

**The Euthydemus of Plato, with revised text, introduction, notes,  
and indices, by Edwin Hamilton Gifford.**

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
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# THE EUTHYDEMUS OF PLATO

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# THE EUTHYDEMUS OF PLATO

WITH REVISED TEXT  
INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND INDICES

BY

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TO  
THE MASTER AND FELLOWS  
OF  
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

THIS LITTLE VOLUME IS INSCRIBED  
IN GRATEFUL REMEMBRANCE  
OF THE MANY PRIVILEGES ENJOYED  
BY THE EDITOR  
DURING SIXTY-FIVE YEARS  
AS SCHOLAR FELLOW  
AND HONORARY FELLOW  
OF THE COLLEGE



## PREFACE

THIS edition of the *Euthydemus* is intended for the use of University Students and the Higher Forms of Public Schools. To such readers there will be little force in the objection made by some critics of a sterner mood that the dialogue is too amusing, too full of satirical humour and even broad comedy, to be worthy of so great a philosopher as Plato. On this character of the 'Literary Form' of the dialogue see the Introduction, § ii.

In revising the text I have made no new collation of manuscripts, but have depended on the critical apparatus of Schanz and the revision of the same by Burnet, except as to a few readings for which I have carefully inspected the phototype of the Codex Clarkianus in the Bodleian Library.

The only original emendations which I have ventured to introduce are 271 ο γ καθ' α for κατά, and 286 ο γ Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευς; for οὐδὲ κελεύεις.

In attempting to determine the date of the *Euthydemus* and its relation to the *Phaedrus* I have derived most help from the Introductions to the latter dialogue by Stallbaum and Thompson, and from Lutoslawski's *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*.

My best thanks are due to the Delegates of the Clarendon Press for allowing the work to be published under their auspices, and to the Secretary and other officials for much valuable assistance and unflinching kindness during the passage of the volume through the press.

OXFORD :  
November, 1904.



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## TEXT OF EUTHYDEMUS

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# INTRODUCTION

## I. CONTENTS.

THE *Euthydemus* is a conversation between Socrates and his old friend Crito, consisting chiefly of a highly dramatized narrative of a discussion in which Socrates himself had played a principal part, the other chief actor being the Sophist from whose name the dialogue takes its title.

The other persons taking part in the action are Dionysodorus, the elder brother of Euthydemus ; Cleinias, an ingenuous and handsome youth of noble birth, first cousin to the famous Alcibiades ; and Ctesiphon, an enthusiastic admirer of Cleinias, a high-spirited young gentleman of irascible temper and rough and ready speech, who has been previously introduced in the *Lysis* (204 C, 205 A, 206 C, D) as rallying his sentimental friend Hippothales with a boisterous kind of wit.

There are also present many pupils and admirers of the two Sophists, and on the other hand many young friends of Cleinias.

i. In the opening scene Socrates gives an account to Crito of the two Sophists with whom he had held a discussion in the Lyceum on the previous day. They were natives of Chios, who had migrated to Thurii, and being banished thence had spent many years in various parts of Greece, and had recently come to Athens as professional teachers of wisdom and virtue. The varied accomplishments which they had displayed on a former visit are extolled by Socrates with playful irony. He had never understood before what true pancratiasts were ; but these men were perfect in every kind of combat. They could teach men to fight in heavy armour with the weapons of actual war, or to arm themselves with speeches for the harder conflicts of the law-courts. They had now set the crown upon pancratiastic art by making themselves masters of the 'eristic philosophy,' an irresistible method of disputation by which every statement, true and false alike, could be refuted with

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B

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equal certainty. Let Crito come with Socrates to be taught these noble arts; it was not too late to learn, for the teachers themselves were old men, and had only learned this new system last year. If Socrates and Crito took their sons with them, they would, no doubt, be admitted as fellow pupils (271 A-272 D).

As Crito wishes to know what sort of wisdom he is to be taught, Socrates proceeds to describe what had occurred in the Lyceum. He had been sitting alone in the apodyterium, and was just rising up to go away when he was forbidden by the usual sign (*τὸ δαμόδιον*) to leave his seat. The two Sophists presently enter and walk up and down in the colonnade, followed by an admiring crowd of pupils. Cleinias, accompanied by Ctesippus and other friends, comes in and sits beside Socrates. On seeing this the Sophists approach, and seat themselves, Euthydemus beside Cleinias, and Diodorus on the other side of Socrates, who introduces them to Cleinias with high commendation of their military and forensic skill. But the brothers receive these compliments with rude contempt, for they are no longer proud of such minor accomplishments, but make the loftier boast of imparting virtue more perfectly and more quickly than any other men. 'The possessors of such a power, says Socrates, must be divine: forgive my irreverent speeches, and grant us an exhibition of this marvellous wisdom: we are all eager to learn, and let the first experiment be made on Cleinias, for whose advancement in wisdom and virtue we are all most anxious' (272 D-275 C).

ii. Before attempting to describe the next scene Socrates, like the poets (*Hom. Il. ii. 484*), invokes the Muses and Mnemosyne to aid him in so great a task: cf. *Theaet.* 191 D.

Then comes the wonderful exhibition of the Sophists' skill in teaching virtue.

*Euthydemus.* Are those who learn the wise or the unwise (*οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*)?

*Cleinias.* The wise.

*Euthydemus.* Do they already know the things which they are learning?

*Cleinias.* No.

*Euthydemus.* Then the learners are the unwise (*ἀμαθεῖς*), not the wise, as you suppose.

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The chorus of the Sophists' followers laugh and applaud; and before Cleinias has time to recover breath Dionysodorus takes him in hand.

'Which of the schoolboys learn the dictated lesson, the clever or the stupid (*οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*)?'—'The clever.'—'Then the wise (*οἱ σοφοί*) are the learners, not the unwise (*οἱ ἀμαθεῖς*), and your answer to Euthydemus was wrong.'

Amid shouts of applause Euthydemus returns to the attack.

'Do the boys learn (*μανθάνουσι*) what they know (*ἐπίστανται*), or what they do not know?'—'What they do not know.'—'But they know the letters?'—'Yes.'—'And the letters make up the lesson?'—'Yes.'—'Then they learn what they know, and your answer was wrong.'

Upon this Diodorus again takes up the ball: 'To learn is to receive knowledge: to know is to have knowledge. The learners receive but have not knowledge: therefore they who do not know learn, not those who know' (275 C-277 C).

Cleinias is quite bewildered, and Socrates interposes to shield him from a third attack. The Sophists, he says, are only playing with him, and dancing round him like the Corybantes, and initiating him by these preparatory rites into the Sophistic mysteries. They are tripping him up with their verbal fallacies in order to teach him that a word may be used in more senses than one. But there has been enough of such play: let them now show Cleinias how to improve in wisdom and virtue; he will himself give an example of what he means in his own simple way (277 C-278 D).

All men desire to be happy, in other words to do well (*εὖ πράττειν*): to this end they count many good things necessary, riches, health, beauty, noble birth, power, honour. To these must be added temperance, justice, fortitude, wisdom, and good fortune. But good fortune is already included in wisdom. In the practice of every art, in playing the flute, in reading and writing, in navigation, in war, in medicine the wise are the fortunate, and he who has wisdom has no further need of fortune.

Moreover all those good things must be used, and used rightly, in order to make men happy; and to use them rightly there must be knowledge for a guide. Without it riches and strength and

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power become even worse than useless, as giving wider opportunities for ill doing. In short all such things are in themselves neither good nor bad : wisdom alone is good, and folly bad, therefore get wisdom.

But how to get it ? Can it be taught, or does it come spontaneously ? Cleinias replies with youthful confidence, ' In my opinion it can be taught ' ; and Socrates is delighted to accept so readily a solution of the great question (278 E-282 D).

Socrates now invites either of the Sophists to discuss the same subject more scientifically, or to go on to show whether it is necessary to acquire every kind of knowledge, or only some one science that will suffice to make Cleinias wise and happy. Dionysodorus, after being assured that they truly and earnestly desire to have Cleinias made wise, argues that they wish him to be now what he is not, that is to be no longer what he now is, in fact to be destroyed. Worthy friends, to wish destruction to the boy !

' Destruction on your own head ! ' cries Ctesippus, ' for telling such an impious lie about us. '—' A lie ! ' says Euthydemus. ' Is it possible to tell a lie ? By telling the thing of which you speak you tell a real thing ; and he who tells the real thing tells the truth, and tells no lie. You can do nothing to what is not, you can only speak what is, that is, speak truth. '—' Yes, of course, ' says Ctesippus, ' he speaks in a certain way of real things, but not as they really are. '—' What do you mean ? ' says Diodorus. ' Do any speak of things as they are ? '—' Yes, gentlemen, and those who speak the truth. '—' Do good men then speak badly of what is bad ? '—' Indeed they do speak very badly of bad men, and if you do not take care, they will speak badly of you. '—' And do they speak greatly of the great, and hotly of the hot ? '—' Certainly, and speak frigidly of the frigid and their frigid arguments. '—' You are insolent, Ctesippus, insolent, I say. '—' Not so, but as a friend I advise you never to say so rudely in my presence that I wish destruction to my dearest friends ' (282 D-284 E).

Socrates again interposes to keep the peace : ' Let us not quarrel over a word ; if by " destruction " they mean making foolish and bad men wise and good, let them try the experiment on me, and boil me, if they please, as in Medea's cauldron. '—' Or they may flay me like Marsyas, ' said Ctesippus, ' only let them make virtue, not

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a bottle, out of my hide : but Dionysodorus must not call contradiction insolence.'

'Is contradiction possible?' said the Sophist. 'At all events you could not prove that you ever heard one person contradicting another.'—'That is true; but let us listen now whether I am proving it to you while Ctesippus is contradicting Dionysodorus' (see the note on the passage).

'Would you undertake to argue this? We should not contradict each other at all, if we both knew the right definition (*λόγον*) of each thing; but when neither knows the right definition, then we should contradict each other, or in this case neither would speak of the thing at all. So when I give the right definition and you some other, you do not speak of the thing itself at all, and, if you do not speak, you cannot contradict' (284 E-286 B).

Ctesippus kept silence, but Socrates said that this argument was as old as Protagoras or older, and had a wonderful way of tripping up the speaker himself as well as others. 'But you can best tell us the truth about it. Is it impossible to speak or even think what is false? Is there no such thing as ignorance, or an ignorant man? Do you really mean this?'—'Refute me if you can,' said Dionysodorus.—'Is refutation possible, if according to your argument no one speaks what is false?'—'No, it is not,' said Euthydemus.—'Neither then did I bid you refute me,' said Dionysodorus.—'Was it you then that bade me, Euthydemus: for I do not clearly understand these subtleties. However, I am going to ask perhaps a stupid question: If it is impossible to contradict, to speak or even think what is false, to be ignorant or in error, pray what are you come to teach?' (285 A-287 A).

Dionysodorus tries to evade this troublesome question: 'Why go back to former arguments? Can you make nothing of the present?'—'They are very difficult,' says Socrates, 'for what does this last phrase, "make nothing of them," mean (*ποῦν*), except that I cannot "refute" them?'

Dionysodorus has heard enough of that word 'refute' (286 E), and insists on passing to a new question: 'Can a mere lifeless word "mean" anything?'—'It was my stupidity,' says Socrates; 'but was I right or wrong? If I was right, you cannot "refute" me: and if I was wrong, you cannot be right in saying that error

## INTRODUCTION

is impossible (287 A). This is not going back to the past: for your present argument can only trip one up and then itself fall' (287 A-288 A).

Ctesippus begins again to jeer at the Sophists, but is checked by Socrates: 'They are not yet in earnest, but are playing tricks like Proteus, and must be held fast till they show themselves in their true form.' He will give them another example of the sort of teaching which he wishes them to impart, by continuing his argument with Cleinias.

It was agreed (282 D 1) that philosophy or the acquisition of knowledge is necessary to make men happy. But what kind of knowledge? Such as teaches them to make the right use of all other acquirements and advantages. Not the knowledge of healing or money-making, nor even a knowledge that would make us immortal without teaching us to use immortality aright: not the art of the speech-maker, sublime and inspired though it sometimes appears; for some know not how to use the speeches they have themselves made, and after all it is only a kind of charm for fascinating judges and assemblies. Is it then the strategic art that makes men happy?—No, says Cleinias, that is only a kind of man-hunting; and hunters and fishermen give over what they catch to cooks, and geometers and astronomers give their discoveries to dialecticians to make use of them.

iii. At this point the narrative of Socrates is interrupted by Crito, who is astonished that one so young as Cleinias should be so wise. A long conversation follows, in which Socrates explains that even the kingly art is found wanting, because it does not impart wisdom or knowledge, and its claim is only an empty boast like *ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος* (290 E-293 A).

iv. Socrates being thus unable, as he pretends, to find the kind of knowledge that will make men happy entreats the Sophists to be serious and rescue them from their difficulty. Euthydemus boldly undertakes to prove that Socrates already possesses the knowledge of which he is in search: he knows something, nay many things, therefore he knows everything; for he cannot be both knowing and not knowing.

'Then you two also,' says Socrates, 'know everything.'—'Yes,' says Dionysodorus, 'and all men know all things, if they know

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one.'—' Good heavens!—for now I see you are in earnest—do you really know all things, such as carpentering, shoemaking, astronomy, and the number of the sands?'—' Of course we do.' At this Ctesippus bursts in with an impudent jibe: 'Does each of them know how many teeth the other has?' Some lively bantering follows, and then Euthydemus, still maintaining that Socrates, as well as themselves, knows all things, insists on having his questions answered categorically, 'Yes' or 'No,' without any exception or limitation, and thus proves to his own satisfaction that Socrates knew all things even before he was born or begotten, and before the earth and the heaven were made (293 A–296 D).

Socrates now turns their own mode of argument against them: 'Do I, or do I not, know that the good are unjust?'—' Yes,' says Euthydemus. 'You know that they are not unjust.'—' But that is not what I ask. How do I know that they *are* unjust?'—' You do not know it at all,' says Dionysodorus; but he is reproved by Euthydemus for spoiling the argument, by admitting that Socrates is at the same time knowing and not knowing.

'Must not your brother, who knows all things, be right?'—' Am I his brother?' says Dionysodorus, trying again to change the argument. To this Socrates replies: 'I cannot fight two at once; even Hercules called his nephew Iolaus to help him.'—' Was Iolaus any more Hercules' nephew than yours?'—' As you will not let Euthydemus answer my question, I must, I suppose, answer yours: Iolaus was Hercules' nephew, not mine at all, not being the son of my brother Patrocles.'—' Is Patrocles your brother?'—' Yes, on the mother's side, not on the father's.'—' Then he both is and is not your brother.'—' Not on the father's side: Chaeredemus was his father, Sophroniscus mine.'—' Then Chaeredemus, being different from a father, was not a father; and so Sophroniscus, in like manner being different from a father, was not a father: so you, Socrates, had no father' (296 D–298 B).

This style of argument suits Ctesippus: 'Your father, you say, is also my father, and father of all, both men and beasts; you therefore are the brother of gudgeons and puppies and little pigs.'—' So are you,' says Dionysodorus: 'your dog is a father of puppies, and he is yours; therefore he is your father, and you are the puppies' brother. When you beat your dog, you beat your own



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father.—‘I would much rather beat your father for begetting such wise sons,’ replies Ctesippus.

Then follows an argument with Euthydemus about having too much of a good thing: a whole cartload of hellebore would be too much for a sick man, unless he were as big as the statue at Delphi; but one shield and spear would not be enough for a Geryon or Briareus (298 B-299 C).

Diodorus here comes to his brother’s aid: ‘Gold you admit is good; then the happiest man must be one who has most gold: gold in his stomach, and skull, and both eyes.’—‘Yes, indeed,’ said Ctesippus, turning to Euthydemus, ‘they say that among the Scythians the happiest and bravest men have much gold in their own skulls, and drink out of their own skulls, and holding their own heads in their hands, see into the inside.’

Euthydemus, catching at the word ‘see,’ carries on the argument by quibbling about the double meaning of *δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν*, ‘able to see,’ or ‘able to be seen,’ of *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, and *λέγοντα σιγᾶν*, until Ctesippus asks, ‘Do all things speak, or all keep silence?’—‘Neither and both,’ cries Dionysodorus; and Ctesippus with a loud laugh declares that by this ‘both’ he has ruined his argument and is beaten and done for (*ἀπέλωλε* alluding perhaps to 283 D, E).

Cleinius laughs with delight, and Ctesippus swells with pride. ‘Why do you laugh,’ says Socrates, ‘at things so important and beautiful?’—‘Are beautiful things different from beauty or the same?’ asks Dionysodorus. Socrates pretends to be puzzled and sorry to have spoken, but answers that they are different from beauty itself, though some beauty is present with each.—‘Then if an ox be present with you, you are an ox, and because I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?’—‘Heaven forbid,’ said Socrates.—‘But in what way must one thing be present to another in order that this other may be other (than it was)?’—‘Do you doubt about that?’—‘Of course I doubt about what is not possible.’—‘Is not the same same, and the other other? Even a child could not doubt that the other is other.’ (Socrates here confounds the Sophist by his own device of using ‘other’ in different senses; see the note on 301 B 1). ‘This point, Dionysodorus, you missed on purpose, but in other respects your dialectic is excellent.’

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Thus encouraged Dionysodorus proceeds in his own fashion to prove the propriety of boiling the cook, smiting the smith, and making pots of the potter. Further he makes Socrates admit that he may give, or sell, or slay his own animals, and that since his gods Zeus, Apollo, or Athene having souls are animals, he may give, sell, or slay them. Socrates is struck dumb, but Ctesippus cries 'Bravo Hercules, what a fine argument!' 'Is "Bravo Hercules," or "Hercules Bravo"?'—'O Poseidon, what clever arguments! I give up,' says Ctesippus; 'they are irresistible.'

Not only are the admirers of Euthydemus bursting with delight, but the very columns of the portico seem to ring with laughter and applause. Socrates, as if enchanted by the Sophists' wisdom, extols ironically their utter disregard of other men's opinions, who would be ashamed to conquer by such arguments, and slyly adds that by denying all predication (301 B 3), and declaring that nothing is either beautiful, or good, or white, they sew up other men's mouths and their own also, a delightful result that does away all offence. But the most marvellous thing is that they can teach others so quickly, as was seen when Ctesippus beat them with their own weapons. So they must not exhibit their skill in public, but only argue with each other alone, or with those who will pay them: such rare wisdom is of too great price to be made as common as water; but he begs them to receive him and Cleinias as pupils (303 B-304 B).

v. Having ended his narrative of the discussion with the Sophists Socrates playfully invites Crito to become his fellow-pupil. But Crito declines the proposal, and tells how he had met a certain person who had heard the discussion, and criticized it as an unworthy fuss about worthless matters. Philosophy itself he said was good for nothing, and Crito would have been ashamed if he had heard how Socrates gave himself up to the Sophists. Socrates ascertains that the critic was no orator, but one of the speech-writers who being neither philosophers nor statesmen, but halfway between the two, tried to disparage real philosophers as their only rivals in wisdom, and shrank from all personal discussion lest they might be worsted by the fallacious tricks of the Sophists; which they supposed to be practised by the philosophers also. Crito might well be afraid of entrusting the education of his sons to

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impostors such as the Sophists, but let him satisfy himself as to the value of true philosophy, and then both study and practise it himself, and encourage his sons to do the same (304 B-307 C).

### II. THE LITERARY FORM.

In the foregoing sketch of the contents of the dialogue we see that its general form and arrangement are clearly marked.

The main subject is the narration by Socrates of a discussion between himself and the Sophists ; but this is set in the frame of a conversation between Socrates and Crito, which both forms the introduction (271 A-272 D), and is resumed in the middle (290 E-293 A) and at the end of the discussion (304 B-the end).

Apart from this conversation the narrative of the discussion itself may be regarded as a drama in five scenes distinguished by the different characters who speak in each. Cf. Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. p. 258.

So. 1. Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Cleinias, Socrates (272 E-277 C).

So. 2. Socrates, Cleinias (277 D-282 E).

So. 3. Dionysodorus, Socrates, Ctesippus, Euthydemus (283 A-288 B).

So. 4. Socrates, Cleinias (288 B-290 D).

So. 5. Euthydemus, Socrates, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus (293 D-304 B).

This dramatic form is more prominent in the *Euthydemus* than in any other of the Platonic dialogues, and from the allusions to a chorus and choric dancing in 276 B and 277 D we may infer that it was consciously adopted by Plato in order to give the most vivid expression to the contrast between the methods of argument practised by Socrates and the Sophists. This peculiar character of the dialogue has been noticed by nearly every critic, and particularly by Archer Butler, *Lectures on Ancient Philosophy*, ii. 24 : ' We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should call "Genteel Comedy" than a philosophical exposition. Thus the entire *Euthydemus* is nothing

## II. LITERARY FORM

less than a *dramatic satire*, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the Sophistic professors, and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle.'

But it is strange, as Schleiermacher remarks in his Introduction, 'that attention has always been exclusively given to this sophistical dramatizing, when to every reader the dialogue presents more important matter, a general philosophical bearing, and a visible reference to other Platonic writings.' It is not in the depth of the arguments employed, but in the liveliness of the action and the incisive force of the satire that the excellence of Plato's work is in this case to be recognized.

If therefore we ever find the *Euthydemus* regarded as little better than a farce and quite unworthy of the genius of Plato, we may wonder whether the critic has quite appreciated the subtle irony, and detected the important truths that underlie the playful language. Socrates is in fact represented throughout as giving full play to his satirical humour, and fooling the Sophists to the top of their bent by pretending to be overpowered by their arguments, to marvel at their supernatural wisdom, and even to address them as absolutely divine (273 E, 296 D). As Euthydemus and his brother are represented in the dialogue as old men, it is not likely that they were still living at the time when Plato wrote; but it is evident that they were men of a very inferior stamp, both socially and mentally, to the greater Sophists such as Protagoras or Gorgias, and were chosen to represent the degenerate class on whom the magnificent Isocrates pours such unmitigated contempt in his oration *Against the Sophists*, 291 D. It was thus easier for Plato to make the contrast between them and Socrates the more striking. Dionysodorus in particular is represented as even more shallow and ignorant than his brother (297 A): his coarse insolence and stupid attempts at wit (283 D, 297 D) serve to justify the introduction on the other side of such a character as Ctesippus. Thus the anger of Plato, guided by his dramatic instinct, finds an outlet in the quarrels of these minor characters for the unsparing sarcasm and vehement reproaches which serve as a foil to the delicate satire and ironical compliments of Socrates. We can hardly fail to be reminded how often the broadest farce is allowed to alternate with the most tragic and pathetic scenes in Shakespeare.

## INTRODUCTION

### III. THE GENERAL PURPOSE.

It is evident from the foregoing sketch of the contents, and is in fact universally admitted, that the main purpose of the *Euthydemus* is 'to represent the opposition of Socratic and Sophistic views with regard to their value in the training and education of youth' (Zeller, *Plato*, ch. ii, note 94).

'The peculiar point of view of the *Euthydemus* was long since rightly indicated by Welcker. . . . If we assume that Plato is here . . . attacking a corrupt kind of education, which though essentially worthless is yet through the approval of the multitude not unimportant for the moment, and that its chief excellence is therefore to be looked for not in the depth of the counter arguments but in the vigour of the action and satirical description, all agrees well under this point of view' (Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* ii. 278). 'The vocation of philosophy to be the true educator of youth is vindicated in opposition to sophistry ("Scheinweisheit") which would usurp its place, and this through the representation of each in action' (ibid. 276 fin.).

This purpose is clearly indicated in the case of Cleinias by the desire of his friends that he should be persuaded to pursue the study of philosophy and of virtue (275 A 6), and again at the end of the dialogue in the anxiety of Crito about the education of his sons (306 D 2).

The professed aim of the two systems of education thus contrasted is the same, namely to promote the study of wisdom and virtue in all men, and especially in the young (273 D 8, 275 A 1, 278 D 3, 282 D 3). But in the *methods* adopted on either side, and in the *results* attained, there is the most striking contrast.

The Sophists employ the commonest logical fallacies and the most trifling verbal quibbles (275 D 3-277 C 7), and the result is that they fully succeed in reducing the mind of an intelligent and ingenuous youth to utter confusion, and expose him to the vulgar ridicule of their own disciples (276 B, D), while Ctesippus in revenge turns their own weapons against them with well-deserved flouts and jeers (284 E, 288 B).

In the strongest possible contrast to this exhibition of Sophistic folly Plato presents an example of true Socratic teaching.

### III. THE GENERAL PURPOSE

Its aim is to guide and encourage Cleinias in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue (278 D). The method adopted is to propose for consideration a serious and important subject, the universal desire for happiness. First there is an enumeration of the good things on which happiness is supposed to depend, and then it is shown by a scientific process of analysis—the division of concepts—that these things contribute to happiness only when rightly used under the guidance of knowledge, which does not come to a man by nature or accident, but by teaching and careful study (282 D).

In continuation (288 D) several kinds of special knowledge, rhetoric, strategy, and government, are found incapable of making men virtuous and happy, the result, so far as Cleinias is concerned, being that he takes part in the discussion with a growing intelligence that excites the admiration of Crito (290 E), while the general inference that philosophy alone can make men wise and good, though clearly indicated, is not expressed in this dialogue but left for further consideration (292 E).

In the renewal of the discussion the contrast between this example of Socratic teaching and that of the Sophists is made more glaring by a series of captious questions, quibbling answers, fallacies and paradoxes, which will be noticed more fully in a later section. Meanwhile it will be sufficient to quote an admirable description of the 'Eristic' art of disputation as practised by the Sophists, and illustrated in the *Euthydemus*, from Zeller's *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, ii. 462, Eng. Tr.: 'We get a vivid picture of the Sophistic art of disputation, as it was constituted in later times, in Plato's dialogue of Euthydemus, and in Aristotle's Treatise on Fallacies; and though we must not forget that the one is a satire written with all poetic freedom, and the other a universal theory which there is no reason to restrict to the Sophists in the narrower sense or to anything historical, yet the harmony of these descriptions one with the other, and with other accounts, shows that we are justified in applying them in all their essential features to the Sophistic teaching. What they tell us is certainly not much to its advantage. The Eristics were not concerned about any scientific result; their object was to involve their adversary or interlocutor in confusion and difficulties from which he could find no way of escape, so that every answer that he gave seemed incorrect': *ibid.*

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NOTE. 'The ἀφουκτα ἐρωτήματα of which the Sophist boasts, *Euthyd.* 275 E, 276 E.'

Ibid. 463. 'If a discussion is uncomfortable to the Sophist, he evades it<sup>1</sup>; if an answer is desired of him, he insists on asking questions<sup>2</sup>; if any one tries to escape from ambiguous questions by closer definition, he demands "Yes" or "No"<sup>3</sup>; if he thinks his adversary knows of an answer, he begins by deprecating all that can possibly be said on that side<sup>4</sup>; if he is accused of contradicting himself, he protests against bringing forward things that are done with long ago<sup>5</sup>. If he has no other resource, he stupefies his adversary with speeches the absurdity of which precludes any reply<sup>6</sup>.'

### IV. THE SPECIAL OCCASION.

Besides the general purpose of vindicating the claims of true science in the education of the young, and of distinguishing the Socratic teaching from that of the Sophists, there is a certain character of the dialogue that calls for further explanation. It is evident from the whole tone and temper of the discussion, and especially of the final conversation between Socrates and Crito, that it was written in a mood of unusual irritation due to some more personal cause than the standing opposition between Plato and the Sophists. It is generally supposed that this angry feeling had been roused by the envious attacks of rival teachers, and many attempts have been made to identify the persons whose doctrines are criticized or caricatured both in the body of the dialogue and in the portrait of the λογογράφος in 305 C.

The name of Lysias is naturally one of the first to occur to any one who thinks of the unfriendly feeling between him and Plato. Athenaeus, in one of his bitter attacks upon Plato (xiii. 611), quotes part of a speech of Lysias in order to take down 'the arrogance (βρέβθος) of the philosophers.' The speech was written for the

<sup>1</sup> *Euthyd.* 287 B sqq., 297 B, 299 A, etc.

<sup>2</sup> 287 B sq., 295 B sqq.

<sup>3</sup> 295 E sq., 297 D sqq.

<sup>4</sup> Thrasymachus in Plato, *Rep.* i. 336 C, 337 A.

<sup>5</sup> This is done with the most delightful naïveté in *Euthyd.* 287 B.

<sup>6</sup> *Euthyd.* 293 D, 298 D, 303 A.

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prosecution of Aeschines Socraticus, whom Lysias charges with crimes especially disgraceful to one 'who had been a disciple of Socrates, and talked so finely about justice and virtue.' Cf. *Ast. Lex. Plat.* 'Σοφιστής a Lysia dictus est Plato una cum Aeschine Socratico, ap. Aristid. c. Plat. ii.' In the oration of Aristides, p. 192, he speaks of Plato as τῶν Ῥητόρων πατέρα καὶ διδάσκαλον (*Fabric. Bibl. Gr.* vol. iv. 386).

Plato's feeling towards Lysias is sufficiently evident in the *Phaedrus*; but in the description of the λογογράφος at the end of the *Euthydemus* there is one feature which shows that it cannot be meant for him. For 'Lysias did on one memorable occasion plead his own cause. The excellent speech Κατὰ Ἐρατοσθένους was delivered by him during his brief tenure of the Athenian franchise' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, 181, n. 8): cf. K. O. Müller, *Lit. of Ancient Greece*, 496.

Schleiermacher, in his introduction to the dialogue, suggests that Antisthenes was one of the persons whom Plato assails under the names of the less important Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.

Antisthenes (*circa* 445-371 B.C.) was at first a pupil of Gorgias, but afterwards a devoted disciple and friend of Socrates, at whose death he was present (*Phaed.* 59 B). In imitation of the self-denial and patient endurance of Socrates, Antisthenes became the founder of the Cynic sect (*Diog. Laert.* vi. 2). The many anecdotes recorded of him contain abundant evidence of the ill-feeling which existed between him and Plato. Having been told that Plato spoke ill of him, 'It is a kinglike fate,' he said, 'to do good and to be evil spoken of.' On meeting Plato, who had been sick, 'I see,' said Antisthenes, 'you have got rid of your bile, but not of your conceit.'

Another anecdote preserved by Diogenes Laertius (iii. 35) not only suggests a cause for this ill-will, but also indicates a direct connexion between Antisthenes and a passage in our dialogue. Plato being once invited by Antisthenes to hear him read a philosophic treatise inquired what the subject was to be, and, when told that it was an argument to prove the non-existence of contradiction (*περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*), replied, 'How then do you write about it, since it is non-existent?' The argument, as Plato showed, can



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be turned round (*περιτρέπεται*), for *μη εἶναι* is itself a contradiction. Hereupon Antisthenes wrote a dialogue against Plato, merely changing the name to Satho.

In *Euthydemus* 285 D 7–286 B 6 there is an unmistakable allusion to this paradoxical doctrine of Antisthenes, which is also mentioned by Aristotle, *Top.* i. 11, 4, and again *Metaph.* iv. 29, 4 'Ο δὲ ψευδῆς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος. Διὸ Ἀντισθένης φέρο εὐθὺς μὴθὲν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκίῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. The meaning of Aristotle in this passage is well explained by Zeller (Part i, *Outlines*, Eng. Tr. p. 118): 'In passionate contradiction to the Platonic ideas he (Antisthenes) allowed the individual being only to exist, and hence demanded that everything should receive its own name (the *οἰκίος λόγος*) and no other. From this he deduced the conclusion (apparently after the pattern of Gorgias) that no subject can receive a predicate of a different nature. He rejected, therefore, definition by characteristic marks; only for what was composite would he allow an enumeration of its constituent parts. What was simple might be explained by comparison with something else, but it could not be defined. With Protagoras he maintained that no man could contradict himself, for if he said what was different, he was speaking of different things. Thus he gave a thoroughly Sophistic turn to the Socratic philosophy of concepts.' Compare Zeller, *Socrates*, chap. xiii Cynic Logic; Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 284, who argues that the opposition between the doctrines of Antisthenes and Plato, the paradoxical form and inconsistency ('Erfolglosigkeit') in the philosophy of Antisthenes, and the ludicrous applications which might be made of his dogmas, render it quite conceivable that Plato reckoned him among the Sophists, and that he actually did so is placed beyond doubt by such passages as 283 E, 285 E.

The same opinion is expressed by Zeller (*Plato*, p. 84, note 94), who writes that in the exposition of his subject 'Plato had to do, not merely with the views of the elder Sophists and their later developments, but also . . . with Antisthenes, who seemed to him in true Sophistic fashion to destroy all possibility of cognition, to confuse Socratic with Sophistic views and thereby spoil them.'

We can well believe therefore that the satire of the *Euthydemus* was in certain passages directed against Antisthenes; but his

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character does not so fully correspond to the particular description in 304 D as to justify the opinion that he was the rhetorician and speech-writer there described.

Winckelmann (*Proleg.* xxxiv) thinks that the description of the *λογογράφος* is intended for Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, the Sophist who argues so vehemently against Socrates on the nature of justice in the first book of the Republic. In the *Phaedrus* he is mentioned (261 C) as a leading Sophist with Gorgias and Theodorus, and in 266 C as a teacher of rhetoric to all who would pay for it (*οἱ δὲ δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν*). Again in *Phaedr.* 267 C he is described as a master of the art of pathetic commonplace: for 'the "sorrows of a poor old man" no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant' (Jöwett). In the same passage the words immediately following, *ὀργίσαι τε αὐ πολλοὺς ἄμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὀργισμένοις ἐπέδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη*, evidently point to some boastful expressions of Thrasymachus, to which there seems to be an allusion in *Euthydem.* 290 A ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπεδῶν (τέχνη), ἔχων τε . . . καὶ νόσων κήλησις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄχλων κήλησις τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὐσα. Not less striking is the similarity between the preceding passage of *Euthydemus* and Plat. *Pol.* 358 B *Θρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται πρῶταίτερον τοῦ δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφει κληθῆναι*.

It thus seems highly probable that Thrasymachus is alluded to in *Euthydem.* 290 A; but when Winckelmann tries to prove that he is the *λογογράφος* referred to in the close of the dialogue, we find that the testimony to which he appeals is quite inadequate to the conclusion. In Cic., *De Orat.* iii. 16, Thrasymachus is named among the rhetoricians 'qui minus ipsi in republica versarentur, sed huius tamen eiusdem sapientiae doctores essent, ut Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Isocrates.' Neither here nor in Quintilian, *Inst. Orator.* iii. 1 'Communes locos tractasse dicuntur Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus et Thrasymachus,' is there the slightest indication of his having written speeches for others to deliver in the law-courts, and the absence of a feature which is so prominent in the description in 304 D, 305 B, C, makes it impossible to suppose that he is the person meant.

We have therefore still to inquire who is the individual, if any, there described. In the statement of Crito, 304 E 5, that he is quoting the very words this person used (*οὕτωςι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπε*

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τοῖς ὀνόμασι) there is 'an intimation,' says Thompson, p. 181, 'that some one in particular is meant.' And the *παρονομασία*, *ἄξιον ἀναξίαν*, and general style of the quotation, may probably be meant to imitate the affected language of Isocrates. Certainly the description which follows seems to correspond with his character as clearly displayed in his writings.

(i) It is almost impossible to open any page of his extant orations without finding abundant evidence that he was ἀνήρ οὐόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός (*Euthyd.* 304 D), one of those who οἰονται εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς (305 C). A single example must suffice, taken from the *Panegyrica* (43 D), an oration published in 380 B.C., when Isocrates was fifty-five years old: 'Ἐγὼ δ' ἦν μὴ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀξίως εἶπω καὶ τῆς δόξης τῆς ἐμαντοῦ καὶ τοῦ χρόνου μὴ μόνον τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν διατριφθέντος ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπατος οὐ βεβίωκα, παρακελεύομαι μηδεμίαν μοι συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καταγελῶν καὶ καταφρονεῖν' οὐδὲν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἀξίός εἰμι πάσχειν, εἴπερ μῆδὲν τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων οὕτω μεγάλας ποιοῦμαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις.

(ii) The next trait, *τούτων τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν* (304 D, 305 B), is proved to be true of Isocrates by the fact that several of such speeches are included in his remaining works. But in his latter years he was very sore at being reminded of his former occupation: 'For I know that some of the Sophists speak ill of my occupation, and say that it has to do with writing speeches for the law-courts, and in this they act just as if one should dare to call Pheidias who built the temple of Athena a doll-maker (*κοροπλάθον*), or say that Zeuxis and Parrhasius practised the same art as the sign-painters: nevertheless I have never yet taken revenge for this their detraction' (*Antidosis*, 310 B).

(iii) The sentence *ρήτωρ τις, ἡ τῶν τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται*; and *Ἐκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία, ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πάποσ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκίνα* (*Euthyd.* 305 B-C) point evidently at Isocrates, who from timidity and weakness of health always shrank from appearing in person in any public assembly or court (Isocr. *Panathen.* 234 D). Cf. *Antid.* 318 A *'Ἐμὲ δ' οὐδεὶς πάποσ' ἑώρακεν οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς συνεδρίοις οὕτε περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις οὐτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὕτε πρὸς τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ἀπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν.*

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Plutarch in the *Life of Isocrates*, *Mor.* 837 A, says that the only speech he ever delivered in public was this, the *De Antidosis*, which we know was not composed till 355 B.C., when he was in his eighty-second year, long after the incident to which it refers: in fact Isocrates himself explains that it was only intended to show what his manner of life had been, and how he might have pleaded in excusing himself from undertaking the trierarchy, which he had actually accepted.

(iv) The next feature in the description of the unnamed writer of speeches is thoroughly characteristic of Isocrates. Οἱτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι μὲν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὗς ἔφη Πρῶδικος μεθύρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ (*Smithyol.* 305 C). Σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνυ εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειν, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου· μετέχων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ὅσον ἔδει (*ibid.* 305 D).

In these passages 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*, as one in whose genius *ἔνεστι τις φιλοσοφία*' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 181).

We may add that the two passages exactly summarize the meaning of a long passage in the *De Antidosis*, 276–290, in which Isocrates, after protesting against the Platonic philosophy (τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινῶν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί) proceeds to say σοφῶς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τούτοις διατρίβοντας ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν.

'The finishing touch in the picture—(v) ἐκτὸς δὲ ὄντες κινδύνων καὶ ἀγῶνων καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν—agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the *Antidosis*' (Thompson, *ibid.*). See especially *Antid.* 162 τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν . . . ἔπειτα τὸν βίον ἡδία νομίσας εἶναι τοῦτον ἢ τὸν τῶν πολλὰ πρᾶττόνων. The expression καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν and the synonymous phrase ἀπολέλυκα τοῦ πράγματος (*Antid.* 208) both refer to the enormous payments which Isocrates received for his teaching and his speeches. That he was the person to whom this description was meant to apply will be made even more evident when we come to examine a passage in which he is mentioned by name at the close of the *Phaedrus*. 'In fact the combination of a smattering of philosophy, a measure of political knowledge, great talent as

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a writer of forensic speeches, and a boundless and intolerant vanity, is one which we find in the writings of Isocrates and in no others of that epoch' (Thompson, p. 182).

'No one will doubt any more that the episode at the end of the dialogue is aimed against Isocrates' (Sudhaus, *Rhein. Mus.* xlv. 52). 'Hunc (Isocratem) esse anonymum de quo ibi sermo est, hodie inter omnes constat' (F. Susemihl, *De Plat. Phaedro et Isocr. c. Sophistas oratione*, p. xi).

### V. DATE OF THE DIALOGUE.

'The date of the *Euthydemus* we have absolutely no means of determining, and, if we set aside tradition, that of the *Phaedrus* may be said perhaps to be equally uncertain' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, Appendix ii. 183).

After such a pronouncement from the late Master of Trinity it may appear presumptuous even to try to determine the approximate dates of the two dialogues, and their mutual relation. But the attempt, I believe, is not hopeless, and in any case can hardly fail to be instructive. Several of Dr. Thompson's own remarks seem to point to what we believe to be the right conclusion.

We have seen reason to believe that Isocrates, though not mentioned by name in the *Euthydemus*, is the person indicated by the description of the clever speech-writer (*λογογράφος*) at the end of the dialogue.

In the *Phaedrus* Isocrates is mentioned by name in a passage which we shall have to examine carefully in its bearing upon the connexion between the two Platonic dialogues and the relation of each to the oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*. Before entering upon this inquiry it is desirable to draw particular attention to the fact that the three works are all concerned with the merits and faults of rival methods of education as practised by the teachers of rhetoric, by the Sophists, and by Socrates and his followers.

We begin with the *Phaedrus*.

The question concerning the date of this dialogue is difficult and much disputed. The oldest opinion, dating from the third century after Christ, is the tradition mentioned by Diogenes Laertius in the *Life of Plato*, iii. 25 λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράψαι αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον' καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μειρακιῶδες τι τὸ πρόβλημα. From the first scholion on

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the *Phaedrus* we learn that the tradition was repeated in the fifth century by Olympiodorus, the master of Proclus: the notion that it was founded by Diogenes on the authority of Euphorion (c. 240 B.C.), Panaetius (c. 143 B.C.) arose from a corrupt reading in Diog. Laer. λόγος, corrected by Cobet to λόγος. Cf. Thompson, *Phaedrus*, xxiii. H. Usener, *Abfassungszeit des platonischen Phaidros*, assigns the dialogue to the first half of 402 B.C., partly, as it seems, on the ground of the tradition, and partly upon the erroneous notion of Spengel, that the Κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν of Isocrates was written as much as fifty years before the Ἀντιδόσις, on which see p. 32 below.

A comparison of the contents and character of the *Phaedrus* with those of the dialogues known to have been written before or soon after the death of Socrates, B.C. 399, shows beyond all question that so mature a work could not possibly have been written by so young a man as Plato was at the still earlier date to which the 'tradition' would assign it. 'When Socrates died, the philosophical education of Plato had but completed its first stage. The acquaintance with other more ambitious systems which his travels enabled him to acquire or to perfect, though it never disturbed his reverence for the teacher of his youth, greatly enlarged his views of philosophy and the philosophic calling' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, p. 154).

On the other hand a very much later date is proposed by Lutoslawski, who adopts (p. 352) a short and easy method of solving the difficulty. 'Thompson has made it evident to the attentive reader of the four dissertations accompanying his edition of the *Phaedrus* (Introduction and three Appendices) that this dialogue was written after the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates, that is after 380; and before the death of Lysias, that is before 378. This is such an exact determination of date as is possible only for a very few Platonic dialogues.'

Every student of Plato would have reason to be grateful indeed to the author of this discovery, if it were true. But unfortunately it is based upon a misapprehension of Dr. Thompson's meaning; in a note on p. 178 of his edition he compares *Phaedr.* 167 A with Isocr. *Panegyricus*, § 8, and remarks that 'Plato jeeringly attributes this boast to Tisias and Gorgias: Isocrates adopts it as his own in perfect seriousness. The date of the *Panegyricus* is B.C. 380.'

This does not mean that the *Panegyricus* was written before the

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*Phaedrus*, but on the contrary that Isocrates seriously appropriates what Plato has previously held up to ridicule. That Isocrates was quite capable of doing this will appear in another instance presently: see p. 31.

Lutoslawski, however, adds a more important remark: 'The same argument has been independently and with far greater assurance produced by Teichmüller in 1881 (*Literarische Fehden*, vol. i. pp. 57-82), and has never been refuted.'

Teichmüller's long argument on *The Phaedrus of Plato and the Panegyricus of Isocrates* (*Lit. Fehd.* i. 3) is summarized by Lutoslawski, p. 348. It is based upon several fundamental errors.

(1) He misunderstands the ironical nature of the prophecy concerning Isocrates in *Phaedrus* 279, on which see p. 26 below.

(2) In particular he misapplies the words *τοὺς λόγους οἷς νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ*, referring them to the time at which Plato wrote instead of the *scenic date* at which Socrates speaks.

(3) He makes the same mistake as Lutoslawski on the relation between the parallel passages *Phaedr.* 167 A and *Panegyrr.* § 8.

(4) He fails to notice the statement in the *Life of Isocrates* (Plut. ii. 837 F), that 'in composing the *Panegyricus* he spent ten years, and some say fifteen.' Cf. Quintil. *Inst. Orator.* x. 5: 'Panegyricum Isocratis, qui parcissime, decem annis dicunt elaboratum.'

If we adopt this 'most moderate' statement, it is still evident that the passage *Paneg.* § 8 may have been written at any time between 390 and 380 B.C., the date of publication, and could therefore afford no closer criterion of the relative date of the passage in the *Phaedrus*.

For more trustworthy evidence we must have recourse to an examination of the contents and purpose of the *Phaedrus* itself, and of any apparent allusions to it in other dialogues of Plato or Isocrates.

During the ten or eleven years that followed the death of Socrates (399 B.C.) Plato had written and studied and taught and travelled much. In the course of his travels there had been many opportunities for personal intercourse with the leaders of the chief schools of philosophy; at Megara with Euclides, at Cyrene with Aristippus, at Tarentum with Archytas and other Pythagoreans, at Velia with the Eleatics, and in Sicily with the Sophistical rhetoricians of the school of Corax, Tisias, and Gorgias.

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On his return to Athens in 388 B. C. with this enlarged knowledge of the existing schools of philosophy, and with the principles of his own system more clearly defined and confirmed by comparison with others, Plato was fully prepared to take a leading part in education as a public teacher of philosophy. Accordingly in the year 387 B. C. he opened his famous school in the Academy.

In Athens at this time the field of education was chiefly occupied by two classes of teachers, both as bitterly opposed to Plato as they were to each other. His old enemies the Eristic Sophists had sunk to the lowest depths of chicanery and imposture, 'their only care being to make money from the young,' *Isocr. Hel. Encom.* 209 B, while 'they put so low a value on all the virtue and happiness which they professed to impart, that they were not ashamed to accept so little as three or four minae in payment,' *Adv. Sophist.* 291 D.

Isocrates himself was not less eager to make money, but on a far grander scale, and by more magnificent professions. From the time of Pericles oratory had been the ruling power in the state, and though its influence over the passions of the democracy had too often led to crime and disaster, it was still the favourite study of all young men whose wealth and ambition prompted them to seek power and fame in the arena of politics. Isocrates was their most popular and successful teacher: in politics his only moral standard was utility, and persuasion, not truth, the end and aim of his rhetorical art.

With the Sophists Plato had already dealt in several of his earlier dialogues, and was to deal with them again even more severely at a later period. His present purpose, carried out in the *Phaedrus*, was to expose the faults of the popular system of education founded upon a shallow rhetoric, and to show the superiority of a new dialectic based upon truer principles both of science and morality. The scene was laid in the lifetime of Socrates, and was to be the mouthpiece of a philosophy which, however enlarged and ennobled by the genius of Plato, was still faithful to the teaching of his master.

'For the purpose of a discussion on rhetoric as an instrument of education, Plato had to select a speech as an example to illustrate his views' (*Lutosl.* p. 327). At the date when the discourse between Socrates and *Phaedrus* was supposed to be held, Isocrates was too young to be introduced as the most eminent rhetorician of



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the day. An older man must be taken, and it was natural to select the orator Lysias who had long enjoyed the highest reputation as a writer of speeches intended for the law-courts (*Phaedr.* 228 A, 257 B.C.). Before he became famous by his accusation of Eratosthenes (403 B.C.) he had been a teacher of rhetoric, and the written essay ascribed to him in the *Phaedrus* was probably a school-exercise of that earlier period. Cf. Lutosl. p. 327.

He is severely and justly censured by Socrates, first for the choice of such a subject, the essay being one of those ἐρωτικὸι λόγοι of which Lysias is said to have been the first author: cf. Thompson, *Phaedr.* pp. 82, 102. When Socrates consents to show how the same subject might have been more ably and more modestly treated, he says, 'I will put a veil over my face and run through the discourse as fast as I can, lest if I look at you I should not know what to say for shame.' But the criticism of Socrates is directed chiefly against the rhetorical faults in the essay of Lysias, who 'seemed to have said the same things two or three times over, like one too barren of matter to be able to say many things on one subject . . . Also he appeared to me to make an ostentatious display of his skill in two different ways, both equally excellent as he flattered himself' (*Phaedr.* 235 A, Thompson). Again the arguments used by Lysias are described as mere commonplace platitudes, which even the worst of writers could not fail to use: they may be allowed and excused; there is no merit in inventing them, but only in the arrangement (236 A). Then after showing in an extemporary speech how the same subject might have been treated more skilfully and more effectively even on the principles of the rhetoric then in vogue, Socrates continues his criticism: 'It was a dreadful argument, Phaedrus, that of the speech which you brought with you, and of that which you made me utter . . . Silly and somewhat impious, and nothing could be worse than that. For if Love be something divine, he cannot be evil, though that was what both our speeches said of him. Their simplicity also was quite amusing, that having no truth nor honesty in them they made a solemn pretence of importance, in the hope of deceiving a few mannikins, and being admired by them' (243 A).

The censure was severe, and was as applicable to Isocrates as to Lysias; but Plato's purpose required yet more: it was neces-

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sary not only to criticize the defects of the fashionable rhetoric, but also to prove the superiority of his own.

Socrates therefore proceeds (244 A) to give a definition of love as a species of divine madness. The soul, he argues, both divine and human, is immortal: its proper food is beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and its triple form—desire, energy (*θυμικόν*), and reason—may be described under the image of a charioteer borne upward by winged steeds. Then in an allegory unrivalled even in Plato for brilliancy of imagination, glowing splendour of language, and sublime speculation, he shows how by the aid of philosophy the love of beauty may rise as in that winged car to a realm beyond the bounds of matter and space and time, even to the heaven of heavens where justice, temperance, and knowledge absolute dwell ever unseen by mortal eye.

At the close of his second speech Socrates offers a prayer to Eros to forgive the faults of the two former speeches, laying the blame upon Lysias for choosing such a subject, instead of studying philosophy like his brother Polemarchus (257 A, B).

In the remainder of the dialogue Socrates proposes a scheme of rhetoric founded on true principles of science and morality (259 E, 260 A).

Among the essential requirements are (1) accurate knowledge, and observance of truth and justice (260 C); (2) clear definition (265 B); (3) organic arrangement (264 D); (4) generalization by concepts (265 D); (5) classification or division into species (265 E).

'Dialectic' thus described is then contrasted with the barren technicalities of the popular rhetoric (266 D–267 E), such as we see exposed in the *Euthydemus*.

Further, the 'dialectician' must understand the motives and principles of human action, and the 'varieties of human character, upon which he has to work in producing that "Persuasion" which is acknowledged to be the final cause of his art' (271 A–272 B; Thompson, Introduction, p. xiv). In short, true rhetoric must be based upon philosophy and morality. It is thus apparent that the *Phaedrus* is throughout a severe criticism of the kind of rhetoric of which Lysias and Isocrates were the most eminent professors: and 'if no names of contemporaries had been mentioned, it would not have been unreasonable to suspect that he (Isocrates) and not

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Lysias was the orator at whom Plato's censures were principally aimed' (Thompson, p. 178). In the conclusion of the dialogue they are both brought forward by name. Lysias is to be told that 'He who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long turning and twisting this way and that, combining or separating one part and another, may be called poet or speech-maker, or writer of laws,' 278 E. Here the words *ἄνω κάτω στρέφων ἐν χρόνῳ, πρὸς ἄλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαιρῶν*, 'long patching and piecing' (Jowett), though addressed to Lysias are far more applicable to Isocrates, who was said to have spent ten or even fifteen years over his Panegyric oration, and was so long in composing a letter in the name of the Athenian state to persuade Philip to make peace, that peace was made long before the letter was ready.

In 278 E Phaedrus asks, 'What message will you send to Isocrates the fair?' and the answer is, 'Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him. I think he has a genius which rises above the orations of Lysias, and a moral character of finer mould. So I should not wonder if, as he grows older, he should both surpass all rivals in his present occupation of writing speeches, and becoming dissatisfied with this should be led on to higher things by some diviner impulse: for there is by nature a sort of philosophy in the man's intellect.'

At the time when Plato wrote, this pretended prophecy had been in part fulfilled, and in part already falsified: Isocrates had become the most eminent of rhetoricians, and the bitterest enemy of what Plato taught as the only true philosophy. What then are we to think of this apparent compliment? Was it sincere or ironical? Or partly ironical and partly sincere? The date to be assigned to the *Phaedrus*, and its relation to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*, depend in great measure on the answers to be given to these questions.

Cicero, a professed admirer of Isocrates, says that with this testimony of Plato in his favour he may disregard all other criticism (*Orator* xiii. 40). Then, after translating the passage of the *Phaedrus*, Cicero adds (42) 'Haec de adolescente Socrates auguratur: at ea de seniore scribit Plato et scribit aequalis, et quidem exagitator omnium rhetorum hunc miratur unum. Me autem qui

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Isocratem non diligunt una cum Socrate et cum Platone errare patiantur.'

Diogenes Laertius in his *Life of Plato* (iii. 9) says that he was a friend of Isocrates, resting his statement on no better reason than the fact that Praxiphanes the Peripatetic wrote a dialogue in which Plato and Isocrates were represented as holding a discussion on the Poets, the scene being laid in Plato's country house.

In recent times the question before us has been much discussed by German scholars, and by none more fully than by Eugen Holzner, *Plato's Phaedrus und die Sophistenrede des Isokrates*, Prag, 1894. He writes thus (p. 5): 'In an unprejudiced view there can be no doubt of one thing, that in those words Plato bestows real praise upon Isocrates; hereby the prophecy gains literary importance: for it must be compared with the fact that Plato and Isocrates were at open enmity. This points out the proper path of inquiry, for the business now is to seek in the works of both writers for the evidence of that former agreement of sentiment.'

Holzner then proceeds to compare the *Phaedrus* and the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* not with an unprejudiced mind but with the preconceived idea that 'if in the *Phaedrus* Plato appropriated thoughts of Isocrates, it will be easier to understand that he wished to speak of him in eulogistic terms in the conclusion of the work.'

This notion that Plato had borrowed his ideas from Isocrates is directly contrary to the judgement of some of the ablest students of Plato.

'Usener asserts (*Rhein. Mus.* xxxi. p. 21) that in the *Karà τῶν Σοφιστῶν* there is a distinct borrowing, sometimes even word for word, from the *Phaedrus*.' To this Holzner can only oppose the very feeble objection that 'Usener has omitted to prove that the relation which he establishes from the passages themselves is the only one possible.'

The passages chiefly discussed and compared are the following:—

*Phaedrus* 269 D.

Isocr. *Or.* xiii. § 20.

Τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὦ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε δεινὸν τὸν μὲν μαθητὴν πρὸς τῷ ἀγωνιστῆν τέλειον γενέσθαι, εἰκός, τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν οἷαν χρὴ τὰ μὲν

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ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, ἔχειν ὅσπερ  
τᾶλλα. Εἰ μὲν σοι ὑπάρχει φύσει  
ῥητορικῆ εἶναι, ἔσει ῥήτωρ ἐλλογι-  
μος προσλαβὼν ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ  
μελέτην, ὅτου δ' ἂν ἐλλίπης τού-  
των, ταύτη ἀτελής ἔσει. Ὅσον δὲ  
αὐτοῦ τέχνη, οὐχ ἢ Δυσίας τε καὶ  
Θρασύμαχος πορευέται δοκεῖ μοι  
φαίνεσθαι ἢ μέθοδος.

εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν, περὶ δὲ  
τὰς χρήσεις αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι. . .  
καὶ τούτων μὲν ἀπώτων συμπεσό-  
των τελείως ἔξουσιν οἱ φιλοσο-  
φοῦντες. Καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν ἐλλειφθῆ τι  
τῶν εἰρημένων, ἀνάγκη ταύτη χεῖρον  
διακείσθαι τοῖς πλησιάζουσας.

According to Plato the power of becoming a perfect orator depends upon the possession of three necessary qualifications, i. A natural faculty for speaking, ii. Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), iii. Careful practice.

These are all indispensable: if either be wanting, the man will be in this respect imperfect. 'But so far as it is technical (*αὐτοῦ= τοῦ δινασθαι ὅστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλειον γενέσθαι*), the true method is not shown, I think, in the way by which Lysias and Thrasymachus proceed.'

Both Lysias and Thrasymachus had published manuals of the art of Rhetoric (*τέχνη ῥητορικῆ*), but these technical rules are expressly rejected by Plato both here and in other passages of the dialogue; cf. *Phaedr.* 269 B τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα ἔχοντες ῥητορικὴν εἴθησαν ἠύρηκται: 271 C οἱ νῦν γράφοντες, ἔν σὺ ἀκήκοας, τέχνας λόγων πανούργοι εἰσι: 266 D where the usual contents of such manuals are described: see also Aristot. *Soph. Elench.* xxxiii. οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύουσιν ὑπελάμβανον.

The real art is described by Socrates, *Phaedr.* 271 D, and consists of (1) 'a dialectical training enabling the man to "divide" and to "collect," and (2) the power of applying his science to human nature and its varieties' (Thompson): compare with this the description of a true scheme of rhetoric on p. 25 of this Introduction.

Against this usual and natural interpretation of the passage Holzner argues that 'If *ἐπιστήμη* in 269 D already meant that later Dialectic and Psychology, it would be inconceivable that Plato in the words *ὅσον δὲ αὐτοῦ τέχνη* denies to this orator any participation in the art. But Plato, as I believe, shows clearly enough

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*what he understands by ἐπιστήμη, the mechanical instrument of Rhetoric.'*

On this paradoxical interpretation Lutoslawski justly remarks (341, note)—'Strangely enough this knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, 262 D) has been misunderstood by many interpreters, as if it meant knowledge of the rules of rhetoric. Even E. Holzner, who corrects the error of those who identified this ἐπιστήμη with the following τέχνη, falls into an almost worse error in asserting the identity of ἐπιστήμη in this passage with τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης ἀναγκαῖα μαθήματα 269 B.'

In the two passages thus compared it is, I think, evident that Isocrates is commenting on Plato, and adopting his thoughts so far as they can be fitted to his own more meagre art of Rhetoric. There is then no evidence, so far, that Plato having borrowed from Isocrates was anxious to propitiate him by a compliment in the close of the dialogue.

In passing to the examination of that passage we must first consider the previous state of feeling between Plato and Isocrates. There had been an enmity of long standing between the rhetoricians and Socrates and his followers. They had their representative at his trial, one of the three accusers being the orator Lycon. 'Socrates had offended them by his incessant censure of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account' (Riddell, *Apology*, x); and this 'enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Socratists' (ibid. p. xii, note). Of Plato's bitter resentment and continued censure there is abundant evidence in his earlier dialogues. Thus in the *Gorgias*, 503 A, Socrates describes two kinds of rhetoric, 'the one a trick of flattery and a base kind of popular declaration, the other noble, being the earnest striving to improve to the utmost the souls of the citizens, and the earnest striving to say what is best, whether that will prove more or less agreeable to the audience.' 'But such rhetoric as this,' says Socrates, 'you never yet saw; or if you have any one of this sort to point out among the orators, let me know at once who he is.' 'No, by my faith,' Callicles answers, 'I cannot name you any one, at any rate of the orators of the present day.'

Again, *Gorg.* 520 A, 'The Sophist and the rhetorician are the same thing, or as nearly as possible alike, as I said to Polus: but you for want of knowledge think the one, rhetoric, a very fine thing, and

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the other you despise. Whereas in truth sophistic is a finer thing than rhetoric.

Having thus ascertained the previous state of Plato's feeling towards Isocrates, we may now proceed to consider the exact meaning of the supposed compliment.

We notice first the manner in which the name of Isocrates is introduced: it shows that, though he had not been hitherto mentioned in the dialogue, its criticisms had been intended for him as well as for Lysias.

'*Soc.* Go then and tell this to your companion.

*Phaedr.* But what are you going to do yourself? For your own companion must by no means be passed over.

*Soc.* Whom do you mean?

*Phaedr.* The fair Isocrates. What message will you carry to him? What shall we say of him?

*Soc.* Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus. I am willing, however, to tell you what I prophesy of him.'

At the *scenic* date of this conversation Isocrates was barely thirty, and being twenty-two years junior to Lysias is naturally described as still young. Socrates of course speaks of him as a former companion with all kindness and courtesy, and goes on to recognize his undoubted merits, as compared with Lysias, his superior genius and finer temperament. So far all is sincere praise, undeniably true, and expressed without a touch of irony. The expectation of Socrates that as years went on he would far surpass all competitors in the kind of speeches on which he was at that time engaged, had been amply fulfilled, and Plato does not fail to recognize fully the great ability and success of Isocrates. And yet his praise would not be altogether welcome. The speeches on which he had been engaged in the lifetime of Socrates might not altogether satisfy him. This also had come to pass; but it was a sore subject with Isocrates, as we have seen above in the passage of the *Antidosis* 310 B quoted above on p. 18, and Plato's allusion to it could hardly be felt as a sincere compliment.

In further fulfilment of the prophecy Isocrates had become dissatisfied with writing forensic speeches (*δικογραφία*), and adopted a style of oratory as far superior to that as the work of Pheidias to that of a doll-maker.

