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Exh. # 1197

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2495-2496-2497

25 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Record of Interrogations of Admiral NAGANO, Osami.

Date: See Below Original (x) Copy () Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: NAGANO, Osami

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Preparation for War, Naval; Japan - USA Relations

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

NAGANO tells role in CHINA Incident and naval attitudes and movement preceding Pearl Harbor. Identifies certain late 1941 naval orders.

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2495	21 March 46
2496	26 March 46
2497	27 March 46

Analyst: W.H. Wagner

Doc. Nos. 2495-2496-2497

EXTRACT FROM INTERROGATIONS OF OSAMI NAGANO, 26 March 1946

"Q. About when, Admiral, did you place your approval upon the plan to attack Pearl Harbor?

A. Either in the end of October or the beginning of November. There was considerable argument between the Fleets and the Naval Operational Bureau. The Fleets were in favor of attacking Pearl Harbor, whereas the Naval Affairs Bureau considered it too much of a speculation and preferred the more conservative method of waiting for the American Fleet in the South Pacific Islands. Admiral YAMAMOTO was very adamant in his belief in his plan to attack Pearl Harbor and he threatened to resign along with his staff if that plan were not carried out.

Q. Prior to this time the plan had been perfected by preliminary maneuvers at sea and also on paper at the Naval Headquarters, had it not, Admiral?

A. Yes, the Fleet studied it very greatly.

Q. And when, Admiral, was it that you decided the conflict between the Navy Affairs Bureau and Admiral YAMAMOTO in favor of the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

A. I originally agreed with the Naval Operational Department but as YAMAMOTO was so avid in about the end of October or early part of November, as I previously stated, I agreed with the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. The Naval Affairs Bureau were in favor of using the plan that they had held for many years of waiting for the American Navy in the South Pacific Islands.

Q. Nevertheless, Admiral, as I understand it, notwithstanding the desires of the Naval Affairs Bureau to adhere to the plan which had been in effect for many years, you came to the conclusion that the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was best and settled the conflict by giving your approval to the Pearl Harbor Plan, is that not correct, Admiral?

A. I was for the plan of the Naval Affairs Department as that seemed to be the more logical but not to have the Commander of the Fleets resign, as he would have, if his plan did not go through, I thought the best thing to do was to approve.

Q. And you did approve, is that correct, the plan for the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. Yes.

"Q. As I understand the situation, Admiral, your approval of the same was the decisive factor in carrying through the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that not right?

A. Yes.

Q. And as I understand it, Admiral, I assume that in the light of that fact, you are willing to assume responsibility for the same. Is that correct, Admiral?

A. Naturally.

Q. Admiral, about when was the fleet first ordered to take position in order to carry through the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. The Fleets were assembled at Chiahima in the middle of November. On November 26 or 27 they started out for Pearl Harbor.....

Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, there was a lision conference held on or about November 28 or 29, 1941, was there not, at which there were present Premier TOJO, Foreign Minister TOGO, Finance Minister KAYA, President of the Cabinet Planning Board SUZUKI, Army Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA, Army Vice Chief of Staff General TANABE, yourself as Navy Chief of Staff, Navy Vice Chief of Staff Rear Admiral ITO, Communications Minister TERASHIMA, Agriculture Minister INO, the Cabinet Secretary HOSHINO, General MUTO as head of the Military Affairs Section for the Army and Head of the Navy General Affairs Section Vice Admiral OKA to complete the determination for war upon the United States, is that not correct?

A. I am not sure of the date but I believe you are correct on that. However, until the very last we were hoping that peace could be established and were prepared to abandon the plan until the very last, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. You can add to the list the Navy Minister Admiral SHIMADA."

EXHIBIT NO. 1197A

一九四六年三月廿六日、永田修身ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

問「大將、閣下ハ何時頃眞珠灣攻撃計畫ニ贊成シマシタカ。

答「十月ノ終リカ十一月ノ始メデス。艦隊側ト軍令部トノ間ニハ可成リノ議論ガアリマシタ。艦隊ハ眞珠灣攻撃ヲ撰ビ海軍軍務局ハ之ヲ余リニモ投機的トシ米艦隊ヲ南太平洋諸島ニ邀撃スル温存戰法ヲ選ビマシタ。山本大將ハ彼ノ眞珠灣攻撃作戰ノ信念ニ凝リ固マツテキマシタ。ソシテ若シ彼ノ計畫ガ實行ニ移サレナイナラバ幕僚ヲ引達レテ身ヲ退クト感シマシタ。

