within four to seven minutes after  
18 the attack started?

19 Admiral Kimmel: My understanding and my belief is  
20 that in from four to seven minutes, variously estimated,  
21 all the guns of the Fleet were firing, all the anti-aircraft  
22 guns of the Fleet, but that those that were manned before  
23 the attack opened fire at once.

24 Mr. Richardson: Is that in your opinion as great a  
25 state of readiness as could have been provided for for those

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 ships under those circumstances that morning?

3 Admiral Kimmel: I think it was a very reasonable  
4 condition to maintain. When any gun, or group of guns,  
5 one-quarter to one-half of them, opened fire at once, and  
6 began to shoot at the first planes coming in, and when the  
7 rest of them chime in to the extent of the whole outfit  
8 within four to seven minutes, I don't believe you will  
9 beat that much anywhere.

10 Mr. Richardson: Also, it is a fact, is it not that  
11 on this Sunday morning, under the Short direction, the Army  
12 was in its first alert against sabotage?

13 Admiral Kimmel: I have heard that stated. I don't  
14 know it as a fact.

15 Mr. Richardson: And you have also heard it stated,  
16 have you not, Admiral, that upon the Army air fields, the  
17 planes of the Army were bunched together in order to facili-  
18 tate guarding themselves against sabotage?

19 Admiral Kimmel: I read that in some reports, yes.

20 Mr. Richardson: Now, passing from the exact condition  
21 in Hawaii on this morning to find out what was not available  
22 then, I bring up again the fact that there was on that  
23 morning no distant patrol reconnaissance out of Oahu.

24 Admiral Kimmel: That has been pretty well established.

25 Mr. Richardson: And there was no continuous radar

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 beyond this operation we referred to between 4 and 7?

3 Admiral Kimmel: You have the testimony on that.

4 Mr. Richardson: And there was no alerting of the  
5 anti-aircraft guns of the Army on that morning?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I learned the details when I read  
7 the report of the Army Board.

8 Mr. Richardson: And those details that you learned,  
9 indicated that they were not alerted?

10 Admiral Kimmel: I think those details, as published,  
11 speak for themselves.

12 Mr. Richardson: That is the only comment you care to  
13 make?

14 Admiral Kimmel: I have no -- I don't think any comment  
15 is called for by me. I don't know whether the assertions  
16 made in the report of the Army Board are correct or not. I  
17 think you should get this from General Short.

18 Mr. Richardson: Well, you don't know, and your Navy  
19 contingent had no knowledge, with respect to whether those  
20 guns were or were not alerted?

21 Admiral Kimmel: I do not know now from my own know-  
22 ledge what condition the Army guns were actually in on that  
23 morning.

24 Mr. Richardson: Was any report made to you by members  
25 of your staff with reference to that fact?



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: I don't recall any at the present time.

Mr. Richardson: Well, now --

Admiral Kimmel: But the members of my staff were not charged with that duty.

Mr. Richardson: That was because it was the duty of the Army?

Admiral Kimmel: No, that was because it was a duty that was, insofar as the Navy had anything to do with it, it was a duty of the Commandant of the District to look out for that.

Mr. Richardson: He was under you?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but he is not my staff. Maybe I spoke in a restrictive sense of "staff."

Mr. Richardson: It was of exceedingly great importance to you that those anti-aircraft guns of the Army were in a condition of readiness?

Admiral Kimmel: I had confidence in General Short. I may say I had confidence in General Marshall. I read the report -- not the report -- the dispatch which came to General Short, in which he was told to report to General Marshall just exactly what he had done, and I had I remember, this dispatch, you see. I had every reason to believe that that business had been looked out for. It



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

was doubly sure that if it were reviewed by the Chief of Staff, that they would get this condition of alert that he with his additional information in Washington knew or believed was required there at that time.

Mr. Richardson: Admiral, at best, that would be an assumption on your part, wouldn't it?

Admiral Kimmel: Oh --

Mr. Richardson: There certainly was no verification of it by you?

Admiral Kimmel: If I made no assumptions, I would have spent all my time running around checking up on every detail.