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Finally Socrates expresses a hope that he may be attracted to philosophy for which he showed a natural capacity: and in fact, Isocrates was fond of dignifying his new style of oratory with the name of philosophy, though fully conscious that it was something totally different from what Socrates and Plato meant by philosophy, and that the modified admission *ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία* was not altogether complimentary. On the whole it seems impossible to doubt that while the pretended prophecy acknowledges the real merits of Isocrates, its praises are not unmixed with a delicate vein of satire which Isocrates could not fail to recognize.

If we now turn to the fragmentary oration of Isocrates *Κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν*, we find that in the very first words (291 A) he finds fault with the large professions of persons 'undertaking the work of education,' as Plato we know was, and especially condemns the pretension to prophesy, which had been made by some rival teacher: 'For it is evident, I suppose, to all that foreknowledge of the future is not within the power of our nature . . . and this is one of the things impossible to man.' Then a little farther on, *c. Soph.* 293 B (a passage which has received less notice than it deserves), he clearly refers again to the prophecy concerning himself in the *Phaedrus*, and tries to appropriate the ambiguous compliment, as if it were in fact well deserved: 'I should have thought it a priceless gain if there had been in philosophy so great a power as these men say; for I perhaps should not have been the hindmost therein, nor would my share have been the smallest.'

It seems impossible to doubt that in these passages there is a direct answer to the prophecy in the *Phaedrus*, and this conclusion will be confirmed by the comparison in parallel columns of the original words of these and other passages of the two dialogues, which will be found at the end of this section of the Introduction, p. 33.

We therefore agree with Zeller (*Plato*, 132, note 94) that 'Spengel is certainly right in believing that the *Phaedrus* must have been written before the speech of Isocrates *Against the Sophists*.'

Spengel's conclusion is contained in his article *Isokrates und Plato* in the *Abh. d. Akad. d. Wissenschaften zu München*, vol. vii. pp. 729-769. His argument is founded on the statements of Isocrates in the speech *De Antidosi* written in the year 355 B.C., when Isocrates was eighty-two years of age, as he is careful to mention, § 312 A:



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ἔγραφον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐκ ἀκμάζων ἀλλ' ἔτη γεγονὸς δύο καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα. In this same speech, § 207, the latter half of the speech *Against the Sophists* was recited by Isocrates 'in more elegant language, but with the same meaning as before,' οὐ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἦν νεώτερος ἀλαζονεύμενος φαίνομαι καὶ μεγάλας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιούμενος, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἀπολέλαυκα τοῦ πράγματος καὶ πρεσβύτερος γέγονα, τῆρκαῖτα ταπεινὴν ποιῶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς λόγοις χρώμενος ἀκμάζων καὶ παυόμενος αὐτῆς (v. l. ἀκμῆς).

From the words ὅτε νεώτερος ἦν and ἀκμάζων Spengel argues (p. 751) that the speech *Against the Sophists* must have been written fifty years before the *De Antidosi*, i. e. about the year 405 B. C., six years before the death of Socrates, and when Plato was about twenty-three years old.

This palpable mistake is due to a misunderstanding of the words νεώτερος and ἀκμάζων. Aristotle says that the soul is at its prime about the age of forty-nine years (*Rhet.* ii. 14, 4). Now, when an old man of eighty-two speaks of what he has done when he was 'younger' and 'in his prime,' adding that he is no longer 'in his prime,' but 'declining from it,' he does not mean to speak of a time fifty years ago, but thirty or five-and-thirty at most, i. e. between B. C. 390 (the date supposed by Lutoslawski) and B. C. 385. In this interval, namely in B. C. 388 or 387, Plato began to teach in the Academy. Stallbaum in his *Prolegomena* to the *Phaedrus* has shown, I think, good reason for believing that it was written at this time, and Zeller is of the same opinion. If this view be accepted, the order of the three works in question will be as follows:

(1) Plato, *Phaedrus*, (2) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*, (3) Plato, *Euthydemus*. The three dialogues will thus have been all published within two or three years after B. C. 388, in which year Plato was forty-one and Isocrates forty-eight years old.

'There is no contradiction,' writes Lutoslawski (p. 211), 'from the standpoint either of logical or of stylistic development in admitting the close relation between the *Euthydemus* and Isocrates' discourse *Against the Sophists*. This relation, first noticed by Spengel and Thompson, has been since investigated by Teichmüller, Sudhaus, Dümmler, and recognized by Zeller and Susemihl, without any noteworthy opposition. According to these investigations the

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*Euthydemus* must have been published not before 390 and probably not much later.'

That Isocrates in the oration *Against the Sophists* is referring to Plato's *Phaedrus* will, I think, be placed beyond doubt if we set a few selected passages opposite to each other in parallel columns.

### I. ON PROPHECYING.

<p><i>Phaedr.</i> 278 E Νέος ἔτι, ὃ Φαῖδρε, Ἴσοκράτης· ὃ μέντοι μαντεύομαι κατ' αὐτοῦ, λέγειν ἐθέλω.</p> <p>242 C εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν μάντις.</p> <p>244 C τῇ καλλίστῃ τέχνῃ, ἣ τὸ μᾶλλον κρίνεται.</p>	<p>ISOCR. 291 B εὐθὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων ψευδῆ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν· οἴμαι γὰρ θρασυ εἶναι φανερόν· ὅτι τὰ μέλλοντα προγιγνώσκαι οὐ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεως ἐστίν.</p>
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292 C περὶ μὲν τῶν μαλλόντων εἰδέναι προσποιουμένους.

### II. ON THE RELATION OF ISOCRATES HIMSELF TO PHILOSOPHY.

<p><i>Phaedr.</i> 279 A φύσει γάρ, ὃ φίλε, ἔνεστί τις φιλοσοφία τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς διανοίᾳ.</p>	<p>ISOCR. 293 B Ἐγὼ δὲ πρὸ πολλῶν μὲν ἀν χρημάτων ἐτιμησάμην τηλικούτων δύνασθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ὅσον οὗτοι λέγουσιν· ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀν ἡμεῖς πλείστον ἀπελείφθημεν, οὐδ' ἀν ἐλάχιστον μέρος ἀπελαύσαμεν αὐτῆς. id. <i>De Antidosis</i> 289 τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινῶν φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί.</p>
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### III. ON THE INFERIORITY OF OPINION (δόξα) TO KNOWLEDGE (ἐπιστήμη).

<p><i>Phaedr.</i> 248 B ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἀπέρχονται (αἱ ψυχαί), καὶ ἀπελθοῦσαι τροφῇ δοξαστῆ χρώνται, 'feed on the chaff and husks of opinion' (Thompson).</p> <p>260 C ὅταν οὖν ὁ βηγορικὸς ἀγνοῶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν . . . δόξας δὲ πλῆθους μεμελητικῶς πείσῃ</p>	<p>ISOCR. 292 C Ἐπειδὴν κατίδωσι . . . μᾶλλον ὁμοιοῦντας καὶ πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχον ἐπαγγελομένους κτλ.</p> <p>294 D ταῦτα δὲ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δεῖσθαι καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι.</p>
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EUTHYDEMUS

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κακὰ πράττειν ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν, ποῖόν τι· ἂν οἶε μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν;

262 B λόγων ἦρα τέχνην, ὃ ἐταῖρε, ὃ τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ εἰδώς, δόξας δὲ τεθηρευκώς, γελῶσαν τινὰ, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ ἀτεχρον παρέξεται.

[That this was the fixed opinion of Isocrates is seen in a later dialogue *Panathenaiscus* 234 D, where he describes his own genius as πρὸς τοὺς λόγους οὐ τελείαν οὔτε πανταχῆ χρησίμην, ἀλλὰ δοξάσαι μὲν περὶ ἐκάστου τὴν ἀλήθειαν μᾶλλον δυναμένην τῶν εἰδέναι φασκόντων.]

291 B προσποιούνται μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζῆταν.

### IV. ON THE COMPARATIVE MERITS OF WRITTEN AND ORAL DISCOURSE.

*Phaedr.* 275 A καὶ νῦν σύ, πατήρ ὧν γραμμάτων, δι' εὐνοίαν τούναντιόν εἶπες ἢ δύναται. τοῦτο γὰρ τῶν μαθόντων λήθην μὲν ἐν ψυχαῖς παρέξει μνήμης ἀμελετησίᾳ, ἀτε διὰ πῶστιν γραφῆς ἔξωθεν ὑπ' ἀλλοτρίων τύπων, οὐκ ἔνδον αὐτοὺς ὑφ' αὐτῶν ἀναμνησκομένους. ὀθλῶν μνήμης ἀλλ' ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον εὖρες· σοφίας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς δόξαν οὐκ ἀλήθειαν πορίζεις.

275 D Οὐκοῦν ὁ τέχνην οἴομενος ἐν γράμμασι καταλιπεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς παραδεχόμενος ὡς τι σαφές καὶ βέβαιον ἐκ γραμμάτων ἐσόμενος πολλῆς ἂν εὐθελείας γέμοι.

278 A ἐν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις καὶ μαθήσεως χάριν λεγομένοις καὶ τῷ ὄντι γραφομένοις ἐν ψυχῇ περὶ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐν μόνοις (τούτοις) τό τε ἐναργεῖς εἶναι καὶ τέλειον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς.

ISOCT. 293 C Θαυμάζω δ' ὅταν ἴδω τούτους μαθητῶν ἀξιουμένους, οἱ ποιητικῷ πράγματος τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες λεληθάσιν σφᾶς αὐτούς. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε πλὴν τούτων ὅτι τὸ μὲν τῶν γραμμάτων ἀκινήτως ἔχει καὶ μένει κατὰ ταῦτόν, ὥστε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν χρώμενοι διατελοῦμεν, τὸ δὲ τῶν λόγων πᾶν τούναντιόν πέπονθεν.

293 E τοῖς δὲ γράμμασιν οὐδενὸς τούτων προσεδέχεν· ὥσθ' οἱ χρώμενοι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις παραδείγμασι πολὺ ἂν δικαίωτερον ἀποτίνοιεν ἢ λαμβάνουεν ἀργύριον, ὅτι πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας αὐτοὶ δεόμενοι παιδεύει τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

In these two passages Isocrates treats the opinion expressed in the *Phaedrus* as a mere platitude known to every body, and proving its author to be unfit for a teacher.

## VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES

### V. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PHILOSOPHY.

239 Β πολλῶν μὲν ἄλλων συνουσιῶν ἀπείργοντα καὶ ὠφελίμων ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστα ἀνὴρ γίγνοιτο, μεγάλης αἰτίου εἶναι βλάβης, μεγίστης δὲ τῆς ὅθεν ἂν φρονιμώτατος εἴη· τοῦτο δὲ ἢ θεῖα φιλοσοφία τυγχάνει εἶναι.

ISOCR. 294 Α ἡγοῦμαι πάντας ἂν μοι τοὺς εὖ φρονούντας συνεκπεῖν ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν τῶν φιλοσοφησάντων ἰδιώται διετέλεσαν ὄντες, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες οὐδενὶ πάποτε συγγενόμενοι τῶν σοφιστῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι δεινοὶ γέγονασιν.

### VI. LOGICAL PRINCIPLES AND FALLACIES.

The chief instrument employed by the Sophists in their discussions was the 'Sophistical Elenchus,' a seeming but not real refutation of the opponent's statement. The various forms of this device are fully described in a treatise ascribed to Aristotle and entitled *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. 'Of confutation there are two kinds; for some depend on the language, and others are independent of the language. The causes dependent on language which produce the false appearance of reasoning are six in number' (*Soph. El.* iv. 525). These are 'Equivocation' the ambiguity of a term (*ἀμυννμία*), the ambiguity of a proposition (*ἀμφιβολία*), false composition (*σύνθεσις*), false disjunction (*διαίρεσις*), wrong accentuation (*προσφδία*), formation of words (*σχημα λέξεως*).

This arrangement was retained by subsequent writers on Logic, as for instance by Aldrich, whose explanation of the several fallacies will be found in Mansel's *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, Appendix, pp. 133 ff.

In the *Euthydemus* we have first several examples of the fallacy of *Equivocation*.

(i) 275 D 3 πότεροί εἰσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μανθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

(ii) 276 D 7 Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν ἢ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἢ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

The explanation is given by Plato himself in 277 E, where Socrates comforts Cleinias by telling him that the Sophists wish to teach him first the right use of words, that *μανθάνω* may mean

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either to acquire knowledge of something previously unknown, or to examine and understand (*συνιέναι*) it by the use of such knowledge.

The same explanation is given in Aristot. *Soph. El.* iv. 1 *Εἰσι δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτε τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι . . . τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον; τὸ τε ξυσιέναι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην.*

We observe also that the words *σοφοί*, *ἀμαθεῖς*, and *ἐπιστάμαι* are all used equivocally in the discussion of these two questions.

(iii) 283 D *Οὐκοῦν δε μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, δε δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι.* The pronoun *δε* is here equivocal, being used both in its proper sense as referring to a person and in an adjectival sense like *οἶος*.

(iv) 283 E 9 *Πότῃρον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα παρ' οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾗ ἢ μὴ λέγοντα*; Here also *λέγειν* is used in two different senses, either 'to speak of a thing,' or to 'speak (i. e. utter) a word.' 'Scilicet is qui loquitur, loquitur de re aliqua, nec nisi improprie dicitur rem loqui. Verba igitur, quae faciat loquens, omnino existunt et vere sunt; sed nisi res existant et eundem ad modum quo verba prae se ferunt ea non sunt vera' (Routh).

The original question out of which this equivocation arises, *ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι*, is discussed at great length in *Cratyl.* 385 B, and again *Soph.* 236 E-246 A, where after examining the many difficulties involved in the dogma of Parmenides 'that not-being is' Plato comes to the conclusion that the nature of 'being' is quite as difficult to define as that of 'not-being' (*ὅτι τὸ ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ποτ' ἔστιν*).

(v) 284 C 2 *οὐκ ἄρα τὰ γε μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, λέγει οὐδέως.* Again the fallacy lies in the assumption that to speak or think of a *thing* is the same as *doing* something to the thing itself, thereby making it a *real object* (*ὥστε καὶ εἶναι ποιήσεις ἂν καὶ ὅστισούν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα*;) 284 B 6.

I do not understand how Bonitz explains this and the two preceding fallacies as dependent upon the identification of subject and predicate, i. e. that the *λόγος τοῦ πράγματος* is the same as the thing itself.

(vi) 284 D I *εἰσι γὰρ τινες ὁ λέγουσι τὰ πρᾶγματα ὡς ἔχει*; As used by Ctesippus *ὡς ἔχει* refers only to the true relation between

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subject and predicate, as in *Cratyl.* 385 B 'Αρ' οὖν οὗτος, δεῖ ἂν τὰ θύνα λέγη ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· δεῖ δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής; but Dionysodorus makes ὡς ἔχει refer to the conditions or qualities of the subject, and afterwards seeks refuge from the sarcasm of Ctesippus, 284 D 2, in the ambiguous use of *κακῶς λέγειν*, a fallacy *παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν*: *Sophist. El.* iv. 4.

(vii) 285 D 7 'Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγαν . . . ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους; Every thing has its own proper definition. If two men give the proper definition (*λόγον*), there is no contradiction.

If they give different definitions, they are not speaking of the same thing, and again there is no contradiction.

This rests on the assumption that the definition given, i. e. the predicate, is identical with the subject (Bonitz).

(viii) 287 C I τί . . . νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥήμα; Here *νοεῖ* is applied metaphorically to a thing without life, and the Sophist immediately seizes on the ambiguous use of the word: cf. 305 A *παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται*. This is an example of the second kind of ambiguity, in the use of a word in a sense which is customary but not proper (*ὅταν εἰσθότες ὄμην οὕτω λέγειν*, *Soph.* *El.* iv. 4). Socrates is willing to admit his error, only it had been argued (287 A) that to err is impossible.

(ix) 293 C 4 οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε θύνα; This and several following arguments of the Sophists are examples of the fallacy 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter,' which is described in Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* iv. 10 τὸ ἀπλῶς, ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῆ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι.

(x) 295 E 4 πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῶν ἅ ἐπίστασαι ἢ οὐ; The Sophist proceeds to argue that since Socrates 'knows all things (that he knows) always (by the same faculty),' therefore 'he knows all things always,' the limitations being disregarded. This argument is closed by a *reductio ad absurdum*, when Socrates asks (296 E 4), 'Do I know that the good are unjust?' Dionysodorus admits that Socrates does not know this, and so does not know all things.

The only resource left to the Sophists is to refuse to answer the questions of Socrates, and to insist on his answering a series of captious quibbles which they hang upon any convenient word that is casually employed by him. This neglect of methodical arrange-

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ment, far from being a fault, is part of Plato's artistic imitation of the eristic mode of argument, while he yet 'allows a definite order to peep out in this seemingly arbitrary irregularity' (Bonitz, 259, note 7).

(xi) Thus 297 E 5 Patrocles the half-brother of Socrates both *is* and *is not* his brother. Chaeredemus the father of Patrocles not being Sophroniscus the father of Socrates both *is* and *is not* a father, and Sophroniscus being different from a father (Chaeredemus) is not a father, and Socrates had no father.

(xii) 298 C 2 ἡ οἰα τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι; Hence a father of one is a father of all, and the father and mother of Euthydemus are father and mother of all kinds of animals, and Euthydemus brother of puppies and little pigs.

(xiii) 298 E 3. The dog is *yours*, Ctesippus, and he is the *father* of puppies, therefore he is *your father*, and you the puppies brother. Cf. *Soph. El.* xxiv. 2 'Ἀρ' ὁ ἀνδρίας σὸν ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; *ibid.* 4 οἷον εἰ ὄδε ἐστὶ πατήρ, ἔστι δὲ σός. Cf. 298 C 4.

(xiv) 299 A 6. That no one wants good things in great quantities, being proved in the case of medicine, is assumed to be true universally.

Thus in the group ix-xiv the arguments of the Sophists all involve the fallacy of omitting all limitations, and passing arbitrarily 'a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter.'

(xv) 300 A 4 δυνατὰ οὖν ὄραν ἐστὶ ταῦτα. Cf. *Soph. El.* iv. 527 καὶ ἄρα ὁ ὄρᾶ τις, τοῦτο ὄρᾶ; ὄρᾶ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὄρᾶ ὁ κίων. Here *τοῦτο* is ambiguous; it may mean either τὸν κίονα or ὁ κίων. Cf. Poste, *Soph. El.* p. 105. Cf. 300 A 2, note.

(xvi) 300 B 1 ἡ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τε σιγῶντα λέγειν; Cf. *Soph. El.* iv. 523 καὶ ἄρ' ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα, *ibid.* x. 558. See notes on 300 B.

(xvii) 300 B 2 ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν; The fallacy is the same as in xvi, for λέγοντα σιγᾶν may mean either 'a speaker's silence,' or 'silence about a speaker.'

(xviii) 301 A 6 καὶ ὅτι νῦν ἐγὼ σοὶ πάραμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἰ; The sense of πάραμι here is different from that of πάρεστι in A 4 πάρεστιν μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι. The fallacy therefore is παρ' ὁμωυ-

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μῖαν, πάρεστι being changed from its meaning as a philosophical term to its common sense of local proximity.

(xix) 301 D 3 τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν. Another example of the fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν, as μάγειρον may be either subject or object of κατακόπτειν.

(xx) 303 A 1 ἄρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοῦς (τοῦς θεοῖς) ἀποδόσθαι; This final paradox is the result of a whole series of fallacies. 'For θεός the universal ζῶν is substituted, the possessive σός is applied to ζῶν and to θεός in different senses, and then what is true only of a particular class of ζῶα is predicated of ζῶα universally and so of θεός' (Bonitz, p. 263). Cf. *Soph. El.* v. 533 ὅταν τὸ ἐν μέρει λεγόμενον ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰρημένον ληφθῆ.

(xxi) 303 A 7 Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππάξ ἐστίν, κτλ.; Dionysodorus pretends to understand the exclamation πυππάξ as a proper name, and besides this silly grammatical joke assumes that if two words stand side by side they must be in apposition.

On the fallacies thus enumerated compare Bonitz, *Platonische Studien*, ii. 266. We may add to the series the example of *Fallacia Accidentis*, 298 B 2 ἕτερος ὢν πατὴρ οὐ πατήρ ἐστίν, and the *Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum*, 300 C 7, where Ctesippus insists on a categorical answer 'Yes' or 'No' to his question, 'Do all things keep silence or speak?' See the notes on these passages. Notice also that in 301 C 1 ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν Socrates himself adopts the fallacy of equivocation, turning it against the Sophists.

Besides the long series of fallacies thus exposed, there are more important logical principles to be noticed in the dialogue.

In *Euthyd.* 301 A 'Beautiful things are not the same as absolute beauty, but some beauty is present with each of them,' we have an example of the process of *generalisation by concepts* which had been already fully described in the *Meno*, 75 A ζητῶ τὸ ἐπὶ πάνσι τοῖσι ταῖσιν, κτλ. On the importance of the discovery see Lotze, *Microcosm.* ii. 319, 320: 'Long as it was since language had begun to indicate in words the general concepts of things . . . consciousness had still continued unaware of what it was about; and even for the contemporaries of Socrates it was hard to see that the convenience of using a common name for different things arose from their dependence upon something which was common to them all, and in all self-identical.'



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Of *Definition*, which follows immediately from the doctrine of *General Concepts*, we have a brief statement in *Euthyd.* 285 E 9 εἶσιν ἑκάστω τῶν ὄντων λόγοι, κτλ., where right definition is shown to be necessary as the means of avoiding contradiction. This subject also had been fully treated in *Meno* 72-76.

Not less important is the question of *Predication*, and the denial of any proper union between *Subject* and *Predicate* implied but not explained in *Euthyd.* 300 E 3, where Dionysodorus asks Σὺ γὰρ ἦδη τι πάποτ' εἶδες, ὃ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα; The denial began with Antisthenes the Cynic, and was adopted by Stilpo the Megarian, of whom Zeller writes, *Socrates*, p. 277: 'He rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.'

That predication does not necessarily imply the identity of subject and predicate is shown by Plato in the *Sophist* 251 A: 'Let us inquire then how we come to predicate many names of the same thing. . . And thus we provide a rich feast for tiros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that man is good; but man, they insist, is man, and good is good' (Jowett).

The term *Not-Being* (τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὰ μὴ ὄντα), which occurs several times in the *Euthydemus*, does not there receive its true explanation. The Sophists maintain, in accordance with the doctrine of Parmenides, that τὸ μὴ ὄν can never be the object of thought or speech or any kind of action (*Euthyd.* 284 B, 286 A). The question is treated in the same manner in the *Republic* 477 A, 478 B. The true explanation of the difficulty is first reached in the *Sophist* 237 B-238 D, where the doctrine of Parmenides is formally discussed, and in 257 B it is explained that '*Not-Being* means only different *Being*, and denotes the relation of notions which do not agree with each other' ('Ὅπῃ τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον). Cf. Zeller, *Pre-Socr. Philos.* 1. 606; Lutoslawski, p. 228.

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

The term *σοφιστής* denoted in its earliest use an eminent master of some liberal art.

Thus in Pindar, *Isihtm.* iv. (v.) 28 it means 'poets':

μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς  
Διὸς ἕκατι πρόσβαλον.

It is applied to 'musicians' in a fragment of Aeschylus quoted by Athenaeus, xiv. 632 C *καὶ πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ (τῇ μουσικῇ) σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Διοχύλος ἐποίησεν*

Ἔϊτ' οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν.

Thamyris is described by the same term in Euripides, *Rhes.* 924:

ὄτ' ἤλθομεν . . .  
Μοῦσαι μεγίστην εἰς ἔριν μελωδίας  
δεινῆ σοφιστῆ Ἐρηκί, κάτυφλώσαμεν  
Θάμυριν.

It is applied by Herodotus, ii. 49, to the priests of the Bacchic mysteries, and (iv. 95) as a title of honour to Pythagoras (*Ἑλλήνων οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῃ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ*), and to the wise men of Greece including Solon by name (i. 29).

When Herodotus thus wrote the name 'Sophist' had already been assumed in a special sense by one whose arrogant claims to universal knowledge, and acceptance of pecuniary reward, quickly tended to degrade an honourable title into a byword and a reproach. Protagoras first appeared in Athens about the middle of the fifth century B.C.

'It was the time when the controversies which had long been carried on in the ancient schools of philosophy had been succeeded by an interval of general lassitude, despondency, and indifference to philosophical truth, which afforded room for a new class of pretenders to wisdom, who in a sense which they first attached to the word were first called Sophists.

'They professed a science superior to all the elder forms of philosophy, which it balanced against each other with the perfect impartiality of *universal scepticism*; and an art which treated them all as instruments useless indeed for the discovery of truth, but equally capable of exhibiting a fallacious appearance of it . . .

'As according to this view there was no real difference between

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truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the proper learning of a statesman consisted in the arts of argument and persuasion by which he might sway the opinions of others on every subject at his pleasure, and these were the arts which they practised and taught' (Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, ch. xxiv).

It will be well to inquire first whether this is a fair representation of Plato's description of the Sophist, and further whether that description is confirmed by other contemporary testimony.

Plat. *Phaed.* 90 B: 'Most especially those who devote themselves to the practice of disputation end, you know, by thinking that they have become the cleverest fellows in the world, and that they alone have discovered that neither in things nor in arguments is there anything sound or sure, but that all existing objects are in a constant flux and reflux, exactly as in the Euripus, and never abide an instant in any state.'

Ibid. 91 A: 'Just at present I fear that on this very subject I am not in a philosophic mood, but, like those vulgar disputants, in a contentious humour. For they whenever they are disputing on a point are utterly regardless of the real truth of the matters in question, but are only anxious to make their own positions seem true to the hearers.'

Ibid. 101 E: 'You would not, like those Eristics (*οἱ ἀντιλογικοί*), confuse in your argument the first principle and its consequences, that is if you wished to discover any real truth.'

*Meno* 75 C: 'I should have told him the truth, and if the inquirer were one of those wise and Eristic and antagonistic persons I should say to him, That is what I have to say, and if I am wrong, it is your business to take up the argument and refute me.'

*Rep.* 454 A: 'Truly, Glaucon, said I, the power of the art of contradiction is a noble one.—Why so?—Because it seems to me that many fall into it even against their will, and think that they are reasoning when they are only disputing, because they cannot examine the question by dividing and classifying, but persist in contradicting the mere words of the argument, and practising disputation not real discussion.'

*Sophist.* 225 E: 'But who is the other who makes money out of private disputations (*ἐπίδων*)? There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who

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re-appears again for the fourth time.—Yes, for he is the money-making species, as it seems, of the Eristic art, that disputations, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now shown, in a word the Sophist.'

The extreme contrast between the stigma thus affixed by Plato to the name 'Sophist' and its original use as a title of honour is so remarkable, that we cannot wonder if historians of different schools of thought have adopted widely different explanations of so surprising a change. Until the middle of the last century it was generally believed that Plato's descriptions corresponded more or less closely to the real character and practices of the Sophists of his day. But the confidence with which this view was entertained received a sudden shock when Mr. Grote published his famous defence of the Sophists in his *History of Greece*, vol. vii. ch. 67. The effect produced by that brilliant but paradoxical essay was, however, of short duration. More exact and impartial students had no difficulty in showing that the misrepresentations alleged by the modern historian were for the most part based upon his own misinterpretation of the ancient testimony. See especially Cope's excellent article 'The Sophists' in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, No. ii. 1854, and the same scholar's *Gorgias*, Introduction, pp. xxii, xxiii; Poste, Aristotle's *Sophistical Elenchi*, p. 100; Jowett, *Sophist*, Introd. pp. 377-380.

It was alleged by Grote (p. 486) that Plato 'stole the term Sophistes out of general circulation . . . and fastened it upon the eminent teachers of the Socratic age.' That the term was in general circulation, and that it was fastened in an unfavourable sense upon a certain class of teachers of bad eminence in the Socratic age, is easily shown by the testimony of contemporary writers other than Plato.

Thus Lysias says in his *Olympic Oration*, 912: 'I have not come hither to make petty quibbles nor to dispute about names. For I think that these are the practices of very worthless Sophists in great want of a livelihood.' Only the commencement of this oration is extant, but according to Plutarch, *Life of Lysias*, *Mor.* 836 D, it was read by him at the Olympic Festival. However this may be, it is certain that the composition could only have been undertaken in the short interval when Lysias was in possession

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of the full rights of citizenship, that is, during the Archonship of Eucleides, B.C. 403.

In that same year Thucydides returned from exile to Athens, and was still engaged in the composition of his History: a description of the Athenians which he puts into the mouth of Cleon (iii. 38) shows somewhat of his estimation of the Sophists, and the theatrical character of their public exhibitions: ἀπλῶς τε ἀκοῆς ἡδογῇ ἡσώμενοι καὶ σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς εὐκότες καθημένοι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ πάλεως βουλευομένοις. The Scholiast remarks that σοφιστῶν here means 'those who in customary language are so called, the teachers of rhetorical questions.' Lysias was no friend of Plato, and Thucydides was too grave a writer to give currency to any slanderous gossip, so that their testimony leaves no room to doubt the existence at Athens of a distinct class of Sophists such as Plato describes. We may therefore confidently accept the further descriptions given by Xenophon and Aristotle, without attributing them to the mere prejudice or jealousy of the Socratic School.

Nothing can be more severe than the censure of Socrates himself as recorded in Xen. *Mem.* i. 6. 13 καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρρους ἀποκαλοῦσιν. The plural ἀποκαλοῦσιν implies that this was not an uncommon way of speaking of the Sophists. A like evil reputation is indicated in Xenophon, *De Venatione*, xiii. 8, where in a full description of their methods of teaching he adds—οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἔξαπατῶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, καὶ οὐδένα οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεὶ ἐκάστην σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἔστιν θνείδος παρά γε τοῖς εὐφρονούσι.

Aristotle's opinion of the Sophists is sufficiently shown in a passage of the *Ethics*, ix. 1: 'In such matters some like the principle of a "stated wage." Those, however, who take the money beforehand, and then do nothing of what they promised, are naturally blamed in consequence of their excessive promises, for they do not fulfil what they agreed. But this course the Sophists are perhaps obliged to adopt, because no one would be likely to give money for the things which they know.' Sir A. Grant remarks on this passage that 'Aristotle contrasts the conduct of Protagoras (of whom he speaks honourably) with that of "the Sophists" after the profession had become regularly settled.'

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Compare *Sophistical Elenchi*, c. i: 'Now it answers the purpose of some persons rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be than to be and not to seem: for sophistry is seeming but unreal philosophy, and the Sophist a person who makes money by the semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his success it is requisite to seem to perform the function of the philosopher without performing it rather than to perform it without seeming to do so. . . The existence of such a mode of reasoning, and the fact that such a faculty is the aim of the persons we call Sophists, is manifest' (Poste's translation).

Mr. Poste's own conclusion concerning the Sophists is expressed as follows (p. 100): 'Did the Sophist ever exist? Was there ever a class of people who professed to be philosophers and to educate, but, instead of method or a system of reasoned truth, only knew and only taught, under the name of philosophy, the game of eristic? . . . Grote says, the only reality corresponding to the name are the *disiecti membra sophistae* in all of us, the errors incidental to human frailty in the search after truth.'

On the manner in which Grote tries to disparage the testimony of Aristotle, see Cope, *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, p. 160.

A question was raised by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the dialogue whether Euthydemus and his brother were real persons and such as Plato describes them. 'Who, then, were these men, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, to deserve such notice and meet with such treatment? History is silent respecting them more than any other of the Sophists mentioned by Plato, so that we may certainly conclude that they never formed any kind of school, nay it would even seem that they were not generally men in very great repute.'

We readily agree that these itinerant professors of universal knowledge were men of no great repute; but they were none the less fit representatives on that account of the low class of Sophists of Plato's day, whom it was part of his purpose to expose. Also the testimony of history is sufficient to show that they were certainly real persons, and in some respects at least such as Plato has described them.

Dionysodorus the elder brother (283 A) is the subject of a whole

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chapter in Xenophon, *Mem. Socr.* iii. i. 1-11. He comes to Athens pretending to teach strategy, but actually teaching nothing beyond the merest elementary tactics and those most imperfectly. 'Go back,' says Socrates, 'and ask him again: for if he knows these things and is not a shameless person, he will be ashamed after taking money to send you away untaught.' How exactly this agrees with Plato's description of the two Sophists and their pretensions may be seen by referring to *Euthyd.* 271 D, 273 C, and to the specimens of their actual teaching in the discussions which follow.

Euthydemus is mentioned by name in the *Cratylus* 386 D, where a distinction is drawn between the dogma of Protagoras that 'for every man all things really are such as they appear to him,' and the more extravagant paradox of Euthydemus, that 'all things are alike to all men at the same time and always.' Other passages in which allusions more or less evident are made to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are *Sophist.* 251 B, C, and *Pol.* 495 C, D. But the independent testimony of Aristotle proves beyond all question both that Euthydemus was a person well known at Athens, and that he used in discussion similar fallacies to those which Plato imputes to him. Cf. *Aristot. Rhetor.* ii. 24 "Ἄλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταῦτον δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ἂν ταῦτον πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθύδημου λόγος. Οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. Καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν. *Soph. Elench.* xx. Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος δὲ λόγος, Ἄρ' οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὖσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὄν; It is needless to quote the words of Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Mathem.* vii. 13, *ibid.* 48, 64, as the statements of so late a writer can add no weight to the contemporary testimony of such authors as Xenophon and Aristotle.

On this historical testimony we cannot refuse to believe that Euthydemus and Dionysodorus were real persons well known at Athens at the *scenic* date of the dialogue, and at that time elderly men like Socrates.

But a further question has been raised by Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden*, I. ii, who maintains with much ingenuity that Dionysodorus is intended to represent Lysias. The theory is based upon the points of resemblance which may be traced between them.

## VII. THE SOPHISTS

(1) Lysias and Dionysodorus each had a younger brother named Euthydemus : the occurrence therefore of this name in the dialogue would at once turn the thoughts of Plato's contemporaries to Lysias and Euthydemus, the well-known sons of Cephalus (Plat. *Rep.* 328 B).

(2) Both pairs of brothers had joined the colony which the Athenians founded at Thurii 444 B.C.

(3) Lysias was not, except for a few months, an Athenian citizen but a *ξένος*, though *ισοτελής*.

The two Sophists were also *ξένοι* (271 A).

(4) Lysias was at one time a teacher of rhetoric, having been a pupil of Tisias the founder, with Corax, of the Sicilian school of dialectic.

This was the same system as that which Diodorus and his brother are described as practising.

(5) Lysias was joint owner with his brother of a shield manufactory in Peiraeus, and had helped Thrasylbulus with money, shields, and a band of mercenaries. If, as Teichmüller thinks, Euthydemus the brother of Lysias is the Sophist described by Plato, *Theaet.* 165 D, as *πελαστικός ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις*, the phrases there applied to him all relate to the art of war, *ἐλλοχῶν, ἐμβάλων, χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ ξυνηδίας, ἐλύτρον*.

From Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1 we know that Dionysodorus came to Athens as a teacher of the art of strategy, and both brothers are described by Plato as masters of the art of fighting in heavy armour (*ὄπλομάχοι*).

(6) Lysias was the most successful writer of speeches for the warfare of the law-courts.

In the dialogue (272 A) Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are both described as *τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειν τε καὶ συγγράφασθαι λόγους οἴους εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια*, and in 273 C as *οἶω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ*. The description is remarkably applicable to Lysias, who not only wrote speeches and taught others, but had made himself famous by the one excellent speech which he had himself delivered in court against the injuries done to him by Eratosthenes, 403 B.C.

Many other points of resemblance more or less striking are discussed by Teichmüller in a long chapter, but the examples given



## INTRODUCTION

above are sufficient to show the general nature of his argument. The degree of probability resulting from it is much increased by the consideration that 'Plato in his dialogues does not rehearse old histories, as a chronicler or a novelist; but contends with living opponents and rival teachers, who disputed with him for influence over the best men of the time and especially over the young, since they professed to teach the same things as he did, only better.'

The theory is very interesting, and by no means improbable: it agrees well with the known relations of Plato and Lysias, and adds to the life and spirit of the dialogue.

### VIII. TEXT.

In this edition of the *Euthydemus* the text is based upon the three chief MSS. collated by Schanz.

(1) Codex Clarkianus, n. 39 in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, written in the year 895 B.C. by Johannes Calligraphus for Arethas a Deaconi of Patras, afterwards Archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia. This excellent MS. is very fully described by Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, 105-118, and by T. W. Allen in the *Preface to the Phototype edition*, 1898. In the MS. as a whole there are many corrections by the hand of the learned Archbishop himself (*Classical Review*, vol. xvi. Nos. 1 and 8). These contemporary corrections (B<sup>2</sup>) are rightly distinguished by Professor Burnet from later corrections (b). But in the *Euthydemus* there is only one legible note in the margin, and this is in the handwriting of Arethas, and refers to the word *σκληφρός*, 271 B 4.

(2) T. In the Library of St. Mark's at Venice this MS. is described as 'Append. Class. 4, cod. 1,' and by Bekker as t: it has been shown by Schanz 'to be the source of all MSS. of the second family,' except that which immediately follows.

(3) Vind., or V, distinguished by Burnet as 'W = cod. Vindobonensis 54, suppl. phil. gr. 7 = Stalbaum Vind. 1.' This MS. Schanz considered to be derived not directly from T, but from a common source, which he marked by the letter M.

In choosing between various readings I have preferred those of Cod. B as being by far the oldest and best authority, except where they are evidently corrupt or fail to give any adequate meaning to the passage.

## VIII. TEXT

The text of Plato as represented in the MSS. has been subjected to much alteration by recent critics, among whom Cobet, Badham, and Schanz are especially distinguished for ingenious emendations and brilliant conjectures, often most successful, and, even when unnecessary, very attractive. In Schanz's edition of the *Euthydemus* such alterations and omissions are extremely frequent, and Professor Burnet has done good service to the students of Plato in the Oxford edition by frequently restoring the readings of the chief MSS.

I have acted on the same principle still more frequently, being convinced that it is often easier to alter the words of such an author as Plato than to understand and explain them. It is, however, the duty of an editor not to tamper with a reading authenticated by the best MSS., until he has exhausted all means within his power of elucidating the words ascribed to his author. Wherever I have ventured to differ from recent editors, I have stated my reasons in the notes.

In the matter of orthography I have been unwilling to depart unnecessarily from long-established and almost universal custom.

Thus, for example, I have retained the usual method of printing the pronoun  $\delta$  *τι* so as to distinguish it from the conjunction  $\delta$  *τι*. The usefulness of the distinction may be seen in such phrases as  $\text{οὐδ' ἦδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅτι εἴεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί (Euthyd. 271 C), ἵνα εἰδῶ ὅτι καὶ μαθησόμεθα (272 D), σοὶ εἰς κεφαλῆν, ὅτι μόν . . . καταφρεύδει (283 E), τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρ' ἂν τύπτοιμι, ὅτι μαθὼν σοφοῦς υἱεῖς οὕτως φυσσεῖ (299 A), οὐπω οἶδα ὅτι μέλλω εἶρεῖν.$

Passages thus printed may have no ambiguity for a competent scholar, but they put a needless difficulty in the way of a beginner.

It is more important, however, to consider whether this mode of printing is or is not etymologically correct. The combination  $\delta$  *ς* *τις*,  $\eta$  *τις*,  $\delta$  *τι* is made up of two separate words, each of which is separately declined, as *Pol.* 462 C  $\epsilon$  *ν ἧ τιμῇ δὴ πῶλει*, where, if we write  $\eta$  *τιμῇ* as one word, the accent becomes impossible. Cf. *Plat. Epist.* vii. 347 E  $\delta$  *πη τε καὶ ὅπως ἤθελε καὶ οἷς τισι.* *Epist.* xi. 359 A  $\iota$  *πὸ νόμων θέσεως καὶ ὧν τινων.* *Legg.* ix. 864 E  $\tau$  *ὴν βλάβην ἦν ἂν τινα καταβλάψῃ.* If therefore we were to be guided by etymology, both the pronoun and the conjunction should be written  $\delta$  *τι*, but the

## INTRODUCTION

sake of distinguishing them the conjunction is conventionally written as one word  $\delta\tau\iota$ .

The remarks and practice of Jannaris are inconsistent and misleading: in 610. 3 he prints ' $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\epsilon$ ,  $\delta,\tau\iota$ ,' and adds in a footnote<sup>1</sup>, 'It should be written  $\delta\tau\iota$ , but ancient grammarians introduced  $\delta,\tau\iota$ —for which modern scholars substitute  $\delta\tau\iota$ —to distinguish it from the conjunction  $\delta\tau\iota$  'that' (79).' But Jannaris himself constantly prints  $\delta,\tau\iota$ , as in  $\delta,\tau\iota$   $\mu\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ ,  $\delta,\tau\iota$   $\pi\alpha\theta\acute{\omega}\nu$ : see his Index.

Cf. Kühner-Blass I. i. 353 (§ 93 Diastole) ' $\delta,\tau\iota$ , nicht wie  $\delta\tau\iota$ .'

We may add that Schanz is mistaken in his critical note on 271 C 6, ' $\delta\tau\iota$  BT,' for Cod. B certainly has  $\delta\tau\iota$ .

272 A 5  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$  B,  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ . There is apparently no authority in the MSS. for the latter form which is adopted in the Oxford text, 1903.

In Kühner-Blass, *Ausführliche Grammatik*, § 277, p. 186,  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$  is described as 'nachklass'; and in § 285, p. 201, on the Doric dialect, we find 'Von  $\tau\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\mu\iota$  lautet das Pf.  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$ ,  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\mu\alpha\iota$ , so auf Inschr.  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\epsilon}\iota\kappa\alpha\tau\iota$ .' In this case  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$  stood for  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\iota\kappa\alpha$ .

Jannaris is of opinion that the diphthong EI arose from the insertion of a simple vertical stroke (not iota) to mark the metrical quantity of E (App. ii. 9). 'Accordingly, when representing a rhythmical or grammatical length E now begins (sixth century B.C.) to figure in the Attic inscriptions as EI (later on as  $\Xi$  or  $\text{H}$  identified with EI) . . . only in sporadic cases, the old orthography . . . remaining in universal practice down to the middle of the fifth century B.C. . . . It is only since the year 403 B.C., under the archonship of Eucleides, (that) the new spelling obtained by a public act official recognition or formal sanction' (ibid. 12). The further inference of Jannaris that 'a new system of orthography was created into which *all previous literary and many inscriptional compositions had to be transliterated*' (the italics are mine) must be regarded as a somewhat doubtful or, at least, exaggerated conjecture. It is, I believe, generally acknowledged that such forms as  $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\acute{\eta}\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ , and  $\phi\omicron\beta\eta$  (2nd person *indicative* middle), are unknown to the MSS. of the Attic drama, and it would require much more evidence than has yet been alleged to prove in opposition to all MSS. that so artistic and poetic a writer as Plato at once discarded the style

## VIII. TEXT

to which he had been accustomed from childhood to his twenty-fifth or twenty-sixth year in favour of an official novelty.

The Attic inscriptions of the period contained in the *Corpus Graecarum Inscriptionum* are almost exclusively legislative or magisterial decrees and public accounts. In such documents the second person naturally is not used, and there is no evidence of any such change as that of φοβεί to φοβῆ. In the accounts ἔθηκαν the aorist only occurs, so that there is no evidence in favour of the change to ἐπιεθήκατον.

On this subject it may be well to quote an incidental remark of the author of the *New Phrynichus*, who will not be thought too conservative in the matter of orthography. Mr. Rutherford writes (p. 45): 'It is no rare experience to find the most distinguished critics advocating an alteration of all the manuscripts, simply because they have never tried to estimate, as is done in this inquiry, the extraordinary ease with which an Athenian of the best age moved among the various coexistent literary dialects of his time.'

## ERRATUM

281 b I *before ἡγουμένη insert <ῖ>*

# ΕΥΘΥΔΗΜΟΣ

ΚΡΙΤΩΝ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ

St. I  
p. 271

ΚΡ. Τίς ἦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ᾧ χθές ἐν Λυκείῳ διελέγου; **a**  
ἢ πολλὸς ὑμᾶς ὄχλος περιειστήκει, ὥστ' ἔγωγε βουλόμενος  
ἀκούειν προσελθὼν οὐδὲν οἴός τ' ἢ ἀκοῦσαι σαφές· ὑπερκύψας  
μέντοι κατείδον, καὶ μοι ἔδοξεν εἶναι ξένος τις ᾧ διελέγου.  
τίς ἦν; **5**

ΣΩ. Ὅπότερον καὶ ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Κρίτων; σὺ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλα  
δύ' ἦστην.

ΚΡ. Ἄν μὲν ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐκ δεξιᾶς τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ καθήστο·  
ἐν μέσῳ δ' ὑμῶν τὸ Ἀξιώχου μειράκιον ἦν. καὶ μάλα πολύ, **b**  
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξεν, καὶ τοῦ ἡμετέρου οὐ  
πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. ἀλλ' ἐκείνος  
μὲν σκληφρός, οὗτος δὲ προφερής καὶ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν  
δύσιν. **5**

ΣΩ. Εὐθύδημος οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Κρίτων, ὃν ἐρωτᾷς, ὃ δὲ  
παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς ἀδελφὸς τούτου, Διονυσό-  
δωρος· μετέχει δὲ καὶ οὗτος τῶν λόγων.

ΚΡ. Οὐδέτερον γινώσκω, ὦ Σώκρατες. καιοὶ τινας αὐ  
οὔτοι, ὡς εἴοικε, σοφισταί· ποδαποῖ; καὶ τίς ἢ σοφία; **c**

ΣΩ. Οὔτοι τὸ μὲν γένος, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἐντεῦθεν ποθέν  
εἰσιν ἐκ Χίου; ἀπέκησαν δὲ ἐς Θουρίους, φεύγοντες δὲ  
ἐκεῖθεν πόλλ' ἤδη ἔτη περὶ τούσδε τοὺς τόπους διατρίβουσιν.  
ὃ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασά, ὦ Κρίτων· **5**  
πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὄ τι εἶεν οἱ  
παγκρατιασταί. τούτῳ γάρ ἐστον κομιδῇ παμμάχῳ. οὐ (καθ' ἃ)

EUTHYDEMUS

F

τῷ Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενέσθη τὸ παγκρατιαστὰ ἀδελφῷ· ἐκείνω  
 α μὲν γὰρ τῷ σώματι μόνον οἴω τε μάχεσθαι, τούτῳ δὲ πρῶτον  
 μὲν τῷ σώματι δεινοτάτῳ ἔστων καὶ μάχῃ, ἣ πάντων ἔστι  
 κρατεῖν—ἐν ὄπλοις γὰρ αὐτῷ τε σοφῶ πάνυ μάχεσθαι καὶ  
 272 ἄλλον, ὃς ἂν διδῶ μισθόν, οἴω τε ποιῆσαι—ἔπειτα τὴν ἐν  
 τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀγωνίσασθαι καὶ  
 ἄλλον διδάξαι λέγειω τε καὶ συγγράφεσθαι λόγους οἴους  
 εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια. πρὸ τοῦ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα δειωῶ ἦσθην  
 5 μόνον, νῦν δὲ τέλος ἐπιτεθείκατον παγκρατιαστικῆ τέχνη. ἣ  
 γὰρ ἦν λοιπὴ αὐτοῖν μάχῃ ἀργός, ταύτην νῦν ἐξείργασθον,  
 ὥστε μηδ' ἂν ἕνα αὐτοῖς οἶόν τ' εἶναι μηδ' ἀντάραι· οὕτω  
 δειωῶ γεγονότατον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειω  
 β τὸ ἀεὶ λεγόμενον, ὁμοίως ἑάντε ψεῦδος ἑάντε ἀληθὲς ἦ. ἐγὼ  
 μὲν οὖν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐν νῶ ἔχω τοῖν ἀνδροῖν παραδοῦναι  
 ἑμαυτόν· καὶ γὰρ φατον ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ποιῆσαι ἂν καὶ  
 ἄλλον ὄντιοῦν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα δειωῶν.

5 ΚΡ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἦδη  
 πρεσβύτερος ἦς;

ΣΩ. Ἕκιστά γε, ὦ Κρίτων, ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον ἔχων καὶ  
 παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. αὐτῷ γὰρ τούτῳ, ὡς ἔπος  
 εἰπεῖν, γέροντε ὄντε ἠρξάσθην ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε  
 10 ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς· πέρυσιν ἢ προπέρυσιν οὐδέπω ἦσθην  
 C σοφῶ. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐν μόνον φοβοῦμαι, μὴ αὐτὸ ὄνειδος τοῖν  
 ξένοιω περιάψω, ὡσπερ Κόννη τῷ Μητροβλίῳ, τῷ κιθαριστῇ,  
 ὃς ἐμὲ διδάσκει ἔτι καὶ νῦν κιθαρίζειν· ὀρώντες οὖν οἱ παῖδες  
 οἱ συμφοιτηταί μου ἐμοῦ τε καταγελῶσι καὶ τὸν Κόννον  
 5 καλοῦσι γεροντοδιδάσκαλον. μὴ οὖν καὶ τοῖν ξένοιω τις  
 ταῦτόν τοῦτο ὄνειδισῇ· οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἴσως φοβοῦμενοι  
 τάχα με οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν προσδέξασθαι. ἐγὼ δ', ὦ Κρίτων,  
 ἐκέῖσε μὲν ἄλλους ἐπέπεια συμμαθητὰς μοι φοιτᾶν πρε-  
 α σβύτας, ἐνταῦθα δὲ γε ἐτέρονσιν πειράσομαι πείθειν. καὶ σὺ τί  
 οὐ συμφοιτᾶς; ὡς δὲ δέλεαρ αὐτοῖς ἄξομεν τοὺς σὸνσιν νείεις·  
 ἐφιέμενοι γὰρ ἐκείνων οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς παιδεύσουσιν.

ΚΡ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐάν γε σοὶ δοκῆι·  
πρῶτον δέ μοι διηγήσαι τὴν σοφίαν τοῦν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐστίν, 5  
ἵνα εἰδῶ ὃ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων· ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί γε εἰπεῖν  
ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν, ἀλλὰ πάνυ καὶ προσεῖχον  
καὶ μέμνημαι, καὶ σοὶ πειράσομαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγή-  
σασθαι. κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, e  
οὐπερ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἦδη ἐν νῶ  
εἶχον ἀναστήναι· ἀνισταμένου δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς  
σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθεζόμεν, καὶ ὀλίγῳ  
ἕστερον εἰσέρχεσθον τοῦτω—ὃ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διουν- 273  
σόδωρος—καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἅμα αὐ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν·  
εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιεπατείτην ἐν τῷ καταστῆγῳ δρόμῳ. καὶ  
οὐπω τοῦτω δὴ ἢ τρεῖς δρόμους περιελλυθότε ἦστην,  
καὶ εἰσέρχεται Κλειώϊας, ὃν σὺ φῆς πολὺ ἐπιδεδωκέναι, 5  
ἀληθῆ λέγων· ὅπισθεν δὲ αὐτοῦ ἔρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοὶ τε  
[καὶ] ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος, νεανίσκος τις Παιανιεύς, μάλα  
καλὸς τε ἀγαθὸς τὴν φύσιν, ὅσον μὴ ὑβριστῆς [δὲ] διὰ τὸ  
νέος εἶναι. ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Κλειώϊας ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου μόνον b  
καθήμενον, ἄντικρυς ἰὼν παρεκαθέζετο ἐκ δεξιῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ  
σὺ φῆς. ἰδόντε δὲ αὐτὸν ὃ τε Διουνσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύ-  
δημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντε διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοισιν, ἄλλην  
καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε εἰς ἡμᾶς—καὶ γὰρ πάνυ αὐτοῖν 5  
προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν—ἔπειτα ἰόντε ὁ μὲν παρὰ τὸ μειράκιον  
ἐκαθέζετο, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὁ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμὲ ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς,  
οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστος ἐτύγχανεν.

Ἦσπαζόμεν οὖν αὐτῶ ἄτε διὰ χρόνον ἑωρακώς· μετὰ δὲ c  
τοῦτο εἶπον πρὸς τὸν Κλειώϊαν· ὦ Κλειώϊα, τῷδε μέντοι τῷ  
ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ, Εὐθύδημός τε καὶ Διουνσόδωρος, οὐ τὰ σμικρὰ  
ἀλλὰ τὰ μεγάλα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πάντα ἐπι-  
στασθον, ὅσα δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὸν στρατηγὸν ἔσεσθαι, 5  
τάς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ ὅσα  
ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι διδακτέον· οἷω τε δὲ καὶ ποιῆσαι

F 2



δυνατὸν εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ἂν τις αὐτὸν ἀδικῆ.

**d** Εἶπων οὖν ταῦτα κατεφρονήθη ὑπ' αὐτοῖν· ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος εἶπεν· Οὔτοι ἐτι ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, σπουδάζομεν, ἀλλὰ παρέργοις αὐτοῖς χρώμεθα.

**5** Κἀγὼ θαυμάσας εἶπον· Καλὸν ἂν τι τὸ ἔργον ὑμῶν εἴη, εἰ τηλικαῦτα πράγματα πάρεργα ὑμῖν τυγχάνει δῦτα, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν εἴπετόν μοι τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν.

Ἄρετήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴομεθα οἷω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.

**e** Ὡ Ζεῦ, οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγετον πρᾶγμα· πόθεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔρμαιον ἠρέτην; ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ ὑμῶν διενούμην ἐτι, ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὡς τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο δειωῖν ὄντων, ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἔλεγον περὶ σφῶν· ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρότερον

**5** ἐπεδημησάτην, τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφῶ ἐπαγγελλομένω. εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετε, ἴλεω εἶητον—  
**274** ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ ὥσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω, συγγνώμην δεόμενος ἔχω μοι τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένων. ἀλλ' ὀρᾶτον, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγετον· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν.

**5** Ἄλλ' εὐ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐφάτην, τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον.

Μακαρίζω ἄρ' ὑμᾶς ἔγωγε τοῦ κτήματος πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ μέγαν βασιλεία τῆς ἀρχῆς· τοσούδε δέ μοι εἶπετον, εἰ ἐν νῷ ἔχετε ἐπιδεικνύει ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ πῶς σφῶν βεβούλευται.

**10** Ἐπ' αὐτὸ γε τοῦτο πάρεσμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐπιδείξοιτε

**b** καὶ διδάξοιτε, ἐάν τις ἐθέλῃ μαθάνειν.

Ὅτι μὲν ἐθελήσουσιν ἅπαντες οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες, ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ἐγγνώμαι, πρῶτος μὲν ἐγώ, ἔπειτα δὲ Κλεινίας οὐτοσί, πρὸς δ' ἡμῖν Κτήσιππός τε ὄδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὔτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ

**5** δεικνὺς αὐτῷ τοὺς ἑραστὰς τοὺς Κλεινίου· οἱ δὲ ἐτύχωνον

ἡμᾶς ἦδη περιστάμενοι. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος ἔτυχε πόρρω  
καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλειώλου—κάμοι δοκεῖν ὡς ἐτύγγαυεν ὁ  
Εὐθύδημος ἐμοὶ διαλεγόμενος προνευκῶς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν,  
ἐν μέσῳ δυτος ἡμῶν τοῦ Κλειώλου, ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίπῳ c  
τῆς θέας—βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι ὁ Κτήσιππος τὰ  
παιδικὰ καὶ ἅμα φιλήκοος ὢν ἀναπηδήσας πρῶτος προσέστη  
ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ κατακτικρῷ οὕτως οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκείνων  
ιδόντες περιέστησαν ἡμᾶς, οἱ τε τοῦ Κλειώλου ἔρασταί καὶ δ  
οἱ τοῦ Εὐθύδημου τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρου ἐταῖροι. τούτους δὴ  
ἐγὼ δεικνὺς ἔλεγον τῷ Εὐθύδημῳ ὅτι πάντες ἔτοιμοι εἶεν  
μανθάνειν· δ τε οὖν Κτήσιππος συνέφη μάλα προθύμως d  
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτῷ κοινῇ πάντες ἐπιδειξασθαι  
τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας.

Εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ· ὦ Εὐθύδημε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε, πάντων μὲν  
οὖν παντὶ τρόπῳ καὶ τούτοις χαρίσασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα δ  
ἐπιδειξασθον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πλείστα δήλον ὅτι οὐκ ὀλίγον  
ἔργον ἐπιδείξαι· τὸδε δέ μοι εἶπετον, πότερον πεπεισμένον  
ἦδη ὡς χρὴ παρ' ὑμῶν μανθάνειν δύναισθ' ἂν ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι  
ἄνδρα μόνον, ἢ καὶ ἐκείνων τὸν μήπω πεπεισμένον διὰ τὸ μὴ e  
οἴεσθαι ὄλως τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀρετὴν μαθητῶν εἶναι ἢ μὴ σφῶ  
εἶναι αὐτῆς διδασκάλῳ; φέρε, καὶ τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα τῆς  
αὐτῆς τέχνης ἔργον πείσαι ὡς καὶ διδασκτὸν ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ οὕτοι  
ὑμεῖς ἔστέ παρ' ὧν ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτὸ μάθοι, ἢ ἄλλης; δ

Ταύτης μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τῆς αὐτῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διону-  
σόδωρος.

Ἔμεις ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώ-  
πων κάλλιστ' ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς 275  
ἐπιμέλειαν;

Οἴομέθα γε δή, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Τῶν μὲν τοῦτων ἄλλων τὴν ἐπιδειξιν ἡμῶν, ἔφη, εἰς αὐθις  
ἀπόθεσθον, τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ ἐπιδειξασθον· τουτουὶ τὸν νεανίσκον δ  
πέισατον ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ  
χαριεῖσθον ἐμοὶ τε καὶ τουτουσὶ πᾶσιν. συμβέβηκεν γάρ τι

τοιοῦτον τῷ μειρακίῳ τούτῳ· ἐγὼ τε καὶ οἷδε πάντες τυγχάνομεν ἐπιθυμοῦντες ὡς βέλτιστον αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. ἔστι δὲ  
 10 οὗτος Ἀξιώχου μὲν υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ, αὐτα-  
 b νέψιος δὲ τοῦ νῦν ὄντος Ἀλκιβιάδου ὄνομα δ' αὐτῷ Κλεωίας.  
 ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέφ,  
 μή τις φθῆῃ ἡμῶς ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν  
 δianoian καὶ διαφθείρη. σφῶ οὖν ἤκετον εἰς κάλλιστον·  
 5 ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν, λάβετον πείραν τοῦ μειρακίου  
 καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναυτίον ἡμῶν.

· Εἰπόντος οὖν ἐμοῦ σχεδὸν τι αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος  
 ἄμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως, Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν διαφέρει, ὦ  
 c Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐὰν μόνον ἐθέλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος.

Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη ἐγὼ, τοῦτό γε καὶ εἴθισται· θαμὰ γὰρ  
 αὐτῷ οἷδε προσιόντες πολλὰ ἐρωτώσιν τε καὶ διαλέγονται,  
 ὥστε ἐπεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι.

5 Τὰ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγη-  
 σαίμην; οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸν τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι ἀναλαβεῖν  
 διεξιόντα σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὄσσην· ὥστ' ἔγωγε, καθάπερ οἱ  
 d ποιηταί, δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ  
 Μνήμην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. ἤρξατο δ' οὖν ἐνθένδε ποθὲν  
 ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ὡς ἐγῶμαι· ὦ Κλεωία, πότεροί εἰσι τῶν  
 ἀνθρώπων οἱ μαυθάνοντες, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;

5 Καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἅτε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος,  
 ἠρυθρίασέν τε καὶ ἀπορήσας ἐβλεπεν εἰς ἐμέ· καὶ ἐγὼ  
 γνοὺς αὐτὸν τεθορυβημένον, Θάρρει, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ Κλεωία,  
 e καὶ ἀπόκριμαι ἀνδρείως, ὁπότερά σοι φαίνεται· ἴσως γάρ  
 τοι ὠφελεῖ τὴν μέγιστην ὠφελίαν.

Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος προσκίψας μοι μικρὸν  
 πρὸς τὸ οὖς, πάνυ μειδιάσας τῷ προσώπῳ, Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη,  
 5 σοί, ὦ Σώκρατες, προλέγω ὅτι ὁπότερ' ἂν ἀποκρίνηται τὸ  
 μειράκιον, ἐξελεγχθήσεται.