問「大將、此ノ時既ニ此ノ計畫ハ海上並ニ海軍々令部ノ机上ニ於テ事前ノ機動演習ガ完結シテキタノテハアリマセンカ。

答「ソウデス。艦隊ハ非常ニ訓練シマシタ。

問「ソレテ、大將、海軍々務局ト山本大將トノ意見ノ衝突ヲ眞珠灣攻撃ニアナタガ決裁シタノハ何時デスカ。

答「私ハ始メ軍令部ニ贊成シテキマシタガ、山本ガ非常ニ強硬ダツタノテ先ニ申ッ替ベタ通り十月ノ終リカ十一月ノ初メニ眞珠灣攻撃ノ計畫ニ贊成シタ。海軍々務局ハ彼等ノ長年ノ経験ヲアル所ノ南太平洋諸島ニ米艦隊ヲ邀撃スル作戰

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ヲ決行スル事ニ賛成デシタ。

問一而シ大將、私ノ解釋スルトコロデハ閣下ハ海軍軍務局ガ長年ノ成果ニ依ル計畫ヲ固執シタニモ拘ラズ、眞珠灣攻撃ガ最上デアルトノ結論ニ達シ、眞珠灣攻撃ヲ是認シテ此ノ意見ノ衝突ヲ解決シタノデアリマスネ、ソウテ有リマセンカ。

答一私ニハ軍令部ノ計畫ノ方が理論的デアルト思ハレタノデ、之ヲ希望シマシタガ若シ艦隊司令長官ノ計畫が通ラナケレバ彼ハ辭職スルダラウカラ艦隊司令長官ヲ辭職サセヌタメニハ賛成スルノガ最良ノ策ダト考ヘマシタ。

問一ソレテ閣下ハ眞珠灣攻撃計畫ニ賛成シタノデスネ。

答一ソウデス。

問一其ノ間ノ事情ヲ解釋スルニ、大將、閣下ノ此ノ賛成ガ眞珠灣攻撃ノ決定要因ダツタノデアリマスネ、ソウテハ有リマセンカ。

答一ソウデス。

問一ソレテ私ノ考ヘテハ大將ハ事實ニ徴シ之ニ對シ喜ンテ責任ヲ負フモノト考ヘマスガ、閣下如何デセウカ。

答一勿論。

問一大將、艦隊ガ眞珠灣攻撃ヲ決行スル爲、配置ニ

就ク最初ノ命令ヲ受ケタノハ何時頃デスカ。

答― 艦隊ハ十一月中旬ニ千島ニ集結シ、十一月二十

六日乃至二十七日ニ眞珠灣ニ向ケ出發シマシタ。

問― 大將、實際ノ處、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十

一月二十八日乃至二十九日頃、連絡會議ガ催サ

レタノデアリマセンカ。之ニハ東條首相、東

郷外相、賀屋藏相、鈴木内閣企畫院總裁、杉山

參謀總長、同次長田邊大將、軍令部總長ノ閣下、

同次長伊藤少將、寺島退相、井野農相、星野内

閣書記官長、陸軍々務局長武藤將軍、海軍々務

局長岡中將ガ對米戰爭決定ヲ完結スベク參集シ

タノデアリマセンカ。

答― 私ハ期日ニ就イテハ明確デアリマセンガ其ノ通

リダト思ヒマス。然シ我々ハ全クギリ々々最終

迄平和確立ヲ希望シ本當ノ最後迄眞珠灣攻撃ノ

計畫ヲ放棄スル用意ハ持ツテニタ。此ノ名簿ニ

ハ海軍大臣島田大將ガ落チテキマス。

Doc 2496A (cont)

書類第二四九六A號

通譯者ノ證明

本職「エリツク・W・フライシヤ」陸軍少尉認
番號〇九三五〇〇〇ハ宣誓ヲ爲シタル上、實施セ
ラレタル質問及應答ニ付夫々英語ヨリ日本語ニ、
日本語ヨリ英語ニ眞實ニ翻譯ヲ爲シタルコト並ニ
右質問及應答ニ付テノ前書轉寫ハ二十二頁綴ノモ
ノニシテ本職ノ智識及自信ノ最大限度ニ於テ眞實
且ツ正確ナルコトヲ陳述ス。

「エリツク・W・フライシヤ」ノ署名ノ

右ハ一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ四月三日本職ノ
面前ニ於テ署名及宣誓ヲ爲シタリ

「ヴァレンティン・O・ハマツク」ノ署名ノ

(官職) 聯合軍最高指揮官總司令部國際檢

察部附正當ニ特別任用セラレタル

調査官

遠記者ノ證明

本職「レオナ・P・コバリー」ハ茲ニ、本職ガ前
記ノ訪問ニ遠記者ノ役目ヲ勤メタルコト、前記ノ
質問及應答ヲ轉寫セルコト並ニ右轉寫ハ本職ノ智

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識及確信ノ最大限度ニ於テ眞實ニシテ且ツ正確ナルコトヲ證明ス。