Mr. Richardson: Was the condition of readiness of your anti-aircraft guns defending Pearl Harbor, simply a matter of detail?

Admiral Kimmel: There was in the dispatch which came to General Short an admonition not to alarm the civil population, and I presumed that he would work that out to the satisfaction of the defense of Pearl Harbor and the Chief of Staff, so it wouldn't alarm the civil population, and that they would get a reasonable set-up for it.

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: In other words, neither you nor any member of your staff made any attempt to verify or find out what the condition of alertness was with respect to the anti-aircraft guns operated by the Army?

Admiral Kimmel: And neither did General Short make any attempt to find out the details of an alert that the Fleet had in effect at that time.

Mr. Richardson: That, I might suggest, Admiral, is one of the troubles in this proceeding.

Admiral Kimmel: Well, there is such a thing as having confidence, and if you don't have confidence in the people you work with you don't get much result.

Mr. Richardson: Let me interject this at this point, Admiral: Do you think the condition of affairs that existed in Oahu, which culminated in the attack on this Sunday morning, has any relevance to the question of a single authority directing military operations?

Admiral Kimmel: I would say no, and the reason I make that statement is that we had two chances to receive the vital information which was withheld from us. One chance was from the Chief of Staff of the Army supplying it to General Short. The other chance was from the Chief of Naval Operations supplying it to me. And if either one of us had had the vital information, which I have set forth, I believe, at great



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 lengths, I think that the conditions that obtained in Hawaii  
3 on that morning would not have obtained.

4 Mr. Richardson: The fact is, is it not, Admiral, that  
5 as you approached December 7 you very definitely gave the  
6 Navy program for action in event of the declaration of war  
7 precedence over the establishment of the defense of Pearl  
8 Harbor?

9 Admiral Kimmel: If I had believed in those days pre-  
10 ceding Pearl Harbor that there was a fifty-fifty chance or  
11 anything approaching that of an attack on Pearl Harbor, it  
12 would have changed my viewpoint entirely. I didn't believe it.  
13 And in that I was of the same opinion as that of the members of  
14 my staff, my advisers, my senior advisers.

15 In this connection it might be appropriate to say this.  
16 I had conversations with Admiral Pye several times during  
17 the week ending on November 7. On November 6 we spent most  
18 of the forenoon together going over the situation.

19 Senator Lucas: Do you mean December 6 or November 6?

20 Admiral Kimmel: December 6, the day before the attack.

21 And in the afternoon I spent practically all afternoon,  
22 and spoiled a couple of golf games, by keeping my Operations  
23 Officer, my War Plans Officer and my Chief of Staff to discuss  
24 the situation. I had conversations with Admiral Wilson Brown,  
25 who was in command of the Scouting Force of the Fleet, and



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 under whose command Admiral Bellinger operated as part of  
3 the Fleet. I had several conversations with him. He went  
4 to sea on the 5th of December and was down at Johnston Island.  
5 I had on my staff Captain Smith, W. W. Smith, commonly known  
6 as "Poko", who has since become a Vice Admiral. And Captain  
7 McMorris, who was my War Plans Officer. Captain McMorris  
8 stayed there with Admiral Nimitz as War Plans Officer for  
9 several months, when he went to sea, and was in action up  
10 in the Aleutians, successful action, too. And then Admiral  
11 Nimitz took him back as his Chief of Staff, where he remained  
12 as Chief of Staff until the end of the war.

13 Admiral Delaney, he is a Vice Admiral now, he was a  
14 Captain, he was my operations officer, and he was one of  
15 the three that was with me most of Saturday afternoon.

(4) 16 There is Admiral Murphy, Rear Admiral Murphy, then the  
17 Commander, who was one of the assistant War Plans Officers.  
18 He has been a very successful Commander in this war.

19 There was Kitz, my Gunnery Officer, the man who,  
20 incidentally, advised me about the torpedoes. He is now  
21 Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ordnance here in the Navy  
22 Department and a very able one.

