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Following is the text of an NBC network broadcast, the 66th in a University of the Air series entitled OUR FOREIGN POLICY:

Subject: GERMANY AND THE OCCUPATION

- Participants:
1. The Honorable John H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State.
 2. The Honorable Howard C. Petersen, Assistant Secretary of War.
 3. Mr. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air.

- - -

ANNOUNCER: Here is NEWS FROM WASHINGTON:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE HILLDRING OUTLINES POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN GERMANY, WITH CENTRAL CONTROL OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES: SAYS RE-EDUCATION OF GERMANS MAY TAKE A GENERATION.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR PETERSEN EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER EFFECT OF FAILURE TO EXTEND DRAFT ON SIZE OF OCCUPATION FORCES: PREDICTS DISEASE AND DISORDER IF MINIMUM FOOD QUOTAS NOT MET: SAYS MORALE AND DISCIPLINE ARE IMPROVING AMONG OCCUPATION FORCES.

The NBC University of the Air presents...OUR FOREIGN POLICY, a weekly discussion of international issues by leading Washington officials. This time, "Germany and the Occupation" will be discussed by Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring, who is in charge of our policy in occupied areas, and Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen, who is responsible for the administration of these areas. Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air, will serve as chairman of the discussion. Mr. Fisher:

FISHER: General

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FISHER: General Hilldring, we're glad to have you with us again. It seems a little strange to have a soldier representing the State Department....

HILLDRING: An ex-soldier, Mr. Fisher. I'm a civilian now.

FISHER: ...and a civilian representing the War Department, Mr. Petersen.

PETERSEN: You've put your finger on an essential feature of our democratic form of government -- civilian control of our War Department.

FISHER: I realize that... Now, I should warn you gentlemen that I have collected a good many criticisms of the way Allied Military Government is being carried on in Germany. I'd like to use these criticisms as a device for getting a point-by-point progress report on our policies and accomplishments in Germany. First of all, here's a question that several of our listeners have asked: How has the 4-Power Allied Control Council in Berlin actually worked out? General Hilldring, hasn't it been a rather awkward arrangement, to say the least?

HILLDRING: Its workability has exceeded our fondest expectations. It wasn't our idea in the first place, to slice Germany into four sectors. We accepted this plan with great reluctance; but with V-E day coming up, we had to find a formula acceptable to all the major powers. However, the Allied Control Council has worked out better than the most optimistic U.S. officers believed possible a year ago.

FISHER: In what way, General?

HILLDRING: In a steady, unspectacular way the Control Council has been a forum in which four great Powers - Russia, Britain, France and ourselves - have for a year worked together on the most complex and vital problems. Let me be very specific: I'd like to recall the dire and gloomy predictions quite a few observers made about a year ago, that the 4-power arrangement would fall to pieces over two problems -
reparations

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reparations and the German standard of living. Yet we were able to get agreement on both of these questions, and many others.

FISHER: That raises an interesting question: How far can you permit production essential for her minimum needs without restoring Germany's war-making potential?

HILLDRING: After a full and frank debate, the Allied Control Council found a middle ground. The case of steel was typical. One of our partners in the Control Council wanted practically no postwar steel industry in Germany, the other wanted a 12-million-ton industry. Both sides exposed their views to the light of logic and of facts. In the end, thanks largely to the perseverance and ability of General Lucius Clay, we were able to bring the two sides together. This to my mind was an historic point in international negotiations.

FISHER: How did you work out the steel question?

HILLDRING: We did it by developing a plan which took account of Germany's minimum domestic and export needs. The Control Council agreed to reduce German steel capacity, which had been around 20 million tons before the war, to 7.5 million tons. But, the German steel industry never runs at 100 percent of capacity, and we are limiting actual production to only 5.8 million tons.

PETERSEN: You can compare that to our own steel industry, which has a capacity of 75 to 80 million tons a year. It's pretty obvious that 6 million tons or so of steel a year could never be a base for a major German war effort - particularly with careful controls over the types of steel products which Germany will be permitted to manufacture.

HILLDRING: So the British and the Russians -- and the French-- agreed on a formula completely in accord with our policy. But this is only one example of the way the Allied Control Council has operated. It has a long list of impressive achievements.

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achievements. The reestablishment of trade unions, judicial reorganization, the de-Nazification program, and many others could be mentioned. Of course, I do not mean to make light of the difficulties inherent in four-power occupation, nor to assert that there are no unresolved problems remaining for continued discussion. What I want to emphasize is that in the Control Council we have a machine already in operation where the four powers can and must and do reconcile the most divergent ideas in an intelligent and friendly spirit.

