

THE REVOLUTION AND THE EMPIRE  
... BEING THE MEMOIRS OF ...  
.. CHANCELLOR PASQUIER ..

1812 - 1814



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
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**MEMOIRS OF CHANCELLOR PASQUIER**

**VOLUME II**



A HISTORY OF MY TIME

MEMOIRS

OF

CHANCELLOR PASQUIER

EDITED BY

THE DUC D'AUDIFFRET-PASQUIER

TRANSLATED BY CHARLES E. ROCHE

*THE REVOLUTION—THE CONSULATE—THE EMPIRE*

VOLUME II 1812-1814

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# MEMOIRS OF CHANCELLOR PASQUIER

## CHAPTER I

The first bulletins of the Grand Army—Fears entertained by MM. de La Valette, Pasquier, Mollien, and Decrès—Napoleon's Illusions—Pius VII. transferred from Savona to Fontainebleau—Battle of the Moskowa—Prolonged occupation of Moscow—The Malet conspiracy—That general's antecedents—The secret society of the *Philadelphes*—Imprisonment of the leaders of the society—The private hospital of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine; MM. de Polignac, de Puyvert, Berthier de Sauvigny, and the Abbé Lafon—Malet at the Popincourt and Minimes barracks, and at the Force prison—Generals Lahorie and Guidal, and the Corsican Boccheiampe—M. Pasquier and the Duc de Rovigo arrested—Malet at General Hulin's, the commander of the military division, and next at General Doucet's, chief of the Staff—Miscarriage of the plot—Malet and Lahorie arrested—The danger incurred by M. Pasquier on his return to the Préfecture de Police—Fright and credulity of M. Frochot, Prefect of the Seine—Arrest of all the conspirators, with the exception of the Abbé Lafon—Malet's plans, his provisional government, his political measures—Lahorie's interrogatory—An investigation into the doings of the men of the former revolutionary party—M. Pasquier has a conversation with Tallien in this connection—Trial of the conspirators—Their sentence and that of their dupes—General Lahorie's letter to the Duc de Rovigo—The Emperor's anger on learning of the conspiracy—An affectation of indignation shown by the Court folks against the police administration.

THE first bulletins received after the crossing of the Niemen had announced the retreat of the Russian army, flying from the French army and carefully avoiding an encounter, which the latter was on the contrary seeking

ardently. This retrograde movement was presented as an indication of weakness from which it was pleasant to draw the brightest inferences; but, to those who were in a better position to know, there could be no doubt that a retreat carried out in so systematic a fashion, was nothing but the result of a cleverly thought out system, the primary object of which was to tire out the main body of the French army by extended marches through a country in which it had no base of supplies, and to draw it away as far as possible from its stores and its reinforcements; it was sought to break its line of operations, and to isolate it from the auxiliary bodies of troops which were to act in concert with it, from Riga on the Baltic, to the line dividing Galicia and Lithuania.

My intimacy with M. de La Valette placed me in a position to know the truth; he had at headquarters several former comrades who kept him well informed, among others, the inspector-general of the military postal service, the nature of whose duties made him likely to know better than any one else the real state of affairs. I was in the habit of frequently hearing M. de La Valette lament the attempts made to give a favorable coloring to the most disastrous happenings. He feared, with good cause, that the Emperor would end in sharing the illusions which he sought to disseminate. I recall his anger, the day on which we read in a bulletin that a few Cossacks who had been made prisoners had declared that their comrades were deserting in large numbers, and were hurrying back to their homes. "Is it possible," exclaimed M. de La Valette, "we are asked to believe such fables? Cossacks desert, indeed! Men whose very life is war, who have everything to gain, and nothing to lose by it!"

The author of these optimist reports to Napoleon was M. Lelorgne d'Ideville, a *maître des requêtes*, who had been

attached to headquarters for that very purpose, and whose business it was to interrogate prisoners. His rose-colored reports were strengthened by those of M. Bignon, then *chargé d'affaires* at the Court of the Grand-Duchy of Warsaw. They perhaps influenced in no slight degree the Emperor's determination to cross the Niemen, as they set down the fighting strength of the Russian army as not exceeding two hundred thousand men. The fears with which M. de La Valette and I were haunted were shared by several of the ministers devoted to Napoleon; in the first place, by M. Mollien, Minister of the Treasury, who, like myself, was on a footing of great intimacy with M. de La Valette. We dined pretty frequently at his house at Boulogne; our conversations sometimes went on well into the night, and we spoke unreservedly and in full confidence. M. Mollien foresaw, in the case of a great disaster, a dearth of money, a matter over which he was all the more alarmed in that he knew better than any one that it would not be possible to raise funds on the Empire's credit.

The following is what happened between M. Decrès, the Minister of Marine, and myself: I was riding across the Place Louis XV. as he was coming out of his official residence afoot; on seeing me, he hailed me, asked me to dismount, and go with him to take a look at a mansion he had just purchased. It took little time to do this, and we afterwards strolled in the garden; during the whole of the hour that this promenade lasted, he did not cease dilating to me on the insane rashness of the Emperor, the risks he was taking, and on his position, which he looked upon as desperate. The conclusion of a peace between Russia and Turkey had just been made known; although signed as early as the end of May, it had been carefully kept secret. This peace released a Russian army corps, which was now free to attack the French army in the rear.

It was known that a meeting had taken place at Abo between the Emperor of Russia and the Prince Royal of Sweden, and that, pursuant to the agreement they had come to, the Russian troops would be able to leave their cantonments in Finland, and go to the rescue of Riga; to this was to be added the diversion which would in all likelihood be made in Pomerania by a Swedish army. And yet, in the midst of all this, Napoleon had decided, after taking Smolensk, to march to Moscow! Everybody had supposed that he would give his army, already sorely fatigued, the time to recuperate, that he would devote his attention to fortify and render secure his position on the Düna, and go into winter quarters there. He might have organized in his rear the old Polish provinces separated from the Russian Empire, and thus have placed himself in a position to be able either to dictate a peace or begin a decisive campaign with the spring. So settled were opinions at headquarters on the necessity of adopting such a plan, that the Prince de Neufchâtel, major-general of the army, had foreshadowed it in his correspondence. "Now, what everybody sees," said M. Decrès, after laying all these facts before me, "the Emperor does not see, or else he is mad enough to cast from him all that appears to run counter to his presumptuous hopes. In the meanwhile, Marmont is being beaten in Spain by Wellington, and, within six months, the result of his defeat may be the loss of Spain." The battle of Arapiles<sup>1</sup> had been fought and lost by Marmont at the end of July. "All this, moreover," M. Decrès went on to say, has not and will not have any effect on him. He will imagine that he can find a way out of the difficulty, by making a further demand for conscripts; the Senate has just turned over one hundred and forty

<sup>1</sup> Battle of Salamanca. — (Translator's note.)

thousand of them to him, which makes four hundred and forty thousand for the year, and do you think that a rope on which there is such a tension can endure for any length of time? . . . No, I tell you he is a lost man."

My position was an awkward one, on hearing such words from the lips of a man between whom and myself no intimacy existed; for form's sake, I made some slight objections to his views, and thanked him laughingly for a proof of confidence which made me proud, and which was a remarkable one on the part of a minister towards a prefect of police with whom he had affected not to speak a single word for two or three years. He replied that he knew full well to whom he was unbosoming himself. This conversation has ever remained fresh in my memory; I do not think that, *at that date*, any was ever held which so probed matters to the bottom. I discovered some short time afterwards that there was a growing intimacy springing up between M. Decrès and the Duc de Rovigo; this explained to me the progress made by the latter in his judgments on the political future.

To the numerous tokens indicative of the stubbornness with which Russia was preparing to enter upon the struggle, may be added the sacrifice she made of the most cherished principles of her policy, as well as her eagerness to go in quest of allies wherever she could meet with an enemy of Napoleon. In order to come to terms of peace with Turkey, she had renounced the assured results of a campaign, which, by giving to her the whole of Georgia, would have extended her frontiers as far as the banks of the Aras, and secured to her the control of the Black Sea; again, she had, towards the end of July, concluded an alliance with the Cortes of Cadiz, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., King of Spain. The two allies agreed to wage a relentless war against their common enemy, the Emperor of the

French, and to give each other all possible support. One needs but to cast a retrograde look at the Erfurt conferences of September, 1808, at a time when Alexander was handing over to his ally, not alone Italy, but the whole of Spain, of which he was now taking up the defence, in order to form a fair idea of the faith that is to be placed in political transactions when those who sign them know no other principle than their all-powerful will.

We had just been given another example of this violence which respects nothing, and which tramples all proprieties under foot; it is all the more necessary to dwell on it, for it was the last of those acts which Napoleon's absolute power was to let him commit. He had hardly left Paris, when he learnt that an English squadron was in sight of Savona. Fearing that its presence had for its object the removal of the Pope, he immediately sent orders to the Minister of Police to compel His Holiness to leave that place of residence in the shortest possible time, and to transfer him to Fontainebleau. The order enjoined that the strictest incognito should be followed during the whole journey. So Pius VII. left, accompanied by two persons only, a colonel and a physician.

The following is the way in which I heard of this affair, in spite of the secrecy observed in connection with it: Having called one morning on the Duc de Rovigo, I found him so visibly agitated that it was impossible for me not to ask the cause. "Well," said he, "the Pope may at the present moment be dying in a hospital on Mont Cenis." "What!" I remarked, "the Pope? And how comes he to be there?" Whereupon he told me of the orders he had received, and of those he had given for their being carried out. His Holiness suffered from a disease of the bladder, which had caused him great pain on the journey from Savona to Turin; on his arrival in that city, he had asked



to be allowed to tarry there awhile, in order to receive proper medical attention, but the Prince Borghese, Governor of Piedmont, had feared being held responsible for the delay, and had absolutely refused to sanction it. So the Pope had fain been compelled to continue on his journey. When he reached the top of Mont Cenis, his distress had become so serious that it had given rise to the worst fears, and there had been no other resource left but to stop at the hospital which gives shelter to travellers when surprised by bad weather. From that place a courier had been dispatched to the Duc de Rovigo. "And it is the Prince Borghese, a Roman prince," he exclaimed in his anger, "who refuses the Pope a day's rest, and to allow him to receive the treatment he cannot dispense with! He will be the cause of his death on that mountain, and the blame of it will be laid to me; it will be said that I killed him. What an effect this will produce in Europe! The Emperor himself will never forgive me for it."

Desirous of neglecting nothing, the Duc de Rovigo had at once dispatched an excellent surgeon; had he but dared, he would have gone himself. Fortunately, his fears were not realized, as the physician who accompanied His Holiness had been fully able to give him the relief of which he stood in need. On the 20th of June the Pope arrived at the château of Fontainebleau, where the cardinals who were in Paris were allowed to go and pay their respects to him. He lived there in a state of seclusion which might aptly be styled solitary confinement.

Meanwhile, the Emperor was pursuing his journey; he had crossed the Düna at the end of August, and ever following an enemy who would not let him come up with him, he had, on the 7th of September, arrived on the banks of the Moskowa. There, the Russian army, unwilling to leave open the road to the capital without an engagement,

determined on risking the fate of a battle. This was at a distance of only twenty-six leagues from Moscow. When the account of the day's fighting, the result of which was nevertheless a brilliant victory, reached Paris, it struck consternation into the hearts of the most steadfast of Napoleon's friends, and produced a sort of stupor in the public mind. The field of battle had remained in the possession of our troops, but the losses were immense. Never, in any one day's fighting, after twenty years of stubborn combats, had so many generals, so many officers of note, been killed or wounded. The road to Moscow was open. This was the only prize snatched by victory. French troops were at last to enter the ancient city of the Czars! What was there to be gained by it? Those who always hoped for the best contended that peace would certainly be found within the walls of Moscow. This illusion was of short duration; we soon learnt of the occupation and burning of the city.

All are agreed upon the point that the battle was wrongly engaged by the Emperor, who had not himself studied the ground. Without his being in as physically weak a condition as is stated by M. de Ségur, it is nevertheless a fact that on the day before, on the day, and on the one following the battle, he was suffering from a violent cold in the head, accompanied by fever. This was with him a chronic ailment, which never failed to prostrate him. He had therefore left to his marshals the duty of reconnoitring; the day before, he had called them together to listen to their reports. The question at issue was whether a front attack should be made on the enemy's position, which was defended by a number of redoubts, or if an attempt should be made to turn it. Marshal Davout maintained that it could be turned on the right, that this was the best line of action to be followed; but he was alone in his opinion.

Napoleon, after having listened to all of them with great attention, resolved upon following the advice of the majority. When they had withdrawn, the Emperor asked M. Daru, who had been present at the council of war, what he thought of it. "Sire," replied M. Daru, "I would rather trust to Marshal Davout, because, as he is very short-sighted, he must have reconnoitred at shorter range than the others."<sup>1</sup>

It would have been easy to turn the position, as pointed out by the marshal; this was seen on the following day. Owing to his advice having been spurned, the most fearful efforts had to be made, and victory was purchased only at the price of lamentable and great sacrifices. It is generally believed that it would have been more complete, and perchance decisive, if the Emperor, towards the close of the day's fighting, had allowed his Guard, which remained inactive, to go into action. He would have taken a large number of prisoners, and made complete the rout of the Russians; instead of this, he left to the enemy's army the means of organizing its retreat, and of once more forming without any hindrance. He therefore, through his own fault, reduced almost to nothing the result of this so eagerly sought for battle. What foundation is there for thus laying the blame to him? The position in which Napoleon had placed himself by his rapid marches after crossing the Niemen, ever pushing onward without taking the precaution of reconnoitring on his flanks, was such that he had no knowledge whatever of the forces opposed to him, nor of what was taking place about him. The swarms of Cossacks surrounding him did not permit him to extend his reconnoitring beyond a league or two, and as the peasantry fled at his approach, all means of getting

<sup>1</sup> I have this particular from M. Daru himself.

information were denied him at one and the same time. Still, he could not conceal from himself that the enemy's army was more considerable and more determined than he had supposed; nothing there was to render him secure in the belief that ten leagues further on he should not find a fortified position with an army ready to defend it. His own forces were becoming depleted at a fearful rate. His magnificent cavalry had especially suffered. He had crossed the Niemen with ninety thousand sabres, and there were left to him only twenty-five thousand mounted men, especially after employing it in carrying the redoubts to the battle-field of the Moskowa. The best bodies of his armies were reduced in strength by the enormous losses they had just suffered. Under such conditions, was it his duty, in order to gain a greater success, to risk the existence of the only body which was still intact, the only one with which he might boldly defy the enemy, the only one with which he could surround himself if it came to his being compelled to retreat? Is it not perfectly just to conclude that his enterprise, conceived with the greatest rashness, was no less madly executed, without any settled plan of campaign, without any assured communication with the reinforcements of which he daily stood in greater need? Pursuing, as he was, an enemy whose strength was unknown to him, he was marching on Moscow without being able to say what he would do when he reached there, seemingly under the impression that everything depended on his occupying that capital. He did not at all take into calculation the spirit and the different characteristics of nationalities, and his forming his opinion as to what the Russians would do after his taking Moscow from what the Austrians and Prussians had respectively done after the taking of Vienna and Berlin, was to rush to almost certain destruction.

If any proof is needed of what I have stated with regard to its being impossible for him to do any scouting on his line of march, well then, one has but to point to the fact that, after winning the battle of the Moskowa, he was for two days unable to discover the road by which the Russian army was retreating. It has been asked why Napoleon did not, immediately after the burning of Moscow, resolve upon beginning his retreat. There still remained time for him to do so, ere the setting in of the wintry season. Was the desperate resolve which led to the burning of that capital a proof that henceforth all coming to terms was an impossibility, and that the Russians were bent on seeing the war to its bitter end? Was he deceived as to Alexander's character? Did he hope to regain the ascendancy he had exercised over him at Tilsit? His faith in this respect was kept up by an overture on his part, to which the Russian generals were shrewd enough to give ear. He sent General Lauriston, his last ambassador, to St. Petersburg, to the outposts. The state of his army, when he reached Moscow, did not permit of his beginning his retreat at once. The sick and wounded were many, and he would have been compelled to leave them behind, for he altogether lacked means of transportation, and the ambulance wagons and baggage carts needed repairs. The men had, during their long marches, been buoyed up with the hope of a rest, which they expected to find in the great capital; fire had destroyed a great part of the stores which it had probably contained, but enough remained to satisfy the most pressing needs. Thus, to have given orders for a precipitate retreat across a devastated country, at a time when most of the soldiers believed that they had reached the end of their work and hardships, was to risk plunging the army into a state of discouragement, the effects of which are not to be calculated. Napoleon's mistake consisted, therefore, not

so much in tarrying in Moscow as in having gone thither; but, at the same time, his sojourn in that capital was prolonged beyond what was absolutely necessary. The Emperor has himself admitted that he ought to have tarried there a fortnight less.

Every private letter which reached Paris from the army served but to increase the intensity of the alarm already felt. I can recall a letter from M. Baraguey d'Hilliers to M. de La Valette, in which the greatest disasters were predicted. M. Baraguey d'Hilliers, whose duties kept him in the rear of the army, could plainly see the difficulties which were accumulating about him; he foresaw that the line of communication which he was entrusted with keeping open would shortly be intercepted. There was only one man who tried to make others share his mistaken confidence, and whose letters ever breathed contentment. This was M. de Bassano, who had stayed at Vilna with a few members of the diplomatic corps, and who dismissed from his mind everything that could cast any doubts on an ultimate success. It was not with him a case of indifference to the sufferings he witnessed, for he was good and humane, and every generous sentiment found its way into his soul; but M. de Bassano was wrapped up in so great an admiration for Napoleon, he so ardently desired seeing him meet with success in all his undertakings, that with him all was sacrificed to the desire of co-operating towards this success, and to furnish Napoleon with the means of reaping it.

It was in the nature of an impossibility that the feeling of alarm, which was gradually taking possession of the most devoted adherents of the Imperial Government, should not inspire Napoleon's enemies with the hope of overthrowing it. Towards the end of October, we were given a demonstration of this, for a conspiracy came to the surface under

most extraordinary circumstances, which deserve to be narrated. Nearly all the accounts published relating to it are more or less tinged with falsehood. I refer to the Malet conspiracy.

General Malet was no longer a young man; he had begun his military career in the *mousquetaires*, and, at the time of their disbandment, had left the service with the rank of captain. At the outset of the Revolution he became an ardent *patriote*, and once more joined the army in 1792; in 1799, he was a *général de brigade*. His fiery republicanism, which none of the horrible deeds of the Revolution could shake (he was one of the few who in the army were designated as *terroristes*), had been the cause of his witnessing with the greatest vexation the elevation of General Bonaparte to the Consulate; he had been one of those generals who, at the time of the Concordat with the Pope, had entered into a plot which had been a source of some alarm to the First Consul. But, for all that, he had been given a post in Italy, and had even been entrusted with the command of the city of Pavia. His services ceased to be availed of in the first days of the Empire, when he settled in Paris, where he formed connections with a few hot-headed men, who were forever engaged in plotting against the Emperor. One of these was General Servan, the former Minister of War, and one Jacquemont, a member of the Tribunat. Servan died just as the police were beginning to have their suspicions about him; Jacquemont was alone arrested, but there was found among the papers of General Servan a well-digested scheme for a provisional government in the event of Napoleon being got rid of. The police unearthed simultaneously a secret society, whose object was to undermine the loyalty of the army. The most able and audacious among the founders of this society, whose members styled themselves *Philadelphes*, was

one Bazin by name, who hailed from Le Mans. He had, during the stormiest days of the Revolution, struck terror in the department of the Sarthe, with a rabid sheet of which he was the editor; it was he who, in 1789, had first conceived the law of the hostages. The dread of falling a victim to the vengeance of the Chouan party had caused M. Bazin to leave Le Mans, and seek a refuge in Paris.

After numberless interrogatories and much searching, no satisfactory proof could be found to incriminate either Bazin or Jacquemont, and so no one was brought to trial. It was deemed sufficient to hold as prisoners of state all those whom one had succeeded in arresting. General Malet, who was implicated in both affairs, was among those committed to jail. Nearly all of them were confined in Paris prisons, probably because M. Dubois, who still entertained the hope that fresh investigations would prove more fruitful, preferred keeping the prisoners within his reach. General Malet rather promptly succeeded in getting himself transferred from the prison of La Force into a private hospital in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. During the course of his revolutionary career, he had had with M. Fouché certain relations which gave him some rights to a kindly remembrance. To him, therefore, was he indebted for this alleviation, which was always looked upon as a step towards a freedom which followed as a matter of course. In fact, any one confined in a private hospital was simply looked upon as a prisoner on parole, and nothing was easier for him than to escape, as in those places there were neither guard, wicket, railing, or bolt. The proprietor of the establishment was alone responsible for those entrusted to his care, and had no one to keep watch over them but the same servants who waited upon them. Anybody and everybody who wished to call upon the inmates of such institutions were free to do so, and were allowed to spend



the better part of the day with them, without any let or hindrance. Thus, no obstacle stood in the way of intercourse with the outer world.

When General Malet entered the private hospital of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, he found there MM. de Polignac, Berthier de Sauvigny, the Abbé Lafon, and M. de Puyvert, who all five were held as participants in a Royalist plot. MM. de Polignac owed their removal from Vincennes to the influence of the Duchesse de Rovigo. She was to a certain degree their kinswoman; she was, moreover, the intimate friend of the wife of the elder of these gentlemen, and had prevailed upon her husband to obtain from the Emperor this mitigation of their long captivity. I had done the same for M. Berthier de Sauvigny, my brother's brother-in-law. The insane ideas of conspiracy which he had entertained, and which had drawn this punishment upon him, were not of a kind to cause him to be greatly feared. As much could not be said for the Abbé Lafon. Born in the department of the Gironde, he had, as early as 1795, signalized himself by his great activity in taking part in every attempt made to re-establish the former monarchy; a promoter of the *chouannerie*, he had, later on, at the time of the occupation of the Papal States by the French troops, devoted much labor to spread broadcast the protests of the Pope, as well as the bull of excommunication which His Holiness had seen fit to fulminate. This last-named undertaking caused him to be arrested at Bordeaux, sent to Paris, and incarcerated at La Force, together with General Malet. The sympathy which he had succeeded in inspiring by means of an actual or feigned malady, had obtained for him his removal to the private hospital, where was M. de Puyvert, who had been deprived of his liberty for nine years. A no less loyal Royalist than M. Lafon, the Marquis de Puyvert, had participated,

while invested with powers from the King, in all the attempts made in the south of France in favor of the cause of royalty.

Such was then the assemblage into which General Malet found himself thrown on quitting La Force. It did not seem as if it was one in harmony with his habits, his opinions, and the memories of his past life. But a like misfortune, especially a common hatred, quickly brings men together. They are not in the habit of prying into the impulses which govern a revenge, the gratifying of which consumes their hearts, when all are agreed in wishing ill to the object of their enmity. A kind of harmony was soon established between the general and his new fellows in misfortune. Still, the virulence of his character, the audacity of his revolutionary methods, must have caused some surprise to the men who had not, like himself, taken any active part in the scenes of '93 and '94. However, the Abbé Lafon seems to have been able to equal him in this respect, and if one is to believe the stories he has published, he powerfully fanned the flame consuming this ardent spirit.

At the time when the happenings of the Russian campaign were beginning to create the general feeling of alarm of which I have tried to give an idea, Malet thought that the downfall of Napoleon not only might be brought about, but was bound to occur immediately. He persuaded himself that it could readily be compassed with very slight action, especially if such action was taken in Paris. It was on the basis of this idea that he laid his plans. M. Lafon has declared that this plan was known to the Royalists who shared the general's captivity. It must be pointed out that M. Berthier was no longer one of the group, as I had obtained for him his liberty at the same meeting of the council at which leave had been granted General Lahorie

to go to America; he had been merely required to reside in Languedoc, with one of his sisters. As to M. de Puyvert, whose word is worthy of credence, he has always solemnly asserted that he was utterly ignorant of the affair. There remain MM. de Polignac. M. Lafon claims that they became alarmed on viewing the consequences of the undertaking; he attributes to the fear of becoming compromised by sharing the general's place of residence, the request which they preferred to be transferred to another private hospital situated in the Faubourg Saint-Jacques. The coincidence between this request and the occurrence gives some color of truth to this statement.

When the plot burst, there only remained in the private hospital of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine General Malet, M. de Puyvert, and the Abbé Lafon. M. de Puyvert took no part in the execution of the plot, the responsibility for which falls, therefore, entirely upon the general and the abbé. Convinced, as they both were, that conspiracies almost always fail through the indiscretion or treachery of the too great number of persons whom one thinks it necessary to take into confidence, they resolved upon keeping their secret as close as possible, basing their hopes of success on the surprise felt by those whom they calculated to draw into the plot, as well as by those against whom it was directed. M. Lafon claims, in his narrative, that he had many correspondents, that many military men were on their side, and that everything had been prepared for a rising in Paris and in the provinces. I shall further on produce a proof which seems to me to formally contradict this assertion.

The means employed by them were as simple as they were foolhardy. They consisted in taking advantage of the night to make an appearance at the gates of a couple of barracks, make announcement of the death of Napoleon,

read out an alleged senatus-consultum repealing the Imperial Government, establishing a provisional government, and investing General Malet with all the powers necessary to take command of the armed force, to require and command it as he should see fit; to thus get for his use a *cohorte* and one battalion of a regiment; lead and send detachments of these two bodies to such points as it was most important to occupy; to employ it in arresting public functionaries whose resistance was most to be feared; this done, to publish and proclaim the spurious senatus-consultum throughout the city; call to them the discontented men of whatever shade, of whatever party, and assemble at the Hôtel de Ville the most important among them; form a provisional government with them, with the aid of which they fondly expected to conquer every kind of opposition and win the obedience and the assent of all France; such were in their entirety the operations which General Malet and M. Lafon were to attempt after leaving the private hospital at eight o'clock on the night of the 23d of October.

They experienced no difficulty in getting out of the hospital, after which they went to the Rue Saint-Gilles, near the Place Royale, where they had arranged to have the use of a room occupied by a Spanish priest. It seems certain that they had already gone to the same place on the Sunday previous, but that having had to wait too long for one of the persons whose co-operation was necessary to them, they had determined upon returning to the private hospital. I even have reason to believe that the owner of that hospital had notified the Minister of Police of this first sally; little attention had been paid to the matter, as the escapade was doubtless considered as having been made in view of a party of pleasure to which it was best to shut one's eyes. The temporary shelter of the Rue Saint-Gilles had been secured to them through the efforts of a young man named

Boutreux, who was in the habit of paying frequent visits to M. Lafon and General Malet. He was a native of Angers, and had been admitted to the practice of the law; there is reason to believe that he had been a member of the Society of the Philadelphes. The two conspirators had resolved upon taking him into their confidence, as they could not do without an accomplice in a position to procure for them a place where they could in safety draw up the necessary documents, and where General Malet would don his uniform. And it was Boutreux who actually welcomed the pair into the room of the Spanish priest; they were soon joined by one corporal Rateau, of the 1st battalion of the Paris *garde*. It was he who had been behind time on the foregoing Sunday; he had been won over, by General Malet, in the private hospital, whither he went pretty frequently to visit one of his relations. He was to bring, and did actually bring, the watchword. These two individuals, together with the Spanish priest, are the only persons who are clearly known to have been entrusted in advance with the secret of the conspiracy. The documents which had to be drawn up and copied consisted of the spurious *senatus-consultum*, of the proclamation of this same *senatus-consultum*, and of an order of the day dated October 23d or 24th, signed by Malet, and, in addition, two letters containing most detailed instructions as to the distribution of the posts to the troops, and the uses the latter were to be put to; the one was addressed to M. Soulier, commanding the 10th *cohorte*, the other, to M. Rouff, commanding the 2d battalion of the *garde de Paris*. The letter directed to M. Soulier informed him that he was promoted to the rank of *général de brigade*, and enclosed an order for one hundred thousand francs, out of which the soldiers were to receive high pay, and the officers twice the regulation pay. General Malet, who had signed both letters, was supposed to hand them to

a General Lamotte, who was to assume command of the troops and see to the execution of all orders. But, as a matter of fact, there was no such person as General Lamotte; Malet was simply undertaking to convey his own dispatches to himself. It took the greater part of the night to draw up all these documents, although they were clumsily fabricated. In the meanwhile, a heavy rainfall took place, which impeded the movements of the conspirators; the Popincourt barracks, where was stationed the 10th *cohorte*, was at some distance from the Rue Saint-Gilles; it was half-past three o'clock when Malet reached there, accompanied by Rateau, who acted as his aide-de-camp. Soulier, the commander of the *cohorte*, was abed with fever. The announcement of the Emperor's death, superadded to his sickness, upset his faculty of reasoning; he believed without hesitation and without verification everything that was told him, and gave orders that the *senatus-consultum* and the proclamation should be read to the troops, which he then placed at the general's disposal. The same success awaited Malet at the Minimes barracks, where was quartered a battalion of the *Paris garde*, composed of six companies. The colonel of the regiment, one Rabbe, to whom the news was brought, showed himself no less credulous than the commander of the *cohorte*, and sent orders to obey all requisitions. Pursuant to these requisitions, the six companies were to wend their way between five and six o'clock in the morning towards the Saint-Martin and Vincennes barriers, the Préfecture de Police, the Quai Voltaire, the Place de Grève, and the Place Royale, each of which posts was to be occupied by a company. Malet therefore disposed of about twelve hundred soldiers. He had kept in reserve the *cohorte* for the purpose of supporting and carrying out those *coups de main* to which he attached the greatest importance. But he required, to direct and put these soldiers

to good use, resolute men who would know how to command and handle them well; now, the prison of La Force had within its walls two generals, whose well-known sentiments guaranteed an energetic co-operation. This prison was on the line of his advance through the city, so he resolved upon setting them free. In their case, also, he made use of the *senatus-consultum*, and he confirmed to them the news of the Emperor's death, successful in this as in his previous undertakings. Nevertheless, much time had already been lost, and the advantages afforded by the darkness of the night could no longer be reckoned upon. It was half-past six o'clock when he made his appearance at La Force, followed by a section of the *cohorte*; the remainder had gone to take possession of the Hôtel de Ville. The doorkeeper of the jail, seeing a body of soldiers, in good order, and commanded by a general in uniform, had not the slightest doubts that he was acting lawfully, and hastened to obey him.

Generals Lahorie and Guidal were therefore set at liberty, as well as one Boccheiampe, a Corsican by birth, who had been recently conveyed to Paris from Parma, where he had been a prisoner of state for many years; the unhappy man had himself petitioned for this removal as a means of obtaining a better hearing of the defence he had to make and of regaining his freedom.

General Guidal, a man of very violent character, had, after numerous quarrels with various ministers of war, been placed on the retired list because of his feelings of animosity towards Napoleon. He had subsequently given frequent utterance to threats which had caused his present imprisonment. Malet had known him at the time, when he was himself an inmate of La Force. Lahorie was slow in making his appearance; he was abed when called, and he took some time to get ready. It does not, however,

appear that he entertained the slightest doubt with regard to what was confided to him. On emerging from prison, he was given the command of a small body of soldiers, and his orders were to proceed to the Préfecture de Police, to arrest the prefect; to install in his stead Boutreux, who, wearing a sash of office, went with him. This expedition disposed of, he was to continue on his way to the Ministry of Police, place the minister under arrest, and usurp his functions. Guidal and Boccheiampe were likewise respectively given the command of a few soldiers, with orders to support, in case of need, the operations of Lahorie, and to obey his orders under any and all circumstances. As to Malet, he took with him one hundred and fifty men, and proceeded to the headquarters of the military division, in the Place Vendôme.

It was past seven o'clock when Lahorie arrived at the Préfecture de Police. I had just arisen from my bed, when I heard considerable noise coming from the rooms leading to my bedroom. My valet left me to go and ascertain the cause of all this commotion. On finding himself in the presence of soldiery, he tried to stop its further progress, and barred the way to my door, displaying in so doing remarkable devotion; he was thrust aside, and received a bayonet wound in the leg. I was attempting to reach the stairway leading to the garden, when I was assailed by a band of soldiers led by an officer, who compelled me to return to my bedroom, while forbidding his men to lay violent hands on me. This officer, whom I did not recognize, wore a mantle; his characteristic feature, his incipient baldness, was concealed by a large hat. It was General Lahorie. He informed me of the death of the Emperor, killed under the walls of Moscow, and notified me of the alleged *senatus-consultum*, which he, however, did not let me read. He likewise told me that the citizen Boutreux, who accom-



panied him, was going to assume my functions, and then made me a prisoner in my own room, placing a couple of soldiers on guard over me. Then he left, after garrisoning the *Hotel*, the guard-room of which had until then been occupied by a few military pensioners.

On his reaching the Ministry of Police, a much more stirring scene took place. The Duc de Rovigo, who, like myself, was taken unawares, was to incur far greater dangers. General Guidal nourished a personal hatred against him, and would have gladly availed himself of the occasion to get rid of him; moreover, he had discovered that similar sentiments existed among some of the soldiers under his command. General Malet had given him orders to have recourse to the most violent methods; one may imagine what he expected from his lieutenants by what he did himself. He had made a clever move in prevailing on the body of soldiers he had selected to follow his lead; they consisted of men torn from their hearths at a time when they had for long years considered themselves exempt from further military service, and were inclined to make a display of their hostile sentiments towards the Imperial Government. They were commanded by officers, almost all of whom were worn out with years and fatigue, and more likely to be deceived than any other. The soldiers under General Guidal invaded the room of the Minister of Police, and it required all the firmness of General Lahorie to protect him from violence. The profound feeling of resentment which he must have entertained against the Duc de Rovigo gave way on this occasion to the natural generosity of his character; he made use of the power with which he was invested to prevent any harm being done to him, but, as he subsequently stated, there was no other way left to save his life but to cause him to be imprisoned. "Fear not," he said to Savary, "for you have fallen into the

hands of a generous enemy, and you shall not be put to death."

The Duc de Rovigo was taken in a cab to La Force by General Guidal. Lahorie, as Minister of Police, signed the order of his commitment; he usurped the functions of minister in this instance only, to save Rovigo's life, so he has himself stated, and he otherwise in no way exercised them. His assertion on this point is not consonant with truth, for immediately upon being installed in the official residence, he sent for a tailor, of whom he ordered the habit of a minister; he then entered the carriage of his predecessor, and had himself driven to the Hôtel de Ville where he presented himself as Minister of Police.

While these events were taking place at the Ministry of Police, I had remained in my bedroom. I finished dressing between my two guards, and then, anxious to learn what was going on, I asked to see the citizen Bouteux. He came to me, and was simple enough to show me the *senatus-consultum* and the proclamation. It was an easy matter for me to see at a glance that these documents were apocryphal, and concocted by men who were ignorant of the form in which they were usually couched. I contented myself with saying to him that the news of the death of the Emperor caused me great surprise, as I had on the previous day seen dispatches brought by an orderly who had travelled post-haste, and that according to these dispatches Napoleon was enjoying good health. A few minutes later, Mme. Pasquier and my brother-in-law, having succeeded in gaining admittance to my room, I told them that all that was happening was based on a clumsy imposture which would soon be laid bare.

I was pondering over the probable result of this wild enterprise, when a sub-lieutenant of the *cohorte*, whom I have since learnt was one Lefèvre, entered my room. He

was the bearer of an order from Lahorie, Minister of Police, and he informed me that he was to take me to La Force. So I took a seat beside the sub-lieutenant in a cab, which was escorted by a dozen soldiers; in the middle of our journey, noticing the smallness of the escort, it struck me that it might be possible to get the officer who had charge of me to listen to reason, so I determined upon telling him that he was the dupe of a gross imposture, that he was doubtless not aware of the consequences of his participating in a most guilty enterprise, and that it might cost him his life; I assured him that the Emperor was not dead, and that the *senatus-consultum*, by virtue of which he acted, was a forgery. At first he showed astonishment; then, thinking that my speech was merely a ruse, or being perhaps in dread of the soldiers who accompanied us, he ordered the escort to go faster and the cab-driver to whip up his horse.

And so we reached La Force. My sub-lieutenant made haste to deliver me to the doorkeeper, one Lebeau, a most worthy man, the son of a doorkeeper, who, in the days of the Terror, had shown remarkable courage in doing acts of kindness to the prisoners under his care. He owed his situation to me. As soon as the doors were closed behind me, he placed himself at my disposal. I learnt from his lips what had taken place at the prison at early morn, when Lahorie, Guidal, and Boccheiampe had been set free; he told me that the Duc de Rovigo had just been brought to him as a prisoner, and that, on leaving, General Guidal had taken the precaution of entrusting the guarding of the outer guard-room to soldiers taken from the *cohorte* which he commanded. Lastly, I was informed that M. Desmarests had likewise been brought to La Force in custody of an officer, shortly after the minister, and had also been registered as a prisoner. After thinking for a few minutes as

to the best plan for me to pursue, and the first steps for me to take, I told the wife of the doorkeeper to go and make sure whether or not the door of the prison opening on another street than the one on which the main entrance opened was guarded by the soldiers of the *cohorte*. I was waiting for her return, when M. Saulnier, secretary of the Minister of Police, and M. Laborde, the town adjutant, entered the office of the prison. They told me that it was all over, that General Malet and Lahorie had been arrested, and so they had not lost a moment in coming to deliver me and the Duc de Rovigo.

We all left the prison together: the Duc de Rovigo entered M. Saulnier's carriage with me, and we drove to the minister's official residence. Thus, I hardly spent more than a quarter of an hour at La Force. I had during that time not left the office, but I had been through a good deal, and I cannot deny having felt greatly upset and having spent what is called a bad fifteen minutes. This is the place to state that on my way from the Prefecture to La Force I had not noticed any excitement, any gatherings. The whole city seemed to be in utter ignorance of what was taking place. Some of the residents of my quarter of the town, who recognized me as I was driven by with an escort, stood and looked at me in great astonishment. The passing of the Minister of Police had caused still less curiosity. Nothing is therefore further from the truth than the assertion made in the work of M. Lafon that the crowd gave vent to hostile expressions against us as we were being driven away, and that threats were made to throw the Minister of Police into the river. On our way back, we found a somewhat large gathering in the Place de Grève; there were many people on the Pont Neuf, on the quays, and in front of the Ministry of Police, and the Préfecture de Police; the arrest of General Malet was already

known, and his enterprise was being discussed as a piece of outrageous folly.

The following is what had hastened the issue.

On arriving at the Place Vendôme, Malet had gone to the residence of General Hulin, who commanded the military division. Leaving his escort at the door, he went upstairs to the suite of rooms occupied by the general, accompanied by two or three officers or non-commissioned officers. He had told the general of the Emperor's death, but, on noticing that his face reflected his disbelief in the news, he had asked him to step into an adjoining room, in order to read the documents he wished to lay before him. No sooner had they both entered this room, and while General Hulin was looking over the *senatus-consultum*, Malet shot him in the head with a pistol; Hulin fell to the ground unconscious. Having perpetrated this crime, Malet hurried back to his command, a portion of which had taken possession of the entrance to the staff headquarters, which were at the further end of the Place Vendôme; but, even at that distance, it had been noticed that something out of the ordinary was happening at General Hulin's, and an alarm had been raised.

Nevertheless, Malet still found time to gain admission to the closet of General Doucet, adjutant-general, and chief of the staff, who was reading the *senatus-consultum*, which had just been handed to him by the commander of the detachment. M. Doucet had detected the forgery, and, as he was protesting against so outrageous an imposture, Malet was preparing to mete out the same treatment to him as he had to General Hulin, when Adjutant Laborde, who had followed him, seeing him grasp his pistol, closed with him and arrested him, and summoned to his assistance the soldiers who guarded the residence. No sooner did those belonging to the *cohorte* learn of what had just hap-

pened, than they quickly surrendered to General Doucet and Adjutant Laborde, whom they were accustomed to look upon as their superior officers.

On hearing of the kidnapping of the Duc de Rovigo, M. Saulnier had called on M. Réal, who had quickly gone to the Archchancellor, then to the Minister of War, and from there to the *École militaire*, where he had required General Deriot, who commanded the Imperial Guard, to immediately send out a sufficient number of detachments to re-establish order. On the other hand, M. Saulnier had had himself driven to General Hulin's; he had reached there a few moments after Malet had shot him, and had found him abed. The Minister of War, who had already been informed of Malet's arrest, had given orders that the soldiers who had been seduced from their allegiance should return to their barracks.

Thus, all was over with General Malet, after a success of four or five hours' duration.

Malet had believed that orders sent from staff headquarters to all the troops throughout the military division would, beyond doubt, secure their absolute obedience, as they would reach them in regulation shape and in the ordinary course. In spite of the striking features of this audacious conception, it is impossible not to look upon it as an act of madness. It would have been necessary to kill the Minister of War and his staff, win over, disarm, or murder the general and the superior officers in command of the portion of the Guard which the Emperor had left behind, and which was stationed at Paris and at Saint-Cloud. Malet should not have been so ignorant as not to know that the Guard was not subject to the orders of the staff of the military division. Its devotion to the Emperor, the Empress, and the King of Rome was well known; it was quartered for the most part beyond the city's limits, at the *École militaire*,

and at Courbevoie; its officers would consequently have had time to learn of what was taking place, and they had at their disposal four or five thousand men.

The conduct of Adjutant Laborde on this occasion showed the most remarkable energy and activity. On leaving the Place Vendôme, where he had arrested General Malet, he had hurried to the Ministry of Police, arrested Lahorie, who had taken up his quarters in the minister's private office, and who had already shown signs of anxiety. It is impossible to credit that he felt that he had been grossly imposed upon by General Malet. Trusting in his words, he had gone to the Hôtel de Ville, in quest of the government constituted by the *senatus-consultum*; great was his astonishment on only finding there two companies of the 10th *cohorte* sent thither by Malet to take possession of the Hôtel de Ville. There being no one who could give him the slightest information as to the supposed provisional government, he had determined upon returning to the Ministry of Police. Surprised at the state of tranquillity reigning throughout the city, wherein nobody seemed cognizant of so great an event as the death of the Emperor and the upsetting of his government, he was absorbed in his reflections, when Laborde made his appearance and arrested him. It was subsequent to this, and pursuant to the orders of the Minister of War, that Laborde had gone to La Force with M. Saulnier, and had set us free.

As we reached the quay, we met the head of a column of Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, which drew up in front of the ministry, and awaited orders; its mere presence was a sufficient guarantee that there would be no disturbance of the peace. We had, therefore, reason to believe that all was over, and yet it was at that very time that I personally ran the most danger.

It was necessary that I should be at my post, and so I

hurried back to the Prefecture. I was imprudent enough to wend my way thither afoot and unescorted. The soldiers of the *cohorte*, who had, in the first instance, taken possession of my official residence, had gone to rejoin the company to which they belonged, during my absence, and their place had been taken by a company from the battalion of the Paris Guard, ordered thither by Malet. This company was commanded by Lieutenant Beaumont.

On reaching the entrance to my residence, and seeing the courtyard filled with soldiers, I called their commanding officer to me, and ordered him to lead his men back to barracks. I imagined that the mere sight of me would be sufficient to make him understand that the state of affairs was no longer the same, but I should have known that the military do not so readily take orders from a civil functionary. The change, such a sudden one, moreover, was not credited by the officer, who, encouraged in his obstinacy by a sergeant who seemed greatly excited, absolutely refused to obey me, and gave the command to his men to grasp their muskets. This was the signal for a hostile demonstration, and cries of, "He ought to be arrested; he ought to be put to death!" Fortunately for me, I was still close to the door, so I sprung back into the crowd of people drawn thither by curiosity, and ran up the little rue de Jérusalem, intending to reach the quay. The soldiers followed me with fixed bayonets, and there was nothing left for me but to seek refuge in a shop at the further end of the street. The soldiers were on the point of breaking in the door, but the many police agents of the Prefecture present stayed them, persuaded them to set guard over the door, and not to have recourse to any act of violence, the uselessness and danger of which they made them understand. So here I was a prisoner once more. For an hour I remained in captivity. The adjutant made his appearance, bearing



orders from the Minister of War, commanding the company to return to barracks, but his authority had, like mine, been ignored, and he had been arrested; all this confusion did not end until it became known that a strong detachment of the Imperial Guard was on its way to the Prefecture. Lieutenant Beaumont then made up his mind to withdraw his company, and thus put an end to a resistance which, nevertheless, cost him his life.

Soulier, the commander of the *cohorte*, who, in obedience to the orders of General Malet, had gone to occupy the Hôtel de Ville, did not reach there until half-past seven o'clock; he stationed his men in the piazza, and entered the building, to communicate to the Prefect of the Seine the orders he had received; but M. Frochot had spent the previous night at his country-house. Soulier, therefore, saw only a clerk, who, aware that the prefect must be on his way to Paris, sent a messenger to meet him, to hurry him forward, and inform him of the death of the Emperor, which news he transmitted by means of a pencilled note bearing the words *Fuit Imperator*. M. Frochot arrived on horseback at eight o'clock. He had been upset by the news, and became all the more flurried by all he learnt. He was told that the Minister of Police had been to the Hôtel de Ville unaware, of course, of the fact that this minister was Lahorie, and that the Duc de Rovigo was in jail. He was also informed that orders had been given to arrest one of his clerks named Lapierre, whom he greatly liked. Lastly, he was called upon by the Duc de Rovigo's family doctor, who came on behalf of the duchess in despair, to inquire where her husband was. In the eyes of M. Frochot, this state of despair was caused by the Emperor's death, and he saw in it a confirmation of the fatal news.

M. Frochot learnt, from the orders handed to him by the commander of the *cohorte*, of the abolition of the Imperial

Government, the creation of a provisional governmental commission, which was to sit at the Hôtel de Ville, and of an injunction to appeal to the country, in case of need, by sounding the tocsin. All these revolutionary measures completely bewildered him. "Well then," he said to Soulier, "what do you require? You will need quarters for the commission, and others for the military staff. There is room enough for the commission in the great hall; as to the staff, it can take up its quarters on the lower floor of the Hôtel." Then, leaving his office, he went into the great hall, summoned the doorkeeper, ordered him to bring a table and some chairs into it, hastened back to his private apartments, and called for his carriage, intending to go and see the Archchancellor as quickly as possible. Just then he was informed of the arrival of Adjutant Laborde bringing orders from the Minister of War to make the *cohorte* take its departure and place other troops in its stead. M. Saulnier soon followed, and informed M. Frochot of the trap into which the latter had fallen. M. Frochot's joy was as great as had been his grief; he supported Adjutant Laborde in his efforts to persuade the colonel to obey an order, which the unfortunate man was greatly tempted to ignore. Hardly knowing to whom he listened in the midst of so many extraordinary and contradictory happenings, he finally yielded, and led his men back to barracks. During this time the chairs and the table brought into the great hall were being carried away, but these preparations had been noticed. M. Frochot was so overjoyed at the unexpected turn of affairs, that he was far from realizing all the troubles and misfortunes that his credulity, however much it was to be excused, was to bring down upon his head.

On the 24th inst., the two commanders, the officers, and non-commissioned officers who had most actively seconded

the operations of General Malet, were arrested. General Guidal and Boccheiampe were found in a house where they were concealed. Boutreux, who had had the audacity to usurp the functions of prefect of police, succeeded at first in eluding all efforts to discover his whereabouts. The same thing happened with regard to Lafon, who was not seen again until the Restoration. A military commission was at once called together to judge the accused prisoners.

Malet and his principal agents belonged to the revolutionary party, so it was in this direction that it was necessary to push investigations; but the documents taken from the conspirators supplied data that were contradictory; thus, the *senatus-consultum* named as members of the provisional government men known for their royalist and anti-revolutionary sentiments. M. Mathieu de Montmorency and M. Alexis de Noailles were there side by side with the Abbé Sieyès. The marriage of Marie-Louise was therein annulled, the infant Napoleon declared illegitimate, the conscription and a part of the indirect taxation were abolished. The Pope's provinces were restored to him; mention was made of a congress which was to labor towards bringing about a general peace, which France was to render easy by contenting herself with her old boundaries. The inalienability of the national domains was guaranteed; this word inalienability could be interpreted in many different ways. The order of the day signed by Malet was no less extraordinary, for by it he handed over the command of the army to Generals Guidal, Desnoyers, and Pailhardy, who were all three revolutionaries. It also disbanded the *cohortes*. General Lecourbe, the most pronounced of Jacobins, and a personal enemy of Napoleon, was appointed to the command of a central army, which was to assemble under the walls of Paris. General Lahorie

was to be the chief of the staff of that army. Promises of high pay and promotion were lavishly made to officers and men who should show the most zeal. Lastly, the arrest of such perverse and corrupt men as should seek to make use of their influence to interrupt the march of the provisional government was to take place without delay; the soldiers, whose duty it should be to make these arrests, were to do so in an orderly and quiet fashion, but with all the energy required to carry out a measure demanded by the public peace. It was plain that the Abbé Lafon was to a great extent the author of the *senatus-consultum*, and that the order of the day was to be attributed in its entirety to the pen of General Malet.

Some hesitancy therefore occurred in making the preliminary investigations. The interrogatory to which General Lahorie was subjected by M. Réal, previous to his being sent before the military commission, laid bare the folly which had presided over the conception of General Malet. The Duc de Rovigo wished that I should be present while it was taking place, so he sent for me with that object in view; I would rather have been excused from this courtesy. M. Pelet was likewise summoned, as well as M. Anglès, M. Saulnier, and M. Desmarets. I was therefore a witness of the scene, which extended over three hours. Lahorie persisted in maintaining and in demonstrating to the last that he had not been taken into the secret of the conspiracy beforehand; the sight of a general presenting himself at the head of a large military force, without any appearance of disorder, had inspired him with confidence; he had really believed in the death of the Emperor, an event which in itself was not extraordinary; the announcement of a revolution did not, therefore, appear to him as unlikely, all the more so that he had seen many changes of government; among others, the one brought about by the

events of the 18th Brumaire. Was it not a *senatus-consultum* that had made the First Consul Emperor? Since the Senate had created the Imperial Government, could it not have abolished it? Taken unawares, aroused suddenly from his slumbers, he had completely become the dupe of a man who was exercising great authority without it being in any way contested, who could unlock prison gates without having recourse to force, and to whose behests everybody yielded. When the *senatus-consultum* was handed to him, and he was asked how he could have allowed himself to be deceived by so gross a fabrication, and by its incoherent tenor, he answered that he had scarcely glanced at it; that urged by Malet to place himself at the head of the soldiers, the command of whom was delegated to him, he had not read a line of it, and had contented himself with listening to what was told him. "Surprise is expressed," he went on to say, "at my having been able to believe in the genuineness of such a document. It would be much more a matter for surprise if, after having examined it carefully, I had been insane enough to make use of it, and to accept it as the basis of an undertaking so fraught with peril. It has never been said that I lacked either intelligence or judgment, and it would be necessary to look upon me as the most obtuse of men, to pretend that I willingly took part in an imposture so rashly concocted. No, I was the first dupe of General Malet, and I am his wretched victim."

When questioned with regard to his behavior towards the Minister of Police and myself, he gave us to understand that had he followed out Malet's instructions, both our lives would have been sacrificed; that his desire to save us had been the principal motive governing him, when taking charge of the expedition which had us in view. "I hope," he remarked, turning towards me, "that you were

not ill treated?" He had already asked this question of me in the morning, when, on re-entering the Ministry of Police with the Duc de Rovigo, I had found him under arrest. On one point only did his defence seem to me not to be worthy of the firmness which he displayed. He obstinately maintained, in spite of the evidence, that he had not sought to usurp the functions of Minister of Police. As a proof of the good faith and credulity which alone had led him to follow Malet, he declared that his visit to the Hôtel de Ville had served to arouse his suspicions. The peaceful state of the citizens he had met on his way thither, and the absence of all those he had expected to see assembled at the Hôtel de Ville, had seemed to him altogether inexplicable. He had therefore returned to the ministry, hardly knowing any more what to think, and was plunged in the most melancholy reflections at the time when Adjutant Laborde came to arrest him.

These several assertions bore unmistakable evidence of truth; but, if Malet had so succeeded in deceiving the man to whom he had entrusted a mission which presupposed the greatest confidence in him, what becomes then of the alleged connections referred to in M. Lafon's printed account of the affair? Is it possible to credit that he had so many accomplices within the army and the several bodies of the state? That, when he had so many people at his disposal, he would go and select as his principal agent an imprisoned general! Fear and despair would be likely to take hold of him as soon as he learnt of the falsity of the facts told him and of the assurances given to him. On the other hand, Malet denied that he had any accomplices, maintaining that alone he had done everything, trusting for the success of his enterprise to a spontaneous outburst of the feelings of hatred and indignation experienced by all classes, and which could not fail to respond to the first given signal.

It would be difficult for me to give an idea of all the suffering I endured while the interrogatory of the unfortunate Lahorie lasted. There is no more pitiable sight than that of a doomed man, who seems to defend himself without any hope of success, merely as a duty to himself. When that man is endowed with courage and a noble mind, when the deed of which he is guilty is one of those which revolutions bring to the surface, and which party spirit justifies, it is heartrending to realize that he who stands before you, so full of life, strength, and energy, is so soon to die!

The members of the commission, MM. Réal and Desmarets, who were doubtless hardened to such a spectacle, did not seem to share our painful emotions; M. Réal even went so far as to occasionally put his questions in a harsh and ironical tone, which was altogether out of place. Poor Lahorie had noticed the effect this conduct produced on several of us; several times I observed his eyes seeking ours, and thanking us for understanding him. There came at last a time when M. Pelet, unable to endure it any longer, rose from his seat, and, joining me near the mantelpiece, said to me: "You are like me. Réal gives me great pain; this scene must be brought to an end"; then turning towards Réal, he spoke to him as follows: "Enough for today. Believe me, it is time to close the sitting; you are not going to extract any more information from the gentleman for the present." So the interrogatory was closed, and we were free to depart.

The trial before the military commission took place on the 29th inst. In the meanwhile, nothing was neglected to make every possible discovery. There was great anxiety to find Boutreux, the Spanish priest, and Lafon. It was more especially important to get hold of the last-named, owing to what was known of his character; moreover, if the

Royalist party had actually countenanced the conspiracy, the threads of it could be only grasped by securing him. It is at all events passing strange that this man, more prudent and more discreet than Malet and Boutreux, this man whose audacity was greater in the council than in the field of action, should not have undertaken any rôle likely to place him in jeopardy; it mattered little to him whether those he urged on should expose themselves to unavoidable perils; as for himself, accustomed as he was to the adventurous life of the *chouannerie*, he would once more go from one hiding-place to another, and enjoy the satisfaction to which the men of that party had so long been accustomed of affording to a small number of persons, glad to risk everything to save him, the onus of an untiring devotion. Such was, as a matter of fact, the life he led until the Restoration.

As to the Spanish priest, he was never discovered, and nothing was even heard of him after the Restoration. With regard to the revolutionary party, it was believed that some important discovery might be made through Guidal; all the men who were known as his friends were therefore subjected to an examination. Every one of them furnished satisfactory proof that they had lived in a state of profound inactivity for some time past, and the greater part showed clearly that so far from having been notified of the conspiracy, they had lived in ignorance of it until after the arrest of the conspirators. There remained, however, a man whom it had been impossible to find, as he had left his dwelling-place at the first news that the police were at work; this man, whom it was well worth taking into consideration, was the famous Tallien. His disappearance was giving rise to the strongest suspicions, when one of my relations, to whom he had rendered good service in the days of the Terror, called upon me on his behalf, and asked



me for a safe-conduct. This favor granted, Tallien made his way into my presence. In reply to my first question, "Why did you conceal yourself?" he said "that a man who had like himself been mixed up with the life and intrigues of the revolutionaries, had to remain on his guard, long experience having taught him that however innocent a man might be, he must never run the risk of being arrested." He supplied me with the most circumstantial particulars concerning all his movements for the past two or three years. He pointed out to me how careful he had been to remain foreign, not only to all semblance of a plot, but even of an intrigue; he went further, and reviewing the names of all the men of the old revolutionary party who were still alive, and who dwelt either in Paris or its suburbs, he showed me how they lived apart from each other, and how they were governed by the fear of compromising themselves. In the end, he left in my mind the conviction that neither he, nor those who might be considered as belonging to his following, had had the slightest understanding with Malet, who was looked upon by them as a crack-brained fool; not one of them would have taken a part in an enterprise conceived and directed by him. The information I thus obtained was in perfect harmony with that collected in all directions by the several police systems. The government, now feeling sure that the public peace was nowise threatened, nobody was molested, and the prisons were not filled with suspects, as had so often been the case.

The proceedings which took place before the commission (the accused numbered twenty-four prisoners) established even more clearly than the foregoing information that the entire conspiracy had been the personal work of Malet, and that his followers were the victims of a lamentable credulity. He did not hesitate, in the course of his interroga-

tories, to take upon himself the entire responsibility, and, in that respect, revealed the nobility of his character. His defence was summed up in these few words: "The man who has constituted himself the defender of his country has no need of any defence: he triumphs, or goes to his death."

Lahorie repeated to the commission what he had previously said before the Duc de Rovigo. He dwelt strongly on the generosity of his conduct towards the Minister of Police. "At all events," he went on to say, "I am aware of the doom that awaits me; I do not speak for the purpose of saving my life, but to establish the truth, and to defend my memory from the odious charges with which it might be sought to dishonor it." Lahorie's defence as well as his interrogatory are reported in full in M. Lafon's work; it is worthy of careful perusal, as is likewise the defence of the other prisoners.

Guidal and Boccheiampe also showed to what a degree they had been led astray by Malet, and endeavored to show excuse for the mistake they had committed. Boccheiampe's good faith had been such that after his expedition with Lahorie to the Ministry of Police, he had not feared returning to La Force, to carry to a friend the assurance that he was taking steps to secure his freedom.

The commanding officer of the *cohorte*, the colonel of one of the Paris regiments, and all the officers under them, pleaded as an excuse the state of confusion in which they had been thrown by the news of the Emperor's death, and how impossible it had been for them in the midst of their sorrow to look deeply into matters. How, they argued, could it have been possible for them to suspect that so disgraceful an advantage should be taken of them? Neither of these two unfortunate men shone by his intelligence. The officers of their command sought refuge in the obedience which they considered they owed to their

superiors in rank. It is a fact that among them all, not one was to be found who could be called intentionally guilty; but deeds of that kind, when committed by the military, are of such gravity, and can be followed by such terrible consequences, that if ever there was a reason for excusing or even calling for severity, it is under similar circumstances. To allow it to be assumed that corps commanders and other officers should with impunity take orders from any other general than the one commanding them, would be to expose governments to every revolutionary attempt which a factious individual might see fit to undertake, so long as he donned the uniform and epaulets of a general. Still, I am of opinion that a lesser number might have been brought to trial, and that fewer lives might have been sacrificed. The Minister of War showed himself inflexible in the severity of his prosecution. Whatever may be thought of the extent to which this prosecution was stretched, the sentence rendered by the commission was an exceedingly severe one, without, however, being open to the charge of unfairness.

Malet, Lahorie, Guidal, Boccheiampe, Rabbe, and Soulier were sentenced to death, together with eight officers and non-commissioned officers, among whom, alas! the lieutenant who had suffered that I should be placed in danger of my life, and the sub-lieutenant who had conducted me to La Force, and whom I had warned of his sad doom. I had, but without any hope of success, pleaded with the Duc de Feltre for their lives. They were all shot to death, next morning, in the plain of Grenelle, with the exception of Rabbe, the colonel of the Paris regiment, and Rateau, a corporal in the same regiment, who were granted a reprieve. I do not recall how Rateau obtained this favor, which was all the more astonishing in his case, in that he had been present at the first meeting in the Rue Saint-Gilles, and

had subsequently acted as Malet's aide-de-camp, hence no doubts could be entertained that he had been initiated into the secret of the conspiracy. As regards Rabbe, the Duc de Rovigo, having remembered that he was a member of the commission which had passed sentence on the Duc d'Enghien, had caused the execution of his sentence to be suspended.

I believe that he likewise made attempts to have Lahorie's life spared, but the Duc de Feltre rendered them fruitless. The following is the letter which the unfortunate man wrote to his former comrade, previous to going to meet his fate. It is a noble, beautiful, and touching letter, every word of it:—

“ From the Abbaye, 29 October, 1812.

“ *Victor Lahorie to H. Exc. the Duc de Rovigo.*

“ It will perhaps surprise you to once more receive a letter from me; but, in this hour of my life, I can look back with so great a pleasure on my behavior towards you, at a time when you had cause to fear that I might act differently, that, going back to other days, I feel a kind of need of bringing myself once more to your notice.

“ At present, I have no interested motives in so doing, and you may believe me when I solemnly declare to you that I am about to forfeit my life for a momentary lack of judgment, which induced me to place credit in an act of folly, and not as a conspirator. My conduct is sufficient proof of this, and it is the truth that on my leaving La Force I was as ignorant as yourself of the mad doings of Malet.

“ What is happening to me is enough to justify a belief in fatalism; you were so anxious to make me leave my own country, while a kind of instinct held me back in it, and I have ended in coming victorious out of that unfortunate trial, but at the cost of my life, a matter neither of us had dreamt of.

“ I once more renew my prayer that at my death you will cause to be handed over to my family the four thousand and odd francs found in my house. I swear to you, on my honor and on my memory, that it is my family who lent me this sum, for the purpose of a journey to America, to wit, my mother, one thousand francs; my brother Régnier, one thousand francs; and the balance, my brother Desloges,

the commander of a troop in the 8th Chasseurs. This insignificant sum can have no value for the Ministry. I am all the more desirous that it should be restored to my family, inasmuch as its members will be placed in the position of having to renounce all claims to my wretched estate.

"I beg you will at least grant the request conveyed to you in this letter, in recollection of the first words I spoke to you on meeting you once more. You cannot but believe that I am dying for having accepted a mission, wherein I had no other object than to save your life, and to secure the order for your being transferred, which alone could save you. I do not remind you of this for my own sake, but from the interest I bear my family, which has already so much to suffer on my account. I have set you the example of generosity.

"Adieu, Savary.

"*Signed* : V. F. LAHORIE."

Boutreux, arrested a few days later, was tried and executed, as had been his accomplices.

There remained to be known the impression made on the mind of Napoleon by such unexpected happenings. It might perhaps be difficult to convince him that the officials who had neither foreseen nor forestalled them were not deserving of severe censure. Nevertheless, what blame could one lay to the Ministry and to the Prefecture of Police? Malet, by taking no one into his confidence, by making no preparations on the outside, by not carrying on any correspondence whatsoever, had rendered all discovery impossible. He had secured himself against acts of betrayal and against such imprudences as almost always mar the execution of plots. He had succeeded in winning over the occupants of a couple of barracks without either the civil or the military police having any knowledge of it. This is easily explained as regards the civil police; it had no jurisdiction and did not exercise any supervision over the barracks, from which it was excluded with jealous care by the military administration. It was never notified be-

forehand of any movement of troops, so that the inspectors of the Ministry and Prefecture of Police, and the Minister and Prefect of Police themselves, might have met the detachments commanded by Malet and the officers under him, without giving the matter the slightest attention, or taking the least umbrage at it. No military body was in any special fashion charged with guarding the city; the municipal administration did not have under its orders one hundred men, with the exception of those of the Fire Brigade, for the gendarmerie obeyed its officers only, and these were either answerable to the military division or to their inspector-general, Marshal Moncey. One could, therefore, only accuse with good cause the military police; it ought to have notified the military staff of the city of movements taking place without its orders; it should have noticed them all the more readily as they had lasted over three hours from the time of Malet's appearance at the Popincourt barracks until he reached the prison of La Force.

The blame for it could also be laid to General Hulin, who came near paying for it with his life. The Archchancellor, the Minister of Police, and myself, all wrote to the Emperor. He was greatly angered by this strange happening, and his anger was heightened by the narratives of his correspondents, who were ever eager to magnify their own importance at the expense of others.

The Duc de Rovigo had many enemies, among them the Minister of War. The Duc de Feltre, anxious to divert the censure which his department probably deserved, drew on his imagination for a plot which had been prepared for some time back, and which, according to him, ought to have been known to the police. He had no hesitation in maintaining that Malet had many confidants in the Senate. I soon learnt that he had written to the Emperor in such

a strain. The people of the Court were just as little favorably disposed as himself towards the police department. It was easy to discern from the language and attitude of those close to the Empress and the King of Rome, that their version of the affair would not be a charitable one. Believing that they had found an excellent occasion to make display of their zeal, they made show of a lively indignation against the inefficiency of the police, which had been unable to forestall a conspiracy which had so audaciously contested the sacred principle of the legitimate succession to the throne.

## CHAPTER II

Napoleon's coolness after the evacuation of Moscow — His arrival in Paris on the 18th of December, 1812 — He receives the Senate and the Council of State next day — Concerted addresses delivered by speakers from both these bodies — The Emperor's reply to these speeches, and his allusions to the Malet conspiracy — M. Frochet's behavior investigated by the committees of the Council of State — Decree removing M. Frochet from office — Fresh disasters of the retreating army — Call for a levy of three hundred and fifty thousand men — Negotiations entered into with the Pope at Fontainebleau — Provisional agreement forced from Pius VII. by Napoleon himself — A *Te Deum* sung in honor of the occasion, while the Pope is preparing a retraction — A letter from Pius VII. to the Emperor on this subject — Napoleon's decree declaring the provisional agreement a law of the state — A renewal of harsh methods against the Pope and his councillors — Death of the Bishop of Nantes and his dying adjuration to the Emperor.

EVENTS of serious import were soon to divert attention from the mad enterprise of General Malet, and from seeking who was to blame for it.

On the 15th of October, 1812, Napoleon began his retrograde movement. He had been compelled to give up the idea of advancing towards Kalouga, and follow the same road he had taken to reach Moscow; then, leaving to their fate the remnants of his army at some distance from Vilna, he had entered a wretched sleigh, having for only companion his grand equerry, and had wended his way towards France, which he had left, seven months earlier, to place himself at the head of an army of over six hundred thousand men. He learnt of the Malet conspiracy just before reaching Smolensk. No orderly had reached him for ten days past. He had, consequently, to read dispatches



sent off at separate intervals, and so learnt at one and the same time of the crime and the punishment of the conspirators. He gave vent to his feelings of astonishment and anger, while reading these missives with M. Daru, in a house by the roadside. Desirous of imparting to several of his officers and generals the dispatches he had received, in order to discover the effect they would produce on their minds, he could not help noticing their consternation, which was plainly due to a diminished confidence in his fortune and his power. M. Daru has confirmed to me what M. de Ségur has written on the subject; no one could be better informed in this respect. In days to come Napoleon was often to adduce the Malet conspiracy as a proof of the wisdom he had shown in evacuating Moscow, in the face of the opinion of those who thought it would have been wiser to try and winter there, even if one had to remain five or six months without being in communication with France.

Such a resolution, admitting for argument's sake that an audacious general might venture upon taking it, would not be fit and proper in the case of a sovereign commanding his own army, and especially in the case of an Emperor of so recent an origin. I am repeating Napoleon's own words. In the midst of his awful crisis he displayed remarkable force of character, and revealed the many resources of his mind. If, on the one hand, no other man but Napoleon could have conceived and ventured on so mad an expedition, on the other, he was to be the only man whom it could not crush. So magnetic was the power which he exercised over the men who perished while following him, that not the slightest sign of disobedience manifested itself, that not a murmur arose from the ranks of an army which was dying of cold and hunger. Such an example has perhaps never been set the world, and Napoleon has never appeared

greater than to those who saw him on the banks of the Beresina, walking along these unknown shores, stick in hand, absorbed in a study of the chances remaining to him of concealing from the enemy the crossing of the river by his army, giving his orders with undisturbed, unruffled coolness, and finally triumphing over a difficulty which would have seemed unsurmountable to any other man. The want of perspicacity shown by the Russian general on the opposite bank doubtless stood him in good stead, but does not the first element in the science of war consist in knowing how to take advantage of the enemy's mistakes?

The twenty-fifth bulletin of the Grand Army informed us that the retreat had begun. The twenty-eighth bulletin, which was dated from Smolensk, and made public in Paris on the 29th of November, was couched in such terms as to cause serious alarm. It announced the setting in of the winter; up to that time, nothing had been heard of but the magnificent weather prevailing. After this, we were eighteen days without getting any news. It can be readily imagined how keen our apprehensions were during this long period; it was evident that there was a break in our line of communication. At last, on the 17th of December, came the twenty-ninth bulletin, one which will remain forever famous. Never will any great calamity be more bluntly told. And yet, the narrative was far from telling the whole truth. I was less surprised at it than any one else, for a few days previous there had arrived in Paris General Nansouty, to whom I was related, and with whom I was consequently on a footing of intimacy. Wounded at the battle of the Moskowa, and thus rendered unfit for further active service, he had, at Moscow, obtained leave to return to France, and so he had gone ahead over the whole of the road which the army was to follow in its retreat; his great experience of war made it easy for him

to measure the extent of the dangers which would beset it; he had told me in confidence that he feared that the Emperor and the whole of his army would perish in the retreat, and that he considered that it would indeed be cause for congratulation if only one-fourth of those taking part in that fatal expedition should ever again see the frontiers of the Empire.

The Emperor reached Paris on the 18th of December, in the middle of the night; on the following morning he saw no one but the Archchancellor, his Ministers, and his intimates. I learnt that notwithstanding the serious preoccupations with which his mind was doubtless burdened, he had found time to refer to the Malet conspiracy, and had sought to learn its merest details. This goes to show that he attached great importance to the matter.

On the following Sunday he held the usual levee on returning from mass. I attended it; it was the first time that I found myself in his presence since his return to the Palace of the Tuileries; there was no one about me who was not most anxious to see what kind of a welcome he would give me. Many there were who expected a scene which would be a painful one for me. This expectation was not realized. The information which he had gathered on the day previous had apparently dissipated the clouds with which it had been sought to darken my conduct; he approached me most affably, and whispered to me so that I alone should hear his words: "And so, *monsieur le préfet*, you, too, have had your day of tribulation; there is no lack of such days in a man's life!"

Following this levee, Napoleon received the Senate and the Council of State with much ceremony. The speakers on behalf of these two bodies had already received their instructions as to what they were to say, hence there never were any utterances less in harmony with what the speak-

ers felt in their innermost hearts. A prominent place had been given in these speeches to the Malet conspiracy. "Men who had escaped from the jails into which they had been placed by imperial clemency, thus snatching them from the death their past crimes deserved, have sought," said M. de Lacépède and M. Defermon, "to disturb the public peace in this great city; they have been made to suffer the penalty of their last felony." The references to this event naturally led up to others concerning the happy guarantees of peacefulness assured to states by a monarchical government and an hereditary throne, in consequence of which nothing should be neglected that would be likely to strengthen such guarantees.

M. de Lacépède recalled the fact that "at the time of the origin of the old French dynasties, the spectacle had been more than once afforded of the king commanding that all Frenchmen of all ranks should be bound in advance to the heir to the throne by a solemn oath. At times, when the age of the young prince had allowed of it, a crown had been placed on his head, as a token of his future authority, and the symbol of the perpetuity of the government." This historical reminiscence had certainly been inspired by the Emperor and sufficiently revealed his intentions. On his side, M. Defermon said: "God, who protects France, will long preserve her from the greatest of misfortunes; but, under such a circumstance, all hearts would rally around the prince who is the object of our wishes and hopes, and all Frenchmen would renew at his feet his oaths of loyalty to and love for the Emperor."

In replying to these addresses, Napoleon made but a slight reference to war; he merely declared that the one which he had undertaken against Russia was a political one, and carried on without any feeling of animosity. He might, had he seen fit, have put weapons into the hands of

the greater portion of the population, by proclaiming the freedom of the serfs, but he had abstained from having recourse to such a measure, as it would have been the means of sending many families to death, and to the most horrible tortures. "If my army," he added, "has sustained any losses, it is due to the severity of the weather." He referred all the more at length to the conspiracy, in that he had said little on the subject of the army. "Timid and cowardly soldiers," he said to the Senate, "are the cause that nations lose their independence, but pusillanimous officials destroy the majesty of the law, the rights of the throne, and even the social order. When I undertook the regeneration of France, I prayed Providence to grant me a certain number of years. The work of destruction is the work of an instant, but it needs the help of time to rebuild. What the state most needs is courageous officials. The cry of our forefathers was: *The king is dead! Long live the king!* These few words embody the principal advantages of the monarchical system. I believe that I have made a careful study of the inclinations displayed by my people during the last centuries, and I have reflected over what has been done at different periods of our history. I will devote still further thought to the matter."

In reply to the Council of State, he said: "If the nation shows so much love for my son, it is because it is at heart fully convinced of the benefits derived from a monarchy." Then came the following long tirade against idealogy: "It is to this tenebrous metaphysic, which, by instituting a subtle investigation into primary causes, wishes to establish on their basis the governing of nations, instead of getting the laws to be made in consonance with a knowledge of the human heart, that are to be attributed all the misfortunes of our lovely France."

The keynote of all these speeches was that it had been

sufficient to spread the news of his death, in order to cause the rights of his son to be cast aside. He had especially noticed, when listening to circumstantial narratives of the conspiracy, that the Prefect of the Seine, whose freedom had not been curtailed, against whom no violence had been exercised, had obeyed the conspirators without disputing the legality of the documents they had brought under his notice, thus, as a matter of fact, recognizing a government which was establishing itself on the ruins of his own, and ignoring the rights of his son. He had gone much further, for he had given orders to make the necessary preparations for the installation of the members of the new government in the Hôtel de Ville. Such a fault was, in his eyes, unpardonable, and it was to him that he had alluded when uttering the words: "Pusillanimous officials subvert the majestic empire of the laws, the rights of the throne, and even the social order system." But M. Frochot was one of his oldest servitors, one of those who had always been to his liking; his reputation as an honorable and honest man was well established. It was therefore necessary to show some consideration when smiting him; on the other hand, his punishment should be an exemplary one, and its nature decided by men so situated as to command general assent. He ordered the committees of the Council of State to separately investigate the conduct of the Prefect of the Seine, and to discuss the course to be pursued regarding him. In order to assist them in this discussion, he caused to be sent to them the documents bearing on the sedition of the 23d of October, a statement drawn up by Count Frochot as to the facts with which he was concerned on that day, and a letter which he had written on the same subject to the Minister of Police. The investigation of these papers and the discussion of the affair were extremely painful to the greater part of the members of the Council of State, by whom M.

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Frochot was generally beloved, and who were convinced of the innocence of his intentions.

All the committees, except the one on Finance, showed the kindest consideration; in the latter, M. Defermon proceeded with the most rigorous zeal, and put his questions in such a manner as to obtain the most unfavorable answers to the man over whom they were sitting in judgment. After setting forth at length both questions and answers, that section gave as its opinion that, "according to the facts established and recognized, there were grounds for the rendering by the Council of State, in conformity with Art. 7 of the constitutions of the Empire, a decision authorizing that Count Frochot, Prefect of the Seine, should be brought to trial; but that, considering the state of surprise into which he had been thrown, and the mental confusion which had taken hold of him, and lastly, the inconveniences and difficulties inherent to any further procedure, the best thing to be done under the circumstances was to remove him from office."

M. Bérenger, alone of all the members of this committee, refused to sign the report asking for this dismissal from office, and drew up a report on his own account, conceived in the same spirit as the one of the Committee of the Interior. This act of independence reflected great honor on him.

All these reports were published on the 25th of December, in the *Moniteur*, which contained simultaneously a decree depriving M. Frochot of his functions as a Councillor of State and as Prefect of the Seine. His place was filled by M. de Chabrol.

Each day brought more distressing news from the army. The fate that had befallen what remained of it, subsequent to the Emperor's departure, became known in the course of the first fortnight in January. It was then learnt that the

losses between Vilna and the Vistula had been even greater than those incurred between Smolensk and Vilna. The defection of General d'Yorck and of the Prussian troops forming part of the army corps under the command of Marshal Macdonald left no doubt as to Prussia's coming defection. One was soon to learn of the sudden departure of the King of Naples, whom Napoleon had entrusted with superintending the retreat, and of the absolute discouragement which had thereupon taken hold of the remnants of an army so miserably abandoned. The alliance with Austria, in such a critical situation, was the only chance of salvation, but how far could it be relied upon?

Napoleon could no longer remain blind to a position which was daily getting worse, but he could see no other remedy for it than in the new efforts he was about to make, and in the fresh sacrifices he was going to exact from the country. On the 11th of January, 1813, a *senatus-consultum* placed three hundred and fifty thousand men at the disposal of the Minister of War, to wit, one hundred thousand men from the *cohortes*, one hundred thousand taken from among the conscripts of 1809, 1810, 1811, and 1812, who had so far not been called upon to serve, and over one hundred and fifty thousand belonging to the conscription of 1814.

The whole of the conscription of 1813 had been levied during the course of 1812. A last call for one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men had been answered in the preceding month of September, pursuant to orders sent by the Emperor at the time when he had come to the resolution to advance from Smolensk on Moscow. But all these levies did not supply him with anything but infantry. Cavalry is not to be improvised, and all the cavalry which four months previously had crossed the Niemen might be considered as destroyed, and yet it had numbered over eighty



thousand sabres. Never had any French army boasted of so large and fine a cavalry.

One stands aghast when one reflects on the amount of work that had to be done, on the resources of all kinds which had to be found to levy, clothe, equip, supply with munitions, to organize in all directions, in the space of five months, an army of five hundred thousand men, and this gigantic achievement had been preceded, at the beginning of 1812, by a similar undertaking, also a heavy one.

It was nevertheless in the midst of these cares, which compelled Napoleon to give so vigorous an impulse to his military administration, that he found time to think of his affairs with the Pope. It was more than ever necessary to bring them to an issue, for the slightest religious dissension could singularly increase the embarrassments of the political situation in Europe. It would seem that he had in this connection received certain warnings from the Emperor of Austria, and it was impossible that he should not give them his most serious consideration. He commissioned the Bishop of Nantes to convey fresh proposals to the Pope. As negotiations were not progressing rapidly enough to suit him in his impatience, he went to Fontainebleau with the Empress, under pretence of a shooting party, presented himself suddenly in the apartments occupied by Pius VII., and made use with him of all the seductions and threats which he thought of a kind to make an impression on his mind, and finally succeeded in extorting from the Sovereign Pontiff his consent to a provisional agreement, which is known as the Concordat of Fontainebleau.

Although the articles of this convention were only signed, as formally stipulated in the preamble, as liable to serve as a basis for a final agreement, Napoleon was truly overjoyed at this achievement; it was perhaps one of the last joys he experienced towards the end of his reign. He

thought he had successfully disposed of one of the great troubles which beset him, and as early as the 26th inst., he hastened to notify all the bishops, through his Minister of Public Worship, that a concordat which brought peace to the Church had been entered into between himself and the Pope.

Anticipating the joy which so important an event was to give to the clergy and all the faithful, he added to the announcement a permission to have a *Te Deum* sung in all the churches of their dioceses. Several prelates were at the same time invited to go to Fontainebleau in order to congratulate the Head of the Church, and a decree was rendered with the object of testifying to the Emperor's satisfaction with the conduct of the cardinals, archbishops, and bishops who had been present at the signing of the treaty and at the preliminary conferences. Pursuant to this decree, Cardinal de Bayane and the Bishop of Evreux were appointed members of the *Sénat conservateur*, and the Bishops of Nantes and of Trèves Councillors of State. The golden eagle of the Legion of Honor was presented to Cardinals Doria and Ruffo. The Archbishop of Edesse received the decoration of the Crown of Iron. To crown all, orders were given that the exiled cardinals should without exception be free to join the Pope. But, while all these measures were being taken on the strength of the Emperor's faith in his having scored a success, the Pope, left to his own thoughts, and no longer under the spell of the powerful influence which had dictated his latest decision, became a prey to regret, and even to remorse. He could not forgive himself for the readiness with which he had surrendered regarding matters and points which his duty commanded him to defend.

The clause affecting episcopal investiture was naturally the one which weighed most heavily on his mind, and it

would appear that he also blamed himself greatly for not having taken advantage of the occasion to claim the rights of sovereignty belonging to the Holy See, which he had sworn to maintain and defend when he was raised to the Chair of St. Peter. And yet, the terms which Pius VII. was blaming himself for having acceded to, were practically the same he had granted at Savona, to the delegates sent to him after the Council; they were even of a more accommodating kind; but, it must at the same time be conceded that the situation on both sides was an entirely different one, and the forcible transporting of His Holiness from Savona to Fontainebleau was not likely to incline him in any marked extent towards condescension.

The first symptom of a change in the resolves of the Pope, was his refusal to accept a somewhat considerable sum of money which the Emperor had placed at his disposal; at the same time he postponed the granting of the bulls of installation asked of him in connection with the bishops who had been appointed by the Emperor, "as he wished above all," so he said, "to have the assurance that his own desires should not encounter any obstacles from Napoleon's side, when the time came for a final settlement."

The scruples which had led to this preliminary retraction were still further increased on his talking matters over with several of the cardinals. Cardinal di Pietro, especially, who had for a long while been held a prisoner at Vincennes, greatly influenced him in those days, and he took no pains to conceal from him that he considered he had gone too far in his concessions, which were in violation of the rights of the Holy See.

The Emperor having caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur* the articles of the provisional convention, Pius VII. quickly summoned about him all the members of the Sacred College he could bring together, and, in consequence of the

counsels of that assemblage, he wrote to Napoleon a long letter, wherein he stated that "from the day he had signed the document of which it was sought to make final and positive use, the deepest remorse and the most acute repentance had harrowed his soul; that his only consolation lay in the thought that the harm done unto the Church by this, his consent, could be undone in the subsequent treaty dealing with a definitive agreement; but that his sorrow had been greatly increased, when, much to his surprise, and contrary to what had been formally agreed upon between His Majesty and himself, he had witnessed the publication, under the title of Concordat, of articles which he had merely signed as likely to furnish the bases of an agreement to be come to in the future. He must therefore state that his conscience placed unsurmountable obstacles between himself and the carrying out of these articles, and that he now saw, to his great confusion and sorrow, that he had used his power not for edification, but for destruction, if he executed what he had without due reflection promised by these same articles." The remainder of the letter embodied a few explanations concerning several of the articles which had been publicly printed, some of which, it was said, required certain modifications, while others were radically bad and should be expunged as contrary to justice and to the canons of the Church.

All this debating went on unknown to the public, and without being bruited abroad, up to the 25th of March. The Pope's letter had been handed to the Emperor on the previous evening. His answer to it was a decree, making the treaty of the 25th of January obligatory for the archbishops, bishops, and chapters, and promulgating the treaty as a law of the state. He also enacted that the *Cours impériales* should henceforth take cognizance of all such cases as were formerly included in the denomination *d'appel comme*

*d'abus*, as well as of all those which should arise from the non-execution of the Concordat. This innovation in the forms of procedure was evidently plainly intended to withdraw from the clergy the protection they had enjoyed so far of being amenable to the jurisdiction of the Council of State only.

There was a renewal of harsh measures against the Pope, who was deprived of all intercourse with the outside world; such members of the Sacred College as were still allowed near him were forbidden to discuss business matters with him, while Cardinal di Pietro, who was considered leader of the opposition, was again removed from the Pope's following, and sent to Auxonne.

In no way, therefore, was peace restored to the Church, and this latest endeavor of Napoleon to impose his law on the Sovereign Pontiff recoiled altogether upon himself. It was patent to everybody that he had acted in bad faith when pretending to give a final character to a treaty extorted from a feeble old man who had never considered it to be anything but provisional.

The Bishop of Nantes, who had shown great moderation in the course of these painful negotiations, died during the month of July; before breathing his last, he wished the sovereign whom he had served in all the sincerity of his heart to hear the truth from his lips, and this with no other idea than to serve the interests of religion, so he wrote to him a few hours before his death, as follows: "I entreat you to restore to the Holy Father his freedom; the thought of his captivity still disturbs my mind as my life goes out. I have on several occasions had the honor of telling you how all Christianity grieved over his captivity, and how many objections there were towards prolonging it. I believe that the return of His Holiness to Rome is necessary to your good fortune and happiness."