23 Those were the type of men I had advising me. Admiral  
24 Calhoun, Vice Admiral now, was the Commander of the base  
25 force. He was there. Not to mention Admiral Bloch, whom I



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1  
2 have talked about before.

3 Mr. Richardson: You agreed, did you not, Admiral,  
4 that if there was real danger of an air attack on Hawaii the  
5 training program shouldn't have stood in the way for a moment?

6 Admiral Kimmel: I didn't let the training program stand  
7 in the way of the alert that I considered necessary at that  
8 time. The Fleet was on the alert. It was on the alert and  
9 any man who says the Fleet wasn't on the alert, when the  
10 whole outfit were firing in the times that have been testified  
11 to here, well, I don't know what he means by alert. I took  
12 certain courses of action. I took them after mature con-  
13 sideration. I did the best I could. And with the same  
14 information again I am not sure but what I would do the same  
15 thing.

16 Mr. Richardson: Well, if you had been sufficiently  
17 wise to have sensed the probability of an air attack, would  
18 you have withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance patrols?

19 Admiral Kimmel: Would I have done what?

20 Mr. Richardson: Withdrawn all of your distant reconnaissance  
21 patrols, as you did do?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Well, I have tried to indicate in my  
23 statement what I believe, now believe, I would have done  
24 had I considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor imminent or  
25 probable.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, let's consider for just a minute the propositions suggested as to mistakes originating in Washington.

You, as I understand it here, assert that the messages that you received from the Chief of Naval Operations properly bear the interpretation that you put on them?

Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: And your point, as I understand it, is that if those dispatches were intended to alert you against an attack at Pearl Harbor they should have said something about Pearl Harbor as well as talking about Borneo and the Malay States and Thai and the China Sea and other places on the Asiatic Coast?

Admiral Kimmel: If they had convinced me in the dispatches which they sent to me of what they now say they meant by those dispatches there would never have been any Pearl Harbor such as it was.

Mr. Richardson: And your contention with reference to what I call the harbor plotting message, your contention with reference to them, is that had that information come to you it would have definitely pointed to Hawaii as a possible point of attack?

Admiral Kimmel: I can't gather any other conclusion from those messages, and I have taken this matter up with



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 members of my staff, former staff, with Admiral Pye, and  
3 they wouldn't believe, when I first told them about it, that  
4 those messages were in existence. They wouldn't believe it.  
5 I couldn't believe it myself.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral, the evidence that has  
7 been given here indicates that those intercepts with reference  
8 to those harbor plotting messages reached all of the High  
9 Command here in Washington who customarily received such  
10 intercepts.

11 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: And that they passed over the desks  
13 of all of those members of the High Command.

14 Admiral Kimmel: That is right.

15 Mr. Richardson: Have you any explanation, as an Admiral  
16 in the Navy for forty years, of how a series of messages like  
17 those could have passed through all those hands without any  
18 significance being attached to them?

(5)  
19 Admiral Kimmel: I have tried to get an answer to that  
20 and I have none. I do feel this, that had they given me those  
21 dispatches, my primary concern out there being the Fleet,  
22 these people in Washington, it is true, had other things to do,  
23 but if they had given them to me I can say without any  
24 reservation whatsoever that it would have changed my ideas  
25 completely, and every one of my staff that I have talked to,



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 and I have talked to Smith, Murphy, Kits, and Pye, all of  
3 them feel exactly the same way I do. We were there. We  
4 were on the ground.

5 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, the thing that bothers me is  
6 just that, you were on the ground.

7 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

8 Mr. Richardson: You were in the midst of the greatest  
9 hotbed of Japanese espionage there was in the United States.  
10 Shouldn't you have had reason to suspect that such an important  
11 bit of information as the plotting of the only Fleet we had  
12 in the Pacific, in Pearl Harbor, was being transmitted to  
13 Tokyo by that Intelligence without receiving information on  
14 it from Washington?