FISHER: Now, several writers have alleged that under the four-power system, the British and Russian zones are rapidly becoming armed camps, directed at each other, while we sit up in the hills of Bavaria looking on. Mr. Petersen, what about that?

PETERSEN: I don't believe that. Take the recurrent story that the British have not disarmed the German armies they captured in Northwest Germany. That's simply not so. It's based on the fact that some former German army units have been disarmed but kept intact as work forces, like prisoners of war, to serve under the Military Government in the British zone. We don't follow that practice in our zone, but it's a very different thing from an armed German force.

FISHER: I have talked to some people who believe that we may be on the wrong track when we worry so much about disarming Germany. They believe German strategy now is to play the major powers against each other.

PETERSEN: I don't doubt that some Germans would like to do just that. They want to end the occupation, and probably figure that encouraging Allied differences may be their best strategy for accomplishing that. But I don't think there is any organized effort along those lines.

FISHER: General

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FISHER: General Hilldring, what do you think of the suggestion that we work toward applying the American policy of political decentralization to all of Germany?

HILLDRING: This Government is committed to destroy the concentrated power of Prussia in Germany. In the U.S. Zone we have made very rapid strides in developing local responsibility in the "Laender", or States, in permitting free elections of local officials, and in encouraging the formation of decentralized political agencies in numerous ways. The peace and prosperity of all of Europe rest in large part on solving the historic problem of the rule of Prussia, and we have encouraged and will continue to encourage the greatest autonomy in municipal, county and provincial administration. It is our purpose to urge our partners to do the same.

FISHER: What about the charge that our economic policy in the Allied Control Council have been inconsistent with our policy of political decentralization?

HILLDRING: Under our original Directive, JCS 1067, and under the Potsdam Declaration, our policy is directed towards the decentralization of the political and administrative structure of Germany. This includes decentralizing the German economic structure. That remains our policy.

FISHER: But are these directives actually being carried out?

HILLDRING: As a matter of fact, in this case, the horseman has jumped clear over the horse. There is no central postal system, no unified transportation system. It is clear that this goes too far - four postal systems and four railroad systems, for example, make a completely unworkable arrangement. The Potsdam Declaration itself says - quote: "The Control Council may .. to a minimum extent .. permit centralized administration or .. central control of essential public services." The Potsdam Declaration expressly provides for the establishment of central agencies in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. We are seeking to carry out these provisions.

PETERSEN: Central

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PETERSEN: Central administration of such essential functions is certainly not inconsistent with an overall policy of decentralization. What we are aiming at is a loose federation of German states with a minimum of central control. But we haven't been able to achieve any central administration. Without that, the American zone in Germany will continue to be unable to feed itself, and we shall face two alternatives: either serious malnutrition for the Germans, or a continuing WPA project in Germany.

FISHER: What has held up this minimum program of centralization, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: We have been unable to get the unanimous agreement of the four powers on the Control Council principally because of French objections.

FISHER: General Hilldring, there are those who argue like the French that detaching the industrial Ruhr region from Germany would be the best possible safeguard against the emergency of a new German war machine.

HILLDRING: That's for the four major powers to decide. This Government recognizes the importance of settling this issue -- and promptly.

FISHER: The general public is a lot more critical of our German policy than of our Japanese policy. The commonest criticism is that we have been too easy on the Germans, or on the Nazis. As Assistant Secretary of State, General Hilldring, do you think we have been tough enough in the actual application of our policy?

HILLDRING: I am glad you asked me that question. I have wanted for a long time to say something about whether our policy in Germany was too tough or too soft. I think softness and toughness are completely irrelevant considerations in the determination of the policy we follow or don't follow in Germany. I think that to weigh our policy by its toughness or
its

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its softness is just about as sensible as to debate whether Texas is too big or too small. It has nothing whatever to do with the problem. Here's the real question: Does the policy we follow in Germany serve the ends we hope to achieve in Germany -- namely, to demilitarize and democratize the country? That question I can answer. The answer is yes.

FISHER: Can you give us an overall picture, Mr. Petersen, of how our Military Government is getting rid of Germany's war potential?