「レオナ・P・コバリー」ノ署名ノ

訊問者ノ證明

本職「ヴァレンティン・C・ハマツク」ハ一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ三月二十六日永野生身ガ本職ノ面前ニ出頭ヲ爲シ且ツ通譯者「エリツク・W・フライシヤ」ニ依リ前記應答ヲ右ニ記載セル數箇ノ質問ニ對シテ爲シタルコトヲ證明ス。

「ヴァレンティン・C・ハマツク」ノ署名ノ

場所 日本東京

期日 一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ四月三日

2496

INTERROGATION OF

NAGANO, OSAMI

Date and Time: 26 March 1946, 0940-1600 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : NAGANO, Osami
Mr. Valentine C. Hammack, Interrogator
2nd Lt. Eric Fleisher , Interpreter
Miss Leona Coberley , Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hammack:

Mr. Hammack : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately in-
terpret and translate from English
into Japanese and from Japanese into
English, as may be required of you, in
this proceeding?

Lt. Fleisher : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hammack.

Q. The last question, Admiral, was to the effect that
you had advised the Emperor in the summer of 1941
that the Navy was ready for war to which your ans-
wer was, "That is correct." You remember that, do
you not?

A. If war could not be avoided, the Navy would put
forth its all.

Q. Admiral, there was between the Army, Navy and the
Cabinet a liaison committee or liaison was main-
tained between the various departments, is that
not correct?

A. There was a liaison officer between the Army, Navy
and the Cabinet and this work was performed by the
Military Affairs Department of the Army and the
Navy.

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NAGANO, Osami

- Q. And at these various liaison meetings, was it not also the practice on important meetings for the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff to be present?
- A. Yes, that is correct. The most important meetings were discussed between the Navy Minister and the War Minister and in the liaison conferences the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff were present.
- Q. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that as a matter of practice, most of the important questions were determined at these liaison conferences at which would be present these officials which you mentioned?
- A. Yes, that was the practice.
- Q. Now, directing your attention, Admiral, to June 25, 1941, do you remember being present at a liaison conference in connection with the world condition and for the purpose of discussing Japan's problems as they existed as of that date?
- A. Yes, I was there.
- Q. And, is it not a fact, Admiral, that on June 25, 1941, in addition to yourself there were present Premier Konee, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, War Minister Tojo, Navy Minister Oikawa, Home Minister Hiranuma, Chief of the Army General Staff General Sugiyama, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Lieutenant General Tsukada, Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral Kondo, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Major General Muto, and Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy Rear Admiral Oka?
- A. I am sure that all except Hiranuma were present. As for Hiranuma I am not sure but he may have been present.
- Q. Admiral, will you state what the reason and the purpose of this liaison conference was?
- A. I believe it was to discuss whether troops would

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be sent to French Indo-China or not.

Q. Is that your best recollection on the matter, Admiral?

A. I don't remember very well but I believe that was it.

Q. Now, then, Admiral, is it not a fact that on July 2, 1941, at which was present in addition to yourself and others the Emperor was present and the conference determined that Japan should continue to adhere to the policy of establishing the Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity regardless of the world's changing conditions as then existed, and, further, Japan should continue to dispose of the China Incident taking armed measures with a view to advancing southward for that purpose? Do you remember that as being the purpose of the meeting at that time and place, Admiral?

A. What do you mean by southward?

Q. In reference to French Indo-China and Thailand.

A. I know for sure that the objective was to cut the supply line to China at that time.

Q. Is it not also a fact, Admiral, that in addition to the objective as just stated by yourself that at this conference Japan's policy already decided with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand should be executed?

A. It was decided that it was necessary to send troops into Indo-China to, first of all, to cut the supply going into China and, secondly, to continue the importation of rice to Japan that the French were threatening to put an end to. As to Thailand I don't remember.

Q. In order to refresh your memory, Admiral, is it not a fact that it was agreed at this conference that troops should be sent into Thailand?

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- A. I don't remember very clearly but I don't believe at that conference the sending of troops to Thailand was discussed.
- Q. Do you remember, Admiral, that at this conference in connection with sending troops to Thailand it was determined that diplomatic negotiations would be entered into with the Thailand government peacefully but that whether peacefully or otherwise it was determined that troops were to be sent there.
- A. I believe you have French Indo-China and Thailand confused. What you said previously applies to French Indo-China but to my memory we did not send troops into Thailand until after the war began.
- Q. That may be true. Admiral, was it not also determined at this conference that Japan would act in accordance with the Tripartite Pact?
- A. I don't remember if this was discussed at the conference or not but the Foreign Minister was always talking about sticking to the Tripartite Alliance. At that time there were some who disfavored the Tripartite Alliance and wished to become friendly with the United States and England and, consequently, the Foreign Minister was always talking about Japan's duty to remain truthful to the Tripartite Alliance.
- Q. Who was the Foreign Minister at this time?
- A. Matsuoka was Foreign Minister and the father of the Tripartite Alliance.
- Q. It is a fact, also, is it not, Admiral, that Matsuoka was a leader in insisting that Japan, at the proper time, should live up to the terms of the Tripartite Alliance in connection with Japan's policy of expansion in the Far East? Is that not correct?
- A. As for expansion, I don't believe Matsuoka talked too much about it but he was very eager that Japan

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should remain truthful to the Tripartite Alliance stating that a country is worthless if it does not uphold its promises.