15 Admiral Kimmel: The significance isn't so much that  
16 they were transmitting this information to Tokyo. The  
17 significance is the demand of Tokyo to get this information  
18 to Tokyo, Tokyo's anxiety to have it, Tokyo's reiteration  
19 of what they wanted, and of making the reports twice a  
20 week, making them even when there was no movement. Tokyo's  
21 demand was, to me, the significant thing. It wasn't so  
22 much that the Consul there was transmitting information.  
23 But there is no reason why they would have wanted that  
24 information unless they were going to use it on the ships  
25 while they were in the harbor. You must remember that this



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 information was good only for a matter of days at best  
3 because the ships got out. They had to find out over again  
4 where they were. This question of getting the ships out of  
5 Pearl Harbor, of putting them in a position where they could  
6 get out and head out, and that kind of stuff, we had worked  
7 that out months before, and when a ship came in she was  
8 berthed headed out, so that all she had to do was cast off  
9 her lines and breast herself out a little bit and out she  
10 steamed.

11 More time was consumed in berthing the ships for that  
12 reason.

13 Mr. Richardson: Now, let me direct your attention  
14 to these dispatches with reference to the so-called cut-off  
15 dates of November 25 and November 29. Those were the dates  
16 mentioned in the letters.

17 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Now, there would be nothing in those  
19 letters, would there, that would indicate an attack on  
20 Pearl Harbor?

21 Admiral Kimmel: No.

22 Mr. Richardson: All you would get from those letters  
23 would be some appreciation of one of the two elements of  
24 doubt, to-wit, when war would be declared?

25 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, yes, and what we would have gotten



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 from those messages is this, that a definite date after  
3 which things were automatically going to happen, had come  
4 and passed, the automatic operation that was planned was not  
5 taking place. It took some time to get it into operation  
6 and every day it was delayed after the 29th made an attack  
7 far distant from Japan much more likely than it had been  
8 before.

9 Mr. Richardson: Let me see if I follow you. Your  
10 contention is that since the 29th passed --

11 Admiral Kimmel: The 25th first.

12 Mr. Richardson: The 25th first, then the 29th passed,  
13 and no action, in view of the language of those dispatches,  
14 that they indicated a movement from Japan to some distant  
15 point that would require that expenditure of time to get  
16 there?

17 Admiral Kimmel: That seems reasonable.

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19 follows

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: For that reason those cut-off dates  
3 didn't have reference to a war on the Asiatic Coast, Thai,  
4 Indo-China, Malasia, or the Philippines?

5 Admiral Kimmel: After the elapse of a certain time.

6 Mr. Richardson: One thing further: You stated in  
7 your testimony with reference to the flight of B-17's that  
8 came in from San Francisco on the morning of the attack,  
9 you suggested that the fact that those planes had been sent  
10 in unarmed, not ready for fighting, indicated that the  
11 high command on the mainland couldn't have contemplated an  
12 attack at Pearl Harbor?

13 Admiral Kimmel: I don't remember my testimony on that  
14 line, but it is quite probable that is what I thought,  
15 whether I testified to it or not, that nobody would send  
16 unarmed plans to Hawaii if they expected an attack on  
17 Hawaii any time in the immediate future.

18 Mr. Richardson: I only brought it up to suggest to  
19 you whether it wasn't known that the reason that the planes  
20 were not sent armed, was because of the necessity of in-  
21 creasing their possible gasoline load so they could make  
22 the trip to Hawaii.

23 Admiral Kimmel: The planes, I have been informed --  
24 I haven't seen the planes -- had the guns on board. I am,  
25 in talking of arming planes, I am talking of self-defense

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 now, not offensive measures. They had guns on board and  
3 they were what was called "kalsomined," put up in heavy  
4 grease, and they couldn't operate.

5 Now, the only additional thing that would have been  
6 required would have been the ammunition necessary to serve  
7 those guns.

8 Mr. Richardson: Admiral, these task operations to  
9 Wake and Midway were under your control, were they not?

10 Admiral Kimmel: Yes.

11 Mr. Richardson: If you had disapproved them, you  
12 wouldn't have had to send those task forces out, would you?

13 Admiral Kimmel: That is correct.

14 Mr. Richardson: But you concluded, as you stated  
15 in your statement that the idea of the high command in  
16 directing those task forces to move to Wake and Midway  
17 was sound?