### CHAPTER III

Pourparlers between the Paris cabinet and the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna — Continued illusions of M. de Bassano — Napoleon's trust in the loyalty of his allies — An offensive and defensive treaty of alliance signed between Prussia and Russia — Austria's ambiguous attitude — A treaty concluded between Great Britain and Sweden — A fresh levy of one hundred and eighty thousand men ordered by Napoleon — Formation of four regiments of mounted Guards of Honor — Deep discontent caused by this measure — The finance law and the budget of 1813 — Excessive optimism of Count Molé — Destitution of the working classes, and straitened circumstances of army officers of high rank — Important public works inaugurated for the benefit of workmen; large orders given out for furniture, and completion of the Avenue de l'Observatoire — Formation of the Paris *gendarmérie*, which is placed under the control of the Prefect of Police — Marshal Moncey's abrupt speech to M. Pasquier in this connection — Opening of the new campaign against the Russo-Prussian coalition — Strength and composition of the armies in the field — The Empress Marie-Louise becomes Regent — Victory of Lutzen — Battle of Bautzen, and death of Grand Marshal Duroc — Armistice signed after the taking of Breslau — Austria's equivocal mediation — Preponderating part played by General Pozzo di Borgo in this diplomatic tournament — His constant opposition to Napoleon, dating from the year 1793.

THE months of January and February, 1813, were spent in pourparlers and negotiations between Paris and Berlin, and Paris and Vienna, the object of them being to preserve for France the friendship of these two powers. Could such a hope be entertained in regard to Prussia? Could the Emperor be sincere when he made a pretence of believing in the good faith of the king, when the latter caused General Yorck to be brought to trial, and sent to Paris a minister extraordinary, Prince von Hatzfeldt, with instructions to tender the offer of another Prussian corps in place of the one which had deserted?

Could one bring himself to believe seriously, that when Prince Eugène was left in command of the remnants of the French army, and compelled to evacuate in succession every position between the Vistula and the Saxon frontier, after leaving a garrison in Dantzic, whose whole army hardly numbered twenty thousand worn out men, and which, even after bringing together the several scattered corps, never reached fifty thousand, could it be supposed, I repeat, that Frederick William would be long in determining to make common cause with the Russian Empire, whose victorious troops were advancing by forced marches towards his provinces? The consequences of such a situation were but too patent.

One evening, towards the end of February, M. de Sémonville and I, both out of patience with the blind trust still assumed by the Duc de Bassano, made every effort to dissipate the state of illusion in which he seemed to delight in living. I had chanced to learn that very morning of what was being talked of at the Austrian and Prussian embassies, and no doubt could be entertained from what was said as to the determination to which the latter power was bound to come. We both of us laid the naked truth before the Duke, and he seemed to be so struck with it that he said to us: "Yes, you are right, and it is my duty to inform the Emperor of all you have just told me. I will do so at once; await my return, and I will then tell you what impression it has made on him." It was ten o'clock at night, and we waited till one o'clock in the morning; he returned at last, and I can even now see him entering his drawing-room with an open and smiling countenance, taking us aside and pronouncing these very words: "Well then, my good friends, all that you told me, and which, I must confess, somewhat disturbed my peace of mind, does not amount to anything: the Emperor simply laughed at it; in a few words,

and, adducing a few positive facts, he blew down this scaffolding of yours of bad omen, leaving not a plank of it standing." There remained but to bow our heads in silence, in the presence of such obstinate blindness, and so our frankness availed nothing.

At any rate, I am of the opinion that on this occasion, Napoleon was deceiving his minister much more than he deceived himself. Had he really believed in the likelihood of retaining Prussia as an ally, would he have refused to settle for the supplies that country had furnished his troops during the campaign? Moreover, he was acquainted with the fickle nature of the King of Prussia; the Prussian nation, as a whole, was in a state of excitement which would compel him ere long to break openly with France. The Emperor Napoleon had been able to see, when passing through the northern provinces of Germany, how unfavorably the population was disposed towards him.<sup>1</sup> I hold it therefore as a fact that his apparent confidence, at the time whereof I speak, was merely assumed, its object being to fight the state of discouragement which was invading the minds of those even nearest to him. There was soon to be no doubt as to the true state of affairs, for,

<sup>1</sup> I have omitted telling an anecdote justifying his doubts and suspicions. During the so rapid journey he made through Northern Germany, with the Duc de Vicence, his grand equerry, he was made to wait at Eisenach, a little town in Saxony, for over two hours, ere he could get a change of horses. The people pretended not to have any, and he was informed that an attempt had been made to obtain them by means of a requisition, but that the horses then asked for did not seem to come. By ferreting in every corner of the post-house, M. de Vicence ended in discovering a stable wherein were locked up several postilions together with some very good horses. He insisted on both leaving the stables, but he succeeded in his desire only by placing the point of his sword on the chest of the postmaster and keeping it there until the carriage was harnessed. Had Napoleon been recognized on his arrival? Had he revealed his identity by some indiscretion? There is reason to believe so, in which case it was perhaps sought to gain sufficient time to notify a few trusty persons, in order to lay some ambuscade for him on his journey. No light has ever been thrown on the matter.



as early as the 28th of February, an offensive and defensive alliance was signed at Kalisch between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia. Would Austria be any more faithful? There were numerous indications to the contrary.

The Austrian army corps, which, as auxiliary, formed a part of the French army, had handed over Warsaw to the custody of Russian troops. Shortly afterwards, this army corps concluded an armistice with the enemy, and withdrew to Galicia, thus leaving open the road of the Oder and of Silesia. The replies vouchsafed to the protests made against such action were not entirely satisfactory, but one had perforce to be content with them and to pretend to find them acceptable. What was still more characteristic in the conduct of the Vienna cabinet was that, ceasing to pose as an ally of France, it hastened to make an offer of its services as mediator between that country and Russia.

Napoleon was compelled to tolerate this change of front and to consent to this proceeding, the only response which the Russian cabinet made to it being a declaration that it could not acquiesce in such interference unless it were acquiesced in in a like degree by England, Prussia, and Sweden. And indeed the time was near when Sweden was to take a hand in the struggle, and send its army into continental battle-fields.

If I am somewhat anticipating dates, it is with the object of facilitating a right understanding of the general state of affairs. A treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Sweden, the latter country binding itself to bring at least thirty thousand men into action, in some direct operation against the common enemy. As the price of this service, England bound herself not to oppose Sweden's occupation of Norway, a matter already agreed upon between Russia and Sweden. A subsidy of one million sterling, payable in monthly instalments, was moreover promised, and the

island of Guadeloupe was ceded to Sweden, coupled with the condition that she should prohibit slave-trade in that colony. This stipulation, recorded in a treaty bearing on interests of a totally different nature, and under such circumstances, shows the importance set by England on the abolition of this trade and her persistency in pursuing this policy.

While this new coalition was being formed, and as proofs of its existence gradually came to the knowledge of Napoleon, he was multiplying his efforts to gather the means to triumph over it. When the secession of Prussia and her alliance with Russia were notified to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, his answer was a *senatus-consultum* placing at the disposal of the Minister of War 180,000 more men, to wit: 80,000 drawn from the National Guard, 90,000 taken from a portion of the conscription of 1814, and lastly, 10,000 men destined to form four regiments of mounted Guards of Honor.

The Guards of Honor were to clothe, equip, and mount themselves at their own expense. After a year with the colors, they were to rank as sub-lieutenants, and finally, after the campaign was over, the formation of four companies of body-guards should be proceeded with, a portion of these companies to be selected from among the Guards of Honor, who should have most distinguished themselves. The idea of creating a body-guard had always been a favorite one with Napoleon, but he had been compelled to relinquish it, owing to the extreme dissatisfaction it caused military men and the veterans of the Guard. The retreat from Russia having laid low the majority of these old warriors, he thought he could safely offer this prospective to the recruits he was calling out, and upon whose good-will he could not depend.

That which stood out most plainly in the regulation drawn up as to the formation of the regiments of Guards of Honor,

was the absolute power vested in the prefects to designate the young men between the ages of nineteen and thirty belonging to the best and richest classes of society. In addition to his seeking to procure a large body of cavalry, whose primary creation would not involve any expense to the state, it is an undoubted fact that the Emperor's object was to secure hostages taken from all families whose loyalty towards him was in doubt.

No measure more than that made irreconcilable enemies for Napoleon, nor made his downfall more ardently prayed for. Still, here is the place to say that these regiments displayed great courage in battle, and worthily maintained the honor of the French flag.

There appeared simultaneously another decree with regard to the National Guard, which was organized so as to render the regiments of the line available for active service. All men from twenty to forty who had so far escaped being called upon to serve were formed into *cohortes* of Grenadiers and Chasseurs. Thus, not a single part of the population but what had to submit to the obligation of military service.

In spite of the trusting tone of the speeches delivered by the Emperor and his ministers at the opening of the session of the *Corps législatif*, public opinion daily was becoming more alarmed and more severe.

In the first days of March, Count Molé, Councillor of State, and Director of *ponts et chaussées* (bridges and highways), brought down the finance law and the budget of 1813. It was then learnt how the inevitable increase in the expenditure was to be met. It was by means of the alienation of certain portions of communal properties, the sale of which it was estimated would produce three hundred and seventy millions. The *communes* were to receive as compensation, a five per cent annuity in proportion to the net amount derived from such properties as they might surrender.

This amounted to an actual loan extorted from the *communes*, as the state became permanently burdened with the annuity, or, in other words, the interest on the capital. But what was especially noticed in the speech of M. Molé, was the language of adulation carried to the highest pitch at a time when it was so little in harmony with the public sentiment. His speech ended with the following sentence, which was for a long time cast at him: "If a man of the times of the Medici or of the age of Louis XIV. were to return to earth, and at the sight of so many wonders were to ask how many glorious reigns, how many centuries of peace had been necessary to produce them, you would say to him, gentlemen: 'Twelve years of war and a single man were sufficient.'" This praise of war seemed out of place<sup>1</sup> at a time when its evils pressed on the nation so heavily, and when the enormous absorption of men was likely to create in the mind of the nation a state of despair the consequences of which were not to be calculated. And yet this was what Napoleon least took into consideration, and I have reason to believe that his preoccupation and his anxieties did not in any way bear on this object. The levying of a number of men seemed to him in a measure more natural and attended with less difficulty than the levying of taxes, and he thought it far more dangerous to abuse the latter than the former.

<sup>1</sup> I must do M. Molé the credit of stating that he believed all he said. All the more indulgence must be shown for the illusions which he entertained in those days regarding the Emperor, as, at his age, it was difficult for him not to be won over by the favor he showed him. I do not think there ever was a man more to Napoleon's liking, and of whom he made more. He often conversed with him, listening with much complacency to what he said, and taking delight in telling him how great were the hopes he built on his talents. It was known beyond any doubt that he intended to give him the position of Archchancellor, whenever M. de Cambacérès should retire; Napoleon had told this to the latter, who often repeated it to me. No one therefore lost so much as did M. Molé by Napoleon's downfall.

What he dreaded above all things was the misery engendered by starvation, which drives people to riots. In this respect he was, in spite of the brilliant picture drawn by the Minister of the Interior, far from feeling entirely secure, especially as regards the capital, and the reports which I was in a position to submit to him added largely to the numerous cares which assailed him. I did not conceal from him, in my daily bulletins, to what a degree the situation was becoming unsatisfactory in the working classes, which were in such large numbers in the *faubourgs*.

Not a day passed but what money became tighter, and, as fears for the future led the most well-to-do families to curtail their expenses, there was, as a result, a considerable decrease in the employment of labor. This deplorable state of things was still further increased by the fact that all the army officers of high rank who generally came home during the winter to add their luxury to that of the Court, were either detained in Germany, or engaged in renewing as economically as possible their equipages, which had been entirely destroyed in the recent campaign, and there was not a single one whom the necessity of so doing did not cripple financially to a considerable extent.

It remains to be said in this connection that the workmen had, in order to keep body and soul together during the recent scarcity of food, exhausted a great part of their resources. In particular, the report which I made with regard to the suffering which was beginning to make itself felt in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, wherein were situated the principal cabinet-making workshops, was cause that orders were given to the comptroller of the Civil List to order a large quantity of furniture from these workshops. It was the intention to use them in furnishing the Louvre and the several palaces. The Royal administrators were rejoiced at finding them, in the days of the Restoration, in

the warehouses of the Crown. I procured another kind of relief for the Faubourg Saint-Marceau. I was aware that the Senate had a considerable reserve fund locked up in its coffers, so I asked that it should be expended in the earth-works necessary to the completion of the pathway from the gardens of the Luxembourg to the Observatory. These works gave employment to the poorest workmen of the faubourg, and to them is due the beautiful avenue which now exists, and which constitutes one of the most noteworthy embellishments of the magnificent palace of the House of Peers.

After having taken the necessary steps to give employment to the workmen, the Emperor turned his thoughts towards the organization of a service, the indispensable necessity for which he had been made to see by the Malet conspiracy. So long as the city government of Paris did not have at its disposal, and subject to its immediate orders, an armed force strong enough to ensure respect, there was nothing to protect it from a *coup de main*. I had already on more than one occasion made the Emperor feel the usefulness of this institution under many circumstances, especially when the population came together in great numbers. It is necessary, in order to properly do police duty, and preserve order, to possess a modicum of patience, which habit alone can give, and which is not possessed by the regulars of the army. They bring to the execution of these delicate functions a roughness which always produces a bad effect, and which is prone to give rise to most untoward incidents. Hence it is that on public festivals, in the markets, on people leaving the theatre, one had on more than one occasion to deplore accidents and acts of brutality which jeopardized authority and rendered it unpopular.

The Emperor was struck by this truth, and early in January he commanded his ministers to devote their atten-

tion to the formation of a corps whose special duty it should be to preserve order in Paris, and which should be placed under the immediate control of the police administration. I drew up several memoranda on the subject, setting forth all the particulars of the organization of the watch of olden times, which I had carefully looked up, and I demonstrated that nothing better could be done than to build on the lines of that organization, and that it was above all indispensable that the new corps should be composed of both cavalry and infantry.

The Emperor, having adopted my idea, caused a bill to be drawn up which was submitted to the Council of State; the measure was opposed by the military men, who could not endure the thought of a military force placed entirely under the control of a civil official. It was on this point that Napoleon, when defending the measure, spoke the words which justified my conduct in the Malet affair: "When I reached Paris," he said, "I hardly knew what to think of the behavior of the Prefect of Police, but after a profound investigation of the facts of the case, I was forced to recognize that it was not right to attach the slightest blame to an official left with so little armed protection, that on returning to his official residence he narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of soldiers who nevertheless belonged to a regiment which was styled the First Regiment of the City of Paris."

As a result of this discussion, there appeared on the 10th of April the decree creating the *gendarmerie* of Paris, composed in conformity with my request of cavalry and infantry. It was made entirely a dependent of my administration, and I became its commander-in-chief, having, however, the assistance of a colonel who spoke the words of command.

I have done little in the course of my laborious life which

gave me so much trouble and which was as difficult as this undertaking. As I was completely ignorant of the complicated rules governing military administration and accounts, I was compelled to study them. The Duc de Rovigo gave me in all loyalty the benefit of his advice, and he especially rendered me the greatest service by presiding over the selection of the men who were to be the first to form the force. This selection, in conformity with the terms of the decree, was to be made jointly by the Minister of War and by the Minister of Police, and the men were to be taken from throughout the whole *gendarmerie* of the Empire.

This was a source of great displeasure to Marshal Moncey, who, as Inspector-General, commanded the force. No one was more particular about trifles and more ready to take offence than he. On my meeting him at the Tuileries, he came towards me, his eyes ablaze with anger, and said: "So then, *Monsieur le préfet*, you go and select at will from my *gendarmerie* all the men whom you see fit to take; and, when I, Marshal of France and Inspector-General, I shall meet in the streets of Paris one of these fine gentlemen, wearing your uniform, I will not even be able to say to him: 'You rascal, why is your hat on one side?'" "*Monsieur le maréchal*," was my rejoinder, "you will no longer do him the honor of looking at him, for you will consider him a paltry civilian."

Finally the organization of this force, which kept me fully occupied during the greater part of the summer, was most successfully carried out. The *gendarmerie* of Paris has done good service since then, and contributed much towards preserving the great city from the riots which might probably have resulted from the two occupations of 1814 and 1815.

The new campaign was about to open. During the course of the winter the Russians and Prussians had marched



forward and pushed on their operations with an activity with which they had so far not been credited. All lines of defence occupied by the French troops had been forced in succession. Early in April, Prince Eugène, leaving the banks of the Elbe, established himself on those of the Saale, after a few vain attempts to make a rush on Berlin. The Prussian army numbered nearly one hundred and thirty thousand men; in addition to this, the whole nation was becoming aroused; the young men of all classes were forming themselves into battalions of infantry and regiments of cavalry; the city of Berlin had, in one day, supplied as many as nine thousand of these volunteer soldiers. Not a moment was therefore to be lost to counteract the effects of this burst of patriotism.

The Emperor had need of a signal victory to once more inspire his enemies with dread, to give fresh courage to his soldiers, and to restore some little confidence to them. How could he flatter himself with gaining any advantage at the very outset of the campaign? In spite of the extreme rapidity with which all his available forces had been pushed forward, he had not been able, by the end of April, to collect on the banks of the Saale more than one hundred thousand combatants, while four-fifths of those who were gathered there had never been under fire.

It was nevertheless a rather fine body of infantry, the better part of which had been supplied by the *cohortes*, and the men were consequently somewhat older than those of the year's conscription. Their creation dated about a year back, and they had at least had the time to learn the manual exercise. But the cavalry which should have been there to support the infantry, was almost totally lacking; the one which was being formed in France was not yet in a fit condition to join it abroad, although all the *gendarmérie* horses to be found in the interior of the Empire had been pressed

into service; they were, generally speaking, fine animals and in good condition, and a liberal price had been paid for them, leaving the gendarmes, whose property they were, the care of replacing them and of remounting themselves as soon as possible. Several cavalry corps doing duty in Spain had been simultaneously recalled, but these corps had not yet been able to reach their destination. Lastly, in order to have sufficient artillery, it had become necessary to supply the place of the trained gunners who had perished in the Moscow campaign with gunners taken from the marine artillery. These men did excellent work for the whole of the remainder of the war.

On the 15th of April, the date at which the Emperor left Paris to take command of his army, it numbered perhaps one hundred and ten thousand men.

The city of Dresden, evacuated by Marshal Davout, had been occupied by the Russians, and the combined line of operations of the Russian and Prussian armies extended from the Bohemian frontier along the whole of the right bank of the Elbe. The French forces were concentrated on the left bank of the Saale, from Magdeburg to the Hartz Mountains. The field of battle open to the opposing armies lay, therefore, between the Elbe and the Saale. The capital, as well as all the provinces of the King of Saxony, the only ally in that portion of Germany who had, in spite of the pressure brought to bear on him, remained faithful to France, was invaded by the troops of the enemy. The sovereign who was setting this courageous example of fidelity to engagements contracted in more prosperous days, had withdrawn to Ratisbonne.

Previous to leaving his capital, Napoleon had placed the regency in the hands of the Empress, thus guarding at home against all contingencies of conspiracy, and, were he to lose his life in some reverse, making Austria inter-

ested in supporting and defending a government entrusted to a woman who was dear to that country. This precaution was both a good and wise one; it presented, however, the disadvantage of adding greatly to the anxiety already awakened by the great events in preparation.

The actual delegation of Napoleon's power and authority was still vested in the Archchancellor. The Empress Regent could not by her signature authorize the presentment of any *senatus-consultum*, nor proclaim any law of the state; she presided over the Senate, the Council of State, the Cabinet Council, and the Privy Council, particularly as regarded petitions for mercy, on which she was authorized to pass. All these presidentships constituted a mere outward show, at least if one is to judge from the one of the Council of State. Whenever she made her appearance and took the Emperor's chair, with her lady-in-waiting sitting behind her, we could not restrain our smiles. The solemn air with which the Archchancellor would make pretence of consulting her and take her orders in all matters was not calculated to weaken our impression in the matter.

All the lively alarm, all the anxiety which was felt at the time of the Emperor's departure, were dissipated as if by miracle on the day that Paris heard of the victory at Lutzen. He had crossed the Saale on the 30th of April and had met the combined Russian and Prussian forces, which, determined to check his march on Leipsic, had given him battle sooner than he expected. This surprise, added to the small amount of experience possessed by his youthful army, did not prevent his winning the day, and French valor has rarely shone more brilliantly.

So glory's palmiest days were to make their return, thought the people. Had not the Emperor, by means of this first victory, disposed of the main difficulties of the

campaign? The enemy, stopped in its onward march, was compelled to beat a retreat, losing all the advantages of being able to take the offensive, and while it sought to find stray positions further in the rear, in order to establish its line of defences, time was given to Napoleon to bring up his reinforcements, and to combine his operations, with that cleverness, that extraordinary faculty of grasping the situation at a glance, and with that military genius, of which he had given such striking examples.

People argued that what had really gained a mastery over him in Russia was the climate, and they fully expected to see him once more resume all advantages in a land which was free from such perilous contingencies. People also indulged complacently in the hope that negotiations would shortly be entered into. In Paris especially, among the multitude which looks only superficially at things, this hope was very generally entertained; but those who, like myself, were ere long to receive positive information regarding the particular features of the battle and its results, could no longer trust to appearances, however fine. We learnt almost at one and the same time that the absolute lack of cavalry had prevented any advantage being taken of the victory, which had been hotly disputed and had remained incomplete. The enemy had retreated without being routed, in the best of order, without losing any of its artillery, and leaving behind none of its men prisoners. Such a result was a long way behind the fruits of the battle of Jena.

Although the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had abandoned the idea of defending the passage of the Elbe, and had rather promptly evacuated the city of Dresden, they had not shown any signs of discouragement. On the contrary, it became known that their only thought was to hurry forward the reinforcements which were on their way to them from all directions. Above all, the way in which the

Prussians especially had stood their ground, and what was known of the doings in all the provinces of Prussia, plainly showed that the war was about to assume a new character, and that in future France would have to contend not only with armies, but with the population.

At as early a date as the 14th of April, the headquarters of the Swedish army, which had landed in Germany, were established at Rostock. Military operations soon followed, and without any loss of time the French troops entered Dresden. The Emperor, having moved his army to the other side of the city, attacked the Russians and Prussians on the 19th, 20th, and 21st; the enemy had concentrated its forces in skilfully chosen positions on the mountain slopes which divide Saxony and Bohemia, on the road leading to Silesia.

The battle of Bautzen is one of those in which Napoleon manœuvred with most skill, and he has seldom given battle with so much honor to himself. Still victory brought with it no other result than the occupation of the positions in which the enemy was established, and to compel it to retreat towards Silesia; but once more no prisoners were taken and scarcely any artillery or baggage was captured.

The French army still lacked cavalry to follow up the victory; the Prussians as well as the Russians might be beaten, but it was no longer possible to put them to rout. The next day, following upon an engagement which the allied forces withstood, in order to render secure their retreat, the Grand Marshal of the Palace, Duroc, was killed at the Emperor's side, by a ball fired from a cannon just as the fight was over. No loss could be more felt by Napoleon, and he was truly affected by it. The battle of Lutzen had already deprived him of one of his most faithful and devoted followers, Marshal Bessières, but Duroc was of far greater worth. He enjoyed his master's fullest confidence, and was

deserving of it in every respect. He was phlegmatic, endowed with a sound mind, of indefatigable activity, and tried discretion. He was one of the very few who enjoyed the privilege of always being listened to.

The end of May was spent in manœuvring so as to enter Silesia, into which the French army penetrated after several more or less contested engagements. On the 1st of June, Breslau fell into its power, and on the 4th, an armistice was signed between the belligerent armies. On this occasion, contrariwise to what had happened heretofore, so far from making important concessions in order to obtain that Napoleon, pausing in his victorious career, should give the time necessary for the conclusion of a final peace, the allied powers had exacted from him concessions at least as great as those granted by them. Was this to be taken as meaning that he was firmly resolved to conclude peace, and that he was consequently fully resigned to all the sacrifices necessary to obtain it? Subsequent events have proved that there was little sincerity in the pacific intentions of both parties. The Prussians and the Russians had, in Silesia, a bad military position out of which they wished to get; the Emperor Alexander, a far more irreconcilable enemy than was supposed, sought for time to bring up all his reserves, and the King of Prussia was desirous of finishing the general arming of his Landwehr, while both of them were very glad of an opportunity to secure for the King of Sweden the delay he needed to finally enter into line.

Napoleon, on the other hand, did not conceal from himself the losses incurred in the battles and engagements in which he had already taken part, and the resistance he encountered also made him feel the necessity of gathering together all his forces, in order to strike a decisive blow. He wished to wait for the reinforcements which were on their way from the interior of the Empire and even from

furthermost Spain. Lastly, both parties hoped to take advantage of the armistice to win over the Emperor of Austria, whose yet uncertain attitude allowed each one to indulge in the belief that he could be got to declare in his favor.

Hence Austria, but recently so crushed, so bowed down, held in its hands, owing to an unexpected turn of fortune, the destinies of Europe. The Vienna cabinet was too shrewd not to feel and calculate the advantages of such a situation. Under pretence of being still prepared to give effect to his offer of mediation, the Emperor Francis had come closer to the seat of war and taken up his quarters in Bohemia. And, as nothing can better support a mediation than a display of considerable power, he had taken good care to set in motion all his available forces. Bohemia was therefore becoming filled with troops which were soon to form an army of over one hundred thousand men.

Count von Bubna went to Dresden to meet Napoleon, and informed him that Russia and Prussia having accepted the mediation of Austria, the last-named country intended to open negotiations at once. So much has already been published concerning this diplomatic tournament that I have nothing to add thereto. The most prominent men on all sides took part in it. Among them is one of whom I must make more special mention, viz., General Pozzo di Borgo, who will soon be taking an important part in the great affairs of Europe.

A Corsican by birth, and a general, because in Russia this title is the concomitant of any position somewhat out of the common, M. de Pozzo was also one of the most witty and able men I have ever come across. He had been for several years attached to the Russian diplomatic service in a subordinate fashion; the hatred which he expressed on all occasions against Napoleon had compelled the Emperor

to repudiate him at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Schönbrunn. He had sought a refuge in England. Such was then the power of Napoleon on the Continent that he had been compelled to travel by way of Constantinople in order to reach London more safely. Once settled down in that city, he had lost no opportunity of transmitting important information to the Emperor Alexander, and, as early as the end of 1811, he had, with the formal permission of the Prince Regent, communicated the most positive facts regarding Napoleon's hostile intentions towards Russia. On his return to the headquarters of that sovereign in the month of February following upon the retreat from Moscow, he had been welcomed and given a place in his cabinet.

General Pozzo was in particular high favor at the time of the opening of the negotiations which were to bring about a peace or the continuation of the war. Personally, he passionately desired war, and so did all in his power to render it inevitable. He advised the sending to Prague as Russia's plenipotentiary, M. d'Anstett, whom it was known Napoleon greatly disliked. He drew up a series of instructions which were forwarded to this negotiator successively, and especially the last one, bearing date of the 5th of August, and which preceded the breaking off of the conference, in which rupture it was a most important factor. His skill consisted in continually placing Austria in a position which Napoleon would not recognize. Thus, whereas the latter contended that Austria's part was merely that of a disinterested mediator, and could therefore make no demands on its own account, M. Pozzo di Borgo gave him to understand on the contrary that Austria, having the greatest interest in a balance of power in Europe, could not allow so favorable an opportunity to escape to claim all that might secure to it the strength and power it stood in need of to be able to



occupy in useful and dignified fashion the place assigned to it with regard to maintaining a general equilibrium.

It is not one of the least odd things in the fate of Napoleon that the part taken in the events which led to his downfall, is to be credited to a fellow-countryman who had come across his path in his earliest youth, and with whom his antagonism went back to 1793. A Royalist deputy to the Legislative Assembly, M. Pozzo di Borgo had returned to Corsica after the 10th of August, where he filled the position of *procureur-syndic* to the departmental administration, and joined his forces with those of the old General Paoli, the idol and mouthpiece of the principal inhabitants of the island, to resist the yoke of the Convention.

Young Bonaparte, an artillery captain in the service of France, was also lieutenant-colonel of the National Guard, over which he had acquired considerable ascendancy. Devoted at first, like M. de Pozzo, to Paoli, he had soon parted company with him, to defend the rights of the French government. He determined upon this course on hearing of Louis XVI.'s doom. I was told this by M. de Sémonville, who was in Corsica at the time as commissioner of the French government. Bonaparte came and roused him in the middle of the night, and said to him: "*Monsieur le commissaire*, I have fully reflected over our situation; people here are on the point of committing follies; the Convention has doubtless perpetrated a great crime, which I deplore more than any one; but, whatever may happen, Corsica must always remain a part of France; it can only exist on this one condition; I have come to tell you that I and mine will defend the cause of union." It is asserted that Paoli said of him: "You see that little man! Well, then, there are in him two Marius and one Sylla." Having succumbed in the struggle, Bonaparte and his family were soon compelled to fly and to seek refuge in Marseilles.

When Corsica once more became united to France, Pozzo was compelled to seek an asylum in England. There, his spite increased in proportion to the elevation of his rival, and all the resources of his mind were put to use to make enemies for him. He became one of the most active agents of British diplomacy, a fact which brought him back on the Continent, first to Vienna, then, after the death of the Emperor Paul to St. Petersburg, where he tendered his services to the Emperor Alexander. He was a faithful servant, for several years the victim of his fidelity, and one whose surmises were all justified by the course of events.

## CHAPTER IV

Napoleon's excessive confidence in the loyalty of the Emperor of Austria — Prolongation of the armistice — Reverses in Spain — Loss of the battle of Arapiles (Salamanca) by Marmont; King Joseph and Jourdan defeated at Vittoria by the Duke of Wellington; gradual evacuation of the Peninsula by the French army, the command of which is given to Marshal Soult — Austria's arming becomes more and more threatening — The Comédie-française summoned to Dresden — Onerous conditions demanded of Napoleon as a basis for peace negotiations — The Emperor's refusal — Formal notification, on the 12th of August, of Austria's accession to the alliance between Russia and Prussia — The coalition obtains the co-operation of Moreau and Bernadotte — Napoleon hesitates as to the plan of campaign he is to adopt — Anecdotal recollection of M. Daru on this point — Renewal of hostilities — Battle of Dresden and Moreau's death — A judgment of the life of that general, as also of the conduct of Bernadotte — Joy caused in Paris by the victory of Dresden and the prompt disillusion following upon it — Defeat of General Vandamme; the entry into Bohemia closed to the French army — The small cause of this serious event — Series of reverses in Saxony completed by the disastrous battle of Leipsic — Napoleon persists in not purchasing peace — Enormous sacrifice of human life imposed on France in the year 1813 — Absolutism of the Prefects — Lively scene, in this connection, between M. Pasquier and the Minister of War — Manifest discontent of the upper classes and increased number of refractory conscripts in the campaigns — The story of a mission of M. Réal in this connection — Napoleon's stubbornness; his abuses of power.

NAPOLÉON had committed the mistake of wounding to the quick M. de Metternich; in the course of a conversation had with him at Dresden, he gave him to understand that he believed he had been won over to England. He could not bring himself to credit that the Emperor of Austria, his father-in-law, should not, as a matter of course, be his ally. He therefore continually reasoned and acted upon this

hypothesis, which gave him a mad confidence, the consequences of which were so fatal to him; and he did not deem it opportune to offer to Austria Illyria, which the cabinet of Vienna was desirous of possessing.<sup>1</sup> This surrender, made at the right moment, might perhaps have had a decisive effect. Napoleon seems to have made it a sort of point of honor not to purchase by means of any sacrifice the most necessary alliances, when he considered they were his *de jure*.

Days rolled on with pourparlers, and the armistice which was to have ended on the 20th of July, no longer left any time for any result to be reached. It was prolonged to the 10th of August at the request and with the guarantee of Austria. It was agreed upon at the same time that the French, Russian, and Prussian plenipotentiaries should meet before the 5th of July at Prague. The Duc de Vicence and Count de Narbonne were sent thither as France's representatives; but the former, continually detained by the Emperor under one pretext or the other, only reached there on the 28th of July. This slight show of eagerness to dispatch the principal plenipotentiary, the trusted confidant, did not bode any good.

The march of events was hurrying forward; in Spain, all went as badly as possible. After the loss of the battle of Arapiles (Salamanca) by Marmont, the Emperor learnt

<sup>1</sup> At the outset of his expedition to Russia, he would have insured its better success, if he had been able to make up his mind to consummate with Austria, the exchange, which he only hinted at, of the Illyrian provinces for that portion of Poland to which Austria had fallen heir in the course of the several partitions of that kingdom. Then, nothing would have prevented him from reconstituting Poland in his rear, and to make it the base of his operations. I have it from a man who gave him this advice, that he made the following answer: "I can very well see that you have no conception of the importance of those provinces. You do not perceive that in having them as a point of support, I have one foot in Rome and the other in Constantinople."

at Dresden of the defeat of King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, at Vittoria, by the Duke of Wellington. All the baggage and artillery had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and a retreat towards France had been the only resource left open to the defeated troops. Thus this king, who was to be the founder of a new dynasty in the Peninsula, was compelled to evacuate a kingdom where the last hours of his presence had been signalized by a disaster, and the English, who had the support of the Cadiz Cortes, were masters of the whole country from Cadiz and Lisbon to the Pyrenees. Marshal Suchet was still holding his own in Catalonia, and in a portion of the Kingdom of Valencia, owing to the excellent discipline which he preserved in his army, and the good administration he had established in the provinces still occupied by it.

It was necessary now to turn one's thoughts towards protecting French territory, for it was to be expected that the victorious army would not respect its frontiers, and would seek to carry the war into our southern provinces. It also might doubtless be believed that the remnants of the defeated army under Joseph were yet in sufficient number to organize a good system of defence, especially with the advantages of position afforded by the chain of the Pyrenees.

Napoleon hastened to recall his brother, as well as Marshal Jourdan, and gave the command which he compelled them to relinquish to Marshal Soult. Here ends the royal career of Joseph. At first he retired to his beautiful Morfontaine estate, then to the Luxembourg Palace, in Paris, where we shall soon see him again, never rising to the level of circumstances.

The armaments of Austria were becoming threatening; in addition to the army which was being assembled in Bohemia, another one was being formed on the Italian frontier. The Emperor had sent back Prince Eugène to his

functions of viceroy and general commanding the French and Italian troops on the other side of the Alps, while he at the same time called to him Murat, the King of Naples, whom he still pretended to hold very dear, in spite of his guilty abandonment of the army, the command of which had been entrusted to him.

After the retreat from Moscow, he had two reasons for desiring to have him near himself: in the first place, he could, under certain circumstances, still be of some service to him on the field of battle; and in the next, he could not help feeling a certain amount of anxiety with regard to the part which his boundless ambition might possibly impel him to play in Italy. Strange as it may seem, the fact remains that what Napoleon most dreaded about Murat was the influence over him of his wife! In order to induce Murat to return to his post near the Emperor, advantage was taken of the influence which M. Fouché had always retained over him. Mme. Murat, taking into consideration the first successes of her brother on the battle-field, had also thought that it was prudent to yield to his advances, and she resigned herself to suspend, temporarily, at least, a negotiation already begun with M. de Metternich, the object of which was to render secure, happen what might, the Crown of Naples on her head and on that of her consort.

In the midst of all the prodigious demands made on everything that could furnish an instrument of war, we were fed with stories about the pomp which surrounded headquarters at Dresden. We learnt that the Comédie-française had been summoned thither, to amuse the Emperor in his moments of leisure; next, that the Empress was about to leave for Mayence. It was said that this princess would yet be the pledge of peace. These flattering hopes were of short duration; Napoleon went to Mayence alone; all his endeavors to get his father-in-law to meet him there

had proved vain. The care taken by the Ministers of Russia and Austria to remove all opportunities which might have brought their respective sovereigns into direct intercourse with Napoleon is worth recording. They seemed to fear the seductions of his closet as much as they dreaded his sword on the battle-field.

The project of completely destroying his power was not yet conceived. This idea could only be born by slow degrees. It was merely sought to take advantage of the opportunity to deliver Germany from the crushing yoke which, ever since Prussia had been humbled, pressed so heavily on it. This object, regarding which there could be no doubt in connection with the allied powers of the North, was at first less distinctly confessed to by Austria, but such were its intentions at heart, and they could not for any length of time be concealed from the eye of Napoleon, who was made to recognize that in order to obtain peace, he should have to practically consent to the Rhine once more becoming France's frontier on the German side; such was Russia's formal demand.

On the Italian side, it was doubtful if Austria would remain content with the cession of the Illyrian provinces; that country likewise entertained the idea of making the Kingdom of Italy independent of the French Empire. It was not in the Emperor's character to submit to such terms, without once more tempting the fortunes of war. "What worse can happen to me?" he argued unto himself. "Will not the Rhine frontier be mine under all circumstances? Moreover, I have but to win a signal victory, and this formidable coalition which is held up as a threat to me will become dissolved. In less than six weeks my eagles will have reappeared on the banks of the Vistula, the blockade of all fortified towns where I am keeping garrisons will be raised, and this most recent effort of my enemies will

only have served to strengthen my power. When a man has risen to such heights, he would be unworthy of fortune did he consent, except as a last resort, to descend as low as is asked of me, and I should lose, in so consenting, all the prestige with which a throne of such recent creation as mine needs to be surrounded."

It was impossible to come to an understanding with such diametrically opposed views as a starting-point. The pourparlers of Dresden, the semblance of a congress at Prague, were therefore nothing else than manœuvres to gain time. The blame may be laid at Napoleon's door, he having apparently put himself in the wrong by showing a determination to yield on no point, and having so combined his plans as to delay submitting the only proposal which might prove effectual until such time as a breaking off of negotiations was bound to happen. I believe that his adversaries were at least as anxious as he to make a final effort, and not lose an opportunity wherein, all of them with the same end in view, they were about, perhaps for the first time, to make a sincere use of their forces.

Conditions greatly out of the common are requisite for the formation of like coalitions, which can never be the fruits of the combinations of a policy, even the most clever. One of the distinguishing characteristics of Napoleon's greatness will forever be, that in order to crush him, it required no less than a coalition of all the European powers against him.

By the 12th of August, all conditions of covenant had been settled between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, which last-named country notified Napoleon that it had entered into the alliance of the two other powers. The plans of the campaign which was about to open had been concerted in a little town of Silesia, whither the King of Sweden, Bernadotte, had been summoned. Note must again be made



of the fact that in order to triumph over the French army and France's power, coalesced Europe considered itself compelled to call upon the military science and talents of two Frenchmen, whom it apparently judged as alone able to reveal the secret of the tactics which for thirty years past had defeated all its armies in succession. General Moreau had even been sought in America, and his hatred of the rival who had expelled him from his fatherland and driven him from the scene of his glory had made him respond to the call. He was on his way to direct the great strategical movements which were soon to take place.

Bohemia, by becoming hostile territory, rendered the occupation of Saxony very perilous to us, especially when such occupation must extend as far as the borders of Silesia; and truly, Bohemia, surrounded by mountains, was going to become a sort of large entrenched camp, which would hold in check the entire right flank of the French army, and would extend in its rear. The enemy, by gathering large forces in this camp, and owing to the faculty it enjoyed of ever being able to screen its movements by the curtain of mountains hiding it from view, would be enabled to make sallies unawares, at whatever point might suit it best; and, were the Emperor but to make a forward movement, he might expect to see an army of one hundred thousand men fling itself between him and France. It therefore became necessary, at the very outset of hostilities, for him to either penetrate into Bohemia with the object of driving the enemy out of it and establishing himself in that province, or resolve upon establishing himself in a position which would remove the danger of his positions being turned. But the war which he had begun as the attacking party, placed him on the defensive, and such a situation disconcerted all his plans.

On the other hand, it was a dangerous thing for him to

enter Bohemia, as on descending the mountains he would encounter a formidable and intact army. While this was happening, Saxony would remain exposed to the invasion of the Russian, Prussian, and Swedish armies which were occupying Silesia, or assembling under the walls of Berlin. It could be seriously doubted whether the lieutenants of the Emperor were in a position to oppose this invasion with the forces he might leave them. Compelled to choose among so many perils, all those who had had any experience in the art of war ardently desired that it should be determined to take up a position in the rear; it may even be said that this was the unanimous desire of the army; Napoleon himself hesitated for a long while.

The following is an anecdote bearing on the matter, the truth of which I can vouch for, as I have it from M. Daru; it explains in a most curious way the conclusion to which the Emperor finally came. He laid great stress on learning the views of the general officers with whom he came in contact, and all of them spoke to him in about the same strain. One day, towards the end of July, after having listened to a report made to him by General Sébastiani regarding an inspection with which he had been entrusted, he asked him what was said of the situation in the cantonments he had just visited. Sébastiani, having replied that if Austria was to be reckoned as an enemy, it was generally believed that it would be difficult not to change the line of operations, and that in such a case it was considered impossible to persist in taking the city of Dresden as a central point. "You are all right," said Napoleon, "and my mind is made up. I am going to return to the banks of the Saale; I will gather there some three hundred thousand men, and, with my rear resting on Mayence, my right flank covered by the extremity of the mountains of Bohemia, I will show the enemy the bull's

horns. He will seek to manoeuvre under my eyes; no sooner will he have committed his first mistake, when I will fall upon him, crush him, and the coalition will vanish more quickly than it appeared."

Dismissing the general, he at once sent for M. Daru, repeated the same words to him, and commanded him to go and at once prepare the orders necessary for this retrograde movement to commence. Unfortunately M. de Bassano entered the closet, as M. Daru was leaving it, and the Emperor having asked him the usual question: "What is being said?" he replied: "People who take upon themselves to speak about everything, without knowing anything, maintain that Your Majesty cannot remain here, and that you are about to take a backward position. In support of their assertion they adduce many poor reasons, forgetting that the great Frederick, with forces vastly inferior to your own, held out all winter in the same position, against the combined armies of Austria and Russia."

This unfortunate comparison apparently made a deep impression on the mind of Napoleon, for M. Daru having a few hours later brought him the work he had ordered him to do, found him in a pensive mood, and was dismissed with these words: "The matter requires more thought." The result of this new meditation was that he persisted in his first system of operation, and the campaign began in conformity with it.

The *début* was extremely brilliant. After an excursion into Silesia, signalized by a rather fine advantage won over the Prussians, the Emperor had returned to Dresden in time to protect that capital against an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, Russians and Austrians. This army had emerged from Bohemia, at a distance of ten leagues in the rear of the threatened city, and had commenced its attack on the suburbs, when Napoleon, coming

on the scene with his Guard and the better part of his army, which he was bringing back by forced marches, suddenly swept down on the assailants, disconcerted their manœuvres, and won one of his finest and happiest victories. On this occasion he made many prisoners.

It was the Austrian army which he had encountered. At this battle, Moreau was struck by a cannon-ball which put an end to his career. In spite of what may have been said by those whose cause he had just served, it would have been better for him to have ended it sooner. The part of Coriolanus may have been one gratifying to men deeply embittered and anxious to avenge personal wrongs, but such a part has always left behind it a sorrowful impression. Moreau, moreover, had just been avenging himself on his own country, on three hundred thousand Frenchmen, many of whom had been his comrades in arms, and several of them his friends, for a wrong which was the act of a single man. He had not the same excuse as Bernadotte, for he, at least, upon accepting a throne, had taken a new country unto himself, and had contracted new duties towards it.

It will not do to argue that General Moreau had in his mind to restore to France its former sovereigns and thus ensure its happiness. This argument was not admissible by those who knew the frame of mind of the European cabinets at the time he was recalled from America. He came with the object of placing his talents and his thirst for revenge under Russia's pay. The news of his death offered a melancholy opportunity to review the history of his career; one ever sees the great military commander, but at the same time a character void of firmness and dignity. He had, after the 18th Fructidor, betrayed and denounced to the Directoire's advantage, his friend and first master in the art of war, General Pichegru; later, his

tergiversations had implicated him in the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal, and had perhaps been the means of making it miscarry. His last undertaking was not of a nature to allow his part to be forgotten.

Public opinion, so severe towards Moreau, was, in spite of the Emperor's efforts, more indulgent towards Bernadotte, whose position, although rather difficult and false, was still to be excused on account of the potent reasons I have mentioned. Nevertheless, it has since been learnt, with but too great a certainty, that ambitious designs foreign to Sweden's interests had played a part in determining his course. He had indulged in the dream that should Napoleon succumb, France might take him up as his heir. It would appear that at the conferences held at Abo, the Emperor Alexander, in order to more completely win him over, had held up this chimerical hope to his view. Mme. de Staël, who, about the same time, sought a refuge near him, doubtless did her share towards entertaining his illusions in this respect.

Whatever may be thought about the matter, the situation of Bernadotte always retained, in this campaign itself, where his co-operation had a decisive effect, a most lamentable side, which he himself must have felt keenly. In spite of the need for his services, in spite of his apparent zeal for the common cause, his allies could never make up their minds to show him their entire confidence, and he remained continually under a sort of surveillance. Four persons were specially entrusted with the care of following him about until the end was reached, and were never to lose sight of him. These persons were, on behalf of England, General Stewart, of Austria, General Vincent, of Prussia, General Krusemarck, and lastly, of Russia, General Pozzo di Borgo.

When the victory of Dresden became known in Paris,

when it was learnt that the result had been the taking of twenty thousand prisoners, and the capture of sixty cannon, great were the rejoicings in the first moments, and a feeling of confidence took the place of the previous state of discouragement. But illusions were not to last long, for a few days later came the news of the check met with by General Vandamme's corps, which had been almost annihilated in a pass leading into Bohemia. In lieu of contenting himself with occupying the opening of this pass, Vandamme had committed the mistake of crossing it and emerging into the open plain. In addition to the very considerable loss in men and artillery resulting from this defeat, another consequence of it was to stop the progress of the movement whereby the French army was to penetrate into Bohemia, with the somewhat well-founded expectation of swooping down on the enemy and annihilating it. The opportunity had been lost, and all the fruits of the victory of Dresden were thus swept away.

This is the place for one of those anecdotes which go so often to show how the most trifling causes may have the most serious consequences. I can again vouch for the accuracy of the present one, for I once more have it from the same witness, whose veracity cannot be impugned, M. Daru. Immediately after the battle of Dresden, the Emperor had sent an order to General Vandamme to make himself master of the pass; his corps was encamped at but a short distance from it. Napoleon himself, two days afterwards, left to take command of his Guard and of the better portion of his troops which he had already caused to advance in the same direction. He felt sure, after a three days' march, of reaching the plains of Bohemia and of reaping the fruits of his recent victory, and indeed one can hardly see what there was to prevent this consummation. His usual staff accompanied him, and M. Daru was a member of it.

"I no longer recall," he said to me, "the circumstance which had somewhat delayed me, but I was about a league behind the rest; great was therefore my surprise, on reaching the first halting-place, to see the whole of the headquarters staff operating a retrograde movement, and to see Napoleon again turning towards Dresden. None of those whom I questioned could tell me the reason for so sudden a change of resolution, the immediate consequence of which was the order which the troops had received to stop their onward march. I therefore retraced my steps with everybody, and without learning anything.

"During the whole of the next day, I had no opportunity of approaching the Emperor, but, on the day following, as I was going to his dwelling-place, I learnt that bad reports were abroad concerning Vandamme's corps. No sooner had I entered his closet, than I hastened to ask him what faith was to be placed in them. 'You may believe the very worst,' he replied, 'the corps is lost and my expedition to Bohemia is now impossible.' He then explained to me that two days previous he had been overtaken while on the march with such violent cramps in the stomach that it had been impossible for him to go any further, and he had been compelled to have himself brought back to the rear. 'Yet it was nothing,' he went on to say, 'but an attack of indigestion caused by a wretched stew seasoned with garlic, which I cannot endure; but I had cause to fear that my ailment was something far more serious.' As a matter of fact, he believed he had been poisoned; it was a fear to which he readily gave credence. 'And on such trifles as these,' he went on to say, 'the greatest events hang! The present one is perhaps irreparable.'"

Had he continued his onward march, he would have occupied the pass in time to support Vandamme, who had only advanced in such a venturesome way feeling sure that he

would follow in his steps. Instead of this, this general found himself attacked in front on the Bohemian side, and surprised in his rear by a corps of the Austrian army which, after the battle, was on the way to the pass, with the object of securing its retreat. This corps itself would have fallen into Napoleon's hands if his forward movement had not been interrupted. Beginning from that day, everything persistently turned against him, and one enters upon the history of that deplorable Saxon campaign, which presents only reverses to the view, and wherein the most consummate skill was paralyzed by the unavoidable disadvantages of a position badly chosen at the outset, and which Napoleon persisted in retaining to the last.

At last came the battle of Leipsic, which finally settled the question, and the valor of the French army was compelled to succumb to the attacks of masses incessantly renewed, and which hurled themselves on it from all points of the compass, and between whom there was hardly left a narrow issue to make good its retreat. The losses accompanying this disaster cannot be compared to those of Moscow; although lesser, at first sight, they were nevertheless to entail the most serious consequences. The duration of this campaign was a little less than three months; it had opened on the 10th of August, and on the 2d of November the Emperor was back in Mayence.

The line of communication between the capital and the army fighting on the banks of the Elbe had for this year remained unbroken. Everything was known and commented upon, judged day by day, and the general opinion was that the Emperor had fallen short of himself. His obstinacy in refusing to purchase a peace at the cost of sacrifices in proportion to the need felt for it, could only have found its justification in the most brilliant successes; on the contrary, the most overwhelming reverses had been



met with; fresh sacrifices were now being demanded, and the whole population seemed destined to fall into an abyss which nothing could fill.

Thus, as early as the end of August, a *senatus-consultum* had granted thirty thousand men to be levied on the conscription of 1814, 1813, 1812, and preceding years, which had not prevented, in the first days of October, the Empress from coming in person to the Senate Chamber (it was, I believe, the only time she ever made her appearance there) and asking for two hundred and eighty thousand men, of which one hundred and twenty thousand were to be drawn from the conscription of 1814 and the years preceding, and the remainder from the conscription of 1815. As a matter of course, this fresh demand was as readily granted as those previously made.

In his reply to the Empress, the President of the Senate, M. de Lacépède, even went so far as to close his speech in the following terms: "With what feelings of gratitude, with what religious care will we not forever preserve the recollection of the memorable words uttered by Her Majesty from the height of her throne!" Such language was too much out of harmony with the sentiments of the nation, and far from inculcating patience, it stirred up indignation. The number of victims was merely being increased by dragging through battle-fields men unable to endure the hardships of war. In this very year 1813, from the 11th of January to the 7th of October, forty thousand men had been demanded of France. I have made mention of the sacrifice of the previous year, and its excessive numbers cannot have been forgotten. I do not think that the like was ever experienced in any other country, and never did any other nation allow itself to be led so willingly in masses to slaughter.

France could no longer meet the demand. This is the

truth, the exact truth, and such is the secret and the explanation of all that has since occurred. With these successive levies of conscriptions past, present, and to come, with the Guards of Honor, with the brevets of sub-lieutenant forced on the young men appertaining to the best families, after they had escaped the conscript lot, or had supplied substitutes in conformity with the provisions of the law, there did not remain a single family which was not in terrible anxiety or in mourning.

The raising of the Guards of Honor had in a special fashion been the occasion of intolerable vexation. As the selection of these men was left to the arbitrariness of the prefects, several had made a most outrageous use of the power thus vested in them, by calling out only sons who frequently were in poor health, and who, it was quite plain to see, were merely being torn away from their families to serve as hostages.

The Minister of War was more especially charged with issuing the commissions to sub-lieutenancies, and I recollect having had one day a lively discussion with him on this very subject. One of these commissions had been sent to a rich young man of very good family, belonging to Le Mans, and, as his sub-lieutenancy was to a cavalry regiment, he had been ordered to report to the Military School of Saint-Germain, in order to receive the necessary instruction. Now, this young man was about thirty years old, and was on the point of getting married. He resolved upon taking refuge in Paris; he brought with him letters of introduction to me from some old friends of my father's. I wrote three letters to the Minister of War, wherein I sought to make him understand how revolting such an abuse of authority was, the age of this young man exempting him from being called upon for military service. My three letters remained unanswered, and the Duc de Feltre appar-

ently thought that his silence was enough to settle the question. I saw him one evening in his box at a theatrical performance given by the Empress at Saint-Cloud, and I spoke to him. He would make no other answer to my protests than the following one: "How can it be helped? His name is down on the list which has been sent to the Emperor; it is impossible to undo matters, he must go to the front." Profoundly angered, I replied that it seemed to him a matter of indifference that of driving men to despair, and he must have formed a strange idea of the patience of the youth of the period. As for myself, who could well remember what I was at the age of twenty-nine, I could tell him that if I had at that time been treated thus, and had the attempt been made to force me to attend a military school, I would have stopped at nothing against the man who was so iniquitously oppressing me. "What!" he exclaimed, "it is a prefect of police who holds such language to me!" "Yes," I replied, "and if you persist in your course, he is capable of writing what he has just said to you to the Emperor himself, in order that he may judge which one of us two serves him with the most reason, intelligence, and conscience." However, I carried my point, and my young protégé was permitted to return to his home.

The language in high circles, which had for some years past been as moderate as could be desired, suddenly became violent and bitter. The Duc de Rovigo could not fail hearing of it. He frequently spoke to me about the matter; he was at that time judging of events with a certain amount of wisdom, and the future loomed up too uncertain before him to allow him to be tempted to compromise himself by acts of coercion for which he might some day be severely held to account.

The feeling which found vent in conversations in *salons*,

was to have far more unpleasant consequences in the less high classes of society, and especially among the residents of the country districts. The number of refractory conscripts increased daily to an alarming extent, and it is easy for those who can recall what were then the laws against refractory conscripts and everything that was devised to punish in the parents the resistance of the children, it is easy, I say, to form an idea of the perturbation which was bound to invade the whole of society from the daily enforcement of laws which had become so odious. The peace of even the most humble dwellings was continually troubled, and the cottage, given up in spite of its poverty to the bailiffs, fell a prey to sufferings until then unknown.

When, some day, an examination is made of the collection of all the laws, decrees, and regulations which were considered necessary to secure the annual levying of human beings torn from their homes, it will be admitted that the intoxication of glory must indeed be powerful, as it sufficed for so many years to make a nation which had reached a high degree of civilization, not only to endure the continual recurrence of so painful a sacrifice, but also the outrageous means which had to be resorted to in order to ensure its being carried out. Habits of obedience must have been deeply rooted, for, even at the point which we had reached, flight was the only method to which one dared have recourse to escape the summons of the recruiting officers, and I can recollect only one locality wherein the conscripts openly rebelled. They were severely punished for it. This took place in one of the departments of Northern Holland.

Troops were immediately sent to the spot from neighboring garrisons, and M. Réal was ordered to go post-haste, make an investigation on the spot, and see that the most severe punishment should without delay be meted out

to the rebellious conscripts. Twenty-four hours after his arrival he had shot eight or ten of the most guilty. Everything thereupon had resumed its normal state. It seemed to me, while he was speaking to the Minister of Police, as though I was listening to a representative of the people rendering an account of his mission to the Committee of Public Safety. I must, however, do the Duc de Rovigo the justice of recording that he said to me, after having dismissed him: "The sang-froid of this man, when reporting on an expedition of that kind, is painful; and yet of such are all these revolutionists."

He was, in those days, greatly inclined to be indulgent. I had a proof of this, almost simultaneously with the event just recorded, with regard to a man in whom I took a deep interest. M. de Mézy, a former councillor in the Paris Parlement, had given his own passport to M. de Montrond, who, tired of being relegated so far from Paris, had resolved upon leaving France, thus freeing himself of the surveillance to which he was subjected.

M. de Montrond, who was on most intimate terms with M. de Talleyrand, was in the highest degree an object of suspicion to the Emperor, and his escape was all the more piquant from the fact that he was in a position to carry abroad the revelation of more than one secret known only to himself and to M. de Talleyrand. Great was the anger of the Duc de Rovigo on hearing of this escape, and as he expected to be most severely censured for it by his master, no efforts were spared to bring back the fugitive. M. de Mézy's participation in his flight could not long remain undiscovered; he was at once arrested on his estate and brought to Paris. His position was made all the worse from the fact that being the mayor of his *commune*, he might justly be charged with a breach of trust in the exercise of his functions. The Minister, on the first impulse, had the intention of sending

him to Vincennes and keeping him a prisoner there until M. de Montrond made his appearance. I had some difficulty in persuading him to give up this line of action, but in the end I succeeded. "M. de Mézy," I said to him, "was my schoolfellow, my oldest friend, and I would consider a personal favor all that would be done on his behalf." He yielded to these entreaties.

These ideas of moderation were not shared by Napoleon. He had permitted himself to commit an act the effect of which was exceedingly bad. It may be said of that deed that it constituted a most useless indulgence in the luxury of absolutism, for circumstances did not warrant it, and yet it found a place among the grievances which were most severely charged against the Imperial Government. A number of embezzlements had been committed in the collection of the *octroi* (local customs) dues of Antwerp, and the officials had been criminally prosecuted for deeds which constituted positive thefts, but they had many friends in the city, and the jury before whom they were tried acquitted them, in spite of the evidence as to their guilt.

The Emperor, angered at this miscarriage of justice, and greatly struck by certain circumstances which justified a belief that a verdict of non-guiltiness had been bought, ordered that the accused officials should be arrested anew and imprisoned. On the prefect refusing to become the accomplice of so arbitrary an act, his place was at once filled. That prefect was M. d'Argenson. His conduct on this occasion did him great credit, although those well versed and perhaps best informed in the science of government were of the opinion that he should in the first place have yielded obedience, reserving the right to tender his resignation subsequently. Whatever may be held, as a principle, regarding this general line of conduct, it will always, in similar cases, reflect great honor on the man

who does no more than commit the same mistake as M. d'Argenson.

Napoleon's anger did not stop at the measures which the prefect of Antwerp had refused to carry out, and the Council of State was ordered to deliberate as to the most appropriate way of annulling the verdict of the jury and of trying the case anew. The draft of a *senatus-consultum*, drawn up with that object in view, was submitted for debate, but the Council of State unanimously declared that it would be a dangerous precedent to adopt such a course, as there could be nothing more dangerous than to violate the respect due to a judgment rendered, especially in a criminal case.

I am persuaded that had the Emperor been present at the discussion, he would have been struck with the reasons adduced, but he only took cognizance of the decision reached, and persisting in his original idea, he sent to the Senate the draft which had been rejected by the Council. On the 8th of September there appeared in the *Moniteur* a *senatus-consultum* annulling the verdict rendered by the jury on the 24th of July in favor of the authors and their accomplices of the peculations committed in the administration of the Antwerp *octroi*. The *Cour de cassation* was invested with the power to send the accused before another Imperial court of justice, which was to render its decision without any jury. The court, thus constituted, was to decide as to the form of prosecution to be adopted with regard to the prisoners charged with corruption in the criminal suit which was giving rise to this unheard-of measure.

What security can there be in a country where an acquittal in a criminal case is annulled by the will of the sovereign? All sensible people could not help openly lamenting so odious an abuse of power.

## CHAPTER V

State of the public mind after the defeat at Leipsic — Explosion of hatred of the allied nations against Napoleon and French preponderance — Unexpected defection of the Bavarians; their march to cut off the French army; their rout at Hanau — Isolation of the Emperor — Murat suddenly leaves the army — In Spain: forced retreat of Soult on Bayonne — In Italy: evacuation of Illyria by Prince Eugène and impending entry of the Austrians into these provinces — Napoleon's return to Saint-Cloud — New sacrifices demanded of the country — Indignation of the Emperor against Bavaria — Capitulation of Marshal Gouvion at Dresden — Death of M. de Narbonne and pen-portrait of that statesman — Overtures made to Ferdinand, the former King of Spain — Proposals of peace of the allied powers submitted by M. de Saint-Aignan — The Emperor's evasive acceptance of them — M. de Metternich's remarks — Proclamation of the allies specifying the only terms on which peace could be concluded — Universal desire, in Paris, of listening favorably to these proposals; the ministry in harmony with this sentiment — The Emperor's tergiversations under the influence of M. de Bassano — The Duc de Vicence takes the latter's place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Favorable reply of the new Minister to M. de Metternich's letter — Fresh demands made by the allies — Napoleon unable to sacrifice his personal pride to the interests of France — Uprising of Holland, which recalls the Prince of Orange — M. Pasquier's estimate of the actual intentions of the sovereigns of Russia and Austria; changes in their intentions owing to the dilatory hesitation of Napoleon — Grounds which determine the coalesced princes to profit to the utmost by the Emperor's embarrassments, the insufficiency of his military forces, and the exhaustion of all his resources — Napoleon's first presentiments of a possible return of the Bourbons — Treaty of Valençay: Napoleon recognizes Ferdinand VII. as King of Spain and of the Indies — Offer made by him to the Pope of the restitution of a portion of his states.

SEVERAL days previous to the battle of Leipsic, there was a lack of news from headquarters, as swarms of Cosacks intercepted all lines of communications. This silence



brought to mind the one preceding the 29th bulletin. The defection of the Saxons and the Württemberg cavalry on the battle-field of Leipsic, had not only rendered defeat inevitable, but had made patent the complete revolution that was going on in the minds of nations. It was plain that the will of the masses was making itself felt to the sovereigns who up to that time had been all-powerful. The hatred against Napoleon and against French preponderation was breaking out. The Emperor had persisted in not believing in the possibility of this misfortune, which many foresaw; he had received the most enlightened warnings on this point, but in vain.

The defection of the Bavarians made his isolation more complete. M. de Talleyrand having heard of it, I know not how, but in a way that left no doubt, had promptly called on the Archchancellor and commissioned him to inform the Emperor of it with the least possible delay. A courier was dispatched, but it was too late, and we soon learnt that the whole of the Bavarian army, under General Wrede, was on its way to take up a position between Mayence and the French army, which was to be entirely cut off. Considering that the disaster it had encountered at Leipsic had put it in the position of a routed army, would it be strong enough to force its way past such an obstacle? It was allowable to entertain some doubts on this score. M. de Talleyrand has since told me that the Emperor, on his return, had for all thanks for such an important warning charged him with having given it with the sole object of discrediting the Duc de Bassano; and indeed the latter had in several instances rejected warnings which ought to have opened his eyes.

Nevertheless, the Bavarians were thoroughly beaten at Hanau, as everybody knows; this latest victory, which once more left open the road to France, was won by the Guard,

commanded by General Nansouty, admirably supported by the artillery, directed by General Drouot. Napoleon had taken but little part in it; he was in a state of prostration difficult to describe, but easy to understand. With the exception of the Guard, which once more stood him in good need, the rest of the army was no longer anything but a mass marching without order, and incapable of executing any vigorous movement.

Already the malady which so easily takes hold of defeated and disheartened soldiers was creating the greatest havoc. And as if the defection of his allies were not sufficient, Napoleon had to bear with one springing from the bosom of his own family. The King of Naples left him to his fate in the early days of the retreat, and this abandonment was apparently accompanied by most serious circumstances, for the Minister of Police received the order, through a messenger dispatched post-haste, that should King Murat make his appearance at the gates of Paris, to arrest him and imprison him at Vincennes. I can entertain no doubt as to this fact, for I have it from the Duc de Rovigo, who instructed me to set all my police agents on the lookout and to let him know as soon as I was notified of the fugitive's appearance.

Murat escaped this danger by not setting foot on any portion of French territory. On reaching the banks of the Rhine, he followed its right shore and returned to Italy by way of Switzerland.

The Emperor, after spending three or four days at Mayence, which time he employed in giving the most pressing orders, arrived at Saint-Cloud on the 9th of November. The following was at that time his position. He had brought back scarcely more than fifty or sixty thousand men, and yet, on hostilities being resumed, after the rupture of the Prague negotiations, he still numbered under his

standards from the mouth of the Elbe to the confines of Bohemia and Silesia 370,000 men, without taking into account at least 80,000 men engaged in defending the fortified towns from Dantzic to Magdeburg. He had thus lost about 400,000 men, for one might consider as actually lost all those taken prisoners on the battle-field and those who were shut up in fortified towns without any hope of being released.

In Spain, the English general, after much hesitation in regard to his movements, and in spite of the slowness of his operations, had nevertheless succeeded in triumphing over Marshal Soult, who had in vain attempted to once more cross the Pyrenees and to come to the rescue of Pamplona and San Sebastian. These two towns had fallen and the British army crossed the Bidassoa in the first days of October. Thus French territory was invaded from that side, and early in November, Soult, driven out of a position which he had vainly sought to defend, had been compelled to retreat on Bayonne.

In Italy, Prince Eugène, who had only been able to collect forty-five thousand men, was in no condition to resist the Austrian forces, which had greatly increased, owing largely to Bavaria's defection. He had therefore been compelled to give up Illyria, which Napoleon had not seen fit to cede at the right moment, and to retreat to the line of the Adige, where he ran the additional risk of being turned by the Tyrol. Thus Italy was about to be open to the Austrians, whose progress could only have been arrested by the union of the Neapolitan troops with those of the Kingdom of Italy. But was it not plain, taking into consideration the well-known mood of the King of Naples, that this junction could not be reckoned upon?

What resources had Napoleon to face all these contingencies? It was necessary that he should compel every

man who had strength enough to shoulder a musket to join the army. On the 25th of October, in the midst of his retrograde movement, the Emperor had, by a decree dated from Gotha, convoked the *Corps législatif* for the 2d of December. It was difficult for him to do without it in order to get the authority for levying the fresh taxes which had become a matter of necessity. Hardly had he reached Saint-Cloud, when he summoned all his Ministers and consulted them with regard to the projected measures which the Council of State was to discuss on the following day.

I was present at the sitting, which has remained deeply engraven on my memory. Previous to our entering the Council Chamber we were granted an audience by Napoleon, whose features revealed the most painful emotions. His first words were spoken to M. Jaubert, Governor of the Bank of France, whom he angrily admonished because of some refusal or other of the Bank to supply funds or to pledge its credit. M. Jaubert defended his course better and with more courage than might have been expected. A year earlier, and he would certainly not have dared answer in such a strain. As soon as we sat down to business, we discussed the draft of a decree which was adopted without any opposition, and which was promulgated the same day. It called for an increase of thirty centimes on the window-and-door tax, and added twenty centimes per kilogramme to the price of salt.

The draft of a *senatus-consultum* placed at the disposal of the government three hundred thousand conscripts of the years 1806 and 1807 and the years following up to 1814 inclusively. What could the answer be to such a demand, if not that since the 11th of January of that year eleven hundred and forty thousand men had been raised! The Emperor, in order to dispose in advance of all remarks, had taken care, immediately after this draft had been read to

us, to submit to us an exposé of the situation, wherein he particularly emphasized the betrayals of which he had been the victim and for which the national honor cried for revenge. His imagination grew heated and his looks flashed fire when dwelling on Bavaria's conduct. "Munich deserves to be burnt down, Munich shall be destroyed by fire!" he exclaimed in tones which I can still hear, and which chilled us with fright. What then did the future have in store for us? What had we not to fear from all the reprisals with which we were about to be threatened? Bavaria, it must be confessed, deserved this indignant censure. Like all the powers which had entered into Napoleon's alliance and who had associated themselves with his policy, it had doubtless had good reasons to complain of his domineering ways and exacting demands, but it had always been liberally repaid for them. Its sovereign, whose daughter had become the wife of Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, owed his crown to the Emperor, and France had never terminated any war with Austria without compelling that country to purchase peace at the cost of important sacrifices in favor of the natural enemy.

So it was that owing to considerable additions to its territory Bavaria had gained on all its sides an excellent frontier; the acquisition of the Tyrol had especially rendered it unassailable at a point where up to that time it had always been most weak. And what had not been the coercion resorted to to compel these good Tyrolese people to submit to this union? The recollection of the military executions ordered by Napoleon to stamp out their resistance will perhaps remain as a stain on his memory, and yet, all that had not been enough to render secure a fidelity so dearly purchased and which had failed him at the most decisive moment, and which had done more than fail him,

as the forces on which he had reckoned for his defence had become his open enemies!

The senatus-consultum which granted the three hundred thousand men was promulgated on the 15th of November, and on the same day the *Moniteur* contained another decree summoning the deputies of the fourth series to exercise their functions during the whole of the session which was to open on the 2d of February. The reason for this measure was the lack of time necessary for the assembling of the electoral colleges. It could scarcely be imagined that the time was favorable for a fresh appeal to the electorate.

A general anxiety prevailed, and on all sides misfortunes were looming up. There was no longer any faith in anything, and every illusion had vanished. So it was in vain that the long columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with addresses and expressions of devotion from all the public bodies, and from all the cities; this official language seemed to the people to be merely a prearranged comedy. A dignified silence would have better served the government, for such alone was suitable under the melancholy circumstances.

It soon became known that Marshal Gouvion, who had been shut up in Dresden with nearly 30,000 men, had been compelled to capitulate; that this capitulation had been violated by the enemy, and that in the end, his troops, which should have been allowed to return to France, were being held as prisoners of war. This incident went still further to show that had it not been for Napoleon's strange persistency in determining to retain to the very last a hold on the fortified towns which he regarded as the basis of his future operations, he would have been able to gather about him without difficulty a reinforcement of from forty to fifty thousand men, with whose aid it might have been possible to score a victory on the plains about Leipsic.

But, up to the last moment, he had been unable to abandon the chimerical hope of reconquering in one battle the whole of Northern Germany.

We also heard simultaneously of the death of M. de Narbonne, a man whom I personally greatly mourned. His loss was felt all the more deeply owing to the circumstance that he was one of the few of those who, being on such a footing as to be able to discuss with the Emperor questions of the highest political import, did not shrink from making the truth known to him, and even went so far as to regard it as a matter of duty. His ready tact furnished him in this respect with the means which M. de Caulaincourt found at hand in his firmness of character. Yet this very tact did not save him from suffering the penalty of his plain speaking. After the breaking off of the Prague negotiations, Napoleon became desirous of having no longer near him so clear-sighted a witness of events, and one who did not approve of his line of action, so he sent him to take command of the fortified town of Torgau, on the Elbe. The garrison of that place was soon attacked by a malady, which M. de Narbonne contracted while caring for the unfortunate soldiers who filled the hospitals.

M. de Narbonne, for a short while Minister of War under Louis XVI., in 1792, during the reign of the Legislative Assembly, had, in his youth, enjoyed the most brilliant successes at Court. The manners and customs of that period had left their mark on him, in the shape of an apparent levity upon which too many people persisted in basing their opinion of him. He was endowed with a rare perspicacity of mind joined to a solidity of reasoning which qualified him to play an important part in great affairs of state, had not his prolonged absence as an *émigré* kept him aloof for so many years. The uneasiness which his return caused M. de Talleyrand, and the trouble which the latter so persistently

took to prevent his coming into contact with the Emperor, afford the best proof in support of my statement.

It was, nevertheless, impossible for the Emperor not to recognize the necessity there was for peace, and more especially that he should not comprehend to what a degree it was indispensable that he should at least have the appearance of desiring it, and of being prepared to resign himself to the greatest sacrifices in order to obtain it. It was the only means left him to calm the public mind, and to win back to himself those who were beginning to openly withdraw their support.

Spain was irrevocably lost; in that direction, therefore, a war could only be attended with disastrous consequences. It now became necessary to keep on the frontier forces, which, if transported to the banks of the Rhine, would have been of the greatest use. The only seasoned soldiers left to France were those which composed the armies of Marshals Soult and Suchet.

In such an extremity, Napoleon flattered himself that if he entered into negotiations with his prisoner at Valençay, the joy the latter would feel in recovering his throne would easily induce him to accept conditions, which, separating his cause from that of England, would compel the British troops to withdraw from Spain. On the 12th of November, he sent M. de Laforest to Ferdinand with the power of making the preliminary overtures. However weak the mind and character of that monarch might be, he was still intelligent enough not to fall into a trap so clumsily contrived. He asked that he should be allowed, ere matters proceeded further, to receive a deputation from the regency, which, in his absence, had undertaken to govern the country, and which alone could make known to him its actual condition.

The Duke of San-Carlos, one of his principal councillors,



who for the past five years had not been allowed to come near him, was thereupon permitted to go to Valençay to see him. The result of his intervention will be seen later. Everything done in this connection was kept a profound secret, even so far as sending M. de Laforest under an assumed name.

Matters were in this state when public attention was attracted in another direction. M. de Saint-Aignan, the brother-in-law of M. de Caulaincourt, and the Emperor's Minister at Weimar, had been carried off from that town by a body of foreign troops, which conveyed him to Frankfort, where the headquarters of the allied sovereigns had been established. He was treated while there with the utmost consideration. He was informed that it was possible to bring about a peace, and, in the course of a conference which was held on the 9th of November between himself, Messieurs de Metternich and Nesselrode, and Lord Aberdeen, Prince Metternich formally told him that the allied powers were determined never to sever the bonds by which they had recently become united, and which constituted their strength, and that they were therefore firmly resolved to obtain for one and all one single treaty which should establish a general peace, and that it was useless to entertain any idea of any armistice or negotiation the primary object of which should not be a general peace.

The allied powers were unanimously agreed as to the power and preponderance France was to retain; she was to remain within her natural frontiers, which were established by the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; the principle of the independence of Germany was a *sine quâ non*, and France should consequently renounce all sovereignty over that country; the independence of Spain and the re-establishment of the former dynasty were likewise a *sine quâ non*; in Italy, Austria was to be granted a frontier which was to

be matter for special negotiation; Piedmont presented several lines of frontier which were open to debate; the general status of Italy was also to be debated upon, it being, however, provided that, like Germany, it should be governed independently of France or of any other power; Holland should likewise furnish matter for negotiation, starting from the principle that it should be independent.

At this conference, England declared that she was disposed to make the greatest sacrifices, in case an understanding were come to towards concluding a peace based on the lines just laid down by M. de Metternich. Such an hypothesis being taken for granted, England was prepared to recognize the freedom of commercial intercourse and of navigation to which France had the right to pretend.

M. de Saint-Aignan was formally commissioned by M. de Metternich and M. de Nesselrode to notify Napoleon of all these conditions at the earliest moment, and to give him to understand that if he accepted the principles of a general peace, some point to be decided upon on the right bank of the Rhine might be neutralized, where the plenipotentiaries of the several belligerent powers might meet without the negotiations suspending the course of military operations.

Although these particulars have been recorded in a note of M. de Saint-Aignan made public, and since that time frequently reprinted, I have thought it well to give them a place here once more, because they clearly express the standpoint which must be taken in order to come to a sound judgment regarding the important events about to follow. M. de Saint-Aignan quickly reached Saint-Cloud, and as early as the 16th of November, the Duc de Bassano wrote to Count von Metternich that "after taking cognizance of the report made by M. de Saint-Aignan of the communications made to him, and pursuant to the assurance that England had given its adherence to the proposition that

a congress should be opened with a view of discussing the terms of a general peace, it was H. M. the Emperor Napoleon's desire that the town to be neutralized on the right bank of the Rhine, for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, should be Mannheim; that the Duc de Vicence, whom His Majesty designated as his plenipotentiary, would go thither as soon as he was informed of the opening day of the congress."

It will be noticed that the most absolute silence was preserved in this answer concerning the asked-for acceptance of the bases of peace laid down at the Frankfort conference. It was merely stated, in general terms, that "His Majesty accepted as the basis of a peace, the independence of all nations, both in relation to their territorial and their military status." This principle of public right, which could not be contested, was plainly made use of as an evasive formula, and M. de Metternich could not but fail to see it in that light. And so he answered in return that "the great powers, whose views remained unaltered, and whose alliance was not to be dissolved, were prepared to enter into negotiations as soon as they were assured that the general and peremptory bases which had been laid before M. de Saint-Aignan were agreed to, and as no reference was made to them in the dispatch of M. de Bassano, they desired that H. M. the Emperor should express himself regarding them; that such was the only means of preventing unsurmountable difficulties from arresting progress at the very outset of the negotiations; at all events, there did not seem any objection to the selection of Mannheim as the meeting-place."

A few days after this letter, on the first of December, the allies published a proclamation all the more remarkable from the fact that their subsequent doings were in cruel contradiction to it. It seemed to be drawn up as a reply to the senatus-consultum which had just decreed a levy of

300,000 conscripts and to the reasons adduced for such action. "The reasons alleged," it said, "embody a challenge to the allied powers; they are therefore compelled to proclaim once more to the face of the world the views which guide them in the present war, the principles on which their conduct is based, their hopes, and their resolves. They are not waging a war against France, but against that loudly proclaimed preponderance, which for the woe of Europe and of France itself, the Emperor Napoleon has exercised for too long a time beyond the boundaries of his Empire.

"Victory has led the allied armies to the banks of the Rhine, and the first use they make of it has been a tender of peace. The conditions of this peace are based on the independence of the French Empire, as well as on that of the other European states. . . .

"The allied sovereigns are prepared to leave the French Empire in possession of an extent of territory which France never enjoyed under its kings, as a brave nation does not fall from its high state because it has in its turn suffered reverses in an obstinate and bloody struggle during which it has fought with its accustomed daring. . . . But the powers are likewise desirous of enjoying a state of calm and happiness. . . . They do not intend to lay down their arms until they have attained this great and beneficent result . . ., before having once more strengthened the political status of Europe, ere immutable principles shall have resumed their sovereignty over vain declarations, ere the sanctity of treaties shall lastly have secured to Europe the blessings of a real peace." It will be seen that in this document the terms tendered to M. de Saint-Aignan were still those alone admitted by the allies.

When such an important negotiation was being engaged in between Frankfort and Saint-Cloud, when all the particulars of it were being made public throughout Germany, it was

impossible that the French public, however great might be the desire to keep a knowledge of the matter from it, should not hear of it. Voluntary and calculated indiscretions occurred, and Paris soon learnt of the proposals of which M. de Saint-Aignan had been the bearer. The desire that they should be accepted was universal, and in the palace, the city and the Council of State, a sort of league was organized, whose object was to push Napoleon into this way of salvation. The Duc de Vicence was the soul of it, while M. de Talleyrand did not remain foreign to it.

Among the ministers themselves, those of the Police and the Treasury pronounced themselves more openly in favor of a prompt and frank acceptance. Both of them were only too cognizant of the troubles which would surely arise, for their opinion to remain in doubt for a single moment. The Prince de Neufchâtel and nearly all the aides-de-camp thought likewise, and acted in consequence. M. de La Valette, an important man, owing to his position as Post-master-General, and because of the confidence always reposed in him, seized every opportunity of having the truth reach his master's ears; I was as active as he in this respect, and I had the means of doing so at hand, as I could in my daily bulletins give a circumstantial account of what was being said about the city.

This concerted action would have carried great weight, had a most powerful adversary not crossed our path. M. de Bassano still enjoyed the Emperor's confidence; after M. de Saint-Aignan had rendered an account of his mission, he had no hesitation in maintaining that the allies felt the need of peace at least as much as France; that the dangers they would have to incur, were they to cross the French frontier, would inspire them with the most ardent desire of concluding at the earliest opportunity an arrangement that would be final. The initiative taken by Austria was a proof

of this; he saw in it, moreover, the first signs of a reconciliation of the father-in-law with the son-in-law; together with the Emperor he agreed in believing that the allies were making demands all the greater that they expected to obtain less. It therefore behooved Napoleon not to accept at the very outset terms which were not to be looked at in the light of an ultimatum, but which were subject to be discussed by the plenipotentiaries in congress. This explains the answer sent on the 16th.

As soon as it became known, it caused the sorest grief to all. Its consequences were easy to foresee. The Duc de Vicence, enlightened by the Prague conferences with regard to the real intentions of the powers, and kept exceedingly well informed by his brother-in-law, M. de Saint-Aignan, at once looked upon the propositions just made as an ultimatum to which a frank reply had to be made, unless it were sought to break off all negotiations. He put the matter plainly before the Emperor and brought to his knowledge how greatly the manner in which the propositions of the allied powers had been received was universally deplored.

The same warning reaching him from all quarters, the Emperor at last became alarmed at the general feeling of disapproval, and understood that it was necessary for him to adopt a line of conduct which would secure to him a return of confidence, so he decided upon sacrificing the Duc de Bassano. No one admitted that peace negotiations could be sincerely entered into as long as he remained at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His place was therefore taken by the Duc de Vicence.

No selection could have given greater pleasure to the public, whose hopes at once revived. But the Emperor, unwilling as he was to part altogether with the Duc de Bassano, made him a Minister without portfolio. It would have been better for him to have had the courage to get rid of him

entirely. M. Maret was doubtless a very trustworthy man, who spoke from his conscience, and who was animated with the most sincere devotion, but this very devotion was precisely, in this situation, what rendered him most dangerous, for the reason that as he was still bound to inspire some slight degree of confidence, he was no longer anything more than an unenlightened malcontent, who was less than ever in a position to have his eyes opened to the truth.

This ministerial change brought about others. M. Daru left the Secretaryship of State and took the place, in the administration of the Ministry of War, of Count de Cessac, who was made Minister without portfolio, and resumed his place as president of the War Committee in the Council of State. M. Molé became Minister of Justice in lieu of M. de Massa, who was also appointed a Minister without portfolio, and shortly afterwards president of the *Corps législatif*.

On the 2d of December, the Duc de Vicence replied to the letter of M. de Metternich, and after having somewhat vainly sought to demonstrate that the adherence demanded was merely a natural consequence of the principle of the independence of all nations, already recognized in the dispatch of M. de Bassano, he concluded in the following terms: "Nevertheless, it is with the liveliest satisfaction that I am able to announce to Your Excellency that I am authorized by the Emperor, my master, to declare that His Majesty gives his adherence to the general and peremptory terms communicated to him by M. de Saint-Aignan. They entail great sacrifices on the part of France, but His Majesty will make them without regret if, through such sacrifices, England affords the opportunities of reaching a general peace honorable to all parties, which Your Excellency assures me is the wish not only of all the continental powers, but of England."

This reply was couched in clear and positive language, but it ought to have been sent twenty days sooner, and it might then perhaps have directed the destinies of France into a quite different channel. When it reached Frankfort, the favorable moment had gone by, and it was now M. de Metternich's turn to reply in a dilatory fashion. On the 10th of December, he announced that he had submitted to Their Majesties "the dispatch of the French Minister; that they had been pleased to gather from it that the Emperor Napoleon had adopted the bases essential to the re-establishment of a state of equilibrium and of the future tranquillity of Europe, that they were therefore desirous that the dispatch should be brought without delay to the knowledge of their allies; Their Imperial and Royal Majesties," he went on to say, "had not the slightest doubt that negotiations could be opened as soon as their replies were received."

Napoleon was severely punished for the mistake he had just committed. What aggravated this mistake was that he allowed himself, in this instance, to be inspired less by the interests of France than by his personal interest. It was open to him, after so many disasters, to leave the country strong and powerful to a high degree; he sacrificed to the embarrassments of his own situation, to the difficulty of finding himself alone, after the crumbling away of his ambitious plans, face to face with a nation which had done everything for him, and which might with some show of justice exact of him an account of all the moneys he had squandered, of all the blood he had shed in his mad undertakings.

Peace, in such a situation, seemed to him the worst of misfortunes. Robbed of the prestige attached to conquerors, surrounded by all those commanders among whom he could no longer distribute the riches of nations, he did not



for a moment take into consideration the possibility of remaining on a throne, when it should have been his first duty to endeavor to obtain forgiveness for his past faults. In this he misappreciated the generosity of the French character, and knew not how to trust himself to a quality which was foreign to his character. He did not even render justice to himself, for there remained in the memories of his brilliant career, even in his mistakes and reverses, a splendor and a grandeur which would always have stood him in good stead. His pride forbade him to acquiesce in the slightest diminution of his prestige. At heart he always preferred risking the fortunes of war, and he did not really make up his mind to negotiate until he was convinced that all and every means of continuing war was failing him at one and the same time. But when he became alive to the situation, his enemies saw the state of affairs as well as he did, and so they acted in consequence.

