

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
APO 234

INTERROGATION NO. 242

PLACE: Tokyo

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Oil and Chemical.

DATE: 5 Nov 1945

SUBJECT: Allocation of Japanese Tanker Shipping.

PERSONNEL INTERROGATED AND BACKGROUND:

Rear Admiral YAMAMOTO, Yoshiyo. For back ground see
Interrogation No. 210.

Captain HARA, Michio. Japanese Navy.

1930-38 At sea aboard cruisers CHOKAI and MYOKO
and carrier KAGA

1938-39 Adjutant (FUKUOKA-BU) Navy Dept.

1939-42 Fuel Section, Ministry of Commerce & Industry

1942-43 Fuel Transportation Officer, 1st Southern
Expeditionary Fleet, Singapore

1944 Jan Chief of 3rd (Supply-HOKYU) Section of 2nd
(Fuel) Division of Ammunition and Supply
Bureau (GUNJU KYOKU) Navy Dept.

Mr. KIMURA, Tadao. Interpreter.

Mr. YOKOE, Toru. From 1935-41 he was employed in the Iino
Shoji Company which was concerned with oil tanker trans-
portation. After 1941 he was attached to the Navy in
the capacity of civilian dealing with oil tankers. The
office he worked for was with the First Division of the
Transportation Section of the Navy Bureau.

WHERE INTERVIEWED: Room 528, Meiji Building.

INTERROGATOR: Lt Comdr G. M. WILLIAMS.

INTERPRETER: Mr. RIE.

ALLIED OFFICERS PRESENT: None.

SUMMARY:

1. Original allocation of tanker tonnage and method
of allocating new tonnage.
2. War construction and losses.
3. Method of routing tankers.

Appendix "A" - Sample Tanker Schedule.

QUESTION: How did they allocate the tankers at the beginning of the war in 1941? How did they schedule them and how did they direct them to points of debarkation? If new ships were made because of losses, etc., I want to know how they were made and who made them?

ANSWER : I stated once before that at the start of the war all tankers belonged to the civilian companies except those which belonged directly to the fleet. How many these were I do not know but can find out if necessary. The ships were proportioned out as follows:

Army	-	10,000 tons
Navy	-	280,000 tons
Civilian	-	190,000 tons

QUESTION: What did the Navy have before they got this allocation?

ANSWER : I am not sure but will investigate to find out from the records.

QUESTION: How did they allocate the new tonnage and who was in charge of the new tanker building and the overall picture?

ANSWER : They built after the outbreak of the war 1,319,000 tons. Besides that they captured 73,000 tons. The method they used in allocation was whenever the Navy lost tankers they had a special conference including all departments to decide allocations to fill up the gaps caused by losses. They filled them from the pool of ships. Of course, as the war progressed this became exceedingly difficult.

Until 1941 the man in charge of this was the Communications Minister. Later it was changed to the Transportation Minister. Since 1941 the construction of new tankers was transferred to the Navy Department. Admiral SHIMADA was the Navy Minister in charge of this tanker construction. The amount of the tonnage was decided in the Cabinet meeting in which Admiral SHIMADA played a greater part. The man in charge of the ship building itself was another man, that is tankers, cargo, etc. So Admiral SHIMADA did not have the entire say so. The Navy Technical Bureau handled the complete shipping picture which included construction of ships for the Army, Civilian, and Navy.

QUESTION: The allocation of tankers was in whose hands?

ANSWER : All tankers first belonged to the Civilians and from that pool the Navy requisitioned theirs.

QUESTION: Who made the decision as to who got what ships upon the submission of requisitions?

ANSWER : They decided this at the meeting of the Supreme War Council.

QUESTION: How often did they meet to consider the allocation of tankers?

ANSWER : They didn't have any special conferences for tankers alone but one for all shipping. These were held about three times a year.

QUESTION: Does the Navy have records on the tonnage allocated to the Army, Navy, and Civilians?

ANSWER : Such records have been burned.

QUESTION: Who had all copies of these records?

ANSWER : The Navy had them and the Army, too, but they burned them. The Munitions Minister may have them.

QUESTION: What is the title of these records so we can check with the Munitions Minister?

ANSWER : I think as far as I know the records were not clearly defined. Explain when you check with the Munitions Minister what records you want.

QUESTION: Was any ratio developed in the replacement of tankers?