Καὶ αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ ταῦτα λέγοντος ὁ Κλεωίας ἔτυχεν  
 ἀποκρινάμενος, ὥστε οὐδὲ παρακελεύσασθαι μοι ἐξεγένετο

εὐλαβηθῆναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, ἀλλ' ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ 276  
εἶεν οἱ μανθάνοντες.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Καλεῖς δέ τινας, ἔφη, διδασκάλους, ἡ  
οὔ;—Ὡμολόγει.—Οὐκοῦν τῶν μανθανόντων οἱ διδάσκαλοι  
διδάσκαλοι εἰσιν, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστῆς καὶ ὁ γραμματιστῆς 5  
διδάσκαλοι δῆπου ἦσαν σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παιδῶν, ὑμεῖς  
δὲ μαθηταί;—Συνέφη.—Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἡνίκα ἐμανθάνετε,  
οὕτω ἠπίστασθε ταῦτα ἃ ἐμανθάνετε;—Οὐκ ἔφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν  
σοφοὶ ἦτε, ὅτε ταῦτα οὐκ ἠπίστασθε;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἦ δ' ὅς. b  
—Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς;—Πάνυ γε.—Ἔμεις ἄρα  
μανθάνοντες ἃ οὐκ ἠπίστασθε, ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐμανθάνετε.—  
Ἐπένευσε τὸ μειράκιον.—Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἄρα μανθάνουσιν, ὦ  
Κλεινία, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ σοφοί, ὡς σὺ οἶει. 5

Ταῦτ' οὖν εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς  
ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορύβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν οἱ ἐπό-  
μνοι ἐκεῖνοι μετὰ τοῦ Διονυσοδώρου τε καὶ Εὐθύδημον· καὶ c  
πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκδεξάμενος  
ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Τί δέ, ὦ Κλεινία, ἔφη, ὅπότε ἀποστοματίζου  
ὑμῖν ὁ γραμματιστῆς, πότεροι ἐμάνθανον τῶν παιδῶν τὰ  
ἀποστοματιζόμενα, οἱ σοφοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς;—Οἱ σοφοί, ἔφη 5  
ὁ Κλεινίας.—Οἱ σοφοὶ ἄρα μανθάνουσιν ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς,  
καὶ οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἔρτι Εὐθύδημῳ ἀπεκρίνω.

Ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ πάνυ μέγα ἐγέλασάν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν d  
οἱ ἔρασταί τοῖν ἀνδρῶν, ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν· οἱ  
δ' ἄλλοι ἡμεῖς ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσιωπῶμεν. γνοὺς δὲ ἡμᾶς  
ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐκπεπληγμένους, ἴν' ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν  
αὐτόν, οὐκ ἀνείε τὸ μειράκιον, ἀλλ' ἠρώτα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ 5  
ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ  
αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔφη· Πότερον γὰρ οἱ μανθάνοντες μανθάνουσιν  
ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται;

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος πάλιν μικρὸν πρὸς με ψιθυρίσας,  
Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔτερον τοιοῦτου οἶον τὸ e  
πρότερον.

ὦ Ζεῦ, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἡ μὴν καὶ τὸ πρότερόν γε καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη τὸ ἐρώτημα.

5 Πάντ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἀφικτα. Τοιγάρτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖτέ μοι εὐδοκμεῖν παρὰ τοῖς μαθηταῖς.

Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ὁ μὲν Κλειῶς τῷ Εὐθύδημῳ ἀπεκρίνατο ὅτι μαθάνοιεν οἱ μαθάνοντες ἀ σὺκ ἐπίσταιντο· ὁ δὲ ἤρετο  
277 αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν περὶ τὸ πρότερον· Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς, σὺκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα;—Ναί, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν ἅπαντα;—  
Ὁμολόγει.—Ὅταν οὖν τις ἀποστοματίζῃ ὀτιοῦν, οὐ γράμματα ἀποστοματίζει;—Ὁμολόγει.—Οὐκοῦν ὧν τι σὺ ἐπίστασαι,  
5 ἔφη, ἀποστοματίζει, εἴπερ πάντα ἐπίστασαι;—Καὶ τοῦτο ὠμολόγει.—Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄρα σὺ (σὺ) μαθάνεις ἅτ' ἂν ἀποστοματίζῃ τις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος γράμματα μαθάνει;—  
—Ὅκ, ἀλλ', ἢ δ' ὅς, μαθάνω.—Οὐκοῦν ἀ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ δ' b ὅς, μαθάνεις, εἴπερ γε ἅπαντα τὰ γράμματα ἐπίστασαι.—  
Ὁμολόγησεν.—Ὅκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀπεκρίνω, ἔφη.

Καὶ οὕτω σφόδρα τι ταῦτα εἶρητο τῷ Εὐθύδημῳ, καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὧσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον πάλω  
5 ἐστοχάζετο τοῦ μειρακίου, καὶ εἶπεν· Ἐξαπατᾷ σε Εὐθύδημος, ὦ Κλειῶ. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, τὸ μαθάνει οὐκ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τούτου οὐ ἂν τις μαθάνῃ;—Ὁμολόγει ὁ Κλειῶς.—Τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν;—Συνέφη.—Τὸ ἄρα μὴ ἐπίστασθαι  
c μῆπω ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἐστίν;—Ὁμολόγει αὐτῷ.—Πότερον οὖν εἰσὼ οἱ λαμβάνοντες ὀτιοῦν οἱ ἔχοντες ἤδη ἢ οἱ ἂν μὴ ἔχωσιν;—Οἱ ἂν μῆ.—Οὐκοῦν ὠμολόγηκας εἶναι τούτων καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἐπισταμένους, τῶν μὴ ἔχόντων;—Κατένευσε.—  
5 Τῶν λαμβανόντων ἄρ' εἰσὼ οἱ μαθάνοντες, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἔχόντων;—Συνέφη.—Οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἄρα, ἔφη, μαθάνουσιν, ὦ Κλειῶ, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι.

d Ἐτι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον καταβαλῶν ὧσπερ πάλαισμα ὄρμα ὁ Εὐθύδημος τὸν νεανίσκον· καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς βαπτίζομενον τὸ

μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαύσαι αὐτό, μὴ ἡμῶν ἀποδειλιά-  
 σαι, παραμυθούμενος εἶπον· ὦ Κλεωία, μὴ θαύμαζε εἰ  
 σοι φαίνονται ἀήθεις οἱ λόγοι. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνη 5  
 οἶον ποιεῖτον τῷ ξένῳ περὶ σέ· ποιεῖτον δὲ ταῦτον ὅπερ  
 οἱ ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων, ὅταν τὴν θρόνῳσι  
 ποιῶσι περὶ τοῦτον ὃν ἂν μέλλωσι τελεῖν. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ  
 χορηγία τίς ἐστι καὶ παιδιὰ, εἰ ἴρα καὶ τετέλεσαι· καὶ νῦν  
 τούτῳ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χορεύετον περὶ σέ καὶ οἶον ὀρχεῖσθον e  
 παίζοντε, ὡς μετὰ τοῦτο τελούντε. νῦν οὖν νόμισον τὰ  
 πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν ἀκούειν τῶν σοφιστικῶν. πρῶτον γάρ,  
 ὡς φησι Πρόδικος, περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ·  
 ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐνδείκνυσθόν σοι τῷ ξένῳ, ὅτι οὐκ ἤδησθα τὸ 5  
 μαυθάνειν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦδε, ὅταν  
 τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς μηδεμίαν ἔχων ἐπιστήμην περὶ πράγματός  
 τινος ἔπειτα ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λαμβάνη τὴν ἐπιστήμην, καλοῦσι 278  
 δὲ ταῦτον τοῦτο καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἔχων ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην· ταύτη  
 τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταῦτον τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῆ ἢ πραττόμενον  
 ἢ λεγόμενον—μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ συνιέναι καλοῦσι ἢ μαν-  
 θάνειν, ἐστὶ δ' ὅτε καὶ μαυθάνειν—σὲ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς οἱτοι 5  
 ἐνδείκνυνται, διαλέληθεν, ταῦτον ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναν-  
 τίως ἔχουσι κείμενα, τῷ τε εἰδότε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μή· παρα-  
 πλῆσιον δὲ τούτῳ καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ ἐρωτήματι, ἐν φ'  
 ἡρώτων σε πότερα μαυθάνουσι οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἐπίστανται b  
 ἢ ἂ μή. ταῦτα δὴ τῶν μαθημάτων παιδιὰ ἐστίν—διὸ καὶ  
 φημι ἐγὼ σοι τούτους προσπαίξω—παιδιὰν δὲ λέγω διὰ  
 ταῦτα, ὅτι, εἰ καὶ πολλὰ τις ἢ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μάθοι,  
 τὰ μὲν πράγματα οὐδὲν ἂν μᾶλλον εἰδείη πῆ ἔχει, προσ- 5  
 παίξω δὲ οἷός τ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν τῶν ὀνο-  
 μάτων διαφορὰν ὑποσκελίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ  
 σκολύθρια τῶν μελλόντων καθιζήσεσθαι ὑποσπῶντες χαίρουσι  
 καὶ γελῶσι, ἐπειδὴν ἴδωσι ὑπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον. ταῦτα c  
 μὲν οὖν σοι παρὰ τούτων νόμιζε παιδιὰν γεγονέναι· τὸ δὲ  
 μετὰ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι τούτῳ γέ σοι αὐτῶ τὰ σπουδαῖα

ἐνδείξεσθον, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑφηγήσομαι αὐτοῖν ἵνα μοι ὁ ὑπέσχοτο  
 5 ἀποδώσω. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν  
 σοφίαν· νῦν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ δεῖν ᾗθητήν πρότερον παῖσαι  
 πρὸς σέ. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημέ τε καὶ Διονυσόδωρε,  
 d πεπαλσθω τε ὑμῖν, καὶ ἴσως ἱκανῶς ἔχει· τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ  
 ταῦτα ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε τὸ μειράκιον ὅπως χρῆ  
 σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι. πρότερον δ' ἐγὼ σφῶν  
 ἐνδείξομαι ὅσον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω καὶ ὅσοι αὐτοῦ ἐπιθυμῶ  
 5 ἀκοῦσαι. ἐὰν οὖν δόξω ὑμῖν ἰδιωτικῶς τε καὶ γελοῖως αὐτὸ  
 ποιεῖν, μὴ μου καταγέλᾳτε· ὑπὸ ἀροθυμίας γὰρ τοῦ ἀκούσαι  
 τῆς ὑμετέρας σοφίας· τολμήσω ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι ἐναυτῶν  
 e ὑμῶν. ἀνάσχεσθον οὖν ἀγελαστὶ ἀκούοντες αὐτοὶ τε καὶ  
 οἱ μαθηταὶ ὑμῶν· σὺ δέ μοι, ὦ παῖ Ἀξιώχου, ἀπόκριναι.

Ἄρα γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; ἢ  
 τοῦτο μὲν ἐρώτημα ὦν νυνδὴ ἐφοβούμην ἐν τῶν καταγελά-  
 5 στων; ἀνόητον γὰρ δήπου καὶ τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὰ τοιαῦτα· τίς γὰρ  
 οὐ βούλεται ἀνθρώπων εὖ πράττειν;—Οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ, ἔφη  
 279 ὁ Κλεωίας.—Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπειδὴ βου-  
 λόμεθα εὖ πράττειν, πῶς ἂν εὖ πράττοιμεν; ἀρ' ἂν εἰ ἡμῶν  
 πολλὰ κάγαθὰ εἴη; ἢ τοῦτο ἐκείνου ἔτι εὐθεότερον; δῆλον  
 γὰρ πονεῖν καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.—Συνέφη.—Φέρε δὴ,  
 5 ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἄρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ  
 χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔοικεν εἶναι  
 εὐπορεῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν·  
 ἢ γάρ;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ  
 b καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευά-  
 σθαι;—Συνεδοκεῖ.—Ἄλλὰ μὴν εὐγένειαί γε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ  
 τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δῆλὰ ἔστω ἀγαθὰ ὄντα.—Ὡμολόγει.—  
 Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἔτι ἡμῖν λείπεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τί ἄρα ἔστιν  
 5 τὸ σῶφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον; πότερον  
 πρὸς Διός, ὦ Κλεωία, ἡγήσῃ σὺ, ἐὰν ταῦτα τιθώμεν ὡς  
 ἀγαθὰ, ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς θήσει, ἢ ἐὰν μή; ἴσως γὰρ ἂν τις ἡμῶν  
 ἀμφισβητήσειεν· σοὶ δὲ πῶς δοκεῖ;—Ἀγαθὰ, ἔφη ὁ Κλε-

νίας.—Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; c  
 ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις;—Ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.—Ἐνθυ-  
 μου δὴ μή τι παραλείπωμεν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὃ τι καὶ ἄξιον  
 λόγου.—Ἄλλὰ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἔφη, οὐδέν, ὃ Κλειώας.—Καὶ  
 ἐγὼ ἀναμνησθεῖς εἶπον ὅτι Ναὶ μὰ Δία κινδυνεύομεν γε 5  
 τὸ μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παραλιπεῖν.—Τί τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς.  
 —Τὴν εὐτυχίαν, ὦ Κλειώα· ὃ πάντες φασί, καὶ οἱ πάν-  
 φαῦλοι, μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι.—Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.  
 —Καὶ ἐγὼ αὖ πάλιν μετανοήσας εἶπον ὅτι Ὀλίγου κατα-  
 γέλαστοι ἐγενόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν ξένων ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ d  
 Ἀξιώχου.—Τί δή, ἔφη, τοῦτο;—Ὅτι εὐτυχίαν ἐν τοῖς ἐμ-  
 προσθεν θέμενοι νυνδὴ αὖθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν.—  
 Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;—Καταγέλαστον δήπου, ὃ πάλαι πρόκειται,  
 τοῦτο πάλιν προτιθέναι καὶ δις ταῦτα λέγειν.—Πῶς, ἔφη, 5  
 τοῦτο λέγεις;—Ἡ σοφία δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐτυχία ἐστίν·  
 τοῦτο δὲ κἀν παῖς γνοίη.—Καὶ ὅς ἐθαύμασεν· οὕτως ἔτι νέος  
 τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστὶ.—Κἀγὼ γνοὺς αὐτὸν θαυμάζοντα, Ἄρα  
 οὐκ οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὦ Κλειώα, ὅτι περὶ αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν e  
 οἱ αὐληταὶ εὐτυχέστατοι εἰσω;—Συνέφη.—Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ'  
 ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ γραμμάτων γραφῆς τε καὶ ἀναγνώσεως οἱ  
 γραμματισταί;—Πάνυ γε.—Τί δέ; πρὸς τοὺς τῆς θαλάττης  
 κινδύνους μῶν οἶε εὐτυχεστέρους τινας εἶναι τῶν σοφῶν 5  
 κυβερνητῶν, ὡς ἐπὶ πᾶν εἰπεῖν;—Οὐ δήτα.—Τί δέ; στρα-  
 τευόμενος μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἥδιον τοῦ κινδύνου τε καὶ τῆς  
 τύχης μετέχοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;— 280  
 Μετὰ σοφοῦ.—Τί δέ; ἀσθενῶν μετὰ ποτέρου ἂν ἠδέως  
 κινδυνεύοις, μετὰ σοφοῦ ἰατροῦ ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—Μετὰ  
 σοφοῦ.—Ἄρ' οὐκ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εὐτυχέστερον ἂν οἶε πρᾶτ-  
 τειν μετὰ σοφοῦ πρᾶττων ἢ μετὰ ἀμαθοῦς;—Συνεχώρει.— 5  
 Ἡ σοφία ἄρα πανταχοῦ εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους.  
 οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτέ τι σοφία, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη  
 ὀρθῶς πρᾶττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν· ἢ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἴη.  
 Συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτῶντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφα- b



λαίψ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχει, σοφίας παρουσίας, φ' ἂν παρῆ μηδὲν  
 προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦτο συνωμολογησάμεθα,  
 πάλιν ἐπυθνανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὡμολογημένα πῶς  
 5 ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι. Ὁμολογήσαμεν γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ  
 πολλὰ παρέη, εὐδαιμονοῦν ἂν καὶ εὐ πράττεω.—Συνέφη.—  
 Ἄρ' οὖν εὐδαιμονοῦμεν ἂν διὰ τὰ παρόντα ἀγαθὰ, εἰ μηδὲν  
 ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ;—Εἰ ὠφελοῖ, ἔφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν  
 c τι ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη μόνον ἡμῖν, χρῶμεθα δ' αὐτοῖς μή; οἶον  
 σιτία εἰ ἡμῖν εἴη πολλά, ἐσθλοῦμεν δὲ μή, ἢ ποτόν, πίνοιμεν  
 δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὃ τι ὠφελοῦμεθ' ἂν;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—Τί δέ;  
 5 οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες, εἰ αὐτοῖς εἴη πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια  
 παρεσκευασμένα ἐκάστῳ εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον, χρῶντο δὲ  
 αὐτοῖς μή, ἂρ' ἂν οὕτοι εὐ πράττειον διὰ τὴν κτήσιν, ὅτι  
 κεκτημένοι εἶεν πάντα ἃ δεῖ κεκτήσθαι τὸν δημιουργόν;  
 οἶον τέκτων, εἰ παρεσκευασμένος εἴη τὰ τε ὄργανα ἅπαντα  
 καὶ ξύλα ἱκανά, τεκταίνουτο δὲ μή, ἔσθ' ὃ τι ὠφελοῖτ' ἂν  
 d ἀπὸ τῆς κτήσεως;—Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.—Τί δέ, εἰ τις κεκτη-  
 μένος εἴη πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ,  
 χρῶντο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή, ἂρ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῖ διὰ τὴν τούτων  
 κτήσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν;—Οὐ δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Δεῖν ἄρα,  
 5 ἔφη, ὡς ἔοικεν, μὴ μόνον κεκτήσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ τὸν  
 μέλλοντα εὐδαίμονα ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς· ὡς  
 οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίνεται.—Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.—Ἄρ'  
 e οὖν, ὦ Κλεινία, ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαίμονα ποιῆσαι  
 τινα, τό τε κεκτήσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς;—  
 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.—Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς χρῆται τις  
 ἢ καὶ ἐὰν μή;—Ἐὰν ὀρθῶς.—Καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις.  
 5 πλεον γάρ που οἶμαι θάτερόν ἐστιν; ἐὰν τις χρῆται ὀρθοῦν  
 μὴ ὀρθῶς πράγματι ἢ ἐὰν ἐᾷ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὔτε  
 281 κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω φαμέν;—Συνεχώρει.—Τί  
 οὖν; ἐν τῇ ἐργασίᾳ τε καὶ χρήσει τῇ περὶ τὰ ξύλα μὲν  
 ἄλλο τί ἐστιν τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι ἢ ἐπιστήμη  
 ἢ τεκτονικὴ;—Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη.—Ἄλλὰ μὲν που καὶ ἐν τῇ

περὶ τὰ σκευὴ ἐργασίᾳ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπεργα- 5  
 ζομένη.—Συνέφη.—Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τὴν χρεῖαν  
 ὧν ἐλέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, πλοῦτου τε καὶ ὑγείας  
 καὶ κάλλους, τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρῆσθαι ἐπι-  
 στήμη ἦν ἡγουμένη καὶ κατορθοῦσα τὴν πράξιν, ἢ ἄλλο τι; **b**  
 —Ἐπιστήμη, ἦ δ' ὅς.—Οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 εὐπραγίαν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἐπιστήμη παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις  
 ἐν πάσῃ κτήσει τε καὶ πράξει.—Ὡμολόγει.—Ἄρ' οὖν ὧ  
 πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀφελός τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων ἄνευ 5  
 φρονήσεως καὶ σοφίας; ἄρα γε ἂν ὄναιτο ἄνθρωπος πολλὰ  
 κεκτημένος καὶ πολλὰ πράττων νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, ἢ μᾶλλον  
 ὀλίγα [νοῦν ἔχων]; ὦδε δὲ σκόπει· οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων  
 ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι, ἐλάττω δὲ ἁμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν **c**  
 κακῶς πράττοι, ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων ἄθλιος ἦττον ἂν  
 εἶη;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω τις  
 πράττοι πένης ὧν ἢ πλούσιος;—Πένης, ἔφη.—Πότερον δὲ  
 ἀσθενῆς ἢ ἰσχυρός;—Ἀσθενῆς.—Πότερον δὲ ἐντιμος ἢ 5  
 ἄτιμος;—Ἄτιμος.—Πότερον δὲ ἀνδρείος ὧν [καὶ σώφρων]  
 ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι ἢ δειλός;—Δειλός.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀργός  
 μᾶλλον ἢ ἐργάτης;—Συνεχώρει.—Καὶ βραδύς μᾶλλον ἢ  
 ταχύς, καὶ ἀμβλὸν ὄρων καὶ ἀκούων μᾶλλον ἢ ὀξύ;—Πάντα **d**  
 τὰ τοιαῦτα συνεχωροῦμεν ἀλλήλοις.—Ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δ', ἔφη,  
 ὧ Κλεινία, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα ἢ τὸ πρῶτον ἐφάμεν ἀγαθὰ  
 εἶναι, οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὅπως αὐτὰ γε  
 καθ' αὐτὰ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ [εἶναι], ἀλλ' ὡς ἔοικεν ὧδ' ἔχει 5  
 ἔαν μὲν αὐτῶν ἡγήται ἀμαθία, μείζω κακὰ εἶναι τῶν ἐναν-  
 τίων, ὅσῳ δυνατώτερα ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ κακῷ ὄντι,  
 ἔαν δὲ φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία, μείζω ἀγαθὰ, αὐτὰ δὲ καθ'  
 αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἕξια εἶναι.—Φαίνεται, ἔφη, **e**  
 ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτως, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.—Τί οὖν ἡμῖν συμβαίνει ἐκ  
 τῶν εἰρημένων; ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ὄν οὔτε  
 ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν, τούτῳ δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων ἢ μὲν σοφία  
 ἀγαθόν, ἢ δὲ ἀμαθία κακόν;—Ὡμολόγει. 5

282 Ἐτι τοίνυν, ἔφη, τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπισκεψώμεθα. ἐπειδὴ εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα πάντες, ἐφάφημεν δὲ τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ χρήσθαι τε τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ ὀρθῶς χρήσθαι, τὴν δὲ ὀρθότητα καὶ εὐτυχίαν ἐπιστήμη ἢ παρέχουσα, δεῖ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκ παυτὸς τρόπου ἅπαντα ἀνδρα τοῦτο παρασκευάζεσθαι, ὅπως ὡς σοφώτατος ἔσται· ἢ οὐ;—Ναί, ἔφη.—Καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δῆπου τοῦτο οἴομενον δεῖν παραλαμβάνειν πολὺν μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ β παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἔραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἱκετευόντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι, οὐδὲν ἀισχρὸν, ὡς Κλεωία, οὐδὲ νεμεσητὸν ἕνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεῖν καὶ ἔραστῇ καὶ παυτὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτιοι ἐθέλουσα ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι· ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη ἐγώ, οὕτως;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ μοι δοκεῖς γ λέγειν, ἢ δ' ὅς.—Εἰ ἔστι γε, ὡς Κλεωία, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, ἢ σοφία διδασκόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγιγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι ἄσκεπτον καὶ οὕτω διωμολογημένον ἔμοι τε καὶ σοί.—Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἢ διδασκὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.—Καὶ ἐγὼ ἤσθεις εἶπον· Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις, ὡς ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, καὶ εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ, πότερον διδασκὸν ἢ οὐ διδασκὸν ἢ σοφία. νῦν οὖν ἐπειδὴ σοι καὶ διδασκὸν δοκεῖ καὶ μόνον τῶν ὄντων εὐδαίμονα καὶ εὐτυχῆ ποιεῖν τὸν δ ἀνθρώπου, ἄλλο τι ἢ φαίης ἀν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῶ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα.

Καθὰ ταῦτα ἄσμενος ἀκούσας, Τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, ἔφη, παρά- ἢ δειγμα, ὡς Διονυσόδωρὲ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημῃ, οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι, τοιοῦτον, ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως καὶ μόλις διὰ μακρῶν λεγόμενον· σφῶν δὲ ὀπότερος βούλεται, ταῦτὸν τοῦτο τέχνη πρᾶττων ἐπιδειξάτω ἡμῖν. εἰ δὲ μὴ e τοῦτο βούλεσθον, ὅθεν ἐγὼ ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς ἐπιδειξάτω

τῷ μειρακίῳ, πότερον πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην δεῖ αὐτὸν κτᾶσθαι, ἢ ἔστι τις μία ἣν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, καὶ τίς αὕτη. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον ἀρχόμενος, περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν τυγχάνει δν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφόν 5 τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἶπον, ὧ Κρίτων· τῷ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο 283 ἔσομένῳ πάνν σφόδρα προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, καὶ ἐπισκόπουν τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἄψωιτο τοῦ λόγου καὶ δπόθεν ἄρξωιτο παρακελεύόμενοι τῷ νεανίσκῳ σοφίαν τε καὶ ἀρετὴν ἀσκέιν. ὁ οὖν πρῆσβύτερος αὐτῶν, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, πρότερος ἤρχετο 5 τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς ἀντίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους τινας λόγους. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη ἡμῖν· θαυμαστὸν γάρ τινα, ὧ Κρίτων, ἀνὴρ b κατῆρχεν λόγον, οὗ σοὶ ἄξιον ἀκοῦσαι, ὡς παρακελευστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἦν ἐπ' ἀρετῆν.

Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι φατὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν τόνδε τὸν νεανίσκον σοφὸν γενέσθαι, πότε- 5 ρον παύσετε ταῦτα λέγοντες ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιθυμεῖτε καὶ σπουδάσετε;

Κἀγὼ διενόηθην ὅτι ῥηθήτην ἄρα ἡμᾶς τὸ πρότερον παύσειν, ἥνίκα ἐκελεύομεν διαλεχθῆναι τῷ νεανίσκῳ αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα προσεπαισάτην τε καὶ οὐκ ἐσπουδασάτην· 10 ταῦτα οὖν διανοηθεὶς ἔτι μᾶλλον εἶπον ὅτι θαυμαστῶς c σπουδάσομεν.

Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, Σκόπει μήν, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὅπως μὴ ἔξαρνος ἔσει ἂ νῦν λέγεις.—Ἐσκεμμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτ' ἔξαρνος γένωμαι.—Τί οὖν; ἔφη· φατὲ 5 βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι;—Πάνν μὲν οὖν.—Νῦν δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, Κλειωίας πότερον σοφός ἐστιν ἢ οὐ;—Οὔκουν φησὶ γέ πω· ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀλαζών.—Ἔμεῖς δέ, ἔφη, βούλεσθε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν σοφόν, ἀμαθῆ δὲ μὴ εἶναι; d —Ἄμολογοῦμεν.—Οὐκοῦν ὅς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, βούλεσθε αὐτὸν γενέσθαι, ὅς δ' ἔστι νῦν, μηκέτι εἶναι.—Καὶ ἐγὼ

ἀκούσας ἐθορυβήθην· ὁ δέ μου θορυβουμένου ὑπολαβών,  
 5 ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ βούλεσθε αὐτὸν ὅς νῦν ἐστὶν  
 μηκέτι εἶναι, βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι; καίτοι  
 πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν φίλοι τε καὶ ἔρασταί,  
 οἴτινες τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιήσαιατο ἐξολωλέναι.

e Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἠγανάκτησέν τε ὑπὲρ τῶν  
 παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ ξένη Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον,  
 ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν· “Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλῆν,” ὅ τι μαθῶν μου  
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι  
 5 οὐδ’ ὄσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ τόνδε βουλοίμην ἂν ἐξολω-  
 λέναι.

Τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶδον  
 τ’ εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;—Νῆ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.—  
 Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ, ἢ μὴ  
 284 λέγοντα;—Λέγοντα, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ  
 ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ λέγει;—Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;  
 ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Ἐν μὴν κάκεινό γ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ  
 λέγει, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο  
 5 λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει;—Ναί.—Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν  
 λέγων καὶ τὰ ὄντα τάληθῆ λέγει· ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος,  
 εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τάληθῆ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ  
 ψεύδεται.

b Naί, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ  
 Εὐθύδημε, οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ  
 ἔστω;—Οὐκ ἔστω.—Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα  
 5 ὄντα ἐστίν;—Οὐδαμοῦ.—Ἔστω οὖν ὅπως περὶ ταῦτα, τὰ μὴ  
 ὄντα, πράξειεν ἂν τίς τι, (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι) ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ  
 ὄσπισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κτή-  
 σιππος.—Τί οὖν; οἱ ῥήτορες ὅταν λέγωσω ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,  
 οὐδὲν πράττουσι;—Πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν  
 c εἴπερ πράττουσι, καὶ ποιούσι;—Ναί.—Τὸ λέγειν ἕρα πράτ-  
 τειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐστὶν;—Ὡμολόγησεν.—Οὐκ ἕρα τά

γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεὶς—ποιοὶ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη τί· σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ οἶόν τ' εἶναι μηδένα ποιεῖν— ὥστε κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ λέγει, ἀλλ' εἶπερ 5 λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τάληθῆ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινα λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὦ Κτήσιππε; εἰσὶν γάρ τινες οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει;—Εἰσὶν μέντοι, α ἔφη, οἱ καλοὶ τε ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τάληθῆ λέγοντες.—Τί οὖν; ἦ δ' ὅς· τάγαθὰ οὐκ εὖ, ἔφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ κακῶς;— Συνεχώρει.—Τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὡς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα;—Ὅμολογῶ.—Κακῶς ἄρα, ἔφη, 5 λέγουσιν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακὰ, εἶπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν.—Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γούν κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ὦν σύ, ἐάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσῃ εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὡς εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι κακῶς 6 λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς.—Καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς θερμῶς;— Μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· τοὺς γούν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσί τε καὶ φασὶν διαλέγεσθαι.—Σὺ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ 5 Διονυσόδωρος, λοιδορῆ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορῆ.—Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε, ἀλλὰ νοθετῶ σε ὡς ἑταῖρον, καὶ πειρῶμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀγροίκως λέγειν ὅτι ἐγὼ τούτους βούλομαι ἐξολοκλέναι, οὗς περὶ πλείστου ποιῶμαι. 285

Ἐγὼ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἐδόκουν ἀγριωτέρως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχειν, προσέπεισζόν τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον ὅτι ὦ Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἢ λέγουσιν, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ δνόματι 5 διαφέρεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολοκλέναι ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ' ἐκ ποιηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χρηστός τε καὶ ἔμφρονος ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο εἶτε αὐτῶ ἠρήρηκατον εἶτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην φθόρον τινα καὶ ὄλεθρον τοιοῦτον, b

EUTHYDEMUS

G

ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφῆναι·  
 εἰ τοῦτο ἐπίστασθον—δήλον δὲ ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην  
 γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι τὴν νεωστὶ ἠύρημμένην ἀγαθοῖς  
 5 ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πονηρῶν—συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν  
 αὐτοῖν αὐτό· ἀπολεσάντων ἡμῶν τὸ μειράκιον καὶ φρόνημον  
 ποιησάντων, καὶ ἅπαντάς γε ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς  
 c οἱ νέοι φοβείσθε, ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος·  
 ὡς ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμί, παρακινδυνεύειν ἔτοι-  
 μος καὶ παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσόδωρῳ τούτῳ ὥσπερ τῇ  
 Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ. ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται,  
 5 ἐψέτω, εἰ δ', ὃ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιεῖτω· μόνον χρηστὸν  
 ἀποφηνάτω.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλων-  
 ται δέρευν ἐτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσσω, εἰ μοι ἡ δορὰ μὴ εἰς  
 d ἄσκον τελεπτήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσίου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετὴν.  
 καίτοι με οἶεται Διονυσόδωρος οὐτοσὶ χαλεπαίνειν αὐτῷ·  
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλεπαίνω, ἀλλ' ἀντιλέγω πρὸς ταῦτα ἃ μοι  
 δοκεῖ πρὸς με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὸν τὸ ἀντιλέγειν,  
 5 ἔφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ κάλει λοιδορεῖσθαι· ἕτερον  
 γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λοιδορεῖσθαι.

Καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ  
 Κτήσιππε, ποιῆ τὸς λόγους;

e Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, καὶ σφόδρα γε· ἡ σύ, ὦ Διονυσό-  
 δωρε, οὐκ οἶε εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν;

Οὐκοῦν σύ γ' ἂν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πρόποτε ἀκούσας οὐδενὸς  
 ἀντιλέγοντος ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ.

5 Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ἀκούωμεν νῦν εἴ σοι ἀποδει-  
 κνυμι ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησίππου Διονυσόδωρῳ.

Ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον;

Πάνυ, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἡ δ' ὅς· εἰσὶν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων λόγοι;—

10 Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν;—

Ὡς ἔστιν.—Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι 286  
 ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ οὐ  
 οὐδεὶς ἐφάνη λέγων.—Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιπ-  
 πος· ἠττόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ;—Πότερον οὖν,  
 ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφό- 5  
 τεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτὰ λέγοιμεν;—  
 Συνεχῶρει.—'Αλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος  
 λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν ὅ  
 οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν;—  
 Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει.—'Αλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ  
 πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε  
 ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις 5  
 τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς (ἂν) ἀντιλέγοι;

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐσίγησεν· ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν  
 λόγον, Πῶς, ἔφην, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ τοι  
 ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλᾶκις ἀκηκοὺς C  
 αἰεὶ θαυμάζω—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο  
 αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ αἰεὶ θαυμαστός τις  
 δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν 5  
 —οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πέν-  
 σεσθαι· ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;—τοῦτο γὰρ  
 δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;—ἀλλ' ἢ λέγουτ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ  
 μὴ λέγειν;

Συνεχῶρει.

Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι d  
 ἔστιν;

Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν.

Οὐκ ἔφη. 5

Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεὶς ἀνθρώποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν  
 εἴη ἀμαθία, εἶπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.



Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

10 Οὐκ ἔφη.

Λόγου ἔνεκα, ᾧ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἄποιν λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι ἀμαθῆς ἀνθρώπων;

e Ἄλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον.

Ἦ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι, μηδενὸς ψευδομένου;

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.

5 Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ νυνδὴ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι; τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν πῶς ἂν τις κελεύσαι;

Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες; ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μανθάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως ἐννοῶ. ἴσως μὲν σὺν φορτικώτερόν τι ἐρήσομαι,

287 ἀλλὰ συγγήνωσκε. δρα δέ· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστιν μήτε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῆ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι πράττη; πράττοντα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ πράττει· οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε;

5 Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἤδη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορικὸν ἐρώτημα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοοῦμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ᾧ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίος διδάσκαλοι ἦκατε; ἢ οὐκ ἔφατε ἀρετὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν

b παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλοντι μανθάνειν;

Εἶτ', ἔφη, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβὼν, οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἂ τὸ πρῶτον εἶπομεν νῦν ἀναμνησθῆσκει, καὶ εἰ τι πέρσιον εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθήσκει, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι

5 λεγομένοις οὐχ ἔξεις ὃ τι χρῆ;

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποὶ εἰσω, πάνυ εἰκότως· παρὰ σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται—ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ παγχαλεπον χρήσασθαι ἔστιν, ᾧ λέγεις. τὸ γὰρ “Οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρώμαι” τί ποτε λέγεις, ᾧ Διονυσόδωρε; ἢ δήλον ὅτι ὡς

οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἶπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο c  
τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ “Οὐκ ἔχω ὁ τι χρῆσθαι τοῖς λόγοις”;

Ἄλλ’ ὁ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, τοῦτ’ γ’ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν  
χρῆσθαι ἐπεὶ ἀπόκριμαι.

Πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίσασθαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; 5

Οὐκ ἀποκρίνη; ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ δίκαιον;

Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη.

Κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ἢ δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε,  
ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῶν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ οἶσθα 10  
ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίσασθαι καὶ ὅτε μὴ; καὶ νῦν οὐδ’ ἂν ὄτιοιεν d  
ἀποκρίνῃ, ἅτε γιγνώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ;

Λαλεῖς, ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίσασθαι· ἀλλ’, ὠγαθέ, πείθου  
καὶ ἀποκρίνῃ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι.

Πειστέον τούτων, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν· σὺ 5  
γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἀλλ’ ἐρώτα.

Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ  
ἄψυχα;

Τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα.

Οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥῆμα ψυχὴν ἔχον; 10

Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί οὖν ἄρτι ἤρου ὁ τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα; e

Τί ἄλλο γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν;  
ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι  
νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα; πότερα φῆς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ  
μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὐδ’ 5  
ἔχεις ὁ τι χρῆσι τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δ’ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ’ οὕτως ὀρθῶς  
λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν. καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς 288  
ἂ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ ἔοικεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσό-  
δωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταῦτ’ μένειν  
καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτειν, καὶ ὥστε  
τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρηθῆ- 5  
σθαι, καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἰθαυμαστῆς οὕσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν  
λόγων.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμάσιά γε λέγετ', ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 b Θούριοι εἶτε Χῖοι εἶθ' ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι  
 ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῶν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν.

Καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς μὴ λαιδορῶν γένηται, πάλιν κατεπρά-  
 νων τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νυνδὴ ἅ  
 5 πρὸς Κλεωῖαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταῦτ' αὐτὰ λέγω, ὅτι  
 οὐ γινώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι θαυμασία ἐστίν.  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλὰ τὸν  
 Πρωτέα μιμείσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.  
 c ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν  
 ἀνδρῶν ἕως ἂν ἡμῶν ἐκφανῆτον ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτῶ σπουδάζοντο  
 οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴν ἄρξονται  
 σπουδάξω. ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχά-  
 5 μεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν  
 ὑφηγήσασθαι οἷω προσεύχομαι αὐτῶ φανῆναι μοι· ὅθεν γὰρ  
 d τὸ πρότερον ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν  
 δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλέησαντέ  
 με καὶ οἰκτίραντε συντεταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτῶ  
 σπουδάσῃτον.

5 Σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεωῖα, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν με πόθεν τότ' ἀπε-  
 λίπομεν. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐγῶμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν. φιλοσοφη-  
 τέον ὁμολογήσαμεν τελευτώντες· ἦ γάρ;—Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.—  
 Ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτήσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως; ἔφην.  
 —Ναί, ἔφην.—Τίνα ποτ' οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς  
 e κησαίμεθα; ἄρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἦτις ἡμᾶς  
 ὀνήσει;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφην.—Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ  
 ἐπισταίμεθα γινώσκωκεν περιούντες· ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίου  
 πλείστον καταρῶρκεται;—Ἴσως, ἔφην.—Ἄλλα τὸ πρότερον,  
 5 ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, τοῦτό γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ' εἰ  
 ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν  
 χρυσίου γένοιτο· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ τὰς πέτρας χρυσῶς ἐπισταί-  
 289 μεθα ποιεῖν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀξία ἦ ἐπιστήμη εἶη. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ  
 χρῆσθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ χρυσίῳ, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ

ἐφάνη ὄν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ἔφην ἐγώ.—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, μέμνημαι.—Οὐδέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ὄφελος γίνεται οὐδέν, οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς οὔτε ἰατρικῆς οὔτε ἄλ- 5 λης οὐδεμίας, ἥτις ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρῆσθαι δὲ μὴ ᾧ ἂν ποιήσῃ· οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδέ γε εἰ τις ἔστω ἐπιστήμη ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἢ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, εἰ τι δεῖ τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁμολογημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι.—Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα.—Τοιαύτης τιwδς ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ὧ καλὲ παῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ᾗ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν 5 καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ δ' ἂν ποιῆ.—Φαίνεται, ἔφη.—Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμᾶς λυροποιοῦς δεῖν εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τιwδς ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα c γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιούσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη, διηρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ λυροποικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαρῖστικὴ πολὺ διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιω. οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποικῆς γε δήλον ὅτι δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη 5 ἑτέρα τοιαύτη.—Συνεδόκει.—Ἄλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ τὴν λογοποικὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν, ἄρα ἔστω αὕτη ἦν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι;—Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών.

Τῶν τεκμηρίω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆσι;

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Ὅρω, ἔφη, τιwδς λογοποιούς, οἱ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιούσω, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκεῖνοι εἰργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι· δήλον οὖν 5 ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἢ τοῦ χρῆσθαι.

Ἰκανόν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειω, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἢ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἦν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαίμων εἶη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾧμην ἐνταῦθά που φανήσεσθαι 10 τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἦν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. καὶ γὰρ μοι οἱ τε e ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοὶ, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρ-

σοφοι, ὧ Κλεωία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν  
 θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· ἔστι  
 5 γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπιδῶν τέχνης μόριον μικρὸν τε ἐκείνης ὑπο-  
 290 δεστέρα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπιδῶν ἔχειν τε καὶ φαλαγγίων  
 καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησιν  
 ἔστω, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ὄχλων κήλησιν τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἡ σοί,  
 5 ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ;

Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὡς σὺ λέγεις.

Ποῖ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίᾳ τέχνῃ;

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι ἠύρηκέναι.

10 Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλεωίας.

b Ἡ στρατηγική μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον  
 εἶναι ἦν ἂν τις κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἶη.

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Πῶς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

5 Θηρευτική τις ἦδε γέ ἔστω τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.

Τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλέον ἔστιν ἡ  
 ὄσον θηρεύσαι καὶ χειρώσασθαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ χειρώσονται  
 τοῦτο δ' ἂν θηρεύονται, οὐ δύναται τοῦτ' ἰσχύειν, ἀλλ' οἱ  
 10 μὲν κυνηγῆται καὶ οἱ ἀλιεῖς τοῖς ὄψοποιοῖς παραδιδόσιν, οἱ  
 c δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί—θηρευ-  
 τικοὶ γάρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα  
 ἕκαστοι τοῦτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ δύναται ἀνευρίσκουσιν—ἄτε οὖν χρή-  
 σθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεύσαι μόνον,  
 5 παραδιδόασιν δὴπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρησθῆναι αὐτῶν τοῖς  
 εὐρήμασι, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνόητοί εἰσιν.

Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλεωία·  
 τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἷ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν  
 d τρόπον, ἐπειδὴν ἡ πόλις τινὰ θηρεύσονται ἢ στρατόπεδον,

παραδιδάσι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσω—αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπί-  
 στανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀ ἐθήρευσαν—ὥσπερ οἶμαι οἱ  
 ὀργυγοθήραι τοῖς ὀργυγοτρόφοις παραδιδάσων. εἰ οὖν, ἢ δ'  
 δε, δεόμεθα ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἣτις φ' ἂν κτήσῃται ἢ ποι- 5  
 ῆσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἢ  
 τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην δὴ τινα, ἕφη,  
 ζητητέον ἀπὸ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.

ΚΡ. Τί λέγεις σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μειράκιον ε  
 τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγγετο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶει, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτ'  
 εἶπεν, οὐτ' Εὐθύδημου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτ' ἀνθρώπου 5  
 δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ'  
 εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;

ΚΡ. Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;

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ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τότε γε εὐ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος οὔτε  
 Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπών ταῦτα· ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων,  
 μή τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρῶν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγγετο; ὅτι γὰρ  
 ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὐ οἶδα. 5

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι  
 τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τινα  
 ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ἤυρετε ἐκελευν ἢ οὐχ ἠύρετε, ἦς  
 ἕνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὦ μακάριε, ἠύρομεν; ἀλλ' ἤμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι· b  
 ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορυδοὺς διώκοντα, αἰεὶ φόμεθα  
 ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἀντίκα λήψασθαι, αἰ δ' αἰεὶ ὑπεξέ-  
 φευγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἂν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ  
 τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτὴν 5  
 εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσα τε καὶ ἀπεργαζο-  
 μένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύριον ἐμπεσοῦντες, οἴομενοι  
 ἦδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς  
 ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι ὅσους περ c  
 ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.

ἀκούσας ἐθορυβήθη· ὁ δὲ μου θορυβουμένου ὑπολαβών,  
 5 ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ βούλεσθε αὐτὸν ὡς νῦν ἐστὶν  
 μηκέτι εἶναι, βούλεσθε αὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀπολωλέναι; καίτοι  
 πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι εἶεν φίλοι τε καὶ ἔρασταί,  
 οἴτινες τὰ παιδικὰ περὶ παντὸς ἂν ποιήσασατο ἐξολωλέναι.

e Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἀκούσας ἠγαυάκτησέν τε ὑπὲρ τῶν  
 παιδικῶν καὶ εἶπεν· ὦ ξένη Θούριε, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον,  
 ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν· “Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλῆν,” ὃ τι μαθὼν μου  
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει τοιοῦτον πρᾶγμα, ὃ ἐγὼ οἶμαι  
 5 οὐδ’ ὄσιον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς ἐγὼ τόνδε βουλόμην ἂν ἐξολω-  
 λέναι.

Τί δέ, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁ Εὐθύδημος, ἡ δοκεῖ σοι οἶόν  
 τ’ εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι;—Νῆ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.—  
 Πότερον λέγοντα τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ἦ, ἢ μὴ  
 284 λέγοντα;—Λέγοντα, ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ λέγει αὐτό, οὐκ  
 ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ λέγει;—Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;  
 ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Ἐν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων, ὃ  
 λέγει, χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἐκεῖνο  
 5 λέγων τὸ ὄν, ἔφη, λέγει;—Ναί.—Ἄλλα μὴν ὃ γε τὸ ὄν  
 λέγων καὶ τὰ ὄντα τᾶληθῆ λέγει· ὥστε ὁ Διονυσόδωρος,  
 εἴπερ λέγει τὰ ὄντα, λέγει τᾶληθῆ καὶ οὐδὲν κατὰ σοῦ  
 ψεύδεται.

b Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλ’ ὃ ταῦτα λέγων, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ  
 Εὐθύδημε, οὐ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος, Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα, ἔφη, ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ  
 ἔστιν;—Οὐκ ἔστιν.—Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τὰ γε μὴ ὄντα  
 5 ὄντα ἐστίν;—Οὐδαμοῦ.—Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως περὶ ταῦτα, τὰ μὴ  
 ὄντα, πράξειεν ἂν τίς τι, (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι) ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ  
 ὁστισοῦν τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα;—Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσι-  
 ππος.—Τί οὖν; οἱ ῥήτορες ὅταν λέγωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ,  
 οὐδὲν πράττουσι;—Πράττουσι μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν  
 c εἴπερ πράττουσι, καὶ ποιῶσι;—Ναί.—Τὸ λέγειν ἄρα πρᾶτ-  
 τειν τε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐστίν;—Ὡμολόγησεν.—Οὐκ ἄρα τὰ

γε μὴ ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεὶς—ποιοὶ γὰρ ἂν ᾗδη τί· σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγηκας τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ οἶόν τ' εἶναι μηδένα ποιεῖν— ὥστε κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ λέγει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ 5 λέγει Διωνυσόδωρος, τάληθῆ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Νῆ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Εὐθύδημε· ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινα λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὡς γε ἔχει.

Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Διωνυσόδωρος, ὦ Κτήσιππε; εἰσὶν γὰρ τιwes οἱ λέγουσι τὰ πράγματα ὡς ἔχει;—Εἰσὶν μέντοι, ἄ ἔφη, οἱ καλοὶ τε κάγαθοι καὶ οἱ τάληθῆ λέγοντες.—Τί ὄν; ἦ δ' ὅς· τάγαθὰ οὐκ εὔ, ἔφη, ἔχει, τὰ δὲ κακὰ κακῶς;— Συνεχώρει.—Τοὺς δὲ καλοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ὁμολογεῖς λέγειν ὡς ἔχει τὰ πράγματα;—Ὁμολογῶ.—Κακῶς ἄρα, ἔφη, 5 λέγουσιν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ κακὰ, εἴπερ ὡς ἔχει λέγουσιν.—Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε, τοὺς γούν κακοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ὦν σύ, ἔάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσῃ εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ σε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ κακῶς λέγωσιν. ὡς εὔ ἴσθ' ὅτι κακῶς 6 λέγουσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοὺς κακοὺς.—Καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, μεγάλως λέγουσι καὶ τοὺς θερμοὺς θερμῶς;— Μάλιστα δῆπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· τοὺς γούν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσί τε καὶ φασὶν διαλέγεσθαι.—Σὺ μὲν, ἔφη ὁ 5 Διωνυσόδωρος, λοιδορῆ, ὦ Κτήσιππε, λοιδορῆ.—Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Διωνυσόδωρε, ἐπεὶ φιλῶ σε, ἀλλὰ νοουθετῶ σε ὡς ἑταῖρον, καὶ πειρῶμαι πείθειν μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ οὕτως ἀγροίκως λέγειν ὅτι ἐγὼ τούτους βούλομαι ἐξολωλέναι, οὗς περὶ πλείστου ποιούμαι. 285

Ἐγὼ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ μοι ἐδόκουν ἀγριωτέρως πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχειν, προσέπαιζόν τε τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον ὅτι ὦ Κτήσιππε, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς παρὰ τῶν ξένων δέχεσθαι ἢ λέγουσιν, ἐὰν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι, καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι 5 διαφέρεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἐπίστανται οὕτως ἐξολλύναι ἀνθρώπους, ὥστ' ἐκ πονηρῶν τε καὶ ἀφρόνων χριστούς τε καὶ ἔμφρονas ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο εἴτε αὐτῶ ἡρῆκατον εἴτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην φθόρον τινα καὶ ὄλεθρον τοιοῦτον, 6

EUTHYDEMUS

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ὥστε ἀπολέσαντες πονηρὸν ὄντα χρηστὸν πάλιν ἀποφῆναι·  
 εἰ τοῦτο ἐπίστασθον—δήλον δὲ ὅτι ἐπίστασθον· ἐφάτην  
 γοῦν τὴν τέχνην σφῶν εἶναι τὴν νεωστὶ ἠῤῥημένην ἀγαθοῦς  
 5 ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκ πονηρῶν—συγχωρήσωμεν οὖν  
 αὐτοῖν αὐτό· ἀπολεσάντων ἡμῶν τὸ μεираκίον καὶ φρόνιμον  
 ποιησάντων, καὶ ἀπαντάς γε ἡμῶς τοὺς ἄλλους. εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς  
 c οἱ νέοι φοβεῖσθε, ὥσπερ ἐν Καρὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος·  
 ὡς ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμί, παρακινδυνεύω ἔτοι-  
 μος καὶ παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσόδωρῳ τούτῳ ὥσπερ τῇ  
 Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ. ἀπολλύτω με, καὶ εἰ μὲν βούλεται,  
 5 ἐψέτω, εἰ δ' ὅ, ὅ τι βούλεται, τοῦτο ποιεῖτω· μόνον χρηστὸν  
 ἀποφηνάτω.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Σώκρατες,  
 ἔτοιμός εἰμι παρέχειν ἑμαυτὸν τοῖς ξένοις, καὶ ἐὰν βούλων-  
 ται δέρειν ἐτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἰ μοι ἡ δορὰ μὴ εἰς  
 d ἄσκον τελευτήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσίου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετήν.  
 καίτοι με οἶεται Διονυσόδωρος οὕτωσὶ χαλεπαίνει αὐτῷ·  
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ χαλεπαίνω, ἀλλ' ἀντιλέγω πρὸς ταῦτα ἃ μοι  
 δοκεῖ πρὸς με μὴ καλῶς λέγειν. ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν,  
 5 ἔφη, ὦ γενναῖε Διονυσόδωρε, μὴ κάλει λουδορεῖσθαι· ἕτερον  
 γάρ τί ἐστι τὸ λουδορεῖσθαι.

Καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, Ὡς ὄντος, ἔφη, τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, ὦ  
 Κτήσιππε, ποιῆ τὸς λόγους;  
 e Πάντως δήπου, ἔφη, καὶ σφόδρα γε· ἢ σὺ, ὦ Διονυσό-  
 δωρε, οὐκ οἶε εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν;

Οὐκὸν σὺ γ' ἂν, ἔφη, ἀποδείξαις πρόποτε ἀκούσας οὐδενὸς  
 ἀντιλέγοντος ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ.

5 Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ἀκούωμεν νῦν εἰ σοὶ ἀποδεί-  
 κνυμι ἀντιλέγοντος Κτησίππου Διονυσόδωρῳ.

Ἦ καὶ ὑπόσχοις ἂν τούτου λόγον;

Πάνυ, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἢ δ' ὅς· εἰσὶν ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων λόγοι;—

10 Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ὡς ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν;—

Ὅς ἔστιν.—Εἰ γὰρ μέμνησαι, ἔφη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ ἄρτι 286  
ἐπεδείξαμεν μηδένα λέγοντα ὡς οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἂν  
οὐδεὶς ἐφάη λέγων.—Τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιπ-  
πος· ἦγτόν τι ἀντιλέγομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ;—Πότερον οὖν,  
ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀμφό- 5  
τεροι λέγοντες, ἢ οὕτω μὲν ἂν δήπου ταῦτα λέγομεν;—  
Συνεχώρει.—'Ἄλλ' ὅταν μηδέτερος, ἔφη, τὸν τοῦ πράγματος  
λόγον λέγῃ, τότε ἀντιλέγομεν ἂν; ἢ οὕτω γε τὸ παράπαν b  
οὐδ' ἂν μεμνημένος εἴη τοῦ πράγματος οὐδέτερος ἡμῶν;—  
Καὶ τοῦτο συνωμολόγει.—'Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὅταν ἐγὼ μὲν τὸν τοῦ  
πράγματος λόγον λέγω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλου τινὸς ἄλλον, τότε  
ἀντιλέγομεν; ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω μὲν τὸ πρᾶγμα, σὺ δὲ οὐδὲ λέγεις 5  
τὸ παράπαν; ὁ δὲ μὴ λέγων τῷ λέγοντι πῶς (ἂν) ἀντιλέγοι;

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Κτήσιππος ἐστῆσεν· ἐγὼ δὲ θαυμάσας τὸν  
λόγον, Πῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις; οὐ γάρ τοι  
ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὺς c  
αἰεὶ θαυμάζω—καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο  
αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ αἰεὶ θαυμαστός τις  
δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν  
—οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύ- 5  
σεσθαι· ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;—τοῦτο γὰρ  
δύναται ὁ λόγος· ἢ γάρ;—ἀλλ' ἢ λέγοντ' ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ  
μὴ λέγειν;

Συνεχώρει.

Πότερον οὖν ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, δοξάζειν μέντοι d  
ἔστιν;

Οὐδὲ δοξάζειν, ἔφη.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ψευδῆς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δόξα ἔστι τὸ παράπαν.

Οὐκ ἔφη. 5

Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ' ἂν  
εἴη ἀμαθία, εἴπερ εἴη, τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων;

Πάνυ γε, ἔφη.

G 2

Ἄλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

10 Οὐκ ἔφη.

Λόγου ἔνεκα, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, λέγεις τὸν λόγον, ἵνα δὴ ἄτοπον λέγῃς, ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι οὐδεὶς εἶναι ἀμαθῆς ἀνθρώπων;

e Ἄλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον.

Ἦ καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, ἐξελέγξαι, μηδεὶς ψευδομένους;

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.

5 Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ νυνδὴ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι; τὸ γὰρ μὴ δὴν πῶς ἂν τις κελεύσαι;

Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες; ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημος, τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ εὖ ἔχοντα οὐ πάνυ τι μαυθάνω, ἀλλὰ παχέως πως ἐννοῶ. ἴσως μὲν οὖν φορτικώτερόν τι ἐρήσομαι,

287 ἀλλὰ συγγήνωσκε. ὄρα δέ· εἰ γὰρ μήτε ψεύδεσθαι ἔστιν μήτε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν μήτε ἀμαθῆ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν, ὅταν τίς τι πράττη; πράττουσα γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀμαρτάνειν τούτου ὃ πράττει· οὐχ οὕτω λέγετε;

5 Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἤδη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ φορτικὸν ἐρώτημα. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττουτες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοοῦμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, τίως διδάσκαλοι ἦκατε; ἢ οὐκ ἄρτι ἔφατε ἀρετὴν κάλλιστ' ἂν

b παραδοῦναι ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἐθέλουσι μαυθάνειν;

Εἴτ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος ὑπολαβὼν, οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος, ὥστε ἂ τὸ πρῶτον εἶπομεν νῦν ἀναμνησθῆσκει, καὶ εἰ τι πέρσιον εἶπον, νῦν ἀναμνησθῆσκει, τοῖς δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι

5 λεγομένοις οὐχ ἔξεις ὃ τι χρῆ;

Καὶ γάρ, ἔφην ἐγώ, χαλεποὶ εἰσω, πάνυ εἰκότως· παρὰ σοφῶν γὰρ λέγονται—ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ τῷ τελευταίῳ παγχαλεποῦν χρῆσασθαι ἔστιν, ὅ ἔλεγες. τὸ γὰρ “Οὐκ ἔχω ὃ τι χρώμαι” τί ποτε λέγεις, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ὡς

οὐκ ἔχω ἐξελέγξαι αὐτόν; ἐπεὶ εἶπέ, τί σοι ἄλλο νοεῖ τοῦτο c  
τὸ ῥήμα, τὸ “Οὐκ ἔχω δ τι χρῆσωμαι τοῖς λόγοις”;

Ἄλλ’ δ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτῳ γ’ οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὸν  
χρηῖσθαι ἐπεὶ ἀπόκρῳαι.

Πρὶν σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; 5

Οὐκ ἀποκρίνη; ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ δίκαιον;

Δίκαιον μέντοι, ἔφη.

Κατὰ τίνα λόγον; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ· ἢ δήλον ὅτι κατὰ τόνδε,  
ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῶν ἀφίξαι περὶ λόγους, καὶ οἶσθα 10  
ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ’ ἂν ὄτιοις d  
ἀποκρίνει, ἅτε γιννώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ;

Παλῆς, ἔφη, ἀμελήσας ἀποκρίνασθαι ἄλλ’, ὠγαθέ, πείθου  
καὶ ἀποκρίνου, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁμολογεῖς με σοφὸν εἶναι.

Πειστέον τούτων, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν· σὺ 5  
γὰρ ἄρχεις. ἄλλ’ ἐρώτα.

Πότερον οὖν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα, ἢ καὶ τὰ  
ἄψυχα;

Τὰ ψυχὴν ἔχοντα.

Οἶσθα οὖν τι, ἔφη, ῥήμα ψυχὴν ἔχον; 10

Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Τί οὖν ἄρτι ἦρου δ τι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥήμα; e

Τί ἄλλο γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ ἐξήμαρτον διὰ τὴν βλακείαν;  
ἢ οὐκ ἐξήμαρτον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς εἶπον, εἰπὼν ὅτι  
νοεῖ τὰ ῥήματα; πότερα φῆς ἐξαμαρτάνειν με ἢ οὐ; εἰ γὰρ  
μὴ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδὲ σὺ ἐξελέγξεις, καίπερ σοφὸς ὢν, οὐδ’ 5  
ἔχεις δ τι χρῆ τῷ λόγῳ· εἰ δ’ ἐξήμαρτον, οὐδ’ οὕτως ὀρθῶς  
λέγεις, φάσκων οὐκ εἶναι ἐξαμαρτάνειν. καὶ ταῦτα οὐ πρὸς 288  
ἂ πέρυσιν ἔλεγες λέγω. ἀλλὰ ἔοικεν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσό-  
δωρέ τε καὶ Εὐθύδημε, οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν ταῦτῳ μένειν  
καὶ ἔτι ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιὸν καταβαλὼν πίπτει, καὶ ὥστε  
τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πω τέχνης ἐξηυρη- 5  
σθαι, καὶ ταῦτα οὕτως ἰθὺς θαυμαστῆς οὕσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν  
λόγων.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, Θαυμασιά γε λέγεται, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες  
 b Θούριοι εἴτε Χῖοι εἴθ' ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι·  
 ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει τοῦ παραληρεῖν.

Καὶ ἐγὼ φοβηθεὶς μὴ λαιδορία γένηται, πάλιν κατεπραῦ-  
 νον τὸν Κτήσιππον καὶ εἶπον· ὦ Κτήσιππε, καὶ νυνδὴ δὲ  
 5 πρὸς Κλεωῖαν ἔλεγον, καὶ πρὸς σὲ ταῦτα ταῦτα λέγω, ὅτι  
 οὐ γινώσκεις τῶν ξένων τὴν σοφίαν ὅτι θαυμασία ἐστίν.  
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐθέλετον ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξασθαι σπουδάζοντε, ἀλλὰ τὸν  
 Πρωτέα μιμείσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς.  
 c ἡμεῖς οὖν τὸν Μενέλαον μιμώμεθα, καὶ μὴ ἀφιώμεθα τοῖν  
 ἀνδρῶν ἕως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκφανῆτον ἐφ' ᾧ αὐτῶ σπουδάζοντε  
 οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν ἀγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, ἐπειδὴν ἕρξωνται  
 σπουδάξω. ἀλλὰ δεώμεθα καὶ παραμυθώμεθα καὶ προσευχώ-  
 5 μεθα αὐτοῖν ἐκφανῆναι. ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ καὶ αὐτὸς πάλιν  
 ὑφηγήσασθαι οἷω προσεύχομαι αὐτῶ φαῆναι μοι· ὅθεν γὰρ  
 d τὸ πρότερον ἀπέλιπον, τὸ ἐξῆς τούτοις πειράσομαι, ὅπως ἂν  
 δύνωμαι, διελθεῖν, ἐάν πως ἐκκαλέσωμαι καὶ ἐλεήσαντέ  
 με καὶ οἰκτίραντε συντεταμένον καὶ σπουδάζοντα καὶ αὐτῶ  
 σπουδάσητον.