Those who have undertaken to defend him have sought to lay great stress on the fact that the allies were not sincere in making the first propositions, and that they had no intention of carrying them out. I think that this assertion is unfounded. Austria and Russia sincerely desired peace; the Emperor Francis assuredly did not wish to dethrone his daughter, while the character of the Emperor Alexander was far too circumspect for him not to dread that by continuing the war he might jeopardize his successes and glory which already surpassed anything that his imagination had ventured to picture to itself in his wildest dreams.

One who frequently came into his presence during the early part of his sojourn in Frankfort, M. de Labouchère, has assured me that on several occasions he heard him speak the following words: "People must not believe that I am foolish enough to carry the war across the Rhine. I am not going to commit the blunder which my opponent has

paid for so dearly, and I do not propose to go to Paris in quest of the fate he met at Moscow." At that time, this Rhenish frontier was still invested with a great prestige; it was considered an arduous feat to cross it, and the undertaking of attacking on its own soil a warlike nation, of attacking it in its very stronghold, in the midst of all its resources, in rear of its line of fortified towns, presented to all minds a terrifying aspect.

Had Napoleon, therefore, replied without hesitation, on the 16th of November, that he accepted the proposed bases of peace, I have not the slightest doubt that Austria and Russia would have considered themselves bound, and that negotiations would have been opened then and there. England and Prussia might perhaps have sought to block the way, but alone they could do nothing, and they would not have risked separating their cause from that of the Emperors of Austria and Russia. But when it was seen that Napoleon declined to give a categorical answer, it was estimated that he was only seeking for time to collect his forces, reorganize his army, and so be in a condition to take advantage of the first favorable opportunity. Now it was an advantage of this kind that they were especially determined he should not enjoy. Troops were therefore hurried forward from all directions, military preparations were set going with the utmost haste, and the allies became actively engaged in distributing their forces in such a manner as to have them in readiness for simultaneous action along all points from Bâle to the extreme limits of the Lower Rhine.

Another important event occurred in this direction just before the end of December, which greatly contributed towards giving the allies a better idea of what they might dare attempt. The whole of Holland rose in rebellion, and, aided by a Russo-Prussian army corps, succeeded in a very few days in expelling from its territory the French troops

and authorities. The first use to which it put its independence was to recall the Prince of Orange, who, on the 20th of November landed at Scheveningen, not far from The Hague, at the very port whence his father had embarked in 1795. He was proclaimed prince-sovereign of the Netherlands, and as such took the reins of government. The example of so promptly executed a revolution and such a complete return to an ancient family, which was granted powers greater than those it had lost, was of a nature to arouse in the minds of nations and cabinets the most serious reflections.

At the same time, the proximity of the French provinces, the facilities of communication which could so easily be established between the opposite shores of the Rhine, gave the allied powers a far greater knowledge than they had heretofore enjoyed of the state of affairs and the public frame of mind throughout France. They could not help discovering that there was not, for the time being, any armed force in fit condition to prevent their crossing the river, should they determine upon such a course. The remnants of the army which the Emperor had brought back after the battle of Hanau had been annihilated by an epidemic which not only carried off the soldiers who had returned to France, but also those constituting the weak garrisons of the fortified towns where they were given shelter. These towns were, for the most part, neither provisioned nor provided with the necessary defences.

On the other hand, the successes of the British army on the frontier of the Pyrenees were for the allied powers on the Rhine the pledge of a diversion the results of which would be of great advantage to them; lastly, the excessive discouragement and discontent which were manifesting themselves in many directions in the interior of that empire but yesterday so unshaken and so united, all afforded favorable opportunities to the coalition.

Is it to be wondered at that these several considerations should have led Austria and Russia to think that the sole way of disposing of the dilatoriness and the resistance of the Emperor, was to drive him to the wall? No doubt of this could any longer be entertained, when it was seen that the month of December was passing by without their seeming to give any thought to the congress, the idea of which had in the first instance originated with them. They made use of the time thus left to them to discuss matters and come to a better understanding with England, and to agree as to the special line of action it should behoove them to take, either in case of the war continuing, or in that of negotiations being opened. In the latter case, the bases which it should be seen fit to adopt might be discussed and laid down anew, for it was plain that the allies no longer held themselves bound by those which they had submitted in the first instance. The envoy extraordinary sent to London to treat these great questions was General Pozzo di Borgo; he was the man most in favor with the Emperor Alexander, while at the same time the most hostile to Napoleon. M. de Pozzo having left in the course of November, bearing instructions drawn up in the name of Russia, Austria, and even Prussia, it was obvious that all matters were to remain in suspense until such time as the result of his mission should be known.

Nevertheless the interests at stake were so complicated, and the way in which they were to be settled depended so greatly on the march of events ever difficult to foresee, that the British cabinet, after granting a hearing to the representative of the three continental powers, and pursuant to an agreement entered into with him, determined to send to the spot the only person whom his position would enable to take at any day or even at any hour the resolutions which the circumstances might require. No other man was

so placed excepting the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lord Castlereagh.

Nothing could be more adverse to the success of Napoleon's diplomatic manœuvres; no room was any longer left to him to indulge in the illusions with which he had so long flattered himself. Everything was failing him at the same time. Towards the middle of November, his private conversations, several of which became known to me, especially those he held every evening with M. de La Valette, left no doubt as to the anxieties which were invading his mind. The insufficiency of his military forces became daily greater and more alarming, and the time had gone by when it was sufficient for him to strike the ground in order to have soldiers rise from it.

Taking it for granted that he could raise the young conscripts which the Senate was handing over to his mercies, of what use could they be at the very outset? It would need some three or four months to collect, clothe, arm, and drill them; and, in that space of time, his quarrel must be finally settled, and his fate determined. He no longer even enjoyed the faculty, from which he had for so long a time derived the benefit, of embodying his conscripts in skeleton corps composed of officers drawn from his veteran forces, whose vigor and experience were sufficient to stimulate the bravery of the young soldiers. The retreat from Moscow and the one from Saxony had exhausted this most valuable reserve force; those who had not perished in the Russian snow, or on the battle-fields of Saxony, remained locked up in the fortified towns, or were prisoners across the Rhine.

Under such conditions, Napoleon, for the first time, perhaps, was brought to take into consideration the possibility of the return of the Bourbons; and I know of a certainty that this thought presented itself to his mind as

a necessary consequence of the state of things at a much earlier date than when it influenced the decisions of the foreign cabinets. He first referred to it on the hypothesis of his death. "You may rest assured," he said, one day, to M. de La Valette, and he spoke in the same strain to M. Molé, "that were I to be killed, the succession to my throne would not at the present time be allowed to devolve upon the King of Rome. At the point which matters have now reached, no one but a Bourbon could succeed me."

As if he had wished, so to speak, to prepare the way for the restoration of that family, which he had so relentlessly pursued, he made up his mind, early in December, to consent with Ferdinand to an arrangement the conditions of which were drawn up at Valençay between M. de Laforest and the Duke of San Carlos. Pursuant to this treaty, he recognized Ferdinand VII. and his successors, in the order of the Spanish succession, King of Spain and of the Indies; he also recognized the integrity of Spain, such as it was previous to the war. On his part, Ferdinand bound himself to make England evacuate Spanish territory, particularly Mahon and Ceuta. All the other conditions were, as matters stood, of very secondary importance. At all events, this treaty was not to be ratified by the King until after it had been communicated to the Spanish regency; and with that object in view, the Duke of San Carlos proceeded at once to Madrid, ostensibly with the mission of laying it before the regency. But it has since become impossible to entertain any doubt that Ferdinand gave him special and private instructions to above all come to an understanding with the English agents and to agree with them as to what would best serve the common cause.

At the very same time, the Bishop of Piacenza had been dispatched to Fontainebleau, to enter with the Pope into

a negotiation, the first condition of which was the restitution of a portion of his states. His Holiness replied that he was determined not to discuss the matter except from Rome, and that nothing could alter his mind regarding this; he added that he had forbidden the cardinals to speak to him about business of any kind. Hence this attempt was, for the time being, abortive.

## CHAPTER VI

Opening of the session of the *Corps législatif*—Precautionary measures taken in anticipation of hostile manifestations—Seditious utterance of M. de Bassompierre as the imperial procession passed by—His arrest and setting at liberty owing to the intercession of M. Pasquier—Adulatory address of the Senate in reply to the speech from the Throne—Entirely different nature of the draft of the address prepared in the *Corps législatif*; guarantees demanded in the name of the rights of the nation against the dangers of absolute power—The Emperor's anger—The Council of Police meets at the Minister's—Reasons submitted by M. Pasquier in support of the necessity of the Emperor's listening to such language—M. Réal holds the same opinion; his reasons for so doing—M. de Rovigo undertakes communicating this view to the Emperor—Napoleon sees matters in a different light—The entire edition of the report seized at the printer's—Adjournment of the *Corps législatif*—M. Molé's attitude on this occasion—Bitter words addressed by Napoleon to the *Corps législatif* at his reception of that body on the 1st of January, 1814—M. Lainé, the reporter, and the other members of the legislative committee notified to leave Paris—Decree authorizing the collection of taxes—Commissioners extraordinary sent into the provinces with exceptional powers—Conversation between the Emperor and M. Pasquier with regard to the public situation—On the latter's proposition, a decree is promulgated calling out the National Guard of Paris; appointment of Marshal Monecy as Major-General of that Guard.

THE meeting of the *Corps législatif* had been prorogued from the 2d to the 19th of December, apparently in the expectation that preliminary negotiations would have been begun by that time, thus rendering less difficult the attitude of the Emperor. In the interval, a fresh decree was rendered, which exacted another sacrifice from the nation; 160,000 men of the National Guard, formed into *cohortes*, were destined to the defence of fortified towns, and to



preserve order in towns not belonging to this category. Although these 160,000 men were, properly speaking, not to form a part of the regular army, they were to go to the front, should, as was very likely, French territory be invaded. They are therefore to be added to the 1,140,000 men already called upon to serve since the month of January, thus presenting the appalling total of 1,300,000 men in the course of one year.

Everybody was on the tiptoe of expectation with regard to the words which the Emperor would utter on opening the session of the *Corps législatif*; Napoleon himself was not without some anxiety as to how the day would pass off. He was compelled, in going to the *Corps législatif*, to proceed slowly and in great state for some distance; he dreaded both the silence of the crowd and the exclamations which might make themselves heard. He had made two or three excursions on horseback through the most thickly populated districts of the city, and in spite of some few cheers gotten up for him in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, he had derived little satisfaction from the experiment. He determined upon taking the shortest road, one which also seemed more easy to set guard and watch over. In lieu of following the quays, as was customary, his cortège wended its way through the Garden of the Tuileries, the Place Louis XV. and the Pont Louis XVI., then known as the Place and Pont de la Concorde. Most fortunately, I had ridden past that way an hour previously, and my eyes had detected an inscription in big black characters on the first pilaster of the bridge: "Down with the tyrant!" I just had time enough to have it erased.

As he was leaving the Tuileries, and when he had scarcely taken twenty steps in the garden, a voice which came from amid a somewhat considerable group of persons was heard to exclaim: "What! Is there no one who will deliver us

from this scoundrel?" A gendarme in citizen's garb, who was one of the group, arrested the man who had uttered this exclamation, and took him to the guard-room. Nobody had responded to his appeal; there had been no manifestations either of approval or disapproval. Meanwhile, the Emperor, having arrived in the hall where awaited him the Senate, the Council of State, and the *Corps législatif*, having seated himself on his throne, and after having received the oath of the new president, the Duc de Massa, delivered a most cleverly conceived speech which produced a deep impression. In spite of the firmness still characterizing it, it can be looked upon, when comparing it with previous ones, as a beginning of abdication. There is indeed a great difference in the tone which governs it, and that to which we had for so many years been accustomed, and which had never belied itself, even at the opening of the session which followed upon the retreat from Moscow. It will be noticed that Spain and the Pope's affairs were entirely passed under silence, and that the personal quarrel with England was more than ever the ground on which he sought to maintain himself.

On reaching home, I enquired as to the full particulars of what had taken place whilst the imperial cortège had crossed the garden. The prisoner had been brought to the Prefecture of Police, and had been subjected to an interrogatory. What was my surprise when I learnt that his name was Bassompierre! As a matter of course, he denied having uttered the words, and maintained that the gendarme who had arrested him had made a mistake. But his denial was not stamped with that characteristic firmness which inspires confidence, and his manner had fully convinced everybody that the mistake of which he complained he was the victim did not really exist. This occurrence was all the more painful to me as I was acquainted with his family, whose

most intimate friend, M. de Bausset, the former Bishop of Alais, I frequently met. M. de Bausset was in the habit of spending the better part of the year with M. de Bassompierre and his family at a country-seat situated at a distance of four leagues from Paris.<sup>1</sup>

Two hours later, I saw the Minister of Police, who was greatly exercised when conversing with me about the occurrence. He informed me that the case had been laid before the Emperor and that those who surrounded him were deeply concerned about it. I told him of M. de Bassompierre's denial, and I particularly called his attention to the fact that there was only one witness to gainsay him, that this witness might be mistaken, as he was listening and doing his duty in the midst of a rather large crowd. I added that I had taken the name of the gendarme, and that I had just sought from his superiors information as to how much confidence could be placed in his veracity. The result of my enquiries was that he was one of the best conducted men in the corps, that his behavior was of the most exemplary, and that every reliance was to be placed in him.

In the evening, I called on the Duc de Rovigo, in order to agree with him as to the report we should make to the Emperor next morning. I therefore made up my mind to frankly enter upon the subject with the Duc de Rovigo. "I have not the slightest doubt," I said, "that M. de Bas-

<sup>1</sup> My intercourse with M. de Bausset, since created cardinal, was stamped with a certain amount of intimacy which I take pleasure in recalling. When he was about to publish his *Histoire de Bossuet*, he sent me his manuscript as he proceeded with it, and sought my opinion, both as to the intrinsic merit of the work and as to the advantages or disadvantages attendant upon its publication. Those who ask for similar advice are always those who least need it, and I had occasion to make but few remarks, to nearly all of which he paid attention. They had special reference to the lack of partiality he showed the Jansenists, while favoring their adversaries. I have treasured the note he wrote me, when sending me one of the earliest printed copies of his book; in this note, he gives me far too much credit for the very minor part I took in his labors.

sompierre is guilty, but what would be gained by establishing that such is the true case, other than to have him shot or imprisoned? The man belongs to one of the best families of France, and his fate will awaken great interest. If the truth of the charge is not believed in, indignation will be aroused; if, on the other hand, it is believed in, it will be said that feelings of hatred must indeed be widespread among the public for such an utterance to have escaped the lips of a man who evidently did not entertain any evil design, as he was unarmed, and who only yielded to a first impulse which he could not control.

“What personal benefit will the Emperor derive from an act of severity or, if one prefers, an act of just revenge? Does his fate now depend on so unimportant an act of repression in the presence of the dangers which surround him? Everything will be settled on some battle-field in three months from now. What is the use of arousing fresh hatreds and fresh desires of revenge against him? What will you yourself gain in accepting the responsibility of a part of them?”

He was impressed with these remarks. The only thing that troubled him was regarding the manner in which he would speak of the matter to the Emperor, who was doubtless already prejudiced by the reports of the police appertaining to his palace and by those of his body-guard. I told him that I would make this my particular business, and that all that I begged of him was not to contradict me. This, he promised me.

Next morning, I attended the *lever*, and, when the audience was at an end, I followed Napoleon into his closet to make my report in the case; I laid the facts before him with most scrupulous exactness, but taking care the while to point out to him that the only evidence against M. de Bassompierre was the word of a gendarme who, after all, might have made

a mistake when selecting this individual from among so many others. The exclamation had been uttered, and that was all that was certain.

As to M. de Bassompierre, it was all the less to be believed that he should have given way to so guilty a deed, from the fact that what characterized him chiefly was his tranquil manners, that he had never given cause for complaint, and that he spent much of his life in a most rational and moderate social circle, that of the former Bishop of Alais. I was aware that the Emperor held in high esteem this prelate, who was the author of a Life of Fénelon and of one of Bossuet, two works which ranked high in his estimation.

“What!” he exclaimed, “he is a friend of the Bishop of Alais! It then becomes hard indeed to understand so outrageous a piece of folly on his part. Well, what do you suggest?” My answer was, “As the facts of the case are somewhat involved in obscurity, my opinion is that upon discharging him from custody he should be ordered to take up his residence at a distance of sixty leagues from Paris, — at Tours, for instance, — where he should remain under surveillance until further orders.” “So be it,” replied Napoleon.

I went and told the Duc de Rovigo of my success, and I must do him the justice of saying that he advised me not to lose a minute in taking advantage of a permission which might at any moment be recalled. M. de Bassompierre was made to leave Paris by five o'clock the same evening. The happy ending of the affair was a cause of great satisfaction to me. By preventing a useless act of revenge, I gave the man whose confidence I enjoyed the best advice that could be given, taking into account his position at the time.

The Senate and the *Corps législatif* appointed committees to take cognizance of the matters communicated in the Speech from the Throne. The Senate committee, which

was composed of Messieurs de Talleyrand, de Fontanes, de Saint-Marsan, de Barbé-Marbois, and de Beurnonville, soon completed its labors, and the report was made by M. de Fontanes. This report and the address which was subsequently voted, are most worthy of notice, especially when compared with the documents which three months later issued from the same body, and were drawn up by the same men. Never was a more severe lesson taught those who would seek to place any reliance in obsequious words supplied to order. Towards the end of December, 1813, flattery is still being expressed in the following fine language, and couched in the most lofty terms; the last sentence of the address is thus conceived: "We will fight for our beloved country between the graves of our fathers and the cradles of our children. Sire, seek to make one last effort which shall be worthy of you and all Frenchmen, to obtain peace, and may your hand, so often victorious, suffer its sword to drop after having signed the peace of the world."

When, on the 30th of December, this address was presented, bodies of the enemy's light cavalry had already found their way into Alsace, Franche-Comté, and Belgium; one of them had even temporarily occupied Colmar, and by the 29th the Emperor had caused the Senate to be informed that the neutrality of the Swiss territory had been violated at Bâle and in its neighborhood by the allied troops. Hence his answer to this challenge was this time somewhat sombre: "The territory at Béarn, Franche-Comté, and Brabant has already been invaded," he said, "and my soul is harrowed with the cries of distress which reach me from the members of my family, so I now call upon Frenchmen to deliver Frenchmen. I now call upon the Frenchmen of Paris, of Brittany, of Normandy, of Champagne, of Burgundy, and of the other departments, to go to the rescue of

their brethren. Are we to abandon them in their misfortune? Peace to our territory, and its deliverance, must be our rallying cry. At the sight of the whole of this nation up in arms the foreigner will fly, or sign peace on the terms which he has himself laid down. There is no longer any question of recovering the conquests which we have made."

The members of the committee of the *Corps législatif* were Messieurs Lainé, Raynouard, Gallois, de Flaugergues, and Maine de Biran; these men had conceived an idea of what was their duty in a fashion entirely different from that of the Senators. They had not thought it permissible to lose such an opportunity of telling wholesome truths and to ask, as the price of the fresh sacrifices about to be demanded of the country, certain guarantees for interests which were continually being slighted, for sacred rights but too often violated. They were of opinion that the time had come to put a curb to absolutism. Since France was being called upon to make the greatest, the most extreme efforts, was it not fair that she should take certain precautionary measures against a recurrence of the rash enterprises which had reduced her to such an extremity? But these ideas — I can truly say so, for I have since then repeatedly been told by all the members of the committee, and especially by M. Lainé — were expressed without any hostile intentions, with no wish to do injury, much less with any revolutionary thought. On the contrary, this committee entertained the sincere desire of once more winning over the nation to the Emperor.

When this report was read in secret committee, on the 29th, it was unanimously endorsed and ordered printed; this was a means of promptly bringing into close communion the feelings of the *Corps législatif* with those of the country; still, as the document was, so to speak, merely in the shape of a draft, on the basis of which an address still

remained to be drawn up, some of the members thought that such an anticipatory publication might savor of some irregularity, that it was contrary to usage, and that it would be preferable to wait until the drawing up of the address, which alone, perhaps, should see the light of print. A discussion ensued on this point, and the committee postponed its decision till the following day.

The next day, just as the Emperor was listening to the address of the Senate, the printing of the report was decided upon in the *Corps législatif* by a vote of two hundred and twenty-three against thirty-one. The appointment of a finance committee was thereupon proceeded with; its labors were to be of the most important kind, and the assembly, in order to testify to the satisfaction felt by it over the way in which the framers of the report had fulfilled their mission, appointed them to this same committee; two other members, who were well known to share the same views, were added to them, viz., Messieurs Blanquart de Bailleul and Pictet (Diodati), of Geneva.

The candidates brought forward under government influence to serve on this committee were thus set aside. When, during the course of the evening, the Emperor was informed of these facts, which the sitting of the previous day should have made him foresee, his anger knew no bounds; still, he did not know of the text of the report; the committee had been careful not to let anybody have a copy of it, and the only knowledge of its contents was vague and contradictory. In his impatience to have more accurate information, and fully determined not to suffer the publication of a document so opposed to his views, Napoleon ordered his Minister of Police, at ten o'clock that night, to go and seize in the composing-room of the printer of the *Corps législatif* the first proof which should be taken, and to forbid him to give out a single copy of the report, until further orders. The



Minister was to bring him this proof next morning, at the hour of the *lever*, and he was instructed to hold himself in readiness to give his opinion on it. And yet there was no subject on which the Duc de Rovigo was less able to express an opinion; he had the good sense to see this, and so he did not hesitate to call to his assistance the members of the Council of Police. We met at his residence at eleven o'clock, but we had to wait until after midnight for the proof on which he was to base his opinion. As soon as it came he asked me to read it to the Council.

The language in which the wishes of the *Corps législatif* were expressed poorly concealed severe strictures, for it apparently demanded liberty, the security of the person, the respecting of vested interests, the free exercise of political rights, for the reason only that one had for too long a time been unjustly deprived of them. To this must be added that the circumstances in the midst of which these demands were made were of a kind to increase their gravity. Have not nations ever been compelled, in order to obtain a hearing for their most just demands, to grasp the opportunities when their sovereigns themselves were compelled to invoke their assistance?

My opinion was that, in spite of the displeasure it might cause the Emperor, there was nothing left but to receive the report without giving expression to too great a display of discontent. It was necessary to revive the national spirit; great and powerful efforts were about to be asked of it, and so, if under such circumstances one broke off with the only body which might be looked upon as representing the nation, if one deprived oneself by too great a display of sensitiveness of the assistance still to be derived from it, from what could one henceforth seek support? What means would then be left to act on the public mind?

Were the Emperor to receive the petition presented to

him in a proper spirit, all that might perhaps be necessary would be a very few words and a declaration that would bind him within just limits only, to transform into satisfaction, not to say enthusiasm, dispositions which were to-day, it could not be dissembled, rather unfavorable to him. M. Pelet and M. Anglès were of the same opinion as myself.

When it came to the turn of M. Réal, who had until then remained in a deeply pensive mood, and whom the Duke apostrophized as follows: "Come, now, Monsieur Réal, you who are a man fertile in expedients, what course shall we follow?" he replied: "What course? Yes, indeed, there ought always be one open to follow; it should be a determined one; but on what would you have it rest? Where are to be nowadays found the men one might call upon to carry out any important and strong measure? Have not, during the past ten years, nearly all the true lovers of their country been dispersed and persecuted, not to say stamped out, — all those energetic men who had rendered such great services in the most decisive crises of the Revolution? Do you think it is possible at present to discover, revive, and resurrect them, and, moreover, where could their like be found? Circumstances out of the ordinary were necessary to produce them; those men had in them the sacred fire, and their worth was not appreciated. And now, the Emperor finds himself face to face with an assembly which knows its own power, and it is an easier matter to win three battles than to face a deliberate assembly which can summon to its side public opinion. To enter into a struggle with it is at present beyond his strength; and it is just as little feasible to do without that assembly. Hence, whether one likes it or not, there is nothing left but to adopt M. Pasquier's way of thinking, and we must have the courage to say so."

This very naïve revolutionary harangue, which, however, ended in so sensible a fashion, made a deep impression on the Duc de Rovigo. "I see full well," he said, after some hesitation, "that there is no course left open, but, gentlemen, it is not so easy to submit such advice to the Emperor as you seem to think."

It would appear that in the course of an after-dinner chat, he had already become aware that the Emperor's frame of mind was little in harmony with the view of the case which prevailed in our midst. Nevertheless, after a moment's reflection, he made up his mind to risk the venture, but he exacted from M. Réal and myself the promise that we should meet him early next morning at the Tuileries. "I will go in to him," he explained, "before the *lever*; I will say before him your views, which I fully accept as mine, and, if I find him too unbending, I will ask him to listen to what you have to say." We arrived punctually at the rendezvous. He went in, as he had announced, before anybody else, but shortly afterwards he emerged, looking greatly perturbed. "Follow me," were his only words. I got into his carriage, and, as we drove along, he told me that he had left the Emperor irrevocably decided upon dissolving the *Corps législatif*, as he considered it was impossible to obtain from it any service which might counterbalance the harm likely to be produced by the publication of such a report.

Hence it became above all things necessary to make sure that the document should not become public, and I was ordered to have the whole edition seized and carried away from the printer's, whom I must be careful to notify that if a single copy of the document found its way outside, he was to be held responsible therefor. "Well and good," I replied, "but ere I do this, it is necessary that I should have a written and signed order. Bear in mind what M. Réal told you

yesterday, of the danger there is in coming into collision with deliberative assemblies. I will, therefore, not do anything which cannot be justified as being regular, and I intend to shield my own responsibility." "Well, then," was his answer, "you shall have such an order in a quarter of an hour." I duly received it, and carried it out.

During the course of the morning, the Emperor held a ministerial council, at which it was decided to adjourn the *Corps législatif*. This decision, far from being unanimous, as people have been pleased to repeat, was warmly contested, but the Emperor had made up his mind beforehand, and the discussion was merely a matter of form. It has been stated, without the slightest foundation, that M. Molé, when approving this measure, had spoken with a good deal of warmth, and that he had gone so far as to suggest the arrest of the reporter of the committee, M. Lainé, and that he be brought to trial. This accusation hung over him for a long time; it was inspired by the jealousy aroused by his too rapid elevation, but I am fully convinced that it is entirely untrue. The Duc de Rovigo gave me the same evening all the particulars of the meeting; and in the account he gave me, an account the truthfulness of which could not be doubted, M. Molé had been one of the Emperor's principal opponents, and neither he nor anybody else had made any suggestions whatever regarding M. Lainé.

On the following day there appeared an ordinance adjourning the *Corps législatif*; this ordinance was based on the fact that the third series of deputies was about to lose its mandatory powers. In order to somewhat save appearances, the same ordinance enacted that the Minister of the Interior should, without further delay, carry out the necessary measures for the assembling of the electoral colleges of the three series whose time had come to renew their lists.

A very strange position was that of this *Corps législatif*, which, according to the terms of the law creating it, was to be annually renewed by fifths, and in which two-fifths, although their mandate had expired, had continued sitting, owing to a prolongation of powers granted to them by successive *senatus-consulta*. The omnipotence of the *senatus-consultum* had thus become the first element of the imperial government, and in its presence all objections were reduced to naught. Never, perhaps, did absolute power imagine a more expeditious form than this one; if, on the one hand, it was advantageous to make use of it, on the other, it had none the less its dangerous side.

The ordinance which so completely separated the Emperor from the nation, whose co-operation and trust had never been so necessary to him, appeared in the *Moniteur* on the 1st of January, 1814. As was the custom, the Senate and *Corps législatif* went to pay their respects to the Emperor. Napoleon took advantage of the occasion to speak these oft-quoted words to the members of the latter body: "What is the throne? Four pieces of wood covered over with velvet." Then followed this somewhat touching expression of his deeply rooted grief: "I stood in need of something to console me, and you have sought to dishonor me. I was expecting that you would unite in mind and deed to drive out the foreigner. You have bade him come! Indeed, had I lost two battles, it would not have done France any greater evil." This evil he was increasing, when in his anger he gave publicity to the report, the existence of which he wished should remain unknown to the public.

During the course of the day, the Minister of Police sent for M. Lainé and the other members of the committee, and informed them somewhat brutally that they were to leave Paris without delay. M. Lainé answered him in a dignified

way which made an impression on him, as he spoke to me about it next day. Very soon, moreover, the presence of this influential man at Bordeaux became much more detrimental to the cause of Napoleon than it could have been in Paris.

The collection of the newly imposed taxes was next decreed. People were so thoroughly accustomed to yield obedience, that no complaining was heard. Commissioners extraordinary, all chosen from among senators or councillors of state, were sent into the provinces. They enjoyed immense powers; they were entrusted with the duty of accelerating the levy of conscripts, the clothing, equipment, and arming of the troops, the provisioning of the fortified towns, the collecting of the horses requisitioned for military service, and the levy and organization of the National Guards.

They were instructed to call for levies *en masse* in such districts as were threatened by the enemy. They were also authorized to order all such police measures as required by the circumstances and for the maintaining of public order; this power carried with it the most extreme latitude in the matter of arrests, and, as a natural consequence, of appointing military commissions, and of arraigning before them, or before specially constituted courts, all persons accused of befriending or holding intercourse with the enemy, or of disturbing the public peace. These commissioners were fortunately well chosen, and it must be said at once that not one of them so placed himself as to incur any serious blame concerning the use he made of such excessive powers. They are only to be compared to those with which the Convention had invested its famous proconsuls; but the times as well as the men had happily changed considerably!

On the 3d of January, I remained after the audience of

the lever, as I had to speak to the Emperor on a matter of importance to the city of Paris. "Well, *monsieur le préfet*," he said, beginning the conversation, "what do they say in this good city? Do they know that it is a fact that the armies of the enemy have crossed the Rhine?" — "Yes, Sire, that was known yesterday afternoon." — "How many of them do people suppose there are?" — "Two hundred thousand is the figure spoken of." — "People are out of their reckoning; there are three or four hundred thousand of them, and they have crossed between Cologne and Bâle at seven or eight different points. The Swiss have suffered their territory to be violated."<sup>1</sup> — "What do people expect me to do?" — "No doubt is entertained that Your Majesty will very shortly start at the head of our troops, and advance towards the enemy." — "My troops! My troops! Do people imagine that I still have an army? Did not almost the whole of the army which I had brought back from Germany succumb to that fearful malady which put the finishing stroke to my misfortunes? An army! I

<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, this passing of the enemy through Helvetic territory had met with no opposition on the part of the Swiss. It had been preceded and followed by negotiations which brought about the new federal organization of Switzerland, such as it exists nowadays. This constituted the first important transaction in which M. Capo d'Istria took part. His presence at Russian headquarters had up to that time passed almost unnoticed. He had joined them under the following circumstances. He chanced to be one of the head men of the Republic of the Seven Isles, when it flourished under Russian protection, and these isles having passed under French domination by the Treaty of Tilsit, he had quickly offered himself to Russia, had been taken into the diplomatic service of that country, and, according to a prevailing custom, attached to a general headquarters. The first at which his services were made use of, was that of the army warring against the Turks. He persevered in this career, which finally led him to the headquarters at Frankfort. When the time came for the Emperor Alexander to require an intelligent man to manage the affairs of the coalition in Switzerland, his choice fell upon M. Capo d'Istria, and his success, while engaged in this mission, soon paved the way to the eminent position which he has since occupied in a most brilliant fashion, in the cabinet of the sovereign to whom he had given his allegiance.

shall be well content, if in three weeks from now, I am able to bring together thirty or forty thousand men."

Then, after a somewhat lengthy silence: "Well, what is it you wish of me?" I thereupon called his attention to the fact that his recent decree regarding the National Guard made no mention of the city of Paris, but that I, nevertheless, thought it absolutely necessary that something should be done in this respect. Paris was probably about to be denuded of the few troops which generally composed the garrison, and under circumstances which might become of so critical a nature, I did not see how it would be possible to dispense with a force capable of preserving order among a population which was likely to be exposed to great hardships, and which, in consequence, would be hard to restrain. Might not the slightest disturbance in his capital while he was engaged in coping with the enemy, be the cause of most cruel embarrassments to him, and was it not wise to make preparations to meet such a danger? A prompt organization of the National Guard therefore seemed to me indispensable.

"This is all very well," he replied; "your National Guard must amount to twenty or forty thousand men, but who is there who is ready to answer to me of the spirit which may animate it? If this spirit is hostile, will it have done me any good to have allowed such a force to be organized in my rear? And then, what are you going to arm it with? I need all my muskets for the conscripts who are on their way to me." I answered him that a judicious selection of officers might ward off the danger he had just pointed out, and which I little dreaded, for the reason that most assuredly the principal care of the *bourgeois* would be to render secure their property rights by maintaining public tranquillity. As to the muskets, it would perhaps be sufficient to grant just the quantity necessary to arm daily the men



relieving guard. I had developed these matters in a report which I left with him and which I begged him to read.

The step I had taken had been in accordance with the views of the Ministers of Police and of the Interior, who so successfully supported my proposition, and worked so well in its favor, that as early as the 8th, there appeared a decree calling out the National Guard of Paris. The Emperor created himself its commander-in-chief, and reserved unto himself the right of appointing all the officers, on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. This decree embodied, moreover, all the details of the organization. Marshal Moncey was made major-general and second in command. The *aides-majors* were the general of division Hulin, Count Bertrand, the grand marshal, Count de Montesquiou, the grand chamberlain, and Count de Montmorency. The *chefs de légion* were likewise men of importance and enjoying consideration in their districts.

Thus became organized that National Guard, which three months later rendered such valuable services, and which we were so proud to show to the foreigner as a proof of the strength which should still ensure us respect, and as a guarantee of the tranquillity which it was so necessary to maintain.

## CHAPTER VII

Napoleon at last recognizes the necessity of negotiating peace—Instructions given to that effect to the Duc de Vicence—Dilatory reply of M. de Metternich, and temporary breaking off of the diplomatic correspondence—The Spanish Regency refuses, and gives its reasons for so doing, to ratify the Treaty of Valençay—The Pope's refusal to negotiate for the total restitution of his states—Vexatious and scornful treatment endured on all sides by the Emperor—Murat, King of Naples, joins the general league formed against his brother-in-law—A comparison between the defection of Murat and of Bernadotte—Napoleon has no longer anything to expect but from a supreme struggle—Unremitting efforts brought by him to organize his feeble resources—Formation of regiments composed of unemployed workmen—The Emperor's mind preoccupied with the possible return of the Bourbons—His words to M. Pasquier in this connection confirmed by his instructions to the Duc de Vicence—Creation, on the 28th of January, of the Council of Regency; its composition—M. de Talleyrand's odd position—King Joseph appointed *lieutenant-général*—Noble and touching allocution of Napoleon, on the day preceding his departure for headquarters, to the officers of the National Guard of Paris—The Emperor enters into the struggle with barely sixty thousand men against the six hundred thousand soldiers of the coalition—Military genius displayed by Napoleon during this extraordinary campaign—Presentiments of an unavoidable catastrophe—An *exposé* of the possible combinations and of the varied interests of the coalesced sovereigns—Even at that moment the Royalist party remains quiescent—No action whatever taken by the partisans of the Bourbons: the Abbé Louis and the Duke of Dalberg—M. de Talleyrand's line of conduct—Napoleon's lack of success at the opening of the campaign—Battle of La Rothière—Paris organized into one vast workshop for the manufacture of arms and equipments, and a camp of instruction for the conscripts—The allies at last consent to the assembling of a congress at Châtillon.

THE Emperor, at last convinced of the necessity for peace, wished, above all, to reach at least a beginning of negotiation. He needed it, especially to divert from himself the accusation, too long deserved, of having shown a

foolhardy obstinacy. He therefore resolved, in spite of the activity of the movements effected by the coalesced armies; in spite of the crossing of the Rhine on so many different points, and which undoubtedly pointed to the allies' firm intention of invading French territory; in spite of the silence preserved towards him since the letter written on the 10th of December by Prince de Metternich, — he resolved, I say, in the last days of January, upon sending the Duc de Vicence to Lunéville.

No sooner had the Duke reached that city, than, on the 9th of January, he wrote a letter to M. de Metternich, wherein he complained of the numberless delays, which seemed inexplicable to him; he added that the Emperor, his master, with the intention of giving the strongest proof of the sincerity of his desire for the re-establishment of a general peace, had sent him, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, invested with full powers, and that he hastened to bring this to the knowledge of the Prince, and that he was awaiting at the French outposts the passports which were necessary to him to proceed to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns.

M. de Metternich, whom this letter reached at Fribourg, replied, on the 8th, that the delays complained of by the Duc de Vicence were inherent to the necessity of communicating to all the allies the answer of the 2d of December; that, on the strength of this communication, the Court of St. James had dispatched to the Continent the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; that the Emperor of Russia was temporarily absent at some distance, and that Lord Castlereagh being expected at any moment, Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, had instructed him to inform His Excellency that he should as early as possible receive an answer to his proposition of visiting the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. Here ended once

more all diplomatic correspondence, which was only resumed to bring about the conferences at Châtillon, which did not begin till the 5th of February.

In the meanwhile, the Duke of San Carlos had taken to Madrid the treaty concluded at Valençay. The Regency had promptly declined to ratify it, basing its decisions, in the first place, on a decree rendered by the Cortes, which laid down that there should be with France neither negotiation, nor treaty, nor truce, so long as the King did not enjoy his absolute freedom, and next, on the engagements entered into with England, by means of a treaty dating as far back as January, 1809, and containing on the part of Spain an engagement not to sign any treaty with France without the consent of England. Thus, all was at an end in this quarter, and it was the Emperor's turn to endure the refusals and the contemptuous treatment which he had so often inflicted on others.

Towards the middle of January, he once more sent to Fontainebleau the Bishop of Piacenza, with the draft of a new treaty, whereby he made restitution to the Holy Father of the whole of his states, without exacting from him in exchange any retrocession whatsoever. Nevertheless, the Pope refused his acceptance of it. He alleged as a reason for this that the restitution of his dominions was an act of justice which could not be made the subject-matter of a treaty; that, moreover, all that he should do when at a distance from his states would bear the appearance of his having been coerced, and would be a scandal to the Christian world. He went on to say that all that he desired was to return to Rome at the earliest possible moment, that he had no needs, and that Providence would lead him.

Finally, to fill up the measure of his bitterness, the Emperor learned that an armistice had been concluded between the Austrians, the English, and Murat, King of

Naples. This was shortly afterwards followed by a treaty of peace, and even of alliance between that sovereign and Austria, which, as the price of his accession to the league against his brother-in-law, against the man who had placed him on his throne, guaranteed unto him, his heirs and successors, the full and peaceable enjoyment, as a sovereign, of all he possessed in Italy. Murat, on the other hand, bound himself to co-operate in every possible way towards the carrying on of the present war, with the object of restoring the balance of power between the powers, and of ensuring a genuine state of peace in Europe, and particularly in Italy. His military contingent in the league was fixed at 30,000 men, Austria binding herself to hold 150,000 men under arms, of whom, 60,000 in Italy.<sup>1</sup> One would hardly have believed that Murat's defection would go so far as to raise his sword against the creator of his fortunes, against the man to whom he owed all his dignities. Still less could one imagine that his wife would drive him to do so.

Ambition was ever the governing power over sentiment and affection, with all the members of that strange Bonaparte family. It ought, at least, to have preserved them from being so absolutely blinded as to their own situation. It was folly to believe that a kingdom so fragilely established at the far end of Italy would be in a position to maintain itself in the face of Sicily, which still belonged to the former dynasty, when the powerful hand which had created it would no longer be there to uphold it.

It is probable that the example of Bernadotte, King of

<sup>1</sup> This treaty was subsequently modified as to several of its conditions which England considered too favorable to Murat, and she only acquiesced in the treaty subject to such modification, which greatly limited the ambitious views he had evidently entertained with regard to the aggrandizement of his kingdom, which he had hoped to enlarge by the addition of the greater part of the Papal States.

Sweden, had much to do with Murat's decision ; but there existed between the two men the following wide difference, viz. that the former had been called to the throne by the Swedes, of their own free will, and that the latter had been forced upon the Neapolitans. Lastly, one may fairly suppose that neither Murat nor his wife foresaw the total downfall of their brother. They were aware of the terms proposed at Frankfort, and they may have thought that the course they were pursuing would have no other consequence than to compel him to accept these terms, to rest content with being Emperor of the French, with the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees as the limits of his empire. However this may be, history will say that they, more than anybody, contributed, at the last moment, to encompass the total ruin of Napoleon.

Indeed, had Murat led his forces to the assistance of those commanded by Prince Eugène in Upper Italy, it would not only have become possible that, united, they should succeed in defending it, but they might even have succeeded so far as to once more threaten the hereditary states of Austria, the road to which from that quarter was a familiar one. In lieu of this, the Neapolitan troops, to the number of 30,000 men, who had since the beginning of December been on the march towards Florence and Ancona, suddenly turned round against those with whom they had until then seemed anxious to co-operate. One of their principal generals took possession of Ancona, and compelled the French garrison to shut itself up in the citadel ; another took possession, in the name of his master, of a portion of the Roman States, and drove the French general into the Castle of San Angelo ; a third took Florence, and the French troops which were occupying Tuscany had no other resource but to retire to Leghorn. By the end of January, the Neapolitan vanguard had arrived on the banks of the Po, whence it

loudly issued an appeal to the Italian populations to "leave their oppressor, and join the King of Naples and his allies."

It was evident that Prince Eugène, having in front of him 60,000 Austrians, and threatened with an equally strong diversion in his rear, could no longer hold his own on any of the military lines which had until then shielded the kingdom of Italy on its German side. He was therefore compelled to begin his retrograde movement, in the course of which there remained to him the honor of fighting a few brilliant engagements. No sooner was the new coalition heard of, than it became certain that Italy was lost to France.

Napoleon, thus attacked from a quarter whence he had least cause to expect it, and all his peaceful overtures being rejected, could see no other hope of salvation than in the battles he was about to fight. The allied powers seemed determined not to allow him any respite. His preparations were far from a state of completion, and his resources were very weak; he showed himself indefatigable in his efforts to augment and to organize them; he omitted nothing, and he even conceived the idea of deriving benefit from the stagnation felt in the manufacturing trade, which up to that time had been in a most flourishing condition. On the 15th of January, he decreed the formation of requirements to be composed of volunteers taken from among the unemployed workmen in the factories of Paris, Rouen, Amiens, Alençon, Caen, Lille, Rheims, Saint-Quentin, Louviers, Elbeuf, and the other towns having such establishments in the 1st, 2d, 14th, and 16th military divisions. These volunteers were to bind themselves in writing to serve until the enemy had been driven out of French territory; and dating from the day of their departure, their wives and children were to receive from the government an indemnity to be distributed

among them by the owners of the factories to which they belonged.

In the midst of these all-absorbing cares, his mind was forever haunted with the thought that the return of the House of Bourbon was among the possibilities. I think I am not far wrong in believing that his pride was flattered at the idea that this ancient dynasty could alone succeed him. This uppermost thought in his mind must have been very strong, for he spoke to me about the matter on two occasions; up to that time, he had never opened his lips on the subject. "You are still too young," he said, "to have really known the House of Bourbon; you were hardly of this world when the Revolution began." I replied that at that date, I had already been for three years a councillor in the Parlement, that I had consequently been present not only at the *lits de justice*, but at the numerous sittings in which the princes had, in those days, taken a part together with the *ducs et pairs*. He thereupon questioned me as to the attitude of the princes during the debates, and regarding their influence in the assembly. "The one known as *Monsieur*," he said, "was reputed to be a man of intellect; did he speak sometimes?" I told him that as far as I could recollect, he had spoken very briefly on two occasions, but that his words were well chosen. There is no doubt that his conversations in this matter went a good deal further with his intimates than with me. The one to whom he laid bare his thoughts in a greater degree was assuredly the Duc de Vicence; and he must have been made to feel that the latter saw into the future as he did himself, for I have it from M. de Rayneval, who accompanied him to Lunéville and to Châtillon, travelling in the same carriage with him, that his first words on setting off on his journey were: "We are about to undertake a most difficult and an especially useless task; for, believe me, whatever we may



do, the era of the Napoleons is drawing near its end, and that of the Bourbons is about to begin."

The Duc de Vicence has, moreover, given to the public in 1820, an extract from instructions sent to him from Paris on the 19th of January, with regard to the points from which he was never to deviate in the course of the negotiations with which he was entrusted. This document leaves no doubt as to what was passing in the Emperor's mind. "The point on which the Emperor insists the most," it is said in these instructions, "is the absolute necessity of France retaining her natural limits. That is a condition, *sine quâ non*. All the powers, even England, have recognized these limits." Then, following upon a well-grounded and well-developed argument, showing the reasons making it imperative that no territory within these limits should be surrendered, one finds the following sentence: "France reduced to its ancient boundaries is inseparable from the restoration of the House of Bourbon." A little further on one reads: "If therefore the allies should wish to alter the terms proposed and accepted, viz. the natural limits, His Majesty sees but three courses left open to him: either to fight and be victorious, to fight and die a glorious death, or lastly, should the nation not stand by him, abdicate." It must be admitted that all future chances are marvellously foreseen and even predicted in these few lines, and it goes to prove that Napoleon no longer entertained any illusions whatever.

The time was approaching when it became absolutely necessary that he should place himself at the head of the very small army which he had succeeded in forming. It became imperative that he should take final steps to secure, during his absence, the authority of his government, and to leave behind him the means of frustrating all plots. The man who inspired him with the greatest distrust was

M. de Talleyrand. His suspicions were strengthened by his recent refusal of the full powers tendered him in regard to the negotiations, the beginning of which was still being hoped for.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor had said on this occasion: "The man who refuses me his services nowadays is necessarily my enemy." And he had been sorely tempted to send this imprudent enemy to expiate his refusal behind the bars of the Vincennes keep. M. de Talleyrand was saved from this danger through the advice given to Napoleon by M. de Cambacérès, the Duc de Vicence, and even the Duc de Rovigo.

Having escaped this fate, M. de Talleyrand soon afterwards entered, as a great dignitary, the Council of Regency, which was composed of the French princes, the great dignitaries, the cabinet ministers, the ministers without portfolio, and of the former *grand juge*, president of the *Corps législatif*. This so sudden transition from the most perilous position to a post which seemed to carry with it the utmost confidence, is not one of the least astounding incidents in that life filled with odd and contradictory facts. What was still more extraordinary, was that on the very morn of the day on which the organization of the Council of Regency was settled, Napoleon had summoned M. de Talleyrand into his cabinet, and in the presence of all the ministers, had treated him to an upbraiding similar to the one he had subjected him on his return from Spain. The imperturbable courtier had endured this second castigation with a sang-froid equal to the one he had displayed

<sup>1</sup> But how could it be, it will be said, that Napoleon should have seriously entertained the idea of making use of M. de Talleyrand on so important an occasion, wherein he needed a negotiator entirely devoted to him! This is to be explained in the first instance by the reliance he placed in his talents, of which he had so long been accustomed to make use, and next by a strong desire of sending him far away from the capital, as well as from the idea that the part which he would thus be compelled to play would bind him anew, and in spite of himself, to the cause of the imperial dynasty.

on the former occasion; but he had considered it his duty to address to the Emperor, on returning to his residence, a letter in which he begged him, in the most decorous terms, to well consider the position in which he was placing him, and which hardly seemed compatible with the place which his title of grand elector called on him to take in the Council of Regency. This letter, together with the steps taken by the persons I have already named, probably helped to avert the storm, and to maintain for him the rank and prerogatives which he had himself thought it was his duty to renounce.

The decree instituting the Council of Regency and appointing Marie-Louise as Regent was published on the 28th of January. It was in all respects similar to the one promulgated at the beginning of the preceding year; but, on the same day also, we saw another one appear, which appointed King Joseph his lieutenant-general. This choice produced a somewhat unfortunate effect. This dethroned monarch, who had so poorly, so unskillfully defended his crown, seemed a very feeble prop under such serious conditions. He had, since his return to France, vanished from public sight, and people were hardly aware of his existence. His position of fallen king was not one likely to increase his prestige. There was still another king without a crown; it was the King of Westphalia, Jérôme. Although a member of the Council of Regency, no one ever heard of him, until the day when he played so sorry a part at Blois.

On the 23d of January, a Sunday, the officers of the twelve légions of the National Guard of Paris filled the Salle des Maréchaux, waiting to be presented to the Emperor on his return from mass. He stopped in the midst of them, and there and then, having the Empress at his side, he took his son in his arms, and presented him to this numerous and brilliant gathering. He told them that he

was entrusting to their care all that he held dearest in the world, and that while he was about to leave to go and fight as a soldier, to expel the enemy from French territory, he reckoned on the zeal and devotion of all the good people, of all the good citizens, of all the heads of families whom he was now addressing, to shield from all peril this priceless trust, and in case of need to make a rampart of their bodies in its defence. This allocution, of which I am sure I am giving the sense, was pronounced in tones that went to the heart, and with noble and touching expression. Great therefore was its effect. I saw tears course down many a cheek. All swore by acclamation to show themselves worthy of the confidence with which they were being honored, and every one of them, at that moment,—I would not venture to except a single one,—took this oath in all sincerity. This powerful sovereign in the toils of adversity, this glorious soldier bearing up against the buffets of fortune, could but deeply stir up souls, when, appealing to the most cherished affections of the human heart, he placed himself under their protection. Hence I can say truthfully that in spite of the intense anxiety felt by all classes, the capital did not remain indifferent on learning of this scene, and that it was more deeply moved by it than one might expect.

Two days later, Napoleon left for Châlons-sur-Marne, his headquarters, a distance of forty leagues from Paris; this alone will suffice to give an idea of the progress already made by the enemy. And indeed, since the beginning of January, while imposing forces composed of Russian, Prussian, and Swedish troops had occupied the departments of Belgium, threatening the Northern provinces, the rest of the coalesced forces, Prussians and Russians, and the whole of the Austrian army, had together penetrated into Franche-Comté, Alsace, and Lorraine.

On the 16th, Nancy had been occupied by the Russians; on the 17th, the Austrians had taken Langres, one of the strongest defensive positions in that part of the country, one of those which should have offered the greatest resistance had but a few troops been sent to its assistance. On the 19th, the Austrians had occupied Dijon also. Toul had fallen into the hands of the Russians on the 20th; and, on the 21st, Châlons-sur-Saône had been occupied by the Austrian general Count Bubna. On the same day, the Russian army, having crossed the Meuse, had settled down on the banks of the Marne, at Saint-Dizier and at Joinville. Lastly, the Austrians had, on the 25th, entered Bar-sur-Aube, forty-seven leagues from Paris.

The totality of these forces, extending from the northern frontier to that of Franche-Comté, reached the figure of 572,000 men, without taking into consideration the reserves which were gathering on the opposite bank of the Rhine, and which have been reckoned at 235,000 men. Napoleon could not gather about him more than 60,000 men, and I even have my doubts as to whether he ever had that number under his immediate command. It was with such disproportionate forces that he was about to enter into a struggle that was to decide all.

I will not venture upon a narrative of that campaign, any more than I have with regard to previous ones; but I can at least say that it will live in history as an admirable and precious monument of what resources military science and skill can present, in order to enable a handful of brave men to resist the combined efforts of the greatest masses. Impartial judges will ever see in it one of the finest claims to glory of that French army, whose feeble remnants were sufficient to arrest, for over two months, the march of the most formidable columns, and to reduce them to such a state of hesitation that, repulsed ten times, they were on

the point of beginning a retrograde movement, and allowing victory to slip past them.

Napoleon, I have heard most competent critics declare, had never showed himself a greater military commander since his first Italian campaigns, and if his genius seemed to have lost some of its strength during the last Saxon campaign, it must be admitted that, in this final trial, it recovered all its brilliancy and energy.

No sooner had the Emperor left his capital, than the dangers which had been foreseen in a more or less distant future became apparent; a catastrophe was judged inevitable even by those most inclined to be of good hope; but who could say what the consequences would be? What were the combinations likely to result from a coalition with such varied interests? Which was to be the dominating influence? Should England succeed in securing it, one might expect that the entire destruction of Napoleon, and the most complete degradation of France, would alone seem sufficient to her, to avenge the dangers to which her natural rival had exposed her in a twenty years' struggle. As regards Prussia, one had every reason to expect an implacable hatred and an ardent desire of retrieving the losses of all kinds which she had suffered. But would not Austria bear in mind the bonds she had entered into with Napoleon? She had no recent injury to avenge. Would she not see some advantage in maintaining a dynasty which, for a long time at least, could not dispense with her support, and which it would consequently have to purchase at whatever cost? Did not her conduct at Frankfort, in the first instance, justify a favorable belief in her secret intentions?

Occupying as he did the most prominent position in the midst of this terrible conflict, the Emperor Alexander had indeed great personal insults to avenge, and the burning of Moscow was liable to inspire the soldiery which followed

him with a strong desire to make France suffer something resembling the sacrifice which their fatherland had imposed on itself; but, alone also, amid all these sovereigns, Alexander had no interest actually clashing with those of France. When the quarrel between him and Napoleon should be settled, so to speak, as between man and man, one could not discern either in the present or in the future, why he should desire the excessive weakening of a power with which he had no point of contact, and which might some day become a most useful ally. From this quarter, therefore, one was justified in expecting entirely different action, and to those who had in their minds the interests of the House of Bourbon in conjunction, of course, with those of France, it was in that direction that they must seek the strongest support. But I can truly say that in those days they were yet only a few who concerned themselves seriously and especially in an active fashion with the fate of the royal family.

There is no doubt that a part of the old, and principally the high nobility, which, on their return from their emigration to foreign lands, had taken up their quarters in the Faubourg Saint-Germain, where, in a certain measure, they lived a separate life in the midst of Paris, had their eyes turned towards their former masters, who had remained the objects of regrets and hopes, which nothing that had happened had discouraged. In the departments of the west, many men of aristocratic birth, who dwelt amid the ruins of their former seigniorial manors, nourished the same sentiments. There was hardly a provincial town which did not contain a social circle animated with the same feelings; but all of them had nothing to offer but impotent prayers for the success of the cause to which they were devoted. I am in nowise exaggerating, when I state that even in Paris, outside of the *salons* to which I have just referred, it would

have been difficult to find more than a few persons who knew the King's place of residence in England, and who were aware that the Queen, his consort, was dead, and lay buried at Westminster. What I here state is not to be contradicted by the events which took place subsequently at Bordeaux ; these were the result of special causes which I will take care to make known in due time.

This very succinct *exposé* will, I am aware, give offence to those who seek to attribute the Restoration to their efforts or to the powerful influence exercised by themselves. But I believe there is some benefit to be derived from setting forth the power inherent in ancient rights, to make people understand that there are circumstances where principles alone can emerge from the deepest oblivion and stand out, of a sudden, as a resource which nations are glad to be able to cling to. Napoleon had felt this fully, as I have shown previously.<sup>1</sup> There was, nevertheless, a small number of men capable of calmly considering all the chances of the future ; their position enabled them to make a choice among these various solutions, and to give their support to those which should seem preferable to them for the common

<sup>1</sup> If my way of looking at things should have little value with certain persons, I must beg them to peruse the published narratives emanating from those who have thought themselves obliged to set off to advantage their merits and services. They will thus be enabled to form an opinion, with a full knowledge of the facts, both of the extent of the means and as to the value of the results obtained. There is, among others, a little volume bearing the title of *Journal d'un Français depuis le 9 mars jusqu'au 15 avril 1814*. M. de Gain-Montagnac, its author, and the chief actor, was as deep as anybody in the confidence and secrets of the Bourbon circle which existed and hestirred itself in the capital. He boldly risked going out to reconnoitre the position and to bear to the allies the expression of the desires of his party ; but, in good faith, what had he to tender to them beyond these desires ? Was it in his power to lead them to expect even a co-operation which had the slightest appearance of efficacy ? I have found it necessary to speak plainly at this stage on this somewhat delicate point, otherwise some surprise might be felt at the unimportant place I shall give in the course of my narrative to those who, since then, have imagined that they possessed such powerful claims on the gratitude of the sovereign.



weal. M. de Talleyrand deserves to be placed at the head of these men, and among the malcontents who sought shelter under his wing, the Duke of Dalberg and the Abbé Louis: the latter, impetuous to the point of imprudence, ambitious, angered at his talents in matters of finance not having been appreciated by the Emperor as greatly as he had for a moment hoped; the Duke of Dalberg, who intrigued to such a degree as to become, if so required, a conspirator, totally unprincipled in every respect, liberal-minded, haughty, and crafty at one and the same time, steeped in corruption, as are all idlers surfeited with the things of life, and demoralized by a sense of boredom and satiety. Both of them were eminently qualified to encourage M. de Talleyrand in the violent hatred which consumed him for some time past; both of them never ceased pointing out to him the dangers threatening him, should Napoleon ever again be in a position to give free rein to his resentment. They encountered little trouble in convincing him in this respect; but they found it a much more arduous task when it came to getting him to take any decided line of action.

A man who had had many trials in the course of a long life, the greater part of which was spent amid the vicissitudes of the Revolution, M. de Talleyrand knew how frequent are the whirligigs of fortune, especially in war. Moreover, his habits and his knowledge of the ways of diplomacy caused him greatly to distrust coalitions. He knew Austria's prudent circumspection, did not consider that her frank co-operation was an assured thing, and argued to himself that she might very well, at the eleventh hour, if she found it ever so little to her advantage, see fit to rescue from total ruin one whom she had previously led to the very brink of the precipice. To watch everything, to strive to know everything, to labor, without too far impli-

cating himself, to aggravate the embarrassments which might arise at any moment, and to hold himself in readiness to deal the fatal blow, if a favorable opportunity presented itself, such was from that time the plan of conduct which he laid down for himself, and which we are about to see him pursue with as much circumspection as perseverance.

From the very outset, the campaign did not open well for Napoleon. He had hardly reached Châlons, when he began to carry out his plan, and a bold piece of strategy had at first made him once more master of Saint-Dizier; but shortly afterwards, he had been compelled to purchase at the price of some most stubbornly contested engagements and of a rather considerable loss of men, the little town and citadel of Brienne. During the fight, he had frequently encountered no inconsiderable personal danger, and the way in which he had exposed himself to it might lead one to infer that he would have gladly welcomed death.

Three days later, he rashly accepted a pitched battle against an army of at least one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty thousand men, composed of Russians, Prussians, Austrians, Bavarians, Würtembergers, to whom he had only forty thousand men to oppose. These forces ought to have been able to crush him, but he worked wonders, and his troops behaved with admirable firmness. It has, moreover, been believed that the Austrians took a lesser share in the fighting than they might have done. He was none the less compelled to leave the enemy in possession of the battle-field, fortunate that his retreat was not turned into a rout, and without his ranks being broken through. He was forced to retreat by way of Troyes, which he soon had to abandon, to hurry back to the banks of the Marne, whence a Prussian army might threaten his capital. The allies entered Troyes almost immediately

after his departure. The moral effect produced in Paris by the news of this lost battle (it is known as the battle of La Rothière) and of the entry of the enemy into Troyes, was a deep one, and finally destroyed all hope. It was easily noticeable in the cooling off of the zeal of the very classes which until then had displayed the most. Thus, the capital had become one huge workshop, and almost the only one where it was possible to prepare all that was required for the maintenance of the army, its arming, equipments, and the clothing of the new levies directed from all parts towards this central point.

In the state of stagnation of trade and manufactures, this circumstance afforded great relief to the working classes, and yet but little eagerness was to be met with among the class furnishing contractors; very few of them came forward, and it became necessary to distribute among the shoemakers and tailors of the city the number of boots and uniforms which each one of them was made to supply. This duty, which was mine, as I was better acquainted with the manufacturing capabilities of each one, was all the more arduous from the fact that the result was not always satisfactory, and that the supplies, when they were not lacking altogether, were often of very poor quality.

It was pitiful to see the bands of conscripts who arrived daily, and who were drawn up in line in the open spaces, and on the public promenades. Could any hope be entertained of their being in a condition to hold their own against the hardened veterans, inured to the hardships of war, whose approach was being heralded? In such a state of affairs, the only hope lay in peace, which depended entirely on the congress which the allies had at last consented to open at Châtillon, whither it was known the Duc de Vicence had gone. The plenipotentiaries of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England were assembled there. The last-named power

had alone three representatives: Lords Aberdeen and Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart. Count de Stadion represented Austria, Count de Razoumovsky and Baron von Humboldt, Prussia. It was not, however, these diplomats, so fully entrusted with the necessary authority, who were to settle matters. Not far from Châtillon was being held another gathering, at which everything was being prepared, and whence came instructions which had to be strictly obeyed.

Lord Castlereagh had arrived, and was following in their march the headquarters of the sovereigns, together with their confidential ministers, viz. M. de Metternich for Austria, M. de Nesselrode for Russia, and M. de Hardenberg for Prussia. It was there that matters were really debated and gone into with serious intention, and that the real dispositions of the allies were manifested. Lord Castlereagh, on his way through Amsterdam, had installed there the Prince of Orange as King of Holland. At about the same moment, *Monsieur*, the brother of Louis XVIII., coming from England, had landed in the neighborhood of the Hague; he had thence wended his way to the eastern frontiers of France, getting as near as possible to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. These two circumstances combined (the second, it is true, was known only by a few) might have led one to suppose that the English government was rather inclined towards supporting the return of the Bourbons. But it has since been conclusively demonstrated that it had not made up its mind on that point, and that it reserved the right of taking counsel from the march of events.

## CHAPTER VIII

Opening of the Congress on the 8th of February — Conciliatory instructions and full powers given to the Duc de Vicence — The two first conferences — The allied plenipotentiaries lay down as the basis of all negotiations the return of France to its boundaries such as they were previous to the Revolution — The Duc de Vicence's very measured reply — Sudden breaking off of the conferences: acting under the inspiration of General Pozzo di Borgo, Russia proposes to her allies the restoration of the Bourbons — Opposition to this proposal shown by the Ministers of Austria, England, and Prussia: text of the contrary conclusions addressed by them to Russia — General Pozzo refutes these conclusions in the name of the Emperor Alexander — All hopes of peace vanish — The Duc de Vicence notified of the confirmation of rigorous conditions against France; he submits them to his sovereign — A succession of military events in the Emperor's favor: almost total destruction of a Russo-Prussian army corps; the large combined forces driven back to the left bank of the Seine — Napoleon's hopes of ultimate victory — His correspondence with the Duc de Vicence — He looks upon the proposals of the allies as degrading — Alarm felt at the headquarters of the coalesced sovereigns, and the offer of an armistice made by them on the 23d of February — Under the inspiration of General Pozzo, Russia persists in laying down unacceptable conditions — Reasons which forbade Napoleon's submitting to such unreasonable demands — First steps taken by a few Royalists in Champagne, led by the Chevalier de Gonault — Indignation felt in the invaded provinces against the Royalists — Exaltation of the national spirit in the face of the foreigner's presence — The Emperor almost unanimously welcomed with cheers on his entry into Troyes — The Chevalier de Gonault sentenced to death.

THE Congress of Châtillon opened on the 5th of February, a few days after the battle of La Rothière. On the day after that battle, the Emperor, no longer able to conceal from himself how critical was his situation, had written the following letter to the Duc de Vicence. It reveals how

greatly he was desirous that the negotiations should come to a prompt issue.

“*Monsieur le duc de Vicence*, — I am going to Troyes, which I shall reach to-morrow. I have instructed M. de La Besnardière to go and join you.

“The enemy’s troops are everywhere behaving outrageously. Everybody is seeking a refuge in the woods. One no longer finds any one but peasants in the villages. The enemy consumes everything, takes all horses and cattle, clothing, and even the peasantry’s ragged garments. They beat everybody, men and women, and commit a great number of rapes. This picture, which I have seen with my own eyes, will readily make you understand my desire to quickly relieve my subjects of this state of misery and suffering, which is truly horrible. It must also give food for thought to the enemy, for the Frenchman is not long-enduring. He is by nature brave, and I expect to see the people organize in bands, of their own volition. You are to present a most energetical picture of these excesses. Boroughs of two thousand souls, like Brienne, are no longer inhabited.

“Whereupon, etc.

“PINEY, February 2d, 1814.”

Five days after writing this letter Napoleon sent unlimited powers to his plenipotentiary, to which M. de Bassano added a letter wherein were the following words: “His Majesty instructs me to inform you in plain terms that he gives you *carte blanche* to carry on the negotiations to a happy termination, to save the capital, and to avoid a battle; therein lies the nation’s last hope.” Napoleon was still under the impression that the Frankfort propositions would serve as the basis of the negotiations; it was an illusion which he soon had to renounce. The allies were only too well aware to what a degree the advantages of their position had increased in three months, and their pretensions could no longer be limited to such moderate terms.

At the first conference, their plenipotentiaries were careful to declare that they were instructed to stipulate, not

only on behalf of the Courts which had sent them, but also on that of all the powers of Europe engaged with them in the present war. They presented a declaration of Great Britain's, the object of which was to set aside all discussion regarding the maritime code, should it be carried on in opposition to the usages observed up to that time. They even went so far as to state that they would consider any attempt on the part of France to insist on this point as opposed to the object for which they had all assembled, and as having a tendency to prevent peace being re-established.

The Duc de Vicence made a reply conceived in terms which allowed it to be construed into an acceptance. Everything, therefore, at this first sitting, seemed to announce the intention of making rapid progress and of a desire to reach a conclusion. When the Russian plenipotentiary, M. de Razoumovsky, made known that he was still without written instructions, the Duc de Vicence expressed his readiness to waive this formality, but the other plenipotentiaries having remarked that M. de Razoumovsky's instructions would probably arrive in the course of the day, the conference was adjourned to the next day. This incident was in itself pregnant with significance, and might be considered as a rather unfavorable symptom of Russia's intentions.

The second conference took place on the 7th. At this one, the allied plenipotentiaries demanded in a positive fashion that "France should consent to return to the boundaries which were hers previous to the Revolution, subject to arrangements mutually to be agreed upon as to certain portions of territory outside these limits, and belonging to the respective contracting parties, and subject to certain restitutions which England was prepared to make, in the general interests of Europe, in exchange for the retrocessions demanded. France was, in consequence, to renounce all direct influence beyond her future boundaries, and all

titles to sovereignty and protectorate over Italy, Germany, and Switzerland."

The tenor of such a proposition would presumably give rise to a sharp discussion, and to the most delicate pourparlers, since the Duc de Vicence was tendered a basis so different from the one upon which he had expected to take up his position. Nevertheless, he had so fully determined to negotiate and to reach a conclusion at any price, that he at first contented himself with asking for a few hours wherein to prepare his reply. The sitting was therefore adjourned until seven o'clock in the evening, when he brought with him a declaration, of which the following is the substance.

The engagement taken by his Court to make the greatest sacrifices for the sake of peace was renewed. However much the demand made that day, in the name of the allied powers, differed from the terms proposed by them at Frankfort, terms based on what the allies had themselves defined as France's natural limits, in spite of this stupendous modification, and notwithstanding the objections which could be raised against it, he would nevertheless define clearly his position in connection with such demand.

But all the questions now before the congress were so interwoven and so subordinate one to the other, that no decision could be reached as to any particular one without an acquaintance with all of them. It could not, besides, be a matter of indifference to him of whom such important sacrifices were demanded, to know for whose benefit he was being asked to consent to them, and what would be the result of his acquiescence; if lastly, in resigning himself to accept them, he might entertain the hope of putting an end to the horrors of war. A scheme which should lay down the views of the allies as a whole, could alone therefore tend to the goal it was sought to attain. The Duc de Vicence consequently insisted that the plenipotentiaries of



the allied Courts should express themselves in plain terms regarding the points he had just set forth.

It was assuredly impossible to assume any position which could better make it understood that he was desirous of coming to an understanding, and, saving a pure and simple acceptance, it was difficult to go any further, and to make more frank advances. The allied plenipotentiaries declared that they accepted the answer *ad referendum*; but what was the astonishment of the Duc de Vicence, when he received, on the 9th, a letter from these same plenipotentiaries, whereby they informed him that the Emperor of Russia having seen fit to consult with the sovereigns, his allies, as to the object of the Châtillon conferences, His Majesty had instructed his plenipotentiary to state that he desired that the conferences should be suspended until he had communicated to him his ulterior instructions! The French plenipotentiary was therefore notified that the conferences must be suspended, and that care would be taken to inform him when it would be possible to resume them. In vain did the Duc de Vicence reply by a note, wherein he sought to point out the indecency of such a proceeding; the thing was a settled matter, and he was unable to obtain that it should be otherwise.

The Duc de Vicence, who had retained the habit of writing confidentially to M. de Metternich, informed him, during the course of the same day, of his intention of asking the allied plenipotentiaries whether France, by consenting to return to its ancient boundaries, would immediately obtain an armistice; that in the case an armistice was to be secured through such a sacrifice, he was prepared to make it, and even, if this were to be the case, to hand over at once a portion of the fortified towns which France was about to lose.

How is the resolution which had so abruptly suspended the conferences to be explained? It had originated in the

mind of the Emperor Alexander, and had been inspired by General Pozzo. The successes won at the outset of the campaign by the allied armies had at last furnished an admirable opportunity to destroy an enemy with whom peace would never mean anything but an insidious truce. To complete his ruin, said General Pozzo, it is necessary to put in his place a family to whom ancient traditions are likely to give uncontested rights and authority. The House of Bourbon alone presented this advantage; although forgotten, the splendor of its restoration would give to it a fresh lustre and would revive recollections that had not been altogether effaced. In putting forward this idea, the general was serving both his old hatred and his former affections. He was, to give him his due, faithful to the cause he had defended in the Legislative Assembly of 1792.

Alexander easily allowed himself to be carried away by these seductive arguments. The plan of again placing the Bourbons on the throne of France could not but please his imagination, when presented to him as having chances of success. He thus could enjoy the twofold satisfaction of striking down a rival, with whom all reconciliation seemed an impossibility, and to couple his name with restoring to its pristine position the most ancient of the reigning families, at the very time when all sovereigns, even those bound to it by the closest blood ties, seemed to have deserted its cause. When instructing his plenipotentiary to cause the conferences to be suspended, the Emperor of Russia had, therefore, acted with the object of obtaining from his allies that they should no longer treat with Napoleon, but await the course of events; he next instigated a serious discussion as to whether it was not opportune to favor the return of the Bourbons. The Austrian cabinet had drawn up a memorandum presented by M. de Metternich, the object of which was diametrically opposed to the foregoing

plan. Alarmed at the magnitude of the undertaking in which they were engaged, finding the line of military operations badly secured, anxious over the hostile display of the population on the army's rear, this cabinet believed it would be advisable to grasp the opportunity presented to sign a favorable peace as quickly as possible. Hence they thought it better to stay the progress of military operations than to accelerate them.

These two utterly different views of the situation were simultaneously submitted for discussion to the four principal ministers attached to headquarters. The result of the conference was far from meeting the views of the Emperor Alexander. The ministers of Austria, England, and Prussia maintained that it would be contrary to the rules of prudence and sound policy, to cast aside an assured and most advantageous result for the sake of pursuing a goal which could only be reached with great difficulty. They enjoyed the certainty of obtaining from Napoleon a peace almost such as one could wish. Were it sought to drive him to the last straits, were it attempted to impose the House of Bourbon on France at a time when not a voice was being raised on its behalf, when nearly the whole of the country did not even seem to remember its existence, it was running the risk of awakening a resistance, which, at the present moment, there was no cause to dread. That if Napoleon accepted the propositions made him, or if he merely asked such modifications of them as would be acceptable, it would be neither just nor reasonable, nor consequent with what had already been done, to refuse coming to an understanding with him. There was even no reason to deny an armistice. M. de Metternich had not neglected making known the overtures made to him in this respect by the Duc de Vicence, and the conditions he had offered in order to obtain it. It would not seem that this opinion,

plainly expressed by the three ministers, had been strongly opposed by M. de Nesselrode, who would willingly have subscribed to it, had he been free to follow his personal inclinations.

To speak plainly, the Emperor Alexander was, in this matter, in accord only with M. de Pozzo. Lord Castlereagh and M. de Hardenberg, in order to give additional weight to their opinion, respectively drew up notes which were to be submitted to the Emperor Alexander. Finally, by way of a conclusion, M. de Hardenberg, who was entrusted with the task, drew up a *résumé* of the arguments which had prevailed at the conference. A certain circumstance enabled me to see the original document, as well as the note drawn up by Lord Castlereagh; I am therefore able to guarantee the correctness of the facts I here state.

The letter of M. de Hardenberg, which was joined to the *résumé*, is dated the 15th, and he was already aware of the first reverses experienced by Blücher on the Marne, and he had not neglected to make good use of this knowledge to add strength to his arguments. He still dwelt on the futility of relinquishing positive advantages for the sake of pursuing others which were entirely problematical. It would be a grand and glorious deed to replace the House of Bourbon on its throne, but could the Emperor Alexander be desirous of sacrificing the blood of his brave soldiers for an object which was not essential? Again, should so much confidence be placed in fortune? and however great might be the victories won so far, was it any the less a reason not to dread reverses? Were not great dangers still to be encountered?

Austria had made clear the situation with rare wisdom; it was impossible that Prussia should take any risks to make an experiment, the results of which were altogether doubtful. Alexander, to whom she owed so much, would

surely not seek to jeopardize the immense services he had rendered her by pursuing a new goal, the vain attempt to attain which might result in undoing all that had so far been done. In his impatience to see the negotiations with Napoleon make rapid strides, M. de Hardenberg, taking it for granted that the armistice would become an accomplished fact, put forward the idea that Paris should be neutralized, and that the sovereigns should all go thither with a detachment of their Guard; thus, being on the spot, it would be easier to come to an understanding; once in the capital, the national spirit could be better gauged, and one must fain admit that up to that time the nation had not expressed itself in favor of the return of the former dynasty.

It is likely that this idea of neutralizing Paris was put forward to flatter the desire attributed to the Emperor Alexander not to return to his empire ere he had in his turn entered the capital of the man who had entered his own, sword in hand. The following is the almost literal text of the note, drawn up under the title of *conclusion*:—

“1. The Russian plenipotentiary at Châtillon shall be instructed to resume negotiations;

“2. The Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be authorized to reply to the Duc de Vicence that the allied plenipotentiaries are prepared to listen to and to admit pourparlers towards an armistice on the terms submitted by the French negotiator, to wit: that military guarantees shall be furnished the allies for a peace founded on the principle that France is prepared to return within the boundaries she possessed previous to 1792;

“3. That the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon should be ordered to negotiate and to conclude an armistice on the following terms: a suspension of hostilities, for the term of a fortnight, subject to a three days' denunciation; the immediate surrender of the fortresses of Luxemburg, Bergen-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Mayence, and Mantua; Huningen and Besançon to be given up as depots, while the troops constituting their garrison were to go into depot cantonments; France's boundaries, such as they were previous to 1792, to be accepted as the basis of a peace.”

The most remarkable thing about Lord Castlereagh's special note was the care he took to lay down that every rule of diplomacy would be violated if England refused to treat with Napoleon, when so many steps had already been taken, with her consent and participation, for the opening of the negotiations. Thus, England, who had for so long and so persistently refused to recognize Napoleon as Emperor of the French, now appeared as the power most anxious to treat with him, as she would have done with any sovereign whose rights she had recognized in the most positive fashion; she was, therefore, following Austria's lead.

One can readily conceive the vexation felt by the Emperor Alexander, when the result of the deliberations of the four ministers was laid before him. On General de Pozzo entering his presence, he greeted him, while giving him the documents to read, with a: "Well, you see that all is at an end; they are going to conclude an armistice, and that man is once more going to be our master." M. de Pozzo replied that in his opinion nothing was settled as yet; that one could perhaps not flatter oneself on being able to prevent negotiations from going on, but that one might very well oppose the armistice, and that if His Majesty firmly rejected it, it would certainly not be concluded.

At the same time, General de Pozzo begged Alexander to grant him until the following morning, to enable him to draw up a refutation of Austria's memorandum, as well as of the special note of M. de Hardenberg, and, on the following day, both documents were submitted to the Emperor. I have read the minutes. The refutation dwelt principally on the inconveniences and dangers of an armistice; such a measure would, it was argued, be entirely to the advantage of Napoleon and to the detriment of his allies, who could only feel sure of reaching a peace the conditions of which would be entirely secure, by pushing military operations

with the most extreme activity and without allowing the enemy a moment's rest. As to the House of Bourbon, it was doubtless not advisable to seek to impose it on France, should this country not express a desire for its return; but, without prejudging the question, was it possible to be acquainted with the actual sentiments of the country, so long as the one who had ruled over it for so many years should still be in a position to defend his power, so long as people were allowed to believe that the allies were dealing with him as with the only possible sovereign? Was it not plain that great hopes could be founded on the march of events, and that from what they would give birth to it would be alone possible to form an exact appreciation of the dispositions of the French people? One might, therefore, if it was deemed advisable, continue negotiating with Napoleon, but this should at least be done while adhering firmly to the conditions already submitted to his plenipotentiary, and in not suffering the slightest modification of them. As to the armistice, it was altogether inadmissible. The firm tone of this refutation was doubtless such as to produce a deep impression on the allies of the Emperor Alexander.

In the special reply vouchsafed to M. de Hardenberg, the Emperor took no pains to conceal his discontent, and to make the weight of it fall more especially on the one among the allies who stood in most need of his support, and who, more than any one else, should show himself anxious to humor him. The following are the sentences which have most struck me in this document: "It is impossible for me not to perceive from the document addressed to me a step evidently concerted with the object of running counter to my desire of securing peace by the destruction of the armies yielding obedience to Napoleon, and of thus stamping out his political existence. I had so far, sir, been under the

impression that you shared these my views. You know better than anybody else whether or not I have ever sought to risk the welfare of Prussia for the sake of advantages altogether problematical. I have never ceased pursuing projects tending to its aggrandizement, and I will not cease acting thus in the future, in spite of all the annoyances I am made to feel. I should have desired that the King's intentions should have been communicated to me in a more confidential fashion, without assuming the shape of a measure concerted with the object of causing me to adopt the views of others. I will persist in my own without any deviation therefrom, because it is by virtue of them that I have, up to this time, been able to secure the good of my allies. I will so regulate my conduct as not to give any color whatsoever to the exaggerated suppositions which are being put forward to throw obstacles in the way of the policy regarding which I flatter myself that Russia and Prussia will ever remain in accord; their union will materially contribute towards cementing that of the others."

I have seen the pencilled note written by Alexander, on returning the draft to its author. It was couched in the following words: "I approve of it fully, and have only made some slight alterations to it." The letter was, therefore, written and immediately dispatched, as well as the answer to the Memorandum and to the joint Conclusion.

On the day following, M. de Hardenberg quickly sent his reply; he complained that he had been misunderstood, threw himself at the Emperor's feet, and declared that he was prepared to withdraw from any active participation in the matter, if his presence was for a single instant to become an obstacle to the closest union between the crowns of Russia and Prussia, a union which his master would never sacrifice under any consideration whatever. Prussia thus being brought back into the Russian fold, Austria and



England were only too glad to adopt the middle course proposed to them,—that of continuing the negotiations, but without any conclusion of armistice.

Thus vanished the hope of a negotiation entered into with a sincere desire for peace, which Napoleon would doubtless have obtained only at the cost of enormous sacrifices, but which would certainly not have involved his absolute ruin. The idea of an armistice having been finally cast aside, the drawing up of the conditions, the bases of which had been laid before the congress on the 7th, was proceeded with. In affecting to render more severe and not to mitigate the harsh measures adopted against France, it was especially sought to vindicate the use it was intended to make of the territorial cessions which were exacted. It was formally stipulated that the Emperor of the French was to recognize the right of the allied powers to fix, according to the treaties existing between them, the limits and international relations of the countries ceded by France and of their respective states, without France being permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus completed, the draft of a preliminary treaty between the allied powers and France was sent to the plenipotentiaries at Châtillon. On the 17th, they informed the Duc de Vicence that there no longer was anything to prevent the conferences from being resumed; and indeed, the very same day, a conference was held at which they made known that Austria's Minister of Foreign Affairs having brought to the knowledge of the allied Courts the overtures addressed to him on the 9th by the Duc de Vicence, with reference to an armistice, they had authorized their plenipotentiaries to declare that they held that a preliminary treaty based on the same principle as the armistice, and which should result in an immediate cessation of hostilities on land and on sea, would better and more properly attain the goal generally sought for.

It was impossible to place the French plenipotentiaries in a more distressful situation. The Duc de Vicence, who had been in constant dread of a rupture, contented himself at that sitting with making a few remarks on the most important points, in particular in regard to those bearing on the situation of Saxony, and to the rights which the King of Westphalia and the Viceroy of Italy might possess, the former, to an indemnity, and the latter, to the possession of the kingdom of Italy, when Napoleon should have renounced it.

The allied plenipotentiaries replied that they would stand for the time being by their project; so M. de Vicence came to a conclusion with the remark that the document which he had just heard read was too important to allow of an immediate answer, and that he reserved to himself to propose an ulterior conference to the plenipotentiaries of the allied Courts. He then hastened to dispatch a courier to Napoleon, in order to lay before him these harsh terms and to take his final orders.

M. de Caulaincourt has been censured for not having availed himself of his powers to subscribe without hesitation, on the 17th of February, to the draft of the treaty presented to him, and which he thought it his duty to submit to the Emperor. His reply to this has been that, acquainted as he was with the character of the man whom he represented, he had not considered that he could expose himself to a denial of ratification which was among the probabilities, and which would have rendered the situation still more critical.

In the meanwhile, there had happened most important events, which had decided Napoleon to curtail the powers previously entrusted to his negotiator. Consequent upon a series of manœuvrings and engagements most skilfully carried out, he had, between the 10th and the 14th, trans-

ported his army from the banks of the Seine to those of the Marne, and, sweeping down unawares on the Russo-Prussian army corps which skirted that river, had all but destroyed it; then, once more directing his efforts with incredible rapidity against the great combined army, he had driven it back to the left bank of the Seine in a couple of engagements which did not yield in brilliancy to the preceding ones. He was all the less inclined to accept the harsh conditions which it had been sought to impose on him at Châtillon, from the fact that he flattered himself that he had once more regained over the allies the ascendancy of victory, and that he thought he had reached the hour when the winning of a single battle would decide in his favor the great question of France's remaining within her natural boundaries. It was then that he said: "The allies are not aware that I am at present nearer to Munich and to Vienna than they are to Paris."

If I cannot vouch for his having uttered these words, I can at least guarantee the genuineness of the following documents addressed to M. de Caulaincourt on the 17th and 19th of February, and 2d of March. That dated the 17th, already made public by M. Fain, is so necessary for a proper comprehension of the situation that I consider it worth reproducing at this juncture.

"*Monsieur le duc de Vicence*, — I gave you *carte blanche* for the purpose of saving Paris and avoiding a battle which was the last hope of the nation. This battle has been fought, and Providence has granted us success. I have made between thirty and forty thousand prisoners; I have captured two hundred guns, a number of generals, and destroyed several armies, almost without striking a blow. Yesterday I cut in two the army of Prince von Schwarzenberg, and I hope to destroy it ere it can recross the boundaries of my empire.

"Your attitude must remain unchanged; all your efforts must tend towards securing a peace; but my wish is that you should not sign anything without my order, for I alone know my position. Speaking

in a general way, I desire nothing but a lasting and honorable peace, and it cannot be such except on the terms proposed at Frankfort.

“Had the allies accepted your proposals on the 9th no battle would have been fought; I should not have dared fortune at a time when the slightest failure would have lost France, and I should not have become aware of their weakness; it is but fair that I should now reap the advantages of the chances which have veered round to my side. I am desirous of obtaining peace, but not a peace which would impose on France conditions more humiliating than those contained in the Frankfort terms. My position is certainly more advantageous than at the time when the allies were at Frankfort; then, they could defy me, for I had won no advantage over them, and they were at a distance from my territory. It is far different to-day. I have won immense advantages over them, advantages such as a twenty years’ military career of some splendor does not afford the like.

“I am prepared to cease hostilities and to let the enemy depart in peace for home, if the preliminaries based on the Frankfort terms are signed.

“The enemy’s bad faith and the violation of the most sacred engagements alone interpose delays between us; for we are at so little distance from each other that if the enemy suffers you to correspond directly with me, your dispatches can be answered in the space of twenty-four hours. Moreover, I am going to come nearer you.