18 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I thought so.

19 Mr. Richardson: Had you made that --

20 Admiral Kimmel: Under my conception at that time.

21 Mr. Richardson: And you made that decision knowing  
22 that you could have held them back if you wanted to?

23 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, I could have held them back,  
24 I could have reported to the Navy Department that I was  
25 going to do so, and then they had the power and the auth-

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1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ority to order me to do it anyhow.

3 Mr. Richardson: Now, if they had not gone out,  
4 isn't it reasonable to expect that the number of ships in  
5 Pearl Harbor at the time of this attack would have been  
6 multiplied?

7 Admiral Kimmel: I don't think so.

8 Mr. Richardson: You don't think you would have in-  
9 creased your ships in Pearl Harbor out of these task forces  
10 if they had not been on missions, but had been in Hawaiian  
11 waters?

12 Admiral Kimmel: Well, that is something that is in  
13 the realm of speculation at the present time.

14 Mr. Richardson: Well, the point that I was driving  
15 at was whether or not the situation wouldn't have been  
16 worse in point of danger to the Fleet, if the task forces  
17 hadn't been sent than it was in sending them, even though  
18 you weakened the defense at Hawaii in sending them?

19 Admiral Kimmel: If I hadn't sent these task forces  
20 to Wake and Midway, it would have been because I wanted to  
21 get the Fleet out and to have air cover there for them.

22 They wouldn't have been in.

23 Mr. Richardson: If you had sent your battleships to  
24 sea on the morning of the 7th, if you had had sufficient  
25 information so that it would have been possible to maneuver

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



1 Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 them and make a sortie with your battleships, wouldn't  
3 those battleships have been in greater danger from air  
4 attack in the open sea without any planes of yours that  
5 could protect them than they were in the Harbor?

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6 Admiral Kimmel: On the morning of December 7, it was  
7 a little late to send the battleships to sea, but on the  
8 night of December 6, I could have arranged a rendezvous  
9 with Halsey and gotten out pretty much in the same vicinity  
10 with him. I could have had the patrol planes out, and  
11 such planes as we had in the Fleet at that time. I could  
12 have called back Newton with the Lexington, and he would  
13 have been in supporting distance of the Fleet by daylight  
14 the next morning.

15 Mr. Richardson: How long would it take to sortie  
16 the battleships out of the harbor into the open sea?

17 Admiral Kimmel: Three hours, perhaps.

18 Mr. Richardson: If you had had ever possible warning  
19 of the one o'clock message which was so delayed on Sunday,  
20 the most you could have done with your battleships in that  
21 time would have been to sortie them, wouldn't it?

22 Admiral Kimmel: Yes, but I think now, and again this  
23 is hindsight, I can't help but believe I wouldn't have  
24 sent the battleships to sea.

25 Mr. Richardson: That is just the point I was making.



Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Admiral Kimmel: I would have sent all the light  
3 forces to sea. I would have gotten the destroyers and  
4 cruisers out. As a matter of fact, one of my problems  
5 all the time there, against a fast raiding force, if any  
6 should come, was the fact that my battleships would have  
7 been of very little use to me.

8 They couldn't go fast enough, and the only ones that  
9 were of use were the ones that could get out and do  
10 something to the enemy.

11 Mr. Richardson: Well, the point that was running in  
12 my mind was that so far as your battleships were concerned,  
13 the two-hour warning that you might have had on the one  
14 o'clock message wouldn't have assisted in your defense?

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Witness Kimmel

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Admiral Kimmel: It would have assisted to this extent. I would have had every gun on deck manned. We would have had not condition X-Ray, as we called it, but condition ZEB in the ships, which would have made it a little bit more difficult to sink them and this two hour warning would certainly have served to warn the Army.

The Vice Chairman: It is now four o'clock and we will recess until ten o'clock in the morning. That will give you a chance to review your notes.

Mr. Richardson: I have just a few minutes left.

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock P.M., January 16, 1946 an adjournment was taken until 10 o'clock A. M., Thursday, January 17, 1946.)

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