PETERSEN: The basic policy was laid down at Potsdam. The Military Government authorities of course worked through the Control Council, as in the case of steel. The first step was to eliminate all war industries -- ammunition, planes, and so on. Then the question was, how much of what was left should be kept in order to permit a German level of living no higher than the average of the other European countries, as provided in Potsdam? Once that question was answered, everything over and above that level was available for reparations.

FISHER: General Hilldring, you mentioned exports of steel. Isn't there a danger that in rebuilding their foreign trade, the Germans may reestablish ties with foreign cartels that will be useful to them if another war comes?

HILLDRING: I don't think so. We shall control Germany's export trade completely. We won't give them a chance to build their fences for another war. Our policy is four-square against any revival of the German cartel system.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, what about the charge that our Military Government authorities have played ball with some of the cartel interests in the American zone?

PETERSEN: That's absolutely false. Our policy is to destroy cartels, and that we are proceeding to do. Some correspondents have seen factories of these cartels still in operation, but this doesn't mean they are not under strict control. In the case of the largest German cartel, I. G. Farben, only 15 percent of its

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of its activities are in the American zone, but we have removed the Farben management from these plants. We have destroyed four or five of the Farben munitions plants. We have kept those which are needed in the German economy -- but not as a part of a cartel structure. One is a pharmaceutical plant -- the biggest aspirin factory in the world. Others are nitrate plants, which are needed for making fertilizer. These plants are still running, but under our close supervision. And I might add, the Control Council has agreed upon a law wiping out the Farben cartel in all four zones.

FISHER: What about the food situation over there? Is it as bad as it has been painted?

PETERSEN: It's the most immediate problem facing our military government today.

FISHER: I have here a letter from a lady down in Lynchburg, Virginia, who asks: "Why should we be 'committed' to give each German 1,500 calories a day when innocent people in Greece, Poland, France, and other countries which Germany ruthlessly invaded, pillaged and ruined are getting far fewer calories?" What do you say to that, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: We are rationing not at the rate of 1,500 calories, but at the rate of only 1,275 calories a day -- but we'll be lucky to continue this standard. Enough food has been allocated, but people can't eat allocations. We shipped only one-third of the amount allocated to our zone in April. Unless our allocations are met, a cut to 1000 or 1100 calories will have to be made.

HILLDRING: That figure of 1,275 calories is lower than in any country in Europe, except Italy and portions of the British zone in Germany, where it is down to 1,000 calories. Our daily ration in the United States is about 3,300 calories, and people can't keep alive and healthy for long on less than 1,500.

FISHER: Does that mean, General, that mass starvation will soon begin in Germany?

HILLDRING: Not

HILLDRING: Not in the sense of people dropping in the streets.

But within a few weeks, diseases of malnutrition will begin to mount. What concerns me most, though, is that democracy just doesn't register with a hungry family.

PETERSEN: We have to bear in mind that the German crop will be only 50 percent of normal this year. The harvest comes late over there. It doesn't really start until September -- which is still four months away. And after that the crops must be processed and transported. ... It's true the Germans are still better off than some of their victims were, at Dachau, for instance. But we don't propose to put all of Germany on Dachau rations. No matter how little sympathy we have for the Germans, we've got to prevent the widespread disease and disorder that inevitably follows hunger. The food riots that have occurred in the British zone can happen to us. If we let the Germans starve, we might as well forget about trying to regenerate them.

FISHER: There have been some stories out of Germany claiming that in recent months, the Nazis are coming back into positions of importance. General Hilldring, what about that?

HILLDRING: There may be a few individual cases which haven't yet been dealt with. But I'd like to point out that we have thrown over 300,000 Nazis out of positions of importance, in the government, industry, the press, and education, in the American zone alone. I can show you press statements and official documents pointing out that de-Nazification has been more vigorously carried out in the American zone than in the other zones.

PETERSEN: Of course, it hasn't been an easy job. Suppose you told the FBI you wanted 18 million people -- about the population of New England plus New York City -- examined for subversive activities. Now, the FBI is a very efficient organization, but it would take considerable time for them to handle a task that large -- especially in a country where the language and the people are strange. Our Military Government has faced
just

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just such a job. Our officials have handled a total of 1,300,000 cases, and in 15 percent of them the evidence was strong enough to justify stripping the person concerned of his political rights and limiting him to employment at manual labor.

FISHER: It's a pretty impressive record when you put it that way. ... General Hilldring, one American correspondent said recently that there is no master file of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers in Germany. Is that true?