“Whereupon, I pray the Almighty will watch over and protect you.

“NANGIS, February 17th, 1814.

“P.S. — How does it happen that to-day only, the 18th, I have received your dispatches of the 14th? We are, after all, but fifteen leagues distant from you.”

On the 19th he had received the mail sent by the Duc de Vicence, and the following is his first reply:—

“*Monsieur le duc de Vicence*, — I have ordered the arrest of the English couriers. I am so deeply moved at the infamous proposition which you transmit to me, that I consider myself dishonored by the mere fact of having placed myself in such a position that it should have been made to you. I will inform you of my intentions from Troyes or from Châtillon, but I think that I should have preferred losing Paris to see you submit such propositions to the French nation.

You are forever speaking of the Bourbons ; I would prefer to see the Bourbons in France coupled with reasonable conditions, to the infamous propositions which you send me. I repeat to you my order to declare in the protocol that the natural limits do not give France any but the same power as that enjoyed by Louis XVI.

“ Whereupon . . .

“ CHÂTEAU DE SURVILLE, February 19th, 1814.”

On the 2d of March, having received another letter from the Duc de Vicence, this is his reply :—

“ *Monsieur le duc de Vicence*, — I am in receipt of your letter of the 27th. You will find herewith the rough sketch of the declaration which you are to make. You may tone it down and change the phraseology, but you are to preserve the substance.

“ Whereupon . . .

“ LA FERTE-SOUS-JOUARRE, March 2d, 1814.”

“ The undersigned has been ordered by his government to state that as the note submitted to him by the plenipotentiaries of the allies does not represent a proposition, but a capitulation, and that it contains matters contrary to the dignity and honor of France, it cannot serve as a basis for negotiation ; that the real basis of all discussion was in the propositions submitted at Frankfort by M. de Metternich, Lord Aberdeen, M. de Nesselrode, and in the name of Chancellor de Hardenberg, and which, owing to France's acceptance of them, carry the weight of a concluded affair. The undersigned has been instructed to annex a copy of these propositions to the present statement. He is, however, instructed to renew the declaration that in no case will France renounce her natural limits, comprised, as most accurately defined by Prince de Metternich, Count de Nesselrode, and Lord Aberdeen, between the Rhine, the Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, the allies agreeing that France shall retain the rank which she enjoyed among the powers previous to the Revolution ; the increase in territory which she has since then acquired is far less than the equivalent secured by Russia, Austria, and Prussia through the partition of Poland, the secularization of the bishoprics of Germany, and the uniting of Venice to Austria, and the acquisitions made by England of the island of Malta, of a portion of the Dutch colonies, and of the whole of the vast Indian peninsula.

“England is not making any cession to France in giving her Pondicherry and the settlements of India, without the addition of the Ile de France (Mauritius) and the Ile de la Réunion. Without these islands France could not derive any advantage from the Indian settlements, and would therefore renounce all claims to them. With England retaining possession of the Saintes, that of Guadeloupe would be burdensome to France. England retains Tobago. Thus, instead of the restitutions which England has made with such a flourish as a contribution towards a general peace, she should have said that she would make restitution only of Martinique, a little island of secondary importance to France, especially since sugar has become a product indigenous to her soil. These restitutions are far from those which she made at the Treaty of Amiens.

“All the powers of Europe are by rights independent. All of them, to wit: Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Würtemberg, Switzerland, etc., are to be represented at the Congress, unless these countries should, in order to avoid delays, prefer delegating their full powers to the Ministers of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. But France cannot bring herself to recognize the species of supremacy which would result from any other method of procedure, to the advantage of the four allied powers over the other powers of Europe, and which would exclude France from the European system. It would only, therefore, be as their delegates that the plenipotentiaries of the four powers could represent independent powers, which is in conformity with the principle of the Frankfort terms to which France has given her adhesion: that no power shall claim any supremacy, direct or indirect, over the others.

“No nation desires peace more than France, since none stands in greater need of it, owing to the union of all the powers against her. But the undersigned is instructed to declare that, whatever may be the misfortunes which weigh so heavily on the French nation and the urgency of circumstances, nothing will induce her to subscribe to anything likely to degrade her national character, and make her fall from the high estate she has occupied in the world for so many centuries.

“When Europe, after having taken cognizance of the Frankfort conditions, set forth in the first place in the note of the ministers of the allied powers, again in the declaration made public at Frankfort by the allied Courts, and lastly in the proclamations of Prince von Schwarzenberg, and moreover accepted by France, will learn of the degrading capitulation subsequently submitted by the plenipotentiaries

of the French nation, she will realize that it is not to establish an European equilibrium and to give a lasting peace to the world that the powers have formed a coalition, but to degrade or destroy a nation of thirty million inhabitants."

The two last documents placed before the reader bear the date of the 2d of March, and are submitted in anticipation of the course of events; I have given them here in order to make better known the dispositions of the Emperor after his last successes. He hastened to countermand his orders to Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, whom he had, after the battle of La Rothière, commanded to evacuate the Kingdom of Italy and to return to France at the earliest possible moment, merely leaving a few garrisons in the most strongly fortified cities. This resolution, which he renounced so readily, was nevertheless an exceedingly prudent one, and the only thing he could reproach himself with was that he had not taken it sooner. Had the army of Italy returned to France by way of Mont Cenis, directed its steps towards Lyons, it would have given to the corps left under the orders of Marshal Augereau a marked superiority over the troops of the enemy manœuvring between the Rhone and the Seine, and the advantages resulting therefrom might have been decisive; the Austrian's vast army would have found itself threatened in its rear, and would have been compelled to begin a retrograde movement. Was it not too late when Napoleon ordered the Viceroy of Italy, at the beginning of February, to withdraw his forces from Italy? There can be no doubt on this point; this does not prevent his having committed a serious mistake when three weeks later he recalled this order. Nothing better depicts the state of his mind than the following sentence, which was embodied in the letter whereby he informed his adopted son of his newly conceived intentions and of his brilliant hopes: "I have found, and again put on, my boots of the Italian campaign."

People around him were far from sharing his confidence, especially in the capital. It was plainly seen that with the large number of enemies he had on his hands, the danger which he warded off in one direction became simultaneously more pressing in others. How disguise from oneself the fact that with a little more determination of purpose, the vast army of the allies could have easily forced its way past the feeble corps in front of it, and marched towards Paris? In spite of the little activity displayed by its chiefs, the French generals had been driven to take up a position so near to the capital that the principal artillery park had been established in the gardens of the village of Bercy, adjoining the Faubourg Saint-Antoine. It was, it is true, said that a misunderstanding in the execution of orders had alone been the cause of this retrograde step, and indeed, the park had, almost immediately, been moved to a more advanced position, but the alarm thus caused was none the less lively; the impression felt in this connection was not one to be promptly effaced; moreover, it was soon to be fully justified by several most alarming occurrences. As the Emperor, who had returned to the banks of the Seine, was engaged in driving before him the great combined army, whose leaders, evidently bent on denying him the decisive battle, the object of all his hopes, were falling back as far as the opposite bank of the Aube, one learnt of the arrival at Laon of a new Russo-Prussian army corps, which, having left Brussels early in February, was hastening to the support of the one recently defeated on the banks of the Marne. According to all appearances, the Emperor would soon be compelled to retrace his steps in order to meet this danger, to which the two feeble corps, composed at most of ten or twelve thousand men, which he had left behind under the command of Marshals Marmont and Mortier, were not in a condition to make any resistance.



Thus the plan of campaign of the allies was developing itself clearly; by threatening the capital on two sides, and forcing Napoleon to rush to the defence now of one, then of the other, his troops would soon become exhausted by continual marches and countermarches. There was nothing brilliant about this plan, which affords a proof of the fear still overawing Europe, in the presence of the man who had so often conquered it.

An armistice was tendered Napoleon on the 23d of February, while under the walls of Troyes, just as he was preparing to enter the city. Its proposition, it is said, was counselled in a fresh memorandum of M. de Metternich's, resuming the train of ideas which he had emitted a fortnight before. Alexander was no more favorable to them in this instance than in the first, but the circumstances, which had become far more serious, did not allow of an absolute demurrer on his part.

Napoleon was not going to reject such an overture, so commissioners were named by both parties, and Lusigny was appointed as the place of meeting. M. de Flahault represented France; no one desired peace more than he did, and no one was more firmly convinced that it was necessary to accept great sacrifices in order to obtain it. The conferences led to no result; they did not for a single instant slacken the operations of the campaign. It is nevertheless a fact that at the time this attempt at coming to an understanding took place, great was the anxiety at the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. The Austrian party, ever most active, derived great strength from the impression produced by Napoleon's recent successes; all the reports of Generalissimo Prince von Schwarzenberg tended towards presenting the military situation as a bad one,—nay, as very alarming. Even at that moment there was considerable hesitation in the councils of the coalition; it is allowa-

ble to suppose that Napoleon was aware of this, and that this circumstance had much to do with the orders which he soon after sent to Châtillon.

The very inert co-operation of Austria's huge army in a struggle wherein it might, at the outset, have struck a decisive blow, and whereof she intentionally delayed the issue, shows that her dispositions were, in the main, rather conciliatory; England considered herself bound to second Austria's views; if they were finally set aside, it was solely owing to the firmness of purpose of the Emperor of Russia acting under the advice of General de Pozzo, whose hatred of Napoleon made him the most relentless enemy of France's grandeur. It was he who refuted M. de Metternich's latest memorandum, as well as Prince von Schwarzenberg's *exposé* of the military situation.

The result of the determination reached after a lively discussion was to carry on the plan of campaign I have already pointed out, and to send to the plenipotentiaries assembled at Châtillon the order not to deviate from the terms laid down on the 17th of February. Is any blame to be attached to Napoleon for not resigning himself to them? Could those who were tendering them expect to see him accept them? I am convinced that in presenting them, those best advised felt sure he could not subscribe to them, and only did so with the object of having them rejected. They never desired anything but the absolute ruin of Napoleon, whose existence seemed to them incompatible with a lasting peace in Europe.

Who can entertain any doubt that this was the idea of General de Pozzo? Admitting that Napoleon had resigned himself to accept these conditions, that in execution of the treaty he should have brought back within the borders of ancient France all the prisoners he had left behind in Germany, all the troops which were in Italy and in the

fortified towns between Dantzic and Antwerp, he would, by uniting these forces to those he had about him, and to those commanded by Soult and Suchet on the frontier, have found himself at the head of an army of at least from four to five hundred thousand men, which would have been the finest in Europe. Does one imagine that, with his consummate skill, it would have been difficult for him to recover Belgium and the Rhenish provinces. They had contracted bad habits, had linked their interests with those of France in such a way as would have promptly determined them to reopen their doors to him. This result was patent, and must have been foreseen by the statesmen of the coalition.

In order to regain such favorable opportunities, could Napoleon accept conditions, the moral effect of which dealt a severe blow at his prestige? Was it possible that the man to whom the Republic had handed over a France which extended to the banks of the Rhine, who had since then invaded Italy and placed the Iron Crown on his brow, and added to his empire the half of Germany, could consent to see France weaker than she was before the Revolution? What answer could he give to those who should ask him to account for the blood of three millions of Frenchmen uselessly shed on so many battle-fields?

The position it was sought to impose on him would not have been tenable, and I cannot but think that he was right not to subject himself to it. When a man has risen so high, it is a hundred times better for him to allow himself to be precipitated from that eminence than to consent to descend so low. The letter to the Duc de Vicence was, to my mind, grand and noble; there was real grandeur in these words: "You are forever speaking to me of the Bourbons."

On the 19th of February, he was writing these lines; on the 24th, on re-entering the capital of Champagne, he made

a cruel and useless example of a resident of that part of the country, the Chevalier de Gonault. Upon the arrival of the foreign armies, this unfortunate man had been so imprudent as to declare openly his preferences for the House of Bourbon; throwing aside the tricolor cockade, and once more donning the Cross of St. Louis, he had undertaken with the assistance of one of his friends, the Marquis de Vidranges, the drawing up and promulgation of an address, whereby the allied sovereigns were asked to replace this house on the throne of France; they had with great difficulty succeeded in obtaining some twenty subscribers to the document; this, however, had not prevented them from presenting it to the Emperor Alexander. He had, showing extreme caution, not given them any encouragement, and even had been generous enough to warn them that they were running the chance of compromising themselves. "We have not come," he had said, "to give a king to France; it is for her to know her own desires." The step taken by them, the first of its kind, and made in towns occupied by the enemy, had none the less created a sensation all the greater that it contrasted in a marked fashion with the sentiments awakened by the sufferings of war. The presence of the foreigner, so far from extinguishing the national sentiment, had, on the contrary, stimulated it; the vexations inseparable from an invasion carried on by an army composed of so many different nations, the pillaging, the acts of violence committed by the troops and by the Cossacks had exasperated the peasantry. In many districts, they were leaving the villages to take refuge in the woods, whence they attacked detachments and killed stragglers; from day to day the war assumed a more odious character, and truly became a national one. This was one of the dangers most dreaded, for obvious reasons, by the coalition; it was likewise one of those which had most struck M. de Metternich.

Finally, it is a fact that the vigor displayed by Napoleon in a defence so fraught with perils had brought back to him, through the admiration it imposed on them, many supporters. The provinces wherein he had won back the greater number of partisans were precisely those which most suffered from this war which his mad actions had drawn upon French soil. Thus are to be explained the almost unanimous acclamations which welcomed him at Troyes, on the 24th; he was greeted as a liberator, and the residents of the city were lavish in giving his troops all kinds of succor.

Such being the popular feeling, it is not surprising that many accusing voices should have been raised against the unfortunate Royalists who had dared to solicit the return of the Bourbons. It was not known that in addition to taking this step they had sent a deputation to Monsieur, Comte d'Artois, whose arrival in Switzerland was no secret. Fortunately for the Marquis de Vidranges, this mission had been entrusted to him, and so he was beyond the reach of danger. With regard to the Chevalier de Gonault, who had not been wise enough to fly, he was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death by a military commission. He was the only victim, no other subscriber to the address having been molested.

## CHAPTER IX

Arrival of Monsieur at Vesoul and of the Duc d'Angoulême at Saint-Jean de Luz, where he issues a manifesto — The South's hostility to Napoleon — The Royalist party of Paris sends M. de Vitrolles on a mission to the allies — M. de Talleyrand's prudent reserve in this contingency — Cool reception granted by the Austrians to the Royalist emissary; the Emperor Alexander pledges himself to a far greater extent — Napoleon, after beating Blücher at Craonne, is defeated at Laon; he then returns to the banks of the Aube and of the Seine, to meet the great army of the allies — Signing of the Treaty of Chaumont — At Châtillon, the Duc de Vicence defends the ground inch by inch; he presents a counter-draft of a treaty; it is rejected by the allied plenipotentiaries, who break off the negotiations — Napoleon makes up his mind too late to grant concessions — Alexander inclines more and more towards the Bourbons — The Emperor, fearing that the Pope may fall into the hands of the allies, resolves upon sending him back to Italy — He adopts the same resolution regarding the Spanish princes, and gives them their freedom — The English invade the Southern departments — M. Lynch, mayor of Bordeaux, and M. de La Rochejaquelein deliver up the city to the Duc d'Angoulême and to Marshal Beresford.

JUST as Monsieur was arriving at Vesoul, the Duc d'Angoulême entered France in rear of the English army, and on the 11th, he made public a proclamation at Saint-Jean de Luz. He called upon the French people to throw off the yoke of a government which had brought so many disasters upon them, and to place themselves under the ægis of their ancient dynasty.

This document, which was circulated throughout the South, produced a somewhat strong impression, especially at Toulouse and at Bordeaux. Sentiments hostile to Napoleon reigned in those two cities more than elsewhere. At

Toulouse; the old nobility, that composed of parliamentary families, had preserved an influence all the greater from the fact that no compensation had come to console this old capital of Languedoc for the losses imposed on it by the Revolution. Manufacturing industries had made little progress in that region, and the products of the soil, owing to the Peninsular War and the blockade strictly enforced by the English over Bordeaux, were deprived of an outlet. The merchants of Bordeaux had not only lost much capital, but they had been unable to indulge in any of their customary ventures, and were condemned to see their ships rot in port. The owners of vineyards were not much more fortunate, all exports of their products, with the exception of what little they might be licensed to export, being a prohibited thing.

All this discontent had its mouthpieces, which rallied in Paris about M. de Talleyrand.

The great question was to know what was going on at the Congress of Châtillon. The roads of communication were as difficult as they were perilous, as it was necessary to pass through the lines of two armies. Where could be found a sufficiently safe and intelligent agent who could be entrusted to say that which it was desired to make known? The Duc de Dalberg found a man to discharge this delicate mission; it was M. de Vitrolles, a former *émigré*, with whom he had for two or three years past entertained financial relations.

M. de Vitrolles had returned from foreign parts after his marriage with an illegitimate daughter of the Duchesse de Bouillon; since then, he had knocked at every door, and had to remain content with the humble position of inspector of the establishments devoted to the increasing of the breed of merinos. It was in that capacity that he had become acquainted with the Duc de Dalberg. He had little to lose and much to gain. When the time came for him to start,

M. de Talleyrand, who had at first countenanced him in a slight degree, would no longer do anything towards accrediting him to the Congress of Châtillon, so I heard M. de Vitrolles say a month or two after the Restoration.

He left, therefore, being actually accredited only by the Duc de Dalberg, who sent him to M. de Nesselrode and to M. de Stadion especially, enjoining upon him to avoid M. de Metternich, and not to unbosom himself to him. He was to make himself known, in the first place, by means of a seal belonging to the Duc de Dalberg, and which, in the course of his numerous visits to Vienna, he had frequently shown to M. de Stadion; and then, a letter wherein were written in sympathetic ink, two women's names, which would recall to his mind *liaisons* known to the Duc de Dalberg alone; and finally, the secret information of which M. de Vitrolles was the bearer, and which would show how far he was initiated in the plots of Napoleon's enemies.

Naturally of an adventurous character, the Duc de Dalberg had, in the instructions he gave personally, gone further in favor of the House of Bourbon than it suited M. de Talleyrand to do. In that, he had not shown any lack of perspicacity; he had, together with Napoleon himself, foreseen the only possible issue, from the moment it was sought to put an end to the imperial régime.

M. de Vitrolles's departure occurred on the 6th of March; he reached Châtillon without hindrance, and at once called on M. de Stadion, who showed himself most favorably disposed, gave him such information as might be of use to him, but did not conceal from him that nothing would be done by his Court except through M. de Metternich, and that it was madness to hold matters back from him.

The arrival of M. de Vitrolles at Châtillon was important, in that it did not leave any doubt as to the fact that there were in Paris men of standing who seemed resolved to con-



tribute with all their might to the downfall of the Emperor. When the name of M. de Talleyrand was found at their head, they were thought to be more numerous and more powerful than was really the case. How could it be supposed that an able man would risk compromising a position like his without having a considerable party at his back? I have therefore no doubt that although he was at first received very coldly, excepting by M. de Stadion, M. de Vitrolles contributed greatly towards strengthening the resolutions of those members of the congress whose secret object was the ruin of Napoleon.

M. de Stadion sent M. de Vitrolles to the headquarters of the allied sovereigns; there he encountered Austria's plainly expressed opposition to the object of his mission. M. de Metternich declared that if Napoleon consented to accept the terms submitted to him, a peace would be certainly concluded with him. He was more successful with the Emperor Alexander, whom he was enabled to see, it would appear, through M. de Nesselrode; he made known to him — such is at any rate his version — that the only way of getting rid of Napoleon was to make up one's mind to adopt a French cause, which might rally to it the public mind, by affording an honorable solution. If the allies had encountered so many obstacles since their entry into France, if they had already lost some 40,000 men, it was owing to their having neglected to follow the only course which would permit the nation to declare itself in their favor. There was still time to adopt it, and no time should be lost in coming to a decision which would remove every difficulty. "One has but to proclaim the House of Bourbon," he said, "and then march on to Paris at once, and all will be at an end."

The Emperor Alexander, still according to M. de Vitrolles, was so greatly impressed with this aspect of the question,

that he shortly afterwards informed him that the resolution he had suggested had been taken, that his advice would be followed, even going so far as to add, when bringing the conversation to an end, the following remarkable words: "If, moreover, we were to suffer defeat under the walls of Paris, it would be just as easy for us to retreat by way of Flanders as by way of Alsace and Lorraine."

That which, however, might cause doubts to be entertained as to the importance attached by that monarch to the mission of M. de Vitrolles, is that he did not bring him into contact with General de Pozzo, who at that time enjoyed his master's fullest confidence, and who was in correspondence with Monsieur, then in quarters at Vesoul. Perhaps, also, the Emperor Alexander, in keeping the matter a secret from his most trusted councillor, wished to avoid supplying him with a fresh argument in support of a cause regarding which he thought it advisable rather to restrain than to urge him on. The amount of zeal and perseverance which M. de Pozzo must have exercised to make that cause triumph is difficult to realize, in the midst of the vicissitudes of a campaign, in the midst of alternate successes and reverses which were continually changing the dispositions of the allied powers.

Napoleon, finding it impossible to induce the hostile army to risk a decisive battle, in which all his hopes were centred, had been compelled, towards the end of February, to turn back in all haste towards the Prussian corps on which he had inflicted so severe a defeat a fortnight earlier. General Blücher, who commanded this corps, had once more ventured to advance through the valley of the Marne, and was seeking to effect a junction with the Russian army which was marching towards him by way of Laon. He had driven back as far as Meaux the two French marshals who had remained in observation on his front, but with

forces very inferior to his own. Thereupon, the combined army, abandoning the positions it occupied on the opposite side of the Aube, had swept down upon the weakened corps in front of it, had routed it, and, after a couple of bloody engagements, had soon made its reappearance under the walls of Troyes.

The Emperor, after seeing Blücher elude him, through the fault of the general who had not been able to hold his own at Soissons for forty-eight hours, and, after a rather brilliant success at Craonne, had failed in an attack on Laon, where the Russo-Prussian corps had withdrawn and entrenched itself. He has been greatly censured for his rashness in attacking this corps. I cannot help remarking, that in so desperate a situation is to be found the excuse for this rash deed.

After meeting with this check, he was forced to manœuvre to take up a position which would enable him to recapture Rheims, which his enemies had occupied while he was pushing on Laon; he then hurried back towards the Aube and the Seine, to arrest the progress which the great allied army was making in its march on Paris. It had already got as far as Nogent and Provins.

While these military movements were going on, events of another kind, but of no less gravity, were taking place. Pursuant to the instructions which the allied plenipotentiaries assembled at Châtillon had received, they could but dwell persistently on the terms which they had offered on the 17th of February, and they asked that at the very least a categorical answer should be given to them; on the 29th, they went so far as to declare that any further delay would be sufficient to bring negotiations to a termination.

The Duc de Vicence, on his part, being specially desirous of avoiding a definitive rupture, had employed, in order to gain time, all the dilatory resources supplied to him by

diplomatic language and usages. He set forth, with good reason, that the demand made that the conditions should be accepted without debate, was an excessive one; had not, indeed, France a right to know what was to be the fate of the provinces which she was asked to cede? Whom was this cession to benefit? Was Belgium, for instance, to be handed over to Holland or to Prussia, or was it to return to its former masters, the emperors of Austria? Again, he daily wrote to Napoleon, asking his permission to present a counter-project modifying the Frankfort terms, and mitigating the severity of the propositions of the 17th. "Without this condescension, all is at an end," he wrote; "negotiations will be broken off, and Your Majesty must not entertain the belief that it will be possible to resume them, as on former occasions."

He wrote these words on the 6th of March; they were all the more well-founded, that a new treaty of defensive and offensive alliance had just been concluded against France between Prussia, Austria, England, and Russia. This treaty has held an important place in the political history of the following years, and is known as the Treaty of Chaumont; it was perhaps the result of an appeal of Napoleon to his father-in-law; its promulgations had served as an argument for those who wished to bring Austria to tighten the bonds of the coalition. As almost always happens in the case of weak characters, the Emperor Francis had seen no other way of preventing his sincerity from being doubted than by contracting more binding engagements. By the convention of March 1st, the four powers bound themselves, in the case of France's refusal to accept the conditions proposed, to devote all possible means to prosecuting the war, and employ this with perfectly concerted action, in order to attain a general peace. The three continental powers were to constantly keep in the field, each one an army of 150,000

men fully equipped; England was to supply an annual subsidy of 150,000,000 francs; none of the powers was to enter into any separate negotiation with the common enemy. This treaty was to be offensive, if the Emperor refused to accept the conditions offered him, and was to remain defensive after his acceptance of them. This stipulation was of the highest importance, and the consequences which followed it thirteen months later are well known. No longer could the slightest hope be entertained of a division in the ranks of the allies; this division was nevertheless the chance of salvation on which Napoleon had persistently reckoned.

Never perhaps did any negotiator find himself in a more difficult position than the Duc de Vicence. When Torcy was sent into Holland by Louis XIV., the unpleasantness and rough treatment he had to endure were at least concealed by the veil of his incognito, while his master showed him his entire confidence and approved his doings; whereas at Châtillon, M. de Vicence, who did not dare to make a step for fear of its being disavowed, had to hold his own against coalesced powers, which daily in secret conference sought to create such fresh obstacles as they saw fit to throw in his way; made to feel, as he did, the counter-stroke of the military events which were happening at a distance of twenty leagues from him, he did not know what should be his line of action. At first, he had with some show of reason believed that he could reckon on Austria's good-will and on the secret co-operation of M. de Metternich; his confidential correspondence with the latter has been made public by M. Fain, and is a proof of this. This confidence, which was shared by Napoleon, was not without its grounds. Up to the last moment, the Emperor Francis would have liked to have seen an arrangement come to, whereby his daughter might retain the crown of France on her brow;

England, for her part, was too closely united with Austria to deny this much desired satisfaction to her sovereign. This explains the language of Lord Castlereagh, when he stated, early in March, that it was impossible that England, having once consented to negotiate with Napoleon, should not treat finally with him, if he subscribed to the terms submitted to him; but, I have spoken elsewhere of the sentiments animating the Emperor Alexander, who compelled Prussia to act in accord with him.

The French plenipotentiary had to thread his way amid these passions and these varied interests. At a conference held on the 15th of March, he read the following draft of a treaty intended to take the place of the one of the 17th of February:—

The Emperor was to renounce all rights of sovereignty over the Illyrian provinces, over territories beyond the Alps, the island of Elba excepted, and over the departments situated on the right bank of the Rhine. He renounced, in favor of Prince Eugène, the crown of Italy, whose boundary on the Austrian side was to be the Adige. He recognized the independence of Holland, under the sovereignty of a prince of the House of Orange, even with an increase of territory. He likewise recognized the independence of the German States in confederation united; that of Switzerland, to be guaranteed by all the great powers; that of Italy, and of all the princes among whom it was or should be partitioned; and finally the independence and integrity of Spain, under the sway of Ferdinand VII.

The Pope and the King of Saxony were to get back their states; the Princess Elisa and the Prince de Neufchâtel were to retain the principalities of Lucca and Neufchâtel; the Grand-Duchy of Berg was to revert to the Grand Duke of that name, while Bremen, Hamburg, Lübeck, Dantzic, and Ragusa were declared free towns. The island of Malta

was to remain in England's possessions; the Ionian Isles were to become the absolute property of the Kingdom of Italy. With regard to the colonies which England was to restore to France, an agreement might be reached, in consideration of a proper equivalent, regarding the cession of those which England had expressed a desire to retain, with the exception of the Saintes, which were a natural dependency of Guadeloupe.

Finally, a proposition was made that a special congress should be convened to determine the fate of the provinces which France renounced, and the indemnities to be paid to the dispossessed kings and princes.

The allied plenipotentiaries, after having heard this document read, declared that its importance was too great to allow of their replying to it then and there, and they informed the French negotiator that they reserved the right of appointing an ulterior sitting for the purpose of taking it into consideration. This sitting took place on the 18th; they brought to it a lengthy note, wherein, after endeavoring to demonstrate the moderation of the principles and views which had ever guided the allied Courts, they set forth that not only did the counter-proposition presented by the Duc de Vicence diverge from the terms proposed on the 17th, but that it was also contrary to their spirit. As this unexpected contradictory reply displayed the intention of delaying negotiations, which would thus become useless and compromising, they found themselves compelled to declare in the name of their respective sovereigns, that the allied powers, faithful to their principles, and in accordance with their former declarations, considered the negotiations entered into at Châtillon as brought to an end by the action of the French government. They were nevertheless instructed to add that these same powers, bound together in an indissoluble union for the purpose of reaching the one great object,

hoped to attain it with the help of God, in no longer warring against France, and that they considered the just limits of that empire as one of the first conditions of the European equilibrium.

The Duc de Vicence brought a counter-note to the conference held the next day, March 19th, and which was the last one. He attempted to show that the breaking off of the negotiations could not be imputed to France, since her propositions were being rejected without even being discussed, as diplomatic custom demanded. The measures proposed on either side should be regarded as nothing more than starting-points from which to reach the goal which all sought to attain. He therefore stated that: "as to himself he could not consider his mission of peace as at an end; that he must await the orders of his Court, and that he was still prepared to go on with the negotiations, or to resume them in such manner or form as might bring about in the most prompt manner possible the cessation of all hostilities."

While M. de Vicence was thus exhausting every means towards warding off a rupture of the negotiations, he was yielding to a profound conviction that the conclusion of any peace whatsoever could alone save the crown of the man whom he represented; for he could not at that time have received a letter which the Emperor had written to him from Rheims, on the 17th, and which reads as follows: "Monsieur le duc de Vicence, I have received your letters of the 13th. I have instructed the Duc de Bassano to reply fully to them. I give you direct authority to make such concessions as would seem indispensable to keep negotiations open, and to obtain a definite knowledge of the ultimatum of the allies; as a matter of course, the result of the treaty would be the evacuation of our territory and an exchange of all prisoners. This letter has no other object, etc."



These few lines, so different from those which I have recorded under the dates of the 19th of February and of the 2d of March, reveal the painful impression produced on his mind by the slight success attendant on his expedition across the Aisne. It is clearly gathered therefrom that the illusions caused by his preceding successes had almost vanished, but it was too late.

At the time of the dissolution of the Congress of Châtillon, the favorable inclinations entertained by the Emperor Alexander towards the House of Bourbon assumed fresh strength in his mind. Lord Castlereagh shared these views, and it was on his suggestion, which he made known to the Comte d'Artois, that the latter left Vesoul, and came as far as Nancy. I have seen a letter from that prince, complaining of the position in which he was being placed, and begging General de Pozzo to interfere strongly on his behalf. At the very time that he was receiving such glad tidings from Lord Castlereagh, M. de Vitrolles was bringing to him the news of the breaking off of the congress, and the assurance of the favorable intentions of the Emperor Alexander. I have it from him that Monsieur so little expected such good news, that it was at first very difficult to bring him to credit them. Soon the events which happened at Bordeaux raised still higher the hopes of the friends of the House of Bourbon.

As fast as the allies advanced, as dangers increased, and the circle surrounding Napoleon tightened, one felt that the powerful hand which had changed the map of Europe had become paralyzed; the work was crumbling. Napoleon knew it better than anybody. Seeing the failure of all his attempts to induce the Pope to enter into a negotiation, overtures for which he persistently rejected, and fearing on the other hand that he might be carried off from Fontainebleau by one of his enemies, Napoleon finally resolved upon

sending him to Italy; so carriages arrived at Fontainebleau, at the very moment when it was least expected. Pius VII. was made to enter them with his suite; he was at once driven in the direction of Linours, whence he wended his way to Savona; thence, contrary to the orders given by the Emperor, he took the direct road to his states, which the French troops had completely evacuated. Such was the issue of that series of acts, each one more melancholy and more lamentable than the other, in the perpetration of which Napoleon had shown himself both unjust and ungrateful towards the Sovereign Pontiff.

The same happened with regard to the Spanish princes. On seeing that the mission of the Duke of San Carlos to Madrid had been fruitless, and that the Spanish government persistently refused to recognize the treaty the signature to which had been extorted from Ferdinand, the Emperor thought that some benefit was still to be derived from allowing that monarch to take his departure; that his return in the midst of his subjects, by creating a happy diversion in their minds, might, perhaps, render them less ardent in their wish to further pursue the war and to second the invasion of the south of France by the British forces. The prisoners of Valençay received their passports on the 7th of March; they left on the 13th; but, as they were passing through Perpignan, the uncle and the brother of the King were again held; it was apparently thought that they might yet serve as hostages in case of need. So the King reached Figueira, the first Spanish frontier town.

Far more serious events were occurring in the south. After the defeat of Marshal Soult, in the vicinity of Orthez, the French army had, by its retreat, opened the way for the English army to enter the departments situated between Toulouse and Bayonne, the Garonne and the Pyrenees. It was then that the Duc d'Angoulême obtained the

Duke of Wellington's formal assistance for carrying out a plan suggested to him by the friends he had in Bordeaux.

The return of M. Lainé to that city, and the particulars he had brought with him concerning the dissolution of the *Corps législatif*, had materially contributed towards exciting a feeling of hostility against the Imperial Government. The bar, which was composed of men of talent, was on an intimate footing with the merchants, and there soon resulted therefrom a kind of active and powerful coalition.<sup>1</sup>

It must be said that Bordeaux, owing to its proximity to the Vendée, held frequent intercourse with the Royalists of that part of the country. At their head was M. de La Rochejaquelein, the eldest brother of the illustrious Vendean chief. No sooner did the Royalist committee hear of the first successes of the Duke of Wellington, and of his march towards the Adour, than it entertained no doubt that if the Duc d'Angoulême were to show himself, with the support of a rather considerable body of British troops, Bordeaux would readily open its gates to him. It would appear that they had already come to an understanding with the mayor of the city, M. Lynch. It was then and there resolved to send an assurance of the foregoing to the prince, and M. de La Rochejaquelein undertook the mission. The difficulty did not consist in persuading the prince, but in inspiring confidence at British headquarters, whither the prince immediately sent him. At first, the reception granted the Royalist envoy was not a very encouraging one; the unfavorable news which had arrived regarding the con-

<sup>1</sup> In addition to M. Lainé, there must be numbered among the lawyers who exercised a potent influence over the Bordelais movement at that period, M. Bavey, M. Martignac, and several others. Among the merchants, M. Gauthier, although a very young man, was one of those who took a most active part; his co-operation was all the more honorable, in that ambition was not his incentive. He received no mark of favor when the goal was reached, and few people in Paris were aware of what he had done in 1814, when he entered the Chamber of Deputies in 1823.

ferences at Châtillon changed the dispositions of the British general; Marshal Beresford, one of Wellington's lieutenants, received orders to proceed from Mont-de-Marsan towards Bordeaux, with a column of ten to twelve thousand men, which the Duc d'Angoulême was to join.

The column set off immediately, meeting with no obstacle in its progress. The prince had sent ahead of him M. de La Rochejaquelein, who entered Bordeaux on the 10th of March, announcing the prince's approaching arrival, and giving the assurance that, although supported by British troops, he would take possession of the city in the name of Louis XVIII., and would once more raise the white standard of the Bourbons. At first, this news caused a feeling of uncertainty, but all hesitation soon vanished; delegates left the same evening, with the mission of conveying to the prince the desires and homage of the citizens of Bordeaux, and at the same time to give Marshal Beresford the assurance that he might enter the city, as into a friendly and allied one.

The white standard was raised on the steeple of the cathedral, and the Duc d'Angoulême made his entry on the 12th, amid cries of "Long live the King! Long live the Duc d'Angoulême!" All the young men of the city went on horseback, and accompanied the mayor, who went out some distance outside the walls, to hand the King and the British general the keys of the city, while he took care, however, to address the following speech to the latter: "If you come as a conqueror, General, you can take possession of these keys without my handing them to you; but if you come as the ally of our august sovereign, Louis XVIII., I present them to you. You will soon be a witness of the proofs of affection which will make themselves manifest in all directions towards our King."

The general renewed the assurances he had already given,

adding that he considered he was entering a city allied and devoted to Louis XVIII. Thereupon, the acclamations became general, and not a shadow of opposition was encountered. The few soldiers who were in the city had evacuated it the previous day, and Senator Cornudet, the commissioner extraordinary, had left it with them. The *maître des requêtes* Portal, his colleague, had thought it his duty to accompany him; yet he was a Bordelais, and entertained the same sentiments as his fellow-citizens; but, finding himself invested by Napoleon with a special duty and one of trust, he had not thought he could, without some appearance of betrayal, take a course so contrary to the object for which he had been sent.

## CHAPTER X

Impression produced in Paris by the surrender of Bordeaux — M. Pasquier's conversation with M. de Saint-Marsan — Frequent visits of the Prefect of Police to M. de La Valette; he meets there M. de Bourrienne, who offers him his co-operation, should the allies enter Paris — The infernal machine of the Palais-Royal — Curious example of Savary's blind obedience to the orders of the Emperor — M. Pasquier, enlightened by M. de La Valette, informs the French princes of the danger they are incurring — Strange conduct of the Duc de Rovigo; his confidences to M. Pasquier — His one idea is to prevent the return of the Bourbons — His anger on learning of the flight of Messieurs de Polignac — Indifference of the Council of Regency — King Joseph's state of discouragement; he blames the Emperor for the loss of Spain — The Council is called upon to pronounce itself regarding the propositions of peace made by the allies under date of February 17th, and as to the timeliness of a general arming of the faubourgs; M. Pasquier opposes this plan — The provisioning of Paris presents ever increasing difficulties — The convoys of wounded threaten the city with typhus — Wretched condition of the French army — Discouragement makes headway especially among the officers — Napoleon's new plan; he seeks to cut off the hostile army from its base — Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube — The Emperor is repulsed, and marches towards Vitry and Saint-Dizier, leaving the way to the capital open to the enemy — Councils of war held by the allies at Pougy and at Sommepeux — They decide to march on Paris, while making Napoleon believe they are still bent on fighting him.

THE return of a large city of France to the authority of the former dynasty was accomplished with a readiness which could but inspire the most serious reflections, and which was a cause for much surprise to the men whose devotion to the imperial régime had never admitted the possibility of a reflection.

The news of it reached Paris on the night between Saturday and Sunday. When, according to custom, I went

to the Tuileries to do obeisance to the Empress, I remember that on entering, I found M. Boulay de La Meurthe, surrounded by a group of servitors and councillors of state, whom he was trying to convince that the rumor could not have any foundation. He at once called on me to testify to the falseness of the news, but I contented myself with replying that I had no information in the matter. Few people were deceived by that answer, and several, when greeting me, said: "Well, nothing remains but to prepare for the worst; it is all coming to an end, but what kind of a dénouement is it going to be?" M. Molé, generally so full of confidence, could not help revealing his anxiety. I cannot, above all, forget a conversation I had with a man of real worth, one of those of whom the Emperor thought the most, and whose eldest son was still with him as orderly officer. It was M. de Saint-Marsan, Napoleon's last ambassador at Berlin. Having reviewed all the blunders, all the mad deeds which had followed in succession for the last two years, he remarked in concluding: "It is his own fault, absolutely, for I know Europe well; she showed all the patience and resignation that could be expected, and if she has risen in rebellion it is because he persisted in driving her to her last intrenchments. But what is to be the outcome of all this? God alone knows!"

M. de Saint-Marsan, one of the last Piedmontese who remained faithful to the House of Savoy, and one of those who subsequently had given their allegiance to the Emperor, had ended by becoming attached to him, and he could not help viewing his downfall with the kind of melancholy sorrow which invades all noble souls at the sight of a great monument which is crumbling.

My intercourse with M. de La Valette had assumed a greater degree of intimacy. I called on him every morning at seven o'clock, and was present when he opened the

bundles and read the letters brought to him by the estafettes. We would then follow on the map the slightest movements of the belligerents. I had presented him with one which the Préfecture de Police had prepared in connection with the provisioning of the capital, and which showed the Seine's course in its smallest details, as well as that of the Marne and of its tributaries. Nothing was, therefore, concealed from me, and I could not form an illusion regarding anything. There was one thing alone which made me feel embarrassed when I was with M. de La Valette, and that was the occasional presence of M. de Bourrienne. They had known each other for a long time, and they had been comrades near the person of the Emperor during the Egyptian campaign. It was through M. de Bourrienne that M. de Talleyrand was kept informed of all the particulars of the military situation, and that the Duc de Rovigo—I am sure of what I state—had been warned of the departure of M. de Vitrolles for Châtillon. One day, just after we had received unfavorable news, we were leaving M. de La Valette's house together, and afoot. "Look you, Monsieur Pasquier," he said to me, "the foreigners will enter Paris, whatever the Emperor may do. Your place is in this city, which you are certainly not going to leave; well then, just speak the word, and I will remain likewise, and be of great service to you. When in Germany, I became thoroughly acquainted with the principal Prussian generals, and I will act as your medium in all the dealings you may have with them, of whatever kind they may be." I thanked him for his display of good will, adding, however, that I lived from day to day, and that I would take counsel of events to determine which was the best way of performing the duties imposed on me by a position whose difficulties and dangers I did not conceal from myself.



Since I have made mention of the Duc de Rovigo, this is the place for an anecdote which goes to show the passive obedience of the former commandant of the *gendarmérie d'élite*. A few thieves conceived the idea, in order to become possessed of the money spread out on one of the gaming-tables of the Palais-Royal, of placing under that table a little infernal machine, which exploded by the relaxation of a spring. This machine duly went off, the table was upset, the lights put out, the theft successfully carried out, and several persons wounded. The police immediately set to work to discover the perpetrators of the outrage and gathered together as articles to produce in evidence the fragments of the machine, from which it was easy to perceive that it was nothing but a cleverly constructed piece of clock-work.<sup>1</sup> In spite of much searching and many enquiries, no discovery was made, and the fragments remained in the possession of the head-clerk, whose business it was to attend to such matters. One morning, it was at the end of February, the Duc de Rovigo said to me: "You have doubtless kept at the *préfecture* the fragments of that little infernal machine of the Palais-Royal. I wish to take another look at them, so be kind enough to send them to me." — "Nothing easier," I replied, "you shall have them in half an hour." I forgot all about the matter, and did not recall it until I was leaving my dinner-table. M. de La Valette had dined with me that day; I told him of my forgetfulness, adding that I was about to repair my remissness. He stopped me, and leading me to the embrasure of a

<sup>1</sup> The British, at the time of the preparations made at Boulogne to invade England, had made use of this means on a considerable scale, and their divers had repeatedly fastened to the keel of the vessels of the flotilla similarly constructed apparatus, for the purpose of blowing them into the air. The results had not been such as anticipated, but the idea, as can be seen, was not lost to the malevolent scoundrels whose minds are forever on the lookout for any means likely to serve them in their thievish practices.

window, said: "Were I in your place, I should do nothing of the kind." — "Why, then?" — "Because the Duc de Rovigo can only have preferred this request with some evil intention. You will see that with the aid of this model he will probably have a few similar machines made, which will be used for some wicked purpose." — "But what can he do with them?" — "Are you not aware," he replied, lowering his voice still more, "that the princes of the House of Bourbon have set foot on French soil, and, were they to advance further into the interior, would it not be an easy means of getting rid of them to place under their table or bed a similar machine, only one more heavily charged with explosives?"

M. de La Valette had assuredly, by means of the letters of which he took secret cognizance, learnt of some such design being entertained in M. de Rovigo's mind, for a similar idea would have never, of its own accord, presented itself to him. I thanked him for the warning by which I profited. On the following day I saw the Duc de Rovigo, who reminded me of his request, and complained of my forgetfulness. "I purposely ignored your request," I answered, frankly; "you have absolutely no need of those fragments; what do you want them for? They must remain where they are; they are exhibits which belong to justice, and which may be required by it." A deep flush o'erspread his features, and he said: "I wanted them in order to have a certain number of machines of the same pattern manufactured to be sent to headquarters, where they might prove most useful for quickly blowing up small bridges." — "What!" I replied, "you can seriously allege this as your motive? Were it the case that you wished to have an instrument of war manufactured which could be used in an honorable fashion, have you not at your disposal the workshops of the artillery depot,

where they know a good deal more about such matters than those whose guilty industry you seek to imitate?" At these words his confusion increased visibly. "Well then," said he, "let the matter drop, since you are so decided about it; let us speak of something else."

A quarter of an hour later, as I was leaving his residence, he ran after me, and catching up with me in the farthest room of his apartments, he spoke these very words to me: "Above all, Monsieur Pasquier, do not mention to anybody what has passed between us this morning." Then, putting his hand to his forehead: "Ah! It must fain be confessed that the Emperor is sometimes very hard to serve." I of course thought that this would be the end of the matter; but, five or six days later, a clockmaker of the Rue du Temple came and informed me that a couple of individuals had gone to his shop and asked him to make them a piece of clockwork, which, when affixed to the spring of any kind of firearm, would set it off at a fixed time, as in the case of alarums. He had in the first instance agreed to do so, but it had subsequently entered his mind that he was perhaps about to compromise himself by becoming an accessory to some evil design. I praised him for his scruples, told him not to execute the order, and instructed him that when the men who had given him the order should call on him again, to state to them that he had taken the precaution of notifying the Prefect of Police of their request, and that the latter had formally forbidden him to comply with it. My orders were obeyed, but this persistency in seeking to carry out an outrageous project made me think that I should go a step further, and that my conscience commanded me, in order to render it fruitless, to employ every means at my disposal, however doubtful they might be.

I was on intimate terms with Mme. de Vintimille, who was herself on similar terms with the Abbé de Montesquiou,

Louis XVIII.'s representative in France; there never was a more discreet and safe person than M<sup>me</sup>. de Vintimille. I therefore spoke to her in full confidence, and begged her to communicate to the Abbé de Montesquiou how necessary it was to inform the princes who might be in France, of the precautions they should take. The rapid march of events soon deprived this warning of all its importance. Such is the first direct and personal connection I had at that time, in the interest of the House of Bourbon, with a man whose devotion to their cause was known to all. There is no need for me to excuse myself or to lay stress on the motives which governed my action in this instance.

The conduct of the Duc de Rovigo is strange: he looked upon Napoleon's downfall as a settled contingency; he had told me over and over again, as had M. de Bourrienne, that he could not prevent the stranger from entering Paris, and that all the imperial edifice would crumble of itself. Then, according to all appearances, it would be possible for us to remain in the capital; somebody must necessarily be left behind who would be able to preserve some little order and prevent any too serious outbreak at the time of the city's occupation by the enemy; I should be thus in a position to form an idea as to the best course to be resolved upon. He envied me my position, and told me so frankly. At that period, he was still carried away by his blind devotion, in spite of his reason and of the natural perspicacity with which he was endowed. He felt a need of doing something which did not always give him time to reflect, and led him to have recourse to means of doubtful morality. To prevent the return of the Bourbons was the constant object of his thoughts. He had received information that the Duc de Berry was about to land in Normandy. When I saw him, after this, he was extraordinarily agitated, and he could not long conceal from me the subject of his anxiety. Hardly

dissembling his satisfaction, he told me that he felt sure, owing to all the precautionary measures he had taken, that the prince, were he but to set foot on the coast, would fall into his hands. "I hope," I replied, "that you will not have occasion to boast of so poor a triumph; it might place you in a very awkward position, and a failure will cause you more joy than the success over which you flatter yourself." My expectations were indeed realized, for when the Duc de Berry made his appearance in Normandy, he had no longer anything to fear from the Minister of the Imperial Police.

His lack of sang-froid became patent to us on another occasion. On seeing the allied troops advance for the second time on Paris, by way of Provins, he resolved upon transferring to the château of Saumur all the prisoners of state detained by him at Vincennes. I am not aware whether or not he had received orders to this effect from the Emperor. Up to that time, Messieurs de Polignac, to whom he had always shown some consideration (he was their kinsman by his wife), had been allowed to remain in a *maison de santé*, where they enjoyed considerable liberty. He saw fit to include them in this general transfer, but on hearing of this, I know not from what source, they quickly decided to fly; this was an easy matter, as they were not closely guarded. Their escape took place a quarter of an hour before the time at which they were to be removed. When the Duc de Rovigo heard of it, he became delirious with rage. He feared that the Emperor might suspect him of having favored their flight. The whole police force was set in motion to catch them, and it seemed as if no other matter was of importance. When a couple of days had passed, I thought it my duty to tell him that it was time he should recover his calmness of mind over an event which everybody had already forgotten, and which was of so little importance in the midst of all those which absorbed our

thoughts. He received me very coldly and hardly listened to me. However, he soon discovered that he must resign himself to the inevitable, for it became plain that Messieurs de Polignac would not be found.

This so little enlightened and so untimely zeal was in strong contrast with everything surrounding him. Even the Council of Regency displayed an amount of lukewarmness under all circumstances. The chief personage in this council, the one who might be considered its head, King Joseph, to name him, was perhaps the one who, in his intimate circle, showed the greatest discouragement. He occupied one of the pavilions of the Tuileries. I occasionally saw him at the audiences he was wont to give after his *lever*. I only had two or three private conversations with him, wherein he never was able to conceal his lack of confidence, and especially his feelings of discontent towards his brother. He forever dwelt on the kingdom he had lost, and would say: "I should still be at Madrid if the Emperor had only ridded me of his troops, his generals, and his marshals. I was greatly beloved in the Peninsula, and the people would have been glad to have me, if only my cause could have been separated from that of my brother." This was giving illusion a pretty free rein.

The Council of Regency had, to my knowledge, to pronounce on three important questions. I will speak further on of the last of these. The first had reference to the propositions made by the allies at Châtillon, on the 17th of February. The Emperor saw fit to submit them to it and to ask its opinion. The council was unanimously of opinion that they should be accepted. This consultation was not meant seriously, for Napoleon did not wait for the council's reply to send his answer, and his correspondence with the Duc de Vicence is there to prove that he had not a moment's hesitation.

The second question was one likely to provoke a more genuine discussion and consequently a more important one. It was whether, as the capital was being closely threatened by the enemy's troops, it would not be advisable to arm the population of the faubourgs, by distributing pikes to all willing men, especially to those out of employment, and to whom some little pay would be granted. The Duc de Rovigo asked my opinion in the matter. I opposed the measure, and sent him my objections in writing; they were many. I dwelt strictly on the fact that the project was to arm a mass whom it would be impossible to lead, for whom nobody could answer, and which was just as likely to fight against the government as for it. The Duc de Rovigo communicated my memorandum to several members of the council, and, on the day of the debate, he did his best to set forth to advantage the reasons therein contained. After a somewhat lengthy debate, the measure was rejected and it was resolved to write to the Emperor that the disadvantages of thus arming the population would greatly outweigh any benefits to be derived therefrom. It would be impossible to say what would have become of the city of Paris, if, at the time of its investment, the population had been strong enough to lay down the law. I therefore consider that on this occasion I rendered a valuable service to my country.

Every day, every hour, brought fresh difficulties for me to cope with; the army was continually calling upon the city for all kinds of succor. Paris being in the centre of the half-circle of all the marching and countermarching troops, the radius which led from this circle to the point which stood in need of help was often the shortest of all roads, and so there was no hesitation in taking advantage of it. It was not merely sufficient to manufacture arms and equipments; there was also the matter of transporta-

tion, and this brought with it constant requisitions for horses and wagons, always a very dangerous demand to make from a city which cannot suffer any interruption in the daily arrival of its food supplies. One day, M. Maret, who was at the head of the provisioning of Paris, conceived the idea of issuing a requisition for all the carts in the public markets, with the object of sending them with loads towards Meaux. I at once called on the Minister of War, and informed him that if these carts were not promptly returned, and that if a similar order were again given, one might expect to see the provisioning of Paris fall off within a week, as the country people would certainly no longer risk sending their carts or wagons into the city. M. Daru at once took all measures necessary to prevent such an occurrence, and it was an easy matter for me to see, on this occasion, that he had no more confidence in the situation than myself. Considering the man's serious nature, the symptom was full of portent.

But that which caused me the greatest anxiety, as administrator of the city, was the constant influx of the sick and wounded, many of whom were suffering from typhus fever. La Pitié, a vast hospital, was allotted to them in the first place. They were completely isolated, and the public was kept in profound ignorance of the disease from which they were suffering. This hospital was quickly filled, and then other precautionary measures had to be taken; they could not be too severe, for had contagion spread among the dense population of the capital, it would have been impossible to calculate the possibilities of its ravages. It was therefore resolved to divert the convoys of sick soldiers, ere they reached the gates of the city, and to send them by routes outside the walls to establishments already in existence or which were hastily organized along the lower course of the Seine, as far as Rouen. Several of



these convoys were sent down the river in barges. In spite of the most minute precautions, in spite of the most active and intelligent supervision, it became impossible to check a beginning of infection. However, it only appeared in a pronounced form at the Hôtel-Dieu, and did not spread outside its doors.

I have left Napoleon, after the taking of Rheims, meditating fresh operations on the Aube and the Seine; but previous to beginning them, he had considered it necessary to give his army a two or three days' rest, and he spent that time in reviewing it. The spectacle which met his eyes must have saddened him: his recent expedition across the Aisne had depleted all the corps, and some of them were reduced by one-half. The loss in officers had been especially enormous, and among the survivors, several of his best generals were literally *hors de combat*. He had been compelled to send them back to Paris for the sake of having their wounds or their health attended to; of this number was General de Nansouty, who had so far rendered him great services at the head of the cavalry, and to whom principally he owed his success at Craonne.<sup>1</sup>

The total number of men composing the several corps did not exceed forty thousand, and he could not leave less than twelve or fourteen thousand with the Ducs de Raguse and de Trévisé, who were to remain behind, to oppose the

<sup>1</sup> I saw General de Nansouty immediately after his arrival in Paris, which he had succeeded in reaching after a miraculous escape from a body of Cossacks, who had surrounded him in the neighborhood of Soissons, and in whose hands he had been compelled to leave his horse, when flying from them through the woods. The picture he traced of the moral and physical condition of the army was such as to cause forebodings of the worst disasters, and these, at no distant period. A noteworthy fact was that it was the officers of high rank who were most demoralized. M. de Nansouty was suffering from a fever, which, had not proper attention been bestowed at once, would have carried him off immediately. Moreover, the excessive hardships of the campaign had so weakened him that he never fully recovered his health, and was laid in his grave within a year.

Prussian and Russian corps, which united under the walls of Laon. All the reinforcements which he had received since the opening of the campaign had therefore been insufficient to fill the void made in two months by disease and battles; moreover, among what remained of his army, all those who were not veterans, all those whom time and habit had not inured to the greatest hardships, were so thoroughly exhausted, that their condition excited profound pity. It was evident that, under such conditions, the struggle could not last much longer. This, therefore, explains the new plan which Napoleon seems to have then and there conceived. His idea was, as promptly as possible, to direct his forces, not on the centre of the enemy's line, with the hope of cutting it in twain, as he had already attempted to do on his return from Champaubert, but on the extremity and the rear of that line, with the object of turning it completely. In order to attain this goal, he marched directly towards Arcis-sur-Aube, by way of Château-Thierry, and la Fère-Champenoise. If he succeeded in occupying that town, it would become easy for him, by following the Aube's course, to make an irruption into the road which formed the base of operations of the large hostile army. He had several days before sent orders to Paris for a reinforcement of nine thousand men, and he had sent others to the generals commanding at Verdun and at Metz, pursuant to which the former was to send strong detachments on the enemy's rear, with the object of capturing his baggage, while the latter was to quickly take from the fortified towns of the third military division some ten or twelve thousand men who were to join his forces as quickly as possible by way of Châlons. His movement began on the 17th of March, when he left Rheims, but, at the very same moment, it so happened that the combined forces of the enemy, under the orders of Prince von Schwarzenberg,

began to move towards him, and advanced, abandoning the position of Provins, in a direction which was soon to bring the combatants face to face; Arcis-sur-Aube was on the enemy's road just as it was on that of the Emperor. Napoleon was the first to reach that town, and so became master of the passage of the Aube; but hardly had the heads of his columns shown themselves on the left bank, when the enemy made his appearance. His army, at that moment, did not exceed ten thousand men, in spite of reinforcements which had just reached him from Paris, and it was only on the next day or on the one following that he could operate his junction with the troops commanded by Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot, who had followed, by a cross-country road, the movement of the combined army which they had for the three past weeks been ordered to hold in check.

So great a disproportion of forces did not prevent Napoleon from giving battle on the 20th; the issue was favorable to him, and left him master of the way into the great plain which lay open between him and Troyes. This success led him to believe that the enemy would retreat, and, reckoning on the confusion which would accompany this retreat, he sought, on the morn of the 27th, to begin what he thought was a pursuit; but, in the course of the night, the coalesced troops, who were in the rear, had had time to arrive, and hardly had he made his advance into the plain, when, to his surprise, he saw at no great distance enormous bodies of soldiers, which could not be estimated at less than one hundred thousand men. It now became his turn to think of a retreat, but it could only be effected in one direction, and in the presence of forces which attacked him furiously, and which were five times more numerous than his own. Never, perhaps, was any operation more difficult to execute. In spite of their exhaustion and their inferiority in numbers, the French soldiers stood their ground admirably. The

action lasted the greater part of the day. Macdonald and Oudinot arrived in time to take part in it. The retreat was finally effected before the close of the day, by way of the bridge of Arcis, and another bridge thrown across the river at no great distance from it; but the losses amounted to over four thousand men, both in killed and prisoners, the latter being but few; such a loss was enormous in the case of an already weakened army.

As at Brienne, Napoleon exposed himself to danger during the engagement, as would do a man seeking death; but the bullets, shells, and cannon-balls which fell around him, and several times covered him with dust, spared him. He had certainly gone into the fight rashly, and in spite of the reconnoitring of several of his generals, who had foreseen the danger. The determination he took cannot be explained, except by his knowledge of the weak character of the generalissimo who opposed him. He was, moreover, fortunate in that Marshal Ney, who was in command of his vanguard, had not shared his security; for, had' the latter at the beginning of the day's fighting, risked his troops in the attack to the extent to which he had received orders, if he had deployed them instead of keeping them massed, all would have been lost. The army overwhelmed by numbers, driven up against the Aube while fighting, would have inevitably been crushed, and Marshal Macdonald would have reached the right bank only to witness a disaster. This granted, however, one hardly knows which to be more surprised at, at the incredible vigor of which Napoleon gave proof on that day, as well as did all those under him, by fighting for every inch of the ground, or at the unskilfulness of an enemy, who, with such superior forces, could not crush him in such a critical position. What course was there left for him to adopt the next day? There was none open to him which was not full of peril; he resolved upon following the

one approaching nearest to the plan he had conceived when leaving Rheims, and he directed his forces towards Vitry. His march on that town met with no interference. The little town of Vitry was occupied by a Prussian general who refused to surrender it. It therefore became necessary to burn the city, and to ford the Marne.

Then only did the Emperor's fresh plan become fully apparent to his generals. He gave orders for the army to proceed to Saint-Dizier, thus deciding upon leaving his capital entirely exposed, and to manœuvre far away in the enemy's rear. He plainly saw that with the feeble forces at his disposal it was impossible for him to successfully resist the concentrated masses of the enemy's army; it was necessary to lure it into marches which would break it up. The scheme was doubtless hazardous, but it carried with it the elements of success; it afforded facilities for rallying the ten or twelve thousand men of the third military division, who were all the more needed, as in spite of his junction with Marshals Oudinot and Macdonald, Napoleon had only twenty-five or thirty thousand fighting men; moreover, it afforded a chance to cut off communications between the great body of the army of the allies and the reserves destined to support it. In order to do this, he had merely to dispatch a body of cavalry from Saint-Dizier, by way of Joinville, to Chaumont; he was aware that that army had left far enough in the rear its heaviest baggage, heavy artillery, and principal stores of ammunitions of war. Finally, he had the choice of leaning either on Metz or Strasburg, and having once adopted this base of operation, he could reinforce his army with the garrisons of Alsace and Lorraine; he was almost in touch with the army commanded by Marshal Augereau in the neighborhood of Lyons, and, were the army of Italy to cross the Alps in time and join him, he might still find himself at the head of a very respectable force, especially when placed entirely in the enemy's rear.

But what were the enemy's plans? Would he follow him in this new path? Would he exhaust himself in efforts to come up with him? Such were Napoleon's desires and hopes; he little dreaded being followed, and with reason, as the advantage of having to set only a small body of troops in motion, and in his own country at that, was bound to give him a great superiority, in marching, over a combined army, whose resolves would always be taken slowly, which would be poorly acquainted with Napoleon's plans, and which consequently would have to advance cautiously. He was, it is true, abandoning his capital to its fate, but were not the two marshals whom he was leaving on the Marne to check the Russo-Prussian forces, able to defend the approaches to the city? They had, for the time being, not more than twelve or fifteen thousand men under their command, but for the future, all the reinforcements which were being got in readiness in Paris, and a portion of which were already on the march, would go and join them; they would thus ere long find themselves at the head of over twenty thousand men. It was, moreover, no easy matter to become master of a city like Paris, which had within its walls, in addition to the National Guard numbering twenty-five thousand men, the depots of a goodly number of regiments, which daily received recruits. There was, besides, a nucleus of Imperial Guard, which could not be reckoned at less than three or four thousand men; the whole *gendarmérie*, both infantry and cavalry, constituting a body of excellent soldiers; finally, a population of seven hundred thousand souls, among which were to be found many old soldiers and retired officers. It would seem a foolhardy enterprise to enter Paris, in the event of the great coalesced army being compelled to make a retrograde movement, and if one took into consideration the consequences of a failure, especially when the retreat was not rendered secure by the occupation of any fortified town. It is, indeed, most important to note that at that

period no fortified town having within its walls a French garrison, from the Rhine to the walls of the capitals, had opened its gates to the enemy.

Such were the reasons which had governed Napoleon's decision. His subsequent conduct has proved that the fact of his going far away would open the gates of his capital to the enemy had not entered into his calculations. Everything depended on the determination arrived at by the leaders of the combined army he was leaving on the banks of the Aube; it was there that his fate was settled. The allies received information of his march towards Saint-Dizier through intercepted dispatches which a courier was conveying from his headquarters to Marshal Macdonald. This discovery gave rise to a council of war, held at Pougy, in the dwelling of the Emperor of Russia. The resolution reached was to continue the movement of Châlons, to join as quickly as possible the Russo-Prussian army, which they would overtake in that neighborhood, and then to act in co-operation with it on the rear and flank of Napoleon. In spite of this decision, Generalissimo Prince von Schwarzenberg, who was in favor of following the French army in its march on Saint-Dizier, was in no haste to issue the necessary orders. This reluctance soon became known at Russian headquarters, so a new council of war was called together at Sommepuis, on the morn of the 24th. It was again General de Pozzo, who, passionately pursuing the object which he wished to attain, demonstrated the necessity of a new discussion of the situation; it was he who most influenced the decision. Supported by several Russian generals, — among others, General Diebitch, who, I believe, held the position of major-general in the Russian army, — he succeeded in convincing his master that the opportunity was an excellent one for marching on Paris and taking possession of it. Not only would its capture deprive Napoleon of his principal resources, but it would give public opinion

a chance to make itself heard; his downfall would thus become a certainty.

The Emperor Alexander lost no time in making known to the prince generalissimo that he had irrevocably made up his mind to march on Paris with the united armies, and that he fully relied on the consent of his allies to this proposition. The King of Prussia was at some distance in the rear, while the Emperor of Austria was still at Chaumont. Prince von Schwarzenberg acceded all the more readily to this resolution, in that he had just learnt that Marshal Blücher, at the head of the Prussians and Russians, had vigorously driven before him Marshals Marmont and Mortier, that he was occupying Rheims and Château-Thierry, and was on the point of entering Châlons.

From that moment there was no longer any hesitation, and preparations were made to unite in one mass all the coalesced forces and to direct them towards the capital of France. The necessary precautions were simultaneously taken to conceal this advance from Napoleon, and, on the contrary, make him believe that he was being followed by the bulk of the army. A heavy body of cavalry, supported by some little infantry, and which could readily be taken for the vanguard of that army, was sent in pursuit of him; at the same time a swarm of light troops was thrown on his flanks, so as to intercept his communications with the region he left behind him. Thus it was that the couriers and orderlies were captured, and prevented from reaching his headquarters, and that he was for several days without receiving news from Paris. There being no interference, he made his advance rapidly. On the 24th he was beyond Saint-Dizier, and on the evening of that day he established his headquarters at Doulevant; on the same day the allies commenced operations on Paris; these lasted up to the 30th inclusively. It therefore took them a week only to become masters of the capital.



## CHAPTER XI

The news of the combats at Arcis-sur-Aube reaches Paris — Communications with the imperial army intercepted — Mortier and Marmont, defeated at la Fère-Champenoise, expose the capital — A most compromising dispatch from the Prince Royal of Sweden to General Maison falls into the hands of the allies — Lieutenant-General Joseph prepares to defend Paris — Doubts raised as to the advisability of the Empress's sojourn in the capital; consulted in this respect by the Duc de Rovigo, M. Pasquier points out the objections to the departure of the sovereign — After a lengthy debate, the lieutenant-general produces a letter from the Emperor enjoining Marie-Louise to leave Paris — Lively discussion between Messieurs Pasquier and de Talleyrand as to the opportuneness of this measure — Significant remark made shortly afterwards by M. de Talleyrand concerning M. Pasquier — Bad impression produced by the flight of the Empress — Napoleon discovers the ruse of the allies; his hesitation regarding the selection of a plan of campaign; a letter from M. de La Valette puts an end to his uncertainties; he advances to the rescue of Paris — Final attempt made by the Duc de Vicence to reopen negotiations — M. de Wessenberg, taken prisoner, is sent by the Emperor to his father-in-law, with a confidential message — The allies attack Paris — Physiognomy of the city during the battle — Joseph, too late enlightened as to the actual forces of the enemy, authorizes the two marshals to capitulate, and joins the Empress at Rambouillet — The whole of the cabinet goes thither on his order — M. de Rovigo entrusts his correspondence with the Emperor to M. Pasquier — The latter is called upon by Mme. de Rémusat and M. de Talleyrand, who seeks a way of remaining in Paris — His stratagems to that end.

THE two combats at Arcis-sur-Aube were at first but imperfectly known; no official bulletin concerning them was ever published. On the 21st, people read in the *Moniteur* a short *résumé* of the news received by the Empress. During the morning of the 24th, some vague news was received of the combats fought on the 20th and 21st. It was known,

moreover, that following upon the fight of the 21st, the Emperor had gone in the direction of Vitry, and people wondered whether he had been driven to do so, or whether it was of his own free will. As for myself, I had no doubts that the issue had been most unfavorable to us, and the march towards Vitry seemed to me a risky one, to say the least. This was also the opinion of M. de La Valette.

In the course of the evening, I met the Archbishop of Malines, who saw matters from quite another standpoint. "What great news!" he exclaimed; "the enemy has at last perpetrated the blunder that I had foreseen for so long;" — he lay great claim to being able to judge of military manœuvres; — "they have suffered the Emperor to get in their rear, and, ere three weeks have gone by, you will see them completely broken and compelled to fly across the Rhine. Fortunate indeed those who will be allowed to reach the opposite bank!" Did he seriously entertain such a belief? I incline to that opinion; but perhaps he had it at heart to undo, in the presence of a member of the government, the effects of a scene which he had had a few days previously, at the residence of the Minister of Police, with General Sébastiani, who had just left the army to come and spend a day in Paris, and whom he had tried to convince that all was over. His conversation with me is none the less curious, when placed in juxtaposition with what he wrote a short time after, and the assurance with which he boasted of having foreseen everything with the utmost precision.

It was not long ere we perceived that all communications with the army of the Emperor were intercepted, as no further news reached us, and as we received no answer to our dispatches. The estafettes sent off on the 25th, 26th, and 27th, left us no doubt as to the determination the allies had come to, as to the union of all their army corps, and as

to the direction they were taking, which was evidently that of Paris. In addition to this, the success they had won on the 25th, in the neighborhood of la Fère-Champenoise, over Marshals Mortier and Marmont, as well as over the divisions brought to their relief by Generals Pacthod and Amey, did not allow of any hope being entertained of arresting their progress. In this fatal day's fighting we had lost 9000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, over sixty guns, and an immense quantity of caissons; it constituted the greatest success won by the allies since the beginning of the campaign. They owed it to their numerical superiority, and the absence of orders from Napoleon's headquarters. Hence it is that the two marshals, receiving no instructions, knowing only that the Emperor was going in the direction of Vitry, and presuming that he was driving before him, or luring after him, the great body of the enemy's army, had thought they ought to seek to join him; this unfortunate movement led them into the midst of the allied forces at the very moment when they had all come together, and so they were crushed.

But for all that, French valor had once more revealed itself in all its splendor, and had more than ever called forth the praise of the victors themselves, who have repeatedly testified to it. The Grand Duke Constantine especially could not conceal his admiration. But what was an acquisition to glory was no contribution towards success or salvation. The two marshals, after a few bloody engagements, were obliged to abandon the road leading to Paris by way of Meaux, and to follow the one which led thither through Charenton. Thus, we were covered on the Meaux side only by a very feeble corps commanded by General Compans, whom the marshals had vainly tried to join, and this corps was not in a condition to arrest, even for a few hours, the progress of the ever-advancing enemy.

The march of the enemy by the Meaux road was attended by serious results for one of the members of the coalition. A courier who had been dispatched to the Prince de Neufchâtel by General Maison, in command at Lille, was intercepted and brought to the headquarters of the allies. In the dispatch of which he was the bearer were found the most circumstantial particulars of overtures recently made by the Prince Royal of Sweden to that general; in order to enter into communication with him, he had availed himself of a few officers taken prisoners by his troops, and whom he had set at liberty. Dissatisfied with the inaction imposed on him by his being left behind in Belgium, seeing the hopes which he had entertained on his own behalf in regard to the Crown of France vanish into air, and unable to endure the idea of the return of the House of Bourbon, he was taking the course of exhorting all Frenchmen to unite in resenting such an insult, and clearly gave it to be understood that one might, in such a contingency, count on his assistance and on the support of all the forces at his disposal. I cannot have any doubt in regard to the matter, as I have held the document in my own hands. The impression it produced on the mind of the Emperor Alexander may be readily conceived. The absolute trust reposed in General Maison by the Prince Royal of Sweden would be hard to explain under such grave circumstances, did one not know that the latter had for a long time been his aide-de-camp, and was indebted to him for nearly all his promotion.

In the face of a situation which was hourly becoming more critical, Lieutenant-General Joseph and the Council of Regency were bound to try and bring together all elements of resistance. The few troops at hand were placed under the command of Marshal Moncey, whose chief of the staff was an engineer officer named Allent, a man of worth, whom his poor health had compelled to withdraw from

active service, and who, some years previous, had entered the Council of State as *maître des requêtes*.

Had it not been for the losses suffered in the two recent combats, the two marshals retreating on Paris might have brought back sufficient forces to dispute its approaches; but they would arrive with troops reduced by one half, and they were besides so closely pressed that they would not be allowed sufficient time to take the most indispensable dispositions.

An article which appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 28th read: "Military Intelligence, Doulevent, March 25th. — The Emperor's headquarters are established here; the French army occupies Chaumont and Brienne; it holds communication with Troyes, and patrols have pushed as far as Langres. Prisoners are brought in from all directions. His Majesty's health is excellent." The difference between the date of the 25th and that of the 28th proved conclusively that the dispatch had reached us only by a circuitous route. Chaumont was, moreover, more than fifty leagues distant from Paris, and Doulevent about the same distance. It was, therefore, plain that the Emperor was manœuvring in an opposite direction to the capital, and that he was in ignorance of the operations being carried on against it by the enemy, or that he heeded them not. Hence, assistance on his part was no longer to be relied upon, and the city was to depend on its own resources. Reduced to this hard necessity, King Joseph, in his capacity of lieutenant-general, gave orders that all available line regiments should go outside the city walls, and occupy Saint-Denis and Vincennes, as well as the bridges of Charenton, Saint-Maur, and Neuilly. The defence of the barriers was entrusted to the legions of the National Guard, and twelve main guards, one from each legion, were placed within the walls.

These measures taken, it remained to decide whether

the Empress should stay in the capital; the matter came up for discussion on the 28th. The Duc de Rovigo asked me for my opinion, as he had been in the habit of doing for some time past with regard to all matters concerning the city of Paris. I plainly told him that the departure of the Empress would produce a deplorable impression; that one could no longer reckon on any great display of energy on the part of the citizens of Paris, but that such a step would destroy what little remained to them of that quality, that it would alienate their affections, for the reason that in depriving them of the only protection which might make them hope for some measure of consideration on the part of the enemy, it would leave them no doubt as to how little was cared for them, their safety, and their property. I even added, that aside from the interests of the city, it was necessary to take into consideration, that when the time came to open negotiations wherein those of the whole empire would be debated, certain additional advantages were to be derived if one could speak and act in the name of the Empress, for whom it was impossible that the allies, and especially the Emperor of Austria, should not preserve considerable regard. The Duc de Rovigo appeared to share my opinion; he took away with him the memorandum I handed him and had it read out, previous to the opening of the council, to several of those who were about to attend its session. The debate was a protracted one, the majority certainly being in favor of the Empress's remaining. This course was strongly advocated, especially by the former *grand juge*, the Duc de Massa, who had a seat in the council as president of the *Corps législatif*, and who spoke with a degree of warmth hardly to be expected from him. He went so far as to deliver to Marie-Louise a most touching allocution on the duties of her position as wife, mother, and Empress; but he was speaking to a woman little inclined to

lead an ear to his words, and who was impatiently awaiting the time of her departure from the city. M. de Talleyrand avoided expressing an opinion in words, and contented himself with an inclination of the head which could be taken to mean anything, but which seemed to indicate principally that one might expect the worst, and resign oneself to it.

No sooner had Lieutenant-General Joseph become sure of the result which the debate would lead to, than he brought it to an abrupt end, by producing a letter from the Emperor who, wishing above all to make secure the liberty of his wife and son, ordered that they should be made to leave Paris on the slightest appearance of danger, and be sent on the Loire, where they should be followed by the ministers, and whither the seat of government should be transferred.<sup>1</sup> The Archchancellor made known that he had received similar instructions, and it would appear that the Empress had likewise received a letter conceived in the same spirit. All these letters had been written by the Emperor at the time when he was beginning his march from Rheims to Arcis. The Empress's departure became, therefore, a settled matter; this determination was arrived at on the 27th. On the evening of that day I met M. de Talleyrand at M. de Rémusat's; we were the only strangers there, and the conversation naturally fell on the coming departure of the Empress. I spoke my mind on the subject, and said to what a degree I looked upon it as likely to have fatal consequences for the cause of the Emperor. M. de Talleyrand knew already that such was my opinion, as he was one of

<sup>1</sup> I have never seen this letter, and I am not sure that matters were therein set forth in such precise terms as I have just mentioned. I know that subsequently the Duc de Bassano has stated the contrary and has pretended that it was only said in it that "if, owing to the contingencies of war, communications came to be intercepted, one should never lose sight of the fact that the person of the Empress and that of her son were never to be exposed to danger."

those who had read the memorandum I had given the Duc de Rovigo. He expressed a contrary opinion, and declared that nothing was of greater importance to Napoleon than not to suffer his wife and son to fall into the enemy's hands. I answered that all hinged on the importance attached to the more or less early surrender of the capital, as well as to the negotiations this event would give rise to. The discussion was a most animated one.

I was the first to leave the house; next day I received from Mme. de Rémusat a request to call on her immediately. "I did not want," she said, as soon as I saw her, "to let you remain in ignorance of what M. de Talleyrand said yesterday as you were leaving; here are his very words: *I would never have believed that M. Pasquier was so hostile to the House of Bourbon; he gave the very advice most unfavorable to it.*" "Well," I replied, "you may tell him on my behalf, fair cousin, that I am not, far from it, an enemy to the House of Bourbon; it would doubtless be as easy for me as for him to go over to it; I am ever one of the men in France whom their return might best suit, and this for a thousand reasons; but I am also a man of honor, and every time people entitled to do so ask for my opinion, I will give it to them in all conscience." If anything had been required to enlighten me as to the intentions of M. de Talleyrand, the foregoing would have sufficed. But I knew all that was necessary on this score, and I merely saw rather more plainly that the time was approaching when he thought it would be possible for him to throw off the mask, and the taking of Paris was beyond doubt the opportunity he was awaiting.

The news which reached us became hourly more and more alarming. The 28th was spent in making preparations for the departure of the Empress, which was to take place the next day; she herself notified the persons who were to



accompany her. It had been decided that Archchancellor Cambacérés should leave simultaneously with her, as he was more especially entrusted with the direction of her actions. The equipages which were to transport her suite, her baggage, and what still remained of the Crown treasury, constituted a very considerable convoy, whose progress must necessarily be rather slow. It was escorted by 1500 men of the Infantry of the Guard, and 300 cavalry, without taking into account the 1000 cavalry soldiers who were at Versailles, and who followed the Empress as far as Rambouillet. This large detachment again reduced to a considerable extent the small amount of forces of which we could dispose for the defence of Paris. The sight of the preparations for the departure, and of all the baggage-wagons which filled the courtyard of the Tuileries on the morn of the 29th, produced the painful impression which it was reasonable to expect; murmurings were heard, especially in the ranks of the National Guard, which plainly saw what little faith was to be attached to the words of the Emperor, when he had made pretence, on the eve of his departure, of reposing such entire confidence in it for the protecting and guaranteeing the security of his wife and son. It was apparently with the object of toning down this impression and to ward off the difficulties it might give rise to, that Prince Joseph saw fit to issue a proclamation, wherein he told the Parisians, "I will not leave you." This assurance was a poor consolation. I believe that nobody was tempted to trust to it.

The departure of the Empress took place on the morn of the 29th, at nine o'clock, and simultaneously the *Moniteur* informed the public that on the 26th the Emperor had defeated General Winzingerode, made two thousand prisoners, and had captured many guns and baggage-wagons. This news revealed a retrograde movement, and truly,

Napoleon, believing that he had found a magnificent opportunity of sweeping down on an important portion of the enemy's army, had retraced his steps, and thus it was that the engagement of the 26th had been fought. The result of this affair was to reveal to him that what he had taken for a regularly constituted army corps was nothing but a strong rideau of cavalry, the object of which was to screen from his view what was happening between him and the capital. He could no longer remain ignorant of the plans of the allies; ere coming to a determination, he waited to learn the results of the reconnoissances he had caused to be made in the direction of Vitry. As soon as there could no longer be any doubt as to the situation, he became greatly perplexed. The allies, by advancing on Paris, had left him master of all his movements. There was no longer anything to prevent him from rallying his garrisons, and closing all roads of retreat to the enemy. By resigning himself to abandon his capital to the foe for a few days, he would without difficulty obtain the time necessary to call to and concentrate about himself all his forces. The army of Suchet, a portion of which was on its way to Lyons, could arrive in time to be of help to him; united to that of Augereau and to that of Italy, it would constitute a solid mass of troops inured to war. The region in which he would have to operate was devoted to him, had at all periods of his reign favorably inclined towards him, and the military spirit predominating it had just been revived by the pillaging and vexations which the passage of the hostile armies had necessarily inflicted on the inhabitants. In Burgundy, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, and the Lyonnais, the voice of war was being heard in every direction, and the peasantry called for leaders and arms to enable them to throw themselves on the enemy, and to organize an irregular warfare, to carry out which the characteristics of the country offered the best facilities.

The struggle which he had just sustained in Champagne had been far from presenting the same favorable circumstances. How did it happen that in the end he abandoned a plan of campaign which was so plainly the right one? He had probably already heard of the defeat inflicted on Marshal Augereau, on the banks of the Saône, by an Austrian army which had crossed the Jura. He was also, according to all appearances, informed of the determination come to by this marshal to abandon Lyons, and to withdraw to Valence, in other words, to the Dauphiné. This mistaken bit of manoeuvring must have upset the Emperor's plans. The taking or, rather, the defection of Bordeaux, had, moreover, decided him to direct towards that city the detachment from Suchet's army, whose first destination had been Lyons. Did he become alarmed at the consequences of the taking of his capital? All great determinations, all revolutions had had their starting-point in Paris; the provinces had never been able to resist following its lead. What would be the course followed by that city, when once occupied by the enemy? What concessions would not the foe obtain from it, if he only promised and guaranteed the safety of the citizens, and respected their properties? Would not the desire of saving the many riches accumulated in it quickly dominate all other sentiments, and would not the most striking and most dangerous of all defections be added to the one of which Bordeaux had shown itself guilty? If the Bourbons had partisans anywhere, could it be doubted that they were to be met with in greater numbers in Paris than elsewhere? Such were probably the potent considerations which flocked through his brain, when on the afternoon of the 28th, on his return from Doulevant, he received an emissary from M. de La Valette, the first direct news he had received from Paris for ten days. The note was in the following terms: "The partisans of the stranger, encouraged

by what is taking place at Bordeaux, are making themselves heard. The presence of Napoleon is necessary if he wishes to prevent his capital being surrendered to the enemy ; not a moment is to be lost."

The Emperor hesitated no longer, and orders were immediately given in view of a movement which began on the 29th, and which was to bring the army by forced marches to the rescue of the capital. The union of all the hostile forces having been accomplished in the valley of the Marne, the road by way of Troyes was again open, and this was soon demonstrated to a certainty by the arrival of couriers and estafettes, who had been detained at Montereau for some time past, and who had finally been able to pass through by that road. The Emperor, greatly exercised by all that he learnt through these messengers, decided, on the second day's march, to take the start of his troops. Hence it was that he reached Fontainebleau on the afternoon of the 30th. He determined to make one more effort to renew the negotiations, the breaking off of which had at last appeared to him in all its consequences. On the 24th, he had been joined by the Duc de Vicence at Saint-Dizier ; the dissolution of the Châtillon congress had left the Duke free to return to him, and he had, since the 20th, been wandering about the country, vainly attempting to reach Napoleon's headquarters. M. de Vicence's arrival meant a return to thoughts of peace, and on the 25th, he was authorized to write to M. de Metternich, to inform him that having reached the Emperor on the foregoing night, he had immediately received his final orders for the conclusion of a peace, and that he had been invested with all the necessary powers to negotiate and sign one with the ministers of the allied Courts, this method being the one above all others which could ensure its prompt conclusion. He was therefore prepared to go to the headquarters of the sovereigns, and

awaited His Excellency's reply at the outposts. M. de Vicence was sufficiently justified in making this overture, by M. de Metternich's latest letter to him, under date of the 18th. A portion of this letter was as follows: "Monsieur le duc, matters are taking a turn for the worse. Whenever a *certain person* shall have completely made up his mind to make peace with the indispensable sacrifices, *come and conclude it*, but do not come as the mouthpiece of inadmissible plans. The questions at issue are too irrevocably settled for it to be possible to indulge in novel-writing without great dangers for the Emperor Napoleon." Then, after further developing this idea, the letter concluded as follows: "You must be aware of our views, principles, and wishes. The first are entirely European, and consequently altogether French; the second demonstrate Austria's interest in France's welfare; *the third are for a dynasty so closely bound up with its own*. It still depends on your master to make peace, in order to put an end to the dangers which threaten France. In a very short time, this may no longer depend on him. The throne of Louis XIV., with what has been added to it by Louis XV., offers too great a temptation to those who think its possessions occupy too great a space on the map of Europe. I will do all I can to detain Lord Castlereagh for a few days longer. When once that minister has left, there will be no concluding of peace." Nothing could better demonstrate that Austria still wished to leave the door open to negotiations, and that this desire led her far beyond the object she was seeking to attain.