Q. Is it a fact, however, Admiral, that at this time the policy of Japan was to establish a New Order in the Far East such as was stated in the Tripartite Pact?

A. Yes, I believe that is true.

Q. Admiral, what is your own understanding of the policy of establishing a New Order on the part of Japan in the Far East?

A. I don't know very much on this subject and I have not studied it but I don't think that the copying of Germany or Italy was very good.

Q. Is it not a fact, however, Admiral, that the policy of Japan at that time was to create a New Order in the Far East by peaceful methods if possible but by the use of arms if necessary?

A. As for myself, I did not hold too much value in this New Order but there probably were others in the government and various departments who did.

Q. Is it not a fact, however, Admiral, that regardless of what your personal views may have been on the subject that, nevertheless, such was the policy of Japan and those who governed Japan at the time?

A. As for Japan's policy, I really don't know too much, but I don't think that it was the Kono Cabinet or a cabinet which followed or preceded its plan or policy for the entire nation. Certain individuals held such an idea in regard to Japan's policy. There were avid nationalists and jingoists but as for the nation's set fixed policy I don't believe this was the case.

Q. But isn't it true, Admiral, that the persons who advocated this policy were so strong that notwithstanding what Prince Kono may have hoped to

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NAGANO, Osami

do that his Cabinet could not stem the tide of Japan's expansion?

- A. As for China, many affairs did not go as the Kono government wished but as for other countries I don't believe there was such a set policy.
- Q. Admiral, at our last meeting you stated that in the spring or summer of 1941 there were two factions in the government. One for the purpose of developing the Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere and to obtain needed supplies by Japan from Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Manchuria and China and who hoped to obtain this objective by peaceful means; that another faction insisted upon obtaining the objective by the use of arms if necessary. That is correct, is it not?
- A. As to the first group you mentioned, yes, there were many of them but as for the second group I don't believe there were too many and they were avid nationalists and, in my opinion, crazy to believe the limited resources of Japan could stand up against the world in pursuing such a policy.
- Q. Is it not a fact, however, Admiral, that at this time, as a result of the war in Europe and the changing conditions of the world, that the tide of those who insisted that Japan utilize world conditions to develop its Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere at the price of war if necessary had reached such proportion that the more moderate ones were unable to withstand such pressure?
- A. Yes, I believe there were people who thought that the time was ripe to pursue Japan's expansion because of the German victories and strength of Germany in Europe. I believe this was a very short-sighted practice and these people were looking only at conditions through the victories of the German army and not from an overall picture, taking into consideration the production capacity of the United States and the British Empire plus the tremendous resources at the command of both of these nations and also the strength of the navies.

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- Q. In the Navy who were those who advocated the expansion program by force of arms if necessary, Admiral?
- A. There must have been some members within the group known as the younger officers but so far as any of the older officers, those with responsibility, I don't believe there was anyone who thought so.
- Q. Who in the army advocated such a program, Admiral, to your knowledge?
- A. I don't know exactly who, but the opinion at that time was current, to that I will agree.
- Q. And is it not a fact, Admiral, that among the leaders who favored such a program in the army were Generals Tojo, Muto and Sato?
- A. Tojo was also a politician, while still being a military man and some of his speeches were made to go over as a big hit with the Japanese population but I don't think anyone who held such a responsible position could be so blind.
- Q. The answer is not responsive to the question, Admiral, it is a fact to your knowledge, is it not, that the leaders among military leaders who favored the expansion program by force of arms if necessary at this time were Generals Tojo, Muto, and Sato?
- A. As I have stated previously, I am trying to tell the truth to my utmost ability and I appreciate your consideration of my position. As for Tojo, Muto, and Sato, it goes without a doubt that they are extreme militarists and would support militarism. The Manchurian Incident started things off in China and with the military meddling in affairs of China the Sino-Japanese Incident broke out. The military thought they could conclude the China Incident successfully in a short time and quite easily, however, when this became impossible, they looked around for other means of settling the China Incident and the Tripartite Alliance resulted from this; the objective, however, also was to conclude the China Incident. The southward

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expansion program, in my opinion, was not the objective of those in power as much as concluding the China Incident was. The Japanese army had had a policy for many, many years past--this policy extends to external affairs as well as internal affairs. It is like a swift stream when once you step out into the current you are pushed down stream. In this manner, I believe, and this is only my opinion, Tojo, Muto and Sato were carried along in the stream of army policy. Whether Tojo, Muto and Sato tried to strengthen that stream I don't know but even if they wished to oppose it, they couldn't have done so.