HILLDRING: It was true at one time. But we now have a master file. We had to piece it together from 90 tons of wreckage we found at Marburg. The files were in a complete mess and it took time to reassemble them. But we have had a master file for nearly three months now. We have used it in two ways. We presented a list of American Nazi's to the Kilgore Committee, and we have been employing the file in the de-Nazification program.

FISHER: And what's the next step in that program?

HILLDRING: To turn over as much of this work as we can to trustworthy Germans. Our business is to cleanse the German mind -- to democratize Germany. Now, we can't spoon-feed the German people indefinitely. So local boards are being set up to finish the job of de-Nazification under our strict supervision.

FISHER: But do you think they will really do the job?

HILLDRING: I think the prospects are pretty good, especially since we shall oversee the process, call the tune, and watch every move.

PETERSEN: I think it would be a good idea, General, for you to tell how the final delousing will operate.

HILLDRING: General Clay directed the three provincial Minister-Presidents in the American zone to work out a de-Nazification law. They did -- and General Clay told me that the provisions of the law they produced were even tougher than those Military Government had in mind. The Germans also devised a questionnaire which every adult German in our zone must fill out and sign. These will be checked against our files of Nazis and pro-Nazis. On the basis of this information, the local boards will finish cleaning house, under our supervision.

FISHER: Let's hope they will really catch the hidden Nazis. ... Of course, Mr. Petersen, the conspiracy that was recently uncovered among Nazi youth was not very encouraging.

PETERSEN: That

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PETERSEN: That was a very limited movement.....To be perfectly frank, Mr. Fisher, it's still too early to expect much underground activity. Most of the Germans are still too busy with the daily problems of living in their devastated country. Problems of food, fuel and shelter come first. But we are not overlooking the possibility of attempts of this kind in the future.

FISHER: That's a fair warning. But General Hilldring, if this is true, wouldn't it be pretty risky to withdraw our troops and depend on a system of inspection to keep the Germans in line, as Secretary Byrnes is said to have proposed in Paris?

HILLDRING: The Secretary's proposal was for a 25-year military alliance to guarantee German disarmament. It did not call for the withdrawal of our forces. But we have got to face the fact that we can't stay in Germany forever...

FISHER: Meanwhile, General, what is being done to reeducate the Germans?

HILLDRING: We're concentrating on reeducation now. I think we can say the schools have been completely screened, and all pro-Nazi teachers thrown out. The worst of the Nazi text books have been eliminated.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, how do you account for the stubborn Nazi tendencies among German youth?

PETERSEN: What can you expect in a year, Mr. Fisher? Let's not be too naive or too optimistic about this. After all, Hitler was supreme dictator for 12 years. That means a German youth who graduated from the equivalent of high school last year spent his entire student life in Hitler schools, from the day he entered the first grade. There's no magic wand that can purge German youth of Nazi ideas in one year.

HILLDRING: Especially

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HILLDRING: Especially since our Military Government had to spend a good part of that first year de-Nazifying the Germans, destroying military installations, taking custody of Nazi property, restoring loot, repatriating displaced persons and starting a reparations program. We're just entering the period when we can spend a major part of our energy on re-education.

FISHER: Now, General Hilldring, about the elections held last month in the American zone in Germany....

HILLDRING: They were more than anything else, a part of our training program for democracy.

PETERSEN: The Christian Social Union won the election. It is really a party of the center, by our standards. The Communists got only about 5 percent of the vote.

FISHER: There have been some reports that this Christian Social Union has furnished a haven for Nazis and Nazi sympathizers -- such men as Dr. Friederich Schaeffer, who was fired from a key position in the Bavarian government when his Nazi connections were exposed.

PETERSEN: He has also been barred from leadership in the Christian Social Union. All Nazis are prohibited from political activity.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, one of the most disturbing reports to come out of Germany recently was about conditions in the camps where D.P.'s -- displaced persons -- are kept.

PETERSEN: These people are a matter of grave concern to us. There were a number of criticisms about conditions in the camps shortly after V-E Day, when the Army was in the midst of the tremendous job of maintaining and repatriating about three million displaced persons. I haven't heard such criticism recently. Conditions in the Jewish camps were investigated not long ago by Judge Simon Rifkind, General McNarney's advisor on Jewish affairs.

FISHER: What

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FISHER: What did he have to say?