Four days later, a fresh opportunity was presented of taking advantage of this friendly disposition, and it was eagerly grasped. Just as the headquarters were being moved from Saint-Dizier to Troyes, during the course of the 29th, there were brought to it eight or ten individuals who had been captured in their carriages on the road from Nancy

to Langres by the scouts of the light cavalry commanded by M. de Piré. They were returning from Nancy, whither they had been sent to see Monsieur, Comte d'Artois. It has been learnt since that M. de Vitrolles was one of them, but he was clever enough to escape, by passing himself off as a servant. Chief among these personages was M. de Wessenberg, Austria's ambassador to England; he had just come from London, and was on his way to join his master. Napoleon did not hesitate to turn this incident to his advantage and make a direct appeal to his father-in-law. M. de Wessenberg was shown the greatest attentions; he was set at liberty, together with all his fellow-travellers, and he left immediately, bearing a confidential communication for the Emperor of Austria, who was thought to be at but a short distance; but, as a last fatality, the unfortunate movement which had just been made against Chaumont had been the cause of that sovereign's leaving that town, and, fearing that he might fall into the hands of the French scouts, he had pushed on as far as Dijon ere halting; he was thus beyond the circle of operations, and even of rapid intercourse by letter; M. de Metternich had accompanied him. The applications made to both of them hence became of no avail.

Marshals Marmont and Mortier reached Charenton on the 29th, towards midday; they have been censured, but, in my opinion, unjustly, considering how greatly fatigued their soldiers must have been, for having lost several hours in occupying the Bondy and Le Bourget roads, by which the enemy was coming; for, during the evening of that same 29th, the headquarters of the Emperor of Russia were already established at Bondy. The whole of the night was put to use on both sides in getting ready for the decisive action, which was to be fought next day, and the recital of which is made with admirable accuracy in the work of

M. de Koch. The French generals had not had the time to reach the positions which it would have been to their best advantage to occupy.

The allies had at their disposal at least 150,000 men, to whom we had only to oppose 18,000 infantry men of all arms, of which 4000 were conscripts, and 6000 men of the National Guard. To these one may add about 5000 cavalymen, but the nature of the ground rendered these almost useless.

The engagement began on the morn of the 30th, at six o'clock. The enemy knew that he had everything to gain by precipitating it; he wished the issue to be decided before the arrival of Napoleon, of whose retrograde and rapid march he had been apprised; his dispositions, taken in haste, were therefore defective in several respects. I had retired at a very late hour on the previous night, and was awakened by the booming of cannons and the roll of musketry. This circumstance led me to believe that the field of battle was much closer at hand than it really was, and, at first, I felt sure that the fighting was raging at the very gates of the city. It was at some great distance, nevertheless. The duties of my position did not allow of my leaving the official residence at the Prefecture of Police; I had to be ready to give at any moment the orders necessary to preserve the interior security of the capital. This obligation was infinitely distressful to me.

The forenoon was spent in listening to the roar of the artillery, and the contradictory news which arrived at every moment, and, it must be said, in the midst of an astonishing tranquillity in the interior of the city. The central portion of it especially remained in silent calm, all the more profound in that all those who had been able to do so had wended their steps towards the boulevards and to the quarter of the city nearest the scene of events. Whatever

might be the various aspirations and hopes, the sentiment of the national honor silenced them at the approach of the enemy; the clash of battle and the imminence of danger had inspired with the most noble ardor all those whom duty placed at some post, however full of peril it might be. Thus, the National Guard, which Napoleon had so greatly distrusted, and which he had armed with such evident reluctance, not only responded to the appeal of its chiefs, but anticipated it, and its ardor needed rather restraining than stimulating. The youths of the Polytechnic School, transformed into artillerymen, rivalled in skill, zeal, and courage, the old soldiers of the army with which they were associated, and this day, at an epoch less fruitful in warlike prodigies, would have been sufficient to give fame to a large number of those called upon to participate in it. Its result was at least to teach a victorious enemy to respect a population capable of such energetic devotion, and to make him understand how great was the consideration due to it. The city of Paris showed itself in these melancholy circumstances worthy of being the capital of France which for twenty years past had made Europe tremble. It is therefore allowable to believe that if it had not been reduced to so small a number of defenders, and especially if he, whose presence was in itself an army, had arrived in time to direct the defence, the result might have been entirely different.

The thick of the fight took place between the plateau of Romainville, and the knoll of Chaumont. Marshal Marmont, who commanded on these heights, made an heroic stand, and inflicted severe losses on the Russians. This artillery repeatedly swept the columns issuing from Pantin to assail from that quarter the flank of his position, and the number of the enemy's soldiers who remained on the field of battle cannot be estimated at less than from four to five



thousand men. But after all, however vigorous his defence, he was being attacked on too many sides and with too much fury not to be compelled to fall back. So he went on fighting, continually losing ground, and the knoll of Chaumont, the village and the heights of Belleville, again and again taken and retaken, finally remained in the possession of the Russians, and towards midday he found himself almost driven up against the city gates. Marshal Mortier was not more fortunate in the plain lying between Montmartre and the Ourcq canal; after carrying the village of Aubervilliers, the enemy had likewise occupied La Villette and La Chapelle. In the direction of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, a Russo-Prussian column having turned from afar all the positions occupied by Marshal Marmont, had invaded the plain lying between Vincennes and the *barrière du Trône*, which could thus be carried at any moment.

The gravity of the situation was increasing hourly, and the time was now fast approaching when fighting was to take place at the entrances to the streets from behind palisades erected beyond the barriers. Several cannon-balls shot over the walls had fallen in the inner boulevards, some had even in the garden of the de Gontaut mansion, at the corner of the *Rue Louis-le-Grand*.

The supreme command was, on that day, in the hands of a man whose prudence was greatly in excess of his resoluteness. Lieutenant-General Joseph had at early morn betaken himself to the heights of Montmartre. He had persistently tried to persuade himself that we were being attacked by only a portion of the great army of the allies. As the morning advanced, the reports which reached him from all directions could but weaken his confidence, which was entirely destroyed between eleven o'clock and noon. Captain Peyre, an engineer in the Fire Brigade, having strayed into the plain

in the direction of Saint-Denis, had been made a prisoner, and brought into the presence of the Emperor Alexander, who had given him his freedom, commissioning him at the same time to make known to the Parisian population that he was at the head of the whole of the allied forces. He had given him several copies of a proclamation issued in the name of Generalissimo Prince von Schwarzenberg, announcing in the first place a most vigorous prosecution of operations, and in the next, attempting to separate Napoleon's cause from that of France. Captain Peyre, on returning to Paris, was immediately taken before Joseph, to whom he handed the proclamations, and to whom he gave a most detailed account of all he had seen and heard. All doubts came to an end, when Major Allent, of the National Guard, made his report. This very experienced officer had already been dispatched several times to reconnoitre; a cursory examination had enlightened him at once as to Marshal Marmont's distressing situation. He was intent in looking with his spy-glass in the direction of Saint-Denis, when he noticed a strong column of the enemy leaving that little town; a portion was wending its way through the plain towards Montmartre, while the other was following the road of La Révolte, with the evident intention of gaining the road of the Bois de Boulogne for the purpose of taking possession of the heights of l'Etoile and of Chaillot. There was not in that direction any force in a condition to resist the carrying out of this plan. M. Allent pointed out to Joseph the consequences of this movement, at the same time calling his attention to the fact that in order to be able to extend its operations on so vast a scale, the enemy must have considerable forces at its disposal.

The lieutenant-general soon made up his mind. Nothing there was that suited him less than to find it necessary that he should join his brother, and, had he but tarried a little

longer, no other road to retreat would have been left open to him than the one which would have brought him into his presence. On the contrary, it fell in more with his views to follow in the steps of the Empress, and to be the chief councillor of the Regent. He therefore did not hesitate sending Marshals Marmont and Mortier the authority to capitulate on behalf of the army and of the capital, and he instructed M. Molé, the *grand juge*, to notify all the great dignitaries, all the ministers, all the Councillors of State, all the high officials, to leave at once for Blois. The Prefect of the Seine and the Prefect of Police alone did not receive this command. It had been agreed upon that they should remain behind for the purpose of preserving order, and to mitigate the misfortunes with which the city was threatened. These steps once taken, Joseph, evidently considering himself released from the engagements contained in his proclamation of the previous day, came down from the heights of Montmartre as quickly as possible, mounted his horse, and, followed by a small suite, gained the gate of the Bois de Boulogne by the shortest road, which was not yet occupied by the enemy's column. He rode on in haste without drawing reins, and in a few hours reached Rambouillet, where he joined the Empress.

Meanwhile, the authority he had sent to the two marshals to capitulate, could not be attended with such prompt results as he had doubtless expected. The struggle was being waged in too many directions, and the line of operations was too extended to allow of any concerted action. The marshals were determined not to surrender, until driven to the wall. The battle continued to rage for several hours with great ardor, especially in the direction of Montmartre. It was five o'clock in the evening when the last position was carried by the Russians. It is indeed true that a suspension of arms had already been agreed upon, and M. de Langeron

has all but been convicted of having feigned to be ignorant of it, in order to finish the operation he had begun and reap the honor of it. Such conduct, at all times reprehensible, is still more so when coming from a French *émigré*, who was fighting in the ranks of the foreigner. It was in defending the positions surrounding Montmartre, especially that of the Clichy barrier, that the National Guard most distinguished itself; it displayed a courage amounting almost to foolhardiness, for it was with difficulty that it could be persuaded upon to seek cover in the houses, even when it was necessary to do so in order to inflict greater injury on the enemy; this seemed to it to be like hiding, and to have an appearance of fear. After the taking of Montmartre, the firing ceased entirely on both sides.

I learnt of the departure of Lieutenant-General Joseph, and of the ministers, through the Duc de Rovigo, who sent for me in great haste at two o'clock. "I am leaving with all the ministers," he said to me; "you are to remain here, and so you are free to do anything you may see fit." He then informed me of everything about which I was still in the dark, adding that the capitulation was about to take place. At the same time he would ask me to render him a service, the nature of which he soon explained, pointing at the same time to a large portfolio which he had just locked. "You must keep this for me," he said; "it represents my most precious possession on this earth; all my correspondence with the Emperor, from the time I have been connected with him, is in it. Therein are to be found the explanation and justification of my conduct in all matters." I pointed out to him that I was the last man in the world to whom he should entrust such a deposit; for indeed, even supposing that I should be left in charge of the Prefecture of Police, would not my actions be watched and would I not be placed under stricter surveillance than anybody else? It might so

happen that all my personal papers, and all those of the Prefecture, would be examined, nay, carried off by foreign commissioners; to sum up, I could not answer for what might happen. It was true that I had a private residence, but it would surely be occupied by one of the foe's officers, as it happened to be untenanted; it would, therefore, be the height of imprudence to attempt to conceal anything in it. Why did he not, I argued, take with him a thing so precious to him, and what was there to prevent his placing the portfolio in his carriage? "Who knows," was his reply, "if I may not be carried off by Cossacks ere I shall have reached Versailles; and, above all things, these documents must not run the chance of falling into the hands of the enemy. So I beg you will take it," he went on to say, "and should you ever think it is in danger of being taken from you, get rid of it by burning it; on this point, I request you to give me your word of honor." "Let it be as you say," I answered, "but there is every reason to believe that the flames will have destroyed it ere to-morrow morning." So the portfolio was taken to my official residence.

On my return thither, I had to give my attention to the many duties that fell to my lot, and which happily prevented me from weighing in all its extent the heavy task with which I was about to be burdened, and to look in the face all the work, cares, anxieties, and vexations of all kinds which I should have to endure during the next fortnight. As it was necessary that I should above all things be well informed of what was going on between our troops and those of the enemy, I dispatched several intelligent messengers to Marshal Marmont. I instructed them to seek him out even on the field of battle, if necessary, and to entreat him to keep me informed of every stipulation; he would grasp the importance of this in the interests of the city of Paris, the security of which was entrusted to me. At

the same time, I dispatched a messenger to Marshal Moncey to enquire of him what was to be expected of the National Guard and what arrangements had been come to regarding it. He was leaving just as my messenger reached him, and he contented himself with letting me know that I might concert with Major-General Allent in this respect, who was to remain in Paris.

I waited till nearly seven o'clock for Marshal Marmont's reply; it had been a difficult matter to get to him. One can imagine how great was my anxiety during this interval, of which I made use in taking all precautionary measures dictated by prudence, in seeing the principal police agents of the Prefecture, especially those belonging to the outdoor service, and in enjoining upon them to use the greatest circumspection in their deeds and words. The one among those agents who caused me most anxiety was Inspector-General Veyrat. I was aware that he was an object of hatred to the population and capable of any treachery. I commanded him to await my orders even in the smallest matters, and consequently not to leave the building.

Just as I was busily engaged in prescribing those measures which were most urgent, I received a most strange visit. M. de Talleyrand called on me at about six o'clock in the evening, accompanied by, or rather brought by, Mme. de Rémusat, for it was she who opened the conversation. "You are aware, cousin," she said to me, "that M. de Talleyrand has received orders to leave and to go and join the Empress. Is this not very unfortunate? Nobody will thus be left to treat with the foreigner, nobody whose name carries any weight with him. Hence you see that M. de Talleyrand is in the greatest dilemma, for how can he avoid obeying, while, on the other hand, what a misfortune it would be for him to be absolutely compelled to leave!" I

replied that I understood all this perfectly, but that I did not see how I could help it. "Yet, he has come to ask your advice," she replied. M. de Talleyrand thereupon stammered out a few faltering sentences, which amounted merely to a repetition of what had just been said by Mme. de Rémusat, who, resuming the conversation, finally proposed, after a good deal of circumlocution, that I should send to the gate by which he was to leave a few of my trusted men, who would stir up the people just as he was passing by, and who would say that it was not to be tolerated that the city should be thus left to itself by those who had most to lose and consequently whose greatest interest was to protect them, and finally compel him to retrace his steps. My answer to this was that, placed as I was in a position wherein my first duty was to preserve public order, I would certainly not take a step which would primarily disturb the peace. "But," I went on to say, "there is a much simpler way for you to attain your desire. M. de Rémusat holds a command in the National Guard, and is surely entrusted with guarding some gate or the other. Let M. de Talleyrand attempt to leave by that gate, and then M. de Rémusat can do through his National Guards what you ask me to do through the people."

This idea was a most natural one, and I think it had already entered their minds; but they would have preferred to let me bear the weight of the responsibility of this manœuvre. Seeing that there was no way of obtaining my co-operation, they decided upon following my advice, and things happened just as I had said. An hour later, M. de Talleyrand showed himself at the gate of the Champs-Élysées, where was stationed M. de Rémusat and his company, when he was most politely requested to go home, which he did without too much entreaty. It is hard to believe that so well advised a man should have imagined

that so clumsy a ruse would shelter him from all danger, and that the Emperor, should he regain his power, would be deceived by such an excuse, when coming from a man against whom he harbored already so many grievances. Yet it must be that M. de Talleyrand entertained some illusion on that score ; it goes to show, at any rate, that he had not yet irrevocably decided upon which course to pursue, and especially that he was not absolutely sure of the one which the allies would take. He feared, perhaps, that the Emperor Alexander, once master of Paris, and yielding to Austria's influence, might impose his will and insist on his defeated rival being treated with some consideration. In such an event, the old diplomat would probably have come forward to conduct and render successful negotiations to that effect ; his remaining in the capital would then have supplied him with the means, by being of some service, of winning back Napoleon's favor, and of resuming his position at the head of affairs.



## CHAPTER XII

Marshal Marmont communicates to M. Pasquier the articles of the capitulation—He bids him call at the head of the municipality on the Emperor Alexander, for the purpose of making his submission—General Dejean, aide-de-camp to the Emperor, joins Mortier—General Girardin, sent by Berthier, arrives in quest of information from the Ministry of War—Later on, he is falsely accused of having had the intention of blowing up the powder-magazine at Grenelle—M. de Chabrol's lack of sang-froid—M. Pasquier takes the necessary steps for provisioning the city—Previous to entrusting M. de Rovigo's portfolio to one of his head-clerks, he examines its contents, and finds among them some curious letters of Napoleon's treating of the pressing attentions of Joseph to Marie-Louise—He leaves for Bondy with the municipal body, in the dead of the night—The deputation experiences great difficulty in getting the city's gate opened to it—Awful sight presented by the field of battle—Pain felt by M. Pasquier on finding Alexander quartered in the château formerly occupied by his grandfather—Pending the Emperor's awakening, M. de Nesselrode lays before M. Pasquier the proclamation of Prince von Schwarzenberg—It was, *de facto*, the work of Pozzo di Borgo, who adroitly led the Austrian generalissimo to affix his signature to it—M. de Nesselrode presents the deputation to the Emperor of Russia; the latter inveighs against Napoleon, and distinctly separates his cause from that of France—He grants M. Pasquier the authority to keep the National Guard under arms—The Prefect of Police, who returns to Paris escorted by Cossacks, issues a proclamation to the Parisian population, and calls on the officers of the *gendarmerie* to see to the maintenance of order—M. de Vicence's vain endeavors to be received by the Emperor Alexander—M. Pasquier burns the portfolio of the Duc de Rovigo.

It was seven o'clock in the evening, when I received information from Marshal Marmont that the terms of the capitulation had almost been agreed upon, and he bade me call on him at his private residence, in the Faubourg Poissonnière. I found the marshal there in the company of a

Russian, an Austrian, and a Prussian officer, each stipulating in the name of the allies. They were engaged in reducing to writing what had been orally agreed upon at La Villette between the two marshals and the commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces. The articles which the marshal submitted to me concerned the army alone. It was to evacuate the city on the 31st of March, *i.e.* the next day, at seven o'clock in the morning. Hostilities were not to be renewed until two hours later. Then followed the usual conventions regarding arsenals, workshops, military storehouses, hospitals, and the wounded; as to the civil interests, that is, those of the city of Paris, there was hardly any mention made of them. The city was recommended to the generosity of the allied powers; it was merely stated that the Guard, whether National or Urban, was to be dealt with totally apart from the regular troops; that it was to be disarmed or disbanded, according to the decision to be come to by the powers.

I asked and obtained with great difficulty that the municipal *gendarmerie* should be treated just as the National Guard. The marshal told me, moreover, that according to the usages of war, it was absolutely necessary that the municipal body should go to Bondy during the night to make its submission to the Emperor Alexander, that I was to be at the head of this deputation, which would enable me to treat with him concerning all matters connected with the city of Paris, and that he had no doubt that my requests would be favorably entertained. He commissioned me to inform the Prefect of the Seine of the necessity of paying this visit, for which we were both to hold ourselves in readiness, together with the municipal body; he presumed that we might be enabled to leave at about eleven o'clock at night. This late hour was due to the fact that it was necessary to wait till the capitulation had been ratified, and to

accomplish this formality it was necessary to proceed to Bondy, where was established the headquarters of the allies.

During my short stay at Marshal Marmont's, I learnt that early in the afternoon General Dejean, aide-de-camp of the Emperor, had come to Marshal Mortier, and had brought him orders to do his utmost to postpone an engagement; he was to notify Prince von Schwarzenberg of the overtures just made by Napoleon to the Emperor of Austria, and which could not fail to bring about a peace. After a lost battle, the time for this was hardly propitious. Still, the marshal had promptly sent a parliamentary to the generalissimo. The latter replied that Napoleon was doubtless misinformed, that his sovereign was united to the coalition in sacred and indissoluble bonds, which did not permit him to treat separately for peace; he had next, to emphasize his reply, handed the parliamentary a copy of his proclamation, the one which the Emperor Alexander had already given Captain Peyre that morning. The arrival of General Dejean proves that had Napoleon exercised the same diligence, which it was entirely possible for him to do, he would have arrived before the battle was over, and no one can tell what would have been the consequences of his appearing on the scene.

Another general officer sent by the Prince de Neufchâtel, Count Girardin, arrived just after General Dejean. He had merely come to obtain information from the Minister of War, and to ascertain what was going on. It was asserted some days afterwards that he had brought with him the order to blow up the powder-magazine situated in the plain of Grenelle, and the explosion of which would have been disastrous to the capital. This allegation found a certain number of believers; an interest was taken in neglecting nothing which would entirely detach the Parisians from the cause of Napoleon. An artillery major, who was entrusted

with the safe-keeping of that magazine, contributed greatly towards getting the story believed; he declared that at nine o'clock at night a colonel, who had presented himself at the Saint-Dominique grille, had sent for him, had asked him if the magazine had been evacuated, and, on receiving an answer in the negative, had ordered him to blow it up immediately, and that he had feigned his readiness to execute the order from fear that some one else would receive this commission, which he had taken good care not to execute. Prejudiced writers, among others M. de Beauchamp, in his *History of 1814*, have not failed to reproduce this story. Now, as the result of a careful examination and weighing of facts, it has been proven that the alleged order was never given, and that the story was made out of whole cloth by a man who had sought to give himself some importance. What demonstrates the truth of this incontestably, is the fact that he was soon heard of no more, and if his narrative had been true, he would certainly have made the most of it for many a day. Moreover, on the 29th, Napoleon had not yet come to believe that the city could be taken; he flattered himself that he could arrive in time to defend it. It is impossible, therefore, that he should have prescribed such a measure, the order for which would at any rate been worth putting into writing, and one that nobody would have consented to carry or to receive by word of mouth.

On leaving Marshal Marmont's, I called on the Prefect of the Seine, at the Hôtel de Ville, in order to inform him of what I had learnt. Everything was there in a state of great confusion. M. de Chabrol, a most worthy man and a good administrator, was out of his element in the midst of such troubles and dangerous times; not that he was deficient in courage, for he would, if necessary, have faced an honorable death, but he lacked sang-froid. A number of the

members of the municipal council had, of their own accord, gathered about him; I suggested to him to call the others together immediately, and to notify M. Allent that he was to accompany us to Bondy. I called his attention to the fact that we should be compelled to furnish a large quantity of rations of all kinds on the following day; so, acting on my advice, he sent for the heads of his department who were in correspondence with those charged with the supplies of food for the hospitals, prisons, and so forth, in order that they should be prepared to meet requisitions for bread, meat, wine, and brandy.

On my return to my own residence I had to give my attention to similar cares; I ordered the bakers to increase their supply of bread, and I notified the officials of the *Octroi* (local customs) that requisitions would in all probability be sent to the *Entrepôt des vins* (City wine-cellar), of which they had the administration. A large number of country folks had already poured into the city, flying from the enemy's columns, with their goods and chattels, horses, and cattle. I instructed the commissaries of police to concert with the mayors in order to find shelter for them. Finally, before returning to the Prefecture of the Seine, I bethought myself of the deposit entrusted to my care by the Duc de Rovigo; I could not leave it in my apartments, for who could tell if I should return from Bondy as prefect of police, and the first care of my successor in office would certainly be to lay hands on all documentary matter. I therefore summoned a head-clerk, in whom I reposed great confidence, and begged him to keep until my return the portfolio, the key of which I would take with me. As it was, however, necessary that he should become aware of its importance, I did not conceal from him what were its contents, and urged upon him to place it, as much as possible, where it would not attract attention. It was with some

difficulty that I got him to accept this responsibility, and he made me promise to relieve him of it next morning. However, ere handing over the portfolio to his care, I considered it necessary to open it, to see for myself whether the Duc de Rovigo had told me the truth regarding its contents, and whether there was among them anything else besides the letters he had mentioned. When making this examination, which confirmed his veracity, my eyes naturally fell on the documents which were on top of all the packages,—and they were the last of the correspondence,—those written by Napoleon on leaving Rheims. Great was my astonishment to see that they had, to a great extent, reference to suspicions he had conceived regarding the Empress Marie-Louise, or rather his brother Joseph, whom he accused of having made the most outrageous advances to her! The Duc de Rovigo was severely lectured for having given him no information on the subject, and he was ordered to exercise for the future the strictest surveillance over what went on in the château. For a long time I believed that this charge of Napoleon against his brother had its source in the mental derangement of a mind, which countless annoyances inclined, at this time, to accredit all kinds of suspicions; but I have since learnt from M. de Saint-Aignan, who, considering his intimacy with the Duchesse de Montebello, must have been thoroughly well informed as to the matter, that Napoleon's suspicions were only too well founded, and that at that period the Empress had been greatly importuned by and had had frequent cause to complain of the assiduous attentions of her brother-in-law.

By eleven o'clock at night I was at the Hôtel de Ville; no news had yet been received from Marshal Marmont. The municipal body was assembled in the council-room; it is a noteworthy fact that in this crisis no voice had so far made itself heard against the man who was the author of it. Not

a murmur was heard from amid that municipal council which was soon to express itself in no uncertain fashion. Its members were as if overwhelmed by the weight of the inevitable. We waited a long time for the order to start. It has since become known that this delay was due to the fact that the foreign officer who had in the first instance brought the ratification from Bondy, had been killed at the approaches of Paris, owing to his not having responded promptly enough to a "Who goes there?" As he did not return, it was resolved to dispatch a second one, who safely reached his destination. But, time had flown, and it was past one o'clock in the morning when we left the Hôtel de Ville.

Wishing to have a travelling companion with whom I might talk freely, I gave a seat in my carriage to M. de Lamoignon, a man of intellect, a well-informed member of the municipal council, and one of my oldest acquaintances. I felt sure that I should always find in him a kindred spirit in the painful circumstances by which we were surrounded. Our train was a long one, and so moved slowly. On reaching the Pantin barrier, the head of our column was stopped by the military post which guarded it, and which refused to allow us to leave the city. As the guard persisted in its obstinacy, I got out of my carriage with the object of trying to remove the difficulty. The post was still occupied by the Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. The officer in command of them told me that the strictest orders had been given not to allow any one to leave the city. I pointed out to him that these orders could not affect the corporation, when going to accomplish the painful duty imposed on it. "Monsieur le préfet," he replied, "I know you, for I have oftentimes seen you when I was on guard duty at the Tuileries. And so, there is no longer any doubt, Paris is abandoned to the enemy! Our capital is taken, and this is then the result of twenty years' combats, of so many battles, and of the vic-

tories in which I have had a share, for I have been in the army since 1792!" As he finished speaking, he put his hands to his face to hide the tears which were welling up in his eyes, and which he could not conceal from me. This patriotic grief of an old warrior, — his moustache was grizzled, — impressed me to an extent I cannot describe. I pressed his hand with a feeling of emotion as deep as his own. "There is nothing to be done but to yield to your request," he said; "you may pass on," at the same time causing the barrier to be opened. I never saw this fine fellow again; I have often regretted not having asked his name. When we returned to the city in the morning, he had been relieved from duty together with his men, and had rejoined the army which was evacuating Paris.

We progressed laboriously along the road to Bondy, astonished and moved by the spectacle presented to our eyes. What a brutal contrast it afforded with all which, for fifteen years past, had dazzled our imaginations: victories, glory, power, all had vanished! Night was still surrounding us; numerous camp-fires crowned the heights of Montmartre, Belleville, Chaumont, and Romainville, while the plain of Saint-Denis was studded with them, and one could see to the very line of the horizon, in the direction of the road leading to the *barrière de l'Etoile*, the line of these fires which enveloped the capital, whose gleam lit up the faubourgs to a considerable distance, and testified to the presence of the formidable army which was to enter it next day. At every step we came across cavalry pickets on their rounds, and we passed between rows of stacked arms, at the feet of which lay sleeping soldiers. On nearing Pantin, the spectacle was a fearful one; this was the point where the fray had been the bloodiest. There was displayed, in all its horrible aspect, the aftermath of the battle; it was here that the Russians, mowed down by the



French artillery, had lost three or four thousand men. Horses and men lay unburied in a confused mass; it was the first time that my eyes had rested on so horrible an accumulation of bodies. My companion, M. de Lamoignon, who had escaped from the butchery at Quiberon, where he had been severely wounded, had less cause to be astonished at such a sight, and yet he was deeply affected by it.

Once past Pantin, our progress became somewhat more rapid; it had been delayed repeatedly between Paris and Pantin. Here, it was a Cossack patrol which stopped us to examine the permit carried by the Russian orderly who preceded us, and who was our only protector. We had no escort, having been compelled to leave at the city barrier the gendarmes who had accompanied us that far. There, the road was encumbered by carts or broken caissons, which had to be moved. So it was that it took us almost four hours to cover a distance of less than three leagues. During those four hours we had plenty of time, M. de Lamoignon and I, to exchange thoughts. He was one of those whose hopes centred on the return of the ancient dynasty, and he was, as a matter of course, on terms of intimacy with the men ready to serve it. What were its chances? All was going to depend on the determination come to by the allied sovereigns. Apart from them, what could one attempt doing for the princes of the House of Bourbon, in a country which hardly knew them any longer, and when it was greatly to be feared that the army would prove hostile to them. Still, we felt that their return would yet be the most desirable ending, for policy would command their not giving offence to any party, and not running counter to any interests; nothing could better than their recall serve to bring about this general peace, the need of which was so generally felt. The example just set by Bordeaux was such as to inspire courage.

We arrived at Bondy at daybreak. As I entered the château wherein the Emperor Alexander had taken up his quarters, impressions of an altogether personal nature came and mingled with those my mind had been a prey to since our departure from the city. This château had been occupied by my maternal grandfather, during the time of my early childhood; I had seldom visited it since that period, but it had left in my memory those recollections which are so powerful regarding all facts that have engraved themselves upon our minds at the outset of our lives; I was brought face to face with them through one of the greatest events which had happened since the establishment of a monarchy in France! I was bearing the submission of the city of Paris to a sovereign whose realms, a century earlier, were hardly known to our fathers, and who, coming from the borders of Asia and bringing in his wake Germania in her entirety, had come to lay down the law to the France of Clovis, Charlemagne, Henri IV., Louis XIV., and Napoleon! And it was we who had sought him out in his far-off frozen regions, who had brought him hither, him and his Tartars, by the light of the conflagration of his capital and his towns in flames! Peter the Great could never have dreamt this, when, in the course of his journey through civilized lands, whose institutions, arts, and manners he came to study, he visited the Palace of the Tuileries in 1717, and, doing homage to the child-king whose guest he was, took him up in his arms!

We were shown into a *salon* on the ground-floor, which was occupied by a few officers doing guard duty; they informed us that the Emperor was abed, but that he would doubtless rise early, probably even the moment he was informed of our arrival. At the end of half an hour there entered a general officer, who came forward in a most courteous manner, and who spoke French fluently, but with

an Italian accent. This was General Pozzo di Borgo. He made an attempt to enter into conversation with us; but, in spite of his extreme courtesy, no one felt in a mood to carry on a useless talk.

A quarter of an hour later, and there appeared another personage; it was M. de Nesselrode. Without possessing the title of minister, he was nevertheless at the head of the Russian cabinet in the matter of foreign affairs, and enjoyed the confidence of his master to a great extent. As he had for a long period been secretary to the Russian legation in Paris, we had met frequently at M. de Basano's, and our social intercourse had always been most pleasant. We were really glad to meet once more, and to have, each one of us, some one we could speak with. He at once drew me aside, and his first words were to ask me if I was cognizant of the proclamation of Prince von Schwarzenberg. I replied that I was aware of its tenor, but that I had not read the text of it. He thereupon gave me a copy of it. This most important document, which has been repeatedly published, had for its object, as I have already stated, to separate Napoleon's cause from that of the capital of France. The following characteristic words were to be found in it: "The allied sovereigns are seeking in all good faith *for a salutary authority in France*, which can cement the union of all nations and of all governments with it. In the present circumstances, it appertains to the city of Paris to accelerate the peace of the world. Its desires are awaited with the interest which so important a result must inspire. Let it pronounce, and, from that very moment, the army now before its walls becomes the supporter of its determination. Parisians, you are acquainted with the situation of your fatherland, the action taken by Bordeaux, the friendly occupation of Lyons, and the real dispositions of your fellow-citizens. . . ." Then followed

an assurance that the population would be treated as considerately as possible, and in all kindness; the whole ended with the following words: "It is with these sentiments that Europe in arms before your walls calls upon you. Do not delay in responding to the reliance she places in your love of country, and in your wisdom."

"Reject Napoleon, and anything you will put in his place will be agreeable to us," could not be more clearly expressed. But how could so formal a declaration have emanated from the pen of the Austrian generalissimo, when, so recently, the chief of the Austrian cabinet, the most intimate confidant of the thoughts of the Emperor Francis, had written to the Duc de Vicence: "You must be aware of our views, principles, and wishes . . . these latter are for a dynasty so closely bound up with our own."

The proclamation was not the work of Prince von Schwarzenberg; it had in some manner been thrust upon him by General Pozzo di Borgo, who had first conceived the idea of it in a little village where the headquarters of the allies had halted previous to reaching Coulommiers; in the course of the evening he had secured approval for it by his Emperor, and the next morning the latter had submitted it<sup>1</sup> to the King of Prussia, who had given his assent to it, and to Prince von Schwarzenberg, who had not dared to refuse his own. Fortified with all these approvals, General de Pozzo had, on reaching Coulommiers, not rested till he had

<sup>1</sup> I have held in my hands and read the original draft of this document of so high a historical importance. It bore several alterations made in pencil by the Emperor Alexander, among others the following one after the sentence which ran thus: "Parisians, you are acquainted with the situation of your fatherland, the action taken by Bordeaux, the friendly occupation of Lyons, etc." M. de Pozzo, in his haste to attain the object he had in view, had written: "You will seek in a legitimate authority." The Emperor, more circumspect, had crossed out these words, and had substituted for them these, which remained: "You will find in these examples."

found a printing establishment, when he had had the document put into type at once, and had ordered a considerable number of copies of it. But Prince von Schwarzenberg had already gone ahead with the Emperor of Russia, and when it came to printing his signature beside the others, the printer stated that an Austrian officer had prohibited him from doing it without further orders. Pozzo had not allowed himself to be thus turned away from his object, and starting off at a gallop had rejoined his Emperor on the high-road, just as he was about to leave Meaux. The generalissimo was at his side. Alexander was not slow in realizing the import of the obstacle submitted to him, and, in order to remove it, he lost no time in cajoling the Prince von Schwarzenberg in such a manner as to successfully dispose of his reluctance to let his name appear. He again gave his consent, which was immediately transmitted to Coulommiers. So it was that the proclamation saw the light of publication, and was distributed with this indispensable signature attached to it.

The Prince von Schwarzenberg was a man of high character and of extreme good nature, but of mediocre intellect and of still more mediocre military talents. He had been appointed generalissimo of the coalesced forces to show some consideration for Austria, and in order to bind her as much as possible to the common cause. The burden was so heavy a one that there was no fear that he would be too zealous of his prerogatives; what was most to be feared from him was his inaction. He always remained under the immediate control of his master and of M. de Metternich. On this occasion he found himself left to his own devices for the first time, and it was not very difficult for as crafty a mind as that of General de Pozzo, and to a prince endowed with such seductive ways as Alexander, to triumph over him, for a few hours at least. The victory won on this occa-

sion by the cleverness of M. de Pozzo is to be reckoned among some of the greatest services ever rendered to the House of Bourbon, if not as the most decisive one.

While I was engaged in reading attentively the document just handed to me by M. de Nesselrode, he was seeking, by closely scrutinizing my countenance, to ascertain what impression it was making on me, and, no sooner had I come to the end, when he hastened to ask me what I thought of it. "I am greatly pleased," I replied, "to notice the interest displayed therein towards the city of Paris. And it is indeed necessary that some consideration should be shown it, if only to ward off deplorable occurrences which would give pain to the generous soul of the Emperor Alexander." "In this respect," was his answer, "you need not entertain any fears, and it will depend on the Parisians themselves to experience an increase of this kindly feeling, and develop into the strongest of protections. Moreover, the Emperor will himself give you all the assurances you need. As soon as he has risen, I will go and take his orders with regard to his receiving the deputation; I will tell him that you are at the head of it, and it will certainly be a source of gratification to him to be able to discuss matters with a person worthy of confidence. Do not make any ceremony with regard to answering his questions and preferring any requests you may have to make. Say to him all that you consider advisable; but I must inform you that he is somewhat hard of hearing and that you must speak in a loud voice in order to be heard." He then begged me to introduce to him the Prefect of the Seine, and the principal members of the deputation. We had still to wait for some length of time after he left us. During this interval, the *salon* gradually became filled with all the great officers of the Emperor Alexander's household, and the principal chiefs of the coalesced army. They made most courteous efforts

to enter into conversation with us, making a show of speaking in great praise and even in great admiration of the magnificent resistance displayed by the French troops, especially during the recent engagements at la Fère-Champenoise.

It was about six o'clock when we were ushered into the presence of the Emperor Alexander, in the suite of rooms which he occupied on the first floor. After M. de Nesselrode had, with the information supplied by us, introduced the members of the deputation to the Emperor, naming each one individually and informing him of the position held by each one, His Majesty began the conversation by paraphrasing the proclamation of the generalissimo. He did not express any more formally than the latter with regard to what was to be substituted for that which was sought to be destroyed, but he spoke much more plainly and in more positive terms when giving vent to his feelings of implacable hatred against Napoleon. "I have," he said, "but one enemy in France, and this enemy is the man who has deceived me in the most infamous fashion, who has abused my confidence, who has violated all his sworn pledges to me, who has carried into my dominions the most iniquitous and outrageous war. All reconciliation between us is henceforth impossible; but — I again say it — he is the only enemy I have in France. All other Frenchmen are my friends. I esteem France and Frenchmen, and my desire is that they will act so as to enable me to do them some good. I honor the courage and the glory of all the brave men against whom I have fought for the past two years, and I have learnt to hold them in high regard whatever has been their conditions. I will ever be ready to render him that justice and those honors due to them. Go, therefore, gentlemen, and tell the Parisians that I am not entering their city as an enemy, and that it depends on them to have me for

a friend ; but tell them also that I have in France one single enemy, with whom I will never become reconciled."

This idea was again and again expressed under various forms and always with extreme vehemence, while he paced up and down the room. We all maintained the most profound silence. When he thought that he had made himself sufficiently clear to all of us, he turned to me and asked me if there was anything I wished to ask for on behalf of the city and of its good order. I told him that it was true that the capitulation excepted the National Guard from everything that had been stipulated regarding the regular troops, but that it left it an open question whether this body was to retain its arms and continue in the exercise of its duties, which I considered indispensable. "You think this is necessary," he replied; "Well then, I grant your request. It is a great proof of confidence I am giving to the Parisians, who, I hope, will show themselves worthy of it." Then, remembering that M. Allent, the major-general of that body, had been introduced to him, he advanced towards him saying: "You will answer to me for their good behavior, sir, will you not?" "Yes, if nothing is asked of them which is contrary to their honor and to the oath they have taken," replied M. Allent in a tone expressing vexation. He had felt hurt at the invective against Napoleon. Happily, he did not speak in a very loud tone, and the Emperor, owing to his hardness of hearing, did not hear much more than the "Yes."

I next ventured to prefer the same request with regard to the Paris *gendarmérie*, whose utility I sought to establish; but this was a paid body, and altogether a military one, and the question was a more delicate one. Alexander reserved unto himself to settle it later on, while allowing, however, that this body should remain temporarily under the city's control. This point settled to that extent, I



pointed out that the proclamation of the generalissimo promised that no troops should be billeted on the capital, and I took the liberty of insisting on the importance of this engagement being strictly adhered to, as regards soldiers. And who, indeed, could answer for what might happen in the midst of a population of over 700,000 souls, if we did not provide against such daily broils as could not fail to arise between the populace and the soldiers billeted in their homes? This engagement was again renewed in most positive terms.

The Emperor then enquired how many barracks there were in the city and faubourgs. He was astonished at the enumeration of them made by the Prefect of the Seine and myself. We remarked, moreover, that there were some very close to the city, and which might be considered as forming part of it, viz. those of Saint-Denis and of Courbevoie. After we had explained this matter, the Emperor added most graciously, and of his own impulse, a promise that public property should be respected and to prevent everything that might savor of looting; he then dismissed us, remarking that orders were about to be issued for setting in motion the troops, which, in accordance with the terms of the capitulation, were to enter the city at seven o'clock that morning. I then gave him to understand that assuming that by that hour they would occupy a few of the barriers, it was most desirable that they should not penetrate into the city before ten or eleven o'clock, as the only public officials who could give the necessary orders to prepare for their reception were in his presence. We had been compelled to leave our posts for nearly the whole of the night, and we could not be back at them before eight or nine o'clock, and it was necessary we should be given time to take a few indispensable measures of precaution, if only to issue a proclamation and to inform the National Guard that

its services were to be retained and that it was to devote itself to preserving good order.

As I was going down the stairs, M. de Nesselrode informed me that one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp was to ride in my carriage and enter Paris with me, in order to prepare apartments for His Majesty. This compelled me to beg M. de Lamoignon to find a seat in another carriage, and M. de Wolkonski got into mine, which at once took the lead, surrounded by an escort of Cossacks of the Guard. We had hardly got two hundred paces beyond Bondy, when I saw the Duc de Vicence coming along the road afoot; he recognized me, and quickly rushed to the door of my carriage, hoping doubtless to learn from me what had just happened, and especially what had been said, for the least words of Alexander were at that time of great weight. I learnt shortly afterwards that he had been there for some time already, and that he had been unable to enter the village, in spite of all his efforts to make his arrival known to the Emperor Alexander. I would greatly have liked to exchange a few words with him, but the Cossacks of the escort, doubtless on a sign from M. de Wolkonski, did not allow my coachman to draw rein and compelled him to drive a great deal faster. Our return journey was, therefore, rapidly accomplished. As may well be imagined, the conversation between my fellow-traveller and myself was not very animated; still I must say that he was most courteous and his manner was most agreeable.

The obstructions which had repeatedly blocked our outward journey had been removed. It was necessary that the road should be cleared for the passing of the numerous columns which were already forming to the noise of warlike strains, and in the midst of which we drove from Pantin to Paris. The troops composing these columns all wore in their headgear a green twig, and a white scarf. This

peculiarity having struck me, my fellow-traveller informed me that the green twig had been adopted to conform with the custom of the Austrian army, which always wore it on entering upon a campaign. As to the white scarf, it had been adopted before the battle of La Rothière, so that the corps of the different nations might know each other in the thick of the fight. It was nearly eight o'clock, when we entered by the barrier, which was already occupied by foreign troops, who had, however, gone no further. At a short distance stood the detachment of *gendarmérie* which we had left there on our outward journey; it took one side of my carriage, while the Cossacks took the other. Thus escorted, I passed through a considerable portion of the city to reach the Prefecture of Police.

This first appearance in the capital of a body of foreign soldiers, produced a startling effect, and I could read in the eyes of nearly all those who saw us go by a painful stupefaction. Many believed that I was returning a prisoner, and drew therefrom the most ominous auguries. When leaving Bondy, I had agreed with M. Allent that he should, on his return, give the National Guard the necessary orders for it to continue its duties, and to secure by means of numerous patrols the tranquillity of the city. I summoned the commandant and the principal officers of the *gendarmérie*, and I informed them that their body was, until further orders, to remain at its post, and that I expected to receive shortly a definitive order to that effect. They were, generally speaking, favorably disposed towards me and most desirous of being of service; yet their military spirit (they had all fought, and fought with distinction) made them look with displeasure at being thus separated from the rest of the army; there were several of them whose devotion to Napoleon was deeply rooted. I spoke to them as best I could, and tried to make them com-

prehend that in the circumstances in which we found ourselves, there were few greater services they could render their country and even the Emperor than to watch over the preservation of the city and to shield it from the misfortunes which might threaten it. Finally, all of them gave me their word, but some of them with evident ill-will.

I was engaged drawing up the proclamation to the people of Paris, when the Duc de Vicence was announced. He had come to ask of me the information which he had not been able to obtain when we had met on the high road, and I gave it to him without reserve; I had, however, previously asked his leave to finish what I was writing, telling him how much importance I attached to it. When I had finished my task, he expressed a desire to see what I had written; I willingly consented, and I even paid heed to his suggestions, in pursuance of which I altered a few words. He then told me that Napoleon had arrived on the previous evening at three leagues from his capital, between la Cour-de-France and Villejuif. There he had met the head of a column of cavalry commanded by General Belliard, and had learnt from him the news of the capitulation. His first impulse had been to continue his road, and to enter Paris, but what could he do there? Retain there the troops which had capitulated and which had entered an engagement to leave the city? This would be tantamount to violating all the laws of war.

On the other hand, the army which was in his wake could not reach the walls of the capital until the 2d of April; he had therefore been compelled to retrace his steps, and had resolved upon going to Fontainebleau. He had then sent the Duc de Vicence to the Emperor Alexander, commissioning him to negotiate a peace at any price, if it were still time. This explains how I had met with him near Bondy; he confessed to me that he had not been more successful

after my departure than before, and that he had found it just as impossible to be admitted into the presence of the Emperor. He flattered himself, however, with obtaining an audience as soon as he should have entered the city. As I dwelt on the formal declarations he had made of his hostile feelings towards Napoleon, "I think I know him well," he replied; "he is no doubt seriously offended, but he is endowed with generosity and moderation; this latest and so great success he has achieved will perhaps be of assistance to me in getting him to understand better and more readily that it would not be wise to hand over to the chances of events the incontestable glory which is his to-day. He has before him a striking example in the fate of his rival; I will call his attention to it, and I should be greatly mistaken if I did not thus impress him." "I am afraid," I replied, "that you are indulging in vain hopes; but one needs confidence to act, and to act with success, and I therefore do not wish to shake yours."

The head-clerk to whom I had entrusted the portfolio of the Duc de Rovigo had returned it to me immediately after my return from Bondy. The sight of the Cossacks who accompanied me, and who had remained in the courtyard, had inspired him with a firm resolution not to remain the custodian of that deposit. What was then to be done with it? It was hard to foresee what the next forty-eight hours would bring. What little I had seen of the correspondence contained in that portfolio had greatly added to what I thought already of the serious consequences which might result from their secrecy being violated, and of the number of persons and interests naturally compromised by them. After a few moments' hesitation, I decided to cast the whole to the flames; five minutes later, all was consumed.

When three weeks later the Duc de Rovigo came and demanded of me the deposit he had left in my safe keeping,

he could not help admitting that I had acted prudently. He added, however, that the loss was one irreparable to him, as therein was to be found the justification of his whole political career. I have doubtless destroyed valuable historical documents; but, when considering the use they could have been put to, when reflecting on the advantage which could so readily have been derived from them to gratify a number of hatreds and resentments, I can say to myself that I have rendered, although without having precisely taken this into consideration, a very great service to a number of my contemporaries. Had I been influenced by personal considerations, I should have argued that in the case it would be sought to injure me in Napoleon's mind, and to expose me, if he came off victorious, to his most severe vengeance, it would be prudent to retain possession of a pledge the restitution of which would not be too dearly purchased by a guarantee that I should not be molested. So great a breach of confidence offended my sense of delicacy, and I remained faithful to the promise I had made to the Duc de Rovigo.

## CHAPTER XIII

Entry of the allied sovereigns into Paris—Royalist demonstrations—Sentiments of the population—M. de Nesselrode's interview with M. de Talleyrand—The sovereigns hold council at the latter's residence—M. de Talleyrand pronounces in favor of the Bourbons; the allied sovereigns declare that they will no longer treat with Napoleon, nor with any member of his family—M. Pasquier's interview with M. de Nesselrode—The boisterous joy of the Royalists renders a collision imminent between them and the rest of the population; they attempt to destroy the Vendôme column—Difficulties attendant upon the distribution of rations to the army of occupation—Kindly reception accorded M. Pasquier by the Emperor Alexander—M. de Talleyrand's antechamber—Alexander definitely refuses to treat with Napoleon—A group of Royalists, among whom M. de Chateaubriand and M. Ferrand, entreat the sovereigns to restore France to the Bourbons—A declaration of the Emperor of Russia reassures officers in hiding in Paris—Harsh rejoinder of M. de Vicence to the Abbé de Pradt—An explanation between the former and M. Pasquier—The Senate meets on the 1st of April, under the presidency of M. de Talleyrand—Organization of a provisional government—Manifesto issued by the municipality—M. Pasquier refuses to subscribe to it—Appearance of M. de Chateaubriand's pamphlet, *Bonaparte and the Bourbons*—Discontent of the *gendarmérie* of Paris—The Cossacks pillage the environs of the capital—M. Pasquier and General de Sacken come to an understanding regarding the administration of the city—Political prisoners given their liberty.

THE Emperor Alexander, accompanied by the King of Prussia, arrived at the gates of Paris at ten o'clock; between eleven o'clock and noon, the interminable filing past of the troops of all arms which preceded or followed the two sovereigns began on the boulevard, by way of the Porte Saint-Denis.

An enormous concourse of people had wended its way since morning to every point of the road along which

the strangers were to pass. The Faubourg Saint-Denis and the boulevards swarmed with them; the crowd was silent and cast down, and awaited the course of events with great anxiety.

Alexander's noble mien, his affable and kindly manners, the care he continually took to urge upon all those surrounding him not to give offence, created a favorable impression; a few cheers greeted him as he rode along the boulevards. About the same time, a gathering formed on the Place Louis XV.; it was composed of a small number of youthful Royalists, who bore the most honored names of the French nobility; they did not hesitate to don the white cockade. A few ladies, who were at the windows overlooking the Place, encouraged this action by their applause, and quickly distributed white favors among those who were willing to wear them in their hats. The young men proceeded along the Boulevard de la Madeleine, marching towards the sovereigns. Their number grew as they progressed. They met the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia near the Boulevard des Italiens; at that point were heard loud cries of: *Long live the Bourbons! Long live the sovereigns! Long live the Emperor Alexander!* Among the women at the windows, many waved white handkerchiefs, and took up these cries, which greeted the sovereigns all along the road to the Champs-Élysées, where they tarried a while to witness the filing past of their troops.

The greater part of the population took no part in these demonstrations; if it did not drown with its protestations the sound of a clamor which seemed to it indiscreet at the very least, the fact is to be attributed to the sight of the white scarf worn on the arms of the foreign soldiery; its true object was not known, so it was thought that the allies were pronouncing openly in favor of the party whose emblem was this color.



No sooner had M. de Nesselrode arrived, than he called on M. de Talleyrand; this visit was undoubtedly the result of the mission of M. de Vitrolles; it had paved the way, and a brief conversation must have sufficed for M. de Nesselrode and M. de Talleyrand to understand each other perfectly. The latter, once assured of the favorable intentions of the Emperor Alexander towards the Bourbons, did not hesitate to promise his co-operation and that of all his friends, and took upon himself to bring about a movement which would settle the matter off-hand; but, as it was necessary that all should be concerted between the Emperor and himself, it was decided that this sovereign should occupy his mansion; this determination had in itself most important consequences.

The filing past of the troops over, Alexander went to M. de Talleyrand's residence towards five o'clock in the evening. He was followed there shortly afterwards by the King of Prussia. After hearing the report of M. de Nesselrode, it was agreed between them that a council should be held at once to determine upon the course to be followed, and to decide upon the preliminary steps it was necessary to take. The council took place immediately; it was composed, in addition to the two sovereigns, of Prince von Schwarzenberg, of Prince von Lichtenstein, who had on several occasions been entrusted by the Emperor of Austria with the most confidential missions, of M. de Nesselrode, and of General Pozzo di Borgo; M. de Talleyrand and the Duc de Dalberg were invited to be present from the beginning. The Abbé de Pradt, Archbishop of Mechlin, and Baron Louis, who were then staying with M. de Talleyrand, were admitted a little later.

M. de Pradt, in his narrative entitled *Récit historique sur la restauration de la royauté en France le 31 mars 1814*, has told pretty accurately what took place at the council; a few

of his assertions may, however, be contested. The Emperor Alexander himself stated the purpose of the meeting. There were three courses to follow, he said: to make peace with Napoleon, while securing oneself against him by every possible guarantee, establish a regency, or recall the House of Bourbon. He did not conceal that he inclined towards the third course, but he at the same time scrupulously pointed out every possible objection that could be made to it. Above all things, it was not to be adopted unless one was assured of the general assent of the country. Could it be concealed that so far not only did this condition not exist, but that appearances were certainly not in its favor? He had seen full well that the Royalist cheers he had heard as he passed through the city in the forenoon, had been given very tardily, and that they did not proceed from the mass of the people; yet they were the first that had greeted his ears since he had entered France; in all the districts through which he had passed, he had, generally speaking, seen a population which strongly held entirely different views; but the army was the all-important factor to be considered. Could one succeed in detaching it from a leader under whom it had once more fought with such heroism, and to whom it had not ceased giving proofs of a most absolute devotion? Would it especially be possible to get it to accept princes against whom it had for twenty long years been inculcated with feelings of hatred?

Alexander's misgivings on that score were in no respect to be wondered at. For a long period, France, in the eyes of the Emperor, had been personified by the army; conquered and crippled, the army was still a grand thing; imagination was held captive by fifteen years of an unparalleled glory, recently heightened by the heroic resistance with which for the past two months it had withstood the combined efforts of all Europe. The thought of giving

France a sovereign whom the army would not accept, or who would even be repugnant to it, was surrounded at that early date with difficulties at which it was impossible not to be alarmed.

Was it then so hard to make both France and the army understand that they would never obtain the rest of which they so greatly stood in need, as long as they were made the subservient instrument of Napoleon's insatiable ambition? M. de Talleyrand could, better than anybody, supply the information required; the Emperor concluded his speech by asking his opinion.

M. de Talleyrand did not hesitate pronouncing in favor of the Bourbons; he asserted that Napoleon no longer exercised in France any power other than the one appertaining to the lawful order of things and to an established form of government; that, in regard to the army, it remained faithful much more to its own glory than to him. The same might be said of the provinces through which the allies had passed; they had rebelled against the burdens and hardships of the invasion, without any serious or deep-rooted attachment to the man who had drawn down on them so crushing a load. Who would dare to pronounce against Napoleon, when, despite his defeat, people saw the foreign powers ever prepared to treat with him, and never questioning his rights to sovereignty? An extraordinary amount of courage would be required to dare brave the terrible vengeance which a man of his temperament would certainly exercise, if the time came when he could indulge in it without restraint. Still, there was the example set by Bordeaux; a number of towns were but awaiting an opportunity to give vent to sentiments so long repressed; the same would be the case in Paris, provided it was not sought to act hastily, to carry things by sheer force or by threats, provided especially one took care to show consideration for

people's feelings and interests, and that one employed men who possessed a real influence.

M. de Talleyrand was next asked to enter into particulars regarding the means he would think it advisable to adopt in order to carry out such a revolution. He replied that he would employ to that end all regularly constituted bodies, such as the Senate itself, and he felt sure that he could obtain from it all the declarations, all the instruments required. No assurances there were which could have greater force; they were confirmed by the Duc de Dalberg, by M. Louis, and by M. de Pradt. Thus fortified, Alexander appealed to the King of Prussia and to Prince von Schwarzenberg; he asked them if they did not think with him that there was no room for hesitation; that a fresh proclamation should at once be issued, wherein it should be positively stated that the allies would never consent to treat with Napoleon. The King of Prussia showed some reluctance, but finally assented to his course, while the generalissimo, already bound, or nearly so, by the proclamation to which he had subscribed, gave his assent without difficulty. England was not represented at this council, and Prince Metternich, the only depositary of the secret intentions of the Emperor of Austria, was absent, having accompanied his master to Dijon. Thus, all depended on the Emperor Alexander; he alone was the supreme arbiter, and to him alone belongs the restoration of the House of Bourbon. M. de Pradt is right when he says that the matter was settled at this council.

When it came to drawing up the fresh proclamation, M. de Talleyrand dwelt on the necessity of formally declaring that the sovereigns would no more treat with any member of Napoleon's family than with himself. This suggestion was adopted without opposition; in affairs of business, when the main point has been reached, no one thinks it

worth his while discussing matters further. Thus, Prince von Schwarzenberg and Prince von Lichtenstein formally acquiesced in the exclusion from the throne of France of the son of the Archduchess Marie-Louise. Most assuredly, they had no authority from their sovereign to enter into such an engagement. The council came to an end with a solemn allocution of the Emperor Alexander regarding his intention of giving a conscientious hearing to all that would enlighten him as to the views of the nation, and binding himself that the people's desire should receive the support of the whole of the allied forces, provided Napoleon and his family were left out of the question.

M. de Nesselrode had written me a note which reached me shortly before five o'clock, asking me to call as promptly as possible at M. de Talleyrand's residence, where the Emperor was about to arrive, as an understanding had to be come to with me. The large number of orders I had to issue did not permit of my complying with this summons at once, so I did not reach the house till after the council had broken up.

I entered the apartments on the mezzanine floor, which M. de Talleyrand had reserved for himself; M. Louis was coming down the stairs; he informed me of what had just been concluded, asked me if I would not give my co-operation to it, and whether I would refuse to enter upon the same course as himself in a cause whose success could alone secure the salvation of France, and restore peace and contentment to it. There was no man less fitted than M. Louis to influence my determination; while conceding his intellect and worth, I thought little of his judgment; it required men of a different calibre to make me come to any determination, so I replied evasively. "I well understand," he replied, "that the course is a risky one, and that one should seek to reflect ere adopting it; but here comes M. de Nessel-

rode; I am going to leave you with him; his words will doubtless carry greater weight with you than mine."

And, indeed, I spent nearly an hour with him. He entered into the fullest details regarding what had been said and done at the council, and dwelt in a special fashion on the fixed resolution come to by the Czar and his allies, never again to treat with Napoleon or his family. This resolution, if it did not result in immediately separating Napoleon from France, or rather in deciding France to abandon his cause, would throw the country into a series of wars and disasters, the end of which could not be foreseen. Had not the time come when an effort should be made to divert so great a misfortune? Did not genuine patriotism enjoin, even at the risk of all personal dangers, to follow the only course which was likely to secure the salvation of the country?

I had already pondered a good deal regarding the serious position in which I was about to be placed; I did not conceal from myself either the dangers or the bitterness of an irrevocable resolution. From this time onward I resolved upon using every means at my disposal to facilitate the Restoration, by making the cause of the Bourbons triumph. I did not conceal from M. de Nesselrode the difficulties of the undertaking, the necessity of doing everything to persuade the people that there was no intention of using any compulsion towards them, that they were to be allowed to act freely, and to yield only to their own feelings, quite apart from all foreign pressure. Special consideration should be shown to the just sentiment of national pride, particularly regarding everything concerning the army. There were in Paris a number of invalided military men, and it was necessary that they should be reassured. I was aware that many of them desired being transported out of the city. "I promise you beforehand," M. de Nesselrode

replied without hesitating, "that the Emperor will agree to anything you may request on behalf of these men. Moreover, you may rest assured that as soon as he is fully convinced of your intentions, you will enjoy his full confidence; he will, besides, give you this assurance himself, for you must see him in the course of the evening."

I expressed a desire to read the text of the proclamation resolved upon at the council, as I was in a position to know what would produce a good or a bad effect on the citizens of Paris; a proof of it was sent to me an hour later at the Prefecture of Police; I made a few changes therein. This proclamation had assuredly been prepared beforehand by M. de Talleyrand or M. de Pozzo, for it would have been impossible, at so short a sitting as that of the council, to draft, while the pen ran on, a document wherein all essential points were so thoroughly and in so just a measure touched upon. Thus, taking it for granted that they were making known the desires of the French nation, they had laid down the proposition that if the conditions of peace were to call for the most stringent guarantees when it was a question of curbing the ambition of Bonaparte, they were to be of a much less severe character should France, by a return to a government full of wisdom, furnish the security of a rest to which all aspired.

The allied sovereigns declared that they would no longer treat with Napoleon, nor with any member of his family, and that they would respect the integrity of ancient France, such as she existed under her legitimate monarchy. They might even go a step farther, for they still professed the principle that France should, for the happiness of Europe, remain great and powerful. M. de Talleyrand deserves severe censure for not having seized the opportunity thus afforded of deriving greater benefits from this important concession. Lastly, the sovereigns agreed to respect and

to guarantee whatever constitution the French nation should determine upon; they called upon the Senate to appoint a provisional government for purposes of administration, and to draw up the constitution most agreeable to the French nation.

M. de Nesselrode was desirous of detaining me, assuring me that the Emperor, who had gone to his study to issue a few orders, would be able to receive me in half an hour; but I pointed out to him that my presence was too necessary at my office for me to remain any longer away from it, especially at that hour of the day. It was agreed that I should return during the evening, M. de Talleyrand having told me that he would call together at nine o'clock the few persons with whom he wished to talk matters over.

On my return to the Prefecture, I learnt in detail all that had happened in the city since the entry of the allies. With the exception of that part of the city comprised between the Boulevard des Italiens, the Place Louis XV., and the Rue de Richelieu as far as the Palais-Royal, where the first Royalist acclamations had been heard, great was the consternation in every direction. At several points, particularly in the neighborhood of the Hôtel de Ville, and in the direction of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, there had repeatedly been a rather pronounced display of dissatisfaction. It had happily been kept within bounds by the numerous patrols of the National Guard, which on that day commenced doing active and intelligent duty, which it persevered in as long as the crisis endured. It was plainly felt that the slightest occurrence might lead to an outburst of wrath, not, of course, against the allied troops, whose strength was too imposing for one to dare defy it, but against the men who came forward on behalf of the House of Bourbon, and whose boisterous joy and harmonious understanding with the foreigners was looked upon by a very great number of citizens as an insult to the public grief and an abandonment of the



national cause. Now, in the existing state of affairs, nothing would have been more disastrous than an outbreak of this nature. All the efforts of the city government were therefore to be directed towards warding off such a danger, and I can truly say that this was no trifling task in the midst of such varied and wrought-up sentiments. I must pay the tribute to my subordinates of saying that I found them all willing and zealous. I had been fortunate enough to inspire them with a large amount of confidence, during the three years I had spent at their head. So, when I called the commissaries of police and the constables together, to give them my instructions, they all told me that they had made up their minds to trust blindly to me, fully convinced that I would direct their efforts in the best possible manner for the interests of the city.

When looking over the reports brought to me, regarding the incidents of the day in the various quarters of the city, I could but take special notice of one which might have entailed serious consequences; it had taken place as early as five o'clock, at the Place Vendôme. A certain number of Royalists who had assembled at the foot of the column surmounted by the statue of Napoleon, had imagined that it would settle matters decisively if they removed the statue from its pedestal, and so they began to utter cries indicative of their intentions. One of them had even gone so far as to ascend to the top of the column, and had struck the statue with impotent blows. Darkness put an end to this attempted outrage, but it had been sufficient to arouse fears of others of a similar nature. The friends of Napoleon were doubtless indignant at the insult thus offered him; moreover, it was impossible that the national and military spirit should not be incensed in the highest degree when sacrilegious hands were laid on the monument which more than any other consecrated the glory of the French armies.

The most embarrassing task during the course of the day was the distribution of food to the immense quantity of troops which had come into the city. In so doing, there had been some delay, which might have had deplorable consequences, had not the sovereigns given the most stringent orders for the preservation of the strictest discipline. Thus, the Russian troops did not receive any bread until seven o'clock at night. I wrote on the subject to the Prefect of the Seine, for it was part of his duty to attend to the matter. I sent for those of his head-clerks who were especially entrusted with this, and spared no efforts to stimulate their zeal. What perplexed us most was the feeding of so large a number of horses. Forage stores were few in Paris; and yet we were fully informed that it would be easier to induce the Cossacks to personally endure a two days' fast than to persuade them to remain patient over a three hours' delay in the distribution of their horses' rations. It was resolved to call upon the principal forage dealers residing in Paris, and summon them to me next day.

I returned to M. de Talleyrand's residence between nine and ten o'clock, and was at once ushered into the presence of the Emperor Alexander. He received me most courteously, and repeated to me at some length all that his minister had told me during the day. He informed me that I enjoyed his confidence, and that he had instructed the general whom he had placed in command of Paris to concert with me in all matters, adding that he was a brave and loyal man, whom it would please me to know. General de Sacken was truly worthy of such praise. He concluded in the following terms: "Should, moreover, anything occur which gives you offence, or if you think of any measure which it would be advantageous to take, you may approach me directly in the matter. Send me a note by an orderly, if you are unable to come yourself, and you shall have my

reply within half an hour." I repeatedly availed myself of this permission, and always with favorable results.

On leaving the Emperor, I went down to M. de Talleyrand's apartments; his antechambers were filled with a crowd of individuals, some of them doubtless brought there through motives of the purest zeal, but among whom it was easy to distinguish men who were in a hurry to have done with it. I noticed that M. de Bourrienne was accompanied by M. Lahorie, who looked well contented; it was not long ere he was appointed secretary to the provisional government. I at once foresaw that whoever placed any confidence in him would have cause to regret it. On entering the closet, I found the Duc de Dalberg, M. Louis, and M. de Jancourt closeted with M. de Talleyrand. They were discussing the methods by which the Senate could be best induced to take action. It was resolved to notify as many of the senators as could be found, and to call them together at the Luxembourg for three o'clock the next afternoon. I learned that M. de Caulaincourt had in the course of the afternoon obtained from the Emperor Alexander the audience he had hoped for, but that the result had shattered his hopes; he had been told most formally that any negotiation having for its object to preserve the Crown to his master was henceforth useless and even impossible.

The first day of April was to reveal to us whether the Senate would respond to the expectations centred in it. Were it to disappoint them, our position would be a critical one, for we should find ourselves alone, and without any legal support in the country. This is beyond doubt the contingency, in all M. de Talleyrand's career, wherein he best exercised his talents for manœuvring, for it is a matter of history how everything he wished for, how everything that was necessary, was obtained, settled, and carried out. As I was about to leave, in the course of the night, we

learnt that a deputation had asked to be ushered into the Czar's presence; it had been sent by an assembly of Royalists who had met at the house of M. de Mortfontaine. The nucleus of it had been formed by the young men who in the forenoon had been the first to don the white cockade; M. de Sémallé announced himself as the bearer of powers entrusted to him by the Comte d'Artois; among those present were M. de Chateaubriand and M. Ferrand; both of them were among the delegates who bore an address wherein Napoleon was styled *a monster foreign to the country*; the sovereigns were entreated to restore to France her king. The Emperor sent them word by M. de Nesselrode that neither he nor his allies would ever treat with Napoleon, and that the most solemn declaration was about to be made public to that effect. It is a remarkable coincidence that this first Royalist meeting publicly held took place in the house of a man whose wife was the daughter of the regicide Le Pelletier de Saint-Fargeau.

On my return home, late at night, I had food enough for serious thought, after all I had seen and heard; fortunately, on such occasions, the turmoil of affairs, the sentiment of duty and of the responsibilities undertaken serve to bear men up. Assailed on all sides by a number of requests which had to be met, or to be answered with orders, I had no time to dwell long on anything, or hardly to take an hour's rest.

Next morning, I was still more perplexed, as considerable anxiety was beginning to be felt concerning the provisioning of the city. Nothing had been brought to market for three days, for people on the outside generally believed that the gates were closed. The country folks therefore did not dare to come near the city; those who ventured doing so were driven to take this course for the purpose of seeking a refuge from the rough treatment of the foreign soldiery,

which, quartered in the villages, and thus beyond the immediate control of its chiefs, was indulging in many excesses. On the other hand, many residents in the city were taking advantage of a movement of calm which might be of short duration to make good their safety, as well as that of their goods and chattels. The position of military men was a delicate one; a number of officers of all ranks, either sick or wounded, had been compelled to leave the army and take up their residence in the city. Unable to derive any benefit from the little time granted the troops by the capitulation to evacuate the city, they feared that the enemy would declare them prisoners; moreover, as the Minister of War had left, together with all the other ministers, taking with him his heads of departments, I alone remained to whom they could apply to enquire how they could best conceal themselves or get themselves safely removed out of the city.

Nothing was settled, so I was ignorant of the extent of the powers which would be allowed me regarding the free circulation of persons. I went to M. de Talleyrand's, to confer with M. de Nesselrode on the subject; on my request it was agreed that I should issue as usual all passports I should deem proper; but, in order that they should be countenanced by the foreign military authorities, it was decided that they should be viséd by the military governor of the city, General de Sacken, and that an officer of his staff should be attached to the Prefecture of Police and issue all visas in his name. It was also settled that I was authorized to announce in the name of Prince von Schwarzenberg, by means of a printed notice to which I was to give the widest possible circulation, that all the barriers would remain open as heretofore. Thanks to these measures, which were most promptly made public, the mails and public conveyances were enabled to leave the same evening; this was

of the utmost importance towards removing France's fears with regard to what was happening in the capital.

There remained the wounded or ailing military men. I pointed out to M. de Nesselrode that nothing would contribute more towards bringing about that feeling of confidence which the Czar was desirous of inspiring than an act of generosity which would completely remove their fears. He left me to take his sovereign's orders in the matter; on his return, he begged that I should myself indite the desired declaration, and that the Emperor would immediately sign it. The declaration is to be found in the *Moniteur* of April 2d; in it Alexander states in his own name as well as in that of the allies that: "Military men of whatever rank, now in Paris, through the natural course of events, or from the necessity of taking care of their health, impaired by severe hardships or wounds reflecting honor on them, have no need to conceal themselves; they are free, entirely free, as well as all other French citizens, and they are called upon to co-operate towards the measures which are to decide the great question which is to be tried for the happiness of France and of the entire world." This declaration produced an excellent effect and restored calm to the public mind. Personally, I experienced a pleasurable emotion over it in the midst of all my cares.

On leaving M. de Talleyrand's closet, I met the Duc de Vicence; he came towards me, drew me into the embrasure of a window, and told me with a good deal of warmth that he felt a mortal ill-will against me for having on the previous day shown a lack of confidence which he did not deserve. "I can in a few words," I replied, "explain away my behavior, and remove your misconception; but this is not the place; we shall meet again." As I finished speaking, and as he was walking across the room, the Abbé de Pradt, carrying high his head, accosted him, and flung the following

words in his face: "Monsieur le duc, go and tell your master that the government funds, which were quoted at from twenty-nine to forty-five francs, are to-day quoted at sixty-three." "Yes," was M. de Vicence's rejoinder, "and I will add that the man whom I have always seen the most assiduous among his flatterers is to-day the first to insult him. Such conduct is, however, perfectly consistent with the natural order of things." Some twenty persons witnessed this scene.

Very shortly afterwards I gave the Duc de Vicence the promised explanation. "I can perfectly well understand," he remarked, at the first words I spoke, "that you should have adopted the course you have seen fit to take, and I in no way condemn your conduct; but you should have known me well enough to unbosom yourself freely with me in the matter, when I saw you on the 31st, at ten o'clock in the forenoon, while, on the contrary, you took the greatest care to prevent my even suspecting it." "A single word is sufficient to reply to all this," I said; "M. de Nesselrode did not make the first overture to me until six o'clock in the evening." "What a relief it is to hear you say so," he answered, warmly grasping my hand the while; "it was so painful to me to think that a gentleman should, under such circumstances, have mistrusted me!" Thus, all bad feeling between us vanished; nay more, for there was born out of this and a few other circumstances, and of all that we learnt of each other in those critical times, a reciprocal feeling of esteem which was lasting, although our conditions in life rarely brought us together. He gave me a proof of this I had little cause to expect, when, thirteen years later, he appointed me to watch over the guardians of his children. Two or three years had elapsed since our last meeting.

The Senate assembled at three o'clock on the 1st of April under the presidency of M. de Talleyrand. On opening the sitting, he contented himself with the remark that the very

nature of the matter to be debated sufficiently showed that the fullest freedom was to preside over the discussion, that "each one was at liberty to give vent to the sentiments pervading his soul, to his desire to save his country, and to his determination to come to the rescue of a forsaken nation."

The Senate responded immediately to this invitation, and proceeded with the creation of a provisional government, the members of which it there and then appointed, in the order which follows: M. de Talleyrand, Count de Beurnonville, Count de Jancourt, the Duc de Dalberg, and the Abbé de Montesquiou, chosen as having been a member of the Constituent Assembly, but also, to the knowledge of most people as having been for a long time past the confidential agent of the banished king. This accomplished, M. de Talleyrand announced that the first matter which should engage the attention of the provisional government would be the drafting of a constitution. It was settled that the appointment of the provisional government should be made known to the French people by means of an address. It was necessary that the address should state the motives which had prompted the resolution taken. The Senate, by issuing it, was necessarily granting the authorization to criticise the government of Napoleon. It next adopted, under the form of a declaration of principles, a series of articles embodying a guarantee of the principal interests born of the Revolution. This much accomplished, an adjournment was taken until nine o'clock in the evening, for the purpose of hearing the reading of the official report of the proceedings, which was signed by all senators present, to the number of sixty-three.<sup>1</sup> Many of the sena-

<sup>1</sup>One noticed among those who put in an appearance to sign the report, M. de Pastoret, who had not seen fit to attend the morning sitting; yet he was secretary to the Senate, and M. de Talleyrand had been at some pains to notify him. But events progressed rapidly, and the time elapsing between morning and night had been, in his case, as in that of many others, sufficient for him to make up his mind in.



tors on arriving at the sitting had assuredly no idea to what lengths they would commit themselves; the appointment of a provisional government, which they could hardly refuse to make, involved all that followed.

The municipal council met spontaneously at the Hôtel de Ville and unanimously agreed upon the most energetic proclamation, the concluding sentence of which read as follows: "that its members abjured all obedience to the usurper, in order to return to their legitimate master." This idea had been first conceived, in the morning, on the return from Bondy, without my being informed of it, by one of my uncles, a member of the council, M. Gauthier; he had confided it to his colleague and intimate friend, M. Bellart. The latter had strongly approved of it, so he had immediately drafted it. This document contained the bitterest invectives against Napoleon. One may judge of this by the following single sentence: "To him are we indebted for the hatred of nations, without having deserved it, as we have, as much as themselves, been far more the unfortunate victims than the melancholy instruments of his rage." The publicity given to this document, emanating from the body which seemed most entitled to express the opinion of the city of Paris, was an important event. M. de Chabrol, as prefect of the department, had intimate relations with the municipal council, of which, to a certain degree, he was a member. Hence his adherence was asked for as a matter of course. He hesitated for twenty-four hours ere giving it.

Personally, I was in an altogether different position, as I had no habitual intercourse with the council as a body, and did not participate in any of its doings. Nevertheless, my signature was wished for, and M. Bellart was commissioned to sound me. He called on me very early next morning. I saw what he required of me from the very outset, and I told him that I could not accede to his request,

it was impossible for me to do so, either in the general interest, or from my personal sentiments. I had to avoid giving offence to a large number of men whom I was striving to bring back. I did not conceal from him that the insulting tone of the proclamation was entirely repugnant to me. I could, indeed, join the party opposed to Napoleon, believing that I was thus rendering a great service to my country; I was prepared to take all the chances of this resolve, however perilous it might prove to me holding my position, for I was one of those whom he would least forgive; but I could not forget that but three days ago I was still serving him, that he had given me a great proof of his confidence in placing me in the position which I held; I should therefore think I was oblivious of what was due to myself, were I to insult the man under whom I but recently occupied such a position. "Your own situation, Monsieur Bellart," I added, "is a far different one. You have never been united to him by any bond. I may even say he has been unfriendly towards you, nay, that he has given you offence. It is therefore quite natural that you should listen to your feelings." He did not press me any further. Although of an impassioned character, he was a righteous man; I am convinced that he appreciated my motives, and I presume that he made his colleagues do likewise, for I heard no more of the matter.

The hot-headed Royalists who were wont to meet at the house of M. de Mortfontaine could not fail to notice the absence of my name at the foot of a document the contents of which filled them with joy; thereupon they immediately began to mistrust me. I record this inception of an ill-will which had the most serious consequences and which, by the nature of things, ever grew apace.

It was about this time that the pamphlet entitled *Bonaparte et les Bourbons* appeared; the author was M. de Cha-

teaubriand, and he affixed to it the date of the 30th of March. I doubt whether there has ever existed in any language, so outrageous, so violent, so excessive a diatribe. The Royalists welcomed it with transports of joy. I met several, a long time afterwards, who were fully convinced that nothing had so greatly contributed to dethrone Napoleon. I can say to the contrary that it was a source of real embarrassment to the men who were actually directing affairs; that at one moment it threatened to cause an explosion in the military party whose feelings it was of such importance to conciliate, and whose adherence the foreigners prayed for as constituting the only possible basis of a lasting arrangement. I will add that it sowed a feeling of indignation in the minds of a large number of men, who felt themselves insulted in the person of the man who had so long been their chief, and that these sentiments, I say it, were not foreign to the catastrophe of the 20th of March of the following year.

Prince von Schwarzenberg sent me, as I was least expecting it, an order to disband the *gendarmerie*. It had been represented to him as being very dangerous, owing to its attachment to Napoleon. I wrote to the prince to make him understand the inconveniences of the measure he had adopted. The chief of the staff of the National Guard, M. Allent, gave me valuable assistance in this contingency; he called on the generalissimo, and pointed out to him that the National Guard was not sufficient to preserve order, for which it was responsible, without the help of the *gendarmerie*, which comprised the only cavalry at the city's disposal. His remonstrances, together with my own, carried the day; we retained our *gendarmerie*. The captain of the company which was quartered at the Minimes barracks, begged me to come and see him, as there was a good deal of discontent in his command, which comprised the men most devoted to the

Emperor. I went thither in the morning; the company was drawn up under arms to receive me. I addressed them, telling them that the city of Paris relied on their zeal and devotion to preserve order, but was interrupted by cries of "Let us go to the Emperor! We wish to rejoin the Emperor!" At the same time a dozen of the most exasperated of them sprang towards me, whereupon their officers surrounded me. Quiet having been somewhat restored, I assured them that the city did not wish to detain them forcibly, that those who were desirous of renouncing the advantages of serving it, were free to do so. At the same time I ordered the captain to draw up a list of those who wished to leave the force, to deprive them of their arms, which were the city's property, and to send me their names, in order that they should at once receive their passports, with a warning that they should leave the city's gates before six o'clock in the evening. Four or five only chose to follow this course, and afterwards there was no longer the slightest disturbance or act of insubordination in the corps.

It was fortunate that it was so, for never was it harder to preserve order. Subjects for broils were hourly becoming more frequent. They were principally caused by the sight of Cossacks who were continually returning to the city with the fruit of their pillaging outside; they had established on the Pont-Neuf a sort of market where they sold what they had stolen from the country folks. The latter followed them as fast as they could, arrived shortly after them, and, as a matter of course, had the support of the people when they attempted to regain possession of their horses, asses, blankets, or cloaks. It will readily be understood how such a spectacle irritated the public mind. In order to put an end to the cause of this, it became necessary to issue safeguards to the villages and dwellings most in danger. These safeguards were delivered by General de Sacken, the military

governor of the city. The number of people petitioning for them soon became so large about his headquarters that it was impossible to pay attention to them; he was continually surrounded by a swarm of individuals, vying in zeal, all animated by the best of intentions, and especially eager to proffer advice. He listened to them all; this soon gave rise to great abuses. Commissaries were appointed to exercise supervision over public games; others to exercise a censorship over the newspapers, which could no longer appear without their permission; others to control theatrical performances, etc. These improvised police agents, members, for the greater part, of the Mortfontaine circle, lacked moderation.

I called on General de Sacken to point out to him the serious dangers of such a state of things. I told him that I was broaching the matter to him before appealing to the Emperor, as the latter had authorized me to do, but that I could no longer pretend to assume any responsibility if he suffered my administration to be thus paralyzed. He fully comprehended my grievances, apologized for having been the cause of them by his listening to those who had overwhelmed him with their importunities. It was evident that he had suffered himself to be repeatedly deceived, when granting his signature. At any rate, the remedy to this was a simple one, and he himself suggested it to me; it consisted in cancelling at one sweep all that had been done in regard to matters of general administration. This fully disposed of the past; but something remained to be done for the future, and it was he again who cut the Gordian Knot. "Give me," he said, "a man whom you can trust; I will sign nothing that he has not looked into, you have my word for it." This was done. I chose a *maître des requêtes* named Janet, who had been a member of the French council in Rome. I well knew his great business capacities and his untiring activity. He

accepted the post, and installed himself near the general; from that moment no further difficulties arose between us.

A new grievance was soon added to those which the Royalists of the Mortfontaine gathering treasured up against me; and indeed it was rarely that they did not find me in their path. The necessity of preserving order compelled me to exercise a check over some of their undertakings, although there was a good side to them and it sprang from most natural feelings. Thus, on the very first day, they presented themselves at the prisons; with the object of opening the doors of them to those whom they considered detained there only as political prisoners. Such a measure, even with regard to those who were entitled to its benefit, could only issue from the superior power. Previous to the installation of the provisional government, M. de Nesselrode was considerate enough to transmit to me an order of the Emperor Alexander, providing for this contingency. I quickly carried it into effect. M. de Polignac, who had returned to Paris with the foreigner, took an active part in this affair; it was natural and even praiseworthy of him to do so. Thus it happened that Perlet, the story of whose arrest I have told, was set free, and also the unfortunate Desol de Grisolles, still a prisoner at Bicêtre. Then followed the destruction of the imperial emblems; on the Place Vendôme there was a repetition of outrageous acts. A number of youths, headed by M. Sothène de La Rochefoucauld, thought they could overthrow the statue. They succeeded in placing round its neck a rope, at which they tugged from below, with the result of shifting it a little; but they failed to remove it. M. de Maubreuil even went so far as to dare to take a ride along the boulevard with the cross of the Legion of Honor attached to his horse's tail. This caused such an outburst of indignation in the Rue Saint-Denis, that, had he not given spurs to his horse, he would very likely have been beaten to death.

These demonstrations caused me much anxiety and trouble until the 4th of April, the day on which the provisional government decreed that all emblems, monograms, and coats of arms, which had characterized the government of Bonaparte, should be done away with, and their removal should be made exclusively by persons appointed for the purpose, and no personal initiative should be permitted to carry the decree into execution.

## CHAPTER XIV

General Dessolle appointed to the command of the National Guard — The Senate pronounces the deposition of Napoleon — *Triomphe de Trajan* at the Opéra — The Emperor Alexander grants an audience to the Senate — His popularity grows daily — The provisional government's address to the army — Formation of the Ministry — M. Pasquier refuses the portfolio of Police — M. de Bourrienne appointed Postmaster-General — Adhesions pour in — Conscripts sent back to their homes — Napoleon decides upon giving battle under the walls of Paris — Napoleon's assassination dreamt of; M. Pasquier notifies M. de Bassano — Alexander understands that it is indispensable to win the adhesion of the army — He turns his thoughts towards Marmont — The latter discontented with Napoleon — The provisional government dispatches M. de Montessuy to him — Marmont lends a willing ear to the propositions conveyed to him by the latter — The judgment passed on him — The Duc de Vicence urges Napoleon to abdicate in favor of his son — Frame of mind of the officers and the army — The marshals extort from the Emperor his signature to an act of abdication — Marmont accompanies them to Paris.

THE first use the provisional government made of its authority was to appoint the commanding officer of the National Guard; it could not have made a better choice than General Dessolle, whose most honorable reputation and urbanity fully qualified him to hold this delicate position. His acceptance of the post was an event of some importance; he was the first general officer of prominence who did not fear to accept the new order of things; for General de Beurnonville, who had become a member of the provisional government, had, for a long time past, had no immediate connection with the active army.

General de Nansouty likewise sent in his adhesion during the course of the same day; it was all the more worthy of



being noted because it was not inspired by the need or desire of obtaining any office. In sending in his adhesion, he did not fear to express openly that his sole motive was to submit to the House of Bourbon. He was, it will be recalled, one of the military men who had been compelled to return to the capital to repair their shattered health.

On the 2d of April, at nine o'clock in the evening, the Senate passed a decree pronouncing Napoleon's deposition. The enacting part of it was not drawn up until the next day; its preamble was an actual indictment. Napoleon was, *de facto*, not only deposed, but the right of heredity was abolished in his family, and the French nation and army were released from all oaths of fealty towards his descendants as well as towards himself.

Chance alone prevented the oddest and untimeliest incident from occurring that evening. The Czar and his principal officers were dining with M. de Talleyrand. All the members of the provisional government had been invited to this dinner. As I was about to go thither, I was notified that the performance to be given at the Opéra had been changed by order of an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, and that the piece to be given was the *Triomphe de Trajan*. This seemed singular to me, to say the least, but my astonishment was greatly increased, when, during the course of the dinner, I heard the Emperor announce his intentions of going to the Opéra that night with the King of Prussia. I quickly asked M. de Talleyrand, who was sitting by the Emperor's side, through one of the footmen, if he was aware that the *Triomphe de Trajan* was being performed by command. This information at once gave rise to a conversation between him and the Emperor Alexander, following which M. de Rémusat, who had charge of all the principal theatres, was sent for, and, in spite of the late hour, he succeeded in substituting the *Vestale* for the

*Triomphe de Trajan*. It would have been most extraordinary to see the two sovereigns assembled at the Opéra to listen to hymns composed in Napoleon's honor at the time of the height of his glory, just as they were engaged in proceeding with his deposition, pronounced that very day in the halls of the Luxembourg Palace. The King of Prussia would have found himself in a particularly embarrassing position during the scene in which Trajan is shown granting to a lady of quality her husband's pardon, and casting into the flames the letter which placed him in such great danger.<sup>1</sup> The fact is that a few young officers of Alexander's staff, who greatly desired witnessing a performance of this opera, had thought that the simplest way of attaining their wish was to make use of the name of their master, not foreseeing the consequences of their deed.