Q. It is a fact, is it not, Admiral, that about this time the situation had become so that Japan, in order to settle the China Incident, was determined to expand southward to obtain the necessary food and supplies as well as to stop the flow of supplies to Chiang Kai Shek's Army?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Now, Admiral, as you have stated, during the summer of 1941 the tide of war was running strongly in Japan, was it not?

A. There were many irresponsible people who were furthering the tide of war but those of responsibility decided that, and knew that, China alone was a problem that would not be easily settled and to take on the British Empire and the United States would be more than we could handle and we looked upon these irresponsible people as "blind bats."

Q. Is it not a fact, however, Admiral, that the situation was such that a further liaison conference was held in September, 1941, and that on September 6, 1941 a conference was held at which were present the Emperor, Prince Konoe, War Minister Tojo, Navy Minister Oikawa, Chief of Army General Staff General Sugiyama, and yourself as Chief of the Navy General Staff, the President of the Planning Board Suguki, General Muto and Admiral Ota?

A. As far as the date I am not sure but I believe such

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NAGANO, Osami

a conference did take place and I further believe that the Chairman of the Privy Council was also present.

Q. And what was his name?

A. Hara.

Q. Now this is your recollection that this meeting I am mentioning took place in the early part of September 1941, is it not, Admiral?

A. As for the date, I don't remember but I believe it was the early part of September, 1941.

Q. And what was the purpose of this meeting, Admiral?

A. The objective of the conference was to discuss American-Japanese relations which at that time were progressing very poorly. Also, preparation for war was discussed and furthermore, it was decided to continue relations with the United States and make a final attempt to settle the problems arising peacefully, however, if this problem could not be settled by the early part of October, then everyone was made to understand that war would be considered unavoidable and preparations would have to be stepped up toward that end.

Q. And is it not a fact, Admiral, that at this meeting it was determined, as stated by yourself, that if the problems could not be solved by October, that Japan would embark upon war against America, England and the Netherlands no later than October and that preparations were immediately instituted in light of such plans?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Admiral, what were the reasons for the collapse of the Konee Cabinet in October, 1941?

A. As I am not a member of the Cabinet I do not know the conditions under which the Cabinet resigned, but this is my own opinion, Tojo had already decided that if the American-Japanese question was not settled by the early part of October, war was

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inevitable, however, Konoé, still thinking there was a chance for peaceful settlement, opposed Tojo and his decision that was inevitable. As a result he was forced to resign.

Q. Admiral, that is not your opinion, but the actual fact, to your knowledge, is that not so?

A. When I say I think, I mean I was so informed.

Q. What you mean, Admiral, is that you know that was so but you were not present at the time perhaps?

A. I always say I think, because I haven't had personal contact.

Q. Not to quibble, Admiral, nevertheless, you know as an intelligent man that those were the facts, do you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Admiral, going back to the conference in the early part of September at which you stated it was determined that in the event the problems between Japan and the United States could not be settled that war would be instituted in October, you concurred in that decision did you not, Admiral?

A. Yes, I did agree.

Q. And having done so, Admiral, I assume you are now willing to assume your full responsibility for your part in such a decision, is that correct?

A. Yes, I take the responsibility for agreeing.

Q. Now, Admiral, we were discussing before lunch the conference of September 1941. Do you remember when they had another conference later than that?

A. It seems that there were many conferences.

Q. Did you attend the conference, Admiral, in October immediately preceding the collapse of the Konoé Cabinet?

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NAGANO, Osami

- A. I think I attended all conferences.
- Q. And all of the conferences were more or less to the same effect were they not?
- A. I can't remember the details but I believe that they were all about the same.
- Q. And the effect of the conferences, Admiral, was that the problems were to be solved if possible by negotiations, by war in the event that failed, was it not?
- A. Yes, that is correct. The Emperor did not wish war and I tried to have the Emperor's wishes carried out.
- Q. About when, Admiral, did you place your approval upon the plan to attack Pearl Harbor?
- A. Either in the end of October or the beginning of November. There was considerable argument between the Fleets and the Naval Operational Bureau. The Fleets were in favor of attacking Pearl Harbor, whereas the Naval Affairs Bureau considered it too much of a speculation and preferred the more conservative method of waiting for the American Fleet in the South Pacific Islands. Admiral Yamamoto was very adamant in his belief in his plan to attack Pearl Harbor and he threatened to resign along with his staff if that plan were not carried out.
- Q. Prior to this time the plan had been perfected by preliminary maneuvers at sea and also on paper at the Naval Headquarters, had it not, Admiral?
- A. Yes, the Fleet studied it very greatly.
- Q. And when, Admiral, was it that you decided the conflict between the Navy Affairs Bureau and Admiral Yamamoto in favor of the attack upon Pearl Harbor?
- A. I originally agreed with the Naval Operational Department but as Yamamoto was so avid in about the end of October or early part of November, as I previously stated, I agreed with the plan to attack

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Pearl Harbor. The Naval Affairs Bureau were in favor of using the plan that they had held for many years of waiting for the American Navy in the South Pacific Islands.