PETERSEN: His report was very favorable. He said that Jewish displaced persons were allowed broad freedom of movement and their camps were more like communities than concentration camps. He spoke of "the Army's warm-heartedness in dealing with all displaced persons." He cited, for example, the fact that the Army had gone to great trouble to provide plane service to bring in much needed instructors and supplies from Palestine to help in the rehabilitation of the Jewish displaced persons.

FISHER: Are the displaced persons getting enough to eat?

PETERSEN: As far as food is concerned, they're comparatively well off. Up to this month, they were getting 2,300 calories a day, and they're still getting 2,000 calories.

FISHER: It isn't primarily a matter of food, though, as I understand it.

PETERSEN: No, they're bitter about having to remain in the camps, and understandably so. They've had such a terrible existence, and seen so much horror, that you can hardly expect them to react any other way. Of course, conditions in the camps are far from ideal, but the real problem is not the day-to-day living conditions of these people, but their uncertainty as to their future. The only solution for the Jewish displaced persons is to give them some assurance of a reasonable life outside of Germany and outside of Europe. Almost all observers have pointed out that most of the Jewish D.P.'s want to go to Palestine. As long as they continue to remain in camps in Germany even under the best of conditions, there is an increased danger of breakdown of morale, violent protests and even large scale suicides.

FISHER: Hasn't there been a certain amount of friction between the American G.I.'s and the displaced persons?

PETERSEN: Yes, there have been a few minor incidents, but we're doing our best to avoid them. We have a program of education, to help our soldiers understand the problems of these refugees.

FISHER: In

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FISHER: In that connection, Mr. Petersen, I'd like to ask you about the rather alarming reports concerning the morale of our occupation forces.

PETERSEN: There's been a good deal of exaggeration in these stories of low morale. We've had our troubles, of course -- mainly because of the tremendous turnover of personnel. We've had to demobilize so rapidly that a certain amount of confusion was inevitable. We had green men, new units with new officers, men who hadn't been welded together in combat. They haven't been together long enough to develop any pride in their units.

FISHER: Couldn't they have been indoctrinated a little better, so they would understand the importance of their assignment?

PETERSEN: With the rapid demobilization and the hurried need for replacements, we haven't had much time for indoctrination, but we are working on it. General McNarney has an excellent orientation program under way. Conditions should improve from here on in. General Eisenhower, speaking of conditions in the Pacific, recently said that the morale and efficiency of the Army has passed the low point and is definitely on the upswing. I think that is true of Germany, too.

FISHER: That's encouraging...Now, getting back to the policy-making side of the German question, General Hilldring, I'd like to ask you to tell us a little about your Occupied Areas office in the State Department. Isn't this a new setup?

HILLDRING: Yes, for the first time a single office has been charged by the Secretary of State with coordinating all State Department policy for occupied enemy territories -- not only Germany, but Austria, Japan and Korea as well. Our purpose is to establish clearly the leadership of the State Department in policy making.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen, I don't suppose the War Department begrudges the State Department this responsibility....

PETERSEN: Quite

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PETERSEN: Quite the contrary, Mr. Fisher. We're delighted with the new alignment. The War Department never wanted responsibility for policy, and we are happy that General Hilldring's office has been created.

FISHER: General Hilldring, has this new arrangement given rise to any reorganization in the State Department?

HILLDRING: No fundamental changes. It's mainly a matter of coordinating the activities of each division that deals with occupied territories, and directing their activities toward a common objective. The work of the State Department's political, economic and information branches has to be coordinated. You can't deal with any major problem without these three. Unless their work is brought together somewhere near the top, disagreement will retard the emergence of sound policy. But with coordination at the top, you get policy and you get it on time.

FISHER: Then, Mr. Petersen, your representatives are charged with executing or administering State Department policy.

PETERSEN: That's right. A policy decision goes first to "SWNCC", the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, on which I am the War Department member and General Hilldring represents the State Department as Chairman. From there the policy is passed on -- in the case of Germany -- to "OMGUS" for execution.

FISHER: You're overwhelming us with initials, Mr. Petersen. What is OMGUS"?

PETERSEN: "Office of Military Government, U. S. Zone". There are about 5000 Military Government personnel in the American zone under General Clay. The War Department has tried to get State to take responsibility for these forces. At one time a date was even set for the transfer -- June 1. We felt that a single agency should handle both policy and administration of military government.

HILLDRING: I

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HILLDRING: I had long urged State Department responsibility for Military Government, as a soldier and an individual.

FISHER: Why then, General Hilldring, hasn't the State Department taken over the whole works?