On Sunday, the 3d, the Senate was granted an audience by the Emperor Alexander, to whom it officially presented the decree passed the previous day.

"I am the friend of the French people," replied the Czar. "What you have just done increases my friendly feelings. It is both just and wise to give to France strong and liberal institutions in harmony with the enlightenment of the present times. My allies and myself are merely here to protect the freedom of your decisions." He then went on to say, in the most kindly tone: "As a proof of the lasting alliance which I wish to enter into with your nation, I now restore to it all the French prisoners at present in my dominions; the provisional government had asked this of me, and I grant the request to the Senate, in consideration of the determination it has just come to."

The Emperor Alexander was fast becoming popular. People saw that everything emanated from and hinged on

<sup>1</sup> It was an open secret that this scene had occurred at Berlin, and that the lady of quality was the Princess von Hatzfeldt.

him. His ally, the King of Prussia, passed unnoticed; little was seen of him, for he avoided showing himself in public, and when he did, he always wore an air of timidity which could not give him any great prominence. Alexander, on the contrary, did not miss an opportunity of showing himself; he was in the habit of riding through all parts of the city, and visiting all public institutions. At the outset, his rides, which he almost invariably took without an escort and without notifying the police, caused me considerable anxiety. What security had we against some criminal attempt? What would not have been the fate of Paris handed over to the mad revenge of his soldiery? So I begged him, but in vain, to allow the taking of a few protective measures, and to notify me daily of the road he intended to follow. In the course of his excursions he sought every opportunity to make himself liked by all classes; thus, on my telling him that the horses of his cavalry, which was bivouacking in the Champs-Élysées, were destroying the trees and shrubberies, he personally went to look into the amount of damage done, gave the necessary orders to prevent its recurrence, and even to repair it as much as possible; we owe him, therefore, the preservation of this magnificent promenade, which, had it not been for him, would have been deprived of its finest feature. When visiting the Museum, he noticed that several pedestals were statueless; on learning that this was by virtue of precautions taken by the director-general, M. Denon, who had caused several magnificent works of art to be put in a place of safety, he was greatly offended. "Did I not, even at Bondy," he said, "promise that all public monuments should be respected? Do people imagine that I have no intention of keeping my word?" It became necessary to tell him that this precautionary measure had been taken anteriorly, and that everything would be again put in its proper place, which was done.

The provisional government issued an address to the army; the last sentence of it may be quoted as a model of its kind. "Soldiers, would you remain deaf to the voice of your country which recalls you to it and entreats you? It speaks to you through your Senate, through its capital, and especially through its misfortunes. You are the most noble of its children, and you cannot belong to the man who has laid it waste, has delivered it up without arms and defenceless, who has sought to render your name a byword among nations, who would perhaps have compromised their glory, if a man who is not even a Frenchman could ever tarnish the honor of your arms and the generosity of our soldiers. You are no longer the soldiers of Napoleon; the Senate and all France release you from your oaths."

Napoleon, *who is not even a Frenchman!* The author of this was M. de Fontanes.

On the 9th of April, the *Corps législatif*, following in the steps of the Senate, pronounced the deposition of Napoleon and of the members of his family; seventy-nine deputies were present. The *Cour de cassation* also sent in its adhesion. The provisional government appointed ministers or rather commissioners, who were entrusted *ad interim* with the various portfolios; this was a matter of urgency, in order to establish some little order in the midst of the actual confusion.

Two of these commissioners were absent from the city, viz. M. Malouet, who was to take charge of the Ministry of Marine, and who was in exile at Tours, and M. Beugnot, Prefect of Lille, who was to act as Minister of the Interior. The latter, whose dominant qualities are not resoluteness and strength of character, was somewhat dismayed at his appointment; in order to get him to set out on his journey it became necessary to telegraph to him repeatedly. The selection made in connection with the Ministry of War

entailed unpleasant consequences. General Dupont was a man of intellect, who had for many years enjoyed a high reputation as a soldier, but he was hampered by the recollection of the capitulation of Baylen; in order to govern the army under the existing circumstances, a man should have been appointed whose reputation was untarnished, and who enjoyed great authority.

M. de Talleyrand offered me the Ministry of Police, which I declined for two reasons: the first was that I did not desire to pursue any further my career in the police, and was, on the contrary, anxious to abandon that branch of the public service; the second was that at that period all actual importance centred in the Prefecture of Police, and I did not care to hold the Ministry of Police simultaneously with it. I consequently preferred that M. Anglès, whose excellent character and whose little encroaching spirit were known to me, should be appointed. This was a mistake, as far as my personal interests were concerned, a great mistake. I remained in a secondary position, which allowed those opposed to me to attack and injure me.

The other commissioners were: for the Ministry of Justice, M. Henrion de Pansey; for the Ministry of Finance, M. Louis; for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. de Laforest.

The office of Postmaster-General was vacant, M. de La Valette having left his post and the official residence. A former aide-de-camp to Napoleon, especially indebted to him for many favors, the husband of one of his nieces, the delicacy of his sentiments did not permit him to play any part, or to take office under a new government, especially one opposed to his benefactor. He had informed me beforehand of his determination, knowing full well that I would come to a contrary one. Although pursuing two such entirely different lines of conduct, we preserved the most friendly relations. M. de Talleyrand decided upon con-

ferring this great and important office on M. de Bourrienne. When M. de La Valette heard of this selection, he was upset by it, and he considered it his duty to make certain representations to those in power, as to the inconveniences and even dangers attendant upon it. He called on me next morning at a very early hour. "Do they not know," he exclaimed, "of what Bourrienne is capable? And yet, M. de Talleyrand must know him well. It is tantamount to delivering up the secrecy of correspondence to the highest bidder!" "How do you expect me," I replied, "to feel astonished at M. de Talleyrand's show of confidence in such a man, when you yourself, for the past three months, in spite of my repeated warnings, in spite of what you knew yourself, allowed yourself to be circumvented by the very same individual! Nevertheless, if you authorize me to do so, I will inform M. de Talleyrand of what you have said to me, word for word." "Certainly," was his answer; "I have called on you for no other purpose." "Well then, your message shall be delivered, but in vain; I can tell you that now." Matters happened as I had foreseen.

I resolved upon letting the public know in an official manner of the line of conduct I was about to follow, and of the determination I had come to. I was particularly anxious that no expression likely to give offence should make itself felt in the language I was about to use, so I exercised the greatest care in framing it, and I remained true to the declaration I had made to M. Bellart in the matter of the proclamation of the municipal council. I ended my circular in the following terms: "Honored as I am with the confidence of the provisional government, which has retained me at my post, I owe it to myself and to you to inform you of my sentiments, and to trace to you your line of duty. Rejoicing as I do to see the end of the misfortunes of my country, I have accepted the fresh means of serving it just

tendered me; I have devoted myself entirely to my country's needs, and I expect my fellow-workers to share this my devotion with me."

The Prefect of the Seine followed my example, and likewise issued a circular. A flood of adhesions thereupon poured in: those of the *Cour des comptes*, of the *Cour impériale*, of the Tribunal of Commerce, of the associations of the bar, and even that of the *gendarmerie* of Paris.

On the 4th, a rescript was published allowing all conscripts who had actually answered the call to return to their homes, and authorizing those who had not yet responded, to stay at home. The same measure was made applicable to the battalions of the new levies which all departments had furnished towards all the levies *en masse*. This was tantamount to depriving Napoleon of his principal resource for continuing war, at the same time giving the population the relief it so ardently desired, and one which would best secure its prompt acquiescence in the new order of things.

Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau on the night of the 30th, after sending the Duc de Vicence to Paris, commissioning him to see the Czar at all costs, and to seek to open a negotiation with him. Did he entertain any illusions regarding this resource? It is not impossible, for a man clings to anything when in desperate straits. Acquainted as he thought he was with the character of that sovereign, one can conceive that it was hard for him to persuade himself that his resolution could not be shaken. At all events, it was necessary that he should, by means of his military dispositions, afford some chance of success to this last attempt. There were two courses to follow; the one chosen by Napoleon was to cause his immediate ruin. The reasons I have already given, which should have made him decide to continue his movement towards the East,

instead of returning to Paris from Saint-Dizier, still held good, as this movement had not prevented the capital from being taken. Yet he concluded to abandon this plan. Is the cause of this to be found in the sort of discouragement which had already taken possession of him on realizing the hardships and difficulties attendant on so tedious an enterprise, or in the dread of finding the same feeling among the principal officers surrounding him? They had, indeed, already given manifest indications in this direction.

I have, nevertheless, been informed that at a council held at Fontainebleau on the morning of the 31st, all the marshals had, with the exception of one, been of opinion to fall back on the South of France. Napoleon, however, decided to concentrate about him the remnants of his forces, and preferred manœuvring around Paris, so as to compel the enemy to sally from it and give him battle; either a victory or a defeat would settle the question. Doubtless, there was a great disproportion between the opposing forces. He could not collect more than 36,000 fighting men; but did not daring and skill combined occasionally triumph over mere numbers? The necessity of holding Paris, which the allies had imposed on themselves when occupying it, would necessarily weaken them; a very strong force would be needed to make them secure against a population of 700,000 souls.

Still, this is not the mistake which decided the fate of Napoleon. His plan once resolved upon, he ordered the army corps under Marshals Marmont and Mortier, which had just evacuated Paris, to stop at Essonnes. These troops thus formed his vanguard; they occupied a position sufficiently well chosen to afford the troops returning from Saint-Dizier time to come up. The latter were advancing by forced marches, but the allies had not remained idle. Although they have been blamed for losing a few hours after



their entry into the capital, they had promptly put forward strong outposts on the roads leading to Fontainebleau and to Orleans. Communications between Paris and Fontainebleau were so easy and rapid that the knowledge of the measures taken by Napoleon could not be long concealed from the enemy's leaders. They soon learnt beyond doubt that the French army, far from being in full retreat, was preparing to resume the offensive; it therefore became necessary, on the 1st of April, in the course of the evening, to get ready for a general engagement. Prince von Schwarzenberg left Paris next morning to establish his headquarters at Chevilly, between Essonnes and Paris. The movement already in progress of troops of all arms and of all nations marching in one and the same direction, on parallel lines, continued uninterruptedly during the next three days.

The thought of a battle waged almost under the walls of Paris struck terror into the hearts of the boldest; for, were the allies to lose it, the consequences were not to be calculated. Who could know what would happen in the case of a precipitate retreat, where they would be hard pressed, and which they might perhaps think would be rendered secure by subjecting the capital of France to the fate endured by that of Russia? As to the men who had dared to pronounce against Napoleon, as we had just done, it was easy to foresee the fate reserved to them; flight would have been their only salvation.

Next morning, as I was at M. de Talleyrand's, conversing with the Duc de Dalberg, on the probabilities of the continuation of the war and the chances of the battle which would probably be fought within the next four days, I could not help telling him what I knew of the anxiety and fears still inspired by the Emperor to the staff of the coalesced forces: "When generals occupying so excellent a position and enjoying the superiority of numbers," I remarked, "are in

such evident dread of the man whom they are about to fight, how can one help taking into account the contingency of their meeting with some great disaster?" "You are right," answered the Duke, "and that is why surer methods than those are to be resorted to."—"Where are you going to find them?"—"The necessary steps have already been taken; the hazards of fate which one has, indeed, good cause to dread will be met more than half-way." He then explained to me that a number of determined individuals, led by a strong b . . . ., —I am giving his very words, — would don uniforms of the Chasseurs of the Guard, which uniforms could be procured from the stores of the Military School, and that either before or during the action, they would, aided by this disguise, surround Napoleon, and rid France of him. The feeling of indignation reflected on my countenance on hearing this outrageous avowal, prevented his giving me further particulars, which I vainly sought to obtain from him. When, however, I enquired of him where it had been possible to find men prepared to undertake so infamous a task, he replied: "There was not the slightest difficulty about it. We have at our disposal men of every stripe, Chouans, Jacobins, and so forth."

I went home, after this conversation, my soul filled with the most sorrowful thoughts, lamenting the events one is fated to come across in great political crises, in revolutionary times! I had hardly sat down, when I received a note from M. de La Valette, evidently written in great haste. "I am aware," he wrote, "how incapable you are of having a hand in the infamous plot meditated against the life of the Emperor; you may even be ignorant of it. I therefore feel it my duty to notify you of it, fully assured as I am that you will do all in your power to thwart it." How did he come to know of the plot? I never knew, but his note convinced me that the preparations for it were in an ad-

vanced state since they had transpired. Almost at the same moment I received a similar warning from Foudras, a police inspector, in whom I reposed the greatest confidence. Like M. de La Valette, he had been notified. I have seldom found myself in so painful a position. Depositary of a secret, the particulars of which I knew but imperfectly, not aware of the name of a single one of the actors in the plot, what could I do to avert a deed which filled me with horror? On all sides there was nothing but snares, and the firmest loyalty could be accused of treachery.

The day came to an end without dissipating my painful state of anxiety. At midnight, a note was brought to me which had been left in my antechamber by a peasant. I recognized the handwriting of the Duc de Bassano. He asked me, on behalf of the Emperor, to furnish him with the particulars of what was going on in Paris, adding that the news which reached him seemed altogether unlikely. I at once made up my mind to take advantage of the opportunity to give a twofold warning: the first, that the Emperor should have his person strictly guarded; and the other, that he must no longer apply to me for anything concerning his service. I decided upon carrying M. de Bassano's note to M. de Talleyrand, next day, and to tell him that it was my intention to reply to it. Strange to relate, the Duc de Dalberg was there; he approved of the warning I was giving, adding that it would have its advantages.

So I drafted the note I was about to send away; it was the Duc de Dalberg who wished that I should embody in it mention of the fact that there were Jacobins among those who were seeking to get near Napoleon with evil intent. The following is the full text of the note, of which I have preserved the draft: "The facts are as follows: the Senate, numbering eighty-two members, has organized a provisional government; the Senate has pronounced the

depositions. The government has issued an address to the army. Several generals have already declared themselves: in the number, Generals Nansouty, Montelegier, Dangranville, and Montbrun. Marshal Victor has made overtures towards a *rapprochement*. General Dessolle is at the head of the National Guard. General Dupont is Minister of War. It is said that several schemes are on foot to get near the Emperor, and that among the individuals entertaining such thoughts are several Jacobins. The bankers have tendered twelve millions. The *Corps législatif* meets this forenoon. It will express itself even more strongly than the Senate. The National Guard is becoming animated in a remarkable manner under its new chief. I must no longer be addressed on any matter whatever; one must be aware of the course I have adopted."

The man who had called on the previous day returned at the appointed hour, and took away with him the note, written and folded so as to occupy the least possible space. I have learned since that it was handed to M. de Bassano in the presence of Napoleon, who, having recognized my handwriting, hastened to read it. He remained in a deep reverie for an instant, then said: "This fellow was in a great hurry; one would think that he had donned his hunting costume in order to get along faster." In the night between the 3d and the 4th, M. de Vicence returned to him and gave him, on many points, more particulars than I had furnished, but he was not in a position to tell him of his deposition.

What I have just narrated with regard to the secret entrusted to me by M. de Dalberg, and his consent to the warning which I sent to the Emperor, will serve later on as the key to an affair which, for a long time afterwards, was destined to cause an unpleasant stir, and about which, even to the present day, many people do not know what to

think. I am speaking of the expedition at the head of which was M. de Maubreuil.

Every effort made in the capital to win over the civic bodies and authorities, and to obtain their co-operation towards the party of the Restoration which we had in view, was being rewarded with success. Was it then impossible to win over the army? Would its fidelity to Napoleon forever remain unshaken? A few individual defections did not count for much, but if one could deprive him of a whole army corps, and form with its aid a nucleus around which would come and group themselves all those who embraced the same cause, in other words, the country's cause, would not an immense step be made? Such was the matter with which the mind of Alexander was constantly occupied. "The army," he was wont to say in his intimate circle, "is always the army; as long as it is not with you, gentlemen, you can boast of nothing; it is the army which represents the French nation, and if it is not won over, what can you accomplish that will endure? The army will ever in the end upset anything set up without its consent, and all the more so anything set up in spite of its feelings."

It was hard to gainsay this method of reasoning, so a search was instituted for some important general whom it would be possible to seduce, and who would enjoy sufficient influence over the troops to lead them away by his example. How did one come to think of Marshal Marmont in this connection? It may seem extraordinary, for he owed everything to Napoleon; no one seemed bound more strongly than he to remain loyal and devoted to him. But he was nearest at hand, and consequently the easiest to approach. If one succeeded with him, no other could be of greater service, as he was in command of the vanguard. To this should be added that he was discontented, and had for some time been at no pains to conceal it. During the whole

of the campaign he had unceasingly repeated that he was being sacrificed. To tell the truth, his post had always been the most arduous one, and the one where the risk of being annihilated was the greatest. On the other hand, he had met with a reverse during the attack on Laon; on this occasion, the Emperor had spoken of him with some bitterness; the marshal had heard of this, and did not hide his vexation. Lastly, it was known that he was ambitious to play an important part, and that he was convinced that his superior was not to be found.

Already, during the night of the 30th of March, at the time he was engaged in issuing the necessary orders for the execution of the capitulation, M. de Talleyrand had come to him, and had endeavored to make him understand that there was a certain course to be followed in order to save the country, by separating its cause from that of the man who had precipitated it into such an abyss of misfortunes. If M. de Talleyrand is to be believed, the name of the House of Bourbon was pronounced in the course of this conversation.

Similar hints had been thrown out to the marshal, on the same night, by M. Perregaux, his brother-in-law, and by Laffitte, the banker. This circumstance deserves being recorded, especially when placed in juxtaposition with the part enacted by both those men in the course of the following year. All these efforts had remained fruitless, and the marshal seemingly paid little attention to them. What was the risk of approaching him in the matter once more? It was, I believe, the Duc de Dalberg who first conceived the idea. He was ever, in the provisional government, the man who had recourse to expedients. It was necessary to find a safe man for the purpose of approaching him. M. Louis and M. Lahorie suggested M. de Montessuy, who had been his aide-de-camp. He was introduced by M. Tourton, one of the principal officers of the staff of the National

Guard, and consented to undertake the mission. He received oral instructions, in addition to the letters accrediting him. The marshal was asked to give himself and his army corps to the provisional government. In so doing, he would be merely obeying the Senate which had released him from his oaths to Napoleon; if he consented, it was suggested that he should withdraw to Normandy, a province as yet untouched by the war, which he would preserve intact to France, and where all officers and troops could gather who decided to follow the same course as himself. Thus an army would doubtless soon be formed there, which, in giving to the new government positive strength, would enable it to treat with the allies, on terms most advantageous for the country. Should he refuse, the result would naturally be a series of incalculable misfortunes; the war, if continued, might entail France's ruin. It would be in vain that prodigies of valor would be accomplished! Devotion to duty and true patriotism consisted in bringing as quickly as possible such a fearful crisis to an end. The matter lay with the marshal, and if he made use of this power, he would forever acquire a nation's gratitude.

This proposition and this method of addressing him having been concerted with the Emperor Alexander, the latter hastened to notify Prince von Schwarzenberg of what had been done, and to inform him that he was to promote by all means at his disposal the attempt about to be made, and to offer, for his part, to Marshal Marmont a military convention which would secure the freedom of his march towards Normandy. So on the evening of the 2d, M. de Montessuy came to receive his final instructions, which were given to him by M. de Talleyrand and M. de Nesselrode.

In order to better disarm suspicion, and as he was to present himself at the French outposts as the bearer of a

letter from Prince von Schwarzenberg, it had been thought advisable that he should don the costume of a Cossack; he even carried the kind of whip known as a *knout*. His appearance, most strange under such a disguise, and on so memorable an occasion, has ever remained present to my mind.

Everything took place as agreed upon. M. de Montessuy was in the presence of the marshal next day, and handed him the letter of Prince von Schwarzenberg; the negotiation was of short duration. Marshal Marmont declared that public opinion and the will of the nation had always governed his conduct; he could clearly see it expressed in what had been done by the Senate, and so he yielded, but on one condition, which was that should, owing to the course he was pursuing, Napoleon fall into the power of the allies, his freedom and security should be assured in some locality selected by them and by the French government. It was agreed that the troops which he commanded should withdraw from their position at Essonnes, and retreat by way of Versailles to a point beyond the scene of hostilities between the armies of Napoleon and those of the allies.

Generalissimo Prince von Schwarzenberg informed him, on the morning of the 24th, that he entirely approved of these arrangements. As the march of the troops was to begin on the night between the 4th and the 5th, all necessary measures were in consequence taken on both sides. The marshal had come to more special understanding in the matter, with the oldest of the general officers of his army, General Souham, and with General Bordesoulle, who was in command of the cavalry. I even have reason to believe that all the generals then serving under his orders were let into the secret, with the exception of Generals Chastel and Lucotte, who soon, however, penetrated it, and who, for sufficiently good reasons, had not been considered favorably disposed towards the plot.



We received, early in the morning of the 4th, the news of this great and decisive event which, by depriving Napoleon of so considerable a portion of his army and by exposing his position in one of the most important directions, was necessarily to disconnect all his plans and almost place him at the mercy of the allies.

M. de Koch believes and says that the convention concluded with the marshal was all the more timely for the latter, in that, on the mere signs of the movement which Napoleon was going to attempt on Paris, they had been so alarmed at the contingency of having to accept battle under the walls of the capital, that their resolution was already taken in the council to evacuate it, and to take up once more their position at Meaux. According to him, the order for this retrograde movement was about to be sent to Count Barclay de Tolly, when the generalissimo caused the dispatch of it to be suspended, by making known the result of his *pourparlers* with the Duke of Ragusa.

M. de Koch is in general so accurate that his mistake must be attributed to false information. In the first place, it is beyond doubt that the negotiation had its origin in Paris, that the Prince von Schwarzenberg acted merely as a go-between in it, and that in consequence he could not have had any notification to make in the matter. I think I was in as good a position as any one to know the truth regarding a fact of such importance, and I can say for certain that there never was the slightest sign to cause it to be even suspected; far from it, the probabilities of a general and early engagement seemed to multiply at every instant; we were a prey to too lively an anxiety for anything which might accelerate or avert this danger to escape our notice.

Moreover, intercourse between the provisional government and the councils of the Emperor Alexander was too

frequent for so capital a change to occur for a single moment in his resolutions, without our being informed thereof. Much that is publicly known is there to prove that he had fully determined to leave the city to go to the front, and be present in person at the scene of operations. He had, in anticipation of this temporary absence, appointed General Pozzo di Borgo, as his representative near the provisional government, and he had consented to the Abbé de Pradt's accompanying him in the same quality on behalf of that government. Assuredly, if he had been on the point of evacuating the capital, to withdraw towards Meaux, he would not have pursued such a plan, as he could feel sure that the members of the provisional government would have no course left them but to follow him.

The news of the convention concluded with Marshal Marmont came to us as a great relief. There are circumstances which can never fully be realized unless one has been placed in them. When, five days earlier, I had decided upon embracing the cause of the Bourbons, I had principally in view the advantage of putting a prompt end to the sufferings of my country; but I was far from foreseeing all the hazards that were to be incurred. My heart ached, as the time approached, when 150,000 foreigners were to sweep down on what remained of so many brave men, who, for the past twenty years, had represented French honor, and among whom were many generals and officers, some of whom I knew intimately; I realized that my ruin as well as that of all persons who had followed the same course as myself would be absolute and irretrievable, were Napoleon to triumph; were he defeated, I could see the complete destruction of the last elements of France's military glory and power. My conflicting emotions may be imagined!

I am aware of all that has been said, of all that may with good cause be thought of Marshal Marmont. Alas! I must

confess that I would not like a deed similar to the one for which he is censured to be imputed to my memory; still, the service he rendered was a valuable one. It remains to be said here, for too many people, perhaps, think differently, that he rendered it without making any conditions, without securing for himself the slightest personal advantage; whatever may have been his innermost thoughts, he did not ask nor stipulate for any reward. We are soon to see his example followed by the most renowned of his peers and rivals. In a word, all of them surrendered within the next three weeks to the new order of things, to the House of Bourbon. Not one of them, any more than he, dreamt of making personal terms. Their conduct compares favorably with that of so many general officers, or commanders of fortified towns, all bearing illustrious names, who made Henri IV. pay so dearly for their adhesion.

While a matter which was to have so great an influence on Napoleon's destinies was being agitated between Essonnes and Paris, on the 3d, Napoleon reviewed his Guard in the *cour du Cheval blanc* at Fontainebleau; he addressed it briefly, in the following terms: "Soldiers, the enemy has stolen three marches on us, and has become master of Paris; he must be driven out of it. A few unworthy Frenchmen, *émigrés* whom we have pardoned, have donned the white cockade, and made common cause with our enemies. These cowards shall receive the reward of this fresh outrage! Let us swear to conquer or to die, and to make respected that tricolor cockade, which, for twenty years, has ever found us in the path of glory and of honor!" The Guard repeated this oath with enthusiasm, and immediately afterwards proceeded to Essonnes. Those who, glancing through the forest, followed its progress under the lofty trees lit up by the moon's rays, have retained a lasting impression of this memorable sight. The deepest silence reigned in the col-

umns, and from the stillness amid which they advanced, it was easy to realize that this admirable body of men was imbued with the conviction that it was going to end its glorious career in a final combat. Fate had other trials in store for it.

The Duc de Vicence had not wished to leave Paris, without being in a condition to make thoroughly known to his master the true state of affairs, and without having made a careful study of the facts as well as of the general sentiment. He gave a most detailed and accurate account to the Emperor of all that had occurred in the capital, from the 31st up to the time he had left it, leaving the provisional government installed, and after being himself formally entrusted by the Emperor Alexander with the most painful answer, as it invited Napoleon to choose for himself and his family a place of settlement and retreat where he should be guaranteed from molestation. At this cost, the further shedding of blood could alone cease and peace be restored both to France and Europe.

M. de Vicence did not conceal from him that the readiness with which the Senate had, from the very first, lent itself to all that had been required of it, was due to the universally accepted conviction that the allies, and more principally the Emperor Alexander, were determined to no longer treat with him. No hope could therefore be entertained that peace was obtainable if his reign continued, and peace at any price was the desire of all.

The Duc de Vicence did not fear to add that he knew the Czar too well not to feel convinced that his determination was irrevocable, that he would not swerve from it, unless in the case of an absolute change in the course of events. It was consequently useless to indulge in any further illusions, and, if the struggle was to be continued, it must be unto death. What would be the consequences

were Napoleon victorious, supposing that a miracle should give him victory? At what cost would he henceforth be suffered to reign? Were he defeated, he would have to reproach himself with having sacrificed the few remaining brave men, whose so oft tested courage and loyalty had remained faithful to his fortune. In the event of such a disaster, all those about him, all that was dear to him, would be annihilated, his whole family with him. Was there no means of saving something from the wreck? The hatred of the allies was directed against his personality. Contingent upon all that had been learnt of Austria's dispositions, upon the last letters received from M. de Metternich, it was hard to believe that the Emperor Francis would witness without the deepest regret the absolute ruin of his daughter and of his grandson. Now, the Emperor Alexander owed some consideration indeed for the feelings of such an ally; there might therefore still remain some chances for a solution of the question which would preserve the throne of France to the Napoleonic dynasty. In order to attain this object, it was necessary to make up one's mind to a great sacrifice, and to have the courage to abdicate. The Duc de Vicence counselled such a course.

In his *Manuscrit de 1814*, M. Fain has said that he had been authorized thereto by a few words spoken just previous to his departure from Paris. According to this author, he had succeeded in obtaining a more favorable hearing from the Emperor Alexander, and had obtained from him something like a feeling of consideration for the interests of the Regent and her son, whose interests could, in more respects than one, balance, in the eyes of the allied sovereigns, those of the House of Bourbon.

In spite of the confidence to which M. Fain is entitled, I think that he goes too far. Nothing justifies me in believing that M. de Vicence had any other assurances to give in

support of his counsel than the presumptions his mind suggested to him. The Emperor Alexander, on the contrary, had been most careful to have it made known that nothing which had been said to him by the Duc de Vicence in the course of the audience he had granted him, had made any impression on his mind, and caused a paragraph to be inserted in the *Moniteur* to that effect. His subsequent vacillations are not in contradiction to what I here state; they are sufficiently explained by the gravity of the resolution of which he was left to assume the responsibility at the eleventh hour.

However this may be, Napoleon was not shaken in his resolution by this first attempt of the Duc de Vicence; the proof of it is to be found in the acceleration he gave to the movement of his troops during the course of the 3d, and in the oath which he made his Guard take. But he was soon to have other assaults to withstand. At daybreak, on the 4th, the news of the deposition pronounced by the Senate became known at Fontainebleau; on the previous day, it had been easy to recognize from more than one word that was suffered to escape the disadvantages of proximity to the capital; frequent and rapid communications had, as a matter of course, been established between the generals surrounding Napoleon and their families which remained in Paris; now, it was more especially on the officers of higher rank that these communications exercised a powerful influence. The wives, the relations, the friends, all wrote, asking, nay, entreating, that an end be put to the matter, and that one should come to the determination of ending combats, the ultimate result of which could but be fatal. What was not written in plain terms was clearly intimated, and willing ears were there to listen to it. Hence it was among the men whom the Emperor had elevated to such high positions that the greatest amount of discouragement was to be met with, and also a firm resolve to forsake his cause.

With but very few exceptions, an entirely different feeling was to be found in the subordinate ranks, especially among the young generals and young officers; their courage increased in proportion to the perils with which they saw themselves surrounded, their fidelity was exalted by the sight of the misfortunes which were gathering over the head of their chief, their emperor, their hero! The same feeling was experienced by the soldiers, whose devotion, altogether disinterested, had its birth in the most noble and generous sentiments.

Such was the moral situation of the army of the staff, and of the household, when the news arrived of the deposition pronounced by the Senate, which until then had been so humbly submissive. Great was the emotion caused by this announcement.

On the other hand, the idea of a voluntary abdication had not suggested itself to the Duc de Vicence, but it had suggested itself to us. If M. Fain is to be believed, Napoleon himself had contributed towards spreading it, by discussing with several of his followers the proposition made to him.

Every moment was of value. The order given to transfer headquarters to Ponthierry made one dread an early engagement which would no longer leave the means of attempting anything towards a solution. After the parade—it took place at noon, according to custom, in the *cour du Cheval blanc*—Napoleon, just as he was returning to his apartments to make final preparations for his departure, was followed by the principal officers of his staff, who asked to hold a conference with him. It was impossible for him to deny this request. The following is the list of those who, to my knowledge, were present, and who took a part in the discussion: the Prince de Neufchâtel, Marshal Ney; the Duc de Dantzig, the Duc de Reggio, Marshal Macdonald, the Duc de Bassano, the Duc de Vicence, and Grand Marshal

Bertrand. It is said that a few persons of lesser importance were present; I think M. Fain was of the number.

A voluntary abdication was proposed subject to a regency which would preserve the throne to the young Napoleon. The Emperor was not easily persuaded, and the discussion lasted a long while. It is a certain fact that he yielded only to persistent entreaties made in a tone which proved to him that he could no longer expect any support from his old companions in arms, and that their state of discouragement had paralyzed what little was left of their devotion. What remained for him to do or even to attempt, when he was no longer surrounded by these old names, these old reputations which were the obligatory accompaniment of his own? Marshal Ney is said to have shown the most animation on this occasion, and his language, it is reported, was even violent. Napoleon finally yielded, and drew up, in his own hand, and in the following terms, the deed demanded of him:—

“The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole obstacle to the restoration of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is prepared to descend from his throne, to leave France and even this life, for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, of those of the regency of the Empress, and of the Empire.

“Given at Fontainebleau, April 4th, 1814.”

The Duc de Vicence, Marshal Ney, and Marshal Macdonald were immediately charged with taking this deed to Paris, to proceed directly to the Emperor Alexander, to place it in his hands and to treat with him as to the manner in which it was to be carried into execution.

On their way through Essonnes, they asked the Duc de Raguse to accompany them. Was this pursuant to an order from the Emperor? Was it, as Marshal Marmont claims, of their own accord, and in order to give greater weight to



the errand with which they were entrusted? I am unable to settle this point. What is certain, however, is that the Duc de Raguse found himself in a most false position, as he had but the day before entered into the agreement with Prince von Schwarzenberg. He had received the ratification of it that very morning, and all measures had been taken for the movement he was about to make during the night towards Versailles. Great was therefore his embarrassment, when, between eight and nine in the evening, the Duc de Vicence and his colleagues came to him, and urged him to accompany them; at first, he was on the point of refusing, but the excuse he gave was of little value, and he was soon compelled to set it aside. It was necessary that he should leave at once, without having the time to concert, in regard to the fresh position in which he was placed, with the generals to whom the command would fall in his absence, and of whom the two principal ones were General Souham and General Bordessoulle. I can, however, have no doubt that, from a letter written by General Bordessoulle, and which has come under my notice, he left with them instructions to await his orders, and not to take any action until after his return and that of the marshals whom he was compelled to accompany. It would seem that when refusing to join the party, he had let escape something of a confession regarding certain messages he had received from Prince von Schwarzenberg, and which, he said, might have important results, requiring his presence at Essonnes.

These avowals, which had seemed somewhat extraordinary to the Duc de Vicence and the two marshals, had, however, not been sufficient to enable them to penetrate his secret, and in spite of certain strange peculiarities in his deportment when passing through the enemy's headquarters, they nevertheless continued their journey with him, without too great a distrust. He had paid a flying visit to Prince von

Schwarzenberg, with whom he had conversed for a few moments. This time was spent, if he is to be believed, in begging to be absolved of his promises. Is this likely, when already the news of the convention had been transmitted to the sovereigns? At all events, it is fair to state that the Duc de Raguse had been able to bring to the knowledge of Prince von Schwarzenberg the fact that the step about to be taken by the marshals, and in which he was to participate, had for its object to place the crown of France on the head of the grandson of the Emperor of Austria.

## CHAPTER XV

M. de Saint-Simon announces the arrival of the marshals to the provisional government—Alexander receives them in the middle of the night—Napoleon's envoys and the members of the provisional government each in turn make known to him their arguments for and against a regency—The Czar dismisses them without coming to any determination—He learns next day of Marmont's defection—The latter restores discipline among his troops, which have mutinied, and leads them to Mantes—The marshals return to Napoleon—Drafting a constitution—Clever tactics of M. de Talleyrand—A council held at his residence on the 3d of April: M. Lebrun finds nothing better to propose than the Constitution of 1791; M. de Talleyrand brings back the council to the point at issue; his eulogy of the new sovereign—Composition of the committee charged by the Senate with studying the draft of the constitution—The *Corps législatif* approves of the *Charte constitutionnelle*—Principles and guarantees embodied in it—The senators reserve many advantages to themselves.

WHAT kind of a reception was this solemn deputation to meet with in Paris? We heard of the success of the negotiation with the Duc de Raguse in the course of the morning, but we were without information as to what was taking place at Fontainebleau, and as to Napoleon's resolves.

The members of the provisional government had met as usual at M. de Talleyrand's between eight and nine o'clock at night. All minds had been intent on the event which was to happen during the course of the night, and about the accomplishment of which one hoped to receive news next day, by the arrival of the marshal's troops at Versailles. As this thought absorbed all others, the sitting had been a short one; several of those present had left between ten and eleven o'clock. I was about to do likewise, and had

reached the foot of the staircase, when I saw M. de Saint-Simon, who was hurriedly getting off his horse. He asked me if M. de Talleyrand was at home, for he had most important news to communicate to him, and asked me to accompany him.

Once in the study, he announced the approaching arrival of the marshals and the Duc de Vicence, who had doubtless then reached Villejuif, and who would arrive ere three-quarters of an hour elapsed. From Essonnes, he had ridden ahead of them. Although he had travelled as rapidly as possible, he could not flatter himself with having gained much on them. He informed us of the errand on which they were bent; they were bringing with them Napoleon's abdication, which was conditional on a regency in the name of his son. Had it not been for M. de Saint-Simon, the government and the Emperor Alexander would both have been taken by surprise; in such a contingency, it is hard to say what would have happened. It was among the probabilities that the Emperor Alexander might allow some unadvised engagement to be extorted from him.

M. de Talleyrand at once sent for M. de Nesselrode, to whom he communicated what we had just learnt, requesting him to inform his master thereof, and to ask him whether it would suit him to receive the marshals as soon as they presented themselves, or whether it was his desire that the conference should be postponed until the next day. A few minutes afterwards M. de Nesselrode returned, and said that his master had resolved to receive the deputation at once, but that as soon as he had heard what it had to say, he would be pleased to confer with the provisional government in regard to all the propositions it might make. Messengers were therefore dispatched for all the members who had left; all returned except the Abbé de Montesquiou. M. Dessolle was present; M. de Talleyrand invited both him and my-

self to remain. So we were present at the all-important debate. We went into the first *salon* of the Emperor, where were assembled M. de Nesselrode, M. de Pozzo, and a few Russian officers on duty about Alexander.

It was near midnight when Napoleon's plenipotentiaries were shown into the room. They seemed greatly astonished to meet us there. On both sides the greeting was a kindly one. After a few words of general conversation, each one found himself engaged in private conference; M. de Talleyrand with the Duc de Vicence. Chance having placed me near Marshal Macdonald, I exchanged a few words with him. He told me that the propositions they brought, and which they had had great difficulty in obtaining, should be considered as a stroke of good fortune. I replied that the regency did not seem to me to offer any elements of security for the future, but this view did not prevent my recognizing the fact that they had rendered a good service in getting Napoleon to consent to this first step. I added that he was not to depend on us for the acceptance of the proposition they bore. At the end of a few minutes, the door of Alexander's closet was opened, and they were ushered into his presence. The conference began with a proposition which they rejected, to enter into direct negotiations with the provisional government. And, indeed, neither they nor the government could accommodate themselves to such a manner of proceeding. They came out in about half an hour, and we were in our turn shown in.

The Emperor Alexander remained standing, while we grouped ourselves in a half-circle about him; he gave us in well-chosen words a most clear *exposé* of all that had just been said to him with the object of deciding him to accept Napoleon's offer. He carefully, even warmly, placed before us all its advantages. It put an end to everything, he said; it secured to France a government which would

respect all vested and new interests; as the governing power would remain in the hands of men who for years past had been prominently identified with public affairs, it would necessarily possess the requisite ability. At home, everything would be perfectly assured. Abroad, no further anxiety would be felt when once the man who was distrusted by everybody disappeared from the scene. The most friendly relations would be established without difficulty with everybody. Added to this was the very lively interest which Austria could not help feeling in the imperial dynasty; this was in itself a sure guarantee that no other power would seek to take advantage of France's somewhat weak political condition, such as would likely arise from the sovereign's minority; lastly, and this was in his eyes the decisive reason, when entering on this path, the assent of the army might be depended on, and one got rid of the only actual difficulty of the situation. No further combats, no further opposition would be possible; peace was truly established, everywhere and instantaneously.

Our reply could not be as concise, nor as clearly deduced, precisely because we had many more things to say. M. de Talleyrand, whom it behooved to be the first to speak, dealt with the main points; he was followed in a few brief words by the Duc de Dalberg and M. Dessolle. It was fully demonstrated that the rapid and prompt solution which it was expected would be reached by accepting the regency did not present any elements of solidity; that, considering the character of Napoleon, the resources with which his enterprising mind would always supply him, there would be no means of preventing him at the end of a year, before perhaps, of seizing the reins of government again. It was surely not dreamed to keep him under lock and key. Such a measure would be incompatible with the direct negotiation entered into with him; if one had recourse to it, it

would bring about a general revulsion of the public feeling in his favor.

What was to be the fate of his family? What part was it to be allowed to play? Many of its members were ambitious and turbulent. The greatest difficulty would result after having clearly revived the rights of the House of Bourbon. Forgotten for a number of years, the Bourbons had found in recent events a life and strength which could not be gainsaid. Although the name of this family had so far not been mentioned in any document, no one was ignorant of what had been done towards paving the way for its return. The Senate as a whole had rallied to that idea; at an early date, perhaps ere another twenty-four hours had elapsed, it would pronounce in its favor. Could it be pretended that facts so patent and of such weight should be considered a dead letter? One of the most important towns in France, Bordeaux, had submitted to the authority of the ancient dynasty. Similar dispositions reigned in several of the Southern towns, while in the capital a large number of persons had expressed their sentiments in no uncertain voice, without thereby incurring the population's displeasure. If one lost this opportunity of bringing back the House of Bourbon, while inducing it to accept conditions which would satisfy everybody, no one could answer for what it might do later on should it happen to triumph. For how many years had not its partisans been seen stirring up the inner portion of the country, and on several occasions, with very real chances of success? In those days, they nevertheless had to fight against the republican spirit which had produced the Revolution, which spirit had had its development in them, and which flourished in its fullest vigor. This spirit had since been smothered by the ascendancy of a man of genius who had known how to revive to his advantage the monarchical sentiment, and who, to found

the Empire, had exercised all means at his command to destroy and uproot the habits and ideas opposed to this form of government. Did history afford a single example of the founder of a sovereign race having been able to bequeath to his descendants what he had not been able to retain himself?

Care had been taken, during this first discussion, not to recall the engagement solemnly entered into by Alexander, *to treat neither with Napoleon nor with any member of his family*. This was, I believe, a piece of good policy, for which he was grateful to us.

After having given us a most patient hearing, the Emperor dismissed us, telling us to wait in the adjoining room. He then recalled Napoleon's delegates. From what has since come to my knowledge, he repeated to them all that we had told him, with as much care and accuracy as he had shown in repeating their words to us. They had not anticipated such an opposition. They dwelt on the argument which ever produced the greatest effect on the mind of Alexander: should their proposition be accepted, they would answer for the general assent of the army; should it be rejected, the army would be justly indignant at seeing the great sacrifice made by the man who was still the object of its worship treated so lightly. Its devotion to him would derive renewed strength therefrom, and a most stubborn struggle might ensue. One should not believe that the army was as shaken as it was supposed; within a very few days, it would be surprising to see how many would flock to Napoleon's standards, and about his person.

The deputation was once more dismissed, and we took its place, and the same happened as at our first audience. The Emperor repeated to us the last argument of the marshals, making a pretence of being deeply impressed with the potency of their reasons. It became necessary to once more



combat them. The abdication would necessarily disconcert the most enthusiastic men, and it was impossible that it should not greatly chill the courage of all. The French soldier was imbued with too much good sense not to understand that the cause of the man who of his own accord descended to such an extremity, was irrevocably lost. Lastly, it was evident that the army would no longer be fighting for Napoleon, but for his son, for the interests of a child; there was nothing therein to inflame the imagination to any great extent. There was considerable exaggeration of the absolute devotion with which the army was credited; as a matter of fact, it belonged more to the country than to Napoleon; the two courses once separated, it would range itself, with but a few exceptions, under the banner which would be that of the country. The facility with which the negotiation with Marshal Marmont and his army corps had been conducted was a proof of this. It was better to wait and see the effect produced by the convention; the marshals were ignorant of it, for the friendly footing on which they stood with Marshal Marmont was a proof of this.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, it became necessary to make use of the argument until then held in reserve: the Emperor could not have forgotten that the members of the provisional government and all those who had been carried away by their example and their counsels, had only taken their present course on the strength of his promise in which they had trusted, and which he made in his own name as well as in that of his allies, that one would no longer treat with Napoleon, *nor with any member of his family*. All those

<sup>1</sup> M. Fain has written in his *Manuscrit de 1814* that the plenipotentiaries of Napoleon had been surprised and dismayed at seeing the Duc de Raguse arrive shortly after them, and enter the *salon* where they were waiting with the members of the provisional government. I can positively state that the Duc de Raguse came with them, and that they expressed no surprise at being in his company.

who had relied on it were exposed to certain dangers; an implacable vengeance would sooner or later reach them; the wisest, the most fortunate, would be those who would take the resolution of expatriating themselves, and would obtain from him the permission to follow him and find an asylum in Russia.

General Dessolle became very excited, at this issue; and, although speaking well to the point, he allowed a few words of a somewhat too soldier-like eloquence to find their way into his impromptu speech. It was thought at the time that this freedom of expression, far from having a bad effect, acted powerfully on the mind of Alexander, who had been greatly struck with it, as affording a proof of most energetic convictions. This has been said, and it has been printed; it is a mistake, the proof of which was subsequently completely demonstrated to me.<sup>1</sup>

The Emperor was greatly shaken in his resolutions when we withdrew. He had received also, during his preceding conference with the marshals, a note sent to him by M. de Pozzo, wherein were jotted down a few recommendations, and some arguments against the regency. His mind was, therefore, to all appearances made up, or at least all but

<sup>1</sup> In 1818, when the business of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had been concluded, the Emperor Alexander resolved upon going to Paris on a short visit to the King of France. It became necessary to send a general officer to the frontier with instructions to receive him and do him the customary honors. The ministers who had remained in Paris — the Duc de Richelieu had stayed behind at Aix-la-Chapelle — thought they could make no better selection than General Dessolle. Great was our astonishment, therefore, when we learnt from the Duc de Richelieu that, far from being satisfied with this selection, the Emperor had been greatly displeased thereat and had expressly said that it was strange that one should have thought of sending to him a man who had spoken to him in so unmannerly a fashion during the night when the question of a regency had been discussed. I think he would have considered it most proper had a prince of the blood been dispatched to welcome him, and his displeasure on seeing that such a thought had not been entertained increased the ill-feeling he displayed towards General Dessolle.

made up, when he dismissed us, telling us at the same time that he desired to ponder over all he had heard; that it was, moreover, necessary that he should talk the matter over with the King of Prussia, and that he would inform us of his decision next morning at nine o'clock. He had doubtless caused a similar notification to be made to the plenipotentiaries of Napoleon.

It was then two o'clock in the morning, and we had taken part in one of the most extraordinary scenes of which history has preserved the recollection. A sovereign, come from the confines of Asia, had caused to be coldly discussed the existence of a dynasty founded by the greatest man of modern times, and the recall of the oldest European dynasty from whom twenty-two years before its throne had been torn by the most terrible of revolutions. He closed the discussion with the words: "I will have decided to-morrow morning before nine o'clock." It is allowable to believe that the Czar himself, in spite of the calmness he affected, felt the gravity of the resolution he was going to take.

It has been said, and it is not impossible, that the Duc de Vicence succeeded in obtaining a second interview with him, and that he made a strong impression on him, by submitting to him the series of difficulties to be faced, and even the dangers contingent upon the restoration of the Bourbons, which restoration was being presented to him as so simple and easy of accomplishment. What must have principally absorbed his thoughts, was the necessity of pronouncing in the absence of the most powerful of his allies, one who was so directly interested in the matter at stake. So long as it had only been a question of entering into arrangements for the overthrow of Napoleon, Alexander had been able to proceed without hesitation; but, the abdication having been signed, the question arose of preserving the crown to his son, to the grandson of the Emperor of Austria, the child of his beloved daughter.

It must be admitted that great was the perplexity of the man whose opinion was to settle the question. There was only one way out of the dilemma, which was to argue that the abdication would prove illusory, that the regency would be nothing less than a continuation of Napoleon's government, until such a time as he would boldly reassume its direction. Such was the argument employed by the Emperor Alexander to his allies. He experienced little trouble in convincing the King of Prussia, whom he called upon at six o'clock in the morning, and who endorsed the absolute refusal of the abdication coupled with the condition of a regency.

It remained but to make this refusal known to the parties interested. The Duc de Vicence and the marshals, with the exception of the Duc de Raguse, had, in their impatience, gone to the Czar's residence long before the appointed hour. He received them without keeping them waiting; affairs had materially altered to their disadvantage. It was hard for them to lay any stress on the sentiments and resolves of the army; the movement agreed upon between Marshal Marmont and Prince von Schwarzenberg had taken place during the night, in spite of the absence, in spite of the injunctions of the marshal, and without awaiting his orders. General Souham and General Bordessoulle with one accord had taken this decisive step, on hearing, it is said, of a warning sent by General Lucotte to the Emperor of the danger which threatened him by the defection of his vanguard.

However this may be, General Souham arrived at Versailles at the head of his troops, and the news of this occurrence had been communicated to the Emperor Alexander at early morn. I have it from M. de Pozzo, that having spent the night in one of the *salons* preceding the Emperor's study, and having gone for a minute to a window to enjoy

a look at the sunrise, he was aroused from his contemplation by feeling a hand placed on his shoulder. It was the Emperor himself. He had just received the news, and wished to share with another the joy he felt over it. He therefore imparted it to M. de Pozzo, adding, with the tone common to *illuminati*, which was at that date already an habitual one with him: "You see, Providence so wills it, it makes itself manifest, it makes heard its voice; no longer is there any room for hesitation."

The plenipotentiaries understood at once that they had nothing to hope for, and announced their intention of returning to Napoleon, to inform him of the failure of their mission, and to learn his final determination. The Emperor had plainly intimated to them that an abdication, full and plain, of the whole of Napoleon's family as well as himself, was the only method of suspending hostilities, which would otherwise be prosecuted to the bitter end, full advantage being taken of the abandoning of the positions occupied by the army corps which had just deserted his cause.

Events, as will be seen from the foregoing, had progressed with the greatest rapidity, and when I returned to M. de Talleyrand's residence at nine o'clock, as agreed upon, no one entertained the slightest doubt that the abdication full and plain would soon follow. In lieu of this, an estafette, dispatched post haste, brought to the government the account of what had happened in the army corps of Marshal Marmont. The troops had left their cantonments without any suspicion of what their leaders were about to do with them; they were even under the belief that they were being moved forward for the purpose of attacking the right flank of the enemy. While on the march it was not hard for them to perceive that their advance was anything but an aggressive one, and that it was plainly made in conjunction with the movements which were being carried on

by the allies. Thereupon, the idea that they were being made to participate in an act of treachery took hold of the mind of the greater number of the soldiers; the absence of their commander confirmed them in this idea, which was equally revolting to their loyalty and their courage. About a hundred Polish cavalymen turned about and galloped back towards Fontainebleau. The officers experienced considerable trouble in restraining the sentiments which, during the latter part of the march, found a vent throughout the ranks, and which loudly burst forth shortly after the arrival of the corps at Versailles. All or nearly all the men began to shout "Long live the Emperor!" and declared that they wished to go and rejoin him. In vain did the generals interpose their authority, it was not heeded, and several of them were insulted.

Marshal Marmont lost no time in leaving for Versailles. On his arrival there, he faced the troops which had been drawn up along the main avenue opposite the château, and caused to be read a proclamation which he had drawn up, wherein, reminding the soldiers of the battles they had fought, of the glory they had acquired during the past three months, he thanked them in the name of the country, assured them of his gratitude, but told them that the time had come when a war would have neither aim nor object. "You are," he added, "the soldiers of your country, and hence you must follow the lead of public opinion, which has commanded me to save you from incurring dangers henceforth useless, to spare your noble blood which you will once more be ready to shed, at your country's bidding, and when the common weal shall demand it. Pleasant quarters are about to be provided for you, and my paternal solicitude will soon, I hope, make you forget even the hardships which you have endured."

The reading of this proclamation did not greatly con-

tribute towards restoring quiet. Murmurs were heard, whereupon the marshal, not allowing himself to be intimidated, and taking command with the authority of a chief accustomed to make himself respected, gave the orders for a movement which would bring the troops on the Saint-Cyr road. This movement was beginning to be executed, when it was bruited in the ranks that the corps was about to be surrounded and disarmed by the Russians; cries of indignation made themselves heard, and the uproar reached the highest point. A few officers broke their swords in two, and tore off their epaulets, the soldiers flung down their muskets, and shots were fired; the mass, after having dispersed in several bands wherein all arms were mingled, ended in coming together near the sheet of water of the Suisses. There, the superior officers again assuming their authority, calmed the soldiers, opened their eyes to their misconceptions, made them form ranks once more, and led them to Saint-Cyr, thence to Mantes, where the several corps were distributed among the cantonments prepared for them.

It is certain that if in the moment when the excitement was at its highest, a daring leader, one devoted to the Emperor, had been desirous of taking the command, the whole of the soldiers and nearly all the officers of inferior rank, would once more have taken with him, at whatever risk and peril, the road to Fontainebleau, even if they had been compelled to fight their way through, sword in hand. Such a leader did not come forward, and thus ended a crisis which might have had serious consequences.

Of all the blows which struck Napoleon at that period, none was more keenly felt by him than the defection of Marshal Marmont. When the news of it reached him at daybreak, it was a long time ere he could bring himself to credit it; when no longer any room for doubt

was left, he gave vent to his grief in touching and bitter terms.

Marshal Macdonald was the first to reach Fontainebleau, and to give Napoleon an account of all the vain efforts made with the allied sovereigns. The Duc de Vicence and Marshal Ney were the next to arrive. The Emperor remained closeted with them for quite a while. I have reason to believe that he opposed the liveliest and most stubborn resistance to the proposition of which they were the bearers. Still they had apparently flattered themselves that they had won him over to it, for Marshal Ney, who had not spared himself during the discussion, wrote at eleven o'clock to M. de Talleyrand a letter, the conclusion of which was that "the Emperor, convinced of the critical position in which he had placed France, and of the impossibility wherein he found himself of saving her himself, had appeared to become resigned and to consent to the full abdication, without any restriction whatsoever. I have hopes that he will hand to me to-morrow a formal and authentic document to that effect. Immediately afterwards, I will do myself the honor of calling on Your Highness." The marshal ended by saying that "an unforeseen event having suddenly arrested the negotiations which he had undertaken in the interest of the dynasty of Napoleon, he had thereupon seen, that in order to spare his beloved country the horrors of a civil war, there remained no other course open to Frenchmen than to embrace the cause of their ancient kings; that, penetrated with this feeling, he had that very evening called on the Emperor Napoleon to manifest to him the nation's desires."

This letter was published in the *Moniteur* of the 7th. The promptitude with which Marshal Ney declared in favor of the House of Bourbon has been attributed, and not without reason, to the influence of his wife. She was the



daughter of Mme. Auguié, who had been chambermaid to Queen Marie Antoinette; she had inherited from her mother a deep attachment to her old masters.

The issue of the *Moniteur* containing the letter of Marshal Ney, also announced that the constitution, the drafting of which had been entrusted to the provisional government and submitted to the examination of a committee appointed by the Senate, had been unanimously adopted. Louis-Stanislas-Xavier was restored to France by the wish of the people.

How did it come about that such a result had been reached so rapidly?

By putting in the foreground the idea of a new constitution, the interests of the country seemed to precede every other consideration. The restoration of the House of Bourbon no longer appeared as an aim, but as a consequence. This plan was conceived by M. de Talleyrand, who carried out its execution with a cleverness and a remarkable perseverance which reflect great honor on him. It was he who dictated the first motion made by the Senate that the provisional government should draw up a constitution. This was the starting-point of all that occurred. Two days later, he assembled at his house a few men selected from among those who seemed most likely to have some opinion to give in such a contingency. First in order, his choice fell upon M. Lebrun, Duc de Plaisance, the Arch-Treasurer; he had returned to Paris after the evacuation of Holland, where he occupied the position of governor-general. On the 30th of March, he had received, together with all officials, the order to leave the capital; he disregarded it, and had quietly remained confined to his residence, without anybody being aware of it. As soon as he heard of the entry of the allies, and of the part which M. de Talleyrand was destined to play, he made no scruples about seeking him out

and placing himself under his wing. M. de Talleyrand requested him to put down in writing a few ideas which would serve as a basis for the draft of the new constitution, and as a text for the debate.

The choice of this man as editor seemed to be an excellent one. Besides his merit as a writer, M. Lebrun enjoyed an old-time reputation for ability in matters of government and administration; he had been a member of the Constituent Assembly, and had never ceased from the time of the *Conseil des Anciens* to occupy some important post in the successive governments. He seemed to accept the task with very good grace. We met at M. de Talleyrand's to listen to him, on the evening of the 3d of April, the deposition having been pronounced in the morning.

The assemblage was composed of some twenty or twenty-five persons, viz. all the members of the provisional government, and, in addition to them, General Dessolle, M. Louis, the Abbé Pradt, and myself; the Senate, as far as I can recollect, was represented by M. de Marbois, M. Lanjuinais, M. Abrial, M. de Pastoret, M. de Fontanes, M. Fabre, M. Cornet, M. Emmery, M. de Malleville, M. Lambrecht, M. Vimar, and a few others whose names escape me; finally, as representing the allies, Messieurs de Pozzo, de Nesselrode, and, I believe, M. de Hardenberg. As soon as everybody was seated as best he could in a little room on the mezzanine, M. de Talleyrand, on whose right sat M. Lebrun, opened the meeting in his usual happy manner. He informed us that the Duc de Plaisance had kindly undertaken the preparation of a draft, which, coming from so enlightened a man and one so profoundly versed as he was in such difficult matters, would shorten the labor and throw considerable light on the debate.

We gave him a most attentive hearing, convinced that we were indeed to listen to carefully digested propositions;

profound silence reigned. M. Lebrun produced with no little trouble from his pocket, a very fine book bound in red morocco, and spoke to us, in the bantering and gruff tone of which he never could rid himself, the words which follow: "As you are about to see, gentlemen, the job has not given me much trouble; I found the work already done for me; I had not to think long to come to the conclusion that even by working hard, I should not do any better, probably not as well. Believe me, just content yourselves with this, for it is never too late to return to what is incontestably good." As he finished these words, he deposited on the table his beautiful volume, which was no less than the Constitution of 1791. We all looked at each other, struck dumb with amazement: the most disconcerted and embarrassed of us all was M. de Talleyrand. He attempted to frame a few sentences, which, without being too ungracious towards M. Lebrun, revealed how his expectations had been deceived; then, while granting certain merits to the Constitution of 1791, it was no difficult matter for him to demonstrate that it could not be adapted to the present situation, and laying stress on the point which he felt assured would best cause him to be fully understood, he said: "For instance, in that Constitution there is but one *Corps législatif* and a single Chamber, whereas we require two. We possess a Senate with which we cannot dispense. This must in itself bring about considerable differences in the combinations of the powers. What we have to decide upon, is a sort of declaration of principles, and the establishment of certain solid bases around which all matters of detail may subsequently group themselves."

All applauded this way of putting the question in its true light. Messieurs de Marbois, Lanjuinais, Emmery, de Pastoret, Lambrecht, and the Abbé de Montesquiou took part in the debate which ensued. I recollect that, as much

stress was being laid on the importance of the Senate, on the need of giving it as much prominence as possible, some few words found their way into the discussion in regard to the endowment which it enjoyed, the *sénatoreries* vested in a large number of senators, and the necessity of consolidating them. This was the prelude to the deplorable provision which was quickly inserted in the draft of the constitution, and which had such an injurious effect on the Senate, as it was the crowning blow to the high esteem in which it was held.

I happened to say, while this point was under discussion, that no mention was being made of the only condition which might place it on a footing proportionate to the part it was expected to enact; that if it was the intention to have two Chambers face to face with each other, there was not, in my opinion, anything but the privileges of heredity which could afford the Senate the means of counterbalancing the influence which the elective body would more particularly exercise over the country from whom it directly received its mandate. My remark was most warmly taken up by M. Emmery, who had seemed to be but little satisfied with the importance which had been attached to pecuniary interests. He said to me, just as we were leaving: "I am afraid that these people will not have the good sense to see that heredity would secure to them far more advantages than these *sénatoreries* which they seem so anxious to preserve."

M. de Talleyrand most skilfully assumed the air of considering the recall of the House of Bourbon as so altogether inevitable, that he only mentioned it, when finishing his speech, as if for the purpose of sounding the praises of the sovereign who was about to mount the throne. "You must remember, gentlemen," he said, "that the work in which you are about to be engaged will be passed upon by a man

of superior intellect. The prince who is to accept it and give it the life which it will derive from his concurrence is better able than any one to pass judgment on it. To his natural lights has been added the experience which a long residence in England has given him of these important matters to which, as you are aware, he has always given his attention. You have doubtless not forgotten the opinions and principles he professed at the time of the existence of the Assembly of Notables. He is therefore in a position to discuss clause by clause, better perhaps than any one of us, all that is to be embodied in a wisely tempered constitution; we must not conceal from ourselves that we shall have to deal with one who is a match for us, and we should fare ill were we to submit to such a prince a work weakly conceived, which would not satisfy either solid intellect or his high enlightenment; we should therefore produce good work, and avoid, above all, going astray in regard to matters of detail." It was impossible to set forth more cleverly the estimate it was advisable to disseminate throughout France regarding the character of the man who was about to become her king. This first conference was sufficient to enable M. de Talleyrand to give to the constitution the appearance of a piece of handiwork which had been well matured by persons whose names exercised a great authority over public opinion.

On the following day, the 4th, the measure was definitively drawn up, and, on the 5th, it was sent to the Senate, which appointed a committee to study it and report thereon. The constitution of this committee deserves passing notice; it was composed of seven members: Messieurs Vimar, Garat, Lanjuinais, Fabre, Cornet, Grégoire and Abrial. M. Grégoire, although absent from the Convention at the time of the trial of Louis XVI., had sent to it his vote in favor of his condemnation without benefit of appeal to the people;

M. Garat, at that time Minister of Justice, had gone to the prison of the Temple to read the death sentence to the illustrious victim. These two men, nevertheless, were still among those who, in 1814, wielded the most influence in the Senate; one cannot help indulging in this belief, since they had been selected on so important an occasion. They made no difficulty in adopting, and in getting adopted, a measure, the second article of which *calls freely to the throne Louis-Stanislas-Xavier of France, brother of the last king, and after him, the other members of the family of Bourbon in the old-established order.*

On the 6th, the measure, invested with the title of *Charte constitutionnelle* (this title is again the creation of M. de Talleyrand), was unanimously adopted by the Senate. The famous Abbé Sieyès was a member of the Senate, and his adhesion is perhaps to be wondered at even more than that of M. Grégoire. Thus was the crown of France restored to its ancient and legitimate owners.

The next day, the 7th, the *Corps législatif*, composed of eighty-three members, promptly gave its adhesion to the constitutional charter, which was thus invested with legality. It embodied the most important guarantees, to wit: freedom of vote in the matter of taxation, institution of juries, fixed judicial tenure, freedom of worship and liberty of conscience, freedom of the press, with the exception of the legal repression of misdemeanors arising from any abuse of the privilege. It is therefore a matter of fact that the most important provisos of the Charter of Louis XVIII. were derived from the constitution voted by the Senate, although these two documents differ in essential points.

The Charter of the Senate was to be submitted to the acceptance of the French nation; it was *de facto* imposed on Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, for he could not be proclaimed

king until he had signed and sworn to respect it. It had been carefully avoided designating him by the qualification of Louis XVII. or of Louis XVIII., which would have made him appear as succeeding *de jure* his brother or his nephew. All these precautions were cast aside. Louis XVIII., and not Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, granted the Charter, which, from that time on, was considered as emanating from him alone. The provisos voted by the Senate secured precious guarantees to vested interests: the old nobility resumed its titles, while the new nobility retained its own, which were made hereditary; the public debt was guaranteed, and the sale of national domains irrevocably confirmed. No Frenchman was to be molested on account of the votes he had cast or the opinions he had expressed during the course of the Revolution; military men on the active list, officers and soldiers on the retired list, widows and officers drawing pensions, were to continue enjoying them and retain their rank; all this was set forth in the Charter of Louis XVIII. There was one clause which had reference to the Senate, which was amended later on under the pressure of popular indignation.

Nothing had been neglected by the framers of the measure in the Senate to secure every kind of privilege to its members. The dignity of senator was to be for life, and hereditary in the male line by order of primogeniture, the present endowment and the *sénatoreries* were to remain in the possession of existing senators, the revenues derived from them were to be equally divided between them, and were to pass on to their successors. At the death of a senator who should not leave any male issue, his endowment was to revert to the public Treasury; senators appointed hereafter were not to share in it: this was both an insult to delicacy and reason.

M. de Talleyrand displayed, amid all these difficulties,

the greatest skilfulness, going straight to his goal without any hesitancy, and allowing neither obstacles nor dangers to make him deviate from it. The week which passed between the 31st of March and the 6th of April inclusively was, in his career, that which reflects the most honor on him.



## CHAPTER XVI

Napoleon's full and plain abdication — He reviews the remnants of his army — The Isle of Elba selected for his place of residence — Signing of the Treaty of Fontainebleau — The act of abdication — The Emperor attempts to poison himself — Adhesions to the new order of things multiply — Napoleon, far from showing himself hurt thereby, encourages them — The tricolor flag and the white flag: Marshal Jourdan settles the question at Rouen by making his troops don the white cockade; General Dessolle acts similarly in Paris with regard to the National Guard — Happy impression produced by the latter on foreigners — Exchange of prisoners — Hostages given their freedom — The bursars of the schools of the state preserve their rights — Imprisoned members of the clergy set free — General Marescot appointed chief Inspector-General of Engineers — The mail service rendered secure — The Council of State resumes its functions — Special agents of the general police suppressed — Severe destitution in the *faubourgs* — M. Pasquier devotes the proceeds of the farming out of the gambling establishments to its relief — The Saint-Antoine quarter placed under surveillance — Adhesions of General Hulin, Cambacérès, and Merlin de Thionville — Easter in Paris — Battle of Toulouse; its unfortunate consequences — Delicate position of the provincial administrators — Prolonged resistance of the *auditeur* Harel in Soissons.

THE Restoration was now a settled affair. Would Napoleon, as Marshal Ney expected, immediately put his signature to his abdication? Even in the case wherein it should embrace his son and all the members of his family, there would remain to be fixed the conditions which would have to be laid down concerning his future existence and that of his family. He spent the whole of the 6th in thinking over and drawing up the instructions he wished to give to his plenipotentiaries, who received them at a very early hour on the 7th. The Duc de Vicence, Marshal Ney, and

Marshal Macdonald left immediately, and he himself, at his *lever* frankly announced the purpose of the new mission they were about to undertake. It was soon afterwards the all-absorbing topic at army headquarters. The army was already suffering from a state of despondency it is hard to describe, brought about at the time when it had learnt that he offered to abdicate conditionally upon a regency; the dejection became still greater when it became known that a full abdication was now the basis of negotiation.

It has been stated that Napoleon had not yet arrived at a proper understanding of his position, and that he persuaded himself up to the very moment of his affixing his signature, even up to the ratification, that he might still take back his word. One cannot doubt his having actually nourished that illusion, if it be true that after the departure of his plenipotentiaries, he became engaged with the Duc de Bassano in preparing for a junction with the Army of Italy.

What is certain, however, is that he determined once more to review two of his army corps. He was welcomed with the usual acclamations, and this greeting seemed to afford him a lively satisfaction. Still, on seeing the weakened state of the battalions, those glorious remnants of the old bands which he had for so long led from one end of Europe to the other, sorrowful thoughts came to embitter his joy. Marshal Oudinot, whom he asked, as he entered his closet, whether he could still reckon on the devotion of his corps, replied without hesitation: "No, Sire, Your Majesty has abdicated." — "Yes, but subject to certain conditions." — "That may be, Sire," replied the marshal, "but a soldier knows nothing of political restrictions." "Well, then," said Napoleon, after a moment's reflection, "let us await the news from Paris."

Negotiations were resumed immediately upon the arrival

of his plenipotentiaries. The Duc de Vicence was really the only one who was able to bring them to a favorable issue. The first point settled was a continuation of the armistice. France was divided between the French and the allied armies. The most delicate point to be solved was the residence of Napoleon. The Czar, when insisting on his full and plain abdication, had caused Corfu, Corsica, and the Isle of Elba to be suggested to him. I have reason to believe that he spoke thus without consulting M. de Talleyrand. I am not aware whether the latter could have opposed this idea or thought it his duty to do so. There was such great haste to end it all, that any means which would bring matters to an issue seemed good; the dangers of the moment prevented those of the future being thought of. The Isle of Elba was indeed very close to France, but Corsica would have been still more so; it was, moreover, an integral part of France. Napoleon would have never consented to return to his native soil under such melancholy circumstances; as to Corfu, he would have dreaded living in the midst of a population so completely foreign to him; there were a thousand reasons for him to believe that he would not be safe in its midst. The selection of the Isle of Elba was, therefore, so to speak, inevitable, and had to be so considered. It was settled that Napoleon should possess it in all sovereignty and property. There remained the stipulations concerning the rank and titles to be secured to him and the members of his family, as well as the incomes to be granted to them. All these conditions, which are interesting, are to be found in the Treaty of Fontainebleau. M. Fain gives it in its entirety in his *Manuscrit de 1814*.

Everything therefore being finally agreed upon and settled, the treaty was signed in Paris, on the 11th of April, by the plenipotentiaries of both parties. Those

representing Napoleon thereupon delivered his abdication, which they were not to part with until that time. It appeared next day in the *Moniteur*; it was in the following terms :

“The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, true to his oath, declares that he renounces for himself and heirs, the thrones of France and of Italy, as there is no personal sacrifice, even that of his life, which he is not ready to make in the interest of France.

“Done at the Palace of Fontainebleau, April 6th, 1814.

“*Signed* :

NAPOLÉON.”

There remained to obtain and exchange the necessary ratifications. Who would believe that, matters being in such an advanced stage, Napoleon should have still hesitated about giving his own? M. Fain declares that, while the final negotiations were progressing, he several times sent to the Duc de Vicence, to beg him, but in vain, for the act of abdication of which I have given the text, and that he again asked him for it when he brought him the treaty just concluded. This fact, however strange it may seem, may be believed on M. Fain's assertion; but it has just been seen that the Duc de Vicence, on his return to Fontainebleau, could no longer comply with this request. The document had already been delivered and made public.

One likewise finds in M. Fain's work, the narrative, traced, I believe, with a great deal of truth, of all the anxieties of Napoleon when the time came for him to take a resolution which could not be recalled. They became still greater when he learnt positively that the Empress, who had started from Blois with the object of joining him, had been stopped on her journey at Orleans, and that, at the request of her father, she was progressing in another direction. It was then that, in the night of the 12th to the 13th,

he attempted his own life. The poison he made use of, and which had been secreted in his dressing-case since the time of the Russian campaign, had probably lost its strength; it failed in its effect, after having made him suffer excruciating pain. Great was the fright felt by those about him. The surgeon who was in attendance upon him (one Yvan) lost his head, ran down into the *cour du Cheval blanc*, and finding a horse ready saddled, sprang into the saddle and started off at full gallop. He was not seen again at Fontainebleau.

Prone as Napoleon was to believe in fatalism, it is probable that the failure of this attempt presented itself to his mind as a sign that his great destiny had not yet run its course, and that it was his duty to reserve himself for what still awaited him. Once under this impression, all his irresolutions ceased, and on the 13th he gave his ratification, two days before the expiration of the time granted by the convention.

The eagerness to rally to the new government became great; most noticeable among all the adhesions was that of the Prince de Neufchâtel, major-general of the army, whose natural mouthpiece he therefore was; he sent it, not only in his own name, as *vice-connétable*, but he had considered himself justified, even at that time, in speaking in the name of the entire army. "Gentlemen and Senators," he wrote, "the army, which is essentially obedient, has not discussed the matter, but has declared its adhesion as soon as its sense of duty has allowed it to do so. Faithful to its oaths, the army will be faithful to the prince whom the French nation has called to the throne of his ancestors. I adhere in my own name and in that of my staff to the acts of the Senate and of the provisional government."

Napoleon, it must be remarked, having once made up his mind, hastened to set everybody at ease; affecting to be re-

lieved of a very heavy burden, he entered into familiar conversation with the generals and officers about him, and told them that under the circumstances the House of Bourbon was what best suited France. He went so far as to sing the praises of the king who was on the point of arriving, said that he had both intellect and ability, that he must have derived much light from experience, and that one might expect a gentle reign and one favorable to all interests.

M. de Koch gives particulars concerning this conversation which harmonize with what I have heard told of it; one thing I am very certain of, for it has been related to me by witnesses worthy of belief, who all spoke in about the same terms, is that he concluded as follows: "Now that I am no longer to remain with you and you have another government, you must attach yourself to it frankly and serve it as well as you have served me. I ask you to do this, nay, I command you to. Hence those who are desirous of starting for Paris previous to my departure, are free to go thither, while those who remain here will act wisely in sending in their resignations."

A good deal of cleverness was displayed in this language, for it suited him greatly that the men who forsook him should still appear to be yielding him obedience and should not believe that they could not at some future time become reconciled with him. His whole future might depend on this careful handling of them.

The *Moniteur* duly published the adhesions of all the courts, the tribunals, the University, and all civil and military bodies. The Paris clergy hastened to send in its own adhesion, using as its mouthpiece the metropolitan chapter. There remained to be obtained, that of the National Guard; it was an important one, for with it was bound up the question of the cockade of three colors, the

one which for the last twenty-five years people had called the national cockade. Was it to be totally discarded and supplanted by the white cockade? The Royalists who had declared themselves at the time of the foreigner's entry, had shown no scruples in donning it; it was the quickest way of making patent their aspirations. But, the goal once attained, Napoleon overthrown, the princes of the House of Bourbon recalled, was it advisable to give complete satisfaction to some, while seriously offending others by this change of color? Officers and soldiers, all, with but few exceptions, had known no other than the tricolor cockade and flag; it was under that flag that they had fought countless engagements, won so many brilliant victories, acquired so much glory, and it was that flag they had dyed so often with their blood. To forsake it was to some extent to abjure memories which constituted their life's whole honor; to exact such a sacrifice from them would be to considerably increase difficulties which were already great enough.

That which would cause such distress and pain to military men, might justly become matter for anxiety to many civil functionaries and even ordinary citizens. It was to be dreaded lest they might discern in it the symptoms of a complete counter-revolution; now this is what the immense majority of French people feared. It was especially important not to let the large class of purchasers of national domains dream of such a contingency. All these considerations were duly presented and discussed at several sittings of the provisional government. Great was the perplexity; I expressed it as my opinion that to retain the national colors would possess this one great advantage of not abandoning them to the enemies of the House of Bourbon, who, if the day came when they wished to raise a standard against it, would be overjoyed at having such a one to resuscitate, and

they might derive great profit therefrom. I was, moreover, in speaking on the question, far more at ease than any one else, having so far, for the foregoing reasons, constantly carried the national cockade. The members of the provisional government had, contrariwise, donned the white cockade from the very first. Hence almost all of them were bound. Again, it was known that *Monsieur* would arrive within a few days, and people were already thinking of what would be most agreeable to him. There was no room for hesitation when it was seen what stress the Abbé de Montesquiou, who generally took so small a part in the debates, laid on this point. Nevertheless, indecision was still reigning, when the question was settled by the news that Marshal Jourdan, commander-in-chief of the 15th military division, had proclaimed at Rouen the constitution adopted by the Senate, made his troops take an oath of obedience and loyalty to Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, and had, as a consequence, made them don the white cockade. A few persons have claimed that he had previously been misled into believing that Marshal Marmont's army corps had already adopted this course, but I do not believe this assertion to be true.

The order of the day, issued by Marshal Jourdan at Rouen on the 8th, reached Paris, together with his adhesion, during the night of the 8th to the 9th. A like example given by one of the marshals, who had always been looked upon as the most attached to the ideas and principles of liberty, by one who, under the Empire, had almost been renowned for his republicanism, in a word, by the victorious general at Fleurus, was decisive. A great danger would have been incurred in allowing one part of the army to adopt the new color, while another persisted in retaining its ancient one. Now that the impulse had been given, there was nothing left but to follow it up to the end. It



was therefore settled on the morning of the 9th, that the commandant of the National Guard should adopt the necessary measures to obtain, without too much trouble arising, that this body should change cockade.

Like myself, General Dessolle had pointed out the inconveniences of such a course, but as he had foreseen that it would be adopted, he had already done his best to pave the way in the matter. He had seen, one after another, the most influential personages, so the very same evening he felt he could safely send to the commanders of legions an order of the day wherein he announced that the provisional government ordered the National Guard to adopt the white cockade, which from this time forward became the national cockade, and the rallying sign for all Frenchmen.

Next morning, in spite of all he had said and done during the preceding days, although this order was officially promulgated in the *Moniteur*, he had still to listen to numerous and strong remonstrances, over which he nevertheless triumphed by the use of the most conciliatory forms. What usually is sufficient to win over Frenchmen, is to show a willingness to give them a courteous hearing; especially when one in authority knows the way of discussing matters with them with a good grace, they, as a general rule, like to let him have his way. The order was therefore obeyed with much more alacrity than had been expected.

The National Guard, once pledged, was irrevocably won over, and its zeal kept ever increasing. It soon supplied a force of over 40,000 men, well armed, well equipped, bearing the finest appearance, whose loyalty never wavered. Did we not indeed see them endure for several months, and without showing any signs of fatigue thereat, the most laborious service? Did they not steadfastly present to the foreigner the imposing spectacle of a truly national force surrounding the throne of the Bourbons? The sight of

such a fine body, sprung spontaneously from the wisest portion of the population, and of necessity the most friendly to order, gave to the strangers (I have good cause to know it) a strong idea of the intrinsic force of the country, of the resources to be found within its bosom, and made them understand that they must be very careful in their treatment of such a nation.

The provisional government adopted several wise measures which calmed the agitation of the public mind. By way of fair reciprocation of what the Emperor Alexander had done in regard to French prisoners, the Russian prisoners who were in France were handed over to the commander-in-chief of the Russian forces. A few important prisoners of war, or rather a few hostages carried away from Prussia, were detained in the château of Saumur; the order was issued to set them free at once. Their coming out was shortly afterwards followed by that of other prisoners who were at Vincennes, all of whom had been confined for political reasons; some of them had been under lock and key for years. Over eight hundred Spanish peasants, made prisoners at the time of the surrender of the fort of Figueira, had been confined since 1811 in the galleys of Brest and Rochefort, where a difference in the color of their uniform alone distinguished them from the malefactors whose labors they shared. This was, on the part of Napoleon, a flagrant violation of the laws of war and of nations. They were ordered to be set free at once, and conducted to the Spanish frontier.

There was reason to believe that the Holy Father would find obstacles on his return journey to again enter his states. A decision was given to remove every hindrance from his journey, and that the honors due to him should be rendered to him. The same determination was taken regarding the *Infante* Don Carlos, detained as an hostage at Perpignan, at

the time his brother Ferdinand had received permission to cross the border and to return to his dominions.

I have already stated that the conscripts called out for the last levies had been sent back to their homes. Many fathers, especially those belonging to the army, were anxious as to the fate of the University, and with regard to the continuation of the free education it gave their children. The provisional government decided that Senator Comte de Fontanes, grand chancellor of the University of Paris, should be requested to retain his position, and that all youths attending lyceums or colleges, and who enjoyed the bursarships granted by the government or by the commune, should continue to enjoy this benefit. Napoleon had compelled those parents whose sentiments were doubtful to send their children to the colleges and lyceums, especially to the military schools, of La Flèche, Saint-Cyr, and Saint-Germain. There, he felt sure that the youths would receive an education in conformity with his views, and that nothing would be neglected to inculcate into them ideas of respect for and devotion to his person.

As Rome and Illyria formed part of the Empire, he had even taken away from these far-off localities children belonging to the best families, and had had them conveyed to the military school of La Flèche. Parents were compelled to leave the shores of the Adriatic to come to that city, in order not to lose sight of those beings who were the object of their dearest affections. This abuse of his might was cruel, as it ignored the sacred rights possessed by fathers to watch over the education of their children, and to have them educated by those alone in whom they placed entire confidence. The provisional government could consequently rely on the approval of all when it ordained that the direction of the education of children and the selection of the form of education should be restored to the authority of

fathers, mothers, and guardians, and that all the children who had been placed in schools, lyceums, institutions, and other public establishments against the wishes of their parents, should be restored to them at once.

The châteaux of Bouillon, Ham, and of Pierre-Châtel contained a number of Belgian priests, detained for several years past owing to the part they had taken in the discussions between Napoleon and the Pope. At the request of M. de Pradt, Archbishop of Mechlin, orders were issued that they should be set at liberty. Similar orders were issued regarding the seminarists of the diocese of Ghent, numbering two hundred and thirty-six, of whom forty deacons and subdeacons had been taken to Wesel in the month of August, 1813, with orders to incorporate them with the artillery; also respecting the members of the Chapter of Tournay who were held prisoners at Alais, and several other members of the Sacred College detained in various French towns, and finally, the Dutch guard of honor, detained in the prisons of Bourges, Metz, and Grenoble.

General Marescot was appointed chief Inspector-General of Engineers. His undeniable talents, his distinguished services, which dated from the recapture of Landrecies in 1794, fully entitled him to this prominent position: it was moreover an act of justice to end a disgrace, which had generally been looked upon as too severe, especially when it was seen that it was prolonged indefinitely. He had incurred it for having, through an act of weakness which was little to be expected from him, accepted from General Dupont the mission to conclude, after the fatal affair of Baylen, the capitulation to which the latter had been reduced to submit.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Marescot did not hold any command in that army. He merely chanced to be with it, because it was to open the way for him to Cadiz, whither he had orders to go.

As no effort was being spared to give pleasure to the public and to inspire it with confidence in the new government, attention was given to the resumption of the mail service at the earliest moment. As early as the 4th of April, the public were notified by the Postmaster-General, M. de Bourrienne, that the immense quantity of letters detained at the Post Office for three years, those from England as well as from other countries, were about to be forwarded to their destination. On the 9th, an ordinance was issued by the provisional government enjoining all officers of the law to see to it that the mails should circulate without let or hinderance. On the same day another ordinance provided for the return to the Treasury of the funds carried away during the days preceding the occupation of Paris by the allied forces. It held responsible, therefore, all depositaries who should not make this reimbursement at once in the manner and form prescribed in the said ordinance.

It was important to reassure the members of the Council of State in regard to their situation. As I knew better than any one else how many able and justly esteemed men were included in that body, I dwelt on the importance of rallying them. The provisional government therefore decided, at my request, on the 6th of April, that the council was to resume its functions, and, owing to the absence of the Archchancellor, be presided over by the Archtreasurer, and that the work in which its several sections were engaged should suffer no interruption. "The government will see with the greatest satisfaction," it was said in the ordinance, "that men so enlightened, who under all circumstances have given proof of their love for their country, continue to co-operate with their learning and lights with the political changes which the stress of circumstances has rendered necessary."

It was nevertheless considered advisable, on the following day, the 8th, to forestall any unreasonable interpretation which a few persons might be induced to give to this declaration, so the provisional government enacted that: "the commissioners temporarily appointed by the government to the departments of war, interior, finance, and public worship, should of themselves provide for the administration of such general offices appertaining to their respective departments that were, owing to absenteeism, unfilled." It added that "ministers who were members of the Council of State, as well as administrators and other functionaries who had followed the former government, could not resume their duties without special legislation emanating from itself."

The commissioners delegated to fill temporarily the functions of ministers had at last arrived at their post; it could therefore be hoped that departmental correspondence would be actively resumed at their hands. This was greatly to be desired, especially as regards the Ministry of the Interior, with which Comte Beugnot was entrusted. It was precisely he who had shown the least readiness to reply to the call; but it is only fair to state that he had, previous to his arrival, powerfully contributed to the all-important adhesion of General Maison, who was in command at Lille, and who for two months past had covered himself with much glory by keeping the field with a handful of soldiers against the vastly superior forces of the enemy.

Immediately on his arrival, M. Beugnot lent his assistance to a measure which I had greatly at heart, and which was adopted at my request. As he had been a prefect for a long time, he knew as well as I to what a degree the special agents of the general police were hated in the departments, and how gladly people would welcome their recall. He was also aware that, far from rendering service

to the government, they always did it harm, impeding the march of administration, and discouraging and bringing into disrepute local officials. The provisional government therefore enacted, at our urgent request, that the functions of directors-general, special directors, and of general and special commissaries of police, should be vested in the prefects and sub-prefects. This enactment was rendered on the 10th.