Q. Nevertheless, Admiral, as I understand it, notwithstanding the desires of the Naval Affairs Bureau to adhere to the plan which had been in effect for many years, you came to the conclusion that the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was best and settled the conflict by giving your approval to the Pearl Harbor Plan, is that not correct, Admiral?

A. I was for the plan of the Naval Affairs Department as that seemed to be the more logical but not to have the Commander of the Fleets resign, as he would have, if his plan did not go through, I thought the best thing to do was to approve.

Q. And you did approve, is that correct, the plan for the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. Yes.

Q. As I understand the situation, Admiral, your approval of the same was the decisive factor in carrying through the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that not right?

A. Yes.

Q. And as I understand it, Admiral, I assume that in the light of that fact, you are willing to assume responsibility for the same. Is that correct, Admiral?

A. Naturally.

Q. Admiral, about when was the fleet first ordered to take position in order to carry through the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. The Fleets were assembled at Chishima in the middle of November. On November 26 or 27 they started out for Pearl Harbor.

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- Q. According to prearranged plan, is that not correct, Admiral?
- A. Yes, they started out according to plan.
- Q. Admiral, going back, it is a fact, is it not, that the final decision to go to war was made on or about December 1, 1941, is that not correct?
- A. Admiral Yamamoto left Japan under the agreement that should he not be called back before December 8 he was to proceed with the plan, however, if at any time he were to be called back, he had given his word he would bring the Fleet back without attacking Pearl Harbor.
- Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, there was a liaison conference held on or about November 28 or 29, 1941, was there not, at which there were present Premier Tojo, Foreign Minister Togo, Finance Minister Kaya, President of the Cabinet Planning Board Suzuki, Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama, Army Vice Chief of Staff General Tanabe, yourself as Navy Chief of Staff, Navy Vice Chief of Staff Rear Admiral Ito, Communications Minister Terashima, Agriculture Minister Ino, the Cabinet Secretary Hoshino, General Muto as head of the Military Affairs Section for the Army and Head of the Navy General Affairs Section Vice Admiral Oka to complete the determination for war upon the United States, is that not correct?
- A. I am not sure of the date but I believe you are correct on that. However, until the very last we were hoping that peace could be established and were prepared to abandon the plan until the very last, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. You can add to the list the Navy Minister Admiral Shimada.
- Q. I realize, Admiral, that there were a number of conferences on November 28 and 29 and also on December 1 and 2, 1941. It is true, is it not, that at all of these conferences war upon the United States had been agreed upon and the various conferences were held for the purpose of determining the military and naval situation on the outbreak of war, is that not correct?

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- A. I don't remember the details but that is correct.
- Q. Do you know Naoki Hoshino?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He was secretary of the cabinet, was he not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I am advised, Admiral, that Naoki Hoshino was perhaps the closest man in the Cabinet to General Tojo. What do you know about that?
- A. Yes, Hoshino was very close to Tojo even from past times in Manchuria.
- Q. And is it not a fact that, notwithstanding that Hoshino was Secretary of the Cabinet, as distinguished from a cabinet officer, he was one of the most active, if not the most active, advocate for war with the United States during this period of time?
- A. At the conferences Hoshino's rank was so low that he was never given a chance to express his opinions. In my opinion, and in that of the higher men, he was a very good Secretary to Tojo.
- Q. Do you know, however, Admiral, of your own knowledge whether or not what I have said is true, that is, that Hoshino was very active in influencing General Tojo, if such a thing were necessary, toward war with the United States?
- A. I don't know what sort of influence Hoshino had upon Tojo but it was well known at that time that he was a very active man.
- Q. Will you explain what you mean by the word active?
- A. You might say that he dabbled in everything and expressed his opinions on everything.
- Q. Is it not a fact that in expressing his opinions

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on many things he also expressed his opinion in favor of war upon the United States.

A. I don't think Hoshino was such a fool as to come out and make his policy obvious.

Q. Do you know, however, that that was his policy even though he may not have been obvious about it?

A. I can't make judgment upon that. He was not very conservative, I think.

Q. Now, Admiral, upon what day was the Imperial Conference held?

A. I don't remember very clearly. I believe there was one in June and one in September.

Q. And the one to which I refer was the one immediately preceding the outbreak of war, the one I now refer to was in December, 1941. Is that not correct, Admiral?