5 Σὺ δέ, ὦ Κλεωῖα, ἔφην, ἀνάμνησόν με πόθεν τότ' ἀπε-  
 λίπομεν. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐγῶμαι, ἐνθένδε ποθέν. φιλοσοφη-  
 τέον ὠμολογήσαμεν τελευτώντες· ἦ γάρ;—Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς.—  
 Ἡ δέ γε φιλοσοφία κτήσις ἐπιστήμης· οὐχ οὕτως; ἔφην.  
 —Ναί, ἔφην.—Τίνα ποτ' οὖν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὀρθῶς  
 e κτησάμεθα; ἀρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἦτις ἡμᾶς  
 ὀνήσει;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφην.—Ἄρ' οὖν ἂν τι ἡμᾶς ὀνήσειεν, εἰ  
 ἐπισταίμεθα γινώσκειν περιούτους ὅπου τῆς γῆς χρυσίον  
 πλείστον κατορώρεται;—Ἴσως, ἔφην.—Ἄλλὰ τὸ πρότερον,  
 5 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε ἐξηλέγξαμεν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον, οὐδ' εἰ  
 ἄνευ πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ ὀρύττειν τὴν γῆν τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν  
 χρυσίον γένοιτο· ὥστε οὐδ' εἰ τὰς πέτρας χρυσᾶς ἐπισταί-  
 289 μεθα ποιῶν, οὐδενὸς ἂν ἀξία ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἴη. εἰ γὰρ μὴ καὶ  
 χρῆσθαι ἐπιστησόμεθα τῷ χρυσίῳ, οὐδὲν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ

ἐφάνη ὄν· ἢ οὐ μέμνησαι; ἔφην ἐγώ.—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη, μέμνημαι.—Οὐδέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης ὄφελος γίνεταί οὐδέν, οὔτε χρηματιστικῆς οὔτε λατρικῆς οὔτε ἄλ- 5 λης οὐδεμιᾶς, ἥτις ποιεῖν τι ἐπίσταται, χρῆσθαι δὲ μὴ ᾧ ἂν ποιήσῃ· οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδέ γε εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ὥστε ἀθανάτους ποιεῖν, ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ b ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς πρόσθεν ὁμολογημένοις τεκμαίρεσθαι.—Συνεδόκει ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα.—Τοιαύτης τιwδς ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ὧ καλὲ παῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν ἣ συμπέπτωκεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν 5 καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι τούτῳ δ' ἂν ποιῆ.—Φαίνεται, ἔφη.—Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῶς λυροποιούς δεῖν εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτης τιwδς ἐπιστήμης ἐπηβόλους. ἐνταῦθα c γὰρ δὴ χωρὶς μὲν ἡ ποιούσα τέχνη, χωρὶς δὲ ἡ χρωμένη, διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι· ἡ γὰρ λυροποιικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ πολλὸν διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοις. οὐχ οὕτως;—Συνέφη.—Οὐδὲ μὴν αὐλοποιικῆς γε δῆλον ὅτι δεόμεθα· καὶ γὰρ αὕτη 5 ἐτέρα τοιαύτη.—Συνεδόκει.—Ἄλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ τὴν λογοποιικὴν τέχνην μάθοιμεν, ἄρα ἔστιν αὕτη ἣν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας εἶναι;—Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών.

Τῶν τεκμηρίων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆσι;

d

Ὅρω, ἔφη, τιwδς λογοποιούς, οἱ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, οἷς αὐτοὶ ποιούσω, οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ λυροποιοὶ ταῖς λύραις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἄλλοι δυνατοὶ χρῆσθαι οἷς ἐκείνοι ἐργάσαντο, οἱ λογοποιεῖν αὐτοὶ ἀδύνατοι· δῆλον οὖν 5 ὅτι καὶ περὶ λόγους χωρὶς ἢ τοῦ ποιεῖν τέχνη καὶ ἢ τοῦ χρῆσθαι.

Ἰκανόν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφην ἐγώ, τεκμήριον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐχ αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ τῶν λογοποιῶν τέχνη, ἣν ἂν κτησάμενός τις εὐδαίμων εἶη. καίτοι ἐγὼ ᾧμην ἐνταῦθά που φανήσεσθαι 10 τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἣν δὴ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν. καὶ γὰρ μοι οἱ τε e ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ οἱ λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρ-

σοφοι, ὦ Κλειώ, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν  
 θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. καὶ μέντοι οὐδὲν θυμαστόν· ἔστι  
 5 γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἐπιφθῶν τέχνης μῦριον μικρῶ τε ἐκείνης ὑπο-  
 290 δεεστέρα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπιφθῶν ἔχειν τε καὶ φαλαγγίων  
 καὶ σκορπίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τε καὶ νόσων κήλησις  
 ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ δικαστῶν τε καὶ ἐκκλησιαστῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ὄχλων κήλησις τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὕσα· ἡ σοί,  
 5 ἔφην ἐγώ, ἄλλως πως δοκεῖ;

Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω μοι φαίνεται, ἔφη, ὥς σὺ λέγεις.

Ποῖ οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, τραποίμεθ' ἂν ἔτι; ἐπὶ ποίαν τέχνην;

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ εὐπορῶ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ οἶμαι ἠύρηκέναί.

10 Τίνα; ἔφη ὁ Κλειώϊας.

β Ἡ στρατηγικὴ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, τέχνη παντὸς μᾶλλον  
 εἶναι ἢν ἂν τις κτησάμενος εὐδαίμων εἴη.

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

Πῶς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

5 Θηρευτικὴ τις ἦδε γέ ἔστιν τέχνη ἀνθρώπων.

Τί δὴ οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ.

Οὐδεμία, ἔφη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλεόν ἔστιν ἡ  
 ὄσον θηρεῦσαι καὶ χειρῶσασθαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ χειρῶσονται  
 τοῦτο δ' ἂν θηρεύωνται, οὐ δύνανται τούτῳ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ  
 10 μὲν κυνηγέται καὶ οἱ ἀλιεῖς τοῖς ὄψοποιοῖς παραδιδόασιν, οἱ  
 γ δ' αὖ γεωμέτραι καὶ οἱ ἀστρονόμοι καὶ οἱ λογιστικοί—θηρευ-  
 τικοὶ γὰρ εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι· οὐ γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὰ διαγράμματα  
 ἕκαστοι τούτων, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσιν—ἅτε οὖν χρῆ-  
 σθαι αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι, ἀλλὰ θηρεῦσαι μόνον,  
 5 παραδιδόασιν δὴπου τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς καταχρησθαι αὐτῶν τοῖς  
 εὐρήμασιν, ὅσοι γε αὐτῶν μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήτοι εἰσιν.

Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ κάλλιστε καὶ σοφώτατε Κλειώϊα·  
 τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν. καὶ οἱ γε στρατηγοί, ἔφη, οὕτω τὸν αὐτὸν  
 δ τρόπον, ἐπειδὴν ἡ πόλις τινὰ θηρεύσονται ἢ στρατόπεδον,

παραδιδάσι τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀνδράσω—αὐτοὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπί-  
 σταται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀ ἐθήρευσαν—ὥσπερ οἶμαι οἱ  
 ὄρνυγοθήραι τοῖς ὄρνυγοτρόφοις παραδιδάσιν. εἰ οὖν, ἡ δ'  
 δε, δεόμεθα ἐκείνης τῆς τέχνης, ἦτις ᾧ ἂν κηθήσεται ἡ ποι- 5  
 ἦσασα ἢ θηρευσαμένη αὐτὴ καὶ ἐπιστήσεται χρῆσθαι, καὶ ἡ  
 τοιαύτη ποιήσει ἡμᾶς μακαρίους, ἄλλην δὴ τινα, ἔφη,  
 ζητητέον ἀντὶ τῆς στρατηγικῆς.

ΚΡ. Τί λέγεις σύ, ᾧ Σώκρατες; ἐκεῖνο τὸ μειράκιον e  
 τοιαῦτ' ἐφθέγγετο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οἶει, ᾧ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι. οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ ταῦτ'  
 εἶπεν, οὔτ' Εὐθύδημου οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἔτ' ἀνθρώπου 5  
 δεῖσθαι εἰς παιδείαν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ πρὸς Διός, μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ'  
 εἰπών, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι;

ΚΡ. Ποῖος Κτήσιππος;

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ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν τότε γε εὖ οἶδα, ὅτι οὔτε Εὐθύδημος οὔτε  
 Διονυσόδωρος ἦν ὁ εἰπών ταῦτα· ἀλλ', ᾧ δαιμόνιε Κρίτων,  
 μὴ τις τῶν κρειττόνων παρῶν αὐτὰ ἐφθέγγετο; ὅτι γὰρ  
 ἤκουσά γε ταῦτα, εὖ οἶδα. 5

ΚΡ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ᾧ Σώκρατες· τῶν κρειττόνων μέντοι  
 τις ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε. ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι τινα  
 ἐζητήσατε τέχνην; καὶ ἤυρετε ἐκείνην ἢ οὐχ ἤυρετε, ἦς  
 ἕνεκα ἐζητεῖτε;

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ᾧ μακάριε, ἤυρομεν; ἀλλ' ἤμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι· b  
 ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορυδούς διώκοντα, αἰεὶ ψόμεθα  
 ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἀπτικά λήψεσθαι, αἱ δ' αἰεὶ ὑπέξέ-  
 φευγον. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ τί ἂν σοι λέγοιμι; ἐπὶ δὲ δὴ  
 τὴν βασιλικὴν ἐλθόντες τέχνην καὶ διασκοπούμενοι αὐτὴν 5  
 εἰ αὕτη εἴη ἢ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παρέχουσά τε καὶ ἀπεργαζο-  
 μένη, ἐνταῦθα ὥσπερ εἰς λαβύριον ἐμπεσόντες, οἰόμενοι  
 ἦδη ἐπὶ τέλει εἶναι, περικάμψαντες πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς  
 ζητήσεως ἀνεφάνημεν ὄντες καὶ τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι δσοῦπερ c  
 ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐζητοῦμεν.



ΚΡ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῶν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ  
5 ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι  
παραδιδόναι ἄρχειω τῶν ἔργων ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσω,  
ὡς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἐδόκει ἡμῶν αὕτη  
10 εἶναι ἢν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ  
d πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου λαμβεῖον μόνῃ ἐν  
τῇ πύρρῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνώσα καὶ  
πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῶν ἐδόκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Σὺ κρῖνεις, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ  
5 ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῶν. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν  
ὠδέ πως· Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τί ἡμῶν  
e ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν; Πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν  
πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὥσπερ εἰ σὺ  
5 ἐγὼ ἐρωτῶην, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἡ ἰατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον  
παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν (ἂν) φαίης;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ὑμέτερα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία, πάντων ἄρχουσα  
292 ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφήν ἂν φαίης  
τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῶν;

ΚΡ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ βασιλική, πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει, τί  
5 ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάνν γ' εὐπορεῖς.

ΚΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα,  
ὅτι εἶπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἢν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ  
εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῶν αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὁμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις ἐγὼ τε ἡ  
καὶ Κλεινίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

ΚΡ. Ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἃ φαίη ἂν τις πολιτικῆς  
εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους τοὺς 5  
πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιάστους—πάντα  
ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ σοφὸς ποιεῖν  
καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ξεμέλλεν αὕτη εἶναι ἢ  
ὠφελουσα τε καὶ εὐδαίμονας ποιούσα. C

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῖν ὁμολογήθη, ὥς  
σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἢ βασιλικὴ σοφὸς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους  
καὶ ἀγαθοὺς; 5

ΚΡ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθοὺς; καὶ πᾶσαν  
ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικὴν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
ἀπάσας, αὕτη ἢ παραδιδούσα ἐστίν;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρησόμεθα; τῶν δ  
μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μῆτε  
κακῶν μῆτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν  
ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν  
αὕτη, ἢ τί χρησόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ ἄλλους 5  
ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρησιμοί; ἢ ἔτι  
λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκεῖνοι ἄλλους;  
ὅ τι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσω, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν φαίνονται, ἐπειδήπερ E  
τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἠτιμάσαμεν, ἀλλ'  
ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρωθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ

ΚΡ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτο ὑμῖν συνέβη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω. ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ  
5 ἡ βασιλικὴ τέχνη ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ταύτῃ τῇ τέχνῃ ἢ τε στρατηγικῇ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι  
παραδιδόναι ἄρχειν τῶν ἔργων ὧν αὐταὶ δημιουργοὶ εἰσω,  
ὡς μόνῃ ἐπισταμένην χρῆσθαι. σαφῶς οὖν ἔδοκει ἡμῖν αὕτη  
10 εἶναι ἣν ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν ἐν τῇ  
d πόλει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Διοσκούρου λαμβεῖον μόνῃ ἐν  
τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ  
πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἔδοκει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

5 ΣΩ. Σὺ κρῖνεις, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ  
ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν. αὐθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν  
ὡδέ πως· Φέρε, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἢ βασιλικὴ τέχνη τί ἡμῖν  
e ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον ἢ οὐδέν; Πάντως δήπου, ἡμεῖς ἔφαμεν  
πρὸς ἀλλήλους. Οὐ καὶ σὺ ἂν ταῦτα φαίης, ὦ Κρίτων;

ΚΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν φαίης αὐτῆς ἔργον εἶναι; ὡσπερ εἰ σὲ  
5 ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσῃν, πάντων ἄρχουσα ἢ ἰατρικὴ ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον  
παρέχεται; οὐ τὴν ὑγίειαν (ἂν) φαίης;

ΚΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ ὑμετέρα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία, πάντων ἄρχουσα  
292 ὧν ἄρχει, τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται; οὐ τὴν τροφήν ἂν φαίης  
τὴν ἐκ τῆς γῆς παρέχειν ἡμῖν;

ΚΡ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἡ βασιλική, πάντων ἄρχουσα ὧν ἄρχει, τί  
5 ἀπεργάζεται; ἴσως οὐ πάνυ γ' εὐπορεῖς.

ΚΡ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς, ὦ Κρίτων· ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε οἶσθα,  
δτι εἴπερ ἐστὶν αὕτη ἣν ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ὠφέλιμον αὐτὴν δεῖ  
εἶναι.

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε. 10

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῶν αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι;

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀγαθὸν δέ γέ που ὠμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις ἐγώ τε b  
καὶ Κλειτίας οὐδὲν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

ΚΡ. Ναί, οὕτως ἔλεγες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔργα, ἀ φαίη ἂν τις πολιτικῆς  
εἶναι—πολλὰ δέ που ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, οἷον πλουσίους τοὺς 5  
πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιάζουσιν—πάντα  
ταῦτα οὔτε κακὰ οὔτε ἀγαθὰ ἐφάνη, ἔδει δὲ σοφοὺς ποιεῖν  
καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδιδόναι, εἴπερ ἔμελλεν αὕτη εἶναι ἡ  
ὠφελουδέα τε καὶ εὐδαίμωνος ποιούσα. c

ΚΡ. Ἔστι ταῦτα· τότε γοῦν οὕτως ὑμῶν ὠμολογήθη, ὡς  
σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡ βασιλικὴ σοφοὺς ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους  
καὶ ἀγαθοὺς; 5

ΚΡ. Τί γὰρ κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα πάντας καὶ πάντα ἀγαθοὺς; καὶ πᾶσαν  
ἐπιστήμην, σκυτοτομικὴν τε καὶ τεκτονικὴν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας  
ἀπάσας, αὕτη ἡ παραδιδουδέα ἔστω;

ΚΡ. Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. 10

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ τίνα δὴ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρῆσόμεθα; τῶν d  
μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν δημιουργὸν εἶναι τῶν μῆτε  
κακῶν μῆτε ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν  
ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν ἑαυτήν. λέγωμεν δὴ οὖν τίς ποτέ ἔστω  
αὕτη, ἢ τί χρῆσόμεθα; βούλει φῶμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ ἄλλους 5  
ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν;

ΚΡ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οἱ τί ἔσονται ἡμῶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; ἢ ἔτι  
λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσομεν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκείνοι ἄλλους;  
ὅ τι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσω, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῶν φαίνονται, ἐπειδήπερ e  
τὰ ἔργα τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡγμάσαμεν, ἀλλ'  
ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον ὁ Διὸς Κόρωθος γίγνεται, καὶ ὅπερ

ἔλεγον, τοῦ ἴσου ἡμῶν ἐνδεῖ ἢ ἔτι πλέονος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τίς  
5 ποτέ ἐστίη ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη ἢ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσειε;

ΚΡ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν,  
ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀφίκεσθε.

ΣΩ. Ἐγώ γε οὖν καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταύτῃ  
298 τῇ ἀπορίᾳ ἐνεπεπτώκη, πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἠφέλω, δεόμενος  
τοῖν ξένωι, ὥσπερ Διοσκώρω ἐπικαλούμενος, σῶσαι ἡμᾶς,  
ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μειράκιον, ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, καὶ  
παντὶ τρόπῳ σπουδάσαι, καὶ σπουδάσοντας ἐπιδείξαι τίς  
5 ποτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἧς τυχόντες ἀν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον  
βίον διέλθομεν.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; ἠθέλησέν τι ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξαι ὁ Εὐθύδημος;

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ ἤρξατό γε, ὦ ἐταῖρε, πάνυ μεγαλο-  
φρόνως τοῦ λόγου ὦδε—

b Πότερον δὴ σε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην,  
περὶ ἣν πάλαι ἀπορεῖτε, διδάξω, ἢ ἐπιδείξω ἔχοντα;

Ὁ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστι δὲ ἐπὶ σοὶ τοῦτο;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

5 Ἐπιδείξον τοίνυν με νῆ Δί', ἔφη ἔγώ, ἔχοντα· πολὺ γὰρ  
ῥῆον ἢ μανθάνειν τηλικόνδε ἄνδρα.

Φέρε δὴ μοι ἀπόκριναι, ἔφη· ἔστιν ὃ τι ἐπίστασαι;—Πάνυ  
γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλά, σμικρὰ γε.—Ἄρκει, ἔφη. ἄρ' οὖν

δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο

c μὴ εἶναι;—Ἄλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.—Οὐκοῦν σὺ ἔφη,  
ἐπίστασθαί τι;—Ἐγώ γε.—Οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ ἐπί-  
στασαι;—Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ.—Οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀλλ'

οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε οὕτα;

5 —Μὰ Δί', ἔφη ἔγώ· ἐπεὶ πολλά ἄλλ' οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι.—

Οὐκοῦν εἶ τι μὴ ἐπίστασαι, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἶ.—Ἐκεῖνον γε,

ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Ἦττον οὖν τι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἐπιστήμων

εἶ; ἄρτι δὲ ἐπιστήμων ἔφησθα εἶναι· καὶ οὕτως τυγχάνεις ὄν

d αὐτὸς οὗτος ὃς εἶ, καὶ αὐτὸ πάλιν οὐκ εἶ, κατὰ ταῦτά ἅμα.

Εἶπεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Εὐθύδημε· τὸ γὰρ λεγόμενον, καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις· πῶς οὖν ἐπίσταμαι ἐκεῖνην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἦν ἐξηγοῦμαι; ὡς δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τε καὶ μή, εἶπερ ἐν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι—οὐ γὰρ 5 ἀν εἶην ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων ἅμα—ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι, κάκεῖνην δὴ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχω· ἄρα οὕτως λέγεις, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σοφόν;

Αὐτὸς σαυτὸν γε δὴ ἐξελέγχεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. e

Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, σὺ οὐ λέπουθας τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; ἐγὼ γάρ τοι μετὰ σοῦ ὄτιοις ἀν πάσῃων καὶ μετὰ Διονυσόδωρου τοῦδε, φθίης κεφαλῆς, οὐκ ἀν πάνυ ἀγανακτοῖην. εἰπέ μοι, σφῶ οὐχὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τῶν 5 ὄντων, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστασθαι;

Ἦκιστα γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

Πῶς λέγετον; ἔφην ἐγώ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπίστασθαι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πάντ' ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ ὄτιοις; 294

Πάντ', ἔφη· καὶ σύ γε πρὸς, εἶπερ καὶ ἐν ἐπίστασαι, πάντα ἐπίστασαι.

Ἦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὡς θαυμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. μῶν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντ' ἐπί- 5 στανται, ἢ οὐδέν;

Οὐ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, τὰ μὲν ἐπίστανται, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐπίστανται, καὶ εἰσὶν ἅμα ἐπιστήμονές τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες.

Ἄλλὰ τί; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Πάντες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πάντα ἐπίστανται, εἶπερ καὶ ἔν. 10

Ἦ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε—δήλοι γάρ b μοὶ ἐστὸν ἤδη ὅτι σπουδάζετον, καὶ μόλις ὑμᾶς προκαλεσάμην σπουδάζειω—αὐτῶ τῷ ὄντι πάντα ἐπίστασθαι; οἷον τεκτονικὴν καὶ σκυτικὴν;

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. 5

Ἦ καὶ νευροραφεῖν δυνατὸ ἐστὸν;

Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία καττύειν, ἔφη.

Ἦ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἀστέρας ὅποσοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἄμμου;

10 Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς· εἶτ' οὐκ ἂν οἶε ὁμολογήσαι ἡμᾶς;  
Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ὑπολαβὼν· Πρὸς Διός, ἔφη, Διουν-  
c σόδωρε, τεκμήριόν τί μοι τούτων ἐπιδείξατον τοιόνδε, ᾧ  
εἶσομαι ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον.

Τί ἐπιδείξω; ἔφη.

Οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον ὅπόσους δδόντας ἔχει, καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος  
5 ὅπόσους σί;

Οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσαι ὅτι πάντα ἐπιστάμεθα;

Μηδαμῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἔτι ἡμῶν μόνον εἶπατον καὶ  
ἐπιδείξατον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγετον· καὶ ἔαν εἴπητον ὅπόσους  
ἐκάτερος ἔχει ὑμῶν, καὶ φαίνησθε γνόντες ἡμῶν ἀριθμη-  
10 σάντων, ἥδη πεισόμεθα ὑμῶν καὶ τᾶλλα.

d Ἐγούμενω οὖν σκώπτεσθαι οὐκ ἠθελέτην, ἀλλ' ὡμο-  
λογησάτην πάντα χρήματα ἐπίστασθαι, καθ' ἐν ἑκαστον  
ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ Κτήσιππου. ὁ γὰρ Κτήσιππος πάνυ ἀπαρα-  
καλύπτως οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἠρώτα τελευτῶν, καὶ τὰ ἀσχιστα, εἰ  
5 ἐπιστάσθη· τῷ δὲ ἀνδρείοτατα ὁμῶσε ἤτην τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι,  
ὁμολογοῦντες εἰδέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ κάπροι οἱ πρὸς τὴν πληγὴν  
ὁμῶσε ὠθούμενοι, ὥστ' ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Κρίτων, ὑπ'  
ἀπιστίας ἠναγκάσθη τελευτῶν ἐρέσθαι [τὸν Εὐθύδημον] εἰ  
e καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι ἐπίσταιτο ὁ Διουνσόδωρος· ὁ δὲ, Πάνυ, ἔφη.

Οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἐς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστῶν καὶ  
ἐπὶ τροχοῦ διωεῖσθαι τηλικούτος ὢν, οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας  
ἦκει;

5 Οὐδέν, ἔφη, ὅ τι οὐ.

Πότερον δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα νῦν μόνον ἐπίστασθον ἢ  
καὶ ἀεὶ;

Καὶ ἀεὶ, ἔφη.

Καὶ ὅτε παῖδιά ἦστον καὶ εὐθύς γενόμενοι ἠπίστασθε  
10 πάντα;

Ἐφάτην ἅμα ἀμφοτέρω.

Καὶ ἡμῖν μὲν ἄπιστον ἐδόκει τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι· ὁ δ' 295  
 Εὐθύδημος, Ἄπιστεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Πλήν γ' ὅτι, (ἦν δ') ἐγώ, εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς ἔστι σοφοὺς εἶναι.

Ἄλλ' ἦν, ἔφη, ἐθειλήσης μοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω  
 καὶ σὲ ταῦτα τὰ θαυμαστὰ ὁμολογοῦντα. 5

Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι. εἰ γάρ  
 τοι λέληθα ἐμαυτὸν σοφὸς ὢν, σὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἐπιδείξεις ὡς  
 πάντα ἐπίσταμαι καὶ ἀεὶ, τί μείζον ἐρμαιον αὐτοῦ ἂν εὐροιμι  
 ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ;

Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη. 10

Ὡς ἀποκρινόμενον ἐρώτα. b

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστήμων του εἶ ἡ οὐ;—  
 Ἐγωγε.—Πότερον οὖν ᾧ ἐπιστήμων εἶ, τούτῳ καὶ ἐπίστασαι,  
 ἢ ἄλλῳ τῳ;—Ὡς ἐπιστήμων. οἶμαι γάρ σε τὴν ψυχὴν  
 λέγειν· ἢ οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις; 5

Οὐκ αἰσχύνει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐρωτώμενος ἀντερωτᾷς;  
 Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλὰ πῶς ποιῶ; οὕτω γὰρ ποιήσω  
 ὅπως ἂν σὺ κελεύης. ὅταν μὴ εἰδῶ ὅ τι ἐρωτᾷς, κελεύεις  
 με ὁμῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπανερέεσθαι;

Ἐπολαμβάνεις γὰρ δήπου τι, ἔφη, ὃ λέγω; c

Ἐγωγε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Πρὸς τοῦτο τοῖνον ἀποκρίνου δ' ὑπολαμβάνεις.

Τί οὖν, ἔφη, ἂν σὺ μὲν ἄλλη ἐρωτᾷς διανοούμενος, ἐγὼ  
 δὲ ἄλλη ὑπολάβω, ἔπειτα πρὸς τοῦτο ἀποκρίνωμαι, ἔξαρκεῖ 5  
 σοι ἔαν μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι;

Ἐμοιγε, ἢ δ' ὅς· οὐ μέντοι σοὶ γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι.

Οὐ τοῖνον μὰ Δία ἀποκρῖνοῦμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρότερον  
 πρὶν ἂν πύθωμαι.

Οὐκ ἀποκρῖνεις, ἔφη, πρὸς ἃ ἂν ἀεὶ ὑπολαμβάνης, ὅτι ἔχων 10  
 φλυαρεῖς καὶ ἀρχαιότερος εἶ τοῦ δέοντος.

Κἀγὼ ξυγνων αὐτὸν ὅτι μοι χαλεπαῖνοι διαστέλλοντι τὰ δ  
 λεγόμενα, βουλόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὄνόματα περιστήσας.  
 ἀνεμνήσθηεν οὖν τοῦ Κύννου, ὅτι μοι κἀκεῖνος χαλεπαίνει



ἐκάστοτε ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπέκω, ἔπειτά μου ἦττον ἐπιμελεῖται  
 5 ὡς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν διενενοσήμεν καὶ παρὰ τούτου  
 φοιτᾶν, ῥήθηεν δεῖν ὑπέκω, μὴ με σκαῖον ἡγησάμενος  
 φοιτητὴν μὴ προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι,  
 e Εὐθύδημε, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως πού  
 κάλλιον ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου  
 ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Ἄποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη, πάλιν, πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ δ  
 5 ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ;—Ἐγώ γε, ἔφη, τῆ γέ ψυχῆ.

296 Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ  
 γὰρ ἐγώ γε ἐρωτῶ ὄντα, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ.

Πλέον αὖ, ἔφη ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρινάμεν ὑπὸ ἀπαι-  
 δευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίνωσκέ μοι ἀποκρινούμαι γὰρ ἦδη  
 5 ἀπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαί τῷ δ ἐπίσταμαι.—Πότερον, ἢ δ' ὅς,  
 τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' αἰ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστι δὲ  
 ὅτε ἐτέρῳ;—Ἀεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτῳ.

Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσει παραφθεγγόμενος;

Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμῶς σφέλλῃ τὸ “αἰ” τοῦτο.

b Οὐκοῦν ἡμῶς γ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου·  
 ἢ αἰ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι;—Ἀεὶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ ἀφελεῖν  
 τὸ “ὅταν.”—Οὐκοῦν αἰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· αἰ δ' ἐπιστά-  
 μενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι ᾧ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δ'  
 5 ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ πάντα;—Τούτῳ, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, ἢ γ'  
 ἐπίσταμαι.

Τούτ' ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη ἦκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα.

Ἄλλ' ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφη ἐγώ, τὸ “ἢ γ' ἐπίσταμαι.”

Ἄλλὰ μηδὲ ἐν, ἔφη, ἀφέλλῃς· οὐδὲν γάρ σου δέομαι.

c ἀλλὰ μοι ἀπόκριναί· δύναο ἀν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ  
 πάντα ἐπίσταιο;

Τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἶη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ὅς εἶπε· Προστίθει τοῖνυν ἦδη ὅτι βούλει· ἅπαντα  
 5 γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι.

“Εοικα, ἔφην ἐγὼ, ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ  
 “ὃ ἐπίσταμαι,” πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ὠμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ ᾧ ἐπίστα-  
 σαι, εἴτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἴτε ὅπως βούλει· αἰεὶ γὰρ ὠμολόγηκας  
 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὧν 10  
 ἠπίστω, καὶ ὄτ’ ἐγγύου, καὶ ὄτ’ ἐφθού· καὶ πρῶν αὐτὸς δ  
 γενέσθαι, καὶ πρῶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω  
 ἅπαντα, εἴπερ αἰεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, αὐτὸς  
 αἰεὶ ἐπίστησει καὶ ἅπαντα, ἂν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι.

Ἄλλὰ βουλευθείης, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, ᾧ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, 5  
 εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ’ οὐ σοι πάνν πιστεύω  
 ἱκανῶ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ σοι συμβουλευθείη ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὐτοσί  
 Διονυσόδωρος· οὕτω δὲ τάχα ἂν. εἶπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ—  
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖην, οὕτως e  
 εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα  
 ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδὴ γε ὑμεῖς φατε—τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα πῶς φῶ  
 ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοί εἰσι·  
 φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι; 5

Ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοί εἰσι οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Πάνν γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, πάλαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλ’ 297  
 ὡς ἄδικοί εἰσι οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ξμαθόν;

Οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

Οὐκ ἄρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφην, τοῦτο ἐγὼ.

Διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν 5  
 Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὐτοσί οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ  
 ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὧν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος  
 ἠρρυθρίασεν.

Ἄλλὰ σύ, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, πῶς λέγεις, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ  
 σοι ὀρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντ’ εἰδώς; b

Ἄδελφὸς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγὼ εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν  
 ὁ Διονυσόδωρος;

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ἐκάστοτε ὅταν αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπέκω, ἔπειτά μου ἦττον ἐπιμελεῖται  
 5 ὡς ἀμαθοῦς ὄντος· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν διενενοήμην καὶ παρὰ τοῦτον  
 φοιτᾶν, ψήθη δεῖν ὑπέκω, μὴ με σκαιὸν ἠγησάμενος  
 φοιτητὴν μὴ προσδέχοιτο. εἶπον οὖν· Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ σοι,  
 e Εὐθύδημε, οὕτω ποιεῖν, ποιητέον· σὺ γὰρ πάντως που  
 κάλλιον ἐπίστασαι διαλέγεσθαι ἢ ἐγώ, τέχνην ἔχων ἰδιώτου  
 ἀνθρώπου. ἐρώτα οὖν πάλω ἐξ ἀρχῆς.

Ἄποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη, πάλω, πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἀ  
 5 ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ;—Ἐγωγε, ἔφη, τῆ γε ψυχῆ.

296 Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ  
 γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ.

Πλέον αὖ, ἔφη ἐγώ, τοῦ δέοντος ἀπεκρωάμην ὑπὸ ἀπαι-  
 δευσίας. ἀλλὰ συγγίγνωσκέ μοι ἀποκρινούμαι γὰρ ἦδη  
 5 ἀπλῶς ὅτι ἐπίσταμαι τῷ ἀ ἐπίσταμαι.—Πότερον, ἢ δ' ὅς,  
 τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ γ' αἰεὶ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τούτῳ, ἔστι δὲ  
 ὅτε ἐτέρῳ;—Ἀεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τούτῳ.

Οὐκ αὖ, ἔφη, παύσει παραφθεγγόμενος;

Ἄλλ' ὅπως μὴ τι ἡμᾶς σφίλλῃ τὸ “αἰεὶ” τοῦτο.

b Οὐκοῦν ἡμᾶς γ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ. ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου  
 ἢ αἰεὶ τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι;—Ἀεὶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ ἀφελεῖν  
 τὸ “ὅταν.”—Οὐκοῦν αἰεὶ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι· αἰεὶ δ' ἐπιστά-  
 μενος πότερον τὰ μὲν τούτῳ ἐπίστασαι ἢ ἐπίστασαι, τὰ δ'  
 5 ἄλλῳ, ἢ τούτῳ πάντα;—Τούτῳ, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἅπαντα, ἀ γ'  
 ἐπίσταμαι.

Τούτ' ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη· ἦκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα.

Ἄλλ' ἀφαιρῶ, ἔφη ἐγώ, τὸ “ἀ γ' ἐπίσταμαι.”

Ἄλλὰ μηδὲ ἐν, ἔφη, ἀφέλλῃς· οὐδὲν γὰρ σου δέομαι.

c ἀλλὰ μοι ἀποκρίναι· δύναιο ἂν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ  
 πάντα ἐπίσταιο;

Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Καὶ ὅς εἶπε· Προστίθει τῶντων ἦδη ὅτι βούλει· ἅπαντα  
 5 γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι.

Ἔοικα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπειδήπερ γε οὐδεμίαν ἔχει δύναμιν τὸ  
 “ἂ ἐπίσταμαι,” πάντα δὲ ἐπίσταμαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ὠμολόγηκας ἐπίστασθαι τούτῳ ᾧ ἐπίστα-  
 σαι, εἶτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἶτε ὅπως βούλει· αἰεὶ γὰρ ὠμολόγηκας  
 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἅμα πάντα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ παῖς ὢν 10  
 ἠπίστω, καὶ ὅτ’ ἐγίγνου, καὶ ὅτ’ ἐφύου· καὶ πρὶν αὐτὸς δ  
 γενέσθαι, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, ἠπίστω  
 ἅπαντα, εἶπερ αἰεὶ ἐπίστασαι. καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφη, αὐτὸς  
 αἰεὶ ἐπιστήσει καὶ ἅπαντα, ἂν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι.

Ἄλλὰ βουλευθείης, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ᾧ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε, 5  
 εἰ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἀλλ’ οὐ σοι πάντι πιστεύω  
 ἰκανῶ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ σοι συμβουλευθείη ὁ ἀδελφός σου οὗτος·  
 Διονυσόδωρος· οὗτω δὲ τάχα ἔν. εἶπετον δέ μοι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ—  
 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οὐκ ἔχω ὑμῖν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖην, οὕτως e  
 εἰς σοφίαν τερατώδεσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα  
 ἐπίσταμαι, ἐπειδὴ γε ὑμεῖς φατε—τὰ δὲ τοιάδε πῶς φῶ  
 ἐπίστασθαι, Εὐθύδημε, ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες ἄδικοι εἰσιν;  
 φέρε εἰπέ, τοῦτο ἐπίσταμαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι; 5

Ἐπίστασαι μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί; ἦν δ’ ἐγώ.

Ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Πάντι γε, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πάσαι. ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ· ἀλλ’ 297  
 ὡς ἄδικοι εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοί, ποῦ ἐγὼ τοῦτο ξιμαθόν;

Οὐδαμοῦ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

Οὐκ ἔρα ἐπίσταμαι, ἔφην, τοῦτο ἐγώ.

Διαφθεῖρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρὸς τὸν 5  
 Διονυσόδωρον, καὶ φανήσεται οὗτος οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ  
 ἐπιστήμων ἅμα ὢν καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων. Καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος  
 ἠρυθρίασεν.

Ἄλλὰ σύ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, πῶς λέγεις, ᾧ Εὐθύδημε; οὐ δοκεῖ  
 σοι ὀρθῶς ἀδελφὸς λέγειν ὁ πάντ’ εἰδώς; b

Ἄδελφός γάρ, ἔφη, ἐγώ εἰμι Εὐθυδήμου, ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν  
 ὁ Διονυσόδωρος;

EUTHYDEMUS

H

Κάγῳ εἶπον· Ἔασον, ὦγαθέ, ἕως ἂν Εὐθύδημός με διδάξῃ  
5 ὡς ἐπίσταμαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ὅτι ἄδικοί εἰσι, καὶ μὴ  
μοι φθορήσῃς τοῦ μαθήματος.

Φεύγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, καὶ οὐκ  
ἐθέλεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Εἰκότως γ', εἶπον ἐγώ· ἦττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου  
10 ὑμῶν, ὥστε πολλοῦ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γε φεύγω. πολλὴ γάρ  
C πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἑρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶός τε ἦν τῆ  
τε ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρία οὔση καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν  
ἀνιέση, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμοι, πολλὰς  
ἀντὶ τῆς μῖας, καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἐτέρῳ σοφιστῆ ἕκ θαλάττης  
5 ἀφικμένῳ, νεωστὶ μοι δοκεῖν καταπεπλευκότι· ὃς ἐπειδὴ  
αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων,  
τὸν Ἴόλεων τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλέσατο, ὁ δὲ αὐτῷ  
d ἰκανῶς ἐβοήθησεν. ὁ δ' ἐμὸς Ἴόλεως [Πατροκλῆς] εἰ ἔλθοι,  
πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν.

Ἀποκρίναι δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ὅποτε σοι ταῦτα  
ἔμνηται· πότερον ὁ Ἴόλεως τοῦ Ἑρακλέους μᾶλλον ἦν  
5 ἀδελφιδοῦς ἢ σός;

Κράτιστον τοίνυν μοι, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπο-  
κρίνασθαι σοι. οὐ γὰρ μὴ ἀνῆς ἐρωτῶν, σχεδόν τι ἐγὼ  
τοῦτ' εὐ οἶδα, φθονῶν καὶ διακωλύων, ἵνα μὴ διδάξῃ με  
Εὐθύδημος ἐκεῖνο τὸ σοφόν.—Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἔφη.—Ἀπο-  
10 κρίνομαι δὴ, εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦ Ἑρακλέους ἦν ὁ Ἴόλεως ἀδελ-  
e φιδοῦς, ἐμὸς δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν. οὐ γὰρ  
Πατροκλῆς ἦν αὐτῷ πατήρ, ὁ ἐμὸς ἀδελφός, ἀλλὰ παρα-  
πλήσιον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἴφικλῆς, ὁ Ἑρακλέους ἀδελφός.—  
Πατροκλῆς δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, σός;—Πάνν γ', ἔφη ἐγώ, ὁμομή-  
5 τρίς γε, οὐ μέντοι ὁμοπάτριος.—Ἀδελφὸς ἄρα ἐστὶ σοι  
καὶ οὐκ ἀδελφός.—Οὐχ ὁμοπάτριός γε, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφη·  
ἐκεῖνον μὲν γὰρ Χαιρέδημος ἦν πατήρ, ἐμὸς δὲ Σωφρονίσκος.  
—Πατὴρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη, Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Χαιρέδημος;—Πάνν  
298 γ', ἔφη· ὁ μὲν γε ἐμὸς, ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνον.—Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἕτερας

ἦν Χαιρέδημος τοῦ πατρὸς;—Τούμου γ', ἔφην ἐγώ.—'Αρ' οὖν πατήρ ἦν ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς; ἢ σὺ εἶ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ λίθῳ; —Δέδοικα μὲν ἔγωγ', ἔφην, μὴ φανῶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς· οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκῶ.—Οὐκοῦν ἕτερος εἶ, ἔφη, τοῦ λίθου; — 5  
'Ετερος μέντοι.—'Αλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὢν λίθου οὐ λίθος εἶ; καὶ ἕτερος ὢν χρυσοῦ οὐ χρυσὸς εἶ;—'Εστί ταῦτα.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ἔφη, ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς οὐκ ἂν πατήρ εἴη.—'Εοικεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ πατήρ εἶναι.

Εἰ γὰρ δήπου, ἔφη, πατήρ ἐστὶν ὁ Χαιρέδημος, ὑπολαβὼν **b**  
ὁ Εὐθύδημος, πάλι αὐτὸν ὁ Σωφρονίσκος ἕτερος ὢν πατρὸς οὐ πατήρ ἐστὶν, ὥστε σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπάτωρ εἶ.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐκδεξάμενος, 'Ο δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, αὐτὸν πατήρ οὐ ταῦτα ταῦτα πέπουθεν; ἕτερός ἐστιν τούμου πατρὸς; 5  
—Πολλοῦ γ', ἔφη, δεῖ, ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—'Αλλά, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὁ αὐτός;—'Ο αὐτὸς μέντοι.—Οὐκ ἂν συμβουλοίμην ἀλλὰ πότερον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἐμὸς μόνον ἐστὶ πατήρ ἢ καὶ τῶν **c**  
ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;—Καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἔφη· ἢ οἷε τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ὄντα οὐ πατέρα εἶναι;—'Ωμίην δήτα, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὅς· χρυσοῦν ὄντα μὴ χρυσοῦν εἶναι; ἢ ἀνθρώπων ὄντα μὴ ἀνθρώπων;—Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, 5  
ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λῶον λῶφ συνάπτεις· δειῶν γὰρ λέγεις πρᾶγμα εἰ ὁ σοὶ πατήρ πάντων ἐστὶν πατήρ.—'Αλλ' ἐστὶν, ἔφη.—Πότερον ἀνθρώπων; ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἢ καὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ζῶων;— Πάντων, ἔφη.—'Η καὶ μήτηρ ἢ μήτηρ;—Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ γε. **d**  
—Καὶ τῶν ἐχλίων ἄρα, ἔφη, ἢ σὴ μήτηρ μήτηρ ἐστὶ τῶν θαλαττίων.—Καὶ ἡ σὴ γ', ἔφη.—Καὶ σὺ ἄρα ἀδελφὸς εἶ τῶν κωβιδίων καὶ κυναρίων καὶ χοιριδίων.—Καὶ γὰρ σὺ, ἔφη.—(Κάπρος) ἄρα σοὶ πατήρ ἐστὶ καὶ κύων.—Καὶ γὰρ 5  
σοί, ἔφη.

Αὐτὶκα δὲ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἂν μοι ἀποκρίνη, ὦ Κτήσιππε, ὁμολογήσεις ταῦτα. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, ἐστὶ σοὶ κων;—Καὶ μάλα πονηρός, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—'Εστω οἷν

e αὐτῷ κυνῖδια;—Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.—Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ὁ κύων;—Ἐγωγέ τοι εἶδον, ἔφη, αὐτὸν ὀχεύοντα τὴν κύνα.—Τί οὖν; οὐ σὸς ἐστιν ὁ κύων;—Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν πατήρ ὦν σὸς ἐστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ  
5 γίγνεται ὁ κύων καὶ σὺ κυναρίων ἀδελφός;

Καὶ αὖθις ταχὺ ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἵνα μὴ πρότερόν τι εἴποι ὁ Κτήσιππος, Καὶ ἔτι γέ μοι μικρόν, ἔφη, ἀπόκριμαι· τύπτεις τὸν κύνα τοῦτον;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη· σὺ γὰρ δύναμαι σέ.—Οὐκοῦν  
10 τὸν σαυτοῦ πατέρα, ἔφη, τύπτεις;

299 Πολὺ μέντοι, ἔφη, δικαιοτέρον τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι, ὅ τι μαθῶν σοφοὺς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἔφυσεν. ἀλλ' ἦ που, ὦ Εὐθύδημε [ὁ Κτήσιππος], πόλλ' ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑμέτερας σοφίας ταύτης ἀπολέλαυκεν ὁ πατήρ ὁ ὑμέτερός  
5 τε καὶ τῶν κυνιδίων.

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν δεῖται πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὦ Κτήσιππε, οὐτ' ἐκείνος οὔτε σύ.

Οὐδὲ σύ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, αὐτός;

Οὐδὲ ἄλλος γε οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων. εἰπέ γάρ μοι, ὦ  
b Κτήσιππε, εἰ ἀγαθὸν νομίζεις εἶναι ἀσθενοῦντι φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοι, ὅταν δέηται· ἢ εἰς πόλεμον ὅταν ἴη, ὅπλα ἔχοντα μᾶλλον ἴναι ἢ ἀνοπλον.—Ἐμοιογε, ἔφη. καίτοι οἶμαί τί σε τῶν καλῶν ἔρειν.—Σὺ  
5 ἄριστα εἶσει, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἀποκρίνου. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὠμολόγεις ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάρμακον, ὅταν δέη, πίνειν ἀνθρώπων, ἄλλο τι τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς πλείστον δεῖ πίνειν, καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, ἔάν τις αὐτῷ τρίψας ἐγκεράσῃ ἑλλεβόρου ἑμαζαν;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος εἶπεν· Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔαν ἦ γε  
c ὁ πίνων ὅσος ὁ ἀνδρὶς ὁ ἐν Δελφοῖς.—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν ὅπλα ἔχειν, ὡς πλείστα δεῖ ἔχειν δόρατά τε καὶ ἀσπίδας, ἐπειδὴ περ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν;—Μάλα δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος· σὺ δ' οὐκ οἶε, ὦ Εὐθύδημε,  
5 ἀλλὰ μίαν καὶ ἐν δόρῳ;—Ἐγωγε.—Ἡ καὶ τὸν Γηρυνόην ἔαν,

ἔφη, καὶ τὸν Βριάρεων οὕτως σὺ ὀπλίσεις; ἐγὼ δὲ ᾤμιεν σὲ δειωότερον εἶναι, ἅτε ὀπλομάχην ὄντα, καὶ τότῳ τὸν ἐταῖρον.

Καὶ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύδημος ἐσίγησεν· ὁ δὲ Διονυσόδωρος πρὸς τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκριμένα τῷ Κτήσιππῳ ἤρετο, Οὐκοῦν καὶ δ χρυσίον, ἢ δ' ὄς, ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν;—Πάνυ, καὶ ταῦτά γε πολὺ, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί οὖν; ἀγαθὰ σὺ δοκεῖ σοι χρῆναι ἀεὶ τ' ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ;—Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ χρυσίον ἀγαθὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι;— 5 Ὡμολόγηκα μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ' ὄς.—Οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ δεῖ αὐτὸ ἔχειν καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ ὡς μάλιστα ἐν ἑαυτῷ; καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐδαιμονέστατος εἰ ἔχοι χρυσίου μὲν τρία τάλαντα ἐν τῇ γαστρὶ, e τάλαντον δ' ἐν τῷ κρανίῳ, στατήρα δὲ χρυσοῦ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶφθαλμῷ;—Φασί γε οὖν, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, τοίτους εὐδαιμονεστάτους εἶναι Σκυθῶν καὶ ἄριστους ἀνδρας, οἳ χρυσίου τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσιν πολλὸν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν, 5 ὥσπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες τὸν κύνα τὸν πατέρα, καὶ ὁ θαυμασιώτερόν γε ἔτι, ὅτι καὶ πίνουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτῶν κρανίων κεχρυσωμένων, καὶ ταῦτα ἐντὸς καθορώσιν, τὴν ἑαυτῶν κορυφὴν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἔχοντες.

Πότερον δὲ ὀρώσω, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, καὶ Σκύθαι τε καὶ 300 οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατὰ ὄραν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατα;—Τὰ δυνατὰ δήπου.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ σύ, ἔφη;—Κἀγώ.—Ὅρῳ οὖν τὰ ἡμέτερα ἰμάτια;—Ναί.—Δυνατὰ οὖν ὄραν ἐστὶν ταῦτα.—Ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὄς.—Μηδέν. 5 σὺ δὲ ἴσως οὐκ οἶε αὐτὰ ὄραν· οὕτως ἠδὺς εἶ. ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς, Εὐθύδημε, σὺ καθεύδων ἐπικεκομησθαι καί, (εἰ) οἶόν τε λέγοντα μηδὲν λέγειν, καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Ἦ γὰρ οὐχ οἶόν τ', ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, σιγῶντα b λέγειν;—Οὐδ' ὅπως οὖν, ἢ δ' ὄς ὁ Κτήσιππος.—Ἄρ' οὐδὲ λέγοντα σιγᾶν;—Ἔτι ἤττον, ἔφη.—Ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, σὺ σιγῶντα λέγεις;—Οὐκοῦν εἰ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα 5 καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγεται, ἐάν τις ἀψῆται·



ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἀλλ' ἔτι  
μοι τὸ ἕτερον ἐπιδείξατον, ὅπως αὐτὸς ἔστιν λέγοντα σιγᾶν.

c Καί μοι ἐδόκει ὑπεραγωνιᾶν ὁ Κτήσιππος διὰ τὰ παιδικά.  
Ὅταν σιγᾶς, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος, οὐ πάντα σιγᾶς;—Ἔγωγε,  
ἢ δ' ὅς.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ λέγοντα σιγᾶς, εἶπερ τῶν ἀπάντων  
ἔστιν τὰ λέγοντα.—Τί δέ; ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, οὐ σιγᾶ  
5 πάντα;—Οὐ δήπου, ἔφη ὁ Εὐθύδημος.—Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ βέλ-  
τιστε, λέγει τὰ πάντα;—Τὰ γε δήπου λέγοντα.—Ἀλλά, ἢ  
δ' ὅς, οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγᾶ ἢ λέγει;

d Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφοτέρα, ἔφη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος·  
εὐ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἔξεις ὃ τι χρῆ.

Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὥσπερ εἰώθει, μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας,  
ὦ Εὐθύδημε, ἔφη, ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐξημφοτέρεικεν τὸν λόγον,  
5 καὶ ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἤττηται. Καὶ ὁ Κλεινίας πάνυ ἦσθη  
καὶ ἐγέλασεν, ὥστε ὁ Κτήσιππος ἐγένετο πλείον ἢ δεκα-  
πλάσιος. ὁ δέ μοι (δοκεῖ) ἀτε πανούργος ὢν, ὁ Κτήσιππος,  
παρ' αὐτῶν τούτων αὐτὰ ταῦτα παρηκηκῶκε· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν  
ἄλλων τοιαύτη σοφία τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων.

e Κἀγὼ εἶπον· Τί γελᾶς, ὦ Κλεινία, ἐπὶ σπουδαίοις οὕτω  
πράγμασιν καὶ καλοῖς;

Σὺ γὰρ ἤδη τι πάποτ' εἶδες, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλὸν πρᾶγμα;  
ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος.

5 Ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ πολλά γε, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.

301 Ἄρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ, ἔφη, ἢ ταῦτα τῷ καλῷ;

Κἀγὼ ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, καὶ ἠγούμην  
δίκαια πεπονθέναι ὅτι ἐγρυζα, ὅμως δὲ ἕτερα ἔφην αὐτοῦ  
γε τοῦ καλοῦ· πάρεστιν μέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.

5 Ἐὰν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγένηται σοι βοῦς, βοῦς εἶ, καὶ ὅτι  
νῦν ἐγὼ σοι πάριμι, Διονυσόδωρος εἶ;

Εὐφήμει τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἐτέρου ἐτέρῳ παραγενομένου  
τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἶη;

\*Αρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς; Ἡδὴ δὲ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν b  
τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμῆσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορώ, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἅπαντες  
ἀνθρωποὶ ἢ μὴ ἔστι;

Τί λέγεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε; οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλὸν 5  
ἔστιν καὶ τὸ αἰσχροὺν αἰσχροὺν;—Ἐὰν ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῆ.—  
Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ;—Πάνν γ', ἔφη.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν ταῦτόν  
καὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τό γε ἕτερον ταῦτόν, ἀλλ'  
ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα ᾤμην τοῦτο ἀπορήσαι, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον c  
ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ', ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὼν παρήκας,  
ἐπεὶ τὰ ἄλλα μοι δοκεῖτε ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοὶ οἷς ἕκαστα  
προ ηκει ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς τὸ διαλέγεσθαι παγκάλως  
ἀπεργάζεσθαι. 5

Οἶσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὃ τι προσήκει ἐκάστοις τῶν δημιουργῶν;  
πρῶτον τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, οἶσθα;—Ἐγώ γε ὅτι χαλ-  
κέα.—Τί δέ, κεραμεύειν;—Κεραμέα.—Τί δέ, σφάπτειν τε  
καὶ ἐκδέρειν καὶ τὰ μικρὰ κρέα κατακόψαντα ἔψειν καὶ ὀπτᾶν;  
—Μάγειρον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Οὐκοῦν ἕαν τις, ἔφη, τὰ προσή- d  
κοντα πράττη, ὀρθῶς πράξει;—Μάλιστα.—Προσθήκει δέ γε,  
ὡς φῆς, τὸν μάγειρον κατακόπτειν καὶ ἐκδέρειν; ὠμολόγησας  
ταῦτα ἦ οὐ;—ὠμολόγησα, ἔφην, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην μοι ἔχε.  
—Δῆλον τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἂν τις σφάξας τὸν μάγειρον καὶ 5  
κατακόψας ἔψησῃ καὶ ὀπτῆσῃ, τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει· καὶ  
ἕαν τὸν χαλκέα τις αὐτὸν χαλκεύῃ καὶ τὸν κεραμέα κεραμεύῃ,  
καὶ οὗτος τὰ προσήκοντα πράξει.

\*Ὡ Πόσειδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἥδη κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς τῇ e  
σοφίᾳ. ἄρά μοι ποτε αὕτη παραγενήσεται ὥστε μοι οἰκεία  
γενέσθαι;

\*Ἐπιγνοῖς ἂν αὐτήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οἰκείαν γενο- 5  
μένην;

\*Ἐὰν σύ γε βούλῃ, ἔφην ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι.

Τί δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὰ σαυτοῦ οἶει γινώσκειν;

Εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις· ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ ἄρχεσθαι,  
τελευτᾶν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον τόνδε.

10 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἔφη, ταῦτα ἡγῆσά εἶναι, ὧν ἂν ἄρξης καὶ ἐξῆ  
 302 σοι αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι ὃ τι ἂν βούλη; οἶον βοῦς καὶ πρόβατον,  
 ἄρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι, ἃ σοι ἐξείη καὶ ἀποδόσθαι  
 καὶ δοῦναι καὶ θῦσαι ὅτῃ βούλοιο θεῶν; ἢ δ' ἂν μὴ οὕτως  
 ἔχη, οὐ σά;

5 Κἀγὼ (ἦδη γὰρ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν καλόν τι ἀνακύνοιτο τῶν  
 ἐρωτημάτων, καὶ ἅμα βουλόμενος ὅτι τάχιςτ' ἀκούσαι)  
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι μόνον  
 ἐμά.—Τί δέ; ζῶα, ἔφη, οὐ ταῦτα καλεῖς ἢ ἂν ψυχὴν ἔχη;

b —Ναί, ἔφη.—Ὁμολογεῖς οὖν τῶν ζῴων ταῦτα μόνον εἶναι  
 σά, περὶ ἃ ἂν σοι ἐξουσία ἢ πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆναι ἢ νυνδὴ  
 ἐγὼ ἔλεγον;—Ὁμολογῶ.—Καὶ ὅς, εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχῶν  
 ὡς τι μέγα σκοπούμενος, Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν

5 σοι Ζεὺς πατῆρ;—Καὶ ἐγὼ ὑποπτέυσας ἤξευ τὸν λόγον  
 οἷπερ ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπορόν τινα στροφὴν ἔφευγόν τε καὶ  
 ἐστρεφόμενην ἦδη ὡσπερ ἐν δικτύῳ εἰλημμένους· Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν  
 δ' ἐγὼ, ὦ Διονυσόδωρε.—Ταλαίπωρος ἄρα τις σύ γε ἄνθρω-

c πος εἶ καὶ οὐδὲ Ἀθηναῖος, ὃ μήτε θεοὶ πατῆροί εἰσιν μήτε  
 ἱερὰ μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν.—Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ,  
 ὦ Διονυσόδωρε, εὐφήμει τε καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδίδασκε.  
 ἔστι γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκεία καὶ πατῆρα καὶ

5 τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα περ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἀθηναίοις τῶν τοιούτων.—  
 Εἶτα τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἔφη, Ἀθηναίοις οὐκ ἔστιν Ζεὺς ὁ πατῆρ;  
 —Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, αὕτη ἡ ἐπωνυμία Ἰώνων οὐδενί,  
 οὔθ' ὅσοι ἐκ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως ἀφικισμένοι εἰσὶν οὔθ' ἡμῶν,

d ἀλλὰ Ἀπόλλων πατῆρ; διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνος γένεσιν· Ζεὺς  
 δ' ἡμῶν πατῆρ; μὲν οὐ καλεῖται, ἔρκειος δὲ καὶ φράτριος,  
 καὶ Ἀθηναία φρατρία.—Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ γ', ἔφη ὁ Διονυσόδωρος·  
 ἐστὶν γὰρ σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀπόλλων τε καὶ Ζεὺς καὶ Ἀθηναί.

5 —Πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτοι σοὶ θεοὶ ἂν εἶεν;  
 ἔφη.—Πρόγονοι, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ δεσπότες.—Ἄλλ' οὖν σοὶ  
 γε, ἔφη, ἢ οὐ σοὺς ὠμολόγηκας αὐτοὺς εἶναι;—Ὁμολόγηκα,  
 ἔφη· τί γὰρ πάθω;—Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, καὶ ζῶα εἰσὶν οὗτοι οἱ

θεοί; ὁμολόγηκας γὰρ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει ζῶα εἶναι. ἦ οὗτοι e  
οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ψυχὴν;—Ἐχουσιν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Οὐκοῦν  
καὶ ζῶα εἰσιν;—Ζῶα, ἔφη.—Τῶν δέ γε ζῶων, ἔφη, ὁμο-  
λόγηκας ταῦτ' εἶναι σά, ὅσα ἂν σοι ἐξῆ καὶ δοῦναι καὶ  
ἀποδόσθαι καὶ θῆσαι δὴ θεῶ ὅτ' ἂν βούλη.—Ὁμολόγηκα, 5  
ἔφη· οὐκ ἔστιν γάρ μοι ἀνάδυσσις, ὧ Εὐθύδημε.—Ἴθι δὴ μοι  
εὐθύς, ἦ δ' ὅς, εἰπέ· ἐπειδὴ σὸν ὁμολογεῖς εἶναι τὸν Δία  
καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους θεούς, ἄρα ἔξεστί σοι αὐτοὺς ἀποδόσθαι 303  
ἢ δοῦναι ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ τι ἂν βούλη χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
ζῴοις;

Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὧ Κρίτων, ὥσπερ πληγεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου,  
ἐκεῖνον ἄφρωνος· ὁ δὲ Κτήσιππός μοι ἰὼν ὡς βοηθήσων, 5  
Πυππᾶξ ὧ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφη, καλοῦ λόγου.—Καὶ ὁ Διονυσό-  
δωρος, Πότερον οὖν, ἔφη, ὁ Ἡρακλῆς πυππᾶξ ἔστιν ἢ ὁ  
Πυππᾶξ Ἡρακλῆς;—Καὶ ὁ Κτήσιππος, ὦ Πόσειδον, ἔφη,  
δευῶν λόγων. ἀφίσταμαι ἀμάχω τῷ ἄνδρῃ.

Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὧ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ τῶν d  
παρόντων ὑπερεπήνεσε τὸν λόγον καὶ τῷ ἄνδρῃ, καὶ γελῶντες  
καὶ κροτοῦντες καὶ χαίροντες ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν. ἐπὶ μὲν  
γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔφ' ἐκάστοις πᾶσι παγκάλως ἐθορύβουν  
μόνοι οἱ τοῦ Εὐθύδημου ἔρασταί, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ὀλίγου καὶ οἱ 5  
κίονες οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκεῖῳ ἐθορύβησάν τ' ἐπὶ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν καὶ  
ἦσθησαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διετέθη, ὥστε  
ὁμολογεῖν μηδένας πώποτε ἀνθρώπους ἰδεῖν οὕτω σοφούς, c  
καὶ παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ  
τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τε καὶ ἐγκωμιάζω αὐτῷ ἐτραπόμην, καὶ εἶπον·  
ὦ μακάριον σφῶ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως, οἱ τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα  
οὕτω ταχὺ καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἐξεύργασθον. πολλὰ μὲν 5  
οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ὧ Εὐθύδημέ τε  
καὶ Διονυσόδωρε· ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστατον,  
ὅτι τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούτων  
τὶ εἶναι οὐδὲν ὑμῖν μέλει, ἀλλὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν μόνον. d  
ἐγὼ γὰρ εὖ οἶδα ὅτι τούτους τοὺς λόγους πάνυ μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι

ἀγαπῶν ἄνθρωποι ὅμοιοι ὑμῖν, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι οὕτω νοοῦσιν  
αὐτούς, ὥστ' εὖ οἶδα ὅτι αἰσχυρθεῖεν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐξελεγχόντες  
5 τοιούτοις λόγοις τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐξελεγχόμενοι. καὶ  
τόδε αὖ ἕτερον δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρῶον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις·  
ὀπόταν φῆτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μηδὲν μήτε ἀγαθὸν πράγμα  
μήτε λευκὸν μηδ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν  
e ἐτέρων ἕτερον, ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε τὰ στόματα  
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὥσπερ καὶ φατέ· ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον· τὰ τῶν  
ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δόξατε ἂν καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν, τοῦτο πάνν  
χαρίεν τέ ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ ἐπαχθὲς τῶν λόγων ἀφαιρείται. τὸ  
5 δὲ δὴ μέγιστον, ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὑμῖν καὶ τεχνικῶς  
ἐξηγῆται, ὥστ' ἐ(ν) πάνν ὀλίγη χρόνη ὄντιωσιν ἂν μαθεῖν  
ἀνθρώπων· ἔγνω ἐγωγε καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέ-  
χων ὡς ταχὺ ὑμῖν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα μιμῆσθαι οἶός τε ἦν.  
304 τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν τὸ σοφὸν πρὸς μὲν τὸ  
ταχὺ παραδίδουαι καλόν, ἐναντίον δ' ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι  
οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον, ἀλλ' ἂν γέ μοι πείθησθε, εὐλαβήσεσθε μὴ  
πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ ταχὺ ἐκμαθόντες ὑμῖν μὴ  
5 εἰδῶσιν χάριν. ἀλλὰ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλω μόνω  
διαλέγεσθον· εἰ δὲ μή, εἴπερ ἄλλου του ἐναντίον, ἐκεῖνον  
μόνου δεῖ ἂν ὑμῖν διδῶ ἀργύριον. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐὰν  
b σωφρονῆτε, καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς συμβουλεύσετε, μηδέποτε  
μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπων διαλέγεσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ ὑμῖν τε καὶ αὐτοῖς·  
τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, ὧ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον, τὸ δὲ ἕδωρ εὐνό-  
τατον, ἄριστον δὲν, ὡς ἔφη Πίνδαρος. ἀλλ' ἄγετε, ἦν δ'  
5 ἐγώ, ὅπως κάμῃ καὶ Κλεινίαν τόνδε παραδέξεσθον.  
Ταῦτα, ὧ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα ἄλλα ἔτι βραχεῖα διαλε-  
χθέντες ἀπήμην. σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις παρὰ τῷ  
c ἄνδρῃ, ὡς ἐκέλευε φατὸν οἶω τε εἶναι διδάξαι τὸν ἐθέλοντ'  
ἀργύριον δίδουαι, καὶ οὔτε φύσιν οὐθ' ἡλικίαν ἐξείργειν  
οὐδεμίαν—δὲ καὶ σοὶ μάλιστα προσήκει ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι οὐδὲ  
τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι φατὸν διακωλύειν οὐδέν—μὴ οὐ παρα-  
5 λαβεῖν ὄντιωσιν εὐπετῶς τὴν σφετέρην σοφίαν.

ΚΡ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φιλήκοος μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ ἠδέως ἂν τι μαθάνοιμι, κινδυνεύω μέντοι κἀγὼ εἶναι τῶν οὐχ ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμῳ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων ὧν δὴ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, τῶν ἠδίων ἂν ἐξελεγομένων ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἀ λόγων ἢ ἐξελεχόντων. ἀτὰρ γελοῖον μὲν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ νοθετεῖν σε, ὅμως δέ, ἀ γ' ἤκουον, ἐθέλω σοι ἀπαγ- γεῖλαι. τῶν ἀφ' ἑμῶν ἀπιόντων ἴσθ' ὅτι προσελθὼν τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι, ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός, τούτων 5 τις τῶν περὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια δεινῶν, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, οὐδὲν ἀκροᾷ τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν;—Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γὰρ οἴός τ' ἢ προσστὰς κατακούειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄχλου.—Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν γ' ἦν ἀκούσαι.—Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ.—Ἴνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων οἱ νῦν ε σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους.—Κἀγὼ εἶπον· Τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι;—Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἢ οἰάπερ ἀεὶ ἂν τις τῶν τοιούτων ἀκούσαι ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίῳ ἀναξίῳ σπονδῆν ποιουμένων; (οὐτωσὶ γάρ πως καὶ 5 εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν).—Καὶ ἐγώ, Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμα ἔστιν ἢ φιλοσοφία.—Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν, ὦ μακάριε; οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἀξίον. ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ νῦν παρεγένου, 305 πάνυ ἂν σε οἶμαι αἰσχυρθῆναι ὑπὲρ τοῦ σεαυτοῦ ἑταίρου· οὕτως ἦν ἄτοπος, ἐθέλων ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις οἷς οὐδὲν μέλει ὅτι ἂν λέγωσιν, παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται. καὶ οὗτοι, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐν τοῖς κράτιστοί εἰσι τῶν 5 νῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνθρώποι οἱ ἐπὶ τῷ πράγματι διατρίβοντες φαῦλοι εἰσιν καὶ καταγέλαστοι. Ἐμοὶ δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐδόκει οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν οὐθ' οὗτος οὐτ' εἰ τις ἄλλος ψέγει· τὸ b μέντοι ἐθέλειω διαλέγεσθαι τοιούτοις ἐναντίον πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀρθῶς μοι ἐδόκει μέμφεσθαι.

ΣΩ. ὦ Κρίτων, θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες. ἀτὰρ οὕτω οἶδα ὅ τι μέλλω ἐρεῖν. ποτέρων ἦν ὁ προσελθὼν 5 σοὶ καὶ μεμφόμενος τὴν φιλοσοφίαν; πότερον τῶν ἀγωνί-

σασθαι δεωὼν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, ῥήτωρ τις, ἢ τῶν τοῦς τοιούτους εἰσπεμπόντων, ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων οἷς οἱ ῥήτορες ἀγωνίζονται;

c ΚΡ. Ἡκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ δεωὼν εἶναι καὶ δειωὺς λόγους συντιθέναι.

5 ΣΩ. Ἡδὴ μαυθάνω· περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νυνδὴ ἐμελλον λέγειν. οὔτοι γάρ εἰσω μὲν, ὦ Κρίτων, οὗς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ, οἴονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν

d ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπων. ἡγοῦνται οὖν, ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσω μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, ἀναμφισβητήτως ἦδη παρὰ πᾶσιν τὰ νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴσεσθαι σοφίας

5 πέρι. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. σοφοὶ δὲ ἡγοῦνται εἶναι πάνυ εἰκότως· μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχειω, μετρίως δὲ πολιτικῶν, e πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου—μετέχειω γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω ὅσον ἔδει, ἔκτῳ δὲ ὄντες κινδύνω καὶ ἀγώνω καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν.

ΚΡ. Τί οὖν; δοκοῦσί σοί τι, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγειω; οὐ γάρ τοι ἀλλὰ ὁ γε λόγος ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἔχει ὄντως, ὦ Κρίτων, εὐπρέπειαν· μᾶλλον 306 ἢ ἀλήθειαν. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον αὐτοὺς πείσαι ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρωποι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα μεταξύ τινω ἑστωῖν καὶ ἀμφοτέρω τυγχάνει μετέχοντα, ὅσα μὲν ἐκ κακοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν βελτίω, τοῦ δὲ χείρω γίγνεται· ὅσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν 5 ἀγαθῶν μὴ πρὸς ταῦτόν, ἀμφοῖν χείρω πρὸς ὃ ἂν ἐκάτερον ἢ χρηστὸν ἐκείων ἐξ ὧν συνετέθη· ὅσα δ' ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν συνετέθητα μὴ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντω ἐν τῷ μέσῳ ἔστιν, ταῦτα b μόνω βελτίω ἐκατέρω ἐκείων ἔστιν, ὧν ἀμφοτέρω μέρος

μετέχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀγαθὸν ἔστιν καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις, πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ἑκάτερα, οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες τούτων ἐν μέσῳ εἰσίν, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν—ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι—εἰ δὲ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, τῶν 5 μὲν βελτίους, τῶν δὲ χείρους· εἰ δὲ κακὰ ἀμφοτέρα, οὕτως ἂν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἂν οὖν οἶμαι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογήσαι οὔτε κακῶ αὐτῶ ἀμφοτέρω εἶναι οὔτε c τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθόν· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι οὗτοι ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες ἀμφοτέρων ἥττους εἰσίν πρὸς ἑκάτερον πρὸς ὃ ἡ τε πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία ἀξίω λόγου ἔστων, καὶ τρίτοι ὄντες τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ζητοῦσι πρῶτοι δοκεῖν εἶναι. 5 συγγιγνώσκει μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς χρὴ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἠγείσθαι μέντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἷοι εἰσιν· πάντα γὰρ ἄνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὅστις καὶ ὄντιον λέγει ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεξίω διαπονεῖται. d

ΚΡ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τῶν υἱῶν, ὥσπερ ἀεὶ πρὸς σε λέγω, ἐν ἀπορίᾳ εἰμι τί δεῖ αὐτοῖς χρῆσασθαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν νεώτερος ἔτι καὶ σμικρὸς ἔστιν, Κριτόβουλος δ' ἤδη ἡλικίαν ἔχει καὶ δεῖται τινος ὅστις 5 αὐτὸν ὀνήσει. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὅταν σοὶ συγγένωμαι, οὕτω διατίθεμαι ὥστ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μανίαν εἶναι τὸ ἔνεκα τῶν παίδων ἄλλων μὲν πολλῶν σπουδῆν τοιαύτην ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γάμου ὅπως ἐκ γενναιοτάτης ἔσονται μητρός, καὶ e περὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὅπως ὡς πλουσιώτατοι, αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας ἀμελήσαι· ὅταν δὲ εἷς τινα ἀποβλέψω τῶν φασκόντων ἂν παιδεύσαι ἀνθρώπους, ἐκπέπληγμαί καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτῶν σκοποῦντι πάνυ ἀλλόκοτος εἶναι, 5 ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθῆ εἰρήσθαι· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως 307 προτρέπω τὸ μεираκιον ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν.

ΣΩ. Ὡ φῖλε Κρίτων, οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐν παντὶ ἐπιτηδεύματι οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι πολλοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, οἱ δὲ σπουδαῖοι ὀλίγοι καὶ παντὸς ἄξιοι; ἐπεὶ γυμναστικῆ οὐ καλὸν δοκεῖ 5 σοι εἶναι, καὶ χρηματιστικῆ καὶ ῥητορικῆ καὶ στρατηγία;



ΚΡ. Ἔμοιγε πάντως δήπου.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν ἐκάστη τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς

b ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάστους ὄρῃς;

ΚΡ. Ναί μὰ τὸν Δία, καὶ μάλα ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν τούτου ἕνεκα αὐτὸς τε φεύξῃ πάντα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τῷ νείει οὐκ ἐπιτρέψει;

5 ΚΡ. Οὐκ οὐν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖωνν ὃ γε οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἀλλ' ἔασας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοὶ εἰσιν εἴτε ποιητοί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ,  
c ἂν μὲν σοι φαίνεται φαῦλον ὄν, πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε, μὴ μόνον τοὺς νείεις: ἂν δὲ φαίνεται οἶον οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ εἶναι, θαρρῶν δῶκε καὶ ἄσκει, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο, αὐτὸς τε καὶ τὰ παιδιά.

NOTES ON THE TEXT OF  
EUTHYDEMUS



## NOTES

ἐν Λυκείῳ. Cf. Pausanias i. 44: 'The Lyceum is named from  $\Sigma\Gamma\text{I}$  Lycus the son of Pandion, but was from the first considered, as it  $\alpha\text{I}$  is now, a temple of Apollo, who was here first called Lyceus.' After Aristotle had made the *περίπατος*, or covered walk, of the Lyceum the place for teaching his pupils, a scene very similar to that which is described in the *Euthydemus* occurred there. In the *Panathenaicus* 236 D Isocrates says that he had heard how 'some three or four of the vulgar Sophists who pretend to know everything had been sitting in the Lyceum' and railing against him.

ἢ πολὺς. The affirmative ἦ in Plato usually begins an answer to a previous speaker, as in *Pol.* 453 E, 530 C, 567 E, *Euthyphr.* 14 B: but Heindorf's proposal to omit it here is rightly rejected by Bekker as too arbitrary.

περιστήκει. The common reading is *περιστήκει*: but Schanz, *Praef.* xiii, refers to Choeroboscus, *Dict.* 596, 27 ἐγένετο εἰσθήκει διὰ τῆς εἰ διφθόγγου.

ὑπεκύψας, 'having leant over.' Cf. Hom. *Ephigr.* xiv. 22 *ὅς δέ χ' ἔ* 3 *ὑπεκύψη*, *πυρὶ τούτου πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον φλεχθείη*.

'Ὀπότερον BT. Cf. *Lys.* 212 C *ὀπότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἔστιν*; *Pol.* 348 B *Ὀποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀρέσκει*, 'Gentler and less direct than ποτέρως, Would you tell me which of the two ways you prefer? Cf. *Euthyd.* 271 B' (Jowett and L. Campbell). On *Pol.* 348 B, cf. Adam: 'Hermann writes ποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in *Euthyd.* 271 A.' In *Lys.* 212 C there is apparently no various reading, and it would be difficult to accommodate Hermann's remarkable conjecture *ὀπάτερος*, adopted by Adam, to *ὀποτέρως*, *Pol.* 348 B. Cf. Jann. 2038: 'The use of the relatives in indirect questions brought them into association with the ordinary or direct interrogatives, and thus

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I

I

rendered them admissible in questions also, *especially in A dialogue,* i.e. in the dialogue of Classical Antiquity, 500–300 B.C.

8 τρίτος ἀπὸ σοῦ, 'next but one to you,' Socrates himself being counted in.

b 1 Ἀξιόχου. Cf. Ps.-Plat. *Axioch.* 364 A Κλεινίαν ὄρω τὸν Ἀξιόχου. The sons of the elder Alcibiades were Cleinias (Hdt. viii. 17) and Axiochus, and their sons were the famous Alcibiades and this younger Cleinias, who were therefore first cousins.

3 ἡλικίαν. The first meaning of the word is 'size,' 'stature,' as in Lucian, *Vera Hist.* i. 40 ἄνδρας μεγάλους ὅσον ἡμισταδίαίους τὰς ἡλικίας. But 'stature' being in early years an indication of 'age,' ἡλικία is commonly used in the latter sense, as here.

ἐκεῖνος μὲν . . . οὗτος δέ. These words are wrongly referred by Routh and Winckelmann to the two Sophists. In correcting this error Stallbaum seems to fall into another by referring ἐκεῖνος to Cleinias, and οὗτος to Critobulus. In reality ἐκεῖνος indicates the one who is thought of as more remote (ἐκεῖ, *yonder*), being only incidentally mentioned, namely Critobulus, οὗτος the nearer in thought, namely Cleinias, of whom Crito has been chiefly speaking. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* i. 3, 13 τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον, ὃ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὠραῖον, τοσοῦτ' αἰσθητέρον ἐστὶ τῶν φαλαγγίων, ὅσα ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἀψάμενα, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδ' ἀπτόμενον, εἰὰν δὲ τις αὐτὸ θεᾶται, ἐνίησί τι. Demosth. *De Cherson.* 108 τὸ βέλτιστον αἰεὶ, μὴ τὸ ῥᾶστον ἀπαντας λέγειν' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις αὐτῆ βαδιεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῆ λόγῳ δεῖ προσέγσθαι διδάσκοντα τὸν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* § 467.

Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 69, understands ἡλικίαν as referring to 'stature,' and ἐκεῖνος to Cleinias, and quotes Xen. *Conv.* iv. 11–12 as proving the superior beauty of Critobulus, though the passage evidently means the very reverse. For after speaking of his own desire to be thought handsome Critobulus says: 'I take more delight in looking upon Cleinias than in all other beautiful things in the world: and I would choose rather to be blind to all other beautiful things than to him alone. And I am vexed by the night and by sleep, because I do not see him, but most thankful to the day and the sun, because they show me Cleinias again.'

4 σκληρὸς T, σκληρὸς B, 'thin,' 'slender,' 'puny': cf. Hesych. σκληρῶν. οἱ ἰσχνοὶ καὶ λεπτοὶ τοῖς σώμασιν. Schol. in *Euthyd.* σκληρὸς ὁ τῆ μὲν χρόνῳ πρεσβύτερος, τῇ δὲ ὕψει νεώτερος δοκῶν.

Προφερὴς δὲ ὁ τῶ μὲν χρόνῳ νεώτερος, τῇ δὲ ὄψει πρεσβύτερος. In B there is a marginal note on σκληφρος· Οὕτω λέγεται καὶ παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει ὁ ἰσχνὸς καὶ λεπτὸς τὸ σῶμα. Cf. Aristot. *Somn.* iii. 17, *Probl.* i. 30, 14, where σκληφροί is a better reading than Bekker's σκληροί.

καλῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν ὄψιν, 'of a noble presence': so Plato describes Parmenides, *Parmen.* 127 B. In Xen. *Conviv.* iii. 7, iv. 10, v. 1 Cleinias is represented as especially proud of his acknowledged beauty.

μετέχα BT. Heindorf's conjecture μετέχε, adopted by Stallbaum 8 and Badham, is quite unnecessary. Socrates is referring to the custom of the two brothers, not merely to yesterday's exhibition.

καινοὶ τινες αὐ οὔτοι, ὡς ἔοικε, σοφισταί. This sentence formerly 9 assigned by Ficinus, Routh, and others to Socrates, is rightly transferred by recent editors to Crito. The conjecture, ὡς ἔοικε, is much more appropriate to Crito than to Socrates, who knew all about the two Sophists. Stallbaum after σοφισταί interpolates Σω. Ναί. unnecessarily.

αὐ, 'again,' implies that in Crito's opinion they had already had Sophists enough in Athens.

ἐντεθὲν ποθεν, i.e. from some part of Greece including the islands. C 2

Θουρίους. Thurii or Thurium was a town of Magna Graecia on 3 the Gulf of Tarentum, deriving its name from a neighbouring fountain Thuria. After the destruction of Sybaris by the people of Crotona an Athenian colony was sent out by Pericles (c. 443 B.C.) to found a new city near the ruins. The history of Sybaris and Thurii is given by Strabo, 263, and more fully by Diodorus Siculus, xii. 9-11.

φεύγοντες. Heindorf's conjecture φυγόντες is unnecessary, as φεύγειν means not only 'to go into exile,' but also 'to be in exile.' Both these meanings are well illustrated by Hdt. vi. 103 Κίμωνα τὸν Στησαγόρειω κατέλαβε φυγεῖν ἐξ Ἀθηνέων Πεισίστρατον τὸν Ἰπποράτεος· καὶ αὐτῷ φεύγοντι ὀλυμπιάδα ἀνελεῖσθαι τεθρίππων συνέβη.

ἐκᾶθεν, i.e. from Thurii. Heindorf points out the error in the 4 statement of Athenaeus xi. 506 ἀνειδίξειν αὐτοῖς (τὸν Πλάτωνα) καὶ τὴν ἐκ Χίου τῆς πατρίδος φυγὴν, ἀφ' ἧς ἐν Θουρίοις κατακίσθησαν.

περὶ τοῦσδε τοὺς τόπους, i.e. Greece, in distinction from Italy or Magna Graecia.

- 5 δ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, 'but as to what you ask about their wisdom.' Cf. Xen. *Anab.* v. 5, 20 Ὁ δὲ λέγεις βία παρελθόντας σκηρῶν, vi. 1, 29 Ὁ δὲ ὑμῖς ἐννοεῖτε, οἳ ἦσαν ἀν στάσις εἴη, *Oecon.* c. 15, 6 δ δὲ εἶπας ὡς δεῖ μαθεῖν . . . καὶ δ δεῖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε ἕκαστα, *Hier.* c. 6, 12 δ δὲ ἐζήλωσας ἡμᾶς, ὡς τοὺς μὲν φίλους μάλιστα εὖ ποιεῖν δυνάμεθα, *Hellen.* ii. 3, 45 δ δ' αὖ εἶπας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἰμι οἶος δεῖ ποτε μεταβάλλεσθαι.

In such passages 'the neuter δ, referring to what follows, stands at the beginning of a proposition, in order to carry back the thoughts to a preceding assertion' (*Matth. Gk. Gr.* 478). Very similar to this is the use of *quod* in Latin: cf. Madvig, *Lat. Gr.* 398, Obs. 2.

τὴν σοφίαν. For the accusative after ἐρωτᾷς cf. *Protag.* 351 E τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν ἐστίν. *Phileb.* 19 B.

θαυμασία, ᾧ Κρίτων B, Stallbaum, Schanz. This reading is better than any of the variations proposed. The sense is quite clear: 'What is their wisdom? A marvellous wisdom, Crito, they are absolutely all-wise.'

- 6 πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γε B, Vind. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* 459. i., who refers to 291 A I Ἄλλὰ μὴν τὴν γε εὖ οἶδα, and *Polit.* 305 C τὴν γε δὴ κατανοητέον, and adds 'mit durchaus epischer Färbung.' For τὴν γε Bekker and Stallbaum adopt ὡς ἔγωγε T, Ficinus 'equidem,' and regard τὴν γε as an error of transcription arising from the accidental omission of ὡς in ἀτεχνῶς ὡς ἔγωγε, and the subsequent change of ΕΓ into T.

If the latter reading were adopted, ὡς would have its consecutive sense, 'so that I did not even know before what pancratiasts were.' Cf. *Hdt.* i. 163, ii. 135; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4, 11.

But the reading of BV is not to be set aside without absolute necessity. 'Apud Platonem saepius quam apud alios scriptores articulus demonstrativi pronominis munere fungitur' (*Schanz, N. C. P.* p. 79).

δ τι εἶεν. On the recent fashion of printing both the pronoun and the conjunction as one word, οἳ, see Introduction, p. 48.

- 7 παγκρατιασταί. Cf. Schol. in Plat. *Pol.* 338 C παγκρατιαστῆς ὁ παγκράτιον ἀγωνιζόμενος ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ἀγὼν τις ἐξ ἀτελοῦς πάλης καὶ ἀτελοῦς πυγμῆς συγκείμενος.

οὐ (καθ' ἃ) τὴν Ἀκαρνᾶνε ἐγενίσθη. κατὰ B, Vind. ἐγενίσθη is

omitted in T, and by Schanz and C. F. Hermann (Teubner), and placed by Badham after *μάχεσθαι*.

But the tense of *ἐγενέσθην* shows that its subject is τὰ Ἀκαρνανε, not the Sophists, and instead of removing *ἐγενέσθην* we need only for *κατά* read *καθ' ἃ*. A careful inspection of Codex Clarkianus shows that there has been an erasion after the first *a* in *καῖτα* (*sic*). Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 6, 5 ὁ εἰδὼς ἃ ἔστι νόμιμα, καθ' ἃ δεῖ πως ἀλλήλοις χρῆσθαι, νόμος ἂν εἴη. *Hellen.* i. 7, 29 αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ἃ καὶ αἱ ἀμυρτῖαι δοκοῦσι γεγενῆσθαι.

καὶ μάχη, ἣ πάντων ἔστι κρατῶν TV, ἔστι om. B : Schanz omits ἣ ἃ α and ἔστι, Madvig conjectures μάχη ἣ πάντων κρατεῖ, Badham and Burnet omit the whole clause. Ficinus follows the text of TV : 'hi vero corpore primum pugnare maxime possunt, et eo genere pugnae quo omnia (omnes?) superantur.' Heindorf, rightly retaining the text of TV, explains it as follows : 'Pugnae genere, quod verum est παγκράτιον. Spectant haec liquido ad superiora illa ὅ τι εἶεν οἱ παγκρατιάσται.' But the real meaning of the clause is most clearly shown by what immediately follows, ἐν ὄπλοις γὰρ . . . μάχεσθαι. The art of fighting in armour with the real weapons of war was the perfection of military training, as described by Nicias, *Lach.* 181 E, 'he who understands this art could certainly not be hurt at all by any single assailant, perhaps not even by many, but in every way would thus have an advantage.' In *Gorg.* 456 D ἔμαθ'ε τις πυκτεῖν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι, ὥστε κρείττων εἶναι καὶ φίλων καὶ ἐχθρῶν, the most important art is named last. Cf. *Legg.* 813 E, 833 E.

καὶ ἀγωνίασθαι. Schanz omits *καὶ* without sufficient reason : in 272 ἀγωνίασθαι there is an allusion to speaking in person, which is here α 2 contrasted with teaching others.

συγγράφεσθαι λόγους, 'to get speeches composed.' Cf. Quintil. 3 *Inst. Orat.* ii. 15 'Socrates inhonestam sibi credidit orationem quam ei Lysias reo composuerat ; et tum maxime scribere litigatoribus quae illi pro se ipso dicerent erat moris, atque ita iuri quo non licebat pro altero agere fraus adhibebatur.'

παγκρατιαστικῆ τέχνη. 'Vellem, interiecto articulo, τῇ παγκρατιαστικῇ τέχνῃ' (Heindorf). The article would be out of place, or at least, unnecessary, as 'pancratiastic art' is not here limited to the well-known bodily exercise.



- 6 ἀργός. Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 766 ἐν δ' ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἀργόν. Schol. ἀργόν' ἄτρακτον καὶ παραλελειμμένον, ὀφείλον γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενόμενον (Heindorf).
- 7 μὴδ' ἀντάραι. Cf. Demosth. 24 Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν ποτε, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἰπὲρ τῶν δικαίων ἀντήρατε. Thuc. iii. 32; Xen. *Cyr.* v. 4, 25.
- 8 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι, an allusion to ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 'to fight in their armour of words.'
- b 2 παραδοῦναι ἑμαυτὸν, 'to give myself over as a pupil.' Cf. 285 c παραδίδωμι ἑμαυτὸν Διονυσόδωρῳ τούτῳ. *Legg.* vii. 811 E τοὺς νέους αὐτοῖς παραδίδοναι διδάσκειν τε καὶ παιδεύειν.
- 7 ἔχων T, ἔχω B; cf. 285 E ἀκούω B (Schanz).
- 8 παραμύθιον τοῦ μὴ φοβέσθαι. The article with the infinitive expresses the purpose or effect of the παραμύθιον. Cf. Aesch. *Prom. V.* 243 ἐξελευσάμην βροτοῦς τοῦ μὴ διαρραισθέντας εἰς Ἄιδου μολεῖν. See Hermann on Viger, *De Idiot. Gr.* not. 271. Paley's suggestion that in τοῦ μὴ two constructions are mixed, τὸ μὴ for ὥστε μὴ, and τοῦ μολεῖν is unnecessary.
- 9 τῆς σοφίας ἥς ἔγυγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς. Diogenes Laertius in his life of Protagoras (ix. 55) names first in a list of the works of Protagoras then extant *Τεχνὴ ἐριστικῶν*. In Plato the word ἐριστικός first appears in *Lys.* 211 B ἀλλὰ ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, εἰάν με ἐλέγχειν ἐπιχειρήῃ ὁ Μενέξενος· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐστίν; In the *Meno*, 80 E, the argument that a man cannot inquire about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know, is termed an ἐριστικὸς λόγος, and contrasted with the doctrine that the soul is immortal and knows all things by reminiscence: 'and therefore we must not believe this ἐριστικῶ λόγῳ for it would make us idle, and is sweet to the ear of the feeble.' Cf. *Meno* 75 C, *Soph.* 225 D.
- In Aristot. *Soph. El.* xi we find the following definition: 'Eristice is illegitimate fighting in disputation. The competitor who is bent on victory at all hazards sticks at no artifice; no more does the eristic reasoner. If victory is his final motive, he is called contentious and eristic (ἐριστικοὶ καὶ φιλέριδες); if professional reputation and lucre, sophistic. For Sophistic is, as I said before, a money-making art' (Poste).
- c 1 αὖ B, αὐτός T. αὖ has its usual sense 'again,' for Socrates adds that he had already brought disgrace upon one of his teachers.

περιάψω, 'hoc proprie adhibetur de infamia vel labe, qua quem s aspergimus' (Heindorf). Cf. Lysias 164, 1 εἰ σωθεὶς αἰσχρῶς ὄνειδη καὶ ἐμαντῶ καὶ ἐκείνοις περιάψω.

Κόννος τῷ Μητροβίου. Cf. 295 D, *Menex.* 235 E. On the supposed identity of Κόννος with Κορνᾶς, who gave the name to a comedy of Ameipsias, see the long dissertation of Winckelmann, *Prolegomena*, cap. viii.

τῷ καθαριστῇ . . . καθαρίζειν. Badham proposed to omit the former, and Schanz the latter, but without authority or necessity. On the affinity of music to philosophy cf. *Lach.* 188 D καὶ κομῆδῃ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι ἄρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμουςμένους οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμουςμένους. Athen. 632 C Κάμοι δὲ διὰ τοῦτο φαίνεται φιλοσοφητέον εἶναι περὶ μουσικῆς. Καὶ γὰρ Πυθαγόρας ὁ Σάμιος, τηλικαύτην δόξαν ἔχων ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ καταφανῆς ἐστὶν ἐκ πολλῶν οὐ παρέργως ἀψάμενος μουσικῆς . . . τὸ δὲ δλον ἔοικεν ἢ παλαιὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφία τῇ μουσικῇ μάλιστα εἶναι δεδομένη . . . καὶ πάντας τοὺς χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ ταύτῃ σοφιστὰς ἀπεκάλουν, ὥσπερ καὶ Αἰσχυλος ἐποίησεν 'Εἶτ' οὖν σοφιστῆς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν.'

οὐ συμφοιτηταὶ μοι ἐμοῦ τε . . . BT. Badham omits μοι, for 4 which Stallbaum and Schanz adopt μοι from Vindob. But it is not likely that μοι, if original, would be changed into μοι immediately before ἐμοῦ. There is not the same reason for μοι here as in *συμμαθητὰς μοι φοιτῶν* below. In B there is a light stroke, seemingly meant for a comma, between μοι, and ἐμοῦ.

ἴσως φοβούμενοι τάχα. 'Obvius hic apud Atticos pleonasmus in 6 Platone quidem frequentissimus est. ἴσως τάχ' ἂν *Tim.* 38 E, *Legg.* iii. 676 C, 686 D, *Apol.* 31 A' (Heind.).

καὶ σὺ τί οὐ συμφοιτᾷς; ὡς Winckelmann. The objection to the δ 1 reading of the best MSS. καὶ σὺ τί πον συμφοιτᾷτα' ἴσως BT is that πού seems never to be joined with an imperative.

ἔξομεν T et ἔξομεν Vind., ἔξομεν B. 'And as a bait for them we 2 will take with us your sons.'

υἱέας. 'The late accusative singular υἱέα, reprehended by Phrynichus, with its consort υἱέας, has not found its way into any Attic text' (Rutherford, *N. Phryn.* 143). Cf. Kühner-Blass, i. § 138 Anmerk. 3: Schanz, *Plat. Legg.* Praef. p. viii. § 5 'P. Foucart hanc observationem ex inscriptionibus Atticis elicit (*Revue de Philologie*, i. 35): une série d'exemples, depuis le

cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère, montre que, au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme *ἴός*. Schanz adds: 'In Clarkiano huius scripturae, quod sciam, nullum est vestigium; in Parisino omnibus fere locis *ἴός* reperitur.' The Codex Clarkianus being our best authority in the *Euthydemus*, which is not contained in the Parisinus, I have not taken upon myself to rewrite our chief MS. in respect of this word.

6 ἴ τι καὶ μαθησόμεθα, 'what it is we are going to learn.' On the force of *καὶ* see Riddell, *Plat. Apol.* 176.

7 οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις ἀκούων, 'iamiam audies.' The ordinary explanation, 'you cannot hear it too soon,' is far better than Hermann's elaborate and confusing note on Viger, *De Idiotismis Gr.* 320. Cf. Kühner-Jelf, § 694, Obs. 2.

ε I κατὰ θεὸν γὰρ τινα. Cf. *Plat. Legg.* iii. 682 A κατὰ θεὸν πῶς εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. The phrase is generally used in a favourable sense, 'by some good providence,' but sometimes in a bad sense, as in *Eur. Iph. in Aul.* 411 'Ἐλλὰς δὲ σὺν σοὶ κατὰ θεὸν νοσεῖ τινα,' according to the will of some god.

3 ἀναστῆναι, 'to rise up and go away.' Cf. *Plat. Protag.* 311 A ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλὴν περιῆμεν. *Phaed.* 116 A ἀνίστατο εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος.

τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον. Cf. *Phaedr.* 242 B. In the *Apologia* 31 D Socrates describes this as a divine intimation which had come to him ever since he was a child (θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον . . . ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον): he calls it a voice which only came to forbid something that he was about to do, but never commanded him to do anything. It was no kind of personal being, no 'genius familiaris,' nor any 'strange god,' as Meletus had misrepresented it in his indictment, but a sudden and spontaneous impression and conviction, which Socrates regarded as a divine intimation. This was usually prohibitive according to Plato, as here, forbidding him to move: but according to Xenophon, *Mem.* i. 1, 4, it was positive as well as negative, bidding as well as forbidding. For fuller accounts see Zeller, *Socrates* 82; Riddell, *Plato's Apology of Socrates*, Appendix A; Xen. *Mem.* Kühner, *Proleg.* 22; Plutarch. *Mor.* 575, *De Genio Socratis*; W. Pater, *Plato* 78; Montaigne, *Of Prognostications*: 'The Daemon of Socrates, &c.'

μαθηταί. By placing this immediately before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν Badham 273 makes the connexion more evident. a 2

καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἔμα αὐ πολλοὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. αὐ is found in B, but omitted in T Vind., and altered by Schanz to αὐτοῖν. If retained it may be rendered 'besides' or 'also,' as in *Protag.* 323 A τὸδε αὐ λαβεῖ τεκμήριον, 326 A οἱ τ' αὐ κισθαρισταί. Badham places μαθηταί immediately before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, in order to make the connexion clearer, 'disciples as it seemed to me.' Without this transposition Ficinus gives the same sense: 'et alii multi cum illis, qui illorum mihi discipuli videbantur.' Schanz supposes that ξένοι or some such word has dropped out before ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν. There is probably some error in the text of B, for αὐ seems to be superfluous after καὶ ἄλλοι μαθηταὶ ἔμα, 'and disciples besides with them.' On αὐ and other 'expletives' see Jannaris 1700 (1).

εἰσελθόντες δὲ περιπατεῖτην BT, εἰσελθόντε π. Vind. 'probavit 3 Cobet' (Schanz). The dual and plural are so frequently interchanged in the context that it is hardly necessary to alter the reading of BT.

δρόμῳ. Cf. Ruhnk. *Tim. Lex.* Δρόμοι sunt loca cursibus destinata, sive ambulacra publica. *Theaet.* 15 B ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἕξῳ δρόμῳ ἤλειφοντο. Ubi Scholiastes: τόποι τινὲς ἦσαν, ὁ μὲν ἐκτὸς ἀστέος, ὁ δὲ ἐντὸς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τελουμένων ὑπὸ τῶν νέων Δρόμοι καλούμενοι. Cf. *Phaedr.* 227 A κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ποιούμεαι τοὺς περιπάτους· φησὶ γὰρ ἀκωπώτερου εἶναι τῶν ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις.

οὕτω . . . περιεληλυθότε ἦσθη, καὶ εἰσέρχεται. On this use of καὶ 4 after a definition of time, so frequent in the New Testament, cf. 277 B οὕτω . . . ταῦτα εἰρηγο . . . καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος . . . Thuc. i. 50 "Ἦδη δὲ ἦν ὄψε καὶ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἐξαπίνης πύρμαν ἐκρούοντο. Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 1, 10 σχεδὸν τε ἔτοιμα ἦν καὶ τῶν Περσῶν οἱ ὀμότμοι παρήσαν. *Anab.* i. 2, 18.

πολλοὶ τε [καὶ] ἄλλοι καὶ Κτήσιππος. Cf. Schanz, *Nou. Com. Plat.* 6 p. 56 'quod coniectando invenimus, optimo libro Clarkiano confirmatum vidimus, qui καὶ omisit.'

Παιανιεύς. Paeania was a borough (δήμος) of the tribe Pandionis. 7 Demosthenes belonged to Paeania.

ὅσον μὴ ἴβριστις [δὲ] διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι BT. Winckelmann omits 8 δέ as an error caused by διὰ following, and compares 301 B "Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μμείοθαι, where for δέ cod. B has

διά. ὅσον μὴ ἰβριστής quite literally means 'as far as he was not boisterous,' i. e. 'except that he was boisterous.' The construction is the same as in *Phaed.* 64 D καθ' ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν, 'except so far as it is absolutely necessary to have to do with them': *ibid.* 83 A πείθουσα δὲ ἐκ τούτων μὲν ἀναχωρεῖν ὅσον μὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι. *Plut. Timol.* iii. πρῶτος διαφερόντως ὅσα μὴ σφόδρα μισοτύραννος εἶναι.

b 1 ἀπὸ τῆς εἰσόδου, 'having from the entrance caught sight of me sitting alone.'

4 ἐπιστόντε διελεγέσθην, 'stopped short and began to talk to each other.' Cf. 172 A κἀγὼ ἐπιστάς περιμένειν. *Symp.* 212 D ἐπιστήναι ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας.

ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε, sc. ὄψιν, 'glancing now and then.' 'Usitatus fuisset ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην' (Heind.); but that would have meant 'this way and that,' which is not the meaning here.

6 ἴοντε, 'they came and sat down, one of them, Euthydemus, beside the youth, and the other beside myself on the left.'

7 Εὐθύδημος B, ὁ Εὐθύδημος T. Schanz adopts the article in his edition, 1880, though he had shown in the *Novae Commentationes Platonicae*, p. 64, that it is often omitted even in a renewed mention of the name as in 289 E, 294 C, 297 B, D, and elsewhere frequently.

παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμέ. Winckelmann reads παρ' αὐτὸν ἐμέ, and for the position of αὐ between a preposition and its case refers to *Pol.* 371 D τοῖς δὲ ἀντὶ αὐ ἀργυρίου διαλλάττειν: *Politic.* 302 D ἐκ δ' αὐ τῶν μὴ πολλῶν ἐκ δ' αὐ τῶν πολλῶν: *Phaed.* 71 A ἀπὸ δ' αὐ τοῦ ἑτέρου. For τὸν ἐμέ cf. *Theaet.* 166 A γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε. The conjecture though simple and ingenious is unnecessary.

c 2 μέντοι seems to have an explanatory as well as an assertive force, giving a reason why he welcomed them: 'These two gentlemen, you know, Cleinias, are skilled not in trifling things, but in those of great importance.'

6 καὶ ὅσα ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι διδασκίον. Schanz brackets μάχεσθαι, following Badham, but suggests as a better reading καὶ ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι, omitting both ὅσα and διδασκίον. There seems to be no need for any alteration in the text of the MSS., 'and all necessary teaching to fight in arms.'

d 1 κατεφρονήθη is the inference which Socrates drew from their looks and laughter: 'I saw that they despised me.'

βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους B, βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλίλους T. Cf. Plat. 2 *Phaedr.* 278 B νῶ καταβάντε ἐς τὸ Νυμφῶν, where καταβάντες (Steph.) may be due to the ἐς following. Here, however, βλέψαντες was probably the original reading, corresponding to ἀλλήλους, for ἀλλίλω T<sup>2</sup> is a very doubtful correction. On the combination of a dual subject with a plural participle see Kühner-Blass, § 368; Jannaris, *Gk. Gr.* 1172; Xen. *Mem.* i. 2, 33 καλίσαντες ὁ τε Κριτίας καὶ ὁ Χαρικλῆς τὸν Σωκράτην τὸν τε νόμον ἐδεικνύτην αὐτῶ.

τὸ ἔργον . . . πάρεργα, 'your work must be something grand, if matters so great as these are your amusements.'

Ἦ Ζεῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. The reading of BT, ἔφην ἦν δ' ἐγώ, may probably have arisen from a marginal quotation or reminiscence of 294 A Ἦ Ζεῦ, ἔφην ἐγώ, since ἔφην in our present passage is an evident gloss or interpretation.

λέγετον πράγμα. Cobet would omit λίγετον without any sufficient reason.

ἔρμαιον. Any great good fortune or unexpected gain was attributed to the influence of Hermes. Cf. 295 A, *Symp.* 217 A ἔρμαιον ἠγησάμην εἶναι καὶ εὐτύχημα ἐμὸν θαυμαστόν. Ruhnk. *Tim. Lex.* 'Ἐρμαῖον' εὐρεμα. Stallb. Plat. *Phaed.* 107 C 'ἔρμαιον interpretate Scholiasta est τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος' ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τιθεμένων ἀπαρχῶν, ὡς οἱ ὁδοιπόροι κατεσθίουσι' ταύτας δὲ τῶ 'Ἐρμῆ ἀφιερῶσιν ὡς ὄντι καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῶν ἐνοδίων θεῶν.' Preller, *Gr. Myth.* 403.

τοῦτο is not to be joined with τὸ πολὺ, but is explained by ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 'clever for the most part in this, I mean in fighting in armour.'

ἐπεδημησάτην BV, γρ. T; ἐπεδημείτην T. The imperfect would imply that they were at home in Athens, the aorist that they came to it as visitors. Cf. *Protag.* 310 E ἔτι γὰρ παῖς ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεδήμησεν.

τοῦτο μέμνημαι σφῶ ἐπαγγελλομένω. 'Non satis notum est Graecos verbis recordandi participia temporis praesentis adiungere . . . *Charm.* 156 A μέμνημαι Κριτία τῶδε συνόντα σε, *Prot.* 359 C μέμνησαι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ταῦτα ἀποκρινόμενος;' (Schanz, *Nov. Com. Plat.* p. 70).

ἴλω εἶπτον, 'be merciful.' Cf. Plat. *Phaedr.* 257 A ἀλλὰ τῶν 6 προτέρων τε συγγνώμην καὶ τῶνδε χάμιν ἔχων, εὐμενὴς καὶ ἴλωσ τῆν

ἔρωτικὴν μοι τέχνην, ἣν ἔδωκας, μίτε ἀφέλη μήτε πηρώσης δε' ὀργήν: *ibid.*  
'εὐμενῆς καὶ Διῶς solennis est dictio de diis *volentibus propitiisque*'  
(Heind.).

- 274 ἔλιγετον BT, 'sed *ē in ras. additum videtur* in B' (Schanz).  
a 2 'Videte utrum vera loquamini' (Ficinus). Stallbaum sees no reason to alter the reading of the MSS.
- 7 μέγαν βασιλέα. As every one knew who the 'Great King' was the article was unnecessary, as in the case of a proper name. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5, 26 ἐν τῇ βασιλείῳ χώρῃ: *ibid. Conv.* iii. 13 τὰ βασιλείῳ χρήματα.
- b 2 ὅτι μὲν B, ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν T. That ἀλλά is an unnecessary addition is shown by Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 63, quoting *Pol.* 412 B, *Phaed.* 87 A. οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες. 'Intell. αὐτῆν' (Stallbaum): i. e. 'the unwise will wish to learn of you'; a rather sarcastic compliment.
- 3 ἐγγυῶμαι. The active voice means 'to give a pledge,' the middle 'I pledge myself,' that is 'I make myself an ἐγγυητής or bail.' Cf. *Protag.* 336 D ἐπεὶ Σωκράτη γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐγγυῶμαι μὴ ἐπιλήσασθαι.
- 7 κίμοι δοκεῖν ὡς. Badham rightly argues that ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν BT refers to ἐπισκόπει, not to ἔτυχε καθεζόμενος, which was not a matter of opinion but of evident fact. He therefore reads κάμοι δοκεῖν ὡς, or ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖν ὡς, either of which is preferable to the awkward conjecture of Schanz πάρω καθεζόμενος τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν ὡσθ' ὡς.
- c 1 ἱπισκόπει. The verb seems to be used by Plato only here, but is not uncommon in the Orators and Polybius, and occurs also in Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 1, 7 ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τὸ ἴδιον ἢ δὴ ἢ λυπηρόν.
- d 2 αὐτῷ Bt, αὐτῷ T. Here T has been corrected, probably from B.
- 6 ἐπιδείξατον BV, ἐπιδείξασθον T. The reading of B is retained by Winckelmann, Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, and justified by 274 A ὡς ἐπιδείξοντε καὶ διδάξοντε, and the many passages of Plato quoted by Winckelmann. As the exhibition is to be made at the request of others, not for their own sake, the active is the right voice, not the middle as in 278 C 4.  
τὰ μὲν οὖν πλεῖστα, 'the main part.'
- e 2 τὸ πρᾶγμα τὴν ἀρετὴν. Hirschig and Badham would omit τὸ πρᾶγμα, and Cobet τὴν ἀρετὴν, changing αὐτῆς into αὐτοῦ. Possibly τὸ πρᾶγμα is a marginal gloss intended to explain the use of μαθηρόν as a predicate of τὴν ἀρετὴν. Cf. Plutarch, *Mor.* 439 Ὅτι διδασκόν

ἡ ἀρετή. Schanz however (*N. C. P.* p. 70) defends τὸ πρᾶγμα, referring to *Prot.* 327 A τούτου τοῦ πράγματος τῆς ἀρετῆς. See also Jann. *Gk. Gr.* 1178<sup>b</sup>.

φέρει, like *age* in Latin, is often found before a question, as if 3 pressing for an immediate answer: 'Come, tell me.' Cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 514 D φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Σωκράτης πῶς ἔχει τὸ σῶμα πρὸς ὑγίειαν; *Legg.* i. 633 C τὴν ἀνδρείαν δι φέρε τί θῶμεν; Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 788 φέρε δὴ νυν, | εἰ κακὸν ἔσμεν, τί γαμίζῃ ὑμεῖς;

ἄλλης B<sup>2</sup>, ἄλλως BT: the correction in B was probably made by 5 Arethas.

ἂν προτρέψαιτε. Winckelmann retains the reading of BT, *προ- 275* *τρέψετε*, but the future indicative with ἂν is, to say the least, so a 1 unusual that *προτρέψαιτε* is certainly to be preferred. Schanz refers to 278 C 4, where there is a similar variation between *ἐνδείξασθον B*, *ἐνδείξασθον T*, and *ἐνδείξασθον Vind. i.*

ἰός. Schanz and Burnett read *ἰός*, without any remark. Cf. 10 Zonaras, 1763, ap. Lobeck. *Phryn.* 40 Ἰός, ἀνευ τοῦ ἰ, Ἀττικοί. Rutherford, *New Phryn.* 143: 'It is probable that throughout the Attic period the iota was never written. At all events Herwerden (*Lafid. de Dial. Att. Test.* pp. 11, 12) distinctly states that in no Attic inscription of a good age does any form but *ἰός* appear except in verse, and even in that case *ἰός*, *ἰείς*, &c. are sometimes found. . . The reason for the prevalence of *ἰός*, *ἰείος*, &c. in the manuscripts of Attic writers is not far to seek. Those forms gradually took the place of *ἰός*, *ἰείος*, &c., in stone records after the time of Alexander.' In Homer, *Il.* vi. 130, xvii. 575, 590, iv. 473, v. 612, vii. 47, where the word is printed with a diphthong, a *short syllable is required*. See 272 D 2, note.

αὐτανέπιος, 'own cousin': see 271 B 1, note. Cf. Eur. *Heracleid.* 987 ἦδη γε σοὶ μὲν αὐτανέπιος γηγώς. Aesch. *Suppl.* 933, 984.

περὶ αὐτῷ B, περὶ αὐτοῦ T. Both constructions occur frequently, b 2 the dative chiefly in cases of *fearing for* or the contrary. Cf. Thuc. i. 60 δεδιότες περὶ τῷ χωρίῳ. *Phaed.* 114 D θαρρεῖν χρή περὶ τῆ ἐαυτοῦ ψυχῇ.

εἰ μή τι διαφέρει ὑμῖν. The same phrase occurs in Plat. *Lach.* 187 D 5 εἰ οὐδ' ὑμῖν μή τι διαφέρει.

ἅμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως. Badham objects to *ἅμα*: 'Absurde 8 praepositur *ἅμα* duabus rebus tam similibus quam sunt *ἀνδρεία* et



θάρρος.' Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 71 replies: 'At ἄμα non pertinet ad ἀνδρείως καὶ θαρραλέως, sed ad ἔφη,' i. e. 'No sooner had I spoken than Euthydemus said,' &c. But in fact 'bravely' and 'confidently' are not synonymous, and ἔφη is too far from ἄμα to be referred to it by 'hyperbaton.'

κ 1 ἀποκρίνεσθαι B, ἀποκρίνασθαι T: cf. C 3 τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι B, τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι T. In both passages B gives the better reading: in dependence on the present ἐὰν ἐθέλῃ, indicating a *general* willingness to answer, ἀποκρίνεσθαι alone is right. In C 3 the aorist ἀποκρίνασθαι is rightly used of the answer to be given to a *particular* question: cf. 275 E 1 ἀπόκριται ἀνδρείως.

2 'Ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ, 'Why, in truth.' Cf. *Gorg.* 466 B, 471 A, 492 E, 506 B, D.

6 τὸ ἔργον δύνασθαι. Schanz, *ibid.* p. 71, quotes Xen. *Cyr.* ii. 2, 11 τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν θήγειν ὑμέτερον τὸ ἔργον.

ἀναλαβῶν διεξιόντα, literally 'to recollect in narrating.' Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 18 D σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον, 'to fight with shadows in defending myself.'

7 διεξιόντα, 'going through in detail': cf. Plat. *Phaedr.* 84 C πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβὰς, εἰ γε δὴ τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι. σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὄσσην. ἀμήχανον as well as ὄσσην agrees with σοφίαν. Cf. *Pol.* ix. 588 A ἀμηχάνῳ δὴ ὄσφ πλείονι νικήσει, vii. 527 E ἀμηχάνως ὡς εὐ δόξεις λέγειν.

δ 1 Μούσας τε καὶ Μνήμη. Cf. *Phaedr.* 237 A Ἄγετε δὴ, ὦ Μούσαι, ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου. It is evident that Μνήμη is here not one of the Muses, but their mother, who is more commonly called Μνημοσύνη. Plat. *Theaetet.* 191 D τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης. Aesch. *Prom. V.* 461 μνήμην θ' ἀπάντων μουσομήτορ' ἐργάτω. Cf. Paus. 795 'The sons of Aloeus thought the Muses were three in number, and named them Μελέτη, Μνήμη, and Ἀοιδή.' Hom. *Hymn in Herm.* 429 Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραρην ἀοιδῆ | μητέρα Μουσάων. II. ii. 491 Ὀλυμπιάδες Μούσαι, Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο | θυγατέρες. *Od.* xxiv. 60 Μούσαι δ' ἐννέα πᾶσαι. Hes. *Theog.* 53:

Μούσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κούραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο,  
τὰς ἐν Πιερίῃ Κρονίδῃ τέκε πατρὶ μωγεῖσα  
Μνημοσύνη.

On the various families of Muses see Plut. *Mor.* 703; Diod. Sic. iv. 7; Cic. *De Nat. Deor.* iii. 21.

μεγάλου. 'H. l. idem est quod χαλεπού, prorsus ut Latine 5  
*magna* quaestio dicitur pro difficili. *Hierp. Mai.* 287 B οὐ μέγα  
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου χαλεπότερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι  
 ἐγὼ σε διδάξαιμι' (Heindorf). Cic. *Tusc.* i. 4, 23 'magna quae-  
 stio est.'

ἔβλεπεν B, 'began to look,' or 'kept looking': ἐνέβλεψεν T, 'cast 6  
 a look.'

πάνυ μεδιόσας, 'with a broad smile.' e 4

ἐξεγένετο. Cf. *Parmen.* 128 E οὐδὲ βουλευσασθαι ἐξεγένετο. Isocr. 8  
*De Antidos.* 312 οὕτως ἂν ἐκγενέσθαι μοι μάλιστα διαλεχθῆναι περὶ  
 ἀπάντων ἂν τυγχάνω βουλόμενος.

κιθαριστῆς. The 'cithara,' 'cittern,' or 'guitar' was very similar 276  
 to the lyre, on which see the article *Lyra* in Smith's *Dict. of Gk.* a 5  
 and *R. Antiquities*.

γραμματιστῆς in Herodotus means the scribe or registrar who  
 kept the accounts of a treasury (ii. 28, iii. 123), or numbered the  
 army of Xerxes (vii. 100): but here it evidently means the 'writing-  
 master,' as in 277 A, and *Charm.* 159 C ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια  
 γράμματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ;

εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς. The Sophist's trick depends wholly upon b 2  
 the unfair use of σοφοί and ἀμαθεῖς in two different senses, as  
 referring (1) to the wish and ability to learn, (2) to the fact of being  
 at present learned or unlearned. The remedy for this fallacy is to  
 define the sense in which the terms are used in the present  
 question.

Οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ἔρα [σοφοί] μανθάνουσιν B: σοφοί is omitted in T 4  
 Vind. If retained, as by Winckelmann and Stallbaum, it must  
 be taken proleptically, 'learn to be wise.' But a superfluous idea  
 is thus brought into the argument, and σοφοί is better omitted, as  
 by most editors.

ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορᾶς ἀποσημήναντος. Cf. Ps.-Aristot. *De* 6  
*Mundo* vi. 20 καθάπερ δὲ ἐν χορῷ κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος συνεπηχεῖ  
 πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν κτλ.

ἀνεθορύβησαν, 'cheered.' 'Vox ἀναθορυβεῖν propria est de *secunda* 7  
*admiratione*. Isocrat. *Panath.* 291 οὐκ ἐθορύβησαν, δ ποιεῖν  
 εἰώθασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς χαρίεντος διελεγμένοις, ἀλλ' ἀνεβόησαν.'

ἐκδεξάμενος, 'took up the discourse,' a metaphor from catching c 2  
 a ball or anything passed from hand to hand: cf. 277 B ὥσπερ

σφαίραν ἐκδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον. 298 A. *Sympos.* 189 A ἐκδεξάμενον οὐν ἔφη εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη.

- 3 ἀποστοματίζου. Cf. Ruhnke. *Tim. Lex.* 'Αποστοματίζειν' ἀπὸ μνήμης λέγειν. 'Timaeus et ex eo Suidas h. l. (277 A) exponunt *memoriter recitare, ore, non scripto, proferre.* At Pollux ii. 102 'Αποστοματίζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς παῖδας Πλάτων που λέγει, ἤγουν ὑπὸ τῶν διδασκάλων ἐρωτάσθαι τὰ μαθήματα, ὡς ἀπὸ στόματος λέγειν. Polluci consentit vetus Grammaticus apud Suidam: 'Αποστοματίζειν φασὶ τὸν διδάσκαλον, ὅταν κελύη τὸν παῖδα λέγειν ἅττα ἀπὸ στόματος.' In our present passage the former interpretation is to be preferred, for in ἀποστοματίζου ὑμῖν the dative shows that it is the master who speaks ἀπὸ μνήμης and ἀπὸ στόματος. In St. Luke xi. 53, ἀποστοματίζειν αὐτὸν περὶ πλείονων, the other sense is to be preferred, 'to make Him speak off-hand of many things,' as is evident from the accusative αὐτόν, and from what follows, *θηρεῖσθαι τι ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ.*
- 4 ἐμάνθανον . . . τὰ ἀποστοματιζόμενα. Cf. Aristot. *De Soph. Elench.* iv. 526 εἰσὶ δὲ παρὰ μὲν τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων, οἷον ὅτι μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι' τὰ γὰρ ἀποστοματιζόμενα μανθάνουσιν. οἱ γραμματικοί' τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ὁμώνυμον, τό τε ξυνίεσθαι χρώμενον τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἐπιστήμην. See Introduction § vi. In this passage οἱ γραμματικοί are of course the pupils, 'those who know their letters,' as in Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 20.
- 7 οὐκ εὖ σύ Burnet: 'οὐκ εὐθύς BT: οὐκ εὖ scripsit Schanz.' This good correction by Schanz is still further improved by Burnet's addition of σύ.
- d. i καὶ πάνν μέγα T Vind. It is of course possible that μέγα, which is omitted in B, may be an interpolation, as Schanz seems to suppose, from 300 D μέγα πάνν ἀνακαγχάσας: on the other hand πάνν ἐγέλασαν is a very questionable phrase, while the constant use of neuter adjectives with γελᾶν, and of μέγα with similar verbs such as λέγειν, βοᾶν, φωνεῖν, ᾄδειν, makes the omission of it here very doubtful.
- 5 ἡρώτα καὶ, 'T Vind. ἡρώτα B: seclisut Schanz' (Burnet). It is more likely that καὶ should have been dropped out in B than ἡρώτα interpolated in T. Vind., and Schanz therefore was not justified in omitting the clause.
- ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησται. The dancers in a chorus reversed their course in the strophe and antistrophe, but something more complicated than this is indicated in the next words.

διπλά ἴστρεψε, 'began to give a double twist to his questions on 6 the same point.' Stallbaum refers to Aristoph. *Thesmoph.* 982 ἕξαιρε δὴ προθύμως διπλὴν χάριν χορείας. Cf. Hesych. διπλῆ ὀρχήσεως εἶδος.

μανθάνουσιν ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται; The same paradoxical question is brought forward in *Meno* 80 E: 'Do you see what an eristic argument this is that you are importing, that it is forsooth impossible for a man to inquire about either what he knows or what he does not know.' The solution depends on the double meaning of *μανθάνω* as explained in Arist. *Soph.* *El.* iv. 526 and 529 *μανθάνει νῦν γράμματα, εἴπερ ἐμάθανεν ἃ ἐπίσταται.*

ἡμῖν BT Vind. The reading of all the MSS. seems to have e 3 been too hastily rejected in favour of ἡμῖν the conjecture of Stephanus, which is followed by Ficinus. But in the answer of Socrates there is a fine irony involved in *καλὸν ὑμῖν ἐφάνη*, 'the former question was a fine revelation for you.' For this sense of *ἐφάνη*, indicating a wonderful or unexpected appearance, cf. 294 A ὃ Ζεῦ, ἕφην ἐγώ, ὡς θαναμαστὸν λέγεις καὶ ἀγαθὸν μέγα πεφάνθαι. *Pol.* 368 D ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη.

ἐρωτᾶμεν ἄφικτά, 'in all our questions of this kind we leave no 5 escape.'

ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταντο. In 276 D, ἃ μὴ ἐπίστανται, there is merely a 9 *supposition* that the learners are ignorant. In the answer there is a definite assertion, which in direct oration would be *μανθάνουσιν ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται.*

οὐκ ἐπίστασαι σὺ γράμματα; The ambiguity of the question is 277 noticed by Aristotle, *Rhet.* ii. 24, 3 τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ α ἢ ἔπος οἶδεν τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν.

ἄρα σὺ (οὐ) μανθάνεις Γ (Coislinianus) Routh, Heindorf: BT omit 6 οὐ. From the antithetical clause ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενος . . . μανθάνει it is evident that both σὺ and οὐ are necessary.

There is a similar confusion in *Phaedr.* 230 C, D, where σὺ (CY) is twice corrupted into οὐ (OY) both in B and T, also in 286 E σὺ δ' ἐκέλευες;

ἢ δ' ὅς. ἕφη B Vind., εἰδώς T. The origin of the corrupt εἰδώς 8 is shown in Routh's ingenious conjecture ἢ δ' ὅς.

ὥσπερ σφαῖραν ἐκδεξάμενος. Cf. Plut. *De Genio Socratis*, ii. 582 F b 4 ὁ δὲ μὴ δεξάμενος ὥσπερ σφαῖραν εὖ φερομένην κατήσχυεν ἀτελεῖ

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παισούσαν. The game of passing the ball to and fro was called in Latin 'ludere datatim,' Plaut. *Curculio*, ii. 3, 17.