HILLDRING: The Department didn't feel able to take on an additional job of such magnitude. So the War Department's Civil Affairs Division will continue to administer Military Government in Germany.

FISHER: But, General, what about the decision to introduce civilian control of military government?

HILLDRING: The War and State Departments are agreed on eventual civilianization. This means that a civilian administrator in Berlin will report to a civilian agency in Washington. Of course, in the meantime the replacement of military government officers by civilians is also going on rapidly....

PETERSEN: As a matter of fact, by June 30, two-thirds of our Military Government personnel will be civilians.

HILLDRING: But some military personnel will stay on, of course. There are some things they can do best -- such as looking after public safety and civilian supplies...One thing I'd like to make clear is, Military Government is quite separate and distinct from the occupation forces. General McNarney heads both the occupation forces and the Military Government of Germany.

FISHER: Isn't it a little awkward to have this division of responsibility in Germany?

HILLDRING: Not at all. The occupation forces are merely a reserve of police power, to back up the authority of Military Government. This division of functions is nothing new. For 30 years we had a civilian Governor General in the Philippine Islands, and also a large military garrison -- commanded for many years by General MacArthur. As soon as a civilian takes over military government, the situation in Germany will be similar to that. General McNarney will then be the Commander of the Occupation Forces.

FISHER: Mr. Petersen

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FISHER: Mr. Petersen, how large are those forces today?

PETERSEN: I don't know about today, Mr. Fisher, but a week or two ago our forces in Europe totaled about 400,000.

FISHER: Mostly in Germany, I suppose.

PETERSEN: Well, there are about 60,000 American troops in Italy and Austria, and nearly all the rest are in Germany -- about 340,000. We will bring this figure down to 300,000 by next June 30, and we expect to make further reductions during the year following.

FISHER: Aren't those pretty modest figures considering the policing job they have to do?

PETERSEN: Of course they are. We could do a better job in almost all fields if we had more manpower. That is why we are so terribly concerned about the recent sham extension of the draft. I say "sham" because it forbids us to induct the only substantial group that is available, the 18 and 19 year olds. We fear we will not be able to meet even our minimum requirements in Germany.

HILLDRING: Our job is to make sure that Germany will never again be a threat to the peace of the world. We've got to have manpower to do that.

FISHER: In short, then, in one year Military Government in Germany has made great headway in cleaning out the Nazis and setting up a master plan for a peaceful Germany. Some problems are still to be solved -- such as getting a degree of centralized control in the essential services, getting enough food to maintain life and a minimum of order in Germany, getting the displaced persons resettled, and re-educating German youth. Is that about it, Mr. Petersen?

PETERSEN: Yes -- and let me add that what we've done in Germany has to be viewed in perspective -- in the light of the time we've had, and of the 4-power division of Germany. Our first job was to get life going again, on some sort of

bare-bones

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bare-bones level. We're over the hump on that, if we can get the food we need. We're just getting to the point where we can turn our full attention to some of the more complicated problems-- such as re-education. My own notion is, a whole set of ideas completely opposite to ours is embedded in the mores of the German people, in their thinking and their way of life. It will take many years to change these ideas.

HILLDRING: We might as well face it: This is not a job we can do in one year, or two, or five. It may take a generation. The American public must approach this task with understanding, patience and vigor.

ANNOUNCER: That was the Assistant Secretary of State John H. Hilldring. He has been discussing "Germany and the Occupation" with Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Peterson and Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air. The discussion was adapted for radio by Seldon Menefee.

Next week we shall present a broadcast on "Our Policy in China", with John Carter Vincent, Director of the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs; Representative Walter Judd of Minnesota; and Representative Hugh DeLacy of the State of Washington. The program will originate at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in Springfield, Massachusetts.

In succeeding weeks we expect to present a special series on the United Nations, dealing with the following topics:

- The United Nations in Action
- The World Food Crisis
- World Education for Peace
- Do We Need A World Government?
- World Maritime Problems
- The Trusteeship Issue
- The Problem of Southeast Asia
- Spain and the United Nations
- Oil and International Relations
- The Future of Our Dependencies
- The Coming International Trade Conference
- Freedom of the Airways
- The New International Court

Officials

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ANNOUNCER: Officials of the United Nations, the State Department (Cont'd) and other government agencies, and Members of Congress, will discuss these important subjects. If you have questions which you would like to have us ask the participants, please send them to OUR FOREIGN POLICY, Box 30, Station J. New York City.

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