A. I must remember these things but at that time everything was already decided and I don't believe there were any important meetings. I just don't remember. Can you give me something to refresh my memory?

Q. It is my information, Admiral, as stated also by yourself, that the determination to embark upon war had been entered into in September but always with the thought that if the problems were solved, that war would be avoided, but through October, November and ultimately on December 1, 1941, and when the persons whom you mentioned were present, war was determined upon and on December 2 this decision having been reached by the cabinet and all persons whom you have mentioned as attending the conference, an Imperial Conference was held at which this decision was presented to the Emperor, is that not correct?

A. There were conferences throughout October and November at which the war plans and prospects were discussed and the results of these conferences were

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made known to the Emperor by Sugiyama, Tojo, and myself as representatives of our respective organizations some time either in late November or in early December. You may be right in assuming the second of December.

- Q. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that your plans in regard to notice to the United States contemplated that the attack would be made before such notice was given or simultaneously with the giving of the notice?
- A. No, that is not true. The Foreign office would never have approved.
- Q. Nevertheless, Admiral, is it not a fact that that was the net result?
- A. Yes, it would be, as to that I don't know I would suggest you ask someone in the Foreign Office about it as that is their business.
- Q. Also, is it not a fact, Admiral, that the notice as given was couched in such language that it could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered a declaration of war and that this was done deliberately also in furtherance of the surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor?
- A. That is strictly the work of the Foreign Office and what they did I have no connection with and don't know what the declaration said.
- Q. You read the notice that was served upon the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, did you not, Admiral?
- A. No, I did not see it.
- Q. Have you ever seen it or a copy thereof?
- A. No, I have not.
- Q. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that it was your understanding that the notice that was served upon Secretary Hull should be served upon him not more

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than one hour and it was finally determined or agreed that the notice should be served one half hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. That is absolutely a lie. I don't know anything about the time element. It was discussed among Togo, Tanabe and Ito. Tanabe, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army and Ito was Vice Chief of Staff for the Navy. As for their talks I know absolutely nothing. As Commander in Chief of the Navy I thought one hour would be ample sufficiency.

Q. What was the information you had, however, from the persons you have mentioned as to the amount of time determined upon?

A. They went to the conference without consulting me and as to its results they did not notify me.

Q. Again, Admiral, I must ask you--it is a fact, is it not, that upon the important question of the surprise element, the matter of the notice to be served upon the United States was discussed by yourself and others and with Foreign Minister Togo?

A. I may have discussed attacking before the defense by the Americans was ready but I am sure I never said anything about violating International Law and attacking before a declaration of war was handed over to the United States. The Navy Minister had the power to notify the United States and it was not within the department of the naval planning strategy department and I don't like to meddle in the work of others so it was up to them.

Q. I am sorry, Admiral, it is my information that at a meeting at which you were present at which the time when the notice of breaking off diplomatic relations to be given to the United States was discussed Foreign Minister Togo insisted that some small amount of time must be given and that you opposed the notice of time and urged as your reason therefor that to achieve success at Pearl Harbor the attack must be a complete surprise. Is that not correct?

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- A. That is not a fact. That was probably said by Togo or some one connected with Togo and I did not make such a statement.
- Q. If you did not make such a statement, Admiral, what was your information as to how the notice would be served upon the United States and the time it would be served preceding the attack upon Pearl Harbor?
- A. It was never decided how many hours before the notice was to be given. This was strictly up to the Foreign Office or the Navy Department.
- Q. Now, Admiral, the answer is not an intelligent one for the reason that you knew that the time of the serving of the notice upon the United States would have to be such that Japan would not be deprived of the element of surprise in the Pearl Harbor attack. In other words, Admiral, I know that you would not send your fleet into a place like Pearl Harbor if you thought for one minute that they would have notice of your intentions and would be waiting for you.
- A. The success depended upon the United States not knowing the intentions of Japan and to attack before preparations had been made in the defense of Pearl Harbor, however, it was never my intention to violate international law and attack before a declaration of war had been given.
- Q. At one of these conferences, Admiral, and I think the Imperial Conference on December 2, 1941, it is a fact, is it not, that you as senior officer of both services stated that the Navy and the Army had completed the preparations for war and were ready for war? Is that not correct?
- A. I don't know whether I said the Navy and the Army were ready but I said that they would put forth their utmost.
- Q. Now, Admiral, about what date in connection with these various conferences, did the conference take place at which you were present, relating to the

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form of notice to the United States and the time when such notice should be served upon the United States preceding the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