- 6 τὸ μαθάνειν οἰκίστι μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν; Cf. 276 C 4 note.
- C 2 ἢ οὐκ ἂν μὴ ἔχουσιν; Burnet, 'ἔχουσιν huc transp. Badham: post μὴ BT: *secl.* Schanz.' ἔχουσιν is certainly wanted in the question rather than in the answer.
- d 1 ἐπὶ τὸ τρίτον . . . ὡς περ πάλαισμα. The victory in wrestling was not gained till the third fall. Cf. Aesch. *Eumen.* 586 'Ἐν μὲν τὸδ' ἦδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων. Plat. *Pol.* 583 B, *Phaedr.* 256 B τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὀλυμπιακῶν. καταβαλῶν Heindorf, καταβαλῶν BT, om. Badham, Schanz. καταβαλῶν cannot be omitted unless τὸν νεανίσκον is omitted also (Cobet). If καταβαλῶν is retained it can only mean 'after throwing the youth was once more setting out for the third bout.' But the future is better.
- 2 βαπτίζόμενον. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 9 B ψυχὴ τοῖς μὲν συμμέτροις αἰξεται πόνοις, τοῖσδ' ὑπερβάλλουσι βαπτίζεται.
- 5 ἀθήεις T, is much better than ἀληθεῖς B Vind. which Winckelmann tries to defend.
- 7 τῇ τελετῇ τῶν Κορυβάντων. Cf. Lucian, *De Saltat.* 272 Πρῶτον δὲ φασὶ 'Ρεῖν ἡσθεῖσαν τῇ τέχνῃ ἐν Φρυγίᾳ μὲν τοὺς Κορύβαντας ἐν Κρήτῃ δὲ τοὺς Κουρήτας ὀρχεῖσθαι κελεύσαι. Ibid. 277 'Ἐὼ λέγειν ὅτι τελετὴν οὐδὲ μίαν ἀρχαίαν ἔστιν εὐρεῖν ἄνευ ὀρχήσεως. Ibid. σὺν ῥυθμῷ καὶ ὀρχήσει μνεῖσθαι. Hence the phrase ἐξορχεῖσθαι τὰ μυστήρια. Cf. Eur. *Bacch.* 123; Hor. *Od.* i. 16, 7; Preller, *Gr. Myth.* 656; Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* 640, 1153; Verg. *Aen.* iii. 111; Ov. *Met.* iv. 282; Lucian, *Tragoedo-Podagra* 36:
- παραπλήγες δ' ἀμφὶ ῥόπτροις  
κελαδοῦσι Κρητὶ ῥυθμῷ  
νόμον Κορύβαντες εὐάν.
- On the dance of the Corybantēs see Smith's *Dict. Class. Antiq.* SALTATIO, 1005 a.
- 9 χορηγία BTV: χορεία t, V marg. As it was the office of the Choregus (χορηγία) to supply a chorus for the dramatist, the use of the word here implies that the Sophists were providing a similar entertainment, and at the same time indicates the dramatic character of the dialogue.
- εἰ ἄρα καὶ τετίλεσαι. In this use of εἰ ἄρα there is an

ellipsis of the apodosis: 'as you know, if, that is, you have been initiated.'

τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἱερῶν, 'the first part of the Sophistic mysteries.' e 2  
There is a similar allusion to the greater and lesser mysteries in *Sympos.* 210 A ταῦτα μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά ἴσως, ὃ Σώκρατες, κἀν σὺ μνηθεῖς· τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά, ὧν ἕνεκα καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστιν, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς μετή, οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ οἶσθ' ἂν εἴης.

ὡς φησι Πρόδικος. Cf. *Charms.* 163 D καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ 4 ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιρούντος. *Crat.* 384 B εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠκηκόη παρὰ Προδίκου τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν . . . εἰδέναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος· νῦν δὲ οὐκ ἀκήκοα, ἀλλὰ τὴν δραχμιαίαν. Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* xiv. 9 Τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς περ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς. Aristophanes, before he had learned to appreciate Socrates, contrasts him unfavourably with Prodicus (*Nub.* 361). On the philological works ascribed to Prodicus see Jann. *Gk. Gr.* App. ii. 12, note 1.

ταύτη τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. Cf. Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* iv, quoted in the note 278 on 276 C 4. a 2

ταῦτὸν ὄνομα ἐπ' ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίως ἔχουσιν κείμενον. The fallacy 6 depending on the equivocal use of words is described by Aristot. *Categ.* i. I 'Ομώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὃ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον, i. e. ζῶον may mean either a living man, or a picture.

σκολύθρια, 'stools': a word occurring only here in Plato. Cf. b 8 Ruhnk. *Tim.* *Lex.* Σκολύθρια· ταπεινὰ διφρία παρὰ τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς, ἃ τινες θρανία καλοῦσιν.

αὐτοῖν ἵνα μοι BT. Winckelmann regarding the repetition of the c syllable ἰν as a corruption conjectures αὐτοῖν ἃ μοι, and the alteration is adopted by Schanz in opposition to the best MSS. The only change required is to correct the itacism ἀποδώσειν in BT into ἀποδώσιν, as Burnet does with many MSS.

ἐπιδείξασθαι BT, ἐπιδείξασθαι Steph. Schanz. The change to the 5 future is quite unnecessary; cf. Hdt. i. 53 προλέγουσαι Κροίσω . . . μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μιν καταῦσαι. Plat. *Sympos.* 193 D ἐλπίδας παρέχεται . . . ἡμῶς . . . εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι. *Phaed.* 97 B πολλὴ ἐλπίς κτήσασθαι. Thuc. v. 22 οὐκ ἔφασαν δέξασθαι. Cf. Routh 'ἐπιδείξασθαι *Sierh. Edit.* veteri relicta lectione sine idonea causa opinor.'

παῖσαι T, παῖλαι B, παῖαι Vt. Cf. Rutherford, *N. Phryn.* p. 91: 6

'The Attic form was doubtless *παίσομαι*, as all forms with  $\xi$ , like *παίξας* and *πέπαιγμα*, were unquestionably un-Attic, and should be removed, with manuscript authority, from such passages as Plato, *Euthyd.* 278 c.'

$\nu\acute{\nu}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  BT,  $\nu\acute{\nu}\ \delta'$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  Heindorf, Bekker, Schanz,  $\nu\acute{\nu}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}, \mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , Stallbaum, Badham, Burnet. Heindorf's dictum, 'Immo  $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ , ut semper scribitur in hac formula (v. Reitz ad Lucian. *de Astrolog.* 9);' seems to have misled subsequent editors. In Lucian  $\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\acute{\iota}\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  is at the beginning of a sentence, where of course the enclitic  $\mu\omicron\iota$  is impossible, and the pronoun in antithesis to  $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\upsilon$  is necessarily emphatic. Stallbaum writes 'etiam  $\mu\omicron\iota$  ita in parenthesi collocari nuper a multis est observatum.' It is better to leave the reading of BT unaltered, instead of inserting commas to make  $\mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  into a formal parenthesis: cf. *Menex.* 236 B where all editors agree in writing  $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \sigma\upsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\tau\acute{\iota}\beta\epsilon\iota$ . See the note on 297 C  $\nu\epsilon\omega\sigma\acute{\iota}\ \mu\omicron\iota\ \delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$ .

d 1  $\pi\epsilon\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\omega$  T, 'let there be an end of this sport,' a less discourteous phrase than  $\pi\epsilon\pi\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\omega$  B, 'let this be stopped.'

7  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\alpha\iota$  V,  $\acute{\alpha}\pi'$   $\acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\acute{o}\ \sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\iota$  B,  $\acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\omicron\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\sigma\alpha\iota$  T. The verb  $\acute{\alpha}\iota\tau\omicron\sigma\chi\epsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\omega$  is found both in earlier dialogues, *Euthyphro* 5 A, 16 A, *Apol.* 20, and in later *Crat.* 413 D, *Phaedr.* 236 D, as well as in Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aristotle. The compound with  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}$  seems to occur only in this passage, and, for the intensive force of  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{o}$ , may be compared with  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\upsilon\theta\alpha\delta\acute{\iota}\zeta\acute{\omicron}\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\varsigma$  *Apol.* 37 A,  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\alpha\upsilon\sigma\chi\omicron\upsilon\eta\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\alpha\iota$  *ibid.* 31 B,  $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\tau\omicron\lambda\mu\acute{\omega}$  *Pol.* 503 B.

e 1  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\epsilon\sigma\theta\omicron$  T:  $\acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\epsilon\tau\omicron$  B does not give the meaning required.

3  $\text{'}\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\alpha}\ \gamma\epsilon\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma\ \dots$  289 B is used in an abridged form by Iamblichus, *Protrept.* C 5.

$\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\ \pi\acute{\rho}\alpha\tau\tau\epsilon\upsilon$ , 'to do well.' 'An ambiguous phrase. In its usual acceptation it would rather mean "faring well" than "acting well." It occurs in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 507 C, in a way which seems to contain the transition between these two ideas— $\pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\acute{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\chi\eta$ ,  $\delta\ \text{Καλλίκλεις, τὸν σῶφρονα, ὥσπερ διήλθομεν, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ ἕσιον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελέως, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πρᾶττειν δ' ἂν πρᾶττη, τὸν δ' εὖ πρᾶττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πρᾶττοντα ἄθλιον. Aristotle was at no pains to solve the ambiguity. Cf. *Eth.* vi. 2, 5.' (GRANT, *Aristot. Eth.* i. 4, 2.)$

*Εἰεν* is frequently used, as here, in passing on from one point to another. 'Well then, as to the next point.' Cf. Reisig ad Soph. a 1 *Oed. Col.* 1308 '*εἰεν*] Hac voce utuntur Graeci in omni genere sermonis, ubi ad alia progrediuntur; atque est plane, ut Grammatici definiunt, *συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένω, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.*'

*σεμνοῦ ἀνδρός*, 'the task of a great man.' '*σεμνὸς ἀνὴρ est quem 6 alius dicit οὐ φῦλον*' (Heind.). Cf. 303 C τῶν σεμνῶν δὴ καὶ δοκούντων τι εἶναι.

*εὐπορεῖν*, 'to be well provided.' Cf. Plat. *Ion* 533 A εὐπορεῖ ὁ τι γ εἴπη, a passage which shows that *εὐρεῖν* (T) is an unnecessary change.

τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. Health is rightly put before beauty and riches in 8 Plat. *Legg.* 661 A λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν ὑγιαίνειν, δεύτερον δὲ κάλλος, τρίτον δὲ πλοῦτος. Cf. *Meno* 87 E ὑγίαια, φαμίεν, καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος δὴ.

τάλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἱκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι. Cf. Iambl. *Protrept.* b 1 ὥστε ἱκανῶς αὐτὸ παρεσκευάσθαι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ φύσιν συμμετρίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν καὶ βῶμην.

ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ. Iamblichus completes the phrase by adding πατριδί. 3 ποῦ χοροῦ. The choir or band of the cardinal virtues, or rather c 1 of goods in general, is incomplete without σοφία. Routh compares Aristeid. *Or. pro Milliad.* ii. 161 Μιλτιάδην δὲ τὸν ἐν Μαραθῶνι ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν.

παρλείπωμεν BT: Cobet, followed by Schanz, alters this to παρε- 3 λίπομεν. But the subjunctive is rightly retained by Burnet, being defended by Heindorf on the ground that ἐνθυμούμαι expresses anxious care, as in *Hērō. Mai.* 300 D ἐνθυμούμαι, ὦ ἑταίρε, μὴ παίξῃς πρὸς με.

Ὀλίγου . . . ἐγενόμεθα, 'we were near to becoming.' Cf. Plat. *Apol.* 9 22 A ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι: *ibid.* 17 A ὀλίγου ἔμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμεν.

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, 'in our former list.' d 2

Ἡ σοφία δὴπον . . . εὐτυχία ἐστίν. The pretence of having for- 6 gotten to include εὐτυχία, and then remembering that it was included in σοφία, is intended to draw especial attention to the contrast between the Socratic doctrine, that virtue consists in wisdom or true knowledge, and the view of the Sophists that it is the result of good fortune, a kind of divine gift, as in the *Meno* 99 C. Cf. *Euthyd.*



280 B σοφίας παρουσίας, φ' ἂν παρῆ μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας. Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 251 note, observes that it is difficult to find (in German, as it is in English) a single word expressing the two meanings of εὐτυχία, an accidental concurrence of favourable circumstances, and success resulting from the agent's judicious choice of means.

7 κἀν παῖς γνοίη. Cf. 301 C I οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα φῆμην τοῦτο ἀπορήσαι. *Lys.* 205 C I, *Symp.* 204 B.

καὶ δε. Here, as in ἡ δ' δε, we see that δε was in its original sense demonstrative.

e 1 περὶ ἀλημμάτων εὐπραγίαν, 'success in flute-tunes.' 'εὐπραγίαν delendum videtur' (Schanz). On the contrary εὐπραγίαν is most appropriate as carrying on the idea that εὐτυχία is an element in εὐ πράττειν.

280 'Ἄρ' οὐκ . . . δετι, 'Is it not because . . .?' 'Vulgo ἄρ' οὐν.' 'Nusa 4 quam vidi οὐν infelicius positum, 'Ἄρ' οὐκ ex Platonico more reposui: sic enim loqui solet qui alterius responsum ante capit' (Badham). Οὐν has probably 'been introduced here, because ἄρ' οὐν occurs so frequently in the context immediately following, 280 B (*bis*), D, 281 A, B.

b 1 ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, 'in general,' i.e. as a summary induction from the particular cases mentioned.

2 φ' ἂν παρῆ, a good emendation supplied from Casaubon's unpublished notes by Routh: it indicates the subject to be understood before προσδεῖσθαι, which is left without any subject by the reading δετην παρῆ BT Vind. 1.

4 πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι, 'how our former agreements would stand,' i.e. how they would be affected by this conclusion about σοφία. Badham's conjecture ἄρ' for ἂν is therefore no improvement.

c 1 ὠφελοῖ, εἰ ἄη Iamblichus: ὠφελοίη η B: ὠφελοιη εἰ ηι T. The scribes of B and T both seem to have been misled by glancing back at ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ. Iamblichus is, of course, a much earlier witness to the true reading.

2 ποτόν. After σίτια the plural would be more usual, as in *Protag.* 314 A, 334 A, *Phaedr.* 259 C, *Pol.* 332. But Stallbaum retains ποτόν as the reading of all MSS., and Winckelmann quotes in support of it a similar combination in Max. Tyr. *Or.* xxxi. 108 ἐμπελάμενοι ποτοῦ καὶ σιτίων.

4 οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες. The term δημιουργός, 'one who works for

the people,' includes all who practise any profession, trade, or craft for pay, from physicians to artisans.

δέν BT Vind.; δει Iamblichus. I have allowed the reading of δ 4 the MSS. to stand, but not without hesitation. It is more likely that δειν should have been altered to δει, in order to make the construction regular, than the reverse. Cf. Aesch. *Persae* 188. *τούτω στάσιν τιν', ὡς ἐγὼ ἴδοικον ὄραν, τεύχειν ἐν ἀλλήλαισι:* and Soph. *Trach.* 1238 *ἀνὴρ δδ', ὡς ζοικεν, οὐ νεμείν ἐμοὶ φθίνοντι μοίραν.* But in these passages the infinitive follows ὡς ζοικεν, and the passages quoted by Winckelmann, to prove that it may precede, are not altogether convincing. More satisfactory, so far as poetry is concerned, is the passage Aesch. *Pers.* 564 *τυτθὰ δ' ἐκφυγεῖν ἀνακτ' αὐτὸν ὡς ἀκούομεν.*

ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος τῆς κτήσεως γίνεται, BT. For ὡς Iamblichus 6 has *ἦ*, *Protrept.* c.v., which has been adopted by Routh, Schanz, and Burnet. Schanz, however, had previously written (*N. C. P.* p. 74): 'Amplecterer ergo Routhii coniecturam (?), ni artis palaeographicae rationem spretam viderem; nam permutationis verborum *ἦ* et ὡς nullum novi exemplum.' Stallbaum retains ὡς, laying an emphasis on τῆς κτήσεως, as does Ficinus: 'nihil enim *sola* possessio iuvat.' This is justified by the consideration that τῆς κτήσεως here, like τὴν τούτων κτήσιν in D 4, still connotes the negative idea expressed in *χρῆστο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή* and *μόνον κεκτηῖσθαι*.

'*Ἀρ' οὖν . . . οὔτε ἀγαθόν*, D 7-281 A I, quoted by Stobaeus, *Florileg.* 7 103, 29.

ἦδη τοῦτο ἱκανόν T, Stob. This is strangely corrupted in B into e 1 the senseless *δ δὴ τούτωι καλλίωι*. *ἦδη* means 'at once,' i. e. 'without anything more,' 'of itself.' Cf. *Gorg.* 486 E *εὐ οἶδ' ὅτι . . . ταῦτ' ἦδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῆ*. On the various uses of *ἦδη* in Plato cf. Lutoslawski, 106, 118.

ἦ καὶ ἐν μή; BT. *καί*, omitted by Stobaeus, is necessary to the 4 exact sense, '*an etiam si non recte?*' (Ficinus).

*καλῶς γε*, Stob., a necessary emendation of *καλῶς δέ*, BTV.

*θάτερον*, 'harm,' is often used as equivalent to *τὸ κακόν*, in order 5 to avoid a word of ill omen. Cf. 297 D *πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσεις*, 'would do more harm than good.'

ἄλλο τι . . . ἦ ἐπιστήμη; 'is that which effects the right use 281 anything else than knowledge of carpentering?' a 3

- 3 τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι. A second τὸ seems to be required before ὀρθῶς, as in A 5 and A 8; ἀπεργάζομαι is apparently not one of the verbs which are followed by the anarthrous infinitive; cf. Jannaris 2085.
- 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν πον καί, 'but surely also in the work pertaining to household furniture.' The whole sentence ἀλλὰ μὴν πον . . . Συνέφη is bracketed by Hirschig and Badham, but without apparent reason.
- 6 τὴν χρείαν, 'the use' in the sense of 'usefulness.' Cf. *Gorg.* 480 A τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεία ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς;
- 8 τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρῆσθαι. Bracketed by Schanz without good reason: for τὸ Badham would prefer τοῦ, but the accusative rightly represents the area or extent of the verb's action: 'in regard to the right use of all these was it knowledge that leads the way?' Cf. *Soph. Philoct.* 99 τὴν γλώσσαν, οὐχὶ τάργα, πάνθ' ἡγουμένην, 'the tongue in all things takes the lead.'
- b 1 ἦν (& ἦ) ἡγουμένη. The article ἡ seems to have been dropped out. Badham supplied it, but omitted ἦν, which is supported by BT.
- 2 οὐ μόνον ἀρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν. Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Eud.* vii. 14, 1 Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ φαμεν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὐ πράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας εὐ ποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, σκεπτεῖον δρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχῆς ὁ δ' ἀτυχῆς, ἡ οὐ; On this passage Zeller, *Plato* 51, n. 13 writes: 'Eudemus, *Eth. Eud.* vii. 14 (1247 b 15) must refer to the *Euthydemus* (279 D sq., 281 B), inasmuch as what is here quoted as Socratic is to be found there and there only.' *Eth. Eud.* vii. 13, 10 καὶ ὀρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. 'Ἄλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη οὐκ ὀρθῶν' ἀρετὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *Plut. Moral.* 440 B οὐκοῦν ἔτι γελοιότερος ὁ μόνον τὴν φρόνησιν μὴ διδακτὴν ἀποφαίνων, ἧς ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὄφελος οὐδὲν οὔτε ὄνησις ἐστίν;
- 7 ἡ μάλλον ὀλίγα; The words νοῦν ἔχων, which follow in BT, are omitted by Iamblichus, and rightly rejected by Badham and Schanz. For in the following argument there is no place for an antithesis between νοῦν ἔχων and νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, but only between πολλά and ὀλίγα: 'Would a man devoid of understanding be benefited by possessing and by doing many things, or rather (by possessing and by doing) few things?'
- c 2 ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων, 'and doing less ill.' The phrase κακῶς πράττειν may mean either 'to do evil' or 'to do (fare) badly.'

Socrates here falls into the same fallacy as the Sophists by using *πράττων* in two different senses, but the purpose and effect of his argument are totally different. Cf. *Charmid.* 172 A *ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*. See Heindorf's note on that passage.

*Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω κτλ.*, 'In which case then would a man be more likely to do fewer things, if he were poor or rich?' 'Cave μᾶλλον cum ἐλάττω coniungas, quod fecit Heindorfius' (Stallbaum).

*ἐντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος*; Cobet would substitute *ἐπίτιμος*, but Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 75, rightly argues that *ἐντιμος* and *ἄτιμος* are both referred to social as well as legal honour, while *ἐπίτιμος* is limited to the latter.

*ἀνδρείος ἄν.* The addition [*καὶ σώφρων*] seems to be inappropriate, and is rejected by Badham and Schanz.

*ἐν κεφαλαίῳ κτλ.* 'To sum up then, Cleinias,' said I, 'as to all things which we at first said were good, the argument probably does not turn upon this question, how they are by nature good of themselves alone.' In the beginning of the sentence *σύμπαντα* is the subject of *κινδυνεύει* and of an infinitive dependent upon it, such as *ταύτη σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖν* (Stallbaum); but Plato afterwards passes by an anacoluthon to *περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι*, 'a change of construction in consequence of the more convenient form of the continuation' (Engelhardt ap. Lutosl. 76).

*πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ [εἶναι]*. There is no objection to the construction *πέφυκεν εἶναι*, which occurs in *Legg.* 723 D, 870 B, but *εἶναι* is omitted in B Vind., and apparently added in T from Iamblichus.

*μείζω κακὰ εἶναι*. The infinitive depends on *ὧδ' ἔχει*. Cf. *Phaed.* 670 C *εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας* (Winckelmann).

*ἔν.* The participle is dependent on *συμβαίνει*, the effect of which extends to the whole passage. The same construction is found in *Pol.* 490 C *ξυνέβη προσῆκον τοῖσι τοῖσι ἀνδράσι*, and in *Crat.* 422 A, *Menex.* 237 C. The infinitive is, however, more usual, as in *Phaed.* 74 A, 92 B, *Parmen.* 134 A.

*τὸ λοιπόν*, i. e. the conclusion that remains to be drawn. 282

*ἐπειδὴ T: ἐπειδὴ δὲ B: ἐπειδὴ δὴ* Stallbaum's conjecture, which illustrates the origin of the error in B as a repetition of the last syllable in *ἐπειδὴ*.

- 2 ἐφάνημεν . . . γιγνόμενοι, 'it was shown that we become.'
- 4 ἐπιστήμη ἢ παρέχουσα. Supply ἐφάνη from ἐφάνημεν. Iamblichus has ἴστίη: Heindorf, Bekker, and Badham without authority add ἦν, 'is, as we said.'
- 5 ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου. The same phrase is found in *Pol.* 499 A, *Legg.* 938 C. The dative is much more usual.
- 6 τοῦτο, used here in its 'prospective' sense, is explained by ὅπως κτλ.
- 7 καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτο οἰόμενον . . . ὑπηρεαίν. 'And when a man thinks that this is what he ought certainly to receive much rather than money from his father, and from guardians and friends, especially those who profess to love him, whether strangers or citizens, and entreats and beseeches them to impart wisdom,—for this purpose, Cleinias, there is no cause for shame or blame in serving or slaving either for a lover or for any man, and being willing to perform any honourable service from the desire to become wise.'

With this passage Routh compares *Symphos.* 184 C νερόμισται κτλ., where the same subject is treated at length in the speech of Pausanias.

- b 6 ἢ οὐ δοκᾷ σοι; . . . Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ κτλ. 'Or do you not think so? Nay, I think you speak quite rightly.'
- c 1 Εἰ ἴστί γε. 'Yes, Cleinias,' said I, 'if at least wisdom can be taught.'
- 4 'Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε . . . 'But in my opinion, Socrates, it can be taught.'
- 6 ἀπαλλάξας. 'Pro ἀπαλλάττων' (Heind.). Stallbaum corrects Heindorf's error, showing that the aorist is required to express a single and as it were momentary action, and comparing *Phaed.* 60 C εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνίσσας με: *Xen. Cyr.* i. 14, 3, and many other passages.
- 8 διδασκτὸν δοκᾷ καὶ . . . ποιεῖν. Badham adds εἶναι after δοκεῖ on account of ποιεῖν following. The construction δοκεῖ διδασκτὸν may be compared with 289 B οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, and *Gorg.* 475 E ὁ ἔλεγχος . . . οὐδέν ἔοικεν. *Tim.* 37 D καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶον αἰδίων.

The question, εἰ διδασκτὸν ἢ ἀρετή, in other words the relation of knowledge to virtue, has been already discussed in several of the early dialogues and especially in the *Protagoras*, where Socrates

begins by denying but ends by affirming that virtue can certainly be taught. Cf. *Protag.* 361 B.

οἷον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι. In the reading of BT, δ 5 οἶον . . . τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων, τῶν προτρεπτικῶν cannot well stand without a substantive: Routh proposed to read οἶον and λόγων, and this emendation is accepted by Stallbaum, οἶον being regarded as a rather unusual form of attraction, 'my example of what I desire protreptic arguments to be': Schanz prefers the emendation found in Cod. Angelic. C. I. 4, a copy of B, οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι. Cobet cuts the knot by omitting the whole clause.

ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως κτλ., 'unskilful perhaps and long and ill-ex-6 pressed.'

ταῦτὸν τοῦτο τέχνην πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω, 'give us a specimen of 8 treating this same subject according to rules of art.'

τὸ εἰρησ κτλ., 'show the youth what follows in order from the e 1 point at which I left off.'

ἦν δὲ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν, 'which he must acquire in order to be 3 happy.' Cf. 289 C ἦν ἔδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι. *Pol.* 427 B. In this construction δεῖ properly applies to the notion of λαβόντα, κεκτημένους, &c.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον. Coislin.<sup>2</sup>: γὰρ om. BTV. 4

τυγχάνει δὲ κτλ. For a full discussion of this use of τυγχάνω 5 with a participle see Rutherford, *N. Phryg.* p. 342, and cf. 290 A 4, *Tim.* 19 A, *Theaet.* 165 C, *Protag.* 313 C ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει δὲ ἔμπορος τις, 2 *Macc.* iii. 9.

ἄφαινο Heindorf: ἀφαινο BTV. Schanz regards ἀφαινο as an 283 error in the original archetype. Cf. Xen. *Conu.* iii. 2 εἰρηγοῦ ποίω α 3 λόγων ἀπτόμενοι μάλιστα ἂν ταῦτα ποιούμεν.

θαυμαστός . . . θαυμαστόν. Plato seems to use either form in- 7 differently both of things and persons: cf. Riddell, *Digest*, § 314.

κατήρχεν λόγον. The accusative after the active voice of this b 2 verb is unusual in prose: but see Pind. *Nem.* iii. 10 ἄρχε δ' οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατερ, δόκιμον ὕμνον. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* § 416, Anmerk 7. After the middle voice the accusative is not uncommon in poetry: Hom. *Od.* iii. 445 χερνίβῃ τ' οὐλοχίτας τε κατήρχετο. Eur. *Hec.* 685 κατήρχομαι νόμον Βακχείων. *Or.* 949 κατήρχομαι στεναγμόν. A poetical construction is not out of place in such a writer as Plato, after a formal invocation of the Muses, 276 D.

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Πότερον λέγοντα, ‘by speaking or by not speaking the thing that may be in question?’

οἷκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων, ‘he speaks no other existing thing than that very thing which he speaks.’ τῶν ὄντων is bracketed by a 2 Badham and Schanz, but rightly retained by Burnet. See the next note.

Ἐν μὴν κάκεινό γ’ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων. This καί proves that there has been a previous mention of τῶν ὄντων. ‘Moreover that which he speaks is one existing thing, independently of the rest.’

τᾶληθῆ rejected by Badham, so as to leave the statement, ‘he that speaks τὸ ὄν speaks also τὰ ὄντα.’ But the alteration is unnecessary. The extension of τὸ ὄν into καὶ τὰ ὄντα is justified by the comprehensive phrase περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ὁ λόγος. Ficinus renders rightly: ‘Enim vero quicumque quod est quaeve sunt dicit, vera loquitur.’

Ναί, ἔφη· ἄλλ’ ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus b 1



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οἶόν τε εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι. Cf. *Sophist.* 236 E 'How it is possible to 7 speak anything false or to suppose that it really exists, and to say this without being involved in a contradiction, is difficult in the extreme. Why so? Because the statement has the boldness to assume that Not-being exists. But when we were boys the great Parmenides testified to us from first to last both in prose and in metre in these words—"For this you ne'er can learn that non-existent things exist." The fallacy depends on the ambiguity of the phrase λέγειν τι, meaning properly 'to speak about a thing,' and only improperly 'to speak a thing.' The words spoken do exist as words, but are not true unless the *thing* exists, and exists as it is spoken of (Routh). Examples of the fallacy παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν are given in the *Soph.* *El.* iv. 4 (527), among them δυνατὰ ὄραν and σιγῶντα λέγειν 300 B.

Πότερον λέγοντα, 'by speaking or by not speaking the thing that may be in question?'

οἷκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων, 'he speaks no other existing thing than 284 that very thing which he speaks.' τῶν ὄντων is bracketed by a 2 Badham and Schanz, but rightly retained by Burnet. See the next note.

'Ἐν μὴν κακείνῳ γ' ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων. This καί proves that there has 3 been a previous mention of τῶν ὄντων. 'Moreover that which he speaks is one existing thing, independently of the rest.'

τάληθῃ rejected by Badham, so as to leave the statement, 'he 6 that speaks τὸ ὄν speaks also τὰ ὄντα.' But the alteration is unnecessary. The extension of τὸ ὄν into καὶ τὰ ὄντα is justified by the comprehensive phrase περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ὁ λόγος. Ficinus renders rightly: 'Enim vero quicunque quod est quaeve sunt dicit, vera loquitur.'

Ναί, ἔφη· ἄλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus D 1

- 4 Εἰπέ μοι, with a plural vocative, is found also in *Protag.* 311 D εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες.
- 8 φηθήτην ἄρα, 'they supposed, as I thought: ' ἄρα refers to 278 D ταῦτα μὲν οὖν . . . πεπαίσθω τε ὑμῖν καὶ ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει.
- C 4 ἔξαρνος ἴσα ἃ νῦν λίγαια. Cf. *Charm.* 158 C ἐξάρνω εἶναι τὰ ἔρωτάμενα.
- 5 Τί οὖν; ἔφη. Schanz's conjecture ἡ οὖν is quite arbitrary and unnecessary.
- 7 οὐκ οὖν φησί γέ πω. Stallbaum quotes many instances of the separation of πω from the negative, *Men.* 72 D, 83 E, *Pol.* 434 D &c.
- 8 ἀλαζών, 'untruthful' one who wanders (ἀλάται) from the truth; 'mendax' (Heindorf). Stallbaum, with Ficinus ('iactabundus') and Winckelmann, retains the more usual meaning as explaining why Cleinias does not claim to be σοφός, 'he says at least that he is not yet wise, for he is no braggart.'
- d 2 δε μὴν οὐκ ἴσθιν. As δε is sometimes used in the sense of οἶος, the Sophist prepares to play upon the double meaning. Cf. *Soph. Ajax* 1259 μαθὼν δε εἰ φύσων. Eur. *Syrphl.* 737 δρωμέν τε τοιαυθ' ἄν σὺ τυγχάνης θέλων. Plat. *Phaedr.* 243 E ἔωσπερ ἔω ἦς δε εἰ.
- 4 ὑπολαβὼν . . . ἔφη, 'took me up and said.'
- 6 ἀπολωλέναι, 'to be dead,' or 'destroyed.'
- καίτοι πολλοὺ ἄν ἄξιοι κτλ. 'Very precious forsooth must such friends and lovers be!'
- e 2 εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, ἔφη, ἦν εἰπεῖν, 'if it were not rather a rude thing to say.' The same phrase is used in *Apol.* 32 D.
- 3 Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, 'In caput tuum istuc recidat,' sc. τὸ ἀπολωλέναι: 'On your head be it.' Cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 525, 669, *Pax* 1063 H. ὦ μέλειοι θνητοὶ καὶ νήπιοι, Tr. εἰς κεφαλὴν σοί.
- δ τι μαθὼν. Cf. 299 A, *Apol.* 36 B τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, δ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἔγον, 'for having taken it into my head not to lead a quiet life.' As the indirect form of τί μαθὼν the phrase must be written with the pronoun δ τι, not with the conjunction ὅτι: cf. Hermann ad Viger, *De Idiot. Gr.* 758. The latter could only be justified if μαθὼν were ever used alone in this sense. Schanz, following Hermann on Viger, *De Idiotism.* 759 sq., wrongly changes μαθὼν into παθὼν. The two phrases are rightly distinguished by L. and Sc., *Lex. manthano.* 'Τί

μαθών; on what *belief* or *persuasion* . . . ? implying voluntary action:—τί παθών; on what *compulsion*?' or, 'What ailed you to do this or that?'

καταψύθει . . . ἐξολωλέναι, 'falsely charge me and the rest of us 4 with a thing of which I think it wicked even to speak,—as that I should wish my friend here to be dead.'

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Ναί, ἔφη· ἄλλ' ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus δ 1

280 B σοφίας παρούσης, φῆ δὲν παρῆ μηδὲν προσδεῖσθαι εὐτυχίας. Bonitz, *Platon. Stud.* 251 note, observes that it is difficult to find (in German, as it is in English) a single word expressing the two meanings of εὐτυχία, an accidental concurrence of favourable circumstances, and success resulting from the agent's judicious choice of means.

7 κὰν παῖς γνοίη. Cf. 301 C I οὐδ' ἂν παῖδα φῆμιν τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι. *Lys.* 205 C I, *Symp.* 204 B.

καὶ ἔσ. Here, as in ἡ δ' ἔσ, we see that ἔσ was in its original sense demonstrative.

e i περι αὐλημάτων εὐπραγίαν, 'success in flute-tunes.' 'εὐπραγίαν delendum videtur' (Schanz). On the contrary εὐπραγίαν is most appropriate as carrying on the idea that εὐτυχία is an element in εὐ πράττειν.

280 Ἄρ' οὐκ . . . ἔτι, 'Is it not because . . .?' 'Vulgo ἄρ' οὐν.' 'Nusquam vidi οὐν infelicitus positum, Ἄρ' οὐκ ex Platónico more repouit: sic enim loqui solet qui alterius responsum ante capit' (Badham). Οὐν has probably been introduced here, because ἄρ' οὐν occurs so frequently in the context immediately following, 280 B (δῖς), D, 281 A, B.

b i ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, 'in general,' i.e. as a summary induction from the particular cases mentioned.

2 φῆ δὲν παρῆ, a good emendation supplied from Casaubon's unpublished notes by Routh: it indicates the subject to be understood before προσδεῖσθαι, which is left without any subject by the reading ἔσαν παρῆ BT Vind. I.

4 πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι, 'how our former agreements would stand,' i.e. how they would be affected by this conclusion about σοφία. Badham's conjecture ἄρ' for ἂν is therefore no improvement.

c i ὠφελοῖ, εἰ εἴη Iamblichus: ὠφελοίη η B: ὠφελοιη εἰ ηι T. The scribes of B and T both seem to have been misled by glancing back at ὠφελοῖ ἢ εἰ ὠφελοῖ. Iamblichus is, of course, a much earlier witness to the true reading.

2 ποτόν. After σίτια the plural would be more usual, as in *Protag.* 314 A, 334 A, *Phaedr.* 259 C, *Pol.* 332. But Stallbaum retains ποτόν as the reading of all MSS., and Winckelmann quotes in support of it a similar combination in Max. Tyr. *Or.* xxxi. 108 ἐμπιλάμειοι ποτοῦ καὶ σιτίων.

4 οἱ δημιουργοὶ πάντες. The term δημιουργός, 'one who works for

the people,' includes all who practise any profession, trade, or craft for pay, from physicians to artisans.

δέν BT Vind.; δεῖ Iamblichus. I have allowed the reading of δ 4 the MSS. to stand, but not without hesitation. It is more likely that δέν should have been altered to δεῖ, in order to make the construction regular, than the reverse. Cf. Aesch. *Persae* 188. *τούτω στάσιν τιν', ὡς ἐγὼ 'δοκοῦν ὄραν, τεύχειν ἐν ἀλλήλαισι:* and Soph. *Trach.* 1238 *ἀνὴρ δδ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐ γεμείν ἐμοὶ φθίνοντι μοῖραν.* But in these passages the infinitive follows *ὡς ἔοικεν*, and the passages quoted by Winckelmann, to prove that it may precede, are not altogether convincing. More satisfactory, so far as poetry is concerned, is the passage Aesch. *Pers.* 564 *τυτθὰ δ' ἐκφυγεῖν ἀνακτ' αὐτὸν ὡς ἀκούομεν.*

ὡς οὐδὲν ἐφέλος τῆς κτήσεως γίνεται, BT. For ὡς Iamblichus 6 has *ἤ, Protrept.* c.v., which has been adopted by Routh, Schanz, and Burnet. Schanz, however, had previously written (*N. C. P.* p. 74): 'Amplecterer ergo Routhii coniecturam (?), ni artis palaeographicae rationem spretam viderem; nam permutationis verborum ἤ et ὡς nullum novi exemplum.' Stallbaum retains ὡς, laying an emphasis on τῆς κτήσεως, as does Ficinus: 'nihil enim sola possessio iuvat.' This is justified by the consideration that τῆς κτήσεως here, like τῆν τούτων κτήσιν in D 4, still connotes the negative idea expressed in *χρῆστο δὲ αὐτοῖς μή* and *μόνον κεκτησθαι.*

\*Αρ' οὖν . . . οὔτε ἀγαθόν, D 7-281 A 1, quoted by Stobaeus, *Florileg.* 7 103, 29.

ἤδη τοῦτο ἱκανόν T, Stob. This is strangely corrupted in B into e 1 the senseless δ δὴ τούτωι καλλίωι. ἤδη means 'at once,' i. e. 'without anything more,' 'of itself.' Cf. *Gorg.* 486 E *εὐ αἰδ' ὅτι . . . ταῦτ' ἤδη ἐστὶν αὐτὰ τάληθῆ.* On the various uses of ἤδη in Plato cf. Lutoslawski, 106, 118.

ἤ καὶ ἔν μή; BT. καί, omitted by Stobaeus, is necessary to the 4 exact sense, '*an etiam si non recte?*' (Ficinus).

καλῶς γε, Stob., a necessary emendation of καλῶς δέ, BTv.

θάτερον, 'harm,' is often used as equivalent to τὸ κακόν, in order 5 to avoid a word of ill omen. Cf. 297 D *πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσεις,* 'would do more harm than good.'

ἄλλο τί . . . ἢ ἐπιστήμη; 'is that which effects the right use 281 anything else than knowledge of carpentering?' a 3



- 3 τὸ ἀπεργαζόμενον ὁρθῶς χρῆσθαι. A second τό seems to be required before ὁρθῶς, as in A 5 and A 8; ἀπεργάζομαι is apparently not one of the verbs which are followed by the anarthrous infinitive; cf. Jannaris 2085.
- 4 ἀλλὰ μὴν που καί, 'but surely also in the work pertaining to household furniture.' The whole sentence ἀλλὰ μὴν που . . . Συνέφη is bracketed by Hirschig and Badham, but without apparent reason.
- 6 τὴν χρεῖαν, 'the use' in the sense of 'usefulness.' Cf. *Gorg.* 480 A τίς ἡ μεγάλη χρεῖα ἐστὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς;
- 8 τὸ ὁρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις χρῆσθαι. Bracketed by Schanz without good reason: for τό Badham would prefer τοῦ, but the accusative rightly represents the area or extent of the verb's action: 'in regard to the right use of all these was it knowledge that leads the way?' Cf. *Soph. Philoct.* 99 τὴν γλῶσσαν, οὐχὶ τάργα, πάνθ' ἡγουμένην, 'the tongue in all things takes the lead.'
- b 1 ἦν (ἦ) ἡγουμένην. The article ἦ seems to have been dropped out. Badham supplied it, but omitted ἦν, which is supported by BT.
- 2 οὐ μόνον ἄρα εὐτυχίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐπραγίαν. Cf. *Aristot. Eth. Eud.* vii. 14, I 'Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἡ φρόνησις ποιεῖ τὴν εὐπραγίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ φαμεν καὶ τοὺς εὐτυχεῖς εὐπράττειν ὡς καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας εὐποιούσης εὐπραγίαν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, σκεπτέον ἄρ' ἐστὶ φύσει ὁ μὲν εὐτυχὴς ὁ δ' ἀτυχὴς, ἢ οὐ;' On this passage Zeller, *Plato* 51, n. 13 writes: 'Eudemus, *Eth. Eud.* vii. 14 (1247 b 15) must refer to the *Euthydemus* (279 D sq., 281 B), inasmuch as what is here quoted as Socratic is to be found there and there only.' *Eth. Eud.* vii. 13, 10 καὶ ὁρθῶς τὸ Σωκρατικόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἰσχυρότερον φρονήσεως. 'Ἄλλ' ὅτι ἐπιστήμην ἔφη οὐκ ὁρθῶν ἀρετῇ γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *Plut. Moral.* 440 B οὐκοῦν ἔτι γελαιότερος ὁ μόνῃ τὴν φρόνησιν μὴ διδακτὴν ἀποφαίναν, ἢς ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὄφελος οὐδὲν οὔτε ὄνησις ἐστίν;
- 7 ἢ μάλλον ὀλίγα; The words νοῦν ἔχων, which follow in BT, are omitted by Iamblichus, and rightly rejected by Badham and Schanz. For in the following argument there is no place for an antithesis between νοῦν ἔχων and νοῦν μὴ ἔχων, but only between πολλά and ὀλίγα: 'Would a man devoid of understanding be benefited by possessing and by doing many things, or rather (by possessing and by doing) few things?'
- c 2 ἦττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων, 'and doing less ill.' The phrase κακῶς πράττειν may mean either 'to do evil' or 'to do (fare) badly.'

Socrates here falls into the same fallacy as the Sophists by using *πράττων* in two different senses, but the purpose and effect of his argument are totally different. Cf. *Charmid.* 172 A *ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον . . . τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι*. See Heindorf's note on that passage.

*Πότερον οὖν ἂν μᾶλλον ἐλάττω κτλ.*, 'In which case then would a man be more likely to do fewer things, if he were poor or rich?' 'Cave μᾶλλον cum ἐλάττω coniungas, quod fecit Heindorfius' (Stallbaum).

*ἔντιμος ἢ ἄτιμος*; Cobet would substitute *ἐπίτιμος*, but Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 75, rightly argues that *ἔντιμος* and *ἄτιμος* are both referred to social as well as legal honour, while *ἐπίτιμος* is limited to the latter.

*ἀνδρείος ὄν*. The addition [*καὶ σώφρων*] seems to be inappropriate, 6 and is rejected by Badham and Schanz.

*ἐν κεφαλαίῳ κτλ.* 'To sum up then, Cleinias,' said I, 'as to all things which we at first said were good, the argument probably does not turn upon this question, how they are by nature good of themselves alone.' In the beginning of the sentence *σύμπαντα* is the subject of *κινδυνεύει* and of an infinitive dependent upon it, such as *ταύτη σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖν* (Stallbaum); but Plato afterwards passes by an anacoluthon to *περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὐτοῖς εἶναι*, 'a change of construction in consequence of the more convenient form of the continuation' (Engelhardt ap. Lutosl. 76).

*πέφυκεν ἀγαθὰ [εἶναι]*. There is no objection to the construction *πέφυκεν εἶναι*, which occurs in *Legg.* 723 D, 870 B, but *εἶναι* is omitted in B Vind., and apparently added in T from Iamblichus.

*μέλω κακὰ εἶναι*. The infinitive depends on *ὄδ' ἔχει*. Cf. *Phaed.* 70 C *εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας* (Winckelmann).

*ὄν*. The participle is dependent on *συμβαίνει*, the effect of which extends to the whole passage. The same construction is found in *Pol.* 490 C *ξυνέβη προσῆκον τοῖσι ἀνδράσι*, and in *Crat.* 422 A, *Menex.* 237 C. The infinitive is, however, more usual, as in *Phaed.* 74 A, 92 B, *Parmen.* 134 A.

*τὸ λοιπόν*, i. e. the conclusion that remains to be drawn. 282

*ἐπειδὴ T: ἐπειδὴ δὲ B: ἐπειδὴ δὴ* Stallbaum's conjecture, which illustrates the origin of the error in B as a repetition of the last syllable in *ἐπειδὴ*.

- 2 ἐφάνημεν . . . γιγνόμενοι, 'it was shown that we become.'
- 4 ἐπιστήμη ἢ παρέχουσα. Supply ἐφάνη from ἐφάνημεν. Iamblichus has ἴστίη: Heindorf, Bekker, and Badham without authority add ἦν, 'is, as we said.'
- 5 ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου. The same phrase is found in *Pol.* 499 A, *Legg.* 938 C. The date is much more usual.
- 6 τοῦτο, used here in its 'prospective' sense, is explained by ὅπως κτλ.
- 7 καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτο οἰόμενον . . . ὑπηρετῶν. 'And when a man thinks that this is what he ought certainly to receive much rather than money from his father, and from guardians and friends, especially those who profess to love him, whether strangers or citizens, and entreats and beseeches them to impart wisdom,— for this purpose, Cleinias, there is no cause for shame or blame in serving or slaving either for a lover or for any man, and being willing to perform any honourable service from the desire to become wise.'

With this passage Routh compares *Sympos.* 184 C *νερόμισται* κτλ., where the same subject is treated at length in the speech of Pausanias.

- b 6 ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; . . . Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εὖ κτλ. 'Or do you not think so? Nay, I think you speak quite rightly.'
- c 1 Ἐἴ ἴστί γε. 'Yes, Cleinias,' said I, 'if at least wisdom can be taught.'
- 4 'Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε . . . 'But in my opinion, Socrates, it can be taught.'
- 6 ἀπαλλάξας. 'Pro ἀπαλλάττων' (Heind.). Stallbaum corrects Heindorf's error, showing that the aorist is required to express a single and as it were momentary action, and comparing *Phaed.* 60 C εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνίσας με: *Xen. Cyr.* i. 14, 3, and many other passages.
- 8 διδασκὸν δοκεῖ καὶ . . . ποιῶν. Badham adds εἶναι after δοκεῖ on account of ποιεῖν following. The construction δοκεῖ διδασκὸν may be compared with 289 B οὐδὲ ταύτης ἔοικεν ὄφελος οὐδέν, and *Gorg.* 475 E ὁ ἔλεγχος . . . οὐδὲν ἔοικεν. *Tim.* 37 D καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶον αἰδίου.
- The question, εἰ διδασκὸν ἢ ἀρετή, in other words the relation of knowledge to virtue, has been already discussed in several of the early dialogues and especially in the *Protagoras*, where Socrates

begins by denying but ends by affirming that virtue can certainly be taught. Cf. *Protag.* 361 B.

οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι. In the reading of BT, δ 5 οἶον . . . τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων, τῶν προτρεπτικῶν cannot well stand without a substantive: Routh proposed to read οἶον and λόγων, and this emendation is accepted by Stallbaum, οἶον being regarded as a rather unusual form of attraction, 'my example of what I desire protreptic arguments to be': Schanz prefers the emendation found in Cod. Angelic. C. I. 4, a copy of B, οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι. Cobet cuts the knot by omitting the whole clause.

Ἰδιωτικὸν ἴσως κτλ., 'unskilful perhaps and long and ill-ex-6 pressed.'

ταῦτόν τοῦτο τέχνην πράττων ἐπιδειξάτω, 'give us a specimen of 8 treating this same subject according to rules of art.'

τὸ εἰς κτλ., 'show the youth what follows in order from the e 1 point at which I left off.'

ἦν δὲ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν, 'which he must acquire in order to be 3 happy.' Cf. 289 C ἦν εἶδει κεκτημένους ἡμᾶς εὐδαιμονας εἶναι. *Pol.* 427 B. In this construction δεῖ properly applies to the notion of λαβόντα, κεκτημένους, &c.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἔλεγον. Coislin.<sup>2</sup>: γὰρ om. BTV.

τυγχάνει δν κτλ. For a full discussion of this use of τυγχάνω 5 with a participle see Rutherford, *N. Phryn.* p. 342, and cf. 290 A 4, *Tim.* 19 A, *Theaet.* 165 C, *Protag.* 313 C ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει δν ἔμπορος τις, 2 Macc. iii. 9.

ἄψοιντο Heindorf: ἀψοῖντο BTV. Schanz regards ἀψοῖντο as an 283 error in the original archetype. Cf. Xen. *Conv.* iii. 2 ἐξηγοῦ ποίων a 3 λόγων ἀπτόμενοι μάλιστα ἂν ταῦτα ποιοῖμεν.

θαυμασίους . . . θαυμαστὸν. Plato seems to use either form in-7 differently both of things and persons: cf. Riddell, *Digest*, § 314.

κατήρχεν λόγον. The accusative after the active voice of this b 2 verb is unusual in prose: but see Pind. *Nem.* iii. 10 ἄρχε δ' οὐρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατερ, δόκιμον ἕμνον. Cf. Kühner-Blass, *Gr. Gr.* § 416, Anmerk 7. After the middle voice the accusative is not uncommon in poetry: Hom. *Od.* iii. 445 χέριβιά τ' οὐλοχίτας τε κατήρχετο. Eur. *Hec.* 685 κατάρχομαι νόμον βακχείον. *Or.* 949 κατάρχομαι στεναγμόν. A poetical construction is not out of place in such a writer as Plato, after a formal invocation of the Muses, 276 D.

- 4 **Ἐπέ μοι**, with a plural vocative, is found also in *Protag.* 311 D **εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες.**
- 8 **ῥηθήτην ἄρα**, 'they supposed, as I thought : ' *ἄρα* refers to 278 D **ταῦτα μὲν οὖν . . . πεπαισθῶ τε ὑμῖν καὶ ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει.**
- C 4 **ἔξαρος ἴσα** & **νῦν λίγας.** Cf. *Charm.* 158 C **ἔξάρην εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτάμενα.**
- 5 **Τι οὖν; ἔφη.** Schanz's conjecture **ἢ οὖν** is quite arbitrary and unnecessary.
- 7 **σέκουν φησί γέ πω.** Stallbaum quotes many instances of the separation of **πω** from the negative, *Men.* 72 D, 83 E, *Pol.* 434 D & C.
- 8 **ἀλαξάν**, 'untruthful,' one who wanders (**ἀλάται**) from the truth; 'mendax' (Heindorf). Stallbaum, with Ficinus ('iactabundus') and Winckelmann, retains the more usual meaning as explaining why Cleinias does not claim to be **σοφός**, 'he says at least that he is not yet wise, for he is no braggart.'
- D 2 **δε μὲν οὐκ ἴσθιν.** As **δε** is sometimes used in the sense of **οἶος**, the Sophist prepares to play upon the double meaning. Cf. *Soph. Ajax* 1259 **μαθῶν δε εἰ φύσω.** Eur. *Syrrh.* 737 **δρῶμίν τε τοιαῖθ' ἄν σὺ τυγχάνης θέλων.** Plat. *Phaedr.* 243 E **ἕωσπερ ἦν ἧς δε εἰ.**
- 4 **ὑπολαβῶν . . . ἔφη,** 'took me up and said.'
- 6 **ἀπολωλέναι**, 'to be dead,' or 'disappeared.'
- καίτοι πολλοὶ ἂν εἴποι κτλ.** 'Very precious forsooth must such friends and lovers be!'
- E 2 **εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον, ἔφη, ἦν εἰπᾶν,** 'if it were not rather a rude thing to say.' The same phrase is used in *Apol.* 32 D.
- 3 **Σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν,** 'In caput tuum istuc recidat,' sc. **τὸ ἀπολωλέναι** : 'On your head be it.' Cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 525, 669, *Pax* 1063 H. **ὦ μέλειο θνητοὶ καὶ νήπιοι,** Tr. **εἰς κεφαλὴν σοί.**
- ὃ τι μαθῶν.** Cf. 299 A, *Apol.* 36 B **τί αξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, ὃ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἔχον,** 'for having taken it into my head not to lead a quiet life.' As the indirect form of **τί μαθῶν** the phrase must be written with the pronoun **ὃ τι**, not with the conjunction **ὅτι** : cf. Hermann ad Viger, *De Idiot. Gr.* 758. The latter could only be justified if **μαθῶν** were ever used alone in this sense. Schanz, following Hermann on Viger, *De Idiotism.* 759 sq., wrongly changes **μαθῶν** into **παθῶν**. The two phrases are rightly distinguished by L. and Sc., *Lex. manthano.* 'Τί

μαθών; on what *belief* or *persuasion* . . . ? implying voluntary action:—τί παθών; on what *compulsion*?’ or, ‘What ailed you to do this or that?’

καταψεύδει . . . ἐξολωλέναι, ‘falsely charge me and the rest of us with a thing of which I think it wicked even to speak,—as that I should wish my friend here to be dead.’

Badham omits the latter part of the sentence, ὡς . . . ἐξολωλέναι, but without reason.

οἶόν τε εἶναι ψεύδεσθαι. Cf. *Sophist.* 236 E ‘How it is possible to speak anything false or to suppose that it really exists, and to say this without being involved in a contradiction, is difficult in the extreme. Why so? Because the statement has the boldness to assume that Not-being exists. But when we were boys the great Parmenides testified to us from first to last both in prose and in metre in these words—“For this you ne’er can learn that non-existent things exist.”’ The fallacy depends on the ambiguity of the phrase λέγειν τι, meaning properly ‘to speak about a thing,’ and only improperly ‘to speak a thing.’ The words spoken do exist as words, but are not true unless the *thing* exists, and exists as it is spoken of (Routh). Examples of the fallacy παρ’ ἀμφιβολίαν are given in the *Soph. El.* iv. 4 (527), among them δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν and σιγῶντα λέγειν 300 B.

Πότερον λέγοντα, ‘by speaking or by not speaking the thing that may be in question?’

οἷκ ἄλλο λέγει τῶν ὄντων, ‘he speaks no other existing thing than <sup>284</sup> that very thing which he speaks.’ τῶν ὄντων is bracketed by <sup>a 2</sup> Badham and Schanz, but rightly retained by Burnet. See the next note.

Ἐν μὴν κάκεινό γ’ ἐστίν τῶν ὄντων. This καί proves that there has <sup>3</sup> been a previous mention of τῶν ὄντων. ‘Moreover that which he speaks is one existing thing, independently of the rest.’

τάληθῆ rejected by Badham, so as to leave the statement, ‘he <sup>6</sup> that speaks τὸ ὄν speaks also τὰ ὄντα.’ But the alteration is unnecessary. The extension of τὸ ὄν into καὶ τὰ ὄντα is justified by the comprehensive phrase περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾗ ὁ λόγος. Ficinus renders rightly: ‘Enim vero quicumque quod est quaeve sunt dicit, vera loquitur.’

Ναί, ἔφη· ἄλλ’ ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ctesippus admits that Diodorus <sup>b 1</sup>

speaks truth, *if* he speaks that which is; but then immediately adds that this condition is not fulfilled in the present case. Stallbaum argues that *ὁ ταῦτα λέγων* means Euthydemus, 'the present speaker'; but it is the falsehood of Dionysodorus that is under discussion throughout the argument, as is evident from C 5 ἀλλ' εἶπερ λέγει Διονυσόδωρος, τάληθῆ τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα λέγει.

Plato is referring throughout the passage 283 E 7—284 C 6 to the doctrine of Parmenides, 'Only that which can be can be thought,' as stated in his *Proem.* 33-40, and more briefly in 43 Χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι, ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ εἶναι· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα. Cf. Mullach, *Fragmenta Philos. Gr.* i. 118, and Zeller, *Pre-Socr. Philos.* i. 584.

3 Τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα κτλ. 'But is it not the fact that non-existing things are not?'

4 "Ἄλλο τι κτλ. 'Then non-existing things are nowhere existing?'

The whole question and answer, "Ἄλλο τι . . . Οὐδαμοῖ", are omitted by Badham, but only the second *ὄντα* by Schanz: this *ὄντα*, however, is supported by the following τὰ μηδαμοῦ ὄντα.

6 (ὥστε καὶ εἶναι). This is Hermann's excellent emendation of various corruptions in the MSS., *ὡς γε Κλεινία* BV, *ὡσ' ἐκλεινία* T, with the marginal conjecture *ὡστ' ἐκείνα* in T Vind. *Κλεινία* is certainly wrong, for Cleinias is not included among those of whom Ctesippus says in E 3 *μου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καταψεύδει*. Also *ἐκείνα* is very questionable as a repetition of *ταῦτα τὰ μὴ ὄντα*, and at all events superfluous, whereas *καὶ εἶναι* adds much to the force of the passage: 'Is it possible that any one, whosoever he may be, could do anything about these non-existing things so as to make the things that exist nowhere actually to exist?' Badham and Schanz bracket τὰ μὴ ὄντα, as not absolutely necessary. The fallacy employed is that of the equivocal use of words, and, in this instance, of the word *λέγειν*. He who speaks speaks *about* something cannot properly be said *to speak the thing* ('rem loqui'). The *words* which he utters in speaking have a real existence, but unless the *things* really exist in the mode indicated by the words, these are not true. *Cratyl.* 385 B *ὅς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ὡς ἔστιν, ἀληθής· ὅς δ' ἂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ψευδής; Ναι.* 'Quod innuit quoque Ctesippus infra' (Routh). Cf. 283 E 7, note.

C 1 εἶπερ πρῆττουσι, καὶ ποιοῦσι, 'if they do, they also make.' Cf.

*Charmid.* 163 B οὐ ταῦτόν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη. Ibid. ποιήσω πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν.

Οὐκ ἔρα τὰ γε μὴ ἔντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδεὶς. 'No one then, said he, speaks what is not; for (in speaking) he would at once make something; and you have admitted that it is impossible for any one to make what is not.' In ποιοῖ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη τί Heindorf would either omit τί or substitute μὴτά, meaning τὰ μὴ ἔντα. Cf. *Sophist.* 238 C οὔτε φθέγγασθαι δυνατὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτ' εἰπεῖν οὔτε διανοηθῆναι τὸ μὴ ἂν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανοητὸν τε καὶ ἀρηρητὸν καὶ ἀφβεγκτον καὶ ἄλογον.

κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον TV: λόγον om. B. 'Huius ellipsis alterum 5 exemplum novimus nullum' (Stallb.).

Ἔσιν μέντοι . . . 'Surely there are. Gentlemen, and those who  $\delta$  speak the truth.'

τοὺς γοῦν ψυχροῦς . . . 'of the frigid they speak frigidly, and call e 4 them frigid disputants.' Cf. Aristot. *Rhet.* iii. 3, 1 τὰ ψυχρά, 'faults of taste'; Isocr. *Ad Nicocl.* 21 D εὐρήσεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοὺς μὲν σεμννομένους ψυχροῦς ἔντας. Athen. vi. 40 ἀηδῆς καὶ ψυχρός. Cic. *De clar. Orat.* 178 'lentus in dicendo et paene frigidus.'

λοιδορεῖ, 'you are abusive': λοιδορεῖ BT, 'go on with your 6 abuse'; but Heindorf's correction has been generally accepted, the middle voice being as usual as the active, and confirmed here by λοιδορεῖσθαι 285 D 5. Cf. *Charm.* 154 A; *Conv.* 213 D.

ἀγριωτέρως . . . ἔχειν BT, 'to be rather savage': ἀγροικότερως V, 285 a 2 'rather rude,' perhaps adopted from 283 E 2 ἀγροικότερον.

δέχεσθαι ἃ λέγουσιν, εἰάν ἐθέλωσι διδόναι BT. Badham would read 5 δέχεσθαι ἂν ἐθέλωσι διδόνται, so as to express the proverb more neatly. Cf. *Gorg.* 499 C κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον, 'to make the best of what you have, and accept what is offered.' Hdt. ix. 111 ὡς μάθης τὰ διδόμενα δέχεσθαι.

μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεισθαι, 'not to quarrel about a word,' sc. ἐξολωλέναι 283 D.

εἶτε καὶ παρ' ἄλλου του ἐμαθέτην. This seems to be one of many 8 allusions in the dialogue to Protagoras, who is represented as boasting that those who became his pupils would grow better and better every day (*Protag.* 318 A), and that he knew better than all others how to make men virtuous (ibid. 328 A).