A heavy task was before us, in the midst of all the private interests which had to be taken into account, of the immense quantity of details which gained importance from the necessity of progressing carefully, and giving offence to none. In addition to all these cares weighing upon me, was superadded the duty of providing for the existence of a large number of artisans during the course of the winter. A widespread destitution existed among this class, which clustered principally in the *faubourgs*. All work had completely ceased during the days immediately preceding the entry of the allies. There was no longer any employment to be obtained, especially in the building trades. This state of things was all the more alarming that many of them were strange to the city, had no fixed abode in it, had nothing to lose, and were consequently ever in readiness to flock to any gathering, or where an opportunity for a disturbance might arise. The only remedy for this was to give them some relief, but where were the necessary funds to be procured? I have already spoken of the extreme poverty of the Treasury, all its coffers having been emptied at the time of the evacuation. Most happily, there was one which was gradually becoming filled, owing to the circumstances which had emptied all the others. The mass of officers of all nations who flocked to Paris were inveterate gamblers, and assiduously frequented the gambling-houses. The farmer, seeing that he was realizing immense profits, thought it

well to secure them unto himself by gaining the good graces of the authorities; he came to me and told me that it was the custom to pay daily into the hands of the Minister of Police a sum of three thousand francs, which he held at my disposal.<sup>1</sup> I ordered him to deposit the arrears and the amount current with the cashier of the Prefecture of Police; then, with these funds I organized a relief fund for the *fau-bourgs* and the poorest quarters. I availed myself principally for the distribution of these alms of the services of the ladies of the *Société maternelle*, who were scattered throughout the various quarters, and with whom Mme. Pasquier had habitual intercourse. They acquitted themselves of this care with the most enlightened zeal, deriving benefit from the counsels of mayors, *curés*, and commissaries of police, and thus succeeded in discovering rather accurately where the need was most pressing. Critical moments were thus tided over much more happily than one might have expected.

<sup>1</sup> This affair of the gambling-houses was, a few days later, to give rise to many ugly intrigues, and brought about an occurrence which afforded me some amusement. All the individuals accustomed to exploit this source of making money, were not slow in perceiving that it was going to become a most productive one. Several of them imagined that it would be an easy matter to dispose of the present farmer and get themselves accepted in his place. To attain their object, they thought that all that was necessary would be to offer a somewhat higher figure for the rental of the farm and great personal advantages to the man who had both the will and the power to allow of this operation being realized. They therefore caused to be made to me propositions rather cleverly disguised, and through every kind of go-between. I invariably avowed that I did not think I had the right to cancel a lease during its run. Thereupon there was no end to the information sent me against the farmer, who was a scoundrel, a Jacobin, a *terroriste*, a sworn enemy of the Bourbons. I paid no attention to all this, and I replied once for all, in order to put an end to the matter, that if the day came when it should be in my power to cancel the lease of the gambling-houses, I would avail myself of it, but it would be with the object that no other should ever be granted. No sooner did this become known than a hue and cry was raised against me. These intrigues did not fail to excite against me the ire of people who were soon not without the means of doing me injury.



As to the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, where the most fiery spirits dwelt, and where some of the remains of the old leaven of the Revolution were still fermenting, it required my more particular attention. In order to keep it within bounds I employed a man who had been prominent among the ardent patriots during the most troublous periods, but who was at the same time a man of intellect and ability. This was M. Tissot, known as a translator of the *Bucolics* of Virgil, who had for a long time taught Latin under the Abbé Delille, and was then residing in the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, where the Duc de Rovigo discovered him when he became Minister of Police. He ordered him to transfer his residence to a central part of the city. When I entered the Prefecture of Police, I found him, so to speak, under the ban, and even in danger of losing his professorship. It seemed to me that he was being dealt with more severely than necessary; I therefore took him under my protection and succeeded in allaying the Duc de Rovigo's alarms. He owed it to me that he had not been molested for three years past. I sent for him, and gave him to understand that, considering his antecedents, it might some day stand him in good stead to have rendered an important service to the government which was being established, that he had the means of doing so, if he would return to the *faubourg* and make use of his former influence to keep it in a state of tranquillity. He quickly agreed to this, promised me that I should be kept informed of anything that might furnish a motive for the slightest alarm, and assured me that he would devote himself wholly to tone down all effervescent spirits. He kept his word. On the very next day, he returned to his old residence. I soon learnt that he was most frankly and efficaciously doing what I had asked him. I also gave him a few relief funds to distribute, which he did conscientiously and with discrimination.

Adhesions continued pouring in in large numbers; the most important ones can be found in the *Moniteur*; they make interesting reading owing to the eagerness displayed in them, and the forms invented to give to this eagerness all possible relief. One sees cardinals, archbishops, bishops, chapters, consistories, tribunals, lawyers, public administrators of all kinds, military bodies constituting the Guard, marshals and generals, even those who might consider themselves as most compromised; General Hulin, for example. But the most remarkable of these adhesions were perhaps those which came from Blois; there were the ministers, the heads of all the great public departments, in a word, the men who should be most attached to the Imperial Government. The Archchancellor, who headed the list, gave the example; no one was in a greater hurry to do so. Already on the 4th, he had written to M. de Talleyrand in the following terms: “*Monseigneur*, the prince’s high dignitaries being senators, I think it is my duty, in so far as is required, to adhere to all the deeds of the Senate made from the 1st of April instant.” On the 9th, he considered it advisable to send a fresh adhesion to the enactments made since the 1st of April, as well as to the dispositions which were “the consequence of these enactments.”

It is impossible not to give a corner in this enumeration to the famous Merlin de Thionville, the *conventionnel* of notorious and redoubtable memory, and moreover a regicide! For a long time forgotten, he had in these recent times tendered his services to Napoleon, and had been charged with raising a free company; no one was better fitted for this purpose, and he had entered upon his task with the greatest zeal. One can find in the *Moniteur* how it came about that he saw fit to cease his labors in that direction, as soon as he learnt that peace was the result of the labors of the provisional government, and how he hastened, when sending

in his adhesion to all that had been done by this *paternal* government, to make an offer of his services to it.

On the 10th, which was Easter Sunday, the city of Paris was treated to the spectacle of a most imposing ceremony. An altar was erected with all military pomp on the Place Louis XV., which, since 1792, had in turns been called Place de la Révolution and Place de la Concorde. I gave it its ancient name in the ordinance issued by me with regard to the police regulations to be observed during the ceremony. The whole of the allied troops had been stationed at early morn along the boulevard, which they occupied from the Arsenal to the Rue Royale. They filed past before the King of Prussia and the Emperor Alexander, who took up their positions at the head of that street; they next grouped themselves in the Place, in that part of it adjoining the Champs-Élysées, where they heard the *Te Deum* and received the blessing which was given by priests of the Greek rite. The sovereigns kissed the crucifix which was presented to them by the same priests. The weather was splendid, and an immense concourse of people covered the terrace of the Tuileries and filled the quays and the adjoining streets. This combined military and religious ceremony produced a deep impression. It so happened that Easter fell on the same day for the Greek rite as for the Roman Church, an exceedingly rare event; the most was made of the occurrence to spread ideas of peace and concord among the people.

Yet, this day, so calm and reassuring in Paris, was, in any other direction, made memorable by a bloody disaster, for, at the very time, the French soldiers and the English army were fighting under the walls of Toulouse. This final battle, fought between the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Soult, was again, in spite of their defeat, glorious for the French troops. It has been stated that the dispositions of the marshal had been good and well taken, but that during

the engagement he had committed blunders which deprived him of the advantages he ought to have derived therefrom. This can readily be believed, for such was ever, according to military men, the weak side of his talent; but he was at any rate hampered by an inferiority of forces, which hardly allowed him to expect a success.

Although this event did not exercise, to any outward appearance, any great influence on public affairs, and although the question of the Restoration was already irrevocably settled in Paris, it is nevertheless certain that it would have been more desirable for France that this battle should not have been fought, or, if fought, then won. In the former hypothesis, her forces remaining intact in the Southern provinces, she would have found herself in a better position with regard to the final treaty of peace; the English army, especially its general, would not have completed acquiring the renown which has remained attached to it, and the ascendancy exercised by the English would have been less marked in the negotiations which decided the most serious questions for our country. In the latter, we might perhaps have avoided, at least partly, the severe preliminary conditions to which we were soon afterwards compelled to subscribe.

It has been claimed that this bloody meeting would have been avoided had the Prefect of Montauban, M. Bouvier-Dumolard, not arrested, or, at any rate, considerably delayed in their march, two parliamentaries sent by mutual agreement by the allies and by the provisional government to the Duke of Wellington and to Marshal Soult. They were instructed to make known the armistice just concluded between the grand army and the French army, and to notify the order for a cessation of hostilities.<sup>1</sup> M.

<sup>1</sup> One of the parliamentaries was M. de Saint-Simon, the same who had brought us the important news of the coming visit of the marshals and of the Duc de Vicence, on the evening of the 4th.

de Beauchamp, who could not fail taking cognizance of this allegation, has recorded it as a certainty in his *History of the Campaign of 1814*. M. Bouvier-Dumolard has stoutly maintained that the accusation did not rest on any foundation. It has not been possible for me to verify the truth of his assertion; but, even had the parliamentaries met with some difficulties at Montauban, and had a delay resulted therefrom, I would nowise be astonished at it; M. Bouvier-Dumolard was most zealously devoted to the Emperor's service, and doubtless did not recognize the provisional government till the very last. Justice must be done to the administrators whose posts were distant; their position was a most delicate one, as they had to decide between a proclamation which reached them in the name of the regency from Blois, and the news they received from Paris.

The question of knowing to whom obedience was due was a perplexing one to many officials. Among those who subsequently rendered yeoman's service, I know more than one whose trials were great. As an instance of these perplexing conditions, I may mention that of a young *auditeur* named Harel, whom Napoleon had sent to Soissons as sub-prefect, or even, I believe, as commissioner-extraordinary. It will be fresh in everybody's memory to what a degree the hurried surrender of that city had proved fatal to his great operation on the Marne. Upon entering it, he had therefore most formally enjoined all the military and civil authorities, to whom its care was entrusted, to defend it to the last extremity, and indeed, the city continued to hold out for some time after the entry of the allies into Paris. They had been compelled to leave under its wretched walls a body of troops, whose sole duty consisted in investing the town. Now, the provisioning of Paris could but suffer from such a blockade, as Soissons was situated on one of the most important roads for the arrival of

the supplies of flour. In vain did one send parliamentaries to M. Harel to give him the most accurate and circumstantial account of the true state of affairs; he would believe nothing, and persisted in seeing in the proceedings taken nothing else than traps, more or less cleverly laid. It was only on receiving a letter from me that he decided upon opening the gates of the town. Verily, it could not be denied that he had good grounds for his distrust and his resistance, for which he has been most unjustly blamed.

## CHAPTER XVII

*Monsieur* invited to come to Paris — His entry into the capital; attitude of the National Guard and the population — Cardinal Maury in disgrace — *Monsieur* and the *lieutenance générale* of the kingdom — Misunderstandings come to the surface in the council, in whose labors M. Fouché participates — Sharp words pass between Marshal Marmont and M. Louis — M. Pasquier's cautious attitude — The Senate confers the *lieutenance générale* on the Comte d'Artois — His reply — The provisional Council of State — The deputy-ministers — *Monsieur's* illusions — Ambition of the Marquis de Vitrolles — The favorites of the Comte d'Artois — Hostility of the Royalist party against M. Pasquier — *Monsieur's* prejudices against him — Errors committed by the provisional government — Revocation of special commissions — Entry of the Emperor of Austria into Paris.

*MONSIEUR*, Comte d'Artois, had for some time past been at too short a distance from Paris for the idea not to have been entertained of bringing him into the city as soon as his presence would no longer offer any inconvenience. It was especially necessary to guard against any show of opposition manifesting itself when the prince made his appearance. The deposition having been pronounced and the recall of the House of Bourbon decreed in the constitutional act, the abdication of Napoleon might be relied on, considering the return of his plenipotentiaries and the negotiations being carried on with them. It was thought opportune to come to some decision, so *Monsieur* was invited to give up his residence in Nancy, and to bend his steps towards Paris. M. de Vitrolles, who had remained in Paris, near the general staff of the allies, was dispatched by M. de Talleyrand and the Duc de Dalberg to inform him

of everything with which it was advisable he should be acquainted.

The king, who was in England, was suffering from an attack of gout which prevented fixing a date for his departure. It was urgent to change as soon as possible a precarious situation which was not unattended with danger; hence, we were about to witness a spectacle as strange as it was unforeseen. After an exile of twenty-two years, during which nothing had occurred to prevent his being consigned to the depths of oblivion, after such a series of events and battles to which he had remained foreign, the one of the chief members of the royal family who had been the first to fly to foreign parts, and who had been the object of social animadversion, was again about to be seen in Paris. He was coming as the angel of peace, as the pledge of all the happiness for which people sighed. He was about to be welcomed with the acclamations of all, blessings were to be invoked on his return in the capital where the blood of his anointed brother, his sister, and his sister-in-law, the queen, had been shed on the scaffold. The National Guard, wherein, on March 31st, not a single company could have been found to whom it would have been safe to propose that it should change the color of its cockade, and which had had difficulty in changing it only four days before, was about to rush into his arms, wearing the new color, and as full of ardor and enthusiasm as if it had never experienced any other feelings.

On the forenoon of the 11th, it became known that *Monsieur* was within three leagues of Paris. All those formerly attached to him, all those who recently, or in the olden days, had enjoyed any intercourse with him, hastened to go and pay their respects to him. The little village of Livry, where he halted on the 11th, was visited by a large concourse of people, among whom were many members of the



National Guard, carried thither by their zeal and by a most natural curiosity. *Monsieur* received them graciously and urbanely, and all went away enchanted with him. They returned, with a white ribbon attached to their white cockade; it had been given to them by Mesdames de Damas and de Chastellux, whose guest *Monsieur* was.

*Monsieur* left Livry at an early hour on the 12th, and, on arriving at Bondy, was met by detachments of all the *légions* of the National Guard, escorted by which he reached the Pantin barrier. He was on horseback, and wore the uniform of the National Guard. He reached the barrier shortly before three o'clock; the provisional government, the municipal council, a large group of general officers, at whose head were the marshals, had gone thither at noon to welcome him. He was harangued by M. de Talleyrand on behalf of the provisional government, and by M. de Chabrol, for the municipal council. His replies were in good taste. Still they should not be judged of with too much confidence from the version of them which appeared in the *Moniteur* on the following day; it was the work of M. Beugnot, who, as a matter of course, edited it, and to whom must be credited this felicitous sentence: "At last do I see France once more; nothing has changed in her, unless it is that there is one more Frenchman on her soil." I can entertain no doubt as to the writer, for he admitted the authorship to me.

M. de Talleyrand's speech, which was summed up in a few sentences, was remarkable in that it affected to be nothing else than a short and heartfelt effusion. M. de Chabrol had committed himself further, and France had most happily been brought on the scene. Hence his speech was most successful; the facile and ornate style of his father-in-law, M. Lebrun, was readily recognized.

The formal entry was favored with splendid weather; it

was a magnificent sight. The procession wended its way along the Faubourg and Rue Saint-Denis to the portals of Notre-Dame, where the prince was to give thanks and hear a *Te Deum*. An immense crowd welcomed him with enthusiastic acclamations all along the route. The allies had, on that day, shown the delicacy of confining all their troops to barracks. No other soldiery was to be seen but the National Guard, which alone held the posts and lined the route. Thus, the ceremony wore an entirely French aspect; all sorrowful thoughts were, as much as possible, cast aside. The streets to be crossed in going from the barrier to Notre-Dame, and thence to the Tuileries, were those which might be considered as appertaining more especially to the *bourgeois* class, to the tradespeople, consequently to the National Guard. At the windows were the wives, daughters, and sisters of the National Guard, all rejoicing in the part taken in this great event by their husbands, fathers, and brothers. It was a manifestation of heartfelt joy. It can truly be said that the merit and honor of this glorious day belonged to the National Guard. In all directions cries were heard of: "Long live the House of Bourbon! Long live the King! Long live *Monsieur!*" In many localities, the walls were hung with tapestry, as formerly on the day of Corpus Christi; flags were streaming from every window, and flowers were flung down into the street. This rejoicing had all the characteristics of a sincere and spontaneous emotion.

I do not think that I have in any way exaggerated the scene I have just described; no one was in a better position to see everything than myself. I formed part of the *cortège*, I was very close to the princes, and I saw much with my own eyes; the reports made to me at the close of the day convinced me that it had been the same at all points which did not come under my personal notice; not a single hostile

cry was heard. The populace was carried away in a lesser degree than the *bourgeois* class, but it would have been impossible to discern the slightest expression of discontent among those who might have been charged with lukewarmness.

I have stated that *Monsieur* had alighted at Notre-Dame. He was received by the Chapter, headed by one of its members. This circumstance calls for passing notice. Cardinal Maury had been set aside. Appointed Archbishop of Paris by Napoleon, he had never been able, as will be remembered, to obtain his bulls of investiture; as a consequence, there remained to him no other title, the power which had installed him having vanished, than the one he derived from the Chapter which had been forced to appoint him administrator of the diocese. Now, his behavior towards several of the canons had only too fully justified the dislike manifested against him as soon as he entered the archiepiscopal palace. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the first opportunity of getting rid of him should have been eagerly seized. He was, in the first place, asked to resign his office. Upon his refusing, the Chapter decided to deprive him of all the powers with which he had been invested. This revocation was accompanied with some rather severe language. In vain had he made some show of resistance and appealed to the provisional government; the latter was not at all desirous of championing his cause, and, to tell the truth, was not sorry to be rid of him. His incumbency of the see of Paris could but be disagreeable to the House of Bourbon; indeed, it may have been that the determination come to by the Chapter had been provoked by one of the members of the government. However this may be, the Cardinal was obliged to stand aloof, and, from this time, his rôle in France may be considered as at an end. The last of his public acts was, if I am not mistaken, the

adhesion of the Chapter to the acts of the Senate, which he signed as administrator of the metropolis.<sup>1</sup>

The ceremony inside the cathedral could not be otherwise than magnificent; there had not been sufficient time to decorate the edifice, yet the ceremony was most effective.

At last, *Monsieur* re-entered the palace of his fathers. Marie-Louise had left it a fortnight earlier, carrying with her the Napoleonic dynasty. Upon his entering it, the white standard was hoisted on the centre pavilion. The rooms were filled with generals and functionaries; the ranks were so closely pressed that the prince experienced difficulty in making his way. No one could better than he have gotten over the difficulty of having to respond to so much attention, and his affable manner and words gave general satisfaction. Many public buildings and most private mansions were spontaneously illuminated at night. In the evening, there was a performance of *La partie de chasse*, when unanimous cheers were given for the House of Bourbon.

From that day on, it can be truly said that the political scene was shifted entirely; the reign of the provisional government was a thing of the past. It did indeed make several acts of note, and its principal members preserved, under a different appellation, for several days, even for several weeks, some considerable importance, but their influence, which constantly diminished, was at times run counter to, and even openly ignored. Finally, dating from the 12th of April, it no longer enjoyed that quasi absolute power which it had held without restraint since the 31st of March. All these men, who, in such troublous times, had rendered

<sup>1</sup> This adhesion of the Chapter is peculiar in that it is to be noticed in its text that it was thought necessary to strengthen it and perhaps justify it, by adding thereto the one it gave simultaneously to the decision rendered by the *Corps législatif*, to the act of adhesion of the *Cour de cassation*, and to the declaration of the *conseil général* and of the municipal council.

so many services, braved such certain dangers, endured such crushing responsibilities, who were entitled to consideration, not to say gratitude, were cast on one side! Then began for them and for those who had in a direct fashion shared their labors, many severe disappointments, which were not without bearing an influence on the future. Hence it has been for me to call attention to their beginnings.

What were to be *Monsieur's* powers? What title was he to assume? Was he to be presented to the people as *lieutenant général* of the kingdom? Was this title to be granted to him at once, on the supposition that he held it from his brother? Or, should it be conferred on him by the Senate? Was the government to pass entirely into his hands? The Abbé de Montesquiou entertained no doubts on any of these points. M. de Talleyrand did not entirely share this view of the matter; he did not take the trouble to contest it as a matter of right, but he considered it inapplicable in fact, and dangerous in view of existing circumstances. In his opinion, it behooved him to be, above all, consistent; the Senate had made a Constitution, and the king could not reign without being accepted and sworn to observe it; he could not therefore delegate a power which he was not yet qualified to exercise. Whether this might in itself be good or bad, fair or unfair, regular or irregular, it was an undoubted fact to which one must fain bow. All had so far gone well by having recourse to the Senate, hence why not continue as they had begun? It would not be more difficult to obtain from the Senate that it should give the *lieutenance générale* to *Monsieur* than it had been to decide it to restore the crown to his brother. With regard to the amount of power with which *Monsieur* was to be entrusted, nothing could be better than apparently to abandon everything to him for the form, but on condition that he should be made to understand that he was to accept as

his principal agents and councillors the only men able to assist him in this difficult and delicate task. These men were plainly the members of the provisional government, those who since the 31st of March had held ministerial positions, who had, in a word, while in important positions, taken an active part in public affairs. It would be too great a piece of folly, argued M. de Talleyrand, to trust, in such a critical moment, to the impassioned inexperience of a few ambitious and enterprising characters who would not fail of tendering their services to the prince, and who would soon usurp his confidence.

This view of the case prevailed; moreover, the Abbé de Montesquiou opposed no other argument to it than to maintain that *Monsieur* would undoubtedly make of his own volition the selection it was sought to impose on him politely. The result of this discussion was that the secret misunderstanding already existing between M. de Talleyrand and the Abbé de Montesquiou was appreciably increased. These two personages had never had any liking for each other; necessity had alone temporarily united them; each worked for himself, and was at no pains to cast reflections on the conduct of the other; each had likewise his friends and partisans in the government. Those of the Abbé de Montesquiou were, it is true, too numerous; but, as it was expected that he would enjoy the king's confidence to a considerable extent, every one showed him deference. He was on especially good terms with M. Louis, who nevertheless knew also how to keep on a very intimate footing with M. de Talleyrand. The intercourse I had with the Abbé de Montesquiou during the course of January will be remembered; the result was that he bore me much goodwill. So he was in the habit of confiding to me any causes he might have for discontent, which I tried to calm and soften; all discords, under present circumstances, were

to be regretted. In spite of his intellect and his many qualities, I have never met with a man more prone to prejudices than the Abbé de Montesquiou; I never knew one who adhered more pertinaciously to any he had once conceived. As a matter of course, I took care not to interfere in all these disputes; I saw that it would be folly to compromise myself, when there was no occasion for it.

I had already enjoyed more than one opportunity of noticing how in proportion to difficulties being smoothed away, the most accommodating spirits became the hardest to satisfy; each one held more strongly to his opinions, and showed less consideration for that of others. The meetings of the provisional government had become too frequent, for M. de Talleyrand too freely opened the door to them. In addition to the ministers, who naturally had the right of entry, in addition to General Dessolle and myself, not a day passed but that some personage was invited by him, at least for once, to take his seat at the round table. There were doubtless certain advantages to be derived from such a course; it was necessary to make partisans, but it rendered the debate all the more difficult; any person endowed with a little prudence felt less inclined to take part therein.

On entering the council-room one day, I found M. Fouché established there, apparently as much at ease as if he had been one of the first pillars of the edifice it was sought to build.<sup>1</sup> He had just returned from the South, where he

<sup>1</sup> M. Fouché did not long hold the position of governor of Illyria, whither he had been sent from Dresden in the summer of 1813. This province having again fallen into the power of Austria immediately on the renewal of hostilities, he in the first place sought a refuge at Trieste, which he was shortly afterwards compelled to leave. Thereupon Napoleon conceived the idea of making him once more assume the title of governor of Rome, whither he settled for a short while. The secret object of his mission was to watch the doings of and keep within bounds the King of Naples, over whom it was still believed he had a good deal of influence. He indeed paid a flying visit to Naples, where he made no discoveries; he left only a

had, in the month of February, seen himself spurned by the prefect of Lyons, who had requested him to leave the city, which his intrigues were stirring up to too great an extent. Fortunately he had only been able to reach the city by a roundabout way, which circumstance had spared us his presence in the first days of April. M. de Talleyrand, who could not view his return with anything but displeasure, had nevertheless been unable to deny him a mark of confidence already granted to so many others. This facile way of his was one of the grievances of the Abbé de Montesquiou, and one of the reasons for which he very often refused to attend the sittings.

The day on which we were made to endure the presence of M. Fouché was, if my memory serves me well, an unlucky one in every respect; it witnessed the breaking out of a scene which was extremely painful for all those present. The actors in it were Marshal Marmont and M. Louis. The marshal was one of those who, while not being a member of it, most frequently attended the meetings of the council; a debate took place on a measure concerning the army, the expenditure of which it was sought to reduce; M. Louis, who, as Minister of Finance, occupied an unenviable position, spoke strongly against the enormous amount of money expended on the body military in France. He lacked tact and moderation, and went so far as to say that the most advisable thing to do would be to free the country of this burden forthwith; for, as the blessings of peace were about to be enjoyed, the army should be placed on the lowest possible footing. Such a plan could not find approval

few days previous to the signing of the treaty concluded between Murat and Austria, a treaty which he would never bring himself to believe in, in spite of the warning of the French ambassador, M. Durand. From Naples, he went to Florence, whence he soon returned to France, the hostile movement which was making itself felt throughout Italy not allowing of his remaining there.



in the eyes of the marshal, who endeavored to convince his hearers that France's recent misfortunes, and even the loss of territory she was about to suffer, would, on the contrary, require the maintaining of a military force that alone could still make her respected in Europe, and all the more esteemed in that the French army, in spite of its reverses, was still, owing to its organization, great talents, and the distinguished reputations in its midst, the best of the Continent, and would for a long time remain the one inspiring most fear. In his reply, M. Louis spoke rather slightly of these great talents and these distinguished reputations, which, he said, had not prevented the country from falling so low, and which had perhaps placed France in her present melancholy position. M. Marmont lost all patience, and apostrophized him in the sharpest manner; insulting remarks passed between the two, and quiet was restored with much difficulty. I do not think that the marshal ever again made his appearance at the council; indeed, it would have been difficult for these two men to face each other again.

As for myself, I never had any cause for complaint. I was treated with consideration by all the members of the council. Far from causing me the slightest unpleasantness, all those who, in those days, took an active part in the management of affairs sought to lighten the burden I had to carry. Absorbed as I was by a multitude of cares, it never entered my thoughts to curry favor with the princes under whose government we were about to pass, nor to secure to myself the influence of the persons by whom their opinion was to be guided. It seemed to me that my actions would suffice to make me known. I did not see what could be expected of a Court where so many who had not accomplished anything, whose good-will was their only stock in trade, would vie in depreciating the

services of those who had borne the heavy burden of the past two months.

From the very day of his arrival, the conversations which *Monsieur* had with the Czar, with M. de Talleyrand, with the members of the provisional government, and with the ministers, left him in no doubt as to the necessity of accepting, at least for the time being, the direction of the provisional government. M. de Vitrolles had already prepared him for this, whatever his personal inclinations might be, in spite of the hints and even the counsels which came to him from Royalists eager to circumvent him. He experienced no hesitancy in adopting the plan I have pointed out in the foregoing, and which consisted in having the *lieutenance générale* conferred on him by the Senate. Everything was therefore set in motion to obtain this result, which had not to be waited for long; on the 14th, the Senate presented itself before the prince to fulfil the last act required of it. Its decision had not been as unanimous as had been expected; at the sitting of the 13th, a few voices had made themselves heard, if not against the proposed measure, at least to insist on its not being adopted except subject to certain restrictions, the first of which would be to require that the prince should bind himself, both on his own behalf and on that of the king his brother, to accept the constitutional Act. This idea was opposed with the argument that there would be a fundamental inherent nullity to such an agreement; that the king, not having conferred on his brother the right to enter into any binding arrangement, might not consider himself bound, and that the Senate would find itself in an altogether false position. This objection carried the day; it was decided by a large majority that the *lieutenance générale* should be conferred on *Monsieur* next day.

It was noticed that on this occasion, M. Fouché, who had

assisted at the sitting for the first time since his return, had conducted himself with prudence. He had not only advocated the full and plain adoption of the proposition, knowing well that the time for raising objections had gone by, but he had avoided forming part of the deputation entrusted with the duty of conveying the decision reached to the prince, and had been the first to point out that care should be taken not to force on his presence persons the sight of whom might awaken painful recollections. This wise discretion won him the respect of those who became cognizant of it, and turned to his advantage with *Monsieur*. From this time dates the confidence placed in him by this prince, and he reaped the benefit of it on a memorable occasion.

The discussion I have just related produced a somewhat bad effect, for it was the crowning point of the blunders perpetrated by the Senate in the framing of its Constitution. The next day, the 14th, it went to the Tuileries, with M. de Talleyrand at its head. The decree granted the power, but the absolute necessity for the king to accept the constitutional Charter, as the primary condition of his reigning, was carefully maintained.

*Monsieur*, in a speech concerted with M. de Vitrolles, and a few other faithful adherents, rather than with M. de Talleyrand, replied that he had taken cognizance of the constitutional Act which recalled to the throne of France the king, his august brother, that he had not received from him the power to accept it; but that, knowing his sentiments and principles, he did not fear being disavowed when he assured them that he would admit the bases of it. Thus, the prince sanctioned the use of the word *recall*, at the same time making felt in anticipation the necessity of certain restrictions to be made in the acceptance of the constitutional Act, and which were plainly indicated by a clever enumeration of such bases as the king would certainly admit,

and on which must rest, he added, *the monarchy balanced by a representative government divided in two Chambers*. The declaration made a short while afterwards at Saint-Ouen is to be found with but few changes in this enumeration. It can therefore be truly said that the work of the Senate was, on the 14th, partly torn to tatters, and all that remained of it were certain provisos to which it should have been prudent enough to confine itself. This quickly taken determination, to which the Abbé de Montesquiou was not foreign, was most disagreeable to M. de Talleyrand, who considered it imprudent: the temper he displayed over it injured him then and there in the mind of *Monsieur*. The first use *Monsieur* made of the power just conferred on him was to form a provisional Council of State, wherein, according to agreement, all the members of the provisional government were included, together with Marshal Moncey, Marshal Oudinot, and General Dessolle. Baron de Vitrolles was appointed secretary to the council, with the title of provisional Secretary of State. Such was his first reward for the services he had rendered and the dangers he had incurred. The commissioners acting as ministers all retained their portfolios; their importance was even increased in an appreciable fashion, as they enjoyed the advantage of working directly with the prince.

Unfortunately, among the men thus called upon to enlighten him, there was not a single one who united to the acquirements and qualities of the mind, the character he should have possessed to make *Monsieur* receive the whole truth both as regarded men and things, and to acquire a useful ascendant over him.

M. Beugnot, with his seductive intellect and the charm of his conversation, was more than any one else in a position to make himself useful, to please, and even to captivate; it was he, in fact, who, at this juncture, was most successful

in obtaining an active confidence; but he lacked both the necessary force and resolution to long retain the advantages of such a position, still less to employ it in a manner calculated to produce great and lasting results. The most important personage next to him was the Minister of War; I have already mentioned the disadvantages under which General Dupont labored: the further matters proceeded, the more they made themselves felt. M. Louis enjoyed the advantage of being thoroughly acquainted with matters of finance, with which he was entrusted, and his mind, bold, tenacious and fertile in resources, was precious at a time when no expedient was to be despised; but I do not think that there ever existed a man less qualified to succeed with a prince, especially a prince whose education and training dated from Versailles. Peremptory in all matters, selfish, and blunt even to coarseness, he knew no other way of getting his views adopted than to impose them, sparing no one, and without consideration for men in high places. The aged Malouet had titles to recognition which could not be contested, and his manner was as engaging as M. Louis's was repellant; but the ministry of marine scarcely afforded him any opportunity of coming to the fore. M. Henrion de Pansey, a still older man, was nothing but a lawyer, whose intellect and worth were out of place amid the stirring and agitated doings, and the intrigues of the period. There remained M. Anglès, whose qualities were not brilliant, and M. de Laforest, who occupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs *pro formâ* only, for it was plain that M. de Talleyrand reserved its direction unto himself. Such were the personages whom the whirligigs of fate had placed in a position whence much could have been derived, but which, nevertheless, not one of them could direct. It is fair to state that the provisional state of this *lieutenant générale*, which was probably to last only a couple of months, was faulty in

that it did not give a proper basis to anything, that it made each one fully realize that whatever he might undertake, whatever trouble he might go to, however successful he might be, would perhaps receive but scant recognition on the king's arrival.

*Monsieur* took no pains to conceal that he considered himself as destined to retain the greater part of the power, after his brother's return. All who came into contact with him in those days remember the opinions he expressed regarding Louis XVIII. "He has doubtless the entire use of his reason, and his mental faculties are still intact and brilliant, but in his present state of health, impossible as it is for him to move about, he will not be able to dispense with a *lieutenant général*; we will, therefore, profit by his lights, and ourselves take care of the executive." In accordance with this, Louis XVIII. was to be king in name only; it is therefore not to be wondered at that the men who thought themselves assured of *Monsieur's* confidence, participated in his illusions. It is thus that they were led, immediately upon the organization of the government of Louis XVIII., to form within the Royalist party itself a nucleus of opposition, of troublesome and sometimes even guilty intrigues. During the whole of his reign, Louis XVIII. suffered from the disadvantages and difficulties which this transitory condition of things gave birth to; so it was that the fit of the gout which detained him in England had consequences which made themselves felt down to the last years of his life.

Although the superior council was composed of eight persons, there were only three who were actually in a position to exercise a certain amount of influence, to wit: M. de Talleyrand, on account of the part he had just enacted and because he was the natural medium between the prince and the foreign powers, who knew none but him and who

only treated with him ; the Abbé de Montesquiou, owing to his antecedents, and General Dessolle, as commandant of the National Guard, that is, the only armed force which could be depended on.

M. de Dalberg, who had until quite recently shown himself so active, was in a manner almost discarded ; as to the two marshals, they had been given honorary seats. There remained General de Beurnonville and M. de Jaucourt ; the former had played but an insignificant part in the provisional government ; the latter's sound, wise, and conciliatory mind had shone on every occasion, but he was without ambition, very reserved, and necessarily easy to put aside.

The same could not be said of M. de Vitrolles ; once he had made his entry into politics, he was fully resolved not to let any opportunity escape to play a part in them. Ambitious, having to make his fortune, not without faculties, without being of a superior order of intellect, indifferent as to the choice of roads leading to success, as well as of the men with whom he could ally himself, he aimed at what was most useful, most convenient, and most sure. A former *émigré*, he had played no part in the last government, so he attached himself to the Royalist party, and tendered to it his services in exchange for the support he expected to receive from it. Having been recently employed in an important fashion by M. de Talleyrand and the Duc de Dalberg, he was on the best of footing with the provisional government ; he could, if he saw fit, enter into all the combinations which might be formed, although he did not conceal from himself that there were more hungry maws to be filled than offices to be disposed of. He became near the person of *Monsieur*, the intercessor of all Royalists whose pretensions were based on services rendered during the first days of the Revolution, in the Vendean civil wars,

under the standards of the emigration, under those of the army of Condé, or better still, those who based their claims on secret services, which had always been surrounded by a deep mystery, the importance of which could consequently always be magnified at will. There were to be found the men who claimed to have done everything during the past three months, who had, if they were to be believed, carried away and stirred up France in favor of the House of Bourbon, who had been the first to don the white cockade, and decided, so they asserted, the foreign sovereigns.

M. de Vitrolles constituted himself their patron, their protector, the mouthpiece of their claims, aided by a few persons already attached to *Monsieur's* suite, but over whom his position in the council gave him a marked superiority. Three of them may be named, who, for a more or less lengthy period played a part of some little importance, to wit: M. de La Maisonfort, an *émigré* known for his wit, by the noise made over his arrest under the imperial régime, and a great deal also by his escape from the Isle of Elba. He had just published a most remarkable screed on the last months of the reign of Napoleon and on his downfall. This screed, which had for title, *Tableau politique de l'Europe depuis la bataille de Leipzig jusqu'au 31 mars 1814*, was rather effective. M. de Bruges, an *émigré*, who had been employed by England in the West Indies, had come across *Monsieur* in Franche-Comté, tendered him his services, which had been welcomed, and had been attached to his person. I believe that he already enjoyed the title of aide-de-camp; none retained longer than he the patronage he had known how to acquire; the third was M. de Monciel, more particularly a servant of the closet, and who acted as secretary; he did not long remain in favor.

Could it be expected that harmony would reign for any length of time among a number of men whose opinions and



origins were so varied, whose interests were so opposed? On the one hand were functionaries who for fifteen years had given proofs of incontestable ability, on the other hand, men embittered by misfortune, by exile, by sufferings endured for a cause now triumphant, awaiting with the greatest impatience the recompense of their fidelity, very little disposed to take into consideration services rendered to the preceding régimes, which they had always fought and detested. It was not long ere I personally realized the underhand hostility environing us, and the efforts made to instil the most unjust prejudices into the prince's mind.

I was one of those whose functions preserved a special importance, but importance and favor are very different things. No one could prevent my having habitual intercourse with the prince, and the carrying out of a number of measures necessarily went through my hands. I was a useful medium with a number of persons towards whom consideration must be shown. The provisioning of the capital was to a great extent dependent on my efforts; and as no one could refuse me the credit of the measures I had taken, it would have been dangerous suddenly to transfer the management into other hands. Finally, my intercourse with the influential personages of the provisional government, and with the foreign sovereigns, made it difficult to oust me brusquely from my position. Still, it was the objective point of innumerable hostile manœuvres. The ardent Royalists of the Mortfontaine circle, whose noisy manifestations I had been compelled to curb, many agents without mandate whom I had kept at arm's length, had poured their grievances into the ear of *Monsieur*, either during his stay at Nancy, or during the first moments of his arrival.

I learnt subsequently that the prejudices instilled into *Monsieur's* mind against me, had been such that two days

after his entering the Tuileries, he had said to M. Beugnot: "To tell you the truth, M. Beugnot, I shall not enjoy any sleep as long as I see M. Pasquier in charge of the police." The latter spared no effort, so at least he has told me, to remove so unjust an impression, trying to make him understand that it was impossible to entertain the idea of putting some one in my place, that I had been useful, and that I was indispensable. *Monsieur* resigned himself, but his first conviction was not shaken.

At first I entertained not the slightest suspicion of the disfavor into which I had fallen; I was still further to increase it by the frankness of my reports and the little care I took to ward off prejudices which I might have dreamt of. I was solely occupied with the importance of the results it was necessary to obtain. In consequence of which I pointed out errors and wrongdoings, without sparing those who committed them; and I gave warning of dangers, from whichever direction they came; I censured whatever was worthy of blame, and counselled that which seemed to me advisable, without troubling myself as to whether my advice gave pleasure or otherwise. To crown the series of my impolitic doings, they were not transmitted by word of mouth, but consigned in the report which I addressed to the prince at the end of each day. These reports next day ran the gauntlet of the council of his intimates, when they were commented upon and discussed in the most ill-natured fashion. I have preserved a copy of these reports. They are all the more interesting to read over again because, written as they were under the inspiration of the moment, they recount the state of affairs with the utmost accuracy. There is also to be found in them perhaps an involuntary and instructive prediction of the formidable catastrophe which was to overwhelm us before a year was over! These counsels dwelt especially on the

necessity of sparing the feelings of the army, and on the careful choice of the commissioners extraordinary sent into the provinces.

Now the whole of the history of the following year may be summed up in two points: mistakes committed in dealing with the army, and mistakes committed by those entrusted by *Monsieur* with power in the provinces. During his stay in Franche-Comté and at Nancy, *Monsieur* had promised the abolition of the *droits réunis* (taxes on liquors, playing-cards, vehicles, etc.) and of the conscription. The latter promise may be excused, as he did not foresee any great need of soldiers; the conscription had pressed so heavily on the populations, that it was policy to announce to them some relief in this respect, but the former was ill-advised to a degree of folly. There were no finances possible without indirect taxation, and, to all appearances, the House of Bourbon did not expect to govern with an empty treasury. In the departments, the commissioners extraordinary did not fail to make the most of these perilous promises, declaring that there no longer were any indirect taxes, and that no longer would they be paid.

This was too high a price for a brief spell of popularity. M. Louis, as Minister of Finance, could not help being madened at all these foolish acts; his remonstrances, joined to my warnings, gave birth to the first act emanating from *Monsieur*; it was countersigned by M. de Vitrolles and bore date of the 15th. After testifying to the satisfaction which *Monsieur* felt at the manner in which those persons to whom he had given more or less extended special commissions in the name of the king, his brother, had acquitted themselves of their duties, it was set forth therein that the government having resumed a regular course, all public affairs were henceforth to be vested in the officials in whose jurisdiction they lay; that all special commissions were

hereby cancelled, and that those holding them up to the present time should henceforth cease exercising the powers conferred by them. The *Moniteur* of the 17th, which contained this salutary prescription, necessarily caused great disappointment to many of those who claimed that they were the most zealous of servants, nor were they ignorant of the fact that I was one of those who had provoked it.

The entry of the Emperor of Austria took place on the 15th with a pomp which was out of place; it would have been in the best taste on the part of the father of Marie-Louise to arrive with less noise. *Monsieur*, escorted by the mounted National Guard, went to the Boulevard du Temple to receive the allied sovereigns. Then all together they wended their way to the Place Louis XV., where a grand review was held, after which the Emperor Francis went to the mansion he was to occupy in the Faubourg Saint-Honoré, and which belonged to the Princess Borghese. He was taken thither by *Monsieur*. Generally speaking, the impression produced by the ceremony on the Parisian mind was a painful one; it could not be otherwise when the prince lieutenant-general of the kingdom appeared in a secondary position, and was overshadowed by the display of military strength and power with which the foreign sovereigns were surrounded. The national feeling was deeply hurt.

## CHAPTER XVIII

The Emperor at Fontainebleau after his abdication; his confidences to the Duc de Vicence; his departure — The Treasury of the civil list brought back to Paris; M. de Maubreuil claims that certain articles have been removed; in order to recover them, he has passports issued to him by all the authorities — He stops the Queen of Westphalia at Fossard; he is himself imprisoned a few days later — Investigation made by the Prefecture of Police; it establishes de Maubreuil's guilt; he then alleges that M. de Talleyrand had commissioned him to assassinate the Emperor — Probable connection between this affair and the Duc de Dalberg's plot — *Monsieur's* *lieutenance générale* — Incessant increase of Royalist demands — Newspapers and pamphlets — The censorship — Royer-Collard appointed director of the *librairie* (censorship of publications) — Efforts made to alleviate the distress of the workmen — Further adhesions from generals — The army and the people ill-disposed — The convention of the 23d of April; it serves to increase the feeling of discontent — M. de Talleyrand's delicate position.

AFTER having signed his abdication and ratified the treaty which was a natural consequence of it, there but remained for the Emperor Napoleon to engage in preparations for his departure; the prolongation of his residence in France did not profit any one, not even himself. His remaining at Fontainebleau was a continual source of well or ill-founded, genuine or affected, anxiety. It needed little to cause these alarms, which the Royalists were ever the first to propagate; thus, the arrival in Paris of Napoleon's valet of the bedchamber and of his mameluke, who had left him, as they wished to enjoy their savings in peace, had sufficed to set astir all the most zealous adherents whose attentions and assiduous notifications besieged the Tuileries. I experienced no little difficulty in allaying the fears

which they had succeeded in arousing. What deserved attention was the impression produced by the thought that their Emperor was still there, and that he might at any moment reappear and again place himself at their head. These hopes were increased by the dissatisfaction felt over the change of cockade, which had been unwillingly submitted to.

Everything has been told with regard to what occurred at Fontainebleau, the circumstances attendant upon Napoleon's departure, his farewell to those who had served him and the soldiers who surrounded him. It cannot be denied that, when once he had determined on his course, his attitude was noble and resigned, and that he displayed high-minded sentiments. His recorded conversations with those with whom he came in contact afford sufficient proof of this. It was with the Duc de Vicence that he unbosomed himself more freely; his confidences have remained a secret, yet a few of his utterances have been disclosed to me. He expressed himself concerning the man who had done him the most injury, M. de Talleyrand, with rare moderation, nay, indulgence: "In the main," he said, "that man served me faithfully, as long as he did serve me; I was perhaps too hasty in quarrelling with him, and thereupon I used him badly. It was natural that he should be tempted to seek revenge; as shrewd a mind as his could not fail to perceive the near return of the Bourbons, and that they alone could secure him the means of revenge. Hence did he go and meet them half way; this is the way of the world. I committed a gross blunder; in having driven him to the state of discontent which he had reached, I should have either imprisoned him or kept him continually at my side."

He repeatedly expressed the greatest indignation with regard to Marshal Marmont; he could find no excuse for him; never had ingratitude been pushed further; the only

wrong he had done in his case was that of having helped him onward in excess of his deserts.

The proclamation of the Paris municipal council was next in order among the acts which wounded him most deeply, in the first place, because it had preceded all others, and finally, because he saw in it a spontaneity which revealed hatreds which nothing had made him foresee. He had more especially been grieved on seeing the name of M. de Chabrol at the foot of this document: "I loaded him and his family," he said, "with benefits, and why should I have done so? What were their claims to such treatment? In truth, I cannot say." He also spoke of me with much vexation, but without bitterness. "I ever made much of him," he said; "I considered him a man of worth, it pleased me to think I could depend on him, and yet he too has forsaken me; but at any rate he made up his mind in frank fashion, knowing what he wanted, and when it was still dangerous. This excuses a good deal, and he at least took the trouble of notifying me of the course he intended to pursue." Such were, I have reasons to feel sure about it, his very words concerning me.

The sudden fashion in which he had been deserted by the Prince de Neufchâtel was deeply felt by him; there is nothing to be astonished at in this. Day by day sorrows of this kind came to fill his cup. He left on the 20th. It is not for me to narrate what happened along his road to the spot where he embarked; the history of this journey is too generally known. But there is an incident which forms part of it, of which I must give an account, because it created a great stir and because it is still enveloped in a few clouds which I wish to disperse; it is one with which M. de Maubreuil was connected.

It will be recollected that decrees had been issued by the provisional government, — I have enumerated them in

their proper place, — with the object of having returned to the Treasury and the several coffers of the state, the sums which in the last days of March had been removed thereupon by order of Napoleon or of the Regency. Commissioners had been sent in various directions to see to the execution of these decrees, and M. Dudon had been specially commissioned by M. Louis to go in quest of the diamonds and treasure of the civil list which had followed Marie-Louise in her flight to Blois, and of which M. de La Bouillerie, treasurer of the civil list, had had charge. M. Dudon had experienced no difficulty in conveying to Paris both the treasure and M. de La Bouillerie, who wished for nothing better than to restore it. But, just as it reached the gates of Paris, the convoy fell in with a band led, if I am not mistaken, by one de Lagrange, who had, so he said, orders to take possession of it. From whom did he hold such orders? I am unable to say. The boxes, instead of being deposited in the Treasury, were to be conveyed to the Tuileries. This incident gave rise to a lively dispute between M. Louis and the counsellors of *Monsieur*, who were desirous of making for him a private treasury out of the eight or ten millions just recovered. They based their claims on the fact that these moneys belonged to the civil list. In M. Louis's opinion, it mattered little whence they came; the public service was above all to be made secure; he maintained, with good cause, that in the depleted state of the Treasury, this sum was indispensable to him.

During the conflict, I remember that the boxes remained twenty-four hours, or twice that time, without being unloaded, in the palace yard of the Tuileries, in the care of a small detachment of the National Guard and of the *gendarmerie*, on whose assistance M. Louis had insisted. Thus it will be seen that the commissioners sent by the Minister of Finance were not the only persons who set themselves



agoing for the discovery and recovery of this treasure ; in this connection, great was the zeal displayed by the Royalists. M. de Maubreuil made himself prominent in this respect. He had a special protector in the person of M. Lahorie ; and M. Lahorie, as assistant secretary to the provisional government, had, from the very outset, placed himself in the position to be able to introduce into the antechambers and outer closets of M. de Talleyrand, a number of persons ready to offer their services, and whose worth, zeal, and loyal sentiments he was always prepared to vouch for. This crowd must have been seen in order to form an idea of the numbers who squeezed into so small a space, and of the extraordinary mixture of which it was composed ; all ranks of society, all shades of opinion, all walks of life, were blended together. The sight was all the more strange when it is considered that on the upper story dwelt the Czar and his principal officers, and that the soldiers of his body-guard filled the courtyard and the stairways of the mansion. There can be no doubt that M. de Maubreuil, under the protecting wing of M. Lahorie, more than once found himself in this throng, and that he was introduced to M. de Talleyrand, and to several of the members of the provisional government. They probably favored him with a few courteous and insignificant words, such as are in similar circumstances spoken to all comers. This did not satisfy him. He was meditating some action of note, and so he conceived what follows. He pretended on the testimony of Lagrange, who had so *à propos* interposed himself in connection with the return of the treasures of the civil list, that two boxes containing precious objects, perhaps a portion of the Crown diamonds, were still lacking, because they had been delivered over to Napoleon ; he offered to go in quest of them, wherever they might be. It would appear in the first instance that he

sought to obtain the necessary authority and orders to carry out this plan from M. de Sémallé; the latter having sent him about his business, he addressed himself to the Minister of War, General Dupont, and on the 16th he became the possessor of a pass enjoining all military authorities and all French troops which he might find on his way, to give him any assistance he stood in need of in the execution of his mission. How comes it that M. Dupont took upon himself to do this, how is it that he gave such an order in a matter so foreign to his powers, without being authorized thereto by any of his colleagues? He does not appear to have preserved any accurate recollection of what passed between him and M. de Maubreuil; he even believes that this order was extorted from him, on the pretence of going in quest of a few precious objects which had been stolen from the war depot, to wit, some copper-plates of Cassini's map.

However this may be, it was necessary that M. de Maubreuil should have a passport; it is noteworthy that he did not dare to ask it of the Prefecture of Police, where he was too well known. After making some little difficulty, M. Anglès decided upon giving him one on the strength of the order of the Minister of War. He added thereto a similar order to the civil authorities. Thus equipped, it became an easy matter for M. de Maubreuil to obtain from M. de Bourrienne on the following day a permit enabling him to take post-horses whenever and wherever he saw fit. What is still more astonishing, is that he received from General de Sacken and the major-general of the allied troops an order placing at his disposal such foreign troops as might be at hand, just as General Dupont had done with regard to French troops. Provided with all these documents, he set off on the 18th, with one Dasies whom he had associated with himself, and with whom he seemed to have first

formed a connection at the time of the attempt made on the Place Vendôme to overthrow the statue of Napoleon.

On the very same day, the Queen of Westphalia, Princess of Würtemberg, was leaving to return to Germany, by way of Nemours. M. de Maubreuil had belonged, as equerry, to the household of her husband in Westphalia; the intercourse he had kept up with members of the household had made it easy for him to learn the time of her departure and the road she was to follow; he had no doubt but that she was carrying away the jewels, diamonds, and precious objects belonging to her. Every one knows how, having at Montereau requisitioned a picket of Chasseurs of the Guard and of Mamelukes, he awaited her near the village of Fossard, stopped her carriage, compelled her to alight from it and enter a barn, and lastly did not allow her to leave until he had possessed himself of eleven boxes containing her jewels, diamonds, and 84,000 francs in gold. He demanded of her the keys of all her boxes; she was forced to surrender them; one alone, which had remained in the possession of her husband, was missing. He alleged as a reason for this outrage on the person of the queen that he had been commissioned to seize her trunks, as she was suspected of attempting to carry off some of the Crown diamonds.

All this took place on the 21st. On the night between the 23d and 24th, on returning to Paris, after a number of adventures all of which are scrupulously recorded in a copy printed in 1827 of the conclusions arrived at by the *avocat général* near the *cour royale*, in May, 1818, the audacious Maubreuil had no hesitation in calling upon M. de Vitrolles at the Tuileries. He brought with him four bags containing gold, which, with the fragments of a box broken on the road, according to his statement, constituted the balance of the treasure of which he had despoiled the Queen of Westphalia; the other boxes had been brought to M. de Vi-

trolles by M. de Vanteaux during the course of the day. All these restitutions, or rather these apparent deposits, were only made owing to a rumor that had spread of the extreme anger expressed by the sovereigns, especially by Alexander, at the news of so infamous an outrage, of such a deadly affront to a princess of the blood royal, and who had but recently worn a crown. She was travelling with passports delivered to her in the name of all the sovereigns, hence there was in her arrest and in the spoliation of which she had been the victim, the most insolent violation of all rights. The foreign ministers received in consequence orders from their masters to peremptorily demand, together with the restitution of the articles carried away, the punishment of the guilty parties.

Great was the rejoicing therefore in the office of the provisional Secretary of State, located in the Pavillon de Marsan, on the delivery of the box, and, later on, the bags containing the money. It was thought that this was an end to the matter. But the clerks of M. de Vitrolles, and M. de Vitrolles himself, had committed the incredible blunder of receiving everything without verification, without insisting on the boxes being opened, without untying a single bag, and had contented themselves with the declaration that the keys had not been given up with the boxes. When next day the locksmith who had made them was sent for to open them (he was one Biennais, famed for that sort of work) they were found to be empty, or almost so; the bags contained twenty sous pieces in silver instead of twenty francs gold pieces. Great was the disappointment. It was to be expected that M. de Maubreuil would maintain that he had delivered the whole just as he had received it, and that he would throw the blame on those with whom he had deposited the boxes. It was difficult to know what course to pursue. The day of the 24th went by amid this un-

certainty. Meanwhile M. de Maubreuil was going about Paris carrying his head as high as ever. This excessive insolence made the foreigners indignant and a charge was preferred against him, whereupon it was resolved to arrest him. He was summoned, together with his associate Dasies to the Tuileries, on the evening of the 25th, to give certain explanations. M. Anglès was there with a commissary of police, who questioned them both, then drew up an official report of the examination and affixed seals to the boxes and bags of silver.

This done, M. de Maubreuil and M. Dasies were brought to the Prefecture of Police; it was towards midnight, and I had already retired for the night. M. Anglès had me awakened and informed me that the two gentlemen were to remain my prisoners. He added that I was to devote all my attention to following up the matter, that I was to spare no effort in discovering the thief, and in finding, if possible, the articles that had been stolen. I had until then had nothing to do with the affair, but I was aware of its gravity, the ministers of the sovereigns having already repeatedly called for my interference. The imprudent Royalists surrounding *Monsieur* might be implicated in it. It could not be imagined that so audacious a *coup* had been attempted without encouragement from high authority, and without the assurance of the most powerful support. I felt therefore the necessity of promptly reaching the desired goal; it was the only way of preventing the spread of unpleasant suspicions; to attain such a result, nothing was neglected in the matter of searching and questioning. The first discovery made was that of a diamond found in the lodgings occupied by Maubreuil; he had three or four in Paris; this one was in the Rue Neuve-du-Luxembourg. The diamond, found on the bed, was plainly one of those belonging to the queen, and proved that they had been handled in that place.

I had sent several most intelligent detectives along the road followed by the thieves, and I expected that their reports would throw considerable light upon the matter; but in order to do good work, time was needed, and they were a long while in returning to me. This delay rendered the sovereigns impatient, and caused them to make renewed and pressing appeals to me to expedite matters. They firmly believed that an attempt was being made to screen the guilty parties, and even to save them from exposure and punishment. Hardly a day passed but what an officer was sent to me from the closet of the Emperor Alexander to ask me how the affair was progressing.

Finally, matters reached such a point that M. de Talleyrand, at his wits' ends to get rid of such an annoying matter, empowered me, in order to have done with it, to offer M. de Maubreuil, if he would make restitution of everything, a sum of money together with the assurance that he would never again be called to account in this connection. I therefore had him brought into my study; so far, he had not come into my presence; he had frequently been examined, but by some of the detectives who were most clever in investigating such matters. He remained unshaken in his conversation with me, and persisted in maintaining his entire innocence; he solemnly asserted that the motive of all his acts had been the desire of rendering a great service without any personal object in view.

Meanwhile, the detectives I had sent out had fulfilled their mission with much cleverness and had been eminently successful. They returned at last with the most circumstantial details of all that had taken place at Fossard and subsequently. Following his track step by step, they had discovered that on his home journey Maubreuil, avoiding the direct road to Paris, had followed on reaching la Croix-de-Bernis, that of Versailles. Once feeling certain of this

fact, it was easy for them to find in that town the inn where he had put up with his acolyte and had succeeded in ascertaining everything that had passed there between these two rascals. They had taken a back room, and had sent for a locksmith who had, at their request, opened with a pick-lock the only box of which they did not possess the key. This was the one which contained the most precious objects. The same workman had been recalled to close it three or four hours later. All these facts were duly established by depositions in good form which were annexed to the official report. No doubt any longer remained as to the place where the boxes had been emptied, and as to the persons who had been thus engaged; I was therefore in a position to give accurate and positive information to the government.

The first thing to be done was to question Maubreuil once more. He was no wise disconcerted and persisted in his denials. It was on this occasion that he for the first time presented a system of defence which was totally unexpected. He said that he quite saw that there was a determination to ruin him, and that it had been determined to sacrifice him because he had so poorly responded to the horrible confidence that had been placed in him. The truth was that he had left Paris with the mission to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon, that this mission had been entrusted to him by M. de Talleyrand; that in spite of the horror with which it had inspired him, he had accepted it from fear that it might be entrusted to another. He had disposed everything in such a fashion as to frustrate the criminal intentions of those who had employed him, and had flattered himself that by bringing them a treasure, he would assuage their discontent by satisfying their avarice. He had deposited everything with M. de Vitrolles, because he knew that such a deposit would nowhere be better

appreciated, and indeed, there had apparently been no scruples in diving into the cases.

In vain was the falseness of his story pointed out to him, in vain was his attention drawn to the incontestable facts which were there to contradict it, in vain was he told that even if the truth of the first part of his tale was admitted, he could not get rid of the facts duly established at Versailles, and which proved beyond argument that the boxes had been emptied of their contents by him in an inn of that town, it was impossible to get him to give up his new system of defence. I reported so to the government. It then became necessary to determine what should be done with him. This was a somewhat embarrassing matter. At first sight, nothing seemed more natural than to bring him to trial. But, in reviewing the situation of the day, it is necessary to realize the effect which would have been produced on the public mind by allegations such as those in which Maubreuil persisted, and especially of the impression which they were likely to make on the mind of military men, particularly on that of the soldiery! In such matters, the greatest untruths are always believed to a certain degree.

It was therefore determined not to act hurriedly, to keep the accused men in prison, and to await counsel and help from time and the march of events. The foreign sovereigns themselves were compelled to acquiesce in such a course. They also found themselves compromised. Maubreuil did not hesitate to assert that the mission he had undertaken had been entrusted to him in a common good, with the assent of all interested parties, among whom he placed in the first rank, *Monsieur*, the Emperor Alexander, and the King of Prussia. As a proof of what he said he pointed to the order of General de Sacken and to that of the Prussian general, both of which empowered him to call



upon the aid of the allied troops whenever and wherever he should see fit. So great a work of confidence was indeed extraordinary, when granted to such a man; in order to explain it, it was difficult not to imagine that some great service had been expected of him. It will be seen therefore with what diabolical skill this scoundrel had known how to make a rampart unto himself of the means he had secured to compromise the highest personages. The responsibility of it all could but fall on the first order issued by General Dupont. The passport, the permission to use post-horses, and the two other orders had been, if not a necessary, at least an excusable, consequence thereof; this seemed all the more serious as General Dupont might be suspected of harboring an ardent desire of revenge against Napoleon.

Is there not some connection between this strange affair and the project of which the Duc de Dalberg spoke to me in confidence? It occasionally happens that the grossest untruths rest on some point presenting an appearance of truth. When speaking to me of the plan of getting rid of Napoleon, M. de Dalberg had told me that the conspirators were to don the uniform of the Chasseurs of the Guard. M. de Maubreuil, in the course of his interrogatories, also said that it had been suggested to him to call this means to his aid. As soon as I learnt of this circumstance, I had no doubt that the chief of the expedition mentioned to me by M. de Dalberg stood at last revealed. The plan had been abandoned, the danger which had fathered the idea having vanished by Marmont's defection. What was to be deduced from all this? That Maubreuil, as he maintained, had been urged forward; that his services in the vile action which he boasted of not having been anxious to commit, had been accepted, but at a date which in no way corresponded with that of his expedition against the Queen of Westphalia. Since that time, none had felt inclined to

once more take up the detestable undertaking which had been renounced, if so it be that it was ever seriously entertained. Maubreuil flung himself into the enterprise, convinced that the secret he possessed would compel the government to be very careful in its treatment of him. The coincidence between the time he was attempting his *coup de main* and that of Napoleon's departure seemed to him a fortunate one, as it allowed him to build up the fable which he had invented. Thus a plan which had come to naught was the actual basis on which rested the audacious enterprise of Maubreuil. This adventure has been a subject for conversation for many a long day. At the time I write, it has served as the pretext for a calumny which has dealt M. de Talleyrand one of the severest blows which could affect him in his old age, by giving it to be understood that he had been cognizant of a conspiracy against the life of the Emperor Napoleon.

I have told in all sincerity all that came to my knowledge concerning this affair. There is nothing to justify, nothing to give even a semblance of foundation to this outrageous allegation. In the turmoil of affairs in which M. de Talleyrand then lived, he may have seen Maubreuil, without attaching any importance to the fact; the latter, I have no doubt, was introduced to him, as were so many others, by M. Lahorie; Maubreuil may have heard a few polite words fall from his lips, but he never, as he has pretended, had any long conversation with him. The prince was far too experienced and too clever to speak of serious matters with a stranger; a few commonplace words without any special meaning are the only ones he can have ever addressed to him.

*Monsieur* exercised the functions of lieutenant-general for seventeen days. It behoves me to review what happened during that space of time. The departure of Napoleon

caused a considerable amount of improvement in the progress of affairs; but in proportion as dangers became more distant, the pretensions, and passions until then kept within bounds, came to the surface and developed themselves in all their boldness; dating from that time, our principal source of embarrassment sprang from the exigencies of the Royalists. The intemperate and imprudent utterances, the openly expressed contempt, the decrying of the whole past, the grand mien assumed by a number of persons who reappeared suddenly on a stage from which they had for so long a time been absent, could not but sow among the people powerful germs of alarm and discontent.

Newspapers and pamphlets made an onslaught on social positions which had been in existence for twenty-five years past; it was fair to assume that no consideration would be shown to any of them, and that there was a desire to annihilate them completely. Thus, on the 17th, the *Journal des Débats* published an article announcing as a fact that M. Dambray was shortly to be raised to the dignity of chancellor; the principal merit ascribed to him was that he had refused to accept any office whatever since the commencement of the Revolution. Besides the impropriety of prejudging the choice of the king, nothing could be more unskilful than this sort of praise, as no other could give greater offence to so many distinguished men who had seen fit to follow a different course. Yet the article was from the pen of M. Lahorie.

Among the pamphlets could not help being noticed one entitled: *Manifeste du peuple français contre les régicides, leurs adhérents et leurs complices*. The most violent recriminations were to be found in it side by side with assertions noteworthy from their untruthfulness and most dangerous counsels. It was therein stated that a fresh lot of prisoners had already taken the place of those whose cells had been

opened by the new order of things. As a matter of fact not a single arrest had been made on political grounds since the first day of April. It censured the collection of taxes and the vexatious requisitions, as if it were possible, in the existing state of affairs, to feed the allied, nay, the French troops without having recourse to requisitions.

I pointed out in my daily reports the dangers and the disturbances which were likely to be produced by such incitements; I commented on them orally in the presence of *Monsieur* every time I had the honor of approaching him, which happened about every other day. I was well received, listened to, and a pretence was made to agree with me; on several occasions, measures recommended by me were adopted, but the secret management of affairs remained the same; this was to be seen from the ever increasing boldness of the party's writers. This compelled me to insist on a more strict organization of the censorship over the newspapers. M. Michaud, who was at the head of it, was either too weak, or too favorably inclined towards the opinions which it was necessary to curb. I asked that the department of the *librairie* should be re-established. The post was provisionally given to M. Royer-Collard, who was designated by the Abbé de Montesquiou. This was his first step in public affairs.

One of the most striking features of the virulence of the press was the animosity shown against the Senate. It was on this point that all attacks centred, thus betraying alarming intentions, for it was necessary to rally as many persons as possible to the new order of things, especially men of sterling worth. What confidence was to inspire the generals whose adhesions were welcomed with joy, when they saw all the services they had rendered treated with contempt? A certain number of enthusiasts, believing that the time had gone by for showing any consideration, sought

to destroy the entire work of the Revolution and to overthrow the institutions and régime it had established; in some of the cafés of the Palais-Royal it was even talked of annulling all the sales of national domains.

The men who like myself did not dwell in dreamland, who watched the course of events, without seeking to deceive themselves, could see that public opinion was not toning down; the violent speeches and deeds of the Royalist party found their counterpart in the party of the Revolution. Not a day passed but some trouble occurred in the taverns, especially those in the neighborhood of the public markets or about the city's barriers; there, the partisans of Napoleon were the strongest and most numerous.

In opposition to the pamphlets to which I have previously referred, one Durbach, a member of the *Corps législatif*, and a brother-in-law of Marshal Mortier (he had been sentenced to death in 1794 for having spoken in defence of Louis XVI.) brought out a pamphlet entitled: *Des véritables intérêts de la maison de Bourbon*, wherein it was expressly laid down that this family could only reign by virtue of a new contract entered into between the nation and itself, and after distinctly accepting conditions which would guarantee all rights and interests. This pamphlet, it could not be denied, responded to the desires of many. So, as a matter of fact, at the end of a fortnight, Royalist sentiment had not made such sincere progress as it would have been natural to expect after the enthusiasm of the first days. It was indeed an easy matter to account for the cause of this disappointment, and I felt it my duty to say so. By dint of repeating the same truths, I sometimes managed to obtain a suspension of the erroneous course which was being pursued, but, in the main, my frankness did perhaps more harm than good to the common weal.

I dwelt continually on the necessity of conciliating the

army, persuaded as I was that nothing lasting could be established without it. Future events only too fully justified my foresight. As to the workmen, there were some four thousand of them who had been previously employed in the erection of government works, and who, for three weeks past had not been able to find any employment that would keep body and soul together; there were to be added to these eight or ten thousand employed in cotton-mills which had been closed. These latter, all men belonging to the city, still enjoyed certain resources in their families; but the men engaged in the building trades were in a fearful state of destitution and were naturally turbulent and threatening. I never relaxed calling the government's attention to them, and I begged that an attempt should be made to give them a little work. It was an easy matter to find contractors, who, if they were ever so little secured against loss, would make advances; if people could but see that work was being resumed in a few directions, it would suffice to restore confidence. I obtained that M. Bruyère, an engineer of *ponts et chaussées*, an able and respected man, should be reinstated as director of public works. M. de Bourrienne came to my assistance by employing towards the resumption of the works begun in the Rue de Rivoli, on the new post-office building a rather large sum in copper coin which lay in the cellars of the old building. But, in spite of what I could say or do, the pitiful circumstances of the workmen was the greatest difficulty with which I had to contend during the short time I was still to remain in office.

Adhesions from the most prominent generals continued to pour in from all directions. There came those of Marshals Soult, Suchet, Augereau, Masséna, and lastly that of Carnot, who was in command at Antwerp; the last named was remarkable from the frankness which had dictated it, com-

ing as it did from the source whence it issued ; it became still more so owing to the part which Carnot was to play shortly afterwards. But in the *bourgeoisie*, in the masses, and in the army, the hatred of and the contempt for the foreigner who was laying down the law, cast over the new order of things an amount of discredit which it was very difficult to overcome.

Conversations gathered at different points but confirmed this melancholy truth. The white cockade was only worn reluctantly by the soldiery, and was displayed as little as possible. At Rouen, the army corps under Marshal Jourdan had donned it before any other ; it nevertheless was one of the cantonments in which it was looked upon with most disfavor, and where the national colors were most regretted. The Lille garrison was no better disposed ; it had required the firmness of General Maison to prevent the almost wholesale desertion of his soldiers. The most lively discontent continued to exist in the army. There was obedience and little more ; discipline alone obtained marks of assent.

Just as the number of military men who returned to Paris increased, so the spirit of the people advanced in its hostility towards the foreign troops, and even towards their sovereigns. They were accused of a thousand odious designs. These bad dispositions were greatly augmented when it became necessary to give to the public the convention entered into between *Monsieur* and the allied powers on the 23d. The terms of it were very severe. The evacuation within a stipulated time of the fortified towns occupied in the provinces situated beyond the boundaries of France, such as they existed on the 1st of January, 1792, and which comprised of those beyond and on the Rhine, in Spain, in Piedmont, in Italy, and lastly in the Mediterranean, in all fifty-three towns, among which were Mayence,

Antwerp, Mantua, and Alessandria, all four of the highest importance, was unavoidable.

The artillery depots and munitions of war were to be handed over to the allies. This constituted an immense amount of stores of war, and comprised twelve thousand cannon, of which eleven thousand were bronze. The French troops were only allowed to take with them their field artillery, to the extent of three guns for every thousand men. The sick, the wounded, and the French corps forming part of the army of Italy were to be recalled at once by the lieutenant-general of the kingdom. Subject to these conditions, the blockade of fortified towns in France was to be immediately raised; it must be pointed out that the allies did not occupy a single one. All these stipulations applied likewise to maritime cities. The contracting powers reserved the right of determining, in a final treaty, the fate of all arsenals, and of all ships of war in them, whether armed or not. This made thirty-one ships of the line and twelve frigates which might be counted as lost, and which were all in the harbor of Antwerp and a few other ports which had to be evacuated. On both sides, prisoners and hostages were to be sent back to their respective countries without the payment of any ransom. The administration of the departments or of the towns occupied by the belligerent forces was to be turned over immediately to officials appointed by the provisional government of the king, who, from that date, bound himself to provide for the needs and the provisioning of the allied troops up to such time as they should evacuate French territory. All military requisitions were, in consequence, to cease then and there.

As to the evacuation of the territory, it was stated that the allied powers would carry it out as soon as the fortified towns occupied beyond the stipulated limits should be evacuated by the French troops. The conditions of the final



treaty of peace were not hard to foresee from the foregoing stipulations. It was, so to speak, written out beforehand, as the cession of the provinces which the allies had determined upon recovering, was *de facto* taking place by the abandonment of the fortified towns which actually constituted the possession of them.

It is easy to understand all the discontent aroused in the minds of those already too prone to conceive it, on perusing such a convention. And so this is what has been gained, they said, by the recall of the House of Bourbon! The sacrifices which France dreaded have been decided upon only more speedily. They are nothing more than the Châtillon propositions, and yet the Emperor Alexander had said that far better terms might be expected if the cause of the House of Bourbon was adopted. Was it not still possible, would it not be fair, to return to the Frankfort propositions, to those which had been made at a time when it was admitted that it was of consequence to Europe that France should be strong and powerful? So then, all this great pretence of generosity amounted to nothing, and had been displayed merely to make the muskets drop from the hands of our soldiers! What was to be obtained by such haste? What was there to be gained by this convention? A cessation of hostilities? They were about to cease everywhere as much in the interests of the allies as in those of the French. The end of the military requisitions? Under all circumstances, did not the fact remain that the foreign troops had to be fed? If France gratuitously suffered her hands to be fettered, and deprived herself of every means of obtaining a final treaty that would be in reason, there must be some secret motives for such indecent haste, as it had not been seen fit to wait for the arrival of the king, which could not be far off.

This upbraiding was directed both against *Monsieur* and

M. de Talleyrand, especially against the latter; it was considered that the responsibility was his, as he was the only man in a position to conduct negotiations with the foreigner. To be fair, it must be admitted that his position was a difficult one, and daily became more delicate. He was alone to curb the pretensions of the foreign cabinets. In this direction, he received no support from *Monsieur*. Was it because France remained what she was in 1792, that he considered that he found her as he had left her? This frame of mind was that of the prince's most intimate confidants. It could not escape being noticed by the foreigners; with the exception of the Czar, whose natural generosity led him to make a less excessive use of his advantages, all were fully resolved to profit thereby. How could M. de Talleyrand obtain better terms, harassed as he was by cares and business? Foreseeing and already being made to feel that the Royalist party would give him trouble, he was anxious to have done with it all.

In my opinion, he came to a decision too quickly. As long as Napoleon was at Fontainebleau, he could make the foreign sovereigns fear that the army might again throw itself into his arms. When he no longer had this means of defence at his disposal, I think he should, at least in his own interest, have refused to accept such harsh conditions until the arrival of the king; his responsibility would thus have been less involved. It is, at all events, difficult to judge in all equity the conduct of men wrestling with such events. M. de Talleyrand probably saw, in the convention of the 23d, the advantage of giving to France the positive assurance that her territory would be shortly evacuated; he knew to what a degree the sojourn of the stranger preyed on her mind, and he was anxious to afford her the relief she most sighed for.

## CHAPTER XIX

The Duc de Berry's entry into Paris; his auspicious début at Rouen — The princes' lack of acquaintance with the society surrounding them; Mlle. Montausier at the Tuileries — M. Pasquier dismisses the police agent Veyrat and threatens to resign if his decision is not indorsed — Commissioners extraordinary of the king sent into the provinces — Carnot and Lecourbe permitted to retain their rank — The Abbé de Montesquion's display of good-will towards M. Pasquier — The latter submits to him his views regarding the reorganization of the police system — The former functionaries of the Empire seek M. Pasquier's advice — The Duc de Rovigo's fruitless overtures to M. de Talleyrand — Louis XVIII.'s reception in London — Napoleon's departure for the Isle of Elba — The provisional government in profound ignorance of the ideas and intentions of the king, which are plainly at variance with those of *Monsieur* — Detachments of French troops brought together for the king's entry into Paris; enthusiastic greeting of them by the population — The *gendarmérie d'élite* disbanded — Alexander and M. de Talleyrand go to meet Louis XVIII. at Compiègne — The Czar finds the king won over to British influence and feels he must give up the idea of a close Franco-Russian union — M. de Talleyrand despairs of ever being able to play the part he had anticipated.

THE Duc de Berry made his entry on the 21st. His coming was all the more attended with success from the fact that he was still young, and that he was reputed to have military tastes and habits. All general officers indulged in a hope that the army would find in him its natural protector. He had made a good beginning, and owed this advantage to the excellent counsels of M. de Girardin, the Prefect of Rouen. He had landed in Normandy, and Rouen was the first town of importance in which he had shown himself; it was occupied by a large body of troops ill-disposed towards him, and it was impossible for him to be in

ignorance of this. Many persons were in favor of his passing through the city without seeing them. He arrived in the evening, and the advice given to him was to leave next day at early morn. Happily, M. de Girardin, whose guest the prince was, prevailed upon him to act differently. The troops were assembled next day at a very early hour on the outer boulevard; the Duc de Berry boldly made his appearance for the purpose of reviewing them; his assurance and his manner won the hearts of the soldiers; they received him much better than he had anticipated, and on his departure, he was greeted with almost unanimous acclamations.

I was one of the first to see the Duc de Berry; he received me most kindly, and I was at his side when he granted his first audience. All the generals who chanced to be in Paris, and they were many, made a point of being present. He did not know a single one of them, so all were compelled to give their names to an *aide-de-camp* who stood near him. It fell to my lot to assist him in this delicate duty. This particular may perhaps be considered somewhat childish; yet, it must be admitted that for men accustomed to play an important part in their country's affairs, for these generals, to whom obeisance was formerly done on their entering this palace, where they attracted above all others the Master's attention, it was difficult to be brought to solicit a look from those who were about to dispose of their fate. One or two persons acquainted with their value should, in the beginning, have been attached to each of the princes, to teach them the names of these officers, and to advise them regarding the consideration due each one.

This unfamiliarity with the society in the midst of which the princes were about to move, had still more serious disadvantages for *Monsieur*. At first, it had been almost im-

possible for him not to receive everybody, and his natural affability lent itself very well to this obligation; by and by, it was extended beyond all necessity, and as no one was charged to look after those who found their way into his audiences, as there was no rule laid down for admission being either granted or denied, people of evil repute and adventurers were soon seen flocking to them. I can remember one day in particular, when this unseemly state of affairs was conspicuously apparent. *Monsieur* was receiving ladies for the first time; the gallery of Diana was filled from one end to the other, the ranks being three deep on either side. Now, the sight afforded by this throng was not only a curious, but occasionally an amusing one, in view of the extraordinary jumbling of all ranks, all ages, all periods; pretensions strangely out of date were easily discerned from the oddities of certain toilets; but what was not to be endured, was that women who would not have been received into any respectable house, had managed to gain admittance there. Fortunately, I had arrived early, so I sought the Duc de Maillé, gentleman-in-waiting to *Monsieur*, and pointed out three or four to him, among others Mlle. Montausier, for a long time a theatrical manager, and famed for a thousand adventures in the course of which she had shown herself the devoted servant of the former Court. He sent some ushers to the ladies, who were shown out without too much scandal. Mistakes of this kind were doubtless unavoidable in the first days, and I merely refer to them to complete the picture of the period.

It would, in 1814, have been very easy to avoid many of the errors of all kinds which were committed, had trust been reposed in persons possessing a true knowledge of men and things. Unfortunately, there was an inclination to distrust everything that was in existence. The consequences of such a line of action in connection with the ser-

vice at whose head I was, were likely to be very unpleasant, for there was no department in which it was easier to be deceived.

Hardly had the little coterie which I have mentioned, and which laid pretensions to managing everything, quartered itself in the Tuileries, than it organized a secret police. There had been no lack of people who tendered their assistance and their lights; they were the refuse of the police force for the past twenty-five years; they comprised all those who had been expelled from it as inefficient or worthless; there were among the spies, spies serving both parties, foreigners as well as Frenchmen. The most important of the agents employed by M. de Vitrolles and his friends was Veyrat. Fully aware of my opinion of him, he lost no time in seeking a protection which might secure him against what he was pleased to call my enmity; he had purchased this protection at the cost of a number of falsehoods and information against people. He thus expected to create unto himself, near *Monsieur*, a position similar to the one he had occupied near the Emperor, through the medium of his bedchamber valet, Constant.

I had made up my mind to get rid of him, and was only waiting for such a time as I could do so without any inconvenience. After the departure of Napoleon, I made the necessary preparations for carrying my design into execution. I had, in the first place, selected his successor, so as to feel sure that his place would be properly filled; I next took the precaution of mentioning the case to *Monsieur* in one of my daily reports. As this dismissal was wholly a matter for me to deal with, I had added that I intended to give effect to it forthwith. On the morning of the 26th, I sent for M. Veyrat and told him that he must understand that the part he had enacted for several years did not permit of my availing myself any longer of his services; that

he had just lost his French citizenship, as the town of Geneva, his birthplace, was no longer a part of France; there was therefore nothing better for him to do than to return to his native city. I delivered to him a passport, with an order to leave next day before nine o'clock in the morning. He made no objection and I heard nothing more about him for the rest of the day; he left the prefecture almost immediately after the notice I gave him, and he was not seen again; I merely heard that he had made no preparations for leaving his domicile.

At midnight, after I had retired, I received a letter from M. de Vitrolles couched in the following terms: "*Monsieur le Baron*, I have the honor of transmitting to you His Royal Highness's order that you will cease all proceedings against Messieurs Veyrat, Senior and Junior, police inspectors." I replied to M. de Vitrolles by the orderly who had brought me this missive, that I had received his letter and that I would bring my reply to it to *Monsieur* myself. True to my word, I was at the Tuileries before seven o'clock next morning. I had M. de Vitrolles called, and commissioned him to inform *Monsieur* that I wished to speak with him as soon as he could be seen, adding that he would oblige me by acquainting him at the same time with the fact that I was bringing him my resignation.

M. de Vitrolles was greatly alarmed, and assured me that I was wrong in taking the matter so much to heart, that no idea had been entertained that I laid such stress on the matter, and that my services were considered most valuable; he undertook, if I would empower him to do so, to arrange it to my entire satisfaction. I remained firm, and insisted upon being ushered into the prince's presence. At the end of half an hour I was received with visible embarrassment. *Monsieur* interrupted me almost as soon as I began to inform him, with a good deal of sang-froid, of my determina-

tion to leave the Prefecture of Police. He confirmed the assurance already given me by M. de Vitrolles, that nothing was further from his thoughts than to give me the slightest cause for displeasure; he added that since I desired so positively to dismiss the Messieurs Veyrat, he left me entire freedom to deal with them as I saw fit; I should indeed have been hard to please, had I not remained content with such satisfaction. I improved the opportunity by telling him what I thought of the benefit which those whom he honored with his confidence sought to reap from police methods of which they had no experience whatever, and an ill-governed use of which might lead them to commit deplorable mistakes. That which had happened in the case of M. Veyrat afforded conclusive proof of this. It was plain that he had been employed secretly; now, there was no man less worthy of confidence or whose services were more compromising. If I might judge from this about the others whom I did not know, the information to be obtained from them could not be of any value. Certain memoranda which had reached me from *Monsieur's* closet during the last few days, were thus explained. My attention was called in them to most serious facts, which, on investigation, proved to be either false or distorted. It had been successfully sought to alarm *Monsieur* regarding certain distributions of money, which, it was alleged, were being made in the *faubourgs* with the worst of intentions. These distributions were none other than those made by most respectable persons under my direction and by my orders; I had applied to that purpose the sum paid to me daily by the lessee of the games of chance. The tranquillity of the *faubourg* had for three weeks past been due to this relief which had been divided with discrimination and which had efficaciously supported poor families burdened with many children.



On returning to the Prefecture of Police, I again sent for M. Veyrat, who had reinstated himself with a great air of triumph. On this occasion, he received orders to leave before six o'clock that evening, an order which was rigorously obeyed.

The issue of this affair might have been considered a triumph for me, yet it left a most painful impression on my mind. The idea that the resolve to subject me to something so intolerably distasteful had been so lightly arrived at was very hard for me to bear; I could no longer entertain any illusion, my position was shaken, and the sincerity which I made my primary duty, rendered it worse daily. Whenever I have thought of the matter since then, I have not been able to restrain a smile over my naïveté and inexperience.

With the assent of M. de Talleyrand and the Abbé de Montesquiou, with whom I always conferred regarding matters of importance, I had been one of the first to propose the dispatch into the departments of a certain number of commissioners invested with duly authenticated powers, with the object of stimulating the zeal of the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, and to enlighten the public mind by making known the true intentions of the government. I had entertained a hope that these commissioners, carefully selected and wisely instructed, would destroy the baneful effect produced in several localities by officials who had put to bad use the powers with which they had been entrusted by the prince previous to his entering the capital. Why also should it not be a good thing to send influential generals to at once review the various army corps, and to set their minds at ease? My hope was realized, and on the 22d, *Monsieur* decreed that a commissioner extraordinary, representing the king, should be sent into each military division. The object of their mission and the extent of their

powers were specified in detail in the decree; these powers were very extensive, too much so, perhaps. This was well, as far as it went, if only able, prudent, and unexceptionable commissioners were chosen. But such was not to be the case; thus, among well-known names, inspiring every confidence, several were found which were entirely out of place, and which were likely to give umbrage to the public mind. The list of them produced a bad impression as soon as it became known, and furnished good grounds for unfavorable criticism. I brought this to the notice of *Monsieur* in a memorandum, which, to tell the truth, I sent separately from my report, in order that it should partake of a more confidential nature. I still wonder at my simplicity in having brought myself to believe that criticisms directed against personal friends of the prince would be well received!

The government neglected nothing which seemed required for the re-establishment of order, the execution of the laws, and the collection of the taxes. With regard to all these matters, the prince acted on the advice of the provisional Council of State, and of the commissioners in charge of the several ministries. Here expired the secret power of the intimate counsellors surrounding him.