- A. I don't believe there was a conference at which this was discussed as this would be the business of the foreign office or even the Army Minister or Navy Minister.
- Q. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that you were present at a liaison conference in which the form of notice breaking off diplomatic relations with the United States was agreed upon and that you are familiar with the determination as to what the notice should contain?
- A. I don't remember the exact date of the conference but I do remember that it was to be announced on December 8 at a time suitable to the Navy.
- Q. Is it not a fact, Admiral, that at a discussion or a liaison conference at which was present yourself and particularly Foreign Minister Togo that you opposed notice to the United States stating as your reason in the attack upon Pearl Harbor that the attack must be made a complete surprise.
- A. I don't believe that I ever said such a thing at any of the liaison conferences but it has been said that Togo said to attack without warning. My prime concern was for the welfare of the Navy, to prevent counter attacks and plan strategy.
- Q. Is it not a fact, however, Admiral, that the success of the Pearl Harbor attack depended upon complete surprise?
- A. Naturally, our attack depended upon the unpreparedness of the United States Navy but to violate international law was not our purpose.
- Q. Admiral, do you remember giving an interview to a newspaper reporter, one Mr. Brines on October 25, 1945 here in Tokyo?
- A. Yes, I do.

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Q. And in which interview you made the following statement, that you as Commander in Chief of the Navy expected that Japan's war declaration would proceed assault by one half hour but for some reason the vital message was delayed.

A. I don't remember having mentioned the thirty minutes that you speak of.

Q. However, Admiral, Mr. Brines quotes you as having made that statement, that you expected Japan's war declaration would proceed assault by one half hour but the vital message was delayed. Would you say under those circumstances that you did not make such a statement?

A. No, I wouldn't say that is incorrect. I did say to Mr. Brines that it was decided that the message should be delivered thirty minutes in advance but I did not decide when the message was to be delivered. That became a fact known to me after the attack on Pearl Harbor. I wish you would talk to Togo in regard to that thirty minutes you mentioned. My assistants did not consult me and conferred with Togo and did not let me know the results.

Q. In relation to your last answer, so there will be no mistake, did you suggest that I talk to Togo the Foreign Minister or Tojo who was Premier at that time?

A. I mentioned Togo, Tanabe and Ito.

Q. Did you not know, Admiral, preceding the attack that the time limit on which to serve the notice upon the United States had been reduced to thirty minutes?

A. No, I didn't know anything about it. I heard that the time had been cut quite some time later after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. And upon whose orders had the time been reduced, Admiral?

A. Outside of Togo and the two others I mentioned I

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don't know who else it could be.

Q. Is it a fact, Admiral, that Togo, as Foreign Minister, determined that the time to serve the notice should be reduced to thirty minutes?

A. I see no other way of looking at it than that Togo was the ranking officer at the conference and he would, consequently, be responsible for the cutting of the time. The job of notifying the United States was with the Foreign Office. And those who had the authority to discuss such matters with the Foreign Office were the Navy Minister and the War Minister. It was the work of the Navy Ministry and the War Ministry to discuss with the Foreign Office such matters pertaining to international law and politics. That is their technical specialty.

Q. However, Admiral, regardless of that point I believe you have already stated that, in the event you have not, I will ask you again, you are the man who gave the final orders for the attack upon Pearl Harbor, and, as such, are willing to assume the responsibility for the same, are you not?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Now, Admiral, going back to the notice, is it not a fact that the notice to be served upon the United States was discussed at a liaison meeting at which you were present?

A. I don't believe that would be a problem to be discussed at the liaison conferences.

Q. Regardless of what you believe, is it not a fact that the problem, however, was discussed at a conference, after war had been determined upon, at which you were present?

A. I don't remember very well but I am sure that no decision was made at any liaison conference in regard to the time of the notifying of the United States.

Q. Admiral, what is your understanding of the notice

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that was served upon the United States and what it purported to be?

A. I didn't see the notice so I don't know but I think it was to the effect that Japan could not accept the proposal of the United States of the 26 November 1941.

Q. Would you consider, Admiral, a notice to the effect that Japan could not accept the proposals submitted by the United States on November 26, would you consider such a notice of that effect as to be, by any possible stretch of the imagination, a declaration of war?

A. I don't know anything about that. That is the business of the Foreign Office.

Q. You do know, Admiral, however, as a professional naval man, generally speaking, what a declaration of war should contain, do you not?

A. As a naval officer and as a student of the Harvard International Law School I do know that a declaration of war should be delivered before the outbreak of war but as to what it should contain I don't know. I do know that a final note should be delivered, before a declaration of war is announced, by the Emperor to the people of Japan but the procedure of delivering this note and what its contents should be I am unfamiliar with.

Q. You do know, however, Admiral, that the contents of the same should be such there could be no doubt as to what the meaning could be, to-wit, declaration of war.

A. I believe that the note should be clear in its meaning and should not have been a vague one.