- C 1 ὥσπερ ἐν Καρί ἐν ἔμοι ἔστω δ κίνδυνος. Socrates offers himself as a *vile corpus* for experiment. Cf. *Lach.* 187 B σκοπεῖν χρῆ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρί ὑμῖν δ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς υἱέσι τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ. The epithet *βαρβαροφώνων* applied to the Carians by Homer, *Il.* ii. 867 is critically discussed by Strabo 661. The Carians were the first mercenary soldiers, and Carian slaves were numerous: cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 764 εἰ δὲ δοῦλος ἔστι καὶ Κάρ ὄσπιρ Ἐξηκεστίδης, | φυσάτω πάππους παρ' ἡμῖν. There is a still older proverb in Hom *Il.* ix. 378 ἐχθρὰ δέ μοι τοῦ δῶρα, τίω δέ μιν ἐν καρὸς αἴσῃ. But the quantity of *καρὸς* forbids our referring it, as the Scholiast does, to the Carians. The meaning is 'pili facio.'
- 3 ὥσπερ τῇ Μηδείᾳ τῇ Κόλχῳ. The first article is emphatic, 'the famous Medea.' Cf. *Ov. Met.* vii. 164-349, where Medea, after restoring Aeson to youth, persuades the daughters of Pelias to cut their father in pieces and boil him. Apollod. i. 9, 27 καὶ τοῦ πιστεύσαι χάριν κρῶν μελεῖσασα καὶ καθεψήσασα ἐποίησεν ἄρνα. On a vase in the British Museum, found at Canino in Etruria, the ram restored to youth is seen jumping out of the pot: see Murray's *Greek and Roman Antiq.* OLLA. For the form Κόλχῳ compare the Latin 'venena Colcha' (*Hor. Od.* ii. 13, 8), 'Colchus an Assyrius' (id. *Ars Poet.* 118).
- 5 εἰ δ', ὅ τι βούλεται. Cf. Alcib. i. 114 B. *Pol.* 432 A εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσῃ· εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύϊ, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει. *Sympos.* 212 C εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὡς ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἑρωτα νόμισον εἰρησθαι, εἰ δέ, ὅτι καὶ ὅπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε. From these passages it is evident that after εἰ δέ we must understand not μὴ or ἄλλο τι, as proposed by Stephanus and others, but βούλεται. See also *Cratyl.* 407 D; *Legg.* 688 B.
- 9 δέριν. Cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* 439:
 

νῦν οὖν χρήσθων ὅ τι βούλονται·  
 τουτὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν σώμ' αἰτοῖσιν  
 παρέχω τύπτειν, πευνῆν, διψῆν,  
 ἀχμῆιν, ῥιγῶν, ἀσκὸν δέριν.
- d 1 ἡ τοῦ Μαρσύου. Cf. *Hdt.* vii. 26 'Here too, in this market-place (Celaenae) is hung up to view the skin of the Silenus Marsyas, which Apollo, as the Phrygian story goes, stripped off and placed there.' *Xen. Anab.* i. 2, 8.
- 8 ποῖε τοὺς λέγους; 'Do you argue upon the supposition that there

is such a thing as contradiction?' Aristot. *Top.* i. 11, 4 gives as an example of a paradoxical opinion *οτι ουκ εστιν αντιλέγειν, καθάπερ εφη Ἀντισθένης*. Cf. *Introd.* p. 15; Zeller, *Plato*, note 94.

Οὐκουν σύ γ' ἄν, εἶπη, ἀποδείξαις πόποτε ἀκούσας κτλ. 'You certainly, said he, could not prove that you have ever heard,' &c. For the construction of ἀκούσας referring to the subject of ἀποδείξαις cf. Eur. *Orest.* 802 ποῦ γὰρ ἄν δείξω φίλος; *Med.* 548 ἐν τῷδε δείξω πρῶτα μὲν σοφὸς γεγώς. *Bacch.* 47. *Plat. Menex.* 242 Ε οὔτοι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα εἶδειξαν . . . τοίτους νικῶντες ἰδίῳ.

Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, εἶπη. Ctesippus admits that he cannot prove that 5 he has heard: to himself it is proved by his own sense of hearing, but this cannot be demonstrated to another. A principle of wide application: 'No proof can establish the existence of that within a man of which he alone has the final cognisance' (B. F. Westcott). There is no reason therefore for turning ἀληθῆ λέγεις into a question. The sense is vigorously expressed by Jowett: 'Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus.'

ἀλλὰ ἀκούωμεν νῦν εἰ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι T. In B ἀκούω μὲν is probably a mere error of transcription. Stallbaum retains the reading of T, and explains it simply and well: 'But let us hear now whether I prove it to you, while Ctesippus contradicts Dionysodorus.' Badham's conjectural emendation, ἀκούω μὲν νυνὶ σοι ἀποδείκνυμι, 'I am proving to you now that I hear Ctesippus contradicting Dionysodorus,' is very ingenious, and at first sight attractive; but it is open to the same objection that Ctesippus could not prove that he himself heard.

ὑπόσχοις ἄν τούτου λόγον; Cf. *Protag.* 338 D ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγὼ γ' ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅπου ἄν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. It is evident from this passage that λόγον ὑπέχειν, like δοῦναι λόγον, means to give a reason in answer to a question, so that 'quaerenti respondere' (Winckelmann) and 'rationem reddere' (Stallbaum) are both implied in the phrase. Cf. *Gorg.* 465 A; *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4, 9; Aristot. *Rhet.* i. 1, 1.

εἰσὶν ἑκάστω τῶν ὄντων λόγοι; 'Have all things their proper 9 definitions?' Cf. *Legg.* 895 Ε Ὅτι δὴ ψυχή τοῦνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος;

Οὐκὸν ὡς ἐστιν ἕκαστον . . . ; 'Of each therefore as it is, or as it is not?'

EUTHYDEMUS

33

L

- 286 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐν οὐδαὶς ἐφάνη λέγων, 'for it was shown that no one  
 a 2 speaks that which is not.' This refers to 284 C 2 Οὐκ ἄρα τὰ γε μὴ  
 ὄντ', ἔφη, λέγει οὐδαίς.
- 5 <τὸν> τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἑμφότεροι λήγοντες, 'if we both  
 gave the definition of the same thing.' <τὸν> omitted in BT, but  
 added by Heindorf, is adopted by most subsequent editors, except  
 Stallbaum. The article is required by the previous statement  
 (285 E 9) that each thing has its proper definition. Cf. *Theaet.*  
 200 B: 'If a man knows both knowledge and ignorance, does he  
 think that one of them which he knows is another which he knows?  
 Or if he knows neither, does he suppose that one which he knows  
 not is another which he knows not? Or if he knows one and not  
 the other, does he think that the one which he knows is the one  
 which he does not know, or that the one which he does not know  
 is the one which he knows.' In a later passage of *Theaet.* 208 C  
 knowledge is declared to be the power of 'Definition by the  
 characteristic difference' (L. Campbell), i.e. λόγον εἰπεῖν, and in the  
*Euthydemus* this is assumed as already settled.
- 6 λήγοντες V, γνόντες BT. The reading of V corresponds better to  
 τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον, immediately following.
- b 5 ἢ ἐγὼ λέγω . . . 'Or do I describe the thing, and you describe  
 nothing at all?'
- 6 <ὄν> ἀντιλέγοι. In BT ἄν is omitted, probably because of the  
 ἀν- immediately following: ἄν is found in one MS., and is perhaps  
 rightly adopted, though not indispensable, 'the boundary between  
 absolute and hypothetical possibility and hypothetical possibility  
 being naturally uncertain' (Bernhardy, *Gr. Synt.* 411).
- 9 οὐ γὰρ τοὶ ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε, 'for in very truth,' more emphatic than  
 οὐ γὰρ ἀλλά. Cf. 305 E 3.
- c 2 οὐ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν. The doctrine of Protagoras based upon the  
 assumption that sensation is knowledge is criticized by Plato, *Theaet.*  
 152-172. See especially 160 C, D: 'Then my perception is true to  
 me, for it is always inseparable from my own being: and according  
 to Protagoras I am the judge to myself of what is and of what is  
 not to me . . . How then, if I never err (ἀψευδὴς ὄν) and never  
 trip in my conception of things being or becoming, can I fail of  
 knowing that which I perceive? . . . Then you were quite right  
 in affirming that knowledge is only perception, and the meaning

turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heraclitus and all that company you say that all is motion and flux, or, with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things' (Jowett in part). This theory (well summarized by L. Campbell, n. 16) is then criticized by Socrates. Cf. Diog. L. ix. 8, 51; Sext. Emp. *Hypotyph.* A 216.

καὶ οἱ ἐπι παλαιότεροι. Cf. *Theaet.* 152 E ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε 3 οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κτλ. *Cratyl.* 429 D Ἄρα οὐ ψευδὴ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὃ φίλε Κράτυλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. This mention of Protagoras in connexion with Heraclitus points to the fact noticed by Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the *Theaetetus* (Dobson, p. 91): 'The dialogue begins with showing that the Protagorean denial of a general standard of knowledge and the Heraclitean theory of the flux of all things, and of *Becoming* alone remaining to the exclusion of all *Being*, as well as the principle here tried throughout which sets up Perception, and Perception alone, for knowledge, do all refer to one another, and form one system.' Cf. Pater, *Plato*, p. 100.

ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. When Antisthenes invited Plato to hear 4 him lecture περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, Plato asked how he could write about this doctrine, and showed that it could be turned round and destroyed itself (διδάσκοντος οὐ περιτρέπεται, Diog. L. iii. 35). Cf. 288 A 4.

ἄλλο τι ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστιν;—τούτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος; ἢ γάρ; 6 The statement that it is impossible to contradict is here declared by Socrates to be equivalent to saying, 'It is impossible to speak falsehood.' The phrase τοῦτο δύναται ὁ λόγος occurs in *Cratyl.* 429 D, quoted above on C 3.

ψευδῆ λέγειν μὲν Vat. Θ, Bekker, Badham. 'Vulgarem ordinem, δ 1 ψευδῆ μὲν λέγειν, immutandum fuisse nobis plane persuasimus' (Stallbaum).

τὸ ψεῦδεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, 'the misrepresentation of things.' 7 The preceding statement concerning ψευδῆς δόξα gives to ψεῦδεσθαι a meaning inclusive of false opinion as well as false statement. Stallbaum refers to *Apolog.* 22 D καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθη: *Lysis* 156, 2 πολλῶν ἐψεύσθητε τῆς οὐσίας, i. e. 'You were mistaken

about many men's property'; with which compare Antiph. *Or.* v. 134, 40 καθ' ὅ τι δ' ἂν ψευσθῆτε τᾶληθοῦς, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀπόλλυμαι.

- 11 Λόγου ἕνεκα, *dicis causa*, 'for form's sake.' Cf. *Lach.* 196 C ὀρώμεν μὴ Νικίας οἰεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. *Crito* 46 D νῦν δὲ κατὰθλος ἄρα ἐγένετο (ὁ λόγος) ὅτι ἄλλως ἕνεκα λόγου ἐλέγετο.

ἵνα δὴ ἀποπον λέγης, 'in order to state a paradox.'

- e 1 'Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον, 'Nay, it is for you to refute me.'

- 5 Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευον, ἔφη, ἐγὼ νυνδὴ, ὁ Διονυσόδωρος, ἐξελέγξαι BT. This reading of the best MSS. has been altered very much for the worse by recent editors into Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐκέλευεν, ἔφην ἐγώ, νυνδὴ Διονυσόδωρος ἐξελέγξαι. For the order of the words in BT compare 289 C Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας ὑπολαβών. Translate therefore: 'Neither then did I,' said Dionysodorus, 'bid you just now to refute me.' νῦν δὴ refers to E 1 'Ἀλλὰ σύ, ἔφη, ἔλεγξον. See also 287 B 2, 297 A 5, and the examples collected by Riddell, *Digest*, § 288, of 'Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.'

- 6 <Σὺ δ' ἐκέλευς;> Σὺ δὲ κελεύεις; Vind. marg., Οὐδὲ κελεύεις B, Vind., om. T, Stallb. On the frequent corruption in B of *ou* for *su* see note on 277 A 6. The question is put by Socrates, who pretends to be confused and in doubt which of the Sophists had bidden him, just as in 290 E 7 he pretends not to remember whether Cleinias or Ctesippus had been speaking. The emphatic position of Σὺ shows that a different person, not Dionysodorus, is now addressed: 'Was it you that were bidding me? For, Euthydemus,' said I, 'I do not at all understand these clever arguments, not even those that are right, but I have only a dull sort of idea.' The imperfect ἐκέλευες is better than κελεύεις, as corresponding to ἐκέλευον in E 5.

- 287 ἄλλο τι οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν; 'Is it not impossible even to make a mistake?'

- 8 τίνας διδάσκαλοι ἤκετε; Cf. *Theaet.* 161 C: 'For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we

poor ignorāmus have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom' (Jowett). The same argument stated so summarily in the *Euthydemus* is one of many indications that this dialogue is later than the *Theaetetus*.

οὕτως εἰ Κρόνος; 'Are you such a dotard?' Cf. Aristoph. *Nub.* b 2 929 Οὐχὶ διδάξεις τούτον Κρόνος δν. Plut. 581 Κρονικαῖς λήμαις ὄντως λημῶνες. Diog. L. ii. 111 Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι διακροῦντες Εὐβουλίδου, ἐν οἷς καὶ Ἀπολλώνιος ὁ Κρόνος, οὗ Διδώτωρος Ἀμεινίου Ἰασεὺς καὶ αὐτὸς Κρόνος ἐπὶ κλην, περὶ οὗ φησι Καλλιμάχος ἐν ἐπιγράμμασιν

Αὐτὸς ὁ Μῶμος

ἔγραφεν ἐν τοίχοις 'ὁ Κρόνος ἐστὶ σοφός.'

νῦν ἀναμνησθεῖ . . . νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει. 'Nescio quomodo (haec) 3 inter se possint iungi, putoque interpolationem statuendam esse' (Schanz, *N.C.P.* p. 77). In his text Schanz brackets νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει, but this leaves καὶ εἰ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον in an unusual position.

χαλεποί. The masculine is used as if λόγοις had been used instead of λεγομένοις (Baier), or with it (Heindorf).

τι, Heindorf's conjecture for δ τι, is rejected by Stallbaum, who 9 explains the indirect δ τι as in 271 A 6; but in the present passage τι is more likely to have been changed into δ τι, which occurs here so frequently, than the converse.

ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ὤσ. After ὅτι we must mentally repeat λέγεις.

νοεῖ, 'means.' Cf. *Crat.* 407 E τί καὶ νοεῖ τὸ ὄνομα; ἐννοεῖ, the C 1 reading of BT, is apparently not used in this manner: this is the only passage quoted by L. and Sc. νοεῖ and νοοῖ occur immediately below. Cf. Stallbaum.

Οὐκ ἔχω δ τι χρῆσθαι T: χρῆσθαι B, which Stallbaum prefers: 2 but as only a single action is in question, and not a continuance in the future, the aorist is to be preferred here, as in 306 D, *Gorg.* 466 A, *Phaed.* 95 A.

'Ἄλλ' ὁ σὺ λέγεις κτλ. 'Nay, but your phrase,' referring to νοεῖ, 3 as is evident from the following discussion in D 7.

τούτῳ (γ' οὐ) πάνυ χαλεπὸν χρῆσθαι, 'with this it is not at all difficult to deal.' The whole clause is omitted by Burnet, leaving the former part of the sentence incomplete and unintelligible. Badham's ingenious conjecture γ' οὐ for τῷ is accepted by Schanz. For τούτῳ τῷ Bekker and Stallbaum adopt the Aldine reading τοῦτο τό, which, like Hermann's τούτῳ τοι, gives an intelligible but less

appropriate meaning: 'It is this phrase of yours (*νοεῖ*) that *is so difficult* to deal with.' Dionysodorus tries to shift the discussion from his own phrase, *οὐχ ἔξεις δ τι χρῆ*, which he finds too much like *οὐκ ἐξελέγεις*, to that of Socrates, *νοεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα*, which he says 'is *not at all difficult* to deal with,' as he tries to show, D 7.

d 1 *οὐδ' ἄν* BT: *ἄν* is omitted by Badham and Schanz, but defended by Ast, *Lex. Plat.*, and Stallbaum, on the ground that the indicative, present, or future may stand in the same sentence with *ἄν*, provided that *ἄν* is not joined with the verb, and does not make the whole sentence conditional, but affects only an accessory word or phrase.

e 4 *εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐξήμαρτον*. On this passage Lutoslawski remarks (211): 'To the right belief explained in the *Meno* Plato adds in the *Euthydemus* (284 A, 287 E) his explanation of error and wrong belief, whose existence is proved against the Sophists by the hypothetical method taught in the *Meno*.'

288 *ἐν ταυτῷ μένειν*. Cf. *Phaed.* 86 E *ἔμοι γὰρ φαίνεται ἔτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὁ*  
a 3 *λόγος εἶναι*, 'It appears to me that the argument remains just where it was,' i.e. has made no advance. *Theaet.* 200 A *οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην ἀρᾶσμεν ἀπορίαν*. *ibid.* C *εἰς ταυτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλεον ποιούντες*.

4 *ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν*, i.e. in the time of Protagoras and earlier, 286 C 2.

*καταβαλὼν πίπτειν*. Cf. 286 C 4 *τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν*.

*ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν . . . ἐξηγήσθαι*. Cf. 303 E 6 *ἐξηγήρηται ὥστε*.

8 *ὡ ἄνδρες Θούριοι εἴτε Χίοι*. Cf. 271 C 3.

b 1 *εἴθ' ὅποθεν καὶ ὅπου κτλ.*, 'or from whatever place and in whatever way you like to be named.'

8 *τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστήν*. Cf. Hom. *Od.* iv. 385 *ἀθάνατος Πρωτεύς Αἰγύπτιος, ὅς τε ῥαλάσσης πάσης βένθεα οἶδε*. Plat. *Phaedr.* 275 B *ὦ Σώκρατες, ῥαδίως σὺ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ ὀδοπαοῦς ἄν ἐθέλῃς λόγοις ποιεῖς*. A reminiscence of Plato's recent visit to Egypt.

c 1 *Μένιλαον μιμήμαθα*. Cf. *Od.* iv. 456:

*ἀλλ' ἢ τοι πρότιστα λέων γένετ' ἠγυγέειος,  
αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δράκων καὶ πάρδαλις ἠδὲ μέγας σῖς·  
γίγνετο δ' ὑγρὸν ὕδωρ καὶ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον.  
ἡμεῖς δ' ἀστεμφέως ἔχομεν τετλητόι θυμῷ*

ἐκφανήθων ἐφ' ἧ αὐτὰ σπουδάζετον. Cf. C 5 ἐκφανῆναι, 'to show a themselves.' Translate: 'Until they let us see the object about which they are themselves in earnest.' Cf. *Pol.* 497 C δῆλος δὴ οὖν εἰ ὁ τι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήσει.

οἶμαι γάρ τι αὐτοῖν πάγκαλον φανεῖσθαι, 'for I think that some- 3 thing very splendid in them will appear.' Cf. *Apolog.* 17 A μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐθαύμασα' (Stallb.).

ἐγὼ οὖν μοι δοκῶ. 'I am inclined therefore myself to indicate 5 again the character in which I beseech them to appear.' For ὑφηγήσασθαι Heindorf proposes ὑφηγήσεσθαι, and Schanz changes καί into κἄν, but neither is necessary: 'Vult enim Socrates statim et e vestigio uno aliquo commonstrare exemplo quales sibi illos apparere cupiat: unde recte utitur aoristo, quem etiam libri tuentur omnes' (Stallb.).

ἐάν πως τ, πᾶν ὅπως BT: 'Nisi putas critici esse elegantes d 2 lectiones captare recipies quae boni libri tibi praebeant' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 78).

συντεταμένον, 'intent': cf. Xen. *Oecon.* ii. 18 γνώμη συντεταμένη ἐπιμελουμένους.

ἡ δὲ φιλοσοφία κτήσις ἐπιστήμης. 'While in the *Protagoras* the 8 word "philosophy" was still used in the meaning of love of wisdom (335 D, 342 D), here we see it defined as acquisition of knowledge (288 D), and the dialectician, who had received his first rules in the *Meno*, becomes the highest judge of every particular knowledge (250 c)' (Lutoslawski, p. 210).

ἀρ' οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν; Cf. *Pol.* 545 E ἡ τότε μὲν ἀπλοῦν; 'absque e 1 ulla exceptione validum' (Ast).

εἰ ἐπιστάμεθα γινώσκων περιόντες, 'if we knew how to go about a and learn.'

ἐξηλέξαμεν, 'we fully proved.' Cf. *Phaedr.* 273 B; *Thuc.* 5 iii. 64 ἀ δὲ ἡ φύσις ἀεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές. But in our present passage the idea of refutation remains, for what is proved is the negative proposition ὅτι οὐδὲν πλέον κτλ. Cf. *Theaet.* 166 C ἐξέλεγον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστω ἡμῶν γίνονται.

τὸ πᾶν ἡμῖν χρυσιόν γενεῖτο, 'all the gold in the world should 6 become ours.'

ἀνευ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ χρῆσθαι. Cf. *Lutosl.* p. 210: 'Plato b 1

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is so proud of his acquired certainty of knowledge that he would not give it up even for immortality, if not accompanied by knowledge how to use it (*Euth.* 289 B).'

- 2 ζοικεν ἄφελος οὐδέν. The omission of εἶναι is not unusual: cf. *Polit.* 280 B πάλιν οὖν ζοικεν ἐπανιτέον. *Crat.* 424 A ἤδη ζοικεν ἐπισκεπτέον.
- 7 λυροποιούς δάιν εἶναι Heindorf, Badham, Burnet. For δάιν we have δεινοῦς in BT, δάιν δεινοῦς Heusde, δεινοῦς ὄντας Winckelmann, Schanz. This last reading gives the sense:—'It is far from being the case that, if we are clever lyre-makers, we are also in possession of any such knowledge as this which we are seeking.' Heindorf's reading is simpler: 'It is far from being the case that we ought to be lyre-makers and possessed of any such art as this (lyre-making).' There is, I think, no force in Winckelmann's assumption that such an indefinite phrase as τοιαύτης τινός must refer to the same kind of art here as in B 4. On the contrary its reference is determined by the nearer context (λυροποιούς), and confirmed by ἐνταῦθα γάρ following.
- C 3 διήρηται δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ BV, δέ is omitted in T. The omission of the whole clause by Schanz is quite arbitrary and unjustifiable. 'The art which makes the lyre is separate from the art which uses it, but though distinct they refer to the same thing.'
- 6 Ἄλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν, ἔφην ἐγώ, 'But seriously, said I.'
- 7 ἦν ἔδει κεκτημένους κτλ., 'which we must acquire in order to be happy.' Cf. 282 E 3 ἦν δεῖ λαβόντα εὐδαιμονεῖν.
- 8 Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ἐγώ, ὁ Κλεινίας. For the like order compare 286 E 5.
- d 2 λογοποιούς. Cf. Ammonius, *De Diff. Voc.* λογογράφος μὲν ἔστιν ὁ τοὺς δικανικοὺς λόγους γράφων· λογοποιὸς δὲ ὁ λόγους τινὰς καὶ μύθους συντίθει. The two meanings are, in fact, common to both words; but λογογράφος more frequently means a 'chronicler' or 'prose writer,' as in Thuc. i. 21 οὔτε ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήσασιν . . . οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι συντίθουσιν. The λογοποιός, ἢ λόγων ποιητής, is distinguished from the ῥήτωρ who delivered the speech, Isocr. *Asu. Soph.* 17 τοὺς δὲ καταδεστέραν τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς ἢ λόγων ποιητὰς οὐκ ἂν ἀποτελέσειεν.
- 4 ἀλλὰ καὶ . . . ἀδύνατοι D 5, omitted by Winckelmann and Schanz against the authority of the MSS.

θεσπεσία τις, 'inspired as it were.' So in *Theaet.* 151 B, Prodicus e 4 and others are spoken of as σοφοίς τε καὶ θεσπεσίους ἀνδράσι.

κῆλησίς τε καὶ παραμυθία τυγχάνει οὔσα, 'a charming and soothing.' 290 In *Protag.* 315 A the great Sophist is described as κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ a 4 ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς. Cf. *Pol.* 358 B ὥσπερ ὄφεις κηληθῆναι. *Phaedr.* 261 A τὸ μὲν δλον ἢ ῥητορικῆ ἀν εἶη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, 271 C Ἐπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οὔσα, a passage of which there may be a reminiscence in the use of the same phrase τυγχάνει οὔσα.

ἐμὲ οἶμαι ἠῆρηκέναι. The personal pronoun marks the antithesis: 9 Cleinias having confessed his ignorance, Socrates exclaims: 'I think I have found it.' Cf. Hom. *Il.* xiii. 269 οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἐμέ φημι λελασμένον ἔμμεναι ἀλκῆς. *Symph.* 175 C, *Pol.* 400 C.

Οὐδεμία, ἴψη, τῆς θηρευτικῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ πλῶν ἐστίν. For αὐτῆς, BT, b 7 many changes have been proposed: 'δύναμις Heindorf, ἀπάσης Ast, ἄσκησις Orelli, ἰκανότης Vermehren, αὐτῆ Vahlen: post αὐτῆς supplevit χρεια vel ἀφέλεια Badham, οὐδέν pro οὐδεμία scripsit Thompson ad *Phaedr.* 128' (Schanz). Schanz himself marks αὐτῆς † as corrupt, but Routh, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Burnet rightly leave it untouched. Ficinus gives a mere paraphrase: 'Nullus sane venationis opus ulterius porrigit quam,' &c. Routh's translation is much better: 'Nulla pars, inquit, ipsius artis venatoriae latius patet, quam ut,' &c.: but he gives no explanation of the construction, which is in fact quite simple. Οὐδεμία agrees with τέχνη understood from the preceding context: τῆς θηρευτικῆς is a substantive, as in *Polit.* 289 A γεωργικῆ δὲ καὶ θηρευτικῆ καὶ γυμναστικῆ καὶ ἰατρικῆ καὶ μαγειρικῆ πᾶν ὑποτιθέντες ὀρθότερον ἀποδώσομεν ἢ τῇ πολιτικῇ. Thus αὐτῆς marks the distinction between 'actual' hunting, and the metaphorical hunting of the geometers, astronomers, and dialecticians.

οὐ γὰρ ποιῶσι τὰ διαγράμματα, 'for they are not the makers of c 2 the geometrical figures.' This is explained by the passage in *Meno* 82 B, where Socrates shows that the uneducated slave has in himself the ideas of the geometrical figures.

τὰ ὄντα ἀνευρίσκουσι, 'they discover the existing realities.' Cf. 3 *Pol.* 527 B τοῦ γὰρ αἰεὶ ὄντος ἢ γεωμετρικῆ γνώσις ἐστίν.

τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς. Lutoslawski, p. 331, argues that 'διαλεκτικῆ 5 meaning metaphysical science (is) never used before Plato, and by

Plato first in *Rep.* vii, cf. *Phaedr.* 276 E; *διαλεκτικός* meaning, not as in the *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, and in Xenophon, one who knows how to ask and answer questions, but the philosopher able to discover unity in the variety of particulars, *Phaedr.* 266 E.' But in this passage τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς must indicate in the higher sense the metaphysicians to whom the geometers hand over their hypotheses to be traced up to first principles. In the full description of Plato's 'dialectic' *Pol.* 531 B-536 B compare with our present passage especially 533 B, C: 'And the remaining arts which, as we said, have some small apprehension of true Being, such as geometry and the arts connected with it, we find that though they dream about real Being, they are unable to behold it in a waking state, so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, because they are unable to explain the reason of them . . . Therefore the dialectic method alone proceeds in this way,—it carries up its hypotheses to the first principle of all, in order to establish them firmly.' Cf. Dr. H. Jackson's excellent articles on the *Republic* in *The Journal of Philology*, vol. x. p. 143, and Lutoslawski, p. 302.

- d 4 τὰς ὄρνυγστράφους, 'the quail-breeders,' who bred and trained the birds to fight. Cf. *Ov. Amor.* ii. 6, 27 'Ecce coturnices inter sua praelia vivunt.'
- e 7 'Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς; 'But then, I wonder, was it Ctesippus?' Socrates pretends to have forgotten: for a similar ironical profession of doubt see 286 E 5, note.
- 291 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; 'Ctesippus indeed?' In this idiomatic use of α 1 ποῖος the interrogation is equivalent to an indignant denial. Cf. 304 E Ποῖος, ἔφη, χάριεν, ὦ μακάριε;
- 4 μή τις τῶν κραιττόνων; 'Was it some superior being that was there and spoke thus?' Crito perhaps means Socrates himself. 'Vides ad Deum auctorem solita ironia . . . eum referre ea quae ipse dialectica quasi obstetricia arte in iuvene egregiae indolis effecerat: vide *Theact.* 150 C, D, E.'
- 6 τῶν κραιττόνων μέντοι τις ἔμοι δοκεῖ. 'It was indeed some superior being, it seems to me, and very superior.'
- b 1 Πόθεν . . . ἤψομεν; 'Find it, my good fellow? Nay, our case was quite ridiculous.' Cf. A 1 Ποῖος Κτήσιππος; *Pol.* 330 A Ποῖ' ἐπεκτησάμην;
- 2 κορυδούς, 'crested larks.' Schol. in loc. Κόρυδοι ὄρνυθες ὄρνυξιν

ὄμοιοι, οὗς ἔτιοι μὲν κορυδάλλου φασί, Γῆς καὶ Ἀθηναίων ἱεροί. Cf. Aristoph. *Aves* 471 :

οὐδ' Αἰσωπον πεπάτηκας,  
ὅς ἔφασκε λέγων κορυδὸν πάντων πρώτην ὄρνιθα γενέσθαι,  
πρωτέραν τῆς γῆς.

Plutarch, *Mor.* 507 E Κόρυδος ἀπται πετόμενος κράτος ἔχων χρυσοῦν καὶ δόρυ. Chrysost. *Orat.* ix. 141 D οἱ δὲ κόρυθοι πόσῃ τιμῇ θάπτον ὑμῶν διέρχονται τὸ στάδιον ;

ὑπεξέφευγον, 'kept slipping away from us.'

b 3

τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλά, 'the long story.'

4

τὴν βασιλικὴν . . . τέχνην. On the βασιλικὴ τέχνη cf. Xen. *Mem.* 5 iv. 2, 11. Stallbaum, *Disq.* 31, points out that the whole argument about 'the regal art' of statesmanship is intended to refute the doctrine of Protagoras, who limited the idea of virtue to prudence in domestic affairs and ability to speak and act for the best in affairs of state : cf. *Protag.* 318 E-328 D, *Meno* 91 A.

ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου λαμβάνον. Cf. Aesch. *Sept. c. Theb.* 1 d 1 Κάδμου πολίται, χρῆ λέγειν τὰ καίρια | ὅστις φύλασσει πρᾶγος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως | οἴακα ρωμῶν. On the use of ἀτεχνῶς in quoting proverbial sayings cf. 292 E 3, 303 E 1.

τί ἡμῖν ἀπεργάζεται ἔργον, 'opus aliquod efficit an non?' (Ficinus). 7 The indefinite τί is shown to be right by the form of the answer, πάντως δήπου, 'something most surely.' Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 80, defends the separation of τί from ἔργον by referring to *Symf.* 194 D εἰ τι ἴσως οἴοιο αἰσχρὸν ποιεῖν : 174 E καὶ τι ἔφη αὐτόθι γελοῖον παθεῖν.

ὑγίαιαν (&ν) φαίη. Ast added (&ν), which may easily have e 7 dropped out after ὑγίαιαν, as before ἀντιλέγοι 286 B 5 ; but see the note there.

τί ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται ; ἔργον B Vind., om. T Burnet. Cf. *Charm.* 292 165 D τὴν ὑγίαιαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται. *Tim.* 30 B ὅπως ὅτι a 1 κάλλιστον εἶη . . . ἔργον ἀπειργασμένον. *Symf.* 178 D, *Legg.* 801 E, *Pol.* 353 B, 553 C, &c.

ἀπήγγελας, 'as you report the discussion': on this case of the c 3 aorist referring to what has taken place just immediately before, compare the similar use of ἐπήρσα, ἦσθην, εἰδεξάμην, ἀπέκτυσα, ἔγνω, &c.

ἢ ἄλλους ἀγαθοὺς ποιήσομεν ; 'Shall we say it is that by which we d 5 shall make others good?'

e 2 ἡτιμάσαμεν BT Vind. 'We discredited.' The correction in τ ἀπεδοκιμάσαμεν is only an explanatory gloss.

ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον, 'there comes in exactly the proverb "Corinthus son of Zeus".' The Scholiast on the passage relates that when Corinth had sent ambassadors to Megara to complain of their revolt, one argument advanced was that the mythical founder 'Corinthus son of Zeus' would be aggrieved if they failed to exact condign punishment. The proverb came to be used of boastful repetitions of the same story. Cf. Paus. ii. 1, ἰ Διὸς δὲ εἶναι Κόρινθον οὐδένα οἶδα εἰπόντα πῶ σπουδῇ πλὴν Κορινθίων τῶν πολλῶν. Cf. Pind. *Nem.* vii. 104:

ταῖτὰ δὲ τρις τετράκι τ' ἀμπολεῖν

ἀπορία τελέθει, τέκνοισιν ἄτε μαψυλάκας, Διὸς Κόρινθος.

Plutarch, *Mor.* 1072 B πολλὸς οὖν ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀφίεται. On ἀτεχνῶς cf. 291 D, note.

5 ποιήσειε BT, ποιήσει Heindorf, Winckelmann, Badham, Schanz, Burnet. Stallbaum rightly defends the optative, referring to Hermann, *Viger De Idiot.* 491. Cf. Aesch. *Choeph.* 594 ἀλλ' ὑπέρολμον ἀνδρὸς φροῦνημα τίς λέγοι; When the optative is used in this potential sense it is not easy to determine in what cases the particle ἄν may or may not be omitted. 'For the boundary between the conditional and unconditional possibility must naturally be very wavering and uncertain' (Bernhardy, *Gk. Synt.* 410). In the dramatists the omission is not uncommon: cf. Eur. *Hippol.* 1186 καὶ θᾶσσον ἢ λέγοι τις ἐξηρτυμένας. *Iph. in Aul.* 417 μήτηρ δ' ὀμαρτεῖ σῆς Κλυταιμνήστρας δέμας | καὶ παῖς Ὀρέστης, ὥστε τερφθείης ἰδῶν. In prose writers the omission occurs chiefly, if not solely, in questions as here, cf. Plat. *Legg.* 894 C τῶν δὴ δέκα μάλιστα ἡμῖν κινήσειον τίνα προκρίναμεν . . .; *Lach.* 190 B 4 ἡμᾶς τῶδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίνα τρόπον τοῖς ὑέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετῆ . . . ἀμείνους ποιήσειε; See also Dinarch. *c. Demosth.* 98; Lycurg. *c. Leocrat.* 168; Plut. *Mor.* 75 E.

293 πᾶσαν ἤδη φωνὴν ἤφλεν. Cf. Eur. *Med.* 278 ἐχθροὶ γὰρ ἐξιάσι  
a 1 πάντα δὴ κάλων. Schol. ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν οὐριδρομούντων καὶ χαλῶντων πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῖς ἀρτίμοις. Cf. Aristoph. *Eq.* 756 νῦν δὴ σε πάντα δεῖ κάλων ἐξίναί. Plat. *Pol.* 475 καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ προφάσεις προφασίζεσθέ τε καὶ πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίετε.

a 2 ὥσπερ Διοσκόρω, 'arogr. Marcianum 184' (Schanz); δισκοῦρων

BT. 'Recte Stephanus et Bekkerus Διοσκόρω . . . Nihil durius quam ἐπικαλούμενος sine accusativo positum; neque σῶσαι aliunde quam a δέόμενος pendere potest' (Badham). Cf. Rutherford, *The New Phrygischus* 310 'Διόσκουροι, ὀρθότερον Διόσκουροι. γελάσει οὖν τοὺς σὺν τῷ υ λέγοντας. Lobeck's note on this article is in his best style: "Nimirum natura ita comparatum est ut dualis numeri longe maior sit usus, apud veteres praesertim, quam plurativi nominis. Διοσκόρω Eur. *Or.* 465; Arist. *Pax* 285; *Eccles.* 1069, &c." The mention of the Dioscuri (*nautis* 'optatos Tyndaridas,' Propert. i. 17, 18) shows the origin of the preceding phrase πάσας φωνὰς ἀφίαναι.

τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου. Cf. Aesch. *Prom. V.* 1036 κακῶν 3 τρικυμία.

τίς ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Cf. *Charm.* 174 Α τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστη- 4 μῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἀπασαι ὁμοίως;

οἶόν τί τι τῶν ὄντων. 'Do you then think it possible for any being b y not to be this very thing which it is?

τούτου γε αὐτοῦ, 'just of this thing itself.' Socrates tries to limit c 3 the proposition to some particular case, as again in C 6 ἐκείνου γε.

τυγχάνεις ἄν . . . , 'you actually are, and, at the same time in the 8 same relation, are not the very same that you are.'

κατὰ ταῦτά, i.e. in relation to knowledge.

εἶεν, 'be it so.' Cf. Ruhnk. *Tim. Lex.* Εἶεν' συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν 3 εἰρημένων, συναφή δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. The Scholiast on Plat. *Polit.* 257 A renders it by 'Ἄγε δῆ: and the Scholiast on Eur. *Phoen.* 856 εἶεν' διηρημένως ἀναγνωστίον. ἔστι δὲ ἐπίρρημα.

καλὰ δὴ πάντα λέγεις BT. Scholiast, Καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄγεις, ἀντί τοῦ ἀγγέλλεις' ἐπὶ τῶν αἴσια ἀναγγελλόντων. πολλὰκις δὲ λέγεται καὶ κατ' εἰρωνείαν. Ἀριστοφάνης Γεωργοῖς καὶ Πλάτων Εὐθυδήμῳ. Whether ἄγεις be a right reading or not, the Scholiast's interpretation of the passage is perfectly clear from what follows, and is admirably suited to the passage. Socrates having been declared by the Sophist to know all things pretends to accept the statement as 'good news entirely.' The words καλὰ πάντα had already become proverbial: cf. Theogn. 283 ἠγείσθαι θ' ὡς καλὰ πάντα τιθεῖ. Hdt. i. 32 πάντα καλὰ ἔχοντα. Plutarch, *Mor.* 236 B τῶν πολιτῶν πυνθανομένων αὐτοῦ Ποῖά τινα ἐν Ἀθήναις, Πάντα, εἶπε, καλὰ' εἰρωνεύμενος καὶ παριστὰς ὅτι πάντα παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καλὰ νομίζεται, αἰσχρὸν δὲ

- οὐδέν. Winckelmann quotes examples of a similar usage from Plato, *Polit.* 273 B, 284 A, *Phileb.* 26 A, *Legg.* 783 E. The conjecture of Abresch. καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς, adopted by Stallbaum, Badham, and Schanz, has no support from MSS., nor from any passage in which παταγεῖν is so used, the usual phrase being φθέγγεσθαι, as in *Theaet.* 179 D τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα εἶτε ὑγίαις εἶτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. The reading of BT is rightly retained by Burnet. The quotation of the passage in Hesych. καλὰ δὴ παταγεῖς· καλὰ λαλεῖς is regarded by Heindorf as a corruption of καλὰ δὴ πάντ' ἄγεις.
- 5 ὡς δὴ, 'since forsooth.' Stallbaum refers to the same ironical use of ὡς δὴ in *Pol.* 337 C Εἶεν, ἔφη· ὡς δὴ ὁμοιον τοῦτο ἐκείνῃ; *Gorg.* 486 E, 492 B, *Protag.* 542 C, in all which passages the ironical sense is evident.
- 8 ἄρα οὕτως ἴγαις; 'Is that your argument, and that your wise invention?'
- Ε 1 αὐτὸς σαυτὸν γε δὴ ἐξελίγχεις. 'Yes, surely you are refuting yourself.'
- 2 Τί δέ, . . . σὺ οὐ πέπονθας κατλ. 'What then, are not you in this same plight? For whatever I might suffer in company with you and our dear friend Dionysodorus here, I certainly should not be at all aggrieved.' On φίλης κεφαλῆς cf. Hom. *Il.* viii. 281 Τεύκρε, φίλη κεφαλῆ. *Phaedr.* 264 A Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλῆ. *Gorg.* 513 C.
- 294 καὶ σὺ γε πρὸς. 'Yes, and you too.' On this absolute use of πρὸς
- α 2 see *Protag.* 321 D πρὸς δὲ καὶ αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν. *Gorg.* 469 B καὶ ἔλεινόν γε πρὸς. In 298 D καὶ πρὸς . . . is corrupt.
- 9 'Ἀλλὰ τί; 'But what then?' The complete question represented elliptically by τί may ask either for a reason, 'Why?', or, as here, for an inference, 'What then?' Cf. *Phaed.* 89 B, *Euthyphro* 14 D, *Pol.* 357 D; Aristoph. *Ran.* 489, and see Riddell, *Digest*, § 20; Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 880, Obs. 2.
- β 2 μῶλις ὑμᾶς προκαλεσάμην, 'I could hardly incite you.' Schanz suspects a corruption in σπουδάξαι.
- 6 νευροραφῆν, 'to do stitching,' as a part of 'shoemaking,' σκυτοτομεῖν (σκυτική), distinct from καττίειν 'to sole': cf. Xen. *Cyr.* viii. 2, 4 ἔστι δὲ ἔνθα καὶ ὑποδήματα ὃ μὲν νευροραφῶν μόνον τρέφεται, ὃ δὲ σχίζων.
- 8 τοὺς ἀστέρας ὀπίσσοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τὴν ἄμμον; Cf. Hdt. i. 47 Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ

ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης. Pind. *Ol.* ii. 98 ψάμμου ἀριθμὸν περιπέφηνεν. Euseb. *Praef. Ev.* 212, 230.

ὀπίσους ὀδόντας ἔχει. Cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 1057 πόσους ἔχεις C 4 ὀδόντας. Aristot. *Rhet.* iii. 5, 4 τύχοι γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ εἰπὼν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσα ἔχει. Lysias, *Fr.* 2, 8 ῥῶν αὐτῆς τοὺς ὀδόντας ἀριθμεῖν ἢ τοὺς τῆς χειρὸς δακτύλους. This last is the game to which Ctesippus alludes, the modern 'Mora,' or 'How many fingers do I hold up?' Aristotle says that 'Even or odd' ('Ludere par impar') is easier.

μηδαμῶς, 'do not say so.' Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 E, *Menex.* 236 C. 7

φαίνηθε γνόντες, 'be found to have known by my counting.' 9

πάνυ ἀπαρακαλύπτως, 'Ctesippus without any reserve whatever' d 3 went on asking anything and everything, at last even the most indecent things,—did they know them?' 3

ἀνδραδέατα ὁμῶσε ἦτην, 'most valiantly encountered his questions.' 5 Cf. *Pol.* 610 C ἐὰν δέ γέ τις . . . ὁμῶσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾶ ἔναι. *Euthyphr.* 3 C. Hom. *Il.* xiii. 337 ὡς ἄρα τῶν ὁμῶσ' ἦλθε μάχη. Eustathius remarks that the use of the phrase in Attic writers was taken from this passage of Homer. Cf. Ruhnck. *Tim. Lex.* Ὁμῶσε. On the form ἦτην cf. Schanz, *Praefatio in Euthyd.* § 15.

οἱ κάπροι . . . ὁμῶσε ὠθούμενοι. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* i. 4, II οἱ δὲ κάπροι, 6 ὥσπερ τοὺς ἄνδρας φασὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ὁμῶσε ἐφέροντο.

[τὸν Εὐθύδημον]. Either this name, or δ Διονυσόδωρος, must be 8 omitted, as is proved by ἡκεῖς following; and τηλικούτος ὦν applies better to Dionysodorus as being the elder.

εἰς μαχαίρας γε κυβιστᾶν. Cf. Xen. *Conviu.* ii. II μέτα δὲ τοῦτο e 2 κύκλος εἰσηνέχθη περίμετος ξιφῶν ὀρθῶν. εἰς οὖν ταῦτα ἢ ὀρχηστρίσ ἐκυβίστα τε καὶ ἐξεκυβίστα ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν (Routh). Plat. *Sympos.* 190 A καὶ ὅποτε ταχὺ ὀρμήσειεν θεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβιστῶντες εἰς ὀρθὸν τὰ σκέλη περιφερόμενοι κυβιστῶσι κύκλῳ. See the illustration in Smith's *Dict. Class. Antiq.* SALTATIO, p. 106.

ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι. Routh finds a description of this gymnastic 3 feat in Xen. *Conviu.* ii. 22 ὅτι δ' ἡ παῖς εἰς τοθπισθεν καμπτομένη τροχοῦς ἐμμεῖτο, ἐκείνος ταῦτα εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπικύπτων μμείσθαι τροχοῦς ἐπειράτο. But ἐπὶ τροχοῦ δινεῖσθαι can only mean 'to be whirled round upon a wheel,' and this meaning is found in a later passage of Xen. *Conviu.* vii. 3 δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τὸ μὲν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστᾶν κινδύνου ἐπίδειγμα εἶναι, δ συμποσίῳ οὐδὲν προσήκει. καὶ μὴν



τό γε ἐπὶ τοῦ τροχοῦ ἄμα περιδουμένου γράφειν τε καὶ ἀναγνώσκειν θαῦμα μὲν ἴσως τί ἐστίν, ἤδοθην δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα δύναμαι γρῶναι τίς ἂν παράσχοι.

- 3 οὕτω πόρρω σοφίας ἤκεις; The separation of this from the former part of the sentence is rightly removed by Winckelmann, Badham, and Burnet. οὕτω inserted before οὕτω by Schanz is quite unnecessary. 'Surely, said I, you do not also know how to turn a somersault into the midst of swords, or to be whirled round on a wheel at your time of life, having attained to such skill as that?'
- 9 εὐθὺς γενόμενοι, 'from the moment of your birth.'
- 11 Ἐφάτην ἕμα ἀμφοτέρω. 'They both affirmed it together.' Schanz adds a second πάντα before ἐφάτην without authority.
- 295 Πλὴν γ' ὅτι, (ἦν δ') ἐγὼ . . . , 'Yes (I cannot believe), except that a 3 you are likely to be wise. ἦν δ' omitted in the MSS. was added by Stephanus from Cornarius. Schanz thinks ἀπιστῶ should be inserted after ἐγὼ: but 'I do not believe that you are likely to be wise' is very unlike the ironical courtesy of Socrates. A better word than ἀπιστῶ would be οἶμαι or something similar. Then πλὴν γ' ὅτι ἐγὼ (οἶμαι) κτλ., 'Yes, except in so far as I think you are likely to be wise.' Either ἐγὼ must be omitted or a verb supplied.
- 6 ἤδιστα ταῦτα ἐξελέγχομαι, 'I am delighted to be refuted on these points.'
- 8 ἔρμαιον. Cf. 273 E 2.
- b 9 ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . A certain correction of ἀλλὰ μὴν . . . , adopted by all editors, except Winckelmann, whose attempt to explain ἀλλὰ μὴν is not satisfactory.
- c 1 Ἐπολαμβάνεις, 'of course you understand something (as the meaning) of what I say.'
- 4 ἄλλη ἐρωτῆς διανοούμενος, 'ask a question intending it in one way, and I take it in another way.'
- 6 μηδὲν πρὸς ἔπος, 'nothing to the point.' Cf. *Philol.* 18 τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὐτῶν ἐστίν; The phrase became proverbial, as in Lucian, *Philopseud.* 29 Οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ταῦτα, φασίν. A similar phrase is οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον, *Philol.* 33 B, 42 E (Heindorf).
- 7 Ἐμοιγε κτλ. 'It will satisfy me, but not you, I imagine.' For a like arrogant speech cf. 296 B Οὐκὸν ἡμᾶς γ', ἔφη, ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σέ.
- 10 Οὐκ ἀποκρινεῖ. The future was rightly restored by Bekker, as

repeating scornfully Socrates' refusal to answer. 'You will not answer what you understand from time to time (to be meant), because you are continually talking nonsense, and are too much of a dotard.'

διαστέλλοντι τὰ λεγόμενα. Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* xvii. 15 'Ἐν μὲν οὖν δ 1 τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασι ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον, 'When words are used in their proper sense, we must answer either simply "yes" or "no," or by drawing a distinction.' *ibid.* Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν οἷς ἀσαφὲς τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἀπλῶς.

θηρεῖσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας, 'to entrap me in his verbal toils.' 2 διανοησάμενον B Vind., 'I had determined,' better than διανοούμενον T. 5 Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται. 'Here again the fellow answers 296 more than is asked.' a 1

'Αεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίσταμαι. Socrates foresees the fallacy involved in 7 'Αεὶ meaning either 'at all times' absolutely or 'at each time.'

παύσαι παραφθεγγόμενος; 'again will you not cease from superfluous qualifications?' In Plutarch, *Mor.* 169 D παραφθέγγεσθαι is 'to speak aside,' and in Polybius xviii. 15. 13 'obiter dicere.'

σφῆλη BT Vind.; the old reading σφάλῃ was altered by Heindorf 9 to σφαλεῖ, but there is no reason for rejecting σφῆλη.

Τοῦτ' ἐκάω, 'There it is again! The same superfluous qualification.' b 7

μηδέ ἐν . . . ἀφέλη. The Sophist arrogantly tells Socrates that he 9 need not withdraw his qualification, meaning himself to ignore it entirely, as he does in his next question.

δύναμι ἀν ἅπαντα ἐπίστασθαι . . . ; The question is framed on the c 1 assumption that Socrates had admitted ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι, and the qualification δ γ' ἐπίσταμαι is disregarded.

εἰ μὴ πάντα ἐπίσταιο. The word used at the beginning of the argument was πάντα, but Socrates in his answer B 5 had said ἅπαντα, seemingly without intending to make a distinction between these two words. But in fact πάντα means 'all severally' (καθ' ἐν ἕκαστον 294 D 2), while ἅπαντα (= ἅμα πάντα 296 C 10) means 'all together.' The Sophist takes advantage of the distinction to frame a question which can only be answered without qualification (ἀπλῶς); and the answer τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἶη is equivalent to a simple 'No.'

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὁμολογεῖς ἐπίστασθαι. The Sophist is exultant: he 4

seizes upon *ἅπαντα* (B 5) and entirely ignores the limitation. His argument would run thus in a formal syllogism :

You cannot know *ἅπαντα* without knowing *πάντα* :

You admit that you know *ἅπαντα* :

Therefore you know *πάντα*.

- 6 *Ἔοικα . . . ἐπίσταμαι.* 'So it seems, said I, since the limitation "what things I know" has not any force, but I know all things.' The last clause is still dependent on *ἐπειδήπερ*.
- 9 *εἶτε ὅταν ἐπίστη εἶτε ὅπως βούλα.* Again the Sophist declares his contempt for all limitations such as A 7 *ἀεὶ, ὅταν ἐπίστωμαι*.
- 10 *καὶ ἔμα πάντα.* Cf. B 3 *ἀεὶ δ' ἐπιστάμενος . . . πάντα*; When *ἀεὶ πάντα* is taken with the absolute sense of *ἀεὶ*, it necessarily implies *ἔμα πάντα*. This absolute *ἀεὶ* he next proceeds to develop.
- d 1 *ὄτ' ἐγγυον καὶ ὄτ' ἐφύου,* 'at the time of your birth, and at that of your begetting.' The climax requires this sense of *ἐφύου*, which might otherwise mean 'growing up' (Jowett).
- 3 [*αὐτός*] *ἀεὶ* BT. *αὐτός* is condemned by all editors, but no satisfactory correction has been found: *αὐ* Schanz, *αὐθις* Ast, *εἰθύς* Heindorf, *αὐθις* or *εἰθύς* Stallbaum, *ἔσαι* for *αὐτός ἀεὶ* Badham. Possibly *αὐτός*, which is certainly superfluous, may be only an erroneous repetition from *αὐτός γενέσθαι* just above. Without it the sense is quite clear.
- 5 *ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημα.* He addresses the Sophist as a god: cf. 273 E *σφῶ ὡσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω*. Aristoph. *Acharn.* 807 *ὦ πολυτίμηθ' Ἡράκλειε*. *Vesp.* 1001 *ὦ πολυτίμητοι θεοί*.
- 7 *συμβουληθεῖα,* 'should be willing to help': cf. *Legg.* 718 B *συμβουληθέντων θεῶν*.
- e 1 *ἀμφισβητοῖν . . . ὅπως ἐγὼ οὐ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.* 'As to other points I know not how I could argue with men of such prodigious wisdom as you that I do not know all things.' Cf. *Charm.* 169 E *Οὐ τοῦτο . . . ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ . . . αὐτὸς αὐτὸν γνώσεται*. *Parmen.* 135 A *ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα*. *Pol.* 476 D.
- 2 *τερατώδεσιν.* On Plato's frequent use of adjectives in *-ώδης* and *εἰδής* see Lutoslawski, p. 113.
- 297 *Διαφθείρεις, ἔφη, τὸν λόγον, ὁ Εὐθύδημος.* On the separation of the a 5 nominative from *ἔφη* compare 286 E, note. Euthydemus is represented as sharper than his elder brother, and so is made the chief speaker throughout.

Ἔασον, ἀγαθὲ . . . καὶ μὴ μοι φθονήσης τοῦ μαθήματος. Cf. *Sympos.* b 4 223 A ἀλλ' ἔασον, ὦ δαιμόνι, καὶ μὴ φθονήσης τῷ μειρακίῳ ἵπ' ἐμοῦ ἐπαινεθῆναι.

Φεύγεις, 'You are running away.' 7  
 ἤττων γάρ εἰμι καὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου ἡμῶν, 'for I am weaker than either 9  
 one of you.' Cf. *Theaet.* 185 A οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέ-  
 ρων αἰσθάνοι' ἄν. *Gorg.* 475 A ἢ τῷ ἐτέρῳ τούτῳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις  
 ὑπερβάλλων.

πολλοὺ δέω μὴ οὐ δύο γὰρ φεύγειν, 'I do not hesitate to run away 10  
 from two.'

τοῦ Ἡρακλέους. Cf. *Phaed.* 89 C πρὸς δύο λέγεται οὐδ' ὁ Ἡρακλῆς C 1  
 οἴος τε εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐμὲ, ἔφη, τὸν Ἴδλεων παρακαλεῖ, ἕως ἔτι φῶς  
 ἐστίν. The Scholiast on the *Phaedo* gives several explanations of  
 the proverb, of which the most generally accepted is quoted from  
 Herodorus and Hellanicus, that 'when Hercules was killing the  
 Hydra, Juno set a crab upon him; and being unable to fight  
 against two he called for Iolaus as his ally, and hence the pro-  
 verbial saying.' Cf. *Legg.* 919 B ὄρθον μὲν δὴ πάλαι τε εἰρημένον, ὡς  
 πρὸς δύο μάχασθαι καὶ ἐναντία χαλεπόν. Cf. *Apollod.* ii. 5, 2.

τῇ τε ὕδρᾳ διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρίᾳ ὄσση, 'to fight it out both with  
 the Hydra, who was a lady-sophist, and by virtue of her wisdom,  
 if any one cut off one head of the argument, sent up many instead  
 of the one.' σοφιστρία is found only here, being specially coined  
 for the occasion. Cf. Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 82: 'Person ap. Dobree  
 Adn. ad Aristoph. *Plut.* 971 "Vox: συκοφαντρία videtur esse ab  
 Aristophane ficta ut σοφιστρία a Platone, *Euthyd.* p. 297 c.'" The  
 second Plutus was acted in the Archonship of Antipater 388 B. C.  
 Plato therefore formed his new word in imitation of the recent  
 coinage of Aristophanes.

νεωστὶ μοι δοκεῖν καταπεπλευκῆναι. After μοι B inserts τινι, an evident 5  
 repetition of τινι immediately above. Dionysodorus, the crab, and  
 his brother had but recently arrived, as is clear from the opening of  
 the dialogue.

ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερά. Cf. 271 B 6 ὁ δὲ παρ' ἐμὲ καθήμενος ἐξ ἀριστερᾶς 6  
 . . . Διονυσόδωρος.

λέγων καὶ δάκνων. Cf. *Apollod.* *ibid.* ἐβόηθει δὲ καρκίνος τῇ ὕδρᾳ  
 ὑπερμεγέθης δάκνων τὸν πόδα.

βοηθὸν ἐπεκαλίσσατο. *Apollod.* *ibid.* ἐπεκαλίσσατο καὶ αὐτὸς βοηθὸν 7

τὸν Ἴδλαον. Apollodorus (*circ.* B. C. 140) seems to have followed Plato's description very closely.

δ 1 δ δ' ἑμὸς Ἴδλαος [Πατροκλῆς] εἰ ἔλθοι. Patrocles was the nephew (ἀδελφιδόου) of Socrates, being the son of his half-brother Chaerædemus (Ξ 7). But the insertion of his name here is probably due to a marginal gloss. δ δ' ἑμὸς Ἴδλαος means little more than 'my helper': 'Iolaum pro *auxiliatore* vulgo accipi ostendit Erasmus *Chiliades*, p. 93' (Routh). The author of the gloss failed to see in the words πλείον ἢν θάτερον ποιήσειεν the allusion to Ctesippus and his fierce retorts upon the Sophists.

ἄλθοι. Heindorf thinks that this cannot refer to Ctesippus who was present without some such addition as εἰς βοηθειάν or βοηθήσων. But this idea is already implied in δ ἑμὸς Ἴδλαος, 'my helper'; and ἐλθεῖν is used in the same indefinite way without any addition in *Protag.* 310 C 5, 335 C 5.

3 δὴ ὅτε σοὶ ταῦτα ἔμνηται, 'whenever you have finished this song.' Ἔμνειν, like the Latin *cantare* and our English 'canting,' is often used in the sense of 'harping upon' a thing. Cf. *Pol.* i. 329 B καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτ' ἤν τὸ γῆρας ὑμνοῦσιν, ὅσων κακῶν σφίσι αἴτιον. *Pol.* viii. 549 E ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔμνειν. v. Ruhnk. *Tim. Lex.*

e 2 παραπλήσιον μὲν τοῦνομα Ἴφικλῆς. But *παραπλήσιος* is preferred by Schanz, as at one time by Heindorf. The neuter is the reading of B T, but the construction is doubtful, for it is not clear, as Heindorf once thought, that because we find ἀνὴρ ὄνομα Ἴφικλῆς we may also write *παραπλήσιον τοῦνομα Ἴφικλῆς*. An example of such usage is wanted.

6 οὐχ ἑμοπάτριός γε. Socrates tries to add the proper limitation to the undistributed term ἀδελφός, as again 298 A 2 τοῦ πατρός: Τοῦμοῦ γ', ἔφη.

8 Πατήρ δὲ ἦν, ἔφη. Dionysodorus, without noticing the objection of Socrates, passes at once to another question.

298 Ἄρ' οὖν πατήρ ἦν ἕτερος ἢν πατρός; See the note on B 2 ἕτερος ἢν πατρός οὐ πατήρ ἐστίν.

3 τῷ λίθῳ, 'the (proverbial) stone': see the next note.

4 μὴ φανῶ ἐπὶ σοῦ δ' αὐτότε. To be like a stone was a common expression of contempt. Cf. *Gorg.* 494 A τὸ ὅσπερ λίθον ζῆν . . . μήτε χαίροντα μήτε λυπούμενον: *ibid.* B Χαράδριου τινα αὐτὸν σὺ βίον λέγεις,

ἀλλ' οὐ νεκροῦ οὐδὲ λίθου. *Sympos.* 198 C μὴ . . . αὐτόν με λίθον τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ ποιήσεις. The Sophist chose λίθος cunningly, as Socrates would gladly admit that he was not a stone. Cf. *Soph. EL* iv. 528.

Οὐκοῦν . . . ἕτερος ἂν πατὴρ οὐκ ἂν πατήρ εἴη, T. ἂν πατήρ ἐστίν B. 8 Schanz writes οὐκοῦν, omits οὐκ ἂν, and reads ἐστίν. These many changes are quite unnecessary.

ἕτερος ἂν πατὴρ οὐ πατήρ ἐστίν. 'Fallacia est *Accidentis*' (Routh), b 1 Cf. Aristot. *Soph. EL* v. 'Paralogisms which arise from accident are when anything is asserted to be equally true of the subject (τῷ πράγματι) and of its accident (τῷ συμβεβηκότι). For since the same subject has many accidents, it is not necessary that the same should all be present to the predicates and to the subject of which they are predicated; for in this case all things would be the same, as the Sophists say. Such a fallacy is the following: If Coriscus is different from a man, he is different from himself, for he is a man. Or, if he is other than Socrates, and Socrates is (a) man, you have acknowledged, say they, that he is other than man, because it happens that he is other than one who is (a) man.'

The passage in the *Euthydemus* put into a syllogism would run thus:

Chaeredemus is not Sophroniscus:

Sophroniscus is a father:

∴ Chaeredemus is not a father.

There is evidently an illicit process of the minor, 'father' being particular in the premiss but universal in the conclusion.

On this 'fallacia accidentis' see Mansel, *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, Append. 136. Diog. Laert. iii. 33, 53 Δύο δὲ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς εἰσι τρόποι, ὃ τε κατ' ἐναντιώσιν, καὶ ὃ ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας. ὃ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἐναντιώσιν ἐστίν ἐξ οὗ τῷ ἐρωτώμενῳ περὶ πᾶσαν ἀπόκρισιν ἀκολουθήσει τὸ ἐναντίον οἶον, 'Ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ τοῦ σοῦ πατὴρ ἦτοι ἕτερός ἐστίν ἢ ὁ αὐτός' εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερός ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πατὴρ ὁ σὸς πατήρ, πατὴρ ἕτερος ἂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη πατήρ. εἰ δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστὶ τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί, ὁ ἐμὸς ἂν εἴη πατήρ.

οὐ ταῦτά ταῦτα πέπονθεν; 'And is not your father in the same plight?'

Οὐκ ἂν συμβουλόμην, 'I should not wish that,' or more plainly, γ 'I should be sorry if he were.'