ANSWER : Tankers and oil allocation are two entirely different matters. They used any tankers to bring in oil. To bring up oil from the South the Navy didn't have to demand tankers. The only ones they did demand were those for the fleet operation. Every year they estimated their needs for the next year which took in assumed tonnage for oil, losses, new ships, etc. Steel and iron shortages cut down on ship building, also.

QUESTION: I still don't have an answer to my last question. Was there a ratio established in replacing losses?

ANSWER : General figures can be given as follows:

Converted	200,000	
Built	<u>1,119,000</u>	1,319,000
Captured		<u>73,000</u>
		1,392,000
Allocations in 1941		
Army	10,000	
Navy	280,000	
Civilian	<u>190,000</u>	<u>480,000</u>
Total Ships During War		
Losses		<u>1,872,000</u>
		<u>1,568,000</u>
Total at end of War		304,000 tons

Although at the beginning of the war cargo ships were converted into tankers, during the last stages of the war when the oil supply was cut off, tankers were reconverted to cargo ships (about 48,000 tons).

QUESTION: Did you build more tankers than other types of ships?

ANSWER : No, we built twice as many cargo ships as others.

QUESTION: How was shipping scheduled as there was no relation between tanker allocation and the oil?

ANSWER : All ships getting oil from the south seas had to belong temporarily to the Army or Navy, being known as an Army or Navy allocated tanker, travelling in convoy and under their protection because these areas were subject to Army or Navy law. The number was decided

in the Army-Navy Oil Committee at which plans were drawn up. The schedules were drawn up and given to the Army and Navy Ministers. The tankers moved under these schedules. When civilian ships went to the south seas the transportation minister didn't have anything to do about them there.

QUESTION: When the Army and Navy met to determine this schedule who sat in on the meeting?

ANSWER : The Vice Ministers of the Army and Navy. They were responsible. The plan was handed up to the proper ministers of each department where they got the final approval.

QUESTION: Who did the actual work in developing these schedules?

ANSWER : The Chief of the Third Department of the General Staff for the Army and the Chief of Transportation Headquarters for the Navy. In almost every case what they decided passed.

QUESTION: When this schedule was made up by these men, how did they go about making the various allocations?

ANSWER : The allocation of this oil was done in the Cabinet meeting from the tentative plans made by the Navy, Army, and Munitions Bureau. The three departments were Navy Supply (Gunju Kyoku), Army War Preparations Bureau (Senbi Kyoku) and Civilian Fuel Bureau of the Munitions Ministry, and also the Munitions Ministry was represented by its General Mobilization Bureau.

QUESTION: How often did the Chief of the Third Department and the Chief of Transportation get together to make this shipping schedule?

ANSWER : They usually didn't have formal conferences. The executive heads of the bureau met informally and discussed the pending problems and submitted their suggestions to the higher brackets. Why they did this informally was because events changed so rapidly that this was the only way they could stay up to date and make the necessary changes in their plans.

QUESTION: Was there a conference to determine how the shipping would be allocated to determine who would get the oil. If half the ships were lost, was everybody cut in half or how was it done?

ANSWER : They had to recorrect the schedule to meet the new situations. They tried to divide by the same ratio but as they couldn't they filled it up with reserve stocks or oil produced in Japan. When the amount lacked, the Civilians got it first.

QUESTION: When the total oil brought in was less than that allocated to each branch, who decided the distribution?

ANSWER : The total was decided by the respective ministers but the monthly or quarterly was decided by the Navy Supply Bureau, Army War Preparations Bureau, Civilian Fuel Bureau, and the General Mobilization Bureau.

QUESTION: In the actual making of the schedule, they didn't care whether it was Army, Navy, or Civilian tanker in sending it to any port?

ANSWER : As far as the destination is concerned, if it is for example a Navy tanker they take into consideration Navy ports, but on the whole this generally didn't matter.

QUESTION: Was there any re-shipping of the oil after it reached Japan?

ANSWER : Yes.

QUESTION: What percentage of tankers was engaged in coastal shipping around Japan?

ANSWER : In general, two 10,000 ton tankers and twenty 1,000 ton tankers were allocated for this purpose. This figure did not change much throughout the war.

QUESTION: Were these Civilian vessels?

ANSWER : Yes, under the Communications Minister.