Such was the origin of the twofold action in the government; its consequences were very injurious and made themselves felt for many a day. In his public acts *Monsieur* seemed to seek to strengthen the action of the provisional government, and it must be admitted that he often countenanced with good grace, acts which must have been distasteful to him, but which were considered indispensable to allay anxieties or give satisfaction to the most suspicious spirits. Thus, he reinstated in his former functions of Inspector-general of Engineers, as soon as he had sent in his adhesion, General Carnot, who was in command at Antwerp. This

general was no other than the regicide, and member of the Committee of Public Safety. This act of his new authority must have cost the brother of Louis XVI. a bitter pang.

The army received a month's pay; all penalties incurred in connection with the conscription were remitted, an act of clemency which opened the prison doors to a number of unfortunate young men whose fate was greatly to be pitied. *Monsieur* granted likewise several well-placed pardons: he reinstated General Lecourbe in the high military position to which he was entitled; the only reason for his services having been dispensed with was his well-known hostility towards Napoleon. He gave the command of a military division to General Souham, who had led Marshal Marmont's army corps to Versailles. He performed an act of justice when dismissing several prefects whose excessive zeal had rendered them odious to those within their jurisdiction.

My brother, who was sub-prefect at La Flèche, was appointed prefect at Le Mans, in the same department where lay our estates; nothing could have pleased him more. I was indebted for this favor to the Abbé de Montesquiou, who showed me particular good-will on all occasions. One morning he called on me at the Prefecture of Police. After a few words regarding current affairs, he said: "Now, let us speak of yourself; the king is about to arrive; I will make it a point of laying before him all the services you have rendered, and he will be desirous of rewarding them. It is necessary that I should know what would be agreeable to you, what your wishes are, so tell me frankly." "I have but one wish," was my reply, "and that is, to leave this department, to give up a position of which I am tired, whose duties are always distasteful to me, sometimes even distressing."—"Well, then, you are asking me to do the only thing I cannot do for you. I am too faithful a servant of the king for me not to tell him, on the contrary, how fortu-

nate he is in finding at the head of the police, on returning to his realm, a man upon whom he can wholly depend, one who knows both the past and the present, men and conditions, and who can in consequence impart to him valuable information which he would obtain to such an extent from no other."

He begged me to consent to remain at the head of the police for one or two years, stating that all such arrangements should be made as I might desire to induce me to adopt this course. I was far from feeling inclined to yield, so, without dwelling any further on what concerned me personally, we discussed the most appropriate way of reorganizing the police department. I suggested the abolition of the ministry of police which was being offered to me, for which, I suggested, could be substituted a general direction with which might be incorporated the functions of prefect of police, who would thus possess, together with more latitude out of doors, the attributes of the lieutenant-general of police before the Revolution. I adduced several reasons in favor of this change, which would at all events present the advantage of turning over many cases to the Department of the Interior, out of whose hands they should never have been taken, and to restore by this means more independence and consideration to prefectural administration. The Abbé de Montesquiou inclined favorably towards my ideas on this subject; he doubtless dwelt on their excellence shortly afterwards, for they were given effect to almost in their entirety in Louis XVIII.'s primary organization of his government.

This conversation is a curious one when viewed in the light of what happened to me very soon afterwards. Could I expect that I would retain for some time longer the office whither fate had led me, which I had accepted with such little enthusiasm, and which had enabled me to play

so important a part, far different from the one I had reason to anticipate? My position was truly a strange one at that period of my existence; the oddest circumstance connected with it was that it made me experience in the last days of its duration injustice and ill-will from some of those to whose service I had devoted myself, while, on the contrary, I won the respect and confidence of nearly all those from whom I had separated myself.

I had preserved my independence. Caring little for personal favors, I had declared without dissembling, without circumlocution, the course I was going to pursue while in a position wherein I had important duties to fulfil towards my fellow-citizens. I had been determined in my course with the sole thought of serving my city and my country; I had always avoided uttering a single word likely to give offence to the man whose cause I had seen fit to desert; it was within my power to become a medium between the new government and the men who were willing to link their fortunes with its own, on condition that it should deign to show them the consideration to which they were entitled.

The matter was a delicate one, for a revolution, and this was one, does not occur without there being fresh services calling for rewards and new pretensions to be satisfied; in order to do justice to them, it becomes absolutely necessary to sacrifice somewhat the older ones. Everything consists in being able to deal cleverly with the claims of all. I do not believe that this quality was ever more lacking than in those at the helm at that time. From the very outset conflicting interests joined issue; the arrivals from Blois were among the most eager to push themselves forward. All came to consult me as to the line of action they should follow. I rendered them every possible service and took special care not to destroy their illusions; the greater part of them labored under the impression that great was the

joy at seeing them present themselves, and that the government would be eager to avail itself of their services. The Archchancellor was perhaps the one who least indulged in this dream; he had resolved not to come forward except as much as should be required in view of his safety, his well-being, and the preservation of his possessions. I was glad to be in a position to repay the kind services he had done me with those I rendered him near the Abbé de Montesquiou, than whom no one could better incline the king's mind in his favor, or tone down his prejudices. There was no abler or more enlightened administrator than M. Regnaud, and no one was more inclined to place his ability entirely at the disposal of the Royal government, but an untoward circumstance caused him to be looked upon with great disfavor. On the 30th of March, he was in command of a legion of the National Guard at the Clichy barrier, one of the points most exposed; just as the engagement seemed about to begin, he had deserted his post and gone home at a full gallop. This desertion was severely commented upon. And yet, he had merely obeyed the order sent him by King Joseph to leave Paris for Blois. At any rate he should have shown less haste in obeying this order, and he might have chosen a more opportune moment.

I have referred to the Duc de Rovigo's inclinations at the time of his departure; they explain his eagerness to have himself accepted. He had written from Blois to M. de Talleyrand, and begged his kind interference. His letter was brought by a bedchamber valet; it remained unanswered; M. de Talleyrand, who had much to attend to, doubtless considered that the Duc de Rovigo was in too great a hurry. The valet had likewise been sent to me; in vain did I repeatedly remind M. de Talleyrand that a single word, however insignificant, would suffice to calm a brain the effervescence of which he was acquainted with; he paid

no heed to my reminders. The Duc de Rovigo considered that he had claims to his attention, and was not in a mood to let him forget that he owed him many a debt of gratitude, so this indifference angered him considerably. Such were the beginnings of a hatred which M. de Talleyrand treated with disdain, which other circumstances were to fan still more, and which dealt him several deadly blows; as regards myself, my showing him some few courtesies was cause that I remained on pretty good terms with him.

Among those who returned towards the end of April, I must note M. de Sémonville. He took his seat in the Senate on the 26th; this was very late in the day in the case of a man as careful as he was to study and foresee great political events. He had not had far to travel, as his mission of commissioner-general had only taken him as far as Moulins; he had managed, while thus engaged, to enter into communication with the most devoted agents of the Royalist cause, such as M. de Rivière, and he also relied on the support of M. Ferrand, who would ere long inevitably play an important part. Thus, he had paved the way; the position which he soon afterwards attained showed that he had not spent his time in vain, and that his steps had been well calculated.

The time was drawing near which was to restore to France and to the capital the head of the House of Bourbon, and with him, all the members of his family. Louis XVIII. had at last left Hartwell. On his way to embark at Dover, he had passed through London, where the Prince Regent had arranged a ceremonious entry for him. He received him with much pomp as King of France. This pageant took place on the 20th; on the same day, Napoleon was leaving Fontainebleau for the Isle of Elba, surrounded by a foreign escort and by British, Russian, Austrian, and Prussian commissioners, who regarded him as an actual prisoner.

The homage paid the king on the other side of the Straits of Dover caused little joy in France; it was not to be concealed that England's interference was unfortunate, it contained an offensive element for our country, and it would have been better had Louis XVIII. selected some other starting-point than one situated on the British coast. He landed at Calais on the 21st. By whom was he accompanied, what was to be his future entourage, who were to compose his intimate circle? People went in anxious quest of the slightest information on these all-important points.

A few persons had already gone to Hartwell to do him homage, and many others met him as he landed at Calais. The individuals who showed such eager haste were, in the main, men who had belonged to the old Court, who had occupied important positions, and been specially attached to his person when he still bore the title of *Monsieur*. It was therefore difficult to derive any indication from this fact. There was something strange in the ignorance in this regard of those persons who should have retained the means of being well informed. I can instance a singular proof in corroboration of this. Some time between the 20th and 30th of April, M. de Talleyrand communicated to me as an important discovery that he had learnt as a certainty that the man who stood highest in favor with the king, and with whom it was consequently important to ingratiate oneself, was M. de Blacas, who had taken the place vacated by M. d'Avaray. This information came, I believe, from M. Charles de Noailles, later Duc de Mouchy. He had been among the Hartwell callers, sent thither by M. de Talleyrand. The king had, for his part, kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with many of his supporters, in consequence of which, his mind was, in many matters, if not fully made up, at any rate filled with ideas



at variance with those of *Monsieur*. His confidence had always been placed in a different quarter, and the agents of the one had seldom been those of the other. The Abbé de Montesquiou, the most important of those who had for long years been employed by the king, had a close connection in Paris with two men who furnished him with the materials for his correspondence. Messieurs Royer-Collard and Becquey even escaped the vigilance of the Imperial police, as also that of *Monsieur* and of all his agents. They had especially stipulated that they should be entirely distinct from the latter; this was the condition of their services.

From whatever quarter they came, the letters written to the two princes were beyond doubt the work of men imbued with prejudices; still, less prejudice penetrated those addressed to the king; the ideas embodied in them were conceived in a fairer spirit, and displayed less blind bias. We were in ignorance of all these occurrences, which were nevertheless to have an important bearing on the course of events. Had it not been for the gout which detained the king so inopportunately in England, he would probably have returned to France two or three days after his brother, and would have taken hold of the reins of government; *Monsieur's* first assumption of them, the consequences of which were never effaced, would have been avoided, and the position of many persons entitled to consideration would have been far different under the House of Bourbon.

The king made rather slow progress; he did not reach Compiègne until six o'clock on the evening of the 29th. His passage by way of Boulogne, Abbeville, and Amiens, had been marked with outward demonstrations of joy; the good taste, moderation, appropriateness, and the graceful expression of his slightest utterances met with great success. He was accompanied by the Duchesse d'Angou-

lême, the Prince de Condé, and the Duc de Bourbon. Everything had been done, not only to give to his entry into the capital the most brilliant pomp, but also to invest the day's proceedings with a truly national character. With this object in view, it was indispensable that a rather considerable number of French troops should participate in them. The undertaking was not unattended with difficulties, considering the presence of the foreign troops. Nevertheless it was resolved upon; an order of the day was issued by the Minister of War on the 30th of April, that by order of *Monsieur*, lieutenant-general of the kingdom, detachments of all arms, taken from the various army corps, were designated to form part of the king's cortège. These detachments, which were to be representative of the entire army, and which were headed by marshals of France and several general officers, were placed under the superior command of the Duc de Berry.

Next morning, a second order of the day announced that *Monsieur* had caused a fresh supply of funds to be placed at his disposal, and a second monthly instalment of back pay was to be distributed in the army. The Minister of Finance deserved great credit for so quickly producing sufficient funds to meet this necessary expenditure.

On the 1st of May, the first of the detachments made its appearance, viz. that of the Chasseurs and the Grenadiers of the Guard. They were enthusiastically welcomed by the people, and the workmen, who went to meet them in great numbers on the Boulevard du Sud, happy, as they said, to see again the *grizzly moustaches*, who could, if they but chose, so easily make the foreigner dance. The soldiers showed their appreciation of such a reception, and it needed great prudence to prevent riotous demonstrations, the consequences of which would have been very serious.

I was compelled to point out the unpleasant effect of a

particular circumstance. The Minister of War, lending a willing ear to certain insinuations, had allowed himself to disband the *gendarmerie d'élite*, which was considered to be composed of men especially devoted to Napoleon. This was childish; this body was no more animated with a hostile spirit than any other; it was composed of a better class of men, for it was considered a favor to be allowed to join it; its suppression was viewed by the other corps as the prelude to the treatment in store for them. It was sought to remove this impression by having it said that the Royal family had, on the contrary, been desirous of giving a proof of their confidence in the whole army by dispensing with the services of a body organized in distrust of it and as the support of an inquisitorial police. This matter afforded the opportunity for the last conversation I had with *Monsieur* concerning the army. I told him once more that I believed it necessary to be very cautious in the treatment of it, and to especially spare no effort to secure the attachment of the Imperial Guard, whose loyalty would pledge that of all the rest of the army. *Monsieur* heard me with a serious mien, and let the following escape his lips: "Yet it would prove an expensive luxury to retain a corps accustomed to so many advantages." At the very time that this economical reason was being alleged, I knew as a fact that strenuous efforts were being made to induce *Monsieur* to give his assent to the re-establishment of the *gardes du corps* and of the entire military household of the king, as formerly constituted. This idea was to be realized only too soon.

I will not go into the particulars of the various occurrences at Compiègne, but there are two incidents, not generally known, which I must not pass in silence. The Emperor Alexander had gone hither with prompt courtesy, while M. de Talleyrand had lost no time in coming upon the scene. Neither of them returned well pleased.

Louis XVIII., in spite of a mind more enlightened than that of most princes, was particularly tenacious of the rules of etiquette in force at the French Court, and which, especially from the days of Louis XIV., seemed to have been invented for the purpose of establishing on all occasions the pre-eminence of his house. He did not depart from them on this occasion; to speak correctly, he resurrected them. I do not know what arrangement of chairs,<sup>1</sup> what rank in entering or leaving a room, must have made the Czar feel that his race was a young one among those of the sovereigns, especially when compared with that of a king of the Bourbon family. He had reckoned on a more friendly and less ceremonious greeting, believing that the great services he had just rendered entitled him to a deference in whose presence the barriers of etiquette would disappear. He felt a keen disappointment over the matter, but this was not the most serious one he was to suffer. Alexander had until then been at the head of all the members of the coalition which had determined Napoleon's fate; not only had his influence preponderated, but for the past six weeks nothing had been done except in accordance with his will; it was he who had decided on everything. In Paris, where this truth was undisputed, all eyes looked in his direction, all requests were addressed to him, and he was the centre of all hopes. All this was brusquely altered at Compiègne.

The king and all his kin arrived from England, where he had found an asylum at a time when he was driven out of the whole of Europe, even Russia; he had just received there the homage, tendered with much pomp, to the crown placed on his brow; the Prince Regent, the entire nation, had acclaimed his restoration; they had, in their pride, affected to rejoice in it as being their work, as the result of their stubborn struggle against Napoleon.

<sup>1</sup> At dinner, the king had an armchair, while an ordinary chair was set for the Emperor Alexander.

“Alone,” they had said to Louis XVIII., “we have always been your allies; among the sovereigns of the Continent, some have been basely submissive to the usurper of your throne, and have sued for the honor which one of them has obtained of giving him for consort a daughter of their blood. If in the end they have joined us in order to dethrone him, the madness of his ambition having driven them to it, they had fought merely for their own existence.” This most specious language had deeply impressed Louis XVIII.

When Alexander made his appearance at Compiègne, it was impossible for him not to perceive that he was entering into an atmosphere differing greatly from the one in which he had hitherto lived. He was no longer the one indispensable man, in whom everything centred; another influence counterbalanced his own, and it was precisely the one distasteful to him above all others, for it came from a quarter which he foresaw would be the only rivalry he would henceforth have to dread in Europe. He had gone to Compiègne imbued with an idea which he had complacently nourished for some time past, that of an intimate union between Russia and France, a union which should be cemented by the marriage of the Duc de Berry with one of his sisters. He had until then foreseen no obstacle in the way of the realization of this idea; was it not now to be feared that rival interests, that a policy in opposition with his own, might seek to prevent its success? He found neither in the king nor his family the effusiveness and cordiality which would have made all preliminary overtures a simple and easy matter. When therefore he returned from Compiègne to Paris, it was in a far different frame of mind from the one on the outward journey.

We shall duly see the consequences of these severe disappointments, when the fearful events which once more

shook Europe and cost France so dear a price, burst forth in all their fury. The conflict between British and Russian influence created at home an analogous division between the political parties. The entire Court and the *émigrés* went over to the side of England, while on Russia's side were the men who had played an active and important part in recent events and all those whose patriotism had been excited against England during the wars of the Empire. A profound hatred of England had become the national sentiment, all military men were imbued with it, the dwellers on the coast had imbibed it with their mothers' milk, and the misfortunes of the war on the seas had but served to increase it. Even after the peace, the sailors who had been prisoners, as fast as they returned to France, added fresh fuel to it by the recital of the infamous treatment to which they had been subjected on the British hulks. Hence, at the very outset the Royal Government was at variance with the great majority of its subjects. This source of disagreement was, like many others, again met with on the 20th of March, and explains the catastrophe.

M. de Talleyrand, when leaving Paris, likewise entertained illusions; he expected to enjoy a lengthy and confidential conversation with the king, who could but be desirous of becoming acquainted with a quantity of facts and information which he was alone in a position to supply. He expected to implant in the king's mind the germs of numerous ideas the development of which would come later. He reckoned on laying the first foundations of the political programme to be followed at home and abroad. I feel pretty sure, from what little he told me in this connection, that his plan was a most extended one; he thought himself so assured of the influence which he was going to exercise, that he had sounded all his intimates with regard to what they would like to have reach the ear of the king.

It will perhaps be asked if he did not look into his heart, and if he seriously entertained the thought that a journey to Compiègne could cause his past to be forgotten.

I am not among those who seek to palliate the serious faults of both the public and private life of M. de Talleyrand. At no time did the charm of his intellect deceive me as to the weak side of his ability or the defects of his character; but I say unhesitatingly that if ever any one was permitted to hope that services rendered could wipe out past misdeeds, no one more than he was entitled to such indulgence on the part of the Bourbons. Great and painful was therefore his astonishment when he saw himself, at Compiègne, relegated to the throng of courtiers, when he was made to wait two or three hours before being received by the king, after having been compelled to by the interference of M. de Blacas, in order not to be kept waiting any longer.<sup>1</sup>

The king, when he finally received him, greeted him with good taste and courteously, and spoke some kindly words to him. I am as sure of the fact as if I had heard them.<sup>2</sup> But the show of confidence which he had antici-

<sup>1</sup> M. de Talleyrand had persisted, in spite of several warnings, in committing a rather serious mistake. He had sent the Duc de Liancourt to meet the king, and had made him the bearer of a certain message on which he set great store. In vain had he been told that this personage, whatever might be his worth, could not be *persona grata* to His Majesty, who doubtless had not forgotten his action in sending back to him his *cordons bleu* (the blue ribbon of the *Ordre du Saint-Esprit*), nor the spirit in which he had written the narrative of his trip to America. M. de Talleyrand obstinately argued and maintained that M. de Liancourt, as grand-master of the wardrobe, would be failing in the duties of his position and be ignoring his privileges if he neglected to take his place at the king's side. Now, the position of grand-master of the wardrobe was held by M. de Blacas, the man whom the king liked most and whom he certainly would not suffer to be dispossessed.

<sup>2</sup> Among other things said, the following is one which M. de Talleyrand oftentimes took pleasure in repeating, as being the first words addressed to him by the king; although he has repeated the very words, many will not view them in the same light as he did. "So then, M. de Talleyrand, it is

pated was not in any way manifested; while being politely treated, he was kept at a distance, and the conversation did not take the turn he had hoped it would.

Still, he succeeded in bringing it to bear on a few important questions, among others, the necessity of an act which should make known the king's intentions with regard to the Charter prepared by the Senate. In this instance, just as in the case of his conference with *Monsieur*, he committed the mistake of suggesting its full and plain acceptance, instead of contenting himself with asking that the fundamental principles set forth therein and which established the blending of the monarchical power with a wise liberty, regulated by law, should be promulgated immediately. He could not have struck a harder blow at his influence and inflicted greater injury to his position. It would seem that his conduct in this connection had been concerted with the Emperor Alexander, who used the same language. Louis XVIII. heard them both and answered as kings possess the secret of answering, leaving everything to be hoped for without binding himself to anything; moreover, his mind was already made up, and it was assuredly not his intention to go beyond the engagements entered into by *Monsieur* in his reply to the Senate. These could neither be ignored nor eluded. If there be added to the good-natured attention with which he was listened to, the repeated marks of satisfaction over the services he had rendered, expressions of confidence that he would yet render others, the sum total will be reached of all the benefit

I who am at last in the right. Had the advantage remained with you on your side, you would have said: 'Let us be seated and talk'; as it is for me to pay you this compliment, pray be seated and talk." M. de Talleyrand seemed flattered at so great a familiarity, at this fashion, so to speak, of treating him as an equal. Should he not have perceived that this language veiled irony? Should he not especially have drawn the inference therefrom that the past had not been forgotten, and that he was to consider himself defeated?



he derived from an interview on which he had built such great hopes. What I can certify to is that on his return we all vied in plying him with questions, and that it was not hard to see that in spite of the satisfied air he assumed, and his clever phrases on the touching spectacle he had just witnessed, he had nothing positive or important to communicate to anybody.

Was there after all any cause for feeling greatly surprised thereat? All were at that period suffering from the same blindness, which did not allow one to form a correct idea of his position or that of others. There was a hidden and unknown side to every situation, and it was an obstacle to a sound judgment of things. Thus, we were not any more acquainted with the House of Bourbon and its followers than they were with us; they were an unknown quantity to us just as we were to them; France was as much *terra incognita* to them, as Hartwell and Edinburgh were to us.

Moreover, the Restoration was, in their eyes, rather the work of fate than the work of men. We all of us had said that a return to the legitimate princes was the only possible solution of the crisis into which we had been thrown. Now, however excellent the setting forth of this truth might have been in order to bring about the Restoration, it was no longer of any value when the matter at issue was to render it wise and grateful. The people in the king's palace did not consider that any debt of gratitude was owed us because we had followed the only course which could save us.

Far more, when M. de Talleyrand, one of the chief authors of the political change in favor of the princes of the House of Bourbon, waited upon them, he brought with him, in spite of the services he had rendered, recollections which caused them the most painful impression. One of the most ardent innovators of the Constituent Assembly, in

those days one of the first to desert the altar, the minister of the Directoire and of Napoleon, the confidant in or artisan of, under these two régimes, all the acts hostile to the rights of the House of Bourbon, lastly, the married bishop, going to meet a house so religiously imbued with its rights, could he become the recipient of first favors, and become both the indispensable counsellor and mentor? It must be considered as one of the principal causes of the difficulties and misfortunes of the period, that the rôle of M. de Talleyrand did not fall to the lot of a man whose antecedents would have rendered him less distasteful, who would have constituted a natural link between the two parties, who, after having powerfully co-operated towards bringing about the Restoration, would have been the steady defender of the legitimate interests of the new France. It was impossible that the confidence and the authority necessary to fill this part should exist between the Royal family and M. de Talleyrand.

## CHAPTER XX

Louis XVIII. at Saint-Ouen, where he receives the great bodies of the state; M. de Talleyrand's speech — The Declaration of Saint-Ouen — The king's entry into Paris — Enthusiasm of the population; fine appearance of the *Garde* — Parade and filing past of the allied troops before the king on the following day — The Austrians displease the population with their victorious airs — M. Pasquier's first interview with Louis XVIII.; the latter brings Messieurs Pasquier and de Blacas together — The *Corps législatif* summoned to meet on the 31st of May — Meeting of the Committee on the Constitution — Counter-revolutionary sentiments of M. Ferrand and the Abbé de Montesquiou — Singular contempt of Chancellor Dambray for the Senate and the *Corps législatif* — Intrigues to secure ministerial portfolios — Creation of a Council of War; General Dupont's responsibility noways lessened by its existence — He co-operates in the reconstruction of the king's military household — M. Pasquier calls his attention to the dangers arising from such a measure — Reorganization of the army; the companies of the *gardes du corps* — *Monsieur* assumes the title of colonel-general of the National Guards — Other appointments of colonels-general.

ON the first of May it was announced in the *Moniteur* that the king would arrive at Saint-Ouen the next day, and that, on the day following, he would make his entry into the capital.

It had already been determined, for some days, that in order that the entry should be made with greater convenience both to His Majesty and the cortège, it was necessary that he should, on the previous day, sleep at some little distance from the city. I had been commissioned by M. de Talleyrand to seek a suitable residence in the neighborhood of Saint-Denis, as it was intended that the king should, as *Monsieur* had done, cross the most thickly populated quar-

ters and follow the same road as the one followed on the 12th of April.

I therefore rode through all the villages which line the Seine in this direction. At Saint-Ouen, I found the old château, which, prior to the Revolution had belonged to the Duc de Nivernais, and which since then had become the property of a Polish lady, also a house belonging to M. Terneaux, and which had once been M. de Necker's. The château was most courteously placed at the disposal of the king and of the Duchesse d'Angoulême, while the residence of M. Terneaux was set apart for the Prince de Condé and the Duc de Bourbon.

The king reached Saint-Ouen at dinner-time, on Monday, May 2d. At seven o'clock in the evening he received the members of the provisional Council of State, the commissioners holding ministerial portfolios, the marshals of France, and deputations from the several bodies of the state, the Senate, the *Corps législatif*, the *Cour de cassation*, the *Cour royale*, the *Cour des comptes*, and the University.

The Senate was introduced by M. de Talleyrand, who delivered a speech, wherein he took note of the determination of His Majesty "to unite all interests to those of the throne by means of a constitutional charter, and to thus strengthen the good-will already shown with the co-operation of all hearts. . . ." "You know better than we do ourselves, Sire," he went on to say, "that similar institutions, so fully tried by a neighboring people, afford support and not barriers to monarchs who are friends to the laws, and the fathers of peoples." And indeed the time had come when there could be no retracing of steps, and when the king must solemnly declare himself and take an engagement which should, by giving satisfaction to the general wish, allay all alarm.

Louis XVIII. disposed of the matter in a happy and bold fashion. Fearing to have his hand forced by the Emperor Alexander,<sup>1</sup> he understood that no time was to be lost. The *Moniteur* of the 3d, which appeared early in the morning, laid before the public a declaration which he had signed only the evening before. It is known as the Declaration of Saint-Ouen.

Frankly approaching the question of the senatorial charter, the king stated therein that after having attentively perused the constitutional plan proposed by the Senate, he had come to the conclusion that its bases were good, but that a number of its articles bore the imprint of the haste with which they had been drafted, and could not, in their actual form, become a fundamental law of the state. He was prepared to adopt a liberal constitution, but he wished it to be wisely framed and he could not accept a measure which absolutely needed revising. He therefore called together, for the 10th of June, the Senate and the *Corps législatif*, binding himself to then lay before them the work he would by that time have prepared with the aid of a committee selected from these two bodies. He bound himself to give as basis to the future constitution the guarantees enumerated in the eleven articles forming part of the declaration. He could not have taken his stand on better ground. The said articles contained all that *Monsieur* had promised on the 14th of April. It could not be denied that the fundamental conditions of a liberal government were therein

<sup>1</sup> The Emperor Alexander clung to the Charter of the Senate as having been conceived under his auspices, as being a condition whose acceptance he had guaranteed, and which had repaid that body for the assistance it had given him towards the realization of his dearest wishes for the annihilation of Napoleon and the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon. I am also inclined to think that a good deal of condescension towards the Emperor Alexander entered into the perseverance shown by M. de Talleyrand in asking of the king the plain and full acceptance of this charter.

most clearly expressed. There was besides, with regard to interests born of the Revolution, every possible guarantee they could pretend to. The sale of national properties remained irrevocable, military pensions, rank, and honors were secured, as well as the old and new nobility; the Legion of Honor was to remain an institution, subject to some modifications in the decoration; all Frenchmen were to be admitted to civil and military posts; lastly, no one was to be molested on account of his opinions and votes. The use of the word *vote* guaranteed immunity even to the regicides.

The result was as satisfactory as could be desired. I feel certain that this important document was drawn up by M. de Vitrolles, and he was justified in always claiming credit for it. It was perhaps revised by the Abbé de Montesquiou.

The entry of the king, for which careful preparations had been made, was admirable. A greater display of magnificence is oftentimes to be seen, but the spontaneous movement and enthusiasm of the population was perhaps never met with to a like degree anywhere. The weather was as fine as on the 12th of April; the same itinerary, the same ceremony at Notre-Dame, the same dressing of houses and windows, and the same joyous transports, especially on the part of the *bourgeoisie*. The statue of Henri IV. had been re-erected as if by enchantment on the platform of the Pont-Neuf; the carriage of the king halted, so that he could read on the pedestal the following simple and beautiful inscription:—

*Ludovico reduce Henricus rediitrus.*

The throng was so great at this point that it cannot be conceived how it was ever possible to keep the passage clear. Advantage had been taken of the slightest space along the

line of march to erect stands which were hidden under the mass of spectators. In the first open carriage sat the old king, whom neither his misfortunes nor his infirmities had deprived of the beautiful expression of his face, recalling the well-known type of his ancient race; at his side was the Duchesse d'Angoulême, the daughter of Louis XVI. and Marie-Antoinette, the prisoner of the Temple, whose melancholy features recalled so many painful recollections. On the front seat was the Prince de Condé, the father of the Duc d'Enghien, and the sole survivor of a race about to die out; *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry rode on either side of the carriage.

Even nowadays, the recollection of that day moves me deeply. I recalled the melancholy days when I used to look at the high walls of the Temple with an aching heart; I saw once more the Place de la Revolution, the death of the king, the death of my father, and the long hours during which the stoutest hearts were a prey to despair! Who could in those days have dreamt that this family, scattered by the storm, would return triumphant amid the acclamations of the population of Paris?

All the foreign troops had been confined to barracks. The French troops behaved admirably, for they saw about the king and the princes their most distinguished leaders, those whom they were accustomed to look up to above all others. Marshal Berthier went ahead of the king's carriage with several general officers. The other marshals surrounded *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry. It would have been very difficult for the troops not to succumb to the enthusiasm which they witnessed on all sides.

The Imperial Guard, which occupied the first rank in the escort, seemed to fully appreciate the honor. At many points of its passage cries had broken forth of "Long live the Guard!" This cry, mingled with that of "Long live

the king! Long live the House of Bourbon!" had produced an excellent effect. Had the very next day one of the princes gone and said to the Guard, in the name of the king: "Comrades, you are to-day the Royal Guard, the king and his family place themselves in your safe-keeping, and require no other pledge of their safety than your bravery and your loyalty," all these fine old soldiers would have been won over irrevocably.

Leaving Saint-Ouen at ten o'clock in the forenoon, the king did not arrive at the château of the Tuileries until six in the evening; an immense concourse of people filled the Carrousel, the courtyards, and the gardens. His Majesty had to appear on the balcony several times during the evening, having the Duchesse d'Angoulême at his side. A display of fireworks and a general illumination brought the day to a close.

I was fortunate enough not to have to write down in my evening report any accident, a rare thing on such a day. Unfortunately things did not pass off as well on the following day. The Russian, Austrian, and Prussian troops were at early morn stationed by columns on the right bank of the Seine, from the Arsenal to the Louvre. At three o'clock, the king took his place at a window of the Pavillon de Flore. On either side of him were the Emperors of Russia and of Austria, the King of Prussia, the Duchesse d'Angoulême, *Monsieur*, and the Duc de Berry. The firing past began immediately and was over by six o'clock. It was under the command of the Grand Duke Constantine. This military ceremony was no doubt a fine one, but it had been all along the line the occasion for great excitement, brought about especially by the custom of which I have already made mention. The Austrians, when on active service, always wear a green sprig in their headgear; the Russians and Prussians had adopted this custom, and it was generally



believed that they displayed this particular ornament as an emblem of their triumph; a general murmur rose therefore both in the ranks of the National Guard and the population. I need hardly state that the army was still more deeply irritated. Towards noon, I resolved upon writing to M. de Nesselrode, begging him to bring my letter to the notice of the Emperor Alexander. Three-quarters of an hour later, an order had been conveyed along the entire Russian line and the ground was strewn with green sprigs torn from shakos and helmets. The Prussians followed this example; the Austrians alone persisted in preserving this ornamentation, and so they were the objects of special censure, which continued increasing until the time came for them to leave.

I had gone out during the day to judge by myself how things were going on in the vicinity of the Tuileries. On my return home, I found on my writing-table a tiny note, the writing of which was new to me; it was the king's. When sending my report of the previous day's doings, I had taken the liberty of writing to His Majesty for the purpose of receiving his orders as to the nature and extent of the intercourse he authorized me to entertain with him personally. I had asked whether it would suit him that I should occasionally wait upon him, as I had done in the case of *Monsieur*, in order to report special matters.

His reply was most obliging; I was authorized to continue the practice I had followed so far, and to wait upon him every morning at eight o'clock. I availed myself of this permission on the following day, and was greeted with much kindness. The king told me that I had communicated with him by correspondence for much longer than I was aware of, as, since his return to France, my reports had been transmitted to him regularly. He added that he had perused them with interest, and instructed me to continue keeping him informed as to all things with as much

frankness and accuracy as hitherto. He again and again told me that I must not entertain any fear of abusing this permission, and that for the present especially, he would be very glad to see me almost daily.

As I emerged from his closet, I found at the door a man who was waiting with an impatient air, and in whose physiognomy I could detect signs of surprise at my having preceded him. He entered immediately, for it was no other than M. de Blacas. Next day, on renewing my call, the king told me, just as it was drawing to a close, to go upstairs and see M. de Blacas; that it was his desire that I should, so far as lay in my power, keep him informed as to the actual situation of affairs; he added that in future I would do well to see him either before entering his own closet, or on leaving it. It was easy for me to infer that this was the result of the displeasure manifested by M. de Blacas on seeing me the day before; I understood that he desired that my visits to him should precede those I paid to His Majesty.

All things considered, I had everything to gain in the interest of the service, in not giving offence to the man who enjoyed to so high a degree the confidence of the king, so I went upstairs to call on M. de Blacas. He occupied at that time a little *entresol* situated above the king's apartments, and his only secretary was an abbé of puny appearance, whose name has escaped me; the sight of him caused me some surprise, as we had lost the habit of seeing ecclesiastics engaged otherwise than in their sacred calling. M. de Blacas, who had read my reports for a week or so, was fully *au fait* regarding the questions we had to discuss. The censure which could be read between the lines of my reports, and which bore on persons who had enjoyed the special confidence of *Monsieur*, and on their management of affairs, could not be otherwise than agreeable to him, for he was on

somewhat bad terms with this prince and his Court. Matters had not always run smoothly between the two brothers; more than once had M. de Blacas been sent to *Monsieur* and his satellites as the somewhat peremptory interpreter of the king's will. So here I was, owing to circumstances of which I knew next to nothing, in an apparently better position than the one I had just left; and indeed, during the whole of the time that I enjoyed direct intercourse with the king and M. de Blacas, I never experienced the slightest unpleasantness, and to the very last I had reason to believe that my services were appreciated.

Now that the king was assuming the reins of government it became necessary that the administration should receive an impulse which it could not enjoy under the lieutenant-general. Many decisions remained to be taken on questions which had been adjourned until this time. The king began by holding councils to which he at first called *Monsieur* and the Duc de Berry, then the members of the provisional Council of State, such as it had been organized by *Monsieur*, and lastly, the commissioners holding ministerial portfolios.

Among the most serious questions of which the public awaited the solution with a lively impatience, were four which had a particular interest for it. Of whom would the king compose his Cabinet? It was felt that it would be necessary to reorganize the army: in what spirit would it be done? What was to be the final treaty of peace? Lastly, when would the Charter make its appearance? Would its tenor correspond with the promises made in the Declaration?

In so far as the Charter was concerned, a striking proof of zeal and loyalty to promises was given, for, on the 6th, there was made public an ordinance which summoned the *Corps législatif* to meet on the 31st of May; the Declara-

tion had announced that its meeting was to take place on the 10th of June only. This measure was principally due, although the public remained in ignorance of the fact, to the persistent demand of the Emperor Alexander. He was desirous of leaving France as soon as possible, and he did not wish to depart from the capital before feeling assured that the engagements entered into would be kept, and that the nation should enjoy a liberal constitution which would protect and defend the interests of all. The fact must never be lost sight of, when studying the events of that period, that all the sovereigns were at that time fully convinced that France could not remain quiet except on this condition. The enlightenment of the king inspired sufficient confidence, but the Royalist party, whose tendencies had seemed different during the *lieutenance générale* of *Monsieur*, was distrusted. The Emperor Alexander particularly dreaded this party; the overtures he had risked making to it on several occasions made him look upon it as capable of any imprudent act. Hence he did not care to remove himself from the scene until everything was settled by the most formal deeds.

There had, for some time past, been so much constitution making, that the undertaking of framing one in two or three weeks did not seem extraordinary to anybody. The committee which was to engage in this task was immediately organized; it was composed of senators, deputies, and a few men in whom the king reposed a particular confidence. It was a somewhat singular thing, that neither decision nor ordinance was inserted in the *Moniteur* nor in the *Bulletin des lois*. There was apparently a dread of creating a sort of constituent power; what was sought for, were counsels, and not resolutions which would be binding. Messieurs de Pastoret, Barthélemy, Boissy d'Anglas, Barbé-Marbois, Sérurier, Garnier, de Fontanes, and de Sémouville,

as senators, Messieurs Lainé, Maine de Biran, Blanquart de Bailleul, Chabaud-Latour, Faget de Baure, Félix Faulcon, Clausel de Coussergues, Duchesne, Duhamel, as deputies, formed part of this committee, together with the Chancellor, the Abbé de Montesquiou, M. Ferrand, and M. Beugnot, as commissioners of the king.

The members of the committee who wielded the most influence in the debate and in the framing, were the Abbé de Montesquiou, M. Lainé, M. Garnier, M. Faget de Baure, M. Ferrand, and M. Beugnot, especially the last-named; it was his hand which directed the pen almost unceasingly, and which drew up the official reports. I know that he has kept them; they must contain interesting documents, for amid all those who figured in this debate, there were very few who kept step together, who knew whither they were drifting, and who sought a common goal. If ever these papers are given to the public, it will doubtless be a cause for surprise that provisions which it was believed were the outcome of the most profound discussions, passed, so to speak, unnoticed. The clauses regarding the freedom of worship, the liberty of the press, and electoral right were hardly discussed. And yet, how many, many times since has not the following been heard: "The intention of the legislator is evident; in his profound wisdom he certainly intended that . . . !"

Among the framers I have mentioned, there were two who in nowise believed in the duration of the work to which they were about to give life, who only looked upon it as a concession to the spirit of the time, as a transitory act by means of which it would be easy to revert to a monarchical system which would be far more simple, the only one, so they believed, feasible in France. The opinions of these two men were entirely at variance. M. Ferrand was a true counter-revolutionist, who, if he had been allowed to have

his way, would have smashed everything, both men and things; the Abbé de Montesquiou, contrariwise, wished to be very sparing of persons, while at the same time believing that the way should be paved towards becoming daily more and more monarchical, but he did not believe that the ancient régime could be reverted to.

As to M. Dambray, whose position as Chancellor had made him the president of the committee, at whose residence all its sittings were held, it was quickly discovered to what a degree the faculties of a man of sterling worth and of great talent could become lessened by a twenty-five years' idleness. From the very opening of the conferences, he had affected to treat senators and deputies merely as *notables* with whom the king had seen fit to increase his council, thus ignoring the quality of senator and of member of the *Corps législatif* which the king had so openly recognized at Saint-Ouen. The formation of the ministry, which it was thought should precede everything else, was nevertheless delayed. Many intrigues were at work; *Monsieur* would have liked to obtain for his followers a share in the distribution of portfolios and important offices, a share which it was difficult for the king to grant. Hence, negotiations which lasted ten full days. This prolonged uncertainty did not create a favorable impression, and I thought it my duty to sound a warning note; it caused a surprise all the greater that certain selections were considered as having been determined upon beforehand. It seemed impossible that M. de Talleyrand should not retain control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and M. Louis of the Ministry of Finance. The Seals and the Ministry of Justice belonged plainly to M. Dambray, already appointed Chancellor. M. Malouet's honorable reputation, his devotion to the royal family, of which he had given so many proofs, his emigration, his disfavor under the imperial

régime, did not permit that the Ministry of Marine should be taken from him. It would have been difficult not to leave the Department of War to General Dupont, who had taken hold of it at a critical moment. Thus, there remained only the Ministries of the Interior and of the Police; this is where rival claims were going to clash.

But there were matters which could not wait without danger for the end of the discussion, and none was more pressing than the one relating to the army. It had therefore been resolved to give it immediate attention. General Dupont, feeling safe in regard to his position, had received the most positive orders from the king, and had taken the wise precaution as early as the 6th of May to get His Majesty to appoint a council of war, from which he expected to derive support, and whose authority would carry great weight. Marshals Ney, Augereau, and Macdonald were members of it, together with ten other general officers of distinction selected from the several branches of the service. All measures it was proposed to adopt were submitted to this council. It would serve as a powerful means of justification for General Dupont, if one saw fit to ignore the great preponderance exercised by a minister who has prepared a work, and the many means at his disposal to make it prevail over the minds of his colleagues who do not shoulder the responsibility of it. Hence, General Dupont, as a matter of fact, must alone be held responsible for his work. Whatever may be the apparent safeguards behind which he has tried to screen it, I do not hesitate to say that it belongs to him entirely; he alone is guilty — the expression is not too strong a one, — for his injurious combinations and his desire to please contributed more than any other to the catastrophe of the 20th of March. Anxious above all to make himself agreeable to the Court and to place his ministerial existence on a more secure footing, and more-

over, indifferent as to the fate of an army from which he had so long been separated, he listened to those whose interest it was to destroy many established positions in order to have places to distribute. He did not tell the king the truth, and made him view as a matter simple enough to be disposed of what was really impolitic and dangerous.

The dominant idea around *Monsieur* was the revival of all the corps of the ancient military household of the king, such as it had existed from the days of Louis XIV., up to the time of the reforms introduced under Louis XVI. by M. de Saint-Germain. They tried to persuade themselves that this undertaking was unattended with inconveniences; that it would be sufficient to admit among the new corps commanders a few celebrities of the national army, and to grant rank to a few officers of that army, who stood higher in favor than others. With the aid of this precaution, no obstacle was seen to re-establishing former designations, and to giving a uniform to all those who, for twenty-five years past, had not unsheathed a sword or trailed a musket. In these privileged bodies, every officer, rank for rank, outranked his brother officer of the regular army. Thus a number of lieutenants, captains, and colonels, who had never been under fire, became entitled to display their epaulets by the side of the epaulets won on the field of battle, the reward of severely tried bravery and of talents incontestable and uncontested!

To bring a similar undertaking to a successful issue, it would have been necessary to be in a position to disband not only the Imperial Guard, but also the entire army. Two or three times, Napoleon the victorious, carried away by the desire of reviving for his own benefit the monarchical pomp of Louis XIV., had conceived the idea of giving himself *gardes du corps*, but he had always hesitated before the dangers of the undertaking! Yet it alarmed neither the



most intimate counsellors of the princes, nor General Dupont, so everything was concerted between them to attain such a consummation.

It was impossible that such a plan should not leak out, and especially that I should not hear something of it. I resolved to speak about the matter to General Dupont; I was all the better able to have a frank explanation with him, as for over a month our intercourse had been frequent and I had supplied him with useful information regarding the necessity of sending out of the city the troops which had come into it to participate in the king's entry, and who were beginning to get troublesome, as they quarrelled with the foreign soldiery. We had agreed together that they should return to their cantonments. I then asked him what progress he had made in his work of organization. "It is well advanced," he replied, "and the results of it will be seen in part ere two or three days have elapsed." This conversation took place in one of the *salons* of the Tuileries on the 8th or the 9th. "But, is it true that you are thinking of reviving the former military household of the king?" — "How can I do otherwise? The princes desire it, and, in a matter which concerns their personal safety, it is impossible to go contrary to their wishes. Moreover, it must be admitted that it will be a most appropriate embellishment for the throne. Bonaparte himself on several occasions thought of it, and it has so often been said that the Revolution would not have taken place had this household been in existence! Now, it cannot be suffered to occur again." — "As to the safety of the princes, I firmly believe it will be endangered rather than protected by such a creation. For one friend to whom it will afford gratification, it will make a thousand enemies for the House of Bourbon, estrange the entire army, and be looked upon as a proof of distrust, which ever invokes danger. This retrograde

step towards an already far-off past will lead people to believe that many others are being meditated. I believe the idea to be a fatal one, so let me beg of you, if the king's mind and your own have not been irrevocably made up, to think the matter over, and to speak boldly and frankly about it to His Majesty." — "Why, the matter has been absolutely decided upon." — "May I then ask what you intend to do with the Imperial Guard, with the old Guard?" — "Make your mind easy on that score; it will be satisfied with its treatment. We are going to let it retain all its privileges of rank and pay and make of it the corps of Royal Grenadiers of France, the corps which, as you know, was such a fine one before the Revolution." — "What!" I rejoined with considerable animation, "is that the fate you have in store for it? In good faith, can you suppose that a corps which has made a reputation of its own, one so fully deserved, will care to change the name by which it is known to all Europe for one whose sole advantage is that it was in existence prior to the Revolution? There is not a single grenadier of the Guard who has ever heard of the Royal Grenadiers; and this is fortunate, or they would know that these fine grenadiers were merely militiamen, and do you imagine that it will be agreeable to veterans who have survived twenty-five years of hard fighting to be thus classed? And where then do you intend to station them?" — "Why, in the best garrisons of France, at Metz, at Nancy." — "So you are about to banish them from Paris, to which they have been accustomed, where they have their families, and which they believed was their home, when not on active service! Can you truly have any illusion as to the consequences of such a revolutionary change? Believe me, General, there is but one title to take the place of that of Imperial Guard, and that is Royal Guard. Have you not been told of what the Emperor said in this connection, when

leaving Fontainebleau? 'As to my Guard, if the king is wise, he will take it over, and trust himself to it without reserve; if he does not follow this course, he must fain disband it.' You do not dare to propose either of these courses, and you are thus about to implant in the army a most potent source of discontent. God grant that it be not followed by some terrible calamity. You are assuming a terrible responsibility, which I should not like to shoulder."

This was the last conversation I ever had with General Dupont. On the 12th, the ordinances bearing on the reorganization of the various arms of the French army were signed, as well as the one disposing of the fate of the Guard. The Guard was converted into a corps of Royal Grenadiers of France, and a corps of Royal *chasseurs à pied* of France; the cavalry, into a corps of Royal Cuirassiers of France, a corps of Royal mounted *chasseurs* of France, and a corps of Royal Light-horse Lancers of France. A few days later, Marshal Oudinot was appointed commander-in-chief of the infantry, and Marshal Ney of the cavalry; it was firmly believed that these two appointments would be sufficient to gratify the military mind.

On the 13th, six companies of *gardes du corps* came into existence in lieu of the four existing in 1789. It had been found necessary to have four for the former captains, and an additional two for two of the marshals whom it was considered advisable thus to honor. The two selected were the Prince de Neufchâtel and the Duc de Raguse. The *gardes de la porte* soon made their appearance, then two more companies of *gardes du corps* for *Monsieur*, and lastly, the *compagnies rouges*; all this was done under the pretence of economy, at a time when considerable reforms were being made in the rest of the army, and an enormous number of officers were posted as unattached, or placed on half pay! I do not deny the necessity of these retrenchments, and I

do not pretend to discuss the new military organization; such is not my intention. But I say that no economy could be more ill-placed than one affecting the army. The time for it had not come; moreover, France has sufficiently demonstrated since then that she was in a position to bear financial burdens considerably heavier than that one.

A far more politic act was the appointing of *Monsieur*, Comte d'Artois colonel-general of all the National Guards of France. This was a felicitous way of sanctioning their existence and of thanking them for the services they had just rendered. It would have been better to have let well alone, and not to have coupled with this title that of colonel-general of the Swiss, as this constituted a very useless return to the former régime. The time chosen was not favorable for granting this honor to the Swiss, who had but recently opened a road across the French frontier to the allied troops, whom they had allowed to pass through their territory. The appointment of the Prince de Condé, the Duc d'Angoulême, the Duc de Berry, the Duc d'Orléans, and the Duc de Bourbon, as colonels-general of the infantry of the line, of cuirassiers and dragoons, of chasseurs and light-horse, of hussars, and of light infantry, was also not without its disadvantages; it should at least have been deferred, as there was no cause for any haste in the matter. It deprived of these titles officers of sterling worth, who were greatly offended thereby. To this displeasure may to a great extent be attributed the behavior of one of them, General Grouchy, on the 20th of March of the following year.

## CHAPTER XXI

The portfolio of the Interior remains in the hands of the Abbé de Montesquiou — The Royalists assail M. Pasquier's position — Disturbance in the Carrousel — M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angely — The king and *Monsieur* secretly decide to remove M. Pasquier from the Prefecture of Police — He is informed of their decision by M. de Blacas, who promises him the position of director of *ponts et chaussées* — M. Beugnot tries in vain to have the decision recalled — The king signs the appointment of M. Pasquier, who hands over the management of the Prefecture to M. Beugnot — The king at the Opéra — M. de La Valette goes over entirely to the opposition — False positions of the foreign sovereigns — Alexander entertains uninterrupted intercourse with the Empress Josephine, who is suddenly carried off by an illness of the throat — Military honors rendered at her funeral by the Russian Guard — The treaty of the 30th of May — France's new limits. Stipulations in regard to the fleet, munitions of war, pecuniary indemnities, the debts of countries ceded by France, and the national domains situated in them — Special convention with England. Secret clauses — Framing of the Charter — It is granted by the king, and is dated the 19th year of his reign — The allied sovereigns and their troops leave Paris — Meeting of the *Corps législatif* — The king's and the Chancellor's speeches — M. Pasquier's happy situation.

It became necessary to come to a determination in regard to the Ministry of the Interior. In spite of the wish of *Monsieur* and his friends, it was difficult to take it away from the Abbé de Montesquiou. The king begged he would retain his portfolio; ere he yielded, the Abbé de Montesquiou raised numerous objections; it required the formal orders of the king, and the entreaties of his family and all his friends to decide him to accept.

*Monsieur*, little satisfied with this selection, was still more anxious that a concession should be made to him in

the matter of the police. His discontent was also a reason why it should be sought to gratify him. Dating from this time, no stone was left unturned which might give strength and some show of reason for the attacks of which I was the object. The opportunity sought for was not long in occurring; for two days in succession some workmen who had started from the Place de Grève, where it was their custom to wait until they were hired, assembled in the Place du Carrousel, asking for work and bread. Measures were immediately taken; the *gendarmérie*, handled with prudence and firmness, cleared the space. On the following days, the same agents of disorder, who had organized the demonstration of the workmen, mingled with the crowd which had taken its stand in the courtyard of the Tuileries, under the king's balcony; cries hostile to the Senate, the nobility, and the Revolution were heard.

There could no longer be any mistake about it; the demonstration had a political character and object. A few police agents having spied out the man who seemed to be the leader of the manœuvre, followed him and saw him go into a corner of the garden, where he gathered his followers together; one of the agents even went so far as quietly to make his way into the group. The leader of the band was one Julienne, who claimed to be a Breton *chevalier*, and who asserted that he had five hundred men at his beck and call; they were all to return in the evening and strike a great blow; the king's entourage was advising him badly; if he did not do away with the Senate, a civil war was unavoidable.

The plans of Julienne were frustrated; his dwelling-place was known, and so he was summoned to appear at the Prefecture of Police the same evening. When men of his stamp are aware that they are known, they generally keep quiet.

All this coincided with a renewed virulence in political pamphlets, and occasionally with demonstrations against those who had played a part in the Revolution. Thus, M. Regnaud de Saint-Jean d'Angély was insulted in an outrageous fashion just as he was leaving the vestibule of the château to enter his carriage. Three or four persons forming part of a group which always loitered about the steps of the vestibule cried out: "Down with the scoundrel!" It was easy to determine whence the acts originated; I referred to the matter in my reports, concealing neither its origin nor its seriousness.

"It is plain," said *Monsieur*, "that a Prefect of Police does not inspire the Royalists with confidence; it is absolutely necessary that they should be granted satisfaction in this connection." The resolutions taken thereupon were known to no one. Everything was settled between the king and *Monsieur*. I cannot but think that the matter was kept a profound secret even from those who were generally the best informed. It was agreed between the two brothers that I was to be supplanted at the Police. *Monsieur* deemed himself fortunate in getting the king to agree to M. Beugnot's succeeding me, as he had a considerable liking for him. He had no trouble about the matter, as the king likewise had a relish for the wit and wide acquirements of M. Beugnot. This arrangement, which was come to on the morning of the 12th, was the same evening communicated by His Majesty to those of his ministers who were engaged with him, as the appointment of M. Beugnot as director-general of the police was to be included in the ordinance to be signed on the following day, and which was to contain the announcement of the ministerial organization.

On the 13th, at eight o'clock in the morning, I called to see the king, and was, as usual, ushered into his presence. His Majesty, after a few words as graciously spoken as

ever, said to me: "You have not seen M. de Blacas this morning; do not fail to go upstairs and see him, on leaving hence, as he has a communication to make to you." On this order, I left. On meeting M. de Blacas, I found his manner embarrassed. "So then, M. Pasquier," he said, "I am to inform you of a change which has been considered advisable, but the king is specially desirous that you should not view it in the slightest degree as a mark of disfavor on his part. In the new ministerial organization, you do not retain the police." Then he hastened to add, without giving me the chance to speak: "His Majesty has commissioned me to ask you what position would best suit you; it shall be yours at once." "You could not," I replied, "impart more welcome news to me; if I remained at the head of the police, it was owing to a painful straining of my devotion. The Abbé de Montesquieu will be able to tell what recently passed between him and me on this subject. As to my wishes, there is an easy way at the king's disposal for gratifying them. The position of director-general of *ponts et chaussées* is vacant. If it is given to me, I shall be quite content." "You may consider the matter settled," said M. de Blacas, who accompanied this promise with a few kind words.

My personal affairs being thus disposed of, I was curious enough to ask him who was to take my place, and on what footing the police was to be organized. "Your advice has been followed," he replied; "there is to be but one general administration in which the two positions are to be fused; it is M. Beugnot whom the king has seen fit to place at its head." It was impossible for me, on hearing this name mentioned, to retain a movement of surprise. M. de Blacas asked me to explain it. I demurred at first, but on his insisting, I confessed to him that M. Beugnot was the man who was the least adapted to the functions he was about to



undertake. "How is that? Is he not possessed of great wit and talent? *Monsieur* was so pleased with him during the time of his *lieutenance générale!*"

I granted that he possessed all the acquirements in the world, that I did not know of any one more highly educated, more endowed with wit, and I felt sure that his intentions were of the best; but, since I was made to speak, I could not conceal that there were in his character all the elements which made him unfit to direct the police system. He was talkative, indiscreet, and in consequence easily seen through; he lacked decision when difficulties presented themselves, and his timidity went as far as pusillanimity. I departed, leaving M. de Blacas amazed.

I next called on the Abbé de Montesquiou who informed me, with a show of displeasure, that he himself had only been informed on the previous day at six o'clock in the evening of the decision come to concerning me. It was, he said, the result of intrigues whose authors it would be easy for me to guess. He had frankly expressed his opinion to the king about the matter. "And what does not always happen," he added, "M. de Talleyrand and I were quite agreed on this point." And truly, I soon afterwards learnt that acting on his first impulse, he had told the king, concerning M. Beugnot, pretty much the same as I had just told M. de Blacas. As a result, M. Beugnot was, during the whole of the time this ministry lasted, on pretty bad terms with the Abbé de Montesquiou and but indifferent friends with M. de Talleyrand. And yet he was innocent of it all, and did not learn of his appointment until the very morning of it. He promptly called on me to tell me that such an arrangement could never be carried out, and begged me not to indorse it with my consent. No position suited him less than the one destined for him; on the contrary, the direction of the *ponts et chaussées* suited him admirably; he

confessed to me that he had done his best to reserve it for himself while at the Ministry of the Interior; he had even gone so far as not to install any one in it even provisionally, in order that when the time came, it should be ready for him. He suggested therefore that we should come to an understanding, and that each of us should remain, as he said, according to the ordinary course of things, in other words, I in charge of the police, and he at the head of the *ponts et chaussées*.

“What!” I replied, “do you expect a man of whom such distrust has been shown, to commit the folly, the cowardice, of remaining at a post from which it has been sought to oust him? I would sooner never hold another position in my life than remain in the present one. So pray make all the necessary arrangements to install yourself in it as soon as possible, for I assure you that I am in a great hurry to leave it.” He went away greatly disappointed, with the object of still finding some other way of getting out of this unfortunate predicament.

I need hardly say that I had found the Abbé de Montesquiou quite as determined as M. de Blacas to satisfy me by giving me the direction of the *ponts et chaussées*. As this department depended on the Ministry of the Interior, it belonged to him to move my being appointed. He informed me that such would be one of the first acts of his ministry, and he was as good as his word, in spite of an obstacle which neither of us had anticipated.

On the 13th, at the council, the king having announced the definitive composition of his ministry, *Monsieur* asked His Majesty for a favor on which he set great store, viz. that of appointing to the position of director-general of the *ponts et chaussées* one of his most faithful servants, one of those who had most suffered for the cause of the Bourbons, M. de La Maisonfort. I have already stated that he had

recently published a work entitled: *Tableau politique de l'Europe, depuis la bataille de Leipzig jusqu'au 30 mars 1814*. This work, which violently attacked Napoleon, had been most favorably received by the Royalists. It was thus a fresh title to consideration to be added to older ones. Had *Monsieur* preferred this request to the king outside the council, it would probably have been granted. The Abbé de Montesquion did not leave the king time to answer; he begged he would reserve his decision as he also had a candidate to suggest to him for that position, one to whom he thought it impossible that the preference should not be granted; desirous as he was of avoiding any discussion on my account, he did not then mention my name, so *Monsieur* could make no reply.

The king did not hesitate when he learnt that I was the person in question; moreover, M. de Blacas informed him of the engagement he had entered into with me in his name. My appointment was therefore signed on the 16th, together with that of M. Becquey as director-general of the department of agriculture, commerce, arts, and manufactures.

All this, under Napoleon, constituted the Ministry of Commerce. The Abbé de Montesquion had hastened to have this signal work of confidence shown to the man who, together with M. Royer-Collard, had so long been the king's faithful servant at home. M. Becquey was really an able man; his gentle and conciliating character soon won him the favor of the many persons who came in contact with him.

While speaking of the ministerial organization, I must not omit saying that M. de Blacas was appointed minister of the household. The same ordinance likewise gave M. Ferrand the postmaster-generalship, and M. Bérenger the direction of the indirect taxes in which were included the Customs which had been united to them by a previous ordinance.

All the members of the provisional Council of State, whose functions ceased at that date, were appointed Ministers of State (ministers without portfolio), as were also M. Ferrand and Chancellor Dambray. The importance attached to the title of Minister of State, given even to the Chancellor, was the revival of a custom of the old régime and was out of harmony with our modern usages. Towards the end of his reign, Napoleon had also created Ministers of State, but they plainly ranked below ministers holding portfolios; still, he had granted this title only to men taking a most active part in the government, as, for example, the presidents of the committees of the Council of State. *Monsieur* and the other princes retained their seats in the council; this circumstance, which considerably curtailed the ministerial power, could but have an important influence on the line of action followed. This state of things lasted until the 20th of March, 1815.

On the 14th of May, a solemn service was held in the Church of Notre-Dame in memory of Louis XVI., Louis XVII., Marie-Antoinette, and Madame Elisabeth. The king and the Duchesse d'Angoulême occupied a screened stall; the other princes acted as chief mourners. This mournful ceremony was very imposing. All the notabilities of the former and the present government were in attendance, and the impression created was profound.

In spite of its worries and arduous labor, I left the Prefecture of Police with a feeling akin to melancholy. I was leaving behind friends and collaborators who had shown me the most meritorious devotion during the critical times we had gone through together. I did my best therefore to make my successor conceive as high an opinion of them as was my own.

In spite of what I had told him, M. Beugnot seemed in no hurry to enter upon his duties, so I was compelled to let him

know, on the evening of the 17th, that I was determined not to sleep at the Prefecture the next night. And indeed I left it on the 18th, before dinner-time, after having made him thoroughly cognizant of all such matters as required his immediate attention, after having introduced to him all the heads of departments, and after having pointed out to him the man most worthy of his confidence; among these, was the new inspector-general of police, M. Foudras, with whom M. Beugnot and all his successors were completely satisfied until the day he retired on a pension, towards the end of 1821.

The same evening, the king went to the Opéra with the Duchesse d'Angoulême and all his family. It was the first time that he thus made his appearance in public. As a matter of course the house was filled to overflowing. I was present at the performance with Mme. Pasquier. The selection of the play was a happy one, as *Œdipe* was performed. As the play progressed, its noble and touching allusions, which were so appropriate to the case of the king and the Duchesse d'Angoulême, naturally presented themselves to the minds of all. They were grasped with enthusiasm; the royal family seemed moved by such a reception, which, on this occasion, it would have been difficult not to believe sincere. If I say *on this occasion*, it is because theatres are, generally speaking, hardly the places where the opinions and sentiments of a people are to be soundly estimated; it is so easy to produce there the effect sought!

It was noticed as being hardly becoming that the Duke of Wellington, who had arrived in Paris a week or so before, should, together with Lord Castlereagh, have shown himself in a box with Mme. Grassini, a famed actress and singer.

On the occasion of this performance, a little disappointment happened to me which deserves recording only in view of subsequent occurrences. I have already stated that my

intercourse with M. de La Valette had not ceased, in spite of the change in our respective circumstances. He had expressed a desire to me of being at the Opéra on the day that the king should go, in consequence of which I had sent him a ticket admitting him to my box. He did not come and the seat remained untenanted. When I asked him next day for the reason of his non-appearance, he was somewhat embarrassed and said: "I was afraid that my presence might compromise you. To be plain with you, my dear friend, I admire your confidence, but I do not share it. You are forever indulging in the fond belief that all is plain sailing, when a man is frank and sincere; what has just happened to you, the manner in which you have been ousted from the police, is a lesson which should be taken to heart." I replied that the worst of things in all situations of life was to lose one's temper, and I begged him not to let himself be carried away by such a weakness which would be unworthy of him, and which would prevent him from forming a sound judgment of things. Unfortunately, he soon had just cause for complaint; it threw him into the arms of the opposition, and even into the ranks of the most malecontent.

The rest of the month was spent in discussing and drawing up the final treaty of peace, in putting the finishing touches to the Charter, and in making all requisite preparations for the meeting of the *Corps législatif*. All this was necessary in order that France should be left to herself, and that the foreign sovereigns should return to their dominions; every one looked forward to this movement with the utmost anxiety. The situation was an unhappy one for all. The foreign sovereigns, since the arrival of the king, were in a false position which daily became more and more embarrassing; for, in spite of the influence they still wielded over affairs, they were compelled to keep in the background

in presence of the sovereign. Placed as they were between the king and the nation, they were not at ease with either; the nation could but look upon them as a burden which bore heavily on it at all times. They were on no footing of intimacy with the royal family, and were compelled, in order to fill their leisure time, to accept whatever diversions presented themselves.

Among the connections which the Emperor Alexander had most assiduously cultivated since his arrival in Paris was one which was about to be broken off in a most sudden and melancholy fashion. The Empress Josephine occupied the château of la Malmaison, where, surrounded by her Court, she led the elegant and polite existence which had always been characteristic of her; her daughter, Queen Hortense, had taken up her abode with her. On the day following his entry into the capital, the Emperor Alexander showed his good taste in calling on her, for the purpose of assuring her that her seclusion should be respected and surrounded by all the consideration to which her rank entitled her. He was charmed with the manner in which she received him, with everything he saw in her entourage, and with the perfect moderation preserved in her every utterance. Josephine extricated herself from this most delicate situation with the nicety and good taste which seldom failed her; she did not forget what she owed Napoleon, and by saying and doing everything it was right and proper for her to say and do, she gained the esteem and good-will of Alexander. In consequence of this, he personally saw to it, when the treaty of abdication was being negotiated, that her interests were duly considered, and that an income was settled on her. Ever since that time, he had been in the habit of calling on her frequently. He spent most of his evenings with her during the last three weeks of May. There was a little music at these soirées,

where he was at ease; it was the place and the society which he most enjoyed. These visits, let it be said parenthetically, were not viewed with pleasure at the château of the Tuileries.<sup>1</sup>

It was in the midst of the sweets of an intimacy which must have greatly flattered her that Josephine was attacked with a disease of the throat which caused no alarm at first, but which quickly became gangrenous, and carried her away after three days. She died on the 29th. The Emperor Alexander showed her the most devoted attention during her illness; he spent nearly the entire night of her death at la Malmaison, and would not leave until all hope of saving her life had fled. What a strange fate was that of this woman, who, after reaching the highest rank, dispossessed, not to say fallen from her state, once more experienced the splendor of it, in the hour of her death, and was comforted in her last hours by the most powerful sovereign of Europe! It has been justly said that such an end was the complement of her fortune; and truly, had her life been prolonged, many and bitter mortifications would have been in store for her. She therefore enjoyed the great good fortune, which has been denied to so many others, and especially to the author of her fortune, to die at the right moment. Two days later she was buried at Rueil, the village adjoining la Malmaison. Her funeral was surrounded with a pomp which no one could have foreseen at the time she was at the height of all her grandeur. The Imperial Russian Guard attended it in full dress uniform,

<sup>1</sup> It was indeed difficult that some of the things which the Emperor Alexander allowed himself to say in the intimacy of this circle, which he trusted more than he should have done, should not be repeated; when in its bosom, he made up for the reserve which he imposed on himself everywhere else. I cannot doubt that on several occasions he expressed his doubts and fears concerning the stability of the work he had undertaken. "*Those folks,*" escaped him in a momentary hurst of temper, when speaking of the Bourbons, "*will never be able to hold their own.*"



escorted the remains from the château to the church, and rendered all the honors which in days gone by she would have received at the hands of the French Imperial Guard.

So that there should be nothing lacking which might stamp her life with a character of predestination, her demise coincided with the final conclusion of the treaty of peace which annihilated the work of Napoleon, and served to wipe out all the grandeur and power France had acquired abroad since the Revolution. Hence Josephine is to be remembered as a meteor which was to vanish together with that grandeur and power.

The treaty was concluded on the 30th of May; peace was proclaimed in public places and in the streets of Paris with the most solemn formalities. The conditions of it were such, or nearly so, as one might expect after the convention of the 23d of April, taking as the basis of France's extent of territory the limits which were hers on the 1st of January, 1792. Nevertheless, a few changes for the better were obtained regarding the frontier, which was rectified by the concession of a few portions of territory, forming re-entering angles; the line of defence was thus strengthened. The fortress of Landau from being isolated in 1792 became incorporated with the territory, while the cession of a part of Savoy which included Chambéry and Annecy, brought our limits in this direction to the foot of the Alps. The ownership of the principality of Avignon, of the *comtat* Venaissin, of Montbéliard and of all the *enclaves* (wedged-in lands) which had formerly belonged to Germany was secured to us. The sum total of this was that France obtained, in excess of its former continental possessions, an aggrandizement of about 150,000 square miles, containing a population of 450,000 souls; the number of those which had belonged to the Empire of Napoleon and which were detached therefrom amounted to over fifteen millions.

I do not pretend to enter into the details of the stipulations composing this treaty which, owing to the fruits they bore and will still bear for many a long year, deserve a special study. I therefore merely note those affecting in a direct fashion France's most precious interests. Thus, the Island of Malta, with its dependencies, was handed over to the full ownership and sovereignty of England. This was the hardest blow dealt at the power and commerce of France in the Mediterranean. A promise had been made to restore her colonies to her, nevertheless Mauritius and Saint Lucia were given to England. The restitution of a few settlements in India was made subject to conditions rendering it almost nugatory.

With regard to the ships, naval artillery, and munitions, whose fate had remained in the balance at the time of the convention of the 23d of April, it was stipulated that the whole should be divided in a proportion of two thirds for France, the remaining third to go to the new possessors; a restriction was coupled with this stipulation, which took considerably from its favorable effect for France. From this partition were excepted the ships and arsenals in the maritime forts which had fallen into the hands of the allies previous to the 23d of April. Now, the vessels and arsenals of Holland, notably the Texel fleet, were included in this reservation. The port of Antwerp became a port of commerce.

There remained to settle the question of pecuniary indemnities. On this point, it must be admitted that the allies behaved with moderation. After so many contributions of war levied by Napoleon in all the countries of Europe, they exacted none, for one cannot speak in this respect of the indemnity of twenty-five millions, the payment of which was stipulated at a convention held on the 28th of May; the cause of it was the necessity of meeting

the expenses at the time of the evacuation, of the subsistence of the army on the march, the depots for the sick, the hospital service, and the transportation of prisoners. The allies demanded this sum as being the equivalent of what they were leaving behind in the French military stores, and which might have been looked upon as legitimate booty by their troops. Renouncing all claims for supplies and advances made, they contented themselves with requiring the French government to liquidate and pay the amounts for which it might be indebted outside of its own territory "by virtue of contracts or formal engagements entered into between individuals or private establishments and the French authorities, both as regards supplies and legal obligations." I quote this clause literally, for no one fully understood its bearing at the time, and the little care taken to execute it during the following months up to March of the next year, was followed by the most serious consequences.

Further stipulations which were not lacking in equity, were included in the treaty with regard to the indebtedness of the countries ceded by France, and which were entered in the ledger of her public debt. It was agreed that these should be taken into account, while she agreed to refund deposits and consignments.

Commissioners were to be appointed by the contracting parties to determine the mode of carrying out these several dispositions as a whole and as to matters of detail. The facilities accorded in regard to everything connected with pecuniary interests were entirely due to the Emperor Alexander, who ever considered himself bound by the promises he had made on entering the capital. It was also due to him that France was permitted to keep all the works of art or science in its galleries, museums, and public libraries.

The Austrians obtained the return of a few books and manuscripts carried away from the Vienna Public Library ;

Prussia insisted on receiving a few articles taken from the châteaux of Potsdam and Berlin. The demand was granted, but means were found to return only a portion of them.

There was in the treaty of the 30th of May an article which I must not pass over; it read as follows: "The possession of national domains acquired *à titre onéreux* (subject to certain conditions) by French subjects in the former departments of Belgium, of the left bank of the Rhine and of the Alps, beyond the ancient limits of France shall be and is confirmed to the purchasers." This ratification in so vast an extent of countries situated outside of France of all sales of national domains legally carried out, argued favorably for the purchasers of estates of the same nature inside the kingdom; they saw in it a guarantee that their vested rights would be respected. The alienation of properties was therefore considered as valid in all the countries united to France by treaties; this principle was extended to Piedmont, although the King of Sardinia had protested against its renunciation. At the same time, all that had been done in countries in which no treaty concluded with the former owners had sanctioned a union to France was set at naught. The words *à titre onéreux* indicated that the sovereigns intended to annul endowments; this was a cruel perspective for many persons, especially generals, as these endowments constituted the greater part of their fortune.

All these various clauses terminated with a formal convention that, within the space of two months, all the powers engaged on both sides in the war just ended should send plenipotentiaries to Vienna, to put at a general congress the finishing touches to the dispositions of the present treaty.

It was necessary to arrange for a fresh distribution among all the European powers of the many territories and provinces which France was giving up. It in no way entered

into the intentions of the great powers, who had sought to re-establish in the matter of France the *statu quo* of 1792, to apply the same principle to the possessors of territories and sovereignties, who had been dispossessed since that date. It would have been exceedingly difficult to perform this rigorous act of justice, for Napoleon, by founding new royalties in Germany, had created interests which it was necessary to treat with consideration; in this, as in so many other matters, he had left his mark in an almost indelible manner.

For the nonce, in appearance at least, France was not excluded, as she had been at Châtillon, from all participation in arrangements which so deeply concerned her future; but, beyond that, all that I have stated with regard to the convention of the 23d of April, is applicable to the treaty of the 30th of May. It was plain that the necessity of leaving France strong and powerful, as recognized and admitted at Frankfort, was forgotten, and that she did not reap sufficiently great advantages for having consented to the return of the House of Bourbon. It was impossible that this should not be deeply felt throughout the country and that it should not do great injury to royalty's prestige.

There is little for me to say about the few special conventions which were attached to the main treaty, and which were concluded separately between France and each one of the four great powers. In each case, the law had been laid down to France. The one entered into with England is worthy of note: France thereby bound herself to assist that power in its efforts to abolish the slave trade, and, in her own case, agreed to renounce it within five years. England also secured special privileges for the settlement of any claims her subjects might have against France. Owing to these privileges, they were treated more favorably than Frenchmen themselves, because the reduction of claims to a third imposed on the latter was not applied to them.

But, what is to be considered still more important, is the existence of several secret articles added to the main treaty. By one of these articles, France bound herself to recognize the partitions which should be made between the allies of conquered or ceded territories; pursuant to another, she gave her consent to the state of Genoa becoming a part of Sardinia. This last-named concession consecrated a painful abdication of political and commercial interests of a high importance. Finally, without formally renouncing the endowments situated outside of France, the French government submitted to be deprived of the faculty of interfering in claims which might be preferred in this connection. The beneficiaries were entirely abandoned to the mercy of the foreign governments.

The framing of the Charter had proceeded apace with the drawing up of the treaty; it had to be so, as the Emperor Alexander was determined not to leave until he was assured of the spirit in which it would be framed, and before feeling certain that nothing would stand in the way of its promulgation. M. de Nesselrode told me of this several times in the most explicit fashion; moreover, having found it necessary to address severe words of censure to M. Beugnot because his work was in several respects incomplete, the latter said to me: "How could I help it? We have been so hard pressed; I would have required fully another week. The Emperor Alexander was absolutely desirous of leaving at a stated period; a promise had been entered into of showing him, previous to his departure, the draft of the Charter such as it was promulgated, hence I was at the last moment compelled to leave aside matter I had prepared concerning elections."

The Charter was not a condition accepted by the king: it was *granted*. It was dated the nineteenth year of his reign. There was doubtless some advantage in both these methods

of procedure, but they were also not without their disadvantages. Several years later, it fell to my lot to have to defend from the rostrum of the Chamber of Deputies this use of the word *granting*. I believe I gave excellent reasons in its defence. The date of the nineteenth year of the reign was a still more delicate matter, and I think that its effect was still more attended with peril. It could not be urged that the king could not claim that, legally speaking, his reign had begun at the death of the son of Louis XVI., Louis XVII.; but, as a matter of fact, it was hard to make so many people who had known nothing but the Republic, the Consulate, and the Empire understand that this reign of nineteen years had any elements of reality about it. It therefore afforded food for criticism and alarmed a good many suspicious minds who enquired what became of all vested rights and titles acquired during this period, if nothing that had existed during these nineteen years had the imprint of legality. With the aid of this extraordinary fiction, they argued, it might be possible, if so it was desired, to cancel all vested rights and titles. Note must be made of these impressions which had such dire consequences.

As the time approached for the promulgation of the Charter, it became necessary to restore to the royal power the outward appearances of the fullest freedom. It was therefore resolved that the sovereigns should leave previous to the meeting of the *Corps législatif*, and that their troops should have evacuated the capital by that day. The Emperor Alexander and the Emperor of Austria began their homeward journey on the 3d of June,<sup>1</sup> and the King

<sup>1</sup> The departure of the Emperor Alexander brings me to speak of a letter of M. de Talleyrand which I have already mentioned in a footnote regarding the conferences of Erfurt, and from which I have deduced that his private relations with that sovereign may perhaps be considered as having

of Prussia, on the morning of the 4th only. General Sacken had ceased acting as military commander of the city on the 2d. I can never forget what I felt when at eight o'clock on the morning of the 3d, while crossing the Place

commenced at that date. M. de Talleyrand addresses this letter to the Czar on the day after the latter's departure from Paris. I have seen it quite recently; there are few documents more interesting to peruse; it affords an excellent insight into some of the important situations of the period. It appears therefrom that Alexander, who was then a strong partisan of liberal ideas, left Paris with discontent because his suggestions in that respect had not been heeded. It will be recalled how great was the importance he had attached to the constitution improvised by the Senate. It had been set aside, to his great displeasure, but its transitory existence had been sufficient to force upon the king the necessity of granting one, the bases of which were laid down in the Declaration of Saint-Ouen, the tenor of which appears in the Charter. M. de Talleyrand had in the first place frankly seconded the views of the Emperor Alexander; he had even gone far enough to compromise himself with the royal family. This engagement once fulfilled, he had found in the Charter everything that satisfied him personally; the sincerity of his liberal sentiments did not go beyond that point, and he endeavored to make the Emperor understand that it would not be reasonable to demand more. This opposition, to which were added a few other disappointments, put the Czar in an angry mood which manifested itself in bitter words. "This man," he said, "is, by his behavior, sacrificing to his ambition both his country and his friends." He went so far as to refuse M. de Talleyrand a parting interview, on the day he left. Hence M. de Talleyrand's letter opens with witty complaints against such hard treatment. Then follows an enumeration of his titles to the Emperor's confidence. He next recalls to his mind their old-established relations, secretly contracted, in connection with which he boasts of having from the outset discovered in the loftiness of his mind, in the generosity of his sentiments, the future saviour of his country, the sovereign who was to deliver France and Europe from the iron yoke which galled them. Then follows a rambling dissertation on the constitutional liberties enjoyed in various countries. "France," he goes on to say, "will in due time feel the necessity of an alliance between a firmly established royalty and free institutions. Let the Emperor Alexander be pleased to exercise patience, to have confidence, and he will find that the future will respond to his hopes and not thwart his noble intentions."

The letter concludes by begging the Emperor Alexander to be pleased to listen on the writer's behalf to a person who would shortly enjoy the pleasure of seeing him frequently, and who, better than any one else, was acquainted with his (the writer's) sincere feelings of attachment towards a prince who had so many claims to his gratitude and to his highest admiration. This person was of course the Duchess of Courland, mother of Mme. de Dino. M. de Talleyrand also expressed the intention of greatly cultivat-



Louis XV. on my way home, I found this *place* and the adjoining quays packed with Russian and Prussian troops homeward bound, and thus completing the evacuation. There was a fog, and whether it must be attributed to the bad weather, or to a feeling of lassitude consequent upon having witnessed so many sights, this great event was accomplished quickly and without lookers-on. No one, or a very few, had gone out of his way to see it. It seemed to be nothing more than an ordinary movement of troops, such as takes place in every-day life.

As for me, in whose mind was still present their entry, which sixty-one days previously had caused others as well as myself so much suffering, as well as embarrassments and dangers which had appeared insurmountable at the time, I could not get over this peaceful scene, this complete *dénouement* reached in so short a time. I thought I was dreaming, and I asked myself if it was not all an illusion. I remained on the bridge for the space of half an hour, motionless, leaning on the parapet, watching the departure of this throng of soldiery, this mass of arms, horses, and guns; as they gradually passed away, I breathed more freely. How far was then from my mind the idea that I was shortly again to see the formidable phalanxes whose presence had so cruelly been felt by us.

The *Corps législatif* met on the next day. The entire royal family had come together for this grand ceremony,

ing the friendship of M. de Pozzo di Borgo, who was also able to testify as to his sentiments. He thanked the Emperor for having entrusted to so well-tryed a man, one of such distinguished worth, the functions of minister plenipotentiary to the Court of France.

This letter is a precious one in every respect, for in it is revealed, in spite of expressions of attachment and professions of a unity of sentiments, the first indication of the situation which developed itself during the following winter at the Congress of Vienna, and which brought M. de Talleyrand and the Emperor Alexander in opposition, not to say open hostility, to each other.

as the Duc d'Angoulême had arrived a week previously. This was the prince who had played the most useful and brilliant rôle in the Restoration. He was presenting himself clothed with all the interest derived from success in a venturesome expedition. He had just gone over a large part of the South, and had visited the armies of Marshal Soult and of Marshal Suchet. He had made an impression everywhere by his spirit of rectitude and moderation of character, which later made him utter, at a time when passions ran highest, these celebrated words: *Union and forgetfulness*. The king was enthusiastically greeted; his venerable air, his noble presence, his sonorous and agreeable delivery, although somewhat sharp, even his infirmities, which he bore with dignity, conciliated all minds. His speech, which was said to be his own production, was truly successful. He referred in it felicitously and in a most touching manner to the will of Louis XVI.<sup>1</sup>

The speech of the Chancellor was less favorably listened to; in it were noticed certain old words whose usage could not be explained; what was meant, in speaking of the Charter, by the expression: *ordonnance de réformation*?

Finally, the Charter itself was read by M. Ferrand. Its preamble was clever; it was hard to better indicate how a constitutional charter, which a king grants freely in his wisdom to the wishes of his subjects, presents more lasting chances than do concessions extorted from the weak by the strong. The dispositions of the Charter are too well known to need enumerating; I will merely point out that if the

<sup>1</sup> M. Beugnot has repeatedly blamed himself for having in connection with this speech committed one of the greatest blunders which it is possible for a courtier to commit. At the meeting of the council where the king read it for the first time, he pointed out a mistake in French, and persisted in his opinion, in spite of the king's assertion to the contrary. The mistake was corrected, but M. Beugnot claimed that the incident was never forgiven.

*Chambre des pairs* was not there and then established as an hereditary institution, the principle of this heredity was laid down, the king reserving unto himself the appointment at will of life or hereditary peers. It is plain that it had not been considered desirable to enter into an engagement to render the peerage hereditary in the families of a few senators to whom one could not help granting it individually. The list of the peers, numbering one hundred and fifty-four, which the king had signed that morning, omitted the names of several senators, principally those who had voted the death of the king.

Thus did the Restoration finally become an accomplished fact.

At no time of my life have I felt so happy as at the one which I have now reached; I experienced above all the supreme enjoyment of having extricated myself without trouble from a difficult, not to say perilous, position. I occupied the very position which suited me best. Entrusted with one of the most interesting branches of the public administration, I was at the head of a body of men distinguished by their talents and lights, who welcomed my incumbency with joy. The civil engineers had dreaded getting a chief foreign to departmental work, and one who would be little inclined to give them credit for past services. They felt sure that they would find in me a zealous defender of their rights and that I might serve them. I was treated by all the Ministers, especially by the one whom I defended, the Abbé de Montesquiou, with marked consideration. All my actions had ever been inspired by my devotion to my country, without any thought of personal interest, and without any desire of gratifying my ambition. No extraordinary reward had been granted me; I occupied a position equal in rank to the one which was mine under the Imperial Government, but of a lesser political importance.

All my friends urged me to ask for the title of Minister of State (minister without portfolio), the more so as it had been granted to M. Anglès. I declined to even hint at such a thing. I even paid no attention to a word which fell from the lips of the Abbé de Montesquiou, and which authorized me to lay claim to a peerage. Lastly, at a time when decorations were being given with such profusion in every direction, I did not obtain any; my rank in the Legion of Honor remained the same.<sup>1</sup> As for myself, my sense of delicacy and my *amour-propre* were flattered by this species of distinction born of the moderation of my desires. Freed from all political responsibility, I enjoyed the present without any anxiety for the future; if occasionally the habit in which I was of watching events, and a certain knowledge of men and things led me to thoughts which were not reassuring, I endeavored to cast them from me.

<sup>1</sup> In the matter of decorations, I must relate a fact illustrative of my way of seeing and thinking. The Emperor Alexander saw fit, previous to taking his departure, to distribute a certain quantity of decorations and of his orders among those who had more particularly won his esteem and goodwill. The list was drawn up by himself, with the assistance of M. de Nesselrode and General de Sacken. My name was put down for some one or the other. M. Jauret, whom I had attached to the general, having heard of this, hastened to impart the news of it to me. I astounded him by telling him that I was greatly displeased at receiving such a mark of favor. "If the Emperor Alexander," I said to him, "had granted it to me for some service rendered to him or to his country, one from which my country would not have suffered, I should have considered myself highly honored; but when it comes to me as a sort of consecration of the triumph of the foreigner over my country and of the occupation of our capital, I can only look at it from a mournful point of view; I am fully decided not to wear it." I begged M. Janet to see to it that it was not sent to me. He promised to do what lay in his power, and I heard no more of the matter. I have since learnt that he got out of the difficulty by filing it away among his papers, together with the letter accompanying it. As a result I appear in the *Almanach russe*, as a *chevalier* of I know not what order; the decoration and letters patent never reached me.