- c 5 μὴ γέρ . . . συνάπτει. For the construction cf. *Alcib.* ii. 139 D ἄλλ' ὄρα . . . μὴ οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχει. *Laches* 196 C ἄλλ' ὀρώμεν μὴ Νικίας οὐραί τι λέγειν. *Thaet.* 145 B ἄλλ' ὄρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν. In this sense, 'whether,' μὴ may also be used without ὄρα or any similar verb: cf. *Protag.* 312 A 'Ἄλλ' ἄρα μὴ οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις, 'Perhaps then you do not suppose.' So, in our present passage, 'Perhaps, as the proverb is, you are not joining like with like,' i. e. the cases which you compare are not similar. See Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 138.
- 6 οὐ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτει. Cf. *Aristot. Phys. Auscult.* iii. 6, 12 Οὐ γὰρ λίνον λίνῳ συνάπτειν ἔστι τῷ ἅπαντι καὶ ὄλη τῷ ἄπειρον. *Simplicius ad Aristot. locum οὐ τὰ συγκλώθεσθαι πεφυκῶτα συγκλώθειν* (Heindorf).
- d 4 κωβιδῶν . . . Cf. *Athen.* 106 E Θύννοισι τευθίς, κωβιῶσι κωβίδες, 'With tunnies cuttle-fish, with gudgeons shrimps.' For κωβιδῶν T, the more usual word βοιδιδῶν has been substituted in B.
- 5 <Κάπρος> Badham, Καὶ πρὸς BTV. 'Quod καὶ πρὸς in κάπρος invitis omnibus libris mutavi, audacius sane factum est; sed quum ex altera parte sordes et tenebras conspicis ex altera lucem et nitorem, difficile est religionis non aliquando oblivisci' (Badham).
- e 4 πατήρ ἂν σὸς ἔστιν, ὥστε σὸς πατήρ γίγνεται. 'Fallacia haec est quae vocatur *compositionis*, i. e. cum coniunctim accipiuntur, quae erant accipienda divisim' (Routh). Cf. *Aristot. Soph. El.* xxiv, where as examples we find ἄρ' ὁ ἀνδριάς σόν ἔστιν ἔργον, ἢ σὸς ὁ κύων πατήρ; and the solution οὐδ', εἰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐμόν, ἔστι δὲ ἔργον, ἐμόν ἔστιν ἔργον, ἄλλ' ἢ κῆμα ἢ πᾶγμα ἢ ἄλλο τι. See note on 298 B 2.
- 299 πατέρα τύπτοιμι BT, πατέρ' ἂν τύπτοιμι Sauppe, Burnet. δικαιό-  
a 1 τερον ἂν Ast, Schanz. But ἂν is not necessary: see 292 E 5 ποιήσεις, note.
- 2 δ τι μαθόν, 'that he was so foolish as to beget such wise sons.' Cf. 283 E.  
ἄλλ' ἢ σου, ironical. 'But I suppose the father of you two and of the puppies has gained many good things from this wisdom of yours.' Cf. *Soph. Ajax* 1008 ἢ πού με Τελαμών, σὸς πατήρ ἐμός θ' ἄμα, | δέξαιτ' ἂν εἰπερὸς ἰλεὸς τ' ἴσως.
- b 4 Σὺ ἄριστα εἶπα, 'You will know best,' i. e. when you have heard what I am going to say.

τοῦτο (τό) ἀγαθόν. 'Articulum τό e cod. *Par. addidi*' (Heindorf). 7  
τό is omitted in BT Vind., having probably dropped out after the  
preceding -το.

καὶ καλῶς ἐκεῖ ἔξει, 'in that case it will be well.' 'Cf. *Theaet.*  
172 B ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ, οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις' (Badham). Schanz reads  
*εἰκέινος*, and Heindorf thinks that ἐκεῖ is an interpolation arising out  
of the following ἔξει.

τρίψας ἐγκέραση ἑλλαβόρου ἄμαξαν, 'should pound and infuse a 8  
wagon-load of hellebore.' Cf. Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* ix. 10, 2  
μίσηγεται δὲ πρὸς τὴν πόσω ἄπως εὐεμῖς ἢ τὸ τῆς ἑλλαβορίνης σπέρμα.  
Cf. Menand. *Arreph.* Fr. v. 'Ἐλλίβορον ἤδη πάποισ' ἔπιες, Σωσία;  
πάλιν πάλιν νῦν πῖθι' μάλιν γὰρ κακῶς. Cf. Hor. *Sat.* ii. 3,  
82, &c.

ὁ ἄνδρις δ' ἐν Δελφοῖς. Pausanias (Lib. x.) gives an almost c 1  
countless list of statues at Delphi, but does not mention any one of  
unusual size. Probably the statue here meant was that of Apollo  
himself, as 'the Greeks who fought against the king of the Persians  
erected a brazen Zeus at Olympia, and an Apollo at Delphi, after  
the battles of Artemisium and Salamis' (Paus. 832).

τὸν Γηρυόνην. Cf. *Legg.* 795 C Γηρυόνου δὲ γε εἰ τις φύσιν ἔχων 5  
ἢ καὶ τὴν Βριάρεω φύοιτο, ταῖς ἑκατὸν χερσὶν ἑκατὸν δεῖ βέλη ῥίπτειν  
δυνατὸν εἶναι. Hesiod. *Theog.* 287 Χρυσάωρ δ' ἔτεκε τρικάρηνον  
Γηρυονῆα μυχθεῖς Καλλιρῆη κούρη κλυτοῦ Ἰακείνου. Cf. Apollod.  
ii. 5, 10.

Βριάρεων. Cf. Apollod. i. 1, 1: Hes. *Theog.* 149 Κόττος τε Βριάρεώς 6  
τε Γύης θ', ὑπερήφανα τέκνα | τῶν ἑκατὸν μὲν χεῖρες ἀπ' ὤμων αἰσσοῖτο |  
ἄπλοτοι, κεφαλαὶ δὲ ἑκάστω πενήκοντα.

καὶ τόνδε τὸν ἱταῖρον. This clause is rejected by Schanz, ap- 7  
parently without sufficient reason.

τὰ πρότερον ἀποκεκρυμένα. The previous answers of Ctesippus d 1  
had reference to the advantage, in some cases, of having many  
shields and spears.

The following argument is intended to ridicule the greed for  
money which is so severely satirized by Aristophanes in the  
*Plutus*, which was acted in its second form, as we now have it  
in 388 B. C.

(χρῆναι ἀεὶ) Badham. 'Librarius quum ad loci rationem minus 4  
attenderet XPHNIAIEI in XPHMATAEII corruptit' (Badham).



- e 4 **Σκυθῶν . . .** of χρυσίων τε ἐν τοῖς κρανίοις ἔχουσιν. Cf. Hdt. iv. 65 (Rawlinson): 'The skulls of their enemies, not indeed of all, but of those whom they most detest, they treat as follows. Having sawn off the portion below the eyebrows, and cleaned out the inside, they cover the outside with leather. When a man is poor, this is all that he does; but if he is rich, he also lines the inside with gold: in either case the skull is used as a drinking-cup. They do the same with the skulls of their own kith and kin if they have been at feud with them, and have vanquished them in the presence of the king. When strangers whom they deem of any account come to visit them, these skulls are handed round,' &c. Cf. Strabo 300.
- 5 **τοῖς ἑαυτῶν.** Ctesippus meets the Sophists with their own weapons: as Dionysodorus had argued (298 E 4) *πατὴρ ὄν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων*, so Ctesippus calls the skulls which the Scythians had taken 'their own,' and so 'they drink out of their own gilded skulls,' and 'hold their own head in their hands and see inside it.'
- 300 **τὰ δυνατὰ ὄραν.** The phrase has two meanings, corresponding
- a 2 to the active and passive senses of *δυνατός*: (1) *ἂ δύνανται ὄραν*, (2) *ἂ δύνανται τις ὄραν*. The former is common and needs no illustration; for the latter sense cf. Aesch. *Agam.* 97 *ὃ τι καὶ δυνάτον καὶ θέμις αἰνεῖν*. Xen. *Anab.* iv. 1, 24 *δυνατὴν καὶ ὑποζυγίους πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν*. The fallacy therefore may be regarded as belonging either to the class *παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν* or *παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν*, on which see Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* iv. 526 and 527: as an example of the latter Aristotle gives *ἄρα ὃ ὄρᾳ τις τοῦτο ὄρᾳ; ὄρᾳ δὲ τὸν κίονα, ὥστε ὄρᾳ ὃ κίονα*.
- 3 **Κάγώ,** scilicet ὄρῶ τὰ δυνατὰ ὄραν. The Sophist seems to have acted like Antisthenes when he turned out the rags of his cloak for Socrates to see, Diog. Laert. vi. 8.
- 5 **Τί δέ;** . . . **Μηδέν.** 'But what can they see?' Nothing. Cf. Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 135 'Μή. (α) In indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition. *Theaet.* 192 E *Σωκράτης ἐπιγινώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὄρᾳ δὲ μηδίκτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν*.' I have completed the quotation.
- 6 **οὔτως ἡδὺς εἶ,** 'sweet innocent as you are.' Cf. *Gorg.* 491 D,

*Pol.* 337 D, Ruhnk. *Tim. Lex.* 'Ἠδύς· εὐήθης καὶ ἄφρων. Suidas: 'Ἠδύς· εὐήθης, ἐκάλουν δὲ οὕτω καὶ τοὺς ὑπομώρους.

οὐ καθεύδων ἐπικειομῆσθαι, 'to have fallen asleep with your eyes γ open.' Cf. Lucian, *Alex.* 255 λαμβάνων γὰρ τὰ βιβλία ἐπεκοιμᾶτο, ὡς ἔφασκεν, αὐτοῖς.

σιγῶντα λέγειν, 'a speaking of the silent.' Cf. Aristot. *Soph.* *El.* b 1 iv. 528 Παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν οἱ τοιοῦτε λόγοι . . . ἄρ' ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; διττὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, τό τε τὸν λέγοντα σιγᾶν καὶ τὸ τὰ λεγόμενα. *ibid.* x. 558 διὸ ἢ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκειῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν ἀντίφασιν), ὅτε δ' ἐν ἀμφοῖν, εἴαν ἢ φανόμενος ἔλεγχος. ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιγῶντα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ.

φθεγγόμενα . . . λέγεται, 'the irons, if anybody touch them, are γ spoken of as roaring and crying aloud.' For λέγεται, BT, Ast conjectured λέγει. But the passive is right in answer to οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις;

τοῦτο μὲν ὑπὸ σοφίας ἔλαθες οὐδὲν εἰπών, 'in this your wisdom has γ made you unwittingly talk nonsense.'

λέγοντα σιγᾶν, 'to be silent in speaking.' 8

ὑπεραγωνιᾶν, 'to be over anxious on account of the boy.' Cf. c 1 *Charmt.* 162 C I Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δηλὸς μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρὸς τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων.

τὰ λέγοντα, a necessary emendation of τὰ λεγόμενα BT, adopted 4 by all editors (except Winckelmann) before Schanz, who bracketed τὰ λεγόμενα.

τά γε δήπου λέγοντα. Euthydemus himself tries to limit the 6 universal term τὰ πάντα by a distinction such as he would not allow Socrates to use, 295 B 4, 296 A 1 οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὄψ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ.

μέγα πάνυ ἀνακαγχάσας, 'with a loud roar of laughter.' Cf. *Pol.* d 3 337 A καὶ δε ἀκούσας ἀνεκάγχασέ τε μάλα σαρδάνιον. See 276 D note.

ἐξημφοτέρικεν τὸν λόγον. For the explanation of this phrase 4 Winckelmann rightly refers to *Pol.* 479 C τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστίασεσιν, ἔφη, ἐπαμφοτερίζουσιν ἔοικε καὶ τῷ τῶν παίδων αἰνίγματι τῷ περὶ τοῦ εἰνούχου τῆς βολῆς περὶ τῆς νυκτερίδος, φ' καὶ ἐφ' οὐ αὐτὸν αὐτὴν αἰνίττονται βαλεῖν. The riddle itself is preserved by the Scholiast on that passage.

## Κλεάρχου γρίφος

αὐτός τις ἔστιν ὡς ἀνὴρ τε κοῦκ ἀνὴρ  
 θρηῖθα κ' οὐκ θρηῖθ' ἰδὼν τε κοῦκ ἰδὼν  
 ἐπὶ ξύλου τε κοῦ ξύλου καθήμενη  
 λίθφ βαλὼν τε κοῦ λίθφ διώλεσεν.

Νυκτερίδα ὁ εἰνούχος νάρθηκι κισήρει.

The point of comparison is that one who 'is and is not a man' strikes that which 'is and is not a bird,' &c. Upon this Plato by the mouth of Glaucon remarks that we cannot form a positive conception of such things either as being or not-being (καὶ οὐτε εἶναι οὐτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν παγίως νοῆσαι). Winckelmann also refers (*Proleg.* xxiii. note b) to an anecdote about Menedemus in Diog. Laert. ii. 135 'Ἀλεξίου ποτὶ ἐρωτήσαντος εἰ πέπανται τὸν πατέρα τύπων, 'Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἔτυπτον, φάσαι, οὐτε πέπανμαι. Πάλιν τ' ἐκείνον λέγοντος ὡς δαχρὴν ἐπιόντᾳ ναὶ ἢ οὐ λύσαι τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν, Γελοῖον, εἶπε, τὸ ἰς ὑμετέροις νόμοις ἀκολουθεῖν, εἶδὼν ἐν πύλαις ἀναβῆναι.

Our Sophists in the *Euthydemus* had insisted on the same rule that the answer must be given categorically 'Yes' or 'No'; and Ctesippus shrewdly turns their own chief weapon against them: 'That is not what I ask, but "Do all things keep silence or speak?"' This is exactly the 'Fallacia plurium interrogationum, quando plures quaestiones velut una proponuntur' (Aldrich ap. Mansel, *Artis Logicae Rudimenta*, App. 139, Whateley, *Elements of Logic*, Bk. iii. 9). Cf. Aristot. *Soph. El.* v. 11 ἢ πάλιν, ὡν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ; ὁπότερον γὰρ ἀν φῆ, ἔστι μὲν ὡς ἔλεγχον ἢ ψεῦδος φαιρόμενον δόξειεν ἀν ποιεῖν τὸ γὰρ φάσαι τῶν μὴ ἀγαθῶν τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τι μὴ ἀγαθὸν ψεῦδος. *ibid.* xxx. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιούντας εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ διοριστέον' ἐρωτήσεις γὰρ μία, πρὸς ἣν μία ἀπόκρισις ἔστιν ὥστε οὐτε πλείω καθ' ἑνὸς οὐτε ἐν κατὰ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καθ' ἑνὸς φάτεον ἢ ἀποφατέον.

In the present case, however, where both sides of the dilemma are to be denied, Dionysodorus might have escaped, if instead of answering 'Yes' or 'No' he had been allowed and contented to answer simply Οὐδέτερον; but 'by adding ἀμφότερα he has ruined his argument' (ἐξημφότερικεν τὸν λόγον).

<sup>5</sup> ἀπόλωλε τε καὶ ἡττήται BT, 'he is beaten and done for. 'Prodidit' (Ficinus), ἀπολώλεκε (Heindorf). 'Quid reponendum sit

non exputo' (Badham). The objection that the weaker word comes first is hardly a sufficient reason for tampering with the text of BT.

πλείων ἢ δεκαπλάσιος. 'Aristid. *Orat. Sacr.* i. 494 Ἦδη μὲν τις καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηστοῦ τινος αὐτῷ συμβάντος καὶ βουλόμενος ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἶπεν ὡς ἄρα εἴη πλείων ἢ διπλάσιος γεγονώς' (Heindorf).

ὁ δέ μοι BT, γρ. ὁ δ' ἐδόκει μοι ἄρε Τ, ὁ δ' οἶμαι Badham, Schanz. 7 The reading of BT ὁ δέ μοι πανούργος ἄν, ὁ Κτήσιππος, has been rightly retained by Bekker, Winckelmann, Stallbaum, and Hermann: μοι is what is called the *dativus commodi*, frequently used to express the interest or opinion of the person speaking (Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 600, Obs. 2): if any change were to be made, the best would be μοι δοκεῖ (Burnet), used parenthetically: 'And he, methinks, rogue that he was, I mean Ctesippus, had overheard this very trick from these men themselves, for there are no other men living that have such wisdom. But cf. *Sophist.* 216 D τοῦ μέντοι ξίνου ἡμῶν ἡδέως ἄν πυνθανοίμην.

παρηγηκέσθαι. Cf. Aristoph. *Ran.* 750 καὶ παρακοίειν δεσποτῶν ἅπ' 8 ἄν λαλώσι (Stallbaum).

'Ἄρα ἕτερα ὄντα τοῦ καλοῦ; 'Were they other than the beautiful?' 301 'In these words I see not merely, with Steinhart, "a close & 1 approximation to the doctrine of ideas," but the actual enunciation of this doctrine' (Zeller, *Plato* 126, note). Stallbaum more correctly sees here only the *logical* doctrine of universals as held by Socrates, upon which Plato afterwards founded his *metaphysical* doctrine of 'Ideas.' Cf. *Meno* 73 D εἶπερ ἐν γέ τι ζητεῖς κατὰ πάντων. 74 A πολλὰς αὐτὴν ἠρήκαμεν ἀρετὰς μίαν ζητοῦντες . . . τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμεθα ἀνευρεῖν. *Parmen.* 130 B. Aristot. *Metaph.* i. 6, 2, and see note on 301 A 4 πάρεστιν, κτλ.

ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, 'was at my wit's end for want of an answer.' Cf. Wyttienbach, *Plut. Mor., De Sera Num. Vind.* 568 A 'ἐν παντὶ γενέσθαι κακῷ διὰ φόβον. Satis erat ἐν παντὶ γενέσθαι; ut postrema ab annotatore quodam addita videantur. 'Ἐν παντὶ εἶναι est Attica locutio, quae notat *in maximo timore esse*. . . . Plato tamen *Pol.* 579 B usus est pleniore forma 'ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη.' Cf. Stallbaum ad *Plat. Sympos.* 194 A εὖ καὶ μάλ' ἄν φόβοιο καὶ ἐν παντὶ εἴη. *Xen. Hell.* v. 4, 29 ἐν παντὶ ἦσαν.

ἔτι ἔγρυφα, 'for putting in my grunt': cf. Aristoph. *Plut.* 598 3 ἀλλὰ φθέρου καὶ μὴ γρύξῃς ἔτι μηδ' ὄτιόν.

- 4 *πάρεστιν μίντοι ἐκάστω αὐτῶν κάλλος τι.* Lutoslawski argues (p. 212, note) that the use of *πάρεστιν* in this passage does not correspond to the terminology of ideas in Plato. But on the many various terms including *παρεῖναι* and *παρουσία*, by which Plato expresses the relation between the universal ideas and the particulars of experience, see Jowett and Campbell, *Rep.* ii. 309, and *Classical Rev.* March, 1904, p. 122.
- 5 *ἴδν οὖν, ἔφη, παραγίγνται σοι βούε.* 'Est fallacia Homonymiae: sita est enim ambiguitas in vocibus *παραγίγνομαι* et *πάρεμι*; nam diverso sensu *παραγίγνεται* alicui bos et pulcritudo' (Routh).
- 8 'Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον . . .', 'But in what way must one thing be present to another, in order that this other may be other (than it was)?' For example, how must beauty be present to a stone that it may be beautiful? See the full discussion of this question in *Lys.* 217 D, and cf. *Μενο 71 A* ἀρετὴν γοῦν εἶτε διδασκτὸν εἶθ' ὅτε τρόπον παραγίγνεται εἶδέναι.
- b 1 *τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν σοφίαν ἑτερόν μιν μάλιστα.* The Sophist had used the predicate *ἕτερον* in a different sense from that which it bore in τὸ ἕτερον, where it indicates merely the numerical distinction of individuals. Socrates does what the Sophists had often done before, he changes the meaning of the predicate *ἕτερον*, pretending to understand it in the same sense as in the subject τὸ ἕτερον.
- 3 *Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀπορῶ . . . ὁ μὴ ἔστι;* 'Of course I am at a loss about a thing that does not exist.' Cf. Zeller, *Socrates* 277 'He (Stilpo) rejected, as did Antisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate, since the conception of the one is different from the conception of the other, and two things with different conceptions can never be declared to be the same.' *ibid.* (note) 'Since the conception of *Σωκράτης μουσικός* is a different one from *Σωκράτης λευκός*, the one according to Megarian hypothesis must be a different person from the other.'
- 6 *Ἐάν μοιγε, ἔφη, δοκῆ.* 'Yes, if it seems so to me.' This is the doctrine of Protagoras that 'man is the measure of all things,' i.e. 'what a thing seems to a man that it is to him.' Cf. 301 E 6; Zeller, *Outlines*, p. 92.
- c 1 *ἀπορήσαι, ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.* 'would have doubted that the other is other.'
- 2 *τοῦτο μὲν ἐκὼν παρήκασ.* 'This point you purposely omitted, since

in all the rest, like workmen whose business it is to finish each his proper work, you also seem to me to finish in very beautiful style the practice of discussion.'

τίνα χαλκεύειν προσήκει, 'whom it befits to forge copper.' 'Dicit 7 τίνα non τίνα, ut statim ambiguitas sermonis nascatur' (Heindorf).

τί δέ, κεραμεύειν; 'Well again, whom to make pots?' The 8 alteration of τί BT into τίνα, with some inferior MSS., is unnecessary.

τὰ μικρὰ κρέα . . . ὀπτᾶν, 'and cut up and boil and roast the small 9 pieces.' Badham reads τὰ κρέα σμικρὰ κατακόψαντα, 'to cut up the flesh into small pieces': but τὰ μικρὰ κρέα depends on the principal verbs εἶψιν και ὀπτᾶν as much if not more than on κατακόψαντα.

κολοφῶνα ἐπιτιθεῖς. Cf. Strabo 643 Ἐκθήσαντο δέ ποτε και ναυτικὴν e 1 ἀξιόλογον δύναμιν Κολοφῶνιοι και ἱππικὴν, ἐν ἣ τσοσούτων διέφερον τῶν ἄλλων ὥσθ' ὅπου ποτέ ἐν τοῖς δυσκαταλύτοις πολέμοις τὸ ἱππικὸν τῶν Κολοφῶνίων ἐπικουρήσειε λύεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον' ἀφ' οὗ και τὴν παροιμίαν ἐκδοθῆναι τὴν λέγουσαν "τὸν Κολοφῶνα ἐπέθηκεν," ὅταν τέλος ἐπιτεθῆ βέβαιον τῷ πράγματι.

ἐπιτιθεῖς Schanz: ἐπιτιθεῖς B, ἐπιτιθεῖς T. Cf. Rutherford, *New Phrynichus*, ccxx. 'The authority of Porson (ad Eur. Or. 141) has induced many scholars to prefer ἴης and τίθης to λείς and τιθεῖς. Brunck, on Aristoph. *Lys.* 895 and Soph. *Phil.* 992, took the opposite view to that of Porson, and in this case the verdict of the great English critic must be reversed. The authority of the MSS. is wholly on the side of Brunck. Thus in Aristoph. *Lys.* 895 the Ravenna exhibits διατιθεῖς, and on *Eg.* 717 ἐντιθεῖς.' In Soph. *Philoct.* 992 Jebb reads τίθης against the authority of the MSS.

ἐπιγνοίης ἂν αὐτήν . . . ; 'Should you recognize it?' 4 ἀπὸ σοῦ γὰρ δεῖ ἀρχεσθαι, τελευταῖν δ' εἰς Εὐθύδημον. An imitation 8 of the common mode of beginning an address to a deity. Cf. Theocr. xvii. 1 Ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχόμεσθα, και ἐς Δία λήγετε, Μοῖσαι. Theogn. *Γνομ.* Ὡ ἄνα, Δητοῦς νιέ, Διὸς τόκος, οὐποτε σείο λήσομαι ἀρχόμενος, οὐδ' ἀποπαύομενος. Hom. *Hymn. ad Dionys.* 17, Arati *Phaen.* 1, Virg. *Ecl.* iii. 59. The same mode of expression is used in Hom. *Il.* ix. 97 by Nestor in addressing Agamemnon: ἐν σοὶ μὲν λήξω, σείο δ' ἀρξομαι.

ὁλον βοῦς και πρόβατον, ἀρ' ἂν ἡγοῖο ταῦτα σὰ εἶναι. On this use 302 of the nominative to introduce an object without regard to the a 1

construction that follows see Bernhardt, *Gr. Syntax*. p. 68; Jelf, § 477; Kühner-Blass, § 356, 2.

- 5 ἀνακύψοιτο τῶν ἐρωτημάτων B, ἀνακύψοι τὸ τῶν ἐρ. T. 'I knew that some fine result would pop up from their questions.' For the future middle see Aristoph. *Av.* 147 ἀνακύψεται κλητῆρ' ἄγοισ' ἔωθεν ἢ Σαλαμῖνα.
- b 3 εἰρωνικῶς πᾶν ἐπισχών, 'after pausing with a very ironical air.' Cf. *Symp.* 218 D ἀκούσας μᾶλα εἰρωνικῶς καὶ σφόδρα ἰαυτῷ εἰσθότως. *Cratyl.* 384 A οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδέν, εἰρωνεύεται τε πρὸς με, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι.
- 6 ἀπορόν τινα στροφήν ἔφηνον, 'I tried to escape by some desperate dodge, and began at once to twist about as if caught in a net.' Cf. *Pol.* 405 C πάσας μὲν στροφὰς στρέψεσθαι.
- 7 Οὐκ ἔστιν. Socrates tries to elude the coming attack of Dionysodorus by what he himself describes as ἀπυρόν τινα στροφήν, 'a helpless kind of twist.' The title Ζεὺς Πατῆρ was used in two senses, (1) as he was the ancestor of an individual or of a race, (2) as he was the guardian of piety towards parents. For (1) cf. *Plat. Pol.* 391 E (with Adam's note)

Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι  
οἱ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ἔν κατ' Ἴδαϊον πάγον  
Διὸς πατρός βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι.

*Soph. Trach.* 287 εὐτ' ἂν ἀγνὰ θύματα ῥέξῃ πατρός Ζηνί. *ibid.* 754 ἔνθα πατρός Διὸς βώμους ὀρίζει τεμενίαν τε φυλλάδα. As Tantalus and Heracles both were sons of Zeus, the title πατῆρ is rightly used in reference to them in sense (1). (2) Aristoph. *Nub.* 1468 :

ΣΤΡ. Ναί, Ναί, καταδέσθητι πατῆρον Δία.  
ΦΕΙΔ. Ἴδού γε Δία πατῆρον, ὡς ἀρχαῖος εἶ.

*Eur. El.* 675 ὦ Ζεῦ πατῆρ, where Zeus is invoked by Orestes 'as the god who avenges the outraged name of *Father*' (Paley). *Plat. Legg.* 881 D ἀρῆ ἐνεχίσθω Διὸς ὁμογνίου καὶ πατρός κατὰ νόμον. Observe also that neither Tantalus, Heracles, nor Orestes was an Athenian, so that the Tragedians in these passages do not contradict what Plato says here. Thus Socrates imitates the logical tricks of the Sophists by denying in one sense what was true in another. Cf. Lobeck, *Aglaoph.* p. 770.

- c 2 Ἔα, . . . εὐφίμει τε, 'Ah! said I, speak reverently, and do not harshly lecture me too soon.' Cf. Aesch. *Prom.* 688 ἔα, ἔα, ἀπεχε.

βωμοὶ καὶ ἱερὰ οἰκία καὶ πατρῶα, 'altars and sacred rites domestic, ancestral, and all the rest of such things that the other Athenians have.'

Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῶος; BT. 'Have not the other Athenians Zeus as their ancestral god?' Schanz rejects the article unnecessarily in his text, having previously proposed ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ πατρῶος.

αὐτῆ ἢ ἐπωνυμία, 'this ancestral title.'

'Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος. Cf. Harpocrat. s. v. τὸν δὲ 'Ἀπόλλωνα κοινῶς δὲ ἰ πατρῶον τιμῶσιν 'Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ 'Ἰωνος' τούτου γὰρ οἰκίσαντος τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ, τοὺς 'Ἀθηναίους' Ἰωνας κληθῆναι καὶ Ἀπόλλω πατρῶον αὐτοῖς ὀνομασθῆναι. The quotation from Aristotle was probably from the opening, now lost, of his treatise *On the Constitution of Athens*: see Kenyon, p. 171. Cf. Demosth. *In Eubulidem* 1315 παιδίων ὄντα με εὐθέως ἦγον εἰς τοὺς φράτορας, εἰς Ἀπόλλωνος πατρῶου ἦγον, εἰς τᾶλλα ἱερά. *De Corona* 274 καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω τὸν Πύθιον, ὃς Πατρῶός ἐστι τῆ πόλει. Cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 2 Αὐλείτῳσαν οὖν, ἔφη, Θηβαίων παῖδες· οὐ γὰρ ἴσασι διαλέγεσθαι· ἡμῖν δὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὡς οἱ πατέρες λέγουσιν, Ἀρχηγέτις Ἀθηναῖα καὶ Πατρῶος Ἀπόλλων ἐστίν, ὃν ἡ μὲν ἔρριψε τὸν αὐλόν, ὃ δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐλητὴν ἐξέδειρε.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἰωνος γένεσιν. Ion, son of Apollo and Creusa, was represented to Xanthus by the oracle as being his own son by Creusa. The story is told in Eur. *Ion* 64-75.

ἔρκειος, 'defender of the house.' Harpocrat. Ἐρκειος Ζεὺς, φ 2 βωμὸς ἐντὸς ἔρκου ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἵδρυται· τὸν γὰρ περιβόλον ἔρκος ἔλεγον. Ὅτι δὲ τοῖτοῖς μετὴν τῆς πολιτείας οἷς εἶη Ζεὺς Ἐρκειος δεδήλωκε καὶ Ὑπερείδης' (Heindorf). Cf. Aristot. *De Rep. Athen.* [col. 28] ἐπερωτῶσιν δ' ὅταν δοκιμάζωσιν, πρῶτον μὲν τίς σοι πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων, καὶ τίς πατὴρ πατήρ, καὶ τίς μήτηρ, καὶ τίς μητὴρ πατήρ καὶ πόθεν τῶν δήμων· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰ ἔστιν αὐτῶν Ἀπόλλων πατρῶος καὶ Ζεὺς ἔρκειος, καὶ ποῦ ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστιν. The ἱερά seem to have been movable shrines.

φράτριος. A φρατρία was a third part (τριτὴς Demosth. 184) of one of the four ancient tribes into which Attica was divided either by Aegeus and his three brothers, sons of Pandion (Soph. *Fr.* 19, Strabo 392), or according to a different tradition by Ion (Strabo 383). Schol. in Plat. *Axioch.* 371 Ἐκτὴν φησὶ, τοῦ δλου πληθους διρημένου Ἀθήνησιν εἰς τε τοὺς γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς δημιουργοὺς, φυλὰς αὐτῶν εἶναι τέσσαρας, τῶν δὲ φυλῶν ἐκάστης μοίρας εἶναι τρεῖς, ἃς τριτῦας τε καλοῦσι καὶ φρατρίας, ἐκάστης δὲ τούτων τριάκοντα εἶναι



- γένη, τὸ δὲ γένος ἐκ τριάκοντα ἑκαστον ἀνδρῶν συνεστάναι. τούτους δὲ τοὺς εἰς τὰ γένη τεταγμένους γεννήτας καλοῦσιν.' Cf. Aristot. *De Rep. Athen.* (Kenyon) 21, *ibid.* Append. Fr. 347.
- 3 Ἀθηναία φρατρία. Under this title Athena was worshipped together with Zeus at the Ἀπατούρια, an annual festival of the phratritiae, Xen. *Hell.* i. 7, 8 ἐν οἷς οἱ τε πατέρες καὶ οἱ συγγενεῖς σύνεισι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς. Cf. Hdt. i. 147.
- 8 τί γὰρ πάθω; 'For what can become of me?' Cf. Eur. *Phoen.* 895 τὸ μέλλον εἰ χρὴ πείσομαι; τί γὰρ πάθω; *Androm.* 513, with Paley's note, Hom. *Od.* v. 465 ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω; τί νύ μοι μήκιστα γένηται;
- e 5 θῦσαι (δη) Schanz, θῦσαι ἄν BT. ἄν, which was omitted by Stephanus and Heindorf, was brought back by Winckelmann and Stallbaum, but changed by Schanz into δη. The uncial ΔΗ is very easily mistaken for AN.
- 303 Πυππάξ δ' Ἡράκλειος, ἴφη, καλοῦ λόγου. 'Bravo, by Heracles!
- a 6 what a fine argument.' Cf. Cratin. *Δραμ.* Fr. 7 οἷδε πυππάξουσι περιτρέχοντες. Aristoph. *Eg.* 680 οἱ δ' ὑπερεπήρουν ὑπερεπίπασζόν τέ με. Schol. in *Euthyd.* τὸ νῦν βομβᾶξ λεγόμενον πύπασξ ἔλεγον, ὡς καὶ Δυκόφρων φήθη. οὐκ ἔστι δέ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πύπασξ τίθεται καὶ ἐπὶ σχετλιασμοῦ καὶ ἐγκωμίου τὸ δὲ βομβᾶξ οὐκέτι.
- 7 δ Πυππάξ. Dionysodorus turns the adverb into a proper name.
- 9 ἀφίσταμαι, 'I withdraw,' 'I give up.' 'Sic iam Pindar, *Ol.* i. 82 sq. elegantissimo asyndeto dixit ἐμοὶ δ' ἄπορα γαστρίμαργον μακάρων τιν' εἰπεῖν ἀφίσταμαι' (Winckelmann).
- b 2 καὶ γελῶντες Badham. καὶ γελῶντε B, γελῶντε T. 'Incredible est neminem adhuc ad vulgatam lectionem offendisse, quae ipsos Sophistas sibi plaudentes induceret, idque adeo vehementer ut paene deficerent. Unum superest verae lectionis vestigium quod in Clarkiano καὶ γελῶντε scriptum est' (Badham). *ibid.* in App. Crit. 'καὶ e Clarkiano restitui, et dualem in pluralem ter mutavi.'
- 3 ὀλίγων παρατάθησαν, 'were almost killed with laughing, and clapping, and rejoicing.' Cf. *Lys.* 204 C παρατάθησεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος. *Symph.* 207 B τῷ λιυῶ παρατεινόμενα. Xen. *Mem.* iii. 13, ὁ παρατάθη μακρὰν ὁδὸν πορευθεῖς.
- ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐφ' ἑκάστοις πᾶσι. 'Over the former victories the admirers of Euthydemus alone shouted gloriously over each and all.' 'Iungendum haud dubie ἐφ' ἑκάστοις πᾶσι, quod nescio cur Winckelmannus recte fieri posse negaverit. Nam ἕκαστα

πάντα sunt *singula quaeque* (Stallbaum). On Plato's use of *pās* or its compounds with *ἕκαστος* see Walbe *αβ*. Lutoslawski, p. 126.

καὶ οἱ κίονες. Cf. *Pol.* 492 B πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἱ τε πέτραι καὶ ὁ τόπος, 5 ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν, ἐπηχούντες διπλάσιον θόρυβον παρέχῃσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἑπαίνου. 'Acerba irrisio inest in Socratis verbis' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 84).

παντάπασι καταδουλωθεὶς κτλ., 'being altogether overpowered by c 2 their wisdom I took to praising and extolling them.'

ὦ μακάριοι σφέ, 'O happy pair, what wonderful genius, that you + have brought so great a subject to perfection so readily and in so short a time!'

ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον BT, 'but among them just 7 this is especially magnificent.' 'Utrum μεγαλοπρεπέστατον?' STEPH. 'Ita verterat ante Stephanum Cornarius. Sed comparativus mihi magis placet, dum sonat *quiddam plus quam solito magnificentum*' (Routh). The change to *μεγαλοπρεπέστατον* was very easily suggested by the well-known use of *ἐν τοῖς* with a superlative, to which it gives additional emphasis (Thuc. iii. 81 ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο: Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* § 140, 4; Donaldson, *Gk. Gr.* § 416 (cc)). But as in that idiom the two words seem never to be separated not even so slightly as here (*ἐν δὲ τοῖς*), it is safer to regard *τοῖς* simply as the demonstrative looking back to *πολλὰ . . . καλά*, and used here instead of *τούτοις* because of *τοῦτο* immediately following. The comparative is maintained by Winckelmann and by Bernhardt, *Gr. Synt.* 436, who refers to this passage, and apparently by Ficinus, 'in quibus id praecipue magnificentum est.'

τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων κτλ., 'for the mass of mankind and for 8 men of importance indeed and of great repute you care nothing at all.' Both words, *σεμνῶν* and *δῆ*, are constantly used in irony. For *δοκοῦντων εἶναι τι* cf. *Gorg.* 472 A. S. Paul, *Gal.* ii. 6.

πῶν μὲν ἂν ὀλίγοι ἀγαπῶν ἀνθρώποι μοιοὶ ὄμην, 'very few would be d 1 satisfied, and those men like yourselves.'

οὕτω νοοῦσιν αὐτούς B Vind., 'have such a notion of them,' 'so 3 conceive of them': cf. *Pol.* 508 D Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόει, 'thus conceive of the soul also': *Phaedr.* 246 C οὕτε ἰδόντες οὕτε ἱκανῶς νοήσαντες θεόν. The various reading *οὕτως ἀγνοοῦσιν* T has given rise to many needless conjectures.

δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρῶν, 'a popular and kindly feature.' πρῶν 6

- refers to their closing their own mouths as well as those of others. Winckelmann refers to Plutarch, *Mor.* 148 D *καὶ τὸν πατέρα τοῖς πολίταις πρῶτον ἀρχοντα παρέχει καὶ δημοτικώτερον.*
- 7 *ὅπῳταν φήτε μήτε καλὸν εἶναι μήτε ἐγαθὸν πρᾶγμα κτλ.* 'Whenever you deny that anything is either beautiful or good': i.e. when you say that there is no unity of substance and attribute, or of subject and predicate. Cf. *Sophist.* 251 C *χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἰῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέγειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον.* The motive was to avoid admitting that the same thing could be both one and many. See the passages quoted in the Introduction, p. 40.
- ε 1 *ἀτεχνῶς μὲν τῷ ὄντι συρράπτετε κτλ.,* 'you do in fact simply sew up men's mouths, just as you say.'
- 3 *πάνυ χαρίεν τέ ἐστίν κτλ.,* 'is a most charming result, and does away with the invidiousness of your arguments.'
- 5 *ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει ὅμῳν καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐξηγῆται, ὥστε κτλ. BT.* Two constructions are in this reading combined, *οὕτως ἔχει ὥστε* and *ἐξηγῆται ὥστε.* Cf. 288 A *καὶ ὥστε τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας πῶ τέχνης ἐξηγηθῆσαι.* For *ἔχει* Schanz reads *εὖ*, Badham *εὖ ἔχει.*
- 6 *ὥστ' (ἐν) πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. ὥστε BT.* 'De Platonis more scribendum suspicor ὥστ' ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ut § 74 (303 C 5) ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, § 3 (272 B 3), *Soph.* 234 A, . . . *Apol. Socr.* 19 A, . . . 24 A, 37 B, *Criton* 52 E, et sexcenta alia loca' (Heindorf).
- 7 *ἔγνω ἔγωγε.* 'Haec cum antecedentibus coniungunt *Ald.* et Basilienses. Melius opinor diviserunt interpretes et Stephanus; et mihi quidem proprium suum in arte sophistica profectum significare videtur Socrates' (Routh). Winckelmann, Badham, and Schanz connect *ἔγνω ἔγωγε* with the preceding sentence, and, I think, rightly: 'But the grandest thing, that this system is so arranged by you and so skilfully invented that any one in the world can learn it in a very short time—this I myself learnt by observing how quickly Ctesippus was able to imitate you offhand.' *καὶ τῷ Κτησίππῳ.* For this use of *καὶ* see Riddell, *Digest of Idioms*, § 132 on 'Kal expletive, preceding and indicating the emphatic word.'
- 304 *τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τοῦ πράγματος σφῶν,* 'This part then of your business is excellent in regard to its rapid transmission, but not expedient

for discussion in public.' The addition in T of τὸ σοφόν after σφῶν may possibly, as Stallbaum suggests, have arisen from σφῶν itself.

αὐτὰ πρὸς ἄλλήλω μόνω. Cf. Cobet, *Var. Lect.* 111 'Alterum indicium eiusdem interpolationis (μόνω) est in Platonis *Euthydemo* p. 504 A . . . ubi si μόνω in margine apponetur, pristinam sedem et iustam receperit.' Recent editors rightly retain μόνω, as adding force to αὐτῶ, according to a very common usage: cf. *Gorg.* 500 B; *Theaet.* 202 A; *Legg.* 667 B.

τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον . . . τίμον. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 826 C τὸ τίμον ἐν τῷ b 3 σπανίῳ τιθέμενον.

ἄγετε . . . ὅπως . . . παραδέξασθον. After ἄγετε, which involves the 4 notion of exhorting or inciting, ὅπως with the future indicative has its original meaning ὅτι τρόπῳ, *quo facto* as below B 7 σκόπει οὖν ὅπως συμφοιτήσεις: cf. Xen. *Cyr.* i. 2, 3 οἱ Περσικοὶ νόμοι ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἴσονται οἱ πολῖται. Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 811.

τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι BT. If we retain this reading of the MSS. c 4 we must, with Winckelmann and others, make a parenthesis of ὁ δὲ καὶ σοὶ . . . οὐδέν, which for convenience of translation we may transpose to the end: 'and (they say) that no limit of capacity or age excludes any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom, and what it most concerns you to hear, they say that there is nothing to hinder a man from money-making.' If we adopt the conjectural emendation of Stephanus τὸ χρηματίζεσθαι, or that of Routh, (τὸ) τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι, the construction is even simpler: 'and (they say) that they exclude no kind of capacity or age, and, what it most concerns you to hear, that not even attention to business at all hinders any one whatever from easily acquiring their wisdom.' Crito seems to have been very keen about his profits from agriculture: cf. 291 E ἡ ὑμέτερα τέχνη ἢ γεωργία.

μανθάνοιμι B, μάθοιμι T. The present is the better tense, as the 7 learning would not be confined to one single act.

κινδυνεύω . . . εἶναι, 'Yet I fear that I too am not one of those who are like Euthydemus, but of those others of whom you were yourself speaking just now, those who would rather be refuted than refute others by such arguments.'

ἔ γ' ἤκουον, 'what was said to me just now.' The use of the d 3 imperfect is like that of ἔλεγε just above.

(ἴσθ') ὅτι Heindorf, οἴσθ' ὅτι BT. The change from either to 4

the other by a simple itacism is so easy that Plato's usage is the best criterion, and this is strongly in favour of *ισθ' ὄτι*, which also gives the more suitable sense: cf. *Phaedr.* 243 D; *Gorg.* 453 A; *Theaet.* 145 B; *Parmen.* 135 D; *Pol.* 328 D; *Euthyd.* 284 E. 'You must know that one of those who were coming away from you came up to me as I was walking about.'

5 *τούτων τις τῶν . . . δεινῶν.* As a litigant at Athens was obliged to plead his own cause, a practice was adopted by Antiphon, Aeschines, Isocrates and other rhetoricians of writing speeches to be recited in court by their clients. On the supposed reference here to Isocrates see Introduction, p. 18.

7 ἀκροῶ. 'listen to the teaching.' *Φυσικαὶ ἀκροάσεις* is the title of Aristotle's lectures on Physics. Cf. *Menex.* 236 A Ἀσπασίας . . . ἡκροόμενῃν περαιούσης ἐπιτάφιον λόγον.

8 οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' εἰ ἢ προστάς κατακούειν, 'for I was not able to hear clearly, though I stood close up.' *προστάς* BT, 'though I stood forward.'

e 1 ἵνα ἤκουσας. After an historic tense (*ἀξίον γ' ἦν ἀκούσαι*) indicating an unfulfilled circumstance *ἵνα*, like *ὡς* and *ὅπως*, is used with a past indicative to declare what would have, but has not, taken place: 'in which case' (or 'that') you might have heard.' Cf. *Protag.* 335 C ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφοτέρα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο. *Crito* 44 D; *Meno* 895; *Soph. Oed. R.* 1386 :

εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν

πηγῆς δι' ὧτων φραγμός, οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμεν

τὸ μὴ 'ποκλείσαι τοῦμὸν ἀθλιὸν δέμας,

ἢν ἢ τυφλὸς τε καὶ κλύων μηδέν.

*Eur. Hippol.* 645.

οὐ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους. This, like *τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν* D 7, is ironical.

3 Τί οὖν ἐφαίνοντό σοι; If *ἐφαίνοντο* refers to the Sophists, the answer is framed as if Crito had asked *Τί οὖν ἐφαίνετό σοι ἂ οὗτοι ἔλεγον; Τί δὲ ἄλλο . . . ἢ οἶά περ κτλ.* But Schanz (*N. C. P.* p. 86) prefers to supply *οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι*.

5 (οὕτως γὰρ πῶς καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασι). 'For it was just so that he spoke word for word,' Lat. *verbum e verbo*. Cf. *Phaedr.* 234 C οὐχ ὑπερφῶς τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εἰρησθαι; *Phaedo* 71 B καὶ εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, 'if we do not use the exact terms

in some places.' 'I am quoting, says Crito to Socrates, the very words this person used. . . . This is an intimation that some one in particular is meant, and that the reader is expected to recognize the author by his style' (Thompson, *Phaedr.* p. 181). Cf. Introduction, p. 18.

'**Ἄλλὰ μέντοι κτλ.** 'But surely philosophy is a fine sort of thing.' 6  
**Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν;** 'Fine indeed? said he.' Cf. 291 A **Ποῖος** 7  
**Κτήσιππος** ;

**ὦ μακάριε,** 'my blessed fellow,' a polite mode of expressing strong disagreement: 'mein Lieber,' vel 'Bester' (Ast).

**οὐδένης μὲν οὖν ἔστιον,** 'Nay rather, good for nothing.'

**ἑαυτὸν παρέχειν,** 'to lend himself' as a tool. Cf. *Euthyphr.* 3 D 3  
**οὐ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν.** *Meno* 95 A **παρέχειν** αὐτοὺς  
**διδασκάλους τοῖς νέοις.**

**παντὸς δὲ ῥήματος ἀντέχονται,** 'lay hold of every word.' 'Cuivis 4  
 vocabulo adhaerent' (Winckelm.). 'Arripiunt et tuentur quidquid  
 in solum venit' (Heind.). 'Clark. Vatic. pro **ῥήματος** nobis  
 tradiderunt **χρήματος**, quod, cum effundat bonum sensum, resti-  
 tuendum est: scriptor enim universe dicit: "aggređiuntur rem  
 quamlibet"' (Schanz, *N. C. P.* p. 86). On **ῥήμα** see Lutosl. p. 430.

**Ἄλλὰ γάρ,** 'But the fact is'; cf. Riddell, *Digest*, 182.

**τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι.** The distinction between  
 philosophical discussion in itself and the men who make a bad  
 use of it is introduced for the sake of what follows, **τὸ πρᾶγμα**  
**εἰδοκεῖ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψέγειν.**

**οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες,** 'Wonderful fellows are the men of this class,' b 4  
 i. e. such as the critic you mention, **ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός.**

**ὅ τι μέλλω εἰπεῖν,** 'what I am to say.' Cf. *Gorg.* 455 B **ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ** 5  
**τοὶ οὐδ' αὐτὸς πω δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι ὅ τι λέγω.** In **μέλλω** the notion  
 of what is about to be done is combined with that of what ought to  
 be done: cf. *Polit.* 291 C **εἰ μέλλομεν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς.**

**ῥήτωρ τις.** The title 'rhetor' or 'orator' is thus appropriated to 7  
 those who actually speak in the law-courts or assemblies of the  
**δημος**, in distinction from those who composed speeches for others  
 to deliver. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6, 15 **Ἐῶρων γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος,**  
**ῥήτορας τε φαύλους ἀγαθοῖς δημηγόροις φίλους ὄντας.** The more  
 powerful of the **δημηγόροι** were called **δημαγωγοί**: cf. Schömann,  
*de Com. Athen.* p. 109; Valckenar. *Diatrib. de Aristob.* xxiii. 251 sq.

τῶν τοῖς τοιοῦτους εἰσπεμπόντων, 'One of those who equip and send into court the former class of men, one who makes the speeches with which the orators (οἱ ῥήτορες) do battle.' Stallbaum would omit οἱ ῥήτορες, supposing that the title could not be applied to litigants who used speeches written for them by others. But the reading of the MSS. is retained by Schanz, and rightly defended by Winckelmann, *Proleg.* xxxvii. note a, on the ground that ῥήτωρ is applied to the actual speaker as such, however his speech may have been prepared. Cf. *Apolog.* 18 A, where ῥήτορες refers to Socrates himself, though it was the first time he had ever appeared to address a court. On the ῥήτορες as a professional class see Riddell, *Apolog.* p. x. note.

- C 2 ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι. The same phrase occurs *Apolog.* 17 D 'The preposition has the notion of "presenting oneself to the court."' Cf. Isaeus, *Fr.* vii. 1. 1. 15 λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβίβημα refers to the βῆμα' (Riddell). *ibid.* Introd. xv. 'The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses.'
- 5 Ἦδη μανθάνω περὶ τούτων. In the older editions these words were connected, but Routh first corrected the punctuation. For a similar use of μανθάνω cf. *Rep.* 524 D μανθάνω τοῖνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω. The absence of any conjunction (asyndeton) before περὶ τούτων is quite in keeping with the rather excited and rapid speech of Socrates (Stallbaum): 'these are the men of whom I was myself going to speak just now.'
- 6 οὓς ἔφη Πρόδικος μεθόρια κτλ., 'whom Prodicus called borderers between a philosopher and a statesman.' I have not found any other reference to this saying. On Prodicus cf. 277 E 4, note, and on μεθόρια compare the two passages from which 'we obtain a complete notion of what Isocrates meant by "philosophy," a combination of the accomplishments of the ῥήτωρ and the πολιτικός' (Thompson, *Phaedr.* Append. ii. 172). Isocr. *Antid.* 196 οἱ δὲ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὄντες τὰς ἰδέας ἀπάσας αἰς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. *ibid.* 290 σοφοὺς μὲν νομίζω τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βελτίστου δυναμένους, φιλοσόφους δὲ τοὺς ἐν τοῦτοις διατρίβοντας, ἐξ ὧν τάχιστα λήψονται τὴν τοιαύτην φρόνησιν. On the question whether Isocrates is here meant see the Introduction, p. 19.
- 8 πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν, 'and (think themselves) not only to be

but also to be so regarded among very many, so that there are none but the philosophers to stand in the way of their universal reputation.' The reading of the chief MSS. τὸ εἶναι must either be altered, as by Stallbaum, to the dative, or altogether omitted, as by Schanz. In this latter case τὸ εἶναι must be regarded as a marginal gloss intended to form a construction for πρὸς, the absolute use of which was not understood: cf. Hom. *Il.* v. 307 θλάσσε δέ οἱ κοτύλην, πρὸς δ' ἄμφω ῥήξει τένοντε. Hdt. i. 71 πρὸς δὲ οὐκ οἴνω διαχρέονται. Eur. *Hel.* 110 καὶ πρὸς γ' Ἀχαιοί.

εἰδοκιμῶν ἐμποδῶν σφίσιν εἶναι. Verbs or phrases expressing hindrance are followed by an infinitive either with or without μή or τοῦ, which Stephanus added in this place. Heindorf refers to Plat. *Pol.* 407 C ὥστε, ὅπη αὐτῆ, ἀρετῇ ἀσκήσθαι καὶ δοκιμάζεσθαι πάντη ἐμποδῖος. Thuc. i. 16 ἐπεγίγνετο . . . κωλύματα μὴ ἀξέηθῆναι.

τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. The addition of ἀνθρώπους, which δ is otherwise unnecessary, is intended to express contempt. Cf. *Phaedr.* 268 C εἶποιεν ἄν, οἴμαι, ὅτι μαινεταὶ ἀνθρώπος. *Gorg.* 518 C διακόρους μοι λέγεις καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν παρασκευαστὰς ἀνθρώπους, 'a parcel of fellows, ministers and caterers to men's appetites' (Cope).

ἐὰν τούτους εἰς δόξαν καταστήσωσιν μηδενὸς δοκεῖν ἀξίους εἶναι, 'if they reduce these to the reputation of being good for nothing.' For the pleonasm δόξαν . . . δοκεῖν cf. *Crito* 44 C καίτοι τίς ἂν αἰσχίων εἶη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι ἢ φίλους; *ibid.* 53 B.

ἀναμφισβητήτως . . . σοφίας πέρι, 'they will at once indisputably carry off the victory in regard to reputation for wisdom.'

εἶναι . . . σφῆς σοφωτάτους T. For the accusative, instead of the more usual nominative with the infinitive, see 290 A 9, note: both here and there the addition of the personal pronoun is emphatic. In our present passage the MSS. vary, B having σφῶς σοφωτάτοι, from which Schanz adopts σφῆς σοφωτάτοι.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, 'when they are caught in private conversations.' Cf. *Pol.* 499 A ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις συνοουσίαις. I do not understand why Schanz prefers ἀπολειφθῶσιν to the well authenticated ἀποληφθῶσιν BT, for which cf. *Gorg.* 522 A ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κακῷ ἀποληφθέντα.

κολούεσθαι, 'are cut short': Schol. κολούεσθαι ἐλαττοῦσθαι, ἐμποδίζεσθαι. Cf. *Apol.* 39 D μὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἐαυτὸν παρασκευά-



ζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. The loose rhetoric which was uninterrupted in a forensic speech was easily refuted by the sharp dialectic of the Sophists: cf. 305 E ἐκτός δὲ ὄντες κινδύνῳ καὶ ἀγέῳ.

πάνυ εἰκότως, 'quite naturally': Stallbaum spoils the rhythm of the sentence by his punctuation πάνυ εἰκότως, both here and 287 B. In Plato and in other authors far most frequently πάνυ precedes the word which it strengthens, as below πάνυ ἐξ εἰκότος λόγου.

8 μετρίως μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφίας ἔχων, 'for they think that they are moderately acquainted with philosophy.' Cf. *Gorg.* 484 C φιλοσοφία γὰρ τοί ἐστιν, ἃ Σόκρατες, χαρίεν, ἂν τις αὐτοῦ μετρίως ἀψήγται ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ. *ibid.* 487 C. 'The middle position, which Isocrates himself aimed at, is shown to be untenable' (Zeller, *Plato*, p. 132). In these words 'we are inevitably reminded of the description of Isocrates in the *Phaedrus* as one in whose genius ἐνεστί τις φιλοσοφία' (Thompson, *Phaedrus*, Append. ii. 181).

e 2 καρπούσθαι τὴν σοφίαν. The finishing touch in the picture (ἐκτός δὲ . . . σοφίαν) agrees perfectly with the account of himself and his own way of life, which is given by Isocrates with no little self-gratulation in the *Antidosis* (Thompson, *ibid.*).

3 οὐ γὰρ τοι ἀλλά, 'for it cannot be denied that.' Cf. 286 C, note.

5 ὄντως Ven. 184, οὕτως BT Vind. Cf. Routh: 'ὄντως. Non liquet fortasse quid legerit Ficinus, qui vertit *ut dicis*.' 'Videlicet grammatici vel scribae ignorarunt usum illum loquendi, quo ὄντως et τῶ ὄντι in dictorum usurpatur confirmatione, ideoque in eius locum otiosum illud atque languidum οὕτως suffecerunt. V. ad *Lach.* 196 D' (Stallbaum).

εὐπρέπειαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀλήθειαν, 'plausibility rather than truth': cf. *Phaedo* 92 C μετὰ εἰκότος τινός καὶ εὐπρεπείας.

306 δσα μεταξύ τινον δυοῖν κτλ., 'all other things that are halfway  
a 2 between some two and partake of both, if compounded of evil and good, are made better than the one and worse than the other, but if of two things good for different objects, they are inferior to both in reference to any object for which either of those component parts is useful.' This notion is not contrary to Plato's conviction that true statesmanship must be based upon a sound philosophy: cf. *Gorg.* 581 D.

ἄσα δὲ ἐκ δυοῖν κακοῖν κτλ., 'but all intermediate compounds of 6 two evil things not having the same object, these and these only are better than either of those things of both of which they participate.'

μετέχουσιν BT: Hirschig's conjecture *μετέχει*, adopted by Schanz, b 2 is unnecessary. The thought is really directed, both at first and throughout, not to things neuter but to men, as immediately appears from the next sentence.

ἡ πολιτικὴ πράξις, 'the business of statesmanship.' Cf. *Gorg.* 484 D *ἐπειδὴν οὖν ἔλθωσιν εἰς τινα ἰδίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν πρᾶξιν.*

οὗτοι δ' ἀμφοτέρων μετέχοντες. Stallbaum takes *ἀμφοτέρων* as 3 masculine, i.e. *τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν*: but the close relation to *ἐκάτερα* shows that it should be referred rather to ἡ φιλοσοφία and ἡ πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις. Cf. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* x, 9, 18 τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ κτλ.

ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ εἰσι φαυλότεροι. Stallbaum's explanation of *ἀμφοτέρων* is properly applicable to this second occurrence of the word.

οὕτως ἂν τι λέγοιεν ἀληθές, 'in this case there would be some 6 truth in what they say.' If philosophy and statesmanship are both bad, those who have but a little of each are better than those who have much of either.

πρὸς ἐκάτερον, πρὸς δ' ἢ τε πολιτικὴ κτλ., 'for either object, for c 3 which statesmanship on the one hand and philosophy on the other are important.' The conjunctions *τε καὶ* are here used disjunctively: cf. Xen. *Hier.* i. 2 *πῆ διαφέρει δ' τυραννικός τε καὶ δ' ἰδιωτικός βίος.* Plat. *Lawus* 831 D; Jelf, *Gk. Gr.* 758, 1; Donaldson, *Gk. Gr.* § 554.

συγγιγνώσκων . . . αὐτοῖς . . . τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. This use of the 6 genitive after *συγγιγνώσκων* appears to be very rare. The accusative occurs in Eur. *Anádrot.* 840 *συγγνώσεται σοι τήνδ' ἀμαρτίαν πόσις.*

πάντα γὰρ ἀνδρα χρὴ ἀγαπᾶν, 'we ought to be satisfied with any 8 man.' Cf. *Cratyl.* 391 C τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπήνῃ ὡς του ἄξια.

ἐχόμενον φρονήσεως, 'bordering on good sense': cf. *Pol.* 496 A οὐδὲν γνήσιον οὐδὲ ἄξιον οὐδὲ φρονήσεως ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον. 'Isocrates calls his own philosophy a φρόνησις in *Antid.* § 290' (Thompson, *ibid.* 182).

- d 2 *περὶ τῶν υἱῶν.* Cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 13 *καὶ οἱ παῖδες δὲ αὐτοῦ (Κριτόνῃ) διήκουσαν Σωκράτους, Κριτόβουλος, Ἐρμούγενης, Ἐπιγίνης, Κτήσιππος, quorum e numero eximendos esse et Hermogenem et Ctesippum vel hic Platonis locus declarat* (Heindorf).  
*υἱῶν B, υἱῶν Schanz* (1880). In the Appendix to the *Phaedrus* (1882) Schanz writes: 'In hoc dialogo semper est *υἱός* in BT, et semper *ἄν δῆ.*'
- 5 *Κριτόβουλος.* Cf. *Apol.* 38 B *Πλάτων δὲ ὄδε, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυᾶσθαι.*  
*ἡλικίαν ἔχει, 'is grown up.'* This description of his age agrees with the fact of his offering bail for the fine which Socrates proposes to pay. Cf. *Men.* 89 B *ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίνονται ταῖς πόλεσι.* *Charm.* 154 A *οὐπω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦν.* *Lys.* 209 A.  
*δοῦναι αὐτὸν ὀνήσει, 'who will be of use to him,' i. e. as a teacher.*
- 7 *ὥστ' ἐμοὶ . . . B, ὥστί μοι T.* Cf. 278 C 7, note.
- e 2 *αὐτῶν δὲ περὶ παιδείας.* The position of *αὐτῶν* makes it emphatic, 'to take no care of the boys themselves in the matter of education.'
- 4 *καὶ μοι δοκεῖ.* Schanz does not attempt to apply the rule about *ἐμοὶ*, 278 C 7, because there is no possibility here of making *μοι δοκεῖ* a parenthesis. Why should it be made formally in the other passages?
- 5 *πάνν ἄλλόκοτος, 'quite unfit for the task.'* Cf. Ruhnke. *Tim. Lex.* 'Phrynichus Προπαρασκ. Σοφιστ. MS. Ἄλλόκοτος σημαίνει μὲν κυρίως τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῆς καθεστῶσης διαίτης καὶ τρόπου; κτλ.'
- 307 *ὥς γε πρὸς σὲ τἀληθῆ εἰρήσθαι, 'to tell you the truth between ourselves.'* Cf. *Pol.* 595 B *ὥς μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἰρήσθαι, οὐ γὰρ μου κατερείτε, 'speaking as between ourselves, for you will not tell of me.'*
- b 1 *ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον* BT: '*τῶν ἔργων* Aristides, probavit Heindorf' (Schanz). Cf. *Phaedr.* 274 E *περὶ ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης.*
- 8 *αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 'the thing itself,' i. e. philosophy.*
- c 3 *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο.* Cf. *Laus.* 804 D *τὸ λεγόμενον, πάντ' ἄνδρα καὶ παῖδα . . . παιδευτέον ἐξ ἀνάγκης.* *Pol.* 372 B *κατακλιθέντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μίλακί τε καὶ μυρρίναις, εὐωχῆσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδία.*

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