QUESTION: Did the Army and Navy control their own ships or were they all under the Navy?

ANSWER : They fell under the command of the concerned area. In Balikpapan they were Navy controlled and in Singapore the Army controlled them.

QUESTION: Were they under these various controls when they left Japan?

ANSWER : No, the moment the ship entered the port they fell under control to either the Army or Navy, in their respective areas.

QUESTION: Didn't they have shipping orders when they left Japan?

ANSWER : When they left Japan they were under Navy orders.

QUESTION: When they are not in Japan they are under their own respective commands?

ANSWER : Yes.

QUESTION: There were no territorial divisions by degrees?

ANSWER : There were none.

QUESTION: Who makes the decision as to routing of ships?

ANSWER : The decision as to routing of ships is made by the "Shipping Sub-Committee" of the Army-Navy Oil Committee and that decision is given to the cognizant ministry who issue the orders to the ships under its control.

QUESTION: Is it possible to get the figures as to the tanker tonnage built and lost each month.

ANSWER : Until December 1944 the records are almost complete but after that they are either fragmentary or lost.

I have this much in my personal possession. I can give it to you with the names of some of the ships. (Yokoe)

QUESTION: Are you prepared to tell us about the allocation of oil now?

ANSWER : As far as the figures are concerned, I cannot give you an answer but the method I can explain in sort of a way.

QUESTION: What figures do you have with you?

ANSWER : The 4th quarter of 1944 oil shipments to Japan.

QUESTION: The main thing I'm concerned with is where the actual control of oil lies.

ANSWER : There wasn't any single authority to control this oil. At one time there was some effort made to unify the control but it faded out. The decisions were made at the Cabinet meeting and the sessions of the Supreme War Council to which the ministers handed their requisitions.

QUESTION: I have seen allocation sheets made up by the General Mobilization Bureau and though those sheets show imports by the Army and Navy, the figures shown are only a part of the actual imports. I have not yet been able to contact Mr. TAKAMINE

I have not found a civilian who knows what they were. When you tell me that the General Mobilization Bureau made the decision, I can't believe it.

These sheets show estimates of imports from the south. The Army and Navy took only one-third of the imports from the south through the General Mobilization Bureau. The other one-half or more must have been allocated through the Army-Navy Oil Committee.

ANSWER : They didn't make total allocation of oil in the General Mobilization Bureau. There wasn't the regular allocation coming in and never showed up what the actual figures showed. The records were not complete as the oil was allocated at various different ports. And then the Navy used different methods for getting their needs such as re-refining the poor grade oil at the bottom of tanks, etc.

I don't believe the Army and Navy were getting more than their share. Every tanker is known to every department of the Government. I never heard anything about these branches getting more than they were entitled to. These figures you are quoting are unbelievable. But the actual figures may have been suppressed. The actual ones can be secured from the Munitions Minister.

APPENDIX "A" - SAMPLE TANKER SCHEDULE

Alloted to Navy or Army	Name of Ship	<u>Sailing Port</u>		<u>Loading Port</u>			<u>Landing Port</u>		Kinds of Oil	Quantity (kl)	<u>Allocation of Oil</u>	
		Port	Date	Port	Arrival	Departure	Port	Date				
BC	San Diego	Moji	11-10	Shonan	11-30	12-5	Shinotru	12-31	Crude	12,000	C	
BC	Mitsu	"	"	"	"	"	Matsuyama	12-30	"	8,000	C	
AC	Kuroshio	"	11-12	"	11-24	11-30	Kure	12-13	Heavy Oil	15,000	A	13,000
AC	Kaiho	"	"	"	"	"	Kudamatsu	"	"	16,000	C	2,000
BC	Tenei	"	"	"	"	"	Tokuyama	"	Motor Gas	15,000	B	10,000
BC	Matsushima	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Avgas	15,000	C	5,000
AC	Munakato	"	"	"	"	"	Kure	"	Heavy Oil	15,000	A	10,000
AC	Erijin	Moji	11-20	Miri	12-10	12-17	Kudamatsu	1-11	Crude	8,000	B	5,000
AC	Yamazono	"	"	"	"	"	Kure	"	"	8,000	C	
AC	Enryaku	"	"	"	"	"	Tokuyama	"	"	8,000	C	
AC	Taishu	"	"	"	"	"	Omishima	"	"	8,000	A	
B												
